See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.

net/publication/303037650

Discourse, explanation and critique

Article  in  Critical Policy Studies · May 2016

DOI: 10.1080/19460171.2015.1131618

CITATIONS READS

6 504

3 authors:

David Robert Howarth Jason Glynos

University of Essex University of Essex
88 PUBLICATIONS   1,697 CITATIONS    59 PUBLICATIONS   1,205 CITATIONS   

SEE PROFILE SEE PROFILE

Steven Griggs
De Montfort University
61 PUBLICATIONS   441 CITATIONS   

SEE PROFILE

Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:

Critical fantasy studies View project

Populism and discourses about populism View project

All content following this page was uploaded by Jason Glynos on 16 May 2016.

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

 Critical Policy Studies, 2016
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19460171.2015.1131618

FORUM
Discourse, explanation and critique
David Howartha, Jason Glynosa and Steven Griggsb*
a
Department of Government, University of Essex, Colchester, UK; bDepartment of Politics and
Public Policy, De Montfort University, Leicester, UK

It is often alleged that post-structuralist discourse theory suffers from a methodological

Downloaded by [Universitetsbiblioteket i Bergen] at 04:59 12 May 2016

and a normative deficit, making it unable to either explain or criticize and evaluate the
policy practices and regimes it investigates. We challenge such claims, arguing instead
that post-structuralist discourse theory is both explanatory and critical. We begin by
providing a quick sketch of how the ontological assumptions of post-structuralist
discourse theory translate into a novel approach to policy studies, one which fore-
grounds the critical evaluation of policies and practices in order to explore underlying
issues of power and ideology. We then discuss what we term to be the critical
dimension of critical explanation. Here we foreground in our discussion how the
assumption of radical contingency, the articulation of social, political and fantasmatic
logics, and a novel perspective on ethical critique and normative evaluation can offer
policy researchers the opportunity to go beyond the strategy of simply inverting
existing hierarchies and binary oppositions to project more positive ontopolitical
presumptions.
Keywords: post-structuralism; logics; discourse; critique

It is often alleged that post-structuralist discourse theory (PDT) suffers from a methodo-
logical and a normative deficit. Some argue that the approach does furnish a grammar of
notions that can help us to describe and characterize phenomena, but it cannot explain
them. Others claim that while it may help us to describe, and even explain, it cannot
criticize and evaluate the policy practices and regimes it investigates (for further discus-
sion, see Glynos and Howarth 2007).
We respond to these two challenges by arguing that PDT is both explanatory and
critical. The general form of the claim is not, of course, unique. First generation theorists
of the Frankfurt School such as Max Horkheimer (1972) argued for a close connection
between explanation and critique. Critical realists like Roy Bhaskar (1986) and Bob
Jessop (1990) argue for a practice of ‘explanatory critique’ in the social sciences.
However, in speaking as post-structuralist discourse theorists, our grounds for justifying
the linkages between explanation, critique and justification are different, as is the overall
approach to such questions.

Discourse theory and critical policy studies

The basic assumptions of PDT and its radical materialist conception of discourse have
been thoroughly set out and discussed elsewhere (see Howarth 2000, 2013). Here we
begin by providing a quick sketch of how its ontological assumptions translate into a
novel approach to policy studies, which foregrounds the critical evaluation of policies
and practices in order to explore underlying issues of power and ideology (for

*Corresponding author. E-mail: sgriggs@dmu.ac.uk

© 2016 Institute of Local Government Studies, University of Birmingham

 2 D. Howarth et al.

developed examples of this approach see Glynos, Klimecki, and Willmott (2015) and
Griggs and Howarth (2013)). First, politics is understood as the contestation and
institution of social relations and practices. PDT thus discloses the contingent character
of any policy practice or regime by showing the role of power and exclusion in its
formation, such that every discursive structure is uneven and hierarchical. In other
words, policy discourses are particular systems of meaningful or articulatory practice,
which are finite and contingent constructions, constituted politically by the construction
of social antagonisms and the creation of political frontiers.
Secondly, policy change, or indeed policy stability, is viewed as the outcome of hege-
monic struggles between different discursive formations or discourse coalitions. Hegemony is
understood as a type of political practice that involves the making and breaking of political
coalitions, as well as a form of rule that speaks to the maintenance of the policies, practices
Downloaded by [Universitetsbiblioteket i Bergen] at 04:59 12 May 2016

and regimes that are formed by such forces, where the focus is on the latter’s subjective and
affective grip. Of particular importance in these hegemonic struggles are the political logics of
equivalence and difference. The former grasps the way in which political frontiers are
constructed via the linking together of different social demands and identities, while the latter
captures the way in which demands are negated, disentangled, mediated and negotiated by
various institutions. At the same time, ideology serves to conceal the contingency and
contestability of social relations and to naturalize the relations of domination in discourses
or meaningful practices. An important analytical focus in this regard is the production of
certain fantasmatic policy narratives, which structure the way different social subjects are
attached to certain signifiers, and the different types of ‘enjoyment’ subjects procure in
identifying with discourses and believing the things they do.
Finally, how do these basic ontological assumptions of PDT get used in conducting
concrete policy research? What Glynos and Howarth (2007) have termed the ‘logics of
critical explanation’, which consists of five connected steps, constitutes one possible
response to this question (see Table 1). Analytically, each step can be separated and
considered independently of one another, but in the conduct of research they are closely
intertwined. The practice of research consists, therefore, of a constant relaying between

Table 1. The logics of critical explanation, Jason Glynos and David Howarth (2007).

Five Connected Steps

1. Problematization Constructing the object of study as a problem, at requisite level of abstraction

and complexity.
2. Retroduction Production and testing of a tentative hypothesis to account for problematized
phenomenon by a to-and-fro engagement with empirical data.
3. Logics Content of explanation: capturing the rules that govern regimes or practices, as
well as the conditions and objects that make such rules possible. Focus on:
social logics that characterize a practice or regime; political logics of
equivalence and difference that account for emergence of practice or regime
and its contestation and transformation; fantasmatic logics that account for
the way particular practices and regimes ‘grip’ subjects.
4. Articulation Process of linking together a plurality of logics in order to account for
problematized phenomenon, modifying each element in the process.
5. Critique Employing political and fantasmatic logics to explain and expose the
contingency of processes and relations. Political logics reveal exclusions and
foreclosures at moments of regime institution. Ideological closure is evident
in fantasmatic narratives that naturalize relations of domination.
 Critical Policy Studies 3

each of the components. In fact, any putative explanans of a complex practice or regime
consists of a plurality of logics – social, political and fantasmatic – which have to be
connected together in relation to a particular set of circumstances, so as to render a
problematic phenomenon intelligible. It is here that the concept of articulation is stressed,
where it is understood as a practice of linking together elements in a procedure that
modifies each particular element in the ‘synthesis of many determinations’. Moreover, in
order to think about this practice of articulation, we stress the role of judgment as a kind
of situated ability, in which a subject – a researching subject in our particular case –
acquires and enacts the capacity to connect a concept to an object, or ‘apply’ a logic to a
series of social processes, within a contingent and contestable theoretical framework. It is
to such judgments and the critical dimension of explanation that we now turn.
Downloaded by [Universitetsbiblioteket i Bergen] at 04:59 12 May 2016

The critical dimension of critical explanation

But what are the implications for ethics and normativity? Where is the critical dimension
of critical explanation? We have already indicated how social logics enable us to char-
acterize the rules and norms of a practice or regime, while political logics can help us to
show other possibilities of social organization when the ‘ignoble beginnings’ of rules and
norms are reactivated, contested and instituted. By contrast, fantasmatic logics disclose a
particular way in which subjects identify and are gripped by a discourse, though this is
only one mode of identification, thus enabling us to detect the particular narratives that
provide ideological closure for the subject.
But is it not possible to go beyond the strategy of simply inverting existing hierarchies and
binary oppositions, thus projecting more ‘positive ontopolitical presumptions’? And under
what set of conditions would this be possible? We shall briefly address these questions by first
focusing on social practices. Our approach assumes that the constitution of every identity,
practice or regime involves a moment of political exclusion, and thus the exercise of power, so
that every relatively settled set of social relations involves some form of hierarchy. Against
this backdrop, there are at least three related ways of complexifying this picture of a social
practice. These are what Laclau and Mouffe (1985, 153–154) name the relations of sub-
ordination, domination and oppression. Relations of subordination pick out those practices
which appear not to invite or need the public contestation of social norms, either by the
subjects engaged in the practice or by the theorist who is interpreting the practice. Existing
social relations are thus reproduced without public contestation, as dislocations are covered
over in the name of legitimate exercises of power or authority. Included in this set are
everyday practices such as working, leisure activities, playing sport and so forth. Such
activities may in fact involve and rely upon relations of subordination, but they are not
experienced as dominating or oppressive, nor are they regarded as unjust by the analyst.
Relations of domination point to those situations in which in the view of the analyst
subjects are judged to be dominated, even though such norms are not explicitly challenged
by those absorbed in the practice. This is because social relations are reproduced without
public contestation, either because dislocatory experiences are processed privately or
informally, or because they do not arise at all. They may take the form of ‘off the record’
complaints – instances of ‘lateral voice’ for example – made by employees amongst
themselves or even toward their managers, who then elicit, deflect or satisfy requests.
Interpretation thus focuses on those practices and strategies that actively seem to prevent
the public contestation of social norms from arising in the first place. On the other hand,
the concealing of dislocation will be accomplished most completely and effectively if
 4 D. Howarth et al.

subjects are rendered ideologically complicit in the practices in which they partake and do
not challenge them at all.
By contrast, relations of oppression illuminate those features of a practice, policy or
regime that are challenged by subjects in the name of a principle or ideal allegedly denied
or violated by the social practice itself. Here the experiences of dislocation are symbolized
in terms of a questioning of norms, which may be accompanied by political challenges to
the practices or regime of practice examined. But equally they may be met with renewed
efforts to offset challenges and maintain the existing social relations.
Characterizing practices as fostering or reinforcing relations of domination immedi-
ately highlights the sociological and normative character of the approach advocated here.
That is to say, identifying a social norm as a possible object of public contestation, while
also claiming that a norm is actively prevented from being contested by the exercise of
Downloaded by [Universitetsbiblioteket i Bergen] at 04:59 12 May 2016

power, presupposes some view of social domination. And it implies that we already have
some grasp of the practice, both sociologically and normatively. Indeed, this is precisely
where social logics come into play: they are crucial for characterizing a practice in terms
of the rules and norms that operate as their conditions of existence. In this context, to
highlight the political dimension of a practice focuses on the myriad ways in which a
practice or regime is instituted and reproduced in the face of actual and potential
challenges. But it also discloses the way in which the public contestation of social
norms may result in their replacement and transformation. In short, the political aspects
of a practice – and the logics exhibited by those practices – involve attempts to challenge
and replace existing social structures, as well as attempts to neutralize such challenges in a
transformist way (Gramsci 1971, 58–9).
But what, then, can we say about ethical critique and normative evaluation? It is clear
that the focus on radical contingency is connected to the practice of critique, as this focus
can disclose points of social contestation and moments of possible reversal. Yet it is also
important to distinguish between ethics and our grounds for normative evaluation. Ethics
in this perspective involves an acknowledgment of the radical contingency of social
existence – the lack inherent in any order of being – and a particular way of responding
to ‘its’ demands. Ethics is thus recast as an ethos that faces up to the fact that each of us is
necessarily marked by our identifications with an object that fills the lack and which
defines who we are and what we stand for.
For example, a subject might identify with a particular faith, or with the constitutional
principles of a modern democratic state – or both – but identify she does. Yet how we
relate to ‘our Thing’ will be vital for how we relate to others and their identifications.
Indeed, in this conception, our relation to others presupposes an acknowledgment and
complex negotiation with the ideals and objects that makes us the subjects we are: a mix
of attentiveness, investment and releasement; in other words, an ethics of ‘failed trans-
cendence’ that adds a further twist to an ethics of abundance and radical immanence.
Ethics is thus directly connected to the fundamental commitments of our social
ontology. In this view, ethical critique demands detailed analyses of the kinds of fantasies
that underpin our social and political practices, and explorations of the ways in which
fantasmatic objects can be destabilized or modulated. By contrast, questions of normativ-
ity are directed at the concrete relations of domination in which subjects are positioned.
Normative questions thus require the analyst to characterize those relations that are
perceived to be oppressive or unfair in the name of alternative values or principles.
Two elements come into play here. First, there are the values that are brought to any
interpretation by the theorist – in our case, for example, the values associated with the
project of radical democracy – as well as the accompanying tasks of continually
 Critical Policy Studies 5

clarifying, justifying and modifying them. Secondly, there is the task of pinpointing and
remaining attentive to those new values and identities encountered in the practices
interpreted: what we might deem the ‘counter-logics’ of social domination and oppres-
sion. These counter-logics, which may amount to little more than ‘marginal practices’ that
are not subsumed by relations of domination, must themselves be evaluated in terms of
their own internal standards and in terms of our contestable values and ideals. Yet they
may in turn lead us to revise the normative grounds of our judgments and justifications.
Finally, it is important to stress that this perspective concedes a lexical priority to the
ethical vis-à-vis the normative. This arises because of the primacy we accord to radical
contingency in our social ontology, but it also stems from the belief that our normative
stances are themselves ultimately contingent. In other words, the norms and ideals that we
project into our objects of study are intrinsically contestable and revisable. Contingency
Downloaded by [Universitetsbiblioteket i Bergen] at 04:59 12 May 2016

necessarily penetrates the realm of normativity, which in turn indicates the need to
develop a suitable ethos for conducting research.

Conclusion
The approach we have set out shares important family resemblances with Foucault’s
method of problematization and William Connolly’s idea of ontopolitical interpretation
(Connolly 1995). Seen in these terms, its task is to reactivate those options that were
excluded and foreclosed during the emergence and institution of a practice, that is, the
forces and elements which are repressed or defeated in the constitution of an identity –
what Foucault called ‘the hazardous play of dominations’ surrounding the production of
social forms. The point is to show how present practices rely upon such exclusions, thus
revealing the non-necessary character of existing social formations and enabling us to
explore the consequences and potential effects of such ‘repressions’.
Seen in another register, its task is also to explore the conditions under which a subject
is gripped by a particular social practice despite the latter’s non-necessary character. This
mode of critique provides the means of critically interrogating the will to (fantasmatic)
closure, which may reside in a particular discursive formation. Both modes of critique are
informed by a fidelity to the condition of radical contingency itself, and they function by
displaying other possibilities that may become objects of political decision and identifica-
tion, as well as other modalities of ethical and political investment. Together they
contribute to a practice of ethico-political interpretation that endeavors to reconcile and
connect the logics of explanation, criticism and normative evaluation.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes on contributors
David Howarth is Professor in Social and Political Theory at the University of Essex, UK. His
research interests are in poststructuralist theories of society, politics and policy-making. His pub-
lications include Discourse, Logics of Critical Explanation in Social and Political Theory (with
Jason Glynos) and The Politics of Airport Expansion in the UK (with Steven Griggs). He has
recently published the research monograph, Poststructuralism and After.

Jason Glynos is Reader in the Department of Government at the University of Essex, UK. He has
published in the areas of poststructuralist political theory and Lacanian psychoanalysis, focusing on
 6 D. Howarth et al.

theories of ideology, democracy, and freedom and the philosophy and methodology of social
science. His publications include Logics of Critical Explanation in Social and Political Theory
(with David Howarth) and Traversing the Fantasy: Critical Responses to Slavoj Žižek (with Geoff
Boucher and Matthew Sharpe).

Steven Griggs is Professor of Public Policy at De Montfort University, UK. His research interests
are in political discourse theory and its contribution to our understanding of policy-making. He has
recently published The Politics of Airport Expansion in the UK (with David Howarth) and the edited
collection, Practices of Freedom (with Aletta J. Norval and Hendrik Wagenaar).

References
Bhaskar, R. 1986. Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation. London: Verso.
Connolly, W. E. 1995. The Ethos of Pluralization. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Downloaded by [Universitetsbiblioteket i Bergen] at 04:59 12 May 2016

Glynos, J., and D. Howarth. 2007. Logics of Critical Explanation in Social and Political Theory.
Abingdon: Routledge.
Glynos, J., R. Klimecki, and H. Willmott. 2015. “Logics in Policy and Practice: A Critical Nodal
Analysis of the UK Banking Reform Process.” Critical Policy Studies 9 (4): 393–415.
Gramsci, A. 1971. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. London: Lawrence and Wishart.
Griggs, S., and D. Howarth. 2013. The Politics of Airport Expansion in the United Kingdom.
Hegemony, Policy and the Rhetoric of ‘Sustainable Aviation’. Manchester: Manchester
University Press.
Horkheimer, M. 1972. Critical Theory: Selected Essays. New York: Herder and Herder.
Howarth, D. 2000. Discourse. Buckingham: Open University Press.
Howarth, D. R. 2013. Poststructuralism and After. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Jessop, B. 1990. State Theory. Cambridge: Polity.
Laclau, E., and C. Mouffe. 1985. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. London: Verso.

View publication stats