CIVIL LAW REVIEW (MC LEGARDA)

2nd SEMESTER, SY 2012-2013

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES

I. INTRODUCTION

II. EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS

A. When laws take effect

Tanada vs Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel
Tuvera public officials to publish in the Official Gazette
various PDs, LOIs, general orders, proclamations,
(1985) EOs, letter of implementation and administrative
orders. Respondents contend that publication in
the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non
requirement for the effectivity of laws where the
laws themselves provide for their own effectivity
dates.
National COA issued and implemented Memorandum No.
Amnesty 97-038 without publication. The Memo directed
Commission vs govt personnel to cause the disallowance of any
COA payment of any form of additional compensation or
remuneration to cabinet secretaries, their deputies
(2004) and assistants, or their representatives, in violation
of the rule on multiple positions, and to effect the
refund of any and all such additional compensation
given to and received by the officials concerned, or
their representatives, from the time of the finality of
the Supreme Court ruling in Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary to the present. NAC was
contending that the memorandum cannot be
implemented without satisfying the requirement of
publication.
Garcillano vs Senate legislative inquiries are being questioned
House of for having no published rules of procedure as
Representatives required by Sec. 21, Art VI of the Consti. There
was publication of the rules in newspapers of
(2008) general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006
Respondents justify their non-observance of the
constitutionally mandated publication by arguing
that the rules have never been amended since
1995 and, despite that, they are published in
booklet form available to anyone for free, and
accessible to the public at the Senate’s internet
web page..
Fuentes vs Tarciano sold a part of conjugal property to sps
Roca Fuentes where the signature of his wife Rosario in
the affidavit of consent was forged. Tarciano and
(2010) Rosario got married in 1950; the sale of the
property was in 1989. Civil Code: Sale is voidable
within 10 years. Family Code: Sale is void.
The phrase “unless it is otherwise provided” in Article 2 of the NCC does not preclude the requirement
of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated
by law. It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of
general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be
bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents.
COA Memorandum No. 97-038 is merely an internal and interpretative regulation or letter of instruction
which does not need publication to be effective and valid.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of
the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of
the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines
to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. COA Memorandum No. 97-038
does not, in any manner or on its own, rule against or affect the right of any individual, except those
provided for under the Constitution. It is not an implementing rule or regulation of a statute but a
directive issued by the COA to its auditors to enforce the self-executing prohibition imposed by Section
13, Article VII of the Constitution on the President and his official family, their deputies and assistants,
or their representatives from holding multiple offices and receiving double compensation.
The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without
duly published rules of procedure.
The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senate’s defiance of the clear and
unambiguous language of the Constitution. The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of
the Senate, or in pamphlet form available at the Senate, is not sufficient under the Tañada v.
Tuvera ruling which requires publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation.
The law that applies to this case is the Family Code. The sale is void.
The Family Code provisions were also made to apply to already existing conjugal partnerships without
prejudice to vested rights. Consequently, when Tarciano sold the conjugal lot to the Fuentes spouses
on January 11, 1989, the law that governed the disposal of that lot was already the Family Code.
 B. Ignorance of the law
Kasilag vs Ambrosio and Kasilag enetered into a mortgage Kasilag is a possessor in good faith based on his excusable ignorance of the law.
Rodriguez agreement. The stipulations were verbally
modified by the same parties in the sense that Gross and inexcusable ignorance of law may not be the basis of good faith, but possible, excusable
(1939) Kasilag would take possession of the land and ignorance may be such basis. Kasilag is not conversant with the laws because he is not a lawyer. In
would benefit by the fruits thereof on condition that accepting the mortgage of the improvements he proceeded on the well-grounded belief that he was
he would condone the payment of interest upon not violating the prohibition regarding the alienation of the land. In taking possession thereof and in
the loan and he would attend to the payment of consenting to receive its fruits, he did not know, as clearly as a jurist does, that the possession and
the land tax. These pacts made by the parties enjoyment of the fruits are attributes of the contract of antichresis.
independently were calculated to alter the
mortgage, converting the latter into a contract of
antichresis. The contract of antichresis, being a
real encumbrance burdening the land, is illegal
and void because it is legal and valid. Can Kasilag
be considered a possessor in good faith?
Elegado v. Warren Taylor Graham a foreigner and former The first estate tax return is valid.
Court of resident of the Philippines died and left certain
Appeals shares of stock in the Philippines. Foreigners cannot be any less bound by our laws in our own country

(1989) Two tax returns were filed under his name. The
first by foreign lawyers amounting to P95k, which
was left unpaid and the second, which was
instituted by Elegado, a Filipino lawyer who was in
charge of the decedent’s estate in the Philippines.

Elegado argued that they could not be charged

under the first estate tax return since the foreign
lawyers did not know Philippine tax law.

Ambil, Jr. v
Sandiganbayan
(2011)

C. Retroactivity of laws
Frivaldo v. Frivaldo contends that he is qualified to assume Frivaldo is qualified to assume the position of Governor
Commission on the position of Governor for which he was elected
Elections since he was able to regain his Filipino citizenship PD 725 , the law regarding repatriation, is curative or remedial in nature and thus should be given
by repatriation on the same day that he was retroactive effect. Curative statutes are those which undertake to cure errors and irregularities which
(1996) supposed to take his oath of office. otherwise would not produce their intended consequences by reason of some statutory disability or
failure to comply with some technical requirement.

On the other hand, remedial or procedural laws are statutes relating to remedies or modes of
procedure which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the
remedy or confirmation of such rights.

In this case, PD 725 both creates a new right to natural born Filipino citizen who lost their citizenship
and provides a new remedy to acquire such citizenship.

It is not only the law which is to be given retroactive effect but the repatriation granted under the said
 law. Frivaldo’s act of re-acquiring his citizenship retroacts to the date he filed his application. He is
therefore deemed qualified to run and assume office.
Aruego Jr. v. On 1983, Aruego and his sister, both minors, filed The TC did not lose jurisdiction over the case. The Civil Code is still the applicable law.
Court of for compulsory recognition as illegitimate children
Appeals of their father who died prior to the institution of the The Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect since its application will prejudice the vested
case. right of the Aruego and his sister to be recognized as illegitimate children.

On 1992, the TC ruled they were the deceased’s Jurisdiction of a court, once attached, cannot be ousted by subsequent events, although of a
(1996) illegitimate children. The legitimate children of the character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance.
deceased contended that the TC lost jurisdiction of
the case when the Family Code took effect on
August 3, 1988. Under the FC, recognition of the
child should be brought at the lifetime of the father.
Francisco v On August 3, 1988, Teresita Francisco filed a suit The Civil Code is the applicable law.
Court of for annulment of general power of attorney of her
Appeals husband Eusebio’s property that were granted to The repeal of Civil Code provisions by the Family Code does not operate to prejudice or affect the
Eusebio’s children from his first marriage. rights which have become vested or accrued while the said provisions were in force. The rights
(1998) accrued survive the repeal.
The TC ruled against Francisco, due to her failure
to prove that the properties were conjugal in
nature. She argues that the pertinent law applied
should be FC 116, which repealed CC 158 an 160
Heir of Simon v. In the 1990s, Chan instituted a criminal action The Revised Rules may be given retroactive effect.
Chan under BP 22 against Eduardo Simon. The retroactive application of procedural laws do not violate any right of a person who may feel
adversely affected since as a general rule, no vested right may attach to or arise from procedural
(2011) In Aug 3, 2000, a civil action for collection of the laws.
amount under CC 33 was filed by Chan. The RTC
dismissed the complaint since under under the Any new rules may validly be made applicable to cases pending at the time of promulgation since
Rules of Court, Chan did not reserve the right to no party to an action has a vested right in the rules of procedure except in criminal cases if they
institute a separate action and thus amounted to permit a lesser quantum of evidence to convict, since it would amount to an ex post facto law which
litis pendentia. is unconstitutional.

The CA reversed and ruled that under the Revised

Rules on Criminal Procedure which became
effective on December 1, 2000, there is no need
for reservation to file a separate civil action under
CC 33.

Simon thus contests that the Revised Rules on

Procedure cannot be given retroactive effect.

Llave v On May 31, 1958, Zorayda married Sen. Tamano The marriage should be declared void since at the time Tamano and Zorayda married, only the Civil
Republic in both civil and Muslim rites. Code and not the Muslim Code was in effect.

(2011) On February 4, 1977, the Muslim Code took effect.

Under this Code, Sen. Tamano allegedly divorced The Muslim Code took effect on February 4, 1977. This law cannot retroactively override the Civil
Zorayda Code which already bestowed certain rights on the marriage of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda. The
Muslim Code explicitly provided for its prospective application.
On May 27, 1993, Tamano married Estralita.
Zorayda filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground of bigamy.
 D. Mandatory or Prohibitory Laws
E. Waiver or rights
D.M. Consunji v. A construction worker of D.M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14
CA floors from the Renaissance Tower to his death.
His wife filed in the RTC of Pasig a complaint for
(2001) damages against the deceased´s employer, D.M.
Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other
defenses, the widow´s prior availment of the
benefits from the State Insurance Fund. The RTC
rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria
Juego, ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff.
Ferrer v Diaz There was a loan where the debtor was made to
sign a Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest
Over a Real Property (still undivided) in favor of the
(2010) creditor.
Valderama v. Lessees had right of first refusal, granted by law, of
Macalde the lot on which their house was built. Lessor sold
the lot to petitioners, instead of the lessees.
(2005)
F. Repeal of laws
Thornton v Wife abandoned husband and took their child with
Thornton her. Husband filed a petition for habeas corpus with
RTC Makati but it was denied since child was
(2004) allegedly in Basilan. Husband could not find the
child in Basilan. The cellphone records of the wife
Did wife waive remedy under the Civil Code when she availed benefits from the State Insurance
Fund? NO.
Waiver is the relinquishment of a KNOWN right. In this case, wife was not aware of her right
under the Civil Code and thus could not waive the same.
The general rule under under the Workmen´s Compensation Law is that a claim thereunder is one
that excludes all further claims under other laws. In the course of availing the remedies provided
under the Workmen’s Compensation law, the claimants are deemed to have waived their
known right of the remedies provided by other laws. HOWEVER, this case falls under the exception
since the wife was unaware of petitioner´s negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits
from the State Insurance Fund. Had the claimant been aware, she would’ve opted to avail of a better
remedy than that of which she already had.
Waiver of hereditary rights invalid.
Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed in favor of
petitioner as not valid and that same cannot be the source of any right or create any obligation
between them for being violative of the second paragraph of Article 1347 of the Civil Code, which
provides that No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance except in cases expressly
authorized by law.
Respondents were deprived of their right of first refusal when, without their knowledge, Albano sold
the property to the petitioners.
The contention of the petitioners that the respondents had waived their right of first refusal is not
supported by the evidence. For a waiver of rights to exist, three elements are essential: (a) existence
of a right; (b) the knowledge of the evidence thereof; and (c) an intention to relinquish such right.
In People v. Bodoso, this Court held that:
It is elementary that the existence of waiver must be positively demonstrated since a waiver by
implication cannot be presumed. The standard of waiver requires that it "not only must be voluntary,
but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances
and likely consequences." There must thus be persuasive evidence of an actual intention to
relinquish the right. Mere silence of the holder of the right should not be easily construed as
surrender thereof; the courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against the existence and
validity of such waiver.
Thus, the petitioners and Albano failed to adduce sufficient, competent and credible evidence that
the respondents had waived their right of first refusal to buy the property.
RA 8369 did not repeal RA 7902. SC, CA and RTC have concurrent jurisdiction over petitions
for habeas corpus for custody of minors.
The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the
inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to
 revealed that she was moving in different regions in
the Philippines. Husband then filed a petition for
habeas corpus with the CA. It was denied since the
CA on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction
over the case. It ruled that since RA 8369 (The
Family Courts Act of 1997) gave family courts
exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for
habeas corpus, it impliedly repealed RA 7902 (An
Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals) and Batas Pambansa 129 (The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980).
Lledo v Lledo Complainant’s father who was a clerk of court, was
dismissed from service after his wife filed an
(2010) administrative case against him for immorality,
abandonment, conduct unbecoming a public
official. As a result of his dismissal, there was a
forfeiture of his GSIS benefits.
History of GSIS law as to effects of dismissal:
1. Commonwealth Act 180: automatic
forfeiture of benefits except ½ of cash
surrender value
2. Amendment of CA 180: entitled to
premiums
3. PD 1146: no similar provision
4. RA 8291: continue to be member of GSIS
and entitled to benefits.
G. Judicial Decisions
People v Licera Licera was convicted with illegal possession of a
rifle. His defense was that he was a peace officer
(1975) and thus exempt from requirements relating to
issuance of license to possess firearms pursuant
to the 1959 case of People v Macarandang. He
also alleges that the court erred in relying on the
later 1967 case of People v Mapa which was not
applicable to him at the time of the offense.
revoke the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court to issue writs of habeas corpus
relating to the custody of minors. Further, it cannot be said that the provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092
and BP 129 are absolutely incompatible since RA 8369 does not prohibit the Court of Appeals and
the Supreme Court from issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases involving the custody of minors.
Thus, the provisions of RA 8369 must be read in harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129 ― that family
courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in petitions for
habeas corpus where the custody of minors is at issue.
There was no implied repeal of CA 180 by the subsequent laws.
Nature of repealing clause of RA 8291: It is certainly not an express repealing clause because it fails
to identify or designate the act or acts that are intended to be repealed. Rather, it is an example of a
general repealing provision. It is a clause which predicates the intended repeal under the condition
that a substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior acts. The failure to add a specific
repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless an irreconcilable
inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws. This latter situation falls
under the category of an implied repeal.
There is no manifest inconsistency between Section 11(d) of Commonwealth Act No. 186, as
amended, and Section 4 of R.A. No. 8291. The latter provision is a general statement intended to
cover members separated from the service whether the separation is voluntary or involuntary, and
whether the same was for cause or not. Moreover, the same deals only with the benefits the
member is entitled to at the time of separation.
For the latter law to be deemed as having repealed the earlier law, it is necessary to show that the
statutes or statutory provisions deal with the same subject matter and that the latter be inconsistent
with the former. There must be a showing of repugnance, clear and convincing in character. The
language used in the later statute must be such as to render it irreconcilable with what had been
formerly enacted. An inconsistency that falls short of that standard does not suffice.
People v Macarandang applies. Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's legal
system. These decisions, although in themselves not laws, constitute evidence of what the laws
mean. The application or interpretation placed by the Court upon a law is part of the law as of the
date of the enactment of the said law since the Court's application or interpretation merely
establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into
effect.
At the time of Licera's designation as secret agent in 1961 and at the time of his apprehension for
possession of the Winchester rifle without the requisite license or permit therefor in 1965,
the Macarandang rule — the Courts interpretation of section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code
- formed part of our jurisprudence and, hence, of this jurisdiction's legal system. Mapa revoked
the Macarandang precedent only in 1967. Certainly, where a new doctrine abrogates an old rule, the
new doctrine should operate respectively only and should not adversely affect those favored by the
old rule, especially those who relied thereon and acted on the faith thereof. This holds more
especially true in the application or interpretation of statutes in the field of penal law, for, in this area,
more than in any other, it is imperative that the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the
guidance of society.
Pesca v Pesca Petitioner & Respondent were married, and she
was being beat up so she left with her children.
(2001) She later sued Respondent for the declaration of
nullity of their marriage. The CA ruled for its
validity.
Petitioner states that the doctrine enunciated in
Santos vs. CA and the guidelines set out in
Republic vs. CA and Molina should have no
retroactive application.
De Castro v JBC This case is about “midnight appointment” which
attended the JBC’s nomination of candidates to fill
(2010) the vacancy to be created by the retirement of
then CJ Puno.
The Petitioners herein filed respective Motion(s)
for Reconsideration, contesting the previous ruling
of the SC that the midnight appointment ban in the
Constitution does not extend to appointments to
the judicial branch.
H. Duty to render judgment
People v Ritter The Accused challenged his conviction of rape
with homicide, which involved a 12yo. girl who had
(1991) been allegedly raped and later died because of a
foreign object left inside her vaginal canal.
I. Presumption and Aplicability of Customs
Martinez v Van The Defendant's wagon & horses ran into the
Buskirk Plaintiff. This happened because the horses were
previously frightened and ran away without the
driver, who was unloading the cargo.
Co Giok Lun v This case involves two lots allegedly co-owned by
Co Petitioner and Fieng. Respondent filed a case for
unlawful detainer against Petitioners.
(2011) Petitioners alleged that one of the properties was
named under Fieng due to it being common
practice and custom in China (that properties
intended for the children are placed in the name of
the eldest child).
Barcellona v Respondent is an heir of who owns the property in
Bañas question. Medina sold this property to Petitioner.
The heirs tried to redeem the property, but Medina
(2011) refused.
An adverse ruling was rendered against Petitioner.
He maintains that the written notice required by law
to be given to adjoining owner was no longer
necessary, because there was already actual
notice.
The interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the contemporaneous legislative
intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of that law
as of the date the statute is enacted.
It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted,
that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the
old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith.
A principle underlying the decision in one case is deemed of imperative authority, controlling the
decisions of like cases in the same court and in lower courts within the same jurisdiction, unless and
until the decision in question is reversed or overruled by a court of competent authority.
In a hierarchical judicial system like ours, the decisions of the higher courts bind the lower courts, but
the courts of co-ordinate authority do not bind each other. The Court, as the highest court of the
land, may be guided but is not controlled by precedent, being invested with the innate authority to
rule according to its best lights.
SC acquitted Accused on criminal charges, but it did not ignore his acts; the SC adjudged him to be
civilly liable and ordered that deportation proceedings be instituted against him.
It does not necessarily follow that the appellant is also free from civil liability, which is impliedly
instituted with the criminal action. The well-settled doctrine is that a person while not criminally liable,
may still be civilly liable.
The SC found that leaving the horses to unload the merchandise was the custom of all drivers,
which custom was sanctioned by their employers.
Acts whose performance is not destructive or injurious and which have been acquiesced by society
for so long that they have ripened into custom, cannot be held to be unreasonable or imprudent.
To hold that the actor is necessarily negligent because an act once resulted in accident or injury is to
go far. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur at most only creates a prima facie case.
Petitioners were not able to prove the existence of the alleged Chinese custom of placing properties
in the name of the eldest child, as provided under Article 1211 of the Civil Code.
In contrast, Respondents were able to show documents of sale from the original owners of the
Gubat property, rendering the claim of custom as immaterial. They also established that Fieng was
the registered owner of the properties while Petitioner was merely an administrator.
The disregard of the mandatory written rule was an exception due to the peculiar circumstance of
the case (of Alonzo); the strict letter of the law must therefore apply. A departure from it should only
be for extraordinary reasons.
Furthermore, interpretation of the law should be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would
be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice.
 J. Legal periods
CIR v. Primetown Property Group applied for the refund or A year is composed of 12 months.
Primetown credit of income tax it paid in 1997. CTA dismissed
the petition arguing that it was filed beyond the two- As between the Civil Code, which provides that a year is equivalent to 365 days, and the
(2007) year prescriptive period for filing a judicial claim for Administrative Code of 1987, which states that a year is composed of 12 calendar months, it is the
tax refund or tax credit. latter that must prevail being the more recent law, following the legal maxim, Lex posteriori derogate
priori.

III. Conflict of Laws

Aznar v. Garcia In the will of Christensen, he instituted an Christensen being domiciled outside California, the law of his domicile, the Philippines is ought to be
acknowledged natural daughter as his only heir but followed.
(1963) left a legacy of some money in favor of Helen
Christensen Garcia who, in a decision rendered by The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen Christensen Garcia said in
the Supreme Court had been declared as an effect that there be two rules in California on the matter.
acknowledged natural daughter of his. Counsel of 1. The conflict rule which should apply to Californian’s outside the California, and
Helen claims that under Art. 16 (2) of the civil code, 2. The internal Law which should apply to California domiciles in California.
California law should be applied, the matter is The California conflict rule, found on Art. 946 of the California Civil code States that “if there
returned back to the law of domicile, that Philippine is no law to the contrary in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the
law is ultimately applicable, that the share of Helen decree of its owner and is governed by the law of the domicile.”
must be increased in view of successional rights of
illegitimate children under Philippine laws. On the
other hand, counsel for daughter Maria , in as
much that it is clear under Art, 16 (2) of the Mew
Civil Code, the national of the deceased must
apply, our courts must apply internal law of
California on the matter. Under California law, there
are no compulsory heirs and consequently a
testator should dispose any property possessed by
him in absolute dominion.
Amos vs Bellis Amos G. Bellis was a citizen and resident of Texas The said illegitimate children are not entitled to their legitimes.
at the time of his death. Before he died, he made
(1967) two wills, one disposing his Texas properties, the Under Texas law, there are no legitimes. Even if the other will was executed in the Philippines, his
other disposing his Philippine properties. In both national law, still, will govern the properties for succession even if it is stated in his testate that it
wills, the recognized illegitimate children were not shall be governed by the Philippine law.
given any share. Texas has no conflict rule (Rule of
Private International Law) governing successional
rights. Furthermore, under Texas law, there are no
compulsory heirs.
Tayag vs Idonah Perkins, an American citizen who died, left Probate court has authority to issue the order enforcing the ancillary administrator’s right to the stock
Benguet among others, two stock certificates issued by certificates when the actual situs of the shares of stocks is in the Philippines.
Consolidated Benguet Consolidated, a corporation domiciled in
the Philippines. As ancillary administrator of The authority of the probate court to require that ancillary administrator’s right to the stock
(1968) Perkins’ estate in the Philippines, Tayag now wants certificates is beyond question for appellant is a Philippine corporation owing full allegiance and
to take possession of these stock certificates but subject to the unrestricted jurisdiction of local courts. Its shares of stock cannot be considered as
County Trust Company of New York, the immune from lawful court orders.
domiciliary administrator, refused to part with them.
Thus, the probate court of the Philippines was
forced to issue an order declaring the stock
certificates as lost and ordering Benguet
 Consolidated to issue new stock certificates
representing Perkins’ shares. Benguet
Consolidated argues that the stock certificates are
not lost as they are in existence and currently in the
possession of the Country Trust Company of New
York.
Kazuhiro Nippon Engineering and Kitamura entered into an
Hasegawa v Independent Contractor Agreement. Hasegawa
Kitamura informed Kitamura that the company had no more
intention of renewing his ICA. Kitamura initiated an
(2007) action for specific performance.
Raytheon v Rouzie (an American citizen) and Brand Marine
Rouzie Services Inc (BMSI) entered into CONTRACT
wherein Rouzie was assigned as BMSI's
(2008) representative to negotiate in sale of services in
several gov't projects in RP for 10% of the gross
receipts. Rouzie secured from RP Gov't a service
contract but he was allegedly not paid his
commission. Rouzie filed COMPLAINT FOR
DAMAGES IN RTC
Zamoranos , a Roman Catholic, married De Jesus,
ZAMORANOS v. a Muslim convert, in May 1982 under Islamic rights.
PEOPLE They wed again on June 1982 under civil rites at
the RTC. In 1983, they obtained a divorce by talaq
(2011) and the dissolution of their marriage was confirmed
by the Sharia Court which issued a Decree of
Divorce in 1992.
Zamorano married Pacasum in 1989 under Islamic
right and then again in 1992 under civil rites. They
had 3 children. They were de facto separated on
1998. In 1999, they entered into a compromise
agreement vesting custody of their children to
Zamoranos with Pacasum having visitorial right.
Pacasum sued Zamoranos saying that since her
first marriage was not dissolved and that their
marriage is bigamous, she being the guilty spouse
should forfeit custody of their children and her
share in the ACP and inheritance from pacasum.
ISSUE: Application of Muslim Code and the Civil
Code on the case. Is the marriage bigamous?
Rayray seeks to annul his marriage with Chae,
RAYRAY v. whose whereabouts are unknown. The case was
CHAE dismissed by the RTC ruling that the court could
not nullify a marriage contracted abroad (Korea).
(1966)
Invocation of choice of law is premature because there is no showing yet of any conflict between the
laws of Japan and Philippines.
Before determining which law should apply, 1st there should exist a conflict of laws situation requiring
the application of the conflict of laws rules. Also, when the law of a foreign country is invoked to
provide the proper rules for the solution of a case, the existence of such law must be pleaded and
proved.
That the subject contract included a stipulation that the same shall be governed by the laws of
Connecticut does not suggest that the Philippine Courts are precluded from hearing the civil action.
The Court outlined three consecutive phases involved in judicial resolution of conflicts-of-laws
problems, namely: jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments. Thus,
in the instances where the Court held that the local judicial machinery was adequate to resolve
controversies with a foreign element, the following requisites had to be proved: (1) that the Philippine
Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a position
to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and (3) that the Philippine Court has or is
likely to have the power to enforce its decision.
Zamoranos’ divorce from De Guzman, as confirmed by an Ustadz and Judge Jainul of the Shari’a
Circuit Court, and attested to by Judge Usman, was valid, and, thus, entitled her to remarry
Pacasum in 1989.
If both parties are Muslims, there is a presumption that the Muslim Code or Muslim law is complied
with. If together with it or in addition to it, the marriage is likewise solemnized in accordance with the
Civil Code of the Philippines, in a so-called combined Muslim-Civil marriage rites whichever comes
first is the validating rite and the second rite is merely ceremonial one. But, in this case, as long as
both parties are Muslims, this Muslim Code will apply. In effect, two situations will arise, in the
application of this Muslim Code or Muslim law, that is, when both parties are Muslims and when the
male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim Code or Muslim
law. A third situation occur[s] when the Civil Code of the Philippines will govern the marriage and
divorce of the parties, if the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance
with the Civil Code.
This is an action in rem, for it concerns the status of the parties herein, and status affects or binds
the whole word. The res in the present case is the relation between said parties, or their marriage
tie.6 Jurisdiction over the same depends upon the nationality or domicile of the parties, not the place
of celebration of marriage, or the locus celebrationis.7 Plaintiff here is a citizen of the Philippines,
domiciled therein. His status is, therefore, subject to our jurisdiction, on both counts. True that

Andre Brimo, brother of the deceased opposes the
MICIANO v. scheme of partition of the estate of Brimo alleging
BRIMO that the provisions of the will are not in accordance
with the laws of his Turkish nationality.
(1927)
The will says that even if he is Turkish, Philippine
laws will apply to his will.
Oppositor did not prove that said testamentary
dispositions are not in accordance with the Turkish
laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence
showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter,
and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they
are presumed to be the same as those of the
Philippines.
IV. Human Relations
Wassmer and Velez decided to be married.
WASSMER v. Wasmer then received a note from Velez telling her
VELEZ that they had to postpone the wedding because his
mother opposes and that he is leaving for Convair
(1964) that day. She received a telegram saying nothing
changed and he is returning soon. Then he
disappeared. Wasmer sued for damages.
Tanjanco courted Santos promising undying love
TANJANCO v. and affection. In consideration of aid promises,
1
. Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances (Tsn., 5; Exh. C). The bride-to-be's trousseau, party drsrses and other apparel for the important occasion were
purchased (Tsn., 7-8). Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl were prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal showers were given and gifts received (Tsn., 6; Exh.
E). And then, with but two days before the wedding, defendant, who was then 28 years old,: simply left a note for plaintiff stating: "Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it ... " He
enplaned to his home city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured returning soon." But he never returned and was never heard
from again
defendant was and — under plaintiff's — theory still is a non-resident alien. But, this fact does not
deprive the lower court of its jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of her marriage to plaintiff herein.
Indeed, marriage is one of the cases of double status, in that the status therein involves and affects
two persons. One is married, never in abstract or a vacuum, but, always to somebody else. Hence, a
judicial decree on the marriage status of a person necessarily reflects upon the status of another and
the relation between them. The prevailing rule is, accordingly, that a court has jurisdiction over
the res, in an action for annulment of marriage, provided, at least, one of the parties is domiciled in,
or a national of, the forum.8 Since plaintiff is a Filipino, domiciled in the Philippines, it follows that the
lower court had jurisdiction over the res, in addition to its jurisdiction over the subject-matter and the
parties. In other words, it could validly inquire into the legality of the marriage between the parties
herein.
The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the instituted legatees
must respect the testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of his
nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the Philippines.
If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to comply with it,
as the herein oppositor who, by his attitude in these proceedings has not respected the will of the
testator, as expressed, is prevented from receiving his legacy.
The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article 792 of the
civil Code provides the following:
Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not
imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the
testator otherwise provide.
And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law
when, according to article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is the
one to govern his testamentary dispositions.
Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered unwritten,
and the institution of legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even
as to the herein oppositor.
It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law which shall govern it,
and to the condition imposed upon the legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law.
It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not contrary to law may be
perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that "any person who
wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."
Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to
marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally1 set a wedding and go through all the above-
described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be
solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which
defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.
Over and above the partisan allegations, the facts stand out that for one whole year, from 1958 to
1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations with
CA Santo gave in to the plea of Tanjanco for them to
have sex. They had sex regularly for 2 years due to
(1966) his promises of looooooove and then she got
pregnant. To avoid humiliation, she resigned from
her job. Then he refused to marry her.
BAKSH v Private Respondent filed a complaint for damages
COURT OF against the petitioner for the alleged violation of
APPEALS their agreement to get married. Private respondent
alleged that she accepted his love on the condition
(1993) that they would get married. She also alleged that
petitioner forced her to live with him in his house.
The lower court applying Art 21 rendered a
decision in favor of the private respondent ordering
the petitioner to pay moral damages, attorney’s
fees and litigation expenses.
ABANAG v An administrative case has been filed against a
MABUTE Court Stenograher for Disgraceful and Immoral
Conduct. The complainant alleged that the
(2011) respondent courted her and professed his undying
love for her. Relying on respondent’s promise that
he would marry her, she agreed to live with him.
She became pregnant but respondent brought her
to a “manghihilot” and tried to force her to take
drugs to abort her baby.
PERSON
I. Capacity to Act
1. Presumption of capacity
CATALAN v Feliciano Catalan was discharged from active
BASA military service due to his schizophrenic reaction.
A year after he got married. Then subsequently,
(2007) he allegedly donated to his a piece of real property
to his sister. Then Feliciano was declared
incompetent by the court.
Feliciano’s guardian filed a case for declaration of
Nullity of Documents, Recovery of possession and
ownership. It averred that the donation to his sister
is void as he was not of sound mind and therefore
was incapable of giving consent
appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction.
Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had she
surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she
would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without exacting early
fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut chart all sexual relations upon
finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his promises. Hence, we conclude that no case is made
under Article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of action being alleged, no error was
committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing the complaint.
The award of damages is proper.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. But where a
man’s promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and
his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of
herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and
that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept
him and to obtain her consent to sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Art 21
not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful
injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury
should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
The acts complained of cannot be considered as disgraceful or grossly immoral conduct.
Mere sexual relations between two unmarried and consenting adults are not enough to warrant
administrative sanction for illicit behavior. The court has repeatedly held that voluntary intimacy
between a man and a woman who are not married, where both are not under any impediment to
marry and where no deceit exists, is neither a criminal nor an unprincipled act that would warrant
disbarment or disciplinary action
The donation is VALID.
In order for donation of property to be valid, what is crucial is the donor’s capacity to give consent at
the time of the donation. Certainly, there lies no doubt in the fact that insanity impinges on consent
freely given. However, the burden of proving such incapacity rests upon the person who alleges it; if
no sufficient proof to this effect is presented, capacity will be presumed. From scientific studies it
can be deduced that a person suffering from schizophrenia does not necessarily lose his
competence to intelligently dispose his property. By merely alleging the existence of schizophrenia,
petitioners failed to show substantial proof that at the date of the donation, Feliciano had lost total
control of his mental faculties. Thus, the lower courts correctly held that Feliciano was of sound mind
at that time and that his condition continued to exist until proof to the contrary was adduced.
 2. Restrictions on capacity to act
(a) Minority
MERCADO V Plaintiffs assail the validity of the deed of sale they
ESPIRITU executed on the ground that they were minors
when they executed it, notwithstanding the fact that
(1917) the deed was drawn up by the notary by their
representation that they were of legal age.
ATIZADO V A minor, together with an adult, was convicted of
PEOPLE murder and sentenced to an imprisonment of
reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay civil
(2010) indemnity and reimburse the heirs of the victim.
(b) Insanity
HERNANDEZ V. Lulu inherited real properties estimated to be worth
SANTOS PHP 50M from her maternal uncle. Because she
was of weak mind, her dad, and later on her half-
(2009) siblings, exercised actual administration of her
property even after she reached the age of
majority. After her dad died, Lulu was maltreated at
home and her properties were being sold without
her consent. Lulu’s maternal first cousin was
granted guardianship over her person and
property. Lulu was later abducted by her half-
siblings.
PEOPLE V. Bulagao was charged with 2 counts of rape of AAA,
BULAGAO a 14-year-old girl, on two separate dates in June
2000.
The Deed of Sale is VALID.
The sale of real estate, made by minors who pretend to be of legal age, when in fact they are not, is
valid, and they will not be permitted to excuse themselves from the fulfillment of the obligation
contracted by them, or to have them annulled in pursuance of the provisions of Law 6, title 19, of the
6th partida; and the judgment that holds such a sale to be valid and absolves the purchaser from the
complaint filed against him does not violate the laws relative to the sale of minors’ property, nor the
judicial rules established in consonance therewith.
CARSON, concurring
But in order to avoid misunderstanding, it is well to indicate that the general statement, in the
prevailing opinion to the effect that the making of false representations as to his age by an infant
executing a contract will preclude him from disaffirming the contract or setting up the defense of
infancy, must be understood as limited to cases wherein, on account of the minor’s representations
as to his majority, and because of his near approach thereto, the other party had good reason to
believe, and did in fact believe the minor capable of contracting
The conviction was affirmed but the penalty imposed on the minor was reduced due to the fact of his
minority at the time of the commission of the crime.
Under Art 248 of the RPC, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. But reclusion
perpetua was not the correct penalty for Montreal due to his being a minor over 15 but under 18
years of age. Pursuant to Art 68 (2) of the RPC, when the offender is over 15 and under 18 years of
age, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law is imposed. Based on Art 61(2) of the RPC,
reclusion temporal is the penalty next lower than reclusion perpetua to death.
Lulu is an incompetent who requires the appointment of a judicial guardian over her person and
property.
Lulu’s half-siblings’ claims that she should have been presumed to be of sound mind and/or in full
possession of her mental capacity is incorrect. Under Section 50, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, an
ordinary witness may give his opinion on the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently
acquainted. Lulu's attending physicians spoke and interacted with her. Such occasions allowed them
to thoroughly observe her behavior and conclude that her intelligence level was below average and
her mental stage below normal. Their opinions were admissible in evidence.
Furthermore, where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not necessary. The
observations of the trial judge coupled with evidence establishing the person's state of mental sanity
will suffice.
Under Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court, persons who, though of sound mind but by reason of
age, disease, weak mind or other similar causes are incapable of taking care of themselves and their
property without outside aid, are considered as incompetents who may properly be placed under
guardianship. The RTC and the CA both found that Lulu was incapable of taking care of herself and
her properties without outside aid due to her ailments and weak mind. Thus, since determining
whether or not Lulu is in fact an incompetent would require a reexamination of the evidence
presented in the courts a quo, it undoubtedly involves questions of fact.
There was no proof that the mental condition Bulagao allegedly exhibited when he was examined by
the psychiatrist was already present at the time of the rape incidents.
 AAA was later presented for the defense. She
recanted her statement and claimed that Bulagao
(2011) didn’t force himself upon her and that he had “a
little defect in his mind”. A clinical psychologist
testified that Bulagao was suffering from mental
retardation.
Anyone who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving it with clear
and convincing evidence. Besides, this Court observes that neither the acts of the accused-appellant
proven before the court, nor his answers in his testimony, show a complete deprivation of
intelligence or free will. Insanity presupposes that the accused was completely deprived of reason
or discernment and freedom of will at the time of the commission of the crime. Only when there is a
complete deprivation of intelligence at the time of the commission of the crime should the exempting
circumstance of insanity be considered.

(c) Deaf-Mutism
(d) Prodigality
(e) Civil Interdiction
(f) Family Relations
(g) Alienage
(h) Absence
OLAGUER V. Olaguer executed an SPA in 1979, appointing as Defining "absence" by its everyday usage makes for a reasonable construction, that is, "the state of
PURUGGANAN his attorneys-in-fact Locsin, Joaquin and Hofileña not being present", given the context that the SPA authorizes the agents to attend stockholders’
for the purpose of selling or transferring his shares meetings and vote in behalf of Olaguer, to sell the shares of stock, and other related acts.
(2007) of stock with Businessday. Olaguer was later
arrested for allegedly committing arson, and during It is a general rule that a power of attorney must be strictly construed; the instrument will be held to
his detention, his shares of stock were transferred grant only those powers that are specified, and the agent may neither go beyond nor deviate from
to Locsin. the power of attorney. However, the rule is not absolute and should not be applied to the extent of
Olaguer claimed that the authority granted under destroying the very purpose of the power. If the language will permit, the construction that should be
the SPA was exceeded, since the sale of his adopted is that which will carry out instead of defeat the purpose of the appointment. Clauses in a
shares was limited to the following conditions: (1) in power of attorney that are repugnant to each other should be reconciled so as to give effect to the
the event of the petitioner’s absence and instrument in accordance with its general intent or predominant purpose. The instrument should
incapacity; and (2) for the limited purpose of always be deemed to give such powers as essential or usual in effectuating the express powers.
applying the proceeds of the sale to the satisfaction
of petitioner’s subsisting obligations with the
companies adverted to in the SPA. He sought to
impose a strict construction of the SPA by limiting
the definition of the word "absence" to the one
provided under CC381.

(h) Insolvency and Trusteeship

UMALE V. ASB Amethyst Pearl was wholly owned by ASB Realty. There is no provision in PD 902-A or in Rule 59 of the Rules of Court that divests corporate officers of
REALTY In 1996, Amethyst Pearl executed a Deed of their power to sue upon the appointment of a rehabilitation receiver.
Assignment in Liquidation of a lot in favor of ASB,
(2011) which got a TCT in its name. In 2003, ASB sued Section 14 , Rule 4 of the Interim Rules expressly limits the receiver’s power by providing that the rehabilitation
Umale for unlawful detainer, since the latter receiver does not take over the management and control of the corporation but shall closely oversee and
continued to occupy the lot despite the expiration of monitor the operations of the debtor. Further, the SEC Rules of Procedure on Corporate Recovery, the rules
the lease. applicable to the instant case, do not include among the receiver’s powers the exclusive right to file suits for the
Umale claimed he had a verbal contract of lease corporation.
with Amethyst Pearl. He also questioned ASB’s
personality to recover the property since ASB had Corporations, such as ASB Realty, are juridical entities that exist by operation of law. As a creature of law, the
been placed under receivership; a rehabilitation powers and attributes of a corporation are those set out, expressly or impliedly, in the law. Among the general
receiver had been duly appointed. powers granted by law to a corporation is the power to sue in its own name. This power is granted to a duly-
organized corporation, unless specifically revoked by another law. The laws on corporate rehabilitation –
particularly PD 902-A, as amended, and its corresponding rules of procedure – do not forfeit the power to sue

(i) Gender
A. Natural persons
GELUZ V. CA Nita Villanueva had three abortions done by Geluz,
in 1950, 1953 and 1955. Her husband, who did not
(1961) know of this third abortion, sued Geluz for
damages.
The RTC granted damages based on CC2206,
which fixed a minimum award of PHP 3,000 for the
death of a person.
Continental Hortillano filed a claim for “Death and Accident
Steel vs. Insurance for Dependent” against his employer
Montano (2009) Continental Steel based on the death of his unborn
child that was prematurely delivered by his wife
and which died during labor. Continental Steel
denied the claim. Hortillano argued that the
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement
between him and Continental Steel did not
specifically state that the dependent should have
been born alive or must have acquired juridical
personality so that his/her subsequent death could
be covered by the CBA death benefits. Continental
Steel answered that the express provision of the
CBA did not contemplate the death of an unborn
child, a fetus, without legal personality. It added
that only one with legal personality could die.
Limjoco vs. The Public Service Commission issued a certificate
Intestate Estate of public convenience to the Intestate Estate of the
of Fragrante deceased Pedro Fragante, authorizing the said
(1948) intestate estate through its Special or Judicial
Administrator, appointed by the proper court of
competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate an
ice plant with a daily productive capacity of two and
one-half (2-1/2) tons in the Municipality of San
Juan and to sell the ice produced from the said
from the corporate officers and Board of Directors.
Corporate rehabilitation is defined as “the restoration of the debtor to a position of successful operation and
solvency, if it is shown that its continuance of operation is economically feasible and its creditors can recover by
way of the present value of payments projected in the plan more if the corporation continues as a going concern
than if it is immediately liquidated.” The intention of the PD 902-A is “to effect a feasible and viable rehabilitation
by preserving a floundering business as a going concern, because the assets of a business are often more
valuable when so maintained than they would be when liquidated.” This concept of preserving the
corporation’s business as a going concern while it is undergoing rehabilitation is called debtor-in-possession or
debtor-in-place. This means that the debtor corporation, through its Board of Directors and corporate officers,
remains in control of its business and properties, subject only to the monitoring of the appointed
rehabilitation receiver.
There is no basis for an award of damages.
No action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the
injuries it received, and no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. Even
if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-
natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical personality.
CC40 doesn’t apply to this case, because it expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing
the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive. In the present case, there is no
dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mother's womb
While the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be extinguished by death, it does
not explicitly state that only those who have acquired jurisdical personality could die. Death has been
defined as the cessation of life. Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire
civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less
than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception – that the State must
protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof
even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.
The estate of Fragrante must be extended an artificial judicial personality. If Fragrante had lived, in
view of the evidence of record, would have obtained from the commission the certificate for which he
was applying. The situation has not changed except for his death, and the economic ability of his
estate to appropriately and adequately operate and maintain the service of an ice plant was the
same that it received from the decedent himself. The reason for this legal fiction, that the estate of
the deceased person is considered a "person", as deemed to include artificial or juridical persons, is
the avoidance of injustice or prejudice resulting from the impossibility of exercising such legal rights
and fulfilling such legal obligations of the decedent as survived after his death unless the fiction is
indulged.
 plant in the Municipalities of San Juan,
Mandaluyong, Rizal, and Quezon City; that
Fragante’s intestate estate is financially capable of
maintaining the proposed service.
Dumlao vs. Oria, after his death, was made one of the No jurisdiction was acquired over Oria, thus, the judgment against him is a patent nullity. Lower
Quality Plastics defendants in a civil case for foreclosure of bond. court’s judgment against Oria is void for lack of jurisdiction over his person as far as Oria was
(1976) Some of his properties were also levied upon and concerned. He had no more civil personality and his juridical capacity which is the fitness to be the
sold by the Sheriff. Oria died in 1958 while the subject of legal relations was lost through death.
summons was served on 1960 upon Soliven, who
received it on behalf of his co-defendants (which
includes Oria). The court, as well as respondent
Quality Plastics, had no idea that Oria was already
dead. It was only until after judgment when it was
found out that Oria has long been deceased.
Hence, testamentary heirs of Oria filed an action
for the annulment of the judgment against Oria and
the execution of his land.
Eugenio vs. Vitaliana Vargas’ brothers and sisters, unaware of When the petition for habeas corpus was filed before the lower court, it was not certain whether
Velez (1990) the former’s death on August 28, 1988 filed a Vitaliana was dead or alive. While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of
petition for Habeas Corpus on September 27, 1988 course or as a mere perfimetory operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is exercised
before the RTC of Misamis Oriental alleging that in its issuance, and such facts must be made to appear to the judge to whom the petition is
she was forcible taken from her residence presented as, in his judgment, prima facie entitle the petitioner to the writ. The court held that the
sometime in 1987 and was confined by petitioner custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to the surviving brothers and sisters
Tomas Eugenio in his residence in Misamis pursuant to Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides:
Oriental. The court then issued a writ of habeas
corpus but petitioner refused to surrender “Persons charged with duty of burial- if the deceased was an unmarried man or woman or a child
Vitaliana’s body on the ground that a corpse cannot and left any kin; the duty of the burial shall devolve upon the nearest kin of the deceased.”
be subjected to habeas corpus proceedings.
Vitaliana died of heart failure due to toxemia of
pregnancy in Eugenio’s residence. The court
ordered that the body should be delivered to a
funeral parlor for autopsy but Eugenio assailed the
lack of jurisdiction of the court.
Joaquin vs. This was a summary proceeding to resolve the Based on the available evidence, a fair inference can be arrived at that JN Jr. died before his
Navarro (1953) order of the deaths of Joaquin Navarro Jr. and his mother. The presumption that Angela died before her son was based on speculations, not
mother Angela. While the battle for the liberation of evidence. Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of evidence by which civil cases are decided,
Manila was raging, the whole family sought refuge this inference should prevail. Evidence of survivorship may be (1) direct (2) indirect (3)
at the German Club. While staying there, it was set circumstantial or (4) inferential.
on fire and the Japanese were shooting at the Art. 43 Speaks about resolving doubt when 2 or more persons are called to succeed each other as
fleeing refugees. 3 daughters were shot dead, to which of them died first. In the Civil Code, in the absence of proof, it is presumed that they died at
Angela refused to leave the place while JN Jr., the same time, and there shall be no transmission of rights from one to another. In the Rules of
wife, FL & JN Sr. fled. JN Jr. was shot while Court, in cases of calamity, there is a hierarchy of survivorship.
coming out. Moments later, the German Club
collapsed. CA said that the mother died before the
son on the basis that she could have died
immediately after for a variety of causes.

B. Juridical persons excluded from Bar coverage

Barlin v Ramirez Post-Spanish era, the town of Lagonoy, Ambos The Roman Catholic Church owns the properties, by the royal order of the Spanish government.
(1906) Camarines decided to sever ties with the Pope
 when they read in the papers that the Pope refused
to recognize the rights of Filipino clergy. Parish
priest Vicente Ramirez refused to turn over the
church, the convent, and other properties when
Nueva Caceras diocese head Jorge Barlin ordered
his replacement with Agripino Pisino. Ramirez
wanted to transfer allegiance to the Filipino
Independent Church, unless the Pope recognized
the rights of Filipino clergy.
Barlin sued Ramirez for the reconveyance of the
properties. The municipality intervened, claiming
that they were the real owners of the property.
II. Citizenship and Domicile
Romualdez- Imelda Marcos filed her candidacy for
Marcos v congressman of the first district of Leyte, stating in
COMELEC the application that she had been a resident for
seven months. Her rivals contested that she failed
(1995) the requirements, whereupon she tried to change
start of her residency to “since childhood”. The
COMELEC main office disqualified Imelda.
She appealed, saying that this was an “honest
misinterpretation or honest mistake”, as she had
thought that question referred to Tolosa, outside of
the first district, rather than in Tacloban City, where
she was born. Imelda appealed to the SC.
Saludo v AMEX Aniceto Saludo filed a complaint for damages
against AMEX in the RTC of Maasin, Leyte, for
(2006) dishonor of his credit card several times abroad.
Allegedly, AMEX cancelled his account for default
in payment. In its answer, AMEX raised the
affirmative defense of improper venue because
Saludo was not a resident of Leyte. The community
certificate he presented was from Pasay City. The
Court of Appeals held that venue was improperly
laid. Saludo appealed to the SC.
Vilando v HRET Jocelyn Limkaichong won and was proclaimed
congressman of the first district of Negros Oriental.
(2011) Vilando et al filed a quo warranto case against her
for being a Chinese citizen (her father was a
Chinaman). HRET dismissed the complaint.
Republic v Nora Sagun was born to a Chinese father and a
Sagun Filipino mother, and under the 1935 Constitution.
(Febraury 15, She was denied a Filipino passport because it was
2012) alleged she was Chinese. The RTC granted her
petition to be declared Filipino (by election under
the old Constitution), but the OSG appealed to the
SC.
The RC Church as well as municipalities as juridical entities can own property, as long as they can
show some semblance of right to the exclusive possession and control of the same. In this case, the
municipality. Even though it was the government which caused the construction and acquisition of
the properties, this was for the enjoyment and use of the Church, and largely funded by tithes.
Imelda retained her domicile in the first district of Leyte, even has she took on several residences
due to necessity such as marriage.
Domicile and residency may be distinguished according to intent [in this case, to return, or animus
revertendi]. Persons acquire residency by birth, for political purposes, and should be deemed to
continue unless
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one;
and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
Marriage may compel such actual change of residency, but it was stated that a married woman
automatically reverts to her residence of birth when her husband dies.
Saludo was a resident of the Leyte, by virtue of his being a representative in the lower house.
The matter of residence can be taken by judicial notice., because it was common knowledge he was
an elected official from there Also, he may have many residences for many purposes, but one
domicile only for a specific purpose.
Limkaichong is not disqualified as a member of the House; and anyway the HRET’s decisions are
beyond judicial interference unless the decisions are arbitrary or improvident.
Limkaichong was born under the 1935 Constitution, and thus she can acquire the Filipino citizenship
of her mother by choice (one of the modes . Even if her mother got an Alien Certificate of
Registration, it did not constitute forfeiture of citizenship.
Sagun cannot be declared a Filipino citizen for failure to comply with procedural requirements for
valid and effective election of Filipino citizenship.
• She had not executed a sworn statement of her election of Philippine citizenship. The only
documentary evidence submitted by respondent in support of her claim of alleged election was
her oath of allegiance, executed 12 years after she reached the age of majority, which was
unregistered.
More so, execution was not within a reasonable time after respondent attained the age of majority
and not registered with the nearest civil registry as required under Section 1 of C.A. No. 625.

III. Surnames
Yasin v. Hon. Hatima C. Yasin, a divorcee, filed a summary case
Judge Shari’a to resume the use of her maiden name. The
Court Shari’a court denied this, holding that she needed
to go through a judicial process under Rule 103 of
(1995) the Rules of Court for a change of name.
In re Adoption Honorato B. Catindig filed a petition to adopt his
of Stephanie minor illegitimate child Stephanie Astorga Garcia.
Nathy Astorga He averred that Stephanie was born on June 26,
Garcia 1994; that Stephanie had been using her mother’s
middle name and surname; and that he is now a
(2005) widower and qualified to be her adopting parent.
He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name be
changed to Garcia, her mother’s surname, and that
her surname “Garcia” be changed to “Catindig” his
surname.
The RTC granted the petition for adoption, and
ordered that pursuant to article 189 of the Family
Code, the minor shall be known as Stephanie
Nathy Catindig.
Honorato filed a motion for classification and/or
reconsideration praying that Stephanie be allowed
to use the surname of her natural mother (Garcia)
as her middle name. The lower court denied
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration holding that
there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an
adopted child to use the surname of his biological
mother as his middle name.
Dapar v. Gloria L. Biascan, married to Mario Biascan, sued
Biascan Zenaida Dapar Biascan, alleging, among others,
that Zenaida’s use of the surname “Biascan” is a
(2004) usurpation of surname under Article 377 of the Civil
Code. Zenaida was Mario’s lover during the latter’s
stay as a contract worker in Saudi Arabia
subsequent to his marriage to Gloria.
Remo v. Prior to the expiry of the validity of her passport,
Secretary of Maria Virgina V. Remo, a Filipino citizen whose
Foreign Affairs marriage still subsists, applied for the renewal of
her passport with a request to revert to her maiden
(2010) name and surname in the replacement passport.
“Reasonable time” had earlier been interpreted as within three (3) years from reaching the age of
majority.
Rule 103 of the Rules of Court finds no application to the right of a divorced female to reuse her
maiden name and surname.
A woman marrying a man is not required to seek judicial authority to use her husband’s name. In the
same way, when the marriage ties no longer exists, in case of death or divorce, as authorized in the
Muslim Code, the widow/divorcee need not seek judicial confirmation of the change in her civil status
in order to reuse her maiden name. Even under the Civil Code, the use of the husband’s surname
during the marriage (Art. 370), after annulment of the marriage (Art 371), and after the death of the
husband (Art. 373), is permissive and not obligatory, except in the case of legal separation (Art.
372).
Stephanie is allowed the use of both her parents’ names.
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the adapter
for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code and Section 17 of Article V of
RA 8557.
Being a legitimate by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights
provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the
surname of her father and her mother. This is consistent with the intention of the members of the
Civil Code and Family Law Committees. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of
the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father.
Gloria is not entitled to damages for usurpation of surname under Article 377 of the Civil Code.
The usurpation of name under Article 377 of the Civil Code43 implies some injury to the interests of
the owner of the name. It consists in the possibility of confusion of identity between the owner and
the usurper, and exists when a person designates himself by another name. The elements are as
follows: (1) there is an actual use of another’s name by the defendant; (2) the use is unauthorized;
and (3) the use of another’s name is to designate personality or identify a person. None of the
foregoing exist in the case at bar. Respondent Gloria Biascan did not claim that the petitioner ever
attempted to impersonate her. In fact, the trial court found that respondent Mario Biascan allowed
the petitioner to use his surname.
Once a married woman opted to adopt her husband’s surname in her passport, she may not revert
to the use of her maiden name, except in the cases enumerated in Section 5(d) of RA 8239.
In the case of renewal of passport, a married woman may either adopt her husband’s surname or
continuously use her maiden name. If she chooses to adopt her husband’s surname in her new

IV.Emancipation
V. Rules Governing Persons who are Absent
Reyes v. Erlinda Reynoso Reyes sought in a petition before
Alejandro the Cavite CFI to declare her husband Roberto L.
Reyes an absentee. Roberto had left the conjugal
(1986) home in 1962 and has not been heard from since.
She also alleged that Roberto did not leave any
wills nor any property in his name nor debts. The
lower court dismissed the petition.
EASTERN Wife of the captain of the “lost” vessel refused to
SHIPPING V receive the death benefits because she still
LUCERO claimed the salary due her husband until the ship
reached Manila, since according to her, the
(2008) contract of her husband was a voyage-to-voyage
contract which will terminate upon the vessel’s
arrival in Manila. She claims that her husband can’t
be presumed dead since 4 years hasn’t elapsed
yet.
But the Company maintained that she was no
longer entitled to such allotments becaus the
Lloyds of London had already confirmed the total
loss of the vessel and had in fact settled the
company's insurance claim.
EDUARDO Manuel is charged with bigamy for contracting a
MANUEL V second marriage. He claims that he hasn’t seen his
PEOPLE first wife for 20 years after she was imprisoned thus
believing that he is free to marry because his wife
is presumed dead. He relied on Art. 390. “After an
absence of seven years, it being unknown whether
(2005) or not, the absentee still lives, he shall be
presumed dead for all purposes, except for those
of succession.”
passport, the DFA additionally requires the submission of an authenticated copy of the marriage
certificate. Otherwise, if she prefers to continue using her maiden name, she may still do so. The
DFA will not prohibit her from continuously using her maiden name.
The cases enumerated in Section 5(d) of RA 8239 are: (1) death of husband, (2) divorce, (3)
annulment, or (4) nullity of marriage. Since petitioner’s marriage to her husband subsists, she may
not resume her maiden name in the replacement passport. Otherwise stated, a married woman’s
reversion to the use of her maiden name must be based only on the severance of the marriage.
Even assuming RA 8239 conflicts with the Civil Code, the provisions of RA 8239 which is a special
law specifically dealing with passport issuance must prevail over the provisions of Title XIII of the
Civil Code which is the general law on the use of surnames.
It is not necessary to have Roberto L. Reyes declared an absentee in this case.
The need to have a person judicially declared an absentee is when he has properties which have to
be taken cared of or administered by a representative appointed by the Court (Article 384, Civil
Code); the spouse of the absentee is asking for separation of property (Article 191, Civil Code) or his
wife is asking the Court that the administration of all classes of property in the marriage be
transferred to her (Article 196, Civil Code). The petition to declare the husband an absentee and the
petition to place the management of the conjugal properties in the hands of the wife may be
combined and adjudicated in the same proceedings (Peyer vs. Martinez, 88 Phil. 72, 80).
The presumption of death under Article 391 (1) (unheard of for 4 years) must yield to the rule of
preponderance of evidence.
There is thus enough evidence (messages from the captain that the vessel is in danger of sinking
because of the bad weather and that they need immediate assistance) to show the circumstances
attending the loss and disappearance of the vessel and its crew. The foregoing facts, quite logically
and are sufficient to lead the court to a moral certainty that the vessel had sunk and that the persons
aboard had perished with it.
Judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absentee must first be secured for someone to be
able to marry again and avoid being charged for bigamy.
It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he married again, he was of the
well-grounded belief that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for more than
20 years since 1975. He should have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court declaring
the presumptive death of his first wife as required by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in
relation to Article 41 of the Family Code.
With the effectivity of the Family Code, the period of seven years under the first paragraph of Article
390 of the Civil Code was reduced to four consecutive years. Thus, before the spouse present may

PANTOLLANO 1994 - Pantollano went missing while on duty as
V KORPHIL engineer of the vessel. In 2001, when his wife
claimed death benefits, the Company argued that
(2011) he committed suicide and was thus not covered by
the death benefits. He was last seen to be deep in
thought and talking to himself. CA ruled that Imelda
should have filed her claim within 3 years from the
time her husband disappeared.
VI. Funerals
VII. Entries in the Civil Register
JENIE SAN 2005 - When Jenie applied for registration of her
JUAN DELA child’s birth (child with Dominique, her live-in-
CRUZ V partner), she sought to use the family name of
RONALD Dominique. She attached the “Affidavit to Use the
GARCIA Surname of the Father + Affidavit of
Acknowledgement executed by Dominique’s father
(2009) that he was an acknowledged illegitimate child.
She also submitted the “autobiography” written by
Dominique acknowledging that Jenie was pregnant
with his child.
Her registration was denied, “the child cannot use
the surname of his father because he was born out
of wedlock and the father unfortunately died prior
to his birth and has no more capacity to
acknowledge his paternity to the child (either
through the back of Municipal Form No. 102)”
MA. CRISTINA First wife (Ma. Cristina) filed a complaint for
TORRES correction of entries of a certain Patrick’s birth
BRAZA v THE certificate alleging that Patrick can’t use the name
CITY CIVIL of his father (Ma. Cristina’s husband) because he
REGISTRAR was an illegitimate and unacknowledged child. His
status wasn’t legitimated even though there was a
contract a subsequent marriage, he or she must institute summary proceedings for the declaration of
the presumptive death of the absentee spouse, without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of
the absentee spouse.
The following conditions must be fulfilled: (a) The prior spouse of the contracting party must have
been absent for four consecutive years, or two years where there is danger of death under the
circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse
present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there is, unlike the
old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absentee for which purpose the spouse
present can institute a summary proceeding in court to ask for that declaration.
The heirs of a missing seaman may file their claim for death compensation benefits within the 3-year
period fixed by law from the time the seaman has been presumed dead
Imelda 's cause of action accrued only on August 2,1998 and not on August 2, 1994 (when her
husband disappeared). On August 2, 1994, it cannot as yet be presumed that Vedasto is already
dead. The boat was not lost. This opens up a number of possibilities. A person missing under the
circumstances as those of Vedasto may not legally be considered as dead until the lapse of the
period fixed by law on presumption of death, and consequently Imelda cannot yet be considered as
a widow entitled to compensation under the law. Article 391: PRESUMED DEAD - (1) A person on
board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who has not been heard
of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;
172.2: An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned.
Special circumstances exist to hold that Dominique’s Autobiography, though unsigned by him,
substantially satisfies the requirement of the law.
First, Dominique died about two months prior to the child’s birth. Second, the relevant matters in the
Autobiography, unquestionably handwritten by Dominique, correspond to the facts culled from the
testimonial evidence Jenie proffered. Third, Jenie’s testimony is corroborated by the Affidavit of
Acknowledgment of Dominique’s father Domingo Aquino and testimony of his brother Joseph Butch
Aquino whose hereditary rights could be affected by the registration of the questioned recognition of
the child. These circumstances indicating Dominique’s paternity of the child give life to his
statements in his Autobiography
In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries
in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy
and filiation.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis a vis Article 412 of the Civil Code charts the procedure by which
an entry in the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding contemplated therein
 “marriage” between Ma. Cristina’s husband and
(2009) Patrick’s mother because this marriage was void as
Ma. Cristina was still legally married to her
husband.
Baldos v. CA Reynaldo Pillazar, alias Reynaldo Baldos, was
born on 30 October 1948. However, his birth was
(2010) not registered in the office of the local civil registrar
until roughly 36 years later or on 11 February 1985.
His certificate of live birth indicated Nieves Baldos
as his mother and Bartolome Baldos as his father.
Nieves Baldos also appeared as the informant on
the certificate of live birth.
On 8 March 1995, Nieves Baldos filed in the
Regional Trial Court a complaint for cancellation of
the late registration of Reynaldo’s birth. She
claimed that Reynaldo was not really her son.
Petitioners insist that the late registration of
Reynaldo’s birth is not authorized by P.D. No. 651.
They claim that P.D. No. 651 applies only to births
within the period from 1 January 1974 up to the
date when the decree became effective. They point
out that Reynaldo was born on 30 October 1948,
outside of the period covered by the decree.
Petitioners contend the late registration of
Reynaldo’s birth amounts to simulation of birth.
Republic v. On June 6, 2005, Merlyn Mercadera (Mercadera)
Mercadera sought the correction of her given name as it
appeared in her Certificate of Live Birth - from
(2010) Marilyn L. Mercadera to Merlyn L. Mercadera
before the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
may generally be used only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in
the civil registry. A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding;
an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless change such
as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the
parent. Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in
which all interested parties are impleaded and due process is properly observed.
The allegations of the petition filed before the trial court clearly show that petitioners seek to nullify
the marriage between Ma. Cristina’s husband and Patrick’s mother on the ground that it is bigamous
and impugn Patrick’s filiation in connection with which they ask the court to order Patrick to be
subjected to a DNA test.
Petition was denied as opposition was filed out of time.
Since Reynaldo was born on 30 October 1948, the late registration of his birth is outside of the
coverage of P.D. No. 651, as amended. The late registration of Reynaldo’s birth falls under Act No.
3753, otherwise known as the Civil Registry Law, which took effect on 27 February 1931. As a
general law, Act No. 3753 applies to the registration of all births, not otherwise covered by P.D. No.
651, as amended, occurring from 27 February 1931 onwards. Considering that the late registration
of Reynaldo’s birth took place in 1985, National Census Statistics Office (NCSO) Administrative
Order No. 1, Series of 1983 governs the implementation of Act No. 3753 in this case.
Under NCSO A.O. No. 1-83, the birth of a child shall be registered in the office of the local civil
registrar within 30 days from the time of birth. Any report of birth made beyond the reglementary
period is considered delayed. The local civil registrar, upon receiving an application for delayed
registration of birth, is required to publicly post for at least ten days a notice of the pending
application for delayed registration. If after ten days no one opposes the registration and the local
civil registrar is convinced beyond doubt that the birth should be registered, he should register the
same.
Reynaldo’s certificate of live birth, as a duly registered public document, is presumed to have gone
through the process prescribed by law for late registration of birth. It was only on 8 March 1995,
after the lapse of ten long years from the approval on 11 February 1985 of the application for
delayed registration of Reynaldo’s birth, that Nieves registered her opposition. She should have
done so within the ten-day period prescribed by law. Records show that no less than Nieves herself
informed the local civil registrar of the birth of Reynaldo. At the time of her application for delayed
registration of birth, Nieves claimed that Reynaldo was her son. Between the facts stated in a duly
registered public document and the flip-flopping statements of Nieves, we are more inclined to stand
by the former.
Applications for delayed registration of birth go through a rigorous process. The books making up the
civil register are considered public documents and are prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts
stated there. As a public document, a registered certificate of live birth enjoys the presumption of
validity. It is not for Reynaldo to prove the facts stated in his certificate of live birth, but for petitioners
who are assailing the certificate to prove its alleged falsity. Petitioners miserably failed to do so.
Thus, the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly denied for lack of merit the petition to cancel
the late registration of Reynaldo’s birth.
RTC correctly ruled that the case falls under Rule 108 as it simply sought a correction of a
misspelled given name. To correct simply means “to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error
from.” To change means “to replace something with something else of the same kind or with
something that serves as a substitute.”
Dipolog City pursuant to Republic Act No. 9048
(R.A. No. 9048).
Under R.A. No. 9048, the city or municipal civil
registrar or consul general, as the case may be, is
now authorized to effect the change of first name
or nickname and the correction of clerical or
typographical errors in civil registry entries. “Under
said law, jurisdiction over applications for change of
first name is now primarily lodged with
administrative officers. The law now excludes the
change of first name from the coverage of Rules
103 until and unless an administrative petition for
change of name is first filed and subsequently
denied” and removes “correction or changing of
clerical errors in entries of the civil register from the
ambit of Rule 108.” Hence, what is left for the
scope of operation of the rules are substantial
changes and corrections in entries of the civil
register.
The Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog
City, however, refused to effect the correction
unless a court order was obtained “because the
Civil Registrar therein is not yet equipped with a
permanent appointment before he can validly act
on petitions for corrections filed before their office
as mandated by Republic Act 9048.”
Mercadera was then constrained to file a Petition
For Correction of Some Entries as Appearing in the
Certificate of Live Birth under Rule 108 before
the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City (RTC).
RTC granted the petition. OSG interposed an
appeal praying for the reversal and setting aside of
the RTC decision.
For the OSG, the correction in the spelling of
Mercadera’s given name might seem innocuous
enough to grant but “it is in truth a material
correction as it would modify or increase
substantive rights.” What the lower court actually
allowed was a change of Mercadera’s given name,
which would have been proper had she filed a
petition under Rule 103 and proved any of the
grounds therefor.
Rule 103 procedurally governs judicial petitions for change of given name or surname, or both,
pursuant to Article 376 of the Civil Code. This rule provides the procedure for an independent
special proceeding in court to establish the status of a person involving his relations with others, that
is, his legal position in, or with regard to, the rest of the community. In petitions for change of name,
a person avails of a remedy to alter the “designation by which he is known and called in the
community in which he lives and is best known.” When granted, a person’s identity and interactions
are affected as he bears a new “label or appellation for the convenience of the world at large in
addressing him, or in speaking of, or dealing with him.” Judicial permission for a change of name
aims to prevent fraud and to ensure a record of the change by virtue of a court decree.
The proceeding under Rule 103 is also an action in rem which requires publication of the order
issued by the court to afford the State and all other interested parties to oppose the petition. When
complied with, the decision binds not only the parties impleaded but the whole world. As notice to
all, publication serves to indefinitely bar all who might make an objection. “It is the publication of
such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction
to hear and decide it.”
Essentially, a change of name does not define or effect a change of one’s existing family relations or
in the rights and duties flowing therefrom. It does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status.
Rule 108, on the other hand, implements judicial proceedings for the correction or cancellation of
entries in the civil registry pursuant to Article 412 of the Civil Code. Entries in the civil register refer to
“acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons,” also as enumerated in
Article 408 of the same law. Before, only mistakes or errors of a harmless and innocuous nature in
the entries in the civil registry may be corrected under Rule 108 and substantial errors affecting the
civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party are beyond the ambit of the rule.
Article 412, which Rule 108 implements, contemplates all kinds of issues and all types of procedures
because “the provision does not say that it applies only to non-controversial issues and that the
procedure to be used is summary in nature.”
“If the purpose of the petition is merely to correct the clerical errors which are visible to the eye or
obvious to the understanding, the court may, under a summary procedure, issue an order for the
correction of a mistake. However, as repeatedly construed, changes which may affect the civil status
from legitimate to illegitimate, as well as sex, are substantial and controversial alterations which can
only be allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings depending upon the nature of the issues
involved. Changes which affect the civil status or citizenship of a party are substantial in
character and should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon the nature of the issues in
controversy, and wherein all the parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or
represented and evidence is submitted to prove the allegations of the complaint, and proof to the
contrary admitted x x x.” “Where such a change is ordered, the Court will not be establishing a
substantive right but only correcting or rectifying an erroneous entry in the civil registry as authorized
by law. In short, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides only the procedure or mechanism for the
proper enforcement of the substantive law embodied in Article 412 of the Civil Code and so does not
violate the Constitution.”
The “change of name” contemplated under Article 376 and Rule 103 must not be confused with
Article 412 and Rule 108. A change of one’s name under Rule 103 can be granted, only on grounds
provided by law. In order to justify a request for change of name, there must be a proper and
compelling reason for the change and proof that the person requesting will be prejudiced by the use
of his official name. To assess the sufficiency of the grounds invoked therefor, there must be
adversarial proceedings.

Republic v. Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng
Magpayo Magpayo (respondent) is the son of Fulvio M.
Magpayo Jr. and Anna Dominique Marquez-Lim
(2011) Coseteng who, as respondent’s certificate of live
birth shows. Claiming, however, that his parents
were never legally married, respondent filed on
July 22, 2008 at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City a Petition to change his name to
Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng.
In support of his petition, respondent submitted a
certification from the National Statistics Office
stating that his mother Anna Dominique “does not
appear in [its] National Indices of
Marriage.” Respondent also submitted his
academic records from elementary up to
college showing that he carried the surname
“Coseteng,” and the birth certificate of his child
where “Coseteng” appears as his surname. In the
1998, 2001 and 2004 Elections, respondent ran
and was elected as Councilor of Quezon City’s
3rdDistrict using the name “JULIAN M.L.
COSETENG.”
The Republic contends that the deletion of the
entry on the date and place of marriage of
respondent’s parents from his birth certificate has
the effect of changing his civil status from
legitimate to illegitimate, hence, any change in civil
status of a person must be effected through
an appropriate adversary proceeding.
Respondent counters that the proceeding before
the trial court was adversarial in nature.
Molok v. Molok Sity Aisa Barangai Molok (respondent) and Col.
Agakhan M. Molok contracted marriage. The
(2011) marriage was registered at the Local Civil Registrar
of Davao City. Agakhan Molok, then a member of
the Philippine Army, died in General Santos City.
When respondent went to the Philippine Army
office to claim the death benefits of her late
husband, she discovered that there was another
claimant, Rosemarie Salma Aragoncillo-Molok
(petitioner), a resident of Poblacion, Pikit,
In petitions for correction, only clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil
registry may be raised. Considering that the enumeration in Section 2, Rule 108 also includes
“changes of name,” the correction of a patently misspelled name is covered by Rule 108. Suffice it
to say, not all alterations allowed in one’s name are confined under Rule 103. Corrections for clerical
errors may be set right under Rule 108.
Change of name was not allowed. The change being sought in respondent’s petition goes so far as
to affect his legal status in relation to his parents. It seeks to change his legitimacy to that of
illegitimacy. Rule 103 then would not suffice to grant respondent’s supplication.
A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 (CHANGE OF NAME) using valid and
meritorious grounds including (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to
write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence such as legitimation; (c)
when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since
childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a
Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody;
and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change
of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public
interest. Respondent’s reason for changing his name cannot be considered as one of, or analogous
to, recognized grounds, however.
Republic v. Labrador mandates that “a petition for a substantial correction or change of entries in
the civil registry should have as respondents the civil registrar, as well as all other persons who have
or claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby.” It cannot be gainsaid that change
of status of a child in relation to his parents is a substantial correction or change of entry in the
civil registry.
The Court finds that petitioner was indeed denied her right to due process.
Petitioner was merely notified of the hearing of respondent’s petition on March 28, 2005 by Order of
January 24, 2005. Neither respondent nor the trial court furnished petitioner with a copy of
respondent’s petition and its annexes, despite her plea therefor.
Indeed, when the trial court ignored her plea, through her “Manifestation (With prayer for
reconsideration of the January 2[4], 2005 Order)” dated March 16, 2005, that she be furnished with a
copy of respondent’s petition and its annexes so that she could file her opposition thereto, petitioner
was denied her day in court. Why petitioner’s plea was unheeded, no reason was proffered by the
trial court. It need not be underlined that her plea was meritorious, given the adversarial nature of
 Cotabato, who declared herself as the wife of
Agakhan Molok by virtue of a Certificate of
Marriage executed in Metro Manila.
Upon inquiry, respondent found out that there was
no record of the second marriage. She also
discovered that the solemnizing officer, Ustadz
Moha-imen Ulama, never solemnized the
supposed marriage of petitioner and Agakhan
Molok.
the proceedings under Rule 108.
In raising the issue of denial of due process in petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the decision,
the trial court, by Order of July 25, 2005, did not specifically address the same. Oddly, said Order
was issued on July 25, 2005, when petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was set for hearing yet
on September 1, 2005, albeit no hearing was held since; as stated earlier, it was a non-working
Muslim holiday, and despite the Clerk of Court’s assurance that petitioner would be advised of the
date of resetting of the hearing.

Respondent thus filed on October 17, 2004 a

verified petition “for cancellation of registration of
the alleged marriage” of petitioner and Agakhan
Molok.

By Decision of June 28, 2005, the trial court found

for respondent. It noted that petitioner
“has not filed any formal opposition” to petitioner’s
petition. Hence, this direct recourse to this Court
via petition for review on certiorari, contending that,
among other things, the trial court, in rendering its
decision solely on the basis of respondent’s
petition, violated her constitutional right to due
process.

FAMILY RELATIONS
I. Marriage
Estrada v. Complainant requested for an investigation of
Escritor rumors that respondent Soledad Escritor, court
interpreter in said court, is living with a man not her
(2003) husband. They allegedly have a child of eighteen
to twenty years old. He filed the charge against
Escritor as he believes that she is committing an
immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court,
thus she should not be allowed to remain
employed therein as it might appear that the court
condones her act.
Respondent Escritor testified that when she
entered the judiciary in 1999, she was already a
widow, her husband having died in 1998. She
admitted that she has been living with Luciano
Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage for
twenty years and that they have a son. But as a
member of the religious sect known as the
Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and
Bible Tract Society, their conjugal arrangement is
in conformity with their religious beliefs. In fact,
A. The concept of "marriage"
Escritor was not held to be administratively liable.
The case at bar being one of first impression, we now subject the respondent’s claim of religious
freedom to the “compelling state interest” test from a benevolent neutrality stance - i.e.
entertaining the possibility that respondent’s claim to religious freedom would warrant carving out an
exception from the Civil Service Law; necessarily, her defense of religious freedom will be unavailing
should the government succeed in demonstrating a more compelling state interest. In applying the
test, the first inquiry is whether respondent’s right to religious freedom has been burdened.
The second step is to ascertain respondent’s sincerity in her religious belief.
Indeed, it is inappropriate for the complainant, a private person, to present evidence on the
compelling interest of the state. The burden of evidence should be discharged by the proper agency
of the government which is the Office of the Solicitor General. To properly settle the issue in the
case at bar, the government should be given the opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state
interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the respondent’s stance that her conjugal arrangement is not
immoral and punishable as it comes within the scope of free exercise protection. Should the Court
prohibit and punish her conduct where it is protected by the Free Exercise Clause, the
Court’s action would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her right to religious
freedom. We cannot therefore simply take a passing look at respondent’s claim of religious
freedom, but must instead apply the “compelling state interest” test. The government must be heard
on the issue as it has not been given an opportunity to discharge its burden of demonstrating the
 after ten years of living together, she executed on
July 28, 1991 a “Declaration of Pledging
Faithfulness.”
Escritor’s partner, Quilapio, executed a similar
pledge on the same day. Both pledges were
executed in Atimonan, Quezon and signed by three
witnesses. At the time Escritor executed her
pledge, her husband was still alive but living with
another woman. Quilapio was likewise married at
that time, but had been separated in fact from his
wife.
GOITA VS. Petitioner (wife) and respondent (husband) were
CAMPOS married in the city of Manila on January 7, 1915
RUEDA and thereafter established their residence where
they lived together for about a month when
(1916) petitioner returned to the home of her parents,
claiming that her husband demanded of her to
perform unchaste and lascivious acts.
Petitioner is now demanding support from her
husband outside of the conjugal domicile.
The husband claims that he is not obliged to give
support since it is the wife who left the conjugal
home.
SILVERIO VS. Petitioner is a male transsexual who who
REPUBLIC underwent sex reassignment surgery to become
anatomically female. He filed a petition for a
change of name and sex appearing in the birth
certificate to reflect the result of the surgery and so
(2007) that he can marry his fiancé.
The RTC granted the petition but this was reversed
by the CA.
PEOPLE OF Victoriano was charged with the crime of Parricide
THE in an Information. The RTC convicted Victoriano as
PHILIPPINES guilty of such crime, which was affirmed by the CA.
VS.
VICTORIANO
DELA CRUZ
(2010)
DE SANTIS VS. On appeal in this case is the decision of the CA
INTESTATE nullifying the Orders of the RTC allowing petitioners
ESTATE OF and their siblings to intervene in the estate
JALANDONI proceedings of the late Rodolfo Jalandoni.
Petitioners claim that their deceased grandmother
Isabel was, at the time of Rodolfo’s death, the legal
spouse of the latter and for which reason Isable is
state’s compelling interest which can override respondent’s religious belief and practice. To repeat,
this is a case of first impression where we are applying the “compelling state interest” test in a case
involving purely religious conduct. The careful application of the test is indispensable as how we will
decide the case will make a decisive difference in the life of the respondent who stands not only
before the Court but before her Jehovah God.
The mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife.
Marriage is something more than a mere contract. It is a new relation, the rights, duties, and
obligations of which rest not upon the agreement of the parties but upon the general law which
defines and prescribes those rights, duties, and obligations.
Marriage is an institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply interested. It is
a relation for life and the parties cannot terminate it at any shorter period by virtue of any contract
they may make. The reciprocal rights arising from this relation, so long as it continues, are such as
the law determines from time to time and none other
In this case, a judgment for separate maintenance is not due and payable either as damages or as a
penalty. Nor is it a debt in the strict legal sense of the term, but rather a judgment calling for the
performance of a duty made specific by the mandate of the sovereign.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public
consequences.
Marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent union
between a man and a woman. One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting
parties who must be make and female.
To grant the change sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on
marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who was undergone
sexual reassignment.
The key element of parricide, other than the fact of killing, is the relationship of the offender of the
victim.
In the case of Parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the accused and the
deceased would be the marriage certificate.
In this case, the testimony of the accused that he was married to the victim, in itself, is ample proof
of such relationship as the testimony can be taken as an admission against penal interest. Clearly,
then, it was established that Victoriano and his wife Anna were husband and wife.
Petitioners and their siblings failed to offer sufficient evidence to establish that Isabel was the legal
spouse of Rodolfo. The very evidence of the petitioners and their siblings negate their claim that
Isabel has interest in Rodolfo’s estate.
Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous marriage between
Isabel and John Desantis was adequately established. This holds true notwithstanding the fact that
no marriage certificate between Isabel and John Desantis exists on record.
(2010) entitled to a share in the estate of Rodolfo.
Note that petitioners are the children of Sylvia, who
is the daughter of Isabel with one John Desantis.
The petitioners presented two marriage certificates
between Isable and Rodolfo and the birth
certificate of their mother Sylvia.
B. Requisites
Discussion
A. Difference in Sex
SILVERIO VS. Petitioner is a male transsexual who who
REPUBLIC underwent sex reassignment surgery to become
anatomically female. He filed a petition for a
change of name and sex appearing in the birth
certificate to reflect the result of the surgery and so
(2007) that he can marry his fiancé.
The RTC granted the petition but this was reversed
by the CA.
B. Some Form of Ceremony
Martinez v Tan Martinez is questioning the validity of her marriage
with Tan. She argued that she signed the
(1909) document believing it was to be used to ask for the
consent of her parents for their marriage and that
it was signed in her home and not in the presence
of the justice of the peace.
C. Legal Capacity
1. Age
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded
as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may
be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth
certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.
In the present case, the birth certificate of Sylvia precisely serves as the competent evidence of
marriage between Isabel and John Desantis. As mentioned earlier, it contains the following notable
entries: (a) that Isabel and John Desantis were "married" and (b) that Sylvia is their "legitimate" child.
In clear and categorical language, Sylvia’s birth certificate speaks of a subsisting marriage between
Isabel and John Desantis.
Pursuant to existing laws, the foregoing entries are accorded prima facie weight. They are presumed
to be true.
No law allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex
reassignment.
The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court
must look to the statutes.
Under the Civil Register Law (Act 3753), a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they
existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth
attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is
no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination fo a person’s sex made at the time of
his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable.
The words “sex”, “male” and “female” as used in the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil
registry (and even all other laws) should be understood in their common and ordinary usage, there
being no legislative intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as “the sum of
peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male from a female” or “the distinction
between male and female.” Femalie is “the sex that produces ova or bears young” and male is “the
sex that produces spermatozoa for fertilizing ova.”
Thus the words male and female in everyday understanding do not include persons who have
undergone sex reassignment.
The marriage is valid.
General order No. 68, section 6 provides: No particular form from the ceremony of marriage is
required, but the parties must declare in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage, that
they take each other as husband and wife.
The petition signed by the Martinez and Tan contained a positive statement that they had mutually
agreed to be married and they asked the justice of the peace to solemnize the marriage. The
document signed by them, and the justice of the peace, stated that they ratified under oath, before
the justice, the contents of the petition and that witnesses of the marriage were produced..
 2. Relationship
3. Prior Marriage
Wiegel v Respondent Karl filed a petition for declaration of
Sempio-Diy nullity of his marriage against petitioner Lilia on the
ground the latter’s existing marriage to one Maxion.
Lilia argues that her marriage will Maxion was null
(2010) and void since they were only forced into it.
Republic v Respondnet Nolasco filed a petition to declare his
Nolasco wife Parker presumptively dead or in the alternative
declare their marriage void ab initio.
(1993)
Garcia v Recio Recio and Samson, an Australian citizen were
married in 1987 and subsequently got a decree of
divorce from an Australian Court. In 1992, Recio
became an Australian citizen and married
petitioner, wherein Recio declared his status as
single and a Filipino.
Petitioner filed a petition to declare her marriage
with respondent null and void on the ground of
bigamy.
Bobis v Bobis In 1985, respondent married Javier. Without having
it annulled, he contracted a second marriage with
petitioner in 1996. He also allegedly contracted a
third marriage with a certain Hernandez.
(2000) Thus a case for bigamy was filed against him. He
claims that the validity of the first marriage is a
prejudicial question which must first be tried before
the criminal action may proceed.
Te v CA, Choa Arthur and Liliana were married although they did
(2000) not live together. Arthur contracted a second
marriage with Julieta. Liliana filed a bigamy case
against Arthur. On the other hand, Arthur filed an
Marriage of petitioner to respondent is null and void.
A prior marriage though void still needs according to the Court a judicial declaration of such fact. For
all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she
contracted her marriage with respondent
The marriage is valid.
There are four (4) requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family
Code for the purposes of remarriage:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if
the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in
Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of
the absentee.
The 3rd requisite is lacking. Respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded belief
required by law that his absent wife was already dead
The case is remanded to the lower court for reception of evidence.
Divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a
vinculomatrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage,
while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. [45] There is no showing in the case at
bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent.
The Australian divorce did not ipso facto restore the respondent’s capacity to remarry.
No. It is not a prejudicial question.
Article 40 of the Family Code, effective at the time of celebration of the second marriage, requires a
prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before a party may remarry.
He who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case may not be
suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity.
A marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any party can marry
again; otherwise the second marriage will also be void. The reason is that, without a judicial
declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. Therefore, any decision in
the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage
during the subsistence of a first marriage.
Petition DENIED.
Outcome of annulment case had no bearing on the determination of Arthur’s innocence or guilt in
bigamy case. Ground for annulment cited by petitioner was for voidable marriage. Therefore, at
 action for annulment on the ground that he was the time he committed the crime of bigamy, marriage was still valid and subsisting.
only forced to marry Lilian. He also alleged that she
concealed her pregnancy by another man. Bigamy simply requires a second marriage to be contracted while a prior one is subsisting.
Mercado v Tan Dr. Vicent Mercado was previously married with Petition DENIED.
(2000) Thelma Oliva in 1976 before he contracted
marriage with Consuelo Tan in 1991 which the A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be
latter claims she did not know. Tan filed bigamy legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial
against Mercado and after a month the latter filed declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by
an action for declaration of nullity of marriage statute as “void.”
against Oliva. The decision in 1993 declared
marriage between Mercado and Oliva null and In the case at bar, Mercado only filed the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Oliva right after
void. Tan filed bigamy case. Hence, by then, the crime had already been consummated. He contracted
second marriage without the judicial declaration of the nullity. The fact that the first marriage is void
from the beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge.
SSS v Jarque In 1955 Clemente Bailon and Alice Petition DENIED.
vda de Bailon Diaz married in Barcelona, Sorsogon. 15+ years
(2006) later, Clemente filed an action to declare the There is no previous marriage to restore for it is terminated upon Clemente’s death. Likewise there is
presumptive death of Alice she being an absentee. no subsequentmarriage to terminate for the same is terminated upon Clemente’s death. SSS is
The petition was granted in 1970. correct in ruling that it is inutile for Alice to pursue the recording of her reappearance before the
local civil registrar through an affidavit or a court action. But it is not correct for the SSS to rule upon
In 1983, Clemente married Jarque. The two live the declaration made by the RTC. The SSC or the SSS has no judicial power to review
together untile Clemente’s death in 1998. Jarque the decision of the RTC.
then sought to claim her husband’s
SSS benefits and the same were granted her. On SSS is indeed empowered to determine as to who should be the rightful beneficiary of
the other hand, a certain Cecilia Baion-Yap who the benefits obtained by a deceased member in case of disputes but such power does not include
claimed that she is the daughter of Bailon to a the appellate power to review a court decision or declaration. In the case at bar, the RTC ruling is
certain Elisa Jayona petitioned before the SSS that binding and Jarque’s marriage to Clemente is still valid because no affidavit was filed by Alice to
they be given the reimbursement for the make known her reappearance legally.
funeral spending for it was actually them who
shouldered the burial expenses of Clemente. They Alice reappeared only after Clemente’s death and in this case she can no longer file such an
further claim that Clemente contracted affidavit; in this case the bad faith [or good faith] of Clemente can no longer be raised –
three marriages; one with Alice, another with Elisa the marriage herein is considered voidable and must be attacked directly not collaterally – it is
and the other with Jarque. Cecilia also averred that however impossible for a direct attack since there is no longer amarriage to be attacked for the same
Alice is alive and kicking and Alice subsequently has been terminated upon Clemente’s death.
emerged; Cecilia claimed that Clemente obtained
the declaration of Alice’s presumptive death in bad
faith for he was aware of the whereabouts of Alice
or if not he could have easily located her in
her parent’s place. She was in Sorsogon all along
in her parents’ place. She went there upon
learning that Clemente had been having extra-
marital affairs. SSS then ruled that Jarque should
reimburse what had been granted her and to return
the same to Cecilia since she shouldered the burial
expenses and that the benefits should go to Alice
because her reappearance had terminated
Clemente’s marriage with Jarque.

Further, SSS ruled that the RTC’s decision in

declaring Alice to be presumptively death is
erroneous. Teresita appealed the decision of the
 SSS before the Social Security Comission and the
SSC affirmed SSS.
The CA however ruled the contrary.
Morigo v Morigo Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates
(2004) in Bohol. They lost contacts for a while but after
receiving a card from Barrete and various
exchanges of letters, they became sweethearts.
They got married in 1990. Barrete went back to
Canada for work and in 1991 she filed petition for
divorce in Ontario Canada, which was granted. In
1992, Morigo married Lumbago. He subsequently
filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity on
the ground that there was no marriage ceremony.
Morigo was then charged with bigamy and moved
for a suspension of arraignment since the civil case
pending posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy
case. Morigo pleaded not guilty claiming that his
marriage with Barrete was void ab initio. Petitioner
contented he contracted second marriage in good
faith.
Tenebro v CA Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with Leticia
(2004) Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were wed by a
judge at Lapu-Lapu City. The two lived together
continuously and without interruption until the later
part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that
he had been previously married to a certain Hilda
Villareyes on Nov. 10, 1986. Tenebro showed
Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract
between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous
marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal
dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that
he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.
On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet
another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda
Villegas. When Ancajas learned of this third
marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the
latter was indeed married to the petitioner.
Villareyes confirmed in handwritten letter that
indeed Tenebro was her husband.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy
against petitioner. During trial, Tenebro admitted
having married to Villareyes and produced two
children. However, he denied that he and
Villareyes were validly married to each other,
claiming that no marriage ceremony took place. He
alleged that he signed a marriage contract merely
to enable her to get the allotment from his office in
connection with his work as a seaman. The trial
court found him guilty of bigamy.
Petition GRANTED. Lucio ACQUITTED from the charge of bigamy.
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be
legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial
declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by
statutes as "void."
Morigo’s marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering that there was no actual marriage
ceremony performed between them by a solemnizing officer instead they just merely signed a
marriage contract. The petitioner does not need to file declaration of the nullity of his marriage when
he contracted his second marriage with Lumbago. Hence, he did not commit bigamy and is
acquitted in the case filed.
Petition DENIED.
Tenebro was guilty of bigamy as he contracted a second marriage while the first marriage was
subsisting. Obtaining an annulment of the second marriage does not absolve him from the
crime.
The prosecution was able to establish the validity of the first marriage. As a second or
subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner’s valid marriage to Villareyes,
petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioner’s
psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a
valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for
the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code criminalizes “any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the
former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings”. A plain reading of
the law, therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second
or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
J. VITUG (Separate Opinion)
Since psychological incapacity, upon the other hand, does not relate to an infirmity in the
elements, either essential or formal, in contacting a valid marriage, the declaration of nullity
subsequent to the bigamous marriage due to that ground, without more, would be
inconsequential in a criminal charge for bigamy. The judicial declaration of nullity of a bigamous
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity merely nullifies the effects of the marriage but it
does not negate the fact of perfection of the bigamous marriage. Its subsequent declaration of
nullity dissolves the relationship of the spouses but, being alien to the requisite conditions for the
perfection of the marriage, the judgment of the court is no defense on the part of the offender who
had entered into it.
J. CARPIO (Dissenting Opinion)
 *sorry can’t find a copy*
NOLLORA v. Nollora was married and contracted a second one Nollora cannot deny that both marriage ceremonies were not conducted in accordance with the
PEOPLE with Geraldino. The trial court found him guilty of Code of Muslim Personal Laws (PD 1083), and therefore the Family Code applies
bigamy under RPC 349. The circumstances in the present case satisfy all the elements of bigamy. The elements of the crime
(2011) Nollora put up his Muslim religion as his sole of bigamy are:
defense. He alleged that his religion allows him to 1. That the offender has been legally married.
marry more than once. 2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent,
theabsent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code.
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.

4. Crime
5. Physical Incapacity

JIMENEZ v. Joel filed for annulment on the ground that the The impotence of the wife cannot be satisfactorily determined from the statement of husband.
CANIZARES office of his wife’s genitals or vagina was too small Filipinas are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would not submit to a physical examination unless
to allow penetration of male organ or penis for compelled by authority. She is not being compelled to be a witness against herself.
(1960) copulation. Remedios was summoned to submit to
a physical examination to determine her capacity
for copulation. Remedios did not comply. RTC
granted annulment.
.

ALCAZAR v. Petitioner filed a Complaint for the annulment of
ALCAZAR her marriage to Respondent , who almost never
resided with Petitioner. Petitioner alleged that
(2009) Respondent was therefore physically incapable of
consummating his marriage with her.
The burden falls upon Petitioner, not just to prove that Respondent suffers from a psychological
disorder, but also that such renders him truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.
Psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," a "refusal," or a "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations.

6. Psychological incapacity

SANTOS v. CA Petitioner filed with the RTC a complaint for
"Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family
(1995) Code.”
Private Respondent, his wife, always quarreled
with him and never returned home from working in
the U.S.A; she also never communicated with him
during her stay thereat
This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not
evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the
other.
Psychological incapacity must refer to mental (not physical) incapacity to comprehend basic mental
covenants characterized by a) gravity, b) juridical antecedence, and c) incurability, existing at the
time of the marriage.
Basic marital covenants (FC 68) – mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support.

CHI MING TSOI Private Respondent filed this case against
v. CA Petitioner in the RTC, which decreed the
annulment of the marriage on the ground of
(1997) psychological incapacity.
She alleges that Petitioner has never tried to have
sexual intercourse with her. She claims that he is
impotent, a closet homosexual.
One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is to procreate children. Constant
non-fulfillment of this obligation will destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at
bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is
equivalent to psychological incapacity.
After almost 10 months of cohabitation, the admission that the husband is reluctant or unwilling to
perform the sexual act with his wife whom he professes to love and who has not posed any
insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative of a hopeless situation, and of a
serious personality disorder that constitutes psychological incapacity to discharge the basic marital

Republic v Olaviano was married to Reynaldo in 1985. They
Molina have a son. Reynaldo showed signs of “immaturity
and irresponsibility” on the early stages of the
1997 marriage, observed from his tendency to spend
time with his friends and squandering his money
with them, from his dependency from his parents,
and his dishonesty on matters involving his
finances. Reynaldo was relieved of his job in 1986,
Roridel became the sole breadwinner. In March
1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and
proceeded to Baguio City. Reynaldo left her and
their child a week later. The couple is separated-in-
fact for more than three years.
The issue is Whether conflicting personalities
should be construed as psychological incapacity.
Antonio v Reyes Antonio and Reyes married. Reyes persistently lied
about herself, the people around her, her
occupation, income, educational attainment and
other events or things. They eventually separated.
(2005) Antonio wants their marriage declared null and void
on the basis on Article 36 of the Family Code.
Te v Te Te was initially attracted to Rowena’s close friend
but, as the latter already had a boyfriend, Te
(2009) decided to court Rowena. It was Rowena who
asked that they elope but Edward refused bickering
that he was young and jobless. Her persistence,
however, made him relent. They left Manila and
sailed to Cebu that month.
They decided to go back to Manila in April 1996.
Rowena proceeded to her uncle’s house and
Edward to his parents’ home. Eventually they got
married but without a marriage license. Edward
was prohibited from getting out of the house
unaccompanied and was threatened by Rowena
and her uncle. After a month, Edward escaped
from the house, and stayed with his parents.
covenants within the contemplation of the Family Code.
The marriage subsists and remains valid.
In the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an
incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and
"conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove
that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that
they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical) illness.
The Court, in this case, promulgated the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36
of the Family Code, removing any visages of it being the most liberal divorce procedure in the world:
(1) The burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the root cause of psychological incapacity must
be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by expert, and clearly
explained in the decision; (3) The incapacity must be proven existing at the time of the celebration of
marriage; (4) the incapacity must be clinically or medically permanent or incurable; (5) such illness
must be grave enough; (6) the essential marital obligation must be embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of
the Family Code as regards husband and wife, and Articles 220 to 225 of the same code as regards
parents and their children; (7) interpretation made by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church, and (8) the trial must order the fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appeal as
counsels for the State.
The marriage was declared null and void under Article 36.
Respondent’s fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live in a
world of make-believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of
giving meaning and significance to her marriage. The root cause of respondent’s psychological
incapacity has been medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by
experts, and clearly explained in the trial court’s decision.
The marriage was declared null and void under Article 36.
The psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically incapacitated.
Petitioner’s behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent personality disorder, and
respondent’s, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder. There is no requirement that
the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if
the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity.
 Edward’s parents wanted them to stay at their
house but Rowena refused and demanded that
they have a separate abode. In June 1996, she
said that it was better for them to live separate lives
and they then parted ways.

After four years in January 2000, Edward filed a

petition for the annulment of his marriage to
Rowena on the basis of the latter’s psychological
incapacity.

Azcueta v RP Marietta averred that Rodolfo was psychologically The marriage was declared null and void under Article 36.
incapacitated to comply with the essential
(2009) obligations of marriage. Marietta complained that Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to perform hismarital duties because of his Dependent
despite her encouragement, Rodolfo never Personality Disorder. A person afflicted with a psychological disorder cannot comply with or assume
bothered to look for a job and always depended on the essential marital obligations. It may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence,
his mother for financial assistance and for his constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are
decisions. They had sex only once a month which manifestations of a sociopathic personality anomaly.
Mariett anever enjoyed. When they discussed this,
Rodolfo told Marietta that sex was sacred and
should not be enjoyed or abused. Rodolfo also told
her he was not ready for a child.
Halili v Halili Petitioner Lester Benjamin S. Halili filed a petition The marriage was declared null and void under Article 36.
to declare his marriage to respondent Chona M.
(2009) Santos-Halili null and void on the basis of his Bby the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-
psychological incapacity to perform the essential making, must consider as essential the expert opinion on the psychological and mental disposition of
obligations of marriage. He alleged that he wed the parties. Dr. Dayan stated that petitioner’s dependent personality disorder was evident in the fact
respondent in civil rites thinking that it was a joke. that petitioner was very much attached to his parents and depended on them for decisions.
After the ceremonies, they never lived together as
husband and wife, but maintained the relationship.
However, they started fighting constantly a year
later, at which point petitioner decided to stop
seeing respondent and started dating other
women. Immediately thereafter, he received prank
calls telling him to stop dating other women as he
was already a married man. It was only upon
making an inquiry that he found out that the
marriage was not fake.

He stressed that the evidence he presented,

especially the testimony of his expert witness, was
more than enough to sustain the findings and
conclusions of the trial court that he was and still is
psychologically incapable of complying with the
essential obligations of marriage.
Ma. Socorro Respondent Reyes is the husband of petitioner. The respondent is suffering from psychological incapacity to fulfill essential marital obligations;
Camacho-Reyes Petitioner filed a case for declaration of nullity of hence the marriage should be declared null and void.
vs Ramon marriage on the ground of psychological
Reyes incapacity. According to the findings of the trial In the instant case, respondent’s pattern of behavior manifests an inability, nay, a psychological
court. Over the course of their marriage, incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations as shown by his: (1) sporadic financial
(2010) respondent quit working for the family business support; (2) extra-marital affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4) failed business attempts; (5) unpaid
 despite having no other source of income. When
he engaged in other businesses (which often
failed) he would be gone for weeks without
contacting his family. When his last business failed,
petitioner refused to go back to work for the family
business despite having no source of income to
support his family. In two instances, first when
petitioner suffered a miscarriage and second, when
petitioner had an operation to remove her cyst,
respondent was nonchalant and uncaring, not
paying attention to petitioner’s request that she be
accompanied to the operating room.
Rosalino L. Petitioner filed a case for declaration of nullity of
Marable vs marriage on the ground of his psychological
Myrna F. incapacity.
Marable Petitioner averred that he came from a poor family
and was already exposed to the hardships of farm
(2011) life at an early age. His father, although
responsible and supportive, was a compulsive
gambler and womanizer. His father left their family
to live with another woman with whom he had
seven other children. This caused petitioner’s
mother and siblings to suffer immensely. Thus,
petitioner became obsessed with attention and
worked hard to excel so he would be noticed.
Despite his success at work, he alleged that his
misery and loneliness as a child lingered as he
experienced a void in his relationship with his own
family.
Petitioner also averred that he previously had a
marital affair, and that it was due to his father being
a womanizer that he became a womanizer.
Cynthia E. Petitioner averred that through all the years of their
money obligations; (6) inability to keep a job that is not connected with the family businesses; and
(7) criminal charges of estafa.
Side-issue:
The lack of personal examination and interview of the respondent, or any other person diagnosed
with personality disorder, does not per se invalidate the testimonies of the doctors. Neither do their
findings automatically constitute hearsay that would result in their exclusion as evidence.
For one, marriage, by its very definition, necessarily involves only two persons. The totality of the
behavior of one spouse during the cohabitation and marriage is generally and genuinely witnessed
mainly by the other. In this case, the experts testified on their individual assessment of the present
state of the parties’ marriage from the perception of one of the parties, herein petitioner. Certainly,
petitioner, during their marriage, had occasion to interact with, and experience, respondent’s pattern
of behavior which she could then validly relay to the clinical psychologists and the psychiatrist.
For another, the clinical psychologists’ and psychiatrist’s assessment were not based solely on the
narration or personal interview of the petitioner. Other informants such as respondent’s own son,
siblings and in-laws, and sister-in-law (sister of petitioner), testified on their own observations of
respondent’s behavior and interactions with them, spanning the period of time they knew him. These
were also used as the basis of the doctors’ assessments.
Petitioner is not psychologically incapacitated.
The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of
the marriage. These are the disorders that result in the utter insensitivity or inability of the afflicted
party to give meaning and significance to the marriage he or she has contracted. Psychological
incapacity must refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage.
In the instant case, petitioner completely relied on the psychological examination conducted by Dr.
Tayag on him to establish his psychological incapacity. The result of the examination and the
findings of Dr. Tayag however, are insufficient to establish petitioner's psychological incapacity. In
cases of annulment of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, the
psychological illness and its root cause must be proven to exist from the inception of the marriage.
Here, the appellate court correctly ruled that the report of Dr. Tayag failed to explain the root cause
of petitioner’s alleged psychological incapacity. The evaluation of Dr. Tayag merely made a general
conclusion that petitioner is suffering from an Anti-social Personality Disorder but there was no
factual basis stated for the finding that petitioner is a socially deviant person, rebellious, impulsive,
self-centered and deceitful.
The evaluation of Dr. Tayag falls short of the required proof which the Court can rely on as basis to
declare as void petitioner’s marriage to respondent. The report did not clearly specify the actions of
petitioner which are indicative of his alleged psychological incapacity. More importantly, there was
no established link between petitioner’s acts to his alleged psychological incapacity. It is
indispensable that the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest
psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
It was in fact shown that petitioner acted responsibly during the marriage. He worked hard during the
marriage to provide for his family. Also, when his wife found out that he was having an affair, he
immediately terminated it. The infidelity was not symptomatic of a grave psychological disorder that
would render him incapable of performing his marital obligations.
Respondent is not psychologically incapacitated.
Yambao vs married life, she was the only one who earned a
Republic of the living and took care of the children. Respondent,
Philippines and she alleged, did nothing but eat and sleep all day,
Patricio E. and spend time with friends. When respondent
Yambao would find a job, he would not be able to stay in it
for long. Likewise, respondent went into several
(2011) business ventures, which all failed. In addition,
respondent loved to gamble and would gamble
away whatever money would come his way.
Petitioner also claimed that, when their children
were babies, respondent did not even help to
change their diapers or feed them, even while
petitioner was recovering from her caesarean
operation, proffering the excuse that he knew
nothing about children. Later, respondent became
insecure and jealous and would get mad every
time he would see petitioner talking to other
people, even to her relatives. When respondent
started threatening to kill petitioner, she decided to
leave the conjugal abode and live separately from
him.10 She then consulted a psychiatrist who
concluded that respondent was indeed
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations
Jose Reynaldo Petitioner and respodent are husband and wife.
B. Ochosa vs Petitioner, being a member of the AFP, would be
Bona J. Alano assigned to different parts of the Respondent as
and Republic of part of his duties. Bona would not live with him in
the Philippines his posts. Eventually, Petitioner was given housing
in Fort Bonifacio.
(2011)
It appears that respondent was an unfaithful
spouse. Even at the onset of their marriage when
petitioner was assigned in various parts of the
country, she had illicit relations with other men.
Respondent apparently did not change her ways
when they lived together at Fort Bonifacio; she
entertained male visitors in her bedroom whenever
petitioner was out of their living quarters. On one
occasion, respondent was caught by Demetrio
Bajet y Lita, a security aide, having sex with
petitioner’s driver, Corporal Gagarin. Rumors of
respondent’s sexual infidelity circulated in the
military community.
Republic of the Respondent was married to Juvy on March 9,
Philippines vs 1994. He filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
Nestor Galang marriage on August 4, 1999. alleged that Juvy was
psychologically incapacitated to exercise the
(20110 essential obligations of marriage, as she was a
In this case, there is no showing that respondent was suffering from a psychological condition so
severe that he was unaware of his obligations to his wife and family. On the contrary, respondent’s
efforts (trying to find a job, but failing due to old age and lack of a college degree), though few and
far between they may be, showed an understanding of his duty to provide for his family, albeit he did
not meet with much success. Whether his failure was brought about by his own indolence or
irresponsibility, or by some other external factors, is not relevant. What is clear is that respondent, in
showing an awareness to provide for his family, even with his many failings, does not suffer from
psychological incapacity.
That respondent, according to petitioner, "lack[ed] effective sense of rational judgment and
responsibility" does not mean he is incapable to meet his marital obligations. His refusal to help care
for the children, his neglect for his business ventures, and his alleged unbearable jealousy may
indicate some emotional turmoil or mental difficulty, but none have been shown to amount to a
psychological abnormality.
Likewise militating against petitioner’s cause is the finding of the trial court, and the same was
affirmed by the CA, that respondent never committed infidelity or physically abused petitioner or their
children. In fact, considering that the children lived with both parents, it is safe to assume that both
made an impact in the children’s upbringing. And still, as found by the RTC and the CA, the parties
were able to raise three children into adulthood "without any major parenting problems." Such fact
could hardly support a proposition that the parties’ marriage is a nullity.
Respondent is not psychologically incapacitated.
Petitioner tries to assert that the sexual infidelity repeatedly committed by respondent has juridical
antecedence. He avers that respondent having a womanizer for a father and a battered woman for a
mother caused her constant sexual infidelity. The psychological assessment of respondent’s pre-
marital history was only from information provided by petitioner. Respondent’s dysfunctional family
portrait which brought about her Histrionic Personality Disorder as painted by the psychologist was
based solely on the assumed truthful knowledge of petitioner, the spouse who has the most to gain if
his wife is found to be indeed psychologically incapacitated. No other witness testified to
respondent’s family history or her behavior prior to or at the beginning of the marriage. In fact, all the
witnesses presented by petitioner only knew the respondent during the marriage.
For a determination though of a party’s complete personality profile, information coming from
persons with personal knowledge of the juridical antecedents may be helpful. This is an approach in
the application of Article 36 that allows flexibility, at the same time that it avoids, if not totally
obliterate, the credibility gaps spawned by supposedly expert opinion based entirely on doubtful
sources of information.
The Court has also ruled in past decisions that to make conclusions and generalizations on a
spouse’s psychological condition based on the information fed by only one side, similar to the case
at bar is not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of
such evidence.
Juvy is not psychologically incapacitated.
The respondent’s testimony failed to show that Juvy’s condition is a manifestation of a disordered
personality rooted in some incapacitating or debilitating psychological condition that rendered her
unable to discharge her essential marital obligation. In this light, the acts attributed to Juvy only
showed indications of immaturity and lack of sense of responsibility, resulting in nothing more than
 kleptomaniac and a swindler. He claimed that Juvy
stole his ATM card and his parents’ money, and
often asked money from their friends and relatives
on the pretext that Christopher (their child) was
confined in a hospital. According to the respondent,
Juvy suffers from "mental deficiency, innate
immaturity, distorted discernment and total lack of
care, love and affection [towards him and their]
child." He posited that Juvy’s incapacity was
"extremely serious" and "appears to be incurable."
A psychologist was also presented by respondent
who testitifed that the incapacity of the defendant is
manifested [in] such a manner that the defendant-
wife: (1) being very irresponsible and very lazy and
doesn’t manifest any sense of responsibility; (2) her
involvement in gambling activities such as mahjong
and kuwaho; (3) being an estafador which exhibits
her behavioral and personality disorders; (4) her
neglect and show no care attitude towards her
husband and child; (5) her immature and rigid
behavior; (6) her lack of initiative to change and
above all, the fact that she is unable to perform her
marital obligations as a loving, responsible and
caring wife to her family. There are just few
reasons to believe that the defendant is suffering
from incapacitated mind and such incapacity
appears to be incorrigible.
Kalaw v Tyrone Kalaw and Malyn Fernandez were married
Fernandez and had 4 children. Malyn left the conjugal home
(2011) some time after their last child was born because
she learned that Tyrone was having an extramarital
affair.
After 9 years of de facto separation, Tyrone filed a
declaration of nullity of marriage based on FC 36
alleging that the psychological incapacity of Malyn
was manifested by her immaturity and
irresponsibility (playing mahjong all day, partying
all night, having an affair) towards him and their
children.
Malyn denied the allegations and as an affirmative
defense said that it was Tyrone suffering from
psychological incapacity as manifested by his drug
dependence, habitual drinking, womanizing and
physical violence.
the difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations.
In like manner, Juvy’s acts of falsifying the respondent’s signature to encash a check, of stealing the
respondent’s ATM, and of squandering a huge portion of the P15,000.00 that the respondent
entrusted to her, while no doubt reprehensible, cannot automatically be equated with a psychological
disorder, especially when the evidence shows that these were mere isolated incidents and not
recurring acts. Neither can Juvy’s penchant for playing mahjong and kuwaho for money, nor her act
of soliciting money from relatives on the pretext that her child was sick, warrant a conclusion that she
suffered from a mental malady at the time of the celebration of marriage that rendered her incapable
of fulfilling her marital duties and obligations. The respondent, in fact, admitted that Juvy engaged in
these behaviors (gambling and what the respondent refers to as "swindling") only two (2) years after
their marriage, and after he let her handle his salary and manage their finances. The evidence also
shows that Juvy even tried to augment the family’s income during the early stages of their marriage
by putting up a sari-sari store and by working as a manicurist.
Psychologist’s Testimony:
The psychologist admitted in her report that she derived her conclusions exclusively from the
information given her by the respondent. Expectedly, the respondent’s description of Juvy would
contain a considerable degree of bias; thus, a psychological evaluation based on this one-sided
description alone can hardly be considered as credible or sufficient.
It was declared in the Marcos case that the person sought to be declared psychologically
incapacitated need not be examined by the psychologist as a condition precedent to arrive at a
conclusion. If the incapacity can be proven by independent means, no reason exists why such
independent proof cannot be admitted to support a conclusion of psychological incapacity,
independently of a psychologist’s examination and report. In this case, however, no such
independent evidence has ever been gathered and adduced. To be sure, evidence from
independent sources who intimately knew Juvy before and after the celebration of her marriage
would have made a lot of difference and could have added weight to the psychologist’s report.
The report was also severely lacking because it did not mention any sort of psychological test that
was administered on the respondent. It must also be stressed that the acts alleged to have been
committed by Juvy occurred during the marriage.
Petition is DENIED. CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the TC’s decision for lack of
legal and factual basis.
Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume
the basic marital obligations. The burden of proving psychological incapacity is on the plaintiff. The
plaintiff must prove that the incapacitated party, based on his or her actions or behavior, suffers a
serious psychological disorder that completely disables him or her from understanding and
discharging the essential obligations of the marital state. The psychological problem must be grave,
must have existed at the time of marriage, and must be incurable.
In the case at bar, Tyrone failed to prove that his wife suffers from psychological incapacity.
He presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that Malyn is
psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses were premised on the alleged
acts or behavior of Malyn which had not been sufficiently proven. Tyrone’s allegations, which served
as the bases or underlying premises of the conclusions of his experts, were not actually proven. In
fact, Malyn presented contrary evidence refuting these allegations of the Tyrone.
 Both parties presented psychologists as witnesses.

RTC: Marriage void ab initio, both parties being

psychologically incapacitated to perform their
marital obligations.

CA: Reversed the RTC decision saying it is not

supported by the facts on record.

D.Consent

People v Bulagao was accused by AAA (14 years old) of Appeal DENIED. CA decision modified that Bulagao must pay exemplary damages for each count of
Bulagao (2011) rape. AAA was “adopted” (not formal) by the rape.
parents of Bulagao. She alleged that on two
occasions she was raped by Bulagao with the Recantation was not accepted considering the circumstance that AAA was staying at the home of
qualifying circumstance of use of deadly weapon Bulagao and his parents as she had nowhere to go.
(knife).
There was no proof that the mental condition Bulagao allegedly exhibited when he was
During the course of the trial, AAA recanted, examined by clinical psychologist, Yolanda Palma, was already present at the time of the
modified, reiterated her testimony. Ultimately rape incidents. Anyone who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden
RECANTING the claim of rape. of proving it with clear and convincing evidence. Besides, this Court observes that neither the
acts of Bulagao proven before the court, nor his answers in his testimony, show a complete
Bulagao claimed that the act was consensual and deprivation of intelligence or free will. Insanity presupposes that the accused was completely
he was claiming as defense MENTAL deprived of reason or discernment and freedom of will at the time of the commission of the crime.
RETARDATION or INSANITY. Only when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence at the time of the commission of the
crime should the exempting circumstance of insanity be considered.
RTC: Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 2 counts
of rape. Said that AAA may have recanted because
she had nowhere else to go but to the home of
Bulagao. noted that the psychological
examination of accused-appellant was
conducted more than a couple of years after
the dates of the complained of incidents. There
was no showing from the findings of the
psychologist that accused-appellant had the
same mental or psychological condition at the
time of the said incidents. Even assuming that
accused-appellant was of such mental state at the
time of the incidents, the psychologist testified
that accused-appellant had the capacity to
discern right from wrong.

CA: Affirmed with modification of penalty in view of

RA 9346 prohibiting imposition of death penalty.
Anaya v Aurora and Fernando were married. A year after,
Palaroan (1970) Fernando filed for annulment on the ground that his
consent was obtained through force and
intimidation. Aurora claimed that prior to their
marriage; Fernando had divulged to her that he
had a pre-marital relationship with a close relative.
ORDER of the TC Affirmed.
The requirements for fraud to be a vice of consent in marriage are enumerated in NCC Art 85 (4).
Non-disclosure of a husband’s pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one
enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment , it is further
excluded by the last paragraph of the article: “no other misrepresentation or deceit as to chastity”

TC: Dismissed the complaint to invalidate
marriage.
Villanueva v CA Orlando and Lilia were married. 4 years after,
(2006) Orlando filed for annulment on ground he was
under threats of violence and duress force when
he married her because Lilia was already pregnant.
Orlando denies fatherhood. On her counterclaim,
Lilia argued that Orlando voluntarily married her.
RTC and CA dismissed petition.
shall give ground to annul a marriage.
Petition PARTLY GRANTED. CA decision affirmed, award of moral and exemplary damages
DELETED for lack of basis.
Force and intimidation is no moment since he was a security guard. In the light of appellant’s
admission that he had a sexual intercourse with his wife in January 1988, and his failure to
attribute the latter’s pregnancy to any other man, appellant cannot complain that he was
deceived by the appellee into marrying her.

E. Authority of the Solemnizing Officer

Aranes v Petitioner Mercedita Mata Aranes charged
Occiano (2002) respondent Judge Occiano with gross ignorance of
the law. Occiano is the presiding judge in Court of
Balatan, Camarines Sur. However, he solemnized
the marriage of Aranes and Dominador Orobia on
February 17, 2000 at the couple’s residence in
Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his
territorial jurisdiction and without the requisite of
marriage license.
It appeared in the records that petitioner and
Orobia filed their application of marriage license on
January 5, 2000 and was stamped that it will be
issued on January 17, 2000 but neither of them
claimed it. In addition, no record also appeared
with the Office of the Civil Registrar General for the
alleged marriage.
Judge Occiana fined Php5,000 with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.
Marriage solemnized without a marriage license and outside of jurisdiction (party’s house) is
VOID. Judges can only solemnize marriages within their jurisdiction. Marriage can only be held
outside a judge’s chamber or courtroom if: (a) at the point of death (b) in remote places (c) request
of both parties in writing & sworn statement (Art. 8 FC).
The court held that “the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality
of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua,
Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability. His act may
not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human
compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage”.

Before Judge Occiano started the ceremony, he

carefully examined the documents and first refused
to conduct the marriage and advised them to reset
the date considering the absence of the marriage
license. However, due to the earnest pleas of the
parties, the influx of visitors and fear that the
postponement of the wedding might aggravate the
physical condition of Orobia who just suffered from
stroke, he solemnized the marriage on the
assurance of the couple that they will provide the
license that same afternoon. Occiano denies that
he told the couple that their marriage is valid.
Navarro v. Mayor Navarro filed an administrative case against Judge Domagtoy acted in gross ignorance of the law.
Domagtoy MCTC Judge Domagtoy in relation to 2 specific
acts: (1) he solemnized a wedding knowing that the An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to
(1996) groom was merely separated from his wife and (2) solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied with.
he solemnized another marriage in Dapa, which is However, Judges, who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within
outside his jurisdiction. said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction,
there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not
affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.
 F. Marriage License
Sy v. CA Filipina filed a petition for the declaration of nullity
of her marriage to Fernando on the ground of
(2000) psychological incapacity. Upon appeal to the SC,
she raised the issue of the marriage being void for
lack of a valid marriage license at the time of its
celebration pointing out that the date of the actual
celebration of their marriage and the date of
issuance of their marriage certificate and marriage
license are different and incongruous.
Alcantara v. Restituto filed a petition for annulment of marriage
Alcantara against Rosita. He alleged that the marriage was
celebrated without the parties securing a marriage
(2007) license. The alleged marriage license, procured in
Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage
contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident
of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to
apply for a license with the local civil registrar of the
said place.
Niñal v. The 1st wife was shot by Pepito resulting in her
Bayadog death. 1 year and 8 months thereafter, Pepito and
Badayog got married without any marriage license.
(2000) In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating
that they had lived together as husband and wife
for at least five years and were thus exempt from
securing a marriage license. After their father’s
death, children from the 1st marriage filed a petition
for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito
and Badayog alleging that the said marriage was
void for lack of a marriage license.
Mallion v. Mallion filed a petition for the declaration of nullity
Alcantara of his marriage to Alcantara on the ground of
psychological incapacity. RTC denied the petition.
(2006) After the decision attained finality, Mallion filed a
2nd petition this time alleging that his marriage to
Alcantara was null and void due to the fact that it
was celebrated without a valid marriage license.
RTC dismissed the case.
De Castro vs. 1. Reinel De castro and Annabelle Assidao-De
De Castro Castro were sweethearts,
February 13, 2. They decided to get married.
2008 3. They applied for the necessary license on
September 1994.
4. They had their first sexual relation sometime in
Under Article 80 of the Civil Code, the marriage between Filipina and Fernando is VOID from the
beginning.
A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the marriage void ab initio.
Marriage is valid.
The cases where the court considered the absence of a marriage license as a ground for
considering the marriage void are clear-cut. To be considered void on the ground of absence of a
marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on
the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar
that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. In this case, the marriage contract between
the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number. A certification to this effect was
also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. The certification moreover is precise in
that it specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued
The second marriage is not covered by the exception to the requirement of marriage license hence it
is VOID because of the absence of such element.
The five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of
marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-
year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period
of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity – meaning no third party was involved at any time within
the 5 years and continuity – that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is
computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other
during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to
have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully
with their spouse.
The case is barred by res judicata.
In Civil Case No. SP 4341-95, petitioner impliedly conceded that the marriage had been solemnized
and celebrated in accordance with law. Petitioner is now bound by this admission. The alleged
absence of a marriage license which petitioner raises now could have been presented and heard in
the earlier case. Therefore, having expressly and impliedly conceded the validity of their marriage
celebration, petitioner is now deemed to have waived any defects therein.
Marriage invalid.
The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of
marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who
have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and
unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid
 October 1994, and had regularly engaged in
sex thereafter.
5. When the couple went back to the Office of the
Civil Registrar, the marriage license had
already expired.
6. In order to push through with their plan of
getting married, in lieu of a marriage license,
they executed an affidavit dated 13 March
1995 stating that they had been living together
as husband and wife for at least five years.
7. The couple got married on the same date
8. Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner
and respondent went back to their respective
homes and did not live together as husband
and wife.
9. 1995: respondent gave birth to a child
named Reinna Tricia A. De Castro.
10. On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint
for support against petitioner before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City
11. Petitioner denied that he is married to
respondent, claiming that their marriage is void
ab initio since the marriage was facilitated by a
fake affidavit (since they did not actually live
together for 5 years prior to the marriage)
ISSUE: Is the marriage valid considering that the
facts stated in the affidavit that they lived together
for 5 years prior to the marriage was untrue?
Republic vs. 1. 24 November 1986: Jose and Felisa were
Dayot married.
March 28, 2008 2. In lieu of a marriage license, Jose and Felisa
executed a sworn affidavit, also dated 24
November 1986, attesting that they had lived
together as husband and wife for at least five
years.
3. However, the contents of the affidavit were
false for they really did not cohabit for 5 years.
In fact, Jose and Felisa started living together
only on June 1986, or barely five months
before the celebration of their marriage.
4. Petitioner Jose now wants to declare the
marriage void. He argues that the requisites
for the proper application of the exemption
from a marriage license under Article 76 of the
Civil Code were not fully attendant in the case
at bar. In particular, Jose cited the legal
condition that the man and the woman must
have been living together as husband and wife
2
Why the Civil Code and not the Family Code was applied - the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated on 24 November 1986, prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code governs their union.
exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous
cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant’s name for
a marriage license. In the instant case, there was no “scandalous cohabitation” to protect; in fact,
there was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so
they could push through with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper.
They were not exempt from the marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a
marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio.
Doctrine2 (although not related to the topic of marriage license): Niñal vs . Bayadog: the Court may
pass upon the validity of a marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of
said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. However, evidence must
be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a
marriage an absolute nullity.
In the case at bar, although the complaint is one for support, the court may still determine the validity
of the marriage since the propriety of the complaint for support hinges on the validity of the marriage.
A false affidavit renders the marriage void ab initio.
For the exception in Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman
must have attained the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years. Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal
requirement in Article 76, that they should have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years, so as to be excepted from the requirement of a marriage license.
The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code 2 applies only to those who
have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry each other. The
Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of five years of
cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since the language of Article 76 is precise.
The minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language of
the law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact cannot be
dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes of
a mandatory character.
Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under a
license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not
be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited for at least five years as
 for at least five years before the marriage.
Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of
marital cohabitation executed by him and
Felisa was false.
ISSUE: Whether or not a false affidavit would
render the marriage void ab initio.
required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to an irregularity of the
marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here, there is no marriage license at all.
Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and
Felisa’s cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement
for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law
precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. If the essential matter in
the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is
as if there was no affidavit at all.

II. Effect of Defective Marriages on the Status of the Children

A. If marriage is voidable
B. If marriage is terminated
C. If marriage is void
III. Marriage Certificate
IV. Additional Requirements for Annulment or Declaration of Nullity

Aurelio vs. 1. Petitioner and respondent were married on March
Aurelio 23, 1988.
June 6, 2011 2. On May 9, 2002, respondent filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch
94, a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.
In her petition, respondent alleged that both she
and petitioner were psychologically incapacitated
of performing and complying with their respective
essential marital obligations.
3. On November 8, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to
Dismiss the petition. He argues that:
a. the allegations contained in respondent’s
petition are insufficient to support a
declaration of nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity. Specifically,
petitioner contends that the petition failed
to comply with three of the Molina
guidelines, namely:
i. that the root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be
alleged in the complaint;
ii. that such illness must be grave
enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of
marriage; and
iii. that the non-complied marital
obligation must be stated in the
petition.
4. The RTC denied the MTD.
5. On February 16, 2004, petitioner appealed the
RTC decision to the CA via petition for certiorari
Yes. Case Remanded. RTC ordered to proceed with trial.
Before anything else, it bears to point out that had respondent’s complaint been filed after
March 15, 2003, this present petition would have been denied since Supreme Court
Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10 prohibits the filing of a motion to dismiss in actions for
annulment of marriage. Be that as it may, after a circumspect review of the arguments raised
by petitioner herein, this Court finds that the petition is not meritorious.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, this Court created the Molina guidelines to aid the courts in
the disposition of cases involving psychological incapacity, to wit:
(1) Burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of
the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71
of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife, as well as Articles 220, 221
and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
6. The CA agreed with the RTC and said that it was Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
proper that the MTD was denied great respect by our courts.
7. Hence, this petition
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
ISSUE: General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down
W/N the complaint complied with the Molina doctrine unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition,
as the case may be, to the petition.

This Court, pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10, has modified the
above pronouncements, particularly Section 2(d) thereof, stating that the certification of the
Solicitor General required in the Molina case is dispensed with to avoid delay. Still,
Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties
and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.

NOTE: Please refer to this footnote3 on why the complaint complied with the Molina doctrine

V. Foreign Marriages and Divorces

Salud Arca vs. 1. Javier was a native born citizen of the Philippines who,
Alfredo Javier in 1937, married Salud R. Arca, another Filipino citizen.
July 31, 1954 2. In 1927 appellant enlisted in the U.S. Navy and in 1938
sailed for the United States leaving behind his wife and
child,
3. on August 13, 1940, he filed an action for divorce in
the Circuit Court of Mobile County, Alabama,
U.S.A., alleging as ground abandonment by his wife.
4. Having received a copy of the complaint, Salud R. Arca
filed an answer alleging, among other things, that
appellant Javier was not a resident of Mobile County,
but of Naic, Cavite, Philippines, and that it was not true
that the cause of their separation was abandonment on
her part but that appellant was in the United States,
without her, because he was then enlisted in the U.S.
No. The decrees of divorce obtained Javier shall not be recognized here.
REASON 1:
The US Alabama Court has no jurisdiction over the persons of Acra and Javier.
In essence, it was held that one of the essential conditions for the validity of a decree of
divorce is that the court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and in order that this
may be acquired, plaintiff must be domiciled in good faith in the State in which it is granted
It is true that Salud R. Arca filed an answer in the divorce case instituted at the Mobile County
in view of the summons served upon her in this jurisdiction, but this action cannot be
interpreted as placing her under the jurisdiction of the court because its only purpose was to
impugn the claim of appellant.

3
First, contrary to petitioner’s assertion, this Court finds that the root cause of psychological incapacity was stated and alleged in the complaint. We agree with the manifestation of respondent that the family backgrounds of both petitioner and
respondent were discussed in the complaint as the root causes of their psychological incapacity. Moreover, a competent and expert psychologist clinically identified the same as the root causes.

Second, the petition likewise alleged that the illness of both parties was of such grave a nature as to bring about a disability for them to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The psychologist reported that respondent suffers from Histrionic
Personality Disorder with Narcissistic Features. Petitioner, on the other hand, allegedly suffers from Passive Aggressive (Negativistic) Personality Disorder. The incapacity of both parties to perform their marital obligations was alleged to be grave,
incorrigible and incurable.

Lastly, this Court also finds that the essential marital obligations that were not complied with were alleged in the petition. As can be easily gleaned from the totality of the petition, respondent’s allegations fall under Article 68 of the Family Code
which states that "the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support."

It bears to stress that whether or not petitioner and respondent are psychologically incapacitated to fulfill their marital obligations is a matter for the RTC to decide at the first instance. A perusal of the Molina guidelines would show that the same
contemplate a situation wherein the parties have presented their evidence, witnesses have testified, and that a decision has been reached by the court after due hearing. Such process can be gleaned from guidelines 2, 6 and 8, which refer to
a decision rendered by the RTC after trial on the merits. It would certainly be too burdensome to ask this Court to resolve at first instance whether the allegations contained in the petition are sufficient to substantiate a case for psychological
incapacity. Let it be remembered that each case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own attendant facts. Courts
should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals. 18 It would thus be more prudent for this Court to remand the case
to the RTC, as it would be in the best position to scrutinize the evidence as well as hear and weigh the evidentiary value of the testimonies of the ordinary witnesses and expert witnesses presented by the parties.

Finally, the CA properly dismissed petitioner’s petition. As a general rule, the denial of a motion to dismiss, which is an interlocutory order, is not reviewable by certiorari. Petitioner’s remedy is to reiterate the grounds in his motion to dismiss, as
defenses in his answer to the petition for nullity of marriage, proceed trial and, in case of an adverse decision, appeal the decision in due time.
 Navy.
5. Nevertheless, the Circuit Court of Mobile County
rendered judgment granting appellant a decree of
divorce on April 9, 1941.
6. On July, 1941 — that is after securing a divorce from
plaintiff Salud R. Arca on April 9, 1941 — defendant
Alfredo Javier married Thelma Francis, an American
citizen
7. In 1949, Thelma Francis, defendant's American wife,
obtained a divorce from him and was granted.
8. Having retired from the United States Navy, defendant
Alfredo Javier returned to the Philippines on February
13, 1950.
9. After his arrival in the Philippines, armed with two
decrees of divorce — one against his first wife Salud R.
Arca and the other against him by his second wife
Thelma Francis — issued by the Circuit Court of Mobile
County, State of Alabama, USA, defendant Alfredo
Javier married Maria Odvina.
10. He was charged with bigamy by herein petitioner.
11. The petitioner also asks for support. She alleges that
since the divorce decree is not valid and therefore their
marriage was still intact, all his subsequent marriages
are bigamous and void.
12. The respondent argues that the divorce decrees
obtained in the US has valid effect here.
ISSUE:
Does the divorce decree of the first marriage have valid
effect in this jurisdiction?
Tenchavez vs. 1. Tenchavez and Escano, both of legal age, were
To give a court jurisdiction on the ground of the plaintiff's residence in the State or country of
the judicial forum, his residence must be bona fide. If a spouse leaves the family domicile
and goes to another State for the sole purpose of obtaining a divorce, and with no
intention of remaining, his residence there is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the
courts of the State
That respondent never intended to live there permanently is shown by the fact that after his
marriage to Thelma Francis in 1941, he moved to New York where he bought a house and lot,
and after his divorce from Thelma in 1949 and his retirement from the U.S. Navy, he returned
to the Philippines and married Maria Odvina of Naic,
REASON 2:
The courts in the Philippines can grant divorce only on the ground of adultery on the
part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband, and if the decree is
predicated on another ground, that decree cannot be enforced in this jurisdiction.
While the decisions of this court heretofore in refusing to recognize the validity of foreign
divorce has usually been expressed in the negative and have been based upon lack of
matrimonial domicile or fraud or collusion, we have not overlooked the provisions of the Civil
Code now enforced in these Islands. Article 9 thereof reads as follows:
"The laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition, and legal capacity of
persons, are binding upon Spaniards even though they reside in a foreign country."
"And Article 11, the last part of which reads
". . . prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts and their property, and those intended to
promote public order and good morals shall not be rendered without effect by any foreign laws
or judgments or by anything done or any agreements entered into a foreign country."
"It is therefore a serious question whether any foreign divorce, relating to citizens of the
Philippine Islands, will be recognized in this jurisdiction, except it be for a cause, and under
conditions for which the courts of the Philippine Islands would grant a divorce."
The courts in the Philippines can grant a divorce only on the ground of "adultery on the part of
the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband" as provided for under section 1 of Act No.
2710. The divorce decree in question was granted on the ground of desertion, clearly not a
cause for divorce under our laws.
The above pronouncement is sound as it is in keeping with the well known principle of Private
International Law which prohibits the extension of a foreign judgment, or the law affecting the
same, if it is contrary to the law or fundamental policy of the State of the forum. It is also in
keeping with our concept or moral values which has always looked upon marriage as an
institution. And such concept has actually crystallized in a more tangible manner when in the
new Civil Code our people, through Congress, decided to eliminate altogether our law relative
to divorce. Because of such concept we cannot but react adversely to any attempt to extend
here the effect of a decree which is not in consonance with our customs, morals, and
traditions.
Invalid
Escano clandestinely married (without the knowledge of
November 29, her parents) on 24 February 1948
1965 2. However, as of June, 1948 the newlyweds were
already estranged
3. On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband,
she applied for a passport, the application was
approved, and she left for the United States.
4. On 22 August 1950, she filed a verified complaint
for divorce against the herein plaintiff in the
Second Judicial District Court of the State of
Nevada in and for the County of Washoe, on the
ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in
character."
5. On 21 October 1950, a decree of divorce, "final
and absolute", was issued in open court by the
said tribunal.
6. On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an
American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada.
7. She acquired American citizenship on 8 August
1958.
8. But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the
proceedings at bar by a complaint against Vicenta
F. Escañoasking for a decree of legal separation
and one million pesos in damages.
9. Vicenta argued that the divorce from plaintiff
obtained in the US was valid and consequently,
her marriage to her present husband, Russell Leo
Moran was also valid.
ISSUE:
W/N the divorce decree obtained by Vicenta in Nevada is
valid here.
Van Dorn v. Petitioner, Alice Van Dorn, is a citizen of the Philippines.
Romillo Respondent, Richard Upton, is a US Citizen. They were
married in Hongkong and resided in the Philippines. Alice
(1985) and Richard were divorced in Nevada, US in 1982 and Alice
The valid marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escaño remained subsisting and
undissolved under Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce that the wife
sought and obtained from the Second Judicial District Court of Washoe County, State of
Nevada. At the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta Escaño, like her husband,
was still a Filipino citizen. She was then subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already in force at the time, expressly
provided:
Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity
of persons are binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad.
The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute divorce, quo ad
vinculo matrimonii; and in fact does not even use that term, to further emphasize its restrictive
policy on the matter, in contrast to the preceding legislation that admitted absolute divorce on
grounds of adultery of the wife or concubinage of the husband (Act 2710). Instead of divorce,
the present Civil Code only provides for legal separation (Title IV, Book 1, Arts. 97 to 108),
and, even in that case, it expressly prescribes that "the marriage bonds shall not be severed"
(Art. 106, subpar. 1).
For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign decree of
absolute divorce betiveen Filipino citizens could be a patent violation of the declared public
policy of the state, specially in view of the third paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code that
prescribes the following:
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for
their object public order, policy and good customs, shall not be rendered ineffective
by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon
in a foreign country.
From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant Pastor Tenchavez should have appeared
in the Nevada divorce court. Primarily because the policy of our law cannot be nullified by acts
of private parties (Civil Code,Art. 17, jam quot.); and additionally, because the mere
appearance of a non-resident consort cannot confer jurisdiction where the court
originally had none (Area vs. Javier, 95 Phil. 579).
From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a necessary consequence that in
this jurisdiction Vicenta Escaño's divorce and second marriage are not entitled to recognition
as valid; for her previous union to plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and
undissolved. It follows, likewise, that her refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her denial of
consortium and her desertion of her husband constitute in law a wrong caused through her
fault, for which the husband is entitled to the corresponding indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176).
Neither an unsubstantiated charge of deceit nor an anonymous letter charging immorality
against the husband constitute, contrary to her claim, adequate excuse. Wherefore, her
marriage and cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran is technically "intercourse with a person
not her husband" from the standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles plaintiff-appellant
Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation under our law, on the basis of adultery"
DIVORCE IS VALID.
RICHARD IS NO LONGER THE HUSBAND OF ALICE AND HAS NO RIGHT ON THE
LATTER'S BUSINESS.
 Remarried Theodore Van Dorn.
In 1983, Richard filed a case against Alice to order the latter
to render an accounting on her business, the Galleon Shop.
Richard argues that the business is their conjugal property
and that the court should give him the right to manage the
conjugal property. On the other hand, Alice argues that the
action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce
proceedings wherein respondent had acknowledged that he
and petitioner had "no community property" as of 1982.
Pilapil v. Petitioner (Imelda) is a Filipino citizen. Respondent (Erich)
Somera is a German National. They were married in Germany and
resided in the Philippines. 3 ½ years after the marriage,
(1989) respondent initiated a divorce proceeding in Germany.
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal
separation, support and separation of property.
In 1986, German court granted the divorce decree and the
custody of the child to petitioner. 5 months after the divorce
decree, respondent filed a case for adultery in Manila
alleging that petitioner had an affair with William Chia as
early as 1982.
Quita v. CA Fe Quita and Arturo Padlan, both Filipino were married in
1941. Fe sued Arturo for divorce in USA. In 1954, she
(1998) obtained a final judgment of divorce. 3 weeks after, she
married Feliz Tupaz but also got divorced. She then married
Wernimont.
Arturo died. Respondent, Blandina Padlan, claiming to be
surviving spouse, and their children prayed for appointment
as administrator of Arturo’s estate.
Trial Court ruled that Blandina is not the surviving spouse
citing Tenchavez v. Escaño which held that "a foreign
divorce between Filipino citizens sought and decreed after
the effectivity of the present Civil Code was not entitled to
recognition as valid in this jurisdiction. TC held that it is Fe
Quita who is the surviving spouse and entitled to the estate.
Llorente v. CA Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the
United States Navy. He married Paula Llorente in 1937. In
(2000) 1943, Lorenzo became a US Citizen. However, when he
returned to the Philippines to visit his family, he discovered
that Paula was living with Ceferino Llorente and was
pregnant. Lorenzo went back to the US and filed for divorce
which was granted in 1952.
Lorenzo returned to the Philippines and married Alicia in
Pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which
validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is
estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged
conjugal property.
Owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law.
COMPLAINT DISMISSED.
RESPONDENT IS NO LONGER THE HUSBAND OF PETITIONER WHEN THE
COMPLAINT IS FILED.
Crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except
upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It is indispensable that the
status and capacity of the complainant to commence the action be definitely established and
such status or capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action.
The rule is that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right
to institute proceedings against the offenders where the statute provides that the innocent
spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery. Where, however,
proceedings have been properly commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can have no
legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a conclusion.
REMANDED TO THE TRIAL COURT FOR RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE
HEREDITARY RIGHTS OF PETITIONER.
Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they
are valid according to their national law.
Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, petitioner
could very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo. Hence, case was remanded to trial court to
receive evidence on citizenship of Petitioner when she obtained the divorce.
DIVORCE IS VALID.
REMANDED TO TRIAL COURT TO DETERMINE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL AND
RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE OF THE FOREIGN LAW.
Lorenzo became an American citizen long before and at the time of: (1) his divorce from
Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death.
Divorce obtained by Lorenzo from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this
jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the
 1958. Alicia had no knowledge of the first marriage even if
they resided in the same town as Paula, who did not
oppose the marriage or cohabitation. Lorenzo left a will
bequeathing his property to Alicia and their children.
Garcia v. Roderick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson,
Recio an Australian citizen. They resided in Australia. In 1989, a
decree of divorce was issued by Australian Family Court.
(2001)
Respondent became an Australian citizen in 1992. He
married Petitioner in 1994. However, in 1995, the two lived
separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage
but their conjugal assets were divided in 1996 in
accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in
Australia.
In 1998, Petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage on the ground of Bigamy alleging that
Respondent had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he
married her in 1994. Also in 1998, Respondent was able to
secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney,
Australia.
RP v. The Orbecidos had a valid marriage in the Philippines when
Orbecido they were both Filipinos. The wife left for US, was
(2005) naturalized, obtained a divorce decree allowing her to
remarry and thereafter married an American. Respondent
husband sought authority to remarry from the Court.
Corpuz v. Sto. Husband is a naturalized Canadian. He married a Filipino
Tomas but found that she was cheating on him. He got a divorce
(2010) decree and desiring to marry another Filipina, he sought to
have the foreign divorce decree recognized. The RTC
denied the petition.
Llave v. Muslim Sen. Tamano married Zorayda (first wife) before the
Republic effectivity of the Muslim Code in a civil ceremony. He
(2011) married Estrellita during the effectivity of the Muslim Code
in both civil and Muslim rites.
estate of the decedent) are matters best left to the determination of the trial court.
As to the validity of the will, the intrinsic validity and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues
best proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was
executed in accordance with the formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine
law.
REMANDED TO RECEIVE EVIDENCE TO SHOW RESPONDENT’S LEGAL CAPACITY TO
MARRY PETITIONER AND IN FAILING THAT, DECLARE THEIR MARRIAGE VOID ON
THE GROUND OF BIGAMY.
Divorce is a question of fact. A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our
jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner.
However, the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who
obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws
and judgments; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of
the alien must be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence.
Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be
presented and admitted in evidence. The best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself.
The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a
foreign country.
The Filipino spouse can remarry.
In Quita, which shared a similar factual pattern with this case, the Court hinted, by way of
obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married
under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the
time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them
becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse
should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage.
The alien spouse can claim no right under the 2 nd par. of Article 26 of the FC as the
substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse.
The provision was included in the law to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse. The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his
or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. This action is not
limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree
capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is
likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. However, no Philippine court can make a
similar declaration for the alien spouse, whose status and legal capacity are generally
governed by his national law.
Sen. Tamano's subsequent marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio.
The Civil Code governs the marriage of Zorayda and the late Sen. Tamano; their marriage
was never invalidated by PD 1083. Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to

Ilupa v. Ilupa filed a complaint against Clerk of Court Abdullah for
Abdullah having issued a certificate of divorce. He claims the divorce
(2011) is not allowed in this country and that Abdullah had a
personal interest in his wife.
Kalaw v. Husband and wife got married in Hongkong. They were
Fernandez separated de facto and husband began to live with another
(2011) woman and had children out of the marriage. Years later,
the husband filed a petition under Art. 36 claiming that his
wife is psychologically incapacitated. The RTC granted the
petition and declared the marriage void ab initio.
"marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a
Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any
part of the Philippines." But we already ruled in GR. No. 126603 that "Article 13 of PD 1083
does not provide for a situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites."
Complaint is devoid of merit. The issuance of a certificate of divorce is within the
respondent’s duties, as defined by Arts. 81 and 83 of the Muslim Code.
If both parties are Muslims, there is a presumption that the Muslim Code or Muslim law is
complied with. If together with it or in addition to it, the marriage is likewise solemnized in
accordance with the Civil Code of the Philippines, in a so-called combined Muslim-Civil
marriage rites whichever comes first is the validating rite and the second rite is merely
ceremonial one. But, in this case, as long as both parties are Muslims, this Muslim Code will
apply. In effect, two situations will arise, in the application of this Muslim Code or Muslim law,
that is, when both parties are Muslims and when the male party is a Muslim and the marriage
is solemnized in accordance with Muslim Code or Muslim law. A third situation occur[s] when
the Civil Code of the Philippines will govern the marriage and divorce of the parties, if the
male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with the Civil Code.
The RTC ruling lacks legal and factual bases.
Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to
assume the basic marital obligations. A finding of psychological incapacity must be supported
by well-established facts. It is the plaintiff's burden to convince the court of the existence of
these facts. The plaintiff must prove that the incapacitated party, based on his or her actions
or behavior, suffers a serious psychological disorder that completely disables him or her from
understanding and discharging the essential obligations of the marital state. The
psychological problem must be grave, must have existed at the time of marriage, and must be
incurable. Petitioner's allegations, which served as the bases or underlying premises of the
conclusions of his experts, were not actually proven. [Note: There was no discussion relevant
to foreign marriages.]

VI. Effects of Defective Marriage

VII. Rules on Forfeiture of the Share of the Guilty Spouse

QUIAO V. Respondent Rita C. Quiao filed a complaint for
QUIAO legal separation against petitioner Brigido B.
(2012) Quiao. RTC rendered a Decision declaring the
legal separation of the spouses. RTC ordered that
their properties be divided equally between them
subject to the respective legitimes of their children
and the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities of
[P]45,740.00. Moreover, the RTC ordered that
Brigido’s share of the net profits earned by the
conjugal partnership be forfeited in favor of their
common children.
Article 129 of the Family Code applies to the present case since the parties' property relation is
governed by the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains.
In other words, the computation and the succession of events will follow the provisions under Article
129 of the Family Code. As to the definition of “net profits,” Article 102(4) of the Family Code is
noted, since it expressly provides that for purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture
under Article 43, No. (2) and Article 63, No. (2), Article 102(4) applies. In this provision, net profits
“shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the time of the
celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution.” Thus, Article 102(4)
applies to both the dissolution of the absolute community regime under Article 102 of the Family
Code, and to the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime under Article 129 of the Family
Code. The difference lies in the processes used under the dissolution of the absolute community
regime under Article 102 of the Family Code, and in the processes used under the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership regime under Article 129 of the Family Code.

VIII. When there is Delivery of the Presumptive Legitiimes

BUENAVENTUR Noel Buenaventura filed a petition for declaration of
A V. COURT OF nullity of his marriage to his wife Isabel on the
APPEALS ground that both he and his wife were
(2005) psychologically incapacitated. The RTC declared
the marriage null and void and ordered the
liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership
property; ordered petitioner a regular support in
favor of his son in the amount of 15,000 monthly,
subject to modification as the necessity arises, and
awarded the care and custody of the minor to his
mother. Buenaventura appealed before the CA.
While the appeal was pending, the CA, upon
respondent’s motion issued a resolution increasing
the support pendants like to P20, 000. The CA
affirmed the RTC decision.
DIÑO V. DIÑO Alain Diño and Ma. Caridad Diño got married on 14
(2011) January 1998. On 30 May 2001, Alain filed an
action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against
Caridad citing psychological incapacity under Art.
36 of the FC. Petitioner alleged that respondent
failed in her marital obligation to give love and
support to him, and had abandoned her
responsibility to the family, choosing instead to go
on shopping sprees and gallivanting with her
friends that depleted the family assets. The trial
court granted the petition and declared their
marriage void ab initio.
YU V. REYES- A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage was
CARPIO filed by Eric U. Yu against Caroline T. Yu. The
(2011) issue in this case is the procedure to be followed
as regards the reception of evidence on the issues
of property relations, custody and support.
Petitioner Eric opposes the fact that the main issue
on declaration of nullity was submitted for decision
in the RTC when he has not yet presented
evidence on the issues on property relations,
custody and support.
RTC Judge Reyes-Carpio explained that it is more
prudent to rule first on the petitioner’s petition and
respondent’s counter-petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage on the ground of each other’s
psychological incapacity to perform their respective
marital obligations. If the Court eventually finds that
the parties’ respective petitions for declaration of
nullity of marriage is indeed meritorious on the
basis of either or both of the parties’ psychological
incapacity, then the parties shall proceed to comply
Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage, the provisions of
Article 50 in relation to Articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code, providing for the dissolution of the
absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case may be, do not apply. Rather, the
general rule applies, which is that in case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the property regime
applicable and to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-ownership.
Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found, both by the trial court
and the Court of Appeals, to have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be
covered by the co-ownership. No fruits of a separate property of one of the parties appear to have
been included or involved in said distribution. The liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties owned in common by the parties herein as ordered by the court a quo should, therefore,
be sustained, but on the basis of co-ownership and not of the regime of conjugal partnership of
gains.
Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the property relations between petitioner and respondent.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present: (1) The man
and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other; (2) They live exclusively with each other
as husband and wife; and (3)Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.
In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 36 of the Family
Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in
common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership.
The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in
accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code,
"[p]artition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x." It is not
necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity
of marriage.
Judge Reyes-Carpio did not deny the reception of evidence on custody, support, and property
relations but merely deferred it, based on the existing rules issued by this Court, to a time when a
decision granting the petition is already at hand and before a final decree is issued.
Conversely, the trial court, or more particularly the family court, shall proceed with the liquidation,
partition and distribution, custody, support of common children, and delivery of their presumptive
legitimes upon entry of judgment granting the petition. And following the pertinent provisions of the
Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, this act is undoubtedly consistent with Articles
50 and 51 of the Family Code, contrary to what petitioner asserts.
Particularly, Arts. 50 and 51 of the Family Code state:
Article 50. x x x
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of
the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the
delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in the previous
judicial proceedings.
xxxx
Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children, computed
as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or
sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had already provided
for such matters.
 with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code before
a final decree of absolute nullity of marriage can be
issued

IX. Legal Separation

1. Grounds for legal separation

KALAW V. (supra) The Court finds no factual basis for the conclusion of psychological incapacity. What transpired
FERNANDEZ between the parties is acrimony and, perhaps, infidelity, which may have constrained them from
(2011) dedicating the best of themselves to each other and to their children. There may be grounds for legal
separation, but certainly not psychological incapacity that voids a marriage.

Petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers from psychological incapacity. He
presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses were premised on the alleged
acts or behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven.

A fair assessment of the facts would show that respondent was not totally remiss and incapable of
appreciating and performing her marital and parental duties. Not once did the children state that they
were neglected by their mother. On the contrary, they narrated that she took care of them, was
around when they were sick, and cooked the food they like. It appears that respondent made real
efforts to see and take care of her children despite her estrangement from their father. There was no
testimony whatsoever that shows abandonment and neglect of familial duties.

2. Defenses in actions for legal separation

Lapuz v. Carmen filed a petition for legal separation againstMacario cannot substitute the deceased and case should be dismissed.
Eufemio her husband Eufemio for the latter’s cohabitation with
another woman. Before the trial could be completed, An action for legal separation is purely personal. Being personal in character, it follows that the death
(1972) Carmen died in a vehicular accident. of on party to the action causes the death of the action itself – actio personalis moritur cum persona.

Macario, father and heir of Carmen, sought to

substitute the deceased.
Matubis v. Socorro married Zoilo. They failed to agree on how to Complaint is dismissed for being filed out of time.
Praxedes live as husband and wife. They agreed to live
separately and executed an agreement towards theArticle 102 of the new Civil Code provides:
(1960) same. In the agreement, they barred all claims An action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one year from and after the date on which
against each other arising from concubinage, adulterythe plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from after the date when cause
and support. occurred.
The complaint was filed outside the periods provided for by the above Article.
Zoilo cohabited with Asuncion. Socorro discovered
this in January 1955. She filed complaint on April
1956.

(a) Consent

Matubis v. Socorro married Zoilo. They failed to agree on how to Complaint is dismissed also because Socorro consented to cohabitation.
Praxedes live as husband and wife. They agreed to live
separately and executed an agreement towards theThe law (Art. 100 Civil Code), specifically provides that legal separation may be claimed only by the
(1960) same. In the agreement, they barred all claimsinnocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or
against each other arising from concubinage, adulteryconcubinage. Having condoned and/or consented in writing, the plaintiff is now undeserving of the
and support. court's sympathy

Zoilo cohabited with Asuncion. Socorro discovered

this in January 1955. She filed complaint on April
1956.
People v. Ursula and Mariano were married with one child.Case is dismissed as Mariano consented to the adulterous relations.
Sansano Mariano left his wife and child for 3 years without
writing or sending them support. Ursula and her childUnder Art. 344, the offended part in crimes of adultery and concubinage cannot institute criminal
(1933) were taken in by another man named Marcelo. prosecution if he shall have consented. By his conduct and seven years of acquiescence, he is not
authorized by law to institute the criminal proceedings.
Mariano returned and successfully filed charges for
adultery against Ursula and Marcelo. After serving
sentence, Ursula begged Mariano’s pardon. He told
her to do whatever she liked and abandoned them
again for 7 years. Ursula went back to cohabiting with
Marcelo. Mariano returned and filed another
complaint for adultery.
People v. Rodolfo married Elena. After 7 years, they agreed to Rodolfo should be acquitted because Elena consented to his act.
Schneckenberg live separately due to incompatibility. They executed
er an agreement (in Spanish) to that effect. The document executed by and between the accused and the complaint in which they agreed to be "en
completa libertad de accion en cualquier acto y en todos conceptos," while illegal for the purpose for
(1941) Rodolfo obtained an invalid divorce decree from which it was executed, constitutes nevertheless a valid consent to the act of concubinage. This
Chihuaha, Mexico and contracted marriage with Julia.operates, within the plain language and manifest policy of the law, to bar the offended party from
He was prosecuted for concubinage. prosecuting the offense.

(b) Condonation

Ginez v Husband Bugayong was married to Ginez. While on Condonation is the conditional forgiveness or remission of one party of a matrimonial offense which the
Bugayong military duty, husband received letters informing him other party committed.
of his wife’s infidelities. He sought his wife and after
(1956) finding her, they lived together as husband and wife The only general rule in American jurisprudence is that any cohabitation with the guilty party, after the
for two nights and one day. The night after, they commission of the offense, and with the knowledge or belief on the part of the injured party of its
continued to live together but the next day, when he commission, will amount to conclusive evidence of condonation; but this presumption may be rebutted
questioned her about her illicit affairs, she desertedby evidence
him. He took this as confirmation of her infidelities. On
November, he filed a complaint for legal separation. American doctrines:
The court ordered the dismissal of the action based
on his condonation of his wife’s acts. • Single voluntary act of marital intercourse between the parties ordinarily is sufficient to
constitute condonation, and where the parties live in the same house, it is presumed that they
live on terms of matrimonial cohabitation.

• A divorce suit will not be granted for adultery where the parties continue to live together after it
was known or there is sexual intercourse after knowledge of adultery or sleeping together for a
single night. The resumption of marital cohabitation as a basis of condonation will generally be
inferred, nothing appearing to the contrary, from the fact of the living together as husband and
wife, especially as against the husband.

There is no ruling on this matter in our jurisprudence but we have no reason to depart from the
 doctrines laid down in the decisions of the various supreme courts of the United States above quoted.

(c) Recrimination

Brown v Brown alleges that while he was interned by the His petition cannot prosper for two reasons: (1) prescriptive period is over since he learned of his wife’s
Yambao Japanese from 1942 to 1945, his wife had engaged inrelations in 1945 and only filed a complaint after ten years; and (2) His cohabitation with another
adulterous relationships from which she begot a child.woman bars him from claiming legal separation. Failure of the wife to set up a defense may be
(1957) He learned of it after his release. From then on they considered circumstantial evidence of collusion between them. Consent and connivance no longer
decided to live separately from each other and need to be proven there being two established statutory grounds to grant the decree of legal
executed, to this effect, an agreement liquidating separation.
conjugal partnership, even giving the erring wife a
share. On July, he filed a suit for legal separation
praying for confirmation of said agreement, custodial
rights and disqualification of wife from succession of
plaintiff. Her wife was declared in default for not
having answered on time. When cross-examined by
the assistant city fiscal, it was revealed however that
Brown, after the liberation from the internment, had
also lived with another woman with whom he has
begotten children. The court refused to grant the
petition on the basis of prescription, commission of
similar offense by petitioner, and involvement of
consent and connivance.
Ong v Ong Wife Lucita filed a Complaint for Legal Separation 1Also without merit is the argument of William that since Lucita has abandoned the family, a decree of
alleging that her life with husband William was legal separation should not be granted, following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code which provides
(2006) marked by physical violence, threats, intimidation andthat legal separation shall be denied when both parties have given ground for legal separation. The
grossly abusive conduct. abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without justifiable cause for more than
one year.40 As it was established that Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct, such does not
Husband countered that Lucita abandoned theirconstitute abandonment contemplated by the said provision.
family hence the petition should be denied.

(d) Collusion/Mutual Consent

Brown v (supra) Collusion in matrimonial cases being "the act of married persons in procuring a divorce by mutual
Yambao consent, whether by preconcerted commission by one of a matrimonial offense, or by failure, in
pursuance of agreement to defend divorce proceedings.
Ocampo v Jose Ocampo was married to Florenciano and hadCollusion in divorce or legal separation means the agreement between husband and wife for one of
Florenciano several children together. Husband discovered onthem to commit, or to appear to commit, or to be represented in court as having committed, a
several occasions that his wife was having illicitmatrimonial offense, or to suppress evidence of a valid defense, for the purpose of enabling the other
(1960) relations with one Jose Arcalas and one Nestor to obtain a divorce. This agreement, if not express, may be implied from the acts of the parties. It is a
Orzame. Husband filed a petition for legal separation. ground for denying the divorce.
Because the wife did not answer the charge, the RTC
declared her in default. The CA, held that aIn this case, there would be collusion if the parties had arranged to make it appear that a matrimonial
confession of judgment on the part of the wife offense had been committed although it was not, or if the parties had connived to bring about a legal
agreeing with the husband signified collusion between separation even in the absence of grounds therefor.
the parties and thus bars the right to procuring a
separation. Here, the offense of adultery had really taken place, according to the evidence.

Collusion may not be inferred from the mere fact that the guilty party confesses to the offense and thus
enables the other party to procure evidence necessary to prove it.

Espinosa v Bar Discipline case about a lawyer that facilitated theAs to Collusion/Mutual Consent:
Omana execution of a document entitled “Kasunduan ng
Paghihiwalay” between spouses Espinsa andExtrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial approval is void. A notary public
(2011) subsequently notarized the same.
Spouses filed the instant case after finding out that case.
their contract of separation was void.
3. Court procedure in legal separation
4. Effect of pendency of the petition
5. Effects of decree of legal separation
6. Reconciliation
7. Effects of reconciliation
X. Rights and Obligations of Spouses
1. General rule and exceptions
Goitia vs This is an action by the wife against her husband
Campos-Rueda for support outside of the conjugal domicile. The
wife left the husband after about a month of
(1916) cohabitation because he “demanded of her that
she perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his
genital organs” The husband argued that he cannot
be compelled to support the plaintiff, except in his
own house, unless it be by virtue of a judicial
decree granting her a divorce or separation from
the defendant.
Arroyo vs The wife left the common home and lived
Vasquez-Arroyo separately from the husband. The husband
initiated the action to compel her to return to the
(1921) matrimonial home and live with him as a dutiful
wife.
Proof that the defendant desires the divorce and makes no defense, is not by itself collusion.
should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the
spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal partnership, which is exactly what Omaña did in this
Citing Selanova v. Judge Mendoza, other cases where the lawyer was sanctioned for notarizing similar
documents as the contract in this case:
“notarizing a document between the spouses which permitted the husband to take a concubine and
allowed the wife to live with another man, without opposition from each other; ratifying a document
entitled “Legal Separation” where the couple agreed to be separated from each other mutually and
voluntarily, renouncing their rights and obligations, authorizing each other to remarry, and renouncing
any action that they might have against each other;preparing a document authorizing a married couple
who had been separated for nine years to marry again, renouncing the right of action which each may
have against the other; and preparing a document declaring the conjugal partnership dissolved”
Husband can be compelled to provide support.
The husband who is obliged to support his wife may, at his option, do so by paying her a fixed pension
or by receiving and maintaining her in his own home. May the husband, on account of his conduct
toward his wife, lose this option and be compelled to pay the pension. But the option is not so absolute
as to prevent cases being considered wherein, either because this right would be opposed to the
exercise of a preferential right or because of the existence of some justifiable cause morally opposed to
the removal of the party enjoying the maintenance, the right of selection must be understood as being
thereby restricted.
We are unable to hold that Mariano B. Arroyo in this case is entitled to the unconditional and absolute
order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile, which is sought in the petitory part of the
complaint; though he is, without doubt, entitled to a judicial declaration that his wife has absented
herself without sufficient cause and that it is her duty to return.
It is not within the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to
cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the property rights of one of the
pair are invaled, an action for restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are disinclined to
sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the

Ilusorio vs Erlinda and Potenciano got married and lived
Bildner together for 30 years. On May 31, 1998, after
attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City,
(2000) Potenciano Ilusorio did not return to Antipolo City
and instead lived at Cleveland Condominium,
Makati. On March 11, 1999, Erlinda filed with the
Court of Appeals a petition for habeas corpus to
have the custody of lawyer Potenciano
2. Designation of domicile
3. Joint management of family life
4. Joint obligation to support
SSS vs De los Antonio and Gloria were married in 1964. Less
Santos than one (1) year after, Gloria left Antonio and
contracted another marriage with a certain
(2008) Domingo Talens in Nueva Ecija. Sometime in
1969, Gloria went back to Antonio and lived with
him until 1983. They had 3 children.
In 1983, Gloria left Antonio and went US. On May
8, 1986, she filed for divorce against Antonio with
the Superior Court of Orange, Sta. Ana, California.
On May 21, 1983, she executed a document
waiving all her rights to their conjugal properties
and other matters. The divorce was granted on
November 5, 1986.
On May 23, 1987, Antonio married Cirila. He also
amended his records in the SSS and designated
another beneficiary in place of Gloria.
Upon Antonio’s death, Gloria filed a claim with the
SSS (denied)
5. The right to exercise a profession or calling
6. Related rights/obligations
Yasin vs Hatima Yasin filed a petition to resume the use of
Shariah Court her maiden name. She was divorced in accordance
with Islamic law. The Sharia’h court denied the
(1995) petition saying that Hatima did not follow the
procedure in Rule 103 of the ROC for change of
name.
Issue: Whether or not in the case of annulment of
marriage, or divorce under the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines, and the husband
is married again to another woman and the former
desires to resume her maiden name or surname, is
she required to file a petition for change of name
and comply with the formal requirements of Rule
103 of the Rules of Court.
restitution of the purely personal rights of consortium.
Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may not be enforced by the extra-
ordinary writ of habeas corpus.
No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture
cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other
mesne process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman’s free
choice.
AN ESTRANGED wife who was not dependent upon her deceased husband for support is not qualified
to be his beneficiary.
As found by both the SSC and the CA, the divorce obtained by respondent against the deceased
Antonio was not binding in this jurisdiction. Under Philippine law, only aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law. The divorce was obtained by respondent
Gloria while she was still a Filipino citizen and thus covered by the policy against absolute divorces. It
did not sever her marriage ties with Antonio.
However, although Gloria was the legal spouse of the deceased, We find that she is still disqualified to
be his primary beneficiary under the SS Law. She fails to fulfill the requirement of dependency upon her
deceased husband Antonio. Although a husband and wife are obliged to support each other, whether
one is actually dependent for support upon the other cannot be presumed from the fact of marriage
alone. A wife who left her family until her husband died and lived with other men, was not dependent
upon her husband for support, financial or otherwise, during the entire period.
No.
While it is true that under Article 376 of the Civil Code, no person can change his name or surname
without judicial authority, nonetheless, the only name that may be changed is the true and official name
recorded in the Civil Register.
In the instant petition, petitioner does not seek to change her registered maiden name but, instead,
prays that she be allowed to resume the use of her maiden name in view of the dissolution of her
marriage to Hadji Idris Yasin, by virtue of a decree of divorce granted in accordance with Muslim law.
Even under the Civil Code, the use of the husband's surname during the marriage (Art. 370, Civil
Code), after annulment of the marriage (Art. 371, Civil Code) and after the death of the husband (Art.
373, Civil Code) is permissive and not obligatory except in case of legal separation (Art. 372, Civil
Code).
When a woman marries a man, she need not apply and/or seek judicial authority to use her husband's
name by prefixing the word "Mrs." before her husband's full name or by adding her husband's surname
to her maiden first name. The law grants her such right (Art. 370, Civil Code). Similarly, when the
marriage ties or vinculum no longer exists as in the case of death of the husband or divorce as
authorized by the Muslim Code, the widow or divorcee need not seek judicial confirmation of the
change in her civil status in order to revert to her maiden name as the use of her former husband's

XI. Property Relations of the Spouses
A. Marriage settlements
1. Form & registration requirement
Valencia v. The spouses Locquiao executed a deed of
Loquiao donation propter nuptias which was written in the
Ilocano dialect, denominated as Inventario Ti Sagut
(2003) in favor of their son, respondent Benito Locquiao
and his bride giving them the contested land
However, upon their death, petitioner Romana, one
of their children, alleged that the donation did not
observe the form required by law as there was no
written acceptance on the document itself or in a
separate public instrument.
2. Donations propter nuptias
Solis v. Solis The spouses Lambino executed a donation of
propter nuptias of land to their son Alejo and his
(1928) bride in a private document.
One of the conditions of this donation is that in
case of the death of one of the donees, one-half of
these lands thus donated would revert to the
donors while the surviving donee would retain the
other half.
On the same year both their son Alejo and his
father,the donor Juan died. After the latter's death,
his wife, Maxima Barroso, recovered possession of
the donated lands.
The surviving done filed an action to recover the ½
land transferred to her.
Mateo v Lagua The spouses Lagua donated a parcel of land to
their son in consideration of his marriage to
Bonifacia Mateo.
(1969) However, the other children of the spouses Lagua
name is optional and not obligatory for her
The donation propter nuptias is valid.
Unlike ordinary donations, donations propter nuptias or donations by reason of marriage are those
"made before its celebration, in consideration of the same and in favor of one or both of the future
spouses.
Under the Old Civil Code, donations propter nuptias must be made in a public instrument in which the
property donated must be specifically described. However, Article 1330 of the same Code provides that
"acceptance is not necessary to the validity of such gifts". In other words, the celebration of the
marriage between the beneficiary couple, in tandem with compliance with the prescribed form, was
enough to effectuate the donation propter nuptias under the Old Civil Code.
Under the Civil Code, Article 127 provides that the form of donations propter nuptias are regulated by
the CC 1403 (Statute of Frauds). Article 1403 (2) requires that the contracts mentioned need be in
writing only to be enforceable. However, as provided in Article 129, express acceptance "is not
necessary for the validity of these donations." Thus, implied acceptance is sufficient.
It is settled that only laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract are applicable and not later
statutes, unless the latter are specifically intended to have retroactive effect. Thus the Old Civil Code
which does not require acceptance is applicable. Even if the Civil Code applies, implied acceptance of
a donation propter nuptias suffices.
The donation propter nuptias is not valid.
A donation propter nuptias is governed by the rules on donations. Under Civil Code, it must be made in
a public instrument in order to be valid. Since the donation was made in a private instrument the
donation is invalid.
A donation propter nuptias cannot be considered as an onerous contract.
In donations propter nuptias, the marriage is really a consideration, but not in the sense of being
necessary to give birth to the obligation. This may be clearly inferred from article 1333, which makes
the fact that the marriage did not take place a cause for the revocation of such donations, thus taking it
for granted that there may be a valid donation propter nuptias, even without marriage, since that which
has not existed cannot be revoked. And such a valid donation would be forever valid, even if the
marriage never took place, if the proper action for revocation were not instituted, or if it were instituted
after the lapse of the statutory period of prescription. This is, so because the marriage in a donation
propter nuptias is rather a resolutory condition which, as such, presupposes the existence of the
obligation which may be resolved or revoked, and it is not a condition necessary for the birth of the
obligation.
The TC did not lose jurisdiction over the case. The Civil Code is still the applicable law.
The Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect since its application will prejudice the vested right of
the Aruego and his sister to be recognized as illegitimate children.
 allege that the donation was inofficious since it
prejudiced their legitime.
3. Parties to a marriage settlement
4. Which law governs property relations
5. Void donation by the spouses
Matabuena v Felix Matabuena donated a piece of lot to his
Cervantes common-law spouse, Petronila Cervantes. This
was executed six years before their marriage.
(1971)
Upon Felix’ death, his sister, filed a claim over the
property alleging that the donation was invalid
since it was between spouses.
Sumbad v CA When Agata Tait died in 1936, her husband
George Tait Sr., lived in common-law relationship
(1999) with Maria Tait to whom he donated land to in
1974. George died in 1977 and Maria died in 1988.
The following year, Emilie Sumbad and Beatrice
Tait sought an action for quieting of title,
nullification of the deed of sale, and recovery of
possession of damages by virtue of being
compulsory heirs of George’s first marriage to
Agata. They allege that Maria sold the lots included
in the property to Okoren, et. al., despite warning
the respondents that Maria was not the real owner
of the property.
Petitioners argue that the deed of donation
contravenes Art. 133 of the Civil Code which
provides:
Art. 133. Every donation between the
spouses during the marriage shall be void.
Xxx
SSS v Davac Davac was an SSS member who designated his
alleged wife Candelaria as his beneficiary.
(1966) When he died, both his first wife, Lourdes and his
second wife, Candelaria filed claims for the death
Jurisdiction of a court, once attached, cannot be ousted by subsequent events, although of a character
which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance.
The donation is not valid.
While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation between the spouses during marriage,
policy consideration of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality requires that the
same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship.
As stated in Buenaventura vs. Bautista (50 OG 3679, 1954), if the policy of the law is to prohibit
donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper
pressure and influence upon the donor, then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy
to persons living together as husband and wife without the benefit of nuptials.
The lack of validity of the donation by the deceased to appellee does not necessarily result in appellant
having exclusive right to the disputed property. As a widow, Cervantes is entitled to one-half of the
inheritance, and the surviving sister to the other half.
Donation valid. No violation of Art. 133 (not FC Art. 87)
In Matabuena v. Cervantes that the prohibition in Art. 133 extends to common-law relations. Indeed, it
is now provided in Art. 87 of the Family Code:
Art. 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect between the spouses during
the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give the spouses may give
each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall apply to persons living together
as husband and wife without a valid marriage. (Emphasis added).
This point is being raised for the first time in this Court. Time and again, this Court has ruled that
litigants cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal as this would contravene the basic rules of fair
play and justice. Even assuming that they are not thus precluded, petitioners were unable to present
evidence in support of such a claim. The evidence on record does not show whether George K. Tait,
Sr. was married to Maria F. Tait and, if so, when the marriage took place. If, as petitioner claim, Maria
F. Tait was not married to their father, evidence should have been presented to show that at the time
the deed of donation was executed, their father and Maria F. Tait were still maintaining common-law
relations. Beatrice Tait's testimony is only to the effect that in 1941 Maria F. Tait became their
stepmother. There is no evidence on record that George K. Tait, Sr. and Maria F. Tait continuosly
maintained common-law relations until April 2, 1974 when the donation was made.
Designation of second wife was valid. No violation of Art. 739.
Without deciding whether the naming of a beneficiary of the benefits accruing from membership in the
Social Security System is a donation, or that it creates a situation analogous to the relation of an
insured and the beneficiary under a life insurance policy, it is enough, for the purpose of the instant
 benefits.
The appellant contends that the designation made
in the person of the second and bigamous wife is
null and void, because (1) it contravenes the
provisions of the Civil Code, and (2) it deprives the
lawful wife of her share in the conjugal property as
well as of her own and her child's legitime in the
inheritance. Appellant argues that a beneficiary
under the Social Security System partakes of the
nature of a beneficiary in life insurance policy and,
therefore, the same qualifications and
disqualifications should be applied. Article 739 and
2012 of the Civil Code prohibits persons who
cannot receive donations from being beneficiaries
of a policy.
Arcaba v When Francicsco’s wife died, having no children to
Tabancura take care of him after his retirement, he asked his
niece Leticia, the latter’s cousin Luzviminda and
petitioner Cirila Arcaba, to take care of his house
(2001) and store.
Conflicting testimonies were offered as to the
nature of the relationship between Cirila and
Francisco. Leticia said that the previous party were
lovers since they slept in the same room while
Erlinda claimed that Francisco told her that Cirila
was his mistress. On the other hand, Cirila said she
was mere helper and that Francisco was too old for
her.
A few months before Francisco’s death, he
executed an instrument denominated “Deed of
Donation Inter Vivos” in which he ceded a portion
of the lot together with is house to Cirila, who
accepted the donation in the same instrument. The
deed stated that the donation was being made in
consideration of the “faithful services she had
rendered over the past ten years.”
Thereafter, Francisco died and the respondents
filed a complaint against Cirila for declaration of
nullity of a deed of donation inter vivos, recovery of
possession and damages. Respondents, who are
nieces, nephews and heirs by intestate succession
of Francisco, alleged that Cirila was the common-
law wife of Francisco and the donation inert vivos is
void under Article 87 of the Family Code.
Ching v Children assail the validity of a contract of sale of
Goyanko property executed by their father, Goyanko, in favor
case, to state that the disqualification mentioned in Article 739 is not applicable to herein appellee
Candelaria Davac (2nd wife) because she was not guilty of concubinage, there being no proof that she
had knowledge of the previous marriage of her husband Petronilo
According to RA 1161, the beneficiary "as recorded" by the employee's employer is the one entitled to
the death benefits.
Donation void. Respondents having proven by a preponderance of evidence that Cirila and Francisco
lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the
donation made by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code.
"Cohabitation" or "living together as husband and wife" means not only residing under one roof, but also
having repeated sexual intercourse. Cohabitation, of course, means more than sexual intercourse,
especially when one of the parties is already old and may no longer be interested in sex. At the very
least, cohabitation is public assumption by a man and a woman of the marital relation, and dwelling
together as man and wife, thereby holding themselves out to the public as such. Secret meetings or
nights clandestinely spent together, even if often repeated, do not constitute such kind of cohabitation;
they are merely meretricious. In this jurisdiction, this Court has considered as sufficient proof of
common-law relationship the stipulations between the parties, a conviction of concubinage, or the
existence of legitimate children.
Was Cirila Francisco's employee or his common-law wife? Cirila admitted that she and Francisco
resided under one roof for a long time, It is very possible that the two consummated their relationship,
since Cirila gave Francisco therapeutic massage and Leticia said they slept in the same bedroom. At
the very least, their public conduct indicated that theirs was not just a relationship of caregiver and
patient, but that of exclusive partners akin to husband and wife.
Other indications that Cirila and Francisco were common-law spouses: documents apparently signed
by Cirila using the surname "Comille"( an application for a business permit to operate as a real estate
lessor, a sanitary permit to operate as real estate lessor with a health certificate, and the death
certificate of Francisco) Similarly, in the answer filed by Francisco's lessees in "Erlinda Tabancura, et
al. vs. Gracia Adriatico Sy and Antonio Sy," (for collection of rentals), these lessees referred to Cirila as
"the common-law spouse of Francisco." Finally, the fact that Cirila did not demand from Francisco a
regular cash wage is an indication that she was not simply a caregiver-employee, but Francisco's
common law spouse. She was, after all, entitled to a regular cash wage under the law.
Sale void.
 of his common-law-wife-herein petitioner Maria B.
(2006) Ching.
Sumbad v CA When Agata Tait died in 1936, her husband
George Tait Sr., lived in common-law relationship
(1999) with Maria Tait to whom he donated land to in
1974. George died in 1977 and Maria died in 1988.
The following year, Emilie Sumbad and Beatrice
Tait sought an action for quieting of title,
nullification of the deed of sale, and recovery of
possession of damages by virtue of being
compulsory heirs of George’s first marriage to
Agata. They allege that Maria sold the lots included
in the property to Okoren, et. al., despite warning
the respondents that Maria was not the real owner
of the property.
Petitioners argue that the deed of donation
contravenes Art. 133 of the Civil Code which
provides:
Art. 133. Every donation between the
spouses during the marriage shall be void.
Xxx
B. Absolute community of property (ACP)
1. When applicable
2. Commencement
3. Waiver during marriage
4. Waiver after marriage
5. Suppletory rules: Co-ownership
6. What constitutes ACP
(a) All property at the time of marriage
(b) Property acquired subsequently
(c) Winnings from gambling
The proscription against sale of property between spouses applies even to common law relationships.
Article 1409 of the Civil Code states inter alia that: contracts whose cause, object, or purposes is
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy are void and inexistent from the
very beginning.
Article 1352 also provides that: "Contracts without cause, or with unlawful cause, produce no effect
whatsoever. The cause is unlawful if it is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public
policy."
Additionally, the law emphatically prohibits the spouses from selling property to each other
subject to certain exceptions. Similarly, donations between spouses during marriage are
prohibited. And this is so because if transfers or conveyances between spouses were allowed during
marriage, that would destroy the system of conjugal partnership, a basic policy in civil law. It was also
designed to prevent the exercise of undue influence by one spouse over the other, as well as to protect
the institution of marriage, which is the cornerstone of family law. The prohibitions apply to a couple
living as husband and wife without benefit of marriage, otherwise, "the condition of those who
incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union.
As the conveyance in question was made by Goyangko in favor of his common- law-wife-herein
petitioner, it was null and void.
Donation valid. No violation of Art. 133 (not FC Art. 87)
In Matabuena v. Cervantes that the prohibition in Art. 133 extends to common-law relations. Indeed, it
is now provided in Art. 87 of the Family Code:
Art. 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect between the spouses during
the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give the spouses may give
each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall apply to persons living together
as husband and wife without a valid marriage. (Emphasis added).
This point is being raised for the first time in this Court. Time and again, this Court has ruled that
litigants cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal as this would contravene the basic rules of fair
play and justice. Even assuming that they are not thus precluded, petitioners were unable to present
evidence in support of such a claim. The evidence on record does not show whether George K. Tait,
Sr. was married to Maria F. Tait and, if so, when the marriage took place. If, as petitioner claim, Maria
F. Tait was not married to their father, evidence should have been presented to show that at the time
the deed of donation was executed, their father and Maria F. Tait were still maintaining common-law
relations. Beatrice Tait's testimony is only to the effect that in 1941 Maria F. Tait became their
stepmother. There is no evidence on record that George K. Tait, Sr. and Maria F. Tait continuosly
maintained common-law relations until April 2, 1974 when the donation was made.
 (d) Presumption of ACP
Muller v Muller Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and
respondent Helmut Muller were married in
(2006) Hamburg, Germany. The couple resided in
Germany at a house owned by respondent’s
parents but decided to move and reside
permanently in the Philippines in 1992. By this
time, respondent had inherited the house in
Germany from his parents which he sold and used
the proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in
Antipolo. The Antipolo property was registered in
the name of petitioner.
Due to incompatibilities and respondent’s alleged
womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment, the
spouses eventually separated. Respondent filed a
petition for separation of properties .
Respondent was aware of the constitutional prohibition and expressly admitted his knowledge thereof
to this Court. He declared that he had the Antipolo property titled in the name of petitioner because of
the said prohibition. His attempt at subsequently asserting or claiming a right on the said property
cannot be sustained.
As already observed, the finding that his wife had used her own money to purchase the property
cannot, and will not, at this stage of the proceedings be reviewed and overturned. But even if it were a
fact that said wife had used conjugal funds to make the acquisition, the considerations just set out to
militate, on high constitutional grounds, against his recovering and holding the property so acquired, or
any part thereof. And whether in such an event, he may recover from his wife any share of the money
used for the purchase or charge her with unauthorized disposition or expenditure of conjugal funds is
not now inquired into; that would be, in the premises, a purely academic exercise.

TC: court rendered a decision which terminated the

regime of absolute community of property between
the petitioner and respondent. It also decreed the
separation of properties between them and ordered
the equal partition of personal properties located
within the country, excluding those acquired by
gratuitous title during the marriage. With regard to
the Antipolo property, the court held that it was
acquired using paraphernal funds of the
respondent. However, it ruled that respondent
cannot recover his funds because the property was
purchased in violation of Section 7, Article XII of
the Constitution.
DE MESA v. Petitioners jointly bought the subject property in Respondent’s TCT may not be cancelled or nullified.
ACERO 1984, while they were merely cohabiting. Their
family home was later built, and the Petitioners got The property became a family home by operation of law when the Family Code took effect and was
married in 1987. thus prospectively exempt from execution.
(2012)
Respondent acquired the land by execution after However, while it is true that the family home is constituted on a house and lot from the time it is
winning a case against Petitioners. occupied as a family residence and is exempt from execution or forced sale, such claim for exemption
Respondent would later file a case for ejectment should be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction. Failure to do
against Petitioners, and the latter sought his TCT’s so would estop the party from later claiming the exemption.
cancellation.
PACIFIC ACE v. Respondent (Japanese) & Evelyn got married in Respondent has a cause of action in seeking annulment of the mortgage.
YANAGISAWA 1989. She purchased a townhouse.
Respondent filed for the declaration of nullity of his The defense that Respondent is a foreigner who cannot own real property does not negate his right to
marriage (in Makati). During its pendency, Evelyn & rely on the Order of the Makati RTC and to hold third persons to the annotations entered on the title.
(2012)
her lawyer voluntarily undertook not to dispose of The Makati RTC ruled on Respondent’s and Evelyn’s ownership rights over the townhouse, and
the properties during the pendency of the case; this embodied Evelyn’s commitment not to dispose of or encumber the property. The Paranaque RTC
was annotated to the TCT, cannot review this ruling, being a court of concurrent jurisdiction.
Evelyn obtained a loan from Petitioner and secured
it with a mortgage over the townhouse. RTC had,
at this time, dissolved their marriage and ordered
liquidation of the properties between them.
 Respondent found out about the mortgage, so he
filed for its annulment (in Paranaque).

7. What is excluded from ACP

ABRENICA v. Respondents filed 2 cases against Petitioner, and The properties do not form part of Petitioner-spouses’ absolute community of property.
ABRENICA he lost these cases, and his properties were levied
upon. Petitioner filed a motion alleging that the Art. 92, par. 3 of the Family Code excludes from the community property the property acquired before
sheriff had levied properties belonging to his the marriage of a spouse who has legitimate descendants by a former marriage; and the fruits and the
(2012)
children and Joena (second wife). Joena alleged, income, if any, of that property. The properties referred to herein do not belong the second marriage;
inter alia, that the house and lot levied formed part they belong to the first marriage, from which Joena’s stepchildren were born.
of the absolute community of property, and so she
should have been made a party-in-interest to the
proceedings.

8. Changes upon ACP

(a) Family expenses
(b) Debts of spouses
(c) Subsidiary liabilities
BUADO v. CA Petitioners filed a complaint for damages against The properties under their conjugal parternship cannot be levied upon, as the crime of slander did not
Erlinda, which originated from her civil liability from redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
(2009) the criminal offense of slander.
The contested property is conjugal in nature. Art. 122 of the Family Code provides that payment of
She was ordered to pay, and their properties were
personal debts contracted by the husband/wife before/during the marriage shall not be charged to the
executed upon, and Petitioners bought the same at conjugal partnership, except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.
public auction. In the system of absolute community, liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-
Her husband then filed a complaint for annulment delict is chargeable thereon. In the system of conjugal partnership of gains, in the absence or
of said sale. insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the same advantage is not accorded.

(d) Sole obligation of spouse

(e) Gambling losses
(f)Other changes

9. Administration and enjoyment of ACO

(a) Joint administration
YU BUN GUAN Petitioner (husband) and Respondent (wife) were The lot is Respondent’s paraphernal property.
v. ONG married in 1961, living together until he left them in
1992. Respondent was able to prove that the money she used to acquire the property was paraphernal (from
In 1968, Respondent bought a lot, and she “sold” her job and paraphernal property), that her parents were well off, and that she had bought several lots
(2011)
this to Petitioner who later failed to pay. before her marriage. Petitioner, on the other hand, was unable to prove the source of the money he
Petitioner filed a petition in to replace the title, alleged to have used to buy the property, flip-flopping between possible sources during his testimony.
alleging that it was lost. Respondent opposed.
DAR v. Legasto Private respondent Nenita Co Bautista filed a case In the instant case, the Court of Appeals should have taken into consideration the fact that the
for unlawful detainer against herein petitioners in petitioners were sued jointly, or as “Mr. and Mrs.” over a property in which they have a common
(2000) the Metropolitan Trial Court, Quezon City. They interest.
were sued as “Mr. and Mrs.” in the said case. The
CA dismissed the petition because while petitioners Such being the case, the signing of one of them in the certification substantially complies with the rule
Ronnie Dar, Randy Angeles, Joy Constantino and on certification of non-forum shopping.
Liberty Cruz signed the Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping, their respective spouses did not sign the
same. Petitioners now contend that since what is
involved in the instant case is their common rights
 and interest to abode under the system of absolute
community of property, either of the spouses can
sign the petition.

(b) Sole administration

(1) Incapacity
(2) Separation in fact
(3) Abandonment
(4) Pendency of legal separation proceeding
(c) Disposition and encumbrance
Matthews v. Respondent Benjamin A. Taylor (Benjamin), a Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease between Joselyn and petitioner.
Taylor British subject, married Joselyn C. Taylor (Joselyn), Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely prohibited from acquiring private and public lands in the
a 17-year old Filipina.4 On June 9, 1989, while their Philippines. Considering that Joselyn appeared to be the designated "vendee" in the Deed of Sale of
(2009) marriage was subsisting, Joselyn bought from said property, she acquired sole ownership thereto. This is true even if we sustain Benjamin’s claim that
Diosa M. Martin a 1,294 square-meter lot (Boracay he provided the funds for such acquisition. He had and has no capacity or personality to question the
property) situated at Manoc-Manoc, Boracay subsequent lease of the Boracay property by his wife on the theory that in so doing, he was merely
Island, Malay, Aklan, for and in consideration exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would
of P129,000.00.5 The sale was allegedly financed countenance indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be declared
by Benjamin. Benjamin and Joselyn had a falling conjugal, this would accord the alien husband a substantial interest and right over the land, as he would
out, and Joselyn ran away with Kim Philippsen. On then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not
June 8, 1992, Joselyn executed a Special Power of permit him to have.
Attorney (SPA) in favor of Benjamin, authorizing
the latter to maintain, sell, lease, and sub-lease
and otherwise enter into contract with third parties
with respect to their Boracay property. Joselyn as
lessor and petitioner Philip Matthews as lessee,
entered into an Agreement of Lease 10 (Agreement)
involving the Boracay property for a period of 25
years, with an annual rental
of P12,000.00. Claiming that the Agreement was
null and void since it was entered into by Joselyn
without his (Benjamin’s) consent, Benjamin
instituted an action for Declaration of Nullity of
Agreement of Lease with Damages11 against
Joselyn and the petitioner.

10. Effect of separation de facto

11. Effect of abandonment
12. Dissolution of ACP
(a) Death
Heirs of Go v. Protacio, Jr. executed an Affidavit of Renunciation The disposition by sale of a portion of the conjugal property by the surviving spouse without the prior
Gervacio and Waiver,1 whereby he affirmed under oath that it liquidation mandated by Article 130 of the Family Code is not necessarily void if said portion has not yet
was his father, Protacio Go, Sr. (Protacio, Sr.), not been allocated by judicial or extrajudicial partition to another heir of the deceased spouse.
(2011) he, who had purchased the two parcels of land (the
property). Protacio, Sr. and his son Rito B. Go sold The alienation made by the surviving spouse of a portion of the community property is not wholly void
a portion of the property Ester L. Servacio ab initio despite Article 103 of the Family Code, and shall be valid to the extent of what will be allotted,
(Servacio) for ₱5,686,768.00. The petitioners in the final partition, to the vendor. And rightly so, because why invalidate the sale by the surviving
demanded the return of the property but Servacio spouse of a portion of the community property that will eventually be his/her share in the final partition?
refused to heed their demand. The petitioners Practically there is no reason for that view and it would be absurd.
averred that following Protacio, Jr.’s renunciation,
the property became conjugal property; and that
 the sale of the property to Servacio without the
prior liquidation of the community property between
Protacio, Sr. and Marta was null and void

(b) Legal separation

(c) Annulment and declaration of nullity
(d) Judicial separation of property
Ugalde v. Ysasi Lorea de Ugalde (petitioner) and Jon de Ysasi The finality of the 6 June 1961 CFI Order in Civil Case No. 4791 resulted in the dissolution of the
(respondent) got married. Petitioner and petitioner and respondent’s conjugal partnership of gains in accordance with Article 175 of the Family
(2008) respondent agreed to have their conjugal Code.
partnership dissolved. The CFI approved this
Amicable Settlement. However, Jon married The Amicable Settlement had become final as between petitioner and respondent when it was
Victoria Eleanor Smith. Hence, on Lorea petitioned approved by the CFI on 6 June 1961. The CFI’s approval of the Compromise Agreement on 6 June
for the dissolution of their conjugal partnership. 1961 resulted in the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains between petitioner and respondent
Pending appeal in CA, a petition for Judicial on even date.
Declaration of Nullity of their Marriage was filed
and granted for lack of a marriage license. The
Certification of Nullity was issued.

13. Effects of dissolution

(a) Liquidation procedure
(b) For cause other than death
(c) Termination due to death
Buenaventura v. Noel Buenaventura filed a petition for the The general rule applies, which is in case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the property regime
CA declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground that applicable to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-ownership.
both he and his wife were psychologically
(2005) incapacitated. Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage, the provisions of
The RTC in its decision, declared the marriage article 50 in relation to articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code, providing for the dissolution of the
entered into between petitioner and respondent absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case maybe, do not apply. Since the
null and violation ordered the liquidation of the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found, both by the RTC and the CA, to
assets of the conjugal partnership property. have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be covered by the co-ownership.
Plaintiff-appellant assails the order of the trial court No fruits of a separate property of one of the parties appear to have been included or involved in said
for him to give one-half of his separation/retirement distribution.
benefits from Far East Bank & Trust Company and
half of his outstanding shares in Manila Memorial
Park and Provident Group of Companies to the
defendant-appellee as the latter’s share in the
conjugal partnership. The trial court rendered a
Partial Decision approving the Compromise
Agreement entered into by the parties. In the
same Compromise Agreement, the parties had
agreed that henceforth, their conjugal partnership
is dissolved. Thereafter, no steps were taken for
the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
Dinos started living together in 1984, separated in Section 19(1) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages and Annulment of
DINO v. DINO 1994, got back together in 1996 and finally married Voidable Marriages (the Rule) does not apply to Article 147 of the Family Code.
each other on 1998. In 2001, the husband filed an
(2011) action for Declaration of Nullity under Art 36 of the In Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon: a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations
FC alleging that the wife failed to give love and of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the
support, abandoned her responsibilities, was Family Code. Article 147 applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any
unfaithful and would at times violently hurt him. He impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void.
 found out later in that his wife;s petition for divorce
was granted by the Superior Court of California in
2001 and the she married Alcantara in the same
year.
The RTC granted his petition, dissolved the ACP
and ruled that the decree shall be issued upon his
compliance with Art 50 and 51 of the FC. Upon
reconsideration, the RTC ruled that the decree
shall be issued after liquidation, partition and
distribution of properties under FC 147.
ISSUE: W/N the decree shall issue only after
compliance with FC 147?
YU v. REYES- Yu filed for declaration of nullity. Wife argues that
CARPIO the the incidents on custody support and family
relations are incidental and not essential in
(2011) resolving the incident on the declaration of nullity.
Yu opposes and says that they should be
proceeded and be simultaneously resolved.
ISSUE: W/N there was error when the RTC
submitted the main issue of nullity for resolution
ahead of the reception of evidence on custody,
support and property relations? No.
C. Conjugal partnership of gains
This case involves the question of ownership over
BELCODERO v. a piece of land acquired by a husband while living
CA with a paramour in 1949 and after having deserted
his lawful wife and children in 1946. He indicated in
(1993) the deed that his civil status was married to his
paramour. He married his paramour in 1958,
without annulling his previous marriage. He died in
1967.
The parties are siblings. The brother wants to annul
JOCSON v. CA documents executed by their father giving a chunk
of the conjugal properties to his sister and wants
(1989) that the properties be divided equally between
them as the only surviving heirs of the parents.
(The father died after the mother, and the mother’s
intestate estate has not been partitioned).
Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final
judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does
not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which
should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties. The rules on
co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil
Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, "[p]artition may be made by
agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x." It is not necessary to liquidate the
properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.
It must be noted that the judge did not disallow the presentation of evidence on the incidents on
custody, support, and property relations but merely deferred the reception of evidence based on the
existing rules issued by this Court, to a time when a decision granting the petition is already at hand
and before a final decree is issued.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages. Particularly, Secs. 19 and 21 of the Rule clearly allow the reception of evidence
on custody, support, and property relations after the trial court renders a decision granting the petition,
or upon entry of judgment granting the petition
The property remained as belonging to the conjugal partnership of Alayo and his legitimate wife
Juliana. Under both the new Civil Code (Article 160) and the old Civil Code (Article 1407), " all
property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." This presumption has not been convincingly
rebutted.
It cannot be seriously contended that, simply because the property was titled in the name of Josefa at
Alayo's request, she should thereby be deemed to be its owner. The property unquestionably was
acquired by Alayo. As regards the property relation between common-law spouses, Article 144 of the
Civil Code merely codified the law established through judicial precedents under the old code (Margaret
Maxey vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-45870, 11 May 1984). In both regimes, the co-ownership rule
had more than once been repudiated when either or both spouses suffered from an impediment to
marry (Jeroniza vs. Jose, 89 SCRA 306). The present provisions under Article 147 and Article 148 of
the Family Code did not much deviate from the old rules; in any case, its provisions cannot apply to this
case without interdicting prior vested rights (Article 256, Family Code).
The certificates of title show, on their face, that the properties were exclusively Emilio Jocson's, the
registered owner in his name alone. This is so because the words "married to' preceding "Alejandra
Poblete' are merely descriptive of the civil status of Emilio Jocson
It is thus clear that before Moises Jocson may validly invoke the presumption under Article 160 he must
first present proof that the disputed properties were acquired during the marriage of Emilio Jocson and
Alejandra Poblete. The certificates of title, however, upon which petitioner rests his claim is insufficient.
The fact that the properties were registered in the name of "Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra
 It is the position of petitioner that since the
properties sold to Agustina Jocson-Vasquez under
Exhibit 3 were registered in the name of "Emilio
Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete," the
certificates of title he presented as evidence were
enough proof to show that the properties covered
therein were acquired during the marriage of their
parents, and, therefore, under Article 160 of the
Civil Code, presumed to be conjugal properties.
W/N presumed conjugal? NO.
Philippine Trust company granted Agcaoili credit
ANSALDO v. account. Ansaldos guaranteed such obligation to
SHERIFF the surety, FSCP. Agcaoili defaulted. FSCP paid
PhilTrust. FSCP now wants to recover from
(1937) Ansaldo. After obtaining a judgment on its favor,
FSCP cause the sheriff to levy on the joint savings
account in the name of the spouses Ansaldo in
BPA. The spouses contend that the money levied
was part of the CPG and is not liable for the
payment of personal obligations of the husband.
Some six years after Santiago Garcia's death, or
ESTONINA v. on March 10, 1973, the then CFI issued an order
CA granting Trinidad Estonina's application for a writ of
preliminary attachment in Civil Case No. 88430
(1997) entitled "Trinidad Estonina et al., plaintiffs -versus-
Consuelo Garcia et al., defendants". Consequently,
a notice of attachment was inscribed as a
memorandum of encumbrance at the back of TCT
No. T-19175 in favor of Trinidad Estonina covering
all the rights, title, interest, and participation that
Consuelo Garcia, the widow of Santiago Garcia,
may have in and to the parcel of land covered by
the said title.
The other heirs of Santiago Garcia want to annul
Poblete" is no proof that the properties were acquired during the spouses' coverture. Acquisition of title
and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well settled that registration does not confer title but
merely confirms one already existing (See Torela vs. Torela, supra). It may be that the properties under
dispute were acquired by Emilio Jocson when he was still a bachelor but were registered only after his
marriage to Alejandra Poblete, which explains why he was described in the certificates of title as
married to the latter.
We are not unmindful that in numerous cases We consistently held that registration of the property in
the name of only one spouse does not negate the possibility of it being conjugal. But this ruling is not
inconsistent with the above pronouncement for in those cases there was proof that the properties,
though registered in the name of only one spouse, were indeed conjugal properties, or that they have
been acquired during the marriage of the spouses, and therefore, presumed conjugal, without the
adverse party having presented proof to rebut the presumption.
It is undisputed that the sum of P636.80 which is now in controversy was derived from the paraphernal
property of the appellee, Margarita Quintos de Ansaldo, the wife of the other appellee Angel A.
Ansaldo. It therefore belongs to the conjugal partnership of the said spouses.
The provision of article 1408 of the Civil Code to the effect that the conjugal partnership shall be liable
for all the debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the husband must be understood as
subject to the qualifications established by article 1386 of the same Code, which provides that:
The fruits of the paraphernal property cannot be subject to the payment of personal obligations
of the husband, unless it be proved that such obligation were productive of some benefit to the
family.
The meaning of this article is clarified by reference to the first paragraph of the preceding article 1385
which reads as follows:
The fruit of the paraphernal property form part of the assets of the conjugal partnership and
are subject to the payment of the debts and expenses of the spouses.
Construing the two articles together, it seems clear that the fruits of the paraphernal property which
become part of the assets of the conjugal partnership are not liable for the payment of personal
obligations of the husband, unless it be proved that such obligations were productive of some benefit to
the family.
In the case now before us no attempt has been made to prove that the obligations contracted by the
appellee, Angel A. Ansaldo, were productive of some benefit to his family.
In the case at bench, the petitioners have been unable to present any proof that the property in
question was acquired during the marriage of Santiago and Consuelo. They anchor their claim solely
on the fact that when the title over the land in question was issued, Santiago was already married to
Consuelo as evidenced by the registration in the name of "Santiago Garcia married to Consuelo Gaza".
It has been repeatedly held by this Court that the presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code that
all property of the marriage belong to the conjugal partnership applies only when there is proof that the
property was acquired during the marriage. Otherwise stated, proof of acquisition during the marriage is
a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.
Being the exclusive property of Santiago Garcia, it was the entire parcel of land in question that formed
part of his estate and which passed to his ten heirs by compulsory succession upon his death. What
could only be attached is the 1/10 share of Consuelo.
 the sheriffs sale to Estonina (which was held after a
favorable decision) and the TCT in the name of the
latter contending that the properties were in the
name of Santiago alone and the land covered by
the same has been the subject of previous sales.
RTC ruled that the properties were acquired during
the marriage of Santiago and Consuelo, and as
such are presumed conjugal, ½ of the conjugal
share was transmitted to the heirs upon his death.
The heirs appealed to saying that it is not conjugal.
CA ruled in their favor.
DE MESA v Petitioners filed against the respondents a The family home may be levied upon.
ACERO complaint to nullify the TCT issued in favor of the
respondents as buyer in the public auction sale. The foregoing rules on constitution of family homes, for purposes of exemption from execution, could
(2011) The petitioners asserted that the subject property is be summarized as follows:
a family home, which is exempt from execution
under the Family Code and thus could not have FIRST, family residences constructed BEFORE the effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3,
been validly levied upon. 1988 must be constituted as a family hme either judicially or extrajudicially in accordance with the
provisions of the Civil Code in order to be exempt from execution;
SECOND,family residences constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 are
automatically deemed to be family homes and thus exempt from execution from the time it was
constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein;
THIRD, family residences which were not judicially or extrajudicially constituted as family home prior to
the effectivity of the Family Code, but were existing thereafter, are considered as family homes by
operation of law and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the
Family Code.

The settled rule is that the right to exemption or forced sale under Art 153 of the Family Code is a
personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as such it must be claimed not by the sheriff, but
by the debtor himself before the sale of the property at public auction. It is not sufficient that the person
claiming exemption merely alleges that such property is a family home. Having failed to set up and
prove to the sheriff the supposed exemption of the subject property before the sale thereof at public
auction, the petitioners now are barred from raising the same. Failure to do so estop them from later
claiming the said exemption.

1. When CPG commences and applies

(a) Marriages under FC
(b) Marriages before FC
(c) Suppletory rules
2. What is included in the CPG
a. Presumption of CPG
TITAN v DAVID The husband filed a complaint for Annulment of The sale is VOID.
Contract and Reconveyance against the buyer,
(2010) Titan, alleging that the sale executed by the wife The property is part of the spouses’ conjugal partnership. The Civil Code of the Philippines, the law in
was without his knowledge and consent, and force at the time of the celebration of the marriage provides that:
therefore void. The buyer claimed that it was a Art 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be
buyer in good faith and for value because it relied proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or wife.
on an SPA allegedly signed by the husband Art 153. Of the civil code also provides:
authorizing the wife to dispose of the property. Art 153. The following are conjugal partnership property:
(1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund,

IMANI v The sheriff levied on a property registered in the
METROBANK name of petitioner, one of the sureties of the
defaulting debtor. A public auction was conducted
(2010) and the property was awarded to the creditor
Metrobank as the highest bidder. To consolidate its
title, Metrobank filed a Manifestation and Motion
praying that the respondent surrender the owner’s
copy of the TCT. Petitioner opposed the motion
arguing that the subject property belongs to the
conjugal partnership and as such it cannot be held
answerable for the liabilities incurred by the
defaulting debtor.
DEWARA v The husband was found guilty of the charge of
LAMELA serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence. In addition to imprisonment, he was
(2011) also held civilly liable. The writ of execution was
served on the husband but it was returned
unsatisfied because he had no property in his
name. The sheriff levied on a property registered
in the name of the wife. The wife filed a case for
annulment of sale and damages claiming that the
levy on execution was illegal because the said
property was her paraphernal property and could
not be made to answer for the personal liability of
her husband.
b. What are included in CPG
CHEESMAN v A Deed of Sale and Transfer was executed in the
IAC name of the wife. The husband, an American
citizen, although aware of the deed, did not object
(1991) to the transfer being made only to his wife. The tax
declarations for the property were issued in the
name of the wife and she assumed exclusive
management and administration of said property.
whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
These provisions were carried over to the Family Code particularly Article 117(1). Article 116 of the
Family Code is even more unequivocal in that “all property acquired during the marriage, whether the
acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is
presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved.”
The husband was not required to prove that the property was acquired with funds of the partnership.
Rather, the presumption applies even when the manner in which the property was acquired does not
appear. In the absence of the husband’s consent, the Deed of sale is void.
The property is exclusive property of the wife, thus it is not exempt from execution.
All property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal. However, for this presumption to apply, the
party who invokes it must first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of
acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non to the operation of the presumption in favor
of the conjugal partnership. Thus, the time when the property was acquired is material. Unfortunately
for petitioner, the proofs offered were not sufficient to prove her claim that the property is conjugal. The
affidavit of vendor has no evidentiary weight because the latter was not presented in court to affirm the
veracity of the said affidavit. The certificate of title stating that the petitioner was married is no proof
that the property was acquired during the spouses’ coverture. Acquisition of title and registration are
two different acts. It is well settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one
already existing.
The subject property belongs to the conjugal partnership.
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that
it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Registration in the name of the husband or the wife
alone does not destroy this presumption. The separation-in-fact between the husband and wife without
judicial approval shall not affect the conjugal partnership. The lot retains its conjugal nature. moreover,
the presumption of conjugal ownership applies even when the manner in which the property was
acquired does not appear. The use of conjugal funds is not an essential requirement for the
presumption to arise.
There is no dispute that the subject property was acquired by the spouses during their marriage. They
are governed by the conjugal partnership of gains since they were married before the enactment of the
Family Code and they did not execute any pre-nuptial agreement as to their property relations. Thus,
the legal presumption of the conjugal nature of the property applies to the lot in question. The
presumption may be rebutted only by strong, clear, categorical, and convincing evidence – there must
be strict proof of the exclusive ownership of one of the spouses, and the burden of proof rests upon the
party asserting it. Aside from the assertions that the sale of the property to the wife was in the nature of
a donation because of the alleged disparity between the actual value of the property and the monetary
consideration for the sale, there is no other evidence that would convince the court of the paraphernal
character of the property.
The property is the wife’s paraphernal property, thus the sale was valid even if husband had no
knowledge or did not consent.
Both the trial court and the appellate court found that the fund used by the wife was money she had
earned and saved prior to her marriage to the petitioner. This finding cannot now be disturbed by the
Court . But even if it were a fact that said wife had used conjugal funds to make the acquisition, the fact
that the fundamental law prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land militate against his recovering
 subsequently, the wife sold it without the
knowledge or consent of the husband. The
husband brought suit praying for the annulment of
the sale on the ground that the transaction had
been executed without his knowledge and consent.
VILLANUEVA v Nicolas and Eusebia were married on October 7,
CA 1926. Nicolas and Pacita started cohabiting in
1936. Eusebia died on November 23, 1996.
(2004) Nicolas and Pacita were married on December 16,
1996. The property in question was purchased on
October 4, 1957.
ZULUETA V. Zulueta had an altercation with the plane captain,
PAN AMERICAN and as a result he was offloaded from a Pan-Am
WORLD flight. Zulueta sued for damages.
AIRWAYS INC.
While the case was pending, Mrs. Zulueta filed a
(1973) motion to dismiss the case insofar as she is
concerned, since Pan-Am had already paid her
PHP 50,000. Pan-Am relied on CC 113, pursuant
to which "(t)he husband must be joined in all suits
by or against the wife except: ... (2) If they have in
fact been separated for at least one year."
and holding the property so acquired or any part thereof.
The property is part of the conjugal partnership of Nicolas and Eusebia.
The Family Code provisions on conjugal The Family Code provisions on conjugal partnerships govern
the property relations between Nicolas and Eusebia even if they were married before the effectivity of
Family Code. Article 105 of the Family Code explicitly mandates that the Family Code shall apply to
conjugal partnerships established before the Family Code without prejudice to vested rights already
acquired under the Civil Code or other laws. Thus, under the Family Code, if the properties are
acquired during the marriage, the presumption is that they are conjugal. The burden of proof is on the
party claiming that they are not conjugal. This is counter-balanced by the requirement that the
properties must first be proven to have been acquired during the marriage before they are presumed
conjugal.
Since the subject property were acquired during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia, the presumption
under Article 116 of the Family Code is that all these are conjugal properties of Nicolas and Eusebia.
The burden is on petitioners to prove that the subject properties are not conjugal. The presumption in
Article 116, which subsists "unless the contrary is proved," stands as an obstacle to any claim the
petitioners may have. The burden of proving that a property is exclusive property of a spouse rests on
the party asserting it and the evidence required must be clear and convincing. 26 Petitioners failed to
meet this standard.
The tax declarations are not sufficient proof to overcome the presumption under Article 116 of the
Family Code. The presumption is not rebutted by the mere fact that the certificate of title of the property
or the tax declaration is in the name of one of the spouses only. Article 116 of the Family Code
expressly provides that the presumption remains even if the property is "registered in the name of one
or both of the spouses."
The compromise agreement between Mrs. Zulueta and Pan-Am is ineffective, insofar as the conjugal
partnership is concerned.
CC 113 refers to suits in which the wife is the principal or real party in interest, not to the case at bar, "in
which the husband is the main party in interest, both as the person principally aggrieved and as
administrator of the conjugal partnership ... he having acted in this capacity in entering into the contract
of carriage with Pan-Am and paid the amount due to the latter, under the contract, with funds of the
conjugal partnership," to which the amounts recoverable for breach of said contract, accordingly,
belong. The damages suffered by Mrs. Zulueta were mainly an in accident of the humiliation to which
her husband had been subjected. For obvious reasons of public policy, she is not allowed by law to
waive her share in the conjugal partnership, before the dissolution thereof. She cannot even acquire
any property by gratuitous title, without the husband's consent, except from her ascendants,
descendants, parents-in-law, and collateral relatives within the fourth degree.
The award was made in the Zuluetas’ favor collectively, and the presumption is that the purpose of the
trip was for the common benefit of the plaintiffs and that the money had come from the conjugal funds,
for, unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed "(t)hat things have happened according to the
ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life." Manresa maintains that they are deemed
conjugal, when the source of the money used therefor is not established, even if the purchase had
been made by the wife. Even property registered, under the Torrens system, in the name of one of the
spouses, or in that of the wife only, if acquired during the marriage, is presumed to belong to the

MENDOZA V. Reyes filed a case for annulment of a deed of sale
REYES of two lots executed by his wife in favor of the
Mendoza spouses. Reyes claimed the sale
involved conjugal properties and were sold without
(1983) his knowledge or consent.
The Reyes spouses were married in 1915, and the
properties were purchased in 1947 on installment
basis. The funds used in paying off the installments
were from loans obtained by the spouses from the
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation.
3. What is excluded from CPG
LAPERAL V. The Laperals sued Katigbak and Kalaw for sums of
KATIGBAK money represented by PNs executed in their favor.
The CFI rendered judgment in favor of the
(1964) Laperals, ordering the defendants to pay the sum
or to return the jewelry. A month after the decision
was rendered, Kalaw filed a complaint against
Katigbak for judicial separation of property and
separate administration, which was granted.
conjugal partnership, unless there is competent proof to the contrary.
The damages involved in the case form part of the conjugal partnership pursuant to CC 153.
Considering that the damages in question have arisen from, inter alia, a breach of the Zuluetas'
contract of carriage with Pan-Am, for which the Zuluetas paid their fare with funds presumably
belonging to the conjugal partnership, said damages fall under paragraph (1) of CC 153, the right
thereto having been "acquired by onerous title during the marriage ." This conclusion is bolstered up by
CC148.
The damages involved in the case at bar do not come under any of these provisions or of the other
provisions forming part of "Paraphernal Property." What is more, if "(t)hat which is acquired by right of
redemption or by exchange with other property belonging to only one of the spouses," and "(t)hat which
is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of the husband," belong exclusively to such wife or
husband, it follows necessarily that that which is acquired with money of the conjugal partnership
belongs thereto or forms part thereof. The presumption under CC 160 — to the effect that all property
of the marriage belong to the conjugal partnership — does not apply unless it is shown that it was
acquired during marriage. In the present case, the contract of carriage was concededly entered into,
and the damages claimed by the plaintiffs were incurred, during marriage. Hence, the rights accruing
from said contract, including those resulting from breach thereof by the defendant, are presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership of Mr. and Mrs. Zulueta. The fact that such breach of contract was
coupled, also, with a quasi-delict constitutes an aggravating circumstance and cannot possibly have the
effect of depriving the conjugal partnership of such property rights.
Defendant insists that the use of conjugal funds to redeem property does not make the property
redeemed conjugal if the right of redemption pertained to the wife. In the absence, however,
of proof that such right of redemption pertains to the wife — and there is no proof that the contract of
carriage with PANAM or the money paid therefor belongs to Mrs. Zulueta — the property involved, or
the rights arising therefrom, must be presumed, therefore, to form part of the conjugal partnership.
The properties are conjugal properties.
The presumption under CC160 is a strong one. As stated in Camia de Reyes v. Reyes de Ilano, "it is
sufficient to prove that the property was acquired during the marriage in order that the same may be
deemed conjugal property." Likewise, the funds used to buy the lot and build the improvements thereon
were at the expense of the common fund (see CC161: all debts and obligations contracted by the
husband and the wife for the benefit of the conjugal partnership are liabilities of the partnership.)
The property, although acquired during the marriage, is not conjugal.
CC 160 states a rebuttable presumption, it unequivocally states that such presumption exists only
"unless it be proved that it (the property) belongs exclusively to the husband or the wife." In this case,
aside from invoking the presumption, Katigbak presented no other evidence. It was also found by the
trial court that the lot was purchased by Kalaw’s mother, who, as was her practice, registered the same
in her daughter’s name. The CFI also concluded that Katigbak couldn’t have possibly purchased the lot
in 1939 because his salary was too small at the time.
 Kalaw and Katigbak were married in 1938 and
neither of them had brought properties into the
marriage. A lot was bought by Kalaw’s mother, who
registered the same in her daughter’s name, in
1939.
VELOSO V. Martinez filed a case against Veloso, personally
MARTINEZ and as administratrix of the estate of Domingo
Franco, for the recovery of possession of a lot and
(1914) some jewelry. Veloso claimed that the jewelry were
pawned to him by Franco, with Martinez’s full
consent.
BERCILES V. GSIS recognized Pascual Berciles as an
GSIS acknowledged natural child and Maria Luisca
Berciles Vallreal, Mercy Berciles Patacsil, and
(1984) Rhoda Berciles as illegitimate children of Judge
Pascual Berciles with Flor Fuentebella. As such,
they are entitled to his retirement benefits. Judge
Berciles’ wife, Iluminada Ponce, and their children,
contested this ruling.
PLATA V. Amalia Plata purchased a lot in 1954. She sold the
YATCO same to Saldana in 1958, who later resold the
property to Plata that same year, who was already
(1964) married to Gaudencio Begosa. A new TCT was
issued to her. The lot was mortgaged in 1958 by
"Amalia Plata of legal age, Filipino, married to
Gaudencio Begosa," to Cesarea Villanueva,
married to Gregorio Leano. The mortgaged was
extrajudicially foreclosed when they defaulted on
their loan. Villanueva filed a case for unlawful
detainer against Begosa, who was later declared
guilty.
Plata claimed she was never legally married to
Begosa and that she was not bound by the
judgment against him.
4. Administration of exclusive property
(a) By spouse-owner
(b) By the other spouse
Veloso vs. Plaintiff (husband) commenced an action to
Martinez (1914) recover from the defendant (wife) the possession
of a certain parcel of land together with the sum of
P125 per month. Defendant, as administratrix of
The record shows that the jewels were the sole and separate property of the wife, acquired from
her mother, and in the absence of further proof, they are presumed part of her paraphernal
property.
As such paraphernal property she exercised dominion over the same. (CC 1382.) She had the
exclusive control and management of the same, until and unless she had delivered it to her husband,
before a notary public, with the intent that the husband might administer it properly. (CC 1384) There is
no proof in the record that she had ever delivered the same to her husband, in any manner, or for any
purpose. That being true, she could not be deprived of the same by any act of her husband, without her
consent, and without compliance with the provisions of the Civil Code.
The GSIS was incorrect in upholding their status as a natural child and as illegitimate children.
There was no evidence of admission of paternity of the respondents, therefore, the retirement benefits
should be distributed equally to his wife and their legitimate children.
The lot is Plata’s paraphernal property.
It had been unquestionably acquired by Plata while still single, as shown by a TCT. The subsequent
conveyance thereof to Celso Saldaña, and the reconveyance of her several months afterward of the
same property, did not transform it from paraphernal to conjugal property, there being no proof that the
money paid to Saldaña came from common or conjugal funds (CC 153). The deed of mortgage in favor
of respondents Villanueva actually recites that Plata was the owner of the tenement in question and so
does the conveyance of it by Saldaña to her. The fact that Begosa signed the mortgage as co-
mortgagor doesn’t suffice to convert the land into conjugal property, considering that it was paraphernal
in origin. This is particularly the case where the addition of Begosa as co-mortgagor was clearly an after
thought, the text of the deed showing that Plata was the sole mortgagor.
Since the property was paraphernal, and the creditors and purchasers were aware of it, the fact being
clearly spread on the land records, it is plain that Plata's possession, therefore, was not derived from
Begosa. The illegal detainer judgment against the husband alone cannot bind nor affect the wife's
possession of her paraphernal, which by law she holds and administers independently, and which she
may even encumber or alienate without his knowledge or consent (CC 136. 137, 140). Hence, as she
was not made party defendant in the eviction suit, Plata could validly ignore the judgment of eviction
against her husband, and it was no contempt of court for her to do so, because the writ of execution
was not lawful against her.
Records show that the jewels were the sole and separate property of the wife acquired from her
mother. It is part of her paraphernal property. As such she exercised dominion over the same. She had
the exclusive control and management of the same, until and unless she had delivered it to her
husband, before a notary public, with the intent that the husband might administer it properly.(Article
 the estate of the late Domingo Franco answered
and filed a counterclaim for services rendered by
the deceased to the plaintiff and recovery of certain
jewelry alleged to be in the possession in the
plaintiff. Plaintiff contends that said jewelry were
pawned to him by the deceased.
Manotok Realty Wife owned a parcel of land. When she died,
vs. CA (1987) husband was appointed special administrator of
her estate, which includes the land in question.
Husband decides to sell the land Manotok Realty.
Ong v CA
5. Encumbrance/disposition of exclusive property
Wong vs. IAC Wife (Katrina) entered into an agreement with Sps.
(1991) Wong where the latter cosigned the former pieces
of jewelry valued at P3M on the condition that the
former had to sell them within a 20-day period.
Katrina failed to sell the jewelry within the 20-day
period and also failed to return them. Sps. Wong
demanded payment from Katrina. Katrina failed to
pay. 4 parcels of land in the name of the husband
(Romarico), married to Katrina, were attached.
Romarico files an action for annulment of
judgment.
6. If property bought by installments
Jovellanos vs. In 1975, Daniel Jovellanos bought on installment a
CA (1992) parcel of land during his marriage to his second
wife, Annette. After Daniel died, petitioners
(children of Daniel from his first marriage) were
asserting ownership over the land in question.
Annette opposed, saying that since Daniel bought
the land during their marriage, it forms part of their
conjugal property.
Tarrosa vs. De Bonifacio, when he was still single, entered into a
Leon (2009) contract to sell with PHHC for the purchase of a
certain parcel of land on installment. In 1968,
Bonifacio married Anita. In 1970, upon full payment
of the purchase price, a deed of sale was
executed by PHHC in the name of Bonifacio,
“single”. Now, Sps. Tarrosa are claiming ownership
over said lot because allegedly, Bonifacio sold the
said lot to them. Anita (wife of Bonifacio) opposed,
saying that the lot forms part of their conjugal
partnership, therefore, the alleged sale was illegal
because it was made without the consent of the
1384, Civil Code.) There is no proof in the record that she had ever delivered the same to her husband,
in any manner, or for any purpose
The record does not show that Don Vicente Legard was the administrator of the paraphernal properties
of Doña Clara Tambunting during the lifetime of the latter. Thus, it cannot be said that the sale which
was entered into by the private respondent and Don Vicente Legarda had its inception before the death
of Clara Tambunting and was entered into by Don Vicente on behalf of Clara Tambunting but was only
consummated after her death. Don Vicente Legarda, therefore, could not have validly disposed of the
lot in dispute as a continuing administrator of the paraphernal properties of Doña Clara Tambunting.
A wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she purchases things necessary for support of the
family. The writ of execution cannot be issued against Romarico and the execution of judgments
extends only over properties belonging to the judgment debtor. The conjugal properties cannot answer
for Katrina’s obligations as she exclusively incurred the latter without the consent of her husband nor
they did redound to the benefit of the family. There was also no evidence submitted that the
administration of the partnership had been transferred to Katrina by Romarico before said obligations
were incurred. In as much as the decision was void only in so far as Romarico and the conjugal
properties concerned, Spouses Wong may still execute the debt against Katrina, personally and
exclusively.
Since as early as 1967, Daniel was already married to Annette, the said property necessarily belonged
to his conjugal partnership with his said second wife. However, since it pertained to the second wife,
she is still liable to pay the corresponding reimbursements to the petitioners who helped pay for the
amortization of the house and lot. Remember Article 118 of the Family Code on property bought on
installments, where ownership is vested during the marriage, such property shall belong to the conjugal
partnership.
Art. 160 of the 1950 Civil Code, the governing provision in effect at the time Bonifacio and Anita
contracted marriage, provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or the wife.
In the case at bar, ownership over what was once a PHHC lot and covered by the PHHC-Bonifacio
Conditional Contract to Sell was only transferred during the marriage of Bonifacio and Anita. It is well
settled that a conditional sale is akin, if not equivalent, to a contract to sell. In other words, in a contract
to sell ownership is retained by the seller and is not passed to the buyer until full payment of the price,
unlike in a contract of sale where title passes upon delivery of the thing sold.
Evidently, title to the property in question only passed to Bonifacio after he had fully paid the purchase
price on June 22, 1970. This full payment, to stress, was made more than two (2) years after his
 wife.
7. Improvements on CPG property
Caltex v Felias
Ravina v Villa-
Abrille
Munoz, Jr. v
Ramirez
(2010)
8. Charges upon and obligations of CPG
Mariano v CA
Ayala v CA
Ching v CA
Homeowners During the marriage of Miguela and Marcelino
Savings and Dailo they purchased a lot from Dalida in San
Loan v. Dailo Pablo City. The Deed of Absolute Sale was
executed only in favor of Marcelino. When he died
(2005) in 1995, it was only then when Miguela found out
that the land was already mortgaged to the
Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank. She filed a
petition for the nullity of the mortgage and the
cancellation of the certificate of sale against the
bank. The bank prayed for dismissal, arguing that
the property in question was Marcelino’s exclusive
property and that the loan he obtained redounded
to the benefit of the Dailo family.
Spouses Ching The spouses Alfredo and Encarnacion Ching, in a
v. Family previous case already decided by the Supreme
Savings Bank Court and in an effort to prevent the deputy sheriff
from consolidating the sale of the their property,
(2010) filed an annulment case with the Makati City RTC.
The Spouses Ching sought to declare void the levy
and sale on execution of their conjugal property by
arguing that the branch sheriff had no authority to
levy upon a property belonging to the conjugal
partnership.
marriage to Anita on April 24, 1968. In net effect, the property was acquired during the existence of the
marriage; as such, ownership to the property is, by law, presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership.
The encumbrance over the San Pablo property by Marcelino without his wife’s consent is void
by operation of Article 124 of the Family Code.
The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the knowledge and consent of his wife,
Marcelino Dailo constituted a real estate mortgage on the subject property, which formed part of their
conjugal partnership. By express provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of (court)
authority or written consent of the other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal
property shall be void.
The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains lies
with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such. Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (he who
asserts, not he who denies, must prove).
The spouses Ching can no longer raise the issue that the property subject of the execution is
part of the conjugal partnership. The execution is valid.
The Supreme Court, in [another case concerning the spouses Ching], had this to say: “In any case,
even without the intervention of Encarnacion Ching in the collection case, it appears that Alfredo Ching
was able to raise the conjugal nature of the property in both the trial court and appellate court. A
perusal of the records reveals that petitioner Alfredo Ching filed a Motion for Reconsideration and to
Quash Writ of Execution before the CFI of Manila. In the motion, he specifically argued that the
execution was invalid for having been enforced upon their conjugal property. Alfredo Ching raised this
argument again on appeal in [another case]. Evidently, due process has been afforded to petitioners
as regards the execution on their conjugal property.”

Ando v. Campo Premier Allied and Contracting Services, Inc.
(PACSI) was an independent labor contractor for
(2011) Victorias Milling Company. Andresito Campo et al.
were dismissed from employment, for which they
were able to secure a favorable ruling from the
Labor Arbiter, which directed PACSI and its owner,
Paquito Ando, to pay the separation pay of Campo
et al. The NLRC then proceeded to execute a
property titled in the name of Ando, married to
Erlinda Ando. Ando filed for prohibition, saying that
the property belongs to him and his wife and not
PACSI, which was the judgment debtor.
Security Bank v. Mar Tierra Corporation, through its president,
Mar Tierra Wilfrido C. Martinez, applied for a P12,000,000
Corporation credit accommodation with Security Bank and
Trust Company. Mar Tierra was not able to pay all
(2006) its debt balance as it suffered business reversals,
eventually ceasing operations. The RTC issued a
writ of attachment on all real and personal
properties of Mar Tierra and individual respondent
Martinez including the conjugal house and lot of
the spouses but it found that it did not redound to
the benefit of his family, hence, it ordered the lifting
of the attachment on the conjugal house and lot of
the spouses Martinez.
Heirs of Domingo Hernandez and his wife Sergia were
Hernandez v. awarded a real property by the Philippine Homesite
Mingoa and Housing Corporation by way of salary
deduction. When Domingo died intestate in 1983,
(2009) his heirs found out that the title to the property was
already registered in the name of the spouses
Mingoa. It turned out that Domingo sold the
property to one Dolores Camisura without the
consent of the former’s wife. Camisura then sold it
to the Mingoas.
Homeowners During the marriage of Miguela and Marcelino
Savings and Dailo they purchased a lot from Dalida in San
Verily, the issue of the conjugal nature of the subject property has been passed upon by the courts and
this Court several times; it is no longer a novel contention. The Spouses Ching cannot, therefore, raise
the same argument again and again.
The NLRC cannot execute against the property of the spouses Ando.
The TCT of the property bears out that, indeed, it belongs to petitioner and his wife. Thus, even if we
consider petitioner as an agent of the corporation – and, therefore, not a stranger to the case – such
that the provision on third-party claims will not apply to him, the property was registered not only in the
name of petitioner but also of his wife. She stands to lose the property subject of execution without ever
being a party to the case. This will be tantamount to deprivation of property without due process.
Moreover, the power of the NLRC, or the courts, to execute its judgment extends only to properties
unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone. A sheriff, therefore, has no authority to attach
the property of any person except that of the judgment debtor. Likewise, there is no showing that the
sheriff ever tried to execute on the properties of the corporation.
The conjugal partnership may not be held liable for an indemnity agreement entered into by
Wilfrido Martinez to accommodate a third-party.
If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., the direct recipient of the money and
services to be used in or for his own business or profession, the transaction falls within the term
“obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.” In other words, where the husband contracts an
obligation on behalf of the family business, there is a legal presumption that such obligation redounds
to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person or entity and the husband
acted only as a surety or guarantor, the transaction cannot by itself be deemed an obligation for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership. It is for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or
his family.
In the case at bar, the principal contract, the credit line agreement between Security Bank and Mar
Tierra, was solely for the benefit of the latter. The accessory contract (the indemnity agreement) under
which individual respondent Martinez assumed the obligation of a surety for respondent corporation
was similarly for the latter’s benefit. Security Bank had the burden of proving that the conjugal
partnership of the spouses Martinez benefited from the transaction. It failed to discharge that burden.
Sergia Hernandez’s action to recover the property from the spouses Mingoa is now barred by
prescription.
Article 173 of the Civil Code provides that the wife may file for annulment of a contract entered into by
the husband without her consent within ten (10) years from the transaction questioned. Petitioners filed
the action for reconveyance in 1995. Twelve (12) years have lapsed since such discovery, and they
filed the petition beyond the period allowed by law. Moreover, when Sergia Hernandez, together with
her children, filed the action for reconveyance, the conjugal partnership of property with Hernandez, Sr.
had already been terminated by virtue of the latter's death on April 16, 1983. Clearly, therefore,
petitioners‟ action has prescribed. In sum, the rights and interests of the spouses Hernandez over the
subject property were validly transferred to respondent Dolores Camisura. Since the sale of the
conjugal property by Hernandez, Sr. was without the consent of his wife, Sergia, the same is voidable;
thus, binding unless annulled.
The encumbrance over the San Pablo property by Marcelino without his wife’s consent is void
by operation of Article 124 of the Family Code.
Loan v. Dailo Pablo City. The Deed of Absolute Sale was
executed only in favor of Marcelino. When he died
(2005) in 1995, it was only then when Miguela found out
that the land was already mortgaged to the
Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank. She filed a
petition for the nullity of the mortgage and the
cancellation of the certificate of sale against the
bank. The bank prayed for dismissal, arguing that
the property in question was Marcelino’s exclusive
property and that the loan he obtained redounded
to the benefit of the Dailo family.
FUENTES V Tarciano sold a lot to the Fuentes spouses.
ROCA Rosario (his wife)’s consent was allegedly obtained
through a notarized affidavit of consent. 8 years
(2010) later, their children filed a petition for reconveyance
and declaration of nullity of the sale alleging that
their mother never gave her consent and that her
signature was forged. Opposition: the children’s
action for the declaration of nullity of the sale had
already prescribed.
9. Ownership, administration and enjoyment
(a) Joint Administration
HOMEOWNERS During the lifetime of her husband, without the
SAVINGS LOAN knowledge and consent of his wife, Marcelino
BANK V DAILO Dailo, Jr. constituted a real estate mortgage on the
subject property, which formed part of their
conjugal partnership. Thus, his wife filed for “Nullity
of REM and Certificate of Sale”.
(2005)
ALINAS V Husband and wife separated in 1982. In 1989
ALINAS (after effectivity of FC), the husband sold the
property to his brother (and his brother’s wife),
(2008) without the knowledge and consent of the wife.
The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the knowledge and consent of his wife,
Marcelino Dailo constituted a real estate mortgage on the subject property, which formed part of their
conjugal partnership. By express provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of (court)
authority or written consent of the other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal
property shall be void.
The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains lies
with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such. Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (he who
asserts, not he who denies, must prove).
Article 124 of the Family Code does not provide a period within which the wife who gave no consent
may assail her husband’s sale of the real property.
It simply provides that without the other spouse’s written consent or a court order allowing the sale, the
same would be void. The law that applies to this case is the Family Code, not the Civil Code. Although
Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950, Tarciano sold the conjugal property to the Fuentes spouses
on January 11, 1989, a few months after the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. The passage
of time did not erode the right to bring such an action.
By express provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of (court) authority or written
consent of the other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void.
The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the property relations of respondent and the late
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. even in a suppletory manner. The regime of conjugal partnership of gains is a
special type of partnership, where the husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds,
products, fruits and income from their separate properties and those acquired by either or both spouses
through their efforts or by chance.
Unlike the absolute community of property wherein the rules on co-ownership apply in a suppletory
manner, the conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on contract of partnership in all that is
not in conflict with what is expressly determined in the chapter (on conjugal partnership of gains) or by
the spouses in their marriage settlements. Thus, the property relations of respondent and her late
husband shall be governed, foremost, by Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family
Code and, suppletorily, by the rules on partnership under the Civil Code. In case of conflict, the former
prevails because the Civil Code provisions on partnership apply only when the Family Code is silent on
the matter
Pursuant Article 124 of the Family Code and jurisprudence, the sale of petitioners' conjugal property
made by petitioner Onesiforo (husband) alone is void in its entirety.
It is true that in a number of cases, this Court abstained from applying the literal import of a particular
provision of law if doing so would lead to unjust, unfair and absurd results.
In the present case, the Court does not see how applying Article 124 of the Family Code would lead to
injustice or absurdity. It should be noted that respondent spouses were well aware that the lot in
question is a conjugal property of petitioners. They also knew that the disposition being made by
Onesiforo is without the consent of his wife, as they knew that petitioners had separated, and, the sale
documents do not bear the signature of petitioner Rosario. The fact that Onesiforo had to execute two
documents, namely: the Absolute Deed of Sale dated March 10, 1989 and a notarized Agreement

DOCENA V Husband and Wife filed a case for recovery of
LAPESURA conjugal property. However, only the husband
signed the Certificate for Non-Forum Shopping.
(2001)
AGGABAO V Wife, with an alleged SPA given to her by her
PARULAN husband, sold the conjugal property to spouses
Aggabao. However, the husband denied giving her
an SPA and filed for declaration of nullity of the
(20010) deed of absolute sale and the cancellation of the
title now issued to the petitioner-buyers. Husband
claimed that even though he was out of the
country, he was still the administrator of the
conjugal properties and that he gave an SPA to his
brother.
(b) Sole administration
(1) Incapacity
UY V CA Jardeleza suffered a stroke which left him
comatose – incapable of motor and mental
functions. His son petitioned for guardianship and
(2000) prayed that the court appoint his mother as a
guardian for his father’s property and in the
meantime the properties shouldn’t be sold,
mortgaged, encumbered. His mother filed a petition
declaring her husband’s incapacity, assumption of
sole powers of administration of conjugal
properties and asked for authority to sell a parcel of
land. Son opposed.
likewise dated March 10, 1989, reveals that they had full knowledge of the severe infirmities of the sale.
It is not required that both (husband and wife) sign the CNFS.
Under the Family Code, the administration of the conjugal property belongs to the husband and the wife
jointly. However, unlike an act of alienation or encumbrance where the consent of both spouses is
required, joint management or administration does not require that the husband and wife always act
together. The husband alone could have filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition to contest the
writs of demolition issued against the conjugal property with the Court of Appeals without being joined
by his wife. The signing of the attached certificate of non-forum shopping only by the husband is not a
fatal defect.
Sale is void without the consent of spouse.
The sale was made on March 18, 1991, or after August 3, 1988, the effectivity of the Family Code. The
proper law to apply is, therefore, Article 124 of the Family Code, for it is settled that any alienation or
encumbrance of conjugal property made during the effectivity of the Family Code is governed by Article
124 of the Family Code.
According to Article 256 of the Family Code, the provisions of the Family Code may apply retroactively
provided no vested rights are impaired. The petitioners did not show any vested right in the property
acquired prior to August 3, 1988 that exempted their situation from the retroactive application of the
Family Code.
The void sale was a continuing offer from the petitioners and Ma. Elena that Dionisio had the option of
accepting or rejecting before the offer was withdrawn by either or both Ma. Elena and the petitioners.
The last sentence of the second paragraph of Article 124 of the Family Code makes this clear, stating
that in the absence of the other spouse’s consent, the transaction should be construed as a continuing
offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding
contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or upon authorization by the court before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both offerors.
The wife may not assume sole powers of administration of the conjugal property under Article 124 of
the Family Code and dispose of a parcel of land and use the rules on summary judicial proceedings
under the Article 124 of the Family Code
The situation contemplated is one where the spouse is absent, or separated in fact or has abandoned
the other or consent is withheld or cannot be obtained. Such rules do not apply to cases where the non-
consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent. In this case, the trial court found
that the subject spouse "is an incompetent" who was in comatose or semi-comatose condition, a victim
of stroke, cerebrovascular accident, without motor and mental faculties, and with a diagnosis of brain
stem infarct. In such case, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceedings under Rule 93 of
the 1964 Revised Rules of Court.
A spouse who desires to sell real property as such administrator of the conjugal property must
observe the procedure for the sale of the ward’s estate required of judicial guardians under Rule 95,
1964 Revised Rules of Court, not the summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code.
In the case at bar, the trial court did not comply with the procedure under the Revised Rules of Court.

(2) Separation in fact
(3) Abandonment
(4) Pendency of legal separation proceedings
10. Disposition and encumbrance
Cheeseman v. The case concerns the attempt by an American
IAC citizen (Thomas) to annul — for lack of consent on
his part — the sale by his Filipino wife (Criselda) of
(1991) a residential lot and building to a third party, also a
Filipino.
Parties are married but de facto separated. The
subject property was indicated in the deed of sale
to be sold to “Criselda P. Cheesman, of legal age,
Filipino citizen, married to Thomas Cheesman.”
Thomas Cheesman, although aware of the deed,
did not object to the transfer being made only to his
wife.
Thereafter—and again with the knowledge of
Thomas Cheesman and also without any protest
by him—tax declarations for the property
purchased were issued in the name only of
Criselda Cheesman and Criselda assumed
exclusive management and administration of said
property, leasing it to tenants. On July 1, 1981,
Criselda Cheesman sold the property to Estelita M.
Padilla, without the knowledge or consent of
Thomas Cheesman.
Hence, the action to annul the sale.
Frenzel v. Catito Petitioner Alfred Fritz Frenzel is an Australian
citizen of German descent. He is married to
(2003) Teresita Santos, Filipina.
Alfred met Ederlina Catito, a Filipina, in a night club
in Sydney and eventually developed a liking
towards her. Ederlina was married to a German
national.
Alfred told Ederlina that he was married but that he
was eager to divorce his wife in Australia. Alfred
proposed marriage to Ederlina, but she replied that
they should wait a little bit longer. Alfred proposed
that he and Ederlina establish a life together in the
Philippines. To which, Ederlina agreed thus she
returned to the Philippines to establish their
Indeed, the trial court did not even observe the requirements of the summary judicial proceedings under
the Family Code. Thus, the trial court did not serve notice of the petition to the incapacitated spouse; it
did not require him to show cause why the petition should not be granted.
TC, CA, SC: Evidence on record satisfactorily overcame the disputable presumption in Article 160 of
the Civil Code—that all property of the marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership "unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife"—and that the immovable in question
was in truth Criselda's paraphernal property.
As already observed, the finding that his wife had used her own money to purchase the property
cannot, and will not, at this stage of the proceedings be reviewed and overturned. But even if it were a
fact that said wife had used conjugal funds to make the acquisition, the considerations just set out
militate, on high constitutional grounds, against his recovering and holding the property so acquired or
any part thereof.
Finally, the fundamental law prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land. Section 14, Article XIV of the
1973 Constitution ordains that, "Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private land shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain." Petitioner Thomas Cheesman was, of course, charged with knowledge of
this prohibition. Thus, assuming that it was his intention that the lot in question be purchased by him
and his wife, he acquired no right whatever over the property by virtue of that purchase; and in
attempting to acquire a right or interest in land, vicariously and clandestinely, he knowingly violated the
Constitution; the sale as to him was null and void. 31 In any event, he had and has no capacity or
personality to question the subsequent sale of the same property by his wife on the theory that in so
doing he is merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain
such a theory would permit indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property were to
be declared conjugal, this would accord to the alien husband a not insubstantial interest and right over
land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the
Constitution does not permit him to have.
Alfred knowingly violated the Constitution; hence, was barred from recovering the money used in the
purchase of the three parcels of land.
Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution provides, as follows:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private land shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands in the public domain.
Lands of the public domain, which include private lands, may be transferred or conveyed only to
individuals or entities qualified to acquire or hold private lands or lands of the public domain. Aliens,
whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain.
Hence, they have also been disqualified from acquiring private lands.
Even if, as claimed by the petitioner, the sales in question were entered into by him as the real vendee,
the said transactions are in violation of the Constitution; hence, are null and void ab initio.52 A contract
that violates the Constitution and the law, is null and void and vests no rights and creates no
obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. The petitioner, being a party to an illegal contract, cannot
 livelihood.
When Alfred returned to the Philippines, he visited
Ederlina in her Manila residence and found it
unsuitable for her. He decided to purchase a house
and lot. Since Alfred knew that as an alien he was
disqualified from owning lands in the Philippines,
he agreed that only Ederlina's name would appear
in the deed of sale as the buyer of the property, as
well as in the title covering the same. After all, he
was planning to marry Ederlina and he believed
that after their marriage, the two of them would
jointly own the property.
Alfred discovered that Ederlina was already
married but was appeased when Ederlina assured
Alfred that she will obtain divorce.
Alfred again purchased several parcels of land in
the name of Ederlina.
In the meantime, Ederlina's petition for divorce was
denied because Klaus opposed the same.
Eventually, their relationship turned sour. A
complaint for recovery of real and personal
properties was filed.
Ayuste v. CA Although the couple resided in Manila, they
operated a machine shop in Barangay Iyam,
(1999) Lucena City, which was managed by Rafael Ayuste
(husband). In order to serve as a temporary
residence for Rafael Ayuste while in Lucena, the
couple purchased a parcel of land on which their
house was built.
Eventually, a deed of absolute sale was executed
by Rafael Ayuste in favor of private respondent
whereby the former sold the abovementioned
parcel of land to the latter for P40,000, which
amount Rafael Ayuste acknowledged having
received in the deed. On page 2 of this deed
appears the signature of Christina Ayuste (wife)
below the phrase "With my conformity."
After Rafael Ayuste's death on October 13, 1989,
Christina Ayuste discovered, in the course of an
inventory of their properties, that the title to the
land in Lucena was missing. She searched for it in
come into a court of law and ask to have his illegal objective carried out. One who loses his money or
property by knowingly engaging in a contract or transaction which involves his own moral turpitude may
not maintain an action for his losses. To him who moves in deliberation and premeditation, the law is
unyielding. The law will not aid either party to an illegal contract or agreement; it leaves the parties
where it finds them. Under Article 1412 of the New Civil Code, the petitioner cannot have the subject
properties deeded to him or allow him to recover the money he had spent for the purchase
thereof. Equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because
of public policy, cannot be done directly. Where the wrong of one party equals that of the other, the
defendant is in the stronger position . . . it signifies that in such a situation, neither a court of equity nor
a court of law will administer a remedy. The rule is expressed. in the maxims: EX DOLO ORITUR
ACTIO and IN PARI DELICTO POTIOR EST CONDITIO DEFENDENTIS.
The petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the constitutional proscription, nor claim that he acted in good
faith, let alone assert that he is less guilty than the respondent. The petitioner is charged with
knowledge of the constitutional prohibition. As can be gleaned from the decision of the trial court, the
petitioner was fully aware that he was disqualified from acquiring and owning lands under Philippine law
even before he purchased the properties in question; and, to skirt the constitutional prohibition, the
petitioner had the deed of sale placed under the respondent's name as the sole vendee thereof.
The petitioner cannot find solace in Article 1416 of the New Civil Code which reads:
Art. 1416. When the agreement is not illegal per se but is merely prohibited, and the prohibition by the
law is designed for the protection of the plaintiff, he may, if public policy is thereby enhanced, recover
what he has paid or delivered.
The provision applies only to those contracts which are merely prohibited, in order to benefit private
interests. It does not apply to contracts void ab initio. The sales of three parcels of land in favor of the
petitioner who is a foreigner is illegal per se. The transactions are void ab initio because they were
entered into in violation of the Constitution. Thus, to allow the petitioner to recover the properties or the
money used in the purchase of the parcels of land would be subversive of public policy.
The action for annulment filed by Christina Ayuste was barred for having been filed out of time since the
marriage has already been dissolved by the death of Rafael.
Under the Civil Code, although the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership, he cannot
alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without his wife's consent, subject
only to certain exceptions specified in the law. The remedy available to the wife in case her husband
should dispose of their conjugal property without her consent is laid down in Article 173 of the Civil
Code which states that —
The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts
for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent
is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the
conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the
dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the husband.
(emphasis supplied)
There is no ambiguity in the wording of the law. A sale of real property of the conjugal partnership made
by the husband without the consent of his wife is voidable. The action for annulment must be brought
during the marriage and within ten years from the questioned transaction by the wife. Where the law
speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation — there is room only for
application.
 the office of her husband in Lucena City and it was
then that she learned from her employees about
the sale of the house and lot by her husband to
private respondent.
Christina Ayuste filed a complaint with the Regional
Trial Court of Lucena City for the annulment of the
sale, cancellation of the title issued in the name of
private respondent and for the payment of moral,
exemplary and actual damages. In her complaint
Christina Ayuste alleges that her signature on the
deed of sale was forged and that her husband
Rafael Ayuste sold the property without her
knowledge and consent.
Villaranda v. A 471-square-meter parcel of land located at
Sps Villaranda Divisoria, Cagayan de Oro City, was left to the two
brothers and their eight other siblings by their
(2004) parents. The two brothers executed the assailed
Deed of Exchange. Under this instrument, Vicente
agreed to convey his 64.22-square-meter portion to
Honorio, in exchange for a 500-square-meter
property in Macasandig, Cagayan de Oro City.
After the execution of the Deed, Honorio took
possession of the 64.22-square-meter lot and
constructed a building thereon.
Years later, on April 6, 1992, a subdivision plan for
Lot 448-B was completed, in pursuit of which TCT
No. T-65893 for the 64.22 square-meter share of
Vicente was issued in his name and designated as
Lot 448-B-7. The other heirs were issued their own
TCTs for their respective shares.
Honorio and his wife, Respondent Ana Maria Y.
Villaranda, then brought an action for specific
performance before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Cagayan de Oro City (Branch 24) to compel
Vicente to comply with his obligations under the
Deed of Exchange. The spouses alleged that they
could not fully use or dispose of their Macasandig
property, because Vicente had yet to identify and
delineate his undivided 500- square-meter portion
of the property. They asked the court to compel
him to do so, as well as to convey to them the
64.22-square-meter Divisoria lot, in compliance
with his obligations under the Deed.
Alinas v. Alinas Spouses Onesiforo and Rosario Alinas (petitioners)
separated sometime in 1982, with Rosario moving
In the present case, the deed of sale was executed on February 27, 1987. Rafael Ayuste died on
October 13, 1989. However, it was only on March 2, 1990 that Christina Ayuste filed her complaint with
the lower court asking for the annulment of the sale. Although the action was filed within ten years from
the questioned transaction, it was not brought during the existence of the marriage which was dissolved
upon the death of Rafael Ayuste in 1989. Clearly, the action for annulment filed by Christina Ayuste
was barred for having been filed out of time.
The fact that Christina Ayuste only learned of the sale after the death of her husband is not material.
We affirm public respondent's ruling that registration of the sale with the Register of Deeds constitutes a
notice to the whole world. Precisely, the purpose of the legislature in providing a system of registration
is to afford a means of publicity so that persons dealing with real property may search the records and
thereby, acquire security against instruments the execution of which have not been revealed to
them. Since the deed of sale was registered on March 5, 1987, Christina Ayuste is presumed to have
constructive notice of the sale from such date.
Without the wife’s consent, the husband’s alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code is not void, but merely voidable.
Indeed, petitioner’s contention is untenable. The Deed was entered into on July 6, 1976, while the
Family Code took effect only on August 3, 1998. Laws should be applied prospectively only, unless a
legislative intent to give them retroactive effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the
language used. Hence, the provisions of the Civil Code, not the Family Code, are applicable to the
present case. The Macasandig lot was part of Honorio and Ana’s conjugal properties. The relevant
provisions of the Civil Code on the disposition of real properties of the conjugal partnership are the
following:
"Article 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil
interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property
of the conjugal partnership without the wife’s consent. x x x
"Article 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction questioned,
ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when
such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her
interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs,
after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of the property fraudulently alienated by
the husband."
According to Article 166, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal
partnership without the wife’s consent. This provision, however, must be read in conjunction with Article
173 of the same Code. The latter states that an action to annul an alienation or encumbrance may be
instituted by the wife during the marriage and within ten years from the transaction questioned.
Videlicet, the lack of consent on her part will not make the husband’s alienation or encumbrance of real
property of the conjugal partnership void, but merely voidable. Hence, the Deed is valid until and unless
annulled.
In this case, the records show no evidence that any action to annul the transfer made by Honorio was
ever brought by Ana within ten years from "the transaction questioned." Her right to bring an action to
invalidate the contract has thus prescribed. Hence, the assailed Deed is still valid and enforceable.
Although petitioners were married before the enactment of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, the sale
in question occurred in 1989. Thus, their property relations are governed by Chapter IV on Conjugal
(2008) to Pagadian City and Onesiforo moving to Manila.
They left behind two lots, which are the subject of
the present petition.
Petitioner Onesiforo Alinas (Onesiforo) and
respondent Victor Alinas (Victor) are brothers.
Petitioners allege that they entrusted their
properties to Victor and Elena Alinas (respondent
spouses) with the agreement that any income from
rentals of the properties should be remitted to the
Social Security System (SSS) and to the Rural
Bank of Oroquieta City (RBO), as such rentals
were believed sufficient to pay off petitioners' loans
with said institutions. Lot 896-B-9-A with the
bodega was mortgaged as security for the loan
obtained from the RBO, while Lot 896-B-9-B with
the house was mortgaged to the SSS. Onesiforo
alleges that he left blank papers with his signature
on them to facilitate the administration of said
properties.
Sometime in 1993, petitioners discovered that their
two lots were already titled in the name of
respondent spouses.
Petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Ozamis City a complaint for recovery of
possession and ownership of their conjugal
properties with damages against respondent
spouses.
Siochi v. Gozon The wife Elvira filed a petition for legal separation
against her husband Alfredo.
(2010)
While the legal separation case was still pending,
Alfredo and Mario Siochi (Mario) entered into an
Agreement to Buy and Sell (Agreement) involving
the property for the price of P18 million. Among the
stipulations in the Agreement were that Alfredo
would: (1) secure an Affidavit from Elvira that the
property is Alfredo’s exclusive property and to
annotate the Agreement at the back of TCT; (2)
secure the approval of the Cavite RTC to exclude
the property from the legal separation case; and (3)
secure the removal of the notice of lis
pendens pertaining to the said case and annotated
on TCT. However, despite repeated demands from
Mario, Alfredo failed to comply with these
stipulations. After paying the P5 million earnest
money as partial payment of the purchase price,
Mario took possession of the property and
Agreement was annotated on TCT.
Partnership of Gains of the Family Code.
The CA ruling completely deviated from the clear dictate of Article 124 of the Family Code which
provides:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. x x x
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of
the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers
do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the
court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent
the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. x x x (Underscoring and emphasis supplied)
Thus, pursuant to Article 124 of the Family Code and jurisprudence, the sale of petitioners' conjugal
property made by petitioner Onesiforo alone is void in its entirety.
In the present case, the Court does not see how applying Article 124 of the Family Code would lead to
injustice or absurdity. It should be noted that respondent spouses were well aware that Lot 896-B-9-B
is a conjugal property of petitioners. They also knew that the disposition being made by Onesiforo is
without the consent of his wife, as they knew that petitioners had separated, and, the sale documents
do not bear the signature of petitioner Rosario. The fact that Onesiforo had to execute two documents,
namely: the Absolute Deed of Sale dated March 10, 1989 and a notarized Agreement likewise dated
March 10, 1989, reveals that they had full knowledge of the severe infirmities of the sale.
Mario’s contentions are without merit.
This case involves the conjugal property of Alfredo and Elvira. Since the disposition of the property
occurred after the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Family Code. Article 124 of
the Family Code provides:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to the recourse
to the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of
the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of
the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do
not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the
written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the
part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon
the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either
or both offerors.
In this case, Alfredo was the sole administrator of the property because Elvira, with whom Alfredo was
separated in fact, was unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal property. However, as
 Legal separation was granted. As regards the
property, the Cavite RTC held that it is deemed
conjugal property. Alfredo executed a Deed of
Donation over the property in favor of their
daughter, Winifred Gozon (Winifred). Later,
Alfredo, by virtue of a Special Power of
Attorney executed in his favor by Winifred, sold the
property to Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. (IDRI)
for P18 million.
Mario then filed with the Malabon Regional Trial
Court (Malabon RTC) a complaint for Specific
Performance and Damages, Annulment of
Donation and Sale, with Preliminary Mandatory and
Prohibitory Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order. Mario alleges that the
Agreement should be treated as a continuing offer
which may be perfected by the acceptance of the
other spouse before the offer is withdrawn. Since
Elvira’s conduct signified her acquiescence to the
sale, Mario prays for the Court to direct Alfredo and
Elvira to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale over the
property upon his payment of P9 million to Elvira.
PATROCINIA Respondent Mary Ann and her husband owned a
RAVINA VS. parcel of land which they acquired during their
ABRILLE marriage. Her husband Pedro owned a parcel of
land adjacent to the one they purchased, which he
(2009) acquired before their marriage. The spouses built a
house on both lots and made improvements
through their joint efforts.
When Pedro and respondent separated in fact, the
former offered to sell the house and two lots to
petitioners. Respondent objected and notified the
petitioners of her objections. However, Pedro still
sold the house and two lots without respondent’s
consent, as evidenced by the absence of
respondent’s signature on the Deed of Sale.
FUENTES VS. Tarciano Roca purchased a lot from his mother
ROCA during his marriage to Rosario Roca. When the
spouses separated, Tarciano sold the lot to the
petitioners.
Later, when the spouses Roca died, their children,
sole administrator of the property, Alfredo still cannot sell the property without the written consent of
Elvira or the authority of the court. Without such consent or authority, the sale is void. The absence of
the consent of one of the spouse renders the entire sale void, including the portion of the conjugal
property pertaining to the spouse who contracted the sale. Even if the other spouse actively
participated in negotiating for the sale of the property, that other spouse’s written consent to the sale is
still required by law for its validity. The Agreement entered into by Alfredo and Mario was without the
written consent of Elvira. Thus, the Agreement is entirely void. As regards Mario’s contention that the
Agreement is a continuing offer which may be perfected by Elvira’s acceptance before the offer is
withdrawn, the fact that the property was subsequently donated by Alfredo to Winifred and then sold to
IDRI clearly indicates that the offer was already withdrawn.
The sale of the lot which was purchased by respondent and Pedro is void. However, the sale of the lot
which Pedro acquired before his marriage to respondent is valid, it belonging exclusively to him and not
to the conjugal partnership.
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides, "All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife."
The presumption of the conjugal nature of the property subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory
and convincing evidence to overcome said presumption or to prove that the subject property is
exclusively owned by Pedro.
Significantly, a sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded after the effectivity of the Family
Code on August 3, 1988, is governed by Article 124 of the same Code that now treats such a
disposition to be void if done (a) without the consent of both the husband and the wife, or (b) in case of
one spouse’s inability, the authority of the court.
The particular provision in the New Civil Code giving the wife ten (10) years to annul the alienation or
encumbrance was not carried over to the Family Code. It is thus clear that alienation or encumbrance
of the conjugal partnership property by the husband without the consent of the wife is null and void.
Hence, just like the rule in absolute community of property, if the husband, without knowledge and
consent of the wife, sells conjugal property, such sale is void. If the sale was with the knowledge but
without the approval of the wife, thereby resulting in a disagreement, such sale is annullable at the
instance of the wife who is given five (5) years from the date the contract implementing the decision of
the husband to institute the case.
Here, respondent Mary Ann timely filed the action for annulment of sale within five (5) years from the
date of sale and execution of the deed. However, her action to annul the sale pertains only to the
conjugal house and lot.
The contract of sale is void without the consent of Rosario.
The law that applies to this case is the Family Code, not the Civil Code. Although Tarciano and Rosario
got married in 1950, Tarciano sold the conjugal property to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989,
a few months after the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.
Its Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains expressly superseded Title VI, Book I of the Civil Code
(2010) the respodnents, filed an action for annulment of
sale and reconveyance of the land against
petitioners, claiming that the sale to the spouses
was void since Rosario did not give her consent to
it. They claimed that Rosario’s signature on the
affidavit of consent was void.
JOSE ROS & Petitioner spouses filed a complaint for the
ESTRELLA annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage and all
AGUETE VS. legal proceedings taken thereunder against PNB
PNB before the CFI.
Petitioner Estrella claimed that she has no
knowledge of the loan obtained by her husband nor
did she consent to the mortgage instituted on the
(2011) conjugal property. Estrella also claimed that her
signatures affixed on the documents were forged
and that the loan did not redound to the benefit of
the family.
FLORES VS. The spouses Lindo obtained a loan from Flores. To
SPOUSES secure the loan, Edna Lindo executed a deed of
LINDO REM covering a property in the name of Edna and
her husband Enrico. Edna also signed a
promissory note and the Deed for herself and for
Enrico as his attorney-in –fact.
(2011) Due to the respondents’ failure to pay, Flores filed
for a judicial foreclosure of the mortgage which was
denied by the RTC Br 33 on the ground that the
Deed was executed by Edna without the consent
and authority of Enrico. It however ruled that
petitioner was not barred from recovering the loan
from Edna through a personal action fro Sum of
Money.
Flores filed a Complain for Sum of Money with
Damages against respondents in another branch of
the RTC which was granted by the latter. The CA
however reversed the RTC stating that by filing a
petition for foreclosure of the real estate mortgage,
the Court of Appeals held that petitioner had
already waived his personal action to recover the
amount covered by the promissory note.
11. Effect of separation de facto
12. Effect of abandonment
PRIMA The petitioner filed a complaint against private
PARTOSA-JO respondent Jose Jo for judicial separation of
VS. CA conjugal property, docketed as Civil Case No. 51,
in addition to an earlier action for support, also
against him. The two cases were consolidated and
tried jointly. However, although there was a definite
on Property Relations Between Husband and Wife. Further, the Family Code provisions were also
made to apply to already existing conjugal partnerships without prejudice to vested rights.
In contrast to Article 173 of the Civil Code (which provides for a prescriptive period of 10 years from the
transaction questioned; it also provides that the alienation of the conjugal property by the husband
without the wife’s consent merely renders the contract voidable, not void), Article 124 of the Family
Code does not provide a period within which the wife who gave no consent may assail her husband’s
sale of the real property. It simply provides that without the other spouse’s written consent or a court
order allowing the sale, the same would be void.
The documents disavowed by Aguete are acknowledged before a notary public, hence they are public
documents which have in their favor, the presumption of regularity.
The Civil Code applies in this case since the spouses were married on 16 January 1954 while the
subject property was acquired in 1968. Under the Civil Code, the husband cannot alienate or encumber
any conjugal real property without the consent, express or implied, of the wife. Should the husband do
so, then the contract is voidable. Article 173 of the Civil Code allows Aguete to question Ros’
encumbrance of the subject property. However, the same article does not guarantee that the courts will
declare the annulment of the contract. Annulment will be declared only upon a finding that the wife did
not give her consent.
In this case, there is a finding by the CA which was affirmed by the SC that Aguete gave her consent as
evidenced by the notarized documents.
The Deed of REM was a valid contract. The SPA constitutes acceptance by the other spouse that
perfected the continuing offer as a binding contract between the parties.
Article 124 of the Family Code of which applies to conjugal partnership property, is a reproduction of
Article 96 of the Family Code which applies to community property.
Both Article 96 and Article 127 of the Family Code provide that the powers do not include disposition or
encumbrance without the written consent of the other spouse. Any disposition or encumbrance without
the written consent shall be void. However, both provisions also state that "the transaction shall be
construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be
perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse x x x before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both offerors."
In this case, the Promissory Note and the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage were executed on 31 October
1995. The Special Power of Attorney was executed on 4 November 1995. The execution of the SPA
is the acceptance by the other spouse that perfected the continuing offer as a binding contract
between the parties, making the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage a valid contract.
Jose’s act of denying admission to petitioner into their conjugal home upon her return from Zamboanga,
coupled with the fact that he failed to give support to petitioner and their daughter, constitutes
abandonment.
Article 178 has been superseded by article 128 of the Family Code. Under the this provision, the
aggrieved spouse may petition for judicial separation on either of these grounds: 1. Abondonment by a
spouse of the other without just cause; and 2. Failure of one spouse to comply with his or her
(1992) disposition of the complaint for support, there was obligations to the family without just cause, even if she said spouse does not leave the other spouse.
no disposition of the complaint for judicial Abandonment implies a departure by one spouse with the avowed intent never to return, followed by
separation of conjugal property. prolonged absence without just cause, and without in the meantime providing in the least for one's
Before the CA, the complaint for judicial separation family although able to do so. There must be absolute cessation of marital relations, duties and rights,
of conjugal property was dismissed for lack of a with the intention of perpetual separation. This idea is clearly expressed in the above-quoted provision,
cause of action and on the ground that separation which states that "a spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left the
by agreement was not covered by Article 178 of conjugal dwelling without any intention of returning."
the Civil Code. The physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by the private respondent to give
The CA dismissed the complaint on the ground that support to the petitioner, sufficed to constitute abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of
the separation of the parties was due to their their conjugal property.
agreement and not because of abondonment. The In addition, the petitioner may also invoke the second ground allowed by Article 128, for the fact is that
respondent court relied mainly on the testimony of he has failed without just cause to comply with his obligations to the family as husband or parent.
the petitioner, who declared under oath that she
left Dumaguete City, where she and Jo were living
together "because that was our agreement." It held
that a agreement to live separately without just
cause was void under Article 221 of the Civil Code
and could not sustain any claim of abandonment
by the aggrieved spouse. Its conclusion was that
the only remedy availabe to the petitioner was legal
separation under Article 175 of the Civil Code, by
virtue of which the conjugal partnership of property
would be terminated.

13. Dissolution of CPG

METROPOLITAN Respondent Nicholson Pascual and Florencia
BANK AND Nevalga were married on January 19, 1985. During
TRUST CO., vs. the union, Florencia bought a lot with a three-door
NICHOLSON apartment standing thereon. In 1994, the marriage
PASCUAL a.k.a. between the spouses was annulled. In the same
NELSON decision, the RTC, inter alia, ordered the
PASCUAL dissolution and liquidation of the ex-spouses’
conjugal partnership of gains. Subsequent events
(2008) however, saw the couple going their separate ways
without liquidating their conjugal partnership.
In 1997, Florencia, together with the spouses
Oliveros, obtained a loan from petitioner
Metrobank, secured by several REMs, including
the subject lot. Metrobank proceeded with
foreclosure proceedings due to the failure of
Florencia to pay her loan. Nicholson filed
Complaint to declare the nullity of the mortgage of
the disputed property, alleging that the property,
which is still conjugal property, was mortgaged
without his consent.
Both the RTC and CA declared the mortgage as
null and void.
Tarrosa v De De Leon before he was married entered into a
Leon conditional contract to sell to purchase a lot in
Quezon City. After his marriage, following the full
(2009) payment the TCT of the lot was transferred in his
While the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and Florencia severed their marital bond and
dissolved the conjugal partnership, the character of the properties acquired before such declaration
continues to subsist as conjugal properties until and after the liquidation and partition of the partnership
This conclusion holds true whether we apply Art. 129 of the Family Code on liquidation of the conjugal
partnership’s assets and liabilities which is generally prospective in application, or Arts. 179 to 185 of
the Civil Code on the subject, Conjugal Partnership of Gains. For, the relevant provisions of both Codes
first require the liquidation of the conjugal properties before a regime of separation of property reigns.
Dael v. Intermediate Appellate Court: pending its liquidation following its dissolution, the conjugal
partnership of gains is converted into an implied ordinary co-ownership among the surviving spouse
and the other heirs of the deceased.
In this pre-liquidation scenario, Art. 493 of the Civil Code (relating to the rules on co-ownership)
shall govern the property relationship between the former spouses.
Accordingly, the mortgage contract insofar as it covered the remaining 1/2 undivided portion of the lot is
null and void, Nicholson not having consented to the mortgage of his undivided half.
The sale of one-half of the conjugal property without liquidation of the partnership is void.
Prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the interest of each spouse in the conjugal assets is
inchoate, a mere expectancy, which constitutes neither a legal nor an equitable estate, and does not
 name where it was indicated that he was single.
He subsequently sold the lot to his sister Tarrosa
wherein the consent of his wife was not obtained.
De Leon died. Tarrosa moved for cancellation of
TCT and its registration in her name. Thus the wife
and children of De Leon filed for reconveyance.
Cabreza v Cabreza filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
Cabreza her marriage to her wife which was granted and
where the conjugal partnership ordered to be
dissolved and liquidated in accordance with Art 129
FC.
(2009) He then moved for the sale of the real property
which was granted. His wife filed a motion for
reconsideration of this order which was denied and
this decision became final.
When a writ of possession was ordered to be
issued to the buyer, wife filed a petition to have it
held in abeyance.
She argued that she in accordance with Art 129(5)
, the conjugal dwelling and lot on which it is
situated shall be adjudicated to the spouse with
whom majority of the children choose to remain,
which in this case is her and that in the deed of
sale, her consent and signature was not obtained
and thus the sale was void.
Go v Servacio Two properties were sold to Protacio Jr. Later he
executed an affidavit of renunciation where he
admitted that the property was actually sold to his
(2011) father Protacio Sr. After Sr.’s wife’s death (Marta),
he and his son Go sold said property to Servacio.
Said sale is not being contested and property is
being demanded to be returned since the property
was conjugal which was not yet liquidated at the
time of the sale.
Ugalde v Ysasi Ugalde and Ysasi separated in 1957. Ysasi
allegedly contarcted another marriage with a
certain Smith.
Ugalde is contending that Ysasi and Smith had
(2008) been disposing their conjugal property to her
prejudice. Thus she fiuled petition for liquidation of
the CPG.
Ysasi countered that an agreement was already
made between them dissolving their CPG in 1957
which was approved by the CFI.
Dino v Dino Dino married his wife in 1998. Later a petition to
ripen into a title until it appears that there are assets in the community as a result of the liquidation and
settlement. The interest of each spouse is limited to the net remainder or "remanente liquido" (haber
ganancial) resulting from the liquidation of the affairs of the partnership after its dissolution. Thus, the
right of the husband or wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the dissolution and
liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or after dissolution of the marriage, when it is finally determined
that, after settlement of conjugal obligations, there are net assets left which can be divided between the
spouses or their respective heirs
The decision of the RTC ordering the sale of the family home has long become final and executory.
The order of possession, writ of possession and notice to vacate, which are now assailed by the wife,
were all implemented after the RTC Decision
The issue on the lack of consent and signature on the sale was not tackled in the present since the
Court held that it was subject of another petition filed in the CA.
The FC provisions does not apply since at the time of death of Sr’s wife, in 1987, it is the NCC’s
provision which governed.
Upon Marta’s death in 1987, the conjugal partnership was dissolved, pursuant to Article 175 (1) of
the Civil Code and an implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Sr. and the other heirs of Marta
with respect to her share in the assets of the conjugal partnership pending a liquidation following its
liquidation.
Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect of Marta’s share in the conjugal
partnership, could not yet assert or claim title to any specific portion of Marta’s share without an actual
partition of the property being first done either by agreement or by judicial decree
Article 105FC also provides that the applicability of the rules on dissolution of the conjugal partnership
is “without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.”
The finality of CFI approving the agreement led in the dissolution of the petitioner and respondent's
conjugal partnership of gains.
The governing law in their marriage is the NCC provisions and thus they are governed by CPG in the
absence of a marriage settlement providing for another regime.
Under Article 175 of the Civil Code, the judicial separation of property results in the termination of the
conjugal partnership of gains:
xxx
(4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article 191.
Sec 19 of the Rule does not apply to Art 147 FC.
 declare marriage void on the ground of
psychological incapacity(Art 36) was filed which
was granted but it was provided that said decree of
(2011) absolute nullity would only be issued upon
compliance with Art 50 and 51 of FC in accordance
with Sec 19 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Null Marriages (Rule). This was modified
and the court order that liquidation, partition, and
distribution of the parties’ properties under Article
147 FC need to be complied before issuance of the
decree.
Yu vs Reyes- In a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
Carpio filed by petitioner Yu, RTC judge granted Motion of
the private respondent to have the incident on the
2011 declaration of nullity of marriage be resolved ahead
of the incidents on custody, support, and property
relations, and not simultaneously. CA affirms
RTC’s order.
Petitioner argues that the court should have
received first the evidence for the incidents on
custody, support, and property relations and
resolved it simultaneous with the issue of nullity of
marriage and not after. He argues that the RTC
Order is tantamount to denial of presentation of
evidence on the issues of custody, support, and
property relations.
(NOTE: This is a Section 36 petition applying
Section 19 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Compare to
Dino vs Dino case which stated that Section 19 (1)
of the A.M. does not apply to Section 36 petitions.
Two cases decided the same year.)
D. Regime of separation of property
(a) In the marriage settlements
(b) When mandatory
(c) Reconciliation in legal separation
(d) Judicial separation of property
E. Property regime of unions without marriage
1. Unions under FC 147, 6, 35, 36, 53
Valdes vs QC Antonio Valdes sought the declaration of nullity of
RTC the marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family
Code. Judgment was rendered declaring the
In a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties during the period of
cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.
Sec 19 requires that before a decree is issued that Art 50 and 51 must be complied with. But Art 50 and
51 only refers to void marriages under Art 40 and 45 FC and thus does not cover void marriages under
Art 36FC.
SC upholds RTC and CA. RTC judge did not disallow the presentation of evidence on the incidents on
custody, support, and property relations. It is clear in the assailed orders that the trial court judge
merely deferred the reception of evidence relating to custody, support, and property relations.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages provides:
Section 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein
that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after
compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation,
Partition and Distribution of Properties.
xxxx
Section 21. Liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of common children and delivery of
their presumptive legitimes. - Upon entry of the judgment granting the petition, or, in case of appeal,
upon receipt of the entry of judgment of the appellate court granting the petition, the Family Court, on
motion of either party, shall proceed with the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of
the spouses, including custody, support of common children and delivery of their presumptive legitimes
pursuant to Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code unless such matters had been adjudicated in
previous judicial proceedings.
The Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC clearly allows the deferment of the reception of
evidence on custody, support, and property relations. Conversely, the trial court may receive evidence
on the subject incidents after a judgment granting the petition but before the decree of nullity or
annulment of marriage is issued.
In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the
period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may
be, of the Family Code.
 marriage null and void under Article 36 on the
ground of their mutual psychological incapacity to Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be
comply with the essential marital obligations. The governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie
court also directed petitioner and respondent presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the
Gomez to start proceedings on the liquidation of acquisition of the property shall still be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's
their common properties as defined by Article 147 "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household." Unlike the conjugal partnership
of the Family Code, and to comply with the of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate property are not included in the co-ownership.
provisions of Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same
Code. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership
of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the
Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of the contract is annulled ),are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-
decision directing compliance with Articles 50 to 52 law spouses. The first paragraph of Article 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2 ),(3 ),(4) and
of the Family Code. She asserted that the Family (5) of Article 43, relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void
Code contained no provisions on the procedure for marriages under Article 40 of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage
the liquidation of common property in “unions contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is judicially declared void. The latter is
without marriage.” a special rule that somehow recognizes the philosophy and an old doctrine that void marriages are
The trial court made a clarification stating that inexistent from the very beginning and no judicial decree is necessary to establish their nullity.
“considering that Article 147 of the Family Code
explicitly provides that the property acquired by It must be stressed, nevertheless, even as it may merely state the obvious, that the provisions of the
both parties during their union, in the absence of Family Code on the "family home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the Family Code,
proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been remain in force and effect regardless of the property regime of the spouses.
obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and
will be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and
defendant, will own their “family home” and all their
other properties in equal shares.” On the issue
regarding the disputes of the family home, the trial
court said that considering the marriage has
already been declared null and void ab initio,
pursuant to Article 147, the property regime of
petitioner and respondent shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership.

Petitioner argues , among others,

a) that Article 147 of the Family Code does not
apply to cases where the parties are
psychologically incapacitated;
b) Article 50 and 51 in relation to Article 102 and
129 of the Family Code govern the disposition of
the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is
declared void ab initio , including a marriage void
by reasons of psychological incapacity of the
spouses.
c) That assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies
to marriage declared void ab initio on the ground of
pyshological incapacity of a spouse, the same may
be read consistently with Article 129.
Carino vs In 1969 SPO4 Santiago Carino married Susan The marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due the absence of a valid marriage license.
Carino Nicdao Carino. He had 2 children with her. In 1992, The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the same has been solemnized
SPO4 contracted a second marriage, this time with without the judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4. Under Article
Susan Yee Carino. In 1988, prior to his second 40 of the FC, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on
marriage, SPO4 is already bedridden and he was the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the
under the care of Yee. In 1992, he died 13 days absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second
 after his marriage with Yee. Thereafter, the
spouses went on to claim the benefits of SPO4.
Susan Nicdao was able to claim a total of
P140,000.00 while Yee was able to collect a total
of P21,000.00. In 1993, Yee filed an action for
collection of sum of money against Nicdao. She
wanted to have half of the P140k. Yee admitted
that her marriage with SPO4 was solemnized
during the subsistence of the marriage b/n SPO4
and Nicdao but the said marriage between Nicdao
and SPO4 is null and void due to the absence of a
valid marriage license as certified by the local civil
registrar. Yee also claimed that she only found out
about the previous marriage on SPO4’s funeral.
Gonzales vs On October 29, 1992, respondent Erminda filed a
Gonzales complaint for annulment of marriage with prayer for
support pendente lite. The complaint alleges that
2005 petitioner Francisco is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with theobligations of
marriage. He beats her for no justifiable reason,
humiliates and embarrasses her, anddenies her
love, sexual comfort and loyalty. During the time
they lived together, they acquiredproperties. She
managed their pizza business and worked hard for
its development. She prays for thedeclaration of
the nullity of their marriage and for the dissolution
of the conjugal partnership of gains.
RTC declared marriage void ab initio and divided
the properties equally between Francisco and
Erminda. Francisco contests such division of
properties.
Dino vs Dino In Section 36 petition, RTC declared marriage void
ab initio. It ruled that a Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage shall only be issued upon compliance
2011 with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code.
Petitioner questions the dissolution of the absolute
community of property and the ruling that the
decree of annulment shall only be issued upon
compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family
Code. Petitioner argues that Section 19(1) of the
marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is
a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no
judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.
Yee has no right to the benefits earned by SPO4 as a policeman for their marriage is void due to
bigamy; she is only entitled to properties, money etc owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. Wages and salaries earned by each party shall belong to him or her
exclusively (Art. 148 of FC). Nicdao is entitled to the full benefits earned by SPO4 as a cop even if their
marriage is likewise void. This is because the two were capacitated to marry each other for there were
no impediments but their marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage license; in their situation, their
property relations is governed by Art 147 of the FC which provides that everything they earned during
their cohabitation is presumed to have been equally contributed by each party – this includes salaries
and wages earned by each party notwithstanding the fact that the other may not have contributed at all.
Petitioner does not challenge the Appellate Court’s Decision declaring his marriage with respondent
void. Consequently, their property relation shall be governed by the provisions of Article 147 of the
Family Code, which enumerates the two instances when the property relations between spouses shall
be governed by the rules on co-ownership. These are: (1) when a man and woman capacitated to
marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage;
and (2) when a man and woman live together under a void marriage. Under this property regime of co-
ownership, properties acquired by both parties during their union, in the absence of proof to the
contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned
by them in equal shares.
Article 147 creates a presumption that properties acquired during the cohabitation of the parties have
been acquired through their joint efforts, work or industry and shall be owned by them in equal shares.
It further provides that a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any
property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
While it is true that all the properties were bought from the proceeds of the pizza business, petitioner
himself testified that respondent was not a plain housewife and that she helped him in managing the
business. In his handwritten letter to her dated September 6, 1989, he admitted that “You’ve helped
me for what we are now and I won’t let it be destroyed.”
It appeared that before they started living together, petitioner offered respondent to be his partner in his
pizza business and to take over its operations. Respondent started managing the business in 1976.
Her job was to: (1) take care of the daily operations of the business; (2) manage the personnel; and (3)
meet people during inspection and supervision of outlets. She reported for work everyday, even on
Saturdays and Sundays, without receiving any salary or allowance.
The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC that in a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property
relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148
of the Family Code. Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless
void, such as petitioner and respondent in the case before the Court.
We agree with petitioner that the trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage shall be issued only after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under
Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not
apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code.
 Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Null
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply to Article
147 of the Family Code.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages
which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family
Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab
initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the
liquidation of the properties of the parties.

2. Unions under FC 148 of FC 50 in rel. to FC 49(2) and FC 50

BALCODERO V Alayo Bosing was married to Juliana and begot 3 The case was decided under Civil Code.
CA children. He left the conjugal home and forthwith
started living with Josefa, his common law wife. The property was presumed conjugal property of Alayo and Juliana. Because there was no evidence
(1993) While he was living with Josefa, he bought a home that it was Alayo’s exclusive property, the Court held that it was conjugal property of Alayo and Juliana.
on installment basis and authorized the seller to
have the name title to his “wife, Josefa”, which they As regards the property relation between common-law spouses, NCC 144 merely codified the law
did. When Alayo died, Josefa and daughter established through judicial precedents under the old code. In both regimes, the co-ownership rule had
executed an Extrajudicial Partition and had the land more than once been repudiated when either or both spouses suffered from an impediment to marry.
titled in the daughter’s name. The present provisions under FC147 and 148 did not much deviate from the old rules; in any case, its
The legitimate widow and children filed a case for provisions cannot apply to this case without interdicting prior vested rights (FC 256).
reconveyance.
A constructive trust under NCC 1456 was deemed created at the time that the adjudication of
ownership was made following Alayo’s demise.
AGAPAY V Miguel married Carlina and they begot a child. The sale of the riceland was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. The provision of law applicable here
AGAPAY They hardly lived together. When Miguel was 73 is FC 148 providing for cases of cohabitation when a man and a woman who are not capacitated to
years old, he married 19 year old Erlinda, while the marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage
(1997) first marriage was subsisting. They bought a or under a void marriage. While Miguel and Erlinda contracted marriage,, said union was patently void
riceland two months before they married. They also because the earlier marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still subsisting and unaffected by the latter's de
bought a property allegedly with Erlinda as sole facto separation.
vendee. Catalina and child filed a case for recovery
of property. Under FC 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution
of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is required by this provision, in contrast to FC
147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household, are regarded as
contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income or work or
industry. If the actual contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no
presumption of equal shares.

In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the business of buy
and sell and had a sari-sari store but failed to persuade us that she actually contributed money to buy
the subject riceland. Worth noting is the fact that on the date of conveyance, petitioner was only around
20 years of age and Miguel was already 64 and a pensioner of the U.S. Government. Considering her
youthfulness, it is unrealistic to conclude that she contributed P3,750.00 as her share in the purchase
price of subject property, there being no proof of the same.

Even assuming that the subject property was bought before cohabitation, the rules of co-ownership
would still apply and proof of actual contribution would still be essential.

As regards the 2nd property, the testimony of the notary public who prepared the Deed of Conveyance
that it was Miguel who paid for the property and directed that Erlinda’s name alone be placed as the
vendee proves that the transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda. Said donation is
void and inexistent (NCC 739). Moreover, FC 87 expressly provides that the prohibition against
donations between spouses now applies to donations between persons living together as husband and

TUMLOS V SPS. An ejectment suit was filed against petitioner. She
FERNANDEZ claims that she is the co—owner of said property
by virtue of her cohabiting with defendant Mario.
(2000)
ATIENZA V DE Petitioner Lupo and Yolanda lived as common law
CASTRO husband and wife despite that fact the Lupo had a
subsisting marriage. They had two children. Their
(2006) relationship turned sour and Lupo filed for Petition
for Partition of a property allegedly bought with his
exclusive funds. Yolanda alleged that she paid for
the property with her own money.
SIGNEY V SSS Rodolfo, an SSS member, died. Three women
wife without a valid marriage, for otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to
be better than those in legal union.
NCC 144 applies only to a relationship between a man and a woman who are not incapacitated to
marry each other, or to one in which the marriage of the parties is void from the beginning. It does not
apply to a cohabitation that amounts to adultery or concubinage, for it would be absurd to create a co-
ownership where there exists a prior conjugal partnership or absolute community between the man and
his lawful wife.
It is clear that Mario was incapacitated to marry petitioner because he was legally married to Lourdes. It
is also clear that, as readily admitted by petitioner, she cohabited with Mario in a state of concubinage.
Therefore, NCC 144 is inapplicable.
The relationship between petitioner and Mario is governed by FC 148. Justice Sempio-Diy points
out that "[t]he FC has filled the hiatus in NCC 144 by expressly regulating in its FC148 the property
relations of couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage.
Petitioner’s argument — that the FC is inapplicable because the cohabitation and the acquisition of the
property occurred before its effectivity — deserves scant consideration. Suffice it to say that the law
itself states that it can be applied retroactively if it does not prejudice vested or acquired rights. In this
case, petitioner failed to show any vested right over the property in question.
Petitioner fails to present any evidence that she had made an actual contribution to purchase the
subject property. Indeed, she anchors her claim of co-ownership merely on her cohabitation with
Respondent Mario Fernandez.
Likewise, her claim of having administered the property during the cohabitation is unsubstantiated. In
any event, this fact by itself does not justify her claim, for nothing in FC 148 provides that the
administration of the property amounts to a contribution in its acquisition.
Clearly, there is no basis for petitioner’s claim of co-ownership. The property in question belongs to the
conjugal partnership of respondents.
Their property regime is governed by FC 148, which applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous
relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships where both man and woman are
married to other persons, and multiple alliances of the same married man
Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or
industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be
presumed to be equal.
Here, although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties commenced in 1983, or way before the
effectivity of the Family Code, FC 148 thereof applies because this provision was intended precisely to
fill up the hiatus in NCC 144.
As we see it, petitioner’s claim of co-ownership in the disputed property is without basis because not
only did he fail to substantiate his alleged contribution in the purchase thereof but likewise the very trail
of documents pertaining to its purchase as evidentiary proof redounds to the benefit of the respondent.
In contrast, aside from his mere say so and voluminous records of bank accounts, which sadly find no
relevance in this case, the petitioner failed to overcome his burden of proof. Allegations must be proven
by sufficient evidence. Simply stated, he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it; mere
allegation is not evidence.
Whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish his or her right thereto by
 (Gina, Editha, Yolanda) claimed the death benefits,
(2008) all claiming to be his wife. Rodolfo has two children
with Gina.
SSC found that Editha is the legal wife and denied
petitioner’s claim.
Borromeo v Jambrich, who is working for an Austrian Company,
Descallar was assigned to work at a project in Mindoro. He
was later transferred to Cebu and met Descallar, a
(2009) separated mother of two boys who was working as
a waitress. He asked Descallar to be his tutor in
English. The tutorials were held in Descallar’s
residence at a squatters’ area. They fell in love and
decided to live together. They later transferred to
their own house and lot in Agro-Macro Subdivision,
Cabancalan, Mandaue City. The TCT was issued
in the name of Descallar alone but it could be
noted that the signature of Jambrich remained in
the Deed of Absolute Sale as buyer. Jambrich
adopted Descallar’s two sons. However, their
relationship lasted for only two months. Descallar
found a new boyfriend and Jambrich lived with
another woman. He supported Descallar’s sons for
only two months.
Jambrich bought an engine and some accessories
for his boat from Borromeo. To pay his debt to
Borromeo, he sold his rights and interests in Agro-
Macro properties. When Borromeo sought to
register the property, he discovered that the titles
have been transferred to Descallar and it was
already mortgaged.
Borromeo filed a complaint for recovery of real
property alleging that Descallar is not the true
owner because she did not pay a single centavo.
TC- in favor of Borromeo. It is highly improbable
that Descallar could have bought the properties
from her own funds
CA-reversed
Heirs of The Heirs are the legitimate wife and children of
Maramag v De Maramag. De Guzman was the concubine of
Guzman Maramag and the suspect in killing the latter. The
other respondents are the illegitimate child of
(2009) Maramag.
Loreto Maramag misrepresented De Guzman as
his legal wife in an insurance policy with Insular
Life. However, he later revoked her designation as
substantial evidence. Since petitioner is disqualified to be a beneficiary and because the deceased has
no legitimate child, it follows that the dependent illegitimate minor children of the deceased shall be
entitled to the death benefits as primary beneficiaries. The SSS Law is clear that for a minor child to
qualify as a "dependent, " the only requirements are that he/she must be below 21 years of age, not
married nor gainfully employed.
Thus the illegitimate children have the right to the benefits.
The SC ruled in favor of Borromeo.
I. Who purchased the properties? Jambrich. Evidence clearly supports this: a) Descallar affirmed under
oath in her re-direct examination that Jambrich was the owner of the properties b) The post dated
checks for the payment was issued by Jambrich c) When they lived in Syria with her two sons, they
completely under the support of Jambrich d) Jambrich executed a last will and testament where he
bequeathed the said properties to Descallar
II. WON the rule on co-ownership will apply? No. “Further, the fact that the disputed properties were
acquired during the couple’s cohabitation also does not help respondent. The rule that co-ownership
applies to a man and a woman living exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage, but are otherwise capacitated to marry each other, does not apply. In the instant
case, respondent was still legally married to another when she and Jambrich lived together. In such an
adulterous relationship, no co-ownership exists between the parties. It is necessary for each of the
partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property in order to be able to lay
claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal contribution do not apply.”
“The rationale behind the Court’s ruling in United Church Board for World Ministries, as reiterated in
subsequent cases, is this – since the ban on aliens is intended to preserve the nation’s land for future
generations of Filipinos, that aim is achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens
who became Filipino citizens by naturalization or those transfers made by aliens to Filipino citizens. As
the property in dispute is already in the hands of a qualified person, a Filipino citizen, there would be no
more public policy to be protected. The objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in
Filipino hands has been achieved.”
The SC decided in favor of the illegitimate children.
It is evident from the face of the complaint that petitioners are not entitled to a favorable judgment in
light of Article 2011 of the Civil Code which expressly provides that insurance contracts shall be
governed by special laws, i.e., the Insurance Code. Section 53 of the Insurance Code states—
SECTION 53. The insurance proceeds shall be applied exclusively to the proper interest of the person
in whose name or for whose benefit it is made unless otherwise specified in the policy.
Pursuant thereto, it is obvious that the only persons entitled to claim the insurance proceeds are either
the insured, if still alive; or the beneficiary, if the insured is already deceased, upon the maturation of
the policy.
 a beneficiary. The petitioners would like to declare
the shares of the illegitimate children as inofficious.
Grepalife (another insurance co) claimed that due
to the misrepresentation, Loreto is ineligible for
insurance. Furthermore, De Guzman was not
designated as a beneficiary.
TC- in favor of the illegitimate children
CA- dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction
XII. Family Relations
Manalo v CA Troadio Manalo, a resident of 1966 Maria Clara
Street, Sampaloc, Manila died intestate on
(2001) February 14, 1992. He was survived by his wife,
Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven (11) children, who
are all of legal age.
At the time of his death, Troadio Manalo left
several real properties located in Manila and in the
province of Tarlac including a business under the
name and style Manalo’s Machine Shop with
offices at No. 19 Calavite Street, La Loma, Quezon
City and at No. 45 Gen. Tinio Street, Arty
Subdivision, Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Respondents filed a petition with the respondent
Regional Trial Court of Manila for the judicial
settlement of the estate of their late father, Troadio
Manalo, and for the appointment of their brother,
Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof.
The only issue raised by herein petitioners in the
instant petition for review is whether or not the
respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the
questioned orders of the respondent trial court
which denied their motion for the outright dismissal
of the petition for judicial settlement of estate
despite the failure of the petitioners therein to aver
that earnest efforts toward a compromise involving
members of the same family have been made prior
to the filing of the petition but that the same have
failed.
Tribiana v Edwin and Lourdes are husband and wife who
Tribiana have lived together since 1996 but formalized their
union only on 28 October 1997. On 30 April 1998,
(2004) Lourdes filed a petition for habeas corpus before
The exception to this rule is a situation where the insurance contract was intended to benefit third
persons who are not parties to the same in the form of favorable stipulations or indemnity. In such a
case, third parties may directly sue and claim from the insurer. Petitioners are third parties to the
insurance contracts with Insular and Grepalife and, thus, are not entitled to the proceeds thereof.
Accordingly, respondents Insular and Grepalife have no legal obligation to turn over the insurance
proceeds to petitioners. The revocation of Eva as a beneficiary in one policy and her disqualification as
such in another are of no moment considering that the designation of the illegitimate children as
beneficiaries in Loreto’s insurance policies remains valid. Because no legal proscription exists in
naming as beneficiaries the children of illicit relationships by the insured, the shares of Eva in the
insurance proceeds, whether forfeited by the court in view of the prohibition on donations under Article
739 of the Civil Code or by the insurers themselves for reasons based on the insurance contracts, must
be awarded to the said illegitimate children, the designated beneficiaries, to the exclusion of petitioners.
It is only in cases where the insured has not designated any beneficiary, or when the designated
beneficiary is disqualified by law to receive the proceeds, that the insurance policy proceeds shall
redound to the benefit of the estate of the insured.
The SC ruled that the judicial settlement of the estate should not be dismissed.
Art. 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should
appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed,
subject to the limitations in Article 2035 (underscoring supplied).
The above-quoted provision of the law is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. This is clear
from the term “suit” that it refers to an action by one person or persons against another or others in a
court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an
injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity. A civil action is thus an action filed in a
court of justice, whereby a party sues another for the enforcement of a right, or the prevention or
redress of a wrong. Besides, an excerpt from the Report of the Code Commission unmistakably reveals
the intention of the Code Commission to make that legal provision applicable only to civil actions which
are essentially adversarial and involve members of the same family, thus:
It is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation between members of the
same family. It is necessary that every effort should be made toward a compromise before a litigation
is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family. It is known that lawsuit between close relatives
generates deeper bitterness than strangers.
It must be emphasized that the oppositors (herein petitioners) are not being sued in SP. PROC.
No. 92-63626 for any cause of action as in fact no defendant was impleaded therein. The Petition for
Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626
is a special proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to establish a
status, a right, or a particular fact. The petitioners therein (private respondents herein) merely seek to
establish the fact of death of their father and subsequently to be duly recognized as among the heirs of
the said deceased so that they can validly exercise their right to participate in the settlement and
liquidation of the estate of the decedent consistent with the limited and special jurisdiction of the
probate court.
SC ruled in favor of Lourdes. The case should not be dismissed.
It is true that the petition for habeas corpus filed by Lourdes failed to allege that she resorted to
compromise proceedings before filing the petition. However, in her opposition to Edwin’s motion to
dismiss, Lourdes attached a Barangay Certification to File Action dated 1 May 1998. Edwin does not
 the RTC claiming that Edwin left their conjugal
home with their daughter, Khriza Mae Tribiana
("Khriza"). Edwin has since deprived Lourdes of
lawful custody of Khriza who was then only one (1)
year and four (4) months of age. Later, it turned out
that Khriza was being held by Edwin’s mother,
Rosalina Tribiana ("Rosalina"). Edwin moved to
dismiss Lourdes’ petition on the ground that the
petition failed to allege that earnest efforts at a
compromise were made before its filing as required
by Article 151 of the Family Code.
Lourdes filed her opposition to Edwin’s motion to
dismiss claiming that there were prior efforts at a
compromise, which failed. Lourdes attached to her
opposition a copy of the Certification to File Action
from their Barangay dated 1 May 1998.
Hiyas Savings Alberto Moreno (private respondent) filed with the
and Loan Bank RTC a complaint against Hiyas Inc., his wife
Inc v Acuna Remedios, the spouses Felipe and Maria Owe and
the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City for
(2006) cancellation of mortgage contending that he did not
secure any loan from Hiyas, nor did he sign or
execute any contract of mortgage in its favor; that
his wife, acting in conspiracy with Hiyas and the
spouses Owe, who were the ones that benefited
from the loan, made it appear that he signed the
contract of mortgage; that he could not have
executed the said contract because he was then
working abroad.
Hiyas filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that
Moreno failed to comply with Article 151 of the
Family Code wherein it is provided that no suit
between members of the same family shall prosper
unless it should appear from the verified complaint
or petition that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made, but that the same
have failed. Hiyas contends that since the
complaint does not contain any fact or averment
that earnest efforts toward a compromise had been
made prior to its institution, then the complaint
should be dismissed for lack of cause of action.
Intestate Estate A criminal complaint was filed against Sato who
of Gonzales vs allegedly committed estafa against his mother-in-
People law. In his Motion to Quash, he invoked the
dispute the authenticity of the Barangay Certification and its contents. This effectively established that
the parties tried to compromise but were unsuccessful in their efforts. However, Edwin would have the
petition dismissed despite the existence of the Barangay Certification, which he does not even dispute.
Evidently, Lourdes has complied with the condition precedent under Article 151 of the Family Code. A
dismissal under Section 1(j) of Rule 16 is warranted only if there is a failure to comply with a condition
precedent. Given that the alleged defect is a mere failure to allege compliance with a condition
precedent, the proper solution is not an outright dismissal of the action, but an amendment under
Section 1 of Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Moreover, in a habeas corpus proceeding involving the welfare and custody of a child of tender age,
the paramount concern is to resolve immediately the issue of who has legal custody of the child.
Technicalities should not stand in the way of giving such child of tender age full protection. This rule
has sound statutory basis in Article 213 of the Family Code, which states, "No child under seven years
of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise." In this case, the child (Khriza) was only one year and four months when taken away from
the mother.
The barangay conciliation requirement in Section 412 of the LGC does not apply to habeas
corpus proceedings where a person is "deprived of personal liberty." In such a case, Section 412
expressly authorizes the parties "to go directly to court" without need of any conciliation proceedings.
There is deprivation of personal liberty warranting a petition for habeas corpus where the "rightful
custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto."
In Magbaleta, the case involved brothers and a stranger to the family, the alleged owner of the subject
property. The Court, taking into consideration the explanation made by the Code Commision in its
report, ruled that:
[T]hese considerations do not, however, weigh enough to make it imperative that such efforts to
compromise should be a jurisdictional pre-requisite for the maintenance of an action whenever a
stranger to the family is a party thereto, whether as a necessary or indispensable one. It is not always
that one who is alien to the family would be willing to suffer the inconvenience of, much less relish, the
delay and the complications that wranglings between or among relatives more often than not entail.
Besides, it is neither practical nor fair that the determination of the rights of a stranger to the family who
just happened to have innocently acquired some kind of interest in any right or property disputed
among its members should be made to depend on the way the latter would settle their differences
among themselves. x x x.
Hence, once a stranger becomes a party to a suit involving members of the same family, the law no
longer makes it a condition precedent that earnest efforts be made towards a compromise before the
action can prosper.
In the subsequent case of De Guzman, the case involved spouses and the alleged paramour of the
wife. The Court ruled that due to the efforts exerted by the husband, through the Philippine
Constabulary, to confront the wife, there was substantial compliance with the law, thereby implying that
even in the presence of a party who is not a family member, the requirements that earnest efforts
towards a compromise have been exerted must be complied with, pursuant to Article 222 of the Civil
Code, now Article 151 of the Family Code.
While De Guzman was decided after Magbaleta, the principle enunciated in the Magbaleta is the one
that now prevails because it is reiterated in the subsequent cases of Gonzales v. Lopez, Esquivias v.
Court of Appeals, Spouses Hontiveros v. Regional Trial Court, Branch , Iloilo City, and the most recent
case of Martinez v. Martinez. Thus, Article 151 of the Family Code applies to cover when the suit is
exclusively between or among family members.
The Continuing Affinity View maintains that relationship by affinity between the surviving spouse and
the kindred of the deceased spouse continues even after the death of the deceased spouse, regardless
of whether the marriage produced children or not. Under this view, the relationship by affinity endures
 absolutory cause in Art 332 of the RPC exempting
(2010) certain relatives by affinity from liability for estafa.
The prosecution contends that the relationship
contemplated in RPC Art 332 was extinguished by
the death of Sato’s wife.
XIII. Family Home
Patricio vs Dario Perla Patricio sought the partition of the family
home after her husband died. Respondent
(2006) Marcelino Dario III, son of Patricio opposes on the
ground that Marcelino IV, his minor son and
grandson of petitioner and decedent, still lives
there.
Modequillo vs Jan. 29, 1988 a money judgment arose from a
Breva vehicular accident to which petiitoner (together with
another person) were found liable to pay private
(1990) respondent
As a result, petitioner’s 2 parcels of land were
levied, on one of the lands was the Family Home of
petitioner.
Petitioner now contends that his house cannot be
levied upon since it was constituted as a Family
Home when the Family Code took effect on Aug.
1988
Cabang vs Basay The Cabangs bought a parcel of land which they
thougt to be Lot No. 7778. As it turns out, it is Lot
(2009) No. 7777 so the SC granted the land to the Basays
in a final decision
The case was remanded to the lower court to
determined rights of the Cabangs under NCC this
is where the Cabangs brought up the claim that the
even after the dissolution of the marriage that produced it as a result of the death of one of the parties
to the said marriage. This view considers that, where statutes have indicated an intent to benefit step-
relatives or in-laws, the "tie of affinity" between these people and their relatives-by-marriage is not to be
regarded as terminated upon the death of one of the married parties.
Thus, for purposes of Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, we hold that the relationship by affinity
created between the surviving spouse and the blood relatives of the deceased spouse survives the
death of either party to the marriage which created the affinity.
The intention of the law is to safeguard and protect the interests of the minor beneficiary until he
reaches legal age and would now be capable of supporting himself. However, three requisites must
concur before a minor beneficiary is entitled to the benefits of Art. 159: (1) the relationship enumerated
in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home, and (3) they are dependent for legal
support upon the head of the family.
In this case, the third requisite is not present. Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV is dependent on legal
support not from his grandmother, but from his father. Thus, despite residing in the family home and his
being a descendant of Marcelino V. Dario, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot be considered as
beneficiary contemplated under Article 154 because he did not fulfill the third requisite of being
dependent on his grandmother for legal support. It is his father whom he is dependent on legal support,
and who must now establish his own family home separate and distinct from that of his parents, being
of legal age.
In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a family home
whether judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became a family home by operation of law
only under Article 153 of the Family Code. It is deemed constituted as a family home upon the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year after its publication in the
Manila Chronicle on August 4, 1987 (1988 being a leap year).
The contention of petitioner that it should be considered a family home from the time it was occupied by
petitioner and his family in 1969 is not well- taken. Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it is provided
that "the provisions of this Chapter shall also govern existing family residences insofar as said
provisions are applicable." It does not mean that Articles 152 and 153 of said Code have a retroactive
effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at
the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from execution for
the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code. Article 162 simply means
that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family
homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code.
Article 162 does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.
Is the family home of petitioner exempt from execution of the money judgment aforecited No. The debt
or liability which was the basis of the judgment arose or was incurred at the time of the vehicular
accident on March 16, 1976 and the money judgment arising therefrom was rendered by the appellate
court on January 29, 1988. Both preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. This
case does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the Family Code.
The the Family Home built on a land of a 3 rd party can be subject for execution. First of all, a Family
Home must be constituted on the land of the head of the family, not on the land of a third party.
There can be no question that a family home is generally exempt from execution, provided it was duly
constituted as such. It is likewise a given that the family home must be constituted on property owned
by the persons constituting it. Indeed as pointed out in Kelley, Jr. v. Planters Products, Inc. "[T]he family
home must be part of the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, or of the
exclusive properties of either spouse with the latter’s consent, or on the property of the unmarried head
 land was constituted as the Family Home
Ramos vs The home of petitioners was being levied upon to
Pangilinan satisfy a money judgment arising from a labor
case.
(2010)
EQUITABLE PCI Spouses Martinez obtained loans from Equitable
BANK, INC. v and secured with a REM over their condo unit in
OJ-MARK Valle Verde 5 where the spouses are residing. Mr.
TRADING, INC. Martinez signed as principal owner and as
and SPOUSES President of the registered owner and third-party
MARTINEZ mortgagor, OJ-Mark Trading.
(2010) The spouses defaulted in their obligation. The
spouses offered to settle their debts with the
assignment to the bank of a commercial lot of
corresponding value. Mr. Martinez failed to submit
documents pertaining to said commercial lot and
the bank was unable to evaluate the spouse’s
proposal.
Equitable initiated an extrajudicial foreclosure on
the REM.
Spouses filed for a TRO, Injunction and Annulment
of Extrajudicial Foreclosure. RT granted the
injunction and CA affirmed.
SPOUSES DE De Mesa’s jointly purchased a property in Bulacan
MESA v while they were merely cohabiting before their
SPOUSES marriage. A house was later constructed on the
ACERO subject property, which the petitioners thereafter
of the family." In other words:
The family home must be established on the properties of (a) the absolute community, or (b) the
conjugal partnership, or (c) the exclusive property of either spouse with the consent of the other. It
cannot be established on property held in co-ownership with third persons. However, it can be
established partly on community property, or conjugal property and partly on the exclusive property of
either spouse with the consent of the latter.
If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988,
then it must have been constituted either judicially by filing a verified petition before the courts and the
registration of the court’s order with the Registry of Deeds of the area where the property is located.
Extrajudicially by the execution of a public instrument which must also be registered with the Registry of
Property. Failure to comply with either one of these two modes of constitution will bar a judgment
debtor from availing of the privilege.
For family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family there is no need to constitute
extrajudicially or judicially, and the exemption is effective from the time it was constituted and lasts as
long as any of its beneficiaries under Art. 154 actually resides therein. Moreover, the family home
should belong to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, or if exclusively by one spouse, its
constitution must have been with consent of the other, and its value must not exceed certain amounts
depending upon the area where it is located. Further, the debts incurred for which the exemption does
not apply as provided under Art. 155 for which the family home is made answerable must have been
incurred after August 3, 1988. And in both cases, whether under the Civil Code or the Family Code, it is
not sufficient that the person claiming exemption merely alleges that such property is a family home.
This claim for exemption must be set up and proved
In the present case, since petitioners claim that the family home was constituted prior to August
3, 1988, or as early as 1944, they must comply with the procedure mandated by the Civil Code.
There being absolutely no proof that the Pandacan property was judicially or extrajudicially constituted
as the Ramos’ family home, the law’s protective mantle cannot be availed of by petitioners
Petition granted. CA reversed and set aside. Injunction denied.
The Court notes that the claim of exemption under FC153, thereby raising the issue of whether the
condo unit was a family home or a corporate property, is entirely inconsistent with the clear contractual
agreement in the REM.
Assuming it is a “family home”, the condo unit will not be exempt from foreclosure, because FC 153 (3)
allows the execution or forced sale of a family home “for debts secured by mortgages on the premises
before or after such constitution.” The spouses failed to show an ostensible right that needs protection
of the injunctive writ.
Petition denied.
Although the subject property is a family home, its exemption from execution must be set up and
proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction.
 occupied as their family home after they got
(2012) married. While it is true that the family home is constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a
family residence and is exempt from execution or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code,
Mrs. De Mesa obtained a loan from Mr. Acero such claim for exemption should be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at
secured by an REM over the Bulacan property. public auction. Failure to do so would estop the party from later claiming the exemption.
Mrs. De Mesa paid with a check which was
subsequently dishonored. De Mesa’s failed to pay The settled rule is that the right to exemption or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code
the obligation despite repeated demands. Aceros is a personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by
filed BP 22 against De Mesas. Latter was acquitted the sheriff, but by the debtor himself before the sale of the property at public auction. It is not
but ordered to pay the obligation. sufficient that the person claiming exemption merely alleges that such property is a family home.This
claim for exemption must be set up and proved to the Sheriff.
Writ of execution was issued over the property
which was sold in auction; Mr. Acero was the
highest bidder. Aceros rented out the house to the
De Mesas, who defaulted on payment of rentals.
Ejectment case was filed by Aceros against De
Mesas. De Mesas claim that they are not mere
lessors and are in fact the lawful owners of the
property.

MTC ordered De Mesas to vacate.

De Mesas filed action to cancel Aceros TCT

claiming that the property was a family home and
cannot be the subject of execution.

RTC dismissed complaint. CA affirmed saying that

he exemption of a family home from execution,
attachment or forced sale under Article 153 of the
Family Code is not automatic and should
accordingly be raised and proved to the Sheriff
prior to the execution, forced sale or attachment.

XIV. Paternity and Filiation

A. Concept of paternity, filiation and legitimacy
ARBOLARIO v Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals Petitioners in this case were unable to establish any right to partition, because they had failed to
CA overstepped its bounds when it ruled that since establish that they were legitimate half-brothers and half-sisters of the deceased Purificacion.
respondents did not raise the issue of partition on Questions as to the determination of the heirs of a decedent, the proof of filiation, and the determination
(2003) appeal, the RTC had no jurisdiction to divide the of the estate of a decedent and claims thereto should be brought up before the proper probate court or
disputed lot. The CA held, however, that the in special proceedings instituted for the purpose. Such issues cannot be adjudicated in an ordinary civil
partition of the property had not been contemplated action for the recovery of ownership and possession.
by the parties, because respondents merely sought
recovery of possession of the parcel held by the
Salhays, while petitioners sought the annulment of
the Deed of Partition respondents had entered into.

B. Legitimate children
TAN v. TROCIO School owner and directress, Felicidad Bariñan
(1990) Tan filed a complaint seeking disbarment of Atty.
Galileo Trocio for immorality and conduct
unbecoming of a lawyer. She alleged that Trocio,
Complaint for disbarment DISMISSED.
The court found insufficient basis for the allegations
The alleged threat to deport her husband could not hold because she admitted having lost contact with
 who is the legal counsel of the school,
overpowered her inside the office and against her
will, succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her.
And as a result, she begot a son whom she named
Jewel Tan. She further alleged that he used to
support Jewel but subsequently lost interest and
stopped. She claimed she filed the complaint only
after 8 years from the incident because of Trocio
threatened her with the deportation of her alien
husband and due to the fact that she was married
with eight children.
ANGELES v Aleli Maglaya petitioned before RTC-Caloocan that
MAGLAYA she be appointed as administratix of Francisco’s
estate claiming that she is his sole legitimate child
(2005) with Genoveva and Belen Angeles is only 2nd wife;
her parents wed in 1938; mother died in 1988.
Belen opposed and petitioned to be the
administratix alleging that when she married him
he was single, he did not sign her Aleli’s birth
certificate and Aleli did not present her parent’s
marriage certificate nor any proof of such union.
They wed in 1948.
RTC favored Belen. CA favored Aleli.
SSS v. Aguas Rossana, Pablo’s surviving spouse, filed a claim
with SSS for death benefits indicating therein that
(2006) Pablo was likewise survived by his minor child,
Jeylynn.
Pablo’s sister, in a sworn letter to SSS, contested
the claim alleging that Rossana left Pablo 6 years
ago and lived with another man and that Pablo had
no legal children.
Janet, who also claimed to be the child of Pablo
and Rosanna, joined as claimant. In Janet’s birth
certificate, which was registered in the Civil
Registry of San Fernando, it appears that her
father was Pablo and her mother was Rosanna.
The claimants averred that Jeylynn was a
her husband when he learned of the respondent’s transgression that very same evening. The fear had
thus become inexistent
Even after the alleged incident, she continued having dealings with the respondent—with Trocio acting
as her personal and family’s legal counsel—as though nothing happened.
Complainant’s contention that Respondent continued supporting the child for several years for which
reason she desisted from charging him criminally, has not been substantiate. In fact, the fact that she
kept her peace for so many years can even be construed as condonation. It is likewise strange that an
unwanted son, as the child would normally have been, should, of all names, be called “Jewel.”
Witness, Elueteria’s (domestic help) testimony did not hold as how near she was to the crime scene,
considering it allegedly happened in school premises, has not been shown. Testimonies of Felicidad
and witness Marilou (another domestic help) to show unusual closeness between Trocio and Jewel, like
playing with him and giving him toys, are not convincing enough to prove paternity. Pictures of Jewel
and Trocio showing allegedly their physical likeness to each other is inconclusive evidence to prove
paternity, and much less would it prove violation of Complainant’s person
More importantly, Jewel Tan was born during the wedlock of Complainant and her husband and
the presumption should be in favor of legitimacy unless physical access between the couple
was impossible. From the evidence on hand, the presumption has not been overcome by adequate
and convincing proof. In fact, Jewel was registered in his birth certificate as the legitimate child of the
Felicidad and her husband, Tan Le Pok.
Petition granted.
SC ruled that Aleli isn’t the legitimate child of Francisco because the marriage of her mom and
Francisco wasn’t proven, no marriage certificate presented (NSO certified!), no priest was presented as
witness and none of the witnesses could affirm the marriage
No testimony that Genoveva and Francisco presented themselves in public as husband and wife.
Aleli’s wedding picture showing Francisco giving her away is insufficient
Francisco also didn’t sign Aleli’s birth certificate, thus she wasn’t even a recognized child if dad didn’t
sign birth certificate, no presumption of legitimacy.
Only Jeylynn is the legitimate child of Pablo thus she is entitled to a monthly pension.
Jeylynn’s claim is justified by the photocopy of her birth certificate which bears the signature of Pablo.
Petitioner was able to authenticate the certification from the Civil Registry showing that she was born
on October 29, 1991. The records also show that Rosanna and Pablo were married on December 4,
1977 and the marriage subsisted until the latter’s death on December 8, 1996. It is therefore evident
that Jeylynn was born during Rosanna and Pablo’s marriage. It bears stressing that under Article 164 of
the Family Code, children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate. The
presumption that Jeylnn is a legitimate child is buttressed by her birth certificate bearing Pablo’s
signature, which was verified from his specimen signature on file with petitioner. A birth certificate
signed by the father is a competent evidence of paternity.
The presumption of legitimacy under Article 164, however, can not extend to Janet because her date of
birth was not substantially proven. The Court cannot give Janet’s birth certificate the same probative
weight as Jeylnn’s because it was not verified in any way by the civil register. In any case, a record of
 legitimate child of Pablo as evidenced by her birth birth is merely prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. Here, the witnesses were unanimous
certificate bearing Pablo’s signature as Jeylynn’s in saying that Janet was not the real child but merely adopted by Rosanna and Pablo. Under Sec. 8(e)
father. of RA 1161, as amended, only "legally adopted" children are considered dependent children.
Rivera v. Heirs Petitioners are allegedly the half-brothers, the half- Angelina is not a legitimate child of Gonzales thus she cannot inherit from Gonzales
of Villanueva sister-in-law, and the children of a half-brother of
the deceased Gonzales. A closer examination of the birth certificate reveals that Angelina was listed as "adopted" by both
(2006) Respondents are heirs of Villanueva. Respondent Villanueva and Gonzales. But definitely, the mere registration of a child in his or her birth
Angelina is allegedly the daughter of Villanueva. certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption, does not confer upon the
From 1927 until her death in 1980, Gonzales child the status of an adopted child and the legal rights of such child, and even amounts to
cohabited with Villanueva without the benefit of simulation of the child's birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a public document.
marriage because the latter was married to one Gonzales is 44 years old, and on the verge of menopause at the time of the alleged birth. Gonzales had
Musngi who died on 1963. In the course of their been living childless with Villanueva for 20 years. Under the circumstances, we hold that it was not
cohabitation, they acquired several properties sufficiently established that Angelina was Gonzales' biological daughter, nor even her adopted
including the properties contested in this case. daughter.
Gonzales died without leaving a will. Villanueva
and Angelina executed a deed of extrajudicial
partition with sale, that is, an extrajudicial
settlement of Gonzales' estate comprising a
number of the properties. In this document,
Villanueva, for the amount of P30,000 conveyed
his interests in the estate to Angelina. Petitioners
filed a case for partition of Gonzales' estate and
annulment of titles and damages in the RTC.

1. Who are considered legitimate children

A. Legitimate proper
(a) Conceived during marriage
1. Valid marriage
2. Terminated marriage under FC 42 in rel. to FC 43(1)
3. Void marriages under FC 53, 36
4. Voidable marriages
(b) Born during marriage
(c) Conceived by artificial insemination
2. Proof of Filiation
(a) Of legitimate children
Diaz v. CA ISIDRO, who died in 1911, was survived by 10 Leodegario is a legitimate child of Isidro.
children. FILOMENA (No. 9) was a legitimate child,
(1984) her mother being Calixta, wife of ISIDRO. 7 The preponderance of evidence sustains a finding of Leodegario's legitimacy.
children were illegitimate children of ISIDRO with His school records from the UST, as a senior student in the College of Law show that he was enrolled
his mistress. as "Leodegario Azarraga y Lozada". Although those records by themselves are not proof of legitimate
LEODEGARIO (No. 8) died intestate, leaving filiation, they constitute strong evidence thereof.
neither surviving spouse nor descendants. He had True, his Certificate of Admission to the Philippine Bar on April 16, 1904 names him simply as
properties in Capiz. MARIA filed A petition for the "Leodegario Azarraga". It cannot be concluded therefrom, however, that he was not the legitimate son
issuance of Letters of Administration in her. of Isidro Azarraga and Calixta Lozada. The several letters wherein he signed simply as "Leodegario
Amador Azarraga filed a formal opposition praying Azarraga" neither disprove legitimacy. Even nowadays, the dropping of the maternal surname in
that he, instead of MARIA, be appointed as correspondence or written documents is commonplace for convenience and/or brevity.
Administrator. CFI appointed Maria. The Last Will and Testament of Pastora which, althoughstanding alone does not establish
Eduardo, heir of the original oppositor, filed before DECEDENT's legitimacy, enhances that conclusion. The Will was duly probated without objection and
the CFI a petition to remove MARIA. Eduardo and specifically indicates that the Leodegario (No. 8), Pastora (No. 10) and Filomena (No. 9) are "brother
his brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces and sisters of the full blood they being children of Isidro Azarrag and Calixta Lozada".
(respondents) filed a petition for declaration as In the narration of facts in the case of Sison v. Azarraga, it was shown that Leodegario had already
 Leogedario’s heirs.
MARIA claims that LEODEGARIO (No. 8) to be the
brother in full blood of her mother FILOMENA (No.
9) and of her aunt PASTORA (No. 10).
Respondents claim that LEODEGARIO (No. 8) was
the illegitimate son of ISIDRO and hence, the
brother in full blood of 7 children. They further claim
that Pastora (No. 10) was an illegitimate daughter
of ISIDRO and one Guadalupe.
Tison v. CA Teodora died with no children, leaving the property
in question to his husband, Martin and to the heirs
(1997) of his deceased brother, Tison and Dezoller. Martin
executed an Affidavit of Extrajudicial Settlement,
adjudicating unto himself, allegedly as sole heir,
the land in dispute. Martin sold the lot to Domingo.
Martin died.
Tison and Dezoller filed an action for reconveyance
claiming that they are entitled to inherit one-half of
the property in question by right of representation.
Domingo filed a demurrer to evidence citing that
they fall short of the requirements set by Art. 172
FC.
Trinidad v. CA Patricio died, leaving 4 parcels of land to his 3
children, Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix. Arturio
(1998) demanded from Felix and Lourdes to partition the
land into 3 equal shares and to give him the 1/3
individual share of his late father, Incocentes, but
they refused. Arturio filed an action for partition.
Felix and Lourdes denied that Arturio was the son
of Inocentes and claimed that Inocentes was single
when he died. As proof that he is the son of
Inocentes and Felicidad, Arturio presented a
certificate of baptism and explained that his birth
certificate was burned during World War 2 and that
he has a certificate of loss issued by the Civil
Registrar of Kalibo, Aklan.
De Jesus vs. Facts:
Estate of Dizon - Aug 23, 1964 – Danilo de Jesus and Carolina
Oct 2, 2001 de Jesus were married.
received his share of the inheritance but that he was also appointed executor of his father Isidro's
estate, as well as a guardian of petitioner and her brother Jesus.
The evidence presented by Tison and Dezoller satisfied the quantum of proof mandated by Art. 172 FC
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in another
action for a different purpose. This principle applies under our Family Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the
code confirm this view, because they refer to "the action to impugn the legitimacy." This action can be
brought only by the husband or his heirs and within the periods fixed in the present articles. Upon the
expiration of the periods provided in Article 170, the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child can no
longer be brought. The status conferred by the presumption, therefore, becomes fixed, and can no
longer be questioned.
The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the relationship between the parties concerned is
the testimony of Corazon Tison to the effect that Teodora in her lifetime, or sometime in 1946,
categorically declared that the former is Teodora's niece. Such a statement is considered a declaration
about pedigree which is admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule 130,
subject to the following conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that the
declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3) that such relationship be
shown by evidence other than the declaration; and (4) that the declaration was made ante litem motam,
that is, not only before the commencement of the suit involving the subject matter of the declaration, but
before any controversy has arisen thereon.
Arturio is a legitimate child of Inocentes.
Arturio secured a certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Aklan that all records of births,
deaths and marriages were lost, burned or destroyed during the Japanese occupation of said
municipality. This fact, however, is not fatal to petitioner's case. Although the marriage contract is
considered the primary evidence of the marital union, Arturio's failure to present it is not proof that no
marriage took place, as other forms of relevant evidence may take its place.
In place of a marriage contract, two witnesses were presented by petitioner: Isabel Meren, who testified
that she was present during the nuptial of Felicidad and Inocentes; and Jovita Gerardo, who testified
that the couple deported themselves as husband and wife after the marriage. Gerardo, the 77-year old
barangay captain of Tigayon and former board member of the local parent-teachers' association, used
to visit Inocentes and Felicidad's house twice or thrice a week. Gerardo dropped by Inocentes' house
when Felicidad gave birth to Arturio. She also attended Arturio's baptismal party held at the same
house. Her testimony constitutes evidence of common reputation respecting marriage. It further gives
rise to the disputable presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. Arturio also presented his baptismal certificate in which
Inocentes and Felicidad were named as the child's father and mother and two family pictures. Although
a baptismal certificate is indeed not a conclusive proof of filiation, it is one of "the other means allowed
under the Rules of Court and special laws" to show pedigree. Furthermore, Arturio consistently used
Inocentes' surname (Trinidad) without objection from Felix and Lourdes — a presumptive proof of his
status as Inocentes' legitimate child.
NO.
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality
 - Carolina; however, allegedly had an affair with
Juan G. Dizon, a married man with kids.
- During the subsistence of Carolina and
Danilo’s marriage, Jacqueline A. de Jesus and
Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus, herein petitioners,
were born.
- June 7 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged
Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as his own
illegitimate children with Carolina Aves de
Jesus in a notarized document
- 12 March 1992 – Juan Dizon died.
- It was on the strength of his notarized
acknowledgment that petitioners filed a
complaint for “Partition with Inventory and
Accounting” of the Dizon estate
- Respondents, the surviving spouse and
legitimate children of the decedent Juan G.
Dizon, including the corporations of which the
deceased was a stockholder, sought the
dismissal of the case, arguing that the
complaint, even while denominated as being
one for partition, would nevertheless call for
altering the status of petitioners from being the
legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de
Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the
illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and
deceased Juan Dizon.
ISSUE:
WON Jinky and Jacquelin can file the petition as
Dizon’s illegitimate children.
ESTATE OF
ROGELIO G. NB: The statements by the SC in this case with
ONG, versus respect to filiation were made only as
Minor JOANNE justifications for the use of DNA testing as a
RODJIN DIAZ, means to prove or disprove paternity. The rules
Represented by on filiation were not used directly to resolve the
Her Mother and main issue in this case.
Guardian, Jinky
C. Diaz, 1. In November 1993 in Tarlac City, Jinky
Respondent. and Rogelio got acquainted.
2007 Dec 17 2. This developed into friendship and later
blossomed into love.
3. At this time, Jinky was already married to
a Japanese national, Hasegawa Katsuo,
in a civil wedding solemnized on 19
February 1993.
4. From January 1994 to September 1998,
Jinky and Rogelio cohabited and lived
together
5. From this live-in relationship, minor
and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. This
presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of
access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the
birth of the child
Succinctly, in an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan G. Dizon, petitioners, in
effect, would impugn their legitimate status as being children of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de
Jesus. This step cannot be aptly done because the law itself establishes the legitimacy of children
conceived or born during the marriage of the parents. The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil
status for the child born in wedlock, and only the father, or in exceptional instances the latter’s
heirs, can contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is
only when the legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned that the paternity of the
husband can be rejected.
The rule that the written acknowledgment made by the deceased Juan G. Dizon establishes petitioners’
alleged illegitimate filiation to the decedent cannot be validly invoked to be of any relevance in this
instance. This issue, i.e., whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledged illegitimate offsprings of the
decedent, cannot be aptly adjudicated without an action having been first been instituted to impugn
their legitimacy as being the children of Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus born in lawful
wedlock. Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the paramount declaration of legitimacy by law cannot
be attacked collaterally, one that can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought
for that purpose. Indeed, a child so born in such wedlock shall be considered legitimate although the
mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as having been an
adulteress.
HELD:
No.
SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. – The appropriate court may, at any time, either motu
proprio or on application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA
testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the
following:
(a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;
Xxx
From the foregoing, it can be said that the death of the petitioner does not ipso facto negate the
application of DNA testing for as long as there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA.
As defined above, the term “biological sample” means any organic material originating from a person’s
body, even if found in inanimate objects, that is susceptible to DNA testing. This includes blood, saliva,
and other body fluids, tissues, hairs and bones.[29]
Thus, even if Rogelio already died, any of the biological samples as enumerated above as may be
 Joanne Rodjin Diaz was conceived and
on 25 February 1998 was born
6. In September 1998, Rogelio
abandoned minor Joanne and Jinky, and
stopped supporting minor Joanne, falsely
alleging that he is not the father of the
child
7. She filed a case for recognition and
support pendent lite
8. The CA remanded the case to the RTC for
the parties to undergo DNA testing.
9. The petitioner questions the remand
saying that Rogelio is already dead
therefore, no biological sample may
anymore be taken
ISSUE:
Is the death of the party being subjected to DNA
testing fatal to the DNA tests?
available, may be used for DNA testing. In this case, petitioner has not shown the impossibility of
obtaining an appropriate biological sample that can be utilized for the conduct of DNA testing.
Discussion on Filiation:
Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal right
associated with paternity, such as citizenship, support (as in the present case), or inheritance. The
burden of proving paternity is on the person who alleges that the putative father is the biological father
of the child. There are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which parties
have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical
resemblance between the putative father and child.[20]
A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is presumed legitimate.[21] As a guaranty
in favor of the child and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code provides:
Article 167. The children shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared
against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy. The
presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and consequently, may be
overthrown by evidence to the contrary. Hence, Article 255 of the New Civil Code[23] provides:
Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the
marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall
be presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility of
the husband’s having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three
hundred which preceded the birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
1) By the impotence of the husband;
2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such a way that access was not possible;
3) By the serious illness of the husband.[24]
The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the
same evidence as legitimate children.
There had been divergent and incongruent statements and assertions bandied about by the parties to

THE REPUBLIC FACTS:
OF THE 1. Respondent is the legitimate child of
PHILIPPINES, Albert S. Chan, a Chinese national, and
Petitioner, Marta Borromeo, a Filipino citizen.
vs. a. She was born on August 8, 1959
NORA FE in Baguio City and
SAGUN, b. did not elect Philippine
Respondent. citizenship upon reaching the
February 15, age of majority.
2012 2. In 1992, at the age of 33 and after getting
married to Alex Sagun, she executed an
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines.
3. Sometime in September 2005,
respondent applied for a Philippine
passport.
4. Her application was denied due to the
citizenship of her father and there being
no annotation on her birth certificate that
she has elected Philippine citizenship.
5. Consequently, she sought a judicial
declaration of her election of Philippine
citizenship and prayed that the Local Civil
Registrar of Baguio City be ordered to
annotate the same on her birth certificate.
ISSUE:
Should Sagun be issued a judicial declaration of
her election of Philippine citizenship?
3. Rights of Legitimate children
1. Action to impugn legitimacy
EUGENIO R. FACTS:
REYES, joined 1. Eugenio Reyes (Eugenio) was the
by TIMOTHY registered owner of the subject parcel of
JOSEPH M. land
REYES, MA. 2. The subject property was adjudicated to
the present petition. But with the advancement in the field of genetics, and the availability of new
technology, it can now be determined with reasonable certainty whether Rogelio is the biological father
of the minor, through DNA testing.
NO
When respondent was born on August 8, 1959, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution. Sec.
1, Art. IV of the 1935 Constitution reads:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
xxxx
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of
majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
Being a legitimate child, respondent’s citizenship followed that of her father who is Chinese, unless
upon reaching the age of majority, she elects Philippine citizenship. It is a settled rule that only
legitimate children follow the citizenship of the father and that illegitimate children are under the
parental authority of the mother and follow her nationality. An illegitimate child of Filipina need not
perform any act to confer upon him all the rights and privileges attached to citizens of the Philippines;
he automatically becomes a citizen himself. But in the case of respondent, for her to be considered a
Filipino citizen, she must have validly elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
The mere exercise of suffrage, continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other similar
acts showing exercise of Philippine citizenship cannot take the place of election of Philippine
citizenship. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine
citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Having failed to comply
with the foregoing requirements, respondent’s petition before the trial court must be denied.
Also important although not under the topic of legitimacy:
For sure, this Court has consistently ruled that there is no proceeding established by law, or the
Rules for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. There is no specific legislation
authorizing the institution of a judicial proceeding to declare that a given person is part of our citizenry.
Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an
individual. Courts of justice exist for settlement of justiciable controversies, which imply a given right,
legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of said right, and a remedy, granted
or sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. As an incident only of the adjudication of the rights of the
parties to a controversy, the court may pass upon, and make a pronouncement relative to their status.
Otherwise, such a pronouncement is beyond judicial power. Clearly, it was erroneous for the trial court
to make a specific declaration of respondent’s Filipino citizenship as such pronouncement was not
within the court’s competence.
NO
Eugenio cannot collaterally attack the status of Leonida in the instant petition.
It is settled law that filiation cannot be collaterally attacked. The legitimacy of the child cannot be
GRACIA S. Eugenio by virtue of an extrajudicial contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a different purpose.
REYES, ROMAN settlement among the heirs following the The necessity of an independent action directly impugning the legitimacy is more clearly expressed in
GABRIEL M. death of his parents. the Mexican code (article 335) which provides: "The contest of the legitimacy of a child by the husband
REYES, and MA. 3. Spouses Godofredo and private or his heirs must be made by proper complaint before the competent court; any contest made in any
ANGELA S. respondent Librada were tenants in the other way is void." This principle applies under our Family Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the code
REYES, subject parcel of land. confirm this view, because they refer to "the action to impugn the legitimacy." This action can be
Petitioners, 4. After Godofredo died, Reyes and Librada brought only by the husband or his heirs and within the periods fixed in the present articles.
vs. allegedly executed a Kasunduan wherein
LIBRADA F. the Librada allegedly waived all her In Braza v. City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, the Court stated that legitimacy
MAURICIO tenancy rights. and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not
(deceased) and 5. After Librada died, Leonida (alleged through collateral attack.
LEONIDA F. daughter of Godofredo and Librada) filed
MAURICIO, the instant case to annul the Kasunduan. The same rule is applied to adoption such that it cannot also be made subject to a collateral attack.
Respondents. She argues that In Reyes v. Sotero, this Court reiterated that adoption cannot be assailed collaterally in a proceeding for
November 24, a. Eugenio took undue advantage the settlement of a decedent’s estate. Furthermore, in Austria v. Reyes, the Court declared that the
2010 of the weakness, age, illiteracy, legality of the adoption by the testatrix can be assailed only in a separate action brought for that
ignorance, indigence and other purpose and cannot be subject to collateral attack.
handicaps of Librada in the
execution of the Kasunduan
rendering it void for lack of
consent;
6. Reyes questioned Leonida’s standing to
sue in this case. He argues:
a. the complaint was rendered moot
with the death of Librada,
Godofredo’s sole compulsory
heir. Eugenio contended that
Leonida is a mere ward of
Godofredo and Librada, thus, not
a legal heir.
7. Leonida countered that her legitimacy
cannot be impugned in this action.

ISSUE:
W/N Leonida’s legitimacy may be impugned in an
action to annul a contract

REPUBLIC OF FACTS: YES

THE 1. Born in Makati on September 9, 1972,
PHILIPPINES, Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng When a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial and
Petitioner, Magpayo (respondent) is the son of Fulvio controversial alterations including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy
vs. M. Magpayo Jr. and Anna Dominique of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated.
JULIAN Marquez-Lim Coseteng who, as
EDWARD respondent’s certificate of live birth shows, The change being sought in respondent’s petition goes so far as to affect his legal status in relation to
EMERSON contracted marriage on March 26, 1972. his parents. It seeks to change his legitimacy to that of illegitimacy. Rule 103 (Change of Name) then
COSETENG- 2. Claiming, however, that his parents were would not suffice to grant respondent’s supplication.
MAGPAYO never legally married, respondent filed on
(A.K.A. JULIAN July 22, 2008 at the Regional Trial Court Labayo-Rowe v. Republic categorically holds that "changes which may affect the civil status from
EDWARD (RTC) of Quezon City a Petition to legitimate to illegitimate . . . are substantial and controversial alterations which can only be allowed after
EMERSON change his name to Julian Edward appropriate adversary proceedings . . ."
MARQUEZ-LIM Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng.
COSETENG), 3. The notice setting the petition for hearing Since respondent’s desired change affects his civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, Rule 108
Respondent. on November 20, 2008 was published in
February 2, 2011 the newspaper Broadside.
4. And a copy of the notice was furnished
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
5. The Republic contends that the deletion of
the entry on the date and place of
marriage of respondent’s parents from his
birth certificate has the effect of changing
his civil status from legitimate to
illegitimate, hence, any change in civil
status of a person must be effected
through an appropriate adversary
proceeding.
ISSUE:
W/N the petition for change of name in this case
requires an adversarial proceeding
applies. It reads:
SECTION 1. Who may file petition.—Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree
concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a
verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the [RTC] of
the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
xxxx
SEC. 3. Parties.—When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the
civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby
shall be made parties to the proceeding.
Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns one’s civil status should be filed in the civil
registry in which the entry is sought to be cancelled or corrected – that of Makati in the present case,
and "all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby" should be made
parties to the proceeding.
As earlier stated, however, the petition of respondent was filed not in Makati where his birth certificate
was registered but in Quezon City. And as the above-mentioned title of the petition filed by respondent
before the RTC shows, neither the civil registrar of Makati nor his father and mother were made parties
thereto.
Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General, all other indispensable parties should have been made
respondents. They include not only the declared father of the child but the child as well, together with
the paternal grandparents, if any, as their hereditary rights would be adversely affected thereby. All
other persons who may be affected by the change should be notified or represented. The truth is best
ascertained under an adversary system of justice.
As for the requirement of notice and publication, Rule 108 provides:
SEC. 4. Notice and publication.—Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix
the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be
given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be
published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation
in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition.—The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under
the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of
the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)
A reading of these related provisions readily shows that Rule 108 clearly mandates two sets of notices
to different "potential oppositors." The first notice is that given to the "persons named in the petition"
and the second (which is through publication) is that given to other persons who are not named in the
petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties, such as creditors. That two
sets of notices are mandated under the above-quoted Section 4 is validated by the subsequent Section
5, also above-quoted, which provides for two periods (for the two types of "potential oppositors") within
which to file an opposition (15 days from notice or from the last date of publication).
What is clear then in Barco and Kho is the mandatory directive under Section 3 of Rule 108 to implead
the civil registrar and the parties who would naturally and legally be affected by the grant of a petition

2. Grounds
(a) Physical impossibility of access
Andal v. Mariano Andal, assisted by his mother, brought an
Macaraig action for recovery of ownership and possession of
parcel of land. He alleged that he is the surviving
(1951) son of Emiliano Andal, who is the owner of the said
parcel of land and had been in possession thereof
until Eduvigis Macaraig (mother of Emiliano Andal),
took advantage of the abnormal situation then
prevailing and enter the land in question (this was
sometime in 1942).
The land in question was given by Eduvigis
Macaraig to her son Emiliano Andal by virtue of a
donation propter nuptias she has executed in his
favor on the occasion of his marriage to Maria
Dueñas. If the son born to the couple is deemed
legitimate, then he is entitled to inherit the land in
question. If otherwise, then the land should revert
back to Eduvigis Macaraig as the next of kin
entitled to succeed him under the law.
TC declared Mariano as legitimate son and owner
of the land.
Important dates:
1941 – Emiliano Andal became sick of tuberculosis
1942 – became so weak and could hardly move
September 1942 – Maria (mother) eloped with Felix
(brother of Emiliano)
January 1, 1943 – Emiliano died
June 17, 1943 – Petitioner, Mariano, was born.
Concepcion v. Gerardo Concepcion (Petitioner) and Theresa
Court of Almonte (Respondent) were married sometime in
Appeals 1989. Almost a year later, Theresa gave birth to
Jose Gerardo.
for correction or cancellation of entries. Non-impleading, however, as party-respondent of one who is
inadvertently left out or is not established to be known by the petitioner to be affected by the grant of
the petition or actually participates in the proceeding is notified through publication.
OBITER:
The present petition must be differentiated from Alfon v. Republic of the Philippines.18 In Alfon, the
Court allowed the therein petitioner, Estrella Alfon, to use the name that she had been known since
childhood in order to avoid confusion. Alfon did not deny her legitimacy, however. She merely sought to
use the surname of her mother which she had been using since childhood. Ruling in her favor, the
Court held that she was lawfully entitled to use her mother’s surname, adding that the avoidance of
confusion was justification enough to allow her to do so. In the present case, however, respondent
denies his legitimacy.
MARIANO IS LEGITIMATE.
Article 108 of the Civil Code provides:
Children born after the one hundred and eighty days next following that of the celebration of marriage
or within the three hundred days next following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be
presumed to be legitimate.
This presumption may be rebutted only by proof that it was physically impossible for the
husband to have had access to his wife during the first one hundred and twenty days of the
three hundred next preceding the birth of the child.
Since the boy was born on June 17, 1943, and Emiliano Andal died on January 1, 1943, that boy is
presumed to be the legitimate son having been born within 300 days following the dissolution of the
marriage. This presumption can only be rebutted by proof that it was physically impossible for the
husband to have had access to his wife during the first 120 days of the 300 next preceding the birth of
the child.
There was no evidence presented that Emiliano Andal was absent during the initial period of
conception, specially during the period comprised between August 21, 1942 and September 10, 1942,
which is included in the 120 days of the 300 next preceding the birth of the child Mariano Andal. On the
contrary, there is enough evidence to show that during that initial period, Emiliano Andal and his wife
were still living under the marital roof. Even if Felix, the brother, was living in the same house, and he
and the wife were indulging in illicit intercourse since May, 1942, that does not preclude cohabitation
between Emiliano and his wife. There are cases where persons suffering from this sickness can do the
carnal act even in the most crucial stage because they are more inclined to sexual intercourse.
Emiliano and his wife were living together, or at least had access one to the other, and Emiliano was
not impotent, and the child was born within three (300) days following the dissolution of the marriage.
Under these facts no other presumption can be drawn than that the issue is legitimate. We have also
seen that this presumption can only be rebutted by clear proof that it was physically or naturally
impossible for them to indulge in carnal intercourse. And here there is no such proof. The fact that
Maria Dueñas has committed adultery can not also overcome this presumption
JOSE GERARDO IS PRESUMED TO BE LEGITIMATE CHILD OF THERESA AND MARIO (1 st
HUSBAND).
Gerardo has no standing in law to dispute the status of Jose Gerardo. Only Ma. Theresa’s husband
(2005)
In 1991, petitioner filed a petitioner to annul their
marriage on the ground of bigamy. He alleged that
9 years prior to their marriage, Theresa married
Mario Gopiao and was never annulled. Theresa
admitted the marriage but allege that it was a sham
and that she never lived with Mario at all.
TC annulled the 2nd marriage as the 1st marriage is
still valid and subsisting. Jose Gerardo was
declared an illegitimate child.
Feeling betrayed and humiliated, Theresa moved
for reconsideration as to the visitation rights
granted to petitioner. She further alleged that the
surname of Jose Gerardo be changed from
Concepcion to Almonte following the rule that an
illegitimate child shall use the mother’s surname.
Mario or, in a proper case, his heirs, who can contest the legitimacy of the child Jose Gerardo born to
his wife.
Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases,
his heirs. Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very beginning, he never
became her husband and thus never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child.
The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in marriage, particularly during the
period of conception. To overthrow this presumption on the basis of Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family
Code, it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access that could have enabled
the husband to father the child. Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where personal access is not
disproved, unless such presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary. The presumption is quasi-
conclusive and may be refuted only by the evidence of physical impossibility of coitus between husband
and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child.
Here, during the period that Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were living together in Fairview, Quezon City,
Mario was living in Loyola Heights which is also in Quezon City. Fairview and Loyola Heights are only
a scant four kilometers apart.

TC denied Theresa’s motion. CA (on MR) reversed Not only did both Ma. Theresa and Mario reside in the same city but also that no evidence at all was
the decision. Hence this appeal by Petitioner. presented to disprove personal access between them. Considering these circumstances, the
separation between Ma. Theresa and her lawful husband, Mario, was certainly not such as to make it
physically impossible for them to engage in the marital act.

Sexual union between spouses is assumed. Evidence sufficient to defeat the assumption should be
presented by him who asserts the contrary. There is no such evidence here. Thus, the presumption of
legitimacy in favor of Jose Gerardo, as the issue of the marriage between Ma. Theresa and Mario,
stands.

(b) Biological or other scientific grounds

Estate of A complaint for compulsory recognition with prayer DECISION REMANDING THE CASE TO TRIAL COURT FOR CONDUCT OF DNA TEST IS
Rogelio Ong v. for support pending litigation was field by Joanne, a AFFIRMED.
Minor Joanne minor, represented by her mother against her
Diaz father. Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal right
associated with paternity, such as citizenship, support (as in the present case), or inheritance. The
(2007) Joanne’s Mother, Jinky, alleged that she had an burden of proving paternity is on the person who alleges that the putative father is the biological father
affair with Rogelio while she was still married to a of the child. There are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which
Japanese National. Jinky and Rogelio lived parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical
together and from this live-in relationship, Joanne resemblance between the putative father and child.
was conceived and born.
A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is presumed legitimate. The law requires
Rogelio was the one who brought Jinky to the that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy. The presumption of legitimacy of the
hospital and took minor Joanne and Jinky home child, however, is not conclusive and consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary.
after delivery. Rogelio paid all the hospital bills and
the baptismal expenses and provided for all of With the advancement in the field of genetics, and the availability of new technology, it can now be
minor Joanne’s needs – recognizing the child as determined with reasonable certainty whether Rogelio is the biological father of the minor, through DNA
his. However, sometime in 1998, Rogelio testing.
abandoned Joanne and Jinky and stopped
supporting Joanne alleging that he was not the DNA is the fundamental building block of a person’s entire genetic make-up. DNA is found in all human
father of the child. cells and is the same in every cell of the same person. Genetic identity is unique. Hence, a person’s
DNA profile can determine his identity.
 TC ordered Rogelio to recognize Joanne as his
natural child and to give monthly support. CA
remanded the case to the trial court for the conduct
of DNA testing
Lucas v. Lucas Jesse Lucas filed a petition to establish Illegitimate
Filiation with Motion for the submission of parties to
(2011) DNA testing.
Petitioner narrated that sometime in 1967, his
mother (Elsie) migrated to Manila and worked in a
prominent nightspot. On one occasion, Elsie got
acquainted with Respondent, Jesus. An intimate
relationship developed and Elsie eventually got
pregnant. In 1969, she gave birth to Petitioner.
The name of the father, however, was not stated in
the certificate of live birth.
When the relationship of Elsie and respondent
ended, Elsie refused to accept respondent’s offer
of support and decided to raise petitioner on her
own. While petitioner was growing up, Elsie made
several attempts to introduce petitioner to
respondent, but all attempts were in vain.
TC dismissed the case. CA affirmed the decision.
Estate of A complaint for compulsory recognition with prayer
Rogelio Ong v. for support pending litigation was field by Joanne, a
Minor Joanne minor, represented by her mother against her
Diaz father.
(2007) Joanne’s Mother, Jinky, alleged that she had an
affair with Rogelio while she was still married to a
The death of the petitioner does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA testing for as long as
there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA. As defined, the term “biological sample” means
any organic material originating from a person’s body, even if found in inanimate objects, that is
susceptible to DNA testing. This includes blood, saliva, and other body fluids, tissues, hairs and bones.
Thus, even if Rogelio already died, any of the biological samples as enumerated above as may be
available, may be used for DNA testing. In this case, petitioner has not shown the impossibility of
obtaining an appropriate biological sample that can be utilized for the conduct of DNA testing.
PETITIONER MUST PRESENT PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OR ESTABLISH A REASONABLE
POSSIBILITY OF PATERNITY TO WARRANT A DNA TESTING ORDER .
(Procedural)
The statement in Herrera v. Alba that there are four significant procedural aspects in a traditional
paternity case which parties have to face has been widely misunderstood and misapplied in this case.
A party is confronted by these so-called procedural aspects during trial, when the parties have
presented their respective evidence. They are matters of evidence that cannot be determined at this
initial stage of the proceedings, when only the petition to establish filiation has been filed. The CA’s
observation that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case—the first procedural aspect in a
paternity case—is therefore misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a party’s evidence and not by
mere allegations in the initiatory pleading.
Clearly then, it was also not the opportune time to discuss the lack of a prima facie case vis-à-vis the
motion for DNA testing since no evidence has, as yet, been presented by petitioner. More essentially, it
is premature to discuss whether, under the circumstances, a DNA testing order is warranted
considering that no such order has yet been issued by the trial court. In fact, the latter has just set the
said case for hearing.
(Merits)
The Rule on DNA Evidence was enacted to guide the Bench and the Bar for the introduction and use of
DNA evidence in the judicial system. It provides the “prescribed parameters on the requisite elements
for reliability and validity (i.e., the proper procedures, protocols, necessary laboratory reports, etc.), the
possible sources of error, the available objections to the admission of DNA test results as evidence as
well as the probative value of DNA evidence.” It seeks “to ensure that the evidence gathered, using
various methods of DNA analysis, is utilized effectively and properly, [and] shall not be misused and/or
abused and, more importantly, shall continue to ensure that DNA analysis serves justice and protects,
rather than prejudice the public.”
To warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show cause hearing wherein
the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case or a
reasonable possibility of paternity or “good cause” for the holding of the test.
The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from
mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must
present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.
DECISION REMANDING THE CASE TO TRIAL COURT FOR CONDUCT OF DNA TEST IS
AFFIRMED.
Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal right
associated with paternity, such as citizenship, support (as in the present case), or inheritance. The
burden of proving paternity is on the person who alleges that the putative father is the biological father
of the child. There are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which
 Japanese National. Jinky and Rogelio lived
together and from this live-in relationship, Joanne
was conceived and born.
Rogelio was the one who brought Jinky to the
hospital and took minor Joanne and Jinky home
after delivery. Rogelio paid all the hospital bills and
the baptismal expenses and provided for all of
minor Joanne’s needs – recognizing the child as
his. However, sometime in 1998, Rogelio
abandoned Joanne and Jinky and stopped
supporting Joanne alleging that he was not the
father of the child.
TC ordered Rogelio to recognize Joanne as his
natural child and to give monthly support. CA
remanded the case to the trial court for the conduct
of DNA testing
parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical
resemblance between the putative father and child.
A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is presumed legitimate. The law requires
that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy. The presumption of legitimacy of the
child, however, is not conclusive and consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary.
With the advancement in the field of genetics, and the availability of new technology, it can now be
determined with reasonable certainty whether Rogelio is the biological father of the minor, through DNA
testing.
DNA is the fundamental building block of a person’s entire genetic make-up. DNA is found in all human
cells and is the same in every cell of the same person. Genetic identity is unique. Hence, a person’s
DNA profile can determine his identity.
The death of the petitioner does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA testing for as long as
there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA. As defined, the term “biological sample” means
any organic material originating from a person’s body, even if found in inanimate objects, that is
susceptible to DNA testing. This includes blood, saliva, and other body fluids, tissues, hairs and bones.
Thus, even if Rogelio already died, any of the biological samples as enumerated above as may be
available, may be used for DNA testing. In this case, petitioner has not shown the impossibility of
obtaining an appropriate biological sample that can be utilized for the conduct of DNA testing.

(c) FC 166(3)
3. Effect of a mother’s declaration
4. in subsequent marriages
People v
Quitoriano

(1997)

5. Presumptions
6. Prescription of action to impugn legitimacy
7. Who may impugn
8. Proof of filiation
De Jesus v
Estate of Juan
Gamboa Dizon

Ong v Diaz

(2007)
Lee v CA

(2010)

4. Illegitimate children
1. Who are considered illegitimate
Joanie Surposa
Uy v Jose Ngo
Chua
(2009)
2. Rights of illegitimate children
MONTEFALCON Dolores P. Montefalcon filed a Complaint for
V. VASQUEZ acknowledgment and support against Ronnie S.
Vasquez alleging that her son Laurence is the
(2008) illegitimate child of Vasquez. She prayed that
Vasquez be obliged to give support to co-petitioner
Laurence Montefalcon, whose certificate of live
birth he signed as father. According to petitioners,
Vasquez only gave a total of P19,000 as support
for Laurence since Laurence was born in 1993.
Vasquez allegedly also refused to give him regular
school allowance despite repeated demands.
Petitioner Dolores added that she and Vasquez are
not legally married, and that Vasquez has his own
family.
HEIRS OF Petitioners are the legitimate wife and children of
MARAMAG V. Loreto Maramag while respondents were Loreto’s
DE GUZMAN illegitimate family. In his insurance policy, Loreto
designated Eva de Guzman Maramag and their
(2009) illegitimate children Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha
Angelie as his beneficiarires. Petitioners filed an
action against the respondents for the revocation
and/or reduction of the insurance proceeds for
being void and/or inofficious.
Laurence is legally entitled to support from Vasquez, and the amount of P5,000 monthly set by the trial
court is neither excessive nor unreasonable.
Article 175 FC mandates that illegitimate filiation may be established in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children. Under Article 172, the filiation of legitimate children is established by
any of the following: (1) through record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final order; or (2) by
admission of filiation in a public document or private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned; or in default of these two, by open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child or by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Laurence's record of birth is an authentic, relevant and admissible piece of evidence to prove paternity
and filiation. Vasquez did not deny that Laurence is his child with Dolores. He signed as father in
Laurence's certificate of live birth, a public document. He supplied the data entered in it. Thus, it is a
competent evidence of filiation as he had a hand in its preparation. In fact, if the child had been
recognized by any of the modes in the first paragraph of Article 172, there is no further need to file any
action for acknowledgment because any of said modes is by itself a consummated act.
As filiation is beyond question, support follows as matter of obligation. Petitioners were able to prove
that Laurence needs Vasquez's support and that Vasquez is capable of giving such support. Dolores
testified that she spent around P200,000 for Laurence; she spends P8,000 a month for his schooling
and their subsistence. She told the lower court Vasquez was earning US$535 monthly based on his
January 10, 2000 contract of employment with Fathom Ship Management and his seafarer information
sheet. That income, if converted at the prevailing rate, would be more than sufficient to cover the
monthly support for Laurence.
Under Article 195 (4) FC, a parent is obliged to support his illegitimate child. The amount is variable.
There is no final judgment thereof as it shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and
the necessities of the recipient. It may be reduced or increased proportionately according to the
reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person
obliged to support. Support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing,
medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
Under the premises, the award of P5,000 monthly support to Laurence is reasonable, and not
excessive nor exorbitant.
Petitioners are third parties to the insurance contracts with Insular and Grepalife and, thus, are not
entitled to the proceeds thereof.
Respondents Insular and Grepalife have no legal obligation to turn over the insurance proceeds to
petitioners. The revocation of Eva as a beneficiary in one policy and her disqualification as such in
another are of no moment considering that the designation of the illegitimate children as beneficiaries in
Loreto’s insurance policies remains valid. Because no legal proscription exists in naming as
beneficiaries the children of illicit relationships by the insured, the shares of Eva in the insurance
proceeds, whether forfeited by the court in view of the prohibition on donations under Article 739 of the
Civil Code or by the insurers themselves for reasons based on the insurance contracts, must be
awarded to the said illegitimate children, the designated beneficiaries, to the exclusion of petitioners. It
is only in cases where the insured has not designated any beneficiary, or when the designated
beneficiary is disqualified by law to receive the proceeds, that the insurance policy proceeds shall
redound to the benefit of the estate of the insured.
DELA CRUZ V. For several months in 2005, then 21-year old Jenie
GRACIA San Juan dela Cruz (Jenie) and then 19-year old
Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino
(2009) (Dominique) lived together as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage. They resided in the
house of Dominique's parents. On September 4,
2005, Dominique died. After almost two months,
Jenie, who continued to live with Dominique's
parents, gave birth to her minor child Christian dela
Cruz "Aquino". Jenie applied for registration of the
child's birth, using Dominique's surname Aquino,
with the Office of the City Civil Registrar, Antipolo
City, in support of which she submitted the
child's Certificate of Live Birth, Affidavit to Use the
Surname of the Father (AUSF) which she had
executed and signed, and Affidavit of
Acknowledgment executed by Dominique's father
Domingo Butch Aquino. Both affidavits
attested, inter alia, that during the lifetime of
Dominique, he had continuously acknowledged his
yet unborn child, and that his paternity had never
been questioned. Jenie attached to the AUSF a
document entitled "AUTOBIOGRAPHY" which
Dominique, during his lifetime, wrote in his own
handwriting.
UY V. CHUA Joanie Surposa Uy filed on 27 October 2003
before the RTC a Petition for the issuance of a
(2009) decree of illegitimate filiation against respondent
Jose Ngo Chua.
Petitioner alleged in her Complaint that
respondent, who was then married, had an illicit
relationship with Irene Surposa (Irene).
Respondent and Irene had two children, namely,
petitioner and her brother, Allan. Respondent
attended to Irene when the latter was giving birth to
petitioner on 27 April 1959, and instructed that
petitioner’s birth certificate be filled out with the
following names: "ALFREDO F. SURPOSA" as
father and "IRENE DUCAY" as mother. Actually,
Alfredo F. Surposa was the name of Irene’s father,
and Ducay was the maiden surname of Irene’s
The City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City is directed to immediately enter the surname of the late
Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino as the surname of petitioner minor Christian dela Cruz in his
Certificate of Live Birth, and record the same in the Register of Births.
Article 176 FC, as amended by R.A. 9255, permits an illegitimate child to use the surname of his/her
father if the latter had expressly recognized him/her as his offspring through the record of birth
appearing in the civil register, or through an admission made in a public or private handwritten
instrument. The recognition made in any of these documents is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgment of the child’s paternity; hence, no separate action for judicial approval is necessary.
That a father who acknowledges paternity of a child through a written instrument must affix his
signature thereon is clearly implied in Article 176 of the Family Code. Paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 of A.O. No.
1, Series of 2004, merely articulated such requirement; it did not "unduly expand" the import of Article
176 as claimed by petitioners.
In the present case, however, special circumstances exist to hold that Dominique’s Autobiography,
though unsigned by him, substantially satisfies the requirement of the law.
First, Dominique died about two months prior to the child’s birth. Second, the relevant matters in the
Autobiography, unquestionably handwritten by Dominique, correspond to the facts culled from the
testimonial evidence Jenie proffered. Third, Jenie’s testimony is corroborated by the Affidavit of
Acknowledgment of Dominique’s father Domingo Aquino and testimony of his brother Joseph Butch
Aquino whose hereditary rights could be affected by the registration of the questioned recognition of the
child. These circumstances indicating Dominique’s paternity of the child give life to his statements in his
Autobiography that "JENIE DELA CRUZ" is "MY WIFE" as "WE FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER"
and "NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER." .
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the earlier quoted statements in Dominique’s Autobiography
have been made and written by him. Taken together with the other relevant facts extant herein – that
Dominique, during his lifetime, and Jenie were living together as common-law spouses for several
months in 2005 at his parents’ house in Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal; she was pregnant
when Dominique died on September 4, 2005; and about two months after his death, Jenie gave birth to
the child – they sufficiently establish that the child of Jenie is Dominique’s.
The Court sees it fit to adopt the following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of
the acknowledging parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a
legitimate or illegitimate child is made: (1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of
evidence submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the
same must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and (2) Where the private handwritten instrument is
accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be
shown to have been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of
such other evidence.
Being contrary to law and public policy, the Compromise Agreement dated 18 February 2000 between
petitioner and respondent is void ab initio and vests no rights and creates no obligations. It produces no
legal effect at all. The void agreement cannot be rendered operative even by the parties' alleged
performance (partial or full) of their respective prestations.
The Compromise Agreement between petitioner and respondent, executed on 18 February 2000 and
approved by RTC-Branch 9 in its Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-
CEB, obviously intended to settle the question of petitioner’s status and filiation, i.e., whether she is an
illegitimate child of respondent. In exchange for petitioner and her brother Allan acknowledging that
they are not the children of respondent, respondent would pay petitioner and Allan P2,000,000.00 each.
Although unmentioned, it was a necessary consequence of said Compromise Agreement that petitioner
also waived away her rights to future support and future legitime as an illegitimate child of respondent.
Evidently, the Compromise Agreement dated 18 February 2000 between petitioner and respondent is
covered by the prohibition under Article 2035 of the Civil Code.
It is settled, then, in law and jurisprudence, that the status and filiation of a child cannot be
compromised. Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation of a child.
Paternity and filiation or the lack of the same, is a relationship that must be judicially established, and it
 mother. Respondent financially supported
petitioner and Allan. Respondent had consistently
and regularly given petitioner allowances before
she got married. He also provided her with
employment.. Petitioner and Allan were introduced
to each other and became known in the Chinese
community as respondent’s illegitimate children.
A Compromise Agreement was executed by the
parties on 18 February 2000 where Joanie
declared, admitted and acknowledged that there is
no blood relationship between her and Allan on
one hand, and between Jose Ngo Chua on the
other. As a gesture of goodwill, Jose Ngo Chua
bound himself to pay Joanie and Allan P2,000,000
each.
HEIRS OF Petitioners are the legitimate wife and children of
MARAMAG V. Loreto Maramag while respondents were Loreto’s
DE GUZMAN illegitimate family. In his insurance policy, Loreto
(SUPRA) designated Eva de Guzman Maramag and their
illegitimate children Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha
(2009) Angelie as his beneficiarires. Petitioners filed an
action against the respondents for the revocation
and/or reduction of the insurance proceeds for
being void and/or inofficious.
De la Cruz v. Dominique Aquino and Jenie lived together without
Gracia the benefit of marriage. Dominique died. Jenie
gave birth to Christian and sought to have him
registered with the surname Aquino.
(2009) She presented as evidence an unsigned,
handwritten autobiography by Dominique where he
admitted that she was pregnant and that they live
together.
is for the Court to declare its existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the
parties.
Neither can it be said that RTC-Branch 9, by approving the Compromise Agreement, in its Decision
dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, already made said contract valid and
legal. Obviously, it would already be beyond the jurisdiction of RTC-Branch 9 to legalize what is illegal.
RTC-Branch 9 had no authority to approve and give effect to a Compromise Agreement that was
contrary to law and public policy, even if said contract was executed and submitted for approval by both
parties. RTC-Branch 9 would not be competent, under any circumstances, to grant the approval of the
said Compromise Agreement.
A judgment void for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right or the
creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no
legal effect. Hence, it can never become final, and any writ of execution based on it is void. It may be
said to be a lawless thing that can be treated as an outlaw and slain on sight, or ignored wherever and
whenever it exhibits its head.
Petitioners are third parties to the insurance contracts with Insular and Grepalife and, thus, are not
entitled to the proceeds thereof.
Respondents Insular and Grepalife have no legal obligation to turn over the insurance proceeds to
petitioners. The revocation of Eva as a beneficiary in one policy and her disqualification as such in
another are of no moment considering that the designation of the illegitimate children as beneficiaries in
Loreto’s insurance policies remains valid. Because no legal proscription exists in naming as
beneficiaries the children of illicit relationships by the insured, the shares of Eva in the insurance
proceeds, whether forfeited by the court in view of the prohibition on donations under Article 739 of the
Civil Code or by the insurers themselves for reasons based on the insurance contracts, must be
awarded to the said illegitimate children, the designated beneficiaries, to the exclusion of petitioners. It
is only in cases where the insured has not designated any beneficiary, or when the designated
beneficiary is disqualified by law to receive the proceeds, that the insurance policy proceeds shall
redound to the benefit of the estate of the insured.
Christian should be allowed to be register with the surname Aquino.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. 9255, permits an illegitimate child to use the
surname of his/her father if the latter had expressly recognized him/her as his offspring through the
record of birth appearing in the civil register, or through an admission made in a public or private
handwritten instrument. It does not explicitly state that a signature is required.
However, read in conjunction with Art. 175 and 172, a signature is clearly implied.
In the present case, however, special circumstances exist to hold that Dominique’s Autobiography,
though unsigned by him, substantially satisfies the requirement of the law. There were other competent
evidence presented: document was in fact written by deceased, fact that Jenie and deceased lived
together, Jenie gave birth 2 months after death, etc.
The Court sees it fit to adopt the following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of
the acknowledging parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a
legitimate or illegitimate child is made:
1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove
filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by the
acknowledging parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent
evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by
the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence.
Manungas v. Florentino was married to Engracia. Florentino had
Loreto an illegitimate son named Diosdado. Florentino
died. Engracia died aftwerwards. Parreno, niece of
Engracia, was appointed special administrator of
(2011) estate of Engracia.
Diosdado, who was a debtor of the estate, claimed
that he should be the special administrator as he is
Florentino’s illegitimate son whereas Parreno is a
collateral relative.
3. Proof of filiation
Reyes v. CA Irene, by alleging that she was the illegitimate
daughter of deceased Francisco obtained deeds
over several parcels of land. Francisco’s siblings
filed a complaint for reconveyance of the properties
(1985) by claiming that Irene was not the daughter of
Francisco.
Irene presented evidence to prove her filiation.
Castro v. CA Eustaquio died and left several properties.
Benita Castro sought to participate in the partition
of the properties left by Eustaquio. She claimed
(1989) that she was the acknowledged and recognized
illegitimate child of Eustaquio. She was allowed to
present evidence to prove her claim.
Baluyut v. In the intestate proceedings of deceased Enrique
Baluyut Baluyut, minors Victoria and Flordeliza filed a
petition for intervention claiming that they were the
illegitimate children of Enrique.
(1990) The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition upon
finding that the petitioners were not the recognized
spurious children of deceased Enrique.
Mendoza v. CA The private respondent claimed she was the
(2005) illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza, but the
latter denied her claim. He denied it to his dying
day.
Diosdado should not be appointed as special administrator.
Diosdado, as an illegitimate heir of Florentino Manungas, is not an heir of Engracia Manungas and is
not entitled to receive any part of the Estate of Manungas. In fact, Diosdado is a debtor of the estate
and would have no interest in preserving its value. There is no reason to appoint him as its special
administrator.
Based on the evidence, Irene is not an heir of Francisco.
The certificates of birth presented were not signed by Francisco. If the alleged father did not sign the
birth certificate, the placing of his name therein is still incompetent evidence of paternity of the child.
The secondary student permanent record and her written consent to the operation of her father, not
being signed nor written by Francisco cannot be taken as authentic writing to prove her recognition by
her alleged father.
Marriage contract where it was stated that Francisco gave his consent was not signed and cannot be
recognized as an authentic document.
Pictures of Irene posing with Francisco do not constitute proof of filiation.
Benita is an acknowledged and recognized illegitimate child of Eustaquio.
Strictly speaking, the birth certificate must be signed by the father. In this instance, although Eustaquio
himself reported the birth of his daughter, the record is not determinative of whether or not he signed
the certificate.
However, the provisions shall be applied liberally considering the facts and equities of the case.
First, Benita enjoyed the love and care of her father from her birth to his death. Second, Eustaquio
himself reported and registered the birth of Benita. There is no showing that he knew that he should
have signed or taken all legal steps to establish Benita’s status as a recognized natural child. Third,
Eustaquio himself gave Benita away during her wedding. Lastly, the certificate of baptism and picture of
Benita at wake of Eustaquio, although not sufficient proof of recognition nevertheless add to the
equities of the case.
Court of Appeals decision finding that the petitioners are not recognized children of Enrique is affirmed.
The petitioner’s records of birth, although in the name of Enqrique are not signed. No authentic writing
presented nor any statement in a court of recod would prove that the petitioners were recognized by the
deceased.
What both the trial court and the respondent court did not take into account is that an illegitimate child is
allowed to establish his claimed filiation by "any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws," according to the Civil Code, or "by evidence or proof in his favor that the defendant is her father,"
according to the Family Code. Such evidence may consist of his baptismal certificate, a judicial

Jison v. CA Private respondent, Monina Jison, instituted a
(1998) complaint against petitioner, Francisco Jison, for
recognition as illegitimate child of the latter. The
case was filed 20 years after her mother’s death
and when she was already 39 years of age.
admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his
pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
To set the record straight, we will stress that it was only Isaac Mendoza who testified on this question of
pedigree, and he did not cite Casimiro's father. His testimony was that he was informed by his father
Hipolito, who was Casimiro's brother, and Brigida Mendoza, Casimiro's own mother, that Teopista was
Casimiro's illegitimate daughter.
Such acts or declarations may be received in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule because "it
is the best the nature of the case admits and because greater evils are apprehended from the rejection
of such proof than from its admission. Nevertheless, precisely because of its nature as hearsay
evidence, there are certain safeguards against its abuse. Commenting on this provision, Francisco
enumerates the following requisites that have to be complied with before the act or declaration
regarding pedigree may be admitted in evidence:
1. The declarant is dead or unable to testify.
2. The pedigree must be in issue.
3. The declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in issue.
4. The declaration must be made before the controversy arose.
5. The relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question must be
shown by evidence other than such declaration.
All the above requisites are present in the case at bar. The persons who made the declarations about
the pedigree of Teopista, namely, the mother of Casimiro, Brigida Mendoza, and his brother, Hipolito,
were both dead at the time of Isaac's testimony. The declarations referred to the filiation of Teopista
and the paternity of Casimiro, which were the very issues involved in the complaint for compulsory
recognition. The declarations were made before the complaint was filed by Teopista or before the
controversy arose between her and Casimiro. Finally, the relationship between the declarants and
Casimiro has been established by evidence other than such declaration, consisting of the extrajudicial
partition of the estate of Florencio Mendoza, in which Casimiro was mentioned as one of his heirs.
The said declarations have not been refuted. Casimiro could have done this by deposition if he was too
old and weak to testify at the trial of the case.
Judgment is hereby rendered DECLARING Teopista Toring Tuñacao to be the illegitimate child of the
late Casimiro Mendoza and entitled to all the rights appurtenant to such status.
MONINA’s reliance on the certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar concerning her birth is clearly
misplaced. It is settled that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not
competent evidence as to the issue of paternity, when there is no showing that the putative father had a
hand in the preparation of said certificates, and the Local Civil Registrar is devoid of authority to record
the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the information of a third person. Simply put, if the alleged
father did not intervene in the birth certificate, e.g., supplying the information himself, the inscription of
his name by the mother or doctor or registrar is null and void; the mere certificate by the registrar
without the signature of the father is not proof of voluntary acknowledgment on the latter’s part. In like
manner, FRANCISCO’s lack of participation in the preparation of the baptismal certificates and school
records renders these documents incompetent to prove paternity, the former being competent merely to
prove the administration of the sacrament of baptism on the date so specified. However, despite the
inadmissibility of the school records per se to prove paternity, they may be admitted as part of
MONINA’s testimony to corroborate her claim that FRANCISCO spent for her education.
We likewise disagree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the certificates issued by the Local
Civil Registrar and the baptismal certificates may be taken as circumstantial evidence to prove
MONINA’s filiation. Since they are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of such filiation, they

Rivero v. CA Benedick Arevalo filed a Complaint against Mary
(2005) Jane Dy Chiao-De Guzman, Benito Dy Chiao, Jr.,
and Benson Dy Chiao, in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Naga City, for compulsory recognition as
the illegitimate child of their father, Benito Dy
Chiao, Sr., and for the administration and partition
of his estate as he had died intestate on July 27,
1995
Heirs of In the complaint before the RTC, respondent
Gabatan (2009) alleged that she is the sole owner of Lot 3095 C-5,
having inherited the same from her deceased
mother, Hermogena Gabatan Evero (Hermogena).
Respondent further claimed that her mother,
Hermogena, is the only child of Juan Gabatan and
his wife, Laureana Clarito.
Dela Cruz v. Jenie Dela Cruz applied for registration of her
Gracia (2009) child’s birth, using Dominique’s (her deceased
common-law spouse) surname Aquino, with the
Office of the City Civil Registrar, Antipolo City, in
support of which she submitted the child’s
Certificate of Live Birth, Affidavit to Use the
Surname of the Father (AUSF) which she had
executed and signed, and Affidavit of
Acknowledgment executed by Dominique’s father
Domingo Butch Aquino. Both affidavits attested,
inter alia, that during the lifetime of Dominique, he
had continuously acknowledged his yet unborn
child, and that his paternity had never been
questioned. Jenie attached to the AUSF a
document entitled “AUTOBIOGRAPHY” which
cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the same.
Article 2035(1) of the New Civil Code provides that no compromise upon the civil status of persons
shall be valid. As such, paternity and filiation, or the lack of the same, is a relationship that must be
judicially established, and it is for the court to determine its existence or absence. It cannot be left to
the will or agreement of the parties.
A compromise is a contract whereby parties, making reciprocal concerns, avoid litigation or put an end
to one already commenced. Like any other contract, it must comply with the requisite provisions in
Article 1318 of the New Civil Code, to wit: (a) consent of the contracting parties; (b) object certain which
is the subject matter of the contract; and (c) cause of the obligation which is established. Like any other
contract, the terms and conditions of a compromise agreement must not be contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public policy and public order. Any compromise agreement which is contrary to law or
public policy is null and void, and vests no rights and holds no obligation to any party. It produces no
legal effect at all. Considering all these, there can be no other conclusion than that the decision of the
RTC on the basis of a compromise agreement where Benedick was recognized as the illegitimate child
of Benito, Sr. is null and void.
Even assuming purely for the sake of argument that the birth certificate presented by respondent
(Exhibit A) is a reliable document, the same on its face is insufficient to prove respondent’s filiation to
her alleged grandfather, Juan Gabatan. All that Exhibit A, if it had been credible and authentic, would
have proven was that respondent’s mother was a certain "Hermogena Clarito Gabatan." It does not
prove that same "Hermogena Clarito Gabatan" is the daughter of Juan Gabatan. Even the CA held that
the conflicting certificates of live birth of respondent submitted by the parties only proved the filiation of
respondent to Hermogena.
It was absolutely crucial to respondent’s cause of action that she convincingly proves the filiation of her
mother to Juan Gabatan. To reiterate, to prove the relationship of respondent’s mother to Juan
Gabatan, our laws dictate that the best evidence of such familial tie was the record of birth appearing in
the Civil Register, or an authentic document or a final judgment. In the absence of these, respondent
should have presented proof that her mother enjoyed the continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child. Only in the absence of these two classes of evidence is the respondent allowed to
present other proof admissible under the Rules of Court of her mother’s relationship to Juan Gabatan.
However, respondent’s mother’s (Hermogena’s) birth certificate, which would have been the best
evidence of Hermogena’s relationship to Juan Gabatan, was never offered as evidence at the RTC.
Neither did respondent present any authentic document or final judgment categorically evidencing
Hermogena’s relationship to Juan Gabatan.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. 9255, permits an illegitimate child to use the
surname of his/her father if the latter had expressly recognized him/her as his offspring through the
record of birth appearing in the civil register, or through an admission made in a public or private
handwritten instrument. The recognition made in any of these documents is, in itself, a consummated
act of acknowledgment of the child’s paternity; hence, no separate action for judicial approval is
necessary.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not, indeed, explicitly state that the private
handwritten instrument acknowledging the child’s paternity must be signed by the putative father.
That a father who acknowledges paternity of a child through a written instrument must affix his
signature thereon is clearly implied in Article 176 of the Family Code. Paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 of A.O.
No. 1, Series of 2004, merely articulated such requirement; it did not “unduly expand” the import of
Article 176 as claimed by petitioners.
 Dominique, during his lifetime, wrote in his own
handwriting, which acknowledged that the child
was his.
The Civil Registrar Ronald Garcia refused
because: “In summary, the child cannot use the
surname of his father because he was born out of
wedlock and the father unfortunately died prior to
his birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge
his paternity to the child (either through the back of
Municipal Form No. 102 – Affidavit of
Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity – or the
Authority to Use the Surname of the Father)”
Lucas v Lucas Is a prima facie showing necessary before a court
(2011) can issue a DNA testing order?
4. Compulsory recognition
On her way home, when she was some distance
from the store, accused-appellant approached her
and pulled her right hand. He covered her mouth
and told her that he will kill her if she tried to shout
for help. Accused-appellant made her lie on a
People v grassy place and removed her shorts and panties.
Magtibay Accused-appellant then undressed, placed himself
(2002) on top of Rachelle and inserted his penis into her
vagina. Because of accused-appellant’s threat on
her life, Rachelle kept silent about the incident. It
was not until she became pregnant that she was
constrained to tell her mother what happened. She
eventually gave birth to a baby boy.
People v Abella That sometime on December 1999, in the afternoon,
(2010) at Barangay San Vicente, Municipality of Pamplona,
In the present case, however, special circumstances exist to hold that Dominique’s Autobiography,
though unsigned by him, substantially satisfies the requirement of the law.
First, Dominique died about two months prior to the child’s birth. Second, the relevant matters in the
Autobiography, unquestionably handwritten by Dominique, correspond to the facts culled from the
testimonial evidence Jenie proffered. Third, Jenie’s testimony is corroborated by the Affidavit of
Acknowledgment of Dominique’s father Domingo Aquino and testimony of his brother Joseph Butch
Aquino whose hereditary rights could be affected by the registration of the questioned recognition of the
child. These circumstances indicating Dominique’s paternity of the child give life to his statements in his
Autobiography that “JENIE DELA CRUZ” is “MY WIFE” as “WE FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER”
and “NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER.”
In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it fit to adopt the following rules respecting
the requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in any private handwritten
instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made:
1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove
filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by the
acknowledging parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent
evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by
the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence.
We agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for compulsory
blood testing, the moving party must show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. A prima
facie case is built by a party’s evidence and not by mere allegations in the initiatory pleadingThe same
condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere
harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present
prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity. Notwithstanding these, it should
be stressed that the issuance of a DNA testing order remains discretionary upon the court. The court
may, for example, consider whether there is absolute necessity for the DNA testing. If there is already
preponderance of evidence to establish paternity and the DNA test result would only be corroborative,
the court may, in its discretion, disallow a DNA testing.
With respect to the acknowledgment and support of the child born out of rape our recent ruling in
People v. Justiniano Glabo (2001) states: “Concerning the acknowledgment and support of the
offspring of rape, Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code provides for three kinds of civil liability that may
be imposed on the offender: a) indemnification, b) acknowledgment of the offspring, unless the law
should prevent him from so doing, and c) in every case to support the offspring. With the passage of
the Family Code, the classification of acknowledged natural children and natural children by legal fiction
was eliminated and they now fall under the specie of illegitimate children. Since parental authority is
vested by Article 176 of the Family Code upon the mother and considering that an offender sentenced
to reclusion perpetua automatically loses parental authority over his children, no “further positive act is
required of the parent as the law itself provides for the child’s status.” Hence, accused-appellant should
only be ordered to indemnify and support the victim’s child. However, the amount and terms of support
shall be determined by the trial court after due notice and hearing in accordance with Article 201 of the
Family Code.”
The accused-appellant was the biological father of the two-year old daughter of AAA as a result of the
rape incident and in view of their “striking facial similarities and features.” The order to acknowledge
 Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, while armed with “Balisong” and
under the influence of liquor, by means of force and
intimidation and with lewd design, did then and there
willfully and feloniously enter the house of herein and support accused-appellant’s offspring is in accordance with Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code.
complainant and then and there have sexual
intercourse with AAA, a woman of feeble mind,
against her will to her damage and prejudice.

5. Legitimated children
1. Who may be legitimated
Abadilla v Ma. Blyth Abadilla, a Clerk of Court, filed a The 3 children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be considered legitimate since the time they were
Tabiliran complaint against Judge Tabiliran on the grounds of born, there was an existing valid marriage between Tabiliran and Teresita. Under Article 177 of the
(1995) gross immorality, deceitful conduct, and corruption Family Code, only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the
unbecoming of a judge. With respect to the charge conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other may be
on gross immorality, she contended that the judge legitimated. Reasons for this limitation:
scandalously and publicly cohabited with Priscilla 1) The rationale of legitimation would be destroyed;
Baybayan during subsistence of his marriage with 2) It would be unfair to the legitimate children in terms of successional rights;
Teresita Banzuela. Tabiliran and Priscilla got 3) There will be the problem of public scandal, unless social mores change;
married in May 1986. On the other hand, with 4) It is too violent to grant the privilege of legitimation to adulterous children as it will destroy the
respect to the charge on deceitful conduct, petitioner sanctity of marriage;
claims that the judge caused his 3 illegitimate 5) It will be very scandalous, especially if the parents marry many years after the birth of the child.
children with Priscilla be registered as “legitimate” by
falsely executing separate affidavits stating the
delayed registration was due to inadvertence,
excusable negligence or oversight when in fact, he
knew these children cannot be legally registered as
legitimate. The judge averred that 25 years had
already elapsed since the disappearance of her wife
in 1966 when he married Priscilla hence the
cohabitation was neither bigamous nor immoral.
However, as early as 1970, based on the record,
Priscilla had begotten her 3 children (1970, 1971
and 1975).

2. How legitimation takes place

3. Retroactivity and effects
4. Action to impugn legitimation
5. Rights of legitimated children

6, Adopted children
Lazatin v Renato Lazatin filed a motion for intervention in the Renato has not established his status as an adopted child. Secondary evidence is not admissible
Campos probate proceedings of the estate of Margarita de unless the existence of therecords is proven along with the contents of the records and its loss.
(1979) Asis as an adopted child. Adoption is a juridical act and the statutory requirements must be strictly carried out.
Cervantes v This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus of minor The provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under five years of age will not
Fajardo Angeline Cervantes. After the birth of Angeline, apply where the court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise. Because the adoptive parents
(1989) respondents offered the child for adoption to are legally married and the respondent’s relationship with her husband is that of common law and that
Zenaida and Nelson. The petitioners have taken respondent has given birth to a child by another man, the court held that it will be in the child’s
 care of the child since she was 2 weeks old and an
Affidavit of Consent to Adoption was executed. The
petition for adoption was granted and the child
surname was changed to Fajardo. The Cervantes
filed for Habeas Corpus alleging that o n A p r i l best interest to stay with her adoptive parents.
1 9 8 7 , p e t i t i o n e r s r e c e i v e d a letter from
respondents demanding P150,000 for the return
of their adopted child who was taken by
respondent Gina Carreon.

1. Who may adopt

In Re: Petition Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist
for Adoption of was married with Primo Lim but were childless.
Michelle Lim Minor children, were entrusted to them by Lucia,
(2009) whose parents were unknown as shown by a
certification of DSWD. The spouses registered the
children making it appears as if they were the
parents. Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died. She
then married an American Citizen, Angel Olario in
December 2000. Petitioner decided to adopt the
children by availing of the amnesty given under RA
8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a
child. In 2002, she filed separate petitions for
adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial
court. Michelle was then 25 years old and already
married and Michael was 18 years and seven
months old. Michelle and her husband including
Michael and Olario gave their consent to the
adoption executed in an affidavit.
Petition was denied. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already remarried. Husband and
wife shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was not present in the case at bar. In case spouses
jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercised parental authority. The use of the word “shall” signifies that
joint adoption of husband and wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint
parental authority since the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but
natural to require spouses to adopt jointly. The affidavit of consent given by Olario will not suffice since
there are certain requirements that he must comply as an American Citizen. He must meet the
qualifications set forth in Sec7 of RA8552. The requirements on residency and certification of the
alien’s qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Sec 7. Parental authority is merely
just one of the effects of legal adoption. It includes caring and rearing the children for civic
consciousness and efficiency and development of their moral mental and physical character and well-
being.

There can be no question that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is not qualified to adopt Solomon
Joseph Alcala under any of the exceptional cases in the aforequoted provision. In the first place, he is
On February 21, 1990, Spouses Alvin Clouse, a
not a former Filipino citizen but a natural born citizen of the United States of America. In the second
natural-born US Citizen and Evelyn Clouse, a
place, Solomon Joseph Alcala is neither his relative by consanguinity nor the legitimate child of his
former Filipino who became a naturalized US
spouse. In the third place, when private respondents spouses Clouse jointly filed the petition to adopt
citizen, filed a petition to adopt Solomon Alcala, a
Republic v Solomon Joseph Alcala on February 21, 1990, private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse was no longer a
minor who is Evelyn's youngest brother. The trial
Toledano Filipino citizen. She lost her Filipino citizenship when she was naturalized as a citizen of the United
court granted the petition. Republic, through the
(1994) States in 1988. Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may appear to qualify
Office of the Solicitor General appealed contending
pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of Article 184 of E.O. 209. She was a former Filipino citizen. She sought to
that the lower court erred in granting the petition for
adopt her younger brother. Unfortunately, the petition for adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone
the spouses are not qualified to adopt under
without violating Article 185 which mandates a joint adoption by the husband and wife.
Philippine Law.

2. Who may be adopted

3. Need for consent
Landingin v RP Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the United
(2006) States of America (USA), of Filipino parentage and
a resident of Guam, USA, filed a petition for the
adoption of minors Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma
Dizon Ramos and Eugene Dizon Ramos who was
No. The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the
natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity
to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption. When she filed her
petition with the trial court, Rep. Act No. 8552 was already in effect. Section 9 thereof provides that if
the written consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained, the written consent of the legal
 born on. The minors are the natural children of
Manuel Ramos, petitioner’s brother (deceased),
and Amelia Ramos- who went to Italy, re-married
there and now has two children by her second
marriage and no longer communicated with her
children .
4. Effects of a decree of adoption
Tamargo vs CA Adelberto Bundo (10 years old) shot Jennifer
Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which
(1992) resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil complaint
for damages was filed by petitioner Macario
Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting parent, and petitioner
spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's
natural parents against respondent spouses Victor
and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with
whom he was living at the time of the tragic
incident. Prior to the incident, the spouses Sabas
and Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt
the minor Adelberto Bundoc. This petition for
adoption was granted on, 18 November 1982, that
is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.
Defense of Adelberto’s natural parents: the
adopting parents are the indispensable parties as
they have parental authority.
Cervantes vs This is a petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus over
Fajardo the person of the minor Angelie Anne Cervantes.
The child was born to Gina and Conrado (common
(1989) law spouses). Gina offered the child for adoption to
her sister and bro-in-law Zenaida and Nelson who
took care and custody of the child since she was 2
weeks old. Gina also executed an Affidavit of
Consent. A petition for adoption was filed and
granted.
Later, the adoptive parents Nelson and Zenaida
received a letter from Gina and Conrado
demanding to be paid the amount of P150,000.00,
otherwise, they would get back their child.
Petitioners refused to accede to the demand. As a
result, on 11 September 1987, while petitioners
were out at work, the respondent Gina Carreon
took the child from her "yaya" at the petitioners'
residence. She refused to return the child. Thus, a
petition for habeas corpus was filed.
In the Matter of May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her
the Adoption of natural father, use the surname of her natural
guardian of the minors will suffice. If, as claimed by petitioner, that the biological mother of the minors
had indeed abandoned them, she should, thus have adduced the written consent of their legal
guardian.
Adelberto's natural parents were the indispensable parties to the suit for damages brought by
petitioners, and that the dismissal by the trial court of petitioners' complaint, the indispensable parties
being already before the court, constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
The basis of parental liability for the torts of a minor child is the relationship existing between the
parents and the minor child living with them and over whom, the law presumes, the parents exercise
supervision and control.
Art 36 of Child and Youth Welfare Code:
Art. 36. Decree of Adoption. — … a decree of adoption shall be entered, which shall be effective he
date the original petition was filed….
We do not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a
liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when adopting parents had no actual or physically
custody over the adopted child. Retroactive affect may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition
for adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the
adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority had been retroactively
lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could not
have foreseen and which they could not have prevented (since they were at the time in the United
States and had no physical custody over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable.
Such a result, moreover, would be inconsistent with the philosophical and policy basis underlying the
doctrine of vicarious liability. Put a little differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on the part of
the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject
to their control at the time the tort was committed.
The petition for habeas corpus is granted in favor of the adopting parents.
In all cases involving the custody, care, education and property of children, the latter's welfare is
paramount.
It is undisputed that Conrado is legally married to a woman other than Gina, and his relationship with
the latter is a common-law husband and wife relationship. His open cohabitation with Gina will not
accord the minor that desirable atmosphere where she can grow and develop into an upright and
moral-minded person. Besides, Gina had previously given birth to another child by another married
man who eventually left her and vanished.
For a minor (like Angelie Anne C. Cervantes) to grow up with a sister whose "father" is not her true
father, could also affect the moral outlook and values of said minor. Upon the other hand, petitioners
who are legally married appear to be morally, physically, financially, and socially capable of supporting
the minor and giving her a future better than what the natural mother (herein respondent Gina Carreon),
who is not only jobless but also maintains an illicit relation with a married man, can most likely give her.
Besides, the minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge and consent of
respondents. A decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the authority vested in
natural parents over the adopted child, except where the adopting parent is the spouse of the natural
parent of the adopted, in which case, parental authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by
both spouses. The adopting parents have the right to the care and custody of the adopted child and
exercise parental authority and responsibility over him.
SC allowed Stephanie to use the surname of her mother as her middle name.
Stephanie mother as her middle name?
Garcia
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig filed a
(2005) petition to adopt his minor illegitimate
child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He
alleged therein, among others, that Stephanie was
born on June 26, 1994; that her mother is Gemma
Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been using
her mother’s middle name and surname; and that
he is now a widower and qualified to be her
adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s
middle name Astorga be changed to “Garcia,” her
mother’s surname, and that her surname “Garcia”
be changed to “Catindig,” his surname.
Rivera vs Adolfo and Rosita were married. Eleuterio, Rosita’s
Ramirez nephew, was appointed as Rosita’s estate
administrator. Eleuterio moved for production and
(2012) inspection of documents of properties believed to
be part of her estate, including a hospital. Roberto
(who had been managing the hospital), together
with Raymond and Lydia, opposed the issuance of
a subpoena claiming that they were children of
Adolfo by another woman.
RTC allowed the examination and production of
documents. Robert filed a special civil action of
certiorari before the CA imputing grave abuse of
discretion on RTC for granting the motion.
CA held that based on the article Women
Physicians of the World found in the record of the
case before it, the late Rosita, a physician, had
adopted Raymond as her child. An adopted child,
said the CA, is deemed a legitimate child of the
adopter. This being the case, Raymond’s presence
barred Eleuterio and Rosita’s other collateral
relatives from inheriting intestate from her.
5. Rescission of adoption
Lahom vs Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom adopted
Sibulo Isabelita’s nephew Jose Melvin Sibulo (1972).
Isabelita, then a widower, filed for rescission of
(2003) adoption (1999).
-respondent refused to change his surname from
Sibulo to Lahom, to the frustrations of petitioner
particularly her husband until the latter died.
The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper name and (2) the surname or family
name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to
distinguish him from other individuals. The surname or family name is that which identifies the family to
which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by the
parents for the child, but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.
There is no law regulating the use of a middle name. Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what
middle name an adoptee may use. However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the
Civil Code and Family Law Committees that drafted the Family Code recognized the Filipino custom
of adding the surname of the child’s mother as his middle name.
In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that “the adopted shall bear the surname of the
adopters.” Again, it is silent whether he can use a middle name. What it only expressly allows, as a
matter of right and obligation, is for the adoptee to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of
the decree of adoption.
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the
rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the
right to bear the surname of her father and her mother
Stephanie’s continued use of her mother’s surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her
maternal lineage.
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally construed to
carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of
primary and paramount consideration
CA gravely abused its discretion in adjudicating on the issue of Raymond’s adoption.
Whether or not the late Rosita had judicially adopted Raymond as her child is a question of fact that
had neither been considered nor passed upon by the RTC in a direct challenge to the claim of Eleuterio
and Rosita’s other collateral relatives that they have the right to inherit from her. The relevant issue
before the RTC was only whether or not the duly appointed administrator of Rosita’s estate had the
right to the production and examination of the documents believed to be in Robert’s possession.
Indeed, one of the reasons Robert brought the special civil action of certiorari before the CA is that
Eleuterio had no right to inspect the requested documents and have access to Adolfo’s estate when
Eleuterio’s authority as administrator extended only to Rosita’s estate.
The issues regarding the late Rosita’s supposed judicial adoption of Raymond as her child and the
consequent absence of right on the part of Eleuterio, et al. to file a petition for the settlement of Rosita’s
estate were never raised and properly tried before the RTC.
Petition dismissed.
In other cases, the Supreme Court ruled that the controversy should be resolved in the light of the
law governing at the time the petition was filed.
It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner filed an action to revoke the
decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new law, had already abrogated and repealed the
right of an adopter under the Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind a decree of
 -respondent remained indifferent and would only
come to Naga to see her once a year.
-respondent all the more remained callous and
utterly indifferent towards petitioner
-respondent has recently been jealous of
petitioner’s nephews and nieces whenever they
would find time to visit her, respondent alleging that
they were only motivated by their desire for some
material benefits from petitioner.
- in view of respondent’s insensible attitude
resulting in a strained and uncomfortable
relationship between him and petitioner, the latter
has suffered wounded feelings, knowing that after
all respondent’s only motive to his adoption is his
expectancy of his alleged rights over the properties
of herein petitioner and her late husband.
Before the filing of the petition, RA 8552 took effect
prohibiting the adopter/s from seeking rescission of
the adoption.
XV. Support
A. What compromises support
B. Who are obliged to provide support
C. Source of support
Lerma vs CA Teodoro Lerma and Concepcion Diaz are husband
and wife. Lerma filed a complaint for adultery
(1974) against Diaz. Diaz filed for legal separation with
custody, support, and support pendent lite. Diaz
was later convicted of adultery.
The legal issue posed by the foregoing facts is
whether adultery is a good defense against the
respondent's claim for support pendente lite.
Reyes vs Ines- Celia Ilustre-Reyes, filed against her husband,
Luciano Manuel J. C. Reyes, for legal separation on the
ground that the defendant had attempted to kill
(1979) plaintiff. The plaintiff asked for support pendente
lite for her and her three children. The defendant
opposed the application for support pendente
lite on the ground that his wife had committed
adoption. Consistently with its earlier pronouncements, the Court should now hold that the action for
rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had come into
force, no longer could be pursued.
Interestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an action to set aside the adoption is subject to
the five–year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the right to
revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within a prescriptive
period is a condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a vested right entitled to protection.
While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a consequential right to rescind the
adoption decree even in cases where the adoption might clearly turn out to be undesirable, it remains,
nevertheless, the bounden duty of the Court to apply the law. Dura lex sed lex would be the hackneyed
truism that those caught in the law have to live with. It is still noteworthy, however, that an adopter,
while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture
of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child
SC held that adultery is a defense against the claim of support.
Art 292 of NCC:
ART. 292. During the proceedings for legal separation, or for annulment of marriage, the spouses and
children shall be supported from the conjugal partnership property. After the final judgment of legal
separation, or of annulment of marriage, the obligation of mutual support between the spouses ceases.
However, in case of legal separation, the court may order that the guilty spouse shall give support to
the innocent one, the judgment specifying the terms of such order.
It is suggested that while adultery may be a defense in an action for personal support, that is, support of
the wife by the husband from his own funds, it is not a defense when the support is to be taken from the
conjugal partnership property. BUT SC said there is no distinction. Article 292 is not in itself the source
of the legal right to receive support. It merely states that the support, not only of the spouses but also of
the children, shall be taken from the conjugal property during the pendency of the legal separation
proceeding.
The right to separate support or maintenance, even from the conjugal partnership property,
presupposes the existence of a justifiable cause for the spouse claiming such right to live separately. A
petition in bad faith, such as that filed by one who is himself or herself guilty of an act which constitutes
a ground for legal separation at the instance of the other spouse, cannot be considered as within the
intendment of the law granting separate support. The loss of the substantive right to support in such a
situation is incompatible with any claim for support pendente lite.
It is true that the adultery of the wife is a defense in an action for support however, the alleged adultery
of wife must be established by competent evidence. The allegation that the wife has committed adultery
will not bar her from the right receive support pendente lite. Adultery is a good defense and if properly
proved and sustained will defeat the action.
He did not present evidence supporting his allegation at the hearing for support pendent lite. The
petitioner has still the opportunity to adduce evidence on the alleged adultery of his wife when the
action for legal separation is heard on the merits. It is to be noted however, that as pointed out by the
 adultery with her physician. Support pendent lite
was granted.
D. Order of support
Mangonon vs Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed, in behalf of her then
CA minor children Rica and Rina, a Petition for
Declaration of Legitimacy and Support, with
(2006) application for support pendente lite. Mangonon
and Delgado’s marriage was annulled.After 7
months, Mangonon gave birth to twins Rica and
Rina. At the time of filing of the petition, the twins
were about to enter college in US. So Mangonon
claimed support from father Federico Delgado, or
in his default, from grandfather Francisco Delgado.
RTC and CA: Mangonon and Federico should be
the ones providing support for their children.
Petitioner also maintains that as respondent
Francisco has the financial resources to help
defray the cost of Rica and Rina’s schooling, the
Court of Appeals then erred in sustaining the trial
court’s Order directing respondent Federico to pay
Rica and Rina the amount of award P5,000.00
each as monthly support pendente lite.
Spouses Lim vs Cheryl was married to Edward, son of Prudencio
Lim and Filomena (petitioners). Cheryl, Edward and
their children resided at petitioner’s house with
(2009) Edward’s grandmother and her husband. Cheryl
with her children left the residence after she
discovered Edward in “a very compromising
position”. She, the, filed for support against
Edward, his parents (petitioners), and his
grandmother.
RTC: Petitioners and grandmom jointly liable with
Edward.
respondents in their comment, the "private respondent was not asking support to be taken from
petitioner's personal funds or wherewithal, but from the conjugal property…". It is, therefore, doubtful
whether adultery will affect her right to alimony pendente lite.
In determining the amount to be awarded as support pendente lite it is not necessary to go fully into the
merits of the case, it being sufficient that the court ascertain the kind and amount of evidence which it
may deem sufficient to enable it to justly resolve the application, one way or the other, in view of the
merely provisional character of the resolution to be entered. Mere affidavits may satisfy the court to
pass upon the application for support pendente lite. It is enough the the facts be established by
affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in the record.
The petition is meritorious.
A court may temporarily grant support pendente lite prior to the rendition of judgment or final order.
Because of its provisional nature, a court does not need to delve fully into the merits of the case before
it can settle an application for this relief. After the hearings conducted on this matter as well as the
evidence presented, we find that petitioner was able to establish, by prima facie proof, the filiation of
her twin daughters to private respondents and the twins’ entitlement to support pendente lite.
An eminent author on the subject explains that the obligation to give support rests principally on those
more closely related to the recipient. However, the more remote relatives may be held to shoulder the
responsibility should the claimant prove that those who are called upon to provide support do not have
the means to do so.
There being prima facie evidence showing that petitioner and respondent Federico are the parents of
Rica and Rina, petitioner and respondent Federico are primarily charged to support their children’s
college education. In view however of their incapacities, the obligation to furnish said support should be
borne by respondent Francisco. Under Article 199 of the Family Code, respondent Francisco, as the
next immediate relative of Rica and Rina, is tasked to give support to his granddaughters in default of
their parents.
The obligor is given the choice as to how he could dispense his obligation to give support. Thus, he
may give the determined amount of support to the claimant or he may allow the latter to stay in the
family dwelling. The second option cannot be availed of in case there are circumstances, legal or moral,
which should be considered. In this case, this Court believes that respondent Francisco could not avail
himself of the second option. With the filing of this case, and the allegations hurled at one another by
the parties, the relationships among the parties had certainly been affected.
Finally, as to the amount of support pendente lite, we take our bearings from the provision of the law
mandating the amount of support to be proportionate to the resources or means of the giver and to the
necessities of the recipient. Guided by this principle, we hold respondent Francisco liable for half of the
amount of school expenses incurred by Rica and Rina as support pendente lite. As established by
petitioner, respondent Francisco has the financial resources to pay this amount given his various
business endeavors.
Petitioners liable but their liability limited to support needed by Cheryl and Edward’s children.
Although the obligation to provide support arising from parental authority ends upon the emancipation
of the child, the same obligation arising from spousal and general familial ties ideally lasts during the
obligee's lifetime.. Also, while parental authority under Title IX (and the correlative parental rights)
pertains to parents, passing to ascendants only upon its termination or suspension, the obligation to
provide legal support passes on to ascendants not only upon default of the parents but also for the
latter’s inability to provide sufficient support.
Here, there is no question that Cheryl is unable to discharge her obligation to provide sufficient legal
support to her children, then all school-bound. It is also undisputed that the amount of support Edward
is able to give to respondents, P6,000 a month, is insufficient to meet respondents’ basic needs. This
 inability of Edward and Cheryl to sufficiently provide for their children shifts a portion of their obligation
to the ascendants in the nearest degree, both in the paternal (petitioners) and maternal lines, following
the ordering in Article 199. To hold otherwise, and thus subscribe to petitioners’ theory, is to sanction
the anomalous scenario of tolerating extreme material deprivation of children because of parental
inability to give adequate support even if ascendants one degree removed are more than able to fill the
void.
However, petitioners’ partial concurrent obligation extends only to their descendants as this word is
commonly understood to refer to relatives, by blood of lower degree. As petitioners’ grandchildren by
blood, only respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III belong to this category. Indeed,
Cheryl’s right to receive support from the Lim family extends only to her husband Edward, arising from
their marital bond.

E. Manner and time of payment

F. Renunciation and termination
G. Support pendent e lite

XVI. Parental Authority and Custody of Children

A. Concept of parental authority
Medina vs Zenaida Medina gave birth to a baby boy named Writ denied.
Makabali Joseph Casero in the Makabali Clinic in San While our law recognizes the right of a parent to the custody of her child, Courts must not lose sight of
Fernando, Pampanga, owned and operated by the basic principle that "in all questions on the care, custody, education and property of children, the
(1969) respondent Dra. Venancia Makabali who assisted latter's welfare shall be paramount"
at the delivery. The boy was Zenaida's third, had As remarked by the Court below, petitioner Zenaida Medina proved remiss in these sacred duties; she
with a married man, Feliciano Casero. not only failed to provide the child with love and care but actually deserted him, with not even a visit, in
The mother left the child with Dra. Makabali from his tenderest years, when he needed his mother the most. It may well be doubted what advantage the
his birth. The latter took care and reared Joseph as child could derive from being coerced to abandon respondent's care and love to be compelled to stay
her own son; had him treated at her expense for with his mother and witness her irregular menage a trois with Casero and the latter's legitimate wife.
poliomyelitis, until he recovered his health; and
sent him to school. From birth (1961) until August
1966, the real mother never visited her child, and
never paid for his expenses.
Zenaida Medina lived with Feliciano Casero with
her two other children apparently with the
tolerance, if not the acquiescence, of Caseros
lawful wife
After extracting from Dra. Makabali a promise to
allow the minor a free choice with whom to live
when he reaches the age of 14, the Court held that
it was for the child's best interest to be left with his
foster mother and denied the writ of habeas
corpus.
Unson v. .Miguel. R. Unson and Edita V. Araneta were The custody of the child is granted to the father.
Navarro married and bore a child, Teresa. Later on, they
separated and executed an agreement for the in controversies regarding the custody of minors the sole and foremost consideration is the physical,
(1980) separation of their properties and to live separately. education, social and moral welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the respective resources
and social and moral situations of the contending parents.
No specific provision was contained in said
agreement about the custody of the child. From the The fact, that Teresa might have been tolerant about her stay with her mother in the past when she was
time of their separation, the mother had custody of still too young to distinguish between right and wrong and have her own correct impressions or notions
the child. about the unusual and peculiar relationship of her mother with her own uncle-in-law, the husband of her
sister's mother, is hardly of any consequence now that she has reached a perilous stage in her life.
 However, petitioner is now seeking custody of
Teresa, now 8 years old, due to the relationship
Edita started with her brother-in law with whom she
lives with and is said to suffer from manic-
depressive disorder.
Bagtas v. Hon. Antonio and Rosita S. Gallardo (Spouses Gallardo)
Ruth Santos are the parents of Maricel S. Gallardo (Maricel).
Maricel ran away with her boyfriend and got
(2009) pregnant.
Later on, she left her child Maryl Joy to Noel B.
Bagtas (Bagtas) and Lydia B. Sioson (Sioson) and
relinquished her rights to the child in the letter.
The Spouses Gallardo tried to obtain the custody of
the child and the two parties agreed on a
compromise agreement regarding the child’s
custody as found in an RTC Order.
The Spouses Gallardo breached the agreement
when they took the child to Samar. The RTC
ordered the spouses Gallardo to produce the child
under pain of contempt. Upon the production of the
child, the RTC dismissed the case as moot and
academic. Bagtas and Sioson argue that the
dismissal was erroneous and the custody of the
child be returned to them
.
B. Transfer of PA
Eslao v CA Petitioner Teresita Sagala-Eslao, the mother in law
of the respondent, seeks the custody of her two
grandchildren, one of them Angelica, who lived
with her for three years.
(1997)
The Court finds no alternative than to grant the mother no more than visitorial rights over the child in
question. Anyway, decisions even of this Supreme Court on the custody of minor children are always
open to adjustment as the circumstances relevant to the matter may demand in the light of the inflexible
criterion
Case is remanded to determine who should have rightful custody of the child.
In cases involving a petition for habeas corpus of minors, the question of illegal and involuntary restraint
of liberty is not the underlying rationale for the availability of the writ as a remedy. Rather, it is
prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right of custody over a child.
In Sombong, the Court laid down three requisites in petitions for habeas corpus involving minors: (1)
the petitioner has a right of custody over the minor, (2) the respondent is withholding the rightful
custody over the minor, and (3) the best interest of the minor demands that he or she be in the custody
of the petitioner.
In determining who has the rightful custody over a child, the child’s welfare is the most important
consideration. The court is not bound by any legal right of a person over the child..
In the present case, these requisites are not clearly established because the RTC hastily dismissed the
action and awarded the custody of Maryl Joy to the Spouses Gallardo without conducting any trial.
Custody of the children belongs to the mother.
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced except in
cases authorized by law.The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows
a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children’s
home or an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a
friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not
constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still
disallows the same.
Thus, in the instant petition, when respondent entrusted the custody of her minor child to her mother in
law, what she gave to the latter was merely temporary custody and it did not constitute abandonment or
renunciation of parental authority. For the right attached to parental authority, being purely personal,
the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a
children’s home or an orphan institution which do not appear in the case at bar.
Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the courts that “the right of parents to the
custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incident to parenthood, a right supported by
law and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not created by the stateli or
decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental relationship
 C. Who exercises PA
Espiritu and Reynaldo and Teresita’s marriage bore 2 children,
Layug v CA Rosalind and Reginald. The couple’s marriage
soured, especially with Reynaldo later on learning
(1995) that Teresita had a prior marriage.
Teresita left and worked in California, leaving the
children with Reynaldo. Reynaldo temporarily had
to work in the US and so left the two children in his
sister’s care.
Teresita came back and filed the petition for a writ
of habeas corpus to gain custody of her children.
The RTC granted custody to Reynaldo but this was
overturned by the CA applying FC 213, giving
custody to the mother if the children are less than 7
years of age.
Santos Sr. v CA
Petitioner Leoul Santos Sr. seeks the custody of
(1995) his 6 year old child, who had been in the custody of
his maternal grandchildren since he was born due
to Leoul’s prior financial difficulties and his
occupation as a soldier. The mother, after moving
to the US, has been MIA.
Prior to the filing of a Petition for Care and Custody
of the grandparents, the father took the child away
from them.
Vancil v. Belmes At issue is who between the paternal grandmother
and the mother should have custody of Vincent,
(2001) who is 16 years of age. The other child, Valerie,
had already reached the age of majority.
The CA erred in granting custody to the mother.
The Court of Appeals was unduly swayed by an abstract presumption of law rather than an
appreciation of relevant facts and the law which should apply to those facts. The task of choosing the
parent to whom custody shall be awarded is not a ministerial function to be determined by a simple
determination of the age of a minor child. Whether a child is under or over seven years of age, the
paramount criterion must always be the child's interests. Discretion is given to the court to decide who
can best assure the welfare of the child, and award the custody on the basis of that consideration.
In this case, the children are already above 7 years, therefore their choice on whose parent they want
to live with should be taken into consideration as well as the testimonies of the child psychologist who
examined both of the children.
From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit person, thus meeting the two requirements found in the first
paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code. The presumption under the second paragraph of said
article no longer applies as the children are over seven years. Assuming that the presumption should
have persuasive value for children only one or two years beyond the age of seven years mentioned in
the statute, there are compelling reasons and relevant considerations not to grant custody to the
mother. The children understand the unfortunate shortcomings of their mother and have been affected
in their emotional growth by her behavior.
The custody of the child belongs to his father.
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced except in
cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows
a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children's
home or an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a
friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not
constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still
disallows the same.
The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over the persons of their common
children. In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising
parental authority. Only in case of the parents' death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental
authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent.
The occupation of the father as a soldier and his spiriting away his boy from his in laws are not
justifiable reasons not to give custody to him.
The custody should be given to the mother.
that respondent, being the natural mother of the minor, has the preferential right over that of petitioner
to be his guardian (FC 211). Petitioner, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental
authority only in case of death, absence or unsuitability of respondent (FC 214).
Petitioner, however, has not proffered convincing evidence showing that respondent is not suited to be
the guardian of Vincent.
Even assuming that respondent is unfit as guardian of minor Vincent, still petitioner cannot qualify as a

David v. Court Ramon Villar, a married man, started an affair with
of Appeals Daisie David which bore a son Christopher J. The
son was accepted by his legal family and one day,
(1995) after a trip to Boracay with his legal family, the
father refused to give the child back to the mother
Briones v. Joey D. Briones sought custody of his illegitimate
Miguel son, Michael Kevin, who was left with him when his
mother went to work in Japan and became a
(2004) national by her marriage to a Japanese.
Joey alleges that the child was taken from him by
his maternal grandparents and at the time of the
SC’s decision, was already residing with his mother
in Japan
Gualberto v. At issue is who between two parents who have
Gualberto separated should have custody over their child who
is less than 7 years of age.
(2005)
The father alleges that he should have custody
since his former spouse is a lesbian.
substitute guardian since she is an American citizen and a resident of Colorado. In fact, in her petition,
she admitted the difficulty of discharging the duties of a guardian by an expatriate, like her. To be sure,
she will merely delegate those duties to someone else who may not also qualify as a guardian. Indeed,
her coming back to this country just to fulfill the duties of a guardian to Vincent for only two years is not
certain.
Significantly, this Court has held that courts should not appoint persons as guardians who are not within
the jurisdiction of our courts for they will find it difficult to protect the wards. The court also considered
her old age and her prior conviction of libel.
The custody of the minor who is less than 7 years old belongs to the mother.
In the case at bar, Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception, his father,
Ramon R. Villar, was married to another woman other than the child's mother. As such, pursuant to Art.
176 of the Family Code, Christopher J. is under the parental authority of his mother, who, as a
consequence of such authority, is entitled to have custody of him.
Indeed, Rule 1021 §1 makes no distinction between the case of a mother who is separated from her
husband and is entitled to the custody of her child and that of a mother of an illegitimate child who, by
law, is vested with sole parental authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody of her child.
The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor child may be a ground for ordering him to
give support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code,
"no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise."
Daisie may not be enjoying a life of affluence that the father promises If the child lives with him. It is
enough, however, that petitioner is earning a decent living and is able to support her children according
to her means.
The custody of the minor belongs to the mother.
David v. Court of Appeals held that the recognition of an illegitimate child by the father could be a
ground for ordering the latter to give support to, but not custody of, the child. The law explicitly confers
to the mother sole parental authority over an illegitimate child; it follows that only if she defaults can the
father assume custody and authority over the minor. Of course, the putative father may adopt his own
illegitimate child; in such a case, the child shall be considered a legitimate child of the adoptive parent.
There is thus no question that Respondent Loreta, being the mother of and having sole parental
authority over the minor, is entitled to have custody of him. She has the right to keep him in her
company. She cannot be deprived of that right, and she may not even renounce or transfer it “except in
the cases authorized by law.” Not to be ignored in Article 213 of the Family Code is the caveat that,
generally, no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, except when the court
finds cause to order otherwise.
The illegitimate father may however be granted visitorial rights in of the constitutionally protected
inherent and natural right of parents over their children
Custody is granted to the mother.
As found in FC 213, “No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the
court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise”.The general rule that children under seven years of
age shall not be separated from their mother finds its raison d’etre in the basic need of minor children
for their mother’s loving care

Silva v CA Carlitos, a married businessman, and Suzanne, an
unmarried actress, cohabited (w/o marriage) which
(1997) resulted in children. They parted ways soon after.
Suzanne refused to allow Carlitos to have the
children during weekends. Carlitos filed a case for
custody of the children, which was opposed by
Suzanne, alleging that Carlitos often engaged in
gambling and womanizing which she feared could
affect the moral and social values of the children.
RTC ruled in favor of Carlitos, Suzanne appealed.
In the meantime, she got married to a Dutch
national and moved to Holland along with the
children. CA ruled in favor of Suzanne, hence this
case.
The issue before the SC is not a question of child
custody; instead, the case merely concerns the
visitation right of a parent over his children which
the trial court has adjudged in favor of petitioner by
holding that he shall have “visitorial rights to his
children during Saturdays and/or Sundays, but in
no case (could) he take out the children without the
written consent of the mother x x x." The visitation
right referred to is the right of access of a
noncustodial parent to his or her child or children.
Salientes v Petitioner Marie and respondent Loran are the
Salientes parents of the 2-year-old minor Lorenzo. They lived
with Marie‘s parents. However due to problems
with the in-laws, Loran suggested that they transfer
(2006) to their own house. Marie refused and so Loran
The so-called “tender-age presumption” under Article 213 of the Family Code may be overcome only by
compelling evidence of the mother’s unfitness. The mother has been declared unsuitable to have
custody of her children in one or more of the following instances: neglect, abandonment,
unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity or
affliction with a communicable disease.
Here, Crisanto cites immorality due to alleged lesbian relations as the compelling reason to deprive
Joycelyn of custody. It has indeed been held that under certain circumstances, the mother’s immoral
conduct may constitute a compelling reason to deprive her of custody.
But sexual preference or moral laxity alone does not prove parental neglect or incompetence. Not even
the fact that a mother is a prostitute or has been unfaithful to her husband would render her unfit to
have custody of her minor child.To deprive the wife of custody, the husband must clearly establish that
her moral lapses have had an adverse effect on the welfare of the child or have distracted the offending
spouse from exercising proper parental care
Such a fact has not been shown here. There is no evidence that the son was exposed to the mother’s
alleged sexual proclivities or that his proper moral and psychological development suffered as a result.
There is, despite a dearth of specific legal provisions, enough recognition on the inherent and natural
right of parents over their children. Article 150 of the Family Code expresses that "(f)amily relations
include those x x x (2) (b)etween parents and children; x x x." Article 209, in relation to Article 220, of
the Code states that it is the natural right and duty of parents and those exercising parental authority
to, among other things, keep children in their company and to give them love and affection, advice and
counsel, companionship and understanding. The Constitution itself speaks in terms of the "natural
and primary rights” of parents in the rearing of the youth. [ There is nothing conclusive to indicate that
these provisions are meant to solely address themselves to legitimate relationships. Indeed, although
in varying degrees, the laws on support and successional rights, by way of examples, clearly go beyond
the legitimate members of the family and so explicitly encompass illegitimate relationships as
well. Then, too, and most importantly, in the declaration of nullity of marriages, a situation that
presupposes a void or inexistent marriage, Article 49 of the Family Code provides for appropriate
visitation rights to parents who are not given custody of their children.
The allegations of respondent against the character of petitioner, even assuming as true, cannot be
taken as sufficient basis to render petitioner an unfit father. The fears expressed by respondent to the
effect that petitioner shall be able to corrupt and degrade their children once allowed to even
temporarily associate with petitioner is but the product of respondent's unfounded imagination, for no
man, bereft of all moral persuasions and goodness, would ever take the trouble and expense in
instituting a legal action for the purpose of seeing his illegitimate children. It can just be imagined the
deep sorrows of a father who is deprived of his children of tender ages.
Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is withheld from a person entitled
thereto. Under Art. 211 of the FC, Loran and Marie have joint parental authority over their son and
consequently joint custody. Although the parents are separated de facto, since the issue of custody has
yet to be adjudicated by the court and in the absence of a judicial grant of custody to one parent, BOTH
parents are still entitled to the right to the custody of their child.
 left. He was thereafter prevented from seeing his
son.
Loran filed for Habeas Corpus and Custody.
Petitioners filed for certiorari but CA dismissed
petition stating that the order of the trial court did
not award the custody of the child to anyone but
was simply a standard order issued for the
production of restrained persons and that a
summary proceeding was still going to be
conducted. Petitioners relied on Art. 213 of FC (no
child under 7 shall be separated from the mother
unless there is compelling reason to do so) and
contend that proper remedy was simply an action
for custody and not habeas corpus since it is
unavailable against the mother who under the law
has the right of custody of the minor.
Sps. Lim v Lim Respondent wife Cheryl and husband Edward, son
of petitioner grandparents, had three children. They
(2009) stayed at the house of the petitioner grandparents
in Forbes Park, Makati City. The husband’s family
business, which provided him with a monthly salary
of only P6,000 which shouldered the family
expenses. The wife had no steady source of
income.
After the husband was caught in a compromising
position with the midwife, there was a violent
confrontation between the spouses which resulted
in the wife leaving petitioner’s place with her
children.
The wife sued the husband AND the petitioner
grandparents for support for her and her children.
The trial court rendered judgment ordering Edward
and petitioners to "jointly" provide P40,000 monthly
support.
Petitioners theorize that their liability is activated
only upon default of parental authority, conceivably
either by its termination or suspension during the
children’s minority. Because at the time
respondents sued for support, Cheryl and Edward
exercised parental authority over their
children, petitioners submit that the obligation to
support the latter’s offspring ends with them.
Because at the time respondents sued for support,
Cheryl and Edward exercised parental authority
over their children, petitioners submit that the
obligation to support the latter’s offspring ends with
them.
In the present case, respondent‘s cause of action is the deprivation of his right to see his child as
alleged in the petition and thus the remedy of habeas corpus is available to him. Furthermore, Art. 213
deals with judicial adjudication of custody and serves as a guideline for the proper award of custody by
the court. It is not a basis for preventing father to see his own child. Nothing in the said provision
disallows father from seeing or visiting his own child under 7 years of age.
Moreover, Article 213 of the Family Code deals with the judicial adjudication of custody and serves as a
guideline for the proper award of custody by the court. Petitioners can raise it as a counter argument for
private respondent’s petition for custody. But it is not a basis for preventing the father to see his own
child. Nothing in the said provision disallows a father from seeing or visiting his child under seven years
of age.
Petitioners Liable to Provide Support but only to their Grandchildren.
Neither the text of the law nor the teaching of jurisprudence supports the severe constriction that the
petitioners are only liable for support of the grandchildren upon default of the parental authority. In the
first place, the governing text are the relevant provisions in Title VIII of the Civil Code, as amended, on
Support, not the provisions in Title IX on Parental Authority. While both areas share a common ground
in that parental authority encompasses the obligation to provide legal support, they differ in other
concerns including the duration of the obligation and its concurrence among relatives of differing
degrees. Thus, although the obligation to provide support arising from parental authority ends upon the
emancipation of the child, the same obligation arising from spousal and general familial ties ideally lasts
during the obligee's lifetime. Also, while parental authority under Title IX (and the correlative parental
rights) pertains to parents, passing to ascendants only upon its termination or suspension, the
obligation to provide legal support passes on to ascendants not only upon default of the parents but
also for the latter’s inability to provide sufficient support
Professor Pineda is of the view that grandchildren cannot demand support directly from their
grandparents if they have parents (ascendants of nearest degree) who are capable of supporting them.
This is so because we have to follow the order of support under Art. 199. We agree with this view.
Here, there is no question that Cheryl is unable to discharge her obligation to provide sufficient legal
support to her children, then all school-bound. It is also undisputed that the amount of support Edward
is able to give to respondents, P6,000 a month, is insufficient to meet respondents’ basic needs. This
inability of Edward and Cheryl to sufficiently provide for their children shifts a portion of their obligation
to the ascendants in the nearest degree, both in the paternal (petitioners) and maternal lines, following
the ordering in Article 199. To hold otherwise, and thus subscribe to petitioners’ theory, is to sanction
the anomalous scenario of tolerating extreme material deprivation of children because of parental
inability to give adequate support even if ascendants one degree removed are more than able to fill the
void.1avvphi1
However, petitioners’ partial concurrent obligation extends only to their descendants as this word is
commonly understood to refer to relatives, by blood of lower degree. As petitioners’ grandchildren by
blood, only respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III belong to this category. Indeed,
Cheryl’s right to receive support from the Lim family extends only to her husband Edward, arising from
their marital bond.
People v Carolina Merano met Marquez at the beauty parlor
Marquez where she was working as a beautician. She
became close with Marquez who gave her tips and
(2011) always brought gifts for her daughter. After a trip to
a beach in Laguna, Marquez allegedly borrowed
Merano’s then three-month old daughter Justine
Bernadette C. Merano (Justine) to buy her some
clothes, milk and food. Merano said she agreed
because it was not unusual for Marquez to bring
Justine some things whenever she came to the
parlor.
Marquez disappeared and did not return the child.
Instead she demanded money from Merano for the
child’s return. Marquez later gave the child to the
Sps. Castillo for a sum of money.
Marquez contends that it was Merano who offered
her child for adoption. Merano allegedly left the
child in Marquez’s home while Marquez was away
and the Sps. Castillo were persuaded by Merano to
pick the child up from there.
Merano filed a charged of kidnapping and failure to
return a minor.
D. Substitute PA
Vancil v Belmes Petitioner Bonifacia is the mother of Reeder Vancil.
Reeder is a US Navy serviceman who had two
(2001) children by his common-law wife, Helen. When he
died, he left them (the children) with his death
pension benefits with a probable value of P
100,000.
Bonifacia commenced guardianship proceedings
before the RTC of Cebu, over the person and
properties of the two children (her grandchildren),
Valerie and Vincent. She was appointed as their
guardian. The natural mother of minors, Helen,
opposed the appointment, asserting that she is the
natural mother in actual custody of and exercising
parental authority over the said minors.
Guilty of Kidnapping and failure to return a minor
Art. 270. Kidnapping and failure to return a minor. — The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon any person who, being entrusted with the custody of a minor person, shall deliberately
fail to restore the latter to his parents or guardians.
This crime has two essential elements:
1. The offender is entrusted with the custody of a minor person; and
2. The offender deliberately fails to restore the said minor to his parents or guardians.
This Court, in elucidating on the elements of Article 270, stated that while one of the essential elements
of this crime is that the offender was entrusted with the custody of the minor, what is actually being
punished is not the kidnapping but the deliberate failure of that person to restore the minor to his
parents or guardians.
It is clear from the records of the case that Marquez was entrusted with the custody of Justine. Whether
this is due to Merano’s version of Marquez borrowing Justine for the day, or due to Marquez’s version
that Merano left Justine at her house, it is undeniable that in both versions, Marquez agreed to the
arrangement, i.e., to temporarily take custody of Justine. It does not matter, for the first element to be
present, how long said custody lasted as it cannot be denied that Marquez was the one entrusted with
the custody of the minor Justine. Thus, the first element of the crime is satisfied.
As to the second element, neither party disputes that on September 6, 1998, the custody of Justine was
transferred or entrusted to Marquez. Whether this lasted for months or only for a couple of days, the
fact remains that Marquez had, at one point in time, physical and actual custody of Justine. Marquez’s
deliberate failure to return Justine, a minor at that time, when demanded to do so by the latter’s mother,
shows that the second element is likewise undoubtedly present in this case.
Marquez’s insistence on Merano’s alleged desire and intention to have Justine adopted cannot
exonerate her because it has no bearing on her deliberate failure to return Justine to Merano. If it were
true that Marquez merely facilitated Justine’s adoption, then there was no more need for Merano to
contact Marquez and vice-versa, since Merano, as Marquez claimed, had direct access to Castillo. The
evidence shows, however, that Merano desperately searched for a way to communicate with Marquez.
MOTHER entitled to custody, not grandparents.
Art. 211 of the Family Code states clearly that the father and mother shall jointly exercise authority
over the persons of their common children. Petitioner at the most, can only exercise substitute parental
authority in case of death, absence or
unsuitability of respondent. Considering the present circumstances, the respondent is very much alive
and exercising parental authority over the minors. Petitioner has not proffered convincing evidence
showing that respondent is not suited to be the guardian of Vincent (as Valerie is already of legal age).
Furthermore, petitioner Bonifacia lives outside the country and her coming back just to fulfill guardian
duties is not certain. She is an American citizen and a resident of Colorado and would obviously not be
able to perform the responsibilities and obligations required of a guardian. The court also opines that
she will merely delegate those duties to someone else who may not qualify as a guardian. The Court
has consistently held in the past that the courts should not grant guardianship to persons who are not
within our jurisdiction for they will find it difficult to protect the wards.
Lastly, in Justice Vitug‘s concurring opinion, he said that parents are thus placed first in rank in matters

E. Special PA
Amadora v CA Alfredo Amadora, 17-years old, had gone to school
after the end of the semester to present his physics
() experiment as a prerequisite to graduation. While
in the auditorium to do so, he was shot dead by a
classmate, Pablito Daffon. Amadora‘s parents are
now asking for damages against the high school
principal, the dean of boys, the physics teacher,
and the school itself, on the ground that the
incident had happened while the deceased was
under their custody, and that they are responsible
and liable for the acts committed by Damon, who is
also a student under their custody.
The rector, high school principal, dean of boys and
the school itself was sued for damages.
F. Effects of PA over the child’s person
G. Filial Privilege
Lee v CA Spouses Lee (husband) and Keh (wife) entered the
of parental authority and that substitute parental authority may only be exercised by grandparents in
case parents have died or are absent or
declared unfit and this order of priority in the exercise of parental authority is not in any way affected by
the child‘s legitimacy. In fact, Article 176 of the Family: illegitimate child shall be under the parental
authority of his mother who, consequentially, should also be entitled to the custody of the child.
The rector, high school principal, dean of boys and the school are not liable for damages.
The Colegio is an academic institution of learning, not a school of arts and trades. Nevertheless, the
Court concluded that Article 2180 should apply to all schools, such that where the school is academic,
responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of that student;
while if it is vocational or technical, it will be the head who is held liable, as an exception to the general
rule that it is the teacher who is liable.
As for the duration of this responsibility, the Court held that it is not coterminous with the semester, but
rather, exists as long as it is shown that the student is in school premises in pursuance of a legitimate
student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student right, and in the enjoyment of a legitimate
student privilege. During these, the teacher-in-charge must answer for his students‘ torts, in the same
way that parents are responsible for a child in their custody. It is not even required that at the time of
the injury, the teacher be physically present and in a position to prevent it, because custody does not
mean immediate and actual physical control but rather, the influence exerted on the child and the
discipline instilled in him as a result of such influence.
However, the responsibility ceases if it can be proven that the persons cited here prove that they
exerted the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damages. Also, with regard to the school,
it may be held to answer only for the acts of the teachers or even the head as the respondeat superior,
but can be exonerated if it proves that it exercised the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias.
The time Alfredo was fatally shot, he was in the custody of the authorities of the school notwithstanding
classes had formally ended when the incident happened. It was immaterial if he was in the school
auditorium to finish his physics requirement. What was important is that he was there for a legitimate
purpose. On the other hand, the rector, high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held
liable because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as defined in the provision. Each was
exercising only a general authority over the students and not direct control and influence exerted by the
teacher placed in-charge of particular classes.
In the absence of a teacher- in charge, dean of boys should probably be held liable considering that he
had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from a student and later returned to him without taking
disciplinary action or reporting the matter to the higher authorities. Though it was clear negligence on
his part, no proof was shown to necessarily link this gun with the shooting incident.
Collegio San Jose-Recoletos cannot directly be held liable under the provision because only the
teacher of the head of school of arts and trade is made responsible for the damage caused by the
student. Hence, under the facts disclosed, none of the respondents were held liable for the injury
inflicted with Alfredo resulting to his death.
Tiu can be compelled to testify against petitioner Emma Lee.
 Philippines in the 1930s as immigrants from China.
(2010) They had 11 children (collectively, the Lee-Keh Rule 130, SECTION 25. Parental and filial privilege.- No person may be compelled to testify against his
children). parents, other direct ascendants, children or other direct descendants.

Lee brought from China a young woman named
Tiu, supposedly to serve as housemaid. The
respondent Lee-Keh children believe that Tiu left
the Lee-Keh household, moved into another
property of Lee nearby, and had a relation with
him.Lee-Keh children learned that Tiu’s children
with Lee (collectively, the Lee’s other children)
claimed that they, too, were children of Lee and
Keh (the original first marriage).
The above is an adaptation from a similar provision in Article 315 of the Civil Code that applies only in
criminal cases. But those who revised the Rules of Civil Procedure chose to extend the prohibition to all
kinds of actions, whether civil, criminal, or administrative, filed against parents and other direct
ascendants or descendants.
But here Tiu, who invokes the filial privilege, claims that she is the stepmother of petitioner Emma Lee.
The privilege cannot apply to them because the rule applies only to "direct" ascendants and
descendants, a family tie connected by a common ancestry. A stepdaughter has no common ancestry
by her stepmother.

Article 965 thus provides:

in Special Proceeding C-1674 for the deletion from Art. 965. The direct line is either descending or ascending. The former unites the head of the family with
the certificate of live birth of the petitioner Emma those who descend from him. The latter binds a person with those from whom he descends.
Lee, one of Lee’s other children, the name Keh and
replace the same with the name Tiu to indicate her Consequently, Tiu can be compelled to testify against petitioner Emma Lee.
true mother’s name. The Lee-Keh children filed
with the RTC an ex parte request for the issuance
of a subpoena ad testificandum to compel Tiu,
Emma Lee’s presumed mother, to testify in the
case.

But petitioner Emma Lee alleges that requiring Tiu

to come to court and testify it would violate her
parental right not to be compelled to testify against
her stepdaughter.

H. Effects of PA over the child’s property

Hebron v Loyola Property was owned by Remigia Baylon who was
married to Januario Loyola. They had seven
(2010) children, among whom were Conrado and
Encarnacion.
The administration of the said lots was entrusted to
Encarnacion. All the heirs of Januario and Remigia
received their shares in the fruits of the subject
properties during Encarnacion's administration
thereof. With the latter's death the administration of
the subject properties was assumed by her
daughter, Amelia Bautista-Hebron, who, after some
time, started withholding the shares of Candida
and the heirs of Conrado.
The minor children of Conrado inherited by representation in the properties of their grandparents
Remigia and Januario. These children, not their mother Victorina, were the co-owners of the inherited
properties. Victorina had no authority or had acted beyond her powers in conveying, if she did indeed
convey, to the petitioner’s mother the undivided share of her minor children in the property involved in
this case. "The powers given to her by the laws as the natural guardian covers only matters of
administration and cannot include the power of disposition. She should have first secured the
permission of the court before she alienated that portion of the property in question belonging to her
minor children." In a number of cases, where the guardians, mothers or grandmothers, did not seek
court approval of the sale of properties of their wards, minor children, the Court declared the sales void.
Although the CA inaccurately cited Articles 321 and 323 of the Civil Code, its conclusion that Victorina
had no capacity to relinquish her children's shares in the inherited properties was, nevertheless,
correct.

By the time partition of the said properties was

formally demanded.

Hebron claimed that Candida and the heirs of

Conrado have already relinquished their shares in
 consideration of the financial support extended
them by her mother, Encarnacion.
Lindain v CA Plaintiffs as minors, owned a parel of registered
land which their mother (Dolores) as guardian, sold
(1992) for P2,000.00 under a deed of absolute sale to the
spouses Apolonia and Federico. The latter knew
that the sale was without judicial approval but still
proceeded with the transaction. The plaintiffs now
contend that the sale is null and void as it was
without the court's approval. The Regional trial
Court ruled that the sale is indeed null and void,
while upon appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA)
confirmed the sale as valid and dismissed the
complaint. Hence this petition.
Badillo v Ferrer Macario Badillo died intestate and survived by his
widow, Clarita Ferrer, and five minor children. He
() left a parcel valued at P7,500.00. Hence, each of
the five minor plaintiffs had inherited a 1/12 share
of the P7,500.00, or P625.00 each, which is less
than the P2,000.00 mentioned in Article 320 of the
Civil Code.
The surviving widow, in her own behalf and as
natural guardian of the minor plaintiffs, sold to
defendants-appellants, the spouses Gregorio
Soromero and Eleuteria Rana.
Under Art. 320 (NCC), a parent acting merely as a legal administrator of the property of his minor
children does not have the power to dispose of or alienate the property of the said child without judicial
approval. And under Rule 84 (Code of Civil Procedure), the powers and duties of the widow as legal
administrator of her minor children's property are merely powers of possession and management.
Hence, the power to sell, mortgage, encumber or dispose must proceed from the court (Rule 89).
Moreover, the private respondent spouses are not purchasers in good faith as they knew right from the
beginning the the transaction was without judicial approval. Further, the minors' action for
reconveyance has not yet prescribed.
The mother Clarita Ferrer Badillo has no authority or has acted beyond her powers in conveying to the
appellants that 5/12 undivided share of her minor children in the property involved in this case. The
powers given to her by the laws as the natural guardian covers only matters of administration and
cannot include the power of disposition. She should have first secured the permission of the court
before she alienated that portion of the property in question belonging to her minor children.
The appellee minors never ratified this Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Sale. In fact, they question its
validity as to them. Hence, the contract remained unenforceable or unauthorized. No restitution may be
ordered from the appellee minors either as to that portion of the purchase price which pertains to their
share in the property or at least as to that portion which benefited them because the law does not
sanction any.

odesta Badillo, a sister of Macario Badillo, was able

to obtain guardianship over the persons and
properties of the minor plaintiffs, without personal
notice to their mother, who was alleged could not
be located inspite of the efforts exerted. Their
guardian caused the minor plaintiffs to file a
complaint in the case below for the annulment of
the sale to defendants-appellants and, conceding
the validity of the sale of the widow's participation
in the property, they asked that, as co-owners, they
be allowed to exercise the right of legal
redemption.

I. Suspension or termination of PA

XV II. Miscellaneous Provisions

XVIII. Summary Judicial Proceedings

PROPERTY
I. Classification of Property
A. Immovable or real
B. Movable
LOPEZ v. In 1946, Respondent invited Petitioner to make an While it is true that generally, real estate connotes the land and the building constructed thereon, it is
OROSA investment in the theater business (PTI). Petitioner obvious that the inclusion of the building, separate and distinct from the land, in the enumeration of
 agreed to supply the lumber necessary for the
(1958) construction, and that payment would be on
demand. A balance of P41, 771.35 was left unpaid
by Respondent. Petitioner filed a complaint, and
got a favorable decision.
Question now is: W/N the lien attaches to the
building alone, excluding the land.
ASSOCIATED Petitioners filed a surety bond and executed an
INSURANCE v. alleged chattel mortgage on the house in favor of
IYA NARIC. The spouses didn’t yet own the land
where the house was. When they did purchase it,
(1958) they executed a real estate mortgage in favor of
Respondent.
The spouses were not able to fulfill their obligation
to NARIC, so Petitioner was compelled to pay (as
surety). Petitioner later foreclosed the chattel
mortgage.
It learned of the real estate mortgage over the
house and lot, so it filed an action against the
spouses.
Respondent filed another civil action against the
spouses, asserting that she has a better right over
the property.
TUMALAD v. Respondent & Simeon executed a chattel
VICENCIO mortgage over their house in favor of Petitioners,
which was being rented by Madrigal and company.
(1971) The mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed upon
failure to pay the loan. The house was sold at a
public auction and the Petitioners were the highest
bidder.
BOARD OF In 1902, the Philippine Commission authorized the
ASSESSMENT Municipal Board of Manila to grant a franchise to
APPEALS v. construct, maintain and operate an electric power
MERALCO system in the City of Manila.
Meralco’s power is generated by its plant in
(1964) Laguna and transmitted to Manila by means of
wires. These wires are attached to steel towers.
Meralco has constructed 40 of these steel towers
within Quezon City, on land belonging to it.
In 1955, The City Assessor of QC declared the
steel towers for real property tax.
MERALCO v. Petitioner owns 2 oil storage tanks, assembled on
CENTRAL the spot. They sit on a foundation of compacted
BOARD OF earth, and a layer of sand and of asphalt.
ASSESSMENT The municipal treasure of Batangas assed the two
APPEALS tanks for realty tax. MERALCO opposed this
assessment, claiming that the tanks are not real
properties.
BERKENKOTTER A sugar company obtained a loan from
v. CU UNJIENG Respondent, secured by a first mortgage on 2
parcels of land, with all its buildings,
what may constitute real properties means that a building is by itself an immovable property. In the
absence of any specific provision of law to the contrary, a building is an immovable property,
irrespective of whether or not said structure and the land on which it is adhered to belong to the same
owner.
A building cannot be divested of its character as real property by the fact that the land on which it is
constructed belongs to another.
If held otherwise, it would result in confusion, for to cloak the building with an uncertain status made
dependent on ownership of the land would create a situation where a permanent fixture changes its
nature or character as the ownership of the land changes hands.
In the case at bar, as personal properties may be the only subjects of a chattel mortgage, the
execution of the chattel mortgage covering said building is null and void.
Certain deviations have been allowed from the general doctrine that buildings are immovable property
such as when through stipulation, parties agree to treat as personal property those, by their nature,
would be real property. This is partly based on the principle of estoppel.
In the case at bar, there is no specific statement referring to the house as personal property, but the
ceding, selling or transferring of the property through chattel mortgage could only have meant that
Respondent conveyed the house as chattel, or at least, intended to treat the same as such. They
should not now be allowed to make an inconsistent stand by claiming otherwise.
The steel towers of an electric company don’t constitute real property for the purposes of real property
tax. Steel towers are not immovable property under paragraph 1, 3 and 5 of NCC 415.
The towers are removable and merely attached to a square metal frame by means of bolts, which
when unscrewed could easily be dismantled and moved from place to place.
The steel towers or supports do not come within the objects mentioned in par. 1, because they do not
constitute and/or are not analogous to buildings or constructions adhered to the soil.
They cannot be included under par. 3, as they are not attached to an immovable in a fixed manner,
and they can be separated without breaking the material or causing deterioration upon the object to
which they are attached
They also do not fall under par. 5, for they are not machineries or receptacles, instruments or
implements, and even if they were, they are not intended for industry or works on the land.
While the 2 storage tanks are not embodied in the land, they may still be considered as improvements
thereon, rendering it useful to the oil industry.
For taxation purposes, the term real property may include things which should generally be considered
as personal property.
The installation of machinery and equipment in a mortgaged sugar central, in lieu of another of less
capacity, for the purpose of carrying out the industrial functions of the latter and increasing production,
constitutes a permanent improvement on the said sugar central. It subjects said machinery and
(1935) improvements, sugar-cane mill, etc. now existing
or that may.
The sugar company decided to increase the
capacity of its sugar central by buying additional
machinery and equipment.
equipment to the mortgage constituted thereon.
The fact that the purchaser of the new machinery and equipment has bound himself to the person
supplying him the purchase money to hold them as security does not alter the permanent character of
the incorporation of said machinery and equipment with the central.

DAVAO Petitioner is the holder of a lumber concession,
SAWMILL v. and it operated a sawmill on land it doesn’t own.
CASTILLO Part of the lease agreement was a stipulation in
which, after the lease agreement, all buildings and
(1935) improvements would pass to the ownership of the
lessor, which would not include machineries
and accessories.
Petitioner had in its sawmill machineries and other
equipment wherein some were bolted in
foundations of cement.
The machinery must be classified as personal property.
The lessee placed the machinery in the building, erected on land belonging to another, with the
understanding that the machinery was not included in the improvements which would pass to the
lessor upon the expiration of the agreement.
The lessee also treated the machinery as personal property, executing chattel mortgages over the
same. It was also levied by the sheriff as personalty, but no protest thereto was registered.
Machinery only becomes immobilized when placed in a plant by the owner of the property/plant, but
not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any person having temporary right, unless they acted
as agent of the owner.

II. Character of Ownership

A. Public Domain
GOVERNMENT Lots 36, 39 and 40, involved in a cadastral proceeding, of the
v. CABANGIS City of Manila were formerly a part of a large parcel of land
belonging to the predecessor of Respondent.
(1929) From 1896, said land began to wear away due to the waves of
Manila Bay, until the said lots became completely submerged
in water in ordinary tides. It remained as such until 1912 when
the Gov’t. undertook dredging to facilitate navigation,
depositing all the sand and silt taken from the bed
on the low lands surrounding those belonging to PMC, thereby
slowly and gradually forming the lots, the subject matter of the
proceeding.
Ownership of land reclaimed from the sea - When lands are converted to public land, no
person can acquire title thereto except in the form and manner established by law.
Article 5 of the Law of Waters of 1866 provides that “lands reclaimed from the sea in
consequence of works constructed by the State, or by the provinces, pueblos, or private
persons, with proper permission, shall become the property of the party constructing such
works, unless otherwise provided by the terms of the grant of authority."
The fact that, since 1912, some fishermen had been drying their fishing nets and depositing
their bancas on lots 36, 39 and 40, by permission of Respondent, does not confer on the
latter or his successors the ownership of said lots. Since they were converted into public
land, no private person could acquire title thereto except in the form and manner established
by the law.

MIAA v. CiTY OF Petitioners filed a complaint for damages against Erlinda,
PASAY which originated from her civil liability from the criminal offense
of slander.
(2009) She was ordered to pay, and their properties were executed
upon, and Petitioners bought the same at public auction.
Her husband then filed a complaint for annulment of said sale.
MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation but a government instrumentality
which is exempt from any kind of tax from the local governments.
The exercise of the taxing power of local government units is subject to the limitations
enumerated in Section 133 of the Local Government Code. Under Section 133 (o) of the
Local Government Code, local government units have no power to tax instrumentalities of
the national government like the MIAA.
Hence, MIAA is not liable to pay real property tax for the NAIA Pasay properties

MIAA v. CA, et MIAA received a Final Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are property of public dominion and therefore
al. from the City of Parañaque for 1992-2001. It’s real estate tax owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines.
delinquency was estimated at P624M. The properties of public dominion mentioned in NCC 420 are owned by the State; the term
(2006) Parañaque issued notices of levy and warrants of levy on the “ports” includes seaports and airports. The MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings constitute a
Airport Lands and Buildings, and later, the Mayor threatened “port” constructed by the State. Under NCC 420, the MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings are
to sell these at public auction. properties of public dominion and thus owned by the State or the Republic of the
MIAA filed with the CA a petition seeking to restrain the City Philippines.
from imposing the tax on, levying against, and auctioning for The Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to public use because they are used by the
public sale the Airport Lands and Buildings. public for international and domestic travel and transportation. The fact that the MIAA
collects terminal fees and other charges from the public does not remove the character of
the Airport Lands and Buildings as properties for public use. NCC420 of the Civil Code
defines property of public dominion as one “intended for public use.”

REPUBLIC VS Petitioner Director of Lands in G.R. No. L-43105 claims that
CA the land sought to be registered is part of the public domain
and therefore not registerable. The Director of Lands would
(1984) like Us to believe that since a portion of the land sought to be
registered is covered with water four to five months a year, the
same is part of the lake bed of Laguna de Bay, or is at least,
a foreshoreland, which brings it within the enumeration in Art.
502 of the New Civil Code quoted above and therefore it
cannot be the subject of registration. Petitioners private
oppositors in G.R. No. L-43190, on the other hand, allege that
they reclaimed the land by dumping duck egg shells thereon,
and that they have been in possession of the same for more
than twenty (20) years
Maneclang vs Petitioners Adriano Maneclang, et. al. filed before the then
IAC Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch XI a complaint
for quieting of title over a certain fishpond located within the
(1986) four [41 parcels of land belonging to them. The trial court
dismissed the complaint upon a finding that the body of water
traversing the titled properties of petitioners is a creek
constituting a tributary of the Agno River; therefore public in
nature and not subject to private appropriation. The parties
decided to settle the case by submitting to the Court a
Compromise Agreement praying that judgment be rendered
recognizing the ownership of petitioners over the land the
body of water found within their titled properties, stating
therein, among other things, that "to pursue the case, the
same will not amount to any benefit of the parties, on the other
hand it is to the advantage and benefit of the municipality if the
ownership of the land and the water found therein belonging to
petitioners be recognized in their favor as it is now clear that
after the National Irrigation Administration [NIA] had built the
dike around the land, no water gets in or out of the land.
Bureau of Four (4) parcels of land were the subject of an application for
Forestry vs CA registration by Mercedes Diago who alleged among others
that she herself occupied said parcels of land. The Director of
(1987) Lands opposed said application on the ground that neither the
applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest have sufficient title
Such fees are often termed user’s tax. This means taxing those among the public who
actually use a public facility instead of taxing all the public including those who never use
the particular public facility.
The Court has also ruled that property of public dominion, being outside the commerce of
man, are not subject to levy, encumbrance or disposition through public or private sale. Any
encumbrance, levy on execution or auction sale of any property of public dominion is void
for being contrary to public policy. Essential public services will stop if properties of public
dominion are subject to encumbrances, foreclosures and auction sale.
Sec 234 of the LGC provides that real property owned by the Republic or any of its political
subdivisions, except when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or
otherwise, to a taxable person, are exempted from payment of the real property tax.
Therefore, the portions which are leased to private entities are not exempt from real estate
tax.
The land sought to be registered not being part of the bed or basin of Laguna de Bay, nor a
foreshore land as claimed by the Director of Lands, it is not a public land and therefore
capable of registration as private property provided that the applicant proves that he has a
registerable title.
The submersion in water of a portion of the land in question is due to the rains "falling
directly on or flowing into Laguna de Bay from different sources. Since the inundation of a
portion of the land is not due to "flux and reflux of tides" it cannot be considered a foreshore
land within the meaning of the authorities cited by petitioner Director of Lands..
A creek, defined as a recess or arm extending from a river and participating in the ebb and
flow of the sea, is a property belonging to the public domain which is not susceptible to
private appropriation and acquisitive prescription, and as a public water, it cannot be
registered under the Torrens System in the name of any individual.
Considering further that neither the mere construction of irrigation dikes by the National
Irrigation Administration which prevented the water from flowing in and out of the subject
fishpond, nor its conversion into a fishpond, alter or change the nature of the creek as a
property of the public domain, the Court finds the Compromise Agreement null and void and
of no legal effect, the same being contrary to law and public policy.
Clearly therefore the land is public land and there is no need for the Director of Forestry to
submit to the court convincing proofs that the land in dispute is not more valuable for
agriculture than for forest purposes, as there was no question of whether the land is forest
land or not.
 over the lands applied for, which could be registered under the
Torrens systems, and that they have never been in open,
continuous and exclusive possession of the said lands for at
least 30 years prior to the filing of the application. The Director
of Forestry on the other hand anchored his opposition
principally on the ground that certain specific portions of the
lands subject matter of the application, with an area of
approximately 194,080 square meters are mangrove swamps
and are within Timberland Block "B " L.C. Project No. 38, L.C.
Map No. 1971 of Buenavista, Iloilo.
Chavez v. PEA The Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Parañaque issued
Transfer Certificates of Title, in the name of PEA, covering the
(2002) three reclaimed islands known as the "Freedom Islands”. PEA
and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without
public bidding. Later, the Board of Directors of PEA, in its
Resolution confirmed the JVA. Then President Fidel V. Ramos
approved the JVA.
The Senate Committees reported the results of their
investigation. Among the conclusions of their report are: (1)
the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the
JVA are lands of the public domain which the government has
not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot
alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of title covering the
Freedom Islands are thus void, and (3) the JVA itself is illegal.
Petitioner Frank I. Chavez as a taxpayer, filed the instant
Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.
Petitioner contends the government stands to lose billions of
pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI.
Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any
renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28, Article II, and
Section 7, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right of
the people to information on matters of public concern.
REPUBLIC VS Petitioner Director of Lands in G.R. No. L-43105 claims that
CA the land sought to be registered is part of the public domain
and therefore not registerable. The Director of Lands would
(1984) like Us to believe that since a portion of the land sought to be
registered is covered with water four to five months a year, the
Admittedly the controversial area is within a timberland block as classification of the
municipality and certified to by the Director of Forestry on February 18, 1956 as lands
needed for forest purposes and hence they are portions of the public domain which cannot
be the subject of registration proceedings. As provided for under Sec. 6 of Commonwealth
Act No. 141, which was lifted from Act No. 2874, the classification or reclassification of
public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest lands is now a prerogative of the
Executive Department of the government and not of the courts. With these rules, there
should be no more room for doubt that it is not the court which determines the classification
of lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or mineral but the Executive Branch of
the Government, through the Office of the President. Hence, it was grave error and/or abuse
of discretion for the respondent court to ignore the uncontroverted facts that (1) the disputed
area is within a timberland block and (2) as certified to by the then Director of Forestry, the
area is needed for forest purposes.
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now
covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the
public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may
not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA
may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership
limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable
natural resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or
disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for
public service. The government can make such classification and declaration
only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these
lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only
natural resources the government can alienate. In their present state, the
592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the
commerce of man.
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation,
ownership of 77.34 hectares[110] of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void
for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which
prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the
public domain.
4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of
290.156 hectares[111] of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is
void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which
prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of
the public domain. PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter,
the government can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable,
and further declare them no longer needed for public service. Still, the
transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will
be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which
prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the
public domain.
The land sought to be registered not being part of the bed or basin of Laguna de Bay, nor a
foreshore land as claimed by the Director of Lands, it is not a public land and therefore
capable of registration as private property provided that the applicant proves that he has a
registerable title.
 same is part of the lake bed of Laguna de Bay, or is at least,
a foreshoreland, which brings it within the enumeration in Art.
502 of the New Civil Code quoted above and therefore it
cannot be the subject of registration. Petitioners private
oppositors in G.R. No. L-43190, on the other hand, allege that
they reclaimed the land by dumping duck egg shells thereon,
and that they have been in possession of the same for more
than twenty (20) years
Maneclang vs Petitioners Adriano Maneclang, et. al. filed before the then
IAC Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch XI a complaint
for quieting of title over a certain fishpond located within the
(1986) four [41 parcels of land belonging to them. The trial court
dismissed the complaint upon a finding that the body of water
traversing the titled properties of petitioners is a creek
constituting a tributary of the Agno River; therefore public in
nature and not subject to private appropriation. The parties
decided to settle the case by submitting to the Court a
Compromise Agreement praying that judgment be rendered
recognizing the ownership of petitioners over the land the
body of water found within their titled properties, stating
therein, among other things, that "to pursue the case, the
same will not amount to any benefit of the parties, on the other
hand it is to the advantage and benefit of the municipality if the
ownership of the land and the water found therein belonging to
petitioners be recognized in their favor as it is now clear that
after the National Irrigation Administration [NIA] had built the
dike around the land, no water gets in or out of the land.
B. Patrimonial property of the state
Laurel v. Garcia Petitioner Laurel asserts that the Roppongi property and the
related lots were acquired as part of the reparations from the
(1990) Japanese government for diplomatic and consular use by the
Philippine government. Vice-President Laurel states that the
Roppongi property is classified as one of public dominion, and not
of private ownership under Article 420 of the Civil Code (See
infra).
The petitioner submits that the Roppongi property comes under
"property intended for public service" in paragraph 2 of the above
provision. He states that being one of public dominion, no
ownership by any one can attach to it, not even by the State. The
Roppongi and related properties were acquired for "sites for
chancery, diplomatic, and consular quarters, buildings and other
improvements" (Second Year Reparations Schedule). The
petitioner states that they continue to be intended for a necessary
service. They are held by the State in anticipation of an opportune
use. (Citing 3 Manresa 65-66). Hence, it cannot be appropriated,
is outside the commerce of man, or to put it in more simple terms,
it cannot be alienated nor be the subject matter of contracts
(Citing Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas, 30 Phil. 20 [1915]). Noting
the non-use of the Roppongi property at the moment, the
The submersion in water of a portion of the land in question is due to the rains "falling
directly on or flowing into Laguna de Bay from different sources. Since the inundation of a
portion of the land is not due to "flux and reflux of tides" it cannot be considered a foreshore
land within the meaning of the authorities cited by petitioner Director of Lands..
A creek, defined as a recess or arm extending from a river and participating in the ebb and
flow of the sea, is a property belonging to the public domain which is not susceptible to
private appropriation and acquisitive prescription, and as a public water, it cannot be
registered under the Torrens System in the name of any individual.
Considering further that neither the mere construction of irrigation dikes by the National
Irrigation Administration which prevented the water from flowing in and out of the subject
fishpond, nor its conversion into a fishpond, alter or change the nature of the creek as a
property of the public domain, the Court finds the Compromise Agreement null and void and
of no legal effect, the same being contrary to law and public policy.
The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy
service does not automatically convert it to patrimonial property.
Any such conversion happens only if the property is withdrawn from public use. A
property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation
or ownership until there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw
it from being such.
An abandonment of the intention to use the Roppongi property for public service and to
make it patrimonial property under Article 422 of the Civil Code must be
definite Abandonment cannot be inferred from the non-use alone specially if the non-use
was attributable not to the government's own deliberate and indubitable will but to a lack
of financial support to repair and improve the property (See Heirs of Felino Santiago v.
Lazaro, 166 SCRA 368 [1988]). Abandonment must be a certain and positive act based
on correct legal premises.
A mere transfer of the Philippine Embassy to Nampeidai in 1976 is not relinquishment of
the Roppongi property's original purpose. Even the failure by the government to repair
the building in Roppongi is not abandonment since as earlier stated, there simply was a
shortage of government funds. The recent Administrative Orders authorizing a study of
the status and conditions of government properties in Japan were merely directives for
investigation but did not in any way signify a clear intention to dispose of the properties.
 petitioner avers that the same remains property of public
dominion so long as the government has not used it for other
purposes nor adopted any measure constituting a removal of its
original purpose or use.
The respondents, for their part, refute the petitioner's contention
by saying that the subject property is not governed by our Civil
Code but by the laws of Japan where the property is located.

Republic v. Respondent Teodoro P. Rizalvo, Jr. filed before the MTC of
Rizalvo Bauang, La Union, acting as a land registration court, an
application for the registration[3] of a parcel of land. The Office of
(2011) the Solicitor General (OSG) filed an Opposition alleging that
neither respondent nor his predecessors-in-interest had been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject property since June 12, 1945 or earlier
and that the tax declarations and tax payment receipts did not
constitute competent and sufficient evidence of ownership. The
OSG also asserted that the subject property was a portion of
public domain belonging to the Republic of thePhilippines and
hence not subject to private acquisition.
Cebu Oxygen v. City Council of Cebu declared the terminal portion of M. Borces
Bercilles Street, Mabolo, Cebu City, as an abandoned road, the same not
being included in the City Development Plan. Subsequently, the
(1975) City Council of Cebu passed Resolution No. 2755, authorizing the
Acting City Mayor to sell the land through a public
bidding. Pursuant thereto, the lot was awarded to the herein
petitioner being the highest bidder the City of Cebu, through the
Acting City Mayor, executed a deed of absolute sale to the herein
petitioner. By virtue of the aforesaid deed of absolute sale, the
petitioner filed an application with the Court of First instance of
Cebu to have its title to the land registered. The Assistant
Provincial Fiscal of Cebu filed a motion to dismiss the application
on the ground that the property sought to be registered being a
public road intended for public use is considered part of the public
domain and therefore outside the commerce of man.
Consequently, it cannot be subject to registration by any private
individual.
Given the fact that respondent and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession
of the subject land since 1948, respondent is still not entitled to registration of title under
Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529
On this basis, respondent would have been eligible for application for registration
because his claim of ownership and possession over the subject property even exceeds
thirty (30) years. However, it is jurisprudentially clear that the thirty (30)-year period of
prescription for purposes of acquiring ownership and registration of public land under
Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529 only begins from the moment the State expressly
declares that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into
patrimonial. Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the
public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of
the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without
such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable,
remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2) [ , and thus incapable
of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are
expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin
to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a
Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law.
The withdrawal of the property in question from public use and its subsequent sale to the
petitioner is valid. Hence, the petitioner has a registerable title over the lot in question.
Since that portion of the city street subject of petitioner's application for registration of
title was withdrawn from public use, it follows that such withdrawn portion becomes
patrimonial property which can be the object of an ordinary contract.
Article 422 of the Civil Code expressly provides that "Property of public dominion, when
no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial
property of the State."

C. Private ownership
Tan Toco v. Municipal council of Iloilo failed to pay Tantoco the The property of a municipality, whether real or personal, necessary for governmental purposes cannot
Mun. of Iloilo purchase price of 2 strips of land, which it be attached and sold at a public auction to satisfy a judgment against the municipality
appropriated for road widening. By virtue of a writ
(1926) of execution, the sheriff attached “two autotrucks
used for street sprinkling, one police patrol
automobile, the police stations on Mabini St., and
other structures, plus the market
III. Essential Form
IV. Designation
V. Susceptible of Substitution
VI. Aptitude for Repeated Use
VII. Susceptibility of Division
VIII. Existence in Time
IX. Dependence
BUNDLE OF RIGHTS
A. Concept of Ownership
PADILLA v The respondents filed a complaint for accion
VELASCO publiciana, accounting and damages against
petitioners. The respondents are the heirs of
(2009) Artemio Velasco who, they claim, is the owner of
said property as evidenced by a “Kasulatan ng
Bilihang Tunay" executed between Artemio and
spouses Brigido Sacluti and Melitona Obial over
Lot No. 2161. The petitioners, on the other hand,
entered the property as trustees of the Solomon
spouses. They claim that the Solomon spouses
owned the property having bought it from the Rural
Bank of Pagsanjan as evidenced by a Deed of
Sale over Lot No. 76-pt.
LUNOD v Petitioners filed a written complaint against
MENESES respondent alleging that they each owned and
possessed farm lands and that from time
(1908) immemorial there existed and still exists in favor of
the rice fields of the plaintiffs a statutory easement
permitting the flow of water over the land in
The respondents have a better right of possession over Lot No. 2161.
Accion publiciana is a plenary action filed to determine the better right to possession of realty
independently of the title. It is also used to refer to an ejectment suit where the cause of dispossession
is not among the grounds for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, or when possession has been lost for
more than one year and can no longer be maintained under Rule 70 of the Rules of court. The
objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership.
Respondents were able to establish lawful possession of Lot No. 2161 when the petitiones occupied
the property. Lot No. 2161 was the subject of Decree No. 403348. The Original Certificate of Title to
the land was issued to Brigido Sacluti and Melitona Obial. The original owners sold the same to
Artemio. From the date of sale until Artemio’s death, he was in continuous possession of the land. On
the other hand, the land bought by the Solomon spouses from the bank is denominated as Lot 76-pt
and previously owned by Valeriano. However, it was proved during trial that the land occupied by
petitioners was Lot No. 2161 in the name of Artemio, whereas the land sold by the bank to the Solomon
spouses was Lot 76-pt. Given this factual milieu, it can be readily deduced that respondents are legally
entitled to the possession of Lot No. 2161
The case filed by respondents for accion publiciana has not prescribed. At the time of the filing of the
complaint, only four years had elapsed from the time of dispossession. Under Article 555(4) of the Civil
Code, the real right of possession is not lost till after the lapse of ten years. It is settled that the remedy
of accion publiciana prescribes after the lapse of ten years. Thus the instant case was filed within the
allowable period.
Title to a registered land cannot be collaterally attacked. Petitioner’s claim that Lot No. 2161 and Lot
76-pt are one and the same, is in effect a collateral attack on the title of the property registered in the
name of Artemio which cannot be countenanced. In accion publiciana, the principal issue is
possession, and ownership is merely ancillary thereto. Only in cases where the possession cannot be
resolved without resolving the issue of ownership may the trial court delve into the claim of ownership.
Respondent had no right to construct the works, nor the dam which blocks the passage of the waters
which flood the higher lands of the plaintiffs.
Article 530 provides that an easement is a charge imposed upon one estate for the benefit of another
estate belonging to a different owner, and the realty in favor of which the easement is established is
called the dominant estate, and the one charged with it the servient estate. The lands of Paraanan
 Paraanan owned by the respondent. They allege
that in 1901, the defendant, without any right or
reason, converted the land in Paraanan into a
fishpond and by means of a dam and a bamboo
net, prevented the free passage of the water
through said place into the Taliptip River, that in
consequence the lands of the plaintiff became
flooded and damaged by the stagnant waters,
there being no outlet except through the land in
Paraanan.
CUSTODIO v The respondents own a parcel of land surrounded
COURT OF by other immovables pertaining to the petitioeners.
APPEALS As an access to the street from the respondent’s
property, there are two possible passageways.
(1996) The petitioners constructed adobe fence in such a
wat that the one of the entire passageway was
enclosed.
ANECO REALTY Aneco and Landex are the buyers of lot owned by
v LANDEX FHDI. Aneco filed a complaint for injunction when
Landex, owner of adjacent lots, started the
(2008) construction of a concrete wall on one of its lots.
Aneco insists that it has the intention of continuing
the subdivision project earlier commenced by the
former owner, thus,the limitation imposed under
RA 440 that no portion of a subdivision road lot
shall be closed without the approval of the Court.
NAPOCOR v Respondents instituted an action against petitioner
IBRAHIM for recovery of possession of land and damages.
They claim that they were the owners of several
(2007) parcels of land and that NAOCOR through alleged
stealth and without respondents’ knowledge and
prior consent, took possession of the sub-terrain of
their lands and constructed therein underground
tunnels
being the lower are subject to the easement of receiving and giving passage to the waters proceeding
from the higher lands and the lake of Calalaran; this easement was not constituted by agreement
between the interested parties; it is of a statutory nature, and the law (Articles 552 and 563 of the Civil
Code) had imposed it for the common public utility in view if the difference in the altitude of the lands in
the barrio Bambang.
The respondents are granted the right of way but they are not entitled to damages.
Petitioners are barred from raising the issue on the entitlement of respondents to a permanent access
to the public street because they did not appeal from the decision of the trial court granting the
respondents the right of way.
However, in this case, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. The act of petitioners in
constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their right as owners, hence not contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy. The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose
of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law. it is within the right of petitioners, as
owners, to enclose and fence their property. Article 430 of the Civil Code provides that “every owner
may enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any
other means without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon.” At the time of the construction of the
fence, the lot was not subject to any servitudes. Hence, petitioners had an absolute right over their
property and their act of fencing and enclosing the same was an act which they may lawfully perform in
the employment and exercise of said right. Whatever injury or damage may have been sustained by
private respondents by reason of the rightful use of the said land by petitioners is damnun absque
injuria.
Landex had the right to construct the concrete wall.
Article 430 of the Civil Code gives every owner the right to enclose or fence his land or tenement by
means of walls, ditches, hedges or any other means. The right to fence flows from the right of
ownership. As owner of the land, Landex may fence his property subject only to the limitations and
restrictions provided by law. absent a clear legal and enforceable right, as here, the Court will not
interfere with the exercise of an essential attribute of ownership. Aneco failed to prove any clear legal
right to prevent, much less restrain, Landex from fencing its own property. Aneco cannot rely on the
road lot under the old subdivision project of FHDI because it knew at the time of the sale that it was
buying ordinary lots, not subdivision lots, fromFHDI. If Aneco wants to transform its own lots into a
subdivision project, it must make its own provision for road lots.
The ownership of land extends to the surface as well as to the subsoil under it.
The landowners’ right extends to such height or depth where it is possible for them to obtain some
benefit or enjoyment, and it is extinguished beyond such limit as there would be no more interest
protected by law. (Art 437) In this regard, the trial court found that respondents could have dug upon
their property motorized deep wells but were prevented from doing so precisely because of the
construction and existence of the tunnels underneath the surface of the property. Respondents,
therefore, still had a legal interest in the sub-terrain portion insofar as they could have excavated the
same for the construction of the deep well.
Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner only occupies the sub-terrain portion, it is liable to pay not
merely an easement fee but rather the full compensation for the land. This is so because in this case,

PEREZ v Petitioners filed an action to quiet title over a piece
MENDOZA of parcel of land against the respondents
(1975)
CANTA v Petitioner was charged of violation of PD No. 533,
PEOPLE otherwise known as the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of
1974. He admitted taking the cow but claimed that
(2001) it was his and that it was lost. He presented two
certificates of ownership.
TECSON v Att. Fausto acquired in co-ownership with his sister
FAUSTO Waldetrudes a 1015 sq meter parcel of land. The
co-owners executed an Agreement of Partition.
(2011) This was never registered with the Register of
Deeds. When Atty. Fausto died Waldetrudes
entered into a contract to sell with Aurora Tecson.
A second partition prepared which drastically
altered the first agreement. Atty. Fausto’s share
was decreased from 508 sq m to 51 sq m. The
second partition was registered with the Register of
Deeds.
SAMPACO v Respondent filed an action to quiet title with
LANTUD damages against petitioner. He alleged that he is
the owner in fee simple of a parcel of residential lot
(2011) and petitioner forcibly and unlawfully entered his
property. Subsequently, the Barangay Captain
issued a decision stating that petitioner is the
owner of the subject parcel of land.
the nature of the easement practically deprives the owners of its normal beneficial use. Respondents,
as the owners of the property thus expropriated, are entitled to a just compensation which should be
neither more nor less, whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than the money equivalent of
said property.
The respondents, the possessors of the subject property, have a better right to the property in question.
Possession is an indicium of ownership of the thing possessed and to the possessor goes the
presumption that he holds the thing under a claim of ownership. Article 433 of the Civil Code provides
that “actual possession under claim of ownership raises a disputable presumption of ownership. The
true owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of the property. It is a fact that the
respondents were in possession of the property and the presumption of ownership in their favor has not
been successfully rebutted by evidence that they are mere lessees of the land in possession as
claimed by petitioners.
Petitioner is guilty of violating PD No. 533.
PD No. 533 Section 2(c) defines castle-rustling as the taking away by any means, methods or scheme,
without the consent of the owner/raiser of any of the abovementioned animals whether or not for profit
or gain, or whether committed with or without violence against or intimidation of any or force upon
things. The evidence shows that the Certificate of ownership of large cattle which petitioner presented
to proves his ownership was falsified. It is not only “not in order.” It is fraudulent, having been
antedated to make it appear it had been issued to him before he allegedly took the cow in question. In
any event, petitioner was not justified in taking the cow without the knowledge and consent of its owner.
If he thought it was the cow he allegedly lost, he should have resorted to the court for the settlement of
his claim. Article 433 of the Civil Code provides that “the true owner must resort to judicial process for
the recovery of the property.”
The second partition is invalid. The sale is valid only up to the share of Waldetrudes according to the
First Agreement of Partition and the heirs of Atty. Fausto can recover 457 sq m.
Wadetrudes and Atty. Fausto were co-owners in equal share. The mother title states in no unclear
terms that they were co-owners of the subject lot. The inscription in the original title carries more than
sufficient weight to prove the existence of a co-ownership between them. The tax declaration
presented by petitioners cannot prevail over the OCT as conclusive evidence of the true ownership of
the subject property. Waldetrudes herself stated the Atty. Fausto was a co-owner. Article 485 provides
that “the portions belonging to the co-owners in the co-ownership shall be presumed equal, unless the
contrary is proved.
The second plan having been prepared without the knowledge and consent of any of the co-owners
have no binding effect on them. The deceit employed by Atty. Tecson goes into the very nature of the
Second partition agreement and not merely to its object or principal condition. Waldetrudes can only
sell her lawful share of 507 square meters.
Respondent is the owner of the subject property covered by the OCT in his name.
The Torrens title is conclusive evidence with respect to the ownership of the land described therein,
and other matters which can be litigated and decided in land registration proceedings. Tax declarations
and tax receipts cannot prevail over a certificate of title which is an incontrovertible proof of ownership.
An original certificate of title issued by the Register of Deeds under an administrative proceeding is as
indefeasible as a certificate if title issued under judicial proceedings. However, the Court has ruled that
indefeasibility of title does not attach to titles secured by fraud and misrepresentation.
Under Article 434 of the Civil Code, to successfully maintain an action to recover the ownership of a
real property, the person who claims a better right to it must prove 2 things: first, the identity of the land

LALUAN v Petitioners filed a complaint against the respondent
MALPAYA for recovery of ownership and possession of 2
parcels of land as heirs of Marciana Laluan. They
(1975) alleged that the first parcel was the exclusive
property of Marciana while the second parcel was
part of the conjugal property. The respondent
claims that the properties belonged to his exclusive
property. These 2 properties were sold by
respondent to third persons
JAVIER V. CA Javier claimed that he filed a Miscellaneous Sales
Application over the lot in 1973, and that the lot
(1994) was in his peaceful and adverse possession since
1971. He sold the lot to de Guzman via a deed of
absolute sale in 1974. De Guzman allowed the
spouses Dionisio and Cesaria Caay to build their
house on the lot, since the latter worked for him. In
1981, Javier repurchased the property from de
Guzman. Javier didn’t immediately eject them from
the property. In 1982, he found out that Demetrio
Caringal, Cesaria’s father, was awarded by the
Bureau of Lands a free patent over the lot and was
issued an OCT in his name.
Caringal claimed he filed a free patent application
over the lot in 11981, and the lot was sold to him
by a certain Tesorero, only heir of the original
applicant for the free patent, who had been in
possession of the lot since 1942.
B. Right of Accession
BACHRACH V. Bachrach’s will provided that his wife, Mary, shall
SEIFERT enjoy a usufruct over his estate, and that upon her
death, ½ shall go to charity and ½ shall go to his
heirs. The lower court authorized Mary to pay the
(1949) other heirs monthly allowances from the fruits and
income of the estate, making these amounts
advances from her personal funds. Mary stopped
giving the heirs their allowances some time after
claimed; second, his title thereto. In this case, petitioner claims that the property in dispute is part of his
larger property. However, petitioner failed to identify his larger property by providing evidence of the
metes and bounds thereof, so that the same may be compared with the technical description contained
in the title of respondent. Petitioner’s claim of title by virtue of open, public and continuous possession
of the disputed property in the concept of owner is nebulous in the light of a similar claim by respondent
who holds a free patent title over the subject property.,
The heirs are entitled to one-half of the second property which is part of the conjugal partnership but as
to the first parcel, the case was remanded for a new trial to establish the identity of land.
The invariable rule is to the effect that in order to maintain an action to recover ownership, the person
who claims that he has a better right to the property must prove not only his ownership of the property
claimed but also the identity thereof. The party who desires to recover must fix the identity of the land
he claims. And where doubt and uncertainty exist as to the identity of the land claimed, a court should
resolve the question by recourse to the pleadings and the record as well as to extrinsic evidence, oral
or written.
Although the action for reconveyance is available to Javier, he failed to show sufficient proof of
ownership of the lot.
After the lapse of 1 year, a decree of registration is no longer open to review or attack although its
issuance is attended with actual fraud. However, the aggrieved party can still avail of reconveyance if
the property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser. The action for reconveyance is an action in
personam and is always available as long as the property has not passed to an innocent third party for
value. If the property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, the remedy is an
action for damages. In this case, the disputed property is still registered in the name of respondent
Demetrio Caringal, so that petitioner was correct in availing himself of the procedural remedy of
reconveyance.
In order to maintain an action to recover ownership of real property, the person who claims that he has
a better right to it must prove not only his ownership of the same but he must also satisfactorily prove
the identity thereof.
The SC found that there is serious doubt as to the precise identity of the parcel of land Javier sought to
recover, the description of the land described in the application for sales patent is different from the one
in his complaint for reconveyance. Because of this, the action for reconveyance must fail. But,
assuming in gratia argumenti that the property which petitioner seeks to be reconveyed to him is the
same as that covered by the OCT in the name of Caringal, he has not proved his ownership of the
same. The filing of the miscellaneous sales application did not vest title upon Javier over the property
as there was no showing that his application was approved by the Bureau of Lands or that a sales
patent over the property was granted to him prior to the issuance of free patent and the OCT in favor of
Caringal.
There is no valid reason for ordering the sale of the ½ of the estate belonging to the heirs.
The cash in the possession of the administratrix corresponding to the ½ of the estate adjudicated to the
heirs is sufficient for the monthly allowances being paid to the heirs and that there is no necessity for
the sale of the ½ of the estate corresponding to them. The main objection to the heirs to the sale of ½
of the estate adjudicated to them, which ½ besides the cash already mentioned, consist mostly of
shares of stock, is that said shares if sold now may not command a good price and that furthermore
said heirs prefer to keep said shares intact as long as there is no real necessity for their sale. Of
 WW2 and requested that she be allowed to sell ½
the estate designated for the heirs in case she be
made to continue to give them allowances.
BACHRACH Bachrach filed a complaint against Talisay-Silay for
MOTOR CO. V. the delivery of a sum of money or PNs in that
TALISAY-SILAY amount as bonus in favor of Mariano Ledesma.
MILLING CO. PNB filed a 3rd party claim alleging a preferential
right over the amount, since that would be civil
(1931) fruits of the land Mariano mortgaged to it.
Mariano mortgaged the land to PNB as security for
Talisay-Silay’s debt, and his bonus consisted of a
percentage paid by Talisay-Silay to Mariano on
account of the mortgage.
PHIL. SUGAR Gabriela De Coster executed a general power of
ESTATES V. attorney in favor of her husband, Juan Poizat,
POIZAT authorizing the latter to loan any amount with or
without securities. Poizat obtained a loan from PSE
(1925) and executed a mortgage upon Gabriela’s main
property. When PSE wanted to foreclose the
mortgage, Gabriela claimed Poizat acted beyond
the scope of his authority.
ORTIZ V. Ortiz continued to administer the lot which was
KAYANAN formerly the subject of a Homestead Application in
his ward’s name after the latter died. In the
(1979) Application, his ward named Martin Dolorico I as
his heir and successor in interest. Dolorico
executed an affidavit relinquishing all his rights
over the property in favor of Comintan and Zamora
and requested that the Application be cancelled.
Ortiz claimed he had a preferential right to the lot
since he had been occupying it, but wasn’t able to
bid at the public auction. The court ordered an
Order and a Writ of Execution in favor of Comintan
and Zamora.
course, once said cash in the hands of the administratrix, corresponding to the heirs is exhausted
because of the payment of the allowances made to the heirs, some other arrangements might be
necessary. The administratrix would then have a right and reason to refuse the payment of said
allowances from her said personal funds or from the fruits of the estate, which as a usufructuary,
belong to her during her lifetime.
Mariano’s bonus is not civil fruits of the land.
Article 355 of the Civil Code considers three things as civil fruits: First, the rents of buildings; second,
the proceeds from leases of lands; and, third, the income from perpetual or life annuities, or other
similar sources of revenue. It may be noted that according to the context of the law, the phrase "u otras
analogas" refers only to rent or income, for the adjectives"otras" and "analogas" agree with the
noun "rentas," as do also the other adjectives "perpetuas" and "vitalicias." That is why we say that by
"civil fruits" the Civil Code understands one of three and only three things, to wit: the rent of a building,
the rent of land, and certain kinds of income.
In order to determine if the bonus is “income” under CC355, it is obvious to inquire whether it is derived
from the land mortgaged by Mariano to PNB for the benefit of the central; for it is not obtained from that
land but from something else, it is not civil fruits of that land. The bonus bears no immediate, but only a
remote accidental relation to the land mentioned, having been granted as compensation for the risk of
having subjected one's land to a lien in favor of the bank, for the benefit of the entity granting said
bonus. If this bonus be income or civil fruits of anything, it is income arising from said risk, or, if one
chooses, from Mariano's generosity in facing the danger for the protection of the central, but certainly it
is not civil fruits or income from the mortgaged property, which, as far as this case is concerned, has
nothing to do with it.
The mortgage as to the paraphernal property is declared null and void ab initio.
Poizat was the only person who signed the mortgage, without indicating that his signature was binding
on his wife. Also, he had no authority to mortgage his wife’s property, unless the mortgage was
executed for her "and in her name, place or stead," and as her act and deed. The mortgage was over
his wife’s lot and the buildings built thereon after the marriage.
To make the mortgage valid, it should have been signed by the husband in his own proper person and
by him as attorney in fact for his wife, and it should have been executed by both husband and wife, and
should have been so acknowledged.
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it must be presumed that the building is conjugal property of
the husband and wife. As such, it is subject of the debts of the conjugal partnership for the payment or
security of which the husband has the power to mortgage or otherwise encumber the property.
Ortiz is not entitled to retain for his own exclusive benefit all the fruits of the property.
A possessor in good faith is entitled to the fruits received before the possession is legally
interrupted. Possession in good faith ceases or is legally interrupted from the moment defects in the
title are made known to the possessor, by extraneous evidence or by the filing of an action in court by
the true owner for the recovery of the property. Hence, all the fruits that the possessor may receive
from the time he is summoned in court, or when he answers the complaint, must be delivered and paid
by him to the owner or lawful possessor.
However, even after his good faith ceases, the possessor in fact can still retain the property, pursuant
to CC546, until he has been fully reimbursed for all the necessary and useful expenses made by him on
the property. This right of retention has been considered as one of the conglomerate of measures
devised by the law for the protection of the possessor in good faith. Its object is to guarantee the

Ortiz claimed that so long as the aforesaid amount
of P13,632,00 decreed in the judgment
representing the expenses for clearing the land
and the value of the coconuts and fruit trees
planted by him remains unpaid, he can appropriate
for his exclusive benefit all the fruits which he may
derive from the property, without any obligation to
apply any portion thereof to the payment of the
interest and the principal of the debt.
TUATIS V. Tuatis claimed that Escol sold to her a piece of real
ESCOL property by installment. Tuatis said she had paid
Escol the entire amount due in installments, and
(2009) took possession of the lot and built a house
thereon. When Tuatis asked Escol to sign the deed
of sale, the latter refused, claiming the entire
amount had not yet been paid.
Tuatis claims CC448 must apply, and that since the
value of the building is greater than the value of the
lot, Tuatis can choose between selling the building
to Escol or buying the lot from the latter.
NARVAEZ C. Alciso sold the subject lot to Bate, who later on sold
ALCISO the lot to Narvaez. The Deed of Sale of Realty had
a stipulation allowing Alciso to repurchase the
(2009) property; Narvaez furnished Alciso with a copy of
the Deed. A TCT was issued in Narvaez’s name
and they built a commercial building thereon.
Alciso wanted to repurchase the property, but they
could not agree on the repurchase price.
reimbursement of the expenses, such as those for the preservation of the property, or for the
enhancement of its utility or productivity. It permits the actual possessor to remain in possession while
he has not been reimbursed by the person who defeated him in the possession for those necessary
expenses and useful improvements made by him on the thing possessed. The principal characteristic
of the right of retention is its accessory character. It is accessory to a principal obligation. Considering
that the right of the possessor to receive the fruits terminates when his good faith ceases, it is
necessary, in order that this right to retain may be useful, to concede to the creditor the right to secure
reimbursement from the fruits of the property by utilizing its proceeds for the payment of the interest as
well as the principal of the debt while he remains in possession.
According to Manresa, the right of retention is analogous to that of a pledge, if the property retained is a
movable, and to that of antichresis, if the property held is immovable. Under CC1731, any person who
has performed work upon a movable has a right to retain it by way of pledge until he is paid. Similarly,
CC1914, the agent may retain in pledge the things which are the object of the agency until the principal
effects reimbursement of the funds advanced by the former for the execution of the agency, or he is
indemnified for all damages which he may have suffered as a consequence of the execution of the
agency, provided he is free from fault. To the same effect, the depositary, under Article 1994 of the
same Code, may retain the thing in pledge until the full payment of what may be due him by reason of
the deposit. The usufructuary, pursuant to Article 612 of the same Code, may retain the property until
he is reimbursed for the amount paid for taxes levied on the capital (Article 597) and tor extraordinary
repairs (Article 594).
In all of these cases, the right of retention is used as a means of extinguishing the obligation.
The rule that the choice under CC448 belongs to the owner of the land is in accord with the principle of
accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the principal and not the other way around. Even as the
option lies with the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive. The landowner cannot
refuse to exercise either option and compel instead the owner of the building to remove it from the land.
Escolin has two options:
1. Appropriate for herself the building after indemnifying Tuatis for the current value of the
necessary and useful expenses the latter incurred for said building, as provided in CC546.
2. Choose not to appropriate the building and instead, oblige Tuatis to pay the present or current fair
value of the land. The amount stated in the Deed of Sale shall no longer apply, since the obligation is
statutory (under CC448) and not contractual. If the present or current value of the land turns out to be
considerably more than that of the building built thereon, Tuatis cannot be obliged to pay for the subject
property, but she must pay reasonable rent for the same. They must agree on the terms of the lease;
otherwise, the court will fix the terms.
CC448 is inapplicable in cases involving contracts of sale with right of repurchase — it is inapplicable
when the owner of the land is the builder, sower, or planter.
In Pecson v. CA, the SC held that: Article 448 does not apply to a case where the owner of the land is
the builder, sower, or planter who then later loses ownership of the land by sale or donation. The SC
said so in Coleongco v. Regalado: “Article 361 of the old Civil Code is not applicable in this case,
for Regalado constructed the house on his own land before he sold said land to Coleongco. Article
361 applies only in cases where a person constructs a building on the land of another in good
or in bad faith, as the case may be. It does not apply to a case where a person constructs a
building on his own land, for then there can be no question as to good or bad faith on the part of
the builder. Elsewise stated, where the true owner himself is the builder of the works on his own
land, the issue of good faith or bad faith is entirely irrelevant.”

LAUREANO V. Laureano was the owner of two lots, which were
ADIL both leased to Ong Cu. When the 15 year lease
period expired, Ong Cu failed to vacate the lots and
(1976) remove the improvements thereon. Laureano filed
an ejectment suit against him.
FLOREZA V. The Evangelistas, who are mother and son, owned
EVANGELISTA a residential lot. They borrowed from Floreza in
1945, and allowed the latter to occupy and build a
(1980) barong-barong on the lot. They did not have an
agreement as to the payment for the use of the lot.
The Evangelistas borrowed money from Floreza on
4 other occasions, and Floreza tore down the
barog-barong and built a house of strong materials
thereon. The Evangelistas later sold the lot to
Floreza with the right to repurchase within 6 years
in consideration of their total outstanding loan.
They paid the full repurchase price within the
period, but Floreza refused to vacate until he was
reimbursed the value of the house.
BACHRACH V. Bachrach’s will provided that his wife, Mary, shall
SEIFERT enjoy a usufruct over his estate, and that upon her
death, ½ shall go to charity and ½ shall go to his
heirs. The lower court authorized Mary to pay the
(1949) other heirs monthly allowances from the fruits and
income of the estate, making these amounts
advances from her personal funds. Mary stopped
giving the heirs their allowances some time after
WW2 and requested that she be allowed to sell ½
the estate designated for the heirs in case she be
made to continue to give them allowances.
Inter-Regional Ricardo Caballero owns an agricultural land and
Development had leased it to Inter-Regional Development Corp.
Corp. vs. CA represented by spouses Jose Bañez and Isabel
(1975) Bañez. Conflict started when Caballero sold the
land to Isidro Estrada even though there was still a
standing crop to be harvested by the petitioner.
Caballero's argument is that when he sold the land,
it follows that whatever was planted there comes
with it. The petitioner for this certiorari case argues
In sales with the right to repurchase, CC1606 and CC1616 apply.
The lower court erred in assuming the Ong Cu was a possessor in good faith. As a lessee who
constructed a building on the leased land, Ong Cu cannot be characterized as a builder in good faith.
Under CC448 the owner of the land on which anything has been built in good faith may appropriate the
building after payment of the indemnity provided in CC546 and 548.
CC448 applies to a case where one builds on land of which he honestly claims to be the owner and not
to lands wherein one's only interest is that of a lessee under a rental contract. A contrary rule would
place it within the power of the lessee "to improve his landlord out of his property". In other words,
CC448 refers to a possessor who occupied the land in the belief that he was the owner thereof. It does
not apply to the lessee because the lessee knows at the outset that he is not the owner of the land. The
tenant has no pretension to being the owner of the land.
CC448 is inapplicable to this case. It applies only when the builder, planter, or sower believes he had
the right so to build, plant or sow because he thinks he owns the land or believes himself to have a
claim of title.
Since Floreza is not a vendee a retro, he cannot invoke the rights under CC1616. The house had
already been constructed as far back as 1949 (1945 for the house of light materials) even before the
pacto de retro sale in 1949. Floreza incurred no useful expense, therefore, after that sale. The house
was already there at the tolerance of the Evangelistas in consideration of the several loans extended to
them. Since he cannot be classified as a builder in good faith within the purview of CC448, nor as a
vendee a retro, who made useful improvements during the lifetime of the pacto de retro, petitioner has
no right to reimbursement of the value of the house which he had erected on the residential lot of the
Evangelistas, much less to retention of the premises until he is reimbursed. The rights of petitioner are
more akin to those of a usufructuary who, under CC579, may make on the property useful
improvements but with no right to be indemnified therefor. He may, however, remove such
improvements should it be possible to do so without damage to the property: For if the improvements
made by the usufructuary were subject to indemnity, we would have a dangerous and unjust situation in
which the usufructuary could dispose of the owner's funds by compelling him to pay for improvements
which perhaps he would not have made.
There is no valid reason for ordering the sale of the ½ of the estate belonging to the heirs.
The cash in the possession of the administratrix corresponding to the ½ of the estate adjudicated to the
heirs is sufficient for the monthly allowances being paid to the heirs and that there is no necessity for
the sale of the ½ of the estate corresponding to them. The main objection to the heirs to the sale of ½
of the estate adjudicated to them, which ½ besides the cash already mentioned, consist mostly of
shares of stock, is that said shares if sold now may not command a good price and that furthermore
said heirs prefer to keep said shares intact as long as there is no real necessity for their sale. Of
course, once said cash in the hands of the administratrix, corresponding to the heirs is exhausted
because of the payment of the allowances made to the heirs, some other arrangements might be
necessary. The administratrix would then have a right and reason to refuse the payment of said
allowances from her said personal funds or from the fruits of the estate, which as a usufructuary,
belong to her during her lifetime.
True it is that under article 440 of the Civil Code the ownership of property includes the right of
accession to everything attached thereto either naturally or artificially, and that under article 415, trees,
plants and growing fruits, while they are attached to the land, are immovable property; it is equally true
that when a person plants in good faith on land belonging to another, the landowner does not ipso facto
acquire ownership of what has been planted; he must first indemnify the planter before he can
appropriate the same. And so provides article 448: The owner of the land in which anything has been
built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or
planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548.
 otherwise.
Sarmiento vs. Mother-in-law offered a lot for the construction
Agana (1984) of house by the spouses. Here comes
Sarmiento, alleging himself to be the owner of the
land. The trial court ordered Sarmiento to exercise
option and there was failure to do so. The spouses
then consigned the amount in court.
Fernandez del Spouses Estanislao and Abesia were co-owners of
Campo vs. a certain lot. When the lot was partitioned, it was
Abesia (1988) found out that Abesia’s house encroached on a 5
sq. m. portion of the spouses’ part of the lot. Lower
court held that Art. 448 does not apply in the case
and ordered Abesia to demolish her house within a
period of 60 days.
Pecson vs. CA Petitioner was the owner of a parcel of land
(1995) wherein he built an apartment complex. Due to his
failure to pay for realty taxes, his land was sold in a
public auction and was sold to spouses Nuguid.
He moved for the setting aside of the auction but
was denied.
Pleasantville vs. Robillo bought a parcel of land from petitioner
CA (1996) Pleasantville. She later found out that the lot she
bought already had improvements built thereon by
one Wilson Kee. Wilson alleged that he bought the
land from CT Torres Enterprises which is the
exclusive real estate agent of petitioner. It was later
found out that petitioner sold the exact same lot to
both Robillo and Kee on account of the negligence
or oversight of petitioner’s agent.
The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by another, is entitled to
retain the possession of the land until he is paid the value of his building, under article 453 (now
Article 546). The owner, of the l a n d , u p o n , t h e o t h e r h a n d , h a s t h e o p t i o n , under
article 361 (now Article 448), either to pay for the building or to sell his land to the
o w n e r o f t h e b u i l d i n g . B u t h e c a n n o t , as respondents here did, r e f u s e b o t h t o
p a y f o r t h e b u i l d i n g a n d t o s e l l t h e l a n d and compel the owner of the building to remove
it from the land where it is erected. He is entitled to such demolition or removal only when, after having
chosen to sell h i s l a n d , t h e o t h e r p a r t y f a i l s t o p a y f o r t h e same.
Article 448 of the Civil Code cannot apply where a co-owner builds, plants or sows on the land owned
in common for then he did not build, plant or sow upon land that exclusively belongs to another but of
which he is a co-owner. The co-owner is not a third person under the circumstances, and the situation
is governed by the rules of co-ownership. However, when the co-ownership is terminated by a partition
and it appears that the house of an erstwhile co-owner has encroached upon a portion pertaining to
another co-owner which was however made in good faith, then the provisions of Article 448 should
apply to determine the respective rights of the parties. As in the present case, the house of Abesia
overlaps or occupies a portion of 5 sq. m. of the land pertaining to the spouses which Abesia obviously
built in good faith. Applying Art. 448, the ff. are the parties options: the spouses have the right to
appropriate said portion of the house of Abesia upon payment of indemnity to the latter, otherwise, the
spouses may oblige Abesia to pay the price of the land occupied by their house. However, if the price
asked for is considerably much more than the value of the portion of the Abesia’s house built thereon,
then the latter cannot be obliged to buy the land. Abesia shall then pay the reasonable rent to the
spouses upon such terms and conditions that they may agree. In case of disagreement, the trial court
shall fix the terms thereof. Of course, Abesia may demolish or remove the said portion of their house, at
their own expense, if they so decide.
With regard to Art. 448, the provision on indemnity may be applied in analogy. Whoever is the owner of
the land may appropriate whatever has been built, planted or sown after paying indemnity. However, it
does not apply when the owner of the land is also the builder of the works on his own land who later on
loses ownership by sale or donation. Art. 546 refers to the necessary and useful expenses which shall
be refunded to the possessor in good faith with right of retention. However, it does not state how to
determine the value of the useful improvement. The respondents [court and private respondents alike]
espouses as sufficient reimbursement the cost of construction in 1965, however, this is contrary to
previous rulings which declares that the value to the reimbursed should be the present market value of
said improvements so as not to unjustly enrich either of the parties. [the trial court erred in ordering
Pecson to pay rent since the Sps. Nuguid has yet to pay the indemnity therefore Pecson has the right
to retain the improvements and the income thereof. The case was remanded to the trial court for
determination of the current market value of the apartment bldg and ordered the Sps to pay Pecson
otherwise it shall be restored to Pecson until payment of indemnity.
Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that he land he is building on is his and his ignorance of
any defect or flaw in his title. The burden of proving bad faith belongs to the one asserting it. At the time
when Kee constructed his improvements on Lot 8, he was not aware that it was actually Lot 9 that was
delivered to him. Article 527 of the Civil Code provides the presumption that petitioner has the burden
of proving that Kee was a builder in bad faith. Kee may be made liable for the violation of the contract
with CTTEI but this may not be used as a basis of bad faith and as a sufficient ground to negate the
presumption of good faith. Petitioner cannot claim and excuse itself from liability by claiming that it was
not directly involved in the delivery of the property. The principalmust be responsible for the acts of the
agent done within the scope of his authority. CTTEI was the sole real estate representative of the
petitioner when the delivery was made. Wilson Kee is therefore declared a builder in good faith.
Petitioner and respondent CTTEI are declared solidarily liable for damages due to negligence.
Technogas vs. Petitioner bought a lot together with the building
CA (1997) and improvements including the wall which
encroached that of the defendant. Upon learning of
such encroachment, petitioner offered to buy the
land but defendant refused. After 2 years, through
an agreement, petitioner agreed to demolish the
wall (but the case did not state what happened to
this agreement, my assumption is that it did not
happen due to conflicts that arose after).
Defendant dug a canal along the wall which
caused a portion of it to collapse. Petitioner filed a
supplemental complaint re the action and a
separate criminal action of malicious mischief
(which the wife was convicted of). RTC decided for
the petitioners and the CA reversed. Note that
respondent wants to have the wall demolished.
When the petitioner purchased the lot, the wall was already built. Even the respondent did not knew
about the encroachment until he has hired a surveyor. Where one derives title to the property from
another, the act, declaration, or omission of the latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property,
is evidence against the former. And possession in good faith does not lose this character except when
the possessor is aware of this impropriety. Encroachment was very narrow which can be considered as
a mere error. The petitioner, despite being a purchaser of the original builder, can compel the
landowner to either buy the property or sell the piece of land because he was really unaware of the
encroachment basing on the fact presented by both sides and when the petitioner bought the land, he
has stepped into the rights of the original owner (hence, the right to compel the LO to buy or sell is also
transferred).

Ballatan vs. CA This is a dispute over forty-two (42) square meters It was the survey made the authorized surveyor of AIA that respondent Winston Go relied upon in
(1999) of residential land belonging to petitioners. Parties constructing his house on his father’s land. He built his house in the belief that it was entirely within the
herein were owners of adjacent lots located at parameters of his father’s land. In short, respondents Go had no knowledge that they encroached
Block No. 3, Poinsettia Street,Araneta University petitioners’ lot. They are deemed builders in good faith until the time petitioner Ballatan informed them
Village, Malabon, Metro Manila. Eden Ballatan of their encroachment on her property.
discovered the there was an encroachment when
she constructed her house which was surveyed by
the authorized surveyor of AIA, the owner-
developer of the subdivision project. Petitioner
Ballatan made a written demand on respondent to
remove and dismantle their improvements on the
said lot. Failing to agree amicably,
petitioner Ballatan instituted against respondents
Go Civil Case for recovery of possession before
the Regional Trial Court.

Tuason vs. Plaintiff JM Tuason filed a civil case against
Macalindong defendant Macalindong alleging that it is the
(1962) registered owner of a parcel of land, commonly
known as the Sta. Mesa Heights Subdivision and
that the defendant, thru force, strategy and stealth,
unlawfully entered into the possession of some 200
square meters, within said parcel of land and
constructed his house thereon. Defendant
answering, stated among others, that prior to 1955
and since time immemorial, he and his
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
adverse, public, continuous and actual possession
of the lot in question in the concept of owner and,
by reason of such possession, he had made
improvement thereon.
MWSS vs. CA The City of Dagupan filed a complaint against the
(1998) former National Waterworks and Sewerage
Authority (NAWASA), now the Metropolitan
From the documents submitted, it appears that defendant was not a builder in good faith. From the
initial certificate of title of plaintiff’s predecessors-in-interest, there is a presumptive knowledge by
defendant of plaintiff’s Torrens Title (which is a notice to the whole world) over the subject premises
and consequently defendant cannot, in good conscience, say now that he believed his vendor (Flores),
his vendor’s vendor (Teotico) and the latter’s seller (De Torres) had rights of ownership over said lot.
Defendant, had likewise, a sufficient warning from the fact that the lot, subject of his purchase, is
described in his Exhibits 1, 2 and 3, to be a portion of an unnumbered and, therefore, unapproved
subdivision plan. Had he investigated before buying and before building his house on the questioned
lot, he would have been informed that the land is registered under the Torrens system in the name of
J.M. Tuason. If he failed to make the necessary inquiry, defendant is now bound conclusively to
appellee’s Torrens Title.
Article 449 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides that "he who builds, plants or sows in bad faith
on the land of another, loses what is built, planted or sown without right to indemnity." As a builder in
bad faith, NAWASA lost whatever useful improvements it had made without right to indemnity.
 Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS), for
recovery of the ownership and possession of the
Dagupan Waterworks System. NAWASA
interposed as one of its special defenses R.A. 1383
which vested upon it the ownership, possession
and control of all waterworks systems throughout
the Philippines and as one of its counterclaims the
reimbursement of the expenses it had incurred for
necessary and useful improvements amounting to
P255,000.00.
Republic v. Modesto Castillo owned parcels of land
Castillo (consolidated and then subdivided into 9) in
Tanauan, Batangas. After his death, his wife
1988 Amanda partitioned the property and passed on
the mortgage to Florencio Castillo. Thus the titles
of the lots were subsequently titled and annotated
in the names of the new owners.
The Philippine government appealed, saying tha
the lands had always formed part of Taal Lake
(washed and inundated) and could not be private
property.
Moreover, under Article 546 of said code, only a possessor in good faith shall be refunded for useful
expenses with the right of retention until reimbursed; and under Article 547 thereof, only a possessor in
good faith may remove useful improvements if this can be done without damage to the principal thing
and if the person who recovers the possession does not exercise the option of reimbursing the useful
expenses. The right given a possessor in bad faith is to remove improvements applies only to
improvements for pure luxury or mere pleasure, provided the thing suffers no injury thereby and the
lawful possessor does not prefer to retain them by paying the value they have at the time he enters into
possession (Article 549).
The property is still clearly a shorelands of Taal Lake, sometimes underwater, that the Castillos just
filled up so that they can use for their business.
Accretions on the bank of a lake, like Laguna de Bay, belong to the owners of the estate to which they
have been added while accretion on a sea bank still belongs to the public domain, and is not available
for private ownership until formally declared by the government to be no longer needed for public use.
This distinction does not help the Castillos because there is no accretion shown to exist. On the
contrary, it was established that the occupants of the lots who were engaged in duck raising filled up
the area with shells and sand to make it habitable.

The Castillos claimed prescription and estoppel,

and that there was accretion of their lakeshore
properties that added land to what they already
owned.

Asst. Exec. Sec. Jesus Larrabaster was granted a home lot of 1,500 When the accretion occurred, the lot had already been allocated and assigned to Larrabaster, thus
v. CA and m2 in Cotabato, on the premise that the lot was accrues to the private property.
Mendoza vacant and free from claim or conflict. However,
Jesus subleased the land to Basilio Mendoza and Larrabaster may not have been the owner (naked title-owner was still the government), he had already
1989 tolerated the squatting og Jorge Gellerto. acquired the beneficial and equitable title over the lot. Thus, the aread within it original boundaries
belong to the awardee whether the creek advances or recedes.
Larrabaster and wife later assigned their rights to
Jose Pena. Pena then claimed that the property
was 3,600 m2, and requested the government to
adjust the title to “conform” to the actual area.

The additional land was found out to be due from

accretion from a creek, and alloted/distributed
already to different lots. This suit is based on
decisions of government agencies.
Ferrer v. Gloria Ferrer claims ownership over a lot by virtue Ferrer is the owner of the land by alluvion.
Bautista of accretion, while Mariano Balanag and
Magdalena Domondon by virtue of long occupation Alluvion gives to the owners of lands on riverbanks any accretion which is gradually received from the
1994 and a Certificate of Title pursuant to a free patent effects of the current of waters. This is “compensation” to owners of land continually exposed to the
application. destructive force of water and subjected to various easements. Because this was private property, the
government thus had no authority to grant a free patent over it.
Ferrer initated several cases against Balanag and
Domondon, but this is a case arising from the [first]
 complaint for reivindicacion.
Agne v. Director Hermenigildo Agpoon was the first registered Agne et al are the owners of the abandoned bed, as riparian owners.
of Lands owner of a parcel of land in Pangasinan.
Presentacion Gascon inherited the land from her The natural occurrence where the river bed was abandoned makes the newly uncovered land private.
1990 father, and was issued a TCT. There is no need for a formal act of acquisition, according to the old civil code which was in effect that
time. The right to additions by accretion = right of an owner of a tree to fruits, or right of an owner of
Allegedly, during the Japanese occupation, animals to the offspring.Private ownership cannnot be distrubed by ythe issuance of a free patent over
Mariano Agne et al took possession of the land. the land.
They claimed that the Agno-Chico River changed
its course in 1920 and so land was deposited unto
their properties. They also said that they had
openly possessed and used the land since then.
Baes v. CA A parcel of land was dug by the government for the Baes is entitled to compensation for the damage or loss to property due to a ‘deliberate act’ of the
construction of a canal to streamline the river. government. But he has already been compensated for the trouble damage brought about by the canal,
1998 Felix Baes eventually bought the land, which was so the case is dismissed.
subdivided into three parcels. The middle parcel
covered the canal. The government gave him If the riparian owner is entitled to compensation for the damage to or loss of his property due to natural
another equivalent parcel as compensation. causes, all the more reason to compensate him when the change in the course of river is effected
through artificial means.
After resurvey, it was discovered that there were
errors. New TCT’s were issued to represent the
enlargements.

Government opposed as the lots were allegedly

unlawfully enlarged. Baes claimed that he should
own dried up land as the creek was discovered to
the canal in his property.
Jagualing v. CA Janita Eduave inherited a parcel of land in Misamis The parcel of land is an island that formed in a non-navigable and non-flotable river, and ans such
Oriental from her father and uncles, which later belongs to the owner of the land with the nearest margin.
1991 was eroded due to a typhoon and through the
movement of land deposit. She granted Maximo If the riparian owner fails to assert his claim, it could be open to adverse possession.
Jagualing et al to plant corn and bananas, hired a
surveyor to put monuments, paid the taxes.

Jagualing denied the assertions of Eduave, saying

that they claimed ownership after a typhoon
caused the formation of the island, which they
occupied for 15 years thence. They presented
pictures of their occupation, and the improvements
and the house established thereon.

The trial court ruled that it was a delta, forming part

of the riverbed and thus part of the public domain.
The CA found that it was an island, and formed due
to alluvial deposits.
Siari Valley v. Siari Valley Inc. brought action to recover 200 Lucasan lost the argument re commixtion, ordered to deliver the 321 heads that had been entrusted to
Lucasan heads of cattle that were driven from its lands to his care to Siari; pay damages for the others he had since sold; and ordered to allow Siari to round up
that of Filemon Lucasan. Lucasan however argued all the buffaloes that may be found on its cattle ranch.
1957 that although there was commixtion of cattle, Siari
already retrieved its animals. The CFI of Art. 382 (now Art. 473) of the CC states that “if the commingling of 2 things is made in bad faith, the
Zamboanga decided in favor of Siari thus the case one responsible for it will lose his share” thus since Lucasan is in bad faith, he should lose his share in
 at bar. the commixtion.

Faja v. CA Levine Frial sued Felipa Faja for illegally
possessing and occuying the property of the owner
1977 (Levine was a heir) for about 30 years. He also
asked for about P150K in unearned income from
the property for the period. His claim was through a
reconstituted OCT.
Faja claimed that she inherited the lot from her
father and grandfather, and so on, with the
property having been in the family for 60 years. Her
claim was under a TCT. She also argued that the
other OCT was fake.
Mamadsual v. Spouses Ali and Salika Mamadsual sought to quiet
Moson the title held by spouses Abdula and Kagui
Macarapan to a property in Cotabato City, before a
1990 Shari’a District Court.
The trial court dismissed the complaint on the
ground of prescription, since it is similar to a
reconveyance which prescribes after ten years
Although there was no actual evidence that all 823 missing animals were taken by Lucasan or his men,
on two occasions however, his men drove away 30 heads of cattle. It is not erroneous to believe that
the others must have also been driven away applying by analogy the principle that one who stole a part
of the stolen money must have taken also the larger sum lost by the offended party.
Frial as the possessor has the right to sue, not the other party. (This case was also referred for
sumamry proceedings.)
A person in actual possession of a piece of land under claim of ownership may wait until his possession
is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, and that his undisturbed
possession gives him the continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine
the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his title.
An action to quiet title is imprescriptible, and must be filed by the persons in possession of the property
– in this case the Mamadsuals. Anyhow, this case was remanded for further proceedings.
In such an action to quiet title the plaintiff "must" have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real
property which is the subject matter of the action. It interpreted legal title to mean registered ownership
and equitable title to mean beneficial ownership. It is not necessary that the person seeking to quiet his
title is the registered owner of the property in question.

The relevant question was whether the petitioners

were the correct parties in interest, and whether the
action had prescribed.
Republic v. Modesto Castillo owned parcels of land The property is still clearly a shorelands of Taal Lake, sometimes underwater, that the Castillos just
Castillo (consolidated and then subdivided into 9) in filled up so that they can use for their business.
Tanauan, Batangas. After his death, his wife
1988 Amanda partitioned the property and passed on Accretions on the bank of a lake, like Laguna de Bay, belong to the owners of the estate to which they
the mortgage to Florencio Castillo. Thus the titles have been added while accretion on a sea bank still belongs to the public domain, and is not available
of the lots were subsequently titled and annotated for private ownership until formally declared by the government to be no longer needed for public use.
in the names of the new owners. This distinction does not help the Castillos because there is no accretion shown to exist. On the
contrary, it was established that the occupants of the lots who were engaged in duck raising filled up
The Philippine government appealed, saying tha the area with shells and sand to make it habitable.
the lands had always formed part of Taal Lake
(washed and inundated) and could not be private
property.

The Castillos claimed prescription and estoppel,

and that there was accretion of their lakeshore
properties that added land to what they already
owned.

Vda. de Aviles v. The deceased Eduardo and his wife Anastacia vda. Boundary disputes are not cognizable in the special civil action for quieting of title.
Court of de Aviles owned a parcel of land in Lingayen,
Appeals Pangasinan. She was in actual possession thereof. Under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, only a person who is interested ‘under a deed, will, contract or
 On the other hand, Camilo Aviles, who owned one
(1996) of the adjacent lots, asserted color of title over the
northern portion of the land owned by the vda. de
Aviles by putting up a bamboo fence. This
prompted her to file an action to quiet title against
Camilo.
C. Co-ownership
Hernandez v. Perla Hernandez bought a parcel of land in
Quitain Masbate from Sancho Manlapaz. The land was
originally part of a larger parcel of land that
(1988) belonged to the spouses Crispulo Manlapaz and
Antonia Villanueva. Upon their death their children
partitioned their estate. Ernesta Valdemoro, one of
the children of the spouses Manlapaz, filed a
complaint for redemption against Hernandez to
recover the parcel of land she bought from Sancho.
Gatchalian v. Jose Gatchalian and other co-plaintiffs purchased
Collector of a lotto ticket from the National Charity
Internal Sweepstakes Office and won P50,000.00. The
Revenue provincial treasurer of Bulacan made an
assessment of P1,499.94 on Jose Gatchalian &
(1939) Co., but Gatchalian et al. asked for an exemption. It
was denied.
Obillos v. Court Obillos Sr. completed payment to Ortigas & Co. for
of Appeals the purchase of two lots. He then transferred his
rights to his children. Purpose of the purchase of
(1985) the lots was to be made into residential lots,
however due to economic reasons, the children
decided to resell the lots to WCSC and Olga
Canada. They treated the profit as a capital gains
tax and paid said income tax.
The Commissioner made an assessment requiring
petitiones to pay corporate income tax in addition
to the individual income taxes they have paid. The
Commissioner considered the profits as distributive
dividends taxable in full and not for only 30%.
Dailisan v. Court Jose Dailisan, in a Complaint for Partition, alleged
of Appeals that he purchased ¼ of the land of Federico Pugao
in Bago Bantay, Quezon City. Dailisan had already
(2008) paid part of the purchase price. However, Pugao
refused Dailisan’s plea for partition. The Court of
Appeals ruled that Dailisan’s action for partition had
prescribed and that the proper cause of action for
him is one for specific performance instead.
other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute or ordinance, may bring an action to
determine any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument or statute and for a
declaration of his rights or duties thereunder.’ This means that the subject matter must refer to a deed,
will, contract or other written instrument, or to a statute or ordinance, to warrant declaratory relief. Any
other matter not mentioned therein is deemed excluded. This is under the principle of expressio unius
est exclusio alterius.
Valdemoro cannot exercise the right of redemption against Hernandez.
The basis of the right of legal redemption under Article 1620 of the Civil Code is the existence of a co-
ownership as defined under Article 484 of the same Code. The Court emphasized that if the party
seeking to redeem is the owner of a portion which has been concretely determined and Identifiable he
cannot be considered a co-owner, and thus not entitled to the right of redemption granted under Article
1620.
Gatchalian and the others formed a partnership, and is thus liable to pay taxes.
According to the stipulation of facts the plaintiffs organized a civil partnership because each of them put
up money to buy a sweepstakes ticket for the sole purpose of dividing equally the prize which they may
win, as they did in fact in the amount of P50,000. The partnership was not only formed, but upon the
organization thereof and the winning of the prize, Jose Gatchalian personally appeared in the office of
the Philippines Charity Sweepstakes, in his capacity as co-partner, as such collection the prize, the
office issued the check for P50,000 in favor of Jose Gatchalian & Co., and the said partner, in the same
capacity, collected the said check. All these circumstances militate against the assertion that he and the
other plaintiffs organized and formed a mere co-ownership.
Obillos is not liable to pay corporate income tax.
There was no intention to form a partnership. They were co-owners pure and simple. To consider them
as partners would be to obliterate the distinction between co-owners and parteners. The division of the
profit was merely incidental to the dissolution of the co-ownership which was in the nature of the thing a
temporary state. Art. 1769 of the Civil Code provides that sharing of gross returns does not in itself
establish a partnership.
Dailisan’s action for partition has not yet prescribed as he is still a co-owner of the property in
question.
Dailisan's action before the RTC was properly captioned as one for partition because there are
sufficient allegations in the complaint that he is a co-owner of the property. The regime of co-ownership
exists when ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. By the nature of a co-
ownership, a co-owner cannot point to a specific portion of the property owned in common as his own
because his share therein remains intangible. The description "undivided 1/4 portion" shows that the
portion sold is still undivided and not sufficiently identified. While the description provides a guide for
identifying the location of the lot sold, there was no indication of its exact metes and bounds. This is the
reason why Dailisan was constrained to cause the survey of the property. As a co-owner of the

Cruz v. Leonor Cruz, Luz Cruz and Norma Maligaya are
Catapang co-owners of a parcel of land in Taal, Batangas. In
1992, Teofila Catapang built a house on a lot
(2008) adjacent to the lot in question with Maligaya’s
consent. The house intruded on a portion of the
property held in co-ownership. When Leonor
learned of this, she demanded that Catapang
vacate the portion intruded upon. When She did
not heed the demand, Leonor sued Catapang for
forcible entry.
Pardell v. Vicenta de Pardell and Matilde Bartolome were
Bartolome heirs of the late spouses Miguel Ortiz and Calixta
Felin. In 1888 Bartolome and her husband Gaspar
(1912) Bartolome took upon themselves the administration
of the property of the deceased spouses in Ilocos
Sur without judicial authorization. Pardell went to
court, demanding payment of rend from the
Bartolomes.
Plasabas v. Nieves Plasabas and Marcos Malazarte brought an
Court of action for recovery of title to property with damages
Appeals against Dominador Lumen and Aurora Aunzo.
Lumen and Aunzo moved to dismiss the complaint,
(2009) alleging that Plasabas and Malazarte, not being the
sole owners of the property, failed to implead the
other co-owners, Jose, Victor and Victoria, as
indispensable parties.
Sunset View v. Aguilar-Bernares Realty was the assignee of a unit
Campos in the Sunset View Condominium Project owned by
Sunset View Corporation, a condominium
(1981) corporation. Sunset View sued Aguilar-Bernares
Realty for collection of assessments levied on the
latter’s unit. Aguilar-Bernares Realty moved to
dismiss, arguing that the court does not have
jurisdiction over the case. The CFI dismissed the
case, ruling that pursuant to Section 2 of Republic
Act No. 4726 (the Condominium Law), a “holder of
a separate interest” and consequently, a
shareholder of the plaintiff condominium
corporation; and that “the case should be properly
filed with the Securities & Exchange Commission
which has exclusive original jurisdiction on
controversies arising between shareholders of the
property, therefore, he has the right to demand partition, a right which does not prescribe.
Norma Maligaya’s consent constitutes devoting a property held in common to her exclusive use
to the prejudice of the co-ownership.
Under Article 491 of the Civil Code, none of the co-owners shall, without the consent of the others,
make alterations in the thing owned in common. The Court ruled that it would necessarily follow that
none of the co-owners can, without the consent of the other co-owners, validly give consent to the
making of an alteration by another person, such as Catapang in this case, in the thing owned in
common. In addition, Article 486 of the same Code states each co-owner may use the thing owned in
common provided he does so in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in such a way
as not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent the other co-owners from using it according
to their rights. The Court ruled that, to give consent to a third person to construct a house on the co-
owned property would be to injure the interest of the co-ownership and would prevent other co-owners
from using the property in accordance with their rights.
The Bartolomes are not liable to pay rent.
The Court ruled that the spouses are not liable to pay rent. Their occupation of the said property was a
mere exercise of their right to use the same as a co-owner. One of the limitations on a co-owner’s right
of use is that he must use it in such a way so as not to injure the interest of the other co-owners. In the
case at bar, the other party failed to provide proof that by the occupation of the spouses Bartolome,
they prevented Vicenta from utilizing the same.
The action by Plasabas and Malazarte may proceed even without being joined by the other co-
owners.
Article 487 of the Civil Code provides that any one of the co-owners may bring an action for ejectment.
The article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession, including an accion publiciana and
a reivindicatory action. A co-owner may file suit without necessarily joining all the other co-owners as
co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. Any judgment of the court
in favor of the plaintiff will benefit the co-owners, but if the judgment is adverse, the same cannot
prejudice the rights of the unimpleaded co-owners.
Thus, Plasabas and Malazarte need not implead the other co-owners, the only exception to this rule
being when the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and is thus
entitled to the possession thereof.
The CFI and the city courts have jurisdiction.
The share of stock appurtenant to the unit will be transferred accordingly to the purchaser of the unit
only upon full payment of the purchase price at which time he will also become the owner of the unit.
Consequently, even under the contract, it is only the owner of a unit who is a shareholder of the
Condominium Corporation. Inasmuch as owners is conveyed only upon full payment of the purchase
price, it necessarily follows that a purchaser of a unit who has not paid the full purchase price thereof is
not The owner of the unit and consequently is not a shareholder of the Condominium Corporation.
In this case, the Master Deed provides that ownership is transferred only upon full payment of the
purchase price.
Aguilar-Bernares Realty has not yet fully paid the purchase price, hence they are not shareholders and
the SEC has no jurisdiction over the claims.
 corporation.”
Republic v. The heirs of Tito Dignos sold Lots A and B to the
Heirs of Dignos- Civil Aeronautics Administration for the
Sorono construction of an airport in Mactan, Cebu. In 1996,
the Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority
(2008) built a security fence on Lot B.
The heirs of Dignos filed a complaint for quieting of
title against MCIAA, alleging that the existence of
tax declarations would cast a doubt on their validly
existing titles over the lots. They argue that they
never sold their shares in the lots. Trial court
upheld the validity of Tito Dignos’ ¼ share of the
lots.
METROBANK V Florencia and Nicholson had their marriage
PASCUAL annulled under Art. 36. But there was no liquidation
of their properties. Thereafter, Florencia mortgaged
(2008) one of their properties to Metrobank. When the
loan wasn’t paid, the property was foreclosed.
Therefore, Nicholson filed a petition for declaration
of nullity of the mortgage.
MONTEROSO V The children of Benjamin, son of first wife, filed with
CA the RTC a Complaint for Recovery of Property with
Damages against their uncle, Tirso (son from first
wife). Benjamin's share of the estate of his
deceased mother was entrusted in the care of his
(2008) brother, Tirso. However, he said that it wasn't
entrusted to him but to Soledad, his sister. Tirso, in
turn filed a Complaint for Partition and Damages
with Receivership involving 12 parcels of land
against his stepmother (his father's 2nd wife) and
all his full and half-siblings. RTC found that the
heirs of Benjamin have been deprived of their
inheritance which corresponded to ¼ share due
their father from the intestate estate of their
grandmother.
QUIMPO v Eustaquia died intestate and left parcels of land to
ABAD her grand and great grandchildren. Joaquin and
the respondents partitioned 1 of the parcels of land
The sale was valid only as to Tito Dignos’ ¼ share therein.
Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner
without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of the co-
owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.
Since there was still no liquidation of properties, the mortgage is only valid as to the share of Florencia.
While the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and Florencia severed their marital bond and
dissolved the conjugal partnership, the character of the properties acquired before such declaration
continues to subsist as conjugal properties until and after the liquidation and partition of the partnership.
In this pre-liquidation scenario, Art. 493 of the Civil Code shall govern the property relationship between
the former spouses, where:
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto,
and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage,
with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division
upon the termination of the co-ownership.
Art. 493 governs this case. Under it, Florencia has the right to mortgage or even sell her one-half (1/2)
undivided interest in the disputed property even without the consent of Nicholson. However, the rights
of Metrobank, as mortgagee, are limited only to the 1/2 undivided portion that Florencia owned.
Accordingly, the mortgage contract insofar as it covered the remaining 1/2 undivided portion of the lot is
null and void, Nicholson not having consented to the mortgage of his undivided half.
Partition is the proper remedy available to Tirso who is a co-owner of the subject properties by virtue of
his being a compulsory heir. The right to seek partition is imprescribtible and can't be barred by laches.
Prescription does not run against a co-owner or co-heir thus acquisitive prescription didn't apply in favor
of Soledad and against Tirso. The fact that Tirso and the other compulsory heirs of Don Fabian were
excluded from the possession of their legitimate and the enjoyment of the fruits does not per se argue
against the existence of a co-ownership. By asserting his right as a compulsory heir, Tirso has
effectively brought into the open the reality that Soledad (and her husband0 were holding some of the
properties in trust and he is a co-owner of all of them to the extent of his legal share or legitime thereon.
Before a partition and eventual distribution of Don Fabian's intestate estate, a regime of co-ownership
among the compulsory heirs existed over the undivided estate of Don Fabian. Being a co-owner of that
intestate estate, Tirso's right over a share thereof is imprescriptible.
A parol partition (an oral partition) may also be sustained on the ground that the parties thereto have
acquiesced in and ratified the partition by taking possession in severalty, exercising acts of ownership
with respect thereto, or otherwise recognizing the existence of the partition.
(2008) and divided it into 2. ½ to Joaquin and ½ to the
respondents; however there was no document
evidencing this partition. 2 of the respondents were
minors at the time of the partition, when they
became of age, they wanted to occupy their shares
already which were administered by Joaquin but he
refused. He also refused to partition the other 2
parcels of land. Respondents filed a complaint for
judicial partition with the RTC. Joaquin denied this
and said that he bought the parcels of land from
Eustaquia.
BETTY During the illicit relationship of Lacbayan and
LACBAYAN v Samoy, they were able to establish a company. 5
BAYANI SAMOY parcels of land were also acquired during the said
period and were registered in their names (as
husband and wife). When they ended their
(2011) relationship, they executed a Partition Agreement.
However, when Lacbayan wanted additional
demands to be included in her share, Samoy
refused thus she filed a complaint for judicial
partition.
TECSON v Atty Fausto acquired in co-ownership with his sister
FAUSTO a parcel of land. They then decided to partition the
lot through an Agreement of Partition. However,
this was never registered with the Register of
(2011) Deeds. When Atty. Fausto died, his sister sold her
share of the land but it was greater than her
allotted share under the Agreement of Partition. A
second Partition Agreement was executed by the
sister and the heirs of Atty Fausto. This
substantially changed the first one and increased
the share of the sister. The sale of the lot as well as
this 2nd Agreement was now registered. Years
later, the heirs filed a complaint to nullify the
documents and recover457 sqm of land which they
For forty-three (43) years, the respondents occupied their portions of the San Jose property and
significantly, Joaquin never disturbed their possession. They also installed tenants in parcel IV, and
Joaquin did not prevent them from doing so, nor did he assert his ownership over the same. These
unerringly point to the fact that there was indeed an oral partition of parcels III and IV. Regardless of
whether an oral partition or agreement to partition is valid and enforceable at law, equity will in proper
cases, where the parol partition has actually been consummated by the taking of possession in
severalty and the exercise of ownership by the parties of the respective portions set off to each,
recognize and enforce such parol partition and the rights of the parties thereunder.
Likewise, A contract of purchase and sale is null and void and produces no effect whatsoever where it
appears that the same is without cause or consideration which should have been the motive thereof, or
the purchase price which appears thereon as paid but which in fact has never been paid by the
purchaser to the vendor. Joaquin was a student at the time of the alleged sale and Eustaquia was in
fact supporting him.
The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination of whether or not
a co-ownership in fact exists, and a partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may
be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property.
While it is true that the complaint involved here is one for partition, the same is premised on the
existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the parties. Petitioner insists she is a co-owner
pro indiviso of the five real estate properties based on the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) covering
the subject properties. Respondent maintains otherwise. Indubitably, therefore, until and unless this
issue of co-ownership is definitely and finally resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the
disputed properties.
A careful perusal of the contents of the so-called Partition Agreement indicates that the document
involves matters which necessitate prior settlement of questions of law, basic of which is a
determination as to whether the parties have the right to freely divide among themselves the subject
properties. Samoy is not allowed by law to waive whatever share his lawful spouse may have on the
disputed properties.
Lacbayan herself admitted that she did not assent to the Partition Agreement after seeing the need to
amend the same to include other matters. Lacbayan does not have any right to insist on the contents of
an agreement she intentionally refused to sign.
The mother title of Lot 2189, OCT No. 734, states in no unclear terms that the sister and Atty. Fausto
were co-owners of the subject lot. The inscription in the original title for Lot 2189 carries more than
sufficient weight to prove the existence of a co-ownership in equal shares.
The Second Partition Agreement is null and void as an absolute simulation, albeit induced by a third
party. The fraud perpetrated by Atty. Tecson did more than to vitiate the consent of the sister and the
respondents. It must be emphasized that the sister and the respondents never had any intention of
entering into a new partition distinct from the First Partition Agreement. The established facts reveal
that the sister and the respondents assented to the Second Partition Agreement because Atty. Tecson
told them that the instrument was merely required to expedite the sale of the sister's share. there is an
absence of a genuine intent on the part of the co-owners to be bound under a new partition proposing a
new division. There is an absence of a genuine intent on the part of the co-owners to be bound under a
new partition proposing a new division of the lot.
The sister can only sell her lawful share (under the first agreement) of the lot. Her sale to Atty Tecson is
therefore null and void as it exceeded her share of the lot. test.
 believed was unlawfully taken from the lawful share
of Atty. Fausto. They insisted that the first
Agreement was the true one.
CO GIOK LUN v This case involves two lots allegedly co-owned by
JOSE CO two brothers, petitioner Co Giok Lun (Lun) and Co
Bon Fieng (Fieng), the father of respondent Jose
Co (Co). Petitioners claim that the one of the
(2011) properties was named under Fieng only since it
has been a common practice and custom in China
that properties intended for the children are placed
in the name of the eldest child.
HEIRS OF GO V Protacio Jr sold a parcel of land which was a part
SERVACIO of their conjugal property. The heirs filed for the
annulment of the sale of the property. The RTC
declared that although the property was conjugal,
(2004) as long as the portion sold, alienated, or
encumbered will not be allotted to the heirs in the
final partition of the property, or as long as the
portion sold does not encroach upon the legitime of
the other heirs, it is valid.
SERING v Sering brought an action for forcible entry against
PLAZO the respondents. However, the RTC dismissed his
complaint because his other co-owners weren’t
impleaded in his complaint. It rationed that for
forcible entry cases, all of the co-owners must be
(1988) joined as plaintiffs. Only in unlawful detainer cases
can any one of the co-owners sue.
A division of property cannot be ordered by the court unless the existence of co-ownership is first
established.
Court held that evidence of petitioners were insufficient or immaterial to warrant a positive finding of
co-ownership over the Gubat and Barcelona properties. The CA correctly observed that petitioners
failed to substantiate with reasonable certainty that (1) Chaco gave Fieng a start-up capital of P8,000 to
be used by Lun and Fieng in setting up a business, (2) that the Philippine Honest and Company was a
partnership between Lun and Fieng, and (3) that the Deed of Sale dated 24 August 1923 involving the
Barcelona property is sufficient to establish co-ownership. Also, petitioners were not able to prove the
existence of the alleged Chinese custom of placing properties in the name of the eldest child as
provided under Article 12 of the Civil Code.
In contrast, respondents were able to show documents of sale from the original owners of the Gubat
property rendering the claim of custom as immaterial.12 Also, respondents sufficiently established that
Fieng was the registered owner of the Gubat and Barcelona properties while Lun was merely an
administrator.
The action for partition cannot be acted upon since petitioners failed to establish any rightful interest in
the properties. Petitioners also failed to prove that co-ownership existed between the parties’
predecessors-in-interest. Thus, respondents, as legal heirs of Fieng, are entitled to the exclusive
ownership of the Gubat and Barcelona properties.
Article 130 of the Family Code mandates that upon termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal
partnership shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased.
This will apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already established between the spouses before the
effectivity of this Code. It is clear that the conjugal partnership of gains established before and after the
effectivity of the Family Code are governed by the rules of the Family Code. Hence, any disposition of
the conjugal property after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership must be made only after the
liquidation, otherwise the disposition is void. However, before applying such rules, the conjugal
partnership of gains must be subsisting at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code. Since the
spouses were married, prior to the effectivity of the FC, their property relation was properly
characterized as one of conjugal partnership governed by the Civil Code. Upon the wife's death, the
conjugal partnership was dissolved, an implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Protactio and the
other heirs of his wife with respect to her share.
Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect of Marta’s share in the
conjugal partnership, could not yet assert or claim title to any specific portion of Marta’s share without
an actual partition of the property being first done either by agreement or by judicial decree. Until then,
all that he had was an ideal or abstract quota in Marta’s share. Nonetheless, a co-owner could sell his
undivided share; hence, Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest,
but not the interest of his co-owners.
Anent the question of whether an action of forcible entry and detainer should be brought in the name of
all co-owners, the Court held that under Article 487 of the new Civil Code, any of the co-owners may
bring the action.
In forcible entry and detainer action(s) the matter to be determined is simply the question of prior
physical possession. It having been alleged in the complaint that the plaintiff was in actual possession
of the properties, certainly the plaintiff alone, who was in actual possession, could file the complaint.
REYNALDO Alfredo Hular filed a complaint for quieting of title of
BALOLOY v real property with damages against the children
ALFREDO and heirs of Iluminado Baloloy. He alleged that
HULAR Baloloy, the petitioner's predecessor-in-interest,
was able to secure a Free Patent over the property
(2004) through fraud. Evidence showed that Hular co-
owned the property with other people. The action of
Hular in the trial court is for: (a) reinvidicatoria, to
declare the respondent the absolute owner of the
subject property and its reconveyance to him as a
consequence of the nullification of the Free Patent
and (b) publiciana, to order the petitioners and the
other heirs of Iluminado Baloloy to vacate the
property and deliver possession thereof to him.
METROBANK V Florencia and Nicholson had their marriage
PASCUAL annulled under Art. 36. But there was no liquidation
of their properties. Thereafter, Florencia mortgaged
(2008) one of their properties to Metrobank. When the
loan wasn’t paid, the property was foreclosed.
Therefore, Nicholson filed a petition for declaration
of nullity of the mortgage.
Adille v. CA Land belonged to Feliza who was married twice.
Dispute over the land is between the child
(1988) (defendant) from the first marriage and children
from the second marriage. Felisa sold the property
in pacto de retro to certain 3rd persons, period of
repurchase being 3 years, but she died in 1942
without being able to redeem and after her death,
but during the period of redemption, herein
defendant repurchased, by himself alone, and after
that, he executed a deed of extra-judicial partition
representing himself to be the only heir and child of
Article 1078 of the Civil Code provides that where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the
decedent is, before partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment of the debts of
the deceased. Until a division is made, the respective share of each cannot be determined and every
co-owner exercises, together with his co-participants, joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in
addition to the use and enjoyment of the same.
Under Article 487 of the New Civil Code, any of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment. This
article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession, including an accion publiciana and a
reinvidicatory action. A co-owner may bring such an action without the necessity of joining all the other
co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all.[27] Any
judgment of the court in favor of the co-owner will benefit the others but if such judgment is adverse, the
same cannot prejudice the rights of the unimpleaded co-owners. If the action is for the benefit of the
plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and entitled to the possession thereof, the action will not
prosper unless he impleads the other co-owners who are indispensable parties.
Here, Hular filed the complaint, claiming sole ownership over the subject property and praying that he
be declared the sole owner thereof. There is no proof that the other co-owners had waived their rights
over the subject property or conveyed the same to the respondent or such co-owners were aware of
the case in the trial court.
Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the respondent was mandated to implead his siblings,
being co-owners of the property, as parties.
Since there was still no liquidation of properties, the mortgage is only valid as to the share of Florencia.
While the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and Florencia severed their marital bond and
dissolved the conjugal partnership, the character of the properties acquired before such declaration
continues to subsist as conjugal properties until and after the liquidation and partition of the partnership.
In this pre-liquidation scenario, Art. 493 of the Civil Code shall govern the property relationship between
the former spouses, where:
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto,
and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage,
with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division
upon the termination of the co-ownership.
Art. 493 governs this case. Under it, Florencia has the right to mortgage or even sell her one-half (1/2)
undivided interest in the disputed property even without the consent of Nicholson. However, the rights
of Metrobank, as mortgagee, are limited only to the 1/2 undivided portion that Florencia owned.
Accordingly, the mortgage contract insofar as it covered the remaining 1/2 undivided portion of the lot is
null and void, Nicholson not having consented to the mortgage of his undivided half.
The right of repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner with aspect to his share alone. While the
records show that the petitioner redeemed the property in its entirety, shouldering the expenses
therefor, that did not make him the owner of all of it. In other words, it did not put to end the existing
state of co-ownership.
Necessary expenses may be incurred by one co-owner, subject to his right to collect reimbursement
from the remaining co-owners.
The result is that the property remains to be in a condition of co-ownership. While a vendee a retro,
under Article 1613 of the Code, "may not be compelled to consent to a partial redemption," the
redemption by one co-heir or co-owner of the property in its totality does not vest in him ownership over
 his mother Felisa with the consequence that he
was able to secure title in his name alone also
After some efforts of compromise had failed, his
half-brothers and sister filed present case for
partition with accounting on the position that he
was only a trustee on an implied trust when he
redeemed the land.
May a co-owner acquire exclusive ownership over
the property held in common?
Melencio v. Dy This is an action for the recovery of a parcel of
land. Plaintiffs further demand monthly rentals
(1930) already due.
Defendant alleged in substance that he was
occupying the said tract of land by virtue of a
contract of lease executed on July 24,1905, in
favor of his predecessor in interest, by Ruperta
Garcia, among others, under the terms specified
therein, and which contract is still in force.
The plaintiffs filed a reply to the answer alleging,
among other things, that Ruperta Garcia was not
one of the co-owners of the land in question; that
the person who signed the alleged contract of
lease never represented themselves as being the
sole and exclusive owners of the land subject to
the lease as alleged by the defendant in his
answer; that the said contract of lease is null and
void for being executed without the intervention
and consent of two coowners, Ramon Melencio
and Jose P. Melencio, and without the marital
consent of the husbands of Juliana and Ruperta
Melencio.
Castro v. Brothers Tomas de Castro and Arsenio de Castro,
Atienza Sr. leased to plaintiff a fishpond. The lessors are
co-owners in equal shares of the leased property.
(1973)
In the meantime, Tomas de Castro died. Plaintiff as
lessee and defendant Arsenio de Castro, Sr. as
one of the lessors, agreed to set aside and annul
the contract of lease (exhibit A).
Condition No. 2 of Exhibit A reads as follows:
Felisa Cruz Vda. de Castro refused to sign Exhibit
A. Defendant did not return the advances made by
plaintiff. Demand for payment was made by
it. Failure on the part of all the co-owners to redeem it entitles the vendee a retro to retain the property
and consolidate title thereto in his name. But the provision does not give to the redeeming co-owner the
right to the entire property. It does not provide for a mode of terminating a co-ownership.
Neither does the fact that the petitioner had succeeded in securing title over the parcel in his name
terminate the existing co-ownership.
The petitioner must then be said to be a trustee of the property on behalf of the private respondents.
The Civil Code states:
ART. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law,
considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.
Considering that, although as a rule the contract of lease constitutes an act of management, as this
court has several times held, cases may yet arise, either owing to the nature of the subject matter, or to
the period of duration, which may render it imperative to record the contract in the registry of property,
in pursuance of the Mortgage Law, where the contract of lease may give rise to a real right in favor of
the lessee, and it would then constitute such a sundering of the ownership as transcends mere
management; in such cases it must of necessity be recognized that the part owners representing the
greater portion of the property held in common have no power to lease said property for a longer period
than six years without the consent of all the coowners, whose propriety rights, expressly recognized by
the law, would by contracts of long duration be restricted or annulled; and as under article 1548 of the
Civil Code such contracts cannot be entered into by the husband with respect to his wife's property, by
the parent or guardian with respect to that of the child or ward, and by the manager in default of special
power, since the contract of lease only produces personal obligations, and cannot without the consent
of all persons interested or express authority from the owner, be extended to include stipulations which
may alter its character, changing it into a contract of partial alienation of the property leased.
The fact that Ramon during his lifetime received his share of the products of land owned in common
with his coheirs is not sufficient proof of knowledge of the existence of the contract of lease when it is
considered that the land in question was only a small portion of a large tract which Pedro R. Melencio
was administering in connection with other community property.
Petitioners' predecessor-in-interest as co-owner of an undivided one-half interest in the fishpond could
validly lease his interest to a third party, respondent Atienza, independently of his co-owner (although
said co-owner had also leased his other undivided one-half interest to the same third party) and could
likewise by mutual agreement independently cancel his lease agreement with said third party. Said
predecessor-in-interest (and petitioners who have substituted him as his heirs) therefore stands liable
on his express undertaking to refund the advance rental paid to him by the lessee on the cancelled
lease and cannot invoke the non-cancellation of the co-owner's lease to elude such liability.
The judgment is fully supported by the Civil Code provisions on the rights and prerogatives of co-
owners, and specifically by Article 493 which expressly provides that
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage,
 plaintiff's counsel on but to no avail, hence the with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be alloted to him in the division
present action. upon the termination of the co-ownership. *

The issue is simply reduced to whether Arsenio as

co-owner of the fishpond owned pro-indiviso by him
with his brother Tomas (succeeded by Felisa Vda.
de Castro) could validly lease his half-interest to a
third party (respondent Atienza) independently of
his
co-owner, and in case his co-owner also leased his
other half interest to the same third party, whether
Arsenio could cancel his own lease agreement with
said third party?
Estoque v. Plaintiff based her complaint for legal redemption Contention is without merit.
Pajimula on a claim that she is a co-owner of Lot No. 802,
for having purchased 1/3 portion thereof. The deed of sale to Estoque clearly specifies the object sold as the southeastern third portion of Lot
(1968) 802 of the Rosario Cadastre, with an area of 840 square meters, more or less. Granting that the seller,
Defendant, who acquired the other 2/3 portion of Crispina Perez Vda. de Aquitania could not have sold this particular portion of the lot owned in common
Lot No. 802 from Crispina Aquitania and her by her and her two brothers, Lorenzo and Ricardo Perez, by no means does it follow that she intended
children, claimed that the plaintiff bought the 1/3 to sell to appellant Estoque her 1/3 undivided interest in the lot forementioned. There is nothing in the
southeastern portion, which is definitely identified deed of sale to justify such inference. That the seller could have validly sold her one-third undivided
and segregated, hence there existed no co- interest to appellant is no proof that she did choose to sell the same. Ab posse ad actu non valet illatio.
ownership at the time and after said plaintiff bought
the aforesaid portion, upon which right of legal While on the date of the sale to Estoque said contract may have been ineffective, for lack of power in
redemption can be exercised or taken advantage the vendor to sell the specific portion described in the deed, the transaction was validated and became
of. fully effective when the next day (October 29, 1951) the vendor, Crispina Perez, acquired the entire
interest of her remaining co-owners (Annex B) and thereby became the sole owner of Lot No. 802 of
Land was originally owned by spouses. Ownership the Rosario Cadastral survey (Llacer vs. Muñoz, 12 Phil. 328). Article 1434 of the Civil Code of the
was transferred to their heirs through succession. Philippines clearly prescribes that — .
Eventually, the other heirs executed a deed of
extrajudicial settlement wherein they assigned all When a person who is not the owner of a thing sells or alienates and delivers it, and later the seller or
their right, interest and participation in Lot No. 802 grantor acquires title thereto, such title passes by operation of law to the buyer or grantee."
to Crispina Perez.
Pursuant to this rule, appellant Estoque became the actual owner of the southeastern third of lot 802 on
The plaintiff's stand is that the deed in her favor October 29, 1951. Wherefore, she never acquired an undivided interest in lot 802. And when eight
was inoperative to convey the southeastern third of years later Crispina Perez sold to the appellees Pajimula the western two-thirds of the same lot,
Lot 802 of the Rosario Cadastre notwithstanding appellant did not acquire a right to redeem the property thus sold, since their respective portions were
the description in the deed itself, for the reason that distinct and separate.
the vendor, being a mere co-owner, had no right to
sell any definite portion of the land held in common
but could only transmit her undivided share, since
the specific portion corresponding to the selling co-
owner is not known until partition takes place
(Lopez vs. Ilustre, 5 Phil. 567; Ramirez vs.
Bautista, 14 Phil. 528). From this premise, the
appellant argues that the sale in her favor,
although describing a definite area, should be
construed as having conveyed only the undivided
1/3 interest in Lot 802 owned at the time by the
vendor.
PNB v. CA It is not disputed that the property in question Under Article 2085, New Civil Code (Art. 1857, Old Civil Code), one of the essential requisites to the
 originally belonged to the spouses Iñigo Bitanga
(1980) and Rosa Ver as their conjugal property. Husband
died. The wife mortgaged the entire property to
PNB.
In the meantime, wife had defaulted in the
fulfillment of her obligation with the Manila Trading
Company. So the said company levied upon her
share in the lot in question. Her interest in the lot in
question was afterwards sold at public auction, at
which the Manila Trading Company was the
highest bidder; deed of sale was subsequently
annotated. Thereafter, as stated, one-half of the
said property passed into the hands of Manila
Trading Company.
Wife, likewise, failed to settle her obligation with the
Philippine National Bank, the latter sold at public
auction the whole lot that the former had
mortgaged to it, and in the same auction sale, the
Philippine National Bank emerged as the highest
bidder after the period of redemption had expired
without the property having been redeemed, the
Philippine National Bank consolidated its title over
it.
Carvajal v. CA Private respondents, who are husband and wife,
had instituted a complaint for ejectment and
(1982) recovery of possession.
The property in question is a 1/5 portion of a 754
sq. qmeter land originally owned by Hermogenes
Espique and his wife, both dead. After their death
their five children, namely: Maria, Evaristo,
Faustina, Estefanio and Tropinia succeeded them
in the ownership of the whole lot.
Petitioner presently occupies two-fifths of the whole
lot inherited pro-indiviso by the Espique children.
Petitioner alleges that he purchased the northern
one-half portion of the lot he is occupying (which is
also claimed by respondents) from Estefanio
Espique. The land subject of the controversy is the
most southern portion of the whole lot inherited by
the Espique children which petitioner claims he had
bought from Estefanio on April 26, 1967 and which
respondents claim they had bought from Evaristo
on April 15, 1964.
Both sales were made while the petition for
partition filed by Evaristo Espique was still pending
before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan,
docketed therein as Civil Case No. T-966.
contract of pledge and mortgage is that the pledgor or mortgagor be the absolute owner of the thing
pledged or mortgaged. And under Article 493, New Civil Code (Art. 399, Old Civil Code), each co-
owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he
may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment,
except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect
to the co-owners, shag be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership.
Hence, We fully agree with the trial court and the respondent Court and affirm the holding that "what the
Philippine National Bank had acquired from Rosa Ver by virtue of the mortgage was simply one-half (½)
of the entire property, for this was all she had in her power to convey — the other half being, as it still is,
the lawful share of the plaintiffs-appellees as inheritance from their father, Iñigo Bitanga. Nemo date
quod non habet — One cannot give what is not his.
Applying the provisions of the Old Civil Code 7 the law in force at the time of Inigo Bitanga's death in
1935, Rosa Ver, as surviving spouse, cannot take part legally in the sharing of the estate left by her
deceased husband (one-half (½) of Lot 9068) with respect to which she only had usufructuary rights.
"The usufructuary not being an owner, cannot alienate or dispose of the objects included in the
usufruct. Thus, he cannot ... mortgage or pledge the thing ...
Respondents have no right to eject petitioners nor demand payment of rentals for the use of the
property in dispute. Until the partition of the estate is ordered by the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan in the pending partition proceedings and the share of each co-heir is determined by metes
and bounds, neither petitioner nor respondents can rightfully claim that what they bought is the part in
dispute.
The action for ejectment and recovery of possession instituted by herein respondents in the lower court
is premature, for what must be settled frist is the action for partition. Unless a project of partition is
effected, each heir cannot claim ownership over a definite portion of the inheritance. Without partition,
either by agreement between the parties of by judicial proceeding, a co-heir cannot dispose of a
specific portion of the estate. For where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate such heirs. Upon
the death of a person, each of his heirs becomes the undivided owner of the whole estate left wtih
respect to the part of portion which might be adjudicated to him, a community of ownership being thus
formed among the co-owners of the estate or co-heirs while it remains undivided.
While under Article 493 of the New Civil Code, each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part
and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto and he may alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
substitute another person in its enjoyment, the effect of the alienation or the mortgage with respect to
the co-owners, shall be limited, by mandate of the same article, to the portion which may be allotted to
him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. He has no right to sell or alienate a
concrete, specific, or determinate part of the thing in common to the exclusion of the other co-owners
because his right over the thing is represented by an abstract or Ideal portion without any physical
adjudication. 3 An individual co- owner cannot adjudicate to himself or claim title to any definite portion
of the land or thing owned in common until its actual partition by agreement or judicial decree. Prior to
that time all that the co-owner has is an Ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire thing
owned in common by all the co-owners. What a co owner may dispose of is only his undivided aliquot
share, which shall be limited to the portion that may be allotted to him upon partition. Before partition, a

Hagosojos v. Anastacio Hagosojos contracted two marriages
CA during his lifetime. His first marriage with Jacinta
Jaucian produced three off-springs, namely: the
(1987) petitioner, Luis and the two other private
respondents, Araceli and Lourdes.
After death of first wife but without the conjugal
partnership assets of the first marriage having
been partitioned and distributed, he got married a
second time to Araceli Hian Out of the second
marriage were born the other private respondents,
Fred, Heidi, and Henry. On January 22, 1973,
Anastacio donated to Henry, who was then only
seven years young, Lot No. 2736, which was part
of the conjugal partnership assets of the first
marriage. The donation was accepted on behalf of
Henry by his mother, Araceli. There is nothing in
the records of this case as to whether or not the
deed of donation was registered.
To compel the partition and distribution of the
conjugal partnership assets of the first marriage,
the petitioner, together with his two sisters, filed the
corresponding complaint against their father,
Anastacio. While the case was still pending
however, Anastacio died on, which compelled Luis
to file an amended complaint substituting as
defendant Araceli, in her personal capacity and as
guardian of the minors Fred, Heidi, and Henry. In a
compromise agreement reached (adopted by trial
court as its decision), the donated property was
given to the children of the first marriage. The
respondents claim mistake as this property has
already been donated to Henry.
Segura v. Land in dispute was originally registered in the
Segura name of Gertrudes Zamora. She died intestate
and without debts in 1936 and was survived by four
(1988) children, who never got around to dividing the
property among themselves. This controversy is
not among the four brothers, who are now also
deceased. It is Gertrudes's grandchildren by three
of her sons (the fourth having died without issue)
co-heir can only sell his successional rights.
In the case at bar, the fact that the sale executed by Evaristo Espique in favor of respondents and the
sale executed by Estefanio Espique in favor of petitioner were made before the partition of the property
among the co-heirs does not annul or invalidate the deeds of sale and both sales are valid. However,
the interests thereby acquired by petitioner and respondents are limited only to the parts that may be
ultimately assigned to Estefanio and Evaristo, respectively, upon the partition of the estate 7 subject to
provisions on subrogation of the other co-heirs to the rights of the stranger-purchaser provided in Article
1088 of the Civil Code.
Donation not valid.
Among those specifically designated in favor of the heirs of the first marriage was the whole property
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-740 comprised of six lots including lot No. 2736." In view
of that partition in 1967. Anastacio could no longer donate Lot No 2736 to Henry on January 22. 1973
because it had already been adjudicated "To The Heirs of the First Marriage" as the Compromise
Agreement specifically states. On the other hand, even it he (Anastacio) is included among the "Heirs
of the First Marriage" he could not donate a specific lot by metes and bounds, but only an aliquot part of
the whole mass of properties which he and his three children of his first marriage (with Jacinta Jaucian)
co-owned.
Even in the unlikely event that the statement regarding the liquidation and partition on February 15,
1967 would be found to be a mistake, still Anastacio could not have validly donated Lot No. 2736 to
Henry. Considering that all the properties specified in the Compromise Agreement were described
conjugal partnership properties of the first marriage, it follows that upon the death of Jacinta, the
conjugal partnership evolved into a co-ownership between her surviving spouse Anastacio, and her
three children, the petitioner and the two other private respondents, Araceli Hagosojos-Alindogan and
Lourdes Hagosojos-Nicolas. Anastacio became the owner of 5/8 of the mass of properties while each
of the three children, of 1/8. Thus, even in such a situation, and pending the partition of the properties
owned in common and the adjudication in his favor Lot No. 2736, Anastacio could not validly donate the
same at that time he claimed he did within the purview of the law on co-ownership.
As a person can sell only what he owns or is authorized to sell, the buyer can as a consequence
acquire no more than what the seller can legally transfer. The deed of partition being invalid as to the
other heirs, the vendors could dispose only of their respective shares in the land, or one-third only of
the property and not the other two-thirds as well which did not belong to them.
To repeat, the general rule is that no one can give what he does not have — nemo dat quod non habet.
Hence, even if it be assumed that Amojido had bought the land in good faith from the parties to the
extrajudicial partition, only so much of their share could be validly acquired by him, with the rest of the
 who are involved in this complaint for recovery of
ownership and possession of the disputed
inheritance, plus damages.
The conflict began when on April 6, 1941, three of
these nine grandchildren, namely, Nicolas,
Santiago and Gaudencio Segura, executed a deed
of extrajudicial partition arrogating the entire
property to themselves alone as equal pro
indiviso owners (thereby, curiously, excluding
Nicolas and Santiago's own brother and two
sisters, and Gaudencio's own sister, besides the
other two co-heirs.) This partition was not
registered immediately, but only in 1946, or five
years later.
Land was then subject of a sale to Amojido by the
parties who executed the extra-judicial partition.
Paulmitan v. CA Agatona Sagario Paulmitan died and left the two
following parcels of land. Agatona begot two
(1992) legitimate children, namely: Pascual Paulmitan,
died after his mother passed away, and Donato
Paulmitan, who is one of the petitioners. Pascual
Paulmitan, the other son of Agatona Sagario, is
survived by the respondents, who are his children.
The estate of Agatona remained unsettled and the
titles to the two lots mentioned above remained in
the name of Agatona. However, petitioner Donato
Paulmitan executed an Affidavit of Declaration of
Heirship, extrajudicially adjudicating unto himself
Lot No. 757 based on the claim that he is the only
surviving heir of Agatona Sagario. The affidavit was
filed with the Register of Deeds and TCT No.
35979 was issued in Donato's name.
As regards Lot No. 1091, Donato executed on May
28, 1974 a Deed of Sale over the same in favor of
petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa, his daughter.
Aromin v. A parcel of land was owned in common by the
Floresca siblings. One of them was able to secure different
tax declarations covering parts of the land. He then
(2006) sold these portions of the land.
property remaining under the ownership of the six excluded co-heirs In other words, Amojido
became pro indiviso co-owner of the land with the other six heirs, who retained title to their respective
shares although he had possession of the entire property. The portion pertaining to the herein
appellants should be deemed held by Amojido under an implied trust for their benefit, conformably to
the ruling in Bargayo v. Camumot, thus:
In law it is understood that the co-owners or co-heir who is in possession of an inheritance pro
indivisofor himself and in representation of his co-owners or co-heirs, if, as such owner, he administers
or takes care of the rest thereof with the obligation of delivering it to his co-owners or co-heirs, is under
the same situation as a depository, a lessee, or a trustee.
From the time of the death of Agatona Sagario Paulmitan to the subsequent passing away of her son
Pascual in 1953, the estate remained unpartitioned. Article 1078 of the Civil Code provides: "Where
there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common
by such heirs, subject to the payment of debts of the deceased." Donato and Pascual Paulmitan were,
therefore, co-owners of the estate left by their mother as no partition was ever made.
When Pascual Paulmitan died intestate in 1953, his children, the respondents, succeeded him in the
co-ownership of the disputed property. Pascual Paulmitan's right of ownership over an undivided
portion of the property passed on to his children, who, from the time of Pascual's death, became co-
owners with their uncle Donato over the disputed decedent estate.
When Donato Paulmitan sold on May 28, 1974 Lot No. 1091 to his daughter Juliana P. Fanesa, he was
only a co-owner with respondents and as such, he could only sell that portion which may be allotted to
him upon termination of the co-ownership. The sale did not prejudice the rights of respondents to one
half (1/2) undivided share of the land which they inherited from their father. It did not vest ownership in
the entire land with the buyer but transferred only the seller's pro-indiviso share in the property and
consequently made the buyer a co-owner of the land until it is partitioned.
An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other
person has a right to or interest in that same property, and who pays a full and fair price at the time of
the purchase or before receiving any notice of another person's claim. The honesty of intention that
constitutes good faith implies freedom from knowledge of circumstances that ought to put a prudent
person on inquiry.
The petitioners' knowledge that the subject property was, at one time, co-owned by Paulo, his brother
Alberto and sister Josefa should have impelled them to inquire and investigate, as any prudent vendee
should, about the status of the co-ownership before buying the subject property. The petitioners'
reliance on Paulo's word alone that he was the sole owner of the subject property when they bought the
same, despite their knowledge of facts that should have put them on guard, constitutes gross
negligence amounting to bad faith. They cannot therefore rightfully claim that they are buyers in good

VAGILIDAD VS. Loreto Labiao, together with his siblings, inherited
VAGILIDAD a parcel of land from their father. After their father’s
death, Loreto sold a portion of the land to Gabino
(2006) Jr. (respondent). After a few years, Loreto sold the
same portion of the land to petitioner. Respondents
filed a complaint for annulment of document,
reconveyance and damages with the RTC. The
RTC ruled that Loreto did not validly convey the lot
to respondent since at that time, the time of the
sale, the heirs of Loreto’s father did not partition
the land therefore Loreto could have only sold his
aliquot share and not a divided part designated by
metes and bounds. The CA reversed the RTC
decision, stating that when Loreto sold the portion
of the land, he already had the right as co-owner to
his share even if at that time, the property had not
yet been partitioned since the rights to succession
are transmitted from the moment of their father’s
death.
ANGELA Angela, Nieves and Antonio Tuason owned a
TUASON VS. parcel of land in common. When Nieves sold her
ANTONIO 1/3 share to respondent corporation, the latter,
TUASON and together with Angela and Antonio, entered into a
GREGORIO MOA wherein they agreed to have the whole lot
ARANETA, Inc. improved and subdivided into small lots and then
sold, the proceeds of the sale to be later divided
among them. The MOA provided a stipulation
faith.
Having established that the subject property was owned in common by Paulo and the siblings, it
necessarily follows that Paulo could only dispose to the petitioners his share in the subject property.
Article 493 of the Civil Code provides that "[e]ach co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and
of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and
even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the
effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion
which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership."
Under the said provision, while a co-owner has the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided
interest, nevertheless, as a co-owner he cannot alienate the shares of his other co-owners – nemo dat
qui non habet. Paulo, however, sold the entire subject property to the petitioners without the consent of
the co-owners. Following the well-established principle that the binding force of a contract must be
recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so – quando res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere
potest - the disposition affects only Paulo's sharepro indiviso, and the transferee, in this case the
petitioners, gets only what corresponds to Paulo's share in the partition of the subject property, i.e.,
one-half of the areas described as riceland, sandy land and swampland which constitute the subject
property.
The subject parcel, being an inherited property, is subject to the rules of co-ownership under the Civil
Code.
Co-ownership is the right of common dominion which two or more persons have in a spiritual part of a
thing, not materially or physically divided. Before the partition of the property held in common, no
individual or co-owner can claim title to any definite portion thereof. All that the co-owner has is an ideal
or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire property.
Loreto sold the subject property to Gabinoas a co-owner. loreto had a right, even before the partition of
the property to transfer in whole or in part his undivided interest in the lot even without the consent of
his co-heirs. This right is absolute in accordance with the well-settled doctrine that a co-owner has full
ownership of his pro-indivisoshare and has the right to alienate, assign or mortgage it, and substitute
another person for its enjoyment. Thus, what Gabino obtained by virtue of the sale were the same
rights as the vendor Loreto had as co-owner, in an ideal share equivalent to the consideration given
under their transaction.
Consequently, when Loreto sold the same portion of the lot to Wilfredo, he was no longer the owner of
the same property and therefore could not have validly sold it.
The mere fact that Loreto sold a definite portion of the co-owned lot by metes and bounds before
partition does not, per se, render the sale a nullity. In Lopez v. Vda. De Cuaycong, the fact that an
agreement purported to sell a concrete portion of a co-owned property does not render the sale void,
for it is well-established that the binding force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally
possible to do so.
In the case at bar, the contract of sale could be legally recognized. At the time of sale, Loretp had an
aliquot share of one-third but he sold more than that portion. It has been ruled that if a co-owner sells
more than his aliquot share in the property, the sale will affect only his share but not those of the other
co-owners who did not consent to the sale.
Article 400 is not applicable therefore the contract is valid.
The contract far from violating the legal provision that forbids a co-owner being obliged to remain a
party to the community, precisely has for its purpose and object the dissolution of the co-ownership and
of the community by selling the parcel held in common and dividing the proceeds of the sale among the
co-owners. The obligation imposed in the contract to preserve the co-ownership until all the lots shall
have been sold, is a mere incident to the main object of dissolving the co-owners. By virtue of the MOA,
the parties thereto practically and substantially entered into a contract of partnership as the
best and most expedient means of eventually dissolving the co-ownership, the life of said
 stating that the contract shall remain in full force
(1951) and effect during all the time it may be necessary
for respondent corporation to fully sell the property
in small and subdivided lots and to fully collect the
purchase prices.
Later, when Angela filed a complaint with the CFI
to order the partition of the property, the complaint
was dismissed.
The main contention of Angela is that the contract
should be declared null and void because its terms
violate the provisions of Art. 400 of the Civil Code.
JOSEFINA Petitioners and respodnent’s husband, Federico
VALDEZ et al. Valdez, Jr., are the heirs of the deceased spouses
vs. TEOFILA Federico Valdez, Sr., from whom they inherited a
OLORGA piece of land.
When Vadez, Sr. purchased the lot, the transfer of
the title in his name was never done because the
OCT was lost. After his death however, his heirs
(1973) were able to transfer the title through Valdez, Jr.,
whose name appeared on the deed of sale as the
only vendee. This was done pursuant to the wishes
of Mr. Quicho (a lessee of a portion of the lot0 who
advanced the money, in order that he could
facilitate the deed of sale between him and the
Valdezes, with the understanding that Federico
Valdez, Jr. will hold the same in trust for his other
brother and sisters.
However, upon Valdez, Jr.’s death, his wife,
respondent, tried to eject the plaintiffs.
When petitioners filed for an action for partition,
respondent claimed acquisitive prescription.
CONCEPCION Ernesto and Victor Roque are co-owners of a lot
ROQUE VS. IAC with their half-sister petitioner. They sold to her the
¾ portion of a lot which they owned. When
petitioner sought for a partition of the property,
respondents refused to acknowledge petitioner’s
(1988) claim of ownership of any portion of the lot.
Petitioner’s complaint for partition with specific
performance was granted by the RTC but reversed
by the IAC. The IAC stated that from the moment
respondents alleged absolute and exclusive
ownership of the whole lot, the RTC should have
immediately ordered the dismissal of the action for
partition and petitioner, if she so desired, should
have refilled the case but this time as an accion
reinvindicatoria and, should this action prosper, a
second action for partition would still have to be
instituted in order to effect division of the property.
partnership to end when the object of its creation shall have been attained.
And even assuming that Art. 400 of the Civil Code were applicable, under which the parties by
agreement may agree to keep the thing undivided for a period not exceeding 10 years, there should be
no fear that the remaining 1,600 sq. m. could not be disposed of within the four years left of the ten-
years period fixed by Art. 400.
As between co-owners, an action for partition does not prescribe.
Given the antecedents of the property and the fact that its acquisition by Federico Valdez, Jr. was for
the benefit not of himself alone but also of his brother and sisters, although for purposes of
convenience he was made to appear as the sole vendee, the juridical relation that arose among them
was one of co-ownership, with the plaintiffs-appellees actually in possession of a portion of the
property.
Under Article 494 of the Civil Code, "No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against
his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership."
Insofar as the aspect of extinctive prescription referred to in this article is concerned, it is but a
restatement of Article 1965 of the Spanish Civil Code, which provides: "As between co-heirs, co-
owners, or proprietors of adjacent estates, the action to demand the partition of the inheritance or of the
thing held in common, or the survey of the adjacent properties, does not prescribe."
And from the standpoint of acquisitive prescription, or prescription of ownership, this Court has held in
numerous decisions involving fiduciary relations such as those occupied by a trustee with respect to
the cestui que trust that as a general-rule the former's possession is not adverse and therefore cannot
ripen into a title by prescription.
Adverse possession in such a case requires, the concurrence of the following-circumstances: (a) that
the trustee has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que
trust; (b) that such, positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust and (c)
that the evidence thereon should be clear and conclusive. These circumstances are not present in this
case.
An action for partition may be seen to be at once an action for declaration of coownership and
for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the property involved.
An action for partition-which is typically brought by a person claiming to be co-owner of a specified
property against a defendant or defendants whom the plaintiff recognizes to be co-owners — may be
seen to present simultaneously two principal issues. First, there is the issue of whether the plaintiff is
indeed a co-owner of the property sought to be partitioned. Second, assuming that the plaintiff
successfully hurdles the first issue, there is the secondary issue of how the property is to be divided
between plaintiff and defendant.
Should the trial court find that the defendants do not dispute the status of the plaintiff as co-owner, the
court can forthwith proceed to the actual partitioning of the property involved. In case the defendants
assert in their Answer exclusive title in themselves adversely to the plaintiff, the court should not
dismiss the plaintiffs action for partition but, on the contrary and in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction, resolve the question of whether the plaintiff is co-owner or not. Should the trial court find
that the plaintiff was unable to sustain his claimed status as co-owner, or that the defendants are or
have become the sole and exclusive owners of the property involved, the court will necessarily have to
dismiss the action for partition. This result would be reached, not because the wrong action was

VIRGILIO Petitioner and respondent Senen are brother who
AGUILAR VS. purchased a house and lot for their father. Initially,
CA they agreed that petitioner’s share in the co-
ownership would be 2/3 while that of respondent
would be 1/3. However, by virtue of a written
memorandum, both agreed that their interests
(1993) would be equal, with Senen assuming the
remaining mortgage obligation of the original
owners with the SSS in exchange for his
possession and enjoyment of the house together
with their father. Since Virgilio was then disqualified
from obtaining a loan from SSS, the brothers
agreed that the deed of sale would be executed
and the title registered in the meantime in the
name of Senen. It was further agreed that Senen
would take care of their father and his needs.
When their father died, petitioner demanded from
Senen that he vacate the property so that it may be
sold and the proceeds divided among them, to
which the latter refused.
The trial court found them to be co-owners of the
house and lot, in equal shares on the basis of their
written agreement and ordered the sale of the
property and the proceeds divided between the
two. The CA set aside the order of the trial court.
REMEDIOS Private respondents are the children and
commenced by the plaintiff, but rather because the plaintiff having been unable to show co-ownership
rights in himself, no basis exists for requiring the defendants to submit to partition the property at stake.
If, upon the other hand, the court after trial should find the eidstence of co-ownership among the parties
litigant, the court may and should order the partition of the property in the same action. Judgment for
one or the other party being on the merits, the losing party (respondents in this case) may then appeal
the same. In either case, however, it is quite unnecessary to require the plaintiff to file another action,
separate and independent from that for partition originally instituted.
It must also be noted that Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that "each co-owner may demand at
any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concemed." No matter how
long the co-ownership has lasted, a co-owner can always opt out of the co-ownership, and provided the
defendant co-owners or co-heirs have theretofore expressly or impliedly recognized the co-ownership,
they cannot set up as a defense the prescription of the action for partition.
But if the defendants show that they had previously asserted title in themselves adversely to the plaintiff
and for the requisite period of time, the plaintiffs right to require recognition of his status as a co-owner
will have been lost by prescription and the court cannot issue an order requiring partition.
In this case, neither of the parties involved had asserted or manifested a claim of absolute and
exclusive ownership over the lot. The co-ownership of the property had continued to be recognized by
all the owners.
Since petitioner and respondents are co-owners of subject house and lot in equal shares, either one of
them may demand the sale of the house and lot at any time and the other cannot object to such
demand.
Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership,
and that each co-owner may demand at any time partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his
share is concerned.
Corollary to this rule, Art. 498 of the Code states that whenever the thing is essentially, indivisible and
the co-owners cannot agree that it be, allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be
sold and its proceeds accordingly distributed. This is resorted to (1) when the right to partition the
property is invoked by any of the co-owners but because of the nature of the property it cannot be
subdivided or its subdivision would prejudice the interests of the co-owners, and (2) the co-owners are
not in agreement as to who among them shall be allotted or assigned the entire property upon proper
reimbursement of the co-owners.
However, being a co-owner respondent has the right to use the house and lot without paying any
compensation to petitioner, as he may use the property owned in common long as it is in accordance
with the purpose for which it is intended and in a manner not injurious to the interest of the other co-
owners. Each co-owner of property held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole
property and may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure
the interests of his co-owners, the reason being that until a division is made, the respective
share of each cannot be determined and every co-owner exercises, together with his co-
participants joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition to his use and enjoyment
of the
same.
But when petitioner filed an action to compel the sale of the property and the trial court granted the
petition and ordered the ejectment of respondent, the co-ownership was deemed terminated and the
right to enjoy the possession jointly also ceased. Thereafter, the continued stay of respondent and his
family in the house prejudiced the interest of petitioner as the property should have been sold and the
proceeds divided equally between them.
Pastor did not acquire acquisitive prescription of ownership of 8/9 of the lots therefore respondents
SALVADOR and grandchildren of Alipio Yabo, who inherited 2 lots
GRACIA from him upon his death.
SALVADOR vs. Pastor Makibalo, who is married to Maria, daughter
CA and YABO of Alipio, claims that he purchased the shares of 7
of Alipio’s children and inherited Maria’s share. He
filed a complaint before the CFI for Quieting of
(1995) Title, Annulmnet of Documents and Damages
against private respondents, and that he may be
declared the absolute owner of 8/9 of the lots.
Respondents filed a complaint before the same
CFI for partition and quieting of title with damages
against Pastor and petitioners, who are strangers
to the Yabo family and assignees of Pastor.
The CFI ruled in favor of petitioners but the CA
overturned the decision.
JOSE MARIA Petitioner filed an action against respondents for
RAMIREZ vs. the partition of a parcel of land owned by both
JOSE EUGENIO parties pro indiviso (1/6 to the petitioner, 5/6 to the
RAMIREZ, et. al. defendants).
Only 2 of the defendants did not object to the
(1967) partition, while the other defendants objected upon
the theory that said partition is "materially and
legally" impossible and "would work great harm
and prejudice to the co-owners."
The lower court ruled in favor of petitioner for the
partition of the property. Respondents argue that
instead of making the aforementioned segregation,
plaintiff's share should be sold to them, as provided
for in Art. 495, since if the plan of partition is
executed, there will be “inestimable damage” to the
property.
MARINA REYES Petitioners filed with the CFI a complaint for
VS. injunction and damages, seeking to enjoin private
CONCEPCION respondents from selling to a third party their pro-
indiviso shares as co-owners in eight parcels of
registered land. Petitioner claims that under Article
(1990) 1620 of the new Civil Code, they, as co-owners,
had a preferential right (or preemptive right) to
purchase these shares from private respondents
for a reasonable price.
action for partition was granted by the SC.
Article 494 of the Civil Code which provides that each co-owner may demand at any time the
partition of the common property implies that an action to demand partition is imprescriptible or
cannot be barred by laches. The imprescriptibility of the action cannot, however, be invoked
when one of the co-owners has possessed the property as exclusive owner and for a period
sufficient to acquire it by prescription.
Prescription as a mode of acquiring ownership requires a continuous, open, peaceful, public, and
adverse possession for a period of time fixed by law. In order that a co-owner's possession may be
deemed adverse to the cestui que trust or the other co-owners, the following elements must
concur: (1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui
que trust or the other co-owners; (2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to
the cestui que trust or the other co-owners; and (3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and
convincing.
In this case, the period of prescription started to run only from the time Pastor filed complaint for
Quieting of Title. However, this was tolled when his co-heirs, the private respondents herein, instituted
an action for partition of the lots. Hence, the adverse possession by Pastor being for only about six
months would not vest in him exclusive ownership of his wife's estate, and absent acquisitive
prescription of ownership, laches and prescription of the action for partition will not lie in favor of
Pastor.
There is nothing to show that, after segregating plaintiff's share, the buildings left on the remaining
portions representing defendants' share, would be unserviceable, either for commercial or for
residential purposes.
On the contrary, it seems obvious that plaintiff would not insist upon the partition prayed for, if his
share were unserviceable for either — particularly the commercial — purpose. In fact, every one of the
aforementioned commissioners, including the one representing defendants herein, recommended the
segregation of plaintiff's share. The commissioners merely failed to agree on the precise configuration
thereof.
In this jurisdiction, the legal provisions on co-ownership do not grant to any of the owners of a property
held in common a pre-emptive right to purchase the pro-indiviso shares of his co-owners. Petitioners'
reliance on Article 1620 of the New Civil Code is misplaced.
Article 1620 contemplates of a situation where a co-owner has alienated his pro-indiviso shares to a
stranger. By the very nature of the right of "legal redemption", a co-owner's light to redeem is invoked
only after the shares of the other co-owners are sold to a third party or stranger to the co-ownership.
But in the case at bar, at the time petitioners filed their complaint for injunction and damages against
private respondents, no sale of the latter's pro-indiviso shares to a third party had yet been made. Thus,
Article 1620 of the New Civil Code finds no application to the case at bar.
Neither do petitioners have the legal right to enjoin private respondents from alienating their pro-indiviso
shares to a third party. The rights of a co-owner of a property are clearly specified in Article 493. The
law does not prohibit a co-owner from selling, alienating or mortgaging his ideal share in the property
held in common. The law merely provides that the alienation or mortgage shall be limited only to the

CORNELIO Restituo Romero gained possession of a
RAMOS VS. considerable tract of land located in Nueva Ecija.
DIRECTOR OF He took advantage of the Royal Decree to obtain a
LANDS4 possessory information title to the land and was
registered as such.
(1918) Parcel No. 1 included within the limits of the
possessory information title of Romero was sold to
Cornelio Ramos, herein petitioner.
Ramos instituted appropriate proceedings to have
his title registered.
Director of Lands opposed on the ground that
Ramos had not acquired a good title from the
Spanish government.
Director of Forestry also opposed on the ground
that the first parcel of land is forest land.
It has been seen however that the predecessor in
interest to the petitioner at least held this tract of
land under color of title.
J.M. TUASON, Petitioner’s ownership of the land in question is
Inc. VS. admitted by Vicente and Ester Jurilla and support
VICENTE by a TCT. Jurilla took possession of a portion of
JURILLA5 said property and constructed therein a house and
other improvements without petitioner’s consent of
(1977) knowledge. Hence, petitioner claims rents for the
area occupied by the Jurillas.
Respondents claim that said portion of the property
occupied by them was acquired by them by virtue
of an alleged deed of sale executed by one
Florencio Deudor in their favor. They also claim
that they have improvements introduced and that
theya re builders in good faith.
Javier v Respondnets filed a petition for reconveyance
4
Digest taken from batasnatin.com
5
taken from http://www.scribd.com/doc/75727043/03-Property-Reviewer
portion of the property which may be allotted to him upon termination of the co-ownership.
Inasmuch as the parties were in agreement as regards the fact that the subject properties should not be
partitioned, and private respondents continued to manifest their desire to terminate the co-ownership
arrangement between petitioners and themselves, respondent trial judge acted within his jurisdiction
when he issued his order requiring the parties to answer certain questions for the purpose of
determining whether or not the legal conditions for the applicability of Article 498 of the New Civil Code
were present in the case.
The sale of the property held in common referred to in the above article is resorted to when (1) the right
to partition the property among the co-owners is invoked by any of them but because of the nature of
the property, it cannot be subdivided or its subdivision [See Article 495 of the New Civil Code] would
prejudice the interests of the co-owners (See Section 5 of Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court) and
(2) the co-owners are not in agreement as to who among them shall be allotted or assigned the entire
property upon reimbursement of the shares of the other co-owners.
The actual occupancy of a part of the land by Romero described in the instrument giving color of title is
sufficient to give title to the entire tract of land.
The general rule is that possession and cultivation of a portion of a tract of land under the claim of
ownership of all is a constructive possession of all, if the remainder is not in the adverse possession of
another.
The claimant has color of title; he acted in good faith and he has open, peaceable, and notorious
possession of a portion of the property, sufficient to apprise the community and the world that the land
was for his enjoyment.
Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square
meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession.
Ramos and his predecessor in interest fulfilled the requirements of the law on supposition that the
premises consisted of agricultural public land.
Since Deudor is not the owner of the property, the latter could not transmit the title to respondents.
Petitioner presented a TCT in it’s name while respondents based their rights on the alleged Testimonial
Title. Thus, petitioner’s title is indefeasible and against the whole world, while that of respondent is not
and could not even be considered an imperfect title as well known in Land Registration Act 496.
The fact that respondents admit not only in their pleading but also in open court that petitioner
corporation is the owner of the property cannot be seriously questioned by respondents and its right
thereto imprescriptible.
At the time they bought the property from Deudor, they did not inquire whether the said Deudor was a
registered owner of the property. Besides, they never registered the deed of sale in the Office of the
Registry of Deed of QC. In order that defendantsmay be called buyers in good faith, it must be shown
by clear and convincing evidence that upon buying the property, they were not aware of any flaw in
their title or made of acquisition. The fact that Jurilla tendered to the Bulacan Subdivision the balance of
the consideration and refused to accept the tender, is a clear indication that notice to Jurilla, who is a
lawyer, that the party from whom he was supposed to have bought the property was not the owner.
The sale of one-half of the conjugal property without liquidation of the partnership is void.
Concepcion against the petitioners, Javier et. al for having
taken in possession land subject of the dispute
(1979) since 1945.
Petitioners argue that they have acquired the said
lot in dispute partly by purchase and partly by
inheritance and their predecessors in interest have
been in possession of the same adversely,
publicly, continuously, peacefully, and in the
concept of owners against the whole world since
the Spanish time up to the present;
Caram v Laureta On 1947 Mata sold a parcel of land to respondent.
However such sale was not registered because it
was not acknowledged before a notary public.
(1981) On 1945, the same land was sold by Mata to
Petitioner Caram through his agents which was
acknowledged before a notary public. An OCT was
issued to Petitioner.
Thus respondent filed an action for nullity, recovery
of ownership and/or reconveyance with damages
and attorney's fees against Petitioners and he
Register of Deeds.
Manotok Realty Petitioner is the registered owner of parcel of land
v CA and Carillo obtained from a purchase from the Testate Estate
of Tambunting de Legarda. However, the lot
cannot be subdivided because it is occupied by
(1985) several houses, including one occupied by
respondent Carillo.
Failing to recover possession of the property,
petitioner filed a reivindicatory action against
respondent.
Petitioner argues that respondent is not a builder
and possessor in good faith. Since if he was in
good faith he should have verified with the Register
of Deeds who the registered owner is.
Tan Queto v CA Respondent acquired a land allegedly by purchase
or donation and a TCT was acquired for the said
land
A contract of lease for ten years was entered
(1987) between respondent and petitioner
Later on, a barter agreement was executed
The established rule is that one cannot acquire title to a registered land by prescription or adverse
possession. Adverse, notorious and continuous possession under claim of ownership for the period
fixed by law is ineffective against a Torrens title. The right to secure possession under a decree of
registration does not prescribe.
As possessors in good faith, petitioners are entitled to the fruits received before their possession was
legally interrupted upon receipt of judicial summons in connection with the filing of the complaint for
reconveyance on October 17, 1959.
The ownership of the land is vested on Laureta.
Art. 1544 provides that If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees…Should it be
immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first
recorded it in the Registry of Property.
In the case at hand, the agents of Caram acted in bad faith. They should have known that there was a
previous sale to Laureta and should have inquired about it. The acts of the agent are deemed acts of
the principal and therefore Caram is deemed to be in bad faith. Since Caram was a registrant in bad
faith, the situation is as if there was no registration at all.
It was Laureta who was a possessor in good faith. A possessor in good faith is one who is not aware
that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it. Laureta was first in
possession of the property. It is true that Mata had alleged that the deed of sale in favor of Laureta was
procured by force. Such defect, however, was cured when, after the lapse of four years from the time
the intimidation ceased, Marcos Mata lost both his rights to file an action for annulment or to set up
nullity of the contract as a defense in an action to enforce the same.
The Petitioner is entitled to the ownership and possession of the land in dispute..
A possessor in good faith is one who is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any
flaw which invalidates it. One who acquires real estate with knowledge of a defect or lack of title in his
vendor cannot claim that he has acquired title thereto in good faith as against the true owner of the land
or of an interest therein. The same rule must be applied to one who has knowledge of facts which
should put a reasonable man upon his guard, and then claims that he acted in good faith under the
belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor.
When the deed of' assignment was executed in favor of the respondent, the disputed lot was already
registered and titled in the name of the petitioner. Such an act of registration served as a constructive
notice to the whole world and the title issued in favor of petitioner made his ownership conclusive.
Respondent’s failure to exercise that measure of precaution which was reasonably required of a
prudent man in order to acquaint him with the defects in the title of his vendor precludes him from
claiming possession in good faith
The property is the exclusive property of petitioner Tan Queto.
Petitioner nursed the belief that the lot was actually respondent’s(making him in bad faith), still
respondent’s failure to prohibit him from building despite her knowledge that construction was actually
being done, makes her also in bad faith. The net resultant of mutual bad faith would entitle petitioner to
the rights of a builder in good faith (Art. 448, Civil Code), ergo, reimbursement should be given him if
 between petitioner and respondent where
petitioner became the owner of the land.
Petitioner then proceeded to construct a concrete
building without any objection from respondent.
Respondent is now suing petitioner for
reconveyance of the title of the property of the
land.
The question now is whether Petitioner is a builder
in bad faith not entitled to reimbursement.
Escritor v IAC In a cadastral proceedings, the court rule that
Escritor(older/petitioner) was the owner of the lot in
dispute and the latter started taking possession of
it.
(1987) Acuna then filed a petition for review alleging fraud
and misrepresentation.
The Court ruled in favor of Acuna as owner and
ordered petitioners to vacate
respondent decides to appropriate the building for herself.
However, it is to be noted that in the case at hand, due to the barter agreement, petitioner became the
owner-possessor of the lot. He is a builder-possessor jus possidendi because he is the owner himself.
A possessor in bad faith is one in possession of a property knowing that his title thereto is defective.
Here it was not shown that petitioners were aware of any flaw in their title nor in the title of their
predecessors.
Assuming Escritor(older) was in bad faith, this should not prejudice his successors in interest. The rule
is that only personal knowledge of flaw in one’s title can make on e a possessor in bad faith, for bad
faith is not transmissible even to an heir.
Under Art 527, good faith is always presumed and upon him who allges bad faith on the part of the
possessor rests the burden of proof.

Later, a suit was again filed by respondent against

the petitioners(heirs of original petitioner) to
recover the damages for the fruits acquired during
the pendency of the earlier case.

The main issue is whether the petitioners were in

bad faith and should be held liable for damages.

De la Cruz IAC Gregorio Monte owned two parcels of land and was They were not buyers in good faith.
survived by his wife Dela Cruz(petitioner) and
children of Gregorio’s siblings (respondent). The buyers herein had notices of the claim of third persons aside from the claim or right of the
Respondents filed a petition to recover the registered owners. These claims were annotated on the two (2) titles of the land.
(1988) possession and ownership of the lands in dispute. A purchaser of a valued piece of property cannot just close his eyes to facts which should put a
CFI ruled in their favor and ordered that the lands reasonable man upon his guard and then claim that he acted in good faith under the belief that there
be surrendered to them. CA affirmed and the were no defect in the title of the vendors. Respondents-buyers should have acted with that measure of
decision became fina. precaution which may reasonably be required to a prudent man in a like situation.
Respondents executed an extrajudicial partition
representing themselves as the only legal heirs of
Gregorio. They sold the lots to the Rabara’s (co-
respondents)
Petitioners then filed a complaint for partition but
this was denied by the lower court. The appellate
court reversed and remanded the case to the lower
court. Respondents thus filed this petition for
certiorari.
One of the issues presented was whether or not
the buyers of lands were buyers in good faith.

Suobiron v CA The parcels of land subject of the dispute was
originally awarded to the Adelantar’s in a court
(1995) decision. However the records were burned. Thus
a motion was filed for their reconstitution which was
granted.
The decision in Civil Case No. 938 declaring the Adelantar spouses owners of the two (2) parcels of
land claimed by Basilia Lorezo, Isabel Lorezo and Canuto Lucero is conclusive upon the parties therein
as well as their successors-in-interest, the parties herein, under the doctrine of res judicata.
It may be that petitioners acquired the disputed properties in good faith and had since then occupied
the same but suchbona fide character of possession ceased when they were served summons.
 Taking advantage of the chaotic situation at the
time, the Lorezo’s appropriated the property for
themselves. Thus the Ponce’s filed a petition to
recover the property from them which was granted
in Civil Case No. 938.
The property became the subject of a cadastral
survey and thus the Adelantar (now in the person
of Ponce, widow of Adelantar) again claimed
ownership. However, the Suobiron’s are also
claiming ownership on the basis of the sale
between their predecessors in interest and the
Lorezo’s.
Thus the present case for quieting of title.
One the issues raised was whether or not the
Suobiron’s were in good faith.
Banco Espanol A certain Reyes was indebted to Petitioner and
Filipino v secured it with mortgages and pledges of
Peterson properties.
Petitioner filed a case against respondent for a
(1907) judgment to be rendered declaring that under the
contract of pledge they had the right to apply the
proceeds of the sale of the said goods to the
payment of the debt for the security of which the
said merchandise was pledged, with preference
over the claim of the other defendants.
Astudillo v Respondent filed in behalf of Ramon Mitra for the
PHHC purchase of the lot in dispute. This was approved.
However, the lot was in the possession of petitioner
Astudillo. Petitioner that she had been a squatter
(1976) since 1957 but requested the PHHC that the award
be granted to her instead of Mitra.
Thus she filed a petition to have the lot in dispute
be sold to her.
Arcal v CA Defendants occupied the subject lot in dispute
allegedly on the implied tolerance of plaintiffs.
Finally on 1984, an ejectment suit was filed by
(1998) plaintiffs against defendants. On the same year
defendants also filed a suit to recover the lot in
dispute against plaintiffs but this case was
dismissed for failure to prosecute.
As regards the ejectment suit, the court renderd a
decision ordering to the defendants to vacate but
the CA reversed the said decision in 1992 stating
that the occupation was not on the mere tolerance
Possession acquired in good faith may not lose this character except in the case and from the moment
facts exist which show that the possessor is not unaware that he possesses the thing improperly or
wrongfully, conformably with Art. 528 of the Civil Code.
As held in Tacas v Tobon, to every possessor in good faith there comes a time when he is considered
a possessor in bad faith. When the owner or possessor with a better right comes along, when he
becomes aware that what he had taken for granted is at least doubtful, and when he learns the grounds
in support of the adverse contention, good faith ceases
The contract in question was, therefore, a perfect contract of pledge under articles 1857 and 1863 of
the Civil Code, it having been conclusively shown that the pledgee took charge and possession of the
goods pledged through a depository and a special agent appointed by it, each of whom had a duplicate
key to the warehouse wherein the said goods were stored, and that the pledgee, itself, received and
collected the proceeds of the goods as they were sold.
The fact that the debtor, Reyes, procured purchasers and made arrangements for the sale of the goods
pledged and that the bills for the goods thus sold were signed by him does not affect the validity of the
contract, for the pledgor, Reyes, continued to be the owner of the goods, (art. 1869, Civil Code), he
being the one principally interested in the sale of the property on the best possible terms.
As a squatter, she has no possessory rights over Lot 16. In the eyes of the law, the award to Mitra did
not prejudice her since she was bereft of any rights over the said lot which could have been impaired by
that award.
Also, She is not a bona fide occupant of. The State is committed to promote social justice and to
maintain adequate social services in the field of housing but the State's solicitude for the destitute and
the have-nots does not mean that it should tolerate usurpations of property, public or private. Her act of
squatting on a government-owned lot and then demanding that the lot be sold her because she does
not yet own a residential lot and house is not justified
As held in Bernards v Bernards:
“In carrying out its social readjustment policies, the government could not simply lay aside moral
standards, and aim to favor usurpers, squatters, and intruders, unmindful of the lawful and unlawful
origin and character of their occupancy. Such a Policy would perpetuate conflicts instead of attaining
their just solution.”
The rule is that possession by tolerance is lawful, but such possession becomes unlawful upon demand
to vacate made by the owner and the possessor by tolerance refuses to comply with such demand. A
person who occupies the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission, without any contract
between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing
which, a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy. The status of the possessor is analogous
to that of a lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy continued by
tolerance of the owner. In such case , the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession is to be
counted from the date of the demand to vacate
An unlawful detainer suit involves solely the issue of physical or material possession over the
property or possession de facto, that is who between the plaintiff and the defendant has a better right to
possess the property in question. Where, however, the issue is who has the better and the legal right
 since the tolerance was withdrawn when an order to possess or to whom possession de jure pertains, accion publiciana in proper. In the case at bar,
to vacate was made on them. Thus unlawful petitioners’ complaint for unlawful detainer was confined to recovery of de facto or physical possession
detainer was not a proper remedy. of the property and was resorted to after private respondents has indubitably failed in their suit assailing
petitioners’ right to ownership.

Petition of Spouses Yu granted.

Refuerzo, Ernesto Dumlao, Jose Alla and two other
persons defrauded Marcelo Steel Corporation in
Citing Chua Hai vs. Kapunan, Jr.:
the sum of P95,434.50 as the value of 90,890 kilos
The acquirer and possessor in good faith of a chattel or movable property is entitled to
of scrap materials delivered to Refuerzo which
be respected and protected in his possession, as if he were the true owner thereof, until
were not paid for.
a competent court rules otherwise.
The scrap metals were later sold by Refuerzo et al
The filing of an information charging that the chattel was illegally obtained through estafa from
to the Spouses Yu. Marcelo Steel filed case of
its true owner by the transferor of the bona fide possessor does not warrant disturbing the
estafa against Refuerzo et al and Spouses Yu. The
Yu v Honrado possession of the chattel against the win of the possessor.
charges against the spouses were dropped.
However, a warrant for search and seizure was still
(1980) The Yu spouses bought the scrap engine blocks in good faith for 44,000 from the alleged swindler
obtained against the Spouses Yu. The warrant was
without any notice that the same were obtained under false pretenses or by means of a bouncing
implemented and police officers seized from the
check. The purchase by the Yu spouses of the scrap engine blocks from Refuerzo, doing business
Soledad Junk Shop 42.8 metric tons of engine
under the tradename C. C. Varried Corporation, was covered by a sales invoice and seemed to have
blocks, which were loaded in six trucks and brought
been made in the ordinary course of business.
for safekeeping to the premises of Marcelo Steel
Corporation.
Restitution should not be required in a case where the offended party voluntarily delivered the thing to
the offender-purchaser in the expectation of being paid the price and where, thereafter, the offender
Spouses Yu seek to recover the scrap iron they
sold the thing to an innocent third party. That situation should be distinguished from the cases of theft
allegedly purchased in good faith.
and robbery where the offended party was involuntarily deprived of his property.

D. Possession
1. Concept of Owner
Donato v CA The land in dispute is Lot 5145, CAD, 325-D of the Alaminos Cadastre,
located at Brgy. Inerangan, Alaminos, Pangasinan. Said land is an
(1993) unregistered riceland used to be owned by Rosario Fontanilla, deceased
mother of the respondents, as her paraphernal property. Said Rosario
Fontanilla died in 1971 in Davao City and is survived by her five children.
All of the said children were born in Inerangan, Alaminos, Pangasinan.
However, between 1957 and 1967, Rosario Fontanilla and her children
migrated separately to Davao City.
Petitioners are the registered owners of a parcel of land, denominated as
Lot No. 5303, CAD, 325-D of Alaminos Cadastre. Petitioners purchased
the land from the Rural Bank of Urbiztondo, Inc. after the said bank
foreclosed the mortgage constituted thereon by one Carolina Abrigo.
Believing that the land which they purchased from the Rural Bank of
Urbiztondo is Lot 5145, CAD, 325-A of Alaminos Cadastre, petitioners
occupied the said land in 1982 and are still in possession of the same up
time of filing of case by respondent.
Petitioners allege that Carolina Abrigo (owner whose mortgage over the
land was foreclosed) acquired her title from one Jose Ochave. Ochave,
on the other hand, bought the land from Basilio Rarang in his capacity as
agent of Rosario Fontanilla as evidenced by an SPA. They allege that
The SPA which petitioners claim Rosario Fontanilla executed authorizing the sale
of the subject parcel of land is null and void (no signature by notary public; the
person who signed is the agent and not the purported principal). This being the
case, all subsequent transactions involving Lot 5145 and springing from the
Special Power of Attorney are also null and void. Consequently, on this alone,
petitioner's claim of ownership should be rejected outright.
Petitioners assert that the appellate court failed to consider their long and
continuous possession over the disputed lot as equivalent to possession in the
concept of owners.
 Petitioners are wrong! Possession, to constitute the foundation of a
prescriptive right, must be possession under a claim of title or it
must be adverse. Petitioners herein cannot be said to be in
possession of the land under a claim of title, since it has been
established that petitioners' title covers a different parcel of land;
more so, can it be considered that petitioners are in adverse
possession thereof.
Petitioners are guilty of bad faith. Having been issued a certificate of title, which
states the exact metes and bounds of the real property covered, they are thus
aware of the extent of their domain. Hence, they are estopped from claiming a
piece of land that is entirely distinct from that which is covered by their title. This
Court cannot simply support the argument set forth by petitioners based merely
on their honest belief that their title pertained to the disputed land.
 the parcel subject of this controversy is the very same Lot No. 5303 over
which petitioners hold the title of ownership. It was a matter of oversight,
they assert, on the part of the Bureau of Lands, that the identity of these
parcels was not reflected in their title.

The property in dispute is a parcel of residential land situated in Dampol

2nd, Pulilan, Bulacan.
CA made following findings of fact: Said land was the subject of the
Kasulatang-Biling-Mabibiling-Muli executed on November 25, 1932, by
Emilia Camacho (surviving widow of Catalino Esguerra), Jose C.
Esguerra and Socorro Esguerra, conveying or selling this land to the
spouses, Victoriano Felipe and Guillerma de la Cruz, with right to
repurchase the same within a period of five years, but that the vendors-
a-retro failed to repurchase the land. Since the date of the sale the
spouses Victoriano Felipe and Guillerma de la Cruz, possessed and
lived on this land. The private respondent was living with her parents on
the land, and upon their deaths, she continued to live on and possess
the same.
On November 29, 1961 private respondent Primitiva de Jesus executed
De Jesus v CA a sworn statement declaring herself the only heir of the deceased
Victoriano Felipe and adjudicating to herself the ownership of the land in
() question.
More than twelve years later or on April 27, 1973, petitioners filed an
action for recovery of ownership and possession and quieting of title to
the abovementioned piece of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 2383,
alleging among others: "that their grandfather, Santiago de Jesus during
his lifetime owned the residential lot; that Santiago de Jesus died before
the outbreak of World War II, leaving three (3) sons, namely: Mariano,
Exequiel, and Jose, all surnamed de Jesus; that Mariano de Jesus died
on September 3, 1956 leaving eight (8) surviving children, namely:
Edgardo, Remedios, Juanita, Juliano, Jose, Flordeliza, Reynaldo, and
Ernesto, all surnamed de Jesus and all of them plaintiffs; that Exequiel
de Jesus died on April 3, 1948, survived by two (2) children — Priscilo
and Corazon, both surnamed de Jesus, also plaintiffs in this case; while
Jose de Jesus died before the outbreak of World War II without any
issue.
The tax receipts and declarations of ownership for tax purposes upon which
private respondent basically anchors her claim, are not incontrovertible evidence
of ownership; they only become evidence of ownership acquired by prescription
when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the property.
Private respondent contends that granting that it was formerly owned by their late
grandfather, they (petitioners) have lost whatever right they may have over the
land by extinctive prescription" for the reason that she, private respondent has
acquired the same by acquisitive prescription.
 Victoriano Felipe was residing in the house of Santiago de Jesus simply
because he was married to Guillerma de la Cruz, daughter of Maria
Reyes by a first marriage, who, obviously, was living with her mother
who had taken Santiago de Jesus for her second husband.
 Victoriano Felipe and his family were residing in the land by mere
tolerance. In effect, their possession of the contested lot was neither
exclusive nor in the concept of owner. Possession, to constitute the
foundation of a prescriptive right, must be possession under a claim of
title or it must be adverse or in the concept of owner or concepto de
dueño
The "Kasulatang-Biling-Mabibiling-Muli" was not even given to private respondent
by her parents; she admitted having found it in the house although they
mentioned its existence to her when they were still alive. Under the
circumstances, the prescriptive period cannot be considered to have accrued
during the lifetime of Victoriano Felipe.

2. Presumption of just title

Heirs of Jumero Heirs of Jumero, as the grandchildren and great grandchildren of
v Lizares Benedicto Jumero, demand the restitution of a piece of land which
is, and has been for the past forty years, in the possession of
(1910) Jacinto Lizares. It is alleged in the complaint that this land belonged
to Benedicto Jumero, and that he willed it of his four children, all
now deceased as well as the said Jumero, named Luisa, Felix,
Florentino, and Pedro, and that the plaintiffs, grandchildren and
great grandchildren, descend from the three last mentioned.
The land passed into the possession of Jacinto Lizares, for the sum
of 50 pesos, about forty years before. The reason for his transfer
was the fact that Nicolas Jumero, a son of Felix, was drafted for the
army, and to secure his release from the military service, or to pay
the attorney who was to negotiate the release, the 50 pesos were
The possessor by virtue or ownership has in his favor the legal presumption that he
holds possession by reason of a sufficient title and he cannot be forced to show it.
Lizares has in his favor the legal presumption that he possesses the land under
sufficient title and he cannot be obliged to produce it.
A purchase verbally made gives a perfect title which, with the occupation or
possession of the thing, confers ownership upon the possessor, provided that he holds
himself out as its owner, until it be proved that he is not. It was incumbent upon the
plaintiffs to prove a character distinct from that of owner, and only then could they
compel the defendant to prove title which actually confers upon him the status of
owner. But the petitioners were unable to prove a character distinct from that of owner,
by due and sufficient proof of a title under mortgage, or that of antichresis. And this
they were unable to do, for the reason that, as established at the trial, no instrument
whatever was executed of the alleged mortgage of or of such an antichresis; and, at
 required.
all times, at least since the promulgation of the Civil Code, the mortgage and the
The plaintiffs claim that the land was delivered under mortgage in
antichresis, as restrictions of the ownership, must necessarily be recorded in writing,
order that Lizares might have the usufruct until it should be
under the first paragraph of rule 4 of the transitory provisions of the Civil Code, in
redeemed through the payment of the 50 pesos. The defendants
connection with articles 1875, 1279, and 1280.
assert the land was sold outright to Lizares for the price of 50 pesos.

The land in question has been covered by a Torrens certificate of title (OCT No. 6386
in the name of Laura, and its derivative certificates) before CDC became the
registered owner by purchase from China Bank. In all that time, neither the respondent
nor his siblings opposed the transactions causing the various transfers. In fact, the
The subject of this case is a registered parcel of land that was
respondent admitted in his complaint that the registration of the land in the name of
originally owned by Isaias Lara, the respondent’s maternal
Laura alone had been with the knowledge and upon the agreement of the entire Lara-
grandfather. Upon the death of Isaias Lara in 1930, the property
Mateo family.
passed on to his children, namely: Miguela, Perfecta and Felicidad,
Worthy of mention is that Candido, Jr., Leonardo, and Cesar’s defense in the
and a grandson, Rosauro.
ejectment case brought by CDC against them was not predicated on a claim of
Felicidad Lara-Mateo had five children, namely: Laura, respondent
their ownership of the property, but on their being agricultural lessees or
Renato, Cesar, Candido, Jr. and Leonardo. With the agreement of
tenants of CDC.
the entire Lara-Mateo family, a deed of sale covering the property
Petitioners failed to adequately prove their grandfather’s ownership of the land. They
was executed in favor of Laura, who, in 1967, applied for land
merely showed six tax declarations. It has been held by this Court that, as against a
registration. After the application was granted, Original Certificate of
Casimiro v transfer certificate of title, tax declarations or receipts are not adequate proofs of
Title (OCT) No. 6386 was issued in Laura’s sole name.
Mateo ownership. Granting arguendo that the land was really owned by the petitioners’
Laura sold land to Pe, who in turn constituted a mortgage on the
grandfather, petitioners did not even attempt to show how the land went from the
property in favor of China Bank as security for a loan. In the end,
(2011) patrimony of their grandfather to that of CDC.
China Bank foreclosed the mortgage, and consolidated its
The CA’s ascribing of bad faith to CDC based on its knowledge of the adverse
ownership of the property in 1985 after Pe failed to redeem. Thus,
possession of the respondent’s siblings at the time it acquired the property from China
TCT No. (99527) T-11749-A was issued in the name of China Bank.
Bank was absolutely unfounded and unwarranted. That possession did not translate to
In 1988, China Bank executed a deed of conditional sale in favor of
an adverse claim of ownership that should have put CDC on actual notice of a defect
petitioner CDC. On June 6, 1991, CDC brought an action for
or flaw in the China Bank’s title, for the respondent’s siblings themselves, far from
unlawful detainer against the respondent’s siblings and the other
asserting ownership in their own right, even characterized their possession only as
occupants of the property.
that of mere agricultural tenants. Under no law was possession grounded on
Respondent, on the other hand, brought an action for quieting of
tenancy a status that might create a defect or inflict a flaw in the title of the
title, reconveyance of four-fifths of the land, and damages against
owner. Consequently, due to his own admission in his complaint that the respondent’s
CDC and Laura.
own possession was not any different from that of his siblings, there was really nothing
– factually or legally speaking – that ought to have alerted CDC or, for that matter,
China Bank and its predecessors-in-interest, about any defect or flaw in the title.

3. Good Faith
Calagan v CFI Mangulon Calagan and his wife Takura were granted
a homestead application over a parcel of land.
(1980) Takura died and was survived by her husband and
their children. On August 8, 1961, Calagan and his
daughter, Paula sold a portion of 9,230 square
meters of their homestead to private respondent,
Petra Sandoval in consideration of the sum of
P2,340.00. Petitioners’ title to the land was borrowed
by private respondent Sandoval so that the latter
could have the sale annotated thereon.
Sandoval was given the title so that the sale could be
annotated. Thereafter, Calagan offered to repurchase
the land but Sandoval didn't agreed. She
Under Article 1616, the vendor a retro cannot avail himself of the right of repurchase without
returning to the vendee the price of the sale, the expenses of the contract and other legitimate
payments, and the necessary and useful expenses made on the thing sold. There can be no question
but that the house which private respondent constructed is a useful expense, defined as that which
increases the value or augments the income of the property, as contrasted to a necessary expense
which is incurred for the preservation of the thing.
However, Article 1616 should be read with Article 456 and 457. Applying Article 547, the
homesteader desiring to repurchase should be given the option to require the vendee a retro to
remove the useful improvements on the land subject of the sale a retro, which option is not granted
the vendor a retro under Article 1616. Under the latter Article, the vendor a retro must pay for the
useful improvements introduced by the vendee a retro, otherwise, the latter may retain possession of
the property until reimbursement is made. To allow a vendee a retro of a homestead, however, the
right of retention until payment of useful expenses is made by the redemptioner would be to render
 continuously refused and was only willing to comply if
Calagan would reimburse the value of the house
constructed on the parcel of land. This prompted
petitioners to file an action for reconveyance, on
which the trial court ruled in their favor, given that
they pay for the value of the house built on good faith
by Sandoval.
CFI ordered the Heirs of Calagan to pay Sandoval
the the value of the house constructed in “good faith”.
The heirs argue that only necessary expenses are
subject to reimbursement. House constructed on a
coconut land is not necessary. It is only useful.
Petitioners filed a complaint for the annulment of titles
of various parcels of land registered in the names of
Melba Limbaco, Linda Logarta, Ramon Logarta,
Eugenio Amores, New Ventures Realty Corporation,
Henry See, Freddie Go, Benedict Que, AWG
Development Corporation (AWG), Petrosa
Development Corporation (Petrosa), and University
of Cebu Banilad, Inc. (UCB).
The complaint alleged that petitioner Lolita Cabigas
and her late husband, Nicolas Cabigas, purchased
two lots from Salvador Cobarde on January 15, 1980.
Cabigas v
Cobarde in turn had purchased these lots from Ines
Limbavo
Ouano on February 5, 1948.
(2011)
Notwithstanding the sale between Ouano and
Cobarde, and because the two lots remained
registered in her name, Ouano was able to sell these
same lots to the National Airports Corporation on
November 25, 1952 for its airport expansion project.
The National Airports Corporation promptly had the
titles of these properties registered in its name.
nugatory the right of repurchase granted by law to a homesteader because all a vendee a retro can
do to prevent repurchase is to build something on the homestead beyond the capacity to pay of the
homesteader who seeks to repurchase. Such a situation should not be allowed to pass.
It is obvious that the heirs of Calagan are not exercising the option to refund the amount of the
expenses incurred by private respondent for the house that the latter built as provided for in Article
546. Sandoval, as the vendee a retro, may remove her house since this can be done without damage
to the principal thing – land. Since the heirs didn't exercise the option to refund the amount of the
expenses incurred by Sandoval for the house he built, and not to pay the increase in value acquired
by the land by reason of such expense Sandoval may remove her house since this can be done
without damage. The heirs should not, as opined by the trial Court, be made to refund the value of
that house to Sandoval.
A purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other
person has a right to or interest in such property, and pays a full and fair price for the same at the
time of such purchase or before he has notice of the claim of another person.
NAC purchased land in good faith
Petitioners, in their submissions to the lower court, never imputed bad faith on the part of the National
Airports Corporation in registering the lots in its name. Since the petitioners never alleged that the
National Airports Corporation acted with bad faith when it registered the lots in its name, the
presumption of good faith prevails. Consequently, the National Airports Corporation, being a
registrant in good faith, is recognized as the rightful owner of the lots in question, and the registration
of the properties in its name cut off any and all prior liens, interests and encumbrances, including the
alleged prior sale to Cobarde, that were not recorded on the titles. Cobarde, thus, had no legal rights
over the property that he could have transferred to the Cabigas spouses.
Petitioners not in good faith
We are dealing with registered land, a fact known to the Cabigas spouses since they received the
duplicate owner’s certificate of title from Cobarde when they purchased the land. At the time of the
sale to the Cabigas spouses, however, the land was registered not in Cobarde’s name, but in
Ouano’s name. By itself, this fact should have put the Cabigas spouses on guard and prompted
them to check with the Registry of Deeds as to the most recent certificates of title to discover if there
were any liens, encumbrances, or other attachments covering the lots in question. Instead, the
Cabigas spouses relied completely on Cobarde’s representation that he owned the properties in
question, and did not even bother to perform the most perfunctory of investigations by checking the
properties’ titles with the Registry of Deeds. Had the Cabigas spouses only done so, they would
easily have learned that Cobarde had no legal right to the properties they were acquiring
since the lots had already been registered in the name of the National Airports Corporation in
1952. Their failure to exercise the plain common sense expected of real estate buyers bound them to
the consequences of their own inaction.

4. Bad faith
5. Applicable presumption
Luga v Arciaga The land in litigation used to form part of the Y. Furukawa Daliao Plantation which. It turned
over to the government and was initially administered by the National Abaca and Other
(2011) Fibers Corporation (NAFCO) and, later, by the Board of Liquidators (BOL), pursuant to
Republic Act No. 477, as amended.
A former tenant of NAFCO at the Furukawa Plantation, Co., Inc., Loreto Luga (Loreto)
became a tenant of the BOL and, in said capacity, occupied the subject parcel since 1957,
eventually building a house of light of materials thereon.
On 28 July 1960, however, an Occupant’s Affidavit was executed by one Honorio Romero
(Honorio), a former employee of NAFCO, over a 2.5 hectare landholding of which the land in
Petitioners argue that the CA erred in giving credit to the
Spouses Arciaga’s tax receipts and tax declarations which, by
themselves, do not conclusively prove ownership of the land.
In civil cases, the rule is settled that the burden of proof is
upon the plaintiff to establish his case by preponderance of
evidence, relying on the strength of his own evidence and not
the weakness of that of his opponent.
As prima facie proofs of ownership or possession of the
property for which such taxes have been paid, tax receipts

litigation formed part. On 3 December 1970, Honorio executed a Deed of Transfer of Right
over a 600 square meter portion of said landholding in favor of Rogelio Arciaga. On 23 March
1972, the former further executed a similar deed selling in favor of the latter his interest over
an adjacent 340 square meter portion of the same landholding.
Elena Arciaga (Rogelios wife) then filed an application for patent/title over the subject parcel.
In support of her application, Elena filed the required Occupant’s Affidavit of Application,
supported by a Joint-Affidavit executed by her witnesses as well as a Certification issued by
Barangay Chairman of Toril, attesting to her actual possession of the subject parcel. On 29
November 1988, Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in favor of respondent Elena who,
forthwith, declared the land in her name for taxation purposes and started paying the real
estate taxes due thereon.
RTC rendered a decision, finding that the evidence adduced by the parties preponderantly
established that Loreto is entitled to the land in litigation since his possession thereof
preceded that asserted by the Spouses Arciaga.
In upholding the Spouses' Arciaga's claim over that asserted by Loreto, the CA ruled that the
evidence on record disclose that: (a) the latter was merely allowed to occupy the land in
litigation by the former's predecessor-in-interest, Honorio; (b) Loreto's testimony revealed
that he never possessed the parcel in the concept of an owner; (c) unlike the Spouses
Arciaga, Loreto never declared the land for taxation purposes in his own name and only
attempted to do so only in 1993; and, (d) since Loreto's evidence does not constitute the
"well-nigh incontrovertible" evidence required to acquire title to land through possession and
occupation, he is not entitled to the recoveyance ordered by the RTC.
and tax declaration may, moreover, become a basis of a
claim of ownership when coupled with proof of actual
possession. More than the Occupant’s Affidavit of Application
executed by Elena, the joint affidavit executed by her
witnesses and the certification issued by the Toril Barangay
Chairman, the Spouses Arciaga’s actual possession of the lot
was, additionally proved by the Inspection and Investigation
Report filed under oath by BOL Inspector/Investigator
Nathaniel Rios. In the absence of proof adduced to rebut the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty,
the same report deserves credence over Loreto’s naked
assertion of possession of the subject parcel.
As the party asserting a right superior to that claimed by the
Spouses Arciaga, Loreto failed to prove that he was a bona
fide occupant of the land in litigation. Despite his
testimony and that elicited from his witnesses to the effect
that he occupied the subject parcel in 1957, Loreto’s
documentary evidence consisting of receipts issued by the
NAFCO and BOL simply showed that he was a tenant on the
plantation from 1955 to 1957, remitting a portion of the
produce harvested therefrom to said government agencies.
When cross-examined by the Spouses Arciaga’s counsel,
Loreto also admitted that he did not file any application for the
land and/or declare the same for taxation purposes because
he knew that he was not the owner thereof.

6. Possession in the concept of a holder

Jose Cruz delivered his car to Belizo for the
latter to sell the same. Belizo forged the letter
of Cruzto the Motor Section of the Bureau of
Public Works and converted the same into a
Deed of Sale. Using the forged deed, he had It is true that both Bulahan and Cruz acted in good faith. One who has lost a movable or had been deprived
the car registered in his name. Thereafter, of the same may recover it from the possessor. This rule applies squarely to this case. Thus, since Cruz
Cruz v Pahati
Belizo sold the car to Bulahan, who in turn was unlawfully deprived by Belizo through the latter’s artifice, he is entitled to recover the same even
sold the same to Pahati. However, the car was against a subsequent purchaser in good faith. The only exception to this rule is if the purchaser acquired the
()
impounded by the police, and the sale to same from a public sale—in which case, reimbursement is in order. It was, in fact, Bulahan who acted
Pahati was cancelled. Bulahan now contends negligently in failing to detect the forged Deed of Sale.
that between 2innocent parties (Bulahan and
Cruz), the person who made possible the
injury must bear the loss—in this case,
supposedly Cruz.
Dizon v Suntay Lourdes Suntay is the owner of a 3-carat SC reiterated the ruling in de Garcia v. CA, that the controlling provision is Art. 559 of the CC which states
diamond ring valued at P5,500. She and that the possession of movable acquired in good faith is equivalent to title. Nevertheless, one who lost any
(1972) Clarita Sison entered into a transaction movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof may recover it from the person in possession of the same.
wherein the ring would be sold on commission. If the possessor of a movable lost of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good
Clarita received the ring and issued a receipt. faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor.
After some time, Lourdes made demands for
the return of the ring but the latter refused to Lourdes, being unlawfully deprived of her ring has a right to recover it from the current possessor. Dizon is
comply. When Lourdes insisted on the return, engaged in a business where presumably ordinary prudence would require him to inquire whether or not an
Clarita gave her the pawnshop ticket which is individual who is offering the jewelry by pledge is entitled to do so. The principle of estoppels cannot help
the receipt of the pledge and she found out him at all. Since there was no precaution availed of, perhaps because of the difficulty of resisting opportunity
 that 3 days after the ring was received by
Clarita, it was pledged by Melia Sison, the
niece of Clarita’s husband in connivance with
Clarita with the pawnshop of Dominador Dizon
for P2,600. Lourdes then filed an estafa case.
She then asked Dominador Dizon for the
for profit, he only has himself to blame and should be the last to complain if the right of the trueo wner of the
return of the ring pledged but refused to return
jewelry should be recognized.
the ring thus the case filed by Lourdes. The
CFI issued a writ of replevin so Lourdes was
able to have possession of the ring during the
pendency of the case. The CFI also ruled in
her favor which was affirmed by the CA on
appeal.

PAJUNAR V CA In 1969, respondent Eluna bartered his cow
(1989) for a female caraboa (which bore the brand
“ART” in her front and hind legs). He was
unable to register the transfer in his name.
In 1980, petitioner filed a Petition for Recovery
of Personal Property with Writ of Replevin,
claiming to be the original owner of the
carabao, which was lost in 1974.
Respondents did not comply with the required registration under the Administrative Code. They are not
possessors in good faith, as a possessor in good faith is one not aware that there exists in his title or mode
of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it. Furthermore, failure of a party to exercise precaution to acquaint
himself with the defects in the title of his vendor precludes him from claiming possession in good faith.
Respondents failed to make a closer inquiry into the certificate of registration of the carabao.
It is thus clear that possession in good faith for 4 years isn’t applicable, neither can possession in bad faith
of 8 years benefit respondents, for when the owner of a movable has lost or has been illegally deprived of
his property can he recover the same without need to reimburse the possessor, as provided in NCC 559.

Neither can NCC 7166 apply for this article evidently refers to a possessor in good faith.

EDCA V In 1981, a person identifying himself as
SANTOS Professor Cruz placed an order by telephone
with the petitioner for 406 books, payable on
(1990) delivery. EDCA delivered the books as
ordered, for which Cruz issued a personal
check. Cruz thereafter sold 120 of the books to
Santos who, after verifying the seller’s
ownership from the invoice he showed her,
paid him P1700.00.
EDCA had Cruz arrested when they found out
he wasn’t really the Dean of La Salle and that
he had no more account with the bank, against
which he had drawn the payment check, and
the 120 books from Santos seized without a
warrant.
Santos sued for recovery of the books.
Petitioner’s contention that Santos hasn’t established their ownership of the books because they haven’t
even produced a receipt to prove he has bought the stock was found to be untenable. The Court held that
NCC 559 dispenses with further proof to acquire title.
Santos was held to have acquired the books in good faith. He ascertained the ownership of the books from
the EDCA invoice showing that they had been sold to Cruz, who then said he was selling them at a discount
because he was in financial need.
The court held that the petitioner was not unlawfully deprived of the books. It held that actually delivery of
the books having been made, Cruz acquired ownership over the books which he could then validly transfer
to the respondent. The fact that he hadn’t yet paid for them to EDCA was a matter between him and EDCA
and didn’t impair the title acquired by the respondents to the books.
Surely, the private respondent did not have to go beyond that invoice to satisfy herself that the books being
offered for sale by Cruz belonged to him; yet she did. Although the title of Cruz was presumed under NCC
559 by his mere possession of the books, these being movable property, Leonor Santos nevertheless
demanded more proof before deciding to buy them.

ARANDA V Petitioner filed an Application for Registration The Court held that the requisites for registration were not met. First, the status of the land applied for as
REPUBLIC of Title, invoking the liberal provision of CA alienable and disposable was not clearly established.
141, having been in continuout possession of

6
Art. 716. The owner of a swarm of bees shall have a right to pursue them to another's land, indemnifying the possessor of the latter for the damage. If the owner has not pursued the swarm, or
ceases to do so within two consecutive days, the possessor of the land may occupy or retain the same. The owner of domesticated animals may also claim them within twenty days to be counted
from their occupation by another person. This period having expired, they shall pertain to him who has caught and kept them.
(2011) the subject land in the concept of owner,
publicly, openly and adversely for more than
30 years prior to the filing of the application.
Petitioner’s witnesses sought to prove that the
land was acquired by petitioner’s father in
1946 and was transferred to petitioner in 1965
through a donation from his father. They
likewise testified that he had been tilling the
land since then, planting it with corn and rice.
7. Acquisition and loss of possession
CATHOLIC Petitioner filed an application for registration
VICAR of title over 4 lots in Benguet. The heirs of
APOSTOLIC V Juan Valdez, and heirs of Egmildo
CA Octaviano filed their Answers/Opposition on
Lots No. 2 and 3, asserting ownership and
(1988) title thereto.
E. Usufruct
1. Imperfect
2. Distinguished from lease
3. Kinds
4. Rights of usufructuary
FABIE V DAVID Fabie is the usufructuary of the income of certain
houses in Santo Cristo, Binondo and Ongpin,
(1945) under the will of deceased Rosario Fabie.
A judgment through written stipulation was
rendered in a case between Fabie and Juan Grey,
It also held that petitioner’s evidence failed to show that he possessed the property in the manner and for
the duration required by law. It found that contrary to its claim, it had only started paying for tax beginning
1994, or three years before filing the application. While, as a rule, tax declarations or realty tax payments of
property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless they are good indicia of possession in the
concept of owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or
constructive possession – they constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property.
Petitioner likewise failed to prove the alleged possession of his predecessors-in-interest. Even assuming
that Lucio actually planted rice and corn on the land, such statement is not sufficient to establish possession
in the concept of owner as contemplated by law. Mere casual cultivation of the land does not amount to
exclusive and notorious possession that would give rise to ownership. Specific acts of dominion must be
clearly shown by the applicant.
We have held that a person who seeks the registration of title to a piece of land on the basis of possession
by himself and his predecessors-in-interest must prove his claim by clear and convincing evidence, i.e., he
must prove his title and should not rely on the absence or weakness of the evidence of the oppositors.
The Court held that petitioner didn’t meet the requirement of 30 years possession for acquisitive prescription
over Lots 2 and 3. Neither did it satisfy the requirement of 10 years possession for ordinary acquisitive
prescription because of the absence of just title.
By the very admission of petitioner, Lots 2 and 3 were owned by Valdez and Octaviano. Both Valdez and
Octaviano had Free Patent Application for those lots since 1906. The predecessors of private respondents,
not petitioner, were in possession of the questioned lots since 1906
.
Private respondents were able to prove that their predecessors' house was borrowed by petitioner after the
church and the convent were destroyed. They never asked for the return of the house, but when they allowed
its free use, they became bailors in commodatum and the petitioner the bailee. The bailees' failure to return
the subject matter of commodatum to the bailor did not mean adverse possession on the part of the borrower.
The bailee held in trust the property subject matter of commodatum. The adverse claim of petitioner came only
in 1951 when it declared the lots for taxation purposes. The action of petitioner by such adverse claim could
not ripen into title by way of ordinary acquisitive prescription because of the absence of just title.
The predecessors-in-interest and private respondents were possessors under claim of ownership in good faith
from 1906; that petitioner was only a bailee in commodatum; and that the adverse claim and repudiation of
trust came only in 1951.
Fabie has the right to administer the property in question. All the acts of administration – to collect the
rents, conserve the property, etc. – were by said judgment vested in the usufructuary. The pretension
of Juan Grey that he is the is the administrator of the property with the right to choose the tenants and
to dictate the conditions of the lease is contrary to both the letter and the spirit of the said clause of the
will, the stipulation of the parties, and the judgment of the court. He cannot manage or administer the
property after all the acts of management and administration have been vested by the court, with his
 owner of the Santo Cristo property, whereby it was
agreed that Fabie will collect the rents of the Sto.
Cristo and Ongpin properties, pay all the real
estate taxes, special assessments, insurance
premiums, make necessary repairs. In case of
default on the part of the usufructuary, the
respective owners shall have the right to make
necessary payment and repairs, and in that even
the owner(s) shall be entitled to collect all
subsequent rents of the property concerned until
the amount paid by him or them and the expenses
of collection are fully covered thereby, afterwhich
the usufructuary shall again collect the rents.
In 1945, Fabie commenced an action of unlawful
detainer against Ngo Boo Soo, alleging that the
latter had subleased the property to another
Chinese without consent and contrary to
agreement. The defendant answered, in part, that
Fabie was a mere usufructuary and has no
authority to eject tenants. Juan Grey intervened
and sided with defendant.
BALURAN V Sps. Paraiso were the owners of a residential lot.
NAVARRO On Feb. 2, 1964, they executed an agreement
entitled “Barter” whereby they argreed to barter and
(1977) exchange with Sps. Baluran their residential lot
with the latter’s unirrigated riceland, under the
following conditions:
1. That both parties shall enjoy the material
possession of their respective properties. Sps.
Paraiso shall reap the fruits of the unirrigated
Riceland and Sps. Baluran shall have a right to
build his own house in the residential lot.
2. In the event any of the children of Natividad
Obendencio, daughter of Sps. Paraiso, shall
choose to reside in this municipality and build
his own house in the residential lot, Sps.
Baluran shall be obliged to return the lot with
damages.
3. Neither of the parties shall encumber, alienate,
or dispose of the properties without the consent
of the other.
In 1975, Antonio Obendencio filed a complaint for
recovery, claiming that he is the rightful owner of
eh residential lot, having acquired it from his
mother Natividad Obendencio, and that he needed
the property for the purpose of constructing his
house thereon.
5. Obligations of usufructuary
consent, in the usufructuary. He admitted that before said judgment he had been collecting the rents as
agent of the usufructuary under an agreement with the latter.
As long as the property is properly conserved and insured he can have no cause for complaint, and his
right in that regard is fully protected by the terms of the stipulation and the judgment of the court above
mentioned. To permit him to arrogate to himself the privilege to choose the tenant, to dictate the
conditions of the lease, and to sue when the lessee fails to comply therewith, would be to place the
usufructuary entirely at his mercy. It would place her in the absurd situation of having a certain
indisputable right without the power to protect, enforce, and fully enjoy it.
Antonio Obedencio is entitled to recover the possession of the residential lot.
With the material ion being the only one transferred, all that the parties acquired was the right of
usufruct which in essence is the right to enjoy the property of another. Under the document in question,
Sps. Paraiso would harvest the crop of the unirrigated riceland while the other party could build a house
on the residential lot, subject, however, to the condition, that when any of the children of Natividad
Paraiso Obedencio, daughter of spouses Paraiso, shall choose to reside in the municipality and build
his house on the residential lot, Avelino Baluran shall be obliged to return the lot to said children "With
damages to be incurred." Thus, the mutual agreement — each party enjoying "material possession" of
the other's property — was subject to a resolutory condition the happening of which would terminate the
right of possession and use.
Usufruct may be constituted by the parties for any period of time and under such conditions as they
may deem convenient and beneficial subject to the provisions of the Civil Code on Usufruct. The
manner of terminating or extinguishing the right of usufruct is primarily determined by the stipulations of
the parties which in this case now before Us is the happening of the event agreed upon. Necessarily,
the plaintiff or respondent Obedencio could not demand for the recovery of possession of the
residential lot in question, not until he acquired that right from his mother, Natividad Obedencio, and
which he did acquire when his mother donated to him the residential lot on October 4, 1974.
With the happening of the resolutory condition provided for in the agreement, the right of usufruct of the
parties is extinguished and each is entitled to a return of his property. it is true that Natividad Obedencio
who is now in possession of the property and who has been made a party to this case cannot be
ordered in this proceeding to surrender the riceland. But inasmuch as reciprocal rights and obligations
have arisen between the parties to the so-called "barter agreement", We hold that the parties and for
their successors-in-interest are duty bound to effect a simultaneous transfer of the respective properties
if substance at justice is to be effected.
GABOYA V CUI Don Mariano Cui sold 3 of his lots to his children
(Rosario, Mercedes and Antonio) pro indiviso.
(1971) Because Rosario was unable to pay for her
corresponding share, the sale to her was cancelled
and her 1/3 share was returned to the vendor. In
said deed of sale, Don Mariano retained for himself
the usufruct of the property.
Rosario and Antonio applied for a loan to build a
12-door commercial building on the property. Don
Mariano executed an authority to mortgage, with
the condition that the rents of said land shall
always be received by him.
The commercial building was built and Rosario and
Antonio received rents, from which they paid the
loan with.
Victoriano Reynes was appointed guardian of Don
Mariano’s properties. Reynes filed a motion in the
guardianship proceedings seeking authority to
collect rentals from the lots in question, which was
denied.
The court held that the reserved usufruct was limited to the rentals of the land alone. Had it been
designed to include also the rents of the buildings intended to be raised on the land, an express
provision would have been included to that effect, since in both the deeds of sale and authority to
mortgage, the possibility of such construction was clearly envisaged and mentioned.
The argument that the terms of the deed constituting the usufruct aren’t determinative of the extent of
the right conferred and that by law, the enjoyment of rents of the building subsequently passed to the
usufructuary, by virtue of NCC 571 was not accepted by the Court. It held that under the NCC articles
on industrial accession by modification on the principal land, such accession is limited either to
buildings erected on the land of another, or buildings constructed by the owner of the land with
materials owned by someone else. Nowhere in these articles on industrial accession is there any
mention of the case of landowner building on his own land with materials owned by himself.
The limitations set by NCC 595 to the construction rights of the naked owner of the land are evidently
premised upon the fact that such constructions would necessarily reduce the area of the land under
usufruct, for which the latter should be indemnified. This is precisely what the court a quo has done in
sentencing the appellee owners of the building to pay to the usufructuary a monthly rent of P1,758.00
for the area occupied by their building, after mature consideration of the rental values of lands in the
neighborhood.

6. Extinguishment of the usufruct

FAJARDO V Respondent, an owner-developer and
FREEDOM TO seller of low-cost housing, sold to
BUILD7 petitioner-spouses, a house and lot in
Marikina. The Contract to Sell contained
(2011) a Restrictive Covenant providing certain
prohibitions:
1. Easements – two meters in front.
2. Upward expansion – 2nd storey is
not prohibited but it must be placed
above the back portion of the
house and shouldn’t extend
forward beyond the apex of the
original building
3. Front expansion – no unit may be
extended in the front beyond the
line as designed and implemented
by the developer.
Petitioner, despite repeated warnings,
extended the roof of their house to the
property line and expanded the 2nd floor
to a point directly above the original
front wall. Respondent filed an action to
demolish the unauthorized structures,
which was decided in their favor.
7
Nothing about usufructuary here. Must be under easements.
Restrictive covenants are not, strictly speaking, synonymous with easements. While it may be correct to state that
restrictive covenants on the use of land or the location or character of buildings or other structures thereon may
broadly be said to create easements or rights, it can also be contended that such covenants, being limitations on
the manner in which one may use his own property, do not result in true easements, but a case of servitudes
(burden), sometimes characterized to be negative easements or reciprocal negative easements. Negative
easement is the most common easement created by covenant or agreement whose effect is to preclude the owner
of the land from doing an act, which, if no easement existed, he would be entitled to do.
Courts which generally view restrictive covenants with disfavor for being a restriction on the use of one's property,
have, nevertheless, sustained them where the covenants are reasonable, not contrary to public policy, or to
law, and not in restraint of trade. Subject to these limitations, courts enforce restrictions to the same extent that will
lend judicial sanction to any other valid contractual relationship. In general, frontline restrictions on constructions
have been held to be valid stipulations.
There appears to be no cogent reasons for not upholding restrictive covenants aimed to promote aesthetics,
health, and privacy or to prevent overcrowding.
Broadly speaking, a suit for equitable enforcement of a restrictive covenant can only be made by one for whose
benefit it is intended. It is not thus normally enforceable by one who has no right nor interest in the land for the
benefit of which the restriction has been imposed. Thus, a developer of a subdivision can enforce restrictions, even
as against remote grantees of lots, only if he retains part of the land. There would have been merit in the argument
of petitioners - that respondent, having relinquished ownership of the subdivision to the homeowners, is precluded
from claiming any right or interest on the same property - had not the homeowners' association, confirmed by its
board of directors, allowed respondent to enforce the provisions of the restrictive covenant.
ALBAR V Deceased Dona Rosario Fabie A life usufruct constituted on the rentals of the building located on a certain place includes the rentals on both the
CARANDANG bequeathed the naked ownership of building and on the land on which it is erected, because the building cannot exist without the land. Hence, the
land in Ongpin and of the building and usufruct isn’t extinguished by the destruction of the building, for under the law, usufruct is extinguished only by the
(1962) improvements thereon to petitioners, total loss of the thing subject of the encumbrance.
and the usufruct thereof to respondent.
Because the improvements were
destroyed during the battle for the
liberation of the City of Manila, the
Philippine War Damage Commission
paid petitioners a certain sum of money
war damage. It was respondent,
however, who paid the real estate taxes
due on the land for the years 1945 to
1954.

Petitioners filed an action to limit

respondent’s usufruct to the legal
interest on the value of the land.

F. Easements
1. Characteristics
PRIVITIZATION Respondent filed a case for Declaration of the
V LEGASPI existence of an easement, alleging that the act
TOWERS of Caruff (original owner and condo developer)
of constructing the powerhouse and sump
pumps on its property constituted a voluntary
easement in favor of respondent.
Velasco v Cui
An easement or servitude is a “real right constituted on another’s property, corporeal and immovable, by
virtue of which the owner of the same has to abstain from doing or to allow somebody else to do something
in his property for the benefit of another thing of person.” The statutory basis of this right is NCC 613.
There are two sources of easements - by law of by the will of the owners. (NCC 619)
In this case, neither type of easement was constituted over the subject property. it should be noted that
when the appurtenances were constructed on the subject property, the lands where the condominium was
being erected and the subject property where the generating set and sump pumps were constructed
belonged to Caruff. Therefore, NCC 613 does not apply, since no true easement was constituted or
existed, because both properties were owned by Caruff. When the owner of two properties alienates one of
them and an apparent sign of easement exists between the two estates, entitlement to it continues, unless
there is a contrary agreement, or the indication that the easement exists is removed before the execution
of the deed.

Valisno v Plaintiff is the absolute owner and actual
Adriano possessor of a 557,949-square-meter parcel of
land. The plaintiff-appellant Valisno bought the
(1988) land from the defendant-appellees sister,
Honorata Adriano Francisco. The land which is
planted with watermelon, peanuts, corn,
tobacco, and other vegetables adjoins that of
the appellee Felipe Adriano on the bank of the
Pampanga River. Both parcels of land had
been inherited by Honorata Adriano Francisco
and her brother, Felipe Adriano, from their
father, Eladio Adriano. At the time of the sale of
the land to Valisno, the land was irrigated by
water from the Pampanga River through a
The existence of the irrigation canal on defendant's land for the passage of water from the Pampanga
River to Honorata's land prior to and at the time of the sale of Honorata's land to the plaintiff was
equivalent to a title for the vendee of the land to continue using it as provided in Article 624 of the Civil
Code.
No enlightened concept of ownership can shut out the Idea of restrictions thereon, such as easements.
Absolute and unlimited dominion is unthinkable, inasmuch as the proper enjoyment of property requires
mutual service and forbearance among adjoining estates (Amor vs. Florentino, 74 Phil. 403).
The deed of sale in favor of Valisno included the "conveyance and transfer of the water rights and
improvements" appurtenant to Honorata Adriano's property. By the terms of the Deed of Absolute Sale, the
vendor Honorata Adriano Francisco sold, ceded, conveyed and transferred to Dr. Nicolas Valisno all
"rights, title, interest and participations over the parcel of land above- described, together with one Berkely
Model 6 YRF Centrifugal Pump G" suction, 6" discharge 500-1500 GPM, with Serial No. 5415812 and one
(1) set of suction pipe and discharge of pipe with elbow, nipples, flanges and footvalves," and the water
 canal about seventy (70) meters long,
traversing the appellee's land.
On December 16, 1959, the appellee levelled a
portion of the irrigation canal so that the
appellant was deprived of the irrigation water
and prevented from cultivating his 57-hectare
land.
2. Kinds of easements
3. Manner of exercise
4. Indication of existence
5. Nature of the limitations
6. Source
North Negros Plaintiff is the owner of a site in
Sugar Co. v which is located its sugar central,
Hidalgo with its factory building and
residence for its employees and
(1936) laborers, known as the "mill site." It
also owns the adjoining sugar
plantation known as Hacienda
"Begoña." Across its properties the
plaintiff constructed a road
connecting the "mill site" with the
provincial highway. Through this
road plaintiff allowed and still allows
vehicles to pass upon payment of a
toll charge of P0.15 for each truck or
automobile. Pedestrians are allowed
free passage through it.
Immediately adjoining the above-
mentioned "mill site" of the plaintiff is
the hacienda of Luciano Aguirre,
known as Hacienda "Sañgay,"
where the defendant has a billiard
hall and a tuba saloon. Like other
people in and about the place,
defendant used to pass through the
said road of the plaintiff, because it
was his only means of access to the
Hacienda "Sañgay" where he runs
his billiard hall and tuba saloon.
Later on, by order of the plaintiff,
every time that the defendant
passed driving his automobile with a
cargo of tuba plaintiff gatekeeper
rights and such other improvements appertaining to the property subject of this sale. According to the
appellant, the water right was the primary consideration for his purchase of Honorata's property, for without
it the property would be unproductive.
Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for irrigation purposes, which are appurtenant to a
parcel of land, pass with the conveyance of the land, although not specifically mentioned in the
conveyance. The purchaser's easement of necessity in a water ditch running across the grantor's land
cannot be defeated even if the water is supplied by a third person (Watson vs. French, 112 Me 371 19 C.J.
868-897). The fact that an easement by grant may also have qualified as an easement of necessity does
detract from its permanency as property right, which survives the determination of the necessity (Benedicto
vs. CA, 25 SCRA 145).
As an easement of waters in favor of the appellant has been established, he is entitled to enjoy it free from
obstruction, disturbance or wrongful interference (19 CJ 984), such as the appellee's act of levelling the
irrigation canal to deprive him of the use of water from the Pampanga River.
Having been devoted by the plaintiff to the use of the public in general, upon paying the passage fees required in the
case of motor vehicles, the road in question is charged with a public interest, and while so devoted, the plaintiff may
not establish discriminatory exceptions against any private person.
The circumstance that the plaintiff is not the holder of a franchise or certificate of public convenience, or that it is a
company devoted principally to the manufacturer of sugar and not to the business of public service or that the state
has not as yet assumed control or jurisdiction over the operation of the road in question by the plaintiff, does not
preclude the idea that the said road is a public utility.
When private property is devoted to public use in the business of a public utility, certain reciprocal rights and duties
are raised by implication of law between the utility and the public it undertakes to serve, and no contract between them
is necessary to give rise thereto. . . . (51 C. J., sec. 12 p. 6.)
Justice Laurel- Concurring-dissenting:
No legal servitude of way exists in the present case. The defendant has not shown that his right of passage across the
tenement of the plaintiff exists by reason of necessity growing out of the peculiar location of his property. He does not
even own the tenement where he conducts his business. Said tenement belongs to Luciano Aguirre who, as the
owner thereof, would be the one entitled to claim the forced servitude of way, on the hypothesis that it is demanded by
the peculiar location of the tenement. A mere lessee can not demand the legal servitude of way (see Manresa, Civil
Code, vol. 4, 2d ed., p. 705). Moreover, it does not appear that Luciano Aguirre or the defendant has otherwise fulfilled
the requirements of the law. (Art. 564, Civil Code; Cuaycong vs. Benedicto, 37 Phil., 781, 797.)
Nor can it be said that a voluntary servitude of way exists. It should be observed that a right of way is discontinuous or
intermittent as its use depends upon acts of ma (art. 532, Civil Code; 4 Manresa, Civil Code, 2d., p. 569;
Cuaycong vs. Benedicto, supra). Lacking the element of continuity in its use, a right of way may not be acquired by
prescription but solely by title (art. 539, Civil Code). Only continuous and apparent servitudes, like the servitude of light
and view, may be acquired by prescription (art. 537, Civil Code). Even assuming, however, that a servitude of way
may be acquired by prescription in view of the provisions of the present Code of Civil Procedure, nevertheless, it can
not be held that prescription exists in the present case. The free passage over the private way rests on mere tolerance
on the part of the plaintiff, is a settled principle of law in this jurisdiction that acts merely tolerated can not give rise to
prescription.
The plaintiff did not encumber his tenement with a servitude of way. Property is always presumed free from any and
all encumbrances. The act of the plaintiff, performed wholly upon its own exclusive property, should not be construed
 would stop him and prevent him
from passing through said road.
Defendant in such cases merely
deviated from said road and
continued on his way to Hacienda
"Sañgay" across the fields of
Hacienda "Begoña," likewise
belonging to the plaintiff.
La Vista Mangyan Road serves as the
Association, boundary between LA VISTA on one
Inc. v CA side and ATENEO and Miriam on
the other. They have a mutual right
(1997) of way over the said road, half of the
road belongs to La Vista, the other
half belongs to Ateneo and Miriam.
Ateneo sold some 16 hectares of its
property along Mangyan Road to
Solid Homes Inc. Solid Homes, Inc.,
developed a subdivision now known
as Loyola Grand Villas and together
they now claim to have an easement
of right-of-way along Mangyan Road
through which they could have
access to Katipunan Avenue.
to constitute the creation of a servitude. Servitus in faciendo consistere nequit. "For a man should not use that which
belongs to him as if it were a service only, but as his own property" (Law 13, title 31, third partida, quoted with
approval in Cortes vs. Yu-Tibo, 2 Phil., 24, 27).
A legal or compulsory easement is that which is constituted by law for public use or for private interest. By express
provisions of Arts. 649 and 650 of the New Civil Code, the owner of an estate may claim a legal or compulsory right-
of-way only after he has established the existence of four (4) requisites, namely, (a) the estate is surrounded by other
immovables and is without adequate outlet to a public highway; (b) after payment of the proper indemnity; (c) the
isolation was not due to the proprietor's own acts; and, (d) the right-of-way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the
servient estate, and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest. A voluntary easement on the other hand is constituted simply by will or agreement of
the parties.
That there is no contract between LA VISTA and Solid Homes, Inc., and thus the court could not have declared the
existence of an easement created by the manifest will of the parties, is devoid of merit. The predecessors-in-interest of
both LA VISTA and Solid Homes, Inc., i.e., the Tuasons and the Philippine Building Corporation, respectively, clearly
established a contractual easement of right-of-way over Mangyan Road. When the Philippine Building Corporation
transferred its rights and obligations to ATENEO the Tuasons expressly consented and agreed thereto. Meanwhile,
the Tuasons themselves developed their property into what is now known as LA VISTA. On the other hand, ATENEO
sold the hillside portions of its property to Solid Homes, Inc., including the right over the easement of right-of-way. In
sum, when the easement in this case was established by contract, the parties unequivocally made provisions for its
observance by all who in the future might succeed them in dominion.

7. Modes of acquiring easement

Valderrama v There was a milling contract where haciendaowners, who bound
The North themselves to furnish the central with all the cane they might
Negros Sugar produce in their estates. Included in the terms of the contract
Co., Inc. was an easement of way.
(1925) Since the hacienda owners could not furnish sufficient cane for
milling, as required by the capacity of said central, the defendant
made other milling contracts with various hacienda owners of
Cadiz, Occidental Negros, in order to obtain sufficient cane to
sustain the central. The hacienda owners complained that the
easement of way is only for the purpose of transporting cane
produced in their hacienda and not from Cadiz, Occidental
Negros.
This is a case of an easement for the benefit of a corporation, voluntarily created by the
plaintiffs upon their respective estates for the construction of a railroad connecting said
estates with the central of the defendant. Once the road is constructed, the easement is
apparent because it is continuously exposed to view by the rails which reveal the use and
enjoyment of said easement. It is evident, as above stated, that the cane of the plaintiffs if
to be transported to the central by means of wagons passing upon the railroad; but as the
easement was created for the benefit of the corporation, owner of the central, it may
cause its wagons to pass upon the road as many times as it may deem fit, according to
the needs of the central. If the plaintiffs do not produce sufficient cane to cover the
capacity of the central, it would be unjust to impose upon the defendant corporation the
burden of maintaining a central, prohibiting it to obtain from another source sufficient cane
with which to maintain its business; this is specially true here, because in the milling
contract with the plaintiffs, there is nothing to prohibit the defendant from making milling
contracts with other planters, and obtain in that way all cane necessary to cover the
capacity of the central.

Furthermore, the record shows a circumstance indicating that at the time of the execution
of the milling contracts above referred to, there was no intention of the part of the
contracting parties to limit the use of the railroad to the transportation of cane grown by
the plaintiffs in their respective haciendas, and that is because, while the duration of the
milling contracts is fixed at thirty years, that of the easement is at fifty. So that if at the end
of thirty years the plaintiffs or their successors should no longer desire to furnish canes for
milling in the central of the defendant, the latter shall still have the right to the easement

Ronquillo v Plaintiffs have been in the continuous and uninterrupted use of a
Roco road or passage way which traversed the land of the defendants
and their predecessors in interest, in going to Igualdad Street
(1958) and the market place of Naga City, from their residential land
and back, for more than 20 years; that the defendants and the
tenants of Vicente Roco, the predecessors in interest of the said
defendants have long recognized and respected the private legal
easement of road right of way of said plaintiffs; that on May 12,
1953, the defendants Jose Roco thru his co-defendants,
Raymundo Martinez and their men with malice aforethought and
with a view to obstructing the plaintiffs' private legal easement
over the property of the late Vicente Roco, started constructing a
chapel in the middle of the said right of way construction actually
impeded, obstructed and disturbed the continuous exercise of
the rights of the plaintiffs over said right of way; that on July 10,
1954 the new defendants Natividad Roco and Gregorio Miras, Jr.
with the approval of the defendant, Jose Roco and with the help
of their men and laborers, by means of force, intimidation, and
threats, illegally and violently planted wooden posts, fenced with
barbed wire and closed hermitically the road passage way and
their right of way in question against their protests and
opposition, thereby preventing them from going to or coming
from their homes to Igualdad Street and the public market of the
City of Naga.
Amor v It appears that over 50 years ago, Maria Florentino owned a
Florentino house and a camarin or warehouse in Vigan, Ilocos Sur. The
house had and still has, on the north side, three windows on the
(1943) upper story, and a fourth one on the ground floor. Through these
windows the house receives light and air from the lot where
the camarin stands.
On September 6, 1885, Maria Florentino made a will, devising
the house and the land on which it is situated to Gabriel
Florentino, one of the respondents herein, and to Jose
Florentino, father of the other respondents. In said will, the
testatrix also devised the warehouse and the lot where it is
situated to Maria Encarnancion Florentino. Upon the death of the
testatrix in 1882, nothing was said or done by the devisees in
regard to the windows in question. On July 14, 1911, Maria
Encarnacion Florentino sold her lot and the warehouse thereon
to the petitioner, Severo Amor, the deed of sale stating that the
vendor had inherited the property from her aunt, Maria
Florentino. In January, 1938, petitioner destroyed the old
warehouse and started to build instead a two-story house. On
March 1st of that year, respondents filed an action to prohibit
petitioner herein from building higher than the original structure
and from executing any work which would shut off the light and
air that had for many years been received through the four
windows referred to. The Court of First Instance found on the
15th of the same month that the construction of the new house
for the remaining period, but without transporting on the railroad any cane for the central.
An interpretation of the clause in question leading to such a result is untenable.
Easement of right of way may not be acquired through prescription.
Under the provisions of the Civil Code, old and new, particularly the articles thereof
aforecited, it would therefore appear that the easement of right of way may not be
acquired through prescription. Even Article 1959 of the Old Civil Code providing for
prescription of ownership and other real rights in real property, excludes therefrom the
exception established by Article 539, referring to discontinuous easements, such as,
easement of right of way. (Bargayo vs.Camumot, 40 Phil., 857, 867).
The easement of light and view has been established in favor of the property of
respondents, for these reasons:
1. Maria Florentino having died in 1892, according to a finding of fact of the
Court of Appeals, which we cannot review, Article 541 of the Civil Code is
applicable to this case.
2. Granting, arguendo, that Maria Florentino died in 1885, nevertheless that
same principle embodied in article 541 of the Civil Code was already an integral
part of the Spanish law before the promulgation of the Civil Code in 1889, and
therefore, even if the instant case should be governed by the Spanish law prior
to the Civil Code, the easement in question would also have to be upheld.
3. The easement under review has been acquired by respondents through
prescription.
4. The petitioner was not an innocent purchaser, as he was in duty bound to
inquire into the significance of the windows.
5. Justice and public policy are on the side of the respondents.
“First, as to the modes of establishing and acquiring easements. According to Article 536,
easements are established by law or by will of the owners. Acquisition of easements is
first by title or its equivalent and seconly by prescription. What acts take the place of title?
They are mentioned in Articles 540 and 541, namely, (1) a deed of recognition by the
owner of the servient estate; (2) a final judgment; and (3) an apparent sign between two
estates, established by the owner of both, which is the case of article 541. Sanchez
Roman calls such apparent sign under article 541 "supletoria del titulo constitutivo de la
servidumbre (Derecho Civil, vol. 3, p. 656). The same jurist says in regard to the ways of
constituting easements:
In the Sentence of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain dated November 7, 1911,
 had almost been completed, so the court denied the writ of
preliminary injunction.
Valisno v Plaintiff is the absolute owner and actual possessor of a
Adriano 557,949-square-meter parcel of land. The plaintiff-appellant
Valisno bought the land from the defendant-appellees sister,
(1988) Honorata Adriano Francisco. The land which is planted with
watermelon, peanuts, corn, tobacco, and other vegetables
adjoins that of the appellee Felipe Adriano on the bank of the
Pampanga River. Both parcels of land had been inherited by
Honorata Adriano Francisco and her brother, Felipe Adriano,
from their father, Eladio Adriano. At the time of the sale of the
land to Valisno, the land was irrigated by water from the
Pampanga River through a canal about seventy (70) meters
long, traversing the appellee's land.
On December 16, 1959, the appellee levelled a portion of the
irrigation canal so that the appellant was deprived of the
irrigation water and prevented from cultivating his 57-hectare
it was held that under article 541 of the Civil Code, the visible and permanent sign of an
easement "is the title that characterizes its existence" ("es el titulo caracteristico de su
existencia.")
It will thus be seen that under article 541 the existence of the apparent sign in the
instance case, to wit, the four windows under consideration, had for all legal purposes the
same character and effect as a title of acquisition of the easement of light and view by the
respondents upon the death of the original owner, Maria Florentino. Upon the
establishment of that easement of light and view, the con-comitant and concurrent
easement of altius non tollendi was also constituted, the heir of the camarin and its lot,
Maria Encarnacion Florention, not having objected to the existence of the windows. The
theory of article 541, of making the existence of the apparent sign equivalent to a title,
when nothing to the contrary is said or done by the two owners, is sound and correct,
because as it happens in this case, there is an implied contract between them that the
easements in question should be constituted.
Analyzing article 541 further, it sees that its wording is not quite felicitous when it
says that the easement should continue. Sound juridical thinking rejects such an idea
because, properly speaking, the easement is not created till the division of the property,
inasmuch as a predial or real easement is one of the rights in another's property, or jura in
re aliena and nobdy can have an easement over his own property, nimini sua res servit. In
the instant case, therefore, when the original owner, Maria Florentino, opened the
windows which received light and air from another lot belonging to her, she was merely
exercising her right of dominion. Consequently, the moment of the constitution of the
easement of light and view, together with that of altius non tollendi, as the time of the
death of the original owner of both properties. At that point, the requisite that there must
be two proprietors — one of the dominant estate and another of the servient estate —
was fulfilled. (Article 530, Civil Code.)
Upon the question of the time when the easement in article 541 is created,
Manresa presents a highly interesting theory, whether one may agree with it or not. He
says:
The concealed easement, as it were by the oneness of the owner,
becomes visible, and is revealed in all its importance when the ownership of the
estate or portions of the estate which respectively should play the role of servient
and dominant estates is divided.
Such a view cannot be fully accepted because before the division of the estate
there is only a service in fact but not an easement in the strictly juridical sense between
the two buildings or parcels of land.
The existence of the irrigation canal on defendant's land for the passage of water from the
Pampanga River to Honorata's land prior to and at the time of the sale of Honorata's land
to the plaintiff was equivalent to a title for the vendee of the land to continue using it as
provided in Article 624 of the Civil Code.
No enlightened concept of ownership can shut out the Idea of restrictions thereon, such
as easements. Absolute and unlimited dominion is unthinkable, inasmuch as the proper
enjoyment of property requires mutual service and forbearance among adjoining estates
(Amor vs. Florentino, 74 Phil. 403).
The deed of sale in favor of Valisno included the "conveyance and transfer of the water
rights and improvements" appurtenant to Honorata Adriano's property. By the terms of the
Deed of Absolute Sale, the vendor Honorata Adriano Francisco sold, ceded, conveyed
and transferred to Dr. Nicolas Valisno all "rights, title, interest and participations over the
parcel of land above- described, together with one Berkely Model 6 YRF Centrifugal
Pump G" suction, 6" discharge 500-1500 GPM, with Serial No. 5415812 and one (1) set
 land.
Tanedo v The private respondent Antonio Cardenas was the owner of two
Bernad (2) contiguous parcels of land situated in Cebu City more
particularly known as Lot 7501-A and Lot 7501-B. On Lot 7501-A
(1988) is constructed an apartment building, while the improvements on
Lot 7501-B consist of one four-door apartment of concrete and
strong materials; one two-storey house of strong materials;
a bodega of strong materials; and a septic tank for the common
use of the occupants of Lots 7501-A and 7501-B. A small portion
of the apartment building on Lot 7501-A also stands on Lot
7501-B.
On 5 February 1982, said Antonio Cardenas sold Lot 7501-A to
herein petitioner Eduardo C. Tañedo. Antonio Cardenas further
agreed that he would sell Lot 7501-B only to Eduardo Tañedo in
case he should decide to sell it, as the septic tank in Lot 7501-B
services Lot 7501-A and the apartment building on Lot 7501-A
has a part standing on Lot 7501-B.
Antonio Cardenas, however, sold Lot 7501-B to the herein
respondent spouses Romeo and Pacita Sim. Upon learning of
the sale, Eduardo Tañedo offered to redeem the property from
Romeo Sim. But the latter refused. Instead, Romeo Sim blocked
the sewage pipe connecting the building of Eduardo Tañedo built
on Lot 7501-A, to the septic tank in Lot 7501-B.
Goldcrest v Goldcrest Realty Corporation (Goldcrest) is the developer of
Cypress Cypress Gardens, a ten-storey building located at Herrera
Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City. On April 26, 1977, Goldcrest
(2009) executed a Master Deed and Declaration of Restrictions which
constituted Cypress Gardens into a condominium project and
incorporated respondent Cypress Gardens Condominium
Corporation (Cypress) to manage the condominium project and
to hold title to all the common areas. Title to the land on which
the condominium stands was transferred to Cypress under
Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-67513. But Goldcrest retained
ownership of the two-level penthouse unit on the ninth and tenth
floors of the condominium registered under Condominium
Certificate of Title (CCT) No. S-1079 of the Register of Deeds of
of suction pipe and discharge of pipe with elbow, nipples, flanges and footvalves," and the
water rights and such other improvements appertaining to the property subject of this
sale. According to the appellant, the water right was the primary consideration for his
purchase of Honorata's property, for without it the property would be unproductive.
Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for irrigation purposes, which are
appurtenant to a parcel of land, pass with the conveyance of the land, although not
specifically mentioned in the conveyance. The purchaser's easement of necessity in a
water ditch running across the grantor's land cannot be defeated even if the water is
supplied by a third person (Watson vs. French, 112 Me 371 19 C.J. 868-897). The fact
that an easement by grant may also have qualified as an easement of necessity does
detract from its permanency as property right, which survives the determination of the
necessity (Benedicto vs. CA, 25 SCRA 145).
As an easement of waters in favor of the appellant has been established, he is entitled to
enjoy it free from obstruction, disturbance or wrongful interference (19 CJ 984), such as
the appellee's act of levelling the irrigation canal to deprive him of the use of water from
the Pampanga River.
The alienation of the dominant and servient estates to different persons is not one of the
grounds for the extinguishment of an easement under Art 631. On the contrary, use of the
easement is continued by operation of law under Art 624.
In the instant case, no statement abolishing or extinguishing the easement of drainage
was mentioned in the deed of sale of Lot 7501-A to Eduardo Tañedo. Nor did Antonio
Cardenas stop the use of the drain pipe and septic tank by the occupants of Lot 7501-A
before he sold said lot to Eduardo Tafiedo. Hence, the use of the septic tank is continued
by operation of law. Accordingly, the spouses Romeo and Pacita Sim the new owners of
the servient estate (Lot 7501- B), cannot impair, in any manner whatsoever, the use of the
servitude.
The owner of the dominant estate cannot violate any of the following prescribed
restrictions on its rights on the servient estate, to wit: (1) it can only exercise rights
necessary for the use of the easement; (2) it cannot use the easement except for the
benefit of the immovable originally contemplated; (3) it cannot exercise the easement in
any other manner than that previously established; (4) it cannot construct anything on it
which is not necessary for the use and preservation of the easement; (5) it cannot alter or
make the easement more burdensome; (6) it must notify the servient estate owner of its
intention to make necessary works on the servient estate; and (7) it should choose the
most convenient time and manner to build said works so as to cause the least
convenience to the owner of the servient estate. Any violation of the above constitutes
impairment of the easement.
Here, a careful scrutiny of Goldcrest’s acts shows that it breached a number of the
aforementioned restrictions. First, it is obvious that the construction and the lease of the
 Makati City. Goldcrest and its directors, officers, and assigns
likewise controlled the management and administration of the
Condominium until 1995.
Following the turnover of the administration and management of
the Condominium to the board of directors of Cypress in 1995, it
was discovered that certain common areas pertaining to Cypress
were being occupied and encroached upon by Goldcrest. Thus,
in 1998, Cypress filed a complaint with damages against
Goldcrest before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB), seeking to compel the latter to vacate the common
areas it allegedly encroached on and to remove the structures it
built thereon. Cypress sought to remove the door erected by
Goldcrest along the stairway between the 8th and 9th floors, as
well as the door built in front of the 9th floor elevator lobby, and
the removal of the cyclone wire fence on the roof deck. Cypress
likewise prayed that Goldcrest pay damages for its occupation of
the said areas and for its refusal to remove the questioned
structures.
NPC vs Heirs of The NPC built an underground tunnel through the land of
Macabangkit respondent heirs of Sangkay. The purpose of this land was to
channel water to the hydroelectric powerplant operated by NPC.
(2011) NPC countered that the Heirs of Macabangkit had no right to
compensation under section 3(f) of Republic Act No. 6395, under
which a mere legal easement on their land was established; that
their cause of action, should they be entitled to compensation,
already prescribed due to the tunnel having been constructed in
1979; and that by reason of the tunnel being an apparent and
continuous easement, any action arising from such easement
prescribed in five years.
8. Extinguishment of easements, NCC 631, 6, 655
G. Legal Easements
1. Water Code
2. NCC 640-641
3. NCC 624-646
4. NCC 647
5. Right of way
office structure were neither necessary for the use or preservation of the roof deck’s
limited area. Second, the weight of the office structure increased the strain on the
condominium’s foundation and on the roof deck’s common limited area, making the
easement more burdensome and adding unnecessary safety risk to all the condominium
unit owners. Lastly, the construction of the said office structure clearly went beyond the
intendment of the easement since it illegally altered the approved condominium project
plan and violated Section 4 of the condominium’s Declaration of Restrictions.
Petitioner contends that the underground tunnels in this case constitute an easement
upon the property of the respondents which does not involve any loss of title or
possession. The manner in which the easement was created by petitioner, however,
violates the due process rights of respondents as it was without notice and indemnity to
them and did not go through proper expropriation proceedings. Petitioner could have, at
any time, validly exercised the power of eminent domain to acquire the easement over
respondents’ property as this power encompasses not only the taking or appropriation of
title to and possession of the expropriated property but likewise covers even the
imposition of a mere burden upon the owner of the condemned property. Significantly,
though, landowners cannot be deprived of their right over their land until expropriation
proceedings are instituted in court. The court must then see to it that the taking is for
public use, that there is payment of just compensation and that there is due process of
law.
There was a full taking on the part of NPC, notwithstanding that the owners were not
completely and actually dispossessed. It is settled that the taking of private property for
public use, to be compensable, need not be an actual physical taking or appropriation.
Indeed, the expropriator’s action may be short of acquisition of title, physical possession,
or occupancy but may still amount to a taking. Compensable taking includes destruction,
restriction, diminution, or interruption of the rights of ownership or of the common and
necessary use and enjoyment of the property in a lawful manner, lessening or destroying
its value. It is neither necessary that the owner be wholly deprived of the use of his
property, nor material whether the property is removed from the possession of the owner,
or in any respect changes hands.
Spouses Valdez Spouses Valdez bought from spouses Caridad
vs Tabisula a 200sqm portion of a 380 sq. m. parcel
Spouses of land. The deed of sale included a provision for a
Tabisula 2.5 meter wide right of way on the western side of
the property not included in the land sold.
(2008) Respondents subsequently built a concrete wall on
the western side of the subject property. In their
complaint, petitioners alleged that they purchased
the subject property on the strength of
respondents’ assurance of providing them a road
right of way. They thus prayed that respondents be
ordered to provide the subject property with a 2½-
meter wide easement and to remove the concrete
wall blocking the same.
Respondents, in their Answer averred that the 2.5
meter easement should be taken from the western
portion of the subject property and not from theirs;
and petitioners and their family are also the owners
of two properties adjoining the subject property,
which adjoining properties have access to two
public roads or highways.
From the allegations in petitioners’ complaint, it is clear that what they seek to enforce is an alleged
grant in the deed by respondents of an easement reading: "they shall be provided a 2 ½ meters wide
road right-of-way on the western side of their lot but which is not included in this sale."
Article 1358 of the Civil Code provides that any transaction involving the sale or disposition of real
property must be in writing. The stipulation harped upon by petitioners that they "shall be provided a 2
½ meters wide road right-of-way on the western side of their lot but which is not included in this sale" is
not a disposition of real property. The proviso that the intended grant of right of way is "not included in
this sale" could only mean that the parties would have to enter into a separate and distinct agreement
for the purpose. The use of the word "shall," which is imperative or mandatory in its ordinary
signification, should be construed as merely permissive where, as in the case at bar, no public benefit
or private right requires it to be given an imperative meaning. Besides, a document stipulating a
voluntary easement must be recorded in the Registry of Property in order not to prejudice third parties.
Thus, to be conferred a legal easement of right of way under Article 649, the following requisites must
be complied with: (1) the property is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a
public highway; (2) proper indemnity must be paid; (3) the isolation is not the result of the owner of the
dominant estate’s own acts; (4) the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient
estate; and (5) to the extent consistent with the foregoing rule, the distance from the dominant estate to
a public highway may be the shortest. The onus of proving the existence of these prerequisites lies on
the owner of the dominant estate, As found, however, by the trial court, petitioners and their family are
also the owners of two properties adjoining the subject property which have access to two public roads
or highways.
Since petitioners then have more than adequate passage to two public roads, they have no right to
demand the grant by respondents of an easement on the western side of respondents’ lot.
St. Michael St. Michael is located outside the northern
Scool vs perimeter fence of Citihomes, a subdivision owned,
Masaito operated and managed by Masaito. Its
passageway occupies a portion of the 61-square
(2008) meter lot described as Lot 4, Block 7, Phase 1 of
Citihomes. The gate to the school is located at the
subdivision’s northern perimeter fence and is the
only entrance and exit for the entire school
population. Petitioners sued for right of way.
The RTC dismissed the complaint for failure to
state a cause of action. It also dismissed the
complaint for the reason that St. Michael School is
not the owner of the land over which the school is
built, hence St. Michael is not a real party-in-
interest
Quintanilla vs Petitioners own QC Rattan Inc., a domestic
Abangan corporation engaged in the manufacture and export
of rattan-made furniture. In the conduct of their
(2008) business, they use vans to haul and transport raw
materials and finished products. As they wanted to
expand their business and construct a warehouse
on their property (the dominant estate), they asked
for a right of way from Abangan sometime in April
1994.
However, it appears that Abangan, sold the lot (the
servient estate) to respondent DARYL'S on March
24, 1994, and thereafter, DARYL'S constructed a
warehouse over the servient estate, enclosing the
same with a concrete fence.
Petitioners, thus, sought the imposition of an
easement of right of way, six (6) meters in width, or
a total area of 244 square meters, over the servient
estate.
Obra vs Respondents filed a complaint for right-of-way
Spouses Badua against petitioner, however, the RTC dismissed. It
observed that when petitioner fenced the northern
(2007) portion of her property, respondents were able to
use another pathway as ingress and egress to the
highway. It stated further that "the new pathway is
more than adequate" for respondents’ use. Thus,
the applied easement of right-of-way on the
The Complaint, first, asserts that petitioners have a right to an easement of right-of-way that cuts
across respondents’ property; second, it refers to respondents’ correlative obligation not to fence off
and close the single gate which is used as the only entry and exit points of the school population; and
third, it refers to respondents’ expansion and excessive terms and conditions, constituting the acts
violating petitioners’ right. We thus hold that the Complaint’s material allegations are enough to entitle
petitioners to a favorable judgment if these are assumed to be true.
The four corners of the initiatory pleading do not reveal any averment that the properties in question are
bounded by public roads and there is an adequate access to a public highway.
The trial court erred when it ruled that the school, not being the registered owner of the subject lot, is
not a real party-in-interest.
It will suffice under Art. 649 of the Civil Code that "any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate
or use any immovable which is surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other persons and
without adequate outlet to a public highway, is entitled to demand a right of way." Clearly, the school is
a real party-in-interest since it has established a right to use the passageway for the benefit of its
students. More importantly, the records reveal that petitioners-spouses are the owners of the lot where
the school is located and they are the incorporators, trustees, and officers of St. Michael. They are also
authorized to represent the corporation in the complaint and subsequent actions. Thus, petitioners are
real parties-in-interest and we rule that the dismissal of the complaint is patently erroneous and bereft
of any legal basis. Petitioners must be allowed to pursue their case before the trial court.
The easement is not granted. The SC sustained the CA, the route of least damage shall be preferred
over the route of shortest distance if the two do not concur.
As provided for under the provisions of Article 650 of the New Civil Code, the easement of right of way
shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with
this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. Where
there are several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, and the easement may be established
on any of them, the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage should be chosen.
But if these two circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, as in the instant case, the way
which will cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be the shortest. The criterion of
least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail over the criterion of shortest distance. The court is not
bound to establish what is the shortest; a longer way may be established to avoid injury to the servient
tenement, such as when there are constructions or walls which can be avoided by a round-about way,
as in the case at bar.
As between a right of way that would demolish a fence of strong materials to provide ingress and
egress to a public highway and another right of way which although longer will only require a van or
vehicle to make a turn, the second alternative should be preferred. Mere convenience for the dominant
estate is not what is required by law as the basis for setting up a compulsory easement. Even in the
face of necessity, if it can be satisfied without imposing the easement, the same should not be
imposed.
Finally, worthy of note, is the undisputed fact that there is already a newly opened public road barely
fifty (50) meters away from the property of appellants, which only shows that another requirement of the
law, that is, there is no adequate outlet, has not been met to establish a compulsory right of way
No pronouncement was ever made regarding the nature and legality of this "new" pathway; therefore,
no easement was established by the Court on petitioner’s property in the dismissed case. Thus, their
claim for a right-of-way on the southern portion had no basis.
More importantly, the case was dismissed by the RTC, meaning no relief was granted by the court to
respondents. Granting arguendo that the issue on the entitlement to respondents of a right-of-way over
the southern portion was likewise raised and was implicit from the pleadings; nevertheless,
respondents, by the dismissal of the case, were not granted any affirmative relief by the trial court.
Granting for the sake of argument that there was a voluntary easement of right-of-way, the records of
 northern portion of petitioner’s property was not
allowed.
The said Decision became final and executory. The
"new" pathway used by respondents, however,
traversed the southern portion of petitioner’s
property. Sometime in 2001, petitioner constructed
a fence on this portion of her lot, which again
restricted the use of respondents’ "new" pathway.
The respondents sought to enforce their alleged
easement over this “new” pathway, which the RTC
granted.
Dichoso vs Petitioners had no access to a public road to and
Marcos from their property, they claimed to have used a
portion of Lot No. 1 in accessing the road since
(2011) 1970. Respondent, however, blocked the
passageway with piles of sand. Though petitioners
have been granted another passageway by the
spouses Benjamin and Sylvia Arce (Spouses
Arce), the owners of another adjacent lot,
designated as Lot No. 21559-B, the former
instituted the complaint before the RTC praying for
right-of-way over defendant’s property.
Ramos vs Respondent fenced off its land, which was being
Gatchalian used by petitioner as his route to the main public
Realty thoroughfare. Due to the closure he has been
constrained to use as his "temporary" way the
(1987) adjoining lots belonging to different persons. Said
way is allegedly "bumpy and impassable especially
during rainy seasons because of flood waters, mud
and tall 'talahib' grasses thereon." However,
petitioner’s lot is bounded by a proposed road that
has not yet been constructed by the owner of
petitioner’s subdivision.
Francisco vs Private respondent had been granted an adequate
IAC access to the public highway (Parada Road)
through the adjacent estate of Epifania Dila even
(1989) as he was trying to negotiate a satisfactory
agreement with petitioner for another passageway
through the latter's property. If at the time he filed
suit against the petitioner, such access (through
the case do not reveal any agreement executed by the parties on the claimed right-of-way. Glaring is
the fact that the terms of the arrangement were not agreed upon by the parties, more particularly, the
payment of the proper indemnity. The evidence is not ample enough to support the conclusion that
there was a verbal agreement on the right-of-way over the southern portion.
More so, since a right-of-way is an interest in the land, any agreement creating it should be drawn and
executed with the same formalities as a deed to a real estate, and ordinarily must be in writing. No
written instrument on this agreement was adduced by respondents.
To be entitled to an easement of right of way, the following requisites should be met:
1. The dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public
highway;
2. There is payment of proper indemnity;
3. The isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; and
4. The right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar as
consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the
shortest.
Admittedly, petitioners had been granted a right of way through the other adjacent lot owned by the
Spouses Arce. In fact, other lot owners use the said outlet in going to and coming from the public
highway. Clearly, there is an existing outlet to and from the public road.
However, petitioners claim that the outlet is longer and circuitous, and they have to pass through other
lots owned by different owners before they could get to the highway. We find petitioners’ concept of
what is "adequate outlet" a complete disregard of the well-entrenched doctrine that in order to justify the
imposition of an easement of right of way, there must be real, not fictitious or artificial, necessity for it.
Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law as the basis of setting up a
compulsory easement. Even in the face of necessity, if it can be satisfied without imposing the
easement, the same should not be imposed.
There is a road right of way provided by the Sabrina Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision indicated as Lot
4133-G-12 in its subdivision plan for the buyers of its lots. The fact that said lot is still undeveloped and
causes inconvenience to the petitioner when he uses it to reach the public highway does not bring him
within the ambit of the legal requisite.
Petitioner should have, first and foremost, demanded from the Sabrina Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision
the improvement and maintenance of Lot 4133-G-12 as his road right of way because it was from said
subdivision that he acquired his lot and not either from the Gatchalian Realty or the respondents
Asprec. To allow the petitioner access to Sucat Road through Gatchalian Avenue inspite of a road right
of way provided by the petitioner's subdivision for its buyers simply because Gatchalian Avenue allows
petitioner a much greater ease in going to and coming from the main thoroughfare is to completely
ignore what jurisprudence has consistently maintained through the years regarding an easement of a
right of way, that "mere convenience for the dominant estate is not enough to serve as its basis. To
justify the imposition of this servitude, there must be a real, not a fictitious or artificial, necessity for it."
For an easement of right of way to be granted, the following requisites must concur:
(1) That the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public
highway (Art. 649, par. 1);
(2) After payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, par. 1, end);
(3) That the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; and
(4) That the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar as
consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the
 the property of Epifania Dila) could no longer be
used, it was because he himself had closed it off by
erecting a stone wall on his lot at the point where
the passageway began for no reason to which the
record can attest except to demonstrate the
isolation of his property alleged in his complaint.
NPC vs NPC filed a case for expropriation for the
Guttierez construction of its electrical transmission lines over
the property of respondents. The issue is the
(1991) determination of whether the acquisition of a mere
right-of-way is an exercise of the power of eminent
domain contemplated by law
Dionisio vs Ortiz Respondents opened a gate into the private road
of respondents. They claimed that it was necessary
(1991) for them to do so because due to the subdivision of
their lot, they were forced to construct a wall which
left only a small passageway.
Floro v Llenado Floro was the owner of a subdivision. Here comes
Llenado who bought the adjoining subdivision lot,
(1995) which was formerly Emmanuel Homes. A creek
separates the property of Llenado from Floro. On
the west side of Llenado’s property was a rice land.
On the subdivision plan of Llenado’s property,
there was a plan to construct an access road to
McArthur Highway but no construction was made.
With the two subdivisions, it was Floro’s which only
had an access road. Floro allowed usage of his
access road pending negotiations but later on
closed the property.
Whether or not the requirements for legal
easement existed to allow Llenado to claim the
same against Mr. Floro.
shortest. (Art. 650).
The law makes it amply clear that an owner cannot, as respondent has done, by his own act isolate his
property from a public highway and then claim an easement of way through an adjacent estate. The
third of the cited requisites: that the claimant of a right of way has not himself procured the isolation of
his property had not been met indeed the respondent had actually brought about the contrary condition
and thereby vitiated his claim to such an easement. It will not do to assert that use of the passageway
through Lot 860-B was dffficult or inconvenient, the evidence being to the contrary and that it was wide
enough to be traversable by even a truck, and also because it has been held that mere inconvenience
attending the use of an existing right of way does not justify a claim for a similar easement in an
alternative location.
The SC sustained the lower court stating that while it is true that NPC is only after a right-of-way
easement, it nevertheless perpetually deprives defendants of their proprietary rights as manifested by
the imposition by the plaintiff upon defendants that below said transmission lines no plant higher than
three (3) meters is allowed. Furthermore, because of the high-tension current conveyed through said
transmission lines, danger to life and limbs that may be caused beneath said wires cannot altogether
be discounted, and to cap it all plaintiff only pays the fee to defendants once, while the latter shall
continually pay the taxes due on said affected portion of their property. Hence, it is properly an eminent
domain taking.
In the case at bar, the easement of right-of-way is definitely a taking under the power of eminent
domain. Considering the nature and effect of the installation of the 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission
lines, the limitation imposed by NPC against the use of the land for an indefinite period deprives private
respondents of its ordinary use.
For these reasons, the owner of the property expropriated is entitled to a just compensation, which
should be neither more nor less, whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than the money
equivalent of said property. Just compensation has always been understood to be the just and
complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the
expropriation
The construction of a wall between the 2 lots leaving only a small passageway between them is an act
imputable to the private respondents which precludes them from asserting a right of way. The opening
of the new gate would definitely be very convenient to the private respondents but mere convenience is
not enough to serve as basis for the assertion of a right of way.
As in the earlier case, the court held that to be entitled to a compulsory easement of right of way, the
preconditions provided under Arts. 649 and 650 of the Civil Code must be established. These include:
that the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public
highway; (2) that proper indemnity has been paid; (3) that the isolation was not due to acts of the
proprietor of the dominant estate; (4) that the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the
servient estate and, in so far as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate
to a public highway may be the shortest.
For this case, it is apparent that the elements have not been met. The original subdivision development
plan presented by Llenado indicates an existing and prior agreement with Ms. Ipapo to create a right of
way through the abandoned Ipapo ricefield. Ipapo had long agreed to these terms but Llenado
apparently thought it too much work and cost to develop such road. It was easier for him to create an
easement via the Floro property.
The court ruled time and again that one may not claim a legal easement merely out of convenience.
Convenience motivated Llenando to abandon the Ipapo access road development and pursue an
access road through the Floro estate. He was stacking the cards in his favor to the unnecessary
detriment of his neighbor. The court refused to countenance his behavior.
 The essential requisites are the following—

1. The property is surrounded by estate of others and there is no adequate outlet to a public highway
2. It must be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate and insofar as consistent
with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest
3. There must be payment of the proper indemnity
4. The isolation should not be due to the proprietor’s own acts Burden of proving the existence of the
prerequisites to validly claim a compulsory right of way lies on the owner of the dominant estate. And it
should be noted that mere convenience of the dominant estate is not what is contemplated by the law
in establishing a right of way.
Dela Cruz v - Ramiscal –owner of a parcel of land. (1) Sps De La Cru are NOT entitled to right of way.
Ramiscal - Sps De la Cruz –occupants of land at the back of • Easement/Servitude: real right constituted on corporeal immovable property of another,
Ramiscal’s property. by virtue of which the owner has to refrain from doing or allow someone to do, something
(2005) - Subject matter of this case: 1.10 m x 12.6 m on his property, for the benefit of another thing/person.
pathway being used by Sps De La Cruz as • In the case at bar, Ramiscal did not voluntarily accord to the spouses the right of way.
pathway to and from 18th avenue, the nearest The spouses failed to show competent evidence other than their bare claim that they
public highway from their property. entered into an agreement with Mang Puling, Ramiscal’s foreman, to use the pathway,
- Ramiscal filed a complaint seeking to demolish which would be reciprocated with an equivalent easement by owner of another adjacent
the structure illegally constructed by the Sps De La estate.
Cruz. She asserted that petitioners have an • Conferment of legal easement has 5 requisites:
existing right of way to a public highway other than (1) it is surrounded by other immovable and has no adequate outlet to a public
the pathway in litigation. highway; (lacking in this case as TC found adequate ingress and egress towards
-Defense of the De La Cruz spouses: such use was Boni Serrano Avenue)
with knowledge of respondent. (2) payment of proper indemnity; (lacking as no indemnity was paid)
(3) the isolation is not the result of its own acts; (lacking as isolation was due to acts
Issues: of Conception de la Pena (the real owner of the lot occupied by Sps De La
(1) WON Sps De La Cruz are entitled to legal Cruz), who is required by law to grant right of way to the occupants of her
easement of right of way, assuming no property).
voluntary right of way was granted to them (4) right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and
by respondent. NO. (5) to the extent consistent with the foregoing rule, where the distance from the
(2) WON operative equitable principle of dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
laches bar the respondent from depriving
• Furthermore, under CC 649, it is the owner OR any person who by virtue of a real right
the petitioners continued use of the said
may cultivate/use, who is entitled to demand a right of way in the neighboring estates. In
right of way. NO.
the case at bar, the De La Cruz spouses that it fell under either of the 2 classifications.
The title to both lots are still registered under the name of Concepcion De La Pena.
(2) Sps De La Cruz cannot find sanctuary in the equitable principle of laches.
• Essential elements of laches are:
(a) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving
rise to the situation complained of;
(b) delay in asserting complainant’s rights after he had knowledge of defendant’s
acts and after he has had the opportunity to sue;
(c) lack of knowledge or notice by defendant that the complainant will assert the
right on which he bases his suit; and
(d) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event the relief is accorded to the
complainant.
Second and third elements are lacking because it was only in 1995 that respondent Ramiscal found out
that the pathway being used by petitioners was part of her property when a relocation survey and
location plan of her property and the adjacent land bought by San Benito Realty were prepared.

6. Party wall
Regala v Carin Regala (petitioner) and Carin (respondent) were In the present case, respondent failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the injuries he
 adjacent neighbors at Spirig Street, BF Resort
(2011) Village, Las Piñas City. When petitioner decided to
renovate his one storey residence by constructing
a second floor, he under the guise of merely
building an extension to his residence, approached
respondent sometime in May 1998 for permission
to bore a hole through a perimeter wall shared by
both their respective properties, to which
respondent verbally consented on condition that
petitioner would clean the area affected by the
work.
As earlier indicated, petitioner’s real intention was
to build a second floor, in fact with a terrace atop
the dividing wall. In the course of the construction
of the second floor, respondent and his wife
Marietta suffered from the dust and dirt which fell
on their property. As petitioner failed to address the
problem to respondent’s satisfaction, respondent
filed a letter-complaint with the Office of the City
Engineer and Building Official of Las Piñas City
sustained were the proximate effect of petitioner’s act or omission. It thus becomes necessary to
instead look into the manner by which petitioner carried out his renovations to determine whether this
was directly responsible for any distress respondent may have suffered since the law requires that
a wrongful or illegal act or omission must have preceded the damages sustained by the claimant.
It bears noting that petitioner was engaged in the lawful exercise of his property rights to introduce
renovations to his abode. While he initially did not have a building permit and may have misrepresented
his real intent when he initially sought respondent’s consent, the lack of the permit was inconsequential
since it only rendered petitioner liable to administrative sanctions or penalties.
Petitioner, however, cannot steer clear from any liability whatsoever. Respondent and his family’s rights
to the peaceful enjoyment of their property have, at the very least, been inconvenienced from the
incident borne of petitioner’s construction work. Any pecuniary loss or damage suffered by respondent
cannot be established as the records are bereft of any factual evidence to establish the same. Nominal
damages may thus be adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, respondent herein, which has
been violated or invaded by the defendant, petitioner herein, may be vindicated or recognized, and not
for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.

Regala was ordered to pay Carin moral and

exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees. In
finding for respondent, the trial court declared that,
apart from the fact that petitioner knowingly
commenced the renovation of his house without
the requisite building permit from the City
Engineer’s Office, he misrepresented to
respondent his true intent of introducing
renovations. For, it found that instead of just boring
a hole in the perimeter wall as originally proposed,
petitioner divided the wall into several sections to
serve as a foundation for his firewall (which ended
up higher than the perimeter wall) and the second
storey of his house.

The trial court further declared that respondent and

his family had thus to contend with the noise, dust
and debris occasioned by the construction, which
petitioner and his work crew failed to address
despite respondent’s protestations, by refusing to
clean the mess or install the necessary safety
devices.

7. Light and view

Fabie v Petitioner Miguel Fabie applied for the registration No. The burden is not on the petitioner to prove on what time the gallery in controversy was constructed
Lichauco of his property in Manila free from any inasmuch as he limits himself to sustaining nad defending the freedom of his property, denying the
encumbrances except the easement of right of way easement o flight and view of the respondent pretends to impose over it. A property is assumed to be
(1908) in favor of respondents Julita Lichauco and Hijos from all encumbrance unless the contrary is proved. Respondent who claims the said easement is
 de Roxas. In addition to the said right of way, obliged to prove the aforementioned gallery, in which the apparent sign of the easement is made to
respondents also claim that of light and view and consist in the present case, existed at the time of ownership of her property and that of the petitioner
drainage. However,the claim was later reduce only were separated. And inasmuch as this issue has not been proved,the claim of the respondents as to
to that of the light and view. Lichauco cliamed that the easements of the light and view which the petitioner does not admit, must of necessity be
when Juan Bautista Coloma, the original owner of dismissed. Therefore, it does not appear from the agreement of the parties that the respondents has
bothestates, established not only an easement of balconies over the land of the petitioner; and as it is, since it has been positively shown that the said
right of way but also that of light and view and that balconies exceed the limit of the lot owned by the former, nor less that they invade the atmospheric
when both the properties were alienated, the area of the lot belonging to the latter, it follows that, even in accordance with the theory maintained by
apparent signs were not removed. The apparent the respondents with which on account of its lack of basis, we consider it unnecessary to deal herein as
sign allegedly consists of a gallery with windows to its other aspect, the easement of view, which might result in such case from the existence of the
through which light is admitted. It was supported on balconies alluded to, would be negative and not a positive one, because the erection of the same would
columns erected on the ground belonging to the not constitute, according to their own statement, an invasion of the right of another, but the lawful
petitioner and the balcony on Lichauco’s property exercise of the right inherent to the dominion of the respondents to construct within their own lot. And
is supported by uprights erected on the land by as said easement is negative, it cannot have prescribed in favor of the property of the respondents in
petitioner. The parties admitted the existence of the absence of any act of opposition, according to theagreement, by which they or their principals
such gallery. The house was now a frontage of 18 would have prohibited the petitioner or his principals to do any work which obstruct the balconies in
meters and 60 centimeters, of which 16 meters and question, inasmuch as said act of opposition is what constitutes the necessary and indispensable point
60 centimeters correspond to the main part of the of departure for computing the time required by law for the prescription of negative easements. Thus,
same, and 1 meter and 90 centimeters to the the judgment appealed from was affirmed in toto by the Court.
gallery in question. It results, therefore, that at the
present day, the house has nearly 2 meters more
frontage than when it was alienated by Coloma.
Therefore, at the present day the house is erected
partly on the land belonging to the owner and
partly, the gallery, over a lot belonging to another;
that is, over that of the petitioner. When it was sold
in October, 1848, no portion of the house occupied
the lot last mentioned, but the entire building was
erected over a lot belonging to the owner as set
forth in the instrument of sale. The lower court held
that the right of way and drainage exist in favor of
the respondents’ respective properties. The claim
as to the easement of light and view was dismissed
by the court.

Issue: Whether or not Respondents are entitled to

the easement of light and view.

8. Other easements
a. drainage of building
b. intermediate distances
c. nuisance
Ongsiaco v There are 3 causes of action filed in this case. One The SC affirmed the Order appealed from.
Ongsiaco of which is the obstruction of the dikes constructed
by the defendants in 1937. Such dikes obstructed Considering that the action was filed in 1951, the legal easement sought to be enforced had been
(1957) the natural flow of excess water from the plaintiff’s extinguished by non-user and the action is therefore barred by prescription.
higher tenement. It was alleged that from time
immemorial before the partition of the Hacienda
Esperanza, the water coming from the portion of
the estate assigned to plaintiffs had been flowing
regularly and without artificial obstruction towards
 the other areas of that same hacienda
subsequently assigned to the defendants, as a
result of the partition in 1929. The CFI granted the
Motion to Dismiss filed by the defendant on the
ground of prescription.
May the dikes be demolished?
Calma v CA Spouses Calma bought a lot in respondent
Pleasantville Development Corporation's
(1989) (hereinafter referred to as PLEASANTVILLE)
subdivision in Bacolod. They built a house on said
lot and established residence therein. The Ongs
also purchased from PLEASANTVILLE a lot
fronting that of the Calma spouses and constructed
their own buildings where they resided and
conducted their business. Calma complained to the
president of the association that the compound of
the Ongs was being utilized as a lumber yard and
that a "loathsome noise and nervous developing
sound" emanating therefrom disturbed him and his
family and caused them and their son to suffer
nervous tension and illness.
Gancayco v QC The MMDA then sent a notice of demolition to
Justice Gancayco alleging that a portion of his
(2011) building violated the National Building Code of the
Philippines in relation to Ordinance No. 2904. He
did not comply with the notice. Thelma then
proceeded to demolish the party wall of the ground
floor structure. The City Government of Quezon
City claimed that the ordinance was a valid
exercise of police power, regulating the use of
property in a business zone. Justice Gancayco filed
a Petition with prayer for a temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. The RTC
ruled that the ordinance was unconstitutional. The
Court of Appeals reversed the RTC’s decision and
ruled that the ordinance was a valid exercise of the
right of the local government unit to promote the
general welfare of its constituents pursuant to its
police powers.
Issue: Did MMDA Resolution No. 02-28, validly
empower the MMDA to demolish Justice
Gancayco’s property?
As found by the Court of Appeals, the COMMISSION's conclusion that the activities being conducted
and the structures in the property of the Ongs constituted a nuisance was not supported by any
evidence. The Solicitor General himself, in his comment filed in the Court of Appeals, admits that the
decision of the COMMISSION did not make any finding of a nuisance [CA Rollo, p. 93]. Apparently, on
the basis of position papers, the COMMISSION assumed the existence of the nuisance, without
receiving evidence on the matter, to support its order for the prevention or abatement of the alleged
nuisance.
Moreover, the spouses Ong, were not even party to the proceedings before the COMMISSION which
culminated in the order for the prevention or abatement of the alleged nuisance. The parties before the
COMMISSION were petitioner and PLEASANTVILLE only, although the persons who would be directly
affected by a decision favorable to petitioner would be the Ong spouses. Certainly, to declare their
property or the activities being conducted therein a nuisance, and to order prevention and abatement,
without giving them an opportunity to be heard would be in violation of their basic right to due process.
No. the Supreme Court held that the power to enforce the provisions of the Building Code was lodged
in the Department of Public Works and Highways, not in MMDA. Since there was no evidence that the
MMDA had been delegated by the DPWH to implement the Building Code, it necessarily had no
authority to carry out the demolition. Additionally, the penalty prescribed by Ordinance No. 2904 itself
does not include the demolition of illegally constructed buildings in case of violations. Instead, it merely
prescribes a punishment of a fine or by imprisonment, or both, at the discretion of the court. The
ordinance itself clearly states that it is the regular courts that will determine whether there was a
violation of the ordinance.
Citing MMDA v. Trackworks, the Court stressed that the MMDA does not have the power to enact
ordinances and thus “cannot supplement” Quezon City Ordinance No. 2904 through Metro Manila
Council Council Resolution No. 02-28, series of 2002 authorizing it to “clear the sidewalks, streets,
avenues, alleys, bridges, parks, and other public places in Metro Manila of all illegal structures and
obstructions.” It found that the there was no valid delegation to the MMDA by the City Government of
Quezon City of, among others, the power to declare, prevent, and abate a nuisance and to further
impose the penalty of removal or demolition at the expense of the owner.
In any case, the Court did not find that the demolished portion of the building as a nuisance per se. It
held that just because an ordinance may declare a structure illegal does not necessarily make that
structure a nuisance. It found the 1966 exemption the City Council gave Justice Gancayco from
constructing an arcade is an indication that the wing walls of the building are not nuisances per se.
The Court also ruled that Justice Gancayco may still question the constitutionality of the ordinance on
the ground of taking of private property without due process of law and just compensation as it was only
in 2003 when he was allegedly deprived of his property when the MMDA demolished a portion of the
building. However, it held that he may not do so on the ground of equal protection when he himself
requested and was granted an exemption from the application of the ordinance in 1966.
The Court also held Quezon City Ordinance No. 2904 as a valid exercise of the police power delegated
by Congress to the city government in RA 537, theRevised Charter of Quezon City, to provide safe and
convenient passage along the sidewalk for commuters and pedestrians more so in the case of subject
property which is located in a business zone along EDSA.
 9. Voluntary easements
Unisource Petitioner Unisource Commercial and Development - The opening of an adequate outlet to a highway can extinguish only legal or compulsory
Commercial v Corporation is the registered owner of a parcel of easements, not voluntary easements like in the case at bar. The fact that an easement by
Chung land. The title contains a memorandum of grant may have also qualified as an easement of necessity does not detract from its
encumbrance of a voluntary easement which has permanency as a property right, which survives the termination of the necessity.
(2009) been carried over from the Original Certificate of - A voluntary easement of right of way, like any other contract, could be extinguished only by
Title of Encarnacion S. Sandico. The certified mutual agreement or by renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate.
English translation of the annotation reads: - Neither can petitioner claim that the easement is personal only to Hidalgo since the annotation
By order dated 08 merely mentioned Sandico and Hidalgo without equally binding their heirs or assigns. That the
October 1924 of the Court of heirs or assigns of the parties were not mentioned in the annotation does not mean that it is
First Instance of Manila, not binding on them. Again, a voluntary easement of right of way is like any other contract.
Chamber IV (AP-7571/T-23046), - As such, it is generally effective between the parties, their heirs and assigns, except in case
it is declared that Francisco where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature,
Hidalgo y Magnifico has the right or by stipulation or by provision of law.
to open doors in the course of his
lot described as Lot No. 2, Block
2650 of the map that has been
exhibited, towards the left of the
Callejon that is used as a
passage and that appears as
adjacent to the said Lot 2 and to
pass through the land of
Encarnacion Sandico y Santana,
until the bank of the estero that
goes to the Pasig River, and
towards the right of the other
Callejon that is situated between
the said Lot 2 and Lot 4 of the
same Block N.
As Sandico’s property was transferred to
several owners, the memorandum of encumbrance of
a voluntary easement in favor of Francisco M. Hidalgo
was consistently annotated at the back of every title
covering Sandico’s property until TCT No. 176253
was issued in petitioner’s favor. On the other
hand, Hidalgo’s property was eventually transferred to
respondents Joseph Chung, Kiat Chung and Cleto
Chung.

Unisource file a Petition to Cancel the

Encumbrance of Voluntary Easement of Right of
Way on the ground that the dominant estate has an
adequate access to a public road which
is Matienza Street.

DIFFERENT MODES OF ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP

A. In general
Acap v CA Acap was a tenant of the lot owned by Cosme In a contract of sale, one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to
Pido. Upon Pido's death, Acap paid the monthly deliver a determinate thing, and the other party to pay a price certain in money or its equivalent. Upon
(1995) rental dues to the widow Lauranciana Pido. He
died intestate. The widow and her 3 sons afterward
executed a notarized document denominated as
"Declaration of Heirship and waiver of rights" in
favor of private respondant De los Reyes. Acap did
not recognize De los Reyes claim of ownership
over the land as he contended that the land still
belongs to the heirs of Cosme Pido, and won't pay
the rent demanded by De los Reyes.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject Declaration of heirship
and waiver of rights is recognized mode of
acquiring ownership? Can it be considered a deed
of sale?
B. Modes of Acquiring Ownership
1. Intellectual creation
2. Occupation
Palero-Tan v Palero-Tan charged Urdaneta with Conduct
Urdaneta Unbecoming a Court Personnel for stealing her
ring and bracelet. Urdaneta claims he found a
(2008) pklastic sachet containing the said jewelry under
his table and thought it belonged to a litigant and
took them for safekeeping. Investigating lawyer
found Urdaneta guilty of the charge.
Republic v. Rizalvo, Jr. filed before the MTC an application for
Rizalvo the registration of a parcel of land. He alleged that
he is the owner, that he obtained title over the land
(2011) by virtue of a Deed of Transfer, and that he is
currently in possession of the land. In support of his
claim, he presented, among others, Tax
Declaration for the year 1994 in his name, and
Proof of Payment of real property taxes beginning
in 1952 up to the time of filing of the application.
the other hand, a declaration of heirship and waiver of rights operates as a public instrument when filed
with the Registry of Deeds whereby the intestate heirs adjudicate and divide the estate left by the
decedent among themselves as they see fit. It is in effect an extrajudicial settlement between the heirs
under Rule 74 of the Rules of Court.
There is a marked difference between a sale of hereditary rights and a waiver of hereditary rights. The
first presumes the existence of a contract or deed of sale between the parties. The second is a mode of
extinction of an ownership where there is an abdication or intentional relinquishment of a known right
with knowledge of its existence in favor of other persons who are co-heirs in the succession. De los
Reyes, being then a stranger to the succession of Cosme Pido, cannot conclusively claim ownership
over the subject lot on the sole basis of the waiver of document which neither recites the elements of
either a sale or donation or any other derivative modes of acquiring ownership.
Despite all the opportunities accorded to respondent to present substantial defense to refute the
charges against him, he failed to do so. Respondent even admitted finding the small plastic sachet
containing complainant’s ring and bracelet and keeping the jewelry in his possession until he
purportedly threw them away.
When a person who finds a thing that has been lost or mislaid by the owner takes the thing into his
hands, he acquires physical custody only and does not become vested with legal possession. In
assuming such custody, the finder is charged with the obligation of restoring the thing to its owner. It is
thus respondent’s duty to report to his superior or his officemates that he found something. The Civil
Code, in Article 719, explicitly requires the finder of a lost property to report it to the proper authorities,
thus:
Article 719. Whoever finds a movable, which is not treasure, must return it to its previous
possessor. If the latter is unknown, the finder shall immediately deposit it with the mayor of the
city or municipality where the finding has taken place.
The finding shall be publicly announced by the mayor for two consecutive weeks in the way he
deems best.
If the movables cannot be kept without deterioration, or without the expenses which
considerably diminish its value, it shall be sold at public auction eight days after the
publication.
Six months from the publication having elapsed without the owner having appeared, the thing
found, or its value, shall be awarded to the finder. The finder and the owner shall be obliged,
as the case may be, to reimburse the expenses.
Rizalvo and his predecessors-in-interest were not in open continuous, adverse, and public possession
of the land in question in the manner and length of time required by law as to entitle them to judicial
confirmation of imperfect title.
Under Section 14 (1), of P.D. No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree, applicants for registration
of title must sufficiently establish first, that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable
lands of the public domain; second, that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and third, that it is
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
 MTC approved Rizalvo’s application. The third requirement that Rizalvo and his predecessors-in-interest be in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the subject property since June 12, 1945 or earlier, has
not been satisfied. He only managed to present oral and documentary evidence of his and his mother’s
ownership and possession of the land since 1958 through a photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated July 8, 1958. He presented Tax Declaration for the year 1948 in the name of Eufrecina Navarro
and real property tax receipts beginning in 1952.
It is well settled that prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership and that properties
classified as alienable public land may be converted into private property by reason of open, continuous
and exclusive possession of at least thirty years. The 30-year period of prescription for purposes of
acquiring ownership and registration of public land only begins from the moment the State expressly
declares that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development
of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. In the case at bar,
Rizalvo merely presented a certification and report from the DENR-CENRO dated July 17, 2001
certifying that the land in question entirely falls within the alienable and disposable zone since January
21, 1987; that it has not been earmarked for public use; and that it does not encroach any area devoted
to general public use. Unfortunately, such certification and report is not enough in order to commence
the 30-year prescriptive period under Section 14 (2).

3. Law
4. Tradition
5. Donation
1. Features
Jutic v. Court of In 1963, Arsenio executed an affidavit in favor of There clearly was no intention to transfer ownership from Arsenio to Melquiades at the time of the
Appeals Melquiades expressing his desire to assign all his instrument's execution.
properties upon his death to his brother,
(1987) Melquiades, upon his death. In 1968, Arsenio It was a mere intention or a desire on the part of Arsenio Seville that in the event of his death at some
mortgaged the properties to the PNB in future time, his properties should go to Melquiades Seville. Donations which are to take effect upon the
consideration of a loan. This was done with the death of the donor partake of the nature of testamentary provisions and shall be governed by the rules
knowledge and acquiescence of Melquiades. In established in the title on succession (Art. 728, Civil Code). The petitioners could not have accepted
1970, Arsenio died intestate, single, without issue, something, which by the terms of the supposed "donation" was not given to them at the time. The
and without any debt. He was survived by his affidavit could not transmit ownership except in clear and express terms. Any claim of ownership of the
brothers and sisters. Thereafter, Melquiades died petitioners is not based on the affidavit but on the fact that they are heirs of Arsenio together with the
and is survived by his children. respondents.
Petitioners filed a complaint with the CFI against
the children of Melquiades for partition and
accounting of the properties of Arsenio. The
children of Melquiades Seville claimed exclusive
ownership of the properties and improvements
thereon on the basis of the instrument executed by
Arsenio in favor of Melquiades and on their alleged
actual possession, occupation, and cultivation of
Lots Nos. 170 and 172 since 1954 continuously
and peacefully in the concept of owner up to the
time of Arsenio's death.
Tayoto v. Heirs In 1963, Pres. Macapagal issued Proclamation No. The donation is VOID.
of Kusop 168 withdrawing from sale or settlement and
reserving for recreational and health resort site There are three essential elements of donation is [1] the reduction of the patrimony of the donor, [2] the
(1990) purposes a meter parcel of land of the public increase in the patrimony of the donee, and [3] the intent to do an act of liberality ( animus donandi).
domain in General Santos in the Province of Granting that there is an animus donandi we find that the alleged donation lacks the first two elements
Cotabato, known as the Magsaysay Park. which presuppose the donor's ownership rights over the subject of the donation which he transmits to
According to said presidential proclamation, the the donee thereby enlarging the donee's estate. This is in consonance with the rule that a donor cannot
 park would be under the administration of the lawfully convey what is not his property. In other words, a donation of a parcel of land the dominical
Municipality of General Santos "subject to private rights of which do not belong to the donor at the time of the donation, is void. This holds true even of
rights, if any there be." Magsaysay Park became the subject of the donation is not the land itself but the possessory and proprietary rights over said land.
known as the Lion's Beach after it was developed In this case, although they allegedly declared Magsaysay Park as their own for taxation purposes, the
by the Matutum Lion's Club into a public park with heirs of Cabalo Kusop did not have any transmissible proprietary rights over the donated property at
swings and a skating rink. The beach also became the time of the donation. In fact, with respect to Lot Y-2, they still had to file a free patents application to
an ideal place to go swimming. In 1973, obtain an original certificate of title thereon. This is because Proclamation No. 2273 declaring as "open
respondents, claiming ownership over the entire to disposition under the provisions of the Public Land Act" some portions of the Magsaysay Park, is not
Magsaysay Park, donated ½ of the western side an operative law which automatically vests rights of ownership on the heirs of Cabalo Kusop over their
thereof to the John F. Kennedy Memorial Lyceum, claimed parcels of land.
Inc., a non-stock private corporation, represented
by Atty. Tayoto. In 1983, the President issued
Proclamation No. 2273 excluding from the
operation of Proclamation No. 168 "certain portions
of the lands embraced therein and declaring the
same open to disposition under the provisions of
the Public Land Act." After a survey had been
conducted, said portions were identified as Lot Y-1
and Lot Y-2. The board of trustees of the Lyceum
adopted Resolution No. 1 authorizing Tayoto to
cede, transfer, convey and assign Lot Y-1 in partial
settlement of years of accumulated salaries. The
resolution states that the one-half western side of
the Magsaysay Park had been definitely identified
as Lot Y-1. The Lyceum, represented by. Tayoto
and his wife, executed a deed assigning its
ownership rights over Lot Y-1 in favor of Tayoto.
Vita v. A complaint was filed by Nazario Vita, in his The land belongs to the defendant by virtue of a valid donation.
Montanano capacity as judicial administrator of the estate of
deceased Edilberto Vita, seeking to recover from From the provision of the document, it clearly appears that the donors shall continue to be the owner
(1991) defendants the possession of 3 parcels of land. and possessors of the properties involved in the donation and shall continue to enjoy the fruits of said
Vita claims that during the lifetime of Edilberto, he properties while they are still living and it is only upon their death that ownership will transfer to the
was the owner and possessor of these 3 parcels of donees. It was the evident intent of the donors in this case to give the donation after their death. In the
land and he was enjoying the fruits therefrom. meantime, they retain full or naked ownership and control of the properties while they are still living and
When he died on 1962, defendants, through stealth title will pass to the donees only after their death. This is donation mortis causa It is true that the last
and strategy, took possession of the above-stated paragraph in each donation contains the phrase "that after the death of the donor the aforesaid
parcels of land and gathered the fruits therefrom. donation shall become effective." . . . However, said expression must be construed together with the
Notwithstanding demands from Vita, defendants rest of the paragraph, and thus taken, its meaning clearly appears to be that after the donor's death, the
refused to surrender the possession of these donation will take effect so as to make the donees the absolute owners of the donated property, free
parcels of land. from all liens and encumbrances; for it must be remembered that the donor reserved for himself a share
Defendants deny that the 3 parcels of land belong of the fruits of the land donated. Such reservation constituted a charge or encumbrance that would
to the estate of Edilberto Vita. Instead, they claim disappear upon the donor's death, when full title would become vested in the donees. Furthermore,
that the two parcels of land belong to Soledad mention must be made of the fact that the consideration of the second deed of donation is love and
Montanano as these were conveyed to her by services rendered by defendants and intervenors to Isidra Montanano, as revealed by the third and
Isidra Montanano (her aunt and wife of Edilberto) fourth paragraphs therein.
and Edilberto Vita in a document signed and
executed by them in 1938 and ratified by one Mr.
Matienzo, a Notary Public of Nagcarlan, Laguna.
However, all copies of said document were lost
during the last war. The 3RD of land is owned in
common by Soledad Montanano, her brother Jose
and sisters Elena and Alodia.
Lagazo v. Court Lagazo flied an action against Cabanlit seeking to
of Appeals recover from the latter a parcel of land which the
former claims to have acquired from his
(1998) grandmother by donation. Cabanlit claimed that
when the alleged donation was executed, he had
already acquired the property by a Deed of
Assignment from a transferee of Lagazo's
grandmother.
Seventh Day In 1959, Sps. Cosio donated a parcel of land to the
Adventis v. South Philippine Union Mission of Seventh Day
Northeaster Adventist Church of Bayugan Esperanza, Agusan
Mindanao (SPUM-SDA Bayugan). The donation was
allegedly accepted by one Liberato Rayos, an elder
(2006) of the Seventh Day Adventist Church, in behalf of
the donee. 21 years later, the same parcel of land
was sold by the Sps. Cosio to the Seventh Day
Adventist Church of Northeastern Mindanao
Mission (SDA-NEMM).
Claiming to be the alleged donee’s successors-in-
interest, SDA Bayugan asserted ownership over
the property. This was opposed by SDA-NEMM
who argued that at the time of the donation, SPUM-
SDA Bayugan could not legally be a done
because, not having been incorporated yet, it had
no juridical personality. Neither were petitioners
members of the local church then, hence, the
donation could not have been made particularly to
them. SDA Bayugan filed a case for cancellation of
title, quieting of ownership and possession,
declaratory relief and reconveyance with prayer for
preliminary injunction and damages. RTC upheld
the sale in favour of SDA-NEMM.
2. Classifications
Austria-Magat v. Basilisa Comerciante is a mother of five children. In
Court of 1953, Basilisa bought a parcel of residential land
Appeals together with the improvement. In 1975, Basilisa
executed a document designated as “Kasulatan sa
(2002) Kaloobpala” and donated the property in favour of
her children. The said document was notarized. In
1979, Basilisa executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of
the subject house and lot in favor of Austria-Magat,
her daughter.
The other children and their heirs filed an action
against Austri-Magat for the annulment of the TCT,
and other relevant documents, and for
The donation is VOID.
A simple or pure donation is one whose cause is pure liberality (no strings attached), while an onerous
donation is one which is subject to burdens, charges or future services equal to or more in value than
the thing donated. Under Article 733 of the Civil Code, donations with an onerous cause shall be
governed by the rules on contracts; hence, the formalities required for a valid simple donation are not
applicable. The donation was simple, not onerous. Even conceding that the full payment of the
purchase price of the lot might have been a burden to Lagayo, such payment was not however
imposed by the donor as a condition for the donation. The words in the deed are in fact typical of a pure
donation.
Acceptance of the donation by the donee is indispensable; its absence makes the donation null and
void. The deed of donation does not show any indication that Lagazo accepted the gift. During the trial,
he did not present any instrument evidencing such acceptance.
Donation to SDA Bayugan is VOID.
Donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a thing or right in favor of
another person who accepts it. The donation could not have been made in favor of an entity yet
inexistent at the time it was made. Nor could it have been accepted as there was yet no one to accept
it. The deed of donation was not in favor of any informal group of SDA members but a supposed
SPUM-SDA Bayugan (the local church) which, at the time, had neither juridical personality nor capacity
to accept such gift. The de facto doctrine exists to protect the public dealing with supposed corporate
entities, not to favor the defective or non-existent corporation.
It is a valid donation inter vivos.
It has been held that whether the donation is inter vivos or mortis causa depends on whether the donor
intended to transfer ownership over the properties upon the execution of the deed. In Bonsato v. CA,
this Court enumerated the characteristics of a donation mortis causa, to wit:
It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what amounts to
the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the
property while alive;
That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but
revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the
properties conveyed;
That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
 reconveyance and damages.
Castro v. Court The original application for registration and
of Appeals confirmation of title was filed by Austria in 1948
covering 10 parcels of land. Castro submitted an
(1969) opposition, alleging that the lands applied for had
been donated to her by the applicant in 1939. In
1950 the Court rendered judgment finding that
Austria had been in possession of the lands in the
concept of owner since 1894, and consequently, by
virtue of the donation, ordered the registration
thereof in the name of the donee, Castro, subject
only to the usufruct reserved by the donor in
herself for the rest of her lifetime.
In 1950 a number of persons, claiming to be heirs
of Austria’s husband (nephews and nieces)
appeared and filed a petition to set aside the
decision and the order of general default previously
entered, and to have their opposition to the
application admitted. Their petition was granted
and the case was set for trial anew. Meanwhile,
Austria died and Castro was substituted in her
place. The averment of the oppositors was that the
lands applied for were owned by Antonio
Ventenilla; that when he died he left a will
bequeathing them in usufruct to his wife Alejandra;
and that upon her death they were passed to the
Construing together the provisions of the deed of donation, we find and so hold that in the case at bar
the donation is inter vivos. The express irrevocability of the same (“hindi na mababawi”) is the
distinctive standard that identifies that document as a donation inter vivos. The other provisions therein
which seemingly make the donation mortis causa do not go against the irrevocable character of the
subject donation. The provision in the deed of donation that the donated property will remain in the
possession of the donor just goes to show that the donor has given up his naked title of ownership
thereto and has maintained only the right to use (jus utendi) and possess (jus possidendi) the subject
donated property.
Furthermore, it also appeared that the provision in the deed of donation regarding the prohibition to
alienate the subject property is couched in general terms such that even the donor is deemed included
in the said prohibition Both the donor and the donees were prohibited from alienating and encumbering
the property during the lifetime of the donor. The prohibition on the donor to alienate the said property
during her lifetime is proof that naked ownership over the property has been transferred to the donees.
It also supports the irrevocable nature of the donation considering that the donor has already divested
herself of the right to dispose of the donated property. Another ndication in the deed of donation that
the donation is inter vivos is the acceptance clause therein of the donees. We have ruled that an
acceptance clause is a mark that the donation is inter vivos. Acceptance is a requirement for
donations inter vivos. On the other hand, donations mortis causa, being in the form of a will, are not
required to be accepted by the donees during the donor’s lifetime.
The act of selling the subject property to Austri-Magat cannot be considered as a valid act of revocation
of the deed of donation for the reason that a formal case to revoke the donation must be filed pursuant
to Article 764 of the Civil Code which speaks of an action that has a prescriptive period of four (4) years
from non-compliance with the condition stated in the deed of donation. The rule that there can be
automatic revocation without benefit of a court action does not apply to the case at bar for the reason
that the subject deed of donation is devoid of any provision providing for automatic revocation in event
of non-compliance with the any of the conditions set forth therein. Thus, a court action is necessary to
be filed within four (4) years from the non-compliance of the condition violated.
The donation is VALID.
Whether a donation is inter vivos or mortis causa depends upon the nature of the disposition made. It is
quite clear from the terms of the donation that the donor intended to and did dispose of her properties
irrevocably in favor of the donee, subject only to the conditions therein expressed, one of which was
that the latter would have no right to the products during the donor's lifetime. This merely indicates a
reservation in herself of the usufruct over said properties, which usufruct would be consolidated with the
naked ownership of the donee upon the former's death. The use of the words "se consolidaran" implied
transfer of the naked ownership, with which the beneficial title would be consolidated upon arrival of the
term thus fixed. The donation was inter vivos thus it was not necessary to comply with the formalities
required of a will.
 said oppositors as his heirs.
Alejandro v. In 1949, Sps. Diaz executed a deed of donation
Geraldez covering eight lots of the Lolomboy Friar Lands
Estate in favour of their daughter-in-law and their
(1977) three children. The husband died in 1962. In 1964,
the wife and her two children executed a deed of
donation denominated as "Kasulatan ng
Pagbibigay na Magkakabisa Pagkamatay
(Donation Mortis causa )" over one-half of Lot No.
2377-A, which is a portion of Lot No. 2377 of the
Lolomboy Friar Lands Estate. In that deed of
donation, the wife donated to Andrea her ½ share
in Lot 2377-A, which one-half share is Identified as
Lot 2377-A-1, on condition that Andrea would bear
the funeral expenses to be incurred after the
donor's death. She died in 1964. It should be noted
that the other ½ share in Lot 2377-A or Lot No.
2377-A-2 was previously adjudicated to Angel
because he defrayed the funeral expenses on the
occasion of the death of the husband.
In 1970 Andrea sued her brother, Angel, for the
partition of Lots Nos. 2377-A and 2502. Teodorico
Alejandro, the surviving spouse of Olimpia, one of
the Diaz children, and their children intervened in
the said case. They claimed 1/3 of Lot No. 2502.
Angel alleged in his answer that he had. been
occupying his share of Lot No. 2502 "for more than
twenty years". The intervenors claimed that the
1949 donation was a void mortis causa disposition.
Del Rosario v. In 1968, Sps. Gonzales executed a document
Ferrer entitled "Donation Mortis Causa" in favor of their
two children, Asuncion and Emiliano, and their
(2010) granddaughter, Jarabini, covering the spouses’ lot
and the house on it. Although denominated as a
donation mortis causa, which in law is the
equivalent of a will, the deed had no attestation
clause and was witnessed by only two persons.
The named donees, however, signified their
The donation is inter vivos.
An inter vivos donation of real property must be evidenced by a public document and should be
accepted by the donee in the same deed of donation or in a separate instrument. In the latter case, the
donor should be notified of the acceptance in an authentic form and that step should be noted in both
instruments. On the other hand, a transfer mortis causa should be embodied in a last will and
testament. It should not be called donation mortis causa . It is in reality a legacy. If not embodied in a
valid will, the donation is void. It is the time of effectivity (aside from the form) which distinguishes a
donation inter vivos from a donation mortis causa . And the effectivity is determined by the time when
the full or naked ownership (dominum plenum or dominium directum) of the donated properties is
transmitted to the donees.
The donation in the instant case is inter vivos because it took effect during the lifetime of the donors. It
was already effective during the donors' lifetime, or immediately after the execution of the deed, as
shown by the granting, habendum and warranty clause of the deed. In that clause it is stated that, in
consideration of the affection and esteem of the donors for the donees and the valuable services
rendered by the donees to the donors, the latter, by means of the deed of donation, wholeheartedly
transfer and unconditionally give to the donees the lots mentioned and described in the early part of the
deed, free from any kind of liens and debts.
The acceptance clause is another indication that the donation is inter vivos. Donations mortis causa ,
being in the form of a will, are never accepted by the donees during the donors' lifetime. Acceptance is
a requirement for donations inter vivos. In the acceptance clause herein, the donees declare that they
accept the donation to their entire satisfaction and, by means of the deed, they acknowledge and give
importance to the generosity and solicitude shown by the donors and sincerely thank them.
In the reddendum or reservation clause of the deed of donation, it is stipulated that the donees would
shoulder the expenses for the illness and the funeral of the donors and that the donees cannot sell to a
third person the donated properties during the donors' lifetime but if the sale is necessary to defray the
expenses and support of the donors, then the sale is valid.
The limited right to dispose of the donated lots, which the deed gives to the donees, implies that
ownership had passed to them by means of' the donation and that, therefore, the donation was already
effective during the donors' lifetime. That is a characteristic of a donation inter vivos.
However, paragraph 3 of the reddendum in or reservation clause provides that "also, while we, the
spouses Gabino Diaz and Severa Mendoza, are alive, our administration, right, and ownership of the
lots mentioned earlier as our properties shall continue but, upon our death, the right and ownership of
the donees to each of the properties allocated to each of them shall be fully effective."
Our conclusion is that the aforequoted paragraph 3 of the reddendum or reservation clause refers to
the beneficial ownership (dominium utile) and not to the naked title and that what the donors reserved
to themselves, by means of that clause, was the management of the donated lots and the fruits thereof.
But, notwithstanding that reservation, the donation, as shown in the habendum clause, was already
effective during their lifetime and was not made in contemplation of their death because the deed
transferred to the donees the naked ownership of the donated properties.
The donation is inter vivos.
That the document in question in this case was captioned "Donation Mortis Causa" is not controlling.
This Court has held that, if a donation by its terms is inter vivos, this character is not altered by the fact
that the donor styles it mortis causa.
In Austria-Magat v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that "irrevocability" is a quality absolutely
incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causa, where "revocability" is precisely the essence
of the act. Here, the donors plainly said that it is "our will that this Donation Mortis Causa shall be
irrevocable and shall be respected by the surviving spouse." The intent to make the donation
 acceptance of the donation on the face of the
document.
Guadalupe, the donor wife, died in 1968. A few
months later, Leopoldo, the donor husband,
executed a deed of assignment of his rights and
interests in subject property to their daughter
Asuncion. Leopoldo died in June 1972.
In 1998, Jarabini filed a petition for the probate
deed of donation mortis causa. Asuncion opposed
the petition, invoking his father’s assignment of his
rights and interests in the property to her.
3. Form
PAJARILLO vs. FACTS:
IAC 1. Juana, Felipe, and Perfecta were siblings
1989 Aug 11 2. They owned the subject parcel of land
3. Juana had a daughter named Salud; therefore,
Salud was also Perfecta’s niece
4. Perfecta died.
5. Upon the death of Perfecta, the two remaining
owners Juana and Felipe donated the land to
Perfecta
6. The donation was made in a public instrument
7. The acceptance of Salud was made in a
SEPARATE public instrument
8. The petitioners, who are allegedly buyers in
good faith of the land, sought to annul the
donation. They argue that the donation is
defective in form because of non-compliance
with the requirements of the law regarding its
acceptance.
a. Old Civil Code provides that “If the
acceptance is made by separate
public instrument, authentic notice
thereof shall be given the donor, and
this proceeding shall be noted in both
instruments.” Both instruments refer
to the deed of donation and Deed of
Acceptance. Since acceptance of the
donation was not made in both
instruments, the donation should be
invalidated
irrevocable becomes even clearer by the proviso that a surviving donor shall respect the irrevocability
of the donation. Consequently, the donation was in reality a donation inter vivos.
The donors in this case of course reserved the "right, ownership, possession, and administration of the
property" and made the donation operative upon their death. But this Court has consistently held that
such reservation (reddendum) in the context of an irrevocable donation simply means that the donors
parted with their naked title, maintaining only beneficial ownership of the donated property while they
lived.
Notably, the three donees signed their acceptance of the donation, which acceptance the deed
required. This Court has held that an acceptance clause indicates that the donation is inter vivos, since
acceptance is a requirement only for such kind of donations. Donations mortis causa, being in the form
of a will, need not be accepted by the donee during the donor’s lifetime.
Puig v. Peñaflorida - in case of doubt, the conveyance should be deemed a donation inter vivos rather
than mortis causa, in order to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property subject of the deed.
Since the donation in this case was one made inter vivos, it was immediately operative and final. The
reason is that such kind of donation is deemed perfected from the moment the donor learned of the
donee’s acceptance of the donation. The acceptance makes the donee the absolute owner of the
property donated. Given that the donation in this case was irrevocable or one given inter vivos,
Leopoldo’s subsequent assignment of his rights and interests in the property to Asuncion should be
regarded as void for, by then, he had no more rights to assign.
ISSUE1:
Does the instrument conform to the requirements under the Civil Code?
HELD:
NO.
A strict interpretation of Article 633 can lead to no other conclusion than the annulment of the donation
for being defective in form as urged by the petitioners.
ISSUE2:
Should the donation be annulled?
HELD:
No.
The purpose of the formal requirement is to insure that the acceptance of the donation is duly
communicated to the donor. In the case at bar, it is not even suggested that Juana was unaware of
the acceptance for she in fact confirmed it later and requested that the donated land be not registered
during her lifetime by Salud. Given this significant evidence, the Court cannot in conscience declare the
donation ineffective because there is no notation in the extrajudicial settlement of the donee's
acceptance. That would be placing too much stress on mere form over substance. It would also
disregard the clear reality of the acceptance of the donation as manifested in these separate instrument
and as later acknowledged by Juana.
 4. Distinctions between inter vivos and mortis causa
ANGELES FACTS:
UBALDE PUIG, 1. Carmen, Catalino, and Luisa are siblings The first donation is a donation inter vivos; therefore, no need to comply with the formality of wills. This
ET AL., plaintiffs 2. Carmen was the owner of two parcels of land donation is valid.
and appellants, (Lot 1 and Lot 2).
vs. ESTELA 3. She donated the two lots, IN SEPARATE The second contract is a will. Not having complied with the formality of wills, the donation is invalid
MAGBANUA instruments, the two lots in question to her
PEÑAFLORIDA, niece Estela, daughter of Luisa. Differences and Other Rules
ET AL., 4. The plaintiffs herein, children of Catalino and Inter Vivos Mortis Causa
defendants and therefore plaintiff’s cousins, want to declare the act is immediately operative, even if the nothing is conveyed to the grantee and nothing
appellants. the donations void for not complying with its actual execution may be deferred until the death is acquired by the latter, until the death of the
1965 Nov 29 formal requirements of the donor (transfer of ownership effective grantor-testator, the disposition being until then
a. Since the donations are donations immediately. What may be deferred is execution) ambulatory and not final (transfer of ownership
Mortis Causa, the same should be effective upon death)8
void for not complying with the formal
requirements of wills
ISSUE: Irrevocable Revocable. Revocability must be absolute
Should the donations be annulled for not complying
with the forms of donations?  That a conveyance for onerous consideration is governed by the rules of contracts and not by
those of donation or testament.

 That in case of doubt, the conveyance should be deemed donation inter vivos rather than
mortis causa, in order to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property subject of the
deed.

FIRST DONATION  Valid Donation

 The conveyance of the properties described in the deed appears made in consideration of the
undertaking of the donee, Estela Magbanua, to bear "all expenses for medical treatment,
hospital expenses and/or burial of the Donor"
 Emphasizing the onerous character of the transaction is the requirement that if the donee should
predecease the donor, Governor Peñaflorida shall assume the obligations of the donee

Power to revoke by Donor is not Absolute

While there is a clause that the donor reserved her right "to mortgage or even sell the donated property,
when and if she should need funds to meet her own needs", this last sentence of the stipulation
appears incompatible with the grantor's freedom to revoke a true conveyance mortis causa.

SECOND DONATION  Donation Mortis Causa. Void for not having complied with the
formalities of Wills

In the second donation, no proprietary right was intended to pass to the alleged "donee" prior to the
donor's death, and that the same was a true conveyance mortis causa, which by law is invalid because
it was not executed with the testamentary formalities required by the statutes in force at the time. Here,
unlike in the previous donation, the designation as donation mortis causa is confirmed by the fact that
no signs contradict or limit the unqualified and unrestricted right of the donor to alienate the
conveyed properties in favor of other persons of her choice at any time that she should wish to

8
That the designation of the donation as mortis causa, or a provision in the deed to the effect that the donation is "to take effect at the death of the donor" are not controlling
criteria; such statements are to be construed together with the rest of the instrument, in order to give effect to the real intent of the transferor

CASTRO vs. CA FACTS:
1969 Apr 28 1. Alejandra Austria wanted to register 10
parcels of land in his name
2. Opposed by Castro saying that the lands
applied for had been donated to her by
the applicant in 1939.
a. Austria had been in possession
of the lands in concept of owner
since 1894, and consequently,
by virtue of the donation, ordered
the registration thereof in the
name of the donee, Socorro A.
Castro, subject only to the
usufruct reserved by the donor
in herself for the rest of her
lifetime.
3. Austria’s heirs countered:
a. said donation was mortis causa
and consequently void because it
did not follow the formalities
required of a will
ISSUE:
Is the donation a donation mortis causa?
Alejandro vs. FACTS:
Geraldez 1. A deed of donation was made.
1977 Aug 18 a. The donation was accepted
during the lifetime of the donors
b. The donees cannot dispose of
the donated properties during the
lifetime of the donors
c. It contains the following clause
(paragraph 3): "also, while we,
the spouses Gabino Diaz and
Severa Mendoza (donors), are
alive, our administration, right,
and ownership of the lots
mentioned earlier as our
properties shall continue”
ISSUE:
Is the donation a donation mortis cause or inter
vivos?
do so. It is so expressed in the deed, and it indirectly recognizes the donor's power to nullify the
conveyance to the alleged "donee" whenever the "donor" wished to do so, for any reason or for no
particular reason at all.
No. Inter Vivos. Therefore, no need to comply with formalities of wills
Did the donor intend to transfer the ownership of the property donated upon the execution of the
donation? If this is so, as reflected from the provisions contained in the donation, then it is inter vivos;
otherwise, it is merely mortis causa, or made to take effect after death. Sometimes the nature of the
donation becomes controversial when the donee's enjoyment of the property donated is
postponed until after the donor's death. When the time fixed for the commencement of the
enjoyment of the property donated be at the death of the donor, or when the suspensive condition is
related to his death, confusion might arise. To avoid it we must distinguish between the actual
donation and the execution thereof. That the donation is to have effect during the lifetime of the
donor or at his death does not mean the delivery of the property must be made during his life or after
his death. From the moment that the donor disposes freely of his property and such disposal is
accepted by the donee, the donation exists, perfectly and irrevocably. Thus, he who makes the
donation effective upon a certain date, even though to take place at his death, disposes of that which
he donated and he cannot afterwards revoke the donation nor dispose of the said property in favor of
another.'
From the terms of the donation that the donor intended to and did dispose of her properties irrevocably
in favor of the donee, subject only to the conditions therein expressed, one of which was that the latter
would have no right to the products during the donor's lifetime. This merely indicates a reservation in
herself of the usufruct over said properties, which usufruct would be consolidated with the naked
ownership of the donee upon the former's death. The use of the words "se consolidaran" implied
transfer of the naked ownership, with which the beneficial title would be consolidated upon arrival of the
term thus fixed.
Inter Vivos.
It is the time of effectivity (aside from the form) which distinguishes a donation inter vivos from
a donation mortis causa. And the effectivity is determined by the time when the full or naked
ownership (dominium plenum or dominium directum) of the donated properties is transmitted to the
donees.
If the donation is made in contemplation of the donor's death, meaning that the full or naked ownership
of the donated properties will pass to the donee only because of the donor's death, then it is at that time
that the donation takes effect, and it is a donation mortis causa which should be embodied in a last will
and testament. But if the donation takes effect during the donor's lifetime or independently of the
donor's death, meaning that the full or naked ownership (nuda proprietas) of the donated properties
passes to the donee during the donor's lifetime, not by reason of his death but because of the deed of
donation, then the donation is inter vivos
The donation in the instant case is inter vivos because it took effect during the lifetime of the donors. It
was already effective during the donors' lifetime, or immediately after the execution of the deed, as
shown by the granting, habendum and warranty clause of the deed.
Provision in Deed of Donation:… buong pusong inililipat at lubos na ibinibigay sa nasabing
pinagkakalooban ang lupang binabanggit at makikilala sa unahan nito, laya sa ano mang sagutin at
 pagkakautang, katulad nito:"

Following the above-quoted granting, habendum and warranty clause is the donors' declaration that
they donate (ipinagkakaloob) Lot No. 2502, the property in litigation, in equal shares to their children
Angel Diaz and Andrea Diaz, the western part to Angel and the eastern part to Andrea.

Acceptance Clause
The acceptance clause is another indication that the donation is inter vivos. Donations mortis
causa, being in the form of a will, are never accepted by the donees during the donors' lifetime.
Acceptance is a requirement for donations inter vivos.

Limitation to Sell to Third Persons

In the reddendum or reservation clause of the deed of donation, it is stipulated that the donees would
shoulder the expenses for the illness and the funeral of the donors and that the donees cannot sell to
a third person the donated properties during the donors' lifetime but if the sale is necessary to
defray the expenses and support of the donors, then the sale is valid. The limited right to dispose of the
donated lots, which the deed gives to the donees, implies that ownership had passed to them by means
of the donation and that, therefore, the donation was already effective during the donors' lifetime. That
is a characteristic of a donation inter vivos.

Interpretation of paragraph 3
Our conclusion is that the aforequoted paragraph 3 of the reddendum or reservation clause refers to
the beneficial ownership (dominium utile) and not to the naked title and that what the donors reserved
to themselves, by means of that clause, was the management of the donated lots and the fruits
thereof.

RUPERTO FACTS: Valid. The donation is a donation Inter Vivos; therefore, no need to comply with the formalities of wills.
REYES and 1. Dr. Emilio Pascual died intestate and
REYNALDO C. without issue The following are characteristics of a donation mortis causa:
SAN JUAN, in 2. The subject property was included in the
his capacity as estate of Pascual (1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what
Special 3. Ursula Pascual filed a motion to exclude amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of
Administrator, some properties from the inventory of the property while alive;
petitioners, vs. Pascual's estate and to deliver the titles
HON. LORENZO thereto to her. (2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but
R. MOSQUEDA, a. Ursula alleged that Dr. Pascual revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the
Judge of CFI, during his lifetime or on properties conveyed;
Pampanga November 2, 1966 executed a
(Branch VII), "Donation Mortis Causa" in her (3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
and URSULA D favor covering properties which
PASCUAL, are included in the estate of Dr. Applying the above principles to the instant petitions, there is no doubt that the so-called DONATION
respondents. Pascual MORTIS CAUSA is really a donation inter vivos. The donation was executed by Dr. Pascual in favor of
1990 Jul 23 4. The petitioners assert that the donation his sister Ursula Pascual out of love and affection as well as a recognition of the personal services
was null and void since it was not rendered by the donee to the donor. The transfer of ownership over the properties donated to the
executed with the formalities of a will. donee was immediate and independent of the death of the donor. The provision as regards the
reservation of properties for the donor's subsistence in relation to the other provisions of the deed of
ISSUE: donation confirms the intention of the donor to give naked ownership of the properties to the donee
Is the donation void for not complying with the immediately after the execution of the deed of donation.
formalities of a will?
Furthermore, the title given to a deed of donation is not the determinative factor which makes the
donation "inter vivos" or "mortis causa."
SPOUSES FACTS:
ERNESTO and 1. Subject property is owned by Aurora Montinola
EVELYN SICAD, 2. She executed a Deed of Donation in favor of
petitioners, vs. her grandchildren (private respondents
COURT OF Valderrama. A relevant characteristic of the
APPEALS, Deed of Donation reads “the donees shall not
CATALINO sell or encumber the properties herein donated
VALDERRAMA, within 10 years after the death of the donor.”
JUDY CRISTINA 3. By virtue of a Deed of Donation, TCT was
M. issued in favor of private respondents
VALDERRAMA 4. Montinola however retained the owner's
and JESUS duplicate copy of the new title (No. T-16622),
ANTONIO as well as the property itself,
VALDERRAMA, 5. She transferred the same ten (10) years later
respondents. to the spouses, Ernesto and Evelyn Sicad.
1998 Aug 13 6. In order avoid future controversy, she filed the
instant case to annul the Deed of Donation she
made to her grandchildren. She argues that
the donation is a donation mortis causa which
is required to comply with the formalities of
wills.
7. The grandchildren opposed saying that there
was a valid inter vivos donation.
ISSUE:
Inter Vivos or Mortis Causa?
Mortis Causa. Donation void. Transfer to the Sicad spouses is valid.
The real nature of a deed is to be ascertained by both its language and the intention of the parties as
demonstrated by the circumstances attendant upon its execution.
Circumstances evidencing the existence of a Mortis Causa Donation
 Aurora Montinola ordered the insertion in the deed of that proviso restricting the donees right
to dispose of the property only after 10 years from the death of the donor,
 after recordation of the deed of donation, she never stopped treating the property as her own.
She continued, as explicitly authorized in the deed itself, to possess the property, enjoy its
fruits and otherwise exercise the rights of dominion, paying the property taxes as they fell due
- all these she did until she transferred the property to the Sicad Spouses.
 She did not give the new certificate of title to the ostensible donees but retained it, too, until
she delivered it to the Sicads on the occasion of the sale of the property to them.
 Montinola's openly expressed view that the donation was ineffectual and could not be given
effect even after ten (10) years from her death.
 She brought suit on to cancel TCT No. T-16622 (issued to her grandchildren) premised
precisely on the invalidity of the donation for failure to comply with the requisites of
testamentary dispositions.
 Before that, she attempted to undo the conveyance to her grandchildren by executing a deed
of revocation
 She caused the annotation of an adverse claim on said TCT.
 She also exercised indisputable acts of ownership over said property by executing, as just
stated, deeds intended to pass title over it to third parties - petitioners herein.
Language of the Deed
 They were prohibited to effect any sale of encumbrance thereof for a period of ten (10) years
after the ostensible donor's decease. 16

A donation which purports to be one inter vivos but withholds from the donee the right to
dispose of the donated property during the donor's lifetime is in truth one mortis causa. In a
donation mortis causa "the right of disposition is not transferred to the donee while the donor is still
alive. 19

SPS. AGRIPINO FACTS: Inter Vivos.

GESTOPA and 1. Spouses Danlag were the owners of the
ISABEL subject properties (6 parcels of land) Note first that the granting clause shows that Diego donated the properties out of love and affection for
SILARIO 2. They donated the properties to private the donee. This is a mark of a donation inter vivos.
GESTOPA, respondent Mercedes. The Deeds of Donation
petitioners, vs. contained the following: Second, the reservation of lifetime usufruct indicates that the donor intended to transfer the
COURT OF a. All deeds contained the naked ownership over the properties. As correctly posed by the Court of Appeals, what was the
APPEALS and reservation of the rights of the need for such reservation if the donor and his spouse remained the owners of the properties?
MERCEDES donors (1) to amend, cancel or
DANLAG y revoke the donation during Third, the donor reserved sufficient properties for his maintenance in accordance with his standing in
PILAPIL, their lifetime, and (2) to sell, society, indicating that the donor intended to part with the six parcels of land.
respondents. mortgage, or encumber the
2000 Oct 5 properties donated during the Lastly, the donee accepted the donation. In the case of Alejandro vs. Geraldez, we said that an
donors' lifetime, if deemed acceptance clause is a mark that the donation is inter vivos. Acceptance is a requirement for donations
necessary. inter vivos. Donations mortis causa, being in the form of a will, are not required to be accepted by the
b. (1) the Danlag spouses shall donees during the donors' lifetime.
 continue to enjoy the fruits of the
land during their lifetime, and that The donor's right to give consent was merely intended to protect his usufructuary interests. In
c. (2) the donee can not sell or Alejandro, we ruled that a limitation on the right to sell during the donors' lifetime implied that
dispose of the land during the ownership had passed to the donees and donation was already effective during the donors'
lifetime of the said spouses, lifetime.
without their prior consent and
approval.
3. Diego and Catalina Danlag sold parcels 3 and
4 to herein petitioners, Mr. and Mrs. Agripino
Gestopa.
4. The Danlags then executed a deed of
revocation recovering the six parcels of
land subject of the aforecited deed of
donation.
5. Mercedes filed the instant case of quieting of
title. She argued that the donations in her
favor were irrevocable donations inter vivos
6. The petitioners argue that the donations were
mortis causa

APOLINARIA 1. Basilia owned the subject property Inter Vivos. Second donation is void
AUSTRIA- 2. She had 5 children: Rosario, Consolacion,
MAGAT, Apolinaria (petitioner), Leonardo, whether the donation is inter vivos or mortis causa depends on whether the donor intended to
petitioner, vs. Florentino (private respondents) transfer ownership over the properties upon the execution of the deed. The characteristics of a
HON. COURT 3. She donated the property to her 5 donation mortis causa are:
OF APPEALS children. Important provsions:
and a. the same will only take effect (1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what
FLORENTINO upon the death of the donor amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of
LUMUBOS, b. there is a prohibition to alienate, the property while alive;
DOMINGO encumber, dispose, or sell the
COMIA, same, are proofs that the (2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum;
TEODORA donation is mortis causa but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of
CARAMPOT, c. The donation is irrevocable(“hindi the properties conveyed;
ERNESTO na mababawi”)
APOLO, d. Usufruct in favor of the donees (3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
SEGUNDA until she lives
SUMPELO, e. Prohibition to alienate and IRREVOCABILITY
MAMERTO encumber on both the donee and (W)HAT IS MOST SIGNIFICANT [in determining the type of donation] is the absence of
SUMPELO and the donor until the death of the stipulation that the donor could revoke the donations; on the contrary, the deeds expressly declare
RICARDO latter them to be “irrevocable”, a quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causa
SUMPELO, 4. However, she later donated the same where revocability is of the essence of the act, to the extent that a testator can not lawfully waive or
respondents. property to Apolinaria alone restrict his right of revocation
2002 Feb 1 5. The private respondents (other siblings
and heirs of deceased siblings) filed the Construing together the provisions of the deed of donation, we find and so hold that in the case at bar
instant case to declare the second the donation is inter vivos. The express irrevocability of the same (“hindi na mababawi”) is the
donation void distinctive standard that identifies that document as a donation inter vivos.
a. They argued that the first
donation to the 5 siblings are Provision that says that the donation will only take effect upon the death of the donor and that
already donations inter vivos. there is a prohibition to alienate, encumber, dispose, or sell the same, are proofs that the
6. The petitioner argues that it was a donation is mortis causa.
donation mortis causa, hence, Basilia can
 validly dispose of the same even after the
first donation.
The said statements only mean that “after the donor’s death, the donation will take effect so as to make
the donees the absolute owners of the donated property, free from all liens and encumbrances; for it
must be remembered that the donor reserved for himself a share of the fruits of the land donated.” It
only means that the usufruct is extinguished and the doneness would now enjoy fully the rights of
ownership that was already given at the time of the donation. In the case at bar, the provision in the
deed of donation that the donated property will remain in the possession of the donor just goes to show
that the donor has given up his naked title of ownership thereto and has maintained only the right to
use (jus utendi) and possess (jus possidendi) the subject donated property.

Prohibition on Donor and Donee to alienate

Both the donor and the donees were prohibited from alienating and encumbering the property during
the lifetime of the donor. If the donor intended to maintain full ownership over the said property until her
death, she could have expressly stated therein a reservation of her right to dispose of the same. The
prohibition on the donor to alienate the said property during her lifetime is `proof that naked ownership
over the property has been transferred to the donees. It also supports the irrevocable nature of the
donation considering that the donor has already divested herself of the right to dispose of the donated
property.

Another indication in the deed of donation that the donation is inter vivos is the acceptance clause
therein of the donees. We have ruled that an acceptance clause is a mark that the donation is
inter vivos. Acceptance is a requirement for donations inter vivos. On the other hand, donations
mortis causa, being in the form of a will, are not required to be accepted by the donees during the
donor’s lifetime.

GANUELAS, vs. 1. Celestina owned the subject parcels of land. Donation Mortis Causa. Therefore, void for not complying t=with the formalities of wills.
CAWED, Judge 2. She executed a Deed of Donation covering the
of the Regional seven parcels of land in favor of her niece Donation inter vivos differs from donation mortis causa in that in the former, the act is immediately
Trial Court of Ursulina Ganuelas operative even if the actual execution may be deferred until the death of the donor, while in the latter,
San Fernando, 3. Celestina executed a document denominated nothing is conveyed to or acquired by the donee until the death of the donor-testator.
La Union as Revocation of Donation
(Branch 29), 4. Celestina died. In the donation subject of the present case, there is nothing therein which indicates that any right,
2003 Apr 24 5. Despite the revocation, Ursulina refused to title or interest in the donated properties was to be transferred to Ursulina prior to the death of
give private respondents (heirs of Celestina) Celestina.
any share in the produce of the properties
despite repeated demands. The phrase “to become effective upon the death of the DONOR” admits of no other interpretation but
6. The respondents filed the instant case to that Celestina intended to transfer the ownership of the properties to Ursulina on her death, not during
compel the petitioner to return to them as her lifetime.
intestate heirs the possession and ownership
of the properties. More importantly, the provision in the deed stating that if the donee should die before the donor, the
a. the Deed of Donation executed by donation shall be deemed rescinded and of no further force and effect shows that the donation is a
Celestina in favor of Ursulina was postmortem disposition.
void for lack of acknowledgment by
the attesting witnesses thereto before As stated in a long line of cases, one of the decisive characteristics of a donation mortis causa is that
notary public Atty. Henry Valmonte, the transfer should be considered void if the donor should survive the donee.
and the donation was a disposition
mortis causa which failed to To classify the donation as inter vivos simply because it is founded on considerations of love and
comply with the provisions of the affection is erroneous. That the donation was prompted by the affection of the donor for the donee and
Civil Code regarding formalities of the services rendered by the latter is of no particular significance in determining whether the deed
wills and testaments, hence, it was constitutes a transfer inter vivos or not, because a legacy may have an identical motivation.[32] In
void. other words, love and affection may also underline transfers mortis causa.
ELOY NOTE: I do not know why this case is included Article 1051 of Civil Code:
IMPERIAL, under the topic donations IV vs. Donation MC
petitioner vs. The repudiation of an inheritance shall be made in a public or authentic instrument, or by petition
COURT OF 1. Leonicio had two sons: petitioner Eloy presented to the court having jurisdiction over the testamentary or intestate proceedings.
APPEALS, (acknowledged natural) and Victor (adopted)
REGIONAL 2. Leonicio donated the subject property to Eloy Thus, when Victor substituted Leoncio in Civil Case No. 1177 upon the latter's death, his act of moving
TRIAL COURT 3. Leonicio later on filed a complaint to revoke for execution of the compromise judgment cannot be considered an act of renunciation of his legitime.
OF LEGASPI the same on the ground that he was deceived He was, therefore, not precluded or estopped from subsequently seeking the reduction of the donation,
CITY, CESAR by petitioner herein into signing the said under Article 772.
VILLALON, JR., document.
TERESA 4. The dispute, however, was resolved through a
VILLALON, compromise agreement.
ANTONIO 5. Leonicio died.
VILLALON, 6. Victor substituted Leonicio.
AUGUSTO 7. Victor died. He was substituted by natural
VILLALON, siblings (Cesar and Teresa)
ROBERTO 8. Cesar and Teresa sought the nullification of
VILLALON, the Deed of Absolute Sale affecting the above
RICARDO property, that the conveyance of said property
VILLALON and in favor of petitioner impaired the legitime of
ESTHER Victor Imperial, their natural brother and
VILLALON, predecessor-in-interest.
respondents. 9. Eloy argued that Victor had already waived his
1999 Oct 8 right to his legitime. When Leoncio died on
January 8, 1962, it was only Victor who was
entitled to question the donation. However,
instead of filing an action to contest the
donation, Victor asked to be substituted as
plaintiff in Civil Case No. 1177 and even
moved for execution of the compromise
judgment therein.

Echavez v. Vicente Echavez is the owner of several lots which
Dozen includes the land subject of controversy. In 1985,
he donated it to Manuel Echavez through a deed of
(2010) donation Mortis Causa. Manuel accepted the
donation.
In 1986, Vicente sold the lots in favor of Dozen
Corporation. Also in that year, Vicente died.
Manuel filed a petition to approve the donation
mortis causa in his favor and to annul the contract
of sale.
TC dismissed the petition and held that the contract
of sale executed after the donation is an equivocal
act which revoked the donation.
CA found that the deed of donation did not contain
an attestation clause and was therefore void.
DONATION IS VOID.
Donation mortis causa must comply with the formalities prescribed by law for the validity of wills.
Otherwise, the donation is void and would produce no effect.
The purported attestation clause embodied in the Acknowledgment portion does not contain the
number of pages on which the deed was written.
The exception to this rule in Singson v. Florentino and Taboada v. Hon. Rosal, cannot be applied to the
present case, as the facts of this case are not similar with those of Singson and Taboada. In those
cases, the Court found that although the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages upon
which the will was written, the number of pages was stated in one portion of the will. This is not the
factual situation in the present case.
That the requirements of attestation and acknowledgment are embodied in two separate provisions of
the Civil Code (Articles 805 and 806, respectively) indicates that the law contemplates two distinct acts
that serve different purposes. An acknowledgment is made by one executing a deed, declaring before a
competent officer or court that the deed or act is his own. On the other hand, the attestation of a will
refers to the act of the instrumental witnesses themselves who certify to the execution of the instrument
before them and to the manner of its execution.

5. Limitations
a. Who may donate
b. Who may be a donee
c. Void donations
Insular Life v. Buenaventura Ebrado was issued by the Insular
Ebrado Life Assurance an insurance policy on a whole-life
plan for P5,882.00 with a rider for Accidental Death
(1977) Benefits for the same amount. He designated
Carponia T. Ebrado, his common-law wife, as his
revocable beneficiary in his policy. In the policy he
referred to her as his wife. When Buenaventura
died, Carponia filed a claim to the insurance
company. She admits however they lived together
as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage.
PascualaEbrado also filed a claim alleging that she
is the legal wife of Buenaventura and asserts a
better right over the proceeds than Carponia who is
a common law wife.
Villanueva v. Gonzalo Villanueva, represented by his heirs, sued
Branoco Spouses Branoco to recover a parcelof land. The
former claimed ownership over the property thru
(2011) purchase from Vere, who in turn, bought the
property from Rodrigo. Gonzalo declared the
property in his name for tax purposes soon after
acquiring it. In their answer, the Spouses Baranoco
similarly claimed ownership over the property thru
purchase from Rodriguez, who in turn, acquired the
property from Rodrigo byway of donation. The
Spouses entered the property and paid taxes
afterwards. The trial court ruled in favor of Gonzalo
and declared him owner of the property, and
ordered the Spouses Branoco to surrender
possession to Gonzalo.
Although the witnesses in the present case acknowledged the execution of the Deed of Donation Mortis
Causa before the notary public, this is not the avowal the law requires from the instrumental witnesses
to the execution of a decedent's will. An attestation must state all the details the third paragraph of
Article 805 requires. In the absence of the required avowal by the witnesses themselves, no attestation
clause can be deemed embodied in the Acknowledgement of the Deed of Donation Mortis Causa.
A common-law wife named as a beneficiary in the life insurance policy of a legally married man cannot
claim the proceeds thereof in case the death of the latter. The contract of insurance is govern by the
provisions of the new civil code on matters not specifically provided for in the insurance code.
Under the Article 739 specifically states “those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or
concubinage at the time of donation” shall be void. Thus common-law spouses are barred from
receiving donations from each other.
No criminal conviction for the offense is a condition precedent. On the contrary, the law plainly states
that the guilt of the party may be proved "in the same acting for declaration of nullity of donation. And, it
would be sufficient if evidence preponderates upon the guilt of the consort for the offense indicated.
The quantum of proof in criminal cases is not demanded.
Policy considerations and dictates of morality rightly justify the institution of a barrier between common
law spouses in record to Property relations since such hip ultimately encroaches upon the nuptial and
filial rights of the legitimate family There is every reason to hold that the bar in donations between
legitimate spouses and those between illegitimate ones should be enforced in life insurance policies
since the same are based on similar consideration
In essence, a life insurance policy is no different from a civil donation insofar as the beneficiary is
concerned. Both are founded upon the same consideration: liberality. A beneficiary is like a donee,
because from the premiums of the policy which the insured pays out of liberality, the beneficiary will
receive the proceeds or profits of said insurance. As a consequence, the proscription in Article 739 of
the new Civil Code should equally operate in life insurance contracts.
DONATION WAS VALID. IT WAS INTER VIVOS.
Having irrevocably transferred naked title over the Property to Rodriguez in 1965, Rodrigo "cannot
afterwards revoke the donation nor dispose of the said property in favor of another." Thus, Rodrigo's
post-donation sale of the Property vested no title to Vere. As Vere's successor-in-interest, petitioner
acquired no better right than him. On the other hand, respondents bought the Property from Rodriguez,
thus acquiring the latter's title which they may invoke against all adverse claimants, including petitioner.
Rodrigo stipulated that "if the herein Donee predeceases me, the property will not be reverted to the
Donor, but will be inherited by the heirs of Rodriguez” signaling the irrevocability of the passage of title
to Rodriguez's estate, waiving Rodrigo's right to reclaim title. This transfer of title was perfected the
moment Rodrigo learned of Rodriguez's acceptance of the disposition which, being reflected in the
Deed, took place on the day of its execution on 3May 1965. Rodrigo's acceptance of the transfer
underscores its essence as a gift in presenti , not in futuro, as only donations inter vivos need
acceptance by the recipient. Rodrigo expressly waived title over the Property in case Rodriguez
predeceases her.
 Rodrigo  (sale) Vere (sale)  Gonzalo
Rodrigo  (donation)  Rodriguez  (sale)
Sps. Branoco
The trial court rejected Spouses Branoco’s claim of
ownership after treating the Deed as a donation
mortis causa which Rodrigo effectively cancelled
by selling the Property to Vere. Thus, by the time
Rodriguez sold the property to the Spouses, she
had no title to transfer.
On appeal, the CA granted the Spouses’ appeal
and set aside the trial court's ruling. it held that the
deed of donation is one of inter vivos. In his
petition, Gonzalo seeks the reinstatement of the
trial court's ruling. Alternatively, petitioner claims
ownership over the Property through acquisitive
prescription, having allegedly occupied it for more
than 10 years.
d. Others
Blanco v. Rivera Eugenia sold her undivided share to Petitioner. The
sale could not be registered because the original
(2006) owner’s copy of the tile was allegedly in the
custody of Respondent who refused to surrender
the same and who did not consent to the sale.
Eugenia again sold her undivided share to
Respondent through a quitclaim deed. Sale was
registered and Respondent took possession of the
property.
Petitioner then sought the assistance of the
barangay insisting that the lot was sold to him.
However, he cannot present the original TCT.
Respondent denied that he knew of the prior sale
to petitioner and filed a case for quieting of title.
Lumbres v. Spring Homes entered into a Contract to Sell with
Tablada Respondent spouses. Having paid the total amount
What Rodrigo reserved for herself was only the beneficial title to the Property, evident from Rodriguez's
undertaking to "give half of the produce of the land to ApoyAlve during her lifetime." Thus, the Deed's
stipulation that "the ownership shall be vested on [Rodriguez] upon my demise," taking into account the
non-reversion clause, could only refer to Rodrigo's beneficial title. Indeed, if Rodrigo still retained full
ownership over the Property, it was unnecessary for her to reserve partial usufructuary right over it.
The existence of consideration other than the donor's death, such as the donor's love and affection to
the donee and the services the latter rendered, while also true of devises, nevertheless "corroborates
the express irrevocability of x xx [inter vivos] transfers."
Nor can petitioner capitalize on Rodrigo's post-donation transfer of the Property to Vere as proof of her
retention of ownership. If such were the barometer in interpreting deeds of donation, not only will great
legal uncertainty be visited on gratuitous dispositions, this will give license to rogue property owners to
set at naught perfected transfers of titles, which, while founded on liberality, is a valid mode of passing
ownership. The interest of settled property dispositions counsels against licensing such practice.
RESPONDENT IS THE OWNER BEING THE FIRST TO REGISTER IN GOOD FAITH AS REQUIRED
BY ART. 1544.
When immovable property is sold to two different buyers at different times, ownership is determined in
accordance with Article 1544 of the Civil Code.
Art 1544: Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall pertain to the person acquiring it who in
good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person, who in good faith was first in
the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there
is good faith.
The requirement of the law is two-fold: acquisition in good faith and registration in good faith. The
vendee who first registers the sale in good faith in the registry of property has a preferred right over
another vendee who has not registered his title. This is true even if the latter is in actual possession of
the immovable property. More credit is given to registration than to actual possession.
But the law is clear – mere registration of title is not enough. Good faith must concur with registration.
What holds relevance and materiality is not whether the second buyer is a buyer in good faith but
whether he registers such second sale in good faith, meaning, without knowledge of any defect in the
title of the property sold.
Here, both the trial and appellate courts declared respondent to be the true owner of the property. He
was uncontestedly the first to register his ownership over the property, untainted by proof of any
knowledge of the prior sale. Respondent’s acquisition and registration of the property were therefore in
good faith.
RESPONDENT IS THE TRUE OWNER. PETITIONERS’ FIRST REGISTRATION COULD NOT
DEFEAT THE RESPONDENT’S TITLE AS THEY ARE IN BAD FAITH.
 which Respondent claims as the full purchase
(2007) price, Spring Homes executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale. Respondent constructed a residential house
on the lot. They also demanded the owner’s copy
of TCT.
To their great dismay, the spouses subsequently
learned that the TCT was canceled and a new one
issued to the Petitioners. Hence, Respondent filed
a case for nullification of title, reconveyance and
damages
Spring Homes argued that Respondent failed to
pay the unpaid balance, hence, the subject lot was
sold to Petitioners.
6. Reduction and revocation
Central In 1939, Don Ramon Lopez Sr. executed a deed of
Philippine donation in favor of CPU together with the following
University v. CA conditions:
a) The land should be utilized by CPU exclusively
(1995) for the establishment & use of medical college;
b) The said college shall not sell transfer or convey
to any 3rd party;
c) The said land shall be called “Ramon Lopez
Campus” and any income from that land shall be
put in the fund to be known as “Ramon Lopez
Campus Fund”.
However, on May 31, 1989, the heirs of Don
Ramon filed an action for annulment of donation,
reconveyance& damages against CPU for not
complying with the conditions. The heirs also
argued that CPU had negotiated with the NHA to
exchange the donated property with another land
owned by the latter.
Lagazo v. CA Catalina Jacob Vda. de Reyes, a widow and
grandmother of plaintiff-appellee, was awarded in
(1998) July 1975 a 60.10-square meter lot which is a
Petitioners cannot claim good faith since at the time of the execution of the Compromise Agreement.
They were indisputably and reasonably informed that the subject lot was previously sold to the
respondents. In fact, they were already aware that the respondents had constructed a house thereon
and are presently in possession of the same.
Knowledge gained by the second buyer of the first sale defeats his rights even if he is the first to
register the second sale because such knowledge taints his prior registration with bad faith. For the
second buyer to displace the first, he must show that he acted in good faith throughout (i.e. in
ignorance of the first sale and of the first buyer's rights) from the time of acquisition until the title is
transferred to him by registration.
Consequently, the respondents are the buyers entitled to the physical possession of the subject lot
since the prevailing doctrine is that as between the buyer who is in possession of a Torrens title but
who has acquired it in bad faith and the first buyer who failed to have his title recorded in the Registry of
Property, the first buyer must prevail.
DONATION IS REVOKED.
A clear perusal of the conditions set forth in the deed of donation executed by Don Ramon Lopez, Sr.,
gives us no alternative but to conclude that his donation was onerous, one executed for a valuable
consideration which is considered the equivalent of the donation itself, e.g., when a donation imposes a
burden equivalent to the value of the donation.
Moreover, the time from which the cause of action accrued for the revocation of the donation and
recovery of the property donated cannot be specifically determined in the instant case. A cause of
action arises when that which should have been done is not done, or that which should not have been
done is done.
Thus, when the obligation does not fix a period but from its nature and circumstances it can be inferred
that a period was intended, the general rule provided in Art. 1197 of the Civil Code applies, which
provides that the courts may fix the duration thereof because the fulfillment of the obligation itself
cannot be demanded until after the court has fixed the period for compliance therewith and such period
has arrived.This general rule however cannot be applied considering the different set of circumstances
existing in the instant case. More than a reasonable period of fifty (50) years has already been allowed
petitioner to avail of the opportunity to comply with the condition even if it be burdensome, to make the
donation in its favor forever valid. But, unfortunately, it failed to do so.
Since the questioned deed of donation herein is basically a gratuitous one, doubts referring to
incidental circumstances of a gratuitous contract should be resolved in favor of the least transmission of
rights and interests. 10 Records are clear and facts are undisputed that since the execution of the deed
of donation up to the time of filing of the instant action, petitioner has failed to comply with its obligation
as donee. Petitioner has slept on its obligation for an unreasonable length of time. Hence, it is only just
and equitable now to declare the subject donation already ineffective and, for all purposes, revoked so
that petitioner as donee should now return the donated property to the heirs of the donor, private
respondents herein, by means of reconveyance.
Simple donation, not onerous. Petitioner/Plaintiff cannot be deemed the owner for lack of acceptance.
It is clear that the donor did not have any intention to burden or charge petitioner as the donee. The
 portion of the Monserrat Estate.
Shortly before she left for Canada where she is
now a permanent resident, Catalina Jacob
executed a SPA in favor of her son-in-law Eduardo
B. Español authorizing him to execute all
documents necessary for the final adjudication of
her claim as awardee of the lot. Due to the failure
of Eduardo B. Español to accomplish the purpose
of the power of attorney granted to him, Catalina
Jacob revoked said authority.
Catalina Jacob executed in Canada a Deed of
Donation over the lot in favor of the Plaintiff.
Following the donation, plaintiff-appellee checked
with the Register of Deeds and found out that the
property was in the delinquent list, so that he paid
the installments in arrears and the remaining
balance on the lot. Plaintiff then sent a demand
letter to the defendant to vacate the lot. Defendant
claims that the lot was sold to them by the
Eduardo.
Danguilan v. Domingo owned 2 lots, which he donated through
IAC a private instrument to Danguilan for the
consideration that the latter must take care of him
(1998) for the remainder of his life and manage his burial.
Domingo’s daughter, Apolonia, laid claim to the
land, presenting a public document allegedly
executed in her favor, the purchase price being
paid for by her mother. She however failed to take
possession of the said property after the execution
of the deed. In fact, she moved out of the farm
when Danguilan started to cultivate the same for as
long as she was given a share from the harvests.
She decided to file a case only after the deliveries
of farm produce have ceased.
De Luna v. De Luna donated a portion of lot to the Luzonian
Abrigo University Foundation. Thedonation was embodied
in a Deed of Donation Intervivos and was subject to
(1990) certain terms andconditions.
words in the deed are in fact typical of a pure donation. The payments even seem to have been made
pursuant to the power of attorney executed by Catalina Reyes in favor of petitioner, her grandson,
authorizing him to execute acts necessary for the fulfillment of her obligations. Nothing in the records
shows that such acts were meant to be a burden in the donation.
Like any other contract, an agreement of the parties is essential. The donation, following the theory of
cognition (Article 1319, Civil Code), is perfected only upon the moment the donor knows of the
acceptance by the donee. Acceptance of the donation by the donee is, therefore, indispensable; its
absence makes the donation null and void. Title to immovable property does not pass from the donor to
the donee by virtue of a deed of donation until and unless it has been accepted in a public instrument
and the donor duly notified thereof.
The acceptance of a donation may be made at any time during the lifetime of the donor. And granting
arguendo that such acceptance may still be admitted in evidence on appeal, there is still need for
proof that a formal notice of such acceptance was received by the donor and noted in both the deed of
donation and the separate instrument embodying the acceptance. At the very least, this last legal
requisite of annotation in both instruments of donation and acceptance was not fulfilled by petitioner.
For this reason, the subject lot cannot be adjudicated to him.
Re Donation: Considering the language of the two instruments, that Domingo Melad did intend to
donate the properties to the petitioner, as the private respondent contends. We do not think, however,
that the donee was moved by pure liberality. While truly donations, the conveyances were onerous
donations as the properties were given to the petitioner in exchange for his obligation to take care of
the donee for the rest of his life and provide for his burial. Hence, it was not covered by the rule in
Article 749 of the Civil Code requiring donations of real properties to be effected through a public
instrument.
On the other hand, both the trial court and the respondent court have affirmed the factual allegation that
the petitioner did take care of Domingo Melad and later arranged for his burial in accordance with the
condition imposed by the donor. It is alleged and not denied that he died when he was almost one
hundred years old, which would mean that the petitioner farmed the land practically by himself and so
provided for the donee (and his wife) during the latter part of Domingo Melad's life. We may assume
that there was a fair exchange between the donor and the donee that made the transaction an onerous
donation.
Re the claim that the property was purchased: At any rate, even assuming the validity of the deed of
sale, the record shows that the private respondent did not take possession of the disputed properties
and indeed waited until 1962 to file this action for recovery of the lands from the petitioner. If she did
have possession, she transferred the same to the petitioner in 1946, by her own sworn admission, and
moved out to another lot belonging to her step-brother. Her claim that the petitioner was her tenant
(later changed to administrator) was disbelieved by the trial court, and properly so, for its inconsistency.
In short, she failed to show that she consummated the contract of sale by actual delivery of the
properties to her and her actual possession thereof in concept of purchaser-owner.
It is the finding of the trial court, which is not disputed by the parties, that the donation subject of this
case is one with an onerous cause. It was made subject to the burden requiring the donee to construct
a chapel, a nursery and a kindergarten school in the donated property within five years from execution
of the deed of donation.Under the old Civil Code, it is a settled rule that donations with an onerous
cause are governed not by the law on donations but by the rules on contracts.
 In case of violation or non-compliance, the property
would automatically revert tothe donor. When the
Foundation failed to comply with the conditions, de
Luna “revived” the
said donation by executing a Revival of Donation
Inter
vivos with the following terms and
conditions:
1) The Donee shall construct on the land and
at its expense a Chapel, Nursery,
andKindergarten School to be named
after St. Veronica
2) Construction shall start immediately and
must be at least 70% completed three
years fromthe date of the Deed unless the
Donor grants extensions
3) Automatic reversion in case of violation
The Foundation accepted and the donation was
registered and annotated in the TCT. By aDeed of
Segregation, the foundation was issued a TCT for
area the lot donated while theremaining area was
retained by the De Luna.
Under Article 1306 of the New Civil Code, the parties to a contract have the right "to establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy."
The validity of the stipulation in the contract providing for the automatic reversion of the donated
property to the donor upon non-compliance cannot be doubted. It is in the nature of an agreement
granting a party the right to rescind a contract unilaterally in case of breach, without need of going to
court. Upon the happening of the resolutory condition of non-compliance with the conditions of the
contract, the donation is automatically revoked without need of a judicial declaration to that effect.
It is clear, however, that judicial intervention is necessary not for purposes of obtaining a judicial
declaration rescinding a contract already deemed rescinded by virtue of an agreement providing for
rescission even without judicial intervention, but in order to determine whether or not the recession was
proper.
The case of Parks v. Province of Tarlac, supra, relied upon by the trial court, is not applicable in the
case at bar. While the donation involved therein was also onerous, there was no agreement in the
donation providing for automatic rescission, thus, the need for a judicial declaration revoking said
donation.The trial court was therefore not correct in holding that the complaint in the case at bar is
barred by prescription under Article 764 of the New Civil Code because Article 764 does not apply to
onerous donations.

The children and only heirs of the late De Luna

(died after the donation) filed a complaint withthe
RTC for the cancellation of the donation on the
ground that the terms were violated.

TheFoundation defended itself by saying that it had

partially and substantially complied with
theconditions and that the donor granted it an
indefinite extension of time to
completeconstruction.Respondent foundation
claimed that it had partially and substantially
complied with theconditions of the donation and
that the donor has granted the foundation an
indefiniteextension of time to complete the
construction of the chapel. It also invoked the
affirmativedefense of prescription of action and
prayed for the dismissal of the complaint
GSIS v. Sanggunian Panlalawigan of Tarlac approved the Considering that the assailed donation is clearly onerous, the rules on contracts will apply.
Province of conversion of Urquico Memorial Athletic Field into
Tarlac a Government Center, as well as the segregation A transfer of real property by a local government unit to an instrumentality of government without first
and donation of portions of said land to different securing an appraised valuation from the local committee on awards does not appear to be one of the
(2003) government agencies for the purpose of void contracts enumerated in the afore-quoted Article 1409 of the Civil Code. Neither does Section 381
constructing or relocating their office buildings. of the Local Government Code expressly prohibit or declare void such transfers if an appraised
valuation from the local committee on awards is not first obtained.
The Province of Tarlac and the GSIS then
executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) on The freedom of contract is both a constitutional and statutory right and to uphold this right, courts
December 13, 1997, whereby the Province of should move with all the necessary caution and prudence in holding contracts void. Furthermore, a duly
Tarlac donated the said lot to the GSIS subject to executed contract carries with it the presumption of validity.
 the conditions stipulated therein.
There being a perfected contract, the Province of Tarlac, through Gov. Yap, cannot revoke or renounce
Subsequently, Gov. Jose Yap was elected. He the same without the consent of the other party. From the moment of perfection, the parties are bound
wrote a letter to the GSIS, inviting the latter to not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all the consequences which,
reevaluate their respective positions with respect to according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage, and law.
the MOA of December 13, 1997. Evidently, Gov.
Yap was of the opinion that the provisions of the
Deed of Donation were unfair to the Province.
Later, the Provincial Administrator wrote the GSIS,
demanding the payment of P33,590,000.00
representing the balance of the value of the lot
donated, which the GSIS refused to pay.

Province of Tarlac then filed a Complaint against

the GSIS for declaration of nullity of donation and
memorandum of agreement, recovery of
possession and enforcement of Article 449 in
relation to Articles 450 and 451 of the Civil Code
EDUARTE V. Pedro Calapine was the registered owner of a The Deed of Donation is revocable on the ground of an act of ingratitude. (Note: However, the
COURT OF parcel of land. He executed a deed of donation petitioners still won because the Court applied the chain of title theory because the lands were
APPEALS inter vivos ceding ½ of the land to his niece, Helen registered lands and it has already passed from the forger (Doria) to innocent purchasers for value
Doria. Subsequently, another deed was (Eduarte, et al.).
(1996) purportedly executed by Pedro Calapine ceding
unto Helen Doria the whole of the parcel of land. Commentaries of Tolentino: “Offense Against Donor. ALL crimes which offend the donor show
Doria donated a portion of the lot (157 sqm) to the ingratitude and are causes for revocation. There is no doubt, therefore, that the donee who commits
Calauan Christian Reformed Church (CCRC). adultery with the wife of the donor, gives cause for revocation by reason of ingratitude. The crimes
Calapine sought to annul the sale and donation to against the person of the donor would include not only homicide and physical injuries, but also illegal
Eduarte and CCRC on the ground that the deed of detention, threats, and coercion; those against honor include offenses against chastity; and those
donation was a forgery and that Doria was against the property, include robbery, theft, usurpation, swindling, arson, damages, etc. [Manresa 175-
unworthy of his liberality claiming ingratitude 176].” (Italics supplied).
(commission of offense against the person, honor
or property of donor [par. 1]) Obviously, the first sentence was deleted by petitioners because it totally controverts their contention.
As noted in the aforecited opinion “all crimes which offend the donor show ingratitude and are causes
Petitioners submit that par (1) of Article 765 of the for revocation.” Petitioners’ attempt to categorize the offenses according to their classification under the
Civil Code does not apply because the acts of Revised Penal Code is therefore unwarranted considering that illegal detention, threats and coercion
ingratitude referred to therein pertain to offenses are considered as crimes against the person of the donor despite the fact that they are classified as
committed by the donee against the person or crimes against personal liberty and security under the Revised Penal Code.
property of the donor. They argue that as the
offense imputed to donee Helen Doria - falsification
of a public document - is neither a crime against
the person nor property of the donor but is a crime
against public interest under the Revised Penal
Code, the same is not a ground for revocation.

7. Succession
8. Prescription
NCC 1106-1155
KIAMCO V. Faustino Maningo sold by pacto de retro the Jose Deguilmo (and now his heirs), no doubt, had already acquired ownership of the subject property
COURT OF subject property to spouses Pedro and Teresa on the basis of acquisitive prescription.
APPEALS Villamor. Subsequently, Faustino requested his
father-in-law Jose Deguilmo, to buy the land from Pursuant to Art. 1116 of the New Civil Code, which provides for transitional rules on prescription, and
(1992) the Villamors. The Villamor spouses sold the land
in dispute to Jose Deguilmo and immediately took
possession of the property, introduced
improvements and paid taxes.
After more than 20 years, Faustino allegedly tried
to forcibly take possession of the property from his
father-in-law although he did not succeed. Faustino
then proceeded to execute a deed of sale in favor
of Marcelino Kiamco who allegedly knew, at the
time of the sale, that defendant Jose Deguilmo,
had already been in possession of the disputed
property for more than twenty (20) years. After the
said sale, Marcelino Kiamco attempted to take
possession but was not successful. However, he
did not file yet any action for ejectment or unlawful
detainer. Seven (7) months after the execution of
the alleged sale, Marcelino Kiamco filed a
complaint for quieting of title and recovery of
possession with damages against Jose Deguilmo.
MERALCO V. Nazario Crisostomo and Maria Escusar owned a
IAC parcel of land situated in Cainta. Upon the death of
both, the property passed on to their daughter
(1989) Bibiana Crisostomo Vda. de Eladio Leyva, whose
title was evidenced by TCT 8144. Ultimately, the
property was inherited by the LEYVAs who were
the children of Bibiana. Prior to the issuance of title
in the name of Nazario between 1929 and 1930,
MERALCO erected thereon two transmission steel
towers.
The LEYVAs sued MERALCO for damages and
sum of money for its continued use of the LEYVAs'
property, claiming that the property became off
limits because of the high voltage of electric current
running in the cable lines.
MERALCO claimed that it had acquired a grant
from the original owner of the land, Nazario
Crisostomo, for a perpetual easement of right of
way for the erection and operation of the
transmission steel towers for which it had paid
Crisostomo the total sum of $12.40. Moreover,
which reads: "Prescription already running before the effectivity of this Code shall be governed by laws
previously in force; but if since the time this Code took effect the entire period herein required for
prescription should lapse, the present Code shall be applicable, even though by the former laws a
longer period might be required," the law to be applied in this case is the Code of Civil Procedure (Act
190). Inasmuch as here the prescription was already running before August 30, 1950, it follows that
only ten (10) years would be required, because under the Code of Civil Procedure, regardless of good
faith or bad faith, the period for acquiring land by prescription was only ten (10) years (Sec. 41, Act 190,
Code of Civil Procedure).
It therefore follows necessarily that in 1960, Jose Deguilmo had already acquired the subject property
by acquisitive prescription. Thus, Marcelino Kiamco should have lost the case, unless of course, the
land was covered by a Torrens Certificate of Title. As found by the CA, the evidence shows that the
land is not a titled property.
The period of ten (10) years must necessarily start from January, 1950, and not from August 1950,
since here, the prescriptive period under the old law was shorter. Had the period under the old law
been longer, it is the shorter period under the New Civil Code that should apply, but this time, the
period should commence from the date of effectivity of the New Civil Code — August 30, 1950 — in
view of the clause "but if since the time this Code took
effect . . ."
With the facts obtaining in the present case, it is immaterial whether the property in dispute was
possessed by Jose Deguilmo in good or bad faith. His adverse possession for more than twenty years
is more than sufficient for purposes of acquisitive prescription under the Code of Civil Procedure. Thus,
even if the alleged Deed of Sale executed on January 10, 1950 (Exh. 2) was void ab initio, as claimed
by petitioner (because Faustino Maningo could still repurchase the property until 1951, thus the
Villamor spouses were not yet the owners thereof), what is important is that Jose Deguilmo immediately
took possession of the property and continuously and adversely possessed and enjoyed it for more
than twenty years. Besides, as correctly found by the respondent court, if Faustino claims that the Deed
of Sale of January 10, 1950 was not authentic and valid, why did he not disturb Jose Deguilmo from
1950 until 1973;" it is hardly the actuation of an owner for Faustino Maningo to do what he did for the
last 24 years, if as the Villamor spouses said Faustino Maningo had already repurchased the property
in 1949."
MERALCO never acquired any easement over the LEYVAs' property to construct and operate the steel
towers. Consequently, the LEYVAs must be compensated and awarded temperate damages, attorney's
fees and annual compensation for the loss of use and deprivation of opportunity to profit and benefit
from their lands.
There being no evidence that the original use of the property in question by Meralco was based upon
any express grant of a fee to the said property, or of an easement of right of way nor that it began
under the assertion of a right on its part, the presumption must be that the origin of the use was the
mere tolerance or license of Nazalio Crisostomo.
The provision of Article 1942 of the Civil Code to the effect that acts which are merely tolerated produce
no effect with respect to possession is applicable as much to the prescription of real rights as to the
prescription of the fee, it being a glaring and self-evident error to affirm the contrary, as does the
appellant in his motion papers. Possession is the fundamental basis of the prescription. Without it no
kind of prescription is possible, not even the extraordinary. Consequently, if acts of mere tolerance
produce no effect with respect to possession, as that article provides, in conformity with Article 444 of
the same Code, it is evident that they can produce no effect with respect to prescription, whether
ordinary or extraordinary. This is true whether the prescriptive acquisition be of a fee or of real rights,
for the same reason holds in one and the other case; that is, that there has been no true possession in
the legal sense of the word. (See also Ayala de Roxas vs. Maglonso, 8 Phil. Rep., 745; Municipality of
Nueva Caceres vs. Director of Lands and Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva Caceres, 24 Phil. Rep.,
485).
Possession, under the Civil Code, to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right, must be
 even without the grant of perpetual easement, the
LEYVAs' complaint is deemed barred by
prescription and laches, because of MERALCO's
open, continuous and uninterrupted enjoyment of
the easement for a period of 43 years.
SOLIS V. Antonio Solis and Angela Solis Calimlim alleged
COURT OF that they are co-owners of a parcel of residential
APPEALS land situated at Barrio Bued, Calasiao,
Pangasinan; that this parcel of land was inherited
(1989) from their parents (Simeon Solis and Petronila
Bauzon); that in 1939, they allowed defendants
Jose Solis and his wife Florencia Dioquino to
construct a house on the eastern portion of
plaintiffs' parcel of land (consisting of 536 square
meters) with the understanding that they
(defendants) should vacate the premises as soon
as their financial conditions would permit them. In
1965, plaintiffs demanded that the defendants
vacate the premises but the latter refused.
The answer of defendants raised as affirmative
defense the fact of their ownership of the property
in question having acquired the same by way of
donacion proper nuptias from spouses Tomas Solis
and Hermenegilda Jimenez, way back in 1931.
They also alleged that since 1931, they were in
possession of said property openly, continuously
and adversely, to the exclusion of all others, and in
the concept of owners and that since 1931 they
have paid the taxes due on the property.
(a) Distinction between Acquisitive and Extinctive Prescription
DINO V. COURT Petitioner spouses Dino and respondent Sio Petitioners’ action is already barred by prescription.
possession under claim of title (en concepto de dueño) or to use the common law equivalent of the
term, it must be adverse. Acts of a possessory character performed by one who holds by mere
tolerance of the owner are clearly not en concepto de dueño and such possessory acts, no matter how
long so continued, do not start the running of the period of prescription.
In the case at bar, the evidence discloses that sometime after the war, plaintiffs complained against
MERALCO's use and occupancy of the premises. Subsequently, defendant sometime in 1968
negotiated with plaintiff for the purchase of the entire lot but the negotiation did not prosper as
MERALCO suspended the negotiations on the ground that it was considering the selection of another
site. Finally, plaintiff filed the present action on August 7, 1973 after their demand for compensation
was refused. It is obvious that there can be no prescription or laches to bar plaintiffs' present action.
Jose Solis and Florencia Dioquino Solis are the lawful owners of the eastern portion of the lot by
prescription.
Even a void donation may be the basis of claim of ownership which may ripen into title by prescription
(Pensador vs. Pensador 47 Phil. 959, 961). It is the essence of the statute of limitations that, whether
the party had a right to the possession or not, if he entered under the claim of such right and remained
in possession for the period (ten years) named in the statute of limitations, the right of action of the
plaintiff who had the better title is barred by that adverse possession. The right given by the statute of
limitations does not depend upon, and has no necessary connection, (with) the validity of the claim
under which the possession is held. ..." (Vda. de Lima vs. Tio, L-27181, April 30, 1970, citing
Conspecto v. Fruto, 129 US 182 [1889]). The "just title" required for acquisitive prescription to set in is
not "titulo verdadero y valid"-or such title which by itself is sufficient to transfer ownership Without
necessity of letting the prescriptive period elapse but only "titulo colorador" — such title where, although
there was a mode of transferring ownership, still something is wrong because the grantor is not the
owner.
The donacion was made in 1931 and spouses Jose Solis and Florencia Dioquino took possession of
the land in 1933 by virtue of the donacion. It was the Code of Civil Procedure which was then in force.
Under the Code of Civil Procedure, ten years of adverse possession by a person claiming to be the
owner, in whatever way such occupancy may have commenced shall vest in every actual possessor of
such land a full complete title.
The lapse of more than twenty (20) years of adverse possession by private respondents is sufficient to
confer ownership on them of the disputed portion under the Old Civil Code which requires only ten (10)
years of adverse possession. The Old Civil Code provides:
Sec. 41. Title to land by prescription. — Ten years of adverse possession by any person claiming to be
the owner for that time of any land or interest in land, uninterruptedly, continuously for ten years by
occupancy, descent, grants or otherwise, in whatever way such occupancy may have commenced or
continued, shall vest in every actual possessor of such land a full complete title, saving to the person
under disabilities the rights, secured by the next Section.
Although petitioners' action for quieting of title was filed in May 30, 1967 when the New Civil Code was
already in effect, Article 1116 of the New Civil Code provides that "prescription already running before
the effectivity of this Code (August 30, 1950) shall be governed by laws previously in force; ..." which in
this case is the aforequoted Section 41 of the Old Civil Code.
Therefore, whatever claim petitioners had over the disputed property had prescribed in view of private
'respondents' open, actual, peaceful, continuous and adverse possession of the same property for
more than thirty years or at the least, for more than twenty (20) years.
OF APPEALS entered into a contract whereby the latter would
manufacture for the petitioners 20,000 pieces of
(2001) vinyl frogs and 20,000 pieces of vinyl mooseheads
at P7.00 per piece in accordance with the sample
approved by the petitioners. These frogs and
mooseheads were to be attached to the shirts
petitioners would manufacture and sell.
Sio delivered in several installments the 40,000
pieces of frogs and mooseheads. Subsequently,
petitioners returned to Sio 29,772 pieces of frogs
and mooseheads for failing to comply with the
approved sample.
Petitioners demanded a refund of the purchase
price but Sio refused to pay. The petitioners filed
an action for collection of sum of money which the
RTC granted. Sio appealed to the CA. The CA
dismissed petitioners' Complaint for having been
filed beyond the prescriptive period.
SUNGA V. DE A private contract of sale was signed by five (5) of
GUZMAN the nine (9) legitimate heirs of the spouses Juan de
Guzman and Lucia Montemayor. The property in
(1979) question was a fishpond of 5,590 sq. m situated in
the barrio of Sebitanan, Sexmoa, Pampanga. It is
undisputed that five (5) of the heirs were the only
heirs among the nine (9) children who sold their
respective shares to Feliciano Sibug, for and in
consideration of P700.00. However, the deed of
sale is not notarized nor registered in the Register
of Deeds of Pampanga.
The De Guzman couple died in 1935 and 1937,
respectively, hence by operation of law, the nine
(9) children succeeded in the ownership of the
property in question. Demands were made by
plaintiffs-appellees for the delivery of their
respective shares from the defendants-appellants
since 1955, but the latter refused to comply with
their lawful demands. From the execution of the
deed of sale, defendants-appellants were in
physical possession of the fishpond in question,
hence an action was instituted against the
defendants on February 5,1962.
By returning the 29,772 pieces of vinyl products to Sio and asking for a return of their purchase price,
petitioners were in effect "withdrawing from the contract" as provided in Art. 1567.
Art. 1571. Actions arising from the provisions of the preceding ten articles shall be barred after six
months from the delivery of the thing sold.
There is no dispute that Sio made the last delivery of the vinyl products to petitioners on September 28,
1988. It is also settled that the action to recover the purchase price of the goods petitioners returned to
the respondent was filed on July 24, 1989 or more than nine months from the date of last delivery.
Petitioners having filed the action three months after the six-month period for filing actions for breach of
warranty against hidden defects stated in Art. 1571, the appellate court dismissed the action.
Following the Gicano doctrine that allows dismissal of an action on the ground of prescription even after
judgment on the merits, or even if the defense was not raised at all so long as the relevant dates are
clear on the record, the SC ruled that the action filed by the petitioners has prescribed. The dates of
delivery and institution of the action are undisputed. There are no new issues of fact arising in
connection with the question of prescription, thus carving out the case at bar as an exception from the
general rule that prescription if not impleaded in the answer is deemed waived.
Rule 9, Sec. 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, provide:
"Section 1. Defense and objections not pleaded. - Defenses and objections not pleaded whether in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings
that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between
the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of
limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim."
Petitioners have not acquired the subject fishpond thru prescription.
While the heirs of the De Guzman spouses knew of the possession of petitioners commencing in the
year 1948, they knew of the sale only when they were told by their brothers who sold their share. What
this proves is that appellees were not definitely aware that appellant's possession extended over the
whole fishpond, including that which pertained to them as their share. In that state of their knowledge
as to the extent and nature of petitioners-appellant's possession, said possession cannot be said to be
adverse and open as to give rise to title by prescription in favor of petitioners-appellants.
A fishpond is not as physically or actually occupied or held in possession as a parcel of land, in that the
signs of possession in the latter are more visible, and the extent of its exercise or enjoyment, more
manifest and easily determined. Hence, the adverse nature of the possession of parcel of land is more
overt as to satisfy also the other element of proscription that the possession must be open and public.
In the case of a fishpond, owned in common, one or some of whose co-owners sell their undivided
share to another, the only way the whole fishpond, including the shares of the other co-owners may be
said to have been held in adverse possession by the vendee, as against the co-owners who did not sell
is if he harvests all the fish in the fishpond, leaving nothing for the other co-owners who did not sell their
share. This is not as easily ascertained as in the exercise of possession over a piece of land, which is
relatively quite easy to show that the possession is to the exclusion of the other co-owners by the
extent of the possession, as by actual occupation or the land is for occupancy, or the extent of the
enjoyment of the produce of said land, as when it is for cultivation or raising of products sustained by
the soil. When one harvests from a fishpond, of which he is only a part-owner, it must be assumed that
his harvest is only to the extent he is rightfully entitled to, until the contrary is positively shown, which
was not done in the present case.
In trying to refute this ruling of the Court of Appeals, petitioners-appellants cite Article 1155 of the New
Civil Code which reads: The prescription of action is interrupted when they are filed before the Court,
when there is a written extra-judicial demand by the creditors and when there is any written
acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor,

OVERSEAS Valenton and Juan obtained from the Overseas
BANK V. Bank a credit accommodation of P150,000 which
GERALDEZ was secured by a chattel mortgage. Despite written
extrajudicial demands, Valenton and Juan refused
(1979) to pay alleging that their obligation has been
assumed by a third party. The bank filed an action
for the recovery of sum of money.
The trial court dismissed the complaint and
reasoned that, because the bank's cause of action
accrued on February 16, 1966 (the date of the
manager's check for P150,000 issued by the
plaintiff bank to the Republic Bank) and as the
complaint was filed on October 22, 1976 or more
than ten years from the accrual of the cause of
action, the complaint was barred by the statute of
limitations. The trial court also held that a demand
letter tolls the prescriptive period only for the period
of time indicated in the letter within which payment
should be made and prescription commences to
run again after the expiration of that period and no
payment is made.
BUENAVENTE The petitioners, numbering thirty-three (33) family-
V. MELCHOR heads, with houses erected on the river bank
portion of a lot owned by the National Development
(1979) Corporation (NDC) located at Pureza Street, Sta.
Mesa, Manila, filed in the CFI of Manila, a petition
for Declaratory Relief and Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction against the respondents with
prayer for the issuance of a writ of imaginary
injunction to prevent the demolition of their houses
and their relocation to Carmona, Cavite, as was
threatened to be done by respondent Sebastian
Santiago, OIC of the Presidential Assistant on
Housing Resettlement Agency.
As may easily be discerned, the cited provision has no relevance to possession as an element of
prescription, referring as it does to "prescription of action", an entirely different matter from the
"interruption of possession" for acquisitive prescriptive purposes, as held in the case of San Carlos vs.
Municipality of Cebu, supra.
The action has not yet prescribed.
The lower court erred in holding that each of the demand letters suspended the prescriptive period for
one day only. The interruption of the prescriptive period by written extrajudicial demand means that the
said period would commence anew from the receipt of the demand. That is the correct meaning of
interruption as distinguished from mere suspension or tolling of the prescriptive period.
An action upon a written contract must be brought within ten years from the tune the right of action
accrues (Art. 1144[1], Civil Code). "The prescription of actions is interrupted when they are filed before
the court, when there is a written extrajudicial demand by the creditors, and when there is any written
acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor".
Interruption of the prescription of actions by means of a written extrajudicial demand by the creditor is a
rule of civil law origin. Article 1155 specifies that the extrajudicial demand and the acknowledgment
should be in writing.
A written extrajudicial demand wipes out the period that has already elapsed and starts anew the
prescriptive period. Under article 1973. it was held that if the action for the collection of a sum of
money accrued on August 31, 1897 and there were written extrajudicial demands by the creditor in
1906, 1907 and 1910, the fifteen-year period for enforcing that kind of personal action had not elapsed
when the action was filed on duly 18, 1913 (Marella vs. Agoncillo, 44 Phil. 844, 854-5).
Interruption of the prescriptive period as meaning renewal of the original term seems to be the basis of
the ruling in Ramos vs. Condez, L-22072, August 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 1146, 1151. In that case the
cause of action accrued on June 25, 1952. There was a written acknowledgment by the vendors on
November 10, 1956 of the validity of the deed of sale. It was held that the vendees' action against the
vendors on the basis of the said deed of sale, which action was filed on May 22, 1963, had not
prescribed because the ten-year prescriptive period was interrupted on November 10, 1956.
Petitioners have no right to continue in occupation of the land.
In denying that they are "squatters" on the NDC lot, as they were so held by the court a quo, petitioners
rely on the following definition of a squatter, "one who settles on the land of another without any legal
authority. This term is applied particularly to person who settle on the public land." (3 Mart. La. U.S.
293; 5 Bles. U.S. 530). Cyclopedic Law Dictionary by Shumaker and Longsdorf . From this definition,
petitioners can derive no comfort from the fact that they built their houses allegedly with the knowledge
and consent of the NDC, and that the lot is not a public land.
What the above definition contemplates is a right that owes its source from the law, and which,
accordingly may be protected by and under the law. Having built their houses with the knowledge and
consent of the NDC which is a government owned corporation, is not sufficient to vest in them any right
which they can assert against the lot-owner when the latter demands that they vacate the premises on
legal and justifiable grounds. When their continued occupation of the lot becomes one against the will
of the owner, even if the latter had allowed their occupation at the beginning without even collecting
rentals, the owner is certainly not barred, under any known principle of law, either by estopped or
waiver, to demand that the lot be vacated so that he may himself enjoy his dominical and possessory
rights thereto.

LEDESMA V. RCBC filed Case No. 38287 in the then Court of
COURT OF First Instance of Rizal against petitioner to enforce
APPEALS & the terms of Trust Receipt Agreement No. 7389
RIZAL executed by them on April 1, 1974 but which
COMMERCIAL petitioner had failed to comply with. As summons
BANKING could not be served on the latter, said case was
CORPORATION dismissed without prejudice on March 3, 1981.
(RCBC)
On December 2, 1988, RCBC instituted Civil Case
(1993) No. 88-2572 in the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Metro Manila, Branch 133, against petitioner on the
same cause of action and subject matter.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of
prescription but was denied and judgment was
rendered in favor of RCBC.
In any case, petitioners have no right to continue in occupation of the land, whether, as legally defined,
they are squatters or not. Their occupation by mere tolerance can by no means given rise to a right that
the law should protect in their favor as against the true legal owners. That the land is a public land can
neither be denied as to give any semblance of plausibility to petitioners' contention that they are not
squatters under the definition they have invoked because the land is not a public land. It is owned by
the NDC hence a "public land" in the broad acceptation of these words.
The action has not yet prescribed.
Article 1155 of the Civil Code provides that the prescription of an action, involving in the present case
the 10-year prescriptive period for filing an action on a written contract under Article 1144(1) of the
Code, is interrupted by (a) the filing of an action, (b) a written extrajudicial demand by the creditor, and
(c) a written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor. The effects of the last two instances have
already been decided by this Court, the rationale wherein should necessarily apply to the first.
Overseas Bank of Manila vs. Geraldez, et al. : “x x x The interruption of the prescriptive period by
written extrajudicial demand means that the said period would commence anew from the receipt of the
demand. That is the correct meaning of interruption as distinguished from mere suspension or tolling of
the prescriptive period.
xxx xxx xxx
A written extrajudicial demand wipes out the period that has already elapsed and starts anew the
prescriptive period. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
That same view as to the meaning of interruption was adopted in Florendo vs. Organo, 90 Phil 483,
488, where it was ruled that the interruption of the ten-year prescriptive period through a judicial
demand means that "the full period of prescription commenced to run anew upon the cessation of the
suspension." When prescription is interrupted by a judicial demand, the full time for the prescription
must be reckoned from the cessation of the interruption. . . .

In Philippine National Railways vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al:

Article 1155 of the Civil Code provides that the "prescription of actions is interrupted" inter alia, "when
there is any written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor." This simply means that the period of
prescription, when interrupted by such a written acknowledgment, begins to run anew; and whatever
time of limitation might have already elapsed from the accrual of the cause of action is thereby negated
and rendered inefficacious. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
. . . The effect of the interruption spoken of in Article 1155 is to renew the obligation, to make
prescription run again from the date of the interruption . . .

Based on the aforecited cases, Article 1155 has twice been interpreted to mean that upon the cessation
of the suspension of the prescriptive period, the full period of prescription commences to run anew.
Petitioner, on the other hand, insists that in case of the filing of an action, the prescriptive period is
merely tolled and continues to run again, with only the balance of the remaining period available for the
filing of another action. This postulation of petitioner, if we are to adopt it, would result in an absurdity
wherein Article 1155 would be interpreted in two different ways, i.e., the prescriptive period is
interrupted in case of an extrajudicial demand and a written acknowledgment of a debt, but it is merely
tolled where an action is filed in court.

(b) Distinction between Extinctive Prescription and Laches

MIGUEL V. Simeon, Emilia and Marcelina Miguel, and Grace The plaintiffs’ cause of action is barred by laches. The judgment in favor of defendant-appellee
CATALINO Ventura brought suit against Florendo Catalino for Florendo Catalino must be sustained.
the recovery of land. Plaintiffs claim to be the
(1968) children and heirs of the original registered owner,
and averred that Catalino, without their knowledge
or consent, had unlawfully taken possession of the
land, gathered its produce and unlawfully excluded
plaintiffs therefrom.
Catalino answered pleading ownership and
adverse possession for 30 years, and
counterclaimed for attorney's fees.
After trial the Court dismissed the complaint,
declared Catalino to be the rightful owner, and
ordered the Register of Deeds to issue a transfer
certificate in lieu of the original.
Lola v. Court of Dolores sold to Fr. Lola a parcel of land. The land
Appeals was composed of Lot 5516 and 5517 with two
certificates of title. Fr. Lola occupied both. Dolores,
32 years later, claimed that she only sold Lot.5516
to Fr. Lola and that she was the registered owner
(1986) of Lot 5517 which was still under her name.
Victoriano v. Masigla had been in possession of Lot 897 since
Court of 1927. Her son entered into possession of the
Appeals adjoining lot 898. The owner of lot 898, Victoriano,
filed a criminal case against the son. In the
process, Victoriano discovered that Lot 897 was
(1991) under the name of his grandfather. He registered it
under his name. He then filed this complaint to be
declared the owner of Lot 897.
Masigla claims that the land was sold to them by
the grandfather. However, they had no title nor
deed of sale.
As in the case of Mejia de Lucas v. Gamponia, the four elements of laches are present in the case at
bar, namely: (a) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to
the situation of which complaint is made and for which the complaint seeks a remedy; (b) delay in
asserting the complainant's rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice, of the defendant's
conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (c) lack of knowledge or notice on
the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and (d)
injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not
held to be barred.
In the case at bar, Bacaquio sold the land in 1928 but the sale is void for lack of the governor's
approval. The vendor, and also his heirs after him, could have instituted an action to annul the sale
from that time, since they knew of the invalidity of the sale, which is a matter of law; they did not have to
wait for 34 years to institute suit. The defendant was made to feel secure in the belief that no action
would be filed against him by such passivity, and also because he "bought" again the land in 1949 from
Grace Ventura who alone tried to question his ownership; so that the defendant will be plainly
prejudiced in the event the present action is not held to be barred.
The difference between prescription and laches was elaborated in Nielsen & Co., Inc. vs. Lepanto
Consolidated Mining Co., L-21601, 17 December 1966, 18 SCRA p. 1040, as follows:
Appellee is correct in its contention that the defense of laches applies independently of prescription.
Laches is different from the statute of limitations. Prescription is concerned with the fact of delay,
whereas laches is concerned with the effect of delay. Prescription is a matter of time; laches is
principally a question of inequity of permitting a claim to be enforced, this inequity being founded on
some change in the condition of the property or the relation of the parties. Prescription is statutory;
laches is not. Laches applies in equity, whereas prescription applies at law. Prescription is based on
fixed time laches is not, (30 C.J.S., p. 522. See also Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, Vol. 2, 5th ed., p.
177) (18 SCRA 1053).
Laches bar Dolores from recovering the lot in dispute.
Although the defense of prescription is unavailing to the Fr. Lola because, admittedly, the title to Lot No.
5517 is still registered in the name of Dolores, still the he has acquired title to it by virtue of the
equitable principle of laches due to the Dolores’ failure to assert her claims and ownership for thirty two
(32) years.
There are precedents for this ruling. In a long line of cases, the equitable defense of laches was upheld
when there is long inaction and delay of the title holder in asserting his right over a disputed lot. Such
bars him from recovering the same.
Victoriano is barred by laches and cannot be declared the owner of the land.
Laches is defined as "such neglect or omission to assert a right taken in conjunction with the lapse of
time and other circumstances causing prejudice to an adverse party, as will operate as a bar in equity."
Masigla has been in continuous possession of the land Since 1927 and they were not ousted
therefrom by the grandfather of Victoriano who sold the property to them, nor by the immediate
successors. It was only after decades had passed that it was discovered that the sale was never
registered or the title cancelled and transferred in the name of Masigla. True, titled lands cannot be
acquired by prescription, however, defendant-appellee's inaction for more than 50 years now bars her
from acquiring possession of the land on the ground of laches.
 (c) Special Cases
Espiritu v. Court Defendants sold to petitioners two parcels of land
of First Instance in 1948. They gave the TCTs but did not execute a
deed of sale. The defendants claimed that they
would execute the deed as soon as their
predecessors-in-interest transferred the title to their
(1972) names. They never did.
Compaint was filed in 1964. Defendants claimed
that the cause of action had prescribed.
Solidarios v. Plaintiffs and Ong entered into an agreement
Alampay whereby plaintiffs would borrow amount of P16,500
with Lot 270-A as security. Ong asked them to
execute a deed of sale in favor of him. Plaintiffs
acceded because of their trust in Ong and need of
(1975) money.
Ong has since occupied the land and refuses to
return it even when the loan was offered to be paid.
Plaintiffs sought reformation of instrument to
properly reflect a contract of mortgage and not a
sale. Ong raises the defense of prescription.
Jalandoni v. Jalandoni was ordered by judgment to pay PNB an
PNB amount of money. His lot in Silay was levied upon
pursuant to the alias writ of execution. A notice of
embargo was annotated on the title.
(1981)
More than 10 years had passed since the levy was
made but PNB had not sold the land at public
auction.
Jalandoni filed a petition for cancellation of the levy
on the ground of prescription.
Petitioner’s action had already prescribed.
Under Article 1143, only the following rights "are not extinguished by prescription: (1) to demand a right
of way, regulated in Article 649 and (2) to bring an action to abate a public or private nuisance", which
are actions involving public policy. Nor is there any other provision of the Civil Code or any unrepealed
law or jurisprudential ruling of this Court, under which petitioner's claim of imprescriptibility can be
sustained. We believe that the specific enumeration in the Civil Code of imprescriptible actions
excludes any other ones.
The applicable provision here is Article 1145 which reads thus:
ART. 1145. The following actions must be commenced within six years:
(1) Upon an oral contract;
(2) Upon a quasi-contract.
Assuming otherwise, the only other possibility is that petitioner's case comes under Article 1149
providing:
ART. 1149. All other actions whose periods are not fixed in this Code or in other laws
must be brought within five years from the time the right of action accrues.
In either case, since the cause of action of petitioner accrued in 1948 and the present suit was
instituted in 1964 or sixteen years later, and none of the interrupting circumstances enumerated in
Article 1155 has been shown to have intervened, it is unquestionable that petitioner's action filed in the
court below has already prescribed.
Action had not prescribed.
The applicable prescription period for such actions based upon a written contract and for reformation
thereof as provided by law is ten (10 years as provided in Article 1144, Civil Code.)
Such right to reformation is expressly recognized in Article 1365 of the Civil Code which provides that
"If two parties agree upon the mortgage or pledge of real or personal property but the instrument states
that the property is sold absolutely or with a right to repurchase, reformation of the instrument is
proper."
Petitioners' action for reformation and recovery of title was brought on November 29, 1972 less than
eight years after execution of the questioned deed on December 24, 1964 and had therefore not
prescribed.
Levy should be cancelled.
It is the rule in the Ansaldo case that "a valid execution issued and levy made within the five-year
period after entry of the judgment may be enforced by sale of the property levied upon thereafter,
provided the sale is made within ten years after the entry of the judgment".
The execution sale should take place within the ten-year prescriptive period for enforcing the judgment.
We find that the "notice of embargo" annotated in 1964 on Jalandoni's title is no longer enforceable and
has become a cloud upon his title. Following the rule in the Ansaldo case, he and his heirs have a good
cause of action under article 476 of the Civil Code for the removal of that state encumbrance.
Moreover, article 478 of the Civil Code provides that "there may also be an action to quiet title or
remove a cloud therefrom when the contract, instrument or other obligation has been extinguished or
has terminated, or has been barred by extinctive prescription".
Board of In 1955, a decision was made pursuant to an
Liquidators v. amicable settlement which ordered Zulueta to pay
Zulueta Land Settlement and Development Corp. (LSDC)
the sum of P10,391 with interest of 4% per annum
until fully paid.
(1982) In 1965, or 10 years later, a complaint was filed to
revive the judgment which had not been enforced
at the time. It was dismissed because of difficulty in
serving summons on Zulueta.
In 1966, another complaint was filed to revive the
judgment. Zulueta claims that the action had
prescribed. LSDC claims that the filing of the action
in 1965 stopped the running of the period.
Republic v. In 1943 defendant Dolores Infants obtained loans
Court of First from the Bank of Taiwan, Ltd., payable at its office
Instance in Bacolod City in the total amount of P683.10 with
interest at the rate of six percent per annum,
compounded quarterly.
On September 15, 1961, plaintiff Republic of the
(1983) Philippines filed a complaint in the Justice of the
Peace Court of Villadolid, Negros Occidental, to
collect from the defendant the said amount of
P683.10. The defendant moved to dismiss the
complaint on the ground of prescription.
Luzon Surety v. In Civil Case No. 59506, judgment was rendered
Intermediate against Gil Puyat, for the principal sum of P20,000.
Appellate Court The judgment became final on April 13, 1967, but
was not enforced.
Within the prescribed period, Civil Case No. 93268
was instituted to revive the judgment in Civil Case
(1987) No. 59506. It was given due course in 1974.
In 1981, Puyat died. When the claim was filed
against the estate, the administrators opposed it is
unenforceable and barred by laches for no steps
were taken bv the claimant to secure a writ of
execution against defendant Gil Puyat during his
lifetime to enforce the judgment
Atok Big Wedge A.I. Reynolds located the Fredia mineral claim in
v. Court of accordance with the Philippine Bill of 1902. A.I.
Appeals Reynolds sold the Fredia mineral claim to Atok Big
Wedge Company in 1931. Atok has been in
possession up to the present.
(1991) Respondent Liwan Consi constructed a hut in the
area of the mineral claim in 1964. In 1984, he was
Action had not prescribed.
Article 1155 of the New Civil Code expressly provides that the "prescription of action is interrupted
when they are filed before the court ..." (Sotelo vs. Dizon, 67 Phil. 537; Cabrera vs. Tianco, 8 SCRA
582.) Such interruption lasts during the pendency of the action. (Florendo vs. Organo, 9 Phil. 483.)
No prescription.
In the case at bar, the loans which had no maturity dates were contracted in 1943, or during the period
of the Japanese occupation of the Philippines. Ordinarily, the counting of the prescriptive period should
be reckoned from the date the debt became due and demandable. However, there were moratorium
decrees (later struck down as unconstitutional) supervening at this time which suspended the
enforcement of payments of all debts and other monetary obligations contracted during the war,
The moratorium laws suspended the running of the prescriptive period during their effectivity. Thus, the
10-year period within which to institute the action against herein appellee began the day after the
moratorium laws were declared unconstitutional or, to be precise, on May 19, 1953. It was on
September 27, 1954 when plaintiff (appellant) made extra-judicial written demand on defendant
(appellee). As the loans in question did not have any maturity dates and, therefore, payable on
demand, prescription could have accrued, if at all, only on September 27, 1954 when petitioner made
the extra-judicial demand. Plaintiff's cause of action will therefore prescribe only on September 27,
1964. And, since the complaint in this case was filed on September 15, 1961, which is within the 10-
year period, the action has not yet prescribed.
Action had already prescribed.
The decision in Civil Case No. 59506 became final and executory on April 13, 1967. The judgment was
not enforced. The petitioner instituted Civil Case No. 93268 within the prescriptive period to revive the
judgment in Civil Case No. 59506. The revived judgment was rendered on May 24, 1974. This
judgment became final and executory sometime in 1974. Again, this was not enforced. On September
1, 1982, the petitioner filed a claim in Special Proceedings No. Q-32291 before the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal. What is sought is a second revival of the judgment that had become final in 1967.
This can no longer be done due to the lapse of the allowable period.
In Philippine National Bank v. Deloso it was said that the 10-year prescriptive period must commence
from the finality of the original judgment. We apply it to the instant case. We find that the right of the
petitioner to enforce the judgment against Gil Puyat, an accomodation party and a defendant in Civil
Case Nos. 59506 and 93268, filed on September 1, 1982 had already prescribed considering that more
than ten (10) years had already elapsed from the finality of the original judgment on April 13, 1967.
Atok could file a complaint for forcible entry against Liwan Consi.
Atok has exclusive rights to the property in question by virtue of their respective mining claims which
they validly acquired before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited the alienation of all lands of the public
domain except agricultural lands, subject to vested rights existing at the time of its adoption. The land
was not and could not have been transferred to the private respondents by virtue of acquisitive
prescription, nor could its use be shared simultaneously by them and the mining companies for
agricultural and mineral purposes.
Since the subject lot is mineral land, private respondent's possession of the subject lot no matter how
 told that the land belonged to Atok. Atok filed a long did not confer upon him possessory rights over the same.
complaint for forcible entry and detainer against Furthermore, Atok is the one “longer in possession”who will be given preference under Art. 538 of the
Liwan Consi. Civil Code since they possessed it in1931 while Liwan possessed it only on 1964.

C. Modes of Extinguishing Ownership

SUCCESSION
I. GENERAL PROVISIONS
A. Definition and Concept
NCC 774, 712, 1311

Estate of Luzon Surety filed a claim against the Estate of
Hemady v. Hemady based on 20 indemnity agreements all
Luzon Surety guaranteed solidarily by the deceased Hemady.
The adminstratix contends that upon the death of
Hemady, his liability as a guarantor terminated.
(1956)
Alvarez v. IAC Petitioners, the heirs of deceased Alvarez contend
(1990) that the liability arising from the sale of the lots by
the deceased to Dr. Rodolfo Siason should be the
sole liability of the deceased or of his estate, after
his death.
The solidary guarantor’s liability is not extinguished by his death.
While in our successional system the responsibility of the heirs for the debts of their decedent cannot
exceed the value of the inheritance they receive from him, the principle remains intact that these heirs
succeed not only to the rights of the deceased but also to his obligations.
Under our law, therefore, the general rule is that a party’s contractual rights and obligations are
transmissible to the successors.
Such contention is untenable for it overlooks the doctrine obtaining in this jurisdiction on the general
transmissibility of the rights and obligations of the deceased to his legitimate children and heirs. Thus,
the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code state:
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to
the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another or
others either by his will or by operation of law.
Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not
extinguished by his death.
Art. 1311. Contract stake effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs except in case
where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by
stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the property received from
the decedent.
As explained by this Court through Associate Justice J.B.L. Reyes in the case of Estate of Hemady vs.
Luzon Surety Co., Inc.:
“The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not altered by the provision of
our Rules of Court that money debts of a deceased must be liquidated and paid from his estate before
the residue is distributed among said heirs (Rule 89). The reason is that whatever payment is thus
made from the state is ultimately a payment by the heirs or distributees, since the amount of the paid
claim in fact diminishes or reduces the shares that the heirs would have been entitled to receive.
Under our law, therefore. the general rule is that a party's contractual rights and obligations are
transmissible to the successors.
The rule is a consequence of the progressive "depersonalization" of patrimonial rights and duties that,
as observed by Victorio Polacco has characterized the history of these institutions. From the Roman
concept of a relation from person to person, the obligation has evolved into a relation from patrimony to
patrimony with the persons occupying only a representative position, barring those rare cases where
the obligation is strictly personal, i.e., is contracted intuitu personae, in consideration of its performance
by a specific person and by no other.”
Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape the legal consequences of
their father's transaction, which gave rise to the present claim for damages. That petitioners did not
inherit the property involved herein is of no moment because by legal fiction, the monetary equivalent
thereof devolved into the mass of their father's hereditary estate, and we have ruled that the hereditary
assets are always liable in their totality for the payment of the debts of the estate.

National NHA awarded awarded Margarita Herrera several
Housing portions of land. When Margarita died, the NHA
Authority v. awarded the lands to only one of the deceased’s
Almeida heirs.
(2010)
Nazareno v. CA Petitioners and respondent Romeo Nazareno are
(2000) three of the five children of spouses Maximino and
Aurea Nazareno, who during their marriage had
acquired properties. After the death of Maximino,
Sr., Romeo filed for intestate proceedings and he
was thereafter appointed administrator of his
It must, however, be made clear that petitioners are liable only to the extent of the value of their
inheritance. With this clarification and considering petitioners' admission that there are other properties
left by the deceased which are sufficient to cover the amount adjudged in favor of private respondents,
we see no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals.
When the petitioner received the "Sinumpaang Salaysay," it should have noted that the effectivity of the
said document commences at the time of death of the author of the instrument; in her words "sakaling
ako'y bawian na ng Dios ng aking buhay…" Hence, in such period, all the interests of the person should
cease to be hers and shall be in the possession of her estate until they are transferred to her heirs by
virtue of Article 774 of the Civil Code which provides that:
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and
obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted
through his death to another or others either by his will or by operation of law.
By considering the document, petitioner NHA should have noted that the original applicant has already
passed away. Margarita Herrera passed away on October 27, 1971. The NHA issued its resolution on
February 5, 1986. The NHA gave due course to the application made by Francisca Herrera without
considering that the initial applicant's death would transfer all her property, rights and obligations to the
estate including whatever interest she has or may have had over the disputed properties. To the extent
of the interest that the original owner had over the property, the same should go to her estate.
Margarita Herrera had an interest in the property and that interest should go to her estate upon her
demise so as to be able to properly distribute them later to her heirs—in accordance with a will or by
operation of law.
The death of Margarita Herrera does not extinguish her interest over the property. Margarita Herrera
had an existing Contract to Sell with NHA as the seller. Upon Margarita Herrera's demise, this Contract
to Sell was neither nullified nor revoked. This Contract to Sell was an obligation on both parties—
Margarita Herrera and NHA. Obligations are transmissible. Margarita Herrera's obligation to pay
became transmissible at the time of her death either by will or by operation of law.
If we sustain the position of the NHA that this document is not a will, then the interests of the decedent
should transfer by virtue of an operation of law and not by virtue of a resolution by the NHA. For as it
stands, NHA cannot make another contract to sell to other parties of a property already initially paid for
by the decedent. Such would be an act contrary to the law on succession and the law on sales and
obligations.
When the original buyer died, the NHA should have considered the estate of the decedent as the next
"person" likely to stand in to fulfill the obligation to pay the rest of the purchase price. The opposition of
other heirs to the repurchase by Francisca Herrera should have put the NHA on guard as to the award
of the lots. Further, the Decision in the said Civil Case No. B-1263 (questioning the Deed of Self-
Adjudication) which rendered the deed therein null and void should have alerted the NHA that there are
other heirs to the interests and properties of the decedent who may claim the property after a testate or
intestate proceeding is concluded. The NHA therefore acted arbitrarily in the award of the lots.
The estate of a deceased person is a juridical entity that has a personality of its own. Though Romeo
represented at one time the estate of Maximino, Sr., the latter has a separate and distinct personality
from the former. Hence, the judgment in CA-GR CV No. 12932 regarding the ownership of Maximino,
Jr. over Lot 3-B binds Romeo and Eliza only, and not the estate of Maximino, Sr., which also has a right
to recover properties which were wrongfully disposed.
 father’s estate. Romeo discovered a deed of sale
selling petitioner Natividad six lots including Lot-3b
occupied by Romeo but which was sold to
petitioner Maximino, Jr. Maximino, Jr. filed an
action for recovery of possession which was
favored by the court. Romeo in turn filed an
annulment of the sales on the ground of lack of
consideration in that the transfer was merely to
avoid inheritance tax and that Natividad was only to
hold the said lots in trust for her siblings.
Petitioners on the other hand filed a third party
complaint against Romeo and his wife Eliza
seeking the annulment of the transfer to Romeo of
Lot 3 which is granted by the trial court except as to
Lots 3, 13-b, 13 and 14 which had passed on to
third persons.
Union Bank v. First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and
Santibanez Efraim Santibañez entered into a loan agreement
(2005) to buy tractors. In view thereof, Efraim and his son,
Edmund, executed a promissory note in favor of
the FCCC.
FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan
agreement. Again, Efraim and Edmund executed a
promissory note and a Continuing Guaranty
Agreement for the later loan.
Efraim died, leaving a holographic will. Testate
proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo
City. Edmund was appointed as the special
administrator of the estate. During the pendency of
the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs,
Edmund and his sister Florence, executed a Joint
Agreement, wherein they agreed to divide between
themselves and take possession of several
tractors. Each of them was to assume the
indebtedness of their late father to FCCC,
corresponding to the tractor respectively taken by
them. In the meantime, a Deed of Assignment with
Assumption of Liabilities was executed by and
between FCCC and Union Bank, wherein the
FCCC assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union
Bank.
Demand letters were sent by Union Bank to
Edmund, but the latter refused to pay. Thus, Union
Bank filed a Complaint for sum of money against
the heirs of Efraim Santibañez, Edmund and
Florence, before the RTC of Makati City.
Summonses were issued against both, but the one
intended for Edmund was not served since he was
in the United States and there was no information
on his address or the date of his return to the
Philippines. Florence filed her Answer and alleged
that the loan documents did not bind her since she
Well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to determine all the properties of the
deceased, to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of
properties to be administered. The said court is primarily concerned with the administration, liquidation
and distribution of the estate.
In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has
been probated. In the present case, Efraim left a holographic will which contained the provision which
reads as follows:
(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be discovered later after my demise,
shall be distributed in the proportion indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph in favor of
Edmund and Florence, my children.
The above-quoted is an all-encompassing provision embracing all the properties left by the decedent
which might have escaped his mind at that time he was making his will, and other properties he may
acquire thereafter. Included therein are the three (3) subject tractors. This being so, any partition
involving the said tractors among the heirs is not valid. The joint agreement executed by Edmund and
Florence, partitioning the tractors among themselves, is invalid, specially so since at the time of its
execution, there was already a pending proceeding for the probate of their late father’s holographic will
covering the said tractors.
The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The bank, purportedly a creditor of the
late Efraim Santibañez, should have thus filed its money claim with the probate court in accordance
with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate court is mandatory. This
requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the executor or
administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to determine
whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is the
speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the property to the
distributees, legatees, or heirs.
Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold Florence accountable for any liability
incurred by her late father. The documentary evidence presented, particularly the promissory notes and
the continuing guaranty agreement, were executed and signed only by the late Efraim Santibañez and
his son Edmund. As the petitioner failed to file its money claim with the probate court, at most, it may
only go after Edmund as co-maker of the decedent under the said promissory notes and continuing
guaranty.
 was not a party thereto. Considering that the joint
agreement signed by her and her brother Edmund
was not approved by the probate court, it was null
and void; hence, she was not liable to Union Bank
under the joint agreement.
Union Bank asserts that the obligation of the
deceased had passed to his legitimate heirs
(Edmund and Florence) as provided in Article 774
of the Civil Code; and that the unconditional
signing of the joint agreement estopped Florence,
and that she cannot deny her liability under the
said document.
In her comment to the petition, Florence maintains
that Union Bank is trying to recover a sum of
money from the deceased Efraim Santibañez; thus
the claim should have been filed with the probate
court. She points out that at the time of the
execution of the joint agreement there was already
an existing probate proceedings. She asserts that
even if the agreement was voluntarily executed by
her and her brother Edmund, it should still have
been subjected to the approval of the court as it
may prejudice the estate, the heirs or third parties.

B. Subjects of Succession
NCC 775, 782, 887, 1003
1. Who are the subjects? - NCC 775, 782
2. Relationship, NCC 963-969
3. Capacity to succeed
a. Determinations, NCC 1034, 1039, 16(2)
Cayetano v. Petitioner Cayetano maintains that since the This contention is without merit.
Leonides (1984) respondent judge Leonidas allowed the reprobate
of Adoracion's will, Hermogenes C. Campos was Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner and thus, the respondent judge
divested of his legitime which was reserved by the should have denied its reprobate outright, the private respondents have sufficiently established that
law for him. Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an American citizen and a permanent resident of Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, U.S.A. Therefore, under Article 16 par. (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code which respectively
provide:

Art. 16 par. (2).

xxx xxx xxx

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to
the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be
the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

Art. 1039.

Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.

 the law which governs Adoracion Campo's will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the national
law of the decedent. Although the parties admit that the Pennsylvania law does not provide for legitimes
and that all the estate may be given away by the testatrix to a complete stranger, the petitioner argues
that such law should not apply because it would be contrary to the sound and established public policy
and would run counter to the specific provisions of Philippine Law.

It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as provided for by
Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must apply.

b. Who may succeed? NCC 1024-26, 1029-30

This case is about the efficaciousness or
Parish Priest of enforceability of a devise of ricelands located at
Victoria v. Rigor Guimba, Nueva Ecija, That devise was made in the
(1979) will of the late Father Pascual Rigor, a native of
Victoria Tarlac, in favor of his nearest male relative
who would study for the priesthood.
We hold that the said bequest refers to the testator's nearest male relative living at the time of his death
and not to any indefinite time thereafter. "In order to be capacitated to inherit, the heir, devisee or
legatee must be living at the moment the succession opens, except in case of representation, when it is
proper" (Art. 1025, Civil Code).
The reasonable view is that the testator was referring to a situation whereby his nephew living at the
time of his death, who would like to become a priest, was still in grade school or in high school or was
not yet in the seminary. In that case, the parish priest of Victoria would administer the ricelands before
the nephew entered the seminary. But the moment the testator's nephew entered the seminary, then he
would be entitled to enjoy and administer the ricelands and receive the fruits thereof. In that event, the
trusteeship would be terminated.

Following that interpretation of the will the inquiry would be whether at the time Father Rigor died in
1935 he had a nephew who was studying for the priesthood or who had manifested his desire to follow
the ecclesiastical career. That query is categorically answered in paragraph 4 of appellant priest's
petitions of February 19, 1954 and January 31, 1957. He unequivocally alleged therein that "not male
relative of the late (Father) Pascual Rigor has ever studied for the priesthood" (pp. 25 and 35, Record
on Appeal).

Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew who became a priest, the unavoidable
conclusion is that the bequest in question was ineffectual or inoperative.

c. Who are incapable of succeeding?

d. Effect of alienations by excluded heir
e. Prescription of Action

C. Object of succession
REYES V. *1954 case is missing
DIMAGIBA
(1954)

ESTATE OF Supra
HEMADY V.
LUZON SURETY
GUINTO V. Leon Guinto filed an action for forcible entry The heirs of Medina, having been merely substituted in his place at the time of his death, their liability
MEDINA against Santiago Medina. The trial court ruled in for damages is only to the extent of the value of the property they might have received, if any, from him.
favor of Guinto. However, Guinto still appealed
because the trial court dismissed his claim for
damages. While the case was on appeal, Medina
died. Medina was substituted by his heirs.
Nazareno v. CA Supra
(2000) .
Heirs of Ureta v Infra
Ureta

(2011)

D.Opening of succession
Requisites of transmission of successional rights
1. Express will of testator or provision of law
2. Death of the person whose property is the subject of succession
3. Acceptance of the inheritance
Heirs of Eliodoro Sandejas Sr. filed a petition for the CA: The shares conveyed were limited only to 3/5 of the whole estate. This is because half of the
Spouses issuance of letters of administration in his favor for conjugal estate goes to the husband after the death of the wife, and the other half (the share of the
REMEDIOS R. the settlement of the estate of his wife who died on wife) shall be divided among the 10 legal heirs (including Sandejas Jr) of the deceased wife.
SANDEJAS and April 17, 1955. The Letters were issued. The 4th
ELIODORO P. floor of Manila City Hall was burned and the SC: CA's computation of Eliodoro Sr.'s share in the disputed parcels of land was erroneous. Eliodoro's
SANDEJAS SR records were lost. Thus Sandejas Sr. filed a Motion share should be 11/20 of the entire property, not 3/5. The CA computed Eliodoro's share as an heir
v ALEX A. LINA for Reconstitution of the records, which motion was based on one tenth of the entire disputed property. It should be based only on the remaining half, after
Petition for granted by the Court. deducting the conjugal share. Succession laws and jurisprudence require that when a marriage is
Review under On April 19, 1983, an Omnibus Pleading for motion dissolved by the death of the husband or the wife, the decedent's entire estate - under the concept of
Rule 45 to intervene and petition-in-intervention was filed conjugal properties of gains -- must be divided equally, with one half going to the surviving spouse and
by Movant Alex A. Lina alleging that Sandejas Sr. the other half to the heirs of the deceased. After the settlement of the debts and obligations, the
bound and obligated himself, his heirs, remaining half of the estate is then distributed to the legal heirs, legatees, and devices.
administrators, and assigns, to sell forever and
absolutely and in their entirety the parcels of land
belonging to the conjugal estate. This agreement
was covered by a Receipt of the Earnest Money
with Promise to Sell and Buy.
The counsel for Sandejas Sr. filed a Manifestation
alleging that Sandejas Sr. Died in Canada in 1984.
He further alleged that the matter of the claim of
Intervenor Lina becomes a money claim to be filed
n the estate of the late Sandejas Sr. On November
29, 1993, Intervenor filed an Omnibus Motion to
approve the deed of conditional sale executed
between Plaintiff-in-lntervention Alex A. Lina and
Sandejas Sr.
On January 13, 1995, the TC rendered the
questioned order granting intervenor's Motion.
JOSE C. LEE Dr. Juvencio P. Ortañez incorporated the Philippine There can be no adjudication of a property under intestate proceedings without the approval of the
AND ALMA International Life Insurance Company Inc. And court. However under Art. 533 of the Civil Code, possession of hereditary property is deemed
AGGABAO, and owned 90% of its subscribed capital stock. Dr. transmitted to the heir without interruption from the moment of death of the decedent. Thus an heir can
FILIPINO LOAN Ortañez died, and he left behind wife Juliana only vlidly sell his right, interest, or participation in the property under administration. However, an heir
ASSISTANCE Salgado Ortañez, three legitimate children (Rafael, can only alienate such portion of the estate that may be allotted to him in the division of the estate by
GROUP, vs. Jose, and Antonio Ortañez) and five illegitimate the probate or intestate court after final adjudication---that is, after all debtors shall have been paid or
RTC OF QC children (herein private respondent Ma. Divina the devisees or legatees shall have been given their shares. An heir may only sell his ideal or undivided
BRANCH 85 and Ortañez-Enderes and her siblings Jose, Romeo, share in the estate, not any specific property therein. In the present case, Juliana Ortañez and Jose
MA. DIVINA Enrico Manuel, and Cesar, all surnamed Ortañez sold specific properties of the estate. Since court approval is necessary for the validity of any
ENDERES (Rule Ortañez).On September 24, 1980, Rafael Ortañez disposition of the decedent’s estate, the disposition of the shares of stocks was invalid, and passes no
45) filed before the CFI of Rizal a petition for letters of title to the purchaser. When the estate of the deceased person is already the subject of a testate or
 administration of the intestate estate of Dr. intestate proceeding, the administrator cannot enter into any transaction involving it without prior
Ortañez. Private respondent and her siblings approval of the probate court.
opposed. The RTC appointed Rafael and Jose
Ortañez as joint special administrators.
Several years before (but already during the
pendency of the intestate proceedings), Juliana
Ortañez and her two children, Special
Administrators Rafael and Jose Ortañez, entered
into a memorandum of agreement dated March 4,
1982 for the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of
Dr. Juvencio Ortañez, partitioning the estate.
The decedent’s wife, Juliana S. Ortañez, claiming
that she owned 1,014 Philinterlife shares of stock
as her conjugal share in the estate, sold said
shares with right to repurchase in favor of petitioner
Filipino Loan Assistance Group (FLAG. Juliana
Ortañez failed to repurchase the shares. Also
Special Administrator Jose Ortañez, claiming that
he owned the remaining 1,011 Philinterlife shares
of stocks as his inheritance share in the estate,
sold said shares with right to repurchase also in
favor of FLAG. He also failed to repurchase.
Private respondent Ma. Divina Ortañez–Enderes
and her siblings (hereafter referred to as private
respondents Enderes et al.) filed a motion for
appointment of special administrator of Philinterlife
shares of stock. The RTC granted the motion and
appointed Enderes as special administratrix of the
Philinterlife shares of stock. Enderes later filed an
urgent motion to declare void ab initio the
memorandum of agreement and an urgent motion
to declare void ab initio the deeds of sale of
Philinterlife shares of stock.
SPS. VIRGILIO Santos, are the legitimate and surviving heirs of the The 107-square meter lot already sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao can no longer be inherited by
F. SANTOS & late Rita Catoc Santos (Rita), who died. During her the petitioners because the same was no longer part of their inheritance; it was already sold during the
ESPERANZA lifetime, Rita sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao lifetime of their mother. Under Article 1311 of the NCC, whatever rights and obligations the decedent
LATI SANTOS, the subject property which is a part of her share in have over the property were transmitted to the heirs by way of succession, a mode of acquiring the
SPS.VICTORINO the estate of her deceased mother. property, rights, and obligations of the decedent to the extent of the value of the inheritance of the heirs.
F. SANTOS, & Rita sold 100 square meters of her inchoate share The heirs have inherited the property subject to the liability affecting their common ancestor. Being
LAGRIMAS in her mother’s estate through a document heirs, there is privity of interest between them and their deceased mother. They only succeed to what
SANTOS, denominated as "Bilihan ng Lupa," and an rights their mother had and what is valid and binding against her is also valid and binding as against
ERNESTO F. additional seven square meters was added to the them.
SANTOS, and land. After acquiring the subject property, At the time of the execution of the documents denominated as "Bilihan ng Lupa," the entire property
TADEO F. respondents Spouses Lumbao took actual owned by Maria, the mother of Rita, was not yet divided among her and her co-heirs. Nevertheless, that
SANTOS, possession thereof and erected thereon a house does not make the contract of sale between Rita and respondents Spouses Lumbao invalid. This is
vs. SPS. JOSE which they have been occupying as exclusive because even while an estate remains undivided, co-owners have each full ownership of their
LUMBAO and owners. Spouses Lumbao made several verbal respective aliquots or undivided shares and may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage them. The co-
PROSERFINA demands upon Rita, during her lifetime, and owner, however, has no right to sell or alienate a specific or determinate part of the thing owned in
LUMBAO (Rule thereafter upon herein petitioners, for them to common, because such right over the thing is represented by an aliquot or ideal portion without any
45) execute the necessary documents to effect the physical division.
issuance of a separate title in favor of respondents.
Rita informed respondent Proserfina Lumbao she
 could not deliver the title to the subject property
because the entire property inherited by her and
her co-heirs from Maria had not yet been
partitioned.
Spouses Lumbao claimed that petitioners, acting
fraudulently and in conspiracy with one another,
executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement,
adjudicating and partitioning among themselves
and the other heirs, the estate left by Maria, which
included the subject property already sold to
respondents. Petitioners still failed and refused to
reconvey the subject property to the respondents
Spouses Lumbao. Consequently, the latter filed a
Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages before
the RTC of Pasig City.
OSCAR C. Oscar and private respondent Rodrigo C. Reyes
REYES vs.RTC, (Rodrigo) are two of the four children of the
ZENITH spouses Pedro and Anastacia Reyes. Pedro,
INSURANCE Anastacia, Oscar, and Rodrigo each owned shares
CORPORATION, of stock of Zenith Insurance Corporation (Zenith).
and RODRIGO Pedro died in 1964, while Anastacia died in 1993.
C. REYES No settlement and partition appear to have been
BRION, J (Rule made with Anastacia’s estate.
45) Zenith and Rodrigo filed a derivative suit with the
SEC against Oscar to obtain an accounting of the
funds and assets of ZENITH INSURANCE
CORPORATION and to determine the shares of
stock of deceased spouses Pedro and Anastacia
Reyes that were arbitrarily and fraudulently
appropriated by Oscar. When RA 87997 took effect,
the SEC’s exclusive and original jurisdiction over
cases enumerated in Section 5 of PD 902-A was
transferred to the RTC designated as a special
commercial court. Oscar filed a Motion to Declare
Complaint as Nuisance or Harassment Suit
claiming that the complaint is not a bona fide
derivative suit as it partakes of the nature of a
petition for the settlement of estate of the deceased
Anastacia. The RTC denied the motion.
CA via petition for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus: affirmed the RTC and denied the
petition.
PUNO vs PUNO Carlos L. Puno, who died on June 25, 1963, was
Enterprises an incorporator of respondent Puno Enterprises,
Inc. On March 14, 2003, petitioner Joselito Musni
Puno, claiming to be an heir of Carlos L. Puno,
initiated a complaint for specific performance
against respondent. Petitioner averred that he is
the son of the deceased with the latter’s common-
law wife, Amelia Puno. As surviving heir, he
Ruling: (To determine the nature of the dispute, the two-tiered test is applied: the relationship test and
the nature of the controversy test. The controversy must not only be rooted in the existence of an intra-
corporate relationship, but must as well pertain to the enforcement of the parties’ correlative rights and
obligations under the Corporation Code and the internal and intra-corporate regulatory rules of the
corporation.)
Is there an intra-corporate relationship between the parties? While Rodrigo holds shares of stock in
Zenith, he holds them in two capacities: in his own right with respect to the 4,250 shares registered in
his name, and as one of the heirs of Anastacia Reyes. Article 777 of the Civil Code declares that the
successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent. Accordingly, upon
Anastacia’s death, her children acquired legal title to her estate (which title includes her shareholdings
in Zenith), and they are, prior to the estate’s partition, deemed co-owners thereof. This status as co-
owners, however, does not immediately and necessarily make them stockholders of the corporation,
unless and until there is compliance with Section 63 of the Corporation Code on the manner of
transferring shares.The transfer of title by means of succession, though effective and valid between the
parties involved (i.e., between the decedent’s estate and her heirs), does not bind the corporation and
third parties. The transfer must be registered in the books of the corporation.
Note that the case at bar is different from Abejo v. Dela Cruz and TCL Sales Corporation v. Court of
Appeals where the transferees held definite and uncontested titles to a specific number of shares of the
corporation. In the present case, each of Anastacia’s heirs holds only an undivided interest in the
shares. This interest, at this point, is still inchoate and subject to the outcome of a settlement
proceeding; the right of the heirs to specific, distributive shares of inheritance will not be determind until
all the debts of the estate of the decedent are paid. In short, the heirs are only entitled to what remains
after payment of the decedent’s debts.
Upon the death of a shareholder, the heirs do not automatically become stockholders of the
corporation and acquire the rights and privileges of the deceased as shareholder of the
corporation. The stocks must be distributed first to the heirs in estate proceedings, and the
transfer of the stocks must be recorded in the books of the corporation. Section 63 of the
Corporation Code provides that no transfer shall be valid, except as between the parties, until the
transfer is recorded in the books of the corporation. During such interim period, the heirs stand as the
equitable owners of the stocks, the executor or administrator duly appointed by the court being vested
with the legal title to the stock. Until a settlement and division of the estate is effected, the stocks of the
 claimed entitlement to the rights and privileges of decedent are held by the administrator or executor. Consequently, during such time, it is the
his late father as stockholder of respondent. The administrator or executor who is entitled to exercise the rights of the deceased as stockholder. Thus,
complaint thus prayed that respondent allow even if petitioner presents sufficient evidence in this case to establish that he is the son of Carlos L.
petitioner to inspect its corporate book, render an Puno, he would still not be allowed to inspect respondent’s books and be entitled to receive dividends
accounting of all the transactions it entered into from respondent, absent any showing in its transfer book that some of the shares owned by Carlos L.
from 1962, and give petitioner all the profits, Puno were transferred to him. This would only be possible if petitioner has been recognized as an heir
earnings, dividends, or income pertaining to the and has participated in the settlement of the estate of the deceased. Furthermore, petitioner was not
shares of Carlos L. Puno. able to prove satisfactorily his filiation to the deceased stockholder; thus, the former cannot claim to be
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the an heir of the latter.
ground that petitioner did not have the legal
personality to sue because his birth certificate
names him as “Joselito Musni Muno.” Petitioner
submitted the corrected birth certificate with the
name “Joselito M. Puno,” certified by the Civil
Registrar of the City of Manila, and the Certificate
of Finality thereof. To hasten the disposition of the
case, the court conditionally admitted the corrected
birth certificate as genuine and authentic.
The Lower court rendered a decision in
favor of Joselito Puno.
The CA ordered the dismissal of the
complaint.

E. Kinds of Succession
1. Testamentary
2. Legal or intestate
3. Mixed
4. Contractual
BLAS vs Simeon Blas contracted a first marriage with Marta
SANTOS Cruz and had three children, only one of whom,
Eulalio, left children namely: Maria Gervacio Blas
(one of the plaintiffs), Marta Gervacio Blas (one of
the defendants), and Lazaro Gervacio Blas. Lazaro
died and is survived by three legitimate children
who are plaintiffs herein namely, Manuel, Leoncio
and Loid. Subsequently after Marta’s death,
Simeon contracted a second marriage with Maxima
Santos. At the time of second marriage, no
liquidation of the properties of Simeon and Marta
was made. A week before Simeon’s death, he
executed a last Will and Testament, and he also
ordered a preparation of a document (Exhibit A)
because the properties he had acquired during his
first marriage with Marta had not been liquidated
and were not separated from those acquired during
the second marriage. Such document contains
promises by Maxima to respect the disposition of
said will and to give one-half (1/2) of the properties
she and her husband will leave to the heirs,
legatees or beneficiaries named in the will (the
heirs of Simeon’s 1st marriage). Pursuant to this
The heirs of Simeon Blas and his wife Marta Cruz can no longer make any claim for the unliquidated
conjugal properties acquired during said first marriage because the same were already included in the
mass properties constituting the estate of the deceased Simeon Blas and in the adjudications made by
virtue of his will. However, they can claim promised properties under the document containining
promises by Maxima to give one-half (1/2) of the properties she and her husband will leave to the heirs
of her Husband in the latter’s 1st marriage(EXHIBIT A). Exhibit A appears to be the compromise defined
in Article 1809 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force at the time of the execution of such document, which
provides as follows:
Compromise is a contract by which each of the parties in interest, by giving, promising, or
retaining something avoids the provocation of a suitor terminates one which has already provocation
been instituted. Being a compromise, which is an obligation, it is just to convey and deliver the subject
properties. Absent the compromise, however, a claim for the unliquidated conjugal properties acquired
during the first marriage can no longer lie because the same were already included in the mass
properties constituting the estate of Simeon and in the adjudications made by virtue of his will.
The agreement or promise that Maxima Santos made in Exhibit A is to hold one-half of her share in
the conjugal assets in trust for the heirs and legatees of her husband’s heirs in the latter’s first
marriage, with the obligation of conveying the same to such of his heirs or legatees as she may choose
in her last will and testament. This kind of compromise/promise is valid.
 document, the plaintiffs instituted an action against
the administration of the estate of Maxima Santos
to secure a judicial declaration that one-half (1/2) of
the properties left by Maxima be adjudicated to
them. Upon filing of opposition by the administratix,
the trial court dismissed the complaint. Hence, this
appeal.

Balus vs. Balus Herein petitioner and respondents are the children The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his death. In addition, the
of the spouses Rufo and Sebastiana Balus. Rufo inheritance of a person consists of the property and transmissible rights and obligations existing at the
mortgaged a parcel of land, which he owns, as a time of his death, as well as those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the succession. In
security for a loan he obtained from the Rural Bank the present case, since Rufo lost ownership of the subject property during his lifetime, as the Bank
of Maigo, Lanao del Norte. Rufo failed to pay his acquired exclusive ownership of the contested lot during the lifetime of Rufo. It only follows that at the
loan. As a result, the mortgaged property was time of his death, the disputed parcel of land no longer formed part of his estate to which his heirs may
foreclosed and was sold to the bank as the sole lay claim. Stated differently, petitioner and respondents never inherited the subject lot from their father.
bidder at a public auction held for that purpose. Furthermore, petitioner's contention that he and his siblings intended to continue their supposed co-
The property was not redeemed within the period ownership of the subject property contradicts the provisions of the subject Extrajudicial Settlement
allowed by law. More than two years after the where they clearly manifested their intention of having the subject property divided or partitioned by
auction, or on January 25, 1984, the sheriff assigning to each of the petitioner and respondents a specific 1/3 portion of the same. Partition calls
executed a Definite Deed of Sale in favor of the for the segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the property owned in common. The
Bank. Thereafter, a new title was issued in the purpose of partition is to put an end to co-ownership, an objective which negates petitioner's claims in
name of the Bank. In 1989, herein petitioner and the present case.
respondents executed an Extrajudicial Settlement
of Estate adjudicating to each of them a specific
one-third portion of the subject property consisting
of 10,246 square meters. The Extrajudicial
Settlement also contained provisions wherein the
parties admitted knowledge of the fact that their
father mortgaged the subject property to the Bank
and that they intended to redeem the same at the
soonest possible time.
Three years after the execution of the Extrajudicial
Settlement, herein respondents bought the
subject property from the Bank. A Deed of Sale of
Registered Land was executed by the Bank in
favor of respondents. Subsequently, a TCT was
issued in the name of respondents. Meanwhile,
petitioner continued possession of the subject lot.
In 1995, respondents filed a Complaint for
Recovery of Possession and Damages against
petitioner, contending that they had already
informed petitioner of the fact that they were the
new owners of the disputed property, but the
petitioner still refused to surrender possession of
the same to them.
The RTC decided in favor of petitioner.
The CA ruled in favor of respondent.

TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSION
II. WILLS
A. Definition
Vitug v. CA Romarico Vitug and Nenita Alonte were co-
administrators of Dolores Vitug’s (deceased)
estate. Rowena Corona was the executrix.
Romarico, the deceased’s husband, filed a motion
with the probate court asking for authority to sell
certain shares of stock and real properties
belonging to the estate to cover alleged advances
to the estate, which he claimed as personal funds.
The advances were used to pay estate taxes.
Corona opposed the motion on ground that the
advances came from a savings account which
formed part of the conjugal partnership properties
and is part of the estate. Thus, there was no
ground for reimbursement. Romarico claims that
the funds are his exclusive property, having been
acquired through a survivorship agreement
executed with his late wife and the bank.
The conveyance is not mortis causa, which should be embodied in a will. A will is a personal, solemn,
revocable and free act by which a capacitated person disposes of his property and rights and declares
or complies with duties to take effect after his death. The bequest or devise must pertain to the testator.
In this case, the savings account involved was in the nature of conjugal funds. Since it was not shown
that the funds belonged exclusively to one party, it is presumed to be conjugal. It is also not a donation
inter vivos because it was to take effect after the death of one party. It is also not a donation between
spouses because it involved no conveyance of a spouse’s own properties to the other. It was an error
to include the savings account in the inventory of the deceased’s assets because it is the separate
property of Romarico. Thus, Romarico had the right to claim reimbursement.
Survivorship agreements are permitted by the NCC. However, its operation or effect must not be
violative of the law (i.e. used as a cloak to hide an inofficious donation or to transfer property in fraud of
creditors or to defeat the legitime of a forced heir).

The agreement stated that after the death of either

one of the spouses, the savings account shall
belong to and be the sole property of the survivor,
and shall be payable to and collectible or
withdrawable by such survivor. The lower court
upheld the validity of the agreement and granted
the motion to sell. CA reversed stating that the
survivorship agreement constitutes a conveyance
mortis causa which did not comply with the
formalities of a valid will. Assuming that it was a
donation inter vivos, it is a prohibited donation
(donation between spouses).

B. Characteristics
C. Interpretation of Wills
SOLLA VS. Dona Maria Solla’s will reads as follows:
ASCUENTA X x x I desire and hereby name Leandro Serrano,
my grandson x x x and I desire him to comply with
the obligation to give or to deliver to the parish
priest of this town a sufficient sum of money
necessary for a yearly novena and for an ordinary
requiem mass for the 1st 8 days thereof and on the
9th or last day, a solemn requiem mass with a vigil
and a large bier (a stand on which a corpse or
coffin is placed before burial – defn not included in
will) for these masses are for the repose of my
soul and those of my parents, husband, children,
and other relatives. I repeat and insist that my heir
shall execute and comply with this request without
fail. And at the hour of his death, he will insist
that his heirs comply with all that I have here
ordered.” In the earlier part of the will, Dona Maria
ordered the distribution of legacies to her brothers,
In order to determine the testator’s intention, the court should place itself as near as possible in his
position, Where the language of the will is ambiguous or doubtful, the court should take into
consideration the situation of the testator and the facts and circumstances surrounding him at the time
the will was executed. Where the testator’s intention is manifest from the context of the will and
surrounding circumstances, but is obscured by inapt and inaccurate modes of expression, the language
will be subordinated to the intention, and in order to give effect to such intention, as far as possible, the
court may depart from the strict wording and read word or phrase in a sense different from that which is
ordinarily attributed to it, and for such purpose, may mould or change the language of the will, such as
restricting its application or supplying words or phrases. In this case, it clearly appearing that it was
Maria Solla’s intention to insist upon compliance of her order by Leandro’s heirs, that the latter should
comply with the pious orders and that she was not referring to her order concerning the legacies, the
will should only be interpreted in so far as the pious orders are concerned (the prayers and masses).
 nephew, protégées and servant.
Leandro Serrano’s will on the other hand reads as
follows:
I command my executor to put all of my property in
order x x x I order my son Simeon not to forget
annually all the souls of the relatives of my
grandmother and also of mine and to have a mass
said on the 1st and 9th days of the yearly novena
and that he erect a 1st class bier x x x I sincerely
desire that the property of my deceased
grandmother, Capitana Maria (Solla) be disposed
of in conformity with all the provisions of her will
and of mine.
Leandro named his son Simeon Serrano, as
executor of his will and that he directed him to put
all of his property in order and to separate that
which came from his deceased grandmother, Maria
Solla. Leandro took possession of the property left
by his grandmother when she died on June 11,
1883. He continued in possession of the same
until his death on August 5, 1921. The petitioners
(grandnieces and grandnephews) now assail his
continued possession. The respondent is the
widow of Leandro Serrano.
What are the orders and requests that Maria Solla
wanted her grandson and his heirs to faithfully
comply with? Did she want Leandro’s heirs to
continue the distribution of legacies too?

D. Law governing form

1. Time of execution
2. Place of execution
In re: Will of On Sept. 6, 1923, Fr. Sancho Abadia, parish priest
Rev. Abadia of Talisay, Cebu, executed a document purporting
to be his last will and testament. He died Jan. 14,
1943. He left properties estimated at P 8k in value.
On Oct. 2, 1946, one of the legatees in the
purported last will filed a petition to probate the will,
to which the cousins and nephews of the deceased
opposed.
The purported last will and testament turned out to
be a holographic will, as one of the attesting
witnesses, the two others being also dead, testified
that Fr. Sancho wrote out his will in Spanish, which
he knew and understood, and that testator signed
on the left hand margin of the front page of each of
the three folios or sheets of which the document is
composed, and numbered the same with Arabic
numerals, and finally signed his name at the end of
his writing at the last page, all this, in the presence
The will may not be probated, and the estate will be divided intestate. Art. 795 "The validity of a will as
to its form depends upon the observance of the law in force at the time it is made." The above provision
is but an expression or statement of the weight of authority to the affect that the validity of a will is to be
judged not by the law enforce at the time of the testator's death or at the time the supposed will is
presented in court for probate or when the petition is decided by the court but at the time the instrument
was executed. One reason in support of the rule is that although the will operates upon and after the
death of the testator, the wishes of the testator about the disposition of his estate among his heirs and
among the legatees is given solemn expression at the time the will is executed, and in reality, the
legacy or bequest then becomes a completed act. This ruling has been laid down by this court in the
case of In re Will of Riosa, 39 Phil., 23. It is a wholesome doctrine and should be followed. When one
executes a will which is invalid for failure to observe and follow the legal requirements at the time of its
execution then upon his death he should be regarded and declared as having died intestate, and his
heirs will then inherit by intestate succession, and no subsequent law with more liberal requirements or
which dispenses with such requirements as to execution should be allowed to validate a defective will
and thereby divest the heirs of their vested rights in the estate by intestate succession. The general rule
is that the Legislature can not validate void wills.
 of the three attesting witnesses after telling that it
was his last will and that the said three witnesses
signed their names on the last page after the
attestation clause in his presence and in the
presence of each other. The oppositors did not
submit any evidence.
Fleumer v Hix Petitioner Fleumer is the special administrator of
Edward Hix’s estate. He appeals the decision of
the CFI denying the probate of Hix’s will. The will
was alleged to be executed in West Virgina on Nov
3, 1925 by Hix, who then resided there. Thus, the
laws of West Virginia govern. He submitted a copy
of section 3868 of Acts 1882 as found in the West
Virginia Code. But the CFI found that this is not
compliance with the law.
Estate of Lela Dalton filed for the legalization of the
Giberson documents which claims to be the holographic will
of William Giberson, executed in California. The
decedent was a citizen of Illinois, US and a
resident of Cebu who died in UST, Manila. Spring
Giberson, a legitimate son of the decedent
opposed with the contention that before a will
executed in a foreign country maybe probated
here, it must be shown that it has been previously
probated in said foreign country. The opposition, in
support of his theory, he argues that Article 635 of
the Code of Civil Procedure has been repealed by
Rule 78, under Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution. That Article 635 of the Code of Civil
Procedure reads as follows: A will executed outside
of the Philippines, which may be authenticated and
legalized under the laws of the state or country
where it was granted, may be authenticated,
legalized and registered in the Philippine Islands,
and will have the same efficacy quesi has been
granted in accordance with the laws of these
Islands.
Dela Cerna v On May 9, 1939, the spouses, Bernabe de la
Potot Serna and Gervasia Rebaca, executed a joint last
The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in Philippine Courts. The Philippine Islands
are not authorized to take judicial notice of the laws of various States of the American Union. Such
laws must be proved as facts. Here the requirements of the law were not met. There was no showing
that the book from which an extract was taken was printed or published under the authority of the State
of West Virginia. Nor was the extract of the law attested by the certificate of the officer having charge
of the original under the seal of West Virginia, as provided in section 301 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. No evidence was introduced to show that the extract from the laws of West Virginia was in
force at the time the alleged will was executed. It was also necessary for the petitioner to prove that the
testator had his domicile in West Virginia and not in the Philippine Islands. The only evidence
introduced to establish this fact was a recital of the alleged will and the testimony of the petitioner.
A person may dispose of their property for after his death by will. The granting of a legal act
testamentoes that can be done in the Philippines or abroad, if granted in a foreign country, must be in
accordance with the laws of that country, it is a rule universally adopted. The alien may have to after his
death his property in the Philippines by will and not forced to give it in the Philippines can do in their
own country or another, but according to the laws of the country granting it. Article 635 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, respecting the freedom of the testator to give his will anywhere, has the will to be
legalized in a foreign country in accordance with the laws of that country can legalizsarse also in the
Philippines. That provision is substantive, it creates the rights of beneficiaries of the will: they are said
to legalize wills otorgadosfuera Philippine Islands if they can be legalized in the country in which they
were granted, giving them cause of action for compliance pedirjudicialmente the last testator's will
whatever the place of execution. Sinesa provision would be truncated to test the power.
And Article 637 reads: "The wills authenticated and legalized in the United States, or any state or
territory thereof, or a state or paisextranjero, in accordance with the laws of that state, territory or
country, may be legalized yarchivados registered in the Court of First Instance of the testator hath
provinciaen property, or property efectados by such wills. " This articulono is in conflict with Article 635,
in fact, more than its corollary noes. If a will made in a foreign country can be legalized in accordance
with the laws of that country may also legalized in the Philippines, with more reason legalizadosen wills
and foreign countries in accordance with the laws of those countries may also legalized in the
Philippines.
Article 1 of Rule 78 is nothing more than a transplantation of Article 637 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Reproduce the two provisions: RULE 78 - SECTION 1. Wills Philippines may be outside PROVED
allowed here. - Wills PROVED and allowed in a foreign country, According To The Laws of Such
country, may be allowed, filed, and Recorded by the Court of First Instance proper in the Philippines.
SEC. 637. Wills islands may be outside PROVED allowed here. - Wills PROVED and allowed in the
United States, or State or Territory Any thereof, or in a foreign state or country, According To The Laws
of Such State, Territory, or country, may be allowed, filed, and Recorded in the Court of First Instance
of the province in Which the testator has real or estate staff on Which Such will may Operate.
The underlined words in the second arrangement is not shown in the first. Article 1 of Rule 78 can not
prevent a legalized in the Philippines will made in a foreign country, if it can be legalized in accordance
with the laws of that country, not previously required to be legalized in that country. It is untenable,
therefore, the theory of the opponent.
It follows that the validity of the joint will, in so far as the estate of the wife was concerned, must be, on
her death, reexamined and adjudicated de novo, since a joint will is considered a separate will of each
 will and testament in the local dialect whereby they testator. Thus regarded, the holding of the court of First Instance of Cebu that the joint will is one
willed that "our two parcels of land acquired during prohibited by law was correct as to the participation of the deceased Gervasia Rebaca in the properties
our marriage together with all improvements in question. Therefore, the undivided interest of Gervasia Rebaca should pass upon her death to her
thereon shall be given to Manuela Rebaca, our heirs intestate, and not exclusively to the testamentary heir, unless some other valid will in her favor is
niece, whom we have nurtured since childhood, shown to exist, or unless she be the only heir intestate of said Gervasia. It is unnecessary to emphasize
because God did not give us any child in our union, that the fact that joint wills should be in common usage could not make them valid when our Civil
Manuela Rebaca being married to Nicolas Potot", Codes consistently invalidated them, because laws are only repealed by other subsequent laws, and no
and that "while each of the testators is yet living, he usage to the contrary may prevail against their observance (Art. 5, Civ. Code of 1889; Art. 7, Civil Code
or she will continue to enjoy the fruits of the two of the Philippines of 1950).
lands. Bernabe dela Serna died on August 30,
1939, and the aforesaid will was submitted to
probate by said Gervasia and Manuela before the
Court of First Instance of Cebu which, after due
publication as required by law and there being no
opposition, heard the evidence.
Upon the death of Gervasia Rebaca on October
14, 1952, another petition for the probate of the
same will insofar as Gervasia was concerned was
filed on November 6, 1952, being Special
Proceedings No. 1016-R of the same Court of First
Instance of Cebu, but for failure of the petitioner,
Manuela R. Potot and her attorney, Manuel Potot
to appear, for the hearing of said petition, the case
was dismissed on March 30, 1954 Spec. Proc. No.
1016-R, In the matter of the Probate of the Will of
Gervasia Rebaca).

E. Law governing content

1. Time
2. Successional rights, etc.
Estate of Edward Christensen was born in New York but he There are two rules in California on the matter; the internal law which applies to Californians domiciled
Christensen migrated to California where he resided for a in California and the conflict rule for Californians domiciled outside of California. Christensen being
period of 9 years. In 1913, he came to the domiciled in the Philippines, the law of his domicile must be followed. The case was remanded to the
Philippines where he became a domiciliary until his lower court for further proceedings – the determination of the successional rights under Philippine law
death. In his will, he instituted an acknowledged only.
natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen
(legitimate), as his only heir, but left a legacy sum
of money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia
(illegitimate). Counsel for Helen claims that under
Article 16, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code, California
law should be applied; that under California law,
the matter is referred back to the law of the
domicile. On the other hand, counsel for Maria,
averred that the national law of the deceased must
apply, illegitimate children not being entitled to
anything under California law.
Testate Estate Facts: Ratio:
of Amos Bellis
vs. Bellis (1967) Amos G. Bellis was “a citizen of the State of Texas The illegitimate children, in claiming that Philippine law should apply, contend that Article 17(3) of the
and of the United States”. He had five legitimate Civil Code should be treated as an exception to Article 16 of said Code. Article 16 “render[s] applicable
children (one of whom predeceased him) by his the national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a)
 first wife, three legitimate children by his second
wife, and finally three illegitimate children. Amos
executed a will in the Philippines, providing, among
others, that his three illegitimate children should
first be given P40,000 each from his distributable
estate before the distribution of the remainder of
the estate to his legitimate children in equal shares.
Amos died a resident of San Antonio, Texas.
Subsequently, his will was admitted to probate in a
Court of First in Manila. After satisfying the legacies
of the three illegitimate children, the executor
divided the residuary estate among Amos’ seven
legitimate children.
The three illegitimate children filed an opposition to
the project of partition, arguing that, as compulsory
heirs, they have been deprived of their legitimes.
The lower court denied the opposition after
applying the national law of the decedent, which
did not provide for legitimes.
the order of succession, (b) the amount of successional rights, (c) the intrinsic validity of the provisions
of the will, and (d) the capacity to succeed. On the other hand, Article 17(3) provides that “prohibitive
laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order,
public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or
by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.”
The Court held that “whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of
legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals.”
Congress’ purpose was to make Article 16(2) a specific provision in itself which must be applied in
testate and intestate succession. “As a further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a
new provision, under Article 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the
national law of the decedent.”
The illegitimate children also argued that Amos executed two wills – one to govern his Texas estate
and the other his Philippine estate. “Assuming that such was the decedent’s intention in executing a
separate Philippine will, it will not alter the law for…a provision in a foreigner’s will to the effect that his
properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal
and void for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters [in] Article 16.”
Thus, Amos’ national law governs, which law does not recognize legitimes.

Issue: Whether or not the national law of the

decedent (Texas law) or Philippine law should be
applied. || Held: The national law of the
decedent should be applied.
Cayetano vs. Facts: Ratio:
Leonidas (1984) Adoracion Campos was an American citizen and a It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as provided for in
permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must apply. The Court quoted
In 1975, she executed a last will and testament. In the ruling in Bellis vs. Bellis (20 SCRA 358), that “whatever public policy or good customs may be
1975, she died in the Philippines while temporarily involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of
residing with one of her sisters in Malate. As foreign nationals for it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to
Adoracion was survived only by his father, the decedent’s national law.”
Hermogenes Campos, and three sisters, his father
(and only compulsory heir) executed an Affidavit
under the Rules of Court whereby he adjudicated
unto himself the ownership of Adoracion’s entire
estate.
Subsequently, one of Adoracion’s sisters, Nenita,
filed a “petition for the reprobate” of the former’s
will with a Court of First Instance in Manila,
claiming that the will which was executed in the
United States had been “probated, allowed, and
registered with the Registry of Wills [in]
Philadelphia…and that therefore, there is an urgent
need for the appointment of an administratrix to
administer and eventually distribute the properties
of the estate located in the Philippines.”
The father opposed the probate of the will, claiming
that it was a forgery. However, he later filed a
Motion to Dismiss, saying that he had verified that
the document was indeed Adoracion’s will. The CFI
 thus allowed reprobate. The father then filed a
Motion to Vacate, contending that his earlier
motion was secured through fraud. He, however,
failed to show up in the motion hearings and
eventually died during the pendency of the case.
Cayetano was appointed executrix of his estate.
Cayetano now claims that the CFI erred in allowing
the reprobate of the Adoracion’s will since in doing
so, it applied Pennsylvania law, which does not
provide for legitimes, hence divesting Hermogenes
of the same.
Issue: Whether or not the national law of the
decedent (Pennsylvania law) or Philippine law
should govern. || Held: The national law of the
decedent applies.

III. TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY AND INTENT

A. Who may make a will?
B. Supervening incapacity
Torres vs. Facts: “The presumption is that every adult is sane. It is only when those seeking to overthrow the will have
Lopez (1926) In August 1923, Don Tomas Rodriguez, then clearly established the charge of mental incapacity that the courts will intervene to set aside a
seventy-six (76) years old, appointed his cousin, testamentary document.”
Vicente Lopez, as the administrator of his property. “Even where the question of insanity is out in issue in the guardianship proceedings, the most that can
For a long time prior to said date, Tomas had been be said of the finding is that it raises a presumption of incapacity to make a will but does not [render?]
in feeble condition due to old age. In October invaluable the testament if competency can be shown. The burden of proving sanity in such case is
1923, Don Tomas’ other cousin, Margarita Lopez, cast upon the proponents.”
petitioned the Court of First Instance of Manila for In this case, “Tomas Rodriguez, in our opinion, comprehended the nature of the transaction in which he
his guardianship. The lower court, finding that was engaged. He had two conferences with his lawyer…and knew what the will was to contain…He
Tomas was incapable of taking care of himself, signed the will and its two copies in the proper places at the bottom and on the left margin. At that time,
named Vicente Lopez guardian. the testator recollected the property to be disposed of and the persons who would naturally be
In January, 1924, while confined in the Philippine supposed to have claims upon him. While for some months prior to the making of the will he had not
General Hospital, Don Tomas executed a will, managed his property, he seemed to have retained a distinct recollection of what it consisted and of his
naming Vicente as heir, in the presence of several income.”
witnesses, among them four physicians. After Don “[He] may have been of advanced years, may have been physically decrepit, may have been weak in
Tomas’ death the following month, his cousin intellect, may have suffered a loss of memory, may have had a guardian and may have a been
Margarita sought to have the will voided on the extremely eccentric, but he still possessed the spark of reason and of life, that strength of mind to form
ground of the former’s incapacity. a fixed intention and to summon his enfeebled thoughts to enforce that intention, which the law terms
Margarita relied on the statements made by the ‘testamentary capacity’."
doctors who had earlier examined Don Tomas in
relation to the guardianship proceedings – that he
was “of unsound mind, suffering from senile
dementia” and that “this form of mental disease is
progressive in its pathological tendency, going on
to progressive atropy and degeneration of the
brain.”
Vicente, on the other hand, relied on the
testimonies of the doctors present at the execution
of the will – that “the result of the different tests to
which the patient was submitted is that his
intellectual faculties are sound, except that his
 memory is weak, which is almost a loss for recent
facts, or events which have recently occurred, due
to his physical condition and old age.”
Issue: Whether or not the testator, characterized as
suffering from senile dementia, had testamentary
capacity at the time of the execution of the will. ||
Held: Yes, he had testamentary capacity
despite the senile dementia.
Baltazar vs. Paciencia Regala was seventy-eight (78) years old, Held: Yes, the testator had testamentary capacity despite her forgetfulness.
Laxa (2012) single, and without any children or siblings when “Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind. Besides, Article 799 of the New Civil Code
she executed her last will and testament in states that ‘to be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his
Pampanga in the house of one Judge Limpin and reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury
in the presence of three instrumental witnesses. All or other cause…”
the formalities in the execution of a will were “[A]part from the [relative’s] testimony…pertaining to Paciencia’s forgetfulness, there is no substantial
observed, with Paciencia bequeathing all her evidence, medical or otherwise, that would show that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the
properties to her nephew, Lorenzo, and the latter’s execution of the Will. On the other hand, we find more worthy of credence [one of the instrumental
wife and two children. Paciencia apparently raised witnesses’] testimony as to the soundness of mind of Paciencia when the latter went to Judge Limpin’s
Lorenzo as her own child. Lorenzo and his family house and voluntarily executed the Will. ‘The testimony of subscribing witnesses to a Will concerning
later migrated to the United States. Shortly after the the testator’s mental condition is entitled to great weight where they are truthful and intelligent.’ More
execution of the will, Paciencia went abroad to live importantly, a testator is presumed to be of sound mind at the time of the execution of the Will and the
with them. She died in the States sixteen (16) burden to prove otherwise lies on the oppositor.”
years later.
Lorenzo filed a petition for the probate of the will
with an RTC in Pampanga. Antonio Baltazar,
claiming to be a nephew of the deceased,
opposed. Other relatives joined Antonio’s
opposition, claiming that the will was null and void
since, among other reasons, “Paciencia was
mentally incapable [of making] a Will at the time of
its execution.” One of them testified that Paciencia
was “ ‘magulyan’ or ‘forgetful’ because she would
sometimes leave her wallet in the kitchen then start
looking for it moments later.”
The lower court gave full credence to the last
testimony, declared that Paciencia did not have
testamentary capacity, and denied the probate of
the will. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower
court, reasoning that "the state of being ‘magulyan’
does not make a person mentally unsound so [as]
to render [Paciencia] unfit for executing a Will."
Issue: Whether or not the testator, characterized as
‘magulyan’ or forgetful, had testamentary capacity.

IV. SOLEMNITIES OF WILLS

A. Kinds of Wills
B. Notarial Wills
1. General requirements
Abangan vs. Ana Abangan’s will consisted of two sheets, the Yes, there was compliance with the solemnities of wills.
Abangan (1919) first of which contained all of the dispositions of the Ratio:
testatrix, duly signed at the bottom by Martin “[I]n a will consisting of two sheets the first of which contains all the testamentary dispositions and is
Montalban (in the name and under the direction of signed at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses and the second contains only the attestation
 the testatrix) and by three witnesses. The following
sheet contained only the attestation clause duly
signed at the bottom by the three instrumental
witnesses. Neither of these sheets was signed on
the left margin by the testatrix and the three
witnesses, nor numbered by letters; and these
omissions, according to appellants' contention, are
defects whereby the probate of the will should have
been denied. Also, the will was in Cebuano and
there was no proof that the testatrix knew the
dialect in which the will was written.
Issue: Whether or not there was compliance with
the solemnities of wills.
Suroza vs. Marcelina Suroza was 73 years old and
Honrado (1981) illiterate when she supposedly executed a
notarial will written in English. Her thumbmark
appears on the document. In the opening
paragraph of the will, it was stated that English
was a language "understood and known" to
the testatrix. But in its concluding paragraph, it
was stated that the will was read to the
testatrix "and translated into Filipino
language".
Issue: Whether or not the will is void.
2. Specific requirements
Barut vs. Severo, Timotea, Catalina, and A.M. Jimenez
Cabacungan were witnesses to the execution of Maria
(1912) Salomon’s will. The signature of the testatrix
was written by Severo at the former’s request
and in her presence and in the presence of all
the other witnesses to the will.
The probate of the will was contended on the
ground that the handwriting of Severo looked
more like the handwriting of one of the 3 other
attesting witnesses to the will.
Issue: Whether or not the will is valid.
Nera vs. There was a dispute as to the circumstances
Rimando (1911) attending the signing of the will on the day of
its execution:
1. whether one of the subscribing witnesses
was present in the small room where it
was executed at the time when the
testator and the other subscribing
witnesses attached their signatures; or
2. whether he was outside, some eight or ten
feet away, in a large room connecting to
clause and is signed also at the bottom by the three witnesses, it is not necessary that both sheets be
further signed on their margins by the testator and the witnesses, or be paged.
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith
and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity.
Therefore the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial
ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law
to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already given
assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more
requisites entirely unnecessary… must be disregarded.
As another ground for this appeal, it is alleged the records do not show that the testatrix knew the
dialect in which the will is written. But the circumstance appearing in the will itself that same was
executed in the city of Cebu and in the dialect of this locality where the testatrix was a neighbour is
enough, in the absence of any proof to the contrary, to presume that she knew this dialect in which this
will is written.”
The will is void.
Ratio:
The fact that the will had to be translated “could only mean that the will was written in a language not
known to the illiterate testatrix and, therefore, it is void because of the mandatory provision of Article
804 of the Civil Code that every will must be executed in a language or dialect known to the testator.
Thus, a will written in English, which was not known to the Igorot testator, is void and was disallowed
(Acop vs. Piraso, 52 Phil. 660)…([Further] The hasty preparation of the will is shown in the attestation
clause and notarial acknowledgment where Marcelina…Suroza is repeatedly referred to as the
"testator" instead of ‘testatrix’).”
Yes, the will is valid.
Ratio:
“We do not believe that a mere dissimilarity in writing thus mentioned by the court is sufficient to
overcome the uncontradicted testimony of all the witnesses to the will that the signature of the
testatrix was written by Severo…at her request and in her presence and in the presence of all the
witnesses to the will. It is immaterial who writes the name of the testatrix provided it is written at her
request and in her presence and in the presence of all the witnesses to the execution of the will.”
“It is unimportant whether the person who writes the name of the testatrix signs his own or not. The
important thing is that it clearly appears that the name of the testatrix was signed at her express
direction in the presence of three witnesses and that they attested and subscribed it in her
presence and in the presence of each other. That is all the statute requires.”
[From Prof. Balane: “The essential thing, for validity, is that the agent write the testator’s name, nothing
more. It would be a good thing, but not required, for the agent to indicate the fact of agency or
authority…”]
The Court admitted the first scenario and ruled that the will is valid.
Ratio:
“The true test of presence of the testator and the witnesses in the execution of a will is not whether
they actually saw each other sign, but whether they might have seen each other sign, had they
chosen to do so, considering their mental and physical condition and position with relation to each
other at the moment of inscription of each signature.
“But it is especially to be noted that the position of the parties with relation to each other at the moment
of the subscription of each signature, must be such that they may see each other sign if they choose to
do so. This, of course, does not mean that the testator and the subscribing witnesses may be held to
have executed the instrument in the presence of each other if it appears that they would not have been
 the smaller room through a doorway,
where a curtain was hung and which
made it impossible for one in the outside
room to see the testator and the other
subscribing witnesses in the act of signing
the instrument
Issue: Whether or not the will is valid in said
instances
Payad vs. The probate of the will was denied on the
Tolentino (1936) ground that the attestation clause was not in
conformity with the requirements of law in that
it was not stated therein that the testatrix
caused Atty. Almario to write her name at her
express direction.The evidence established
that the testatrix, assisted by Atty. Almario
placed her thumb mark on each and every
page of the questioned will and that said
attorney merely wrote her name to indicate the
place where she placed said thumb mark.
Issue: Whether or not probate of the will should be
allowed.
Garcia vs. This case involves the will of Antero
Lacuesta (1951) Mercado, which among other defects was signed
by the testator through a cross mark (an “X”). The
will was signed by Atty. Javier who wrote the name
of Mercado as testator and the latter allegedly
wrote a cross mark after his name. The CFI
allowed the will but the CA disallowed it because its
attestation clause was defective for failing to certify
1) that the will was signed by Atty. Javier at the
express direction of the testator, 2) that the testator
wrote a cross at the end of his name after Atty.
Javier signed for him, and 3) that the 3 witnesses
signed the will in the presence of the testator and
of each other.
Issue: Whether the will should be allowed despite
the defect of the attestation clause since the
testator had placed a cross mark himself as his
signature.
Lopez vs. Don Sixto Liboro executed a last will and testament
Liboro (1948) in Spanish. “The will compromises two pages, each
of which is written on one side of a separate sheet.
The first sheet is not paged either in letters or in
Arabic numerals.” The document was contested on
the ground of failure to comply with the solemnities
of wills and of its silence on the testator’s
understanding of the Spanish language.
Issue: Whether or not the will is valid.
able to see each other sign at that moment, without changing their relative positions or existing
conditions.”
Yes, probate of the will should be allowed.
Ratio:
“Atty. Almario did not sign for the testatrix. She signed by placing her thumb mark on each and every
page thereof. ‘A statute requiring a will to be ‘signed’ is satisfied if the signature is made by the
testator’s mark…’ It is clear, therefore, that it was not necessary that the attestation clause in question
should state that the testatrix requested Atty. Almario to sign her name in as much as the testatrix
signed the will in question in accordance with law.”
No, the will should not be allowed.
Ratio:
The attestation clause is fatally defective for failing to state that Mercado directed Javier to
write the testator’s name under his express direction. Petitioner’s argument that such recital is
unnecessary because the testator signed the will himself using a cross mark which should be
considered the same as a thumb-mark (which has been held sufficient in past cases) is not acceptable.
“It is not here pretended that the cross appearing on the will is the usual signature of Antero Mercado or
even one of the ways by which he signed his name. After mature reflection, we are not prepared to
liken the mere sign of the cross to a thumb mark, and the reason is obvious. The cross cannot and
does not have the trustworthiness of a thumb mark.”
Yes, the will is valid.
Ratio:
“In the present case, the omission to put a page number on the first sheet, if that be necessary, is
supplied by other forms of identification more trustworthy than the conventional numerical words or
characters. The unnumbered page is clearly identified as the first page by the internal sense of its
contents considered in relation to the contents of the second page. By their meaning and coherence,
the first and second lines on the second page are undeniably a continuation of the last sentence of the
testament, before the attestation clause, which starts at the bottom of the preceding page. Furthermore,
the unnumbered page contains the caption "TESTAMENTO," the invocation of the Almighty, and a
recital that the testator was in full use of his testamentary faculty, — all of which, in the logical order of
sequence, precede the direction for the disposition of the marker's property. Again, as page two

Reyes vs. Vda. The lower court disallowed the probate of the will of
de Vidal (1952) Maria Zuñiga Vda. de Pando on the ground that it
was not proven that the deceased knew the
Spanish language in which the document was
written.
Issue: Whether or not the will should be allowed.
Matias vs. Salud The CFI denied probate of the will of Gabina
(1957) Raquel. It must be noted that Gabina Raquel was
suffering from herpes zoster that afflicted the right
arm and shoulder of the testatrix, which made
writing difficult and a painful act. Thus, upon the
insistence of the attorney, Gabina attempted to
sign, but since it was so painful she just managed
to thumbmark the foot of the document and the left
margin of each page. The parties opposing the
probate of the will contended that the will was void
due to the irregularities in the execution thereof.
One of the points raised by the oppositors
was that the finger mark cannot be regarded as the
decedent’s valid signature as it does not show
distinct identifying ridgelines. And since the finger
mark was an invalid signature, there must appear
in the attestation clause that another person wrote
the testator’s name at his request.
Issue: Whether or not the will is valid
Javellana vs. The Court of First Instance of Iloilo
Ledesma (1955) admitted to probate the testament and codicil duly
executed by the deceased Da. Apolinaria Ledesma
Vda. de Javellana on March 30, 1950 and May 29,
1952, respectively, with Ramon Tabiana, Gloria
contains only the two lines above mentioned, the attestation clause, the mark of the testator and the
signatures of the witnesses, the other sheet cannot by any possibility be taken for other than page one.”
As regards the silence of the will on the testator's understanding of the Spanish language,”[t]here is no
statutory requirement that such knowledge be expressly stated in the will itself. It is a matter that may
be established by proof aliunde. This Court so impliedly ruled in Gonzales vs. Laurel, 46 Phil., 781, in
which the probate of a will written in Tagalog was ordered although it did not say that the testator knew
that idiom. In fact, there was not even extraneous proof on the subject other than the fact that the
testator resided in a Tagalog region, from which the court said "a presumption arises that said Maria
Tapia knew the Tagalog dialect.”
Yes, the will should be allowed.
Ratio:
“There is indeed nothing in the testimony of the witnesses presented by the petitioner which would
indicate that the testatrix knew and spoke the Spanish language used in the preparation of the will in
question. But, in our opinion, this failure alone does not in itself suffice to conclude that this important
requirement of the law has not been complied with, it appearing that there is enough evidence on
record which supplies this technical omission. In the first place, we have the undisputed fact that the
deceased was a mestiza española, was married to a Spaniard, Recaredo Pando, and made several
trips to Spain. In the second place, we have the very letters submitted as evidence by the oppositor
written in Spanish by the deceased possessed the Spanish language, oppositor cannot now be allowed
to allege the contrary. These facts give rise to the presumption that the testatrix knew the language in
which the testament has been written, which presumption should stand unless the contrary is proven
(Abangan vs. Abangan, 40 Phil., 476; Gonzales vs. Laurel, 46 Phil. 750). And this presumption has not
been overcome. And finally, we have the very attestation clause of the will which states that the
testatrix knew and possessed the Spanish language. It is true that this matter is not required to be
stated in the attestation clause, but its inclusion can only mean that the instrumental witnesses wanted
to make it of record that the deceased knew the language in which the will was written. There is,
therefore, no valid reason why the will should be avoided on this ground.”
Yes, the will is valid.
Ratio:
As to the clarity of the ridge impressions, “it is so dependent on aleatory requirements (consistency of
the ink, overinking, slipping of the finger, etc.) as to require dexterity that can be expected of very few
persons; and we do not believe that testators should not be required to possess the skill of trained
officers. It is to be conceded that where a testator employs an unfamiliar way of signing, and both the
attestation clause and the will are silent on the matter, such silence is a factor to be considered against
the authenticity of the testament; but the failure to describe the unusual signature by itself alone is not
sufficient to refuse probate when the evidence for the proponent fully satisfies the court (as it does
satisfy us in this case) that the will was executed and witnessed as required by law.”
And as to the validity of the thumbprints as signature, the SC held that it has been held in a long line of
cases that a thumbprint is always a valid and sufficient signature for the purpose of complying with the
requirement of the article.
Furthermore, the validity of thumbprints should not be limited in cases of illness or infirmity. A
thumbprint is considered as a valid and sufficient signature in complying with the requirements of the
article.
Yes, the codicil was validly executed.
Ratio:
“Whether or not the notary signed the certification of acknowledgment in the presence of the testatrix
and the witnesses, does not affect the validity of the codicil. The new Civil Code does not require that
the signing of the testator, witnesses and notary should be accomplished in one single act. A
 Montinola de Tabiana and Vicente Yap as
witnesses. The contestant, Matea Ledesma, sister
and nearest surviving relative of said deceased,
appealed from the decision, insisting that the said
exhibits were not executed in conformity with law.
The instrumental witnesses asserted that after the
codicil was signed by the testatrix and the
witnesses at the San Pablo Hospital, the same was
signed and sealed by notary public Gimotea on the
same occasion. On the other hand, Gimotea
affirmed that he did not do so, but brought the
codicil to his office, and signed and sealed it there.
Ledesma now questions the validity of the codicil
on the ground that the notary did not sign the
instrument in the presence of the testator and the
witnesses.
Issue: Whether or not the codicil was validly
executed.
Balonan vs. Anacleta Abellana executed a last will and
Abellana (1960) testament written in the Spanish language and
consisting of two (2) typewritten pages. The first
page was signed by Juan Bello and under his
name appears typewritten "Por la testadora
Anacleta Abellana, residence Certificate A-
1167629, Enero 20, 1951, Ciudad de Zamboanga';
on the second page appears the signature of three
(3) instrumental witnesses. The oppositors
questioned the will because it was not signed in the
name of the testator but rather in the name of Dr.
Abello.
Issue: Whether or not the signature of Dr. Juan A.
Abello above the typewritten statement "Por la
Testadora Anacleta Abellana . . ., Ciudad de
Zamboanga," complies with the requirements of
law prescribing the manner in which a will should
be executed.
Icasiano vs. Josefa Villacorte executed a last will and testament
Icasiano (1964) in duplicate, “published before and attested by
three instrumental witnesses.” The will was
acknowledged by the testatrix and by the said three
instrumental witnesses on the same date before a
notary public. “The records show that the original of
the will…consists of five pages, and while signed at
the end and in every page, it does not contain the
signature of one of the attesting witnesses, Atty.
Jose V. Natividad, on page three thereof, but the
duplicate copy…is signed by the testatrix and her
three attesting witnesses in each and every page.”
Issue: Whether or not the will is valid.
Garcia vs. The allowance of the will of Gatchalian was denied
Gatchalian on the ground that the attesting witnesses did not
comparison of Articles 805 and 806 of the new Civil Code reveals that while testator and witnesses sign
in the presence of each other, all that is thereafter required is that "every will must be acknowledged
before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses" (Art. 806); i.e., that the latter should avow to
the certifying officer the authenticity of their signatures and the voluntariness of their actions in
executing the testamentary disposition. This was done in this case. The subsequent signing and
sealing by the notary of his certification that the testament was duly acknowledged by the participants
therein is no part of the acknowledgment itself nor of the testamentary act. Hence their separate
execution out of the presence of the testatrix and her witnesses cannot be said to violate the rule that
testaments should be completed without interruption. It is noteworthy that Article 806 of the new Civil
Code does not contain words requiring that the testator and the witnesses should acknowledge the
testament on the same day or occasion that it was executed.”
No, there was no compliance with the legal requisites.
Ratio:
“Note that the old law as well as the new require that the testator himself sign the will, or if he cannot do
so, the testator's name must be written by some other person in his presence and by his express
direction.xxx
In the case at bar the name of the testatrix, Anacleta Abellana, does not appear written under the will
by said Abellana herself, or by Dr. Juan Abello. There is, therefore, a failure to comply with the express
requirement in the law that the testator must himself sign the will, or that his name be affixed thereto by
some other person in his presence and by his express direction.”
Yes, the will is valid.
Ratio:
“[W]e hold that the inadvertent failure of one witness to affix his signature to one page of a testament,
due to the simultaneous lifting of two pages in the course of signing, is not per se sufficient to justify
denial of probate. Impossibility of substitution of this page is assured not only of the fact that the
testatrix and two other witnesses did sign the defective page, but also by its bearing the coincident
imprint of the seal of the notary public before whom the testament was ratified by testatrix and all three
witnesses.”
“That the failure of witness Natividad to sign page three (3) was entirely through pure oversight is
shown by his own testimony as well as by the duplicate copy of the will, which bears a complete set of
signatures in every page. The text of the attestation clause and the acknowledgment before the Notary
Public likewise evidence that no one was aware of the defect at the time.”
No, the will should not be allowed.
Ratio: Compliance with the requirement contained in Article 806 to the effect that a will must be
(1967) acknowledge it before a notary public as required
by law. The document was acknowledged before a
notary public by the testator but not by the
instrumental witnesses.
Issue: Whether or not the will should be allowed.
Vda. De Ramos The lower court allowed the probate of the will and
vs. Court of codicil of Eugenia Danila despite testimony by two
Appeals (1978) of the attesting witnesses that they did not see the
testatrix sign the will but that the same was already
signed by her when they affixed their own
signatures thereon. On appeal, the lower court’s
decision was reversed.
Issue: Whether or not the will should be allowed.
Cruz vs. Villasor Of the 3 instrumental witnesses thereto, Atty.
(1973) Teves, Jr. is at the same time the Notary Public
before whom the will was supposed to have been
acknowledged. As the 3rd witness is the notary
public himself, petitioner argues that the result is
that only 2 witnesses appeared before the notary
public to acknowledge the will.
Issue: Whether or not the will was executed in
accordance with law.
Gabucan vs. The petition for probate of a will was dismissed on
Court of the ground that it does not bear a thirty-centavo
Appeals (1980) documentary stamp fixed in section 225 of the Tax
Code, now section 237 of the 1977 Tax Code..
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and also by the witnesses is indispensable for its
validity. As the document under consideration does not comply with this requirement, it is obvious that
the same may not be probated.
Yes, the will should be allowed.
Ratio:
“Unlike other deeds, ordinary wills by necessity of law must contain an attestation clause which
significantly is a separate memorandum or record of the facts surrounding the execution…This Court
had previously held that the attestation clause basically contracts the pretence of undue execution
which later on may be made by the attesting witnesses. In the attestation clause, the witnesses do not
merely attest to the signature of the testatrix but also to the proper execution of the will, and their
signature following that of the testatrix show that they have in fact attested not only to the genuineness
of the testatrix's signature but also to the due execution of the will as embodied in the attention
clause. By signing the will, the witnesses impliedly [admitted?] the truth of the facts which admit [the
will] to probate, including the sufficiency of execution, the capacity of the testatrix, the absence of
undue influence, and the like.”
“ [On] the absence of a photograph of the testator Eugenia Danila in the act of signing her will[:] The
fact that the only pictures available are those which show the witnesses signing the will in the presence
of the testatrix and of each other does not belie the probability that the testatrix also signed the will
before the presence of the witnesses. We must stress that the pictures are worthy only of what they
show and prove and not of what they did not speak of including the events they failed to capture. The
probate of a will is a proceeding not imbued with adverse character, wherein courts should relax the
rules on evidence ‘to the end that nothing less than the best evidence of which the matter is
susceptible’ should be presented to the court before a reported will may be probated or denied
probate.”
No, the will was not executed in accordance with law.
Held:
“The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be considered as the third
instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the will. To
acknowledge before means to avow (Javellana v. Ledesma; Castro v. Castro); to own as genuine, to
assent, to admit; and "before" means in front or preceding in space or ahead of. Consequently, if the
third witness were the notary public himself, he would have to avow assent, or admit his having signed
the will in front of himself. This cannot be done because he cannot split his personality into two so that
one will appear before the other to acknowledge his participation in the making of the will. To permit
such a situation to obtain would be sanctioning a sheer absurdity. Furthermore, the function of a notary
public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangement (Balinon v. De Leon). That
function would defeated if the notary public were one of the attesting instrumental witnesses. It would
place him in inconsistent position and the very purpose of acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud,
would be thwarted.
Admittedly, there are American precedents holding that notary public may, in addition, act as a witness
to the executive of the document he has notarized. There are others holding that his signing merely as
notary in a will nonetheless makes him a witness thereon. But these authorities do not serve the
purpose of the law in this jurisdiction or are not decisive of the issue herein because the notaries public
and witnesses referred to in these cases merely acted as instrumental, subscribing attesting witnesses,
and not as acknowledging witnesses. Here, the notary public acted not only as attesting witness but
also acknowledging witness, a situation not envisaged by Article 805-06. Probate of will set aside.”
Yes, probate of the will should be allowed.
Held:
We hold that the lower court manifestly erred in declaring that, because no documentary stamp was
affixed to the will, there was "no will and testament to probate" and, consequently, the alleged "action
 Issue: Whether or not probate of the will should be
allowed.
Taboada vs Written in the Cebuano-Visayan dialect, the will of
Rosal Dorotea Perez consists of two pages. The first
page contains the entire testamentary dispositions
(1982) and is signed at the end or bottom of the page by
the testatrix alone and at the left hand margin by
the three (3) instrumental witnesses. The second
page which contains the attestation clause and the
acknowledgment is signed at the end of the
attestation clause by the three (3) attesting
witnesses and at the left hand margin by the
testatrix. The judge denied the probate of the will.
For the validity of a formal notarial will, does Article
805 of the Civil Code require that the testatrix and
all the three instrumental and attesting witnesses
sign at the end of the will and in the presence of
the testatrix and of one another?
Testate Estate 1) Oppositor Caponong-Noble asserts that the will
of the Late of Abada does not indicate that it is written in a
Alipio Abada vs language or dialect known to the testator. Further,
Abaja she maintains that the will is not acknowledged
before a notary public.
(2005) 2) Caponong-Noble alleges that the attestation
clause fails to state the number of pages on which
the will is written.
3) Caponong-Noble further alleges that the
attestation clause fails to state expressly that the
testator signed the will and its every page in the
presence of three witnesses. She then faults the
Court of Appeals for applying to the present case
the rule on substantial compliance found in Article
809 of the New Civil Code.
4) Caponong-Noble argues that the will is invalid
because the attestation clause does not indicate
the number of witnesses.
5) Caponong-Noble alleges that the attestation
clause does not expressly state the circumstances
that the witnesses witnessed and signed the will
and all its pages in the presence of the testator and
of each other.
Azuela vs CA The following appeared on the alleged will of
deceased Eugenia Igsolo:
must of necessity be dismissed".
What the probate court should have done was to require the petitioner or proponent to affix the
requisite thirty-centavo documentary stamp to the notarial acknowledgment of the will which is the
taxable portion of that document.
That procedure may be implied from the provision of section 238 that the non-admissibility of the
document, which does not bear the requisite documentary stamp, subsists only "until the requisite
stamp or stamps shall have been affixed thereto and cancelled."
The signatures of the instrumental witnesses on the left margin of the first page of the will attested not
only to the genuineness of the signature of the testatrix but also the due execution of the will as
embodied in the attestation clause.
It must be noted that the law uses the terms attested and subscribed Attestation consists in witnessing
the testator's execution of the will in order to see and take note mentally that those things are, done
which the statute requires for the execution of a will and that the signature of the testator exists as a
fact. On the other hand, subscription is the signing of the witnesses' names upon the same paper for
the purpose of Identification of such paper as the will which was executed by the testator. (Ragsdale v.
Hill, 269 SW 2d 911).
Insofar as the requirement of subscription is concerned, it is our considered view that the will in this
case was subscribed in a manner which fully satisfies the purpose of Identification.
We have examined the will in question and noticed that the attestation clause failed to state the number
of pages used in writing the will. This would have been a fatal defect were it not for the fact that, in this
case, it is discernible from the entire will that it is really and actually composed of only two pages duly
signed by the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses.
1) Under the Code of Civil Procedure (the applicable law when the will was executed in 1932), the
intervention of a notary is not necessary in the execution of any will. Also, there is no statutory
requirement to state in the will itself that the testator knew the language or dialect used in the will.
This is a matter that a party may establish by proof aliunde.
2) The phrase “en el margen izquierdo de todas y cada una de las dos hojas de que esta compuesto
el mismo” which means “in the left margin of each and every one of the two pages consisting of the
same” shows that the will consists of two pages. The pages are numbered correlatively with the
letters “ONE” and “TWO” as can be gleaned from the phrase “las cuales estan paginadas
correlativamente con las letras “UNO” y “DOS.”
3) The English translation of the first sentence is: “Subscribed and professed by the testator Alipio
Abada as his last will and testament in our presence, the testator having also signed it in our
presence on the left margin of each and every one of the pages of the same.” The
attestation clause clearlystates that Abada signed the will and its every page in the presence of the
witnesses.
4) He’s correct. BUT the Court agrees with the appellate court in applying the rule on substantial
compliance in determining the number of witnesses. While the attestation clause does not state the
number of witnesses, a close inspection of the will shows that three witnesses signed it. This Court
has applied the rule on substantial compliance even before the effectivity of the New Civil Code. We
rule to apply the liberal construction in the probate of Abada’s will. Abada’s will clearly shows four
signatures: that of Abada and of three other persons. It is reasonable to conclude that there are
three witnesses to the will. The question on the number of the witnesses is answered by an
examination of the will itself and without the need for presentation of evidence aliunde.
5) Precision of language in the drafting of an attestation clause is desirable. However, it is not
imperative that a parrot-like copy of the words of the statute be made. He clause “in its witness,
every one of us also signed in our presence and of the testator” satisfies the requirement.
A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of pages on which the will is written is
fatally defective. A will whose attestation clause is not signed by the instrumental witnesses is fatally
(2006) “PATUNAY NG MGA SAKSI
Ang kasulatang ito, na binubuo ng ____ dahon pati
ang huling dahong ito, na ipinahayag sa amin ni
Eugenia E. Igsolo, tagapagmana na siya niyang
Huling Habilin, ngayon ika-10 ng Hunyo 1981, ay
nilagdaan ng nasabing tagapagmana sa ilalim ng
kasulatang nabanggit at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat
at bawa’t dahon, sa harap ng lahat at bawa’t sa
amin, at kami namang mga saksi ay lumagda sa
harap ng nasabing tagapagmana at sa harap ng
lahat at bawa’t isa sa amin, sa ilalim ng nasabing
kasulatan at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawa’t
dahon ng kasulatan ito.”
“Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo
10, 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila.
(Sgd.)
PETRONIO Y. BAUTISTA”
The three named witnesses to the will affixed their
signatures on the left-hand margin of both pages of
the will, but not at the bottom of the attestation
clause.
Guerrero vs The will was acknowledged by the testator and the
Bihis witnesses at the testator’s residence in Quezon
City before a commissioned notary public for and in
(2007) Caloocan City.
Lee vs Tambago This is a disciplinary case against the notary public
before whom the will was acknowledged. The will
(2008) was purportedly executed and acknowledged
before respondent on June 30, 1965. Complainant,
however, pointed out that the residence certificate
of the testator noted in the acknowledgment of the
will was dated January 5, 1962. Complainant also
questioned the absence of notation of the
residence certificates of the purported witnesses
Noynay and Grajo. Complainant further asserted
that no copy of such purported will was on file in
the archives division of the Records Management
and Archives Office of the National Commission for
Culture and the Arts (NCCA).
Samaniego- Petitioner raises the following issues: whether or
Celada vs not the will was signed by the testator in the
Abena presence of the witnesses and of one another,
whether or not the signatures of the witnesses on
(2008) the pages of the will were signed on the same day,
and whether or not undue influence was exerted
upon the testator which compelled her to sign the
will.
defective. And perhaps most importantly, a will which does not contain an acknowledgment, but a mere
jurat, is fatally defective. Any one of these defects is sufficient to deny probate. A notarial will with all
three defects is just aching for judicial rejection.
An acknowledgement taken outside the territorial limits of the officer’s jurisdiction is void as if the
person taking it were wholly without official character.
A notarial commission is issued “within and for” a particular territorial jurisdiction and the notary public’s
authority is co-extensive with it. A notary public is authorized to perform notarial acts, including taking
acknowledgements, within that territorial jurisdiction only.
A cursory examination of the acknowledgment of the will in question shows that this particular
requirement was neither strictly nor substantially complied with. For one, there was the conspicuous
absence of a notation of the residence certificates of the notarial witnesses Noynay and Grajo in the
acknowledgment. Similarly, the notation of the testator’s old residence certificate in the same
acknowledgment was a clear breach of the law. These omissions by respondent invalidated the will.
The Notarial Law then in force required the exhibition of the residence certificate upon notarization of a
document or instrument.
In the issuance of a residence certificate, the law seeks to establish the true and correct identity of the
person to whom it is issued, as well as the payment of residence taxes for the current year. By having
allowed decedent to exhibit an expired residence certificate, respondent failed to comply with the
requirements of both the old Notarial Law and the Residence Tax Act. As much could be said of his
failure to demand the exhibition of the residence certificates of Noynay and Grajo.
Respondent’s failure, inadvertent or not, to file in the archives division a copy of the notarized will was
not a cause for disciplinary action, based on Art 806.
The notary was suspended from the practice of law for one year and his commissioned was revoked
and she was perpetually disqualified from reappointment.
The petitioner raises questions of fact and SC did not disturb the findings of the lower courts.
SC quoted with approval the RTC:
With [regard] to the contention of the oppositors [Paz Samaniego-Celada, et al.] that the testator
[Margarita Mayores] was not mentally capable of making a will at the time of the execution thereof, the
same is without merit. The oppositors failed to establish, by preponderance of evidence, said allegation
and contradict the presumption that the testator was of sound mind (See Article 800 of the Civil
Code). In fact, witness for the oppositors, Dr. Ramon Lamberte, who, in some occasions, attended to
the testator months before her death, testified that Margarita Mayores could engage in a normal

Baltazar vs Laxa Rosie testified that the decedent Paciencia was
referred to as "magulyan" or "forgetful" because
she would sometimes leave her wallet in the
(2012) kitchen then start looking for it moments later. On
cross examination, it was established that Rosie
was neither a doctor nor a psychiatrist, that her
conclusion that Paciencia was "magulyan" was
based on her personal assessment.
The oppositors dispute the validity of the will
insisting that all the subscribing witnesses and the
notary should have been presented.
a. Witness to a will
(i) Who are competent?
Gonzales vs CA Petitioner-oppositor argues that the requirement in
Article 806, Civil Code, that the witnesses must be
(1979) credible is an absolute requirement which must be
conversation and he even stated that the illness of the testator does not warrant hospitalization…. Not
one of the oppositor’s witnesses has mentioned any instance that they observed act/s of the testator
during her lifetime that could be construed as a manifestation of mental incapacity. The testator may
be admitted to be physically weak but it does not necessarily follow that she was not of sound
mind. [The] testimonies of contestant witnesses are pure aforethought.
Anent the contestants’ submission that the will is fatally defective for the reason that its attestation
clause states that the will is composed of three (3) pages while in truth and in fact, the will consists of
two (2) pages only because the attestation is not a part of the notarial will, the same is not
accurate. While it is true that the attestation clause is not a part of the will, the court, after examining
the totality of the will, is of the considered opinion that error in the number of pages of the will as stated
in the attestation clause is not material to invalidate the subject will. It must be noted that the subject
instrument is consecutively lettered with pages A, B, and C which is a sufficient safeguard from the
possibility of an omission of some of the pages. The error must have been brought about by the honest
belief that the will is the whole instrument consisting of three (3) pages inclusive of the attestation
clause and the acknowledgement. The position of the court is in consonance with the “doctrine of
liberal interpretation” enunciated in Article 809.
We agree with the position of the CA that the state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a
person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to execute a Will. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to
being of unsound mind.
In this case, apart from the testimony of Rosie pertaining to Paciencia’s forgetfulness, there is no
substantial evidence, medical or otherwise, that would show that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the
time of the execution of the Will. On the other hand, we find more worthy of credence Dra. Limpin’s
testimony as to the soundness of mind of Paciencia when the latter went to Judge Limpin’s house and
voluntarily executed the Will. "The testimony of subscribing witnesses to a Will concerning the testator’s
mental condition is entitled to great weight where they are truthful and intelligent." More importantly, a
testator is presumed to be of sound mind at the time of the execution of the Will and the burden to
prove otherwise lies on the oppositor.
The very fact that she cared for and raised Lorenzo (Lorenzo was the decedent’s nephew to whom she
bequeathed all of her properties in the will)and lived with him both here and abroad, even if the latter
was already married and already has children, highlights the special bond between them. This
unquestioned relationship between Paciencia and the devisees tends to support the authenticity of the
said document as against petitioners’ allegations of duress, influence of fear or threats, undue and
improper influence, pressure, fraud, and trickery which, aside from being factual in nature, are not
supported by concrete, substantial and credible evidence on record. It is worth stressing that bare
arguments, no matter how forceful, if not based on concrete and substantial evidence cannot suffice to
move the Court to uphold said allegations.
We note that the inability of Faustino and Judge Limpin to appear and testify before the court was
satisfactorily explained during the probate proceedings. As testified to by his son, Faustino had a heart
attack, was already bedridden and could no longer talk and express himself due to brain damage. To
prove this, said witness presented the corresponding medical certificate. For her part, Dra. Limpin
testified that her father, Judge Limpin, suffered a stroke in 1991 and had to undergo brain surgery. At
that time, Judge Limpin could no longer talk and could not even remember his daughter’s name so that
Dra. Limpin stated that given such condition, her father could no longer testify.
Under the law, there is no mandatory requirement that the witness testify initially or at any time during
the trial as to his good standing in the community, his reputation for trustworthythiness and
reliableness, his honesty and uprightness in order that his testimony may be believed and accepted by
 complied with before an alleged last will and
testament may be admitted to probate and that to
be a credible witness, there must be evidence on
record that the witness has a good standing in his
community, or that he is honest and upright, or
reputed to be trustworthy and reliable. According to
petitioner, unless the qualifications of the witness
are first established, his testimony may not be
favorably considered.
Nera vs The only question raised by the evidence in this
Rimando case as to the due execution of the instrument
propounded as a will in the court below, is whether
one of the subscribing witnesses was present in
(1911) the small room where it was executed at the time
when the testator and the other subscribing
witnesses attached their signatures; or whether at
that time he was outside, some eight or ten feet
away, in a large room connecting with the smaller
room by a doorway, across which was hung a
curtain which made it impossible for one in the
outside room to see the testator and the other
subscribing witnesses in the act of attaching their
signatures to the instrument.
Icasiano vs The records show that the original of the will, which
Icasiano was surrendered simultaneously with the filing of
the petition and marked as Exhibit "A" consists of
five pages, and while signed at the end and in
(1964) every page, it does not contain the signature of one
of the attesting witnesses, Atty. Jose V. Natividad,
on page three (3) thereof; but the duplicate copy
attached to the amended and supplemental petition
and marked as Exhibit "A-1" is signed by the
testatrix and her three attesting witnesses in each
and every page.
the trial court.
It is enough that the qualifications enumerated in Article 820 of the Civil Code are complied with, and
that the witness has none of the disqualifications. We also reject as without merit petitioner's contention
that the term "credible" as used in the Civil Code should be given the same meaning it has under the
Naturalization Law where the law is mandatory that the petition for naturalization must be supported by
two character witnesses who must prove their good standing in the community, reputation for
trustworthiness and reliableness, their honesty and uprightness. The two witnesses in a petition for
naturalization are character witnesses. In probate proceedings, the instrumental witnesses are not
character witnesses for they merely attest the execution of a will or testament and affirm the formalities
attendant to said execution.
The main qualification of a witness in the attestation of wills, if other qualifications as to age, mental
capacity and literacy are present, is that said witness must be credible, that is to say, his testimony may
be entitled to credence.
The instrumental witnesses must be competent and their testimonies must be credible before the court
allows the probate of the will they have attested.
A majority of the members of the court is of opinion that this subscribing witness was in the small room
with the testator and the other subscribing witnesses at the time when they attached their signatures to
the instrument.
But we are unanimously of opinion that had this subscribing witness been proven to have been in the
outer room at the time when the testator and the other subscribing witnesses attached their signatures
to the instrument in the inner room, it would have been invalid as a will, the attaching of those
signatures under circumstances not being done "in the presence" of the witness in the outer room. This
because the line of vision from this witness to the testator and the other subscribing witnesses would
necessarily have been impeded by the curtain separating the inner from the outer one "at the moment
of inscription of each signature."
The lower court judge erroneously believed that the issue is not important, relying on a case which
stated that “The true test of presence of the testator and the witnesses in the execution of a will is not
whether they actually saw each other sign, but whether they might have been seen each other sign,
had they chosen to do so, considering their mental and physical condition and position with relation to
each other at the moment of inscription of each signature.” But SC explained that the question whether
the testator and the subscribing witnesses to an alleged will sign the instrument in the presence of each
other does not depend upon proof of the fact that their eyes were actually cast upon the paper at the
moment of its subscription by each of them, but that at that moment existing conditions and their
position with relation to each other were such that by merely casting the eyes in the proper direction
they could have seen each other sign.
On the question of law, we hold that the inadvertent failure of one witness to affix his signature to one
page of a testament, due to the simultaneous lifting of two pages in the course of signing, is not per se
sufficient to justify denial of probate.
Impossibility of substitution of this page is assured not only the fact that the testatrix and two other
witnesses did sign the defective page, but also by its bearing the coincident imprint of the seal of the
notary public before whom the testament was ratified by testatrix and all three witnesses. The law
should not be so strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of the
inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she had no control, where the purpose of the law
to guarantee the identity of the testament and its component pages is sufficiently attained, no
intentional or deliberate deviation existed, and the evidence on record attests to the full observance of
the statutory requisites. Otherwise, as stated in Vda. de Gil. vs. Murciano, 49 Off. Gaz. 1459, at 1479
(decision on reconsideration) "witnesses may sabotage the will by muddling or bungling it or the
attestation clause".
That the failure of witness Natividad to sign page three (3) was entirely through pure oversight is shown
 by his own testimony as well as by the duplicate copy of the will, which bears a complete set of
signatures in every page. The text of the attestation clause and the acknowledgment before the Notary
Public likewise evidence that no one was aware of the defect at the time.

Cagro v. Cagro A will, allegedly executed by the deceased Vicente
Cagro, was not signed by the attesting witnesses in
(1953) the attestation clause. Their signatures however
were found in the left-hand margin.
Apellant Cagro contends that the absence of the
signatures renders the will fatally defective.
The will is fatally defective.
The attestation clause is 'a memorandum of the facts attending the execution of the will' required by law
to be made by the attesting witnesses, and it must necessarily bear their signatures. An unsigned
attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the witnesses, since the omission of their
signatures at the bottom thereof negatives their participation.
The signatures on the upper left hand corner cannot correct the absence of their signatures, because
said signatures are in compliance with the legal mandate that the will be signed on the left-hand margin
of all its pages. If an attestation clause not signed by the three witnesses at the bottom thereof, be
admitted as sufficient, it would be easy to add such clause to a will on a subsequent occasion and in
the absence of the testator and any or all of the witnesses.

(ii) Supervening incompetency

(iii) Competency of interested witnesses
3. Special requirements for deaf, etc.
Garcia v . Oppositors contest the will of Gliceria Avelino del The will is fatally defective.
Vasquez Rosario since CC 808 was not complied with. The
deceased was said to be unable to read at near The provision of Article 808 mandatory. The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the
distances because of cataracts. testator if he is blind or incapable of reading the will himself (as when he is illiterate) , is to make the
provisions thereof known to him, so that he may be able to object if they are not in accordance with his
wishes.

Alvarado v 79 year old Brigido Alvarado, who was suffering
Garcia from glaucoma, executed a notarial will,
disinheriting his illegitimate son (the petitioner).
(1993) As testified by the three instrumental witnesses, the
notary public and the respondent, the will was not
read by the testator but was read to him aloud by
the lawyer who drafted the 8-page document in the
presence of the three instrumental witnesses and
the notary public. The latter four followed the
reading with their own respective copies previously
furnished them.
Petitioner contends that the will is fatally defective
since it does not comply with CC 808, which
requires that the will must be read to him twice:
once, by one of the subscribing witnesses, and
again, by the notary public before whom the will is
acknowledged
The will is valid.
Art 808 applies not only to blind testators but also to those who, for one reason or another, are
"incapable of reading the(ir) will(s)." Since Brigido Alvarado was incapable of reading the final drafts of
his will and codicil on the separate occasions of their execution due to his "poor," "defective," or
"blurred" vision, Brigido Alvarado comes within the scope of the term "blind" as it is used in Art. 808.
Art 808’s requirement of the will being read twice is to make known to the incapacitated testator the
contents of the document before signing and to give him an opportunity to object if anything is contrary
to his instructions.
In this case, although CC 808 was not strictly followed, substantial compliance is acceptable where the
purpose of the law has been satisfied. The circumstances of the lawyer reading the will at loud, with
the notary public and 3 instrumental witnesses reading it silently with them, and considering that the
three instrumental witnesses were persons known to the testator, shows that the spirit behind the law
was served though the letter was not. Although there should be strict compliance with the substantial
requirements of the law in order to insure the authenticity of the will, the formal imperfections should be
brushed aside when they do not affect its purpose and which, when taken into account, may only defeat
the testator's will.

4. Substantial compliance
Gil v Murciano The Court of First Instance of Manila admitted to
probate the alleged will and testament of the
(1951) deceased Carlos Gil. The oppositor Pilar Gil Vda.
de Murciano appealed to the SC on the ground that
The will is fatally defective.
The attestation clause merely declares it was signed by the witnesses and not the testator. This is a
fatal defect, for the precise purpose of the attestation clause is to certify that the testator signed the will,
 the attestation clause does not state that the
alleged testor signed the will
Caneda v CA
Mate Caballero executed a will before three
(1993) attesting witnesses. The said testator was duly
assisted by his lawyer, Atty. Emilio Lumontad, and
a notary public, Atty. Filoteo Manigos, in the
preparation of that last will.
Upon his death, petitioners opposed the validity of
the will since its attestation clause
fails to specifically state the fact that the the
testator signed the will and all its pages in the
attesting witnesses
presence and that they, the witnesses, likewise
signed the will and every page thereof in the
presence of the testator and of each other
C. Holographic Wills
1. General requirements
2. Specific requirements
3. Probate
Roxas v De Bibiana de Jesus executed a holographic with the
Jesus date Feb/61. It was alleged that this does not
comply with CC 810 which requires that the Will
(1985) should contain the day, month and year of its
execution and that this should be strictly complied
with.
Labrador v CA Melecio Labrador executed a holographic will
which is alleged to be fatally defective because of
(1990) the absence of a date.
Kalaw v Relova Gregorio Kalaw, claiming to be the sole heir of the
deceased Natividad Kalaw, filed a petition for the
(1984) probate of her holographic will.
The holographic Will, as first written, named ROSA
K. Kalaw, a sister of the testatrix as her sole heir.
Hence, on, petitioner ROSA K. Kalaw opposed
probate alleging, in substance, that the holographic
Will contained alterations, corrections, and
insertions without the proper authentication by the
full signature of the testatrix
this being the most essential element of the clause. Without it there is no attestation at all. It is said that
the court may correct a mere clerical error. This is too much of a clerical error for it effects the very
essence of the clause. Alleged errors may be overlooked or correct only in matters of form which do not
affect the substance of the statement.
It is said that the rules of statutory construction are applicable to documents and wills. This is true, but
said rules apply to the body of the will, containing the testamentary provisions, but not to the attestation
clause, which must be so clear that it should not require any construction.
The will is fatally defective.
The attestation clause lacked the statement that the witnesses signed the will and every page thereof
in the presence of the testator and of one another. This absence is a fatal defect or imperfection which
must necessarily result in the disallowance of the will that is here sought to be admitted to probate.
The rule on Art 809 cannot be relied on since the rule is that omissions which can be supplied by an
examination of the will itself, without the need of resorting to extrinsic evidence, will not be fatal and,
correspondingly, would not obstruct the allowance to probate of the will being assailed. However, those
omissions which cannot be supplied except by evidence aliunde would result in the invalidation of the
attestation clause and ultimately, of the will itself. The absence in the attestation clause falls on the
latter.
The will is valid.
As a general rule, the "date" in a holographic Will should include the day, month, and year of its
execution. However, when as in the case at bar, there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue
influence and pressure and the authenticity of the Will is established and the only issue is whether or
not the date "FEB./61" appearing on the holographic Will is a valid compliance with Article 810 of the
Civil Code, probate of the holographic Will should be allowed under the principle of substantial
compliance.
The will is valid. The will has been dated in the hand of the testator himself in perfect compliance with
Article 810 within the paragraphs of the will. The law does not specify a particular location where the
date should be placed in the will. The only requirements are that the date be in the will itself and
executed in the hand of the testator. These requirements are present in the subject will.
The will is defective.
Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the testator in a
holographic Will litem not been noted under his signature, ... the Will is not thereby invalidated as a
whole, but at most only as respects the particular words erased, corrected or interlined.
However, when as in this case, the holographic Will in dispute had only one substantial provision, which
was altered by substituting the original heir with another, but which alteration did not carry the requisite
of full authentication by the full signature of the testator, the effect must be that the entire Will is voided
or revoked for the simple reason that nothing remains in the Will after that which could remain valid. To
state that the Will as first written should be given efficacy is to disregard the seeming change of mind of

Azaola v The holographic will of Fortunata de Yance was
Singson denied by the trial court on the ground that under
CC 811, the proponent must present three
(1960) witnesses who could declare that the will and the
signature are in the writing of the testatrix, the
probate being contested; and because the lone
witness presented by the proponent "did not prove
sufficiently that the body of the will was written in
the handwriting of the testatrix.
Codoy v A holographic will allegedly written by deceased
Calugay Matile Vda de Ramonal was admitted to probate by
the CA, despite the fact that it did not follow the 3-
witness requirement under CC 811 since the
genuiness of the will was contested.
(1999)
The CA held that the requirement under CC 811 is
only directory as found in the ruling in Azaola v
Singson.
Gan v Yap After the death of Felicidad Esguerra Alto-Yap,
Fausto Gan filed a petition for the probate of a
(1958) holographic will allegedly executed by the fomer.
Opposing the petition, her surviving husband
Ildefonso Yap asserted that the deceased had not
left any will, nor executed any testament during her
lifetime. The will itself was not presented. Gan
tried to establish its contents and due execution by
the statements of allegedly four (4) witnesses to
the execution of the alleged will. After hearing the
parties and considering their evidence, the court
refused to probate the alleged will. Due to the
denial of motion for reconsideration, Gan appealed.
Rodelas v Petitioner-appellant filed a petition with the CFI-
Aranza Rizal for the probate of the holographic will
the testatrix. But that change of mind can neither be given effect because she failed to authenticate it in
the manner required by law by affixing her full signature,
The will should be admitted to probate.
The rule to provide three witnesses in CC 811 is merely directory and is not mandatory. Article 811 of
our present Civil Code can not be interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation of three
witnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator, under penalty of having the probate denied. Since
no witness may have been present at the execution of a holographic will, none being required by law
(Art. 810, new Civil Code), it becomes obvious that the existence of witness possessing the requisite
qualifications is a matter beyond the control of the proponent.
Under CC 811 par 2, the law even foresees the possibility that no competent witness may be able to
testify and resorts to expert evidence to supply the deficiency “if the court finds it necessary”.
In this case, the presentation of one witness, since the will was not contested, is sufficient.
The case is remanded to the trial court in order to allow petitioners to adduce evidence in support of
their opposition to the probate of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal.
Article 811 of the Civil Code is mandatory. The word “shall” connotes a mandatory order thus the need
to present three witnesses. The court also considered the ff circumstances (1) The will was found not in
the personal belongings of the deceased but with one of the respondents, who kept it even before the
death of the deceased. (2) A visual examination of the holographic will shows that the strokes are
different when compared with other documents written by the testator. The signature of the testator in
some of the disposition is not readable. There were uneven strokes, retracing and erasures on the will.
The execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare
testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will.
The Rules of Court allow proof (and probate) of a lost or destroyed will by secondary evidence – the
testimony of witnesses in lieu of the original document. Yet such Rules could not have contemplated
holographic wills which could not then be validly made here.
Obviously, when the will itself is not submitted, the means of opposition, and of assessing the
evidence arenot available. And then the only guaranty of authenticity — the testator's handwriting —
has disappeared.
Undoubtedly, the intention of the law is to give the near relatives the choice of either complying with the
will if they think it authentic, or to oppose it, if they think it spurious. Such purpose is frustrated when the
document is not presented for their examination. If it be argued that such choice is not essential,
because anyway the relatives may oppose, the answer is that their opposition will be at a distinct
disadvantage, and they have the right and privilege to comply with the will, if genuine, a right which
they should not be denied by withholding inspection thereof from them.
Unlike holographic wills, ordinary wills may be proved by testimonial evidence when lost or destroyed.
The difference lies in the nature of the wills. In the first, the only guarantee of authenticity is the
handwriting itself; in the second, the testimony of the subscribing or instrumental witnesses (and of the
notary, now). The loss of the holographic will entails the loss of the only medium of proof; if the ordinary
will is lost, the subscribing witnesses are available to authenticate.
(Discussion of footnote in next case)
A holographic will which was lost or cannot be found CAN be proved by means of a photostatic copy.
 of Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of letters
testamentary in her favor. The petition was
(1984) opposed by appellees Amparo Aranza Bonilla,
Wilferine Bonilla Treyes, Expedita BonillaFrias and
Ephraim Bonilla. The grounds of their opposition
are as follows:
1. Appellant was estopped from claiming that the
deceased left a will by failing to produce the will
within twenty days of the death of the testator….
3. The original must be presented and not the copy
thereof,
4. The deceased did not leave any will. The
appellees also moved for the dismissal of the
petition for the probate of the will.
Rivera v IAC Venancio Rivera died. Jose Rivera, claiming to be
the only surviving legitimate son of the deceased,
(1990) filed a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration over Venancio’s estate. Docketed as
SP No. 1076, this petition was opposed by
Adelaido J. Rivera. Who denied that Jose was the
son of the decedent. Adelaido averred that
Venancio was his father and did not
die interstate but in fact left two holographic wills.
Ajero v CA Petitioner submitted for probate the holographic will
of the late Annie Sand who died. Private
(1994) respondent opposed the probate because the
purported will was not Annie’s hand writing; it
contained alterations and corrections, which were
not duly signed by decedent and it was procured
by petitioners through pressure and undue
influence. The lower court allowed the will for
probate as 3 witnesses were presented who
testified on the authenticity and that the latter is of
sound mind.
Baltazar v Laxa Paciencia was a 78 year old spinster when she
made her last will and testament entitled "Tauli
(2012) Nang Bilin o Testamento Miss Paciencia
Regala" (Will) in the Pampango dialect on
September 13, 1981. The Will, executed in the
house of retired Judge Ernestino G. Limpin (Judge
Limpin), was read to Paciencia twice. After which,
Paciencia expressed in the presence of the
instrumental witnesses that the document is her
last will and testament.
The witnesses to the Will were Dra. Maria Lioba A.
Limpin (Dra. Limpin), Francisco Garcia (Francisco)
and Faustino R. Mercado (Faustino). The three
A photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be
made with the standard writings of the testator. In the case of Gan vs. Yap, the Court ruled that "the
execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare
testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The will itself must be presented;
otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law regards the document itself as material proof of
authenticity. "But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that "Perhaps it may be proved by
aphotographic or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by othersimilar means, if
any, whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may beexhibited and tested before the
probate court," Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be
admitted because then the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the
probate court.
In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Based on this unrefuted legal
presumption, Jose Rivera is not the son of the deceased Venancio Rivera whose estate is in question.
Jose Rivera is not the son of the deceased Venancio Rivera whose estate is in question. Hence, being
a mere stranger, he had no personality to contest the wills and his opposition thereto did not have the
legal effect of requiring the three witnesses. The testimony of Zenaida and Venancio Rivera, Jr., who
authenticated the wills as having been written and signed by their father, was sufficient.
1. Kalaw vs. Relova: Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by
the testator in a holographic Will have not been noted under his signature, . . . the Will is not thereby
invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular words erased, corrected or interlined.
Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date of the
holographic will or on testator's signature, their presence does not invalidate the will itself. The lack of
authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes.
2. As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of
the will sought to be probated. However, in exceptional instances, courts are not powerless to do what
the situation constrains them to do, and pass upon certain provisions of the will. In the case at bench,
decedent herself indubitably stated in her holographic will that the Cabadbaran property is in the name
of her late father, John H. Sand (which led oppositor Dr. Jose Ajero to question her conveyance of the
same in its entirety). Thus, as correctly held by respondent court, she cannot validly dispose of the
whole property, which she shares with her father's other heirs.
As to formalities
Faithful compliance with the formalities laid down by law is apparent from the face of the Will.
Courts are tasked to determine nothing more than the extrinsic validity of a Will in probate
proceedings. This is expressly provided for in Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which states:
Section 1. Allowance necessary. Conclusive as to execution. – No will shall pass either real or personal
estate unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court. Subject to the right of appeal, such allowance
of the will shall be conclusive as to its due execution.
Due execution of the will or its extrinsic validity pertains to whether the testator, being of sound mind,
freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. These formalities are
enshrined in Articles 805 and 806 of the New Civil Code, to wit:
Here, a careful examination of the face of the Will shows faithful compliance with the formalities laid
down by law..
1. As to soundness of mind of decedent
 attested to the Will’s due execution by affixing their
signatures below its attestation clause and on the
left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof, in the
presence of Paciencia and of one another and of
Judge Limpin who acted as notary public.
Dra. Limpin was the only instrumental witness who
testified. Questioned by the prosecutor regarding
Judge Limpin’s present mental fitness, Dra. Limpin
testified that her father had a stroke in 1991 and
had to undergo brain surgery. The judge can walk
but can no longer talk and remember her name.
Because of this, Dra. Limpin stated that her father
can no longer testify in court.
Oppositors of the probate allege that Paciencia
was "magulyan" or forgetful so much so that it
effectively stripped her of testamentary capacity.
They also claimed she was suffering from
paranoia.
They also insist that all subscribing witnesses and
the notary public should have been presented in
court since all but one witness, Francisco, are still
living..
We agree with the position of the CA that the state of being forgetful does not necessarily make
a person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to execute a Will. Forgetfulness is not
equivalent to being of unsound mind. (See Article 799)
In this case, apart from the testimony of Rosie pertaining to Paciencia’s forgetfulness, there is no
substantial evidence, medical or otherwise, that would show that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the
time of the execution of the Will. On the other hand, we find more worthy of credence Dra. Limpin’s
testimony as to the soundness of mind of Paciencia when the latter went to Judge Limpin’s house and
voluntarily executed the Will. "The testimony of subscribing witnesses to a Will concerning the testator’s
mental condition is entitled to great weight where they are truthful and intelligent." More importantly, a
testator is presumed to be of sound mind at the time of the execution of the Will and the burden to
prove otherwise lies on the oppositor. (See Article 800)
Here, there was no showing that Paciencia was publicly known to be insane one month or less before
the making of the Will. Clearly, thus, the burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind lies upon
the shoulders of petitioners. However and as earlier mentioned, no substantial evidence was presented
by them to prove the same, thereby warranting the CA’s finding that petitioners failed to discharge such
burden.
Furthermore, we are convinced that Paciencia was aware of the nature of her estate to be disposed of,
the proper objects of her bounty and the character of the testamentary act. As aptly pointed out by the
CA:
A scrutiny of the Will discloses that [Paciencia] was aware of the nature of the document she executed.
She specially requested that the customs of her faith be observed upon her death. She was well aware
of how she acquired the properties from her parents and the properties she is bequeathing to
LORENZO, to his wife CORAZON and to his two (2) children. A third child was born after the execution
of the will and was not included therein as devisee.
Bare allegations of duress or influence of fear or threats, undue and improper influence and pressure,
fraud and trickery cannot be used as basis to deny the probate of a will.

2. As to presentation of instrumental witnesses

ISSUE: WON A76 was complied with when only one instrumental witness testified—
Yes.

Petitioners dispute the authenticity of Paciencia’s Will on the ground that Section 11 of Rule 76 of the
Rules of Court was not complied with. 9
We note that the inability of Faustino and Judge Limpin to appear and testify before the court was
satisfactorily explained during the probate proceedings. As testified to by his son, Faustino had a heart
attack, was already bedridden and could no longer talk and express himself due to brain damage. To
prove this, said witness presented the corresponding medical certificate. For her part, Dra. Limpin
testified that her father, Judge Limpin, suffered a stroke in 1991 and had to undergo brain surgery. At
that time, Judge Limpin could no longer talk and could not even remember his daughter’s name so that
Dra. Limpin stated that given such condition, her father could no longer testify. It is well to note that at
that point, despite ample opportunity, petitioners neither interposed any objections to the testimonies of
said witnesses nor challenged the same on cross examination. We thus hold that for all intents and
purposes, Lorenzo was able to satisfactorily account for the incapacity and failure of the said
subscribing witness and of the notary public to testify in court. Because of this the probate of
9
Section 11. Subscribing witnesses produced or accounted for where will contested. – If the will is contested, all the subscribing witnesses, and the notary in the case of wills executed under the Civil Code of the Philippines, if
present in the Philippines and not insane, must be produced and examined, and the death, absence, or insanity of any of them must be satisfactorily shown to the court . If all or some of such witnesses are present in the
Philippines but outside the province where the will has been filed, their deposition must be taken. If any or all of them testify against the due execution of the will, or do not remember having attested to it, or are otherwise of
doubtful credibility, the will may nevertheless, be allowed if the court is satisfied from the testimony of other witnesses and from all the evidence presented that the will was executed and attested in the manner required by law.
If a holographic will is contested, the same shall be allowed if at least three (3) witnesses who know the handwriting of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator; in the
absence of any competent witnesses, and if the court deem it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to. (Emphasis supplied.)
 Paciencia’s Will may be allowed on the basis of Dra. Limpin’s testimony proving her sanity and the due
execution of the Will, as well as on the proof of her handwriting. It is an established rule that "[a]
testament may not be disallowed just because the attesting witnesses declare against its due
execution; neither does it have to be necessarily allowed just because all the attesting witnesses
declare in favor of its legalization; what is decisive is that the court is convinced by evidence before it,
not necessarily from the attesting witnesses, although they must testify, that the will was or was not
duly executed in the manner required by law."

Moreover, it bears stressing that "[i]rrespective x x x of the posture of any of the parties as regards the
authenticity and due execution of the will x x x in question, it is the mandate of the law that it is the
evidence before the court and/or [evidence that] ought to be before it that is controlling." "The very
existence of [the Will] is in itself prima facie proof that the supposed [testatrix] has willed that [her]
estate be distributed in the manner therein provided, and it is incumbent upon the state that, if legally
tenable, such desire be given full effect independent of the attitude of the parties affected thereby."

V. INCORPORATION OF DOCUMENTS BY REFERENCE

VI. CODICILS
A. Definition
B. Solemnities
VII. REVOCATION OF WILLS AND TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITIONS
A. Definition of revocation
B. When may revocation be effected
C. Law governing revocation
D. Modes of revocation
Gago v 1. July 27, 1918 Miguel Mamuyac executed The will had been revoked.
Mamuyac a last will and testament.
2. January 922: Mamuyac died. Francisco Where a will which cannot be found is shown to have been in the possession of the testator, when last
(1927) Gago petitioned for the probation of seen, the presumption is, in the absence of other competent evidence, that the same was cancelled or
Mamuyac’s will destroyed.
3. This was opposed by Cornelio Mamuyac,
Ambrosio Lariosa, Feliciana Bauzon and Same presumption rises where it is shown that the testator had ready access to the will and it cannot
Catalina Mamuyac. CFI denied the be found after his death. It will not be presumed that such will has been destroyed by any other person
petition for probation on the ground that without the knowledge or authority of the testator. The presumption of cancellation is never conclusive
the deceased executed a new will and but may be overcome by proof that the will was not destroyed by the testator with intent to revoke it.
testament on April 1919. In this case, since the original will of 1919 could not be found after the death of the testator and in view
4. Feb. 1925: action to secure the probation of the positive proof that it had been cancelled, the conclusion is that it had been cancelled and
of the April 1919 will, which was opposed revoked.
with oppositors alleging that said will is a
copy of the 2nd will and testament In a great majority of instances in which wills are destroyed for the purpose of revoking them there is no
executed by Miguel Mamuyac cancelled witness to the act of cancellation or destruction and all evidence of its cancellation perishes with the
and revoked during the lifetime of Miguel testator. Copies of wills should be admitted by the courts with great caution. When it is proven,
not the last will and testament of Miguel. however, by proper testimony that a will was executed in duplicate with all the formalities and
Witnessed by Fenoy who typed the will requirements of the law, then the duplicate may be admitted in evidence when it is made to appear that
and Bejar who saw it actually cancelled by the original has been lost and was not cancelled or destroyed by the testator.
Miguel (because Miguel sold to Bejar a
house and the land where the house
wasbuilt, he had to cancel the 1919 will)
Casiano v CA Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs the parties No revocation.
(Aldina, Constantcio, Panfilo and Felino) in this It is clear that the physical act of destruction of a will, like burning in this case, does not per se
(1988) case who are her niece and nephews. Believing constitute an effective revocation, unless the destruction is coupled with animus revocandi on the part
that the deceased did not leave behind a last will of the testator. It is not imperative that the physical destruction be done by the testator himself. It may
 and testament, the four (4) heirs commenced an be performed by another person but under the express direction and in the presence of the testator. Of
intestate proceeding for the settlement of their course, it goes without saying that the document destroyed must be the will itself.
aunt’s estate which was instituted in the then CFI. In this case, while animus revocandi or the intention to revoke, may be conceded, for that is a state of
However, while the case was still in progress, the mind, yet that requisite alone would not suffice. "Animus revocandi is only one of the necessary
heirs executed an agreement of extrajudicial elements for the effective revocation of a last will and testament. The intention to revoke must be
settlement of Adriana’s estate which provides for accompanied by the overt physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will carried out
the division of the estate into four equal parts by the testator or by another person in his presence and under his express direction. There is paucity of
among themselves. When presented before the evidence to show compliance with these requirements. For one, the document or papers burned by
court, said agreement was approved. However, Adriana's maid, Guadalupe, was not satisfactorily established to be a will at all, much less the will of
three years later, Atty. Sulpicio Palma, a former Adriana Maloto. For another, the burning was not proven to have been done under the express
associate of Adriana’s counsel, discovered a direction of Adriana. And then, the burning was not in her presence. Both witnesses, Guadalupe and
document entitled “KATAPUSAN NGA Eladio, were one in stating that they were the only ones present at the place where the stove
PAGBUBULAT-AN (Testamento) and purporting to (presumably in the kitchen) was located in which the papers proffered as a will were burned.
be the last will and testament of Adriana. Panfilo
and Felino are still named as heirs in the said will,
Aldina and Constancio are bequeathed much
bigger and more valuable shares in the estate that
what they have received by virtue of the agreement
of extrajudicial settlement. The will likewise gives
devises and legacies to other parties, among them
being the petitioners. Thus, Aldino and Constancio
joined by other devisees and legatees filed a
motion for reconsideration and annulment of the
proceedings therein and for the allowance of the
will. Upon denial of the trial court, the petitioners
came before the Supreme Court by way or petition
for certiorari and mandamus which were dismissed
because they were not the proper remedies. The
appellate court found out that the will was burned
by the househelper of Adriana and was at the
possession of the lawyer in because Adriana was
seeking the services of the lawyer in order to have
a new will drawn up.

E. Effect of Revocation
F. Doctrine of Dependent Relative Revocation
Diaz v De Leon The only question raised in this case is whether or The second will Exhibit 1 executed by the deceased is not cloth with all the necessary requisites
to the will executed by Jesus de Leon, now, was to constitute a sufficient revocation.
(1922) revoked by him.
The intention of revoking the will is manifest from the established fact that the testator was anxious to
The petitioner denies such revocation, while the withdraw or change the provisions he had made in his first will. This fact is disclosed by the testator’s
contestant affirms the same by alleging that the own statements to the witnesses Canto and the Mother Superior of the Hospital where he was
testator revoked his will by destroying it, and by confined.
executing another will expressly revoking the
former. The original will herein presented for probate having been destroyed with animo revocandi, cannot now
be probated as the will and last testament of Jesus de Leon.
From the evidence submitted in this case, it
appears that the testator, shortly after the
execution of the first will in question, asked that the
same be returned to him. The instrument was
returned to the testator who ordered his servant to
 tear the document. This was done in his presence
and before a nurse who testified to this effect. After
some time, the testator, being asked by Dr.
Cornelio Mapa about the will, said that it had been
destroyed.

Molo v Molo Mariano Molo died on January 24, 1941 without A subsequent will containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed, for the reason
leaving any forced heir either in the descending or that it was not executed in conformity with the provisions of law as to the making of wills, cannot
ascending line. produce the effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as said revocatory clause is void.

His wife Juana Molo (petitioner) survived him, and The doctrine of dependent relative revocation is usually applied where the testator cancels or destroys
by his nieces and nephew Luz, Gliceria and a will or executed an instrument intended to revoke a will with a present intention to make a new
Cornelio, all surnamed Molo (oppositors- testamentary disposition as a substitute for the old, and the new disposition is not made or, if made,
appellants). fails to effect for same reason.

Oppositors – appellants were the legitimate The failure of the new testamentary disposition, upon whose validity the revocation depends, is
children of a deceased brother of the testator. equivalent to the non-fulfillment of a suspensive condition, and hence prevents the revocation of the
original will. But a mere intent to make at some time a will in place of that destroyed will not render the
Mariano left two wills, one executed on August 17, destruction conditional. It must appear that the revocation is dependent upon the valid execution of a
1918 and another executed on June 20, 1939. In new will.
both the 1918 and 1939 wills Juana was instituted
as his universal heir. Even in the supposition that the destruction of the original will by the testator could be presumed from
the failure of the petitioner to produce it in court, such destruction cannot have the effect of defeating
The latter will contains a clause, which expressly the prior will of 1918 because of the fact that it is founded on the mistaken belief that the will of 1939
revokes the will executed in 1918. has been validly executed and would be given due effect.

Juana Molo filed in the CFI a petition seeking the The theory on which the “principle of dependent relative revocation “ is predicated in that the testator
probate of the will executed in 1939. did not intend to die intestate. And this intention is clearly manifest when he executed two wills on
different occasions and instituted his wife as his universal heir. There can therefore be no mistake as to
The court rendered a decision denying the probate his intention of dying testate.
of said will on the ground that the petitioner failed
to prove that the same was executed in
accordance with law.

In view of the disallowance of the will, the widow

filed another petition for the probate of the will
executed by the deceased on August 18, 1918.
The oppositors filed an opposition to the petition
contending that, notwithstanding the disallowance
of the 1939 will, the revocatory clause is valid and
still has the effect of nullifying the prior will of 1918.

Likewise, regardless of the revocatory clause, said

will of 1918 cannot still be given effect because of
the presumption that the testator himself
deliberately revoked it.

VIII. REPUBLICATION AND REVIVAL OF WILLS

IX. ALLOWANCE OF WILLS
Guevera v Victorino L. Guevara executed a will wherein he
Guevera made bequests to his legitimate son, natural
daughter and stepchildren and wife of 2nd marriage.
(1943)
Subsequently, Victorino executed a deed of sale in
favor of Ernesto M. Guevara conveying to him a
parcel of land.
Victorino died. His last will and testament, however,
was never presented to the court for probate, nor
has any administration proceeding ever been
instituted for the settlement of his estate.
Rosario Guevara, who had her father's last will and
testament in her custody, did nothing judicially to
invoke the testamentary dispositions made therein
in her favor, whereby the testator acknowledged
her as his natural daughter and, aside from certain
legacies and bequests, devised to her a portion of
21.6171 hectares of the large parcel of land
described in the will. But a little over four years
after the testator's demise, she commenced the
present action against Ernesto M. Guevara alone
for the purpose hereinbefore indicated; and it was
only during the trial of this case that she presented
the will to the court, not for the purpose of having it
probated but only to prove that the deceased
Victorino L. Guevara had acknowledged her as his
natural daughter. Upon that proof of
acknowledgment she claimed her share of the
inheritance from him, but on the theory or
assumption that he died intestate, because the will
had not been probated, for which reason, she
asserted, the betterment therein made by the
testator in favor of his legitimate son Ernesto M.
Guevara should be disregarded. Both the trial court
and the Court of Appeals sustained that theory.
DE LA CERNA, 1939, the spouses De la cerna executed a joint will.
ET AL. vs. They willed that their properties be given to
POTOT, ET AL. Manuela (their niece and the wife of Nicolas Potot).
The husband died, and the will was submitted to
(1964) probate by his wife and Manuela before the CFI,
which admitted the same to probate.
GALLANOSA Florentino executed a will. He died (1939), and was
vs. HON. survived by his brother, Leon.
ARCANGEL A petition for probate was filed in the CFI. In the
ISSUE
WON the procedure adopted by the Rosario Guevara is sanctioned by law
HELD
No. We cannot sanction the procedure adopted by the respondent Rosario Guevara, it being in
violation of procedural law and an attempt to circumvent and disregard the last will and testament of the
decedent.
The proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, with notice by publication to the whole world and
with personal notice to each of the known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator. Although not
contested (section 5, Rule 77), the due execution of the will and the fact that the testator at the time of
its execution was of sound and disposing mind and not acting under duress, menace, and undue
influence or fraud, must be proved to the satisfaction of the court, and only then may the will be
legalized and given effect by means of a certificate of its allowance, signed by the judge and attested
by the seal of the court; and when the will devises real property, attested copies thereof and of the
certificate of allowance must be recorded in the register of deeds of the province in which the land lies.
(Section 12, Rule 77, and section 624, C. C. P.)
It will readily be seen from the above provisions of the law that the presentation of a will to the court for
probate is mandatory and its allowance by the court is essential and indispensable to its efficacy. To
assure and compel the probate of a will, the law punishes a person who neglects his duty to present it
to the court with a fine not exceeding P2,000, and if he should persist in not presenting it, he may be
committed to prison and kept there until he delivers the will.
We hold that if the decedent left a will and no debts and the heirs and legatees desire to make an
extrajudicial partition of the estate, they must first present that will to the court for probate and divide the
estate in accordance with the will. They may not disregard the provisions of the will unless those
provisions are contrary to law. Neither may they do away with the presentation of the will to the court for
probate, because such suppression of the will is contrary to law and public policy. The law enjoins the
probate of the will and public policy requires it, because unless the will is probated and notice thereof
given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered
nugatory, as is attempted to be done in the instant case. Absent legatees and devisees, or such of
them as may have no knowledge of the will, could be cheated of their inheritance thru the collusion of
some of the heirs who might agree to the partition of the estate among themselves to the exclusion of
others.
The final decree of probate has conclusive effect as to the will, despite the fact that joint wills are
invalid. The error thus committed by the probate court was an error of law which should have been
corrected by appeal, but which did not affect the jurisdiction of the probate court, nor the conclusive
effect of its final decision, however erroneous.
A final judgment rendered on a petition for the probate of a will is binding upon the whole world, and
public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgment of courts
should become final at some definite date fixed by law. Interest rei publicae ut finis set litium.
However, the probate decree in could only affect Bernabe’s share, as Gervasia was then still alive and
so the probate court had no jurisdiction over her interest in the conjugal properties (prior to the new
Civil Code, a will could not be probated during the testator's lifetime).
CFI committed a grave abuse of discretion in its reconsideration.
What the plaintiffs seek is the "annulment" of a will duly probated in 1939 by the CFI itself. The
proceeding is coupled with an action to recover the lands adjudicated by virtue of the probated will. This
 will, he bequeathed his ½ share in the conjugal
(1978) estate to Tecla, and, should she predecease him
(which was the case), his ½ share would be
assigned to the spouses Pedro & Corazon
Gallanosa.
Leon opposed, however the CFI admitted the will
to probate.
REYES vs. In 1992, Torcuato executed his will, giving certain
COURT OF properties to his wife Asuncion.
APPEALS PRespondent filed a petition for probate of the will
before the RTC. The children of Torcuato filed an
(1997) opposition alleging inter alia that Asuncion exerted
undue influence and that Asuncion was then still
married to Lupo Ebarle.
DOROTHEO vs. Private Respondents’s were the legitimate children
COURT OF of Alejandro & Aniceta Dorotheo. The latter died
APPEALS without her estate being settled; Alejandro died
thereafter.
(1999) Petitioner, who claims to have taken care of
Alejandro before he died, filed for the probate of
the latter's will - the court issued an order admitting
the will to probate, and an entry of judgment was
made by the CA.
PR’s did not appeal, and several years after, they
filed a "Motion To Declare The Will Intrinsically
Void."
CAMAYA vs. 1972, Reyes executed a will, devising a lot to her
PATULANDONG Mangulabnan. The latter later sought the delivery
to him by executor Patulandong of the title to the
(2004) lot.
Patulandong refused due to a codicil which
modified the testator’s will.
Mangulabnan filed for partition, which was granted
but without prejudice to the probate of the codicil.
He sold the lot to Petitioners.
Patulandong previously filed a petition for probate
of the codicil, and the RTC admitted the codicil to
probate, declaring the Sale void.
action is a revival of the complaint which the CFI had already previously dismissed – this action is
barred by res judicata.
The 1939 decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution or formal validity of the will. This
means that the testator was of sound & disposing mind at when he executed the will and was not acting
under duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence; that the will was signed by him in the presence of the
required number of witnesses, and that the will is genuine trial is not a forgery. Accordingly, these facts
cannot again be questioned in a subsequent proceeding, not even in a criminal action for the forgery of
the will.
Unless legally flawed, a testator's intention in his last will and testament is its "life and soul", which
deserves reverential observance.
GEN. RULE: Courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the
will, merely inquiring on its due execution - whether or not it complies with the formalities prescribed by
law, and the testamentary capacity of the testator. The intrinsic validity is not considered since the
consideration thereof usually comes only after the will has been proved and allowed.
EXCEPTIONS: 1) When the defect of the will is apparent on its face and the probate of the will may
become a useless ceremony if it is intrinsically invalid, 2) When there is preterition of heirs, 3) the
testamentary provisions are of doubtful legality, or 4) where the parties agree that the intrinsic validity
be first determined.
The testimonies of the witnesses were merely hearsay and even uncertain as to the whereabouts or
existence of Lupo Ebarle, the supposed husband of Asuncion.
The petition is without merit. A final and executory decision or order can no longer be disturbed or
reopened no matter how erroneous it may be.
The matters of due execution of the will and the capacity of the testator acquired the character of res
judicata and cannot again be brought into question, all juridical questions in connection therewith being
closed. Such final order makes the will conclusive against the whole world, as to its extrinsic validity and
due execution.
The intrinsic validity is another matter, and questions regarding the same may still be raised even after
the will has been authenticated; It does not necessarily follow that an extrinsically valid last will and
testament is always intrinsically valid.
Not that this Court finds the will to be intrinsically valid, but a final and executory decision (of which the
party had the opportunity to challenge) must stand. Failure to avail of the remedies constitutes waiver.
The only instance where a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set
aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or
inadvertence not imputable to negligence, which circumstances do not concur herein.
The probate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it further declared the deed of sale and the titles of
petitioners null and void. A probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate
cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are
equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All that said court could do as regards said properties is to
determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be
administered by the administrator.
However, though the judgment in the partition case had become final and executory, it specifically
provided that it was without prejudice to the probate of the codicil.
Therefore, the probate of the codicil was lawful, and the judgment therein affirmed, except as to the
nullification of the title.
 A. Concept of Probate
RODRIGUEZ vs. Juanito executed a will, giving Petitioner two
RODRIGUEZ apartments, and one each for his children
(Respondents). Juanito later sold the entire
(2007) property in favor of Petitioner.
Petitioner filed for unlawful detainer against
Respondents.
Also, there was a Partition Agreement, where they
recognized each other as co-owners and
partitioned the property in accordance with the will.
HEIRS OF The subject lot is the eastern half portion of two
LASAM vs. lots. The subject lot was inherited by Isabel, and
UMENGAN the other by Irene.
The Petitioners filed for unlawful detainer against
(2006) Respondent, who was the daughter of Isabel’s son
by her first husband.
The MTCC ruled for Petitioners due to the newly
discovered alleged will of Isabel, where she
bequeathed the subject lot to her son, Rosendo
Lasam.
MANINANG vs. Aseneta died, leaving a holographic will, giving all
COURT OF her properties to Petitioner, and declaring that she
APPEALS does not consider Respondent to be her adopted
son.
(1982) Petitioners filed for probate of the will; Respondent
instituted intestate proceedings – these were
consolidated.
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Testate
Case as he was preterited.
PASTOR, SR. Pastor, Sr. died and survived by Petitioners, and
vs. COURT OF an illegitimate child, Quemada.
APPEALS Quemada filed for probate of an alleged
holographic will of Pastor, Sr. which had one
(1983) disposition: a legacy in favor of Quemada
consisting of shares in Atlas Mining and some
mining claims.
The will was later allowed to probate. Quemada
was appointed special administrator, and later filed
against Petitioners for reconveyance of alleged
properties of the estate.
QUASHA LAW Triviere died, and proceedings for the settlement of
vs. LCN his intestate estate were instituted by his widow,
CONSTRUCTION with Petitioners as their counsel. As administrators,
Petitioners incurred expenses (real estate taxes,
(2008) etc.).
Respondents failed to prove their right of possession, as the will and the Partition Agreement have no
legal effect since the will has not been probated. Before any will can have force or validity it must be
probated. This cannot be dispensed with and is a matter of public policy.
As the will was not probated, the Partition Agreement which was executed pursuant thereto cannot be
given effect. Thus, the fact that Petitioner was a party to the Agreement becomes immaterial in the
determination of the issue of possession. Moreover, at the time of the sale, Juanito was still the owner,
since ownership would only pass to his heirs at the time of his death.
The CA correctly held that Respondent has a better right to possess the subject lot. The purported will
of Isabel could not be relied upon to establish Petitioners’ right to possess the subject lot because,
without having been probated, the said will could not be the source of any right.
A will is essentially ambulatory. At any time prior to the testator’s death, it may be changed or revoked,
and until admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder. Before
any will can have force or validity it must be probated.
To probate a will means to prove before some officer or tribunal, vested by law with authority for that
purpose, that the instrument offered to be proved is the last will and testament of the deceased person
whose testamentary act it is alleged to be, and that it has been executed, attested and published as
required by law, and that the testator was of sound and disposing mind. It is a proceeding to establish
the validity of the will. Moreover, the presentation of the will for probate is mandatory and is a matter of
public policy.
The law enjoins the probate of the Will and public policy requires it, because unless the Will is probated
and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by Will may
be rendered nugatory.
Normally, the probate of a Will does not look into its intrinsic validity. However, where practical
considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated,
the Court should meet that issue. The probate of a will might become an Idle ceremony if on its face it
appears to be intrinsically void.
By virtue of the dismissal of the Testate Case, the determination of that controversial issue has not
been thoroughly considered.
While the reconveyance suit was still being litigated, the probate court ordered Execution and
Garnishment, ruling in effect that the legacy to Quemada was not inofficious.
In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and large is restricted to the extrinsic
validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance
with the formalities prescribed by law.
However, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in
the inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such
determination is provisional, subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title.
The Probate Order did not resolve the question of ownership, considering that the issue of ownership
was the very subject of controversy in the reconveyance suit that was still pending.
The intestate proceedings were not yet concluded, and the RTC still had to hear and rule on the
pending claim of LCN against the estate of the late Raymond Triviere and only thereafter can it
distribute the residue of the estate, if any, to his heirs.
[The case following the citation does not deal with probate – it deals with intestate proceedings.]
 Petitioners filed a Motion for Payment of their
litigation expenses, which was denied. They filed
another Motion for Payment. Respondent was the
only remaining claimant against the Estate, and it
countered that the court had already resolved the
issue. The RTC granted the second Motion for
Payment.

Jimenez v IAC Leonardo (Lino) Jimenez married Consolacion,with As a general rule, a probate court can only pass upon questions of title provisionally.
whom he had four children (Alberto, Leonardo
(1990) Jr,Alejandra and Angeles). During this marriage, Since the probate, court's findings are not conclusive being prima facie, a separate proceeding is
he acquired 5 parcels of lot. When Consolacion necessary to establish the ownership of the five (5) parcels of land. In a special proceeding for the
died, he contracted marriage with Genoveva and probate of a will, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot
begot seven children (Tomas, Visitacion, Digno, resolve with finality. This applies with equal force to an intestate proceeding as in the case at bar.
Antonio, Amadeo,Modesto and Virginia). Upon
Virginia’s petition in the
probate court, she (Virginia) was appointed
administratrix of Lino’s property, and in the
inventory thereof, she included the said 5 parcels
of lot. Leonardo Jr, however, opposed such on the
ground of having already adjudicated the subject
lots to Lino’s children with Consolacion and that
the properties were acquired during Lino and
Consolacion’s marriage. On Dec 10, 1984, Virginia
filed for recovery of the 5 parcels of land in the
RTC but this was denied on the ground of res
judicata and prescription/laches.

Issue:
WON in a settlement proceeding, the lower court
has jurisdiction to settle questions of ownership.
Ozaeta v Maria Cuartero and Rosa Gonz
Cuartero Ales both claimed that they were married to Carlos
Palanca Taguinlay in 1929 and 1945, respectively.
(1956) The marriage of Rosa to Carlos had been duly
established by testimonial and documentary
evidence. One of the pieces of evidence presented
was the will executed by Carlos Palance wherein
he declared that he married Rosa Gonzales in
which marriage they had eight children.
Issue: WON the declarations in the last will and
testament may be admitted as conclusive evidence
of an existence of a fact during the lifetime of the
testator.
Coso v The testator, a married man, became acquainted
Fernandez Deza with Rosario Lopez and had illicit relations with her
for many years. They begot an illegitimate son.
(1921) The testator’s will gives the tercio de libre
disposicion to the illegitimate son and also
provides for the payment of nineteen hundred
Declarations in a valid will and testament may be admitted as conclusive evidence of an existence of a
fact during the lifetime of the testator of the said will.
Palanca executed executed his will and he made the solemn declaration in said document that since
1923 and for some years, thereafter, he maintained amorous relations with Maria Cuartero and had by
her six natural children whom, according to him, he had liberally fed and supported. He said nothing
about having married Maria; on the contrary he declared that for grave reasons he regarded her
unworthy of being guardian of the persons and property of his children by her and so appointed Felisa
Joson de Fernandez and the Philippine National Bank as guardians of their persons and property,
respectively. On the same will, he spoke of his marriage to Rosa Gonzales and the eight children he
had by her, which according to him were legitimated by reason of their subsequent marriage. Said
declaration in the will may not be taken lightly.
Mere general or reasonable influence over a testator is not sufficient to invalidate a will; to have that
effect, the influence must be undue. The rule as to what constitutes undue influence has been variously
stated, but the substance of the different statements is that, to be sufficient to avoid a will, the influence
exerted must be of a kind that so overpowers and subjugates the mind of the testator as to destroy his
free agency and make him express the will of another rather than his own.
 Spanish duros to Rosario Lopez by way of
reimbursement for expenses incurred by her in
talking care of the testator when he is alleged to
have suffered from severe illness. The will was set
aside on the ground of undue influence alleged to
have been exerted over the mind of the testator by
Rosario Lopez. There is no doubt that Rosario
exercised some influence over the testator.
Nepomuceno v Martin Jugo named and appointed herein petitioner
CA Sofia Nepomuceno as his sole and only executor
of his estate. The will clearly stated that the
(1985) testator was legally married to a certain Rufina
Gomez by whom he had legitimate children, Oscar
and Carmelita. He stated that since 1952 he had
been estranged from his lawfully wedded wife and
had been living with petitioner as husband and
wife. The testator and the petitioner herein were
married in Victoria, Tarlac before the Justice of the
Peace. The testator devised to his forced heirs,
namely his legal wife and his children (Oscar &
Carmelita) his entire estate. He devised the free
portion thereof to herein petitioner.
The pet filed a petition for the probate of the last
will and testament of the deceased. The legal wife
and her children filed an opposition.
The lower court denied the probate of the will on
the ground that the testator admitted to cohabiting
with the pet. The Will's admission to probate will be
an Idle exercise because on the face of the Will,
the invalidity of its intrinsic provisions is evident.
The respondent court set aside the decision of the
CFI. It declared the will to be valid except the
devise in favor of the pet pursuant to Art, 739 in
relation with Art. 1028.
Ortega v Two years after the arrival of Placido from the
Valmonte United States and at the age of 80 he wed Josefina
who was then 28 years old. But in a little more than
(2005) two years of wedded bliss, Placido died. Placido
executed a notarial last will and testament written
in English and consisting of 2 pages, and dated 15
June 1983¸but acknowledged only on 9 August
1983. The allowance to probate of this will was
opposed by Leticia, Placido’s sister. According to
the notary public who notarized the testator’s will,
after the testator instructed him on the terms and
dispositions he wanted on the will, the notary
public told them to come back on 15 August 1983
to give him time to prepare. The testator and his
witnesses returned on the appointed date but the
notary public was out of town so they were
instructed by his wife to come back on 9 August
While it is shown that the testator entertained strong affections for Rosario Lopez, it does not appear
that her influence so overpowered and subjugated his mind as to destroy his free agency and make
him express the will of another rather than his own. Mere affection, even if illegitimate, is not undue
influence and does not invalidate a will. Influence gained by kindness and affection will not be regarded
as undue, if no imposition or fraud be practiced, even though it induces the testator to make an
unequal and unjust disposition of his property in favor of those who have contributed to his comfort and
ministered to his wants, if such disposition is voluntarily made.
The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring the Will to be validly drawn, it
went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the Will and declared the devise in favor of the petitioner
null and void.
The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination
and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will. The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute.
Given exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains
it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the Will. In view of certain unusual provisions of the will,
which are of dubious legality, and because of the motion to withdraw the petition for probate (which the
lower court assumed to have been filed with the petitioner's authorization) the trial court acted correctly
in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been established. The
probate of a will might become an Idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where
practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is
probated, the court should meet the issue.
The disposition in favor of petitioner is not valid.
The records do not sustain a finding of innocence or good faith. As argued by the private respondents:
First. The last will and testament itself expressly admits indubitably on its face the meretricious
relationship between the testator and petitioner, the devisee. Second. Petitioner herself initiated the
presentation of evidence on her alleged ignorance of the true civil status of the testator, which led
private respondents to present contrary evidence.
1. YES. Despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the kinds of property he
owned, the extent of his shares in them and even their location. As regards the proper objects of
his bounty, it was sufficient that he identified his wife as sole beneficiary. The omission of some
relatives from the will did not affect its formal validity. There being no showing of fraud in its
execution, intent in its disposition becomes irrelevant.
2. NO. Fraud is a trick, secret devise, false statement, or pretense, by which the subject of it is
cheated. It may be of such character that the testator is misled or deceived as to the nature or
contents of the document which he executes, or it may relate to some extrinsic fact, in
consequence of the deception regarding which the testator is led to make a certain will which, but
for fraud, he would not have made.
The party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the existence of fraud at the time of
its execution. The burden to show otherwise shifts to the proponent of the will only upon a showing
of credible evidence of fraud.
Omission of some relatives does not affect the due execution of a will. Moreover, the conflict
between the dates appearing on the will does not invalidate the document, “because the law does
not even require that a notarial will be executed and acknowledged on the same occasion.
 1983. The formal execution was actually on 9 The variance in the dates of the will as to its supposed execution and attestation was satisfactorily
August 1983. He reasoned he no longer changed and persuasively explained by the notary public and instrumental witnesses.
the typewritten date of 15 June 1983 because he
did not like the document to appear dirty.

Petitioner’s argument:
1. At the time of the execution of the notarial will
Placido was already 83 years old and was no
longer of sound mind.
2. Josefina conspired with the notary public and
the 3 attesting witnesses in deceiving Placido
to sign it. Deception is allegedly reflected in
the varying dates of the execution and the
attestation of the will.

ISSUE:
1. W/N Placido has testamentary capacity at the
time he allegedly executed the will.
2. W/N the signature of Placido in the will was
procured by fraud or trickery
Dorotheo v CA Private respondents were the legitimate children of A final and executory decision or order can no longer be disturbed or reopened no matter how
Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes. The latter erroneous it may be.
(1999) died in 1969 without her estate being settled.
Alejandro died thereafter. Sometime in 1977, after In setting aside the Order that has attained finality, the trial court in effect nullified the entry of judgment
Alejandro's death, petitioner, who claims to have made by the Court of Appeals. It is well settled that a lower court cannot reverse or set aside decisions
taken care of Alejandro before he died, filed a or orders of a superior court, for to do so would be to negate the hierarchy of courts and nullify the
special proceeding for the probate of the latter's essence of review. It has been ruled that a final judgment on probated will, albeit erroneous, is binding
last will and testament. In 1981, the court issued on the whole world.
an order admitting Alejandro's will to probate.
Private respondents did not appeal from said
order. In 1983, they filed a "Motion To Declare The
Will Intrinsically Void." The trial court granted the
motion and issued an order.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing that

she is entitled to some compensation since she
took care of Alejandro prior to his death although
she admitted that they were not married to each
other.

Later on, Judge Zain B. Angas set aside the final

and executory Order, as well as the Order directing
the issuance of the writ of execution, on the ground
that the order was merely "interlocutory", hence not
final in character.

ISSUE:
May a last will and testament admitted to probate
but declared intrinsically void in an order that has
become final and executory still be given effect?
Palaganas v Ruperta C. Palaganas (Ruperta), a Filipino who
Palaganas became a naturalized United States (U.S.) citizen,
died single and childless. In the last will and
(2011) testament she executed in California, she
designated her brother, Sergio C. Palaganas
(Sergio), as the executor of her will for she had left
properties in the Philippines and in the U.S.
Respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas (Ernesto),
another brother of Ruperta, filed with the a petition
for the probate of Ruperta’s will and for his
appointment as special administrator of her estate.
However, petitioners Manuel Miguel Palaganas
(Manuel) and Benjamin Gregorio Palaganas
(Benjamin), nephews of Ruperta, opposed the
petition on the ground that Ruperta’s will should
not be probated in the Philippines but in the U.S.
where she executed it
The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already been allowed and probated in the
country of its execution.
In insisting that Ruperta’s will should have been first probated and allowed by the court of California,
petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in mind the procedure for the reprobate of will before
admitting it here. But, reprobate or re-authentication of a will already probated and allowed in a foreign
country is different from that probate where the will is presented for the first time before a competent
court. Reprobate is specifically governed by Rule 77 of the Rules of Court. Contrary to petitioners’
stance, since this latter rule applies only to reprobate of a will, it cannot be made to apply to the present
case. In reprobate, the local court acknowledges as binding the findings of the foreign probate court
provided its jurisdiction over the matter can be established.
Besides, petitioners’ stand is fraught with impractically. If the instituted heirs do not have the means to
go abroad for the probate of the will, it is as good as depriving them outright of their inheritance, since
our law requires that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless the will has been proved
and allowed by the proper court.

Agtarap v Joaquin died intestate on November 21, 1964
Agtarap in Pasay City without any known debts or
obligations. During his lifetime, Joaquin contracted
(2011) two marriages, first with Lucia Garcia (Lucia),[5] and
second with Caridad Garcia (Caridad). Joaquin
and Lucia had three children—Jesus (died without
issue), Milagros, and Jose. Joaquin married
Caridad and had three children—Eduardo,
Sebastian, and Mercedes. At the time of his death,
Joaquin left two parcels of land with improvements
in Pasay City.
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate or an intestate court, relates
only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased
persons, but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the
proceedings.
The general rule does not apply to the instant case considering that the parties are all heirs of Joaquin
and that no rights of third parties will be impaired by the resolution of the ownership issue. More
importantly, the determination of whether the subject properties are conjugal is but collateral to the
probate court’s jurisdiction to settle the estate of Joaquin.

Eduardo filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),

Branch 114, Pasay City, a verified petition for the
judicial settlement of the estate of his deceased
father Joaquin Agtarap (Joaquin).

Joseph, Gloria, and Teresa filed their

answer/opposition. They alleged that the two
subject lots belong to the conjugal partnership of
Joaquin with Lucia, and that, upon Lucia’s death in
April 1924, they became the pro indiviso owners of
the subject properties. They said that their
residence was built with the exclusive money of
their late father Jose, and the expenses of the
extensions to the house were shouldered by Gloria
and Teresa, while the restaurant (Manong’s
Restaurant) was built with the exclusive money of
Joseph and his business partner. They opposed
the appointment of Eduardo as administrator on
 the
following grounds: (1) he is not physically and
mentally fit to do so; (2) his interest in the lots is
minimal; and (3) he does not possess the desire to
earn. They claimed that the best interests of the
estate dictate that Joseph be appointed as special
or regular administrator.
B. Necessity of Probate
De Borja v De Francisco de Borja filed a petition for probate of the
Borja will of his wife who died, Josefa Tangco, with the
(1972) CFI of Rizal. He was appointed executor and
administrator, until he died; his son Jose became
the sole administrator. Francisco had taken a 2nd
wife Tasiana before he died; she instituted testate
proceedings with the CFI of Nueva Ecija upon his
death and was appointed special administatrix.
Jose and Tasiana entered upon a compromise
agreement, but Tasiana opposed the approval of
the compromise agreement. She argues that it was
no valid, because the heirs cannot enter into such
kind of agreement without first probating the will of
Francisco, and at the time the agreement was
made, the will was still being probated with the CFI
of Nueva Ecija.
ISSUE:
W/N the compromise agreement is valid, even if
the will of Francisco has not yet been probated
C. Modes of Probate
Guevara v Victorino L. Guevara executed a will with all the
Guevara (1943) formalities of the law, wherein he made bequests
to his legitimate son, natural daughter and
stepchildren and wife of 2nd marriage.
Victorino L. Guevara executed a deed of sale in
favor of Ernesto M. Guevara conveying to him the
southern half of a large parcel of land in
consideration of the sum of P1 and other valuable
considerations. A final decree of registration was
issued in favor of Ernesto M. Guevara over the
whole parcel of land described in the deed of sale
above referred to. The registration proceeding had
been commenced by Victorino L. Guevara and
Ernesto M. Guevara as applicants, with Rosario,
among others, as oppositor; but before the trial of
the case Victorino L. Guevara withdrew as
applicant and Rosario Guevara and her co-
oppositors also withdrew their opposition, thereby
facilitating the issuance of the title in the name of
Ernesto M. Guevara alone.
The compromise agreement is valid.
The agreement stipulated that Tasiana will receive P800,000 as full payment for her hereditary share in
the estate of Francisco and Josefa. There was here no attempt to settle or distribute the estate of
Francisco de Borja among the heirs thereto before the probate of his will. The clear object of the
contract was merely the conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her individual share and
interest, actual or eventual, in the estate of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco. There is no
stipulation as to any other claimant, creditor or legatee. And as a hereditary share in a decedent's
estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the moment of the death of such causante or
predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 777) there is no legal bar to a successor (with
requisite contracting capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary share immediately after such death,
even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate.
We cannot sanction the procedure adopted by the respondent Rosario Guevara, it being in violation of
procedural law and an attempt to circumvent and disregard the last will and testament of the decedent.
The proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, with notice by publication to the whole world and
with personal notice to each of the known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator. Although not
contested (section 5, Rule 77), the due execution of the will and the fact that the testator at the time of
its execution was of sound and disposing mind and not acting under duress, menace, and undue
influence or fraud, must be proved to the satisfaction of the court, and only then may the will be
legalized and given effect by means of a certificate of its allowance, signed by the judge and attested
by the seal of the court; and when the will devises real property, attested copies thereof and of the
certificate of allowance must be recorded in the register of deeds of the province in which the land lies.
(Section 12, Rule 77, and section 624, C. C. P.)
It will readily be seen from the above provisions of the law that the presentation of a will to the court for
probate is mandatory and its allowance by the court is essential and indispensable to its efficacy. To
assure and compel the probate of a will, the law punishes a person who neglects his duty to present it
to the court with a fine not exceeding P2,000, and if he should persist in not presenting it, he may be
committed to prison and kept there until he delivers the will.
We hold that if the decedent left a will and no debts and the heirs and legatees desire to make an
extrajudicial partition of the estate, they must first present that will to the court for probate and divide the
estate in accordance with the will. They may not disregard the provisions of the will unless those
provisions are contrary to law. Neither may they do away with the presentation of the will to the court for
 Victorino L. Guevara died. His last will and probate, because such suppression of the will is contrary to law and public policy. The law enjoins the
testament, however, was never presented to the probate of the will and public policy requires it, because unless the will is probated and notice thereof
court for probate, nor has any administration given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered
proceeding ever been instituted for the settlement nugatory, as is attempted to be done in the instant case. Absent legatees and devisees, or such of
of his estate. Whether the various legatees them as may have no knowledge of the will, could be cheated of their inheritance thru the collusion of
mentioned in the will have received their respective some of the heirs who might agree to the partition of the estate among themselves to the exclusion of
legacies or have even been given due notice of the others.
execution of said will and of the dispositions therein
made in their favor, does not affirmatively appear
from the record of this case. Ever since the death
of Victorino L. Guevara, his only legitimate son
Ernesto M. Guevara appears to have possessed
the land adjudicated to him in the registration
proceeding and to have disposed of various
portions thereof for the purpose of paying the debts
left by his father.
Rosario Guevara, who had her father's last will and
testament in her custody, did nothing judicially to
invoke the testamentary dispositions made therein
in her favor, whereby the testator acknowledged
her as his natural daughter and, aside from certain
legacies and bequests, devised to her a portion of
21.6171 hectares of the large parcel of land
described in the will. But a little over four years
after the testator's demise, she commenced the
present action against Ernesto M. Guevara alone
for the purpose hereinbefore indicated; and it was
only during the trial of this case that she presented
the will to the court, not for the purpose of having it
probated but only to prove that the deceased
Victorino L. Guevara had acknowledged her as his
natural daughter. Upon that proof of
acknowledgment she claimed her share of the
inheritance from him, but on the theory or
assumption that he died intestate, because the will
had not been probated, for which reason, she
asserted, the betterment therein made by the
testator in favor of his legitimate son Ernesto M.
Guevara should be disregarded. Both the trial court
and the Court of Appeals sustained that theory.

ISSUE
WON the procedure adopted by the Rosario
Guevara is sanctioned by law

D. Requirements for probate of a holographic will

1951: Felicidad Yap died of heart failure
GAN v. YAP 1952: Fausto Gan initiated petition for probate of
holographic will of Felicidad.
(1958) Felicidad’s husband opposed the same claiming
that his wife did not leave any will. Probate court
THE EXECUTION AND THE CONTENTS OF A LOST OR DESTROYED HOLOGRAPHIC WILL MAY
NOT BE PROVED BY THE BARE TESTIMONY OF WITNESSES WHO HAVE SEEN AND/OR READ
SUCH WILL
Authenticity and due execution is the dominant requirements to be fulfilled when such will is submitted
 refused to probate the will.
The will itself was not presented. Petitioner tried
to establish its contents and due execution by the
statements in open court of Felina Esguerra,
Primitivo Reyes, Socorro Olarte and Rosario Gan
Jimenez. They claim the Felicidad wanted to keep
it a secret from her bad-tempered husband.
ISSUE: W/N the will should be probated?
Aranza filed petition for probate of holographic will
RODELAS v. of Ricardo Bonilla. But what was produced was a
ARANZA photocopy and not the actual alleged holographic
will.
(1982)
The probate was denied on the ground that under
AZAOLA v. Article 811 of the Civil Code, the proponent must
to the courts for allowance. For that purpose the testimony of one of the subscribing witnesses would
be sufficient if there is no opposition (Sec. 5, Rule 77). If there is, the three must testify, if available.
(Cabang vs. Delfinado, 34 Phil., 291; Tolentino vs.Francisco, 57 Phil., 742). From the testimony of such
witnesses (and of other additional witnesses) the court may form its opinion as to the genuineness and
authenticity of the testament, and the circumstances its due execution.
Now, in the matter of holographic wills, no such guaranties of truth and veracity are demanded, since
as stated, they need no witnesses; provided however, that they are "entirely written, dated, and signed
by the hand of the testator himself." The law, it is reasonable to suppose, regards the document
itself as material proof of authenticity, and as its own safeguard, since it could at any time, be
demonstrated to be — or not to be — in the hands of the testator himself. "In the probate of a
holographic will" says the New Civil Code, "it shall be necessary that at least one witness who knows
the handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the
handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least three such witnesses shall be required. In the
absence of any such witnesses, (familiar with decedent's handwriting) and if the court deem it
necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to."
The witnesses so presented do not need to have seen the execution of the holographic will. They may
be mistaken in their opinion of the handwriting, or they may deliberately lie in affirming it is in the
testator's hand. However, the oppositor may present other witnesses who also know the testator's
handwriting, or some expert witnesses, who after comparing the will with other writings or letters of the
deceased, have come to the conclusion that such will has not been written by the hand of the
deceased. (Sec. 50, Rule 123). And the court, in view of such contradictory testimony may use its own
visual sense, and decide in the face of the document, whether the will submitted to it has indeed been
written by the testator.
Obviously, when the will itself is not submitted, these means of opposition, and of assessing the
evidence are not available. And then the only guaranty of authenticity3 — the testator's handwriting —
has disappeared.
The only question here is whether a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be proved
by means of a photostatic copy. Pursuant to Article 811 of the Civil Code, probate of holographic wills is
the allowance of the will by the court after its due execution has been proved. The probate may be
uncontested or not. If uncontested, at least one Identifying witness is required and, if no witness is
available, experts may be resorted to. If contested, at least three Identifying witnesses are required.
However, if the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will can
not be probated because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said will. It is
necessary that there be a comparison between sample handwritten statements of the testator and the
handwritten will. But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because
comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator. In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104
PHIL. 509, the Court ruled that "the execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will
may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The will
itself must be presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law regards the document itself as
material proof of authenticity." But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that "Perhaps it may be
proved by a photographic or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other
similar means, if any, whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and
tested before the probate court," Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed
holographic will may be admitted because then the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can
be determined by the probate court.
OUR CONCLUSION IS THAT THE RULE OF THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 811 OF THE
CIVIL CODE IS MERELY DIRECTORY AND IS NOT MANDATORY.
SINGSON present three witnesses who could declare that the
will and the signature are in the writing of the
(1960) testatrix, the probate being contested; and because
the lone witness presented by the proponent "did
not prove sufficiently that the body of the will was
written in the handwriting of the testatrix."
The proponent appealed, urging: first, that he was
not bound to produce more than one witness
because the will's authenticity was not questioned;
and second, that Article 811 does not mandatorily
require the production of three witnesses to identify
the handwriting and signature of a holographic will,
even if its authenticity should be denied by the
adverse party.
Devisees and legatees of the holographic will of
CODOY v. the deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal, filed
CALUGAY a petition for probate of the holographic will of the
deceased, who died on January 16, 1990.
(1999)
On June 28, 1990, Eugenia Ramonal Codoy and
Manuel Ramonal filed an opposition to the petition
for probate, alleging that the holographic will was a
forgery and that the same is even illegible. This
gives an impression that a "third hand" of an
interested party other than the "true hand" of
Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal executed the
holographic will. They argued that the repeated
dates incorporated or appearing on will after every
disposition is out of the ordinary. If the deceased
was the one who executed the will, and was not
forced, the dates and the signature should appear
at the bottom after the dispositions, as regularly
done and not after every disposition. And assuming
that the holographic will is in the handwriting of the
deceased, it was procured by undue and improper
pressure and influence on the part of the
beneficiaries, or through fraud and trickery.
In this petition, the petitioners ask whether the
provisions of Article 811 of the Civil Code are
Since the authenticity of the will was not contested, he was not required to produce more than one
witness; but even if the genuineness of the holographic will were contested, we are of the opinion that
Article 811 of our present Civil Code can not be interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation of
three witnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator, under penalty of having the probate denied.
Since no witness may have been present at the execution of a holographic will, none being required by
law (Art. 810, new Civil Code), it becomes obvious that the existence of witness possessing the
requisite qualifications is a matter beyond the control of the proponent. For it is not merely a question of
finding and producing any three witnesses; they must be witnesses "who know the handwriting and
signature of the testator" and who can declare (truthfully, of course, even if the law does not so
express) "that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator". There may be no
available witness of the testator's hand; or even if so familiarized, the witnesses may be unwilling to
give a positive opinion. Compliance with the rule of paragraph 1 of Article 811 may thus become an
impossibility
The law foresees the possibility that no qualified witness may be found (or what amounts to the same
thing, that no competent witness may be willing to testify to the authenticity of the will), and provides for
resort to expert evidence to supply the deficiency. Under Article 811, the resort to expert evidence is
conditioned by the words "if the Court deem it necessary", which reveal that what the law deems
essential is that the Court should be convinced of the will's authenticity. Where the prescribed number
of witnesses is produced and the court is convinced by their testimony that the ill is genuine, it may
consider it unnecessary to call for expert evidence. On the other hand, if no competent witness is
available, or none of those produced is convincing, the Court may still, and in fact it should, resort to
handwriting experts. The duty of the Court, in fine, is to exhaust all available lines of inquiry, for the
state is as much interested as the proponent that the true intention of the testator be carried into effect.
We are convinced, based on the language used, that Article 811 of the Civil Code is mandatory. The
word "shall" connotes a mandatory order. We have ruled that "shall" in a statute commonly
denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the
presumption is that the word "shall," when used in a statute is mandatory.
It will be noted that not all the witnesses presented by the respondents testified explicitly that they were
familiar with the handwriting of testator.
From the testimonies of these witnesses, the Court of Appeals allowed the will to probate and disregard
the requirement of three witnesses in case of contested holographic will, citing the decision in Azaola
vs. Singson,31 ruling that the requirement is merely directory and not mandatory.
In the case of Ajero vs. Court of Appeals,32 we said that "the object of the solemnities surrounding the
execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and
testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore, the laws on this subject should be
interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But on the other hand, also one must not
lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to
make a will.
However, we cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document being adjudged as the will of the
testator, which is why if the holographic will is contested, that law requires three witnesses to declare
that the will was in the handwriting of the deceased.
The will was found not in the personal belongings of the deceased but with one of the
respondents, who kept it even before the death of the deceased. In the testimony of Ms. Binanay, she
revealed that the will was in her possession as early as 1985, or five years before the death of the
deceased.
 permissive or mandatory. The article provides, as a
requirement for the probate of a contested
holographic will, that at least three witnesses
explicitly declare that the signature in the will is the
genuine signature of the testator.
There was no opportunity for an expert to compare the signature and the handwriting of the deceased
with other documents signed and executed by her during her lifetime. The only chance at comparison
was during the cross-examination of Ms. Binanay when the lawyer of petitioners asked Ms. Binanay to
compare the documents which contained the signature of the deceased with that of the holographic will
and she is not a handwriting expert. Even the former lawyer of the deceased expressed doubts as to
the authenticity of the signature in the holographic will.

Martin Jugo died on July 16, 1974 in Malabon,
NEPOMUCENO Rizal. He left a last Will and Testament duly signed
v. CA by him at the end of the Will on page three and on
the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof in the
(1985) presence of Celestina Alejandro, Myrna C. Cortez,
and Leandro Leano, who in turn, affixed their
signatures below the attestation clause and on the
left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 of the Will in the
presence of the testator and of each other and the
Notary Public. The Will was acknowledged before
the Notary Public Romeo Escareal by the testator
and his three attesting witnesses.
On August 21, 1974, the petitioner filed a petition
for the probate of the last Will and Testament of the
deceased Martin Jugo and asked for the issuance
to her of letters testamentary.
A visual examination of the holographic will convince us that the strokes are different when compared
with other documents written by the testator. The signature of the testator in some of the disposition is
not readable. There were uneven strokes, retracing and erasures on the will.
We, therefore, cannot be certain that ruling holographic will was in the handwriting by the deceased.
The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination
and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will.
The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate
court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain
provisions of the Will.
There appears to be no more dispute at this time over the extrinsic validity of the Will. Both parties are
agreed that the Will of Martin Jugo was executed with all the formalities required by law and that the
testator had the mental capacity to execute his Will.
The prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is against the making of a donation between persons
who are living in adultery or concubinage. It is the donation which becomes void. The giver cannot give
even assuming that the recipient may receive. The very wordings of the Will invalidate the legacy
because the testator admitted he was disposing the properties to a person with whom he had been
living in concubinage. The donation only and not the entire will is void.

On May 13, 1975, the legal wife of the testator,

Rufina Gomez and her children filed an opposition
alleging inter alia that the execution of the Will was
procured by undue and improper influence on the
part of the petitioner; that at the time of the
execution of the Will, the testator was already very
sick and that petitioner having admitted her living in
concubinage with the testator, she is wanting in
integrity and thus, letters testamentary should not
be issued to her.

CA declared donations to concubine null and void

as being contrary to law.

E.
Effect of allowance of wills
Florentino Hitosis executed a will in the Bicol
GALLANOSA v. dialect on June 19, 1938 when he was eighty years
ARCANGHEL old. He died on May 26, 1939. On June 24, 1939 a
petition for the probate of his will was filed. After a
(1978) hearing, wherein the oppositors did not present any
evidence in support of their opposition, Judge
What the plaintiffs seek is the "annulment" of a last will trial testament duly probated in 1939 by the
lower court itself. The proceeding is coupled with an action to recover the lands adjudicated to the
defendants by the same court in 1943 by virtue of the probated will, which action is a resuscitation of
The complaint of the same parties that the same court dismissed in 1952.
Our procedural law does not sanction an action for the "annulment" of a will. In order that a will may
 Pablo S. Rivera, in his decision of October 27, take effect, it has to be probated, legalized or allowed in the proper testamentary proceeding. The
1939, admitted the will to probate and appointed probate of the will is mandatory.
Gallanosa as executor. On February 20, 1952,
Leon Hitosis trial the heirs of Florentino's deceased A decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution or formal validity of the will. That means that
brothers trial sisters instituted an action against the testator was of sound trial disposing mind at the time when he executed the will and was not acting
Pedro Gallanosa for the recovery of the said sixty- under duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence; that the will was signed by him in the presence of the
one parcels of land. required number of witnesses, and that the will is genuine trial is not a forgery. Accordingly, these facts
cannot again be questioned in a subsequent proceeding, not even in a criminal action for the forgery of
the will. After the finality of the allowance of a will, the issue as to the voluntariness of its execution
cannot be raised anymore.
ROBERTS v. Edward M. Grimm an American resident of Manila, We hold that respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of
LEONIDAS died at 78 in the Makati Medical Center on jurisdiction, in denying Ethel's motion to dismiss.
November 27, 1977. He executed on January 23,
(1984) 1959 two wills in San Francisco, California. One A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills and "no will shall pass
will dispose of his Philippine estate which he either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed". The probate of the will is mandatory.
described as conjugal property of himself and his
second wife. The second will dispose of his estate It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be settled in an intestate
outside the Philippines. proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding and the
judge assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the two cases.
43 days after Grimm's death, his daughter of the
first marriage, Ethelfiled intestate proceeding No.
113024 for the settlement of his estate. She was
named special administratrix. On March 11, the
second wife, Maxine, filed an opposition and
motion to dismiss the intestate proceeding on the
ground of the pendency of Utah of a proceeding for
the probate of Grimm's will.

Ethel filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in

this Court, praying that the testate proceeding be
dismissed, or. alternatively that the two
proceedings be consolidated and heard in Branch
20 and that the matter of the annulment of the Utah
compromise agreement be heard prior to the
petition for probate.
NEPOMUCENO Will contained provision donating properties to The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination
v. CA concubine. Lower court ruled on the intrinsic and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will.
validity of the disposition and declared the donation
(1985) to the concubine void for being contrary to law. The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate
court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain
provisions of the Will.

There appears to be no more dispute at this time over the extrinsic validity of the Will. Both parties are
agreed that the Will of Martin Jugo was executed with all the formalities required by law and that the
testator had the mental capacity to execute his Will.

The prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is against the making of a donation between persons
who are living in adultery or concubinage. It is the donation which becomes void. The giver cannot give
even assuming that the recipient may receive. The very wordings of the Will invalidate the legacy
because the testator admitted he was disposing the properties to a person with whom he had been
living in concubinage. The donation only and not the entire will is void.
DELA CERNA v. May 9, 1939, the spouses, Bernabe de la Serna
POTOT and Gervasia Rebaca, executed a joint last will and
testament in the local dialect. . Bernabe dela Serna
(1964) died on August 30, 1939, and the aforesaid will
was submitted to probate and was allowed. Upon
the death of Gervasia Rebaca on October 14,
1952, another petition for the probate of the same
will insofar as Gervasia was concerned was filed
on November 6, 1952. The Court of First Instance
ordered the petition heard and declared the
testament null and void, for being executed
contrary to the prohibition of joint wills in the Civil
Code. But on appeal by the testamentary heir, the
Court of Appeals reversed, on the ground that the
decree of probate in 1939 was issued by a court of
probate jurisdiction and conclusive on the due
execution of the testament.
X. DISALLOWANCE OF WILLS
On 2 January 1960, Catalina de la Cruz, single and
PASCUAL v. DE without any surviving descendant or ascendant,
LA CRUZ died at the age of .89. On 14 January 1960, a
petition for the probate of her alleged will was filed.
(1969) Opposing the petition, Pedro de la Cruz and 26
other nephews and nieces of the late Catalina de la
Cruz contested the validity of the will on the
grounds that the formalities required by law were
not complied with; that the testatrix was mentally
incapable of disposing of her properties by will at
the time of its execution; that the will was procured
by undue and improper pressure and influence on
the part of the petitioner; and that the signature of
the testatrix was obtained through fraud.
Oppositors-appellees claim that the lower court
erred in giving credence to the testimonies of the
subscribing witnesses and the notary that the will
was duly executed, notwithstanding the existence
of inconsistencies and contradictions in the
testimonies, and in disregarding their evidence that
the will was not signed by all the witnesses in the
presence of one another, in violation of the
requirement of the law.
The appealed decision correctly held that the final decree of probate, entered in 1939 by the Court of
First Instance of Cebu (when the testator, Bernabe de la Cerna, died), has conclusive effect as to his
last will and testament despite the fact that even then the Civil Code already decreed the
invalidity of joint wills, whether in favor of the joint testators, reciprocally, or in favor of a third
party. But the Court of Appeals should have taken into account also, to avoid future misunderstanding,
that the probate decree in 1989 could only affect the share of the deceased husband, Bernabe de la
Cerna. It could not include the disposition of the share of the wife, Gervasia Rebaca, who was then still
alive, and over whose interest in the conjugal properties the probate court acquired no jurisdiction,
precisely because her estate could not then be in issue. Be it remembered that prior to the new Civil
Code, a will could not be probated during the testator's lifetime.
It follows that the validity of the joint will, in so far as the estate of the wife was concerned, must be, on
her death, reexamined and adjudicated de novo, since a joint will is considered a separate will of each
testator. Thus regarded, the holding of the court of First Instance of Cebu that the joint will is one
prohibited by law was correct as to the participation of the deceased Gervasia Rebaca in the properties
in question, for the reasons extensively discussed in our decision inBilbao vs. Bilbao, 87 Phil. 144, that
explained the previous holding in Macrohon vs. Saavedra, 51 Phil. 267.
Therefore, the undivided interest of Gervasia Rebaca should pass upon her death to her heirs intestate,
and not exclusively to the testamentary heir, unless some other valid will in her favor is shown to exist,
or unless she be the only heir intestate of said Gervasia.
It is unnecessary to emphasize that the fact that joint wills should be in common usage could not make
them valid when our Civil Codes consistently invalidated them, because laws are only repealed by
other subsequent laws, and no usage to the contrary may prevail against their observance.
In this jurisdiction, it is the observed rule that, where a will is contested, the subscribing with are
generally regarded as the best qualified to testify on its due execution. However, it is similarly
recognized that for the testimony of such witnesses to be entitled to full credit, it must be reasonable
and unbiased, and not overcome by competent evidence, direct or circumstantial. For it must be
remembered that the law does not simply require the presence of three instrumental witnesses; it
demands that the witnesses be credible.
In connection with the issue under consideration, we agree with the trial judge that the contradictions
and inconsistencies appearing in the testimonies of the witnesses and the notary, pointed out by the
oppositors-appellants (such as the weather condition at the time the will was executed; the sequence of
the signing by the witnesses; and the length of time it took to complete the act), relate to unimportant
details of the impressions of the witnesses about certain details which could have been affected by the
lapse of time and the treachery of human memory, and which inconsistencies, by themselves, would
not alter the probative value of their testimonies on the due execution of the will.
Basic principles on undue pressure and influence as laid down by the jurisprudence of this Court: that
to be sufficient to avoid a will, the influence exerted must be of a kind that so overpowers and
subjugates the mind of the testator as to destroy his free agency and make him express the will of
another rather than his own; that the contention that a will was obtained by undue influence or improper
pressure cannot be sustained on mere conjecture or suspicion, as it is enough that there was
opportunity to exercise undue influence, or a possibility that it may have been exercised; that the
exercise of improper pressure and undue influence must be supported by substantial evidence that it
was actually exercised; that the burden is on the person challenging the will to show that such influence
was exerted at the time of its execution; that mere general or reasonable influence is not sufficient to
invalidate a will; nor is moderate and reasonable solicitation and entreaty addressed to the testator; or

XI. LEGITIME
A. Concept
B. Who are entitles to legitimes: compulsory heirs
NUGUID v Rosario Nuguid died single, without descendants,
NUGUID legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her
legitimate parents and 6 brothers and sisters. One
(1966) of the sisters (Remedios) filed a holographic will
allegedly executed by Rosario instituting Remedios
as the sole, universal heir. The parents entered
their opposition to the probate of the will due to
preterition.
BALANAY v Felix Jr filed a petition for the probate of his
MARTINEZ mother’s will. In the will, the mother devised and
partitioned the conjugal lands as if they were all
(1975) owned by her. She disposed of in the will her
husband’s one half share of the conjugal assets.
The trial court declared that the will was void. It
dismissed the petition for the probate and
converted the testate proceeding into an intestate
proceeding.
omission of relatives, not forced heirs, evidence of undue influence.
This is a clear case of preterition.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either
because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor
are expressly disinherited. Disinheritance, in turn, is a testamentary disposition depriving any
compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law.
The will here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix’s parents, the forced heirs. It simply omits their
names altogether. Said will rather than be labeled ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in which the
said forced heirs suffer from preterition.
Preterition under Article 854 of the Civil Code shall annul the institution of the heir. This annulment is in
toto, unless in the will there are, in addition, testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or
legacies. In ineffective disinheritance under Article 918 of the same Code, such disinheritance shal
also annul the institution of heirs but only insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited.
Nothing in Article 854 suggests that the mere institution of a universal heir in a will – void because of
preterition – would give the heir so instituted a share in the inheritance. As to him, the will is inexistent.
There must be, in addition to such institution, a testamentary disposition granting him bequests or
legacies apart and separate from the nullified institution of heir.
The trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will’s intrinsic validity even beore its formal
validity had been established. The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its
face it appears to be instrinsically void.
But the probate court erred in declaring that the will was void and in converting the testate proceeding
into an intestate proceeding. The rule is that “the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a
will does not result in the invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the testator
would not have made such other dispositions if the first invalid disposition had not been made.
The statement of the testatrix that she co-owned the “southern half of the conjugal lands” is contrary to
law because although she was a co-owner thereof, her share was inchoate and pro-indiviso. But that
illegal declaration does not nullify the entire will. It may be disregarded.
The provision of the will that the properties of the testatrix should not be divided among her heirs during
her husband’s lifetime but should be kept intact and that the legitimes should be paid in cash is contrary
to Article 1080. She did not assign the whole estate to one or more children, as envisaged in Article
1080. Hence, she had no right to require that the legitimes be paid in cash. On the other hand, her
estate may remain undivided only for a period of 20 years.
Felix Sr. could validly renounce his hereditary rights and his one half share of the conjugal partnership
but insofar as said renunciation partakes of a donation of his hereditary rights and his one half share in
the conjugal estate, it should be subject to the limitations prescribed in Articles 750 and 752 of the Civil
Code. A portion of the estate should be adjudicated to the widower for his support and maintenance.
Or at least his legitime should be respected. It should be stressed that by reason of the surviving
husband’s conformity to his wife’s will and his renunciation of his hereditary rights, his one half conjugal

SOLANO v CA Bienvenido and Emeteria Garcia, claiming to be
illegitimate children of Dr. Solano filed an action for
(1983) recognition against him. Solano denied paternity.
Solano died so Zonia Solano was ordered
substituted for the decedent as the only surviving
heir mentioned in his Last Will and Testament. The
trial court declared the Garcias and Zonia as the
illegitimate children of Dr. Solano. It also said that
the institution of Zonia as sole and universal heir of
the deceased in the will is null and void and the
three children shall share equally the estate.
ROSALES v Petra Rosales, the mother-in-law of Irenea Rosales
ROSALES died. Irinea insists on getting a share of the estate
in her capacity as the surviving spouse of one of
(1987) Petra’s children, claiming that she is a compulsory
heir of her mother-in-law together with her son.
ACAIN v IAC Constantino Acain filed a petition for the probate of
the will of his brother Nemesio Acain.
(1987) Respondents, legally adopted daughter and
Nemesio’s widow filed a motion to dismiss on the
grounds that petitioner has no legal capacity to
institute these proceedings, that he is merely a
universal heir, that the widow and daughter have
been preterited
SEANGIO v Petitioners filed a petition for the probate of the
REYES holographic will of Segundo Seangio. Private
respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate
share became a part of his deceased’s wife’s estate. In the instant case, the preterited heir was the
surviving spouse. His preterition did not produce intestacy. Moreover, he signified his conformity to his
wife’s will and renounced his hereditary rights.
The preterition of the Garcia’s should annul the institution of Zonia as heir only insofar as the
legitime of the omitted heirs is impaired. The will, therefore, is valid subject to that limitation.
It is clear that the intention of the testator was to favor Zonia with certain portions of his property, which
under the law, he had a right to dispose of by Will, so that the disposition in her favor should be upheld
as to the one half portion of the property that the testator could freely dispose of. Since the legitime of
illegitimate children consists of one half of the hereditary estate, the Garcias and Zonia each have a
right to participation therein in the proportion of one third each. Zonia’s hereditary share will therefore
be ½ +(1/3 of 1/2) or 4/6 of the estate, while the Garcias will respectively be entitled to 1/3 of ½ or 1/6 of
the value of the estate. The usufruct in favor of Trinidad over the properties indicated in the will is valid
and should be respected.
Irenea is not an an heir of her mother-in-law.
Intestate or legal heirs are classified into 2 groups, namely, those who inherit by their own right, and
those who inherit by the right of representation. There is no provision in the Civil Code which states
that a widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law either by her own right or by
the right of representation. Article 887 refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which case the
surviving spouse is a compulsory heir. It does not apply to the estate of a parent-in-law. the surviving
spouse is considered a third person as regards the estate of the parent-in-law.
Article 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox, the son, is called to succession by law because of his
blodd relationship. He does not succeed his father who predeceased his grandmother but the latter
whom his father would have succeeded. Petitioner cannot assert the same right of representation as
she has no filiation by blood with her mother-in-law.
Only the adopted daughter has been preterited.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either
because they are not mentioned therein, or though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor
are expressly disinherited. Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 of the Civil Code may not
apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. Stated
therwise, even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she is omitted
from the inheritance, for she is not in the direct line. However, the same thing cannot be said of the
adopted daughter. Adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a
legitimate child. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child.
Preterition annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate succession the
entire inheritance. The only provisions which do not result in intestacy are the legacies and devises
made in the will for they should stand valid and respected, except insofar as the legitimes are
concerned. the universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the entire
inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution
of universal heirs without any other testamentary disposition in the will amounts to a declaration that
nothing at all was written.
The document executed by Segundo is a holographic will.
A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely written, dated, and
(2006) proceedings primarily on the ground that the
document purporting to be the holographic will
does not contain any disposition of the estate of
the deceased and thus does not meet the definition
of a will. According to private respondents, the will
only shows an alleged act of disinheritance of the
eldest son and nothing else; that all other
compulsory heirs were not named nor instituted as
heir, devisee or legatee, hence, there is preterition
which would result to intestacy.
JLT AGRO v The children of the first marriage and the father
BALANSAG entered into a Compromise agreement which
embodied the partition of all the properties of the
(2001) father. One of the properties retained by the father
is Lot 63. The father and one of the children of the
first marriage executed a Deed of Assignment of
Assets with Assumption of Liabilites in favor of
petitioner which was followed by a Supplemental
Deed. TCT was issued in the name of petitioner by
virtue of these deeds.
Meanwhile, the second wife and children of the
second marriage immediately took possession over
the subject property and subsequently sold it to
respondents. When respondents failed to register
the Deed of Absolute Sale, they filed a complaint
seeking the declaration of nullity and cancellation
of title of petitioner.
The trial court dismissed the complaint but the CA
reversed the trial court and held that by virtue of
the Compromise Agreement, the two sets of heirs
acquired full ownership and possession of the
properties respectively adjudicated to them in the
CFI decision (re Compromise Agreement) and the
father could no longer dispose of the same,
including Lot 63.
signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of
the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
Segundo’s document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument,
conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. it written, dated and signed by the
hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly deduced from the terms of
the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latter’s property, the
disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who
would succeed in the absence of Alfredo
The compulsory heirs in the direct line were not preterited in the will. It was Segundo’s last expression
to bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did
not institute an heir to the exclusion of his other compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the name of
one of the petitioners in the document did not operate to institute her as the universal heir. Her name
was only included plainly as a witness to the altercation between the decedent and his son.
The TCT in the name of petitioner is declared null and void.
Well-entrenched is the rule that all things, even future ones, which are not outside the commerce of
man may be the object of a contract. The exception is that no contract may be entered into with
respect to future inheritance, and the exception to the exception is the partition inter vivos referred to in
Article 1080.
A contract may be classified as a contract upon future inheritance, prohibited under the second
paragraph of Article 1347, where the following requisites occur:
1) That the succession has not yet been opened
2) That the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance
3) That the promissory has, with respect to the object, am expectancy of a right which is purely
hereditary in nature
Article 1056 of the Civil Code (now Article 1080) authorizes a testator to partition inter vivos his
property, and distribute them among his heirs, and this partition is neither a donation nor a testament,
but an instrument of a special character, sui generis, which is revocable at any time by the causante
during his lifetime and does not operate as a conveyance of title until his death. It derives its binding
force on the heirs from the respect due to the will of the owner of the property, limited only by his
creditors and the intangibility of the legitime of the forced heirs.
The partition inter vivos of the properties of Don Julian is undoubtedly valid pursuant to Article 1347.
However, considering that it would become legally operatice only upon the death of Don Julian, the
right of his heirs from the second marriage to the properties adjudicated to him under the compromise
agreement was but a mere expectancy. It was a bare hope of succession to the property of their father.
Being the prospect of a future acquisition, the interest by its nature is inchoate. It had no attribute of
property, and the interest to which it related was at the time nonexistent and might never exist.
Evidently, at the time of the execution of the deed of assignment covering Lot 63 in favor of petitioner,
Don Julian remained the owner fo the property since ownership over the subject lot would only pass to
his heirs from the second marriage at the time of his death. Thus, as the owner of the subject lot, Don
Julian retained tha bsolute right to dispose of it during his lifetime.
However, the issuance of TCT in the name of the petitioner is marred by a grave irregularity which is
also an illegality. As petitioner bases its right to the subject lot on the Supplemental Deed, it should
have presented it to the Register of Deeds to secure the transfer of the title in its name. Apparently, it
had not done so. Therefore, petitioner’s title was declared null and void.
 C. Concurrence of compulsory heirs and their corresponding legitimes
BARITUA v CA Bienvenido Nacario, then driving his tricylcle, died Petitioners are not liable to the private respondents (parents).
as a result of an accident involving the bus owned
(1990) and operated by petitioner. The widow entered into There is no denying that the petitioners had paid their obligation arising from the accident. The widow
an extrajudicial settlement with the insurer of the and her son with the deceased are the successors in interest referred to in law as the persons
petitioner. She executed a “Release of Claim” on authorized to receive payment. The parents of the deceased succeed only when the latter dies without
favor of petitioner and the insurer. Subsequently, a legitimate descendant. As it has been established that Bienvenido was married to Alicia and that they
the parents of Bienvenido filed a complaint for begot a child, the private respondents are not successors-in-interest of Bienvenido; they are not
damages against the petitioners claiming that they compulsory heirs. The petitioners therefore acted correctly in settling their obligation with the widow.
were the ones who paid for the funeral expenses This is so even if the widow had been estranged from Bienvenido. Mere estrangement is not a legal
and that Bienvenido owed them the purchase price ground for the disqualification of a surviving spouse as an heir of the deceased spouse.
of the tricycle.
While it may be true that the parents loaned the purchase price of the damaged tricycle and shouldered
the expeses for his funeral, the said purchase price and expenses are but money claims against the
estate of their deceased son.
IN RE PETITION Petitioner and first husband Primo Lim were The petition for adoption was denied. Joint adoption by the husband and wife is required.
FOR ADOPTION entrusted with the care of 2 children. They
OF MICHELLE registered the children to make it appear that they The use of the word “shall” in Section 7 of RA 8552 means that joint adoption by the husband and the
LIM were the children’s parents. Primo died. Petitioner wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child
married her second husband, an American citizen. which is the ideal situation.
(2009) Petitioner decided to adopt the 2 children by
availing of the amnesty given to those individuals Adoption has the following effects:
who simulated the birth of a child. Petitioners filed 1) Sever all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee, except when the
the petition alone but her second husband biological parent is the spouse of the adopter;
executed an Affidavit of Consent for the adoption. 2) Deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the adopter; and
The children are already of age when the petition 3) Give adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of
was filed. parent and child, including but not limited to:
i. The right of the adopter to choose the name the child is to be known; and
ii. The right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of each other.
Therefore, even if emanciation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still considered a legitimate
child of the adopter with all the rights of a legitimate child such as:
1) To bear the surname of the father and the mother;
2) To receive support from their parents; and
3) To be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights
Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to which
biological parents are entitled such as support and successional rights.
IN THE MATTER Stephanie, a minor, is the illegitimate child of Yes, Stephanie should be permitted to use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name.
OF THE Catindig and Garcia. Catindig, now a widower, filed
ADOPTION OF a petition to adopt Stephanie. He also prayed that Stephanie’s continued use of her mother’s surname as her middle name will maintain her material
STEPHANIE her last name be changed from “Garcia” to lineage. CC189(3) and RA 855, Art. V, Sec. 18 provide that the adoptee remains the intestate heir of
GARCIA “Catindig” and that she be allowed to use her his/her biological parent. Stephanie can assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother in
biological mother’s surname as her middle name. the future.
(2005)
IN THE MATTER In 1990, Cristina, married to Federico Suntay, died The attendant facts in this case necessitate, at least, a joint administration by Emilio III and Isabel of
OF THE intestate. Their only son, Emilio I, died in 1979. Cristina’s estate.
INTESTATE Cristina was survived by her husband and 5
ESTATE OF grandchildren, including Emilio III and Isabel. Rule 78, Section 6 of the ROC lists the order of preference in the appointment of an administrator of an
SUNTAY estate, but this order isn’t absolute. It depends on the attendant facts and circumstances of each case.
Emilio I was married and had 3 kids, one of whom
(2010) was Isabel. His marriage was later annulled, and
he then had 2 kids, Emilio III and Nenita, out of
wedlock. These illegitimate children were
acknowledged by Emilio I and were raised by
Federico and Cristina. Federico and Cristina were
estranged from their legitimate grandchildren.
Vda. de De la Rosa v. Heirs of Marciana Rustia Vda. de Damian: “[i]n the appointment of an
administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in the estate of the one to be appointed. The
order of preference does not rule out the appointment of co-administrators, specially in cases where
justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the
estates.”

In 1993, Federico adopted their illegitimate

grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita.

In 1995, Isabel filed a petition for the issuance of

letters of administration in her favor. Federico
opposed this, claiming he was capable of
administering the properties and that Isabel failed
to include Emilio III and Nenita as heirs in her
petition. He later nominated Emilio III as
administrator in his behalf. Federico died in the
course of the proceedings.

D. Restrictions regarding the legitime

URETA V. Alfonso had 14 children. In 1969, he executed 4 CC842 does not apply to this case. CC842 refers to the freedom of disposition by will, while this case
URETA Deeds of Sale in order to reduce inheritance taxes. involved a Deed of Sale. Alfonso’s heirs need not first prove that the disposition substantially diminished
One of the Deeds of Sale was in favor of their successional rights or unduly prejudiced their legitimes befor assailing the validity of the Deed of
(2011) Policronio, covering 6 lots and which are the Sale.
properties in dispute in this case. No monetary
consideration was given for the sales, and Alfonso
continued to own the lots until his death in 1972.

Policronio died in 1974. Policronio’s heirs claimed

the 6 lots belonged to their late father and as such
should be excluded from the Deed of Extra-Judicial
Partition involving Alfonso’s estate. They claimed
Alfonso’s heirs cannot assail the validity of the
Deed of Sale since CC842 should apply.

E.
Determination of computation
COLLATION
DIZON-RIVERA Agripina Valdez was survived by 7 compulsory In this case, collation is not required since the amount of legitime is determined and undisputed.
V. DIZON heirs: 6 legitimate children and one legitimate
granddaughter (a legitimate daughter of Agripina’s CC906 and 907 safeguard he rights of compulsory heirs to their legitime. Adjudications and
(1970) son who predeceased her). In her will she named assignments in a will of specific properties to specific heirs cannot be considered devises.
as additional beneficiaries 7 other legitimate
grandkids.

Under the will, 2 of her children, Marina and

Tomas, received more than their legitime while the
other heirs received less. Marina and Tomas then
reduced their shares in order to complete the
others’ legitimes. The devises remained
untouched.
DE ROMA V. CA Candelaria de Roma was survived by her 2 legally The Deed of Donation expressed an irrevocable donation, not an express prohibition to collate.
 adopted daughters, Buhay and Rosalinda. In the
(1987) intestate proceedings, Buhay was appointed
administratrix and submitted an inventory which did
not include properties earlier donated by
Candelaria to Buhay and their fruits. She claimed
the Deed of Donation contained an express
prohibition to collate, i.e., “sa pamamagitan ng
pagbibigay na di mababawing muli.”
LOCSIN V. CA Mariano Locsin and Catalina Jaucian were
married, and they agreed that after both of them
(1992) died their respective properties would revert to their
respective sides of the family. Mariano died first.
Catalina began distributing properties to respective
relatives on the Locsin side. When she died, some
Jaucian relatives claimed the transfers were
inofficious.
VIZCONDE V. Spouses Lauro and Estrellita Vizconde had 2 kids,
CA Carmela and Jennifer. Estrellita is the daughter of
Rafael and Salud Nicolas. She had 4 other siblings,
(1998) Antonio, Ramon, Teresita, and Ricardo, an
incompetent. Antonio predeceased his parents and
is survived by his widow, Zenaida, and their 4 kids.
In 1979, Estrellita purchased from Rafael the
Valenzuela property, as evidenced by a Deed of
Absolute Sale. A TCT in Estrellita’s favor was
issued. In 1990, she sold the property to Lim and
Chiu. Estrellita used the proceeds in purchasing a
parcel of land with improvements (Paranaque
Property), a car, and the remaining amount was
deposited in a bank.
In 1991, Estrellita and her 2 daughters were killed
(Vizconde Massacre). The NBI found that Estrellita
died ahead of her daughters. Accordingly, Lauro
was left as the sole heir of his daughters. Despite
this, he entered into an Extra-Judicial Settlement of
the Estate of Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde With
Waiver of Shares with Rafael and Salud, who got
50% of the bank deposits.
Rafael died intestate in 1992. Ramon claimed that
the Valenzuela property was given to Estrellita and
prayed that their legitime should come from the
collation of all the properties distributed to his
children by Rafael during his lifetime. Lauro was
considered an heir by right of representation.
ARELLANO V. Angel Pascual died intestate in 1999, laving as
PASCUAL heirs his siblings: Amelia (represented by her
daughters Agnes and Nora), Francisco, and
(2010) Miguel. Francisco and Miguel claimed that a lot
Such irrevocable donations are not excluded from CC1061. Under this Article, the intent to exempt from
collation must be expressed plainly and unequivocally.
The properties conveyed to the Locsins during Catalina’s lifetime are not part of her hereditary estate,
and the Jaucians are not entitled to them.
The rights to a person’s succession are transmitted from the moment of his death, and do not rest in his
heirs until such time. In any case, the right arising under certain circumstances to impugn and compel
the reduction/revocation of a decedent’s gifts inter vivos does not inure to the Jaucian relatives, since
they are neither the donees not the compulsory heirs.
Collation is not proper in this case.
CC1061 speaks of collation. The SC went on to define collation as “the act by virtue of which
descendants or other forced heirs who intervene in the division of the inheritance of an ascendant bring
into the common mass, the property which they received from him, so that the division may be made
according to law and the will of the testator. Collation is only required of compulsory heirs succeeding
with other compulsory heirs and involves property or rights received by donation or gratuitous title
during the lifetime of the decedent. The purpose is to attain equality among the compulsory heirs in so
far as possible for it is presumed that the intention of the testator or predecessor in interest making a
donation or gratuitous transfer to a forced heir is to give him something in advance on account of his
share in the estate, and that the predecessor's will is to treat all his heirs equally, in the absence of any
expression to the contrary. Collation does not impose any lien on the property or the subject matter of
collationable donation. What is brought to collation is not the property donated itself, but rather the
value of such property at the time it was donated, the rationale being that the donation is a real
alienation which conveys ownership upon its acceptance, hence any increase in value or any
deterioration or loss thereof is for the account of the heir or donee.”
The probate court committed several errors: 1) Lauro, as Rafael’s son-in-law, is not a compulsory heir
as provided by CC887 and should not be considered a part of the intestate estate proceeding; 2) It
went beyond its jurisdiction when it determined the validity of the sale between Rafael and Estrellita; 3)
It prematurely ordered the collation of the Paranaque Property since the proceedings is still in its
initiatory stage and there is nothing to indicate that the legitimes of Rafael’s heir have been impaired; 4)
Even if collation is appropriate, the court erred in including the Paranaque Property since it was the
Valenzuela Property which was transferred by Rafael to Estrellita; and 5) Rafael inherited from Estrellita
an amount more than the value of the Valenzuela property, therefore collation cannot be allowed since
the value of such property has long been returned to Rafael’s estate.
Collation is not proper, because it takes place when there are compulsory heirs. In this case, Angel is
survived only by his siblings, who are collateral relatives and as such are not entitled to any legitime.
The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any legitime, he was at liberty to
donate all his properties, even if nothing was left for his siblings-collateral relatives to inherit. His
 transferred by Angel to Amelia via a Deed of donation to Amelia, assuming that it was valid, is deemed as donation made to a “stranger,” chargeable
Donation should be considered as an advance against the free portion of the estate. There being no compulsory heir, however, the donated property is
legitime to the latter. The probate court not subject to collation.
provisionally passed upon the question of the title
of the donated property only for the purpose of The estate should be partitioned equally among the heirs, pursuant to CC1003 and 1004.
determining whether it formed part of Angel’s
estate. It found the donation valid, but invoked
CC1061 and ruled that the donated property is
subject to collation. The probate court didn’t
partition Angel’s estate equally among Amelia,
Francisco, and Miguel.

F. Freedom to dispose free portion

PRINCIPLES AFFECTING LEGITIME

XII. PRETERITION
ESCUIN V. The testator executed a will before a notary public
ESCUIN in Spain, wherein he stated that in case he had a
duly registered successor, his child would be his
(1908) sole and universal heir, but if there was no such
heir his father and his father’s wife would divide the
estate between them equally.
The testator could validly leave 2/3 of the property to his father and to his father’s wife. Emilio was an
acknowledged natural child and a general heir.
Under CC842 a natural child is entitled to 1/3 of the estate. Since Emilio was ignored by the testator in
the latter’s will, the designation of heirs therein was annulled by force of law insofar as the legal portion
of the son was impaired. Legacies and betterments shall be valid, insofar as they are not illegal.

The testator had a natural child, Emilio.

AZNAR V. Christensen, a citizen of California domiciled in the
DUNCAN PH, died. The CFI approved a project of partition
dividing the estate between Lucy and Helen, who
(1966) was declared a natural child of the deceased. In
Christensen’s will Lucy was instituted as an heir,
and the CFI held that since Helen was preterited
such institution was annulled.
A forced heir who gets a legacy worth less than his legitime but without being referred to as an heir or
even as a relative cannot ask that the entire institution of heirs be annulled, but only that the legitime be
completed.
Preterition - the omission of an heir in the will, either by not naming him at all, or while mentioning him
as father, son, etc., by not instituting him as heir without disinheriting him expressly, nor assigning to
him some part of the legitime.

Lucy claimed that since Helen was given a legacy

under the will, this case did not involve preterition,
but falls under CC906. Lucy also claimed that since
Helen was left a legacy despite the fact that
Christensen expressly denied his relation to her,
Helen was defectively disinherited.
Nuguid vs. Rosario died without descendants, legitimate or
Nuguid (1966) illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate
parents – Felix and Paz, and 6 brothers and
sisters. Remedios, one of the sister filed in court a
holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario
instituting the former as the sole, universal heir of
all her properties. She prayed that said will be
admitted to probate and that letter of administration
be issued to her. Felix and Paz opposed to the
probate of the will on the ground that by the
institution of Remedios as universal heir of the
deceased, oppositors – who are compulsory heirs
in the direct ascending line – were illegally
Where the deceased left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate, but she left forced heirs in the
direct ascending line – her parents, and her holographic will does not explicitly disinherit them but
simply omits their names altogether, the case is one of preterition of the parents, not a case of
ineffective disinheritance.
Preterition “consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either
because they are not mentioned therein, or, through mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor
are expressly disinherited”. Disinheritance, in turn, “is a testamentary disposition depriving any
compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law”.
Where the one sentence will institutes the petitioner as the sole, universal heir and preterits the parents
of the testatrix, and it contains no specific legacies or bequests, such universal institution of petitioner,
by itself, is void. And intestate succession ensues.
 preterited and that in consequence, the institution
is void.
Petitioners contention is that the present is a case
of ineffective disinheritance rather than one of
preterition drawing the conclusion that Article 854
does not apply in the case at bar.

Reyes vs. When Bibiano Barretto died, he left his share of his If there is a compulsory heir in the direct line, such heir is instituted in the will, and the testamentary
Barreto-Datu properties in a will to Salud Barretto, mother of disposition given to such heir is less than her legitime, there is no preterition. There is no total omission,
(1967) plaintiff’s wards, and Lucia Milagros Barretto and a inasmuch as the heir received something from the inheritance. The remedy is for completion of legitime
small portion as legacies to his two sisters Rosa under Articles 906 and 907.
Barretto and Felisa Barretto and his nephew and
nieces. The usufruct of the fishpond situated in
Barrio San Roque was reserved for his widow,
Maria Gerardo.

Upon Maria Gerardo’s death, it was discovered that

she had executed two wills, in the first of which,
she instituted Salud and Milagros, both surnamed
Barretto, as her heirs; and, in the second, she
revoked the same and left all her properties in
favor of Milagros Barretto alone. Thus, the later will
was allowed and the first rejected. In rejecting the
first will presented by Tirso Reyes, as guardian of
the children of Salud Barretto, the lower court held
that Salud was not the daughter of the decedent
Maria Gerardo by her husband Bibiano Barretto.
Balanay vs. Leodegaria Julian died. She was survived by The trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal
Martinez (1975) herhusband, Felix Balanay, Sr., and six legitimate validity had been established. The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face
children. Felix Balanay, Jr. filed a petition for the it appears to be intrinsically void. But the probate court erred in declaring that the will was void and
probate of his mother’s notarial will, which was in converting the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding. The will is intrinsically valid and the
written in English. In that will, Leodegaria declared partition therein may be given effect if it does not prejudice the creditors and impair the legitimes. The
that it was her desire her properties should not be distribution and partition would become effective upon the death of Felix Balanay, Sr. In the meantime,
divided among her heirs during her husband's the net income should be equitably divided among
lifetime and that their legitimes should be satisfied the children and the surviving spouse.
out of the fruits of her properties. She devised and
partitioned the conjugal lands as if they were all (Relate to Articles 779 and 780 : In this case, there is testamentary succession because it resulted from
owned by her. She disposed of in the will her the designation of heirs by the testatrix, made in a will executed in the form prescribed by law. It can be
husband's one-half share of the conjugal assets. considered as a mixed succession because there is partly by will (execution of the will and execution of
Felix Balanay, Sr. and Avelina B. Antonio opposed the waiver) and by operation of law (as to the share of the husband of the conjugal party of
the probate of the will. Thereafter, Felix Balanay, which he eventually waived.)
Sr. signed an instrument waiving and renouncing
his right in Leodegaria’s estate in
favor of their 6 children.

Solano vs. CA Bienvenido and Emeteria filed an action for
(1983) recognition against Melita Solano Meliton died
during the pendency of the petition and his
daughter substituted him while asking for the
probate of the will of the decedent. RTC specified
the legal issues as 1) the recognition of Garcias, 2)
That being compulsory heirs, the Garcias were preterited from Meliton’s will, and as a result, Sonia’s
institution as sole heir is null and void pursuant to Art. 854
“The preterition or omission of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living
at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of
heir, but the devises and legacies shall be valid…
The intention of the decedent is to favor Sonia with certain portions of his property which the testator
 correct status of Zonia, 3) the hereditary share of
each of them in view of the probated will. In
deciding, RTC declared Garcias as illegitimate
children of late Meliton.; the institution of Sonia as
sole heir declared null and void, the 3 children shall
share equally the estate CA affirmed.
Acain vs. CA Constantino filed a petition for the probate of the
(1987) will of the late Nemesio. The will provided that all
his shares from properties he earned with his wife
shall be given to his brother Segundo (father of
Constantino). In case Segundo dies, all such
property shall be given to Segundo’s children.
Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio. The oppositors
Virginia, a legally adopted daughter of the
deceased, and the latter's widow Rosa filed a
motion to dismiss on the following grounds: (1) the
petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these
proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir and
(3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been
preterited.
XIII. RESERVA TRONCAL
Edroso vs. Marcelina Edroso was married to Victoriano Sablan
Sablan (1913) until his death on Sept. 22, 1882. In this marriage
they had a son named Pedro, who was born on
August 1, 1881, and who at his father's death
inherited the two said parcels. Pedro also died on
July 15, 1902, unmarried and without issue, and by
his decease the two parcels of land in Pagsanjan,
Laguna, passed through inheritance to his mother,
Marcelina Edroso. Hence the hereditary title
whereupon is based the application for registration
of her
ownership.
Two legitimate brothers of Victoriano Sablan
[uncles german of Pedro] appeared in the case to
oppose the registration, claiming either (1) that the
had the right to such so that it should be upheld as to the one-half portion of the property that the
testator could freely dispose of Sonia’s share is hereby declared to be 4/6 of the estate and Garcias 1/6
each. The usufruct in favor of will should not be invalidated all together.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either
because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor
are expressly disinherited. Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 may not apply as she does
not ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. Even if the surviving
spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she is omitted from the inheritance,
for she is not in the direct line. The same thing cannot be said of the other respondent Virginia,
whose legal adoption by the testator has not been questioned by petitioner. Adoption gives to the
adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and
makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she was totally
omitted and preterited in the will of the testator and that both adopted child and the widow were
deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly disinherited.
This is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child. Preterition annuls the institution of an heir
and annulment throws open to intestate succession the entire inheritance. The only provisions which do
not result in intestacy are the legacies and devises made in the will for they should stand valid and
respected, except insofar as the legitimes are concerned. The universal institution of petitioner together
with his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will
because the nullification
of such institution of universal heirs - without any other testamentary disposition in the will - amounts to
a declaration that nothing at all was written. In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a
probate proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be
affected by it. Petitioner is not the appointed executor, neither a devisee or a legatee there being no
mention in the testamentary disposition of any gift of an individual item of personal or real property he is
called upon to receive. At the outset, he appears to have an interest in the will as an heir. However,
intestacy having resulted from the preterition of respondent adopted child and the universal institution of
heirs, petitioner is in effect not an heir of the testator. He has no legal standing to petition for the
probate of the will left by the deceased.
The hereditary title is one without a valuable consideration [gratuitous title]. He who acquires by
inheritance gives nothing in return for what he receives. Art. 811, OCC provides: “The ascendant who
inherits from his descendant property which the latter acquired without a valuable consideration from
another ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is under obligation to reserve what he has acquired by
operation of law for the relatives who are within the third degree and belong to the line whence the
property proceeded.”
Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from him these two parcels of land which he
acquired without a valuable consideration – that is, by inheritance from another ascendant, his father
Victoriano. Having acquired them by operation of law, she is obligated to reserve them intact for the
claimants, who are uncles or relatives within the third degree and belong to the line of Mariano Sablan
and Maria Rita Fernandez, whence the lands proceeded. The trial court's ruling that they partake of the
nature of property required by law to be reserved is therefore in accordance with the law.
If Pedro Sablan had instituted his mother in a will as the universal heiress of his property, all he left at
death would not be required by law to be reserved, but only what he would have perforce left her as the
 registration be denied OR (2) that if granted to her
the right reserved by law to the opponents be
recorded in the registration of each parcel.
The Court of Land Registration denied the
registration and the applicant appealed through a
bill of exceptions. Registration was denied because
the trial court held that the parcels of land in
question partake of the nature of property required
by law to be reserved and that in such a case
application could only be presented jointly in the
names of the mother and the said two uncles of
Pedro Sablan.
Sienes vs. Lot 3368 originally belonged to Saturnino Yaeso.
Esparcia (1961) With his first wife, Teresa Ruales, he had four
children named Agaton, Fernando, Paulina and
Cipriana, while with his second wife, Andrea
Gutang, he had an only son named Francisco.
According to the cadastral records of Ayuquitan,
Saturnino upon his death left Lot 3368 (western
portion) to Francisco. As a result of the cadastral
proceedings, Original Certificate of Title No. 10275
covering Lot 3368 was issued in the name of
Francisco. Because Francisco was a minor at the
time, his mother Andrea Gutang administered the
property for him.
When Francisco died, single and without any
descendant, his mother, as his solheir, executed
the public instrument entitled EXTRAJUDICIAL
SETTLEMENT AND SALE whereby, among other
things, for and in consideration of the sum of
P800.00 she sold the property in question to
appellants. When thereafter said vendees
demanded from Paulina Yaeso and her husband
Jose Esparcia, the surrender of OCT No. 10275 —
which was in their possession — the latter refused,
thus giving rise to the filing of the corresponding
motion in the cadastral record No. 507. The same,
however, was denied.
Florentino vs. Apolonio Jr.’s first marriage to Antonia produced
Florentino nine children. Antonia died so Apolonio contracted
(1919) a second marriage with Severina with whom he
had two children Merces and Apolonio III. Out of
Apolonio’s children by Antonia, three remained
unmarried until their respective deaths. The
petitioners in this case are the surviving children of
Apolonio’s children by Antonia along with the heirs
of Apolonio’s other married children who had since
died.
legal portion of a legitimate ascendant. [Art. 809, OCC.] In such case only the half constituting the legal
portion would be required by law to be reserved, because it is what by operation of law would fall to the
mother from her son's inheritance; the other half at free disposal would not have to be reserved. This is
all that article 811 of the Civil Code says. Proof of testate succession devolves upon the heir or heiress
who alleges it. In this case, the interested party has not proved that either of the lots became
Marcelina’s inheritance through the free disposal of her son.
As held by the trial court, it is clear upon the facts already stated, that the land in question was
reservable property. Francisco Yaeso inherited it by operation of law from his father Saturnino, and
upon Francisco's death, unmarried and without descendants, it was inherited, in turn, by his mother,
Andrea Gutang. The latter was, therefore, under obligation to reserve it for the benefit of relatives within
the third degree belonging to the line from which said property came, if any survived her. The record
discloses in this connection that Andrea Gutang died, the lone reserve surviving her being Cipriana
Yaeso.
In connection with reservable property, the weight of opinion is that the reserve creates two resolutory
conditions, namely, (1) the death of the ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the survival, at the time of
his death, of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which the property came. The
Court has held in connection with this matter that the reservista has the legal title and dominion to the
reservable property but subject to a resolutory condition; that he is like a life usufructuary of the
reservable property; that he may alienate the same but subject to reservation, said alienation
transmitting only the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservists, the rights acquired by the
transferee being revoked or resolved by the survival of reservatarios at the time of the death of the
reservista.
Even if Severina left in her will said property, together with her own, to her only daughter and forced
heiress, Mercedes Florentino, nevertheless this property had not lost its reservable nature inasmuch as
it originated from the common ancestor of the litigants, Apolonio Jr.
The right of the nearest relative, called reservatario, over the property which the reservista (person
holding it subject to reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the one more remote. The right
of representation cannot be alleged when the one claiming same as a reservatario of the reservable
property is not among the relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which such
property came from.
 Nevertheless there is right of representation on the part of reservatarios who are within the third
Apolonio died on February 13, 1890, survived by degree, mentioned by law, as in the case of nephews of the deceased person from whom the
his window Severina and his ten children. His reservable property came. These reservatarios have the right to represent their ascendants (fathers
second child Apolonio III by Severina was born and mothers) who are the brothers of the said deceased person and relatives within the third degree.
after his death.On January 17 and February 13,
1890, Apolonio Isabelo Florentino executed a will In this case it is conceded without denial by defendants, that the plaintiffs are the legitimate children of
before the notary public of Ilocos Sur, instituting as the first marriage of the deceased Apolonio Jr. to Antonia. There are then seven "reservatarios" who
his universal heirs his ten childrenhis widow are entitled to the reservable property left at the death of Apolonio III: Encarnacion, Gabriel,
Severina and his yet unborn son Apolonio III. He Magdalena; his three children, Jose, Espirita and Pedro who are represented by their own twelve
declared that his property should be divided children respectively; and Mercedes Florentino, his daughter by a second marriage.
equally among his children. Among the properties
received by Apolonio III were the properties
marked A, B, C, D, E and F. Apolonio III died in
1891 and his mother succeeded to all his property
described in the complaint. When Severina died,
she left a will designating her daughter Mercedes
as the universal heiress.

Mercedes took possession of her mother’s

property, including the properties marked A to F
which Severina inherited from her son. Mercedes
had been gathering the fruits of the said properties
for herself.
Padura vs. Upon the death of Benita (the reservista) on Oct The nephews of the whole blood should take a share twice as large as that of the nephews of the half
Baldovino 15, 1952, the heirs took possession of the blood. The reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of the reservable
(1958) reservable properties. CFI Laguna declared the property to the third degree relatives belonging to the line from which the
children of Manuel and Candelaria to be the rightful property originally came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by the relatives of the inheriting
reservees, and as such, entitled to the reservable ascendant (reservista). Article 891 of the Code provides:
properties (the original reservees, Candelaria and
Manuel, having predeceased the ART 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the
reservista). The Baldovino heirs filed a petition latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother
seeking to have the properties partitioned, such or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by
that one-half be adjudicated to them, and the other operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and
half to the appellees, allegedly on the basis that who belong to the line from which said property came.
they inherited by right of representation from their
respective parents, the original reservees. The purpose of the reserva troncal is accomplished once the property has devolved
to the specified relatives of the line of origin. But from this time on, there is no further occasion for its
Padura heirs opposed, maintaining that they application. In the relations between one reservatario and another of the same degree, there is no call
should all be deemed as inheriting in their own for applying Art 891 any longer; the respective share of each in the reversionary property should be
right, under which, they claim, each should have an governed by the ordinary rules of interstate succession.
equal share. (In essence, the Baldovino heirs, who
are whole blood relatives of the reservista, were
contending that they should get more than their
half-blood relatives, the Padura heirs.
They anchor their claim on Articles 1006 and 1008
of the Civil Code).
Chua vs. CFI It appears that in the first marriage of Jose Frias The pertinent provision of reserva troncal provides:
(1977) Chua with Patricia S. Militar alias Sy Quio he sired
three children, namely: Ignacio, Lorenzo and ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have
Manuel. When Patricia died, Jose Frias Chua acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such
contracted a second marriage with Consolacion de property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the
 la Torre with whom he had a child by the name of third degree and belong to the line from which said property came. In order that a property may be
Juanita Frias Chua. Manuel died without leaving impressed with a reservable character the following requisites must exist: (1) that the property was
any issue. acquired by a descendant from an ascendant or from a brother or sister by gratuitous title; (2) that said
descendant died without an issue; (3) that the property is inherited by another ascendant by operation
Then in 1929, Jose died intestate leaving his widow of law; and (4) that there are relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which said
Consolacion and his son Juanito of the second property came.
marriage and sons Ignacio and Lorenzo of his first
marriage. In the Intestate Proceeding, the lower In this case, all of the foregoing requisites are present. Juanito died intestate; he died without leaving
court issued an order adjudicating, among others, any issue; his pro-indiviso of 1/2 share of Lot No. 399 was acquired by his mother; Juanito who died
the one-half portion of Lot No. 399 and the sum of intestate had relatives within the third degree. These relatives are Ignacio and Dominador and
P8,000.00 in favor of Jose's widow, Consolacion, Remidios, the supposed legitimate children of the deceased Lorenzo, who are the petitioners herein.
the other half of Lot No. 399 in favor of Juanito;
P3,000.00 in favor of Lorenze; and P1,550.00 in
favor of Ignacio. By virtue of said adjudication, a
TCT was issued by the Register of Deeds in the
names of Consolacion and Juanito. On Feb.27,
1952, Juanito died intestate without any issue.
After his death, his mother Consolacion succeeded
to his pro-indivisio share of Lot No. 399. In a
week's time, Consolacion executed a declaration of
heirship adjudicating in her favor the proindiviso
share of her son Juanito as a result of which a TCT
covering the whole lot was issued in her name.
Then on March 5, 1966, Consolacion died intestate
leaving no direct heir either in the descending or
ascending line except her brother and sisters.

In the "Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre",

the petitioners herein, Ignacio, of the first marriage
and Dominador and Remedios Chua, the
supposed legitimate children of the deceased
Lorenzo Chua, also of the first marriage filed the
complaint before the respondent CFI of Negros
Occidental, praying that the one-half portion of Lot
No. 399 which formerly belonged to Juanito but
which passed to Consolacion upon the latter's
death, be declared as a reservable property for the
reason that the lot in question was subject to
reserval troncal pursuant to Article 981 of the NCC.
Gonzales v. CFI Parcels of land in Quezon City, Manila, Tayabas The properties are reservable, and since they do not form part of her estate, are not hers to give away.
and Baguio were passed on within the Legarda
1981 family upon the death of Benito 2 (father) in 1933 In reserva troncal, there must be three transmissions: 1) by lucrative title from an ancestor, brother or
and Filomena 2 (daughter) ten years after. sister [origin] to a descendant [prepositus], 2) by operation of law from the descendant to another
Filomena 1 (mother) was sole heiress to her ascendant, and 3) from the reservor to relatives within the third degree (reservista). Those who finally
daughter’s properties including those from Benito 2 inherit must legitimately by blood belong to the line of the first ascendant.
and the elder Benito 1 (grandfather). She
partitioned the property from the grandfather with Within the third degree, the nearest relatives exclude the more remote subject to the rule of
her six surviving children, and then willed the representation.
father’s properties to her grandchildren through her
sons. Here, the brothers and sisters are indeed the reservatarios, and as such exclude the granchildren as
heirs. The law (Article 891) requires that the property be passed on to them, and any testamentary
Daughter Beatriz (sister to Filomena 2) claimed disposition, even if mutually agreed upon, will be void.
 that the properties were reservable properties and
should thus be given to her and five other siblings.

During the pendency of the probate of Filomena 1’s

will, Beatriz filed a separate civil action against her
relatives for the purpose of securing a declaration
that the properties were reservable.
De Papa v. Aunt Romana donated four parcels of land to
Camacho Toribia. When Toribia died in 1915, she left the
said property to Faustino and Trinidad, her
1986 children. When her father Balbino (borther of
Romana) died in 1928, three percels of land were
adjudicated to Toribia and
since she predeceased her father, the same was
given to grandchildren Faustino and Trinidad.
Dalisay as the closest relative in blood line, excludes the others, and thus is the sole reservatario.
Lower court reversed.
The court discussed reserva troncal as merely determining the group of relatives [reservatarios] to
whom the property should be returned. But within that group, the individual right to the property should
be decided by the applicable rules of ordinary intestate succession, since Art. 891 does not specify
otherwise. This condition strengthened by the circumstances that the reserve being an exceptional
case, its application should be limited to what is strictly needed to accomplish the purpose of the law.

Faustino died in 1937 and left his . pro-indiviso Hence, reservation of the reservable property being governed by the rules on intestate succession,
share in the seven lands to his father Eustacio Dalisay must be held without any right thereto because, as aunt and uncles of Faustino [propositus],
Dizon, subject to reserve troncal. When Trinidad they are excluded from the succession by his niece, the latter being the nearest relative. { excludes that
died in 1939, all her . pro-indiviso share were of the one more remote].
inherited by daughter Dalisay, subject to usufruct of
husband Primo Tongko. Eustacio died in 1965,
survived by his only granddaughter Dalisay.
Dalisay claims the . by virtue of the reserva troncal
implied by law upon the death of Faustino.

De Papa and other plaintiffs, as uncles and aunts,

also claim. of the . pro-indiviso share, being a third
relative
of Faustino.

The lower court ruled that the plaintiffs and

defendant are all entitled as reservatarios.

Not satisfied, Dalisay asked the SC if there will be

no distinction as to degree of relation of the heirs.

XIV. RESERVA ADOPTIVA

Banawa v. Maria Mirano was de facto adopted by spouses
Mirano Banawa because they were childless. She was a
niece treated like their own child, and as it appears,
1980 was named as buyer of several parcels of land
procured by the spouses Banawa. When Maria
died, her sister and nephews/nieces through a
brother, claimed that two parcels under her name,
the Iba and Carsuche properties, were due them
via intestate succession.
The spouses Banawa claim otherwise, saying that
they put it in the name of Maria only to secure it as
future inheritance. For the Carsuche property
The Miranos only own the Iba property, and the Banawa the Carsuche. Makasiar dissented, saying that
the sale in favor of Maria were simulated, and the fact that she was not legally adopted compared to
Gliceria, meant that she was not meant to inherit much.
The Iba property was considered by the lower courts as a donation intervivos. The spouses Banawa
may have paid for the parcels of land, but the money had been donated to Maria. Even the conduct of
the spouses during the time of the sale correponds with their intent to give the property to Maria. Thus,
the document presented is what is purports to be: a deed of sale between Maria and the sellers. The
court brushed aside arguments that 1) it is a simulated sale shortcutting the sale to the spouses
Banawa and then a donation to Maria; 2) there is implied trust [the transactions took place before the
Civil Code was applicable, sorry]; and 3) by acquisitve prescription the Banawas were owners.
The Carsuche property, meanwhile, had sufficient proof to show that it was owned by the Banawas.
 however, there are two documents claimed to exist:
a public instrument where Maria is the vendee, and
a private instrument in the handwriting of the seller
in favor of the spouses. Neither document was
presented before the court.
The sale to Maria was in 1935, but it was sold again to the Banawas in 1940. Despite this double sale,
acquisitive prescription set in after 10 years. This was computed 10 years after the registration of the
property with the Register of Deeds (second sale). Bad faith (that the land had been previously sold to
Maria) is of no consequence as long as the possession was open, public, continuous and under a claim
of title.

In the interim, spouses Banawa died and in their Other points:

stead were Gliceria Abrenica, who was legally Donation can be perfected with actual or constructive delivery.
adopted by the spouses, and husband. Extrajudicial adoption is not within the contemplation of the rules of reversion adoptive.

The lower court and the CA both ruled that the

Miranos were the lawful owners of the properties.
Teotico v. Del Maria Mortera executed a will in Spanish where
Va she made a statement that she was in in full use of
her mental faculties, free from illegal pressure or
1965 influence, and that she had no one entitled to
legitime.
Josefina was made sole and universal heir to
remiander of the properties not disposed of. She
gave a legacy to Rene Teotico, husband of niece
Josefine Mortera; a building to their children; but
the usufruct of her interest in such building to the
parents (Teotico spouses).
Ana does have no personality in the probate proceedings, and will may be allowed on the strength of
the testimony of the witnesses. The voiding of the legacy for Rene, meanwhile, was not done with due
process. Thus all other pronouncements regarding the disposition of the estate in favor of some relative
must be set aside. Remanded for further proceedings.
1) An intervenor must have interest in the estate either as heir, executor, or administrator, or has a
claim to property affected by the will. Also, even if Ana may be a relative by blood, she is illegitimate; if
by adoption, the relation is only confined between the adoptor and the adoptee.
2) A probate court cannot entertain questions as to the instrinsic validity or legality of provisions of the
will because its only purpose is to determine if the will has been executed in accordance with the
requirements of the law.Valid issues are: capacity of testator, were formallities complied with, etc.

Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child

of Maria’s sister and natural child of a brother, thus
also a niece, claimed that there was duress when
the will was signed, and the will should be
inoperative against Rene because he was the
attending physician.

The probate court admitted the will but voided the

part for Rene. Both parties appealed, Rene saying
Ana had no personality and Ana contesting the
probate of the will.

XV. DISINHERITANCE
Ching v. Lim San/Antonio Ching had several sets of The trial court had jurisdiction over this ordinary civil action One glaring point is that there is no will to
Rodriguez illegitimate families. Common-law wife Mercedes consider in the supposed disinheritance of Ramon.
bore two sons. Another wife Lucina bore Ramon,
2011 who is alleged to be adopted with his birth The complaint was haphazrdly put together: disinheritance – this would be a special proceeding! –
certificate mereky simulated. declaration of nullity of agreement and waiver, extrajudicial settlement, etc. But it was allowed by the
court as an ordinary civil suit because it delves mainly on the question of ownership of the properties.
Ramon is prime suspect in the death of Antonio by
stabbing, and was at large for the entire period. Still, a settlement proceeding must follow thereafter, to recover the properties that Ramon had
transferred to his name.
But before he was formally tagged as a suspect,
Ramon had already tried to dispose of the
properties. He made an inventory, whereupon he
transferred some properties, shares of stock to
 himself already. He coaxed Mercedes to surrender
a time deposit certificate for P4 million, as well as
titles to condo units.He also apparently sold some
properties without authority.

In the interim, his wife managed the properties.

All the other heirs, including Ramon’s mother

Lucina, joined forces to recover their shares.

PRINCIPLES AFFECTING THE FREELY DISPOSABLE PORTION

XVI. INSTITUTION OF HEIRS
A. In General
1. Definition
2. Requisites for valid institution of heirs
3. Effect if will institutes no heir
4. Freedom of disposition
5. Manner of designating an heir
6. Disposition in favor of an unknown person
7. Disposition in favor of a definite class
8. Equality of heirs
9. Individuality of institution
10. Simultaneity of institution
11. Institution based on a false cause
Austria v. Reyes Basilia Austria had her will probated two years The court denied this petition for certiorari to annul lower courts’ orders restricting the intervention.
before her death. Bulk of her estate was meant to
1970 be passed on to five legally adopted children. To annul the institution of heirs (Article 850), first, the cause for institution must be stated; second, the
cause must be shown to be false; and third, it must appear from the face of the will that the testator
Her nephews and nieces intervened in the partition would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of the cause.
of the properties alleging that they were the
nearest kin and that the children were not legally Here, the cause was not specifically stated, although petitioners claim that she was led to believe that
adopted and were thus strangers. she was bound by law to give her adopted children as much (legitime).

The lower court allowed, but restricted the The legality of the adoption can be assialed only in a separate action and not subject to a collateral
intervention to properties properties not included in attack.
the testamentary dispositions.

12. Shares in the institution

13. Predecease of heirs
B. Kinds of institution
1. Simple or pure
2. Conditional
a) Kinds
Vda.de Kilayko Maria Lizares died childless but with a will in the The petition for certiorari by Celsa et al is denied, with the following substantial pronouncements:
v. Tengco possession and custody of niece Eustaquia
Lizares. The will was duly probated and allowed, The Lizares sisters were part of the partition of the property and are hence estopped from questioning it
1992 and the court appointed Eustaquia as the by res judicata. The partition barred any further ligitation on the title. Take note that no partition is valid
adminstrator. Eustaquia moved on to the until after the will is probated
partitioning of the properties, unto the persons
specifically mentioned in the will. When it later Also, their petition was filed out of time forappeal. An erroneous distribution could only be corrected by
appeared that some properties were omitted, appeal, otherwise it becomes final and binding in rem.
 Eustaquia asked court permission to adjudicated
those upon her. Eustaquia thereafter died single And even if tehre was no re judicata, the provisions in the will do not imply fideicommisary substitution
without any descendants. as alleged. As is not clearly stated, i.e. there is no obligation upon Eustaquia to preserve the estate in
favor of Celsa et al, it cannot be deemed to be such.
Celsa Vda. De Kilayko and two other sisters of
Maria then claimed that the testamentary The cancellation of lis pendens may be done by the court upon a proper showing of notice to the other
provisions in Maria’s will was simply subsitution, party.
prayed for the reopening of the probate, and
declaration of them as owners of a fraction of the
properties Haciendas Minuluan and Matab-ang,
Negros Occidental. The court denied their motion
and reconsideration. Celsa et al then filed a
complaint for recovery of ownership and
possessiom, and filed a notice of lis pendens with
the Register of Deeds. The lis was contested and
later cancelled.

b) Inoperative conditions
c) Disposition captatoria
d) Compliance
e) Effect
3. Institution with a term
a) Kinds
b) Effect
4. Modal institution

XVII. SUBSTITUTION OF HEIRS

A. Concept
B. Kinds
1. Simple or common
2. Brief or compendious
3. Reciprocal
4. Fideicommisary
Ramirez v. Vda. Jose Ramirez died with only his widow, a French The court expressly ruled the distribution will be as follows: one half to the widow as her legitime; one
De Ramirez national who lives in Paris, as compulsory heir. He half of the free portion to Roberto and Jorge in naked onwership and to Wanda in usufruct, with simple
wanted to provide also for his two grandnephews substitution in favor of Juan Pablo and Horace.
1982 Roberto and Jorge Ramirez, and his companion
Wanda de Wrobleski (Austrian who lives in Spain). In the discussion, the court first emphasized that the widow’s legitime cannot be impaired below one
His will was admitted to probate but was found to half of the property. Nevertheless, the ususfruct as willed, which meant to compensate for the smaller
have impaired the widow’s legitime in favor of bequest to Marcelle, cannot be entertained anymore. To give Marcelle more than her legitime would
Wanda. The administratrix proposed a partition: run counter to Jose’s intentions to give more to Wanda.
one half to the widow, the other part to Jorge and
Roberto Ramirez, but one third of the free portion Wanda meanwhile, appears to be entitled to the entire usufruct. As a foreigner, she is not allowed by
will be charged with the widow’s usufruct and the Section 5 of the 1935 Constitution to own land, the only exception being by intestate succession from
rest in favor of Wanda. Filipinos. (Testamentary succession would allow a foreigner to circumvent the prohibition by paying
money to a Filipino landowner for a devise of a piece of land). Usufruct, however, does not vest title to
Jorge and Roberto opposed the substitution of the land even if it may be a real right.
Wanda, and then in favor of Juan and Horacio; the
grant of a usufruct in favor of an alien, and the The substitution in favor of Juan Pablo and Horace are invalid, as they are not related to Wanda, the
order to divide ownership of a building with the heir originally instituted (Article 863).
widow which was meant for them alone.
Crisologo v. Leona Singson, owner of a house and lot in Vigan,
Singson Ilocos Sur, died single She willed the property to
Consolacion Florentino, but if she died it would
1962 pass on to brothers Evaristo, Manuel and Dionisio.
If this was vulgar substitution, upon death of
Leona, Consolacion became the owner of
undivided one half; if this was fideicommisary
substitution, she would have acquired nothing but
usufruct.
C. Time-limitation on inalienability
XVIII. LEGACIES AND DEVISES
Fernandez v. Benedicta delos Reyes died leaving Ismaela
Dimagiba Dimagiba as sole heir. Dionisio Fernandez and
several other Reyeses opposed, claiming to be
1967 heirs. Grounds included forgery, vices of consent,
estoppel by lachesm and revocation of the will by
two deeds of conveyance of major portions of the
estate (although these were eventually set aside by
the Supreme Court).
The probate court allowed the will, but reserved
judgment on questions of estoppel and revocation.
Later, the trial court found that the estate was
unaffected by the deeds of sale. The probate was
then considered final and executory.
Belen v. BPI In this case involving the codicil to the will of the
late Benigno Diaz y Heredia, Onesima D. Belen
(1960) contends that the amount which should have
appertained to her mother Filomena Diaz (who was
named legatee by Benigno, and who herself died
later on), should now be divided between herself
and her sister Milagros Belen de Olaguera only, as
the surviving children of Filomena, to the exclusion
of Milagros’ seven legitimate children. To support
her cause Onesima invokes Article 959 of the Civil
Code, which provides that a distribution in general
terms shall be understood as made in favor of
those nearest in degree.
Villanueva v. Gonzalo Villanueva sued the spouses Froilan and
Spouses Leonila Branoco for recovery of a parcel of land in
Branoco Culaba, Leyte. Villanueva avers that he purchased
the land from Casimiro Vere in 1971, who in turn
(2011) purchased it from the original owner, Alvegia
Rodrigo, in 1970. The spouses Branoco on the
other hand allege that they purchased the land in
1983 from Eufracia Rodriguez to whom Rodrigo
donated the property in a Deed of Donation (which
This is a simple/vulgar substitution, as there is no express statement of fideicommisario.
Fideicommissary susbstitution requres a clear statement to the effect that appellee, during her lifetime,
shall only enjoy usufructuary rights over the property bequeathed to her, naked ownership thereof being
vested in the brothers of the testatrix. Here, it merely provides that upon Consolacion’s death, her share
shall belong to her brothers.
The Court of Appeals is affirmed in admitting the will to probate, and declaring that there was no legal
revocation by the deeds of sale because these were made in favor of the Ismaela herself.
Fernandez tries to make excuses for failing to appeal on time. First, he claims that an order allowing the
probate of a will is interlocutory! Absolutely no. Even if estoppel and revocation cannot be resolved, the
probate decree already finally and definitively settles issues as to capacity of the testator and proper
execution and witnessing of the will.
Fernandez also argues that they should have waited for the Court’s resolution on other grounds for
opposition, otherwise there would be multiplicity of recourses. But this is not so per Section 1, Rule 109
which states six manners of appeal of special proceedings.
The revocation, meanwhile, is irrelevant to this case. Also, the revocation is merely implied from
subsequent acts of abandonment of the original intention. But such would only revoke the particular
devise or legacy. Only total and absolute revocation can preclude probate of the revoked testament.
Article 959 of the Civil Code does NOT apply where the beneficiaries are relatives of another
person (in this case, the legatee Filomena Diaz), and not of the testator (Benigno Diaz).
There is no logical reason in this case to presume that Benigno Diaz intended to refer to the rules of
intestacy, for he precisely made a testament and provided substitutes for each legatee; nor can it be
said that his affections would prefer the nearest relatives of the legatee to those more distant, since he
envisages all of them in a group, and only as mere substitutes for a preferred beneficiary.
Should Article 959 (old Art. 751) be applied by analogy? There are various reasons against this. The
most important one is that under this article, as recognized by the principal commentators on the Code
of 1889, the nearest of exclude all the farther relatives and right of representation does not operate.
The Supreme Court sustained the Court of Appeals in finding that Rodrigo passed naked title to
Rodriguez under a perfected donation inter vivos and not a testamentary disposition mortis
causa and ruling that the spouses Branoco had superior title in the property.
It is immediately apparent that Rodrigo passed naked title to Rodriguez under a perfected donation
inter vivos. Rodrigo stipulated that “if the herein Donee predeceases me, the [Property] will not be
reverted to the Donor, but will be inherited by the heirs of x x x Rodriguez,” signaling the irrevocability of
the passage of title to Rodriguez’s estate, waiving Rodrigo’s right to reclaim title. This transfer of title
was perfected the moment Rodrigo learned of Rodriguez’s acceptance of the disposition which, being
 was also accepted in the same instrument), in
1965. The trial court ruled in favor of Villanueva,
holding the donation in favor of Rodriguez as
mortis causa, and was effectively revoked when
Rodrigo sold it to Vere in 1970. The Court of
Appeals reversed, ruling that it was a donation
inter vivos, and not a devise. Before the Supreme
Court, Villanueva argues that the non-reversion
clause contained in the Deed of Donation was
actually a fideicomissary substitution clause.
Arrogante v. A series of misfortunes struck the Deliarte family of
Deliarte Daanbantayan, Cebu. Beethoven Deliarte
shouldered the costs of the hospitalization,
(2007) transport and burial of his deceased brother and
his parents Bernabe Deliarte, Sr. and Gregoria
Placencia. Between the time of Gregoria’s and
Bernabe’s deaths, the Deliarte siblings agreed to
waive and convey in favor of Beethoven all their
rights, interests and claims over their parents’
parcel of land in Daanbantayan, Cebu for
P15,000.00. All his siblings signed a deed of
confirmation, except Fe Deliarte Arrogante. Lordito
Arrogante, son of Fe, installed placards on the
fences built by his uncle Beethoven, depicting that
the latter is a landgrabber who took the lot from the
former, in whose favor Bernabe Sr. had devised it.
Beethoven had allegedly destroyed and torn his
father’s will. The Arrogantes allege that Beethoven
Deliarte was not the owner of the entire lot because
Bernabe was still alive in 1978 when Beethoven’s
siblings conveyed all their rights and interests
thereon in his favor. Both the RTC and the Court of
Appeals ruled to quiet title in favor Beethoven
Deliarte. Before the Supreme Court, the Arrogantes
argue that the 1978 sale did not contemplate the
alienation of Bernabe Sr.’s share in the conjugal
partnership as he failed to sign the private
document.
LEGAL OR INTESTATE SUCCESSION
XIX. GENERAL PROVISIONS
A. In General
1. When does it take place?
2. Who are the intestate Heirs
Intestate Estate Petra V. Rosales of Cebu City died intestate in
of Rosales v. 1971. She was survived by her husband Fortunato
Rosales T. Rosales and their two children, Magna Acebes
and Antonio Rosales. Another child, Carterio
(1987) Rosales, predeceased Petra, leaving behind a
child, Macikequerox Rosales and his widow Irenea
reflected in the Deed, took place on the day of its execution on 3 May 1965. Rodrigo’s acceptance of
the transfer underscores its essence as a gift in presenti, not in futuro, as only donations inter vivos
need acceptance by the recipient.
The question of the Deed’s juridical nature, whether it is a will or a donation, is the crux of the present
controversy. By treating the clause in question as mandating fideicommissary substitution, a mode of
testamentary disposition by which the first heir instituted is entrusted with the obligation to preserve and
to transmit to a second heir the whole or part of the inheritance, Villanueva assumes that the Deed is a
will. The existence of consideration other than the donor’s death, such as the donor’s “love and
affection” to the done and “the services the latter rendered,” supports the finding that it is a
donation inter vivos and not a testamentary disposition.
The 1978 private deed of sale was void insofar as it disposed of Bernabe Sr.’s share in the
conjugal partnership prior to his death. The Supreme Court held that this was in the nature of a
conveyance of the future inheritance of the Deliarte siblings. But the Court nonetheless held
that it was effectively a donation inter vivos in favor of his children.
Florenda Deliarte Nacua, Beethoven's sister, corroborated the testimony of Beethoven that their father
was present during, and was aware of, the transaction that took place among his children. The 1978
deed of sale, albeit void, evidenced the consent and acquiescence of each Deliarte sibling to said
transaction. They raised no objection even after Beethoven forthwith possessed and occupied the
subject lot.
The foregoing arrangement, vaguely reflected in the void deed of sale, points to a meeting of the minds
among the parties constitutive of an innominate contract, akin to both an onerous and a remuneratory
donation. In this regard, Bernabe’s waiver and relinquishment of his share in the subject lot is
effectively a donation inter vivos to his children. However, the gratuitous act is coupled with an onerous
cause – equal accountability of the Deliarte siblings for the hospitalization and death expenses of
deceased family members to be taken from their shares in the subject lot. In turn, the remunerative
cause pertains to Beethoven’s recompense for the family expenses he initially shouldered.
During his lifetime, Bernabe remained the absolute owner of his undivided interest in the subject lot.
Accordingly, he could have validly disposed of his interest therein. His consent to the disposition of the
subject lot in favor of Beethoven, agreed upon among his children, is evident, considering his presence
in, knowledge of, and acquiescence to the transaction. Further, the arrangement was immediately
effected by the parties with no objection from Bernabe or any of the Deliarte siblings, including herein
petitioner Fe. Ineluctably, the actual arrangement between the parties included Bernabe, and the
object thereof did not constitute future inheritance.
Irenea Rosales is NOT a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law Petra Rosales.
There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate heir
of her mother-in-law. The entire Code is devoid of any provision which entitles her to inherit from her
mother-in- law either by her own right or by the right of representation. The provisions of the Code
which relate to the order of intestate succession (Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate with meticulous
 Rosales. During the intestate proceedings
Macikequerox was granted a ¼ share in the estate
of his grandmother Petra. However, Irenea insists
on being granted a share in the estate as the
surviving spouse of the late Carterio Rosales. She
asserts that she is a compulsory heir of her mother-
in-law Petra.
3. Order and share in the intestate succession
De los Santos v. This case involves the settlement of the estate of
de la Cruz Pelagia de la Cruz, which was the subject of the
subject extrajudicial partition agreement. Pelagia
(1971) died intestate in October 1962. Maximo de la Cruz
is a nephew of Pelagia, while Gertrudes de los
Santos is a grandniece of the same. De los Santos’
mother, Marciana de la Cruz, is a niece of Pelagia.
Marciana predeceased Pelagia in September
1935. The purpose of the extrajudicial agreement
is to divide and distribute the estate of Pelagia
among her heirs.
Bagunu v. Ofelia Hernando Bagunu sought intervention in the
Piedad intestate proceedings over the estate of the late
Augusto H. Piedad pending before the Pasay City
(2000) RTC. She alleged that she was entitled to a share
in Piedad’s estate, and assailed the award of its
entirety to Pastora Piedad on the ground of lack of
notice to personal heirs like Bagunu. The
proceedings have been closed. Augusto Piedad
died without any direct descendants or ascendants.
Pastora Piedad is the maternal aunt of Augusto,
making her a third-degree relative of the latter. On
the other hand, Bagunu is a fifth-degree relative of
Augusto.
Heirs of Uriarte Benedicto Estrada is the son of Agatonica Arreza,
v. Court of daughter of Pedro Arreza and Ursula Tubil. When
Appeals Pedro died, Ursula married Juan Arnaldo and they
had a daughter, Justa Arnaldo-Sering. On the other
(1998) hand, the heirs of Pascasio Uriarte are descended
from Domingo Arnaldo, a brother of Juan Arnaldo,
father of Justa. Estrada brought this action for the
partition of the land left by Justa Arnaldo-Sering.
The heirs of Uriarte question the succession of
Estrada to the estate, since he is the son of
Agatonica Arreza, who is only a half-sister of Justa
Arnaldo-Sering.
exactitude the intestate heirs of a decedent, with the State as the final intestate heir. The conspicuous
absence of a provision which makes a daughter-in-law an intestate heir of the deceased all the more
confirms Our observation. If the legislature intended to make the surviving spouse an intestate heir of
the parent-in-law, it would have so provided in the Code. Article 887(3) of the Civil Code only applies
to the estate of a deceased spouse, not of a deceased parent-in-law.
Gertrudes de los Santos is NOT an heir of Pelagia, the former being a grandniece of the latter.
She could therefore not inherit from Pelagia by right of representation, nor by her own right
under Article 962 of the Civil Code.
In Linart v. Ugarte (1905), the Supreme Court ruled: “... [I]n an intestate succession a grandniece of the
deceased and not participate with a niece in the inheritance, because the latter being a nearer relative,
the more distant grandniece is excluded. In the collateral line the right of representation does not obtain
beyond sons and daughters of the brothers and sisters, which would have been the case if Pablo
Linart, the father of the plaintiff, had survived his deceased uncle.”
In the present case, the relatives "nearest in degree" to Pelagia de la Cruz are her nephews and
nieces, one of whom is Maximo de la Cruz. Necessarily, de los Santos, a grandniece is excluded by
law from the inheritance.
Pastora Piedad, being a relative within the third civil degree of the late Augusto H. Piedad,
excludes Ofelia Bagunu, a relative of the fifth degree, from succeeding ab intestato to the estate
of the decedent.
The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in degree to the decedent and
excludes the more distant ones except when and to the extent that the right of representation can
apply. Thus, Article 962 of the Civil Code provides: “In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree
excludes the more distant ones, saving the right of representation when it properly takes place.
Relatives in the same degree shall inherit in equal shares, subject to the provisions of article 1006 with
respect to relatives of the full and half blood, and of article 987, paragraph 2, concerning division
between the paternal and maternal lines.”
By right of representation, a more distant blood relative of a decedent is, by operation of law, "raised to
the same place and degree" of relationship as that of a closer blood relative of the same decedent. The
representative thereby steps into the shoes of the person he represents and succeeds, not from the
latter, but from the person to whose estate the person represented would have succeeded.
Estrada, as a third-degree relative of Justa, is the only heir of the latter.
In this case, Estrada is the son of Agatonica, the half-sister of Justa. He is thus a third degree relative
of Justa. On the other hand, the heirs of Uriarte are the sons and daughters of Justa’s cousin. They are
thus fifth degree relatives of Justa.
Applying the principle that the nearest excludes the farthest, then plaintiff is the lawful heir of Justa.
The fact that his mother is only a half-sister of Justa is of no moment.
Nevertheless, the heirs of Uriarte make much of the fact that Estrada is not an Arnaldo, his mother
being Ursula’s daughter not by Juan Arnaldo but by Pedro Arreza. They claim that this being the case,
Estrada is not an heir of Justa and thus not qualified to share in her estate.

B. Right of representation
Teotico v. del In a will written in Spanish, the late María Mortera
Val vda. de Aguirre left a huge fortune to various heirs.
One of these was a legacy of P20,000 in favor of
(1965) Rene Teotico, married to Josefina Mortera, niece of
the testatrix. The decedent also left the usufruct of
her interest in the Calvo building to said spouses.
Josefina was also instituted as universal heir to the
remainder of her properties not otherwise
specifically disposed of in the will. Ana del Val
Chan, an adopted daughter of Francisca Mortera, a
sister of the testatrix and an acknowledged natural
daughter of Jose Mortera, also a brother of María,
opposed the probate of the will.
Diaz v. The spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion
Intermediate had only two legitimate children, Juliana and
Appellate Court Simona Pamuti. Simona had a niece named Felisa
Pamuti Jardin, daughter of Juliana and her
(1987) husband Simon Jardin. Simona and her husband
Pascual Santero had an only legitimate son, Pablo
Santero, who predeceased his mother Simona.
When Pablo died in 1973, he was survived by
Simona and Pablo’s minor natural children, four
with Anselma Diaz and two with Felixberta
Pacursa. The trial court judge declared Felisa
Pamuti Jardin as the sole legitimate heir of Simona
Santero. Jardin sought to intervene in the
settlement of the estate of both Pablo and Pascual
Santero. Diaz opposed. The trial court ruled in
favor of Diaz, but was reversed on appeal before
the Intermediate Appellate Court.
In re Estate of Melodía Ferraris of Cebu City transferred to Manila.
Ferraris, More than ten years had passed since the last time
Abellana de anything was heard of about her, so she was
Bacayo v. declared presumptively dead for the purpose of
Ferraris- opening her succession. Ferraris left several
Borromeo properties in Cebu and no surviving direct
descendant, ascendant or spouse. She was
The heirs of Uriarte misappreciate the relationship between Justa and private respondent. As already
stated, Estrada is the son of Justa’s half-sister Agatonica. He is therefore Justa’s nephew. A nephew
is considered a collateral relative who may inherit if no descendant, ascendant, or spouse survive the
decedent. That Estrada is only a half-blood relative is immaterial. This alone does not disqualify him
from being his aunt’s heir.
Under the terms of the will, Ana del Val Chan has no right to intervene because she has no
interest in the estate either as heir, executor or administrator, nor does she have any claim to
property affected by the will, because it appears nowhere therein that she had been designated
by María Mortera as heir, legatee or devisee of any portion of the estate. Neither is Ana a legal
heir under the Civil Code even if the will is denied probate.
Ana del Val Chan cannot also derive comfort from the fact that she is an adopted child of Francisca
Mortera because under our law the relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter
and the adopted and does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents or of the adopted child
except only as expressly provided for by law. Hence, no relationship is created between the adopted
and the collaterals of the adopting parents. As a consequence, the adopted is an heir of the adopter but
not of the relatives of the adopter.
The minor children of Anselma Diaz, who are illegitimate children of Pablo Santero, are
disqualified from inheriting from Simona Santero by virtue of Article 992 of the Civil Code.
ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children
and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same
manner from the illegitimate child. (943a).
Pablo Santero is a legitimate child, he is not an illegitimate child. On the other hand, the oppositors
Diaz et al. are the illegitimate children of Pablo Santero.
Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a
succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the
father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized
by law for the purposes of Art. 992. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is
presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully
looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter
considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the
former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a
blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of
resentment.
Thus, petitioners herein cannot represent their father Pablo Santero in the succession of the letter to
the intestate estate of his legitimate mother Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, because of the barrier
provided for under Art. 992 of the New Civil Code.
In case of intestacy, nephews and nieces of the de cujus exclude all other collaterals (aunts and
uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the succession. This is readily apparent from articles 1001,
1004, 1005, and 1009 of the Civil Code.
Under the last article (1009), the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the decedent is a
precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to the succession.
(1965) survived by her aunt Filomena Abellana de
Bacayo, a half-sister of Melodía’s father Anacleto,
and by her nieces and nephew, children of her only
brother of the full-blood, Arturo Ferraris, who had
died ahead of her. The trial court ruled that the
nieces and nephew exclude the aunt of Melodía,
reasoning that the former are nearer in degree than
the latter since nieces and nephews succeed by
right of representation while the aunt is three
degrees distant.
CORPUS V At the time of Teodoro Yangco's death, he had no
CORPUS forced heirs. He only had his half-brother, half-
sister and the children of his other half-brother.
(1978)
Tomas Corpus filed an action to recover Juanita's
supposed share in the Yangco's intestate estate.
Juanita was the half-sister of Teodoro. She was
however a legitimate child while Teodoro was an
acknowledged natural child.
Brothers and sisters and nephews and nieces inherited ab intestato ahead of the surviving spouse,
while other collaterals succeeded only after the widower or widow. The present Civil Code of the
Philippines merely placed the spouse on a par with the nephews and nieces and brothers and sisters of
the deceased, but without altering the preferred position of the latter vis a vis the other collaterals.
Juanita Corpus, the petitioner's mother was not a legal heir of Yangco because there is no reciprocal
succession between legitimate and illegitimate relatives. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab
intestate from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother, nor shall such children or
relatives inherit in the same manner from the legitimate child.
Legitimate relatives of the mother cannot succeed for her illegitimate chid. The natural child cannot
represent his natural father in the succession to the estate of the legitimate grandparent. The natural
daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle, a legitimate brother of her natural
mother.

XX. ORDER OF INTERSTATE SUCCESSION

A. Descending direct line
1. Estate of legitimate decedent
a) Illegitimate descendants
CORPUS V supra
CORPUS

(1978)
Leonardo V CA Francisca Reyes died intestate, survived by 2 Petitioner cannot by right of representation claim a share of the estate left by the deceased Francisca
daughters, Maria and Silvestra and a grandson Reyes considering that he was born outside wedlock as shown by the fact that when he was born, his
Sotero, the son of her daughter Pascuala who died alleged putative father and mother were not yet married because his father's first marriage was still
before her. Petitioner Cresenciano, claiming to be subsisting. Petitioner would be an illegitimate child who has no right to inherit ab intestate from the
(1983) the son of the late Sotero, filed a complaint for legitimate children and relatives of his father, like Francisca. (Article 992 of the Civil Code.)
ownership of properties and accounting seeking
judgment to be declared one of the lawful heirs of
the late Francisca Reyes (alleged great-
grandmother).

DIAZ v IAC Felisa filed a petition praying among other things
that the corresponding letters of Admin be issued
(1987) in her favor and that she be appointed as special
Administratrix of the properties of the deceased
Simona.
Felisa is the niece of Simona who together with
Felisa's mother, Juliana, were the ONLY legitimate
children of spouses Felipa and Petronila. Anselma
Diaz, as guardian of her minor children with Pablo
Santero, son of Simona who died before his
The children of Pablo cannot inherit from their grandmother. Pablo was a legitimate child. On the other
hand, his children were all illegitimate. Article 992 prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato
between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said
child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Article
992. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate one, there is presumed to be an intervening
antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon the legitimate
family. Thus, petitioners cannot REPRESENT their father, Pablo, in the succession of the latter to the
intestate estate of his legitimate mother, Simona.
 mother, opposed. Likewise, Felixberta opposed as
guardian of her minor children with Pablo. Neither
Felixberta nor Anselma were married to Pablo thus
all the children of Pablo are illegitimate.

Manuel v Ferrer Petitioners, the legitimate children of sps Antonio
and Beatriz, sought the declaration of nullity of the
(1995) titles of various parcels of land. Antonio had an
illegitimate son, Juan Manuel. Because they didn't
have any children, they took in Modesta and raised
her as their own daughter.
A month after the death of her "parents", Modesta
excited an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication claiming for
herself the 3 parcels of land (all in the name of
Juan Manuel).
Petitioners argue that they are the legal heirs over
one-half of Juan's intestate estate, being the half-
siblings of Juan Manuel.
Petitioners cannot inherit from Juan Manuel. Article 992 prohibits legitimate children/relative from
inheriting from the illegitimate children. Article 992, a basic postulate, enunciates what is so commonly
referred to in the rules on succession as the "principle of absolute separation between the legitimate
family and the illegitimate family." The doctrine rejects succession ab intestato in the collateral line
between legitimate relatives, on the one hand, and illegitimate relatives, on other hand, although it does
not totally disavow such succession in the direct line. Since the rule is predicated on the presumed will
of the decedent, it has no application, however, on testamentary dispositions.
Where the illegitimate child had half-brothers who were legitimate, the latter had no right to the former's
inheritance; that the legitimate collateral relatives of the mother cannot succeed from her illegitimate
child; that a natural child cannot represent his natural father in the succession to the estate of the
legitimate grandparent; that the natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle
who is a legitimate brother of her natural father; and that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father.

2. Estate of an illegitimate decedent

a) Legitimate children and descendants
b) Illegitimate children and descendants
DIAZ v IAC supra
De La Puerta v When Dominga died, she had three surviving Assuming she is indeed the daughter of the late Vicente, as she was illegitimate, she doesn't have
CA children. Vicente, one of her children, filed a successional rights to the estate of her grandmother, Dominga. Her claims for support and inheritance
petition to adopt Carmelita years after his mother should be filed in the proceedings for the settlement of her own father's estate and cannot be
died. Petition was granted but was appealed by considered in the probate of Dominga's will. She may only inherit from the intestate estate of her father.
(2009) Isabel (his sister). During the pendency of the
appeal, Vicente died. Carmelita, filed a motion for
the payment of her monthly allowance as the
acknowledged natural child of Vicente. However,
Isabel opposed saying that Carmelita couldn't be
have been the natural child of Vicente because she
was the daughter of a certain Juanita and Gloria.
Now, Carmelita is claiming successional rights to
the estate of Dominga, her alleged grandmother.

Suntay v Federico Suntay opposes Isabel's petition for Isabel is a legitimate daughter of Emilio and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay because she was born before
Cojuangco appointment as administratrix of her grandmother's the marriage was annulled. (note: marriage was voidable). Isabel may invoke her successional right of
estate by virtue of her right of representation. representation in the estate of her grandmother when her father predeceased her grandmother.

(1998) Isabel is the daughter of Emilio and Isabel

Cojuangco-Suntay whose marriage was then
declared null and void. Federico opposed saying
he is the surviving spouse of the decedent and that
he has been managing the conjugal properties.
 B. Surviving spouse
Santillon v Pedro died intestate leaving one son, Claro and his Since this is an intestate proceeding, Article 996 applies. Claro can't rely on Article 892 to support his
Miranda wife, Perfecta. During his marriage, Pedro acquired claim to ¾ of his father's estate as Article 982 falls under the chapter of Testamentary Succession.
several parcels of land. Claro then filed a petition Article 892 merely fixes the legitime of the surviving spouse and Art 888 thereof, the legitime of children
for letters of administration. His mother opposed on in the testate succession. While it may indicate the intuit of the law with respect to the ideal shares that
(1977) the ground that the properties enumerated in the a chidl and a spouse should get when they concur with each other, it does not fix the amount of shares
petition were all conjugal except for three which that such child and spouse are entitled when intestacy occurs. but if the latter happens, 996 applies.
Perfecta owned. Claro filed a motion to declare
share of heirs and to resolve the conflicting claims Article 996 provides that when the widow survives with only 1 legitimate children, they share the estate
of the parties with respect to their rights in the in equal parts (the estate of Claro). In intestate succession, where there is only one child of the
estate. Invoking 892, he insisted that after marriage, the child gets one-half and the widow/widower gets the other half.
deducting ½ from the conjugal properties in the
conjugal share of Perfecta, the remaining ½ must
be divided as follows: ¼ for her and ¾ for him.
Perfecta on the other hand claimed that besides
her conjugal half, she was entitled, under article
996, to another ½ of the remaining half.

C. Ascending direct line

1. Legitimate parents and ascendants
2. Illegitimate parents
D. Collateral line
Bicomong v Simeon and Sisenandra got married and had three In the absence of descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or surviving spouse, collateral
Almanza children, Perpetua (who had four children), Igmedia relatives succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. Since Maura died intestate and her husband and
(who had 3 children) and Ignacio (who had 1 child). her ascendants died ahead of her, she is succeeded by surviving collateral relatives, namely the 1) her
When Sisenandra died, Simeon married Silvestra) niece: the daughter of her sister of full blood and 2) her nieces and nephews: the children of her brother
() and had 2 children, Felipa (who had 2 children) and sisters of half-blood. (Note: all of them are legitimate)
and Maura.
The nephews and nieces are entitled to inherit in their own right. Nephews and nieces alone do not
The subject matte is the half undivided share of inherit by right of representation unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased. The
Maura Bagsic which she inherited from Silvestra contention that Maura should be succeeded by Felipa to the exclusion of the nephews and nieces is
(her mother who died already). Her nieces and erroneous. As it was shown, Felipa predeceased her sister Maura.
nephews from the first marriage of her father claim
successional rights. However, her brother-in-law
and her niece (Felipa's husband and daughter)
opposed contending that since Maura died ahead
of Felipa, Felipa succeeded to Maura's estate, to
the exclusion of the plaintiffs. They said that the
relatives nearest in degree excludes the more
distant ones.
Abellana v Melida was declared presumptively dead and was
Borromeo survived by her aunt (half-sister of her father), and
by her nieces and nephew (children of her only A decedent's uncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestato when there are nephews and nieces of
brother of full blood who predeceased her). They the decedent still alive and are willing and qualified.
(1965) claim to be the nearest intestate heirs and seek to
participate in the estate of Melodia. As an aunt, she is as far distant as the nephews/nieces. However, in case of intestacy, nephews and
nieces exclude all other collaterals (aunts, uncles).
 E. The State
PROVISIONS COMMON TO TESTATE AND INTESTATE SUCCESSION
XXI. RIGHT OF ACCRETION
A. Concept
B. In legal succession
C. Testamentary
XXII. PARTITION AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE
A. Partition
Legasto v. Sabina Almadin executed a will, devising certain
Verzosa parcels of land belonging to her, to her four nieces,
Maria Verzosa, Oliva Verzosa, Toribia Verzosa,
(1930) and Ruperta Palma, daughters of her sister
Catalina Almadin, designating the parcels to be
given to each.
Prior to her death, Sabina Almadin partitioned her
property among her aforesaid sister and nieces,
executing a deed to her niece, Maria Verzosa,
assigning and making over to her three parcels of
her land. Maria Verzosa and Sabina Almadin
appeared before the deputy provincial assessor
and municipal secretary of Biñan, stating that the
land was sold by the aunt to the niece. Sabina
likewise executed several deeds assigning
respective properties to the other nieces.
The assignees, Maria Verzosa, Toribia Verzosa,
Oliva Verzosa, and Ruperta Palma, took
possession of their respective parcels thus ceded
by Sabina Almadin, and have to this day been
cultivating them as exclusive owners thereof.
Vivencio Legasto, the special administrator of
Sabina Almadin's estate, filed the complaint which
originated this case, claiming the delivery of the
parcels of land. The first question to decide in the
instant appeal is whether the partition made by
Sabina Almadin of her property among her nieces,
the defendants and appellants herein, was valid
enforceable.
Article 1056 of the Civil Code provides: ART. 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his
property by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall stand in so far as it does not prejudice the
legitime of the forced heirs.
Manresa comments on the article as follows:
A distinction must be made between the disposition of property and its division; and the provision of
article 1056 authorizing the testator to dispose of his property by acts inter vivos or by last will, must be
understood in accordance with this distinction. The idea is to divide the estate among the heirs
designated by the testator. This designation constitutes the disposition of the properties to take effect
after his death, and said act must necessarily appear in the testament because it is the expression of
the testator's last will and must be surrounded by appropriate formalities. Then comes the second part,
to wit, the division in conformity with that disposition, and the testator may make this division in the
same will or in another will, or by an act inter vivos. With these words the law, in article 1056 as well as
in article 1057, which we shall hereafter examine, makes allusion to the forms or manner of making the
partition and not to the effects thereof, which means that, for the purposes of partition the formal
solemnities which must accompany every testament or last will are not necessary. Neither is it
necessary to observe the special formalities required in case of donations, because it is not a matter of
disposing gratuitously of properties, but of dividing those which already have been legally disposed of.
It is thus seen that both the Spanish Supreme Court and the learned and authoritative commentator,
Manresa, are of opinion that a testator may, by an act inter vivos, partition his property, but he must first
make a will with all the formalities provided for by law. And it could not be otherwise, for without a will
there can be no testator; when the law, therefore, speaks of the partition inter vivos made by a testator
of his property, it necessarily refers to that property which he has devised to his heirs. A person who
disposes of his property gratis inter vivos in not called a testator, but a donor. In employing the word
"testator," the law evidently desired to distinguish between the one who freely donates his property in
life and one who disposes of it by will to take effect his death.
BUT: As Sabina Almadin's will was disallowed for the reason that it did not contain all the essential
requisites provided by law for its validity, can the aforesaid partition of her estate made by said testatrix
among her nieces be deemed valid? Certainly not; for it is an indispensable condition precedent to a
testator partitioning his estate inter vivos that he have made a valid will disposing of said estate among
his heirs; and if this will be declared null and void, the partition made by the testator in pursuance of its
provisions is likewise null and void, for where these provisions cease to exist, the partition made in
conformity therewith also becomes null and void, as the cessation of the cause implies the cessation of
the effect.
And since Sabina Almadin's will is null and void for lack of the legal requisites, consequently, the
partition which she made of her estate among her nieces the defendants-appellants herein, during her
lifetime is likewise null and void.
Fajardo v. Appellant and appellee are brother and sister, and
Fajardo the sole heirs of the decedent spouses.
(1930) Appellant alleges that his father had long before
death divided his estate between his children, while
appellee denies such partition.
The evidence shows that the appellant took
possession of certain lands belonging to his
deceased father before the latter's death, paying
the land tax and appropriating the fruits thereof for
his own personal use.
There are only two ways in which said partition could have been made: By an act inter vivos, or by will.
In either case there were formalities which must be followed. Manresa thus comments on articles
1056 et seq. of the Civil Code: A testator may therefore partition his estate either by an act inter
vivos or by will; that is, following the proper formalities of one, or the other of these acts.
(Commentaries on the Spanish Civil Code, vol VII, p. 694, 5th edition.)
If the partition was made by an act inter vivos, it should have been reduced in writing (sec. 335, No. 5,
Code of Civ. Proc.) in a public instrument (article 1280, Civil Code) because it was a conveyance of real
estate. If by last will and testament, the legal requisites should have been observed. Neither appears in
the record to have been done.

While the appellee, too, now holds certain land

from the same predecessor, it has not been shown
that such tenure dates back to her father's lifetime.
And both she and her husband have testified that
they took possession thereof only after her father's
death.
The record, then, does not bear out the allegation
that the late Magdaleno Fajardo divided his estate
between his two children who are the parties
herein.
At any rate, it does not appear that if such a
partition was made, it was made in accordance
with law and is therefore enforceable.
Tuason v. In 1941 the sisters Angela I. Tuason and Nieves ART. 400. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain a party to the community. Each may, at any time,
Tuason Tuason de Barreto and their brother Antonio demand the partition of the thing held in common.
Tuason Jr., held a parcel of land in common, each Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a specified length of time, not exceeding
(1951) owning an undivided 1/3 portion. Nieves wanted ten years, shall be valid. This period may be a new agreement.
and asked for a partition of the common property,
but failing in this, she offered to sell her 1/3 portion. We agree with the trial court that the provisions of Art. 400 of the Civil Code are not applicable. The
Eventually, the share of Nieves was sold to contract (Exh., 6) far from violating the legal provision that forbids a co-owner being obliged to remain a
Gregorio Araneta Inc., a domestic corporation, and party to the community, precisely has for its purpose and object the dissolution of the co-ownership and
a new Certificate of Title No. 61721 was issued in of the community by selling the parcel held in common and dividing the proceeds of the sale among the
lieu of the old title. The three co-owners agreed to co-owners. The obligation imposed in the contract to preserve the co-ownership until all the lots shall
have the whole parcel subdivided into small lots have been sold, is a mere incident to the main object of dissolving the co-owners. By virtue of the
and then sold, the proceeds of the sale to be later document Exh. 6, the parties thereto practically and substantially entered into a contract of partnership
divided among them. This agreement is embodied as the best and most expedient means of eventually dissolving the co-ownership, the life of said
in a document entitled "Memorandum of partnership to end when the object of its creation shall have been attained.
Agreement."

Before, during and after the execution of this

contract, Atty. J. Antonio Araneta was acting as the
attorney-in-fact and lawyer of the two co-owners,
Angela I. Tuason and her brother Antonio Tuason
Jr. The contract provides that the three co-owners
agreed to develop their co-owned land into a
residential subdivision.
 Later, Angela I. Tuason revoked the powers
conferred on J. Antonio Araneta. Angela notified
Araneta, Inc. that because of alleged breach of the
terms of the "Memorandum of Agreement" and
abuse of powers granted to it in the document, she
had decided to rescind said contract and she
asked that the property held in common be
partitioned. Angela filed a complaint in the CFI
asking the court to order the partition of the
property in question and that she be given 1/3 of
the same including rents collected during the time
that the same including rents collected during the
time that Araneta Inc., administered said property.

The main contention of the appellant is that the

contract should be declared null and void because
its terms provide that if the Tuasons decide to sell
their shares, the Araneta Inc shall have the right of
first refusal. If Araneta does not buy the property,
sale to third parties shall be subject to the terms
and conditions of Araneta Inc. Such proviso is
alleged to be contrary to Art 400 of CC.
Chavez v. IAC The land in question is the paraphernal property of
petitioner Manuel Buenavista (defendant in Civil
(1990) Case No. 1934 of the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Norte) who had six (6) children, named
Antonio, Rosario, Concepcion, Raquel,
Presentacion and Floserpina.
Presentacion Chavez, with the conformity of her
mother, Manuela Buenavista, executed a deed of
sale pertaining to her 1/6 undivided share of the
land in question to her sister, Concepcion Chavez.
Two years later, Floserpina Chavez, with the
conformity of her mother, also sold her 1/6
undivided share of the same land to her sister,
Concepcion. Raquel, with the conformity of her
mother, likewise sold her undivided 1/6 share of
the same property to Concepcion Chavez. Having
acquired the shares of Presentacion, Floserpina
and Raquel, Concepcion thereby became the
owner of a total undivided 4/6 share of the land in
question with Antonio and Rosario as owners of the
remaining 2/6 shares.
In all documents, it is provided that: the owner,
Manuela Buenavista, had assigned or distributed to
her children, in equal pro-indiviso shares
Despite the transfers or assignments her children
had executed with her conformity ten years earlier,
Article 1080 of the New Civil Code allows a person to make a partition of his estate either by an
act inter vivos or by will and such partition shall be respected insofar as it does not prejudice the
legitimate of the compulsory heirs. While the law prohibits contracts upon future inheritance, the
partition by the parent, as provided in Art. 1080, is a case expressly authorized by law (Art. 1347, par.
2, Civil Code of the Phil. by Padilla, 1987 Edition, p. 744.) Art. 1080 of the Civil Code clearly gives a
person two options in making a partition of his estate; either by an act inter vivos or by WILL. When a
person makes a partition by will, it is imperative that such partition must be executed in accordance with
the provisions of the law on wills; however, when a person makes the partition of his estate by an
act inter vivos, such partition may even be oral or written, and need not be in the form of a will, provided
that the partition does not prejudice the legitime of compulsory heirs.
In numerous cases it has been held or stated that parol partitions may be sustained on the ground of
estoppel of the parties to assert the rights of a tenant in common as to parts of land divided by parol
partition as to which possession in severalty was taken and acts of individual ownership were
exercised. And a court of equity will recognize the agreement and decree it to be valid and effectual for
the purpose of concluding the right of the parties as between each other to hold their respective parts in
severalty.
A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties thereto have acquiesced in and
ratified the partition by taking possession in severalty, exercising acts of ownership with respect thereto,
or otherwise recognizing the existence of the partition. (Hernandez vs. Andal, et al., 78 Phil. 196, 203.)
In the instant case, the respondent appellate court declared the Deeds of Sale executed by
Presentacion, Floserfina and Raquel, all surnamed Chavez (Exhs. A, B, and C) in favor of Concepcion
Chavez as evidence of a valid partition of the land in question by and between Manuela Buenavista and
her children as she not only gave her authority thereto but also signed the sales. The Deeds of Sale
(Exhs. A, B, and C) are not contracts entered into with respect to feature inheritance but a contract
perfected and consummated during the lifetime of Manuela Buenavista who signed the same and gave
her consent thereto. Such partition inter vivos, executed by the property owner herself, is valid.
 Manuela Buenavista, on August 27, 1968, signed a
"Bilihang Patuluyan ng Lupa" of the entire property
in favor of her daughter, Raquel Chavez, and her
husband, Gerardo Jimenez. On October 7, 1968,
Antonio, Rosario and Concepcion filed Civil Case
No. 1934 against their mother Manuela and their
sister Raquel. Thereupon, Manuela sold the entire
property to Pepito Ferrer, on February 4, 1969
(Exh. F) with right to repurchase. Ferrer was later
sued as an additional defendant in Civil Case No.
1934.
After the trial, judgment was rendered by the trial
court dismissing the complaint, dissolving the
preliminary injunction it had previously issued, and
ordering the plaintiffs to pay the costs. The court
did not award damages.
Alsua- Betts v. Spouses Alsua and their children entered into a
CA duly notarized agreement, Escritura de Particion
Extrajudicial, over the then present and existing
(1979) properties of the spouses Don Jesus and Doña
Florentina enumerated in a prepared inventory.
On January 5, 1955, Don Jesus and Doña
Florentina, also known as Doñ;a Tinay separately
executed their respective holographic wills, the
provisions of which were in conformity and in
implementation of the extrajudicial partition of
November 25, 1949. Their holographic wills
similarly provided for the institution of the other to
his or her share in the conjugal properties, the
other half of the conjugal assets having been
partitioned to constitute their legitime among their
four living children in the Extrajudicial Partition of
1949.
The spouses Don Jesus and Doña Tinay filed
before the Court of First Instance of Albay their
respective petitions for the probate of their
respective holographic wills.
Upon death of Dona Tinay, Don Jesus cancelled
his holographic will in the presence of his
bookkeeper and secretary, Esteban P. Ramirez,
whom he instructed to make a list of all his
remaining properties with their corresponding
descriptions.
This notarial will and testament (Exh. A) of Don
Jesus executed on November 14, 1959 had three
essential features: (a) it expressly cancelled,
revoked and annulled all the provisions of Don
.... As the defendants freely participated in the partition, they are now estopped from denying and
repudiating the consequences of their own voluntary acts. It is a general principle of law that no one
may be permitted to disavow and go back upon his own acts, or to proceed contrary thereto. (Joaquin
vs. Mitsumine 34 Phil. 858.)
Where a piece of land has been included in a partition, and there is no allegation that the inclusion was
effected through improper means or without the petitioner's knowledge, the partition barred any further
litigation on said title and operated to bring the property under the control and jurisdiction of the court
for proper disposition according to the tenor of the partition... They cannot attack the partition
collaterally ...
We do not agree with this ruling of the Court of Appeals. We hold that the Extrajudicial Partition of
November 25, 1949 is null and void under Article 1056 in relation to Article 1271 of the old Civil Code
which are applicable hereto. These Articles provide as follows:
Art. 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his property by an act inter vivos, or by will,
such partition shall stand in so far as it does not prejudice the legitime of the forced heirs. ...
Art. 1271. All things, even future ones, which are not excluded from the commerce of man,
may be the subject-matter of contracts.
Nevertheless, no contract may be entered into with respect to future inheritances, except
those the object of which is to make a division inter vivos of an estate, in accordance with
Article 1056.
All services not contrary to law or to good morals may also be the subject- matter of contract.
Article 1056 specifically uses the word "testator" from which the clear intent of the law may be deduced
that the privilege of partitioning one's estate by acts inter vivos is restricted only to one who has made a
prior will or testament. In other words, Article 1056 being an exception cannot be given a wider scope
as to include in the exception any person whether he has made a will or not.
We are not in conformity with the holding of the respondent court that the extrajudicial partition of
November 25, 1949 which under the old Civil Code was expressly prohibited as against public policy
had been validly ratified by the holographic will of Don Jesus executed on January 5, 1955 and his
codicil of August 14, 1956. Such a holding of the appellate court that a person who executes a will is
permitted to partition his properties pursuant to the provisions of Article 1056 of the old Civil Code even
before executing his will as long as he mentions this fact in the will, is not warranted under the ruling
of Legasto vs. Verzosa, supra and the commentary of Manresa as quoted above. We rule, therefore,
that the respondent court erred in denying probate to the will of Don Jesus dated November 14, 1959; it
erred in holding that Don Jesus being a party to the extrajudicial partition of 1949 was contractually
bound by the provisions thereof and hence could not revoke his participation therein by the simple
expedience of making a new will with contrary provisions or dispositions. It is an error because the so-
called extrajudicial partition of 1949 is void and inoperative as a partition; neither is it a valid or
enforceable contract because it involved future inheritance; it may only be given effect as a donation
inter vivos of specific properties to the heirs made by the parents.
 Jesus' holographic will of January 5, 1955 and his
codicil of August 14, 1956; (b) it provided for the
collation of all his properties donated to his four
living children by virtue of the "Escritura de
Particion Extra. judicial" of 1949, and that such
properties be taken into account in the partition of
his estate among the children; and (c) it instituted
his children as legatees/devisees of certain specific
properties, and as to the rest of the properties and
whatever may be subsequently acquired in the
future, before his death, were to be given to
Francisca and Pablo, naming Francesca as
executrix to serve without a bond.
On May 6,1964, Don Jesus Alsua died.
The respondent court ruled that the Extrajudicial
Partition of November 25, 1949 was an
enforceable contract which was binding on Don
Jesus Alsua as the surviving spouse, barring him
from violating said partition agreement, barring him
from revoking his holographic will of January 5,
1955 and his codicil of August 14, 1956, and
further barring him from executing his new will and
testament of November 14, 1959, now the subject
of the probate proceedings elevated to this Court.
Doromal v. CA Lot was owned by the late Justice Antonio
Horilleno; but before he died, he executed a last
(1975) will and testament attesting to the fact that it was a
co-ownership between himself and his brothers
and sisters: Luis, Soledad, Fe, Rosita, Carlos and
Esperanza.
Shares of the siblings were sold to spouses
Doromal. Petitioner, 1/7 co-owner, want to redeem
the shares sold.
Considering that the document, the extrajudicial partition of November 25, 1949, contained specific
designation of properties allotted to each child, We rule that there was substantial compliance with the
rules on donations inter vivos under the old Civil Code (Article 633). On the other hand, there could
have been no valid donation to the children of the other half reserved as the free portion of Don Jesus
and Doñ;a Tinay which, as stated in the deed, was to be divided equally among the children for the
simple reason that the property or properties were not specifically described in the public instrument, an
essential requirement under Article 633 which provides as follows:
Art. 633. In order that a donation or real property be valid it must be made by public instrument
in which the property donated must be specifically described and in the amount of the
encumbrances to be assumed by the donee expressed.
The acceptance must be made in the deed of gift or in a separate public writing; but it shall
produce no effect if not made during the lifetime of the donor.
If the acceptance is made by separate public instrument, authentic notice thereof shall be
given the donor, and this proceeding shall be noted in both instruments.
This other half, therefore, remained as the disposable free portion of the spouses which may be
disposed of in such manner that either of the spouses would like in regards to his or her share in such
portion, unencumbered by the provision enjoining the last surviving spouse to give equally to the
children what belongs or-would pertain to him or her. The end result, therefore, is that Don Jesus and
Doñ;a Tinay, in the Deed of 1949, made to their children valid donations of only one-half of their
combined properties which must be charged against their legitime and cannot anymore be revoked
unless inofficious; the other half remained entirely at the free disposal of the spouses with regards to
their respective shares.
Petitioners do not question respondent's right to redeem, she being admittedly a 1/7 co-owner of the
property in dispute. The thrust of their first assignment of error is that for purposes of Article 1623 of the
Civil Code which provides that:
ART. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty days
from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of
sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor
that he has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining owners.
the letters sent by Carlos Horilleno to respondent and dated January 18, 1968, Exhibit 7, and
November 5, 1967, Exhibit 6, constituted the required notice in writing from which the 30-day period
fixed in said provision should be computed.
In the light of these considerations, it cannot be said that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the
letters aforementioned sufficed to comply with the requirement of notice of a sale by co-owners under
Article 1623 of the Civil Code. We are of the considered opinion and so hold that for purposes of the co-
owner's right of redemption granted by Article 1620 of the Civil Code, the notice in writing which Article
1623 requires to be made to the other co-owners and from receipt of which the 30-day period to
redeem should be counted is a notice not only of a perfected sale but of the actual execution and
delivery of the deed of sale. This is implied from the latter portion of Article 1623 which requires that
before a register of deeds can record a sale by a co-owner, there must be presented to him, an affidavit
to the effect that the notice of the sale had been sent in writing to the other co-owners. A sale may not
be presented to the register of deeds for registration unless it be in the form of a duly executed public

Alonzo v. IAC Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro
indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in 'the
(1987) name of their deceased parents under OCT No.
10977 of the Registry of Deeds of Tarlac.
In 1963, one of them, Celestino Padua, transferred
his undivided share of the herein petitioners for the
sum of P550.00 by way of absolute sale. One year
later, on April 22, 1964, Eustaquia Padua, his
sister, sold her own share to the same vendees, in
an instrument denominated "Con Pacto de Retro
Sale.”
By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners
occupied, after the said sales, an area
corresponding to two-fifths of the said lot,
representing the portions sold to them. The
vendees subsequently enclosed the same with a
fence. In 1975, with their consent, their son
Eduardo Alonzo and his wife built a semi-concrete
house on a part of the enclosed area.
On February 25, 1976, Mariano Padua, one of the
five coheirs, sought to redeem the area sold to the
spouses Alonzo, but his complaint was dismissed
when it appeared that he was an American
citizen. On May 27, 1977, however, Tecla Padua,
another co-heir, filed her own complaint invoking
the same right of redemption claimed by her
brother.
The trial court also dismiss this complaint, now on
the ground that the right had lapsed, not having
been exercised within thirty days from notice of the
sales in 1963 and 1964. Although there was no
written notice, it was held that actual knowledge of
the sales by the co-heirs satisfied the requirement
of the law. The co-heirs lived on the same lot.
instrument. Moreover, the law prefers that all the terms and conditions of the sale should be definite
and in writing. As aptly observed by Justice Gatmaitan in the decision under review, Article 1619 of the
Civil Code bestows unto a co-owner the right to redeem and "to be subrogated under the same terms
and conditions stipulated in the contract", and to avoid any controversy as to the terms and conditions
under which the right to redeem may be exercised, it is best that the period therefor should not be
deemed to have commenced unless the notice of the disposition is made after the formal deed of
disposal has been duly executed. And it being beyond dispute that respondent herein has never been
notified in writing of the execution of the deed of sale by which petitioners acquired the subject property,
it necessarily follows that her tender to redeem the same made on June 10, 1968 was well within the
period prescribed by law. Indeed, it is immaterial when she might have actually come to know about
said deed, it appearing she has never been shown a copy thereof through a written communication by
either any of the petitioners-purchasers or any of her co-owners-vendees
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all
of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the
sale, provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of
the sale by the vendor.
According to Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who was the ponente of the Court, furnishing the co-heirs with a
copy of the deed of sale of the property subject to redemption would satisfy the requirement for written
notice. "So long, therefore, as the latter (i.e., the redemptioner) is informed in writing of the sale and the
particulars thereof," he declared, "the thirty days for redemption start running. "
In the earlier decision of Butte v. UY, " the Court, speaking through the same learned jurist, emphasized
that the written notice should be given by the vendor and not the vendees, conformably to a similar
requirement under Article 1623, reading as follows:
Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty days
from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendors, as the case may be. The deed
of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the
vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of the adjoining owners.
As "it is thus apparent that the Philippine legislature in Article 1623 deliberately selected a particular
method of giving notice, and that notice must be deemed exclusive," the Court held that notice given by
the vendees and not the vendor would not toll the running of the 30-day period.
The petition before us appears to be an illustration of the Holmes dictum that "hard cases make bad
laws" as the petitioners obviously cannot argue against the fact that there was really no written notice
given by the vendors to their co-heirs. Strictly applied and interpreted, Article 1088 can lead to only one
conclusion, to wit, that in view of such deficiency, the 30 day period for redemption had not begun to
run, much less expired in 1977.
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its
purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge
should be to discover in its provisions the in tent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never
be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An
indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render
justice.
In the face of the established facts, we cannot accept the private respondents' pretense that they were
unaware of the sales made by their brother and sister in 1963 and 1964. By requiring written proof of
such notice, we would be closing our eyes to the obvious truth in favor of their palpably false claim of

Bautista v. Can the property of the surviving husband be the
Grino-Aquino subject of an extrajudicial partition of the estate of
the deceased wife?
(1988)
The land of Manuel Bautista was subject to extra-
judicial partition among the heirs of his late wife
(Manuel’s children with his first wife). Manuel
married again and had one offspring. Manuel
Bautista denied participation in the Extrajudicial
Partition of Property.
De los Santos v. Gertrudes de los Santos filed a complaint for
De la Cruz specific performance against Maximo de la Cruz,
alleging, among others, that on August 24, 1963,
she and several co-heirs, including the defendant,
executed an extrajudicial partition agreement (a
copy of which was attached to the complaint) over
a certain portion of land.
In his answer, the defendant admitted the due
execution of the extrajudicial partition agreement,
but set up the affirmative defenses that the plaintiff
had no cause of action against him because the
said agreement was void with respect to her, for
the reason that the plaintiff was not an heir of
Pelagia de la Cruz, deceased owner of the
property, and was included in the extrajudicial
partition agreement by mistake.
The owner of the estate, subject matter of the
ignorance, thus exalting the letter of the law over its purpose. The purpose is clear enough: to make
sure that the redemptioners are duly notified. We are satisfied that in this case the other brothers and
sisters were actually informed, although not in writing, of the sales made in 1963 and 1964, and that
such notice was sufficient.
The property subject matter of said extrajudicial partition does not belong to the estate of Juliana
Nojadera. It is the exclusive property of Manuel Bautista who inherited the same from his father
Mariano Bautista, which was registered in his name under T.C.T. No. 2210.
Under Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court an extrajudicial settlement of the Estate applies only to
the estate left by the decedent who died without a will, and with no creditors, and the heirs are all of age
or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives. If the property does not belong
to the estate of the decedent certainly it cannot be the subject matter of an extrajudicial partition.
As the subject property does not belong to the estate of Juliana Nojadera, the Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition, isvoid ab initio being contrary to law. To include in an extrajudicial partition property which
does not pertain to the estate of the deceased would be to deprive the lawful owner thereof of his
property without due process of law. Only property of the estate of the decedent which is transmitted by
succession can be the lawful subject matter of an extrajudicial partition. In this case, the said partition
obviously prejudices the right of Manuel Bautista as exclusive owner of the property.
The said partition also effectively resulted in the preterition of the right of Evangeline Bautista as a
compulsory heir of Manuel Bautista, daughter of the latter by his second marriage. It is difficult to
believe that Manuel Bautista would wittingly overlook and ignore the right of her daughter Evangeline to
share in the said property. It is not surprising that he denied signing the said document. Moreover,
private respondents knew Evangeline Bautista who is their half-sister to be a compulsory heir. The
court finds that her preterition was attended with bad faith hence the said partition must be rescinded.
Prescription cannot be invoked in this case as the petitioners' right to sue their co-owners for partition of
the property is imprescriptible. And even assuming that the present action may prescribe as ruled by
the respondent court, petitioners Emiliana Bautista and Evangeline Bautista who are not parties to the
said instrument asserted that they discovered the same only soon before they filed the complaint in
court. Certainly the action has not prescribed.
The pivotal question is whether, in the premises, plaintiff-appellee is a heir of the decedent. We are
convinced that she is not. Plaintiff-appellee being a mere grandniece of Pelagia de la Cruz, she could
not inherit from the latter by right of representation.
But what is the legal effect of plaintiff-appellee's inclusion and participation in the extrajudicial partition
agreement insofar as her right to bring the present action is concerned? They did not confer upon her
the right to institute this action. The express purpose of the extrajudicial partition agreement, as
admitted by the parties in the stipulation of facts, was to divide the estate among the heirs of Pelagia de
la Cruz. Indeed, the said agreement itself states that plaintiff-appellee was participating therein in
representation of her deceased mother.
It is quite apparent that in executing the partition agreement, the parties thereto were laboring under the
erroneous belief that plaintiff-appellee was one of the legal heirs of Pelagia de la Cruz. Plaintiff-appellee
not being such a heir, the partition is void with respect to her, pursuant to Article 1105 of the Civil Code,
which reads:
ART. 1105. A partition which includes a person believed to be a heir, but who is not, shall be void only
with respect to such person.
 extrajudicial partition agreement, was Pelagia de la
Cruz, who died intestate on October 16, 1962; that
defendant-appellant is a nephew of the said
decedent; that plaintiff-appellee is a grandniece of
Pelagia de la Cruz, her mother, Marciana de la
Cruz, being a niece of the said Pelagia de la Cruz;
that plaintiff-appellee's mother died on September
22, 1935, thus predeceasing Pelagia de la Cruz;
and that the purpose of the extrajudicial partition
agreement was to divide and distribute the
estate among the heirs of Pelagia de la Cruz.
Lacbayan v. Petitioner and respondent met each other through
Samoy a common friend sometime in 1978. Despite
respondent being already married, their
(2011) relationship developed until petitioner gave birth to
respondent’s son.
During their illicit relationship, petitioner and
respondent, together with three more
incorporators, were able to establish a manpower
services company. Five parcels of land were also
acquired during the said period and were
registered in petitioner and respondent’s names,
ostensibly as husband and wife.
Eventually, however, their relationship turned sour
and they decided to part ways sometime in 1991.
In 1998, both parties agreed to divide the said
properties and terminate their business partnership
by executing a Partition Agreement. Initially,
respondent agreed to petitioner’s proposal that the
properties in Malvar St. and Don Enrique Heights
be assigned to the latter, while the ownership over
the three other properties will go to
respondent. However, when petitioner wanted
additional demands to be included in the partition
agreement, respondent refused. Feeling aggrieved,
petitioner filed a complaint for judicial partition of
the said properties before the RTC in Quezon City
on May 31, 1999.
Ureta v Ureta supra
(2011)
OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS
PART I - OBLIGATIONS
XXIII. IN GENERAL
a. Nature
Partition of property affected between a person entitled to inherit from the deceased owner thereof and
another person who thought he was an heir, when he was not really and lawfully such, to the prejudice
of the rights of the true heir designated by law to succeed the deceased, is null and void (De Torres vs.
De Torres, et al., 28 Phil. 49). A fortiori, plaintiff-appellee could hardly derive from the agreement the
right to have its terms enforced.
The extrajudicial partition agreement being void with respect to
plaintiff-appellee, she may not be heard to assert estoppel against defendant-appellant. Estoppel
cannot be predicated on a void contract (17 Am. Jur. 605), or on acts which are prohibited by law or are
against public policy.
The determination as to the existence of co-ownership is necessary in the resolution of an action for
partition. Thus:
The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination of whether or not
a co-ownership in fact exists, and a partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may
be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This phase may end with a
declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either because a co-ownership does not exist,
or partition is legally prohibited. It may end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership
does in truth exist, partition is proper in the premises and an accounting of rents and profits received by
the defendant from the real estate in question is in order. x x x
The second phase commences when it appears that "the parties are unable to agree upon the partition"
directed by the court. In that event[,] partition shall be done for the parties by the [c]ourt with the
assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. This second stage may well also deal with the
rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by the [c]ourt after the parties have been accorded
opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for the recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of
their just share in the rents and profits of the real estate in question. x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
While it is true that the complaint involved here is one for partition, the same is premised on the
existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the parties. Petitioner insists she is a co-owner
pro indiviso of the five real estate properties based on the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) covering
the subject properties. Respondent maintains otherwise. Indubitably, therefore, until and unless this
issue of co-ownership is definitely and finally resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the
disputed properties. More importantly, the complaint will not even lie if the claimant, or petitioner in this
case, does not even have any rightful interest over the subject properties.
There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked, but that rule is not
material to the case at bar. What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title
itself. The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds known as the TCT. In
contrast, the title referred to by law means ownership which is, more often than not, represented by that
document. Petitioner apparently confuses title with the certificate of title. Title as a concept of ownership
should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such ownership although both are
interchangeably used.
 i. Definition
ii. Sources
a) Law
b) Contract
PSBA VS. CA A stabbing incident on 30 August 1985 which
caused the death of Carlitos Bautista while on the
(1992) second-floor premises of the Philippine School of
Business Administration (PSBA) prompted the
parents of the deceased to file suit in the Regional
Trial Court of Manila (Branch 47) presided over by
Judge (now Court of Appeals justice) Regina
Ordoñez-Benitez, for damages against the said
PSBA and its corporate officers. At the time of his
death, Carlitos was enrolled in the third year
commerce course at the PSBA. It was established
that his assailants were not members of the
school's academic community but were elements
from outside the school.
The suit impleaded the PSBA and some school
authorities. Substantially, private respondents
sought to adjudge them liable for the victim's
untimely demise due to their alleged negligence,
recklessness and lack of security precautions,
means and methods before, during and after the
attack on the victim. Petitioners now seek to have
the suit dismissed, alleging that since they are
presumably sued under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, the complaint states no cause of action
against them, as jurisprudence on the subject is to
the effect that academic institutions, such as the
PSBA, are beyond the ambit of the rule in the
afore-stated article.
c) Quasi-Contract
d) Delict
e) Quasi-Delict
BARREDO VS. A taxi driven Fontanilla and owned by petitioner
GARCIA collided with a carretela. Faustino Garcia, a 16
year-old boy who was a passenger of the caratella,
died as a result of injuries he sustained from the
(1942) collision. Respondents are the parents of Faustino
who filed a criminal action against Fontanilla in the
CFI. The latter was convicted and sentenced.
Respondents then brought an action in the CFI of
A contractual relation is a condition sine qua nonto the school's liability. The negligence of the school
cannot exist independently of the contract, unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances set
out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.
Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule of in loco parentis.
In all such cases, it had been stressed that the law (Article 2180) plainly provides that the damage
should have been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of he educational institution sought to be
held liable for the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody. However, this material situation
does not exist in the present case for, as earlier indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not
students of the PSBA, for whose acts the school could be made liable.
When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established
a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to
comply with. For its part, the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that
would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher
education or a profession. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the school's
academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations.
Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or "built-in" obligation of providing their
students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of
imparting knowledge. Necessarily, the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain
peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof.
Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the PSBA and
Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. 8 A perusal of Article 2176 shows that
obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only
between parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied. However, this
impression has not prevented this Court from determining the existence of a tort even when
there obtains a contract. From the cases of Air France vs. Carrascoso and Cangco vs. Manila
Railroad, it can be concluded that should the act which breaches a contract be done in bad faith
and be violative of Article 21, then there is a cause to view the act as constituting a quasi-delict.
In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as yet, no finding that the contract
between the school and Bautista had been breached thru the former's negligence in providing proper
security measures. This would be for the trial court to determine. And, even if there be a finding of
negligence, the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only.
A quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana " is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a
substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from delict or
crime. Upon this principle and on the wording and spirit article 1903 of the Civil Code, the
primary and direct responsibility of employers may be safely anchored.
Articles 20 and 21 of the Penal Code, after distributing in their own way the civil responsibilities among
those who, for different reasons, are guilty of felony or misdemeanor, make such civil responsibilities
applicable to enterprises and establishments for which the guilty parties render service, but with
subsidiary character, that is to say, according to the wording of the Penal Code, in default of those who
are criminally responsible.
 Manila against petitioner as the sole proprietor of
the taxicab.
The main theory of the defense is that the liability
of Fausto Barredo is governed by the Revised
Penal Code; hence, his liability is only subsidiary,
and as there has been no civil action against Pedro
Fontanilla, the person criminally liable, Barredo
cannot be held responsible in the case.
GUTIERREZ VS. This case involves the collision of a passenger
GUTIERREZ truck and an automobile owned by the defendants.
Petitioner was a passenger of the truck whose leg
(1931) was injured as a result of the accident.
It is conceded that the collision was caused by
negligence pure and simple. The difference
between the parties is that, while the plaintiff
blames both sets of defendants, the owner of the
passenger truck blames the automobile, and the
owner of the automobile, in turn, blames the truck.
In this regard, the Civil Code does not coincide because article 1903 says: "The obligation imposed by
the next preceding article is demandable, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom another is responsible." Among the persons enumerated are the subordinates and
employees of establishments or enterprises, either for acts during their service or on the occasion of
their functions. It is for this reason that it happens, and it is so observed in judicial decisions, that the
companies or enterprises, after taking part in the criminal cases because of their subsidiary civil
responsibility by reason of the crime, are sued and sentenced directly and separately with regard to the
obligation, before the civil courts.
In this case, the taxi driver was found guilty of criminal negligence, so that if he had even sued for his
civil responsibility arising from the crime, he would have been held primarily liable for civil damages,
and Barredo would have been held subsidiarily liable for the same.
But the plaintiffs are directly suing Barredo, on his primary responsibility because of his own presumed
negligence — which he did not overcome — under article 1903. Thus, there were two liabilities of
Barredo: first, the subsidiary one because of the civil liability of the taxi driver arising from the
latter's criminal negligence; and, second, Barredo's primary liability as an employer under
article 1903. The plaintiffs were free to choose which course to take, and they preferred the
second remedy. In so doing, they were acting within their rights
The guaranty given by the father at the time the son was granted a license to operate motor vehicles
made the father responsible for the acts of his son.
Based on these facts, pursuant to the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code, the father alone and
not the minor or the mother, would be liable for the damages caused by the minor. What is dealth with
here is the civil law liability of parties for obligations which arise from fault or negligence. In the United
States, it is uniformly held that the head of a house, the owner of an automobile, who maintains it for
the general use of his family is liable for its negligent operation by one of his children, whom he
designates or permits to run it, where the car is occupied and being used at the time of the injury for the
pleasure of other members of the owner's family than the child driving it. The theory of the law is that
the running of the machine by a child to carry other members of the family is within the scope of the
owner's business, so that he is liable for the negligence of the child because of the relationship of
master and servant
On the other hand, the liability of Saturnino Cortez, the owner of the truck, and of his chauffeur
Abelardo Velasco rests on a different basis, namely, that of contract.

b.
Effect of Obligations
i. Kinds of Prestations
a) To give
a) Rules regarding improvement, loss, or deterioration
b) To do
CHAVEZ VS. Petitioner delivered a typewriter to the defendant Gonzales is liable under Art. 1165 and not 1197.
GONZALES for the latter to repair it. Defendant was not able to Defendant cannot invoke Article 1197 of the Civil Code for he virtually admitted nonperformance by
finish the job after some time despite repeated returning the typewriter that he was obliged to repair in a non-working condition, with essential parts
(1970) reminders by the petitioner. Later, Gonzales asked missing. The fixing of a period would thus be a mere formality and would serve no purpose that to
Chavez for P6 for the purchase of spare parts. delay.
However, there was still delay in the repair so
Chavez demanded the return of the typewriter, The parties had a perfected contract for cleaning and servicing a typewriter. They intended that the
which was returned to him in shambles, with the defendant was to finish it at some future time, although such time was not specified, and such time had
interior of the cover and some parts and screws passed without the work having been accomplished, for the defendant returned the
missing. Petitioner then demanded the return of typewriter cannibalized and unrepaired, which in itself is a breach of his obligation, without demanding
these parts and the P6 which defendant did return. that he should be given more time to finish the job, or compensation for the work he had already done.
Chavez then had his typewriter repaired by another The time for compliance having evidently expired, and there being a breach of contract by non-
company, which cost him a total of P89.95, performance, respondent is therefore liable to the petitioner for the cost of the repair.
 including labor and materials.
Petitioner is now demanding from defendant the
cost of the repair plus damages.
Defendant claims he is not liable since his contract
with Chavez did not contain a period. According to
the former, the petitioner should have first filed a
petition for the court to fix a period under Art. 1197.
TANGUILIG VS. Petitioner and respondent Vicente Herce entered
CA into a contract for the construction of a windmill.
After it’s construction however, respondent refused
(1997) to pay his remaining balance to petitioenr, claiming
that he already paid such amount to SPGMI,
another company who constructed the deep well to
which the windmill system was to be connected.
According to respondent, since the deep well
formed part of the system the payment he tendered
to SPGMI should be credited to his account by
petitioner.
Petitioner denied that the construction of a deep
well was included in the agreement to build the
windmill system, for the contract price of
P60,000.00 was solely for the windmill assembly
and its installation, exclusive of other incidental
materials needed for the project.
c) Not to do
ii. Irregularity in Performance
a) Attributable to debtor
a) Fraud (dolo)
WOODHOUSE Petitioner and respondent entered into a contract
VS. HALILI of partnership. Under the contract, petitioner was to
secure the Mission Soft Drinks franchise for and in
(1953) behalf of the proposed partnership in consideration
for which petitioner was to receive 30% of the net
profits of the business.
Later however, defendant refused to give
Woodhouse the 30% agreed upon, alleging that
defendant’s consent to the agreement was secured
by the fraudulent representation of Woodhouse
that he was the owner or was about to become the
owner of an exclusive bottling franchise.
GERALDEZ VS. An action for damages by reason of contractual
It is clear that the defendant contravened the tenor of his obligation because he not only failed to repair
the typewriter but returned it in shambles. For such contravention, he is liable under Art. 1167 for the
cost of executing the obligation in a proper manner.
The preponderance of evidence supports the finding of the trial court that the installation of a deep well
was not included in the proposals of petitioner to construct a windmill system for respondent.
There were in fact two (2) proposals: one dated 19 May 1987 which pegged the contract price at
P87,000.00. This was rejected by respondent. The other was submitted three days later, i.e., on 22
May 1987 which contained more specifications but proposed a lower contract price of P60,000.00.The
latter proposal was accepted by respondent and the construction immediately followed.
Notably, nowhere in either proposal is the installation of a deep well mentioned, even remotely. Neither
is there an itemization or description of the materials to be used in constructing the deep well. There is
absolutely no mention in the two documents that a deep well pump is a component of the proposed
windmill system.
It is a cardinal rule in the interpretation of contracts that the intention of the parties shall be
accorded primordial consideration and, in case
of doubt, their contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally considered.
Woodhouse fraudulently represented that he was an exclusive grantee of a franchise. However, this did
not amount to fraud which vitiated Halili’s consent.
Article 1270 of the Spanish Civil Code distinguishes two kinds of (civil) fraud, the causal fraud, which
may be a ground for the annulment of a contract, and the incidental deceit, which only renders the party
who employs it liable for damages. In order that fraud may vitiate consent, it must be the causal (dolo
causante), not merely the incidental (dolo causante), inducement to the making of the contract.
The defendant was led to the belief that plaintiff had the exclusive franchise, but that the same was to
be secured for or transferred to the partnership. The plaintiff no longer had the exclusive franchise, or
the option thereto, at the time the contract was perfected. But while he had already lost his option
thereto (when the contract was entered into), the principal obligation that he assumed or undertook was
to secure said franchise for the partnership, as the bottler and distributor for the Mission Dry
Corporation.Therefore, if he was guilty of a false representation, this was not the causal
consideration, or the principal inducement, that led plaintiff to enter into the partnership
agreement.
However, while the representation that plaintiff had the exclusive franchise did not vitiate defendant's
consent to the contract, it was used by plaintiff to get from defendant a share of 30 per cent of the net
profits; in other words, by pretending that he had the exclusive franchise and promising to transfer it to
defendant, he obtained the consent of the latter to give him (plaintiff) a big slice in the net profits. This is
the dolo incidentedefined in article 1270 of the Spanish Civil Code, because it was used to get the other
party's consent to a big share in the profits, an incidental matter in the agreement.
Kenstar committed fraudulent misrepresentations amounting to bad faith, to the prejudice of petitioner
CA and breach was filed by petitioner Lydia L. Geraldez
KENSTAR against private respondent Kenstar Travel
TRAVEL CORP. Corporation.
According to petitioner, she paid Kenstar for a 22-
(1994) day European tour package for her sister and
herself.
Petitioner claimed that, during the tour, she was
very uneasy and disappointed when it turned out
that, contrary to what was stated in the brochure,
there was no European tour manager for their
group of tourists, the hotels in which she and the
group were bullited were not first-class, the UGC
Leather Factory which was specifically added as a
highlight of the tour was not visited, and the Filipino
lady tour guide by private respondent was a first
timer, that is, she was performing her duties and
responsibilities as such for the first time.
and the members of the tour group.
This fraud or dolo which is present or employed at the time of birth or perfection of a contract
may either be dolo causante or dolo incidente. The first, or causal fraud referred to in Article
1338, are those deceptions or misrepresentations of a serious character employed by one party
and without which the other party would not have entered into the contract. Dolo incidente, or
incidental fraud which is referred to in Article 1344, are those which are not serious in character
and without which the other party would still have entered into the contract. Dolo
causante determines or is the essential cause of the consent, while dolo incidente refers only to
some particular or accident of the obligations. The effects of dolo causante are the nullity of the
contract and the indemnification of damages, and dolo incidente also obliges the person
employing it to pay damages.
In the belief that an experienced tour escort and a European tour manager would accompany them,
with the concomitant reassuring and comforting thought of having security and assistance readily at
hand, petitioner was induced to join the Volare 3 tourists, instead of travelling alone 65 She likewise
suffered serious anxiety and distress when the group was unable to visit the leather factory and when
she did not receive first-class accommodations in their lodgings which were misrepresented as first-
class hotels. These, justify the award of moral damages.

b) Effects of fraud
1. Specific Performance
1. Specific determinate thing
2. Generic thing
3. Preserve
4. Deliver all its accessions
5. Interest
6. Deliver all its accessories
2. Substituted performance
3. Rescission
BOYSAW VS. • May 1, 1961 Contract Solomon Boysaw and Although respondent violated the May 1, 1961 contract, it was Boysaw who first violated the
INTERPHIL his then Manager, Willie Ketchum, signed with contract giving Interphil, the injured party, the power to rescind the contract.
Interphil Promotions, Inc. represented by Lope • the evidence established that the contract was violated by appellant Boysaw himself when, without
(1987) Sarreal, Sr., a contract to engage Gabriel the approval or consent of Interphil, he fought Louis Avila on June 19, 1961 in Las Vegas Nevada.
"Flash" Elorde in a boxing contest for the junior Appellant Yulo admitted this fact during the trial
lightweight championship of the world. • While the contract imposed no penalty for such violation, this does not grant any of the parties the
• the bout would be held at the Rizal Memorial unbridled liberty to breach it with impunity. Our law on contracts recognizes the principle that
Stadium in Manila on September 30, 1961 or actionable injury inheres in every contractual breach.
not later than thirty [30] days thereafter should o A1170: Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence
a postponement be mutually agreed upon, and or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the terms thereof, are liable for
that Boysaw would not, prior to the date of the damages
boxing contest, engage in any other such o A1191: The power to rescind obligations is implied, in reciprocal ones, in case one
contest without the written consent of Interphil of the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him.
Promotions, Inc. • There is no doubt that the contract in question gave rise to reciprocal obligations.
• On June 19, 1961, Boysaw fought and o "Reciprocal obligations are those which arise from the same cause, and in which
defeated Louis Avila in a ten-round non-title each party is a debtor and a creditor of the other, such that the obligation of one is
bout held in Las Vegas, Nevada, U.S.A. dependent upon the obligation of the other. They are to be performed
• Management rights over Boysaw was simultaneously, so that the performance of one is conditioned upon the
transferred from Ketchum to Araneta to Yulo simultaneous fulfillment of the other" [Tolentino]
• Respondent informed the GAB that they were o The power to rescind is given to the injured party.
not formally notified of the change in • Another violation of the contract in question was the assignment and transfer, first to J. Amado
management Araneta, and subsequently, to appellant Yulo, Jr., of the managerial rights over Boysaw without the
• The GAB called a series of conferences of the knowledge or consent of Interphil.
 parties concerned culminating in the issuance o These were novations of the original contract which required the consent of
of its decision to schedule the Elorde-Boysaw Interphil to be valid
fight for November 4, 1961. o A1293: Novation which consists in substituting a new debtor in the place of the original
• Yulo refused to accept the change in the one, may be made even without the knowledge or against the will of the latter, but not
boxing date even though it was later on moved without the consent of the creditor.
to October 28, 1961 which was within the 30- o Under the law when a contract is unlawfully novated by an applicable and unilateral
day period of allowable postponements substitution of the obligor by another, the aggrieved creditor is not bound to deal with the
• While an Elorde-Boysaw fight was eventually substitute.
staged, the fight contemplated in the May 1,
1961 boxing contract never materialized.
• Boysaw and Yulo sued Interphil for damages
allegedly occasioned by the refusal of Interphil
and Sarreal, aided and abetted by Nieto, Jr.,
then GAB Chairman, to honor their
commitments under the boxing contract of May
1,1961.

UP VS. DE LOS UP and ALUMCO entered into a logging As a general rule, the party who deems the contract violated may consider it resolved or
ANGELES agreement under which the latter was granted rescinded, and act accordingly, without previous court action.
exclusive authority, for a certain period, to cut, However, it proceeds at its own risk, for it is only the final judgment of the corresponding court
(1970) collect and remove timber from the Land Grant, in that will conclusively and finally settle whether the action taken was or was not correct in law.
consideration of payment to UP of royalties, forest But the law definitely does not require that the contracting party who believes itself injured must first file
fees, etc. suit and wait for a judgment before taking extrajudicial steps to protect its interest.
ALUMCO however, incurred an unpaid account of
P219,362.94, which, despite repeated demands, it
had failed to pay.
The parties then entered into a Proposed Manner
of Payment which contained a rescission clause in
favor of UP should ALUMCO fail to comply with its
undertaking.
When ALUMCO again incurred an unpaid account,
UP informed ALUMCO that it had considered as
rescinded and of no further legal effect the logging
agreement.
ALUMCO and the lower court both contend that it
is only after a final court decree declaring the
contract rescinded for violation of its terms that UP
could disregard ALUMCO’s rights under the
contract and treat the agreement as breached and
of no force or effect.
Vda de Mistika v Eulalio, the predecessor in interest of petitioner The contract is a contract of sale where the remedy of an unpaid seller is either specific performance or
Sps. Naguiat entered into a contrac t to sell his parcel of land rescission
with respondent for P20,000. Respondent made a
(2003) down payment of P2000, and another partial Under Article 1191 of the Civil Code, the right to rescind an obligation is predicated on the violation of
payment of P1000 in 1980. Eulalio died in 1986. the reciprocity between parties, brought about by a breach of faith by one of them.

In 1991, Petitioner filed a complaint for rescission
for failure to pay th remaining balance thus forming
a substantial brach in accordance with Art 1191
NCC.
Respondents argue that the contract canot be
The failure to pay in full the purchase price stipulated in a deed of sale does not ipso facto grant the
seller the right to rescind the agreement. Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties, rescission is
allowed only when the breach of the contract is substantial and fundamental to the fulfillment of the
obligation.
 rescinded since there is a stipulation that failure to
pay the balance would only subject the remaining
obligation to a 12% interest per annum. They also
allege that they offered to pay the balance on the
wake of Eulalio but this was refused.
In the present case, the failure of respondents to pay the balance of the purchase price within ten years
from the execution of the Deed did not amount to a substantial breach. In the Kasulatan, it was
stipulated that payment could be made even after ten years from the execution of the Contract,
provided the vendee paid 12 percent interest. The stipulations of the contract constitute the law
between the parties

4. Damages
1. Unilateral obligations
2. Reciprocal obligations
c) Negligence (culpa)
d) Effects of Negligence
Gutierrez v An action was brought by plaintiff to recover As regards the Gutierrez, Bonifacio was in incompetent chauffeur, that he was driving at an
Gutiuerrez for damages suffered by him when he excessive rate of speed, and that, on approaching the bridge and the truck, he lost his head and so
fractured his right leg when a truck where he contributed by his negligence to the accident. The guaranty given by the father at the time the son
was a passenger and an automobile collided. was granted a license to operate motor vehicles made the father responsible for the acts of his son.
The truck was owned by Cortez and the Pursuant to the provisions of Art 1903 of the Civil Code, the father alone and not the minor or the
(1932) automobile was owned by the Gutierrez which mother, would be liable for the damages caused by the minor.
at that time was driven by their minor son
Bonifacio. The liability of Cortez is based on contract since plaintiff was a passenger of the truck when the
accident occurred.
Vasquez v De Borja Vasquez and Busuego obligated themselves The fault and negligence referred to in articles 1101-1104 of the Civil Code are those incidental to
to sell to de Borja 4000 cavans of palay. The the fulfillment or nonfullfillment of a contractual obligation; while the fault or negligence referred to in
former received the full payment but still failed article 1902 is theculpa aquiliana of the civil law, homologous but not identical to tort of the common
(1944) to deliver the remaining balance of 1512 law, which gives rise to an obligation independently of any contract
cavans of palay which caused De Borja to
suffer damages. The fact that the corporation, acting thru Vazquez as its manager, was guilty of negligence in the
Thus a suit was filed by De Borja to recover fulfillment of the contract, did not make Vazquez principally or even subsidiarily liable for such
from them jointly and severally. negligence. Since it was the corporation's contract, its nonfulfillment, whether due to negligence or
fault or to any other cause, made the corporation and not its agent liable.
As defense, Vasquez alleges that De Borja
actually entered into a contract with the However, if independently of the contract Vazquez by his fault or negligence cause damaged to the
corporation where Vasquz was the Acting plaintiff, he would be liable to the latter under article 1902 of the Civil Code. But then the plaintiff's
Manager and not with him personally thus the cause of action should be based on culpa aquiliana and not on the contract alleged in his complaint
suit should not prosper. herein; and Vazquez' liability would be principal and not merely subsidiary

e) Delay (mora)
SSS v Moonwalk Moonwalk obtained a loan from SSS secured
by a real estate mortgage. After completing
the payment of the loan, the mortgage was
(1993) released.
Howeve,r later SSS found out that it made an
honest mistake in releasing Moonwalk from its
obligation since the former did not include in
the computation the penalties incurred by the
latter. .
Thus SSS filed a complaint to collect the
remaining balance.
Under the Civil Code, delay begins from the time the obligee judicially or extrajudicially demands
from the obligor the performance of the obligation.
"Art. 1169. Those obliged to deliver or to do something incur in delay from the time the obligee
judicially or extrajudicially demands from them the fulfillment of their obligation."
There are only three instances when demand is not necessary to render the obligor in default. These
are the following:
(1) When the obligation or the law expressly so declares;
(2) When from the nature and the circumstances of the obligation it appears that the designation of
the time when the thing is to be delivered or the service is to be rendered was a controlling motive
for the establishment of the contract; or
(3) When the demand would be useless, as when the obligor has rendered it beyond his power to
perform.

f) Kinds of Delay
1. Mora solvendi
Abella v Gonzaga Gonzaga entered into a special contract of
lease with Abella.It was agreed in the contract
that the ownership of the leased property shall
be transferred to Abella during the period of
(1931) lease. Gonzaga failed to transfer said
property.
Gonzaga contends in his answer that the
Abella’s right to compel him to make the
transfer of the land in question is not absolute,
but conditional; that the conditions have not
been complied with, but violated by the
plaintiff, who made the last payment over a
year after the obligation had become due, that
is, on March 27, 1927, instead of March 5,
1926.
Santos Ventura Santos and SVHFI were plaintiff and
Hocorna Foundation defendants in several cases. On October 26
v Santos 1990, they reached a compromise agreement,
portions of which provide:SVHFI would pay
Santos P14.5M (1.5 immediately payable and
the balance to be paid in one lump sum or in
(2004) installments at the discretion of SVHFCI within
a period of not more than two years from date
of execution of the agreement. It was also
provided that failure to comply with the terms
entitles the party aggrieved to a writ of
execution to enforce the compromise
agreement.
On October 28 1992, Santos inquired as to
when SVHFI would pay the remaining
balance. Hearing no response, Santos applied
for issuance of writ of execution which was
granted by the RTC.
Vasquez v Ayala In 1984, Ayala entered into a Memorandum of
Corporation Agreement with Vasquez buying the his
shares with Conduit Development—which
(2004) constitute 50 hectares of the land in Ayala
Alabang.
In the case at hand, it did not appear that SSS demanded from Moonwalk the payment of its monthly
amortizations. Neither did it show that petitioner demanded the payment of the stipulated penalty
upon the failure of Moonwalk to meet its monthly amortization.
Moonwalk was never in default because SSS never compelled performance. Though it tried to
foreclose the mortgages, SSS itself desisted from doing so. If the Statement of Account could
properly be considered as demand for payment, the demand was complied with on time. Hence, no
delay occurred and there was, therefore, no occasion when the penalty became demandable and
enforceable
It is argued that at the time when the contract Exhibit A was entered into (April 15, 1921), the
defendant was not the owner of the land in question, inasmuch as he acquired the ownership on
December 16, 1922, as shown by a deed executed on that date to him by virtue of which certificate
of title No. 7379 was issued to him, and that he could not bind himself to transfer the ownership of
the land after the period of five years of the alleged contract of lease.
therefore, he cannot now be heard to say that he was not the owner of said land, after inducing the
plaintiff to believe that he was.
Moreover, it was shown that Abella was able to pay the consideration in full plus interests. Thus he
may now compel Gonzaga to fulfill his obligation to execute the proper deed of transfer of the full
ownership of the property in question.
Article 1169 of the New Civil Code provides:
Those obliged to deliver or to do something incur in delay from the time the obligee
judicially or extrajudicially demands from them the fulfillment of their obligation. [Emphasis
supplied]
Delay as used in this article is synonymous to default or mora which means delay in the fulfillment of
obligations. It is the non-fulfillment of the obligation with respect to time.
In order for the debtor to be in default, it is necessary that the following requisites be present: (1) that
the obligation be demandable and already liquidated; (2) that the debtor delays performance; and (3)
that the creditor requires the performance judicially or extrajudicially
In the case at bar, the obligation was already due and demandable after the lapse of the two-year
period from the execution of the contract. The two-year period ended on October 26, 1992. When
the respondents gave a demand letter on October 28, 1992, to the petitioner, the obligation was
already due and demandable. Furthermore, the obligation is liquidated because the debtor knows
precisely how much he is to pay and when he is to pay it.
The second requisite is also present. Petitioner delayed in the performance. It was able to fully settle
its outstanding balance only on February 8, 1995, which is more than two years after the extra-
judicial demand.
In reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in delay if the other does not comply or is not ready to
comply in a proper manner with what is incumbent upon him. From the moment one of the parties
fulfills his obligation, delay by the other begins.
In order that the debtor may be in default it is necessary that the following requisites be present: (1)
that the obligation be demandable and already liquidated; (2) that the debtor delays performance;
 and (3) that the creditor requires the performance judicially or extrajudicially
Under the MOA, in clause 5.7 it is provided
that: Under Article 1193 of the Civil Code, obligations for whose fulfillment a day certain has been fixed
The BUYER hereby commits that it will shall be demandable only when that day comes. However, no such day certain was fixed in the
develop the 'Remaining Property' into a first MOA. Petitioners, therefore, cannot demand performance after the three (3) year period fixed by the
class residential subdivision of the same class MOA for the development of the first phase of the property since this is not the same period
as its New Alabang Subdivision, and that it contemplated for the development of the subject lots. Since the MOA does not specify a period for
intends to complete the first phase under its the development of the subject lots, petitioners should have petitioned the court to fix the period in
amended development plan within three (3) accordance with Article 119734 of the Civil Code. As no such action was filed by petitioners, their
years from the date of this Agreement. x x x". complaint for specific performance was premature, the obligation not being demandable at that
point.
It is to be noted that the parties agreed that
the development plan referred to in paragraph
5.7 is not Conduit's development plan, but
Ayala's amended development plan which
was still to be formulated as of the time of the
MOA. While in the Conduit plan, the 4 lots to
be offered for sale to the Vasquez Spouses
were in the first phase thereof or Village 1, in
the Ayala plan which was formulated a year
later, it was in the third phase, or Phase II-c.
Ayala failed to complete the projects
according to the alleged deadline as
understood by Vasquez (3 years from date of
MOA). When it was completed the lots were
offered in their prevailing price in 1990.
Vasquez rejectd the offer and demanded that
they be offered the lots for their price in 1984.
Since no amicable settlement was made,
Vasquez filed for specific performance and
damages against Ayala.

Pantaleon v Petitioner and his family went on a European
American Express tour in 1991. There they made purchases
(diamond, pendant, chains) and used an
American Express Credit Card to pay for it.
(2009) During these transactions, the clearance of
his card too long which led to the tour of the
city of Amsterdam to be cancelled. This
caused humiliation, moral shock mental
anguish to the petitioners. Thus they sued
respondent for the damage caused.
Under mora solvendi, the three requisites for a finding of default are that the obligation is
demandable and liquidated; the debtor delays performance; and the creditor judicially or
extrajudicially requires the debtor’s performance
Generally, the relationship between a credit card provider and its card holders is that of creditor-
debtor with the card company as the creditor extending loans and credit to the card holder, who as
debtor is obliged to repay the creditor. This relationship already takes exception to the general rule
that as between a bank and its depositors, the bank is deemed as the debtor while the depositor is
considered as the creditor.
the respondent has the right, if not the obligation, to verify whether the credit it isextending upon on a
particular purchase was indeed contracted by the cardholder,and that the cardholder is within his
means to make such transaction. The culpable failure of respondent herein is not the failure to timely
approve petitioner’s purchase, but the more elemental failure to timely act on the same, whether
favorably or unfavorably.

The delay committed by defendant was clearly attended by unjustified neglect and bad faith, since it
alleges to have consumed more than one hour to simply go over plaintiff’s past credit history with
defendant, his payment record and his credit and bank references, when all such data are already
 stored and readily available from its computer
It should be emphasized that the reason why petitioner is entitled to damages is not simply because
respondent incurred delay, but because the delay, for which culpability lies under Article 1170, led to
the particular injuries under Article 2217 of the Civil Code for which moral damages are
remunerative.

2. Mora accipiendi
Vda d Villaruel v This case is a petition of the judgment that
Manila Motor Corp. ordered Manila Motor Co., Inc. to payVillaruel
for the lease of their building from June 1,
1942 to March 29, 1945 as wellas for them to
(1958) pay for the destruction of the property
Manila Motor Co., Inc. leased the building
from Villaruel and entered a contract which
would last for 5 years and wherein a rent of
P350 per month should be paid.
The lessor's insistence upon collecting the occupation rentals for 1942-1945 was unwarranted in
law. Hence, their refusal to accept the current rentals without qualification placed them in default
(mora creditoris or accipiendi) with the result that thereafter, they had to bear all supervening risks of
accidental injury or destruction of the leased premises.
That the lessee and sublessee did not consign or deposit in court the rentals tendered to and
improperly rejected by the lessors, did not render the debtor liable for default (mora solvendi) nor
answerable for fortuitous events.
The only effect of the failure to consign the rentals in court was that the obligation to pay them
subsisted and the lessee remained liable for the amount of the unpaid contract rent But the failure to
consign did not eradicate the default (mora) of the lessors nor the risk of loss that lay upon them.

The period of lease started om Oct 31,

1940, when Manila Motor Co., Inc. was
placed in possession of the property.
This continued until the invasion of
1941.

During the invasion, it was the

Japanese military which occupied the
premises. At this time no payment of
rental was made by Manila Motors. When the
Americans liberated the country they took
possession of the said property and paid for
the same amount of rent to Villaruel.

Manila Motors now wants to resume

the contract considering that the
contract provides them the option to continue
such lease. Villaruel on the other hand
claimed for rescission. Of the contract. During
the pendency of the case, a fire razed the
premises. Thus in addition to the case, the
Villaruel’s claimed reimbursement from Manila
Motors for the razed premises basing their
right to do so on Manila Motors alleged default
in the payment of post-liberation rentals.

Tengco v CA Cifra is the owner of the a property
which she leased to Tengco. Their
contract was entered verbally. W hile
(1989) the contract was still subsisting, Cifra
transf erred theownership of the property
to Benjamin Cifra. Since then the collector of
The issue in this case is whether or not the lessor (Cifra or Lutgarda) was guilty of mora accipiendi.
In the circumstance of the case, the refusal to accept the proffered rentals is not without justification.
The ownership of the property had been transferred to the Cifra and the person to whom payment
was offered had no authority to accept payment. It should be noted that the contract of lease
between the petitioner and Lutgarda, the former owner of the land, was not in writing and, hence,
unrecorded. The Court has held that a contract of lease executed by the vendor, unless recorded,
 Lutgarda no longer came so Tengco did not ceases to have effect when the property is sold, in the absence of a contrary agreement. Tengco
make any payment and just waited for the cannot claim ignorance of the transfer of ownership of the property because, by her own account,
collector to return. Aurora Recto and Cifra at various times, had informed her of their respective claims to ownership of
the property occupied by her. Tengco should have tendered payment of the rentals to the private
Later, Tengco was informed of the change in respondent and if that was not possible, she should have consigned such rentals in court.
ownership but she still did not give the
payment to Benjamin Cifra or consigned the
amount to the court. She even tried to pay the
rentals to Lutgarda but this was refused.

Benjamin Cifra, Jr. then filed an action for

unlawf ul detainer to evict the Tengco,
from the premises for her failure
and refusal to pay the stipulated rentals
despite repeated demands. MTC
judgment was rendered against Tengco and
ordered her to vacate the premises
occupied by her and to surrender
possession thereof to the plaintiff.

3. Compensatio morae
Central Bank vs CA Island Savings Bank approved the loan The loan agreement implied reciprocal obligations. When one party is willing and ready to perform,
application for P80K of Sulpicio Tolentino who the other party not ready nor willing incurs in delay. When Tolentino executed real estate mortgage,
(1985) executed a real estate mortgage over his 100 he signified willingness to pay. That time, the bank’s obligation to furnish the P80K loan accrued.
hectare land. The loan called for a lump sum Now, the Central Bank resolution made it impossible for the bank to furnish the P63K balance. The
of P80K, repayable in semi-annual prohibition on the bank to make new loans is irrelevant because it did not prohibit the bank from
installments for 3 yrs, with 12% annual releasing the balance of loans previously contracted. Insolvency of debtor is not an excuse for non-
interest. It was required that Tolentino shall fulfillment of obligation but is a
use the loan solely as additional capital to breach of contract.
develop his other property into a subdivision.
A mere P17K partial release of the loan was The bank was in default and Tolentino may choose between specific performance or rescission with
made by the bank and Tolentino and his wife damages in either case. But considering that the bank is now prohibited from doing business,
signed a promissory note for the P17K at 12% specific performance cannot be granted. Rescission is the only remedy left, but the rescission should
annual interest payable within 3 yrs. An only be for the P63K balance.
advance interest was deducted from the
partial release but this prededucted interest However, Tolentino’s failure to pay the partial loan amount of P17k made him party in default, hence,
was refunded to Tolentino after being not entitled to rescission. This time, it is the bank which has right to rescind the promissory note.
informed that there was no fund yet for the
release of the P63K balance. The bank VP Since both Tolentino and the bank are in default, both are liable for damages. Liability may be offset.
and Treasurer promised release of the
balance.

Monetary Board of Central Bank, after finding

that bank was suffering liquidity problems,
prohibited the bank from making new loans
and investments. And after the bank failed to
restore its solvency, the Central Bank
prohibited Island Savings Bank from doing
business in the Philippines.
 Island Savings Bank in view of the non-
payment by Tolentino of the P17K filed an
application for foreclosure of the real estate
mortgage.

Tolentino filed petition for specific

performance or rescission and damages w/
preliminary injunction, alleging that since the
bank failed to deliver P63K, he is entitled to
specific performance and if not, to rescind the
real estate mortgage.

Trial court found Tolentino’s petition

unmeritorious. CA affirmed dismissal of
Tolentino’s petition for specific performance,
but it ruled that the bank can neither foreclose
the real estate mortgage nor collect the P17K
loan.

g) Not attributable to the debtor

1. Fortuitous event
Nakpil vs CA Philippine Bar Association (PBA) decided to Petitioners are not exempt from liability. The applicable law is Art.1723 of the New Civil Code which
construct an office building. The building was holds the architects liable for damages on the building due to defects in the design, and contractors
(1986) completed in June, 1966. In the early morning for damages due to defects in the construction. On the other hand, the general rule is that no person
of August 2, 1968 an unusually strong shall be responsible for events which could not be foreseen or which though foreseen, were
earthquake (7.3 magnitude) hit Manila and the inevitable.
building in question sustained major damage.
The front columns of the building buckled, An act of God has been defined as an accident, due directly and exclusively to natural causes
causing the building to tilt forward without human intervention which by no amount of foresight, pains or care, reasonably to have been
dangerously. As a temporary remedial expected, could have been prevented. To exempt the obligor from liability under Art.1174 of the new
measure, the building was shored up by Civil Code for a breach of obligation due to an act of God, the following must concur:
United Construction at the cost of P13, a) the cause of the breach of obligation must be independent of the will of the debtor;
661.28. b) the event must be unforeseeable or unavoidable;
c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a
PBA commenced action or the recovery of normal manner; and
damages arising from the partial collapse of d) the debtor must be free of any participation in, or aggravation of the injury to the creditor.
the building against United Construction Inc.
PBA claims that the collapse was due to Thus if upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act of God, there concurs a corresponding
defects in the construction, the failure of fraud, negligence, delay or violation or contravention in any manner of the tenor of the obligation
contractors to follow plans and specifications which results in loss or damage, the obligor cannot escape liability. Thus it has been held that when
and violations by the defendants of the terms the negligence of a person concurs with an act of God in producing a loss, such person is not
of the contract. On the other hand, United exempt from liability by showing that the immediate cause of the damage was the act of God. To be
Construction Inc. filed a third-party complaint exempt, he must be free from any previous negligence or misconduct.
against the architects Nakpil alleging that the
collapse was due to the defects in the said The negligence of the contractor and the architect was established beyond dispute in both the trial
plans and specifications. During the pendency court and the CA. UCCI was found to have made substantial deviations from the plans and
of the case, three more earthquakes occurred specifications, and to have failed to observe the requisite workmanship in the construction as well as
and with the PBA’s request, the building was to exercise the requisite amount of supervision. Nakpil on the other hand were found to have defects
demolished at their expense. in the plans and specifications prepared by them. As correctly assessed by both courts, the defects
in the construction and in the plans and specifications were the proximate causes that rendered the
The Commissioner submitted his report which PBA building unable to withstand the earthquake.
 stated that the damage sustained by the PBA
building was directly caused by the
earthquake and was also caused by the
defects in the plans and specifications
prepared by the architects, deviations from
said plans and specifications by the contractor
and failure of the contractor to observe the
requisite workmanship in the construction of
the building. The trial court agreed with the
findings of the Commissioner. All parties
involved appealed and the CA affirmed the
decision of the trial court but modified the
decision by granting PBA an additional
P200,000 to be paid by the contractor and
architects jointly.

Petitioners Nakpil and UCCI claimed that it

was an act of God that caused the failure of
the building which should exempt them from
responsibility.

h) Other provisions
i) Remedies of creditors
1. Levy and execution
2. Accion Subrogatoria
3. Accion Pauliana
Khe Hong Cheng vs The Philippine Agricultural Trading Article 1389 of the Civil Code simply provides that, “The action to claim rescission must be
CA Corporation shipped on board the vessel M/V commenced within four years.” Since this provision of law is silent as to when the prescriptive period
PRINCE ERIC, owned by petitioner Khe Hong would commence, the general rule, i.e, from the moment the cause of action accrues, therefore,
(2001) Cheng, 3,400 bags of copra atMasbate, applies. (Art. 1150. The time for prescription for all kinds of actions, when there is no special
Masbate, for delivery to Dipolog City, provision which ordains otherwise, shall be counted from the day they may be brought.)
Zamboanga del Norte. The said shipment of
copra was covered by a marine insurance It is the legal possibility of bringing the action which determines the starting point for the computation
policy issued by American Home Insurance of the prescriptive period for the action.
Company (respondent Philam's assured).
Art. 1383. An action for rescission is subsidiary; it cannot be instituted except when the party
M/V PRINCE ERIC sank resulting in the total suffering damage has no other legal means to obtain reparation for the same.
loss of the shipment. Because of the loss,
theinsurer, American Home, paid the amount An action to rescind or an accion pauliana must be of last resort, availed of only after all other legal
of P354,000.00 (the value of the copra) to the remedies have been exhausted and have been proven futile. For an accion pauliana to accrue, the
consignee. Having been subrogated into the following requisites must concur:
rights of the consignee, American Home 1) That the plaintiff asking for rescission has a credit prior to the alienation, although
instituted a civil case to recover the money demandable later;
paid to the consignee, based on breach of 2) That the debtor has made a subsequent contract conveying a patrimonial benefit to a
contract of carriage. third person;
3) That the creditor has no other legal remedy to satisfy his claim, but would benefit by
While the case was still pending, or on rescission of the conveyance to the third person;
December 20, 1989, petitioner Khe Hong 4) That the act being impugned is fraudulent;
Cheng executed deeds of donations of 5) That the third person who received the property conveyed, if by onerous title, has been
parcels of land in favor of his children, herein an accomplice in the fraud.
 co-petitioners Sandra Joy and Ray Steven.
The trial court rendered judgment against
petitioner. After the said decision became final
and executory, a writ of execution was issued.
Despite earnest efforts, the sheriff found no
property under the name of Butuan Shipping
Lines and/or petitioner Khe Hong Cheng to
levy or garnish for the satisfaction of the trial
court's decision. When the sheriff,
accompanied by counsel of respondent
Philam, went to Butuan City on January 17,
1997, to enforce the alias writ of execution,
they discovered that petitioner Khe Hong
Cheng no longer had any property and that he
had conveyed the subject properties to his
children.
An accion pauliana thus presupposes the following: 1) A judgment; 2) the issuance by the trial court
of a writ of execution for the satisfaction of the judgment, and 3) the failure of the sheriff to enforce
and satisfy the judgment of the court.
It requires that the creditor has exhausted the property of the debtor. The date of the decision of the
trial court is immaterial. What is important is that the credit of the plaintiff antedates that of the
fraudulent alienation by the debtor of his property. After all, the decision of the trial court against the
debtor will retroact to the time when the debtor became indebted to the creditor.
To count the four year prescriptive period to rescind an allegedly fraudulent contract from the date of
registration of the conveyance with the Register of Deeds, as alleged by the petitioners, would run
counter to Article 1383 of the Civil Code as well as settled jurisprudence. It would likewise violate the
third requisite to file an action for rescission of an allegedly fraudulent conveyance of property, i.e.,
the creditor has no other legal remedy to satisfy his claim.

Respondent Philam filed a complaint for the

rescission of the deeds of donation executed
by petitioner Khe Hong Cheng in favor of his
children and for the nullification of their titles.
Respondent Philam alleged, that petitioner
executed the aforesaid deeds in fraud of his
creditors, including respondent Philam.

Petitioners moved for its dismissal on the

ground that the action had already prescribed.
They posited that the registration of the deeds
of donation on December 27, 1989 constituted
constructive notice and since the complaint a
quo was filed only on February 25, 1997, or
more than four (4) years after said
registration, the action was already barred by
prescription.

Siguan vs Lim On 25 and 26 August 1990 LIM issued two
Metrobank checks in the sums of P300K and
(1999) P241,668, respectively, payable to “cash”.
Upon presentment by petitioner Siguan with
the drawee bank, the checks were dishonored
for the reason that the account was already
“closed.” Demands to make good the checks
proved futile.
For accion pauliana to prosper, the following must be present:
• plaintiff asking for rescission has a credit prior to the alienation;
• debtor has made a subsequent contract conveying a patrimonial benefit to a 3rd party;
• creditor has no other legal remedy to satisfy his claim;
• act impugned is fraudulent;
• the 3rd person who received the property conveyed (if by onerous title), has been an
accomplice in the fraud.

A criminal case for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 was filed against LIM.
On29 December 1992 the RTC convicted LIM
as charged. LIM was also convicted of estafa
filed by Victoria Suarez. This was affirmed by
CA. However the Supreme Court acquitted
LIM but found her civilly liable in the amount
GENERAL RULE: rescission requires existence of creditors at the time of the alleged fraud, and this
must be proved as one of the bases of the judicial pronouncement setting aside the contract.
Without any prior existing debt, there can neither be no injury nor fraud.
The Deed of Donation executed is a public document, having been acknowledged before a notary
public. It is evidence of the fact which gave rise to its execution and of its date (Sec. 23, Rule 132,
Rules of Court) Court is not convinced that it was antedated.
 of P169K.
On 2 July 1991 a Deed of Donation conveying
parcels of land and purportedly executed by
LIM on 10 August 1989 in favor of her
children, was registered with the Register of
Deeds of Cebu. New transfer certificates of
title were thereafter issued in the names of the
donees.
Petitioner filed an accion pauliana against LIM
and her children. Petitioner claimed therein
that sometime in July 1991 LIM, through a
Deed of Donation, fraudulently transferred all
her real property to her children in bad faith
and in fraud of creditor, including her; that LIM
conspired and confederated with her children
in antedating the questioned Deed.
Contracts entered in fraud may be rescinded only when the creditors cannot in any manner collect
the claims due them. Action for rescission is a subsidiary remedy only. The petitioner was not able to
prove that she had exhausted other legal means to obtain reparation for the same.
Fourth requisite for accion pauliana not present either. Art. 759 of Civil Code states that donation is
always presumed to be in fraud of creditors when the donor did not reserve sufficient property to pay
his debts prior to donation. Petitioner’s alleged credit existed only a year after the deed of donation
was executed. She cannot be said to have been prejudiced or defrauded by such alienation. In
addition, when the Deed was executed, LIM had properties such as farming lands, a house and lot,
residential lots which were sufficient to cover the debts.
In an attempt to support the case for rescission, petitioner brought up the criminal case involving
Victoria Suarez. However, Suarez, albeit a creditor prior to the alienation, is not a party to the accion
pauliana. Only the creditor who brought the action for rescission can benefit from the rescission (Art.
1384, Civil Code). The revocation is only to the extent of the plaintiff creditor’s unsatisfied credit; as
to the excess, alienation is maintained.

Trial court ordered the rescission of the

questioned deed of donation; declared null
and void the transfer certificates of title issued
in the name of LIM’s children.

20 February 1998 CA reversed RTC’s

decision and dismissed petitioner’s accion
pauliana, because two requisites for said
action was absent:
1. there must be a credit existing
prior to the celebration of the
contract;
2. there must be a fraud, or the intent
to commit the fraud.

4. Accion Directa
iii. Transmissibility

XXIV. KINDS OF OBLIGATIONS

a. According to demandability
i. Pure obligations
ii. Conditional obligations
Gaite vs Fonacier Gaite was appointed by Fonacier as attorney-
in-fact to contract any party for the exploration
(1961) and development of mining claims. Gaite
executed a deed of assignment in favor of a
single proprietorship owned by him. For some
reasons, Fonacier revoked the agency, which
was acceded to by Gaite, subject to certain
conditions, one of which being the transfer of
ores extracted from the mineral claims for
The shipment or local sale of the iron ore is not a condition precedent (or suspensive) to the
payment of the balance of P65,000.00, but was only a suspensive period or term. What
characterizes a conditional obligation is the fact that its efficacy or obligatory force (as distinguished
from its demandability) is subordinated to the happening of a future and uncertain event; so that if
the suspensive condition does not take place, the parties would stand as if the conditional obligation
had never existed.
A contract of sale is normally commutative and onerous: not only does each one of the parties
assume a correlative obligation (the seller to deliver and transfer ownership of the thing sold and the
buyer to pay the price),but each party anticipates performance by the other from the very start. While
 P75,000, of which P10,000 has already been
paid upon signing of the agreement and the
balance to be paid from the first letter of credit
for the first local sale of the iron ores. To
secure payment, Fonacier delivered a surety
agreement with Larap Mines and some of its
stockholders, and another one with Far
Eastern Insurance. When the second surety
agreement expired with no sale being made
on the ores, Gaite demanded the P65,000
balance. Defendants contended that the
payment was subject to the condition that the
ores will be sold.
Gonzales vs Heirs of Paula Ano Cruz, together with heirs of
Thomas Thomas and Paula Cruz (Lessors) entered
into a CONTRACT OF LEASE/PURCHASE
(1999) with Felix Gonzales (sole proprietor of Felgon
Farms/Lessee) of a half-portion of a parcel of
Contract contains the following provisions:
PAR.1. The terms of this contract is
for a period of one year upon the
signing thereof. After the period of
this Contract, the LESSEE shall
purchase the property on the
agreeable price of 1M payable w/in 2
years period with an interest of 12%
per annum...
PAR.2. The LESSEE shall pay by
way of annual rental an amount
equivalent to P2,500 per hectare,
upon signing of contract on 12/01/83
PAR.9. The LESSORS hereby
commit themselves and shall
undertake to obtain a separate and
distinct T.C.T. over the herein leased
portion to the LESSEE within a
reasonable period of time which shall
not in any case exceed 4 years, after
which a new Contract shall be
executed by the parties which shall
be the same in all respects with this
Contract insofar as the terms and
conditions are concerned.
Gonzales paid P2500 per hectare or P15,000
annual rental; he took possession of the
property and installed Sambrano as his
caretaker. He did not exercise his option to
purchase the property immediately after
in a sale the obligation of one party can be lawfully subordinated to an uncertain event, so that the
other understands that he assumes the risk of receiving nothing for what he gives (as in the case of
a sale of hopes or expectations, emptio spei), it is not in the usual course of business to do so;
hence, the contingent character of the obligation must clearly appear. Nothing is found in the record
to evidence that Gaite desired or assumed to run the risk of losing his right over the ore without
getting paid for it, or that Fonacier understood that Gaite assumed any such risk. This is proved by
the fact that Gaite insisted on a bond a to guarantee payment of the P65,000.00, an not only upon a
bond by Fonacier, the Larap Mines & Smelting Co., and the company's stockholders, but also on
one by a surety company; and the fact that appellants did put up such bonds indicates that they
admitted the definite existence of their obligation to pay the balance of P65,000.00.
In the interpretation of contracts, if some stipulation should admit of several meanings, it shall be
understood as bearing that import most adequate to render it effectual. Considering the antecedents
of the ownership of the disputed lot, Gonzales’ interpretation that par.9 is a condition precedent to
the purchase of the property renders it most effectual.
Both RTC and CA interpreted par.9 to mean that respondents obliged themselves to obtain a TCT in
the name of petitioner. But petitioner maintains that respondents were obligated to obtain a TCT in
their names. Par.9 was intended to ensure that respondents would have a valid title over the specific
portion they were selling to the petitioner. At the time the contract was executed, land was not
registered in the names of lessors, and extra-judicial proceedings were still ongoing.
In a contract of sale, title to the property passes to the vendee upon the delivery of the thing sold.
(NEMO DAT QUOD NON HABET: no one can give what one does not have) In the Contract,
respondents were given a maximum of 4 years to obtain a separate TCT. Gonzales also advanced
P50T to them expedite transfer of TCT to their names.
Par.1 was effectively modified by par.9. Gonzales can only be compelled to perform his obligation
under par1, after Cruz’s have complied with par9.
In requiring the lessors to obtain first a separate and distinct TCT in their names, such undertaking is
a condition precedent to the lessee’s obligation to purchase and pay for the land.
Condition is defined as “every future and uncertain event upon which an obligation or provision is
made to depend. It is a future and uncertain event upon which the acquisition or resolution of rights
is made to depend by those who execute the juridical act.” Without the fulfillment of the condition,
sale of the property under the Contract cannot be perfected, and Gonzales cannot be obliged to
purchase the property.
There can be no rescission of an obligation as yet non-existent, because the suspensive condition
has not happened. They have not caused the transfer of the TCT to their names which is a condition
precedent to Gonzales’ obligation.
 expiration of 1-yr lease. He remained in
possession of the property without paying the
purchase price provided for in the Contract,
and w/o paying any further rentals.

Cruz sent out a letter to Gonzales informing

him of the lessors’ decision to rescind the
Contract due to a breach committed by
Gonzales; letter also served as a demand for
him to vacate the premises within 10 days
from the receipt of the letter. Gonzales
refused to vacate the property.

Heirs of Cruz filed a complaint for recovery of

the possession of the property alleging breach
of par.9 and payment of only P50T of the
P500T agreed down payment on the
purchase price of P1M

RTC ruled that Par.9 is a condition and it

clearly indicates that the Heirs of Cruz shall
obtain a Transfer Certificate of Title in the
name of the lessee within 4 years before a
new contract is to be entered into under the
same terms and conditions as the original
Contract of Lease/Purchase. The failure of
Lessors to secure the TCT does not entitle
them to rescind the contract. The power to
rescind is given to the injured party. Also, they
cannot terminate the Contract of Lease due to
their failure to notify the defendant in due time
of such intention. Demand made will come
under the implied new lease of Art. 1682 and
1670.

CA ruled that the transfer of title to the

property in Gonzales’ name cannot be
interpreted as a condition precedent to the
payment of the agreed purchase price. Terms
of contract require no interpretation; normal
course of things in sale of real properties
dictate that there must first be payment of
agreed purchase price before transfer of title
can be made.

a) Suspensive (condition precedent)

Gonzales vs Heirs of Supra.
Thomas
Coronel vs CA Coronel sold his property located in Quezon The parties have entered into a conditional contract of sale. In a conditional contract of sale, upon
City to respondent Alcaraz. Since the title of the fulfillment of the suspensive condition, the sale becomes absolute and this will definitely affect
(1996) the property was still in the name of the the seller's title thereto. The consummation of the contract is subject only to the successful transfer
 deceased father of the Coronels, they agreed
to transfer its title to their name upon payment
of the down payment of 50K, and thereafter
an absolute deed of sale will be executed.
Alcaraz’s mother paid the down payment in
behalf of her daughter and as such, Coronel
made the transfer of title to their name.
Notwithstanding this fact, Coronel sold the
property to petitioner Mabanag. Coronels
canceledand rescinded the contract with
Alcaraz by depositing the down payment in
the bank in trust for Alcaraz.
b) Resolutory (condition subsequent)
Parks vs Province of On Oct 18, 1910, Concepcion Cirer and
Tarlac James Hill, the owners of parcel of land No. 2,
donated it perpetually to the municipality of
(1926) Tarlac, Province of Tarlac, under certain
conditions specified in the public document in
which they made the donation.
The donation was accepted by Mr. Santiago
de Jesus, as municipal president, in the same
document on behalf of the municipal council
of Tarlac. The parcel thus donated was later
registered in the name of the donee, the
municipality of Tarlac.
Jan 15, 1921, Concepcion Cirer and James
Hill sold this parcel to petitioner George L.
Parks.
Aug 24, 1923, the municipality of Tarlac
transferred the parcel to Province of Tarlac.
The Province of Tarlac, by reason of the
transfer, applied for and obtained the
registration of the land in its name, the
corresponding certificate of title having been
of the certificate of title from the name of petitioners' father, to their names. A second buyer of the
property who may have had actual or constructive knowledge of such defect in the seller's title, or at
least was charged with the obligation to discover such defect, cannot be a registrant in good faith.
Such second buyer cannot defeat the first buyer's title. In case a title is issued to the second buyer,
the first buyer may seek reconveyance of the property subject of the sale.
If the suspensive condition is not fulfilled, the perfection of the contract of sale is completely abated.
However, if the suspensive condition is fulfilled, the contract of sale is thereby perfected, such that if
there had already been previous delivery of the property subject of the sale to the buyer, ownership
thereto automatically transfers to the buyer by operation of law without any further act having to be
performed by the seller.
When a contract is a contract to sell where the ownership or title is retained by the seller and is not
to pass until the full payment of the price, such payment being a positive suspensive condition and
failure of which is not a breach, casual or serious, but simply an event that prevented the obligation
of the vendor to convey title from acquiring binding force (Roque v. Lapuz).Upon the fulfillment of the
suspensive condition which is the full payment of the purchase price, the
prospective seller’s obligation to sell the subject property by entering into a contract of sale with the
prospective buyer becomes demandable as provided in Article 1479 of the Civil Code (“A promise to
buy and sell a determinate thing for a price certain is reciprocally demandable.”) An accepted
unilateral promise to buy or to sell a determinate thing for a price certain is binding upon the
promissor if the promise is supported by a consideration distinct from the price
In a contract to sell, upon the fulfillment of the suspensive condition which is the full payment of the
purchase price, ownership will not automatically transfer to the buyer although the property may
have been previously delivered to him. The prospective seller still has to convey title to the
prospective buyer by entering into a contract of absolute sale.
The sale made by Cirer and Hill to Parks cannot have any effect. The parcel having been donated by
Cirer and Hill to the municipality of Tarlac, which donation was accepted by the latter, the title to the
property was transferred to the municipality of Tarlac. The donation was not revoked when Cirer and
Hill made the sale to the plaintiff. In order to consider it
revoked, it is necessary either: 1) that the revocation had been consented to by the donee, the
municipality of Tarlac, or 2) that it had been judicially decreed. None of these circumstances existed
when Cirer and Hill sold the parcel to the plaintiff.
Consequently, when the sale was made, Cirer and Hill were no longer the owners of this parcel and
could not have sold it to the plaintiff, nor could Parks have acquired it from them.
With regard to the “condition precedent”, it is true that the condition has not been complied with. But
the allegation that it is a condition precedent is erroneous. The characteristic of a condition
precedent is that the acquisition of the right is not effected while said condition is not complied with
or is not deemed complied with. Meanwhile nothing is acquired and there is only an expectancy of
right. Consequently, when a condition is imposed, the compliance of which cannot be effected
except when the right is deemed acquired, such condition cannot be a condition precedent. In the
present case the condition that a public school be erected and a public park made of the donated
land could not be complied with except after giving effect to the donation. Although the appellant’s
contention that noncompliance of the condition of the donation is sufficient ground for revocation, the
period for bringing an action for the revocation of the donation has prescribed. Under the laws in
force (sec. 43, Code of
Civ. Proc.), the period of prescription of this class of action is ten years. The action for the revocation
of the donation for this cause arose or April 19, 1911, that is, six months after the ratification of the
 issued to it. instrument of donation of October 18, 1910. The
complaint in this action was presented July 5, 1924, more than ten years after this cause accrued.
Petitioner brought this action against the
Province of Tarlac, the municipality of Tarlac,
Concepcion Cirer and James Hill and prayed
that he be declared the absolute owner
entitled to the possession of the parcel of
land, that the transfer of the same by the
municipality of Tarlac to the Province of Tarlac
be annulled, and the transfer certificate issued
to the Province of Tarlac cancelled. He
alleged that a condition precedent having
been imposed in the donation and the same
not having been complied with, the donation
never became effective. This “condition
precedent” according to appellant, refers to
the condition imposed that one of the parcels
donated was to be used absolutely and
exclusively for the erection of a central school
and the other for a public park, the work to
commence in both cases within the period of
six months from the date of the ratification by
the parties of the document evidencing the
donation.

Central Philippines In 1939, Don Ramon Lopez, Sr. who was a
vs CA member of the Board of Trustees of the
Central Philippine College (now Central
(1995) Philippine University) executed a deed of
donation in favor of the latter of a parcel of
land with the following annotations:
1. the land described shall be utilized
by the CPU exclusively for the
establishment and use of a medical
college with all its buildings as part of
the curriculum
2. the said college shall not sell,
transfer or convey to any third party
nor in any way encumber said land
3. the said land shall be called
RAMON LOPEZ CAMPUS and the
said college shall be under obligation
to erect a cornerstone bearing that
name. Any net income from the land
or any of its parks shall be put in a
fund to be known as the RAMON
LOPEZ CAMPUS FUND to be used
for improvements of said campus
and erection of a building thereon
Don Ramon Lopez, Sr. executed for a valuable consideration which is considered the equivalent of
the donation itself. Under Art. 1181 of the Civil Code, on conditional obligations, the acquisition of
rights, as well as the extinguishment or loss of those already acquired, shall depend upon the
happening of the even which constitutes the condition.
The condition imposed by the donor depended upon the exclusive will of the donee as to when this
condition shall be fulfilled. Since the time within which the condition should be fulfilled depended
upon the exclusive will of the petitioner, it has been held that its absolute acceptance and the
acknowledgment of its obligation provided in the deed of donation were sufficient to prevent the
statute of limitations from barring the action of private respondents upon the original contract which
was the deed of donation. In this case, the starting point from which the obligation to comply must be
counted from the expiration of a reasonable period and opportunity for petitioner to fulfill what has
been charged upon it by the donor.
Art. 1197, where the courts may fix the duration for fulfillment, cannot be applied in this case. More
than a reasonable period of 50 years has already been allowed petitioner to avail of the opportunity
to comply with the condition even if it be burdensome, to make the donation in its favor forever valid,
hence, there is no more need to fix the duration of a term of the obligation when such procedure
would be a mere technicality and formality and would serve no purpose than to delay or lead to an
unnecessary and expensive multiplication of suits.

On May 31, 1989, the heirs of Don Ramon

Lopez, Sr. filed an action for annulment of
 donation, reconveyance and damages against
CPU alleging that:
1. since 1939 up to the time the action was
filed the latter had not complied with the
conditions of the donation
2. that CPU had in fact negotiated with the
National Housing Authority to exchange the
donated property with another land owned by
the latter

CPU, in its answer alleged that:

1. the right of the private respondents to file
the action had prescribed
2. that it did not violate any of the conditions in
the deed of donation because it never used
the donated property for any other purpose
than that for which it was intended
3. that it did not sell, transfer, or convey it to
any third party

TC held that petitioner failed to comply with

the conditions of the donation and declared it
null and void. It further directed the petitioner
to execute a deed of reconveyance of the
property in favor of the heirs of the donor,
namely, private respondents.

CA ruled that the annotations at the back of

petitioner’s certificate of title were resolutory
conditions breach of which should terminate
the rights of the donee thus making the
donation revocable. It also found that while
the first condition mandated petitioner to
utilize the donated property for the
establishment of a medical school, the donor
did not fix a period within which the condition
must be fulfilled, hence, until a period was
fixed for the fulfillment of the condition,
petitioner could not be considered as having
failed to comply with its part of the bargain,
thus, it remanded the case to the court of
origin for the determination of the time within
which the petitioner should comply with the
first condition annotated in the certificate of
title

QUIJADA V CA Trinidad Quijada and her siblings donated of
(1998) the subject property in favor of the
Municipality of Talacogon, with the condition
Martinez, J. that the land shall be used solely and
exclusively as part of the campus of the
proposed provincial high school.
The resolutory condition is the construction of the school. When a person donates land to another on
the condition that the latter would build upon the land a school, the condition imposed is not a
condition precedent or a suspensive condition but a resolutory one.
Thus, at the time of the sales made in 1962 towards 1968, the alleged seller (Trinidad) could not
have sold the lots since she had earlier transferred ownership thereof by virtue of the deed of

Trinidad remained in possession of the parcel
of land and on 1962, she sold a part of the
land to respondent.
In 1987, the proposed provincial high school
having failed to materialize, the Sanggu
Bayan of Talacogon enacted a Resolution
reverting the property to the donors.
Petitioners, as heirs of Trinidad, filed a
complaint for quieting of title recovery of
possession and ownership against
respondents. RTC ruled in their favor. CA
reversed.
a) Potestative
LIM V CA Lim and private respondent Dy entered into
a Contract of Lease for 3 years (1976-
(1990) 1979). After the expiration of the term, Dy
refused to vacate the premises. Lim filed
Regalado, J. an ejectment suit, which was terminated by
a judicially approved compromise
agreement10 of the parties.
By reason of said compromise, the lease
continued until 1985, when Lim advised Dy
that he would no longer renew the contract.
However, Dy informed Lim of his intention
to renew. Lim replied that he didn’t agree to
the renewal.
Lim filed another ejectment suit, which was
dismissed because the lease hasn’t
expired, it being a continuing lease, and
that the previous ejectment suit constitutes
res judicata.
RTC affirmed. CA affirmed.
b) Casual
NATELCO V CA On November 1, 1977, NATELCO and
CASURECO entered into a contract for the
(1994) use by petitioners in the operation of its
telephone service the electric light posts of
10
3. That the term of the lease shall be renewed every three years retroacting from October 1979 to October 1982; after which the abovenamed rental shall be raised
automatically by 20% every three years for as long as defendant needed the premises and can meet and pay the said increases, the defendant to give notice of his intent to
renew sixty (60) days before the expiration of the term
donation. So long as the resolutory condition subsists and is capable of fulfillment, the donation
remains effective and the donee continues to be the owner subject only to the rights of the donor or
his successors-in-interest under the deed of donation. Since no period was imposed by the donor on
when the donee must comply with the condition, the latter remains the owner so long as he has tried
to comply with the condition within a reasonable period. Such period, however, became irrelevant
herein when the donee-Municipality manifested through a resolution that it cannot comply with the
condition of building a school and the same was made known to the donor. Only then — when the
non-fulfillment of the resolutory condition was brought to the donor's knowledge — that ownership of
the donated property reverted to the donor as provided in the automatic reversion clause of the deed
of donation.
The donor may have an inchoate interest in the donated property during the time that ownership of
the land has not reverted to her. Such inchoate interest may be the subject of contracts including a
contract of sale. In this case, however, what the donor sold was the land itself which she no longer
owns. It would have been different if the donor-seller sold her interests over the property under the
deed of donation which is subject to the possibility of reversion of ownership arising from the non-
fulfillment of the resolutory condition.
The stipulation “for as long as the defendant needed the premises and can meet and pay said
increases” is a purely potestative condition because it leaves the effectivity and enjoyment of leasehold
rights to the sole and exclusive will of the lessee. It is likewise a suspensive condition because the
renewal of the lease, which gives rise to a new lease, depends upon said condition. The condition is
not resolutory in nature because it is not a condition that terminates the lease contract, which is for a
definite period of 3 years upon the expiration of which the lease automatically terminates.
The continuance, effectivity and fulfillment of a contract of lease cannot be made to depend exclusively
upon the free and uncontrolled choice of the lessee between continuing the payment of the rentals or
not, completely depriving the owner of any say in the matter. Mutuality does not obtain in such a
contract of lease and no equality exists between the lessor and the lessee since the life of the contract
is dictated solely by the lessee.
Leases which may have been intended to be renewable in perpetuity will nevertheless be construed as
importing but one renewal if there is any uncertainty in that regard
Article 1267 speaks of "service" which has become so difficult. Taking into consideration the rationale
behind this provision, the term "service" should be understood as referring to the "performance" of the
obligation.
Nocon, J. private respondent in Naga City. In
consideration therefor, petitioners agreed
to install, free of charge, 10 telephone
connections for the use by private
respondent. After the contract had been
enforced for over 10 years, private
respondent filed with the RTC against
petitioners for reformation of the contract
with damages, on the ground that it is too
one-sided in favor of petitioners; that it is
not in conformity with the guidelines of the
National Electrification Administration; that
after 11 years of petitioners' use of the
posts, the telephone cables strung by them
thereon have become much heavier with
the increase in the volume of their
subscribers; that a post now costs as much
as P2,630.00; so that justice and equity
demand that the contract be reformed to
abolish the inequities thereon.
Private respondent also alleged that
starting with the year 1981, petitioners
have used 319 posts outside Naga City,
without any contract with it; that at the rate
of P10.00 per post, petitioners should pay
private respondent for the use thereof the
total amount of P267,960.00 from 1981 up
to the filing of its complaint; and that
petitioners had refused to pay private
respondent said amount despite demands.
And as third cause of action, private
respondent complained about the poor
servicing by petitioners.
In the present case, the obligation of private respondent consists in allowing petitioners to use its posts
in Naga City, which is the service contemplated in said article. Furthermore, a bare reading of this
article reveals that it is not a requirement thereunder that the contract be for future service with future
unusual change. According to Senator Tolentino, Article 1267 states in our law the doctrine of
unforeseen events. This is said to be based on the discredited theory of rebus sic stantibus in public
international law; under this theory, the parties stipulate in the light of certain prevailing conditions, and
once these conditions cease to exist the contract also ceases to exist. Considering practical needs and
the demands of equity and good faith, the disappearance of the basis of a contract gives rise to a right
to relief in favor of the party prejudiced.
The allegations in private respondent's complaint and the evidence it has presented sufficiently made
out a cause of action under Article 1267. The Court, therefore, release the parties from their correlative
obligations under the contract. However, the disposition of the present controversy does not end here.
The Court has to take into account the possible consequences of merely releasing the parties
therefrom: petitioners will remove the telephone wires/cables in the posts of private respondent,
resulting in disruption of their essential service to the public; while private respondent, in consonance
with the contract will return all the telephone units to petitioners, causing prejudice to its business.
The Court shall not allow such eventuality. Rather, the Court requires, as ordered by the trial court: 1)
petitioners to pay private respondent for the use of its posts in Naga City and in the towns of Milaor,
Canaman, Magarao and Pili, Camarines Sur and in other places where petitioners use private
respondent's posts, the sum of ten (P10.00) pesos per post, per month, beginning January, 1989; and
2)private respondent to pay petitioner the monthly dues of all its telephones at the same rate being paid
by the public beginning January, 1989. The peculiar circumstances of the present case, as
distinguished further from the Occeña case, necessitates exercise of a equity jurisdiction.

c) Mixed
OSMENA V RAMA On Nov. 15, 1890, Rama executed and In the acknowledgment of the indebtedness made by the defendant, she imposed the condition that
delivered a contract to Osmena, which she would pay the obligation if she sold her home. If the statement found in her acknowledgment of the
(1909) states that she owes Osmena P200 pesos, indebtedness should be regarded as a condition, it was a condition which depended upon her exclusive
which she will pay in sugar plus interest. will and is therefore void. The acknowledgment therefore was an absolute acknowledgment of the
Johnson, J. obligation and was sufficient to prevent the statute of limitation from barring the action upon the original
Rama pledged as a security all her present contract.
and future property and as a
special security her house in which she
lives. On Oct. 27, 1891, another contract
was executed, for a further loan amounting
to P70, wherein she loaned P50 to
Penares, leaving her with P20. Osmena
died sometime after the execution and
delivery of the said contract. After the
settlement and division of his estate, the
 contract became the property of Rafols, his
heir.

On March 15, 1902, the plaintiff presented

the contracts to defendant for payment and
she acknowledged her responsibility, thus,
executing another contract promising the
plaintiff to pay, if her house is sold. On
June 26, 1906, the defendant failed to pay
her obligations, the plaintiff filed a
complaint in court. The defendant
answered by filing a general denial and
setting up the special defense of
prescription. After the hearing of evidence,
the court rendered its judgment in favor of
the plaintiff. Ordering the defendant to pay
200 pesos plus interests and 20 pesos plus
interests on both at the rate of 18 ¾ per
annum.
SMITH BELL V Smith Bell and Co. entered into contract The export of the machinery in question was, as stated in the contract, contingent upon the sellers
MATTI with Sotelo in August 1918. Two steel obtaining certificate of priority and permission of the United States Government, subject to the rules
tanks were to be sold to Sotelo in the and regulations, as well as to railroad embargoes, then the delivery was subject to a condition the
(1922) amount of P21,000.00; two expellers at fulfillment of which depended not only upon the effort of the herein plaintiff, but upon the will of third
P25,000.00 each and two electric motors at persons who could in no way be compelled to fulfill the condition. In cases like this, which are not
Romualdez, J. P2,000.00 each. The steel tanks are to be expressly provided for, but impliedly covered, by the Civil Code, the obligor will be deemed to have
delivered within 3 or 4 months; the sufficiently performed his part of the obligation, if he has done all that was in his power, even if the
expellers to be delivered in September condition has not been fulfilled in reality.
1918 or as soon as possible; electric
motors approximate delivery within 90 days In such cases, the decisions prior to the Civil Code have held that the obligee having done all that was
and is not guaranteed. The tanks arrived at in his power, was entitled to enforce performance of the obligation. This performance, which is fictitious
Manila on April, 27 1919: the expellers on - not real - is not expressly authorized by the Code, which limits itself only to declare valid those
October 26, 1918; and the motors on conditions and the obligation thereby affected; but it is neither disallowed, and the Code being thus
February 27, 1919. The plaintiff corporation silent, the old view can be maintained as a doctrine.
notified the defendant,. Sotelo, of the
arrival of these goods, but Sotelo refused
to receive them and to pay the prices
stipulated.

The plaintiff brought suit against the

defendant, alleging, among other facts, that
it immediately notified the defendant of the
arrival of the goods, and asked instructions
from him as to the delivery thereof, and that
the defendant refused to receive any of
them and to pay their price. The plaintiff,
further, alleged that the expellers and the
motors were in good condition.

In their answer, the defendant, Sotelo, and

the intervenor, the Manila Oil Refining and
By-Products Co., Inc., denied the plaintiff's
 allegations as to the shipment of these
goods and their arrival at Manila, the
notification to Sotelo, the latter's refusal to
receive them and pay their price, and the
good condition of the expellers and the
motors, alleging as special defense that
Sotelo had made the contracts in question
as manager of the intervenor, the Manila
Oil Refining and By-Products Co., Inc
which fact was known to the plaintiff, and
that "it was only in May, 1919, that it
notified the intervenor that said tanks had
arrived, the motors and the expellers
having arrived incomplete and long after
the date stipulated." As a counterclaim or
set-off, they also allege that, as a
consequence of the plaintiff's delay in
making delivery of the goods, which the
intervenor intended to use in the
manufacture of coconut oil, the intervenor
suffered damages in the sums of
P116,783.91 for the nondelivery of the
tanks, and P21,250 on account of the
expellers and the motors not having arrived
in due time.
RUSTAN PULP V IAC Petitioner established a pulp and paper And insofar as the express discretion on the part of petitioners is concerned regarding the right of
mill with Lluch as one of its supplier of row stoppage, We feel that there is cogent basis for private respondent's apprehension on the illusory
(1992) materials. resumption of deliveries inasmuch as the prerogative suggests a condition solely dependent upon the
will of petitioners. Petitioners can stop delivery of pulp wood from private respondents if the supply at
Melo, J. In the contract of sale entered in to the plant is sufficient as ascertained by petitioners, subject to re-delivery when the need arises as
between petitioner and Lluch, it is provided determined likewise by petitioners.
that the contract to supply is not exclusive
because the petitioner has the option to A purely potestative imposition of this character must be obliterated from the face of the contract
buy from other supplier who are qualified to without affecting the rest of the stipulations considering that the condition relates to the fulfillment of an
sell and That the BUYER shall have the already existing obligation and not to its inception. that a condition which is both potestative (or
right to stop delivery of the said raw facultative) and resolutory may be valid, even though the saving clause is left to the will of the obligor.
materials by the seller covered by this
contract when supply of the same shall There is no doubt that the contract speaks loudly about petitioners' prerogative but what diminishes the
become sufficient until such time when legal efficacy of such right is the condition attached to it which, as aforesaid, is dependent exclusively
need for said raw materials shall have on their will for which reason, We have no alternative but to treat the controversial stipulation as
become necessarily provided, however, inoperative (Article 1306, New Civil Code). It is for this same reason that We are not inclined to follow
that the SELLER is given sufficient notice. the interpretation of petitioners that the suspension of delivery was merely temporary since the nature
of the suspension itself is again conditioned upon petitioner's determination of the sufficiency of
During the test run of the pulp mill, the supplies at the plant.
machinery line thereat had major defects
while deliveries of the raw materials piled
up, which prompted the Japanese supplier
of the machinery to recommend the
stoppage of the deliveries and so the
suppliers were informed to stop deliveries.

Private respondent try to clarify whether the

 respondent is terminating the contract but
Respondent did not answer so Private
respondent filed a complaint of contractual
breach but was dismissed by the court of
origin.
ROMERO V CA Private respondent entered into a
“Conditional Deed of Sale” with petitioner
(1995) over a parcel of land in Paranaque, the
latter advancing P50,000 for the eviction of
Vitug, J. squatters therein. An ejectment suit was
then filed by the private respondent against
the squatters. Although successful, private
respondent sought the return of the
downpayment she received because “she
could not get rid of the squatters”.
c) Possible
d) Impossible
ROMAN CATHOLIC The administrators of the estate of
ARCHBISHOP OF deceased spouses Eusebio and Martina
MANILA V CA De Castro filed a complaint to nullify the
deed of donation, rescission of contract,
(1991) and reconveyance of the property
against spouses Florencio and Soledad
Regalado, J. Ignao, Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus, and
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila. The
A perfected contract of sale may either be absolute or conditional depending on whether the agreement
is devoid of, or subject to, any condition imposed on the passing of title of the thing to be conveyed or
on the obligation of a party thereto. When ownership is retained until the fulfillment of a positive
condition the breach of the condition will simply prevent the duty to convey title from acquiring
an obligatory force. If the condition is imposed on an obligation of a party which is not complied with,
the other party may either refuse to proceed or waive said condition. Where, of course, the condition is
imposed upon the perfection of the contract itself, the failure of such condition would prevent the
juridical relation itself from coming into existence.
In determining the real character of the contract, the title given to it by the parties is not as much
significant as its substance. For example, a deed of sale, although denominated as a deed of
conditional sale, may be treated as absolute in nature, if title to the property sold is not reserved in the
vendor or if the vendor is not granted the right to unilaterally rescind the contract predicated on the
fulfillment or non-fulfillment, as the case may be, of the prescribed condition. The term "condition" in the
context of a perfected contract of sale pertains, in reality, to the compliance by one party of an
undertaking the fulfillment of which would beckon, in turn, the demandability of the reciprocal prestation
of the other party. The reciprocal obligations referred to would normally be, in the case of vendee, the
payment of the agreed purchase price and, in the case of the vendor, the fulfillment of certain express
warranties (which, in the case at bench is the timely eviction of the squatters on the property).
Under the agreement, private respondent is obligated to evict the squatters on the property. Private
respondent's failure "to remove the squatters from the property" within the stipulated period gives
petitioner the right to either refuse to proceed with the agreement or waive that condition in consonance
with Article 1545 of the Civil Code. This option clearly belongs to petitioner and not to private
respondent.
In contracts of sale particularly, Article 1545 of the Civil Code allows the obligee to choose between
proceeding with the agreement or waiving the performance of the condition. Here, evidently, petitioner
has waived the performance of the condition imposed on private respondent to free the property from
squatters.
The right of resolution of a party to an obligation is predicated on a breach of faith by the other party
that violates the reciprocity between them. It is private respondent who has failed in her obligation
under the contract. Petitioner did not breach the agreement. He has agreed, in fact, to shoulder the
expenses of the execution of the judgment in the ejectment case and to make arrangements with the
sheriff to effect such execution.
The action has already prescribed. Art. 764 is not applicable in this case. The deed of donation
involved expressly provided for automatic reversion of the property donated in case of violation of the,
as was correctly recognized by the CA.A judicial action for rescission of a contract is not necessary
where the contract provides that it may be revoked and cancelled for violation of any of its terms and
conditions. This cancellation can be applied in the case at bar. Art. 732 of the Civil Code provides
that donations inter vivos shall be governed by the general provisions on contracts and obligations in all
that is not determined by the law on donations. In contracts providing for automatic revocation, judicial
intervention is necessary not for purposes of obtaining a judicial declaration rescinding a contract
 administrators alleged that in 1930 the De already deemed rescinded, but in order to determine whether or not the rescission was proper. Thus,
Castros executed the deed of donation the cause of action has not yet prescribed since an action to enforce a written contract prescribes in ten
over their Cavite property to the (10) years. Article 764was intended to provide a judicial remedy in case of non-fulfillment or
Archbishop, said deed allegedly providing contravention of conditions specified in the deed of donation if and when the parties have not agreed
that the latter cannot dispose or sell the on the automatic revocation of such donation upon the occurrence of the contingency contemplated
property within 100 years from execution. therein. That is not the situation in the case at bar.
The administration of the said properties
was transferred to the Bishop of Imus in Nonetheless, while the action may not be dismissed by reason of prescription, the same should be
1962. And in 1980, the Bishop of Imus sold dismissed on the ground that the estates of the De Castros have no cause of action against the Ignaos and
the property to the spouses Ignao. The other petitioners. The cause of action of the De Castros is based on the alleged breach of the
Ignaos were then able to transfer the TCT resolutory condition that the property donated should not be sold within the prohibited period. Said
under their names. The lower court ruled condition, however, constitutes an undue restriction on the rights arising from ownership and is,
that the action had already prescribed and therefore, contrary to public policy and should be declared as an illegal or impossible condition.
dismissed the complaint. This was
reversed by the CA. The Ignaos and the
Bishops contend that the cause of action
had already prescribed, relying on Art. 764
which provides that "(t)he donation shall be
revoked at the instance of the donor, when
the donee fails to comply with any of the
conditions which the former imposed upon
the latter," and that "(t)his action shall
prescribe after four years from the non-
compliance with the condition, may be
transmitted to the heirs of the donor, and
may be exercised against the donee's
heirs.”

e) Positive
f) Negative
g) Divisible
h) Indivisible
i) Conjunctive
j) Alternative
k) Express
l) Implied
iii. Obligations with a term
a) Types
a) With a suspensive period (ex die)
b) With a resolutory period (in diem)
c) Legal
d) Voluntary
e) Judicial
ARANETA V PHIL. Magdalena Estate, Inc. sold to Louis Myrick The contract of sale contains no provision authorizing the vendor, in the event of failure of the vendee
SUGAR ESTATES lotsmNo. 28 and 29 of Block 1, Parcel 9 of to continue in the payment of the stipulated monthly installments, to retain the amounts paid to him on
DEVELOPMENT the San Juan Subdivision, San Juan, Rizal. account of the purchase price. The claim therefore, of the petitioner that it has the right to forfeit said
Their contract of sale sums in its favor is untenable. Under Article 1124 of the Civil Code, however, he may choose between
(1967) provides that the Price of P7,953 shall be demanding the fulfillment of the contract or its resolution. These remedies are alternative and not
payable in 120 equal monthly installments cumulative, and the petitioner in this case, having elected to cancel the contract cannot avail himself of
Reyes, J.B.L., J. of P96.39 each on the second day of every the other remedy of exacting performance. As a consequence of the resolution, the parties should be
month beginning the date of execution of restored, as far as practicable, to their original situation which can be approximated only be ordering
 the agreement. the return of the things which were the object of the contract, with their fruits and of the price, with its
interest, computed from the date of institution of the action
In pursuance of said agreement, the
vendee made several payments amounting
to P2,596.08, the last being
due and unpaid was that of May 2, 1930.
By reason of this, the vendor, through its
president, notified the vendee that, in view
of his inability to comply with the terms of
their
contract, said agreement had been
cancelled, relieving him of any further
obligation thereunder, and that all amounts
paid by him had been forfeited in favor of
the vendor. To this communication, the
vendee did not reply, and it appears
likewise that the vendor thereafter did not
require
him to make any further disbursements on
account of the purchase price.
CENTRAL PHIL. In 1939, the late Don Ramon Lopez was a The donation was an onerous one, where failure of the school to construct a medical college would
UNIVERSITY V CA member of the board of trustees of Central give the heirs the power to revoke the donation, reverting the property back to the heirs of the donor. It
Philippine University when he executed a is therefore a resolutory condition. Although, the period was not stated, and the courts should have
(1995) donation to the school, stating that the land fixed a period, in this case, 50 years has lapsed since the donation was executed, thus fixing a period
must be for exclusive use of a medical would serve no purpose and the property must already be reverted back.
Bellosillo, J. college. 50 years later, The heirs of Ramon
Lopez filed an action to annul the donation,
stating the failure of the school to construct
the medical college over the land. RTC
ruled in favor of respondents, which the CA
affirmed.

f) Express
g) Tacit
h) Original
i) Grace
j) Definite
k) Indefinite
b) According to Plurality of Object
a) Alternative Obligations
1. Kinds
1. Simple alternative
2. Facultative
2. Right to choose
1. In general
2. Loss of right
3. Loss/Impossibility
1. Liability for loss of thing/impossibility of performance
2. Creditor’s right to indemnity for damages
c) According to Plurality of Subjects
a) Single
b) Joint
 1. General Rule
2. Presumption
3. Indivisibility
c) Solidary
1. When solidary
2. Kinds
LAFARGE V Parties executed a Letter of Intent whereby Obligations may be classified as either joint or solidary. “Joint” or “jointly” or “conjoint” means mancum
CONTINENTAL Lafarge, on behalf of its affiliates including or mancumunada or pro rata obligation; on the other hand, “solidary obligations’ may be used
CEMENT LCLC, agreed to purchase the cement interchangeably with “joint and several” or “several.” Thus, petitioners’ usage of the term “joint and
business of Continental. The parties solidary” is confusing.
(2004) entered into a Sale and Purchase
Agreement (SPA). Petititoners were well The ambiguity in petitioners' counterclaims notwithstanding, respondents' liability, if proven, is solidary.
Panganiban, J. aware that Continental had a case pending This characterization finds basis in Article 1207 of the Civil Code, which provides that obligations are
with SC (APT v CA and Continental). In generally considered joint, except when otherwise expressly stated or when the law or the nature of the
anticipation of the liability from there, the obligation requires solidarity. However, obligations arising from tort are, by their nature, always solidary.
parties allegedly agreed to retain from the
purchase price a portion of the contract In a "joint" obligation, each obligor answers only for a part of the whole liability; in a "solidary" or "joint
price, which was to be deposited in an and several" obligation, the relationship between the active and the passive subjects is so close that
interest-bearing account. each of them must comply with or demand the fulfillment of the whole obligation.

However, petitioners allegedly refused to The fact that the liability sought against the CCC is for specific performance and tort, while that sought
apply the sum to APT after a decision was against the individual respondents is based solely on tort does not negate the solidary nature of their
rendered in its favor. liability for tortuous acts alleged in the counterclaims

Continental filed a complaint praying that
petitioners be directed to pay the “APT
retained amount”
Petitioner filed a compulsory counterclaim
against Continental, its majority stockholder
and president Lim and its corporate
secretary Mariano for damages. It
characterize their liability as “joint and
solidary”. Continental filed a MTD. Its
personality to file a MTD was questioned.
The solidary character of respondents' alleged liability is precisely why credence cannot be given to
petitioners' assertion. According to such assertion, Respondent CCC cannot move to dismiss the
counterclaims on grounds that pertain solely to its individual co-debtors.32 In cases filed by the
creditor, a solidary debtor may invoke defenses arising from the nature of the obligation, from
circumstances personal to it, or even from those personal to its co-debtors. The act of Respondent
CCC as a solidary debtor -- that of filing a motion to dismiss the counterclaim on grounds that pertain
only to its individual co-debtors -- is therefore allowed.
However, a perusal of its Motion to Dismiss the counterclaims shows that Respondent CCC filed it on
behalf of Co-respondents Lim and Mariano; it did not pray that the counterclaim against it be dismissed.

d) According to performance
a) Divisible/Indivisible obligations
e) According to sanction for breach
a) Obligations with a penal clause
Lambert v Fox (1914) The plaintiff and the defendant are the two Where the language used by the parties is plain, then construction and interpretation are unnecessary
largest stockholders in the new corporation In the case at bar the parties expressly stipulated that the contract should last one year. No reason is
called John R. Edgar & Co., Incorporated. shown for saying that it shall last only nine months. Whatever the object was in specifying the year, it
A few days after the incorporation was was their agreement that the contract should last a year and it was their judgment and conviction that
completed plaintiff and defendant entered their purposes would not be subversed in any less time. What reason can give for refusing to follow the
into the following agreement: plain words of the men who made the contract? We see none.
Therefore, the undersigned
mutually and reciprocally agree There is no need to prove the damages in fixing the penalty
not to sell, transfer, or otherwise In this jurisdiction, there is no difference between a penalty and liquidated damages, so far as legal
dispose of any part of their results are concerned. Whatever differences exists between them as a matter of language, they are
present holdings of stock in said treated the same legally. In either case the party to whom payment is to be made is entitled to recover
 John R. Edgar & Co. Inc., till after the sum stipulated without the necessity of proving damages. Indeed one of the primary purposes in
one year from the date hereof. fixing a penalty or in liquidating damages, is to avoid such necessity.
Either party violating this
agreement shall pay to the other The stipulation is not illegal
the sum of one thousand (P1,000) The suspension of the power to sell has a beneficial purpose, results in the protection of the
pesos as liquidated damages, corporation as well as of the individual parties to the contract, and is reasonable as to the length of time
unless previous consent in writing of the suspension.
to such sale, transfer, or other
disposition be obtained.
Notwithstanding this contract the defendant
Fox on October 19, 1911, sold his stock in
the said corporation to E. C. McCullough of
the firm of E. C. McCullough & Co. of
Manila, a strong competitor of the said
John R. Edgar & Co., Inc.
This sale was made by the defendant
against the protest of the plaintiff and with
the warning that he would be held liable
under the contract hereinabove set forth
and in accordance with its terms. In fact,
the defendant Foz offered to sell his shares
of stock to the plaintiff for the same sum
that McCullough was paying them less
P1,000, the penalty specified in the
contract.
The trial court decided the case in favor of
the defendant upon the ground that the
intention of the parties as it appeared from
the contract in question was to the effect
that the agreement should be good and
continue only until the corporation reached
a sound financial basis, and that that event
having occurred some time before the
expiration of the year mentioned in the
contract, the purpose for which the contract
was made and had been fulfilled and the
defendant accordingly discharged of his
obligation thereunder.
SSS v Moonwalk On February 20, 1980, the Social Security Issue: Is the penalty demandable even after the extinguishment of the principal obligation?
(1993) System, SSS for brevity, filed a complaint
in the Court of First Instance of Rizal Nowhere in this case did it appear that SSS demanded from Moonwalk the payment of its monthly
against Moonwalk Development & Housing amortizations. Neither did it show that petitioner demanded the payment of the stipulated penalty upon
Corporation, Moonwalk for short, alleging the failure of Moonwalk to meet its monthly amortization. What the complaint itself showed was that
that the former had committed an error in SSS tried to enforce the obligation sometime in September, 1977 by foreclosing the real estate
failing to compute the 12% interest due on mortgages executed by Moonwalk in favor of SSS. But this foreclosure did not push through upon
delayed payments on the loan of Moonwalk Moonwalk's requests and promises to pay in full. The next demand for payment happened on October
— resulting in a chain of errors in the 1, 1979 when SSS issued a Statement of Account to Moonwalk. And in accordance with said
application of payments made by statement, Moonwalk paid its loan in full. What is clear, therefore, is that Moonwalk was never in default
Moonwalk and, in an unpaid balance on the because SSS never compelled performance. Though it tried to foreclose the mortgages, SSS itself
principal loan agreement in the amount of desisted from doing so upon the entreaties of Moonwalk. If the Statement of Account could properly be
P7,053.77 and, also in not reflecting in its considered as demand for payment, the demand was complied with on time. Hence, no delay occurred
statement or account an unpaid balance on and there was, therefore, no occasion when the penalty became demandable and enforceable. Since
 the said penalties for delayed payments in there was no default in the performance of the main obligation — payment of the loan — SSS was
the amount of P7,517,178.21 as of October never entitled to recover any penalty, not at the time it made the Statement of Account and certainly,
10, 1979. not after the extinguishment of the principal obligation because then, all the more that SSS had no
reason to ask for the penalties. Thus, there could never be any occasion for waiver or even mistake in
The following is the stipulation of facts: the application for payment because there was nothing for SSS to waive as its right to enforce the
1. Plaintiff approved the application of penalty did not arise.
defendant Moonwalk for an interim loan of
P30,000,000.00 Definition of a penal clause- "an accessory obligation which the parties attach to a principal obligation
2. The sum of P9,595,000.00 was released for the purpose of insuring the performance thereof by imposing on the debtor a special presentation
to defendant Moonwalk as of November (generally consisting in the payment of a sum of money) in case the obligation is not fulfilled or is
28, 1973; irregularly or inadequately fulfilled"
3. There was a restructuring of the
payment of the released amount of Now then when is the penalty demandable? A penalty is demandable in case of non performance or
P9,595,000.00. late performance of the main obligation. In other words in order that the penalty may arise there must
4. Defendants substituted Associated be a breach of the obligation either by total or partial non fulfillment or there is non fulfillment in point of
Construction and Surveys Corporation, time which is called mora or delay. The debtor therefore violates the obligation in point of time if there is
Philippine Model Homes Development mora or delay. Now, there is no mora or delay unless there is a demand. It is noteworthy that in the
Corporation, Mariano Z. Velarde and present case during all the period when the principal obligation was still subsisting, although there were
Eusebio T. Ramos, as solidary obligors; late amortizations there was no demand made by the creditor, plaintiff-appellant for the payment of the
5. On July 23, 1974, after considering penalty. Therefore up to the time of the letter of plaintiff-appellant there was no demand for the
additional releases in the amount of payment of the penalty, hence the debtor was no in mora in the payment of the penalty.
P2,659,700.00, made to defendant
Moonwalk, defendant Moonwalk delivered Let it be emphasized that at the time of the demand made in the letters of November 28, 1979 and
to the plaintiff a promissory note for December 17, 1979 as far as the penalty is concerned, the defendant-appellee was not in default since
P12,254,700.00 there was no mora prior to the demand. That being the case, therefore, the demand made after the
6. Moonwalk made a total payment of extinguishment of the principal obligation which carried with it the extinguishment of the penal clause
P23,657,901.84 to SSS for the loan being merely an accessory obligation, was an exercise in futility.
principal of P12,254,700.00 released to it.
The last payment made by Moonwalk in the
amount of P15,004,905.74 were based on
the Statement of Account, prepared by
plaintiff SSS for defendant;
7. After settlement of the account plaintiff
issued to defendant Moonwalk the Release
of Mortgage for Moonwalk's mortgaged
properties
8. In letters to defendant Moonwalk, dated
November 28, 1979 and followed up by
another letter dated December 17, 1979,
plaintiff alleged that it committed an honest
mistake in releasing defendant.
9. In a letter dated December 21, 1979,
defendant's counsel told plaintiff that it had
completely paid its obligations to SSS;
TC-dismissed the complaint

Robes-Francisco In May 1962 Robes-Francisco Realty &
Realty & Development Corporation, now petitioner,
Development agreed to sell to private respondent Lolita
Corporation v CFI Millan for and in consideration of the sum
(1978) of P3,864.00, payable in installments, a
parcel of land containing an area of
WON the clause is a penalty clause. NO
There can be no dispute in this case under the pleadings and the admitted facts that petitioner
corporation was guilty of delay, amounting to nonperformance of its obligation, in issuing the transfer
certificate of title to vendee Millan who had fully paid up her installments on the lot bought by her.
Article 170 of the Civil Code expressly provides that those who in the performance of their obligations
approximately 276 square meters, situated are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof,
in Barrio Camarin, Caloocan City, known are liable for damages.
as Lot No. 20, Block No. 11 of its Franville
Subdivision. Petitioner contends that the deed of absolute sale executed between the parties stipulates that should
the vendor fail to issue the transfer certificate of title within six months from the date of full payment, it
Millan complied with her obligation under shall refund to the vendee the total amount paid for with interest at the rate of 4% per annum, hence,
the contract and paid the installments the vendee is bound by the terms of the provision and cannot recover more than what is agreed upon.
stipulated therein, the final payment having Presumably, petitioner in invoking Article 1226 of the Civil Code which provides that in obligations with
been made on December 22, 1971. The a penal clause, the penalty shall substitute the indemnity for damages and the payment of interests in
vendee made a total payment of P5,193.63 case of noncompliance, if there is no stipulation to the contrary.
including interests and expenses for The foregoing argument of petitioner is totally devoid of merit. We would agree with petitioner if the
registration of title. clause in question were to be considered as a penal clause. Nevertheless, for very obvious reasons,
Thereafter, Lolita Millan made repeated said clause does not convey any penalty, for even without it, pursuant to Article 2209 of the Civil Code,
demands upon the corporation for the the vendee would be entitled to recover the amount paid by her with legal rate of interest which is even
execution of the final deed of sale and the more than the 4% provided for in the clause.
issuance to her of the transfer certificate of It is therefore inconceivable that the aforecited provision in the deed of sale is a penal clause which will
title over the lot. On March 2, 1973, the preclude an award of damages to the vendee Millan. In fact the clause is so worded as to work to the
parties executed a deed of absolute sale of advantage of petitioner corporation.
the aforementioned parcel of land. The
deed of absolute sale contained, among The nominal damages was reduced by the Court to Php 10,000.00
others, this particular provision:
That the VENDOR
further warrants that the
transfer certificate of title
of the above-described
parcel of land shall be
transferred in the name
of the VENDEE within
the period of six (6)
months from the date of
full payment and in case
the VENDOR fails to
issue said transfer
certificate of title, it shall
bear the obligation to
refund to the VENDEE
the total amount already
paid for, plus an interest
at the rate of 4% per
annum.
Notwithstanding the lapse of the above-
mentioned stipulated period of six (6)
months, the corporation failed to cause the
issuance of the corresponding transfer
certificate of title over the lot sold to Millan,
hence, the latter filed on August 14, 1974 a
complaint for specific performance and
damages against Robes-Francisco Realty
& Development Corporation.

b) Characteristics of penal clause

 1. Subsidiary or alternative
2. Exclusive
iv. Extinguishment of obligations
a) Payment or performance
a) As to prestation
1. Identity
Exception
1. Dacion en pago
2. Novation
2. Integrity
3. Indivisibility
b) As to parties
1. Payor, obligor, debtor
2. Payee, obligee, creditor
c) As to time and place of performance
d) NOTE: 4 special forms of payment
1. Dacion en pago
Filinvest Credit On October 30, 1971, the Philippine Issue: WON the return of the mortgaged motor vehicle to the appellee by virtue of its voluntary
Corporation v Acetylene Co., Inc., defendant-appellant surrender by the appellant totally extinguished and/or cancelled its obligation to the appellee;
Philippine Acetylene herein, purchased from one Alexander Lim,
Co. Inc. (1982) as evidenced by a Deed of, a motor vehicle The mere return of the mortgaged motor vehicle by the mortgagor, the herein appellant, to the
described as Chevorlet for P55,247.80 with mortgagee, the herein appellee, does not constitute dation in payment or dacion en pago in the
a down payment of P20,000.00 and the absence, express or implied of the true intention of the parties. Dacion en pago, according to Manresa,
balance of P35,247.80 payable, under the is the transmission of the ownership of a thing by the debtor to the creditor as an accepted equivalent
terms and conditions of the promissory of the performance of obligation. In dacion en pago, as a special mode of payment, the debtor offers
note, at a monthly installment of P1,036.70 another thing to the creditor who accepts it as equivalent of payment of an outstanding debt. The
for thirty-four (34) months, due and payable undertaking really partakes in one sense of the nature of sale, that is, the creditor is really buying the
on the first day of each month starting thing or property of the debtor, payment for which is to be charged against the debtor's debt. As such,
December 1971 through and inclusive the essential elements of a contract of sale, namely, consent, object certain, and cause or
September 1, 1974 with 12 % interest per consideration must be present. In its modern concept, what actually takes place in dacion en pago is an
annum on each unpaid installment, and objective novation of the obligation where the thing offered as an accepted equivalent of the
attorney's fees in the amount equivalent to performance of an obligation is considered as the object of the contract of sale, while the debt is
25% of the total of the outstanding unpaid considered as the purchase price. In any case, common consent is an essential prerequisite, be it sale
amount. or innovation to have the effect of totally extinguishing the debt or obligation.
As security for the payment of said
promissory note, the appellant executed a The evidence on the record fails to show that the mortgagee, the herein appellee, consented, or at
chattel mortgage over the same motor least intended, that the mere delivery to, and acceptance by him, of the mortgaged motor vehicle be
vehicle in favor of said Alexander Lim. construed as actual payment, more specifically dation in payment or dacion en pago. The fact that the
Subsequently, on November 2, 1971. mortgaged motor vehicle was delivered to him does not necessarily mean that ownership thereof, as
Alexander Lim assigned to the Filinvest juridically contemplated by dacion en pago, was transferred from appellant to appellee. In the absence
Finance Corporation all his rights, title, and of clear consent of appellee to the proferred special mode of payment, there can be no transfer of
interests in the promissory note and chattel ownership of the mortgaged motor vehicle from appellant to appellee. If at all, only transfer of
mortgage by virtue of a Deed of possession of the mortgaged motor vehicle took place, for it is quite possible that appellee, as
Assignment). mortgagee, merely wanted to secure possession to forestall the loss, destruction, fraudulent transfer of
Thereafter, the Filinvest Finance the vehicle to third persons, or its being rendered valueless if left in the hands of the appellant.
Corporation, as a consequence of its
merger with the Credit and Development
Corporation assigned to the new
corporation, the herein plaintiff-appellee
Filinvest Credit Corporation, all its rights,
title, and interests on the aforesaid
promissory note and chattel mortgage
 which, in effect, the payment of the unpaid
balance owed by defendant-appellant to
Alexander Lim was financed by plaintiff-
appellee such that Lim became fully paid.
Appellant failed to comply with the terms
and conditions set forth in the promissory
note and chattel mortgage since it had
defaulted in the payment of nine
successive installments. Appellee then sent
a demand letter whereby its counsel
demanded "that you (appellant) remit the
aforesaid amount in full in addition to
stipulated interest and charges or return
the mortgaged property to my client at its
office at 2133 Taft Avenue, Malate, Manila
within five (5) days from date of this letter
during office hours. " Replying thereto,
appellant, thru its assistant general-
manager, wrote back advising appellee of
its decision to "return the mortgaged
property, which return shall be in full
satisfaction of its indebtedness pursuant to
Article 1484 of the New Civil Code."
Accordingly, the mortgaged vehicle was
returned to the appellee together with the
document "Voluntary Surrender with
Special Power of Attorney To
Sell" executed by appellant on March 12,
1973 and confirmed to by appellee's vice-
president.
On April 4, 1973, appellee wrote a letter to
appellant informing the latter that appellee
cannot sell the motor vehicle as there were
unpaid taxes on the said vehicle in the sum
of P70,122.00. On the last portion of the
said letter, appellee requested the
appellant to update its account by paying
the installments in arrears and accruing
interest in the amount of P4,232.21 on or
before April 9, 1973.

Tan Shuy v Sps Petitioner Tan Shuy is engaged in the
Maulawin (2012) business of buying copra and corn in the
Fourth District of Quezon Province.
According to Vicente Tan (Vicente), son of
petitioner, whenever they would buy copra
or corn from crop sellers, they would
prepare and issue a pesada in their favor.
A pesada is a document containing details
of the transaction, including the date of
sale, the weight of the crop delivered, the
trucking cost, and the net price of the crop.
Issue: Whether the delivery of copra amounted to installment payments for the loan obtained by
respondents from petitioner. YES
Petitioner is already estopped from questioning the due execution and authenticity of the pesadas. As
found by the CA, Tan Shuy "could have easily belied the existence of x x x the pesadas or receipts, and
the purposes for which they were offered in evidence by simply presenting his daughter, Elena Tan
Shuy, but no effort to do so was actually done by the former given that scenario." The pesadas having
been admitted in evidence, with petitioner failing to timely object thereto, these documents are already
deemed sufficient proof of the facts contained therein. We hereby uphold the factual findings of the
RTC, as affirmed by the CA, in that the pesadas served as proof that the net proceeds from the copra
deliveries were used as installment payments for the debts of respondents.
 He then explained that when a pesada
contained the annotation "pd" on the total
amount of the purchase price, it meant that
the crop delivered had already been paid
for by petitioner.
Guillermo Maulawin (Guillermo),
respondent in this case, is a farmer-
businessman engaged in the buying and
selling of copra and corn. On 10 July 1997,
Tan Shuy extended a loan to Guillermo in
the amount of P 420,000. In consideration
thereof, Guillermo obligated himself to pay
the loan and to sell lucad or copra to
petitioner.
Petitioner filed a complaint to collect the
balance of the loan. Respondent Guillermo
countered that he had already paid the
subject loan in full. According to him, he
continuously delivered and sold copra to
petitioner from April 1998 to April 1999.
Respondent said they had an oral
arrangement that the net proceeds thereof
shall be applied as installment payments
for the loan. He alleged that his deliveries
amounted to P 420,537.68 worth of copra.
To bolster his claim, he presented copies of
pesadas issued by Elena and Vicente. He
pointed out that the pesadas did not
contain the notation "pd," which meant that
actual payment of the net proceeds from
copra deliveries was not given to him, but
was instead applied as loan payment.
2. Application of payments
Reparations It is not disputed that the Universal Deep-
Commission v Sea Fishing Corporation was awarded six
Universal Deep Sea (6) trawl boats by the Reparations
Fishing (1978) Commission as end-user of reparations
goods. These fishing boats, christened the
M/S UNIFISH 1, M/S UNIFISH 2. M/S
UNIFISH 3. M/S UNIFISH 4, M/S UNIFISH
5, and M/S UNIFISH 6 were delivered to
UNIVERSAL two at a time, f.o.b. Japanese
port.
The M/S UNIFISH 1 and M/S UNIFISH 2,
with an aggregate purchase price of
P536,428.44, were delivered to
UNIVERSAL on November 20,1958, and
the contract of Conditional Purchase and
Sale of Reparations Goods, executed by
and between the parties on February 12,
The defendant explained that for the receipts (pesadas) from April 1998 to April 1999 he only gets the
payments for trucking while the total amount which represent the total purchase price for the copras
that he delivered to the plaintiff were all given to Elena Tan Shuy as installments for the loan he owed
to plaintiff. The defendant further averred that if in the receipts or "pesadas" issued by the plaintiff to
those who delivered copras to them there is a notation "pd" on the total amount of purchase price of the
copras, it means that said amount was actually paid or given by the plaintiff or his daughter Elena Tan
Shuy to the seller of the copras. To prove his averments the defendant presented as evidence two (2)
receipts or pesadas issued by the plaintiff to a certain "Cariño" (Exhibits "1" and "2" – defendant)
showing the notation "pd" on the total amount of the purchase price for the copras. Such claim of the
defendant was further bolstered by the testimony of Apolinario Cariño which affirmed that he also sell
[sic] copras to the plaintiff Tan Shuy. He also added that he incurred indebtedness to the plaintiff and
whenever he delivered copras the amount of the copras sold were applied as payments to his loan.
The witness also pointed out that the plaintiff did not give any official receipts to those who transact
business with him (plaintiff).
Thus, equity dictates that the total amount of P41,585.25 which corresponds to the payment for "mais"
(corn) delivered by the plaintiff shall be deducted from the total amount of P420,537.68 which according
to the defendant based on the pesadas (Exhibits "3" to "64") that he presented as evidence, is the total
amount of the payment that he made for his loan to the plaintiff.
Clearly from the foregoing, since the total amount of defendant’s loan to the plaintiff is P420,000.00 and
the evidence on record shows that the actual amount of payment made by the defendant from the
proceeds of the copras he delivered to the plaintiff is P378,952.43, the defendant is still indebted to the
plaintiff in the amount of P41,047.53 (sic) (P420,000.00-P378,952.43).
The surety company also claims that judgment, trial court erred in not applying judgment, amount of
P10,000.00, paid as down payment by UNIVERSAL to judgment, Reparations Commission, to
judgment, guaranteed indebtedness. According to judgment, surety company, under Article 1254 of
judgment, Civil rode, where there is no imputation of payment made by either judgment, debtor or
creditor, The debt which is the most onerous to the debtor shall be deemed to have been satisfied, so
that the amount of P10,000.00 paid by UNIVERSAL as down payment on the purchase of the, M/S
UNIFISH 1 and M/S UNIFISH 2 should be applied to the guaranteed portion of the debt, this releasing
part of the liability hence the obligation of 'The surety company shall be only P43,643.00, instead of
P53,643.00.
The rules contained in Articles 1252 to 1254 of judgment, Civil Code apply to a person owing several
debts of judgment, same kind to a single creditor. They cannot be made applicable to a person whose
obligation as a mere surety is both contingent and singular, which in this case is the full and faithful
compliance with the terms of the contract of conditional purchase and sale of reparations goods, The
obligation included the payment, not only of the first installment in the amount of P53,643.00, but also
of the ten (10) equal yearly installments of P56,597.20 per annum. The amount of P10,000.00 was,
indeed, deducted from judgment, amount of P53,643.00, but then judgment, first of judgment, ten (10)
equal yearly installments had also accrued, hence, no error was committed in holding judgment, surety
 1960, provided among others, that "the first company to judgment, full extent of its undertaking.
installment representing 10% of the amount
or FIFTY THREE THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED FORTY TWO PESOS AND
EIGHTY FOUR CENTAVOS (P53,642.84)
shall be paid within 24 months from the
date of complete delivery thereof, the
balance shall be paid in the manner herein
stated as shown in the Schedule of
Payments
To guarantee the faithful compliance with
the obligations under said contract, a
performance bond in the amount of
P53,643.00, with UNIVERSAL as principal
and the Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc.,
as surety, was executed in favor of the
Reparations Commission. A Corresponding
indemnity agreement was executed to
indemnify the surety company for any
damage, loss charges, etc., which it may
sustain or incur as a consequence of
having become a surety upon the
performance bond.
The M/S UNIFISH 3 and M/S UNIFISH 4,
with a total purchase price of P687,777.76
were delivered to UNIVERSAL on April 20,
1959 and the Contract of Conditional
Purchase and Sale Reparations Goods,
dated November 25, 1959, provided that
"the first installment representing 10% of
the amount or SIXTY-EIGHT THOUSAND
SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTY-SEVEN
PESOS AND SEVENTY-SEVEN
CENTAVOS shall be paid within 24 months
from the date of complete delivery thereof,
the balance shall be paid in the manner
herein stated as shown in the Schedule of
Payments
On August 10, 1962, judgment,
Reparations Commission instituted
judgment, present action against
UNIVERSAL and judgment, surety
company to recover various amounts of
money due under these contracts. In
answer, UNIVERSAL claimed that
judgment, amounts of money sought to be
collected are not yet due and demandable.
Paculdo v Regalado He alleged that he had paid the amount of Issue: Would petitioner’s failure to object to the letter of July 15, 1991 and its proposed application of
P11,478,121.85 for security deposit and payments amount to consent to such application?
rentals on the wet market building, but Petitioner submits that his silence is not consent but is in fact a rejection.
respondent, without his consent, applied The right to specify which among his various obligations to the same creditor is to be satisfied first rests
portions of the payment to his other with the debtor,as provided by law, to wit:
 obligations. The vouchers and receipts
indicated that the payments made were for
rentals. Thus, at the time of payment
petitioner had declared as to which
obligation the payment must be applied.
"Article 1252. He who has various debts of the same kind in favor of one and the same creditor, may
declare at the time of making the payment, to which of them the same must be applied. Unless the
parties so stipulate, or when the application of payment is made by the party for whose benefit the term
has been constituted, application shall not be made as to debts which are not yet due.
If the debtor accepts from the creditor a receipt in which an application of the payment is made, the
former cannot complain of the same, unless there is a cause for invalidating the contract."
The statement of account prepared by respondent was not the receipt contemplated under the law. The
receipt is the evidence of payment executed at the time of payment, and not the statement of account
executed several days thereafter.
There was no clear assent by petitioner to the change in the manner of application of payment. The
petitioner’s silence as regards the application of payment by respondent cannot mean that he
consented thereto. There was no meeting of the minds. Though an offer may be made, the acceptance
of such offer must be unconditional and unbounded in order that concurrence can give rise to a
perfected contract. Hence, petitioner could not be in estoppel.

3. Cession
4. Tender of payment and consignation
Meat Packing Corp. v PIMECO was sequestered by PCGG. In the case at bar, there was prior tender by PCGG of the amount of P5,000,000.00 for payment of the
Sandiganbayan PCGG tendered to MPCP two checks in rentals in arrears. MPCP’s refusal to accept the same, on the ground merely that its lease-purchase
the amounts of P3,000,000.00 and agreement with PIMECO had been rescinded, was unjustified. As found by the Sandiganbayan, from
P2,000,000.00, or a total of P5,000,000.00, January 29, 1986 to January 30, 1990, PIMECO paid, and GSIS/MPCP received, several amounts due
representing partial payment of accrued under the lease-purchase agreement, such as annual amortizations or rentals, advances, insurance,
rentals on the meat packing plant, which and taxes, in total sum of P15,921,205.83. Surely, the acceptance by MPCP and GSIS of such
MPCP refused to accept on the theory that payments for rentals and amortizations negates any rescission of the lease-purchase agreement.
the lease-purchase agreement had been Parenthetically, the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are conclusive upon this Court, subject to
rescinded. Thus, the PCGG filed an Urgent certain exceptions. The aforesaid factual findings, moreover, have not been disputed by petitioner.
Motion praying that the Sandiganbayan
order MPCP to accept the tendered
amount of P5,000,000.00.

b) Loss of thing due

a) Impossibility of performance
1. Original
2. Supervening
c) Condonation or remission of the debt
Yam v CA The private respondent sent two demand The answer is in the affirmative. Art. 1270, par. 2 of the Civil Code provides that express condonation
letters to petitioners, dated September 4, must comply with the forms of donation. Art. 748, par. 3 provides that the donation and acceptance of a
1986 and September 25, 1986, seeking movable, the value of which exceeds P5,000,00, must be made in writing, otherwise the same shall be
payment of the balance of P266,146.88. As void. In this connection, under Art. 417, par. 1, obligations, actually referring to credits, are considered
petitioners did not respond, private movable property. In the case at bar, it is undisputed than the alleged agreement to condone
respondent filed this case in the Regional P266,196.88 of the second IGLF loan was not reduced in writing.
Trial Court of Metro Manila for the Nonetheless, petitioners insist that the voucher covering the Pilipinas Bank check for P410,854.47,
collection of P266,146.88 plus interests, containing the notation that the amount is in "full payment of IGLF loan," constitutes documentary
penalties, and service charges or, in the evidence of such oral agreement. This contention is without merit. The notation in "full payment of IGLF
alternative, for the foreclosure of the loan" merely states petitioners' intention in making the payment, but in no way does it bind private
mortgaged machineries. respondent. It would have been a different matter if the notation appeared in a receipt issued by
In their Answer, petitioners claimed that respondent corporation, through its receiver, because then it would be an admission against interest.
they had fully paid their obligation to private Indeed, if private respondent really condoned the amount in question, petitioners should have asked for
respondent. They contended that some a certificate of full payment from respondent corporation, as they did in the case of their first IGLF loan
time after receiving private respondent's of P500,000.00.
letter of July 25, 1986 (concerning the
 conditional offer to reduce their penalty
charges), petitioner Victor Yam and his
wife, Elena Yam, met with Carlos
Sobrepeñas, president of respondent
corporation, during which the latter agreed
to waive the penalties and service charges,
provided petitioners paid the principal and
interest, computed as of July 31, 1986, less
the earlier payment of P50,000.00. This is
the reason why according to them they only
paid P410,854.47. Petitioners added that
this fact of full payment is reflected in the
voucher accompanying the Pilipinas Bank
check they issued, which bore the notation
"full payment of IGLF loan."

d) Confusion or merger of rights of the creditor

e) Compensation
Gan Tion v CA Ong Wan Sieng was a tenant in certain Issue: The sole issue here is whether or not there has been legal compensation between petitioner
premises owned by Gan Tion. In 1961 the Gan Tion and respondent Ong Wan Sieng.
latter filed an ejectment case against the Held: Yes. It is the litigant, not his counsel, who is the judgment creditor and who may enforce the
former, alleging non-payment of rents for judgment by execution. Such credit, therefore, may properly be the subject of legal compensation.
August and September of that year, at
P180 a month, or P360 altogether. The
defendant denied the allegation and said
that the agreed monthly rental was only
P160, which he had offered to but was
refused by the plaintiff. The plaintiff
obtained a favorable judgment in the
municipal court (of Manila), but upon
appeal the Court of First Instance, on July
2, 1962, reversed the judgment and
dismissed the complaint, and ordered the
plaintiff to pay the defendant the sum of
P500 as attorney's fees. That judgment
became final.
On October 10, 1963 Gan Tion served
notice on Ong Wan Sieng that he was
increasing the rent to P180 a month,
effective November 1st, and at the same
time demanded the rents in arrears at the
old rate in the aggregate amount of
P4,320.00, corresponding to a period from
August 1961 to October 1963.
In the meantime, over Gan Tion's
opposition, Ong Wan Sieng was able to
obtain a writ of execution of the judgment
for attorney's fees in his favor. Gan Tion
went on certiorari to the Court of Appeals,
where he pleaded legal compensation,
 claiming that Ong Wan Sieng was indebted
to him in the sum of P4,320 for unpaid
rents. The appellate court accepted the
petition but eventually decided for the
respondent, holding that although
"respondent Ong is indebted to the
petitioner for unpaid rentals in an amount of
more than P4,000.00," the sum of P500
could not be the subject of legal
compensation, it being a "trust fund for the
benefit of the lawyer, which would have to
be turned over by the client to his counsel."

Mirasol vs CA The Mirasols are sugarland owners and Set-off or compensation is not proper in this case.
planters. Private respondent Philippine
(2001) National Bank (PNB) financed the Mirasols' First, neither of the parties are mutually creditors and debtors of each other. Under P.D. No. 579,
sugar production venture. The Mirasols neither PNB nor PHILEX could retain any difference in the price of sugar sold. It went to the National
signed Credit Agreements, a Chattel Government. There was nothing with which PNB was supposed to have off-set Mirasols’ admitted
Mortgage on Standing Crops, and a Real indebtedness
Estate Mortgage in favor of PNB. The
Chattel Mortgage empowered PNB as the Second, compensation cannot take place where one claim is still the subject of litigation, as the same
petitioners' attorney-in-fact to negotiate and cannot be deemed liquidated.
to sell the latter's sugar in both domestic
and export markets and to apply the
proceeds to the payment of their
obligations to it.

P.D.No. 579 was issued, authorizing the

Philippine Exchange Co., Inc. to purchase
sugar allocated for export. The decree
directed that whatever profit made was to
be remitted to a special fund of the national
government. PHILEX would be funded by
PNB.

PNB continued to finance the sugar

production of the Mirasols. It then asked
petitioners to settle their due and
demandable accounts, which they did,
leaving an unpaid overdrawn account of
P1,513,347.78.

Despite demands, the Mirasols failed to

settle said due and demandable accounts.
PNB then proceeded to extrajudicially
foreclose the mortgaged properties.

The spouses asked PNB to account for the

proceeds of the sale of their sugar, insisting
that said proceeds could offset their
obligations. PNB insisted that under P.D.
No. 579, there was nothing to account
 since all earnings from the sales of sugar
went to the National Government.

f) Novation
a) Subjective or personal
Starbright Sales vs On April 17, 1988 Ramon Licup wrote
Philippine Realty Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, offering to buy
Corporation three contiguous parcels of land in
Parañaque that The Holy See and
(2012) Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC)
owned. Licup accepted the responsibility
for removing the illegal settlers on the land
and enclosed a check for P100,000.00 to
"close the transaction." He undertook to
pay the balance of the purchase price upon
presentation of the title for transfer and
once the property has been cleared of its
occupants.
Msgr. Cirilos accepted the offer. A stop
payment order was made on the checks,
Licup wrote Msgr. Cirilos on April 26, 1988,
requesting that the titles to the land be
instead transferred to petitioner Starbright
Sales Enterprises, Inc. (SSE). He enclosed
a new check for the same amount. SSE’s
representatives, Mr. and Mrs. Cu, did not
sign the letter. However, Msgr. Cirilos later
stated that it should be Starbright that
would clear the area of its occupants.
Starbright agreed if the purchase price
were to be lowered. Msgr. Cirilos rejected
the updated proposal. Eventually, the lots
were sold to another corporation. Starbright
demanded rescission of the sale to another
corporation, hence an action was brought
against the Philippine Realty Corporation.
There was a perfected contract of sale between the Licup and PRC. However, the subjective novation
(making SSE/Starbright the purchaser) was not completed.
The Court believes that the April 17, 1988 letter between Licup and Msgr. Cirilos, the representative of
the property’s owners, constituted a perfected contract. When Msgr. Cirilos affixed his signature on that
letter, he expressed his conformity to the terms of Licup’s offer appearing on it. There was meeting of
the minds as to the object and consideration of the contract.
But when Licup ordered a stop-payment on his deposit and proposed in his April 26, 1988 letter to
Msgr. Cirilos that the property be instead transferred to SSE, a subjective novation took place.
A subjective novation results through substitution of the person of the debtor or through subrogation of
a third person to the rights of the creditor. To accomplish a subjective novation through change in the
person of the debtor, the old debtor needs to be expressly released from the obligation and the third
person or new debtor needs to assume his place in the relation.
Novation serves two functions – one is to extinguish an existing obligation, the other to substitute a new
one in its place – requiring concurrence of four requisites: 1) a previous valid obligation; 2) an
agreement of all parties concerned to a new contract; 3) the extinguishment of the old obligation; and 4)
the birth of a valid new obligation.
Notably, Licup and Msgr. Cirilos affixed their signatures on the original agreement embodied in Licup’s
letter of April 26, 1988. No similar letter agreement can be found between SSE and Msgr. Cirilos.
The proposed substitution of Licup by SSE opened the negotiation stage for a new contract of sale as
between SSE and the owners. The succeeding exchange of letters between Mr. Stephen Cu, SSE’s
representative, and Msgr. Cirilos attests to an unfinished negotiation. Msgr. Cirilos referred to his
discussion with SSE regarding the purchase as a "pending transaction."

PRC alleges there was no perfected

contract of sale between it and Licup.

b) Objective or real
c) Mixed
g) Invalid payment
h) Annulment
i) Rescission
j) Fulfillment of the resolutory condition
k) Prescription
l) Death in certain instances
 m) Renunciation by the creditor
n) Compromise
o) Arrival of a resolutory term
p) Mutual desistance
Saura vs DBP In July 1953 the plaintiff (hereinafter
referred to as Saura, Inc.) applied to the
(1972) Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC),
before its conversion into DBP, for an
industrial loan of P500,000.00, to be used
as follows: P250,000.00 for the
construction of a factory building (for the
manufacture of jute sacks); P240,900.00 to
pay the balance of the purchase price of
the jute mill machinery and equipment; and
P9,100.00 as additional working capital.
On January 7, 1954 RFC passed
Resolution No. 145 approving the loan
application for P500,000.00, to be secured
by a first mortgage on the factory building
to be constructed, the land site thereof, and
the machinery and equipment to be
installed.
The loan contract is no longer subsisting
When RFC turned down the request in its letter of January 25, 1955 the negotiations which had been
going on for the implementation of the agreement reached an impasse. Saura, Inc. obviously was in no
position to comply with RFC's conditions. So instead of doing so and insisting that the loan be released
as agreed upon, Saura, Inc. asked that the mortgage be cancelled, which was done on June 15, 1955.
The action thus taken by both parties was in the nature cf mutual desistance — what Manresa terms
"mutuo disenso" — which is a mode of extinguishing obligations. It is a concept that derives from the
principle that since mutual agreement can create a contract, mutual disagreement by the parties can
cause its extinguishment.
The subsequent conduct of Saura, Inc. confirms this desistance. It did not protest against any alleged
breach of contract by RFC, or even point out that the latter's stand was legally unjustified. Its request
for cancellation of the mortgage carried no reservation of whatever rights it believed it might have
against RFC for the latter's non-compliance. In 1962 it even applied with DBP for another loan to
finance a rice and corn project, which application was disapproved. It was only in 1964, nine years after
the loan agreement had been cancelled at its own request, that Saura, Inc. brought this action for
damages. All these circumstances demonstrate beyond doubt that the said agreement had been
extinguished by mutual desistance — and that on the initiative of the plaintiff-appellee itself.

Both parties sought the renegotiation of the

terms of the loan, eventually the
negotiations came to a standstill. Several
years thereafter, Saura filed a case against
RFC praying for damages due to the the
loan proceeds not being released.

q) Unilateral withdrawal
r) Change of Civil Status
s) Rebus Sic Stantibus
Naga Tel Co vs CA Contract between NATELCO and WON the case falls under Art. 1267? YES.
CAUSERCO II (entered into in 1
(1994) November 1977) Action must be found to relieve CAUSERCO from the continued operation of the said agreement
NATELCO to use the electric light posts of
CAUSERCO in Naga City for the operation CAUSERCO did not contemplate at the outset of the contract the vast expansion of NATELCO and the
of their telephone service. impossibility of compliance with the terms. The conditions have become too onerous, with the strain of
As compensation, NATELCO to install 10 the telephone lines causing the electrical posts to break during storms.
telephone connections for CAUSERCO’s
use free of charge.
“The term or period of this contract shall be
as long as the party of the first part
(NATELCO) has need for the electric light
posts of the party of the second part
(CAUSERCO) it being understood that this
contract shall terminate when for any
reason whatsoever, the party of the second
part is forced to stop, abandoned its
 operation as a public service and it
becomes necessary to remove the electric
light post.”
Regional Trial Court (case for reformation
of contract filed by CAUSERCO on 2
January 1989) as they stated that the
condition has become too onerous.
PNCC vs CA This petition for review on certiorari was
sparked by PNCC’s refusal to pay the
(1994) rentals as stipulated in the contract of lease
on an undivided portion of 30,000 square
meters of a parcel of land owned by private
respondents (Raymundo family). The lease
was for P240,000 per year for 5 years.
On 7 January 1986, PNCC obtained from
the Ministry of Human Settlements a
Temporary Use Permit for the proposed
rock crushing project. The permit was to be
valid for two years unless sooner revoked
by the Ministry.
On 16 January 1986, private respondents
wrote petitioner requesting payment of the
first annual rental in the amount of
P240,000 which was due and payable
upon the execution of the contract.
In its reply, PNCC argued that under
paragraph 1 of the lease contract, payment
of rental would commence on the date of
the issuance of an industrial clearance by
the Ministry of Human Settlements, and not
from the date of signing of the contract. It
then expressed its intention to terminate
the contract, as it had decided to cancel or
discontinue with the rock crushing project
"due to financial, as well as technical,
difficulties."
Osmena vs SSS 2 Petitions by Osmena and several other
senators plus members of the SSS
(2007) assailing the sale of the SSS’s shares of
stock of Equitable PCI Bank. BDO sought
to acquire the shares.
On July 14, 2004, SSS passed Res. No.
428 approving, as earlier stated, the sale of
the EPCIB shares through the Swiss
Challenge method. A month later, the
equally assailed Res. No. 485 was also
passed.
On August 23, 24, and 25, 2004, SSS
PNCC cannot invoke rebus sic stantibus to release itself from its obligations.
It is a fundamental rule that contracts, once perfected, bind both contracting parties, and obligations
arising therefrom have the force of law between the parties and should be complied with in good faith.
But the law recognizes exceptions to the principle of the obligatory force of contracts. One exception is
laid down in Article 1266 of the Civil Code, which reads: "The debtor in obligations to do shall also be
released when the prestation becomes legally or physically impossible without the fault of the obligor."
PNCC cannot, however, successfully take refuge in the said article, since it is applicable only to
obligations "to do," and not to obligations "to give." An obligation "to do" includes all kinds of work
or service; while an obligation "to give" is a prestation which consists in the delivery of a movable or an
immovable thing in order to create a real right, or for the use of the recipient, or for its simple
possession, or in order to return it to its owner.
The obligation to pay rentals or deliver the thing in a contract of
lease falls within the prestation "to give"; hence, it is not covered within the scope of Article
1266. At any rate, the unforeseen event and causes mentioned by petitioner are not the legal or
physical impossibilities contemplated in the said article. Besides, petitioner failed to state
specifically the circumstances brought about by "the abrupt change in the political climate in the
country" except the alleged prevailing uncertainties in government policies on infrastructure projects.
Rebus Sic Stantibus also does not apply. The parties must be held to have assumed the abrupt change
in the political climate. It is a matter of record that petitioner PNCC entered into a contract with private
respondents on November 18, 1985. Prior thereto, it is of judicial notice that after the assassination of
Senator Aquino on August 21, 1983, the country has experienced political upheavals, turmoils, almost
daily mass demonstrations, unprecedented, inflation, peace and order deterioration, the Aquino trial
and many other things that brought about the hatred of people even against crony corporations. On
November 3, 1985, Pres. Marcos, being interviewed live on U.S. television announced that there would
be a snap election scheduled for February 7, 1986.
On November 18, 1985, notwithstanding the above, petitioner PNCC entered into the contract of
lease with private respondents with open eyes of the deteriorating conditions of the country.
The petition is moot.
Under the theory of rebus sic stantibus, the parties stipulate in the light of certain prevailing conditions,
and once these conditions cease to exist, the contract also ceases to exist. Upon the facts obtaining in
this case, it is abundantly clear that the conditions in which SSS and BDO Capital and/or BDO
executed the Letter-Agreement upon which the pricing component – at P43.50 per share – of the
Invitation to Bid was predicated, have ceased to exist. Accordingly, the implementation of the Letter-
Agreement or of the challenged Res. Nos. 428 and 485 cannot plausibly push through, even if the
central figures in this case are so minded.
Lest it be overlooked, BDO-EPCI, in a manner of speaking, stands now as the issuer of what were
once the subject Shares. Consequently, should SSS opt to exit from BDO and BDO Capital, or BDO
Capital, in turn, opt to pursue SSS’s shareholdings in EPCIB, as thus converted into BDO shares, the
sale-purchase ought to be via an Issuer Tender Offer -- a phrase which means a publicly announced
 advertised an Invitation to Bid for the block intention by an issuer to acquire any of its own class of equity securities or by an affiliate of such issuer
purchase of the Shares. The Invitation to to acquire such securities. In that eventuality, BDO or BDO Capital cannot possibly exercise the "right
Bid expressly provided that the "result of to match" under the Swiss Challenge procedure, a tender offer being wholly inconsistent with public
the bidding is subject to the right of BDO bidding. The offeror or buyer in an issue tender offer transaction proposes to buy or acquire, at the
Capital … to match the highest bid." stated price and given terms, its own shares of stocks held by its own stockholder who in turn simply
October 20, 2004 was the date set for have to accept the tender to effect the sale. No bidding is involved in the process.
determining the winning bid.
The records do not show whether or not
any interested group/s submitted bids. The
bottom line, however, is that even before
the bid envelopes, if any, could be opened,
the herein petitioners commenced the
instant special civil action for certiorari,
setting their sights primarily on the legality
of the Swiss Challenge angle and a
provision in the Instruction to Bidders under
which the SSS undertakes to offer the
Shares to BDO should no bidder or
prospective bidder qualifies. And as earlier
mentioned, the Court, via a status quo
order, effectively suspended the
proceedings on the proposed sale.

Pending consideration of the petition,

supervening events and corporate
movements transpired that radically altered
the factual complexion of the case. BDO
and EPCIB merged.
So vs Foodfest Food Fest Land Inc. (Food Fest) entered
into a September 14, 1999 Contract of
(2010) Lease with Daniel T. So (So) over a
commercial space in San Antonio Village,
Makati City for a period of three years
(1999-2002) onwhich Food Fest intended
to operate a Kentucky Fried Chicken carry
out branch.
Before forging the lease contract, the
parties entered into a preliminary
agreement dated July 1, 1999, the
pertinent portion of which stated:
The lease shall not become binding upon
us unless and until the government
agencies concerned shall authorize, permit
or license us to open and maintain our
business at the proposed Lease Premises.
We shall promptly make an application for
permits, licenses and authority for our
business and shall exercise due diligence
to obtain it, provided, however, that you
The lease contract is valid and subsisting, the payment of the lease must be made.
As for Food Fest’s invocation of the principle of rebus sic stantibus as enunciated in Article 1267 of the
Civil Code to render the lease contract functus officio, and consequently release it from responsibility to
pay rentals, the Court is not persuaded. Article 1267 provides:
Article 1267. When the service has become so difficult as to be
manifestly beyond the contemplation of the parties, the obligor may
also be released therefrom, in whole or in part.
This article, which enunciates the doctrine of unforeseen events, is not, however, an absolute
application of the principle of rebus sic stantibus, which would endanger the security of contractual
relations. The parties to the contract must be presumed to have assumed the risks of unfavorable
developments. It is, therefore, only in absolutely exceptional changes of circumstances that equity
demands assistance for the debtor.
Food Fest claims that its failure to secure the necessary business permits and licenses rendered
the impossibility and non-materialization of its purpose in entering into the contract of lease, in support
of which it cites the earlier-quoted portion of the preliminary agreement dated July 1, 1999 of the
parties.
The cause or essential purpose in a contract of lease is the use or enjoyment of a thing. A party’s
motive or particular purpose in entering into a contract does not affect the validity or existence of the
 shall assist us by submitting such contract; an exception is when the realization of such motive or particular purpose has been made a
documents and papers and comply with condition upon which the contract is made to depend. The exception does not apply here.
such other requirements as the It is clear that the condition set forth in the preliminary agreement pertains to the initial application of
governmental agencies may impose. We Food Fest for the permits, licenses and authority to operate. It should not be construed to apply to
shall give notice to you when the permits, Food Fest’s subsequent applications.
license and authorities have been obtained.
We shall also notify you if any of the
required permits, licenses and authorities
shall not be be (sic) given or granted within
fifteen days (15) from your conform
(sic)hereto. In such case, the agreement
may be canceled and all rights and
obligations hereunder shall cease

Foodfest got the appropriate permits the

first year, however it failed to have them
renewed the next year. It refused to pay So
on the strength of the above-quoted
condition of the lease.

t) Want of Interest
u) Judicial Insolvency

PART II – CONTRACTS
A. GENERAL PROVISIONS
a. Definition
b. Characteristics
i. Obligatory force
ii. Mutuality
iii. Relativity
Exceptions:
1. Accion Pauliana
2. Accion Directa
3. Art. 1312
4. Stipulation pour autrui
iv. Autonomy of will
Capalla v Comelec On July 10, 2009, the Comelec and Issue: Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
Smartmatic-TIM entered into a Contract for on the part of the Comelec in issuing the assailed Resolutions and in executing the assailed Extension
(2012) the Provision of an Automated Election Agreement and Deed.
System for the May 10, 2010 Synchronized
National and Local Elections,(AES Held: No.
Contract). The contract between the It is a basic rule in the interpretation of contracts that an instrument must be construed so as to give
Comelec and Smartmatic-TIM was one of effect to all the provisions of the contract. In essence, the contract must be read and taken as a whole.
“lease of the AES with option to purchase While the contract indeed specifically required the Comelec to notify Smartmatic-TIM of its OTP the
(OTP) the goods listed in the contract.” In subject goods until December 31, 2010, a reading of the other provisions of the AES contract would
said contract, the Comelec was given until show that the parties are given the right to amend the contract which may include the period within
December 31, 2010 within which to which to exercise the option. There is, likewise, no prohibition on the extension of the period, provided
exercise the option. In September 2010, that the contract is still effective.
the Comelec partially exercised its OTP
920 units of PCOS machines with A reading of the other provisions of the AES contract would show that the parties are given the right to
corresponding canvassing/consolidation amend the contract which may include the period within which to exercise the option. There is, likewise,
system (CCS) for the special elections in
certain areas in the provinces of Basilan,
Lanao del Sur and Bulacan. In a letter
dated December 18, 2010, Smartmatic-
TIM, through its Chairman Flores,
proposed a temporary extension of the
option period on the remaining PCOS
machines until March 31, 2011, waiving the
storage costs and covering the
maintenance costs. The Comelec did not
exercise the option within the extended
period. Several extensions were given for
the Comelec to exercise the OTP until its
final extension on March 31, 2012.
On March 29, 2012, the Comelec issued a
Resolution resolving to accept Smartmatic-
TIM’s offer to extend the period to exercise
the OTP until March 31, 2012 and to
authorize Chairman Brillantes to sign for
and on behalf of the Comelec the
Agreement on the Extension of the OTP
Under the AES Contract (Extension
Agreement). Comelec again issued a
Resolution resolving to approve the Deed
of Sale between the Comelec and
Smartmatic-TIM to purchase the latter’s
PCOS machines to be used in the
upcoming May 2013 elections and to
authorize Chairman Brillantes to sign the
Deed of Sale for and on behalf of the
Comelec. The Deed of Sale was forthwith
executed.
no prohibition on the extension of the period, provided that the contract is still effective. The Comelec
still retains P50M of the amount due Smartmatic-TIM as performance security, which indicates that the
AES contract is still effective and not yet terminated. Consequently, pursuant to Article 19 of the
contract, the provisions thereof may still be amended by mutual agreement of the parties provided said
amendment is in writing and signed by the parties. Considering, however, that the AES contract is not
an ordinary contract as it involves procurement by a government agency, the rights and obligations of
the parties are governed not only by the Civil Code but also by RA 9184. A winning bidder is not
precluded from modifying or amending certain provisions of the contract bidded upon. However, such
changes must not constitute substantial or material amendments that would alter the basic parameters
of the contract and would constitute a denial to the other bidders of the opportunity to bid on the same
terms.
The conclusions held by the Court in Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation
(PSALM) v. Pozzolanic Philippines Incorporated and Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals
Co., Inc., (PIATCO) cannot be applied in the present case. First, Smartmatic-TIM was not granted
additional right that was not previously available to the other bidders. The bidders were apprised that
aside from the lease of goods and purchase of services, their proposals should include an OTP the
subject goods. Second, the amendment of the AES contract is not substantial. The approved budget for
the contract was P11,223,618,400.00 charged against the supplemental appropriations for election
modernization. Bids were, therefore, accepted provided that they did not exceed said amount. The
competitive public bidding conducted for the AES contract was sufficient. A new public bidding would
be a superfluity. Lastly, the amendment of the AES contract is more advantageous to the Comelec and
the public because the P7,191,484,739.48 rentals paid for the lease of goods and purchase of services
under the AES contract was considered part of the purchase price. For the Comelec to own the subject
goods, it was required to pay only P2,130,635,048.15. If the Comelec did not exercise the option, the
rentals already paid would just be one of the government expenses for the past election and would be
of no use to future elections.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the

Comelec Resolutions on the grounds that
the option period provided for in the AES
contract had already lapsed; that the
extension of the option period and the
exercise of the option without competitive
public bidding contravene the provisions of
RA 9184; and that the Comelec purchased
the machines in contravention of the
standards laid down in RA 9369. On the
other hand, respondents argue on the
validity of the subject transaction based on
the grounds that there is no prohibition
either in the contract or provision of law for
it to extend the option period; that the OTP
is not an independent contract in itself, but
is a provision contained in the valid and
existing AES contract that had already
satisfied the public bidding requirements of
 RA 9184; and that exercising the option
was the most advantageous option of the
Comelec.

c. Elements of a Contract
i. Essential
1. Consent of the contracting parties
2. Offer
3. Acceptance
Rosenstock v Burke Defendant Edwin Burke owned a motor Issue: Whether or not there was a valid contract of sale which is binding against plaintiff as used in the
yacht, known as Bronzewing, which he letter of offer which was accepted by the defendant.
(1924) acquired in Australia in 1920. He wanted to
sell the yacht and after several Held: The Supreme Court held that it was not a valid contract of sale. The words used by plaintiff could
months plaintiff H. W. Elser, at the not be interpreted as a definite offer to purchase the yacht, but simply a position to deliberate whether
beginning of the year 1922, began or not he would purchase the yacht. It was but a mere invitation to a proposal being made to him, which
negotiations with the defendantfor the might be accepted by him or not. He used such words as, “I am in positionand am willing to entertain
purchase of it. The plan of the plaintiff was the purchase of the yacht.” not “I want to buy the yacht.” Furthermore, the plaintiff wanted to organize a
to organize a yacht club and sell it yacht club and the only thing he wanted from defendant was he sells it so that he could profit from it if
afterwards the yacht for P120,000, of which he re-sells it. The letter of the plaintiff not containing a definite offer but a mere invitation to an offer
P20,000 was to be retained by him as being made to him. Plaintiff is bound to pay the amount of the repairs of the yacht in exchange for the
commission and the remaining P100,000 to use thereof.
be paid to the defendant. To be able to sell
the yacht, he wanted to make a voyage
on board the yacht with business men so
that he could make a sale to them. But the
yacht needed some repairs which in
turn, plaintiff paid for
because defendant had no budget for that.
It has been stipulated that the plaintiff was
not to pay anything for the use of the yacht.
Because of the said repairs,plaintiff loaned
money from the Asia Banking Corporation.
Since it amounted to its maximum amount
already, the bank could no longer give
loans to plaintiff. Defendant now
gave plaintiff the option of sale
to plaintiff amounting to P80,000; P5,000
each month during the first six months and
P10,000 thereafter until full payment of the
price.Plaintiff in turn agreed by
letter. Defendant demanded the plaintiff for
performance after he accepted the offer
of plaintiff for the purchase of the yacht.
However, plaintiff now brings action to
recover the sum of money he used for
repairs of the yacht.
Sanchez v Rigos In an instrument entitled "Option to Was there a contract to buy and sell between the parties or only a unilateral promise to sell?
Purchase," executed on April 3, 1961,
(1972) defendant-appellant Severina Rigos The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision. The instrument executed in 1961 is not a
"agreed, promised and committed ... to "contract to buy and sell," but merely granted plaintiff an "option" to buy, as indicated by its own title
sell" to plaintiff-appellee Nicolas Sanchez "Option to Purchase." The option did not impose upon plaintiff Sanchez the obligation to purchase
 for the sum of P1,510.00 within two (2)
years from said date, a parcel of land
situated in the barrios of Abar and Sibot,
San Jose, Nueva Ecija. It was agreed that
said option shall be deemed "terminated
and elapsed," if “Sanchez shall fail to
exercise his right to buy the property" within
the stipulated period. On March 12, 1963,
Sanchez deposited the sum of Pl,510.00
with the CFI of Nueva Ecija and filed an
action for specific performance and
damages against Rigos for the latter’s
refusal to accept several tenders of
payment that Sanchez made to purchase
the subject land.
defendant Rigos' property. Rigos "agreed, promised and committed" herself to sell the land to Sanchez
for P1,510.00, but there is nothing in the contract to indicate that her aforementioned agreement,
promise and undertaking is supported by a consideration "distinct from the price" stipulated for the sale
of the land. The lower court relied upon Article 1354 of the Civil Code when it presumed the existence
of said consideration, but the said Article only applies to contracts in general.
However, it is not Article 1354 but the Article 1479 of the same Code which is controlling in the case at
bar because the latter’s 2nd paragraph refers to "sales" in particular, and, more specifically, to "an
accepted unilateral promise to buy or to sell." Since there may be no valid contract without a cause or
consideration, the promisor is not bound by his promise and may, accordingly, withdraw it. Pending
notice of its withdrawal, his accepted promise partakes, however, of the nature of an offer to sell which,
if accepted, results in a perfected contract of sale. Upon mature deliberation, the Court reiterates the
doctrine laid down in the Atkins case and deemed abandoned or modified the view adhered to in the
Southwestern Company case.

Defendant Rigos contended that the

contract between them was only “a
unilateral promise to sell, and the same
being unsupported by any valuable
consideration, by force of the New Civil
Code, is null and void." Plaintiff Sanchez,
on the other hand, alleged in his compliant
that, by virtue of the option under
consideration, "defendant agreed and
committed to sell" and "the plaintiff agreed
and committed to buy" the land described
in the option. The lower court rendered
judgment in favor of Sanchez and ordered
Rigos to accept the sum Sanchez judicially
consigned, and to execute in his favor the
requisite deed of conveyance. The Court of
Appeals certified the case at bar to the
Supreme Court for it involves a question
purely of law.
Malbarosa v CA The petitioner Salvador Malbarosa ISSUES
was the president and general 1. W ON there was a valid acceptance on Malbarosa's part of the March 14, 1990 Letter-
(2003) manager of Philtectic Corporation and an offer of the respondent
officer of other corporations belonging to 2. WON there was an effective withdrawal by the respondent of said Letter-offer
the SEADCgroup of companies. SEADC
assigned to him a 1982 model Mitsubishi HELD
Gallant SuperSaloon car and was also 1. NO.- Article 1318 of CC says that “There is no contract unless the following requisitesconcur:(1)
issued membership certificates in the consent of the contracting parties;(2) object certain which is the subject matter of the contract(3) cause
Architectural Center,Inc.- On January 8, of the obligation which is establishedIn this case, there is no contract as Malbarosa failed to meet the
1990, Malabarosa tendered his resignation requirements of avalid acceptance to wit:(a) may be express or implied(b) must be absolute,
from all his positions inthe SEADC group of unconditional and without variance of any sort from the offer© must be made known to the offeror(d)
companies and reiterating his request for must be made in the manner prescribed by the offeror
the payment of hisincentive compensation
for 1989 which is approximately Reasoning
P395,000.00 according tohim.- Malabarosa communicated his acceptance only after the knowledge of revocation or withdrawal of his
SEADC, through its President Louis offer. He should have transmitted his conformitywhile the offer was subsisting. The time given to him
Da Costa, accepted was long enough.2. YES- Implicit in the authority given to Philtectic Corporation to demand for and
 his resignation andentitled him to recoverfrom the petitioner the subject car and to institute the appropriate action againsthim to recover
an incentive amounting possession of the car is the authority to withdraw the respondent'sLetter-offer.
to P251,057.67, which was lower
thanMalbarosa's expectation. It is to be Disposition
satisfied by transferring to him the car Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.
assignedto him, which estimated fair
market value is P220,000.00 and the
membershipshare of SEADC subsidiary,
Tradestar International Inc. in the
Architectural Center,Inc. amounting to
P60,000.00.- The respondent prepared
the letter-offer dated march 14, 1990
and requiredMalbarosa to affix his
conformity on the space provided
therefor and the datethereof on the right
bottom position of the letter.- On March
16, 1990, Da Costa met with the
petitioner and handed to him
theoriginal copy of the letter-offer for
his consideration but he refused to
sign it,instead said that he will review the
offer first. More than two weeks have
passedand Da Costa never heard
feedback from Malbarosa. Thus he
decided to finallywithdraw his offer
on April 3, 1996. However, Malbarosa
transmitted the copy of the signed
Letter-offer to respondent on April 7,
1996 and he alleged that he
hasaffixed his signature on it since
March 28, 1996 but failed to
communicate hisacceptance
immediately.
Procedure
- Due to petitioner's refusal to return the
vehicle after April 3, 1996, the
respondentfiled a complaint for recovery of
personal property with replevin, with
damages andatty's fee.- RTC – issued a
writ of replevin- CA – affirmed RTC's
decision

4. Object
Blas v Santos Simeon Blas married twice. His first ISSUE
marriage was with Marta Cruz. They W ON plaintiffs can make a claim for half of the properties received by Maxima Santos
(1961) had 3children only one of whom, after the death of Simeon Blas
Eulalia left children namely Maria,
Marta and Lazaro. Lazaro laft 3 HELD
legitimate children. Maria and Lazaro’s YES
children are plaintiffs herein. The principal basis for the plaintiffs' action in the case at bar is the documentExhibit " A" . Plaintiffs-
 Simeon Blas contracted another
marriage with Maxima Santos when
Marta Cruzdied. Ti should be noted that
when Marta Cruz died, there was no
liquidation of thecouple’s property. A
week before the death of Simeon
Blas, he executed a
will w h i c h s t a t e d
that half of their property (with
Maxima) is the share
o f h i s wife.another document (exibit A)
was executed by Maxima Santos which
states thatone-half of her share of the
properties left to her by her husband, she
would give tothe heirs and legatees or
the beneficiaries (plaintiffs) named in
the will of herhusband.- This action was
instituted by plaintiffs against the
administratrix of the estate of Maxima
Santos, to secure a judicial declaration that
one-half of the properties leftby said
Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas and
requesting that the said properties
sopromised be adjudicated to the
plaintiffs.- Trial court held that said Exhibit
"A" has not created any right in favor of
plaintiffswhich can serve as a basis of the
complaint; that neither can it be considered
as avalid and enforceable contract for lack
of consideration and because it deals with
future inheritance
. The court also declared that Exhibit "A" is
not a will because itdoes not comply
with the requisites for the execution
of a will; nor could it be considered as a
donation.- Both the court below in its
decision and the appellees in their
brief before us,argue vehemently
that the heirs of Simeon Blas and his
wife Marta Cruz can nolonger make
any claim for the unliquidated conjugal
properties acquired during saidfirst
marriage, because the same were already
included in the mass of
propertiesconstituting the estate of the
deceased Simeon Blas and in the
adjudications madeby virtue of his will, and
that the action to recover the same
has prescribed.
Tanedo v CA October 20, 1962 - Lazardo Tañedo
executed a notarized deed of absolute sale
appellants argue before the Court that Exhibit "A" is both atrust agreement and a contract
in the nature of a compromise to avoid litigation.Defendants-appellees, in answer, claim that it is
neither a trust agreement nor acom promise agreement. The Court finds that the
preparation and execution of Exhibit "A" was ordered by Sim eon Blas evidently to
prevent his heirs by his firstmarriage from contesting his will and dem anding
liquidation of the conjugal properties acquired during his -first marriage, and an accounting of the
fruits andproceeds thereof from the time of the death of his first wife.Exhibit "A", therefore, appears to
be the compromise defined in Article 1809 of theCivil Code of Spain, in force at the tim e of
the execution of Exhibit " A" , which provides as follows:"Compromise is a contract by
which each of the parties in interest, by giving, promising, or retaining something avoids the
provocation of a suit or terminates onewhich has already been instituted." The agreement or promise
that Maxima Santos makes in Exhibit "A" is to hold one-half of her said share in the conjugal assets in
trust for the heirs and legatees of herhusband in his will, with the obligation of conveying, the same to
such of his heirs orlegatees as she may choose in her last will and testament. Under
Exhibit " A" ,
therefore, Maxima Santos contracted the obligation and promised to give one-half of the above
indicated properties to the heirs and legatees of Simeon Blas
*this case is under future inheritance so this next paragraph is important
- The Court also rejects the defendant’s contention that Exibit A is a contract
onfuture inheritance. It is an obligation or prom ise made by the maker to transm it one-
half of her share in the conjugal properties acquired with her husband, whichp r o p e r t i e s a r e
s t a t e d o r d e c l a r e d t o b e c o n j u g a l p r o p e r t i e s i n t h e w i l l o f t h e husband. The
conjugal properties were in existence at the time of the execution of Exhibit "A" on December 26, 1936.
The properties mentioned were even includedby Maxim a in the inventory of her husband’s
property. The docum ent refers to existing properties which she will receive by operation of law
on the death of herhusband, because it is her share in the conjugal assets.- It will be noted that what is
prohibited to be the subject matter of a contract underArticle 1271 of the Civil Code is "future
inheritance." To us future inheritance is anyproperty or right not in existence or capable of
determ ination at the tim e of thecontract, that a person may in the future acquire by
succession. The properties subject of the contract Exhibit "A" are well-defined properties, existing
at the timeof the agreement, which Simeon Blas declares in his testament as belonging to hiswife as
her share in the conjugal partnership.- It is also claimed that the case at bar are concluded by the
judgment rendered inthe proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Simeon Blas for the reason
thatthe properties left by him be longed to himself and his wife Maxima Santos; that theproject of
partition in the said case. But the main ground upon which plaintiffs basetheir present action is the
document Exhibit "A", already fully considered above. Asthis private document contains the
express prom ise made by Maxima Santos to convey in her testament, upon her death, one-
half of the conjugal properties shewould receive as her share in the conjugal properties, the action to
enforce the saidpromise did not arise until and after her death when it was found that she did
notc o m p l y w i t h h e r a b o v e - m e n t i o n e d p r o m i s e . I t m a y b e a d d e d t h a t
p l a i n t i f f s - appellants did not question the validity of the project of partition precisely becauseof the
promise made by Maxima Santos in the compromise Exhibit "A".
Disposition
The defendant-appellee, administratrix of the estate of MaximaSantos, is ordered to convey
and deliver one-half of the properties adjudicated toMaxima Santos as her share in the conjugal
properties to the heirs and the legateesof her husband Simeon Blas.
ISSUES
1. WON sale of a future inheritance is valid2. WON the subsequent execution on January 13, 1981
(1996) infavor of his eldest brother, Ricardo
Tañedo, and the latter’s wife, Teresita
Barera(private
respondents) whereby in considerati
on of P1,500.00,
“one hectare of whatever share
shall have over Lot No. 191 of the
cadastral survey of Gerona, Province
of Tarlac… the said property being his
future inheritance from his parents”
- February 28, 1980 - Lazaro executed an
“Affidavit of Conformity” upon death of his
father Matias to “re-affirm, respect.
acknowledge and validate the sale I
madein 1962.”- January 13, 1981 -
Lazaro executed another notarized
deed of sale in favor of private
respondents covering his “undivided ONE
TWELVE (1/12) of a parcel of landknown
as Lot 191” where he acknowledged
receipt of P 10,000.00 as consideration-
February 1981 - Ricardo learned that
Lazaro sold the same property to his
children(petitioners) through a deed of sale
dated December 29, 1980 conveying to his
tenchildren his allotted portion under the
extrajudicial partition executed by the
heirsof Matias- June 7, 1982 – Sps Ricardo
Tanedo recorded the Deed of Sale in their
favor in theRegistry of Deeds- July 16,
1982 – Lazaro’s children filed a complaint
for rescission (plus damages) of the
deeds of sale executed by Lazaro in
favor of Sps Ricardo Lazao covering
theproperty inherited by Lazaro from his
father.- Petitioners also presented in
evidence(1) a private writing purportedly
prepared and signed by Matias dated
December28, 1978, stating that it was
his desire that whatever inheritance
Lazaro would receive from him should be
given to his (Lazaro’s) children(2) a
typewritten document dated March 10,
1979 signed by Lazaro in the presenceof
two witnesses, wherein he confirmed
that he would voluntarily abide by
thewishes of his father, Matias, to
give to his (Lazaro’s) children all the
property hewould inherit from the latter(3)
a letter dated January 1, 1980 of Lazaro to
his daughter, Carmela, stating thathis
share in the extrajudicial settlement of the
(and registration with theRegistry of Property) of a deed of sale covering the same property
to the samebuyers is valid3. WON this Court may review the findings of the respondent Court
ina. holding that the buyers acted in good faith in registering the said subsequentdeed of sale andb.
failing to consider petitioners’ evidencec. its conclusions “being illogical and off-tangent”
I HELD*
“errors” which are reviewable by this Court in this petition for review on certiorariare only those
allegedly committed by the respondent Court of Appeals and not directly those of the trial
court, which is not a party here.
*
The “assignm ent of errors” in the petition quoted above is theref ore totallymisplaced,
and for that reason, the petition should be dismissed. But in order togive the parties
substantial justice we have decided to delve into the issues as above re-stated.1. NO.-
A1347 CC
no contract may be entered into upon a future inheritance except
i n c a s e s expressly authorized by law.
TF contract made in 1962 is not valid and cannot be the source of any right nor thecreator of any
obligation between the parties and also, “affidavit of conformity” dated February 28, 1980,
that validates or ratifies the 1962 sale, is also useless2. YESIn land, an immovable property,
ownership shall belong to the buyer who in goodfaith registers it first in the registry of property the
documents that are critical to the resolution of this case are:(a) the deed of sale of January
13, 1981 in favor of private respondents covering Lazaro’s undivided inheritance of one-twelfth
(1/12) share in Lot No. 191, which wassubsequently registered on June 7, 1982(b) the deed of sale
dated December 29, 1980 in favor of petitioners covering thesame property.- These two documents
were executed after the death of Matias (and his spouse)and after a deed of extrajudicial settlement of
his (Matias’) estate was
executed,t h u s v e s t i n g i n L a z a r o a c t u a l t i t l e o v e r s a i d p r o p e r t y . I n o t h e r w o r d s ,
t h e s e dispositