Chapter 1

Caltex vs Palomar
G.R. No. L-19650 29 September 1966
CASTRO, J.:

Facts:
In the year 1960, Caltex conceived a promotional scheme and called it "Caltex Hooded Pump
Contest". It calls for participants to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each
Caltex Station will dispense during a specified period. For the privilege to participate, no fees or
consideration, nor purchase of Caltex products were required.

For seeing the extensive use of mails relative to the contest, representations were made by Caltex
with the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in advanced for mailing. The acting Postmaster
General opined that the scheme falls within the purview of sections 1954, 1982 and 1983 of the Revised
Administrative Code and declined to grant the requested clearance.

Issues:
W/N construction should be employed in this case and W/N the contest violates the provisions of
the Postal Law

Ruling:
Yes. Construction is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of
the authors of the law with respect to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst
others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law. In the present
case, the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law inescapably require an inquiry into the intended
meaning of the words therein. This is as much as question of construction or interpretation as any other.
The Court is tasked to look beyond the fair exterior, to the substance, in order to unmask the real
element and pernicious tendencies that the law is seeking to prevent.

No, according to the Supreme Court, the contest scheme is not a lottery but it appears to be more
of a gratuitous distribution since nowhere in the rules is any requirements that any fee be paid, any
merchandise be bought, any services be rendered, or any value whatsoever be given for the privilege to
participate. Since, a prospective contestant has to do is go to a Caltex Station, request for the entry form
which is available on demand and accomplish and submit the same for the drawing of the winner.
Because of this, the contest fails to exhibit any discernible consideration which would brand it as a
lottery. Moreover, the law does not condemn the gratuitous distribution of property by chance, if no
consideration is derived directly or indirectly from the party receiving the chance, but it does condemn
as criminal scheme in which a valuable consideration of some kind is paid directly or indirectly for the
chance to draw a prize.
Allarde v COA
G.R. No. 103578 January 29, 1993
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

Facts:
Rodolfo T. Allarde (Allarde) was the presiding Judge of Branch 80, Metropolitan Trail Court in
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. He had resigned and it was accepted January 13, 1997. He
applied for retirement which the Supreme Court (SC) approved on July 11, 1989. In
addition to Allarde's retirement pay, GSIS included P240,000 representing the 5 year
lump sum of his P4,000 allowance from the Municipality of Muntinlupa. This was to be
charged to the Municipality of Muntinlupa in pursuance of Batas Pambansa Blg. 866, which was
subject to the availability of funds. The Metro Manila Authority had received news regarding this
and had denied Allarde of this benefit.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Allowance provided by the Municipality of Muntinlupa is included
in his retirement pay?

Ruling:
As clearly specified in the law, only transportation, living and representation allowances may be
included in the computation of the first five-year lump sum retirement benefits for members of
the judiciary.

It is an elementary principle of statutory construction that where the words and phrases of a
statute are not obscure or ambiguous, the meaning and intention of the legislature should be
determined from the language employed, and where there is no ambiguity in the words, there is
no room for construction.

The petition for review is hereby DISMISSED.

Songco, et al. vs. National Labor Relations Commission
G.R. Nos. 50999-51000 March 23, 1990
MEDIALDEA, J.

Facts:
Zuellig (M) Inc. filed with the Department of Labor (Regional Office No. 4) a clearance to
terminate the services of petitioners Jose Songco, Romeo Cipres and Amancio Manuel due to
alleged financial losses. However, the petitioners argued that the company is not suffering any
losses and the real reason for their termination was their membership in the union. At the last
hearing of the case, the petitioner manifested that they no longer contesting their dismissal,
however, they argued that they should be granted a separation pay. Each of the petitioners was
receiving a monthly salary of P40, 000.00 plus commissions for every sale they made.

The Labor Arbiter rendered his decision directing the company to pay the complainants
separation pay equivalent to their one month salary (exclusive of commissions, allowances,
etc.) for every year of service that they have worked with the company. The petitioners
appealed to the NLRC but it was denied. Petitioner Romeo Cipres filed a Notice of Voluntary
Abandonment and Withdrawal of petition contending that he had received, to his full and
complete satisfaction, his separation pay. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not earned sales commissions and allowances should be included in the monthly
salary of petitioners for the purpose of computation of their separation pay?

Held:
The petition is granted.

The allowances should be included in the monthly salary of petitioners for the purpose of
computation of their separation pay is concerned, this has been settled in the case of Santos vs.
NLRC, 76721, in the computation of backwages and separation pay, account must be taken not
only of the basic salary of petitioner but also of her transportation and emergency living
allowances. In the issue of whether commission should be included in the computation of their
separation pay, it is proper to define first commission. Blacks Law Dictionary defined
commission as the recompensed, compensation or reward of an agent, salesman, executor,
trustees, receiver, factor, broker or bailee, when the same is calculated as a percentage on the
amount of his transactions or on the profit to the principal. The nature of the work of a salesman
and the reason for such type of remuneration for services rendered demonstrate clearly that the
commission are part of petitioners wage and salary. Some salesmen do not receive any basic
salary but depend on commission and allowances or commissions alone, are part of petitioners
wage and salary. Some salesman do not received any basic salary but depend on commission
and allowances or commissions alone, although an employer-employee relationship exist.

In Soriano v. NLRC, it is ruled then that, the commissions also claimed by petitioner (override
commission plus net deposit incentive) are not properly includible in such base figure since such
commissions must be earned by actual market transactions attributable to petitioner. Applying
this by analogy, since the commissions in the present case were earned by actual market
transactions attributable to petitioners, these should be included in their separation pay. In the
computation thereof, what should be taken into account is the average commissions earned
during their last year of employment.

Ramirez v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995
KAPUNAN, J.:

Facts:
A civil case was filed by Petitioner alleging that Private Respondent, in a confrontation in the latter’s
office allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated him. Petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event
to support her claim. The act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal. Thus, respondent and filed a
criminal case.

Issue:
Whether or not the facts charged against him constituted an offense.

Ruling:
The law makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties in any private communication to
secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to
whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from
those involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to
make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any". Where the law makes no
distinctions, one does not distinguish.
Domingo v. COA
G.R. No. 112371 October 7, 1998
PURISIMA, J.:

Facts:
An original petition for certiorari seeks to nullify a COA decision preventing reimbursement for
transportation expenses of DSWD Director Aida where transportation vehicle is already
provided.

Issue:
Whether or not a commutable transportation allowance may still be claimed by a government
official provided with a government vehicle for the days official did not actually use the vehicle?
Ruling:
No, according to Sec 14 of PD 733 an official furnished with motor corporation allowance shall
be allowed to use motor vehicle transportation operated and maintained from funds
appropriated.
It is an elementary rule that when the law speaks in clear and categorical language there is no
need in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary for any interpretation. Words and
phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary and common usage meaning.
Republic v CA
G.R. No. 103882 November 25, 1998
PURISIMA, J.:

Facts:
On June 22, 1957, Republic Act No. 1899 ("RA 1899”) was approved granting authority to all
municipalities and chartered cities to undertake and carry out at their own expense the reclamation by
dredging, filling, or other means, of any foreshore lands bordering them, and to establish, provide,
construct, maintain and repair proper and adequate docking and harbor facilities as such municipalities
and chartered cities may determine in consultation with the Secretary of Finance and the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications.

On May 6, 1958, invoking RA 1899, the Pasay City Council passed Ordinance No. 121, for the reclamation
of Three Hundred (300) hectares of foreshore lands in Pasay City. The said Ordinance was amended on
April 21, 1959 by Ordinance No. 158, which authorized the Republic Real Estate Corporation ("RREC") to
reclaim foreshore lands of Pasay City under certain terms and conditions.
On December 19, 1961, Republic of the Philippines ("Republic") filed a Complaint 3 for Recovery of
Possession and Damages questioning the Agreement between Pasay City and RREC (Exhibit "P") on the
grounds that the subject-matter of such Agreement is outside the commerce of man, that its terms and
conditions are violative of RA 1899, and that the said Agreement was executed without any public
bidding.
Pasay City and RREC countered that the object in question is within the commerce of man because RA
1899 gives a broader meaning on the term “foreshore land” than that in the definition provided by the
dictionary.

RTC rendered judgment in favor of Pasay City and RREC, and the decision was affirmed by the CA with
modifications.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the term “foreshore land” includes the submerged area.

Ruling:

The Court ruled that it is erroneous and unsustainable to uphold the opinion of respondent court that
the term “foreshore land” includes the submerged areas. The term "foreshore lands" refers to the the
strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternately wet and dry
according to the flow of the tide. A strip of land margining a body of water (as a lake or stream); the
part of a seashore between the low-water line usually at the seaward margin of a low-tide terrace and
the upper limit of wave wash at high tide usually marked by a beach scarp or berm.(Webster's Third New
International Dictionary)
The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling Act, RA 1899. In so doing, we cannot broaden its
meaning; much less widen the coverage thereof. If the intention of Congress were to include submerged
areas, it should have provided expressly. That Congress did not so provide could only signify the
exclusion of submerged areas from the term “foreshore lands.”

RE: REQUEST OF JUDGE TITO G. GUSTILO

A.M. NO. RTJ-04-1868 : August 13, 2004
CALLEJO, SR., J.

Facts:

On May 26, 2004, Judge Tito G. Gustilo of the RTC of Iloilo City, wrote a letter addressed to Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., saying that he is due to retire at the age of 70 (compulsory
retirement) on September 29, 2004. By then, he would have served the Judiciary for 21 years; 7
years and 11-and-1/2 months of which as Executive Judge of the RTC of Iloilo City. Judge Gustilo
requests to consider his retirement is ”barely one month from November 2004” , the second
tranche of the Special Allowance granted to judges under Republic Act No. 92271 be included in
the computation of his retirement benefits.

To recall, Rep. Act No. 9227, which took effect on November 11, 2003,2 granted additional
compensation in the form of Special Allowance to justices, judges and all other positions in the
Judiciary with the equivalent rank of justices of the Court of Appeals and judges of the Regional
Trial Court. The special allowance shall be one hundred percent (100%) of the basic monthly
salary specified for their respective salary grades under Republic Act No. 6758, as amended,
otherwise known as the Salary Standardization Law, to be implemented for a period of four (4)
years.

In such sums or amounts equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%) of the basic salaries of the
positions covered hereof. Subsequent implementation shall be in such sums and amounts and
up to the extent only that can be supported by the funding source specified in Section 3 hereof.

Issue:

Whether or not the court can adopt a liberal stance in interpreting the retirement laws in favor
of retiree Judge Gustilo?

Held:
The Chief Attorney recommends that Judge Gustilo's request be denied for not being in accord
with Rep. Act No. 9227 and the Guidelines promulgated by the Court. Sec 5 of RA No. 9227 is
clear and unambiguous. There is no room for its interpretation.

Francisco v. HRET
G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Fact:
This is a petition questioning the constitutionality of the impeachment proceedings being held by
the House of Representatives against Chief Justice Davide.

The first impeachment proceeding brought against the Chief Justice, together with other
associate justices, is by Joseph Estrada, for the alleged culpable violation of the Constitution,
betrayal of public trust, and other high crimes. It proceeded due to good form but was later on
dismissed due to lack of substance.

Another impeachment proceeding was being brought against the Chief Justice, in a period less
than the one-year bar provided by the Constitution and the rules of the House of
Representatives. This was initiated by 2 representatives and was endorsed by many other
representatives.

This resulted to many petitions by many individuals as well as associations questioning the
constitutionality of such move by Congress. The petitions were consolidated having raised
similar issues. The petitions contend that the second impeachment proceeding was in culpable
violation of the Constitution wherein there is a one-year bar before one can initiate impeachment
proceedings against the same individual. The first proceeding was less than a year away from
the filing of the second proceeding.

Congress mainly contended that the Supreme Court had no power to inquire about the
impeachment proceedings as it is the former which has the power to facilitate or administer
impeachment proceedings, as provided by the Constitution. If the Supreme Court interrupts and
inquires about the proceedings, it will disturb the doctrine of separation of powers as well as the
doctrine of checks and balances. The impeachment proceeding is in itself under the power of
the Congress and is a political question.
Issues:
1. w/n the second impeachment proceeding against Davide is constitutional?
2. w/n the impeachment proceeding was a political question wherein the SC cannot disturb it?

Ruling
1. It is prevalent that the second impeachment proceeding against the Chief Justice is
unconstitutional. Under Article XI of our present Constitution, it is provided that with regard to
the impeachment of public officials such as the Chief Justice, there is a one-year bar provided.
No impeachment proceeding shall be initiated against the same official within a period of one
year. The term initiate refers to the filing of the case against the official. It starts when a
complaint is filed with the Committee of Justice of the House of Representatives. It is not
initiated during the time when it is verified by the other members of the House or when it is given
to Senate for hearing.

2. It is said that the SC cannot question or inquire about the impeachment proceedings since it
will disturb the separation of power, check and balance between the branches of government,
and that the SC has vested interest in the issue.

The Constitution was equivocal in granting the judiciary, moreover the SC, the duty to settle
controversies that are legally demandable and enforceable. It has been vested the duty to check
if there is any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or office of government. In this
petition wherein the constitutionality of the impeachment proceeding is questioned, no one has
the power to interpret the fundamental law of the land and answer the issue of constitutionality
other than the SC. Given such, even if the legislative that commences and administers
impeachment proceedings, it is not a bar for the SC to inquire about their actions especially if
constitutionality is involved.

MANTRADE v. ARBITRATOR FROILAN M. BACUNGAN

GR No. L-48437, Sep 30, 1986
FERIA, J.

Facts:

This is a petition for Certiorari and Mandamus filed by petitioner against arbitrator Froilan M.
Bacungan and Mantrade Development Corporation arising from the decision of respondent
arbitrator that ruled that the Mantrade Development Corporation is not under legal obligation to
pay holiday pay (as provided for in Article 94 of the Labor Code in the third official Department of
Labor edition) to its monthly paid employees who are uniformly paid by the month, irrespective of
the number of working days therein, with a salary of not less than the statutory or established
minimum wage.

Issue:
Whether or not monthly salaried workers are excluded from holiday pay?

Held:
No, Respondent corporation is under legal obligation to grant its monthly salaried employees
holiday pay. As decided by the court in Insular Bank of Asia and American Employees’ Union v
Inciong, . 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code is null
and void for enlarging the scope of the exclusion provided for in Art. 94. Art. 82 provides for the
inclusion while Art. 94 provides for exclusion. Taken together, it is clear that monthly-paid
employees are not excluded from payment of holiday pay. An administrative interpretation which
diminishes the benefits of labor more than what the statute delimits or withholds is ultra vires.

BRAULIO CONDE v. IAC

[ GR No. 70443, Sep 15, 1986 ]
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Facts:

Braulio Conde (Conde), et. al. filed a complaint for the recovery of possession of a parcel of
land. He also filed a petition against Gutierrez (Gutierrez) for fraud. Conde claims that Gutierrez
used fraud to acquire absolute ownership of the properties of Esteban Guiterrez (Esteban) and
Fermina Ramos (Fermina) by succession.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the courts have acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in dismissing the case of fraud

Ruling:
The Petition is DISMISSED. There are two kinds of fraud, Intrinsic and Extrinsic. Intrinsic fraud
is the presentation of false documents before the courts, while extrinsic fraud is a fraudulent
scheme that would prevent a party from having his day in court from presenting his/her case.
The CA was correct in determining that the fraud committed by Gutierrez was intrinsic in nature.
Even if the contention of Conde, et. al. were true it would be of no merit because intrinsic fraud
is not sufficient to attack a judgment of the court. DISPOSITIVE PORTION:WHEREFORE, the
petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The respondents' counsel, Atty. Adelaido G. Rivera is
fined Five Hundred Pesos (P500) for his failure to act on the order to file comment.
GO KA TOC SONS and CO v. RICE AND CORN BOARD
G.R. No. L-23607 May 23, 1967
BENGZON, J.P., J.:

Facts:

Go Ka Toc Sons & Co. is a duly registered partnership, not wholly owned by Filipinos, engaged
since 1958 in the manufacture, processing and marketing of vegetable oil extracted from corn,
rice, copra, soybean, peanuts, fish, and other vegetable products. 1äwphï1.ñët

On August 2, 1960, Republic Act 3018 was approved which prohibited partnerships whose capital
was not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines from engaging, directly or indirectly, in the
rice and/or corn industry. The law was to take effect on January 1, 1951. However, Section 3 (a)
allowed such partnerships, upon registration with the municipal treasurer, to continue business
until two years from and after January 1, 1961.
On November 21, 1960, the newly created Rice and Corn Board1 issued Resolution No. 10,
defining the term "by product" used in the law. On July 10, 1961, they issued Gen. Circular No. 1,
as amended, which defined the term "capital investment" which limits the maximum amount of
capital investments of alien persons and entities engaged in the rice and/or corn industry in
pursuant to RA 3018.

Issue:

Whether or not Go Ka Toc and Sons activities are covered by the prohibitions stated in RA
3018?

Ruling:
 Section 1 of the law defines "rice and/or corn industry" as including the handling of distribution,
either in wholesale or retail, and the acquisition for purpose of trade, of the by-products of rice
and corn.

Now, "tahup," "sungo" and "rice husk," which plaintiffs acquires from rice and corn millers and
from which it manufactures the vegetable oil and produces the "corn meal" or "corn germ meal"
that it subsequently distributes and sells are clearly by-products of rice and/or corn.2

Although the term "by-product" is not particularly and by specifically stated in the title of Republic
Act 3018, its inclusion in the body of the law is not invalid, as the lower court held, since it
is germane to the subject matter expressed in the title of the law.3

The law is clear in enunciating the policy that only Filipinos and associations, partnerships or
corporations 100% Filipino can engage even in the trade and acquisition of the by-products of
rice and/or corn. So the court's only duty was to apply the law as it was.4 The purpose of the
Act, as expressed in the introductory note of the bill, can control the language of the law only in
case of ambiguity.5 There is none here. Furthermore, the court below's interpretation would
render the statute nugatory and defeat its aims, rather than apply and effectuate its
provisions,6 since it struck off the phrase "by-products thereof" from the text of the law.

PEOPLE vs. MARIO MAPA y MAPULONG

G.R. No. L-22301, AUGUST 30, 1967
FERNANDO, J.:

Facts:
Mapa was charged for illegal possession of firearms in violation of section 878 of RAC in
connection 2692 of the same code as amended by CA 56 and RA 4. Caliber 22 without license.
Mapa admits the accusation but on grounds of his duty as a secret agent to Batangas
Governor Leviste. The lower court rendered a decision convicting Mapa of the crime and
imprisonment of 1 year 1 day to 2 years.

Issue:
Whether or not a secret agent should, like Mapa, be licensed firearm exempt?

Ruling:
The law is clear that it is unlawful for any person to possess firearms in section 878 and of the
RAC, except when such are in possession of public officials in the performance of their
duties. SC affirmed the judgment.
.

CYNTHIA S. BOLOs v. DANILO T. BOLOS

G.R. No. 186400 October 20, 2010
MENDOZA, J

Facts:
Petitioner Cynthia Bolos(Cynthia)filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to
Respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of the Family Code. After trial on the merits,
the RTC granted the petition for annulment. A copy of said decision was received by respondent
Danilo and he thereafter timely filed the Notice of Appeal.

The RTC denied due course to the appeal for Danilo’s failure to file the required motion for
reconsideration or new trial, in violation of Section 20 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Thereafter, the RTC issued the
order declaring its decision declaring the marriage null and void as final and executory and
granting the Motion for Entry of Judgment filed by Cynthia. Not in conformity, Danilo filed with
the CA a petition forcertiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul the orders of the RTC as they were
rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. Danilo also
prayed that he be declared psychologically capacitated to render the essential marital obligations
to Cynthia, who should be declared guilty of abandoning him, the family home and their children.

The CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the assailed orders of the RTC declaring
the nullity of marriage as final and executory. The appellate court stated that the requirement of
a motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply
in this case as the marriage between Cynthia and Danilo was solemnized on February 14, 1980
before the Family Code took effect.

Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also applicable to marriages solemnized before the
effectivity of the Family Code. According to petitioner, the phrase “under the Family Code” in A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word “petitions” rather than to the word “marriages.” Such that
petitions filed after the effectivity of the Family Code are governed by the A.M. No. even if the
marriage was solemnized before the same. Danilo, in his Comment, counters that A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC is not applicable because his marriage with Cynthia was solemnized on February 14,
1980, years before its effectivity.

ISSUE:

Whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled “Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,” is applicable to the case at bench.

Ruling:

No, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated on March 15, 2003,
is explicit in its scope. Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads:

“Section 1. Scope.—This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.

The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.”

The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage extends
only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on
August 3, 1988.7 The rule sets a demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code
and those solemnized under the Civil Code.8 The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to
petitioner’s interpretation that the phrase “under the Family Code” in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers
to the word “petitions” rather than to the word “marriages.”

In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the RTC decision which denied due
course to respondent’s appeal and denying petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file a
motion for reconsideration.

TARLAC DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

No. L-41012 September 30, 1976
CASTRO, C.J

Facts:

Facts:

On June 26, 1905, the Philippine Commission enacted Act No. l360 which authorized the City of
Manila to reclaim a portion of Manila Bay. The Act provided that the reclaimed area "Shall be
the property of the City of Manila" and that "the City of Manila is hereby authorized to set aside
a tract of the reclaimed land to form part of the Luneta extension.

Philippine Commission passed on May 18, 1907 Act No. 1657, amending Act No. 1360, so as to
authorize the City of' Manila either to lease or to sell the portion set aside as a hotel site.

The total area reclaimed was a little over 25 hectares. The City of Manila applied for the
registration of the reclaimed area, and on January 20, 1911, O.C.T. No. 1909 was issued in the
name of the City of Manila.

On July 13, 1911, City of Manila, affirming a prior sale dated January 16, 1909 cancelled
5,543.07 square meters of the reclaimed area to the Manila Lodge No. 761, Benevolent and
Protective Order of Elks of the U.S.A. (BPOE) on the basis of which TCT No. 2195 was
issued to the latter over the Marcela.

On November 19, 1963, Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks, Inc." BPOE sold for the sum of
P4,700,000 the land together with all the improvements thereon to the Tarlac Development
Corporation (TDC) which paid P1,700.000 as down payment and mortgaged to the vendor the
same realty to secure the payment of the balance to be paid in quarterly installments.

In June 1964, the City of Manila filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for the
reannotation of its right to repurchase; the court, after hearing, issued an order, dated
November 19, 1964, directing the Register of Deeds of the City of Manila to reannotate in
toto the entry regarding the right of the City of Manila to repurchase the property after fifty years.
TDC and BPOE appealed to this Court which on July 31, 1968 affirmed in G.R. Nos. L-24557
and L-24469 the trial court's order of reannotation, but reserved to TDC the right to bring
another action for the clarification of its rights.
Trial court rendered decision that subject land to be part of the "public park or plaza" and,
therefore, part of the public domain, dismissing the complaint. CA affirmed the decision of lower
court.

Issue:

Whether or not property subject of the action, pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 1360, as
amended by Act No. 1657, was patrimonial property of the City of Manila and not a park or
plaza?

Ruling:
Neither. It is public dominion. Although the City of Manila was to pay for the construction of such
work and timber bulkheads or sea walls as may be necessary for the making of the Luneta
extension, the area to be reclaimed would be filled at the expense of the Insular Government
and without cost to the City of Manila, with material dredged from Manila Bay. Hence, the letter
of the statute should be narrowed to exclude maters which if included would defeat the policy of
the legislation. The reclaimed area, an extension to the Luneta, is declared to be property of the
City of Manila. Property, however, is either of public ownership or of private ownership. It is of
public dominion, intended for public use. Without the authorization expressly given by Act No.
1360, the City of Manila could not lease or sell even the northern portion; much less could it
dispose of the whole reclaimed area. Consequently, the reclaimed area was granted to the City
of Manila, not as its patrimonial property. At most, only the northern portion reserved as a hotel
site could be said to be patrimonial property for, by express statutory provision it could be
disposed of, and the title thereto would revert to the City should the grantee fail to comply with
the terms provided by the statute. The subject property is not that northern portion authorized to
be leased or sold; the subject property is the southern portion. Hence, applying the rule of
expresio unius est exlusio alterius, the City of Manila was not authorized to sell the subject
property. Article 344 of the Civil Code of Spain provides that to property of public use, in
provinces and in towns, comprises the provincial and town roads, the squares streets fountains,
and public waters the promenades, and public works of general service paid for by such towns
or provinces." A park or plaza, such as the extension to the Luneta, is undoubtedly comprised in
said article.

Municipality of San Juan v CA

G.R. No. 125183 September 29, 1997
MELO, J.

Facts:
On February 17, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1716 reserving for
Municipal Government Center Site Purposes certain parcels of land located in the Municipality of San
Juan, Metro Manila. After resettling hundreds of squatter families occupying the land covered by the
proclamation, the Municipality of San Juan started to develop its government center. On October 6, 1987,
after Congress had already convened on July 26, 1987, former President Corazon Aquino issued
Proclamation No. 164, amending Proclamation No. 1716 by excluding from its operation the parcels of
land not being utilized for government center sites purposes but actually occupied for residential
purposes. On June 1, 1998, the Corazon de Jesus Homeowners Association, Inc., one of the herein private
respondents, filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition for prohibition with urgent prayer for
restraining order against the Municipal Mayor and Engineer of San Juan and the Curator of Pinaglabanan
Shrine, to enjoin them from either removing or demolishing the houses of the association members who
were claiming that the lots they occupied have been awarded to them by Proclamation No 164. The
regional trial court dismissed the petition and the appeal before the Court of Appeals was likewise
dismissed. This decision became final. Disregarding the ruling of the court, private respondent hired a
private surveyor to make consolidation-subdivision plans of the land in question, submitting the same to
respondent DENR in connection with their application for a grant under Proclamation No. 164. To
prevent DENR from issuing any grant to private respondents, petitioner municipality filed a petition for
prohibition with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against
respondent DENR and private respondent Corazon de Jesus Homeowners Association. The regional trial
court sustained petitioner municipality but the Court of Appeals reversed the decision, hence, the present
recourse.

Issue:
Is proclamation No. 164 a valid exercise of legislative power? More specifically, is Proclamation No. 164
a valid legislation?

Ruling
Proclamation No. 164 is obviously not a valid act of legislation. Not withstanding the fact that the
reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals would be justified upon the issue of res judicata, there,
exists a more basic reason for setting aside the appealed decision and this has reference to the
fundamental and gross error in the issuance of Proclamation No. 164. Proclamation No. 1716 was issued
by the late President Ferdinand Marcos in the due exercise of legislative power vested upon him. Being a
valid act of legislation, said Proclamation may only be amended by an equally valid act of legislation.
Proclamation No. 164 is obviously not a valid act of legislation. After the so-called bloodless revolution
of February 1986, President Corazon Aquino took the reigns of power under a revolutionary government.
On March 24, 1986, she issued Proclamation No. 3, promulgating the Provisional Constitution, the
President shall continue to exercise legislative power until a legislature is elected and convened under a
new constitution. When Congress was convened on July 26, 1987, President Aquino lost this legislative
power under the Freedom Constitution. Proclamation No. 164 was issued on October 6, 1987 when
legislative power was already solely in Congress. The Supreme Court holds that the issuance of
Proclamation No 164 was an invalid exercise of legislative power. Consequently, said Proclamation is
hereby declared void. The appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby set aside. Public
respondent DENR is hereby permanently enjoined from enforcing Proclamation No. 164

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL vs. GSIS

G.R. No. 122156, FEBRUARY 3, 1997
BELLOSILLO, J.:

FACTS:
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under
Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding
30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel
Corporation. In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders
participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which
offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad,
a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same
number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending the
declaration of Renong Berhad as the
winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, matched
the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad.

On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded

the tender of the matching bid and that the saleof 51% of the MHC may be
hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner
came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus.

In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution
and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has
practically become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and
culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation
of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence and its power
and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it
has become a part of the national patrimony.

Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carry with it the ownership of
the business of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government - owned and
controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism
industry is unquestionably a part of the
national economy.

Issue:
Whether or not the sale of Manila Hotel to Renong Berhad is in violation of the
Constitutional provision of Filipino First policy
and is therefore null and void?

Ruling:

Yes. The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any
commodity to be sold to the highest bidder solely for the sake of privatization. The
Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a significant role as an authentic
repository of twentieth century Philippine history and culture. This is the plain and simple
meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision of the Philippine Constitution. And this Court,
heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the duty of being the elderly
watchman of the nation, will continue to respect and protect the sanctity of the
Constitution. It was thus ordered that GSIS accepts the matching bid of petitioner Manila
Prince Hotel Corporation to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary clearances and to do
such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for purpose.
BIRAOGO V. PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION
G. R. No. 192935. December 7, 2010
MENDOZA, J.:

FACT:

E.O No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) of 2010 was signed by President
Aquino. The said PTC is a mere branch formed under the Office of the President tasked to
investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and
employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration
and submit their findings and recommendations to the President, Congress and the
Ombudsman. However, PTC is not a quasi-judicial body, it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve,
settle or render awards in disputes between parties. Its job is to investigate, collect and asses
evidences gathered and make recommendations. It has subpoena powers but it has no power
to cite people in contempt or even arrest. It cannot determine for such facts if probable cause
exist as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.

Petitioners contends the Constitutionality of the E.O. on the grounds that.

It violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of Congress to create a public office
and appropriate funds for its operation;
The provisions of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot
legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize
the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity, and efficiency does not include the
power to create an entirely new office was inexistent like the Truth Commission;
The E.O illegally amended the Constitution when it made the Truth Commission and vesting it
the power duplicating and even exceeding those of the Office of the Ombudsman and the DOJ.
It violates the equal protection clause

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT the said E.O is unconstitutional?

RULING:

Yes, E.O No. 1 should be struck down as it is violative of the equal protection clause. The Chief
Executive’s power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having
been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents
belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees
faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is
sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC
had the same composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in
conducting the inquiry.

Hidalgo v. Hidalgo
G.R. No. L-25327 May 29, 1970
TEEHANKEE, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioners pray to Agrarian Court to be entitled as share tenants to redeem parcel of land they are
working from the purchasers where no notice was previously given to them by the vendor of the latter’s
intention to sell the property and where the vendor did not execute the affidavit required by Sec. 13 of the
Agricultural Land Reform Code before the registration of the deed of sale. Agrarian Court dismissed
petitions, stating that the right of redemption granted by Sec. 12 of the same code is only for leasehold
tenants and not for share tenants, claiming that share tenancy and leasehold tenancy are within the
jurisdiction of the code – that the code expressly grants said right to leaseholders only and nobody else.
Moreover, the court held that if the intention of Congress was to extend the right of redemption to share
tenants through judicial legislation, the section would have expressly said so.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the right of redemption granted by Sec. 12 of the Agrarian Reform Code addresses only
leaseholders and not share tenants.

Ruling:
Agrarian Court fell into several erroneous assumptions and premises, reducing “agricultural lessee” to
only “leasehold tenants”. The purpose of the Agricultural Land Reform Code is the abolition of
agricultural share tenancy. The policy of the State is to establish owner cultivatorship. Adherence to the
letter would result in absurdity, injustice and contradictions and would defeat the plain and vital purpose
of the statute.
Quijano v. Development Bank of the Philippines
G.R. No. L-26419 October 16, 1970
BARREDO, J.:.

Facts:
Petitioners filed an application for an urban estate loan with the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation
(RFC), predecessor-in-intent of Respondent. They mortgaged real estate properties to secure the loan;
loan was approved on April 30, 1953. Mortgage contract was executed by Petitioners in favor of DBP on
March 23, 1954. As of July 31, 1965, outstanding obligation of the Petitioners with DBP was P13,
983.59. Petitioner wrote Respondent offering to pay P14, 000 for his outstanding obligation out of his
back pay pursuant to RA 897 (Back Pay Law). Respondent advised Petitioners of the non-acceptance of
this offer on the ground that the loan was not incurred before or subsisting on June 20, 1953, when RA
897 was approved. Respondent filed on October 14, 1965 an application for the foreclosure of real estate
mortgage executed by the Petitioners; Respondent Sheriff scheduled the public auction after advising
Petitioner of the application for foreclosure filed by DBP.

Issues:
Whether or not the obligation of the Petitioners was subsisting at the time of the approval of RA 897, the
Amendatory Act of June 20, 1953, to RA 304, the original Back Pay Law?
Whether or not the trial court erred in declaring that the loan of the Petitioners was not subsisting when
RA 897 was enacted on June 20, 1953?

Ruling:
RA 897 has clear provisions that expressly require that the obligations for which back pay certificates
may be accepted as payments must be subsisting at the time RA 897 was approved (June 20, 1953).
While Petitioner’s loan was approved on April 30, 1953, they only availed of it much later on March 23,
1954. The obligation therefore attaches only on March 23, 1954. It cannot be said that there was an
obligation subsisting at the time of the approval of RA 897.
Marcos v. Manglapus
G.R. No. 88211 October 27, 1989
Cortes, J

Facts:

After Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the presidency, he and his family fled to Hawaii. Now in his
deathbed, petitioners are asking the court to order the respondents to issue their travel documents and
enjoin the implementation of the President’s decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners
contend under the provision of the Bill of Rights that the President is without power to impair their
liberty of abode because only a court may do so “within the limits prescribed by law.” Nor, according to
the petitioners, may the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do
so.

Issue:

Whether or not the president have the power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines?

Ruling:

Yes, the President has the obligation, under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their
welfare and advance national interest.

This case calls for the exercise of the President’s power as protector of the peace. The president is not
only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with day-to-day
problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign
foe appears on the horizon.

The documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their followers to destabilize the country
bolsters the conclusion that their return at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence
directed against the state and instigate more chaos.

The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking preemptive actions against
threats to its existence if, though still nascent they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct
protection of the people is the essence of the duty of the government.

The Supreme Court held that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in
determining the return of the petitioners at the present time and under present circumstances poses a
serious threat to national interest and welfare prohibiting their return to the Philippines. The petition is
DISMISSED.
Chapter 2

Sps Pascual v Sps Ballesteros

G.R. No. 186269 February 15, 2012
REYES, J.:

DANILO PARAS vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. L-123169, NOVEMBER 4, 1996
FRANCISCO, J.:

FACTS:
A petition for recall was filed against Danilo Paras, who is the incumbent Punong
Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City. The recall election was postponed due to a
later date due petitioner‘s opposition that under Section 74 of RA 7160, no recall shall
take place within one year from the date of the official‘s assumption to office or one year
immediately preceding a regular local election. Since the Sangguniang Kabataan
election was set on the first Monday of May 2006, no recall may be instituted.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the prohibition of Section 74 (b) of the LGC may refer to SK
elections, where the recall election is for Barangay post?

Ruling:
No. Petition was dismissed. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with
reference to its context. It is clear that Sec 74 is to subject an elective local
official to recall once during his term, provided in paragraph (a) and (b). Thus
interpreting the phrase ―regular local election‖ to include SK election will unduly
circumscribe the Code since there will never be a recall of election rendering
useless in the provision. In interpreting a statute, the Court assumed that the
legislature intended to enact an effective law. An interpretation should be
avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated,meaningless
or inoperative.

Uytengsu vs. Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-6379 (September 29, 1954)

FACTS:
Petitioner-appellee was born, of Chinese parents in Dumaguete, Negros Oriental n October 6,
1927. After finishing primary and secondary education here in the Philippines, he went to the
United States to further his studies from the year 1947-1950. In April of the same year he
returned to the Philippines for four (4) months vacation. On July 15, 1950, he filed for
naturalization. Forthwith, he returned to the United States and took a post-graduate degree which
he finished in July 1951l but he did not return to the Philippines until October 13, 1951. Hence,
the original date of hearing the case, originally scheduled to take place on July 12, 1951, had to
be postponed.

ISSUE:
1. W/N the application for naturalization may be granted, notwithstanding the fact that petitioner
left the Philippines immediately after the filing of his petition and did not return until several
months after the first date set for the hearing thereof.
2. W/N domicile and residence are synonymous.

Ruling:
1. No. Section 7 of C.A. No. 473 requires applicant for naturalization to “reside continuously in
the Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition up to the time of his admission to
Philippine citizenship. 2. No. Although the words “residence” and “domicile” are often used
interchangeably, each has, in strict legal parlance, a meaning distinct and different from that of
the other. Actual and substantial residence within the Philippines, not legal residence or
domicile, is required. Residence indicates permanency of occupation, distinct from lodging or
boarding, or temporary occupation. Domicile is residence with intention to stay.

TANADA vs TUVERA
G.R. No. L-63915, 24 April 1985

FACTS:
Petittioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent government officials to publish
and/ or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters
of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementation
and administrative orders. The petitioners are invoking the right to be informed on matters
of public concern (Sec. 6, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution). The petitioners are also
invoking that for laws to be valid and enforceable, they must be published in the Official
Gazette.
The respondents contended that the case should be dismissed outright on the ground that
petitioners have no legal standing to carry out such petition since they are not personally
and directly prejudiced by the non-publication of the issuances in question. Respondents
also contended that the publication in the Official Gazette is a non-requirement for laws
which provide their own affectivity date. Since the issuances in question contain the date of
effectivity, publication is not necessary.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioners have the legal personality or standing to carry out the instant
petition and whether publication is necessary for laws which have its own effectivity date.
HELD:
The Court recognizes a private citizen’s legal personality since the right sought to be
enforced by the petitioners is a public right recognized by the Constitution.

The Court anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code which states that:

“Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided.”

Publication is indispensable because without such publication, there would be no adequate

notice to the general public of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and
conducts as citizens. It would render injustice to punish or burden a citizen for the
transgression of law which he had no notice.

It is the respondent officials’ duty to enforce the Constitutional rights of the people to be
informed on matters of public concern. Thus, the publication of all presidential issuances of
“public nature” or of general applicability” is mandated by law. Unless so published, laws
shall have no binding force or effect.

PEOPLE vs QUE PO LAY

G.R. No. L-6791, 29 March 1954

FACTS:
Que Po Lay was convicted at the Court of First Instance of Manila for violating Central Bank
Circular No. 20 in connection with Section 34 of Republic No. 265. The appellant was in
possession of foreign exchange consisting of U.S dollars, checks and money orders
amounting to about $ 7,000. He failed to sell the said currency to the Central Bank through
its agents one day following the receipt of such currency as required by Circular No.20. The
appellant was sentenced to six months imprisonment and a fine of Php 1, 000.

The appellant based the appeal on the claim that said circular was not published on the
Official Gazette prior to the act of omission of the appellant, thus, said circular has no force
and effect.

Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank was issued in the year 1949. It was not published until
November 1951, or after three months after appelant’s conviction of its violation.

ISSUES:
Whether or not:
 1. Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank, not being a statute or a law should be subjected to
publication requirement stated in Article 2 of the Civil Code;
2. The appellant is liable to the said Circular No. 20 when the latter was only published
after about three months of his conviction.
HELD:
1. Circular No. 20 is not a statute or a law but it is being issued for the implementation of
the law authorizing its issuance, therefore it has the force and effect of the law. Circulars
and regulations which prescribe a penalty for its violation should be published before
becoming effective. It is based on the general principle that before the public is bound
by penal provisions, the people should be officially informed of its contents and
penalties.
2. Appellant could not be held liable for the violation of Circular No. 20 for it was not
binding at the time he was found to have failed to sell the foreign exchange.

FRIVALDO vs. COMELEC

G.R No. 120295, 28 June 1996

FACTS:
Juan Frivaldo filed a Certificate of Candidacy (COC) on March 20, 1995. Raul Lee made a
petition to cancel the COC for being disqualified to seek public office because he was not a
Filipino Citizen, which was granted by the COMELEC.

Frivaldo filed a motion for reconsideration which remained unacted upon until after May
1995 election. His candidacy continued and he was elected as Governor. However, the
COMELEC affirmed his disqualification on May 11, 1995. Raul Lee having garnered the
2nd highest number of votes was proclaimed Governor.
Frivaldo filed a petition to annul the proclamation on the grounds that: 1. He took an Oath
of Allegiance on June 30 as his petition for naturalization in September 1994 had been
granted; 2. There is no more legal impediment for his proclamation; 3. The Vice Governor
and not Lee should occupy the seat as Governor in case of vacancy due to disqualification.

ISSUE:
Is Juan Frivaldo a Filipino Citizen during his election as Governor?

HELD:
Yes. It is true that he was disqualified by the Court in the 1988 and 1992 elections on the
issue of his citizenship and he was stateless when he filed his COC for the 1995 elections,
thus making him ineligible to hold public office. But his case is unique and the law should be
interpreted liberally on his favor.

1. He sought American citizenship to escape prosecution of the Martial Law, not to

denounce his being a Fiipino.
2. He took an Oath of Allegiance every time he files his COC despite being denied several
times.
 3. He demonstrated tenacity and sheer determination to re-acquire his citizenship despite
technical setbacks.
4. Assured of a life of ease and plenty as an American Citizen he opted on returning and
serving his country which gives no doubt as to his loyalty and dedication to this country.
5. The people of Sorsogon overwhelmingly voted for him three times which makes him
deserving to govern the people.
Frivaldo was upheld as the rightful Governor of Sorsogon and granted Filipino citizenship.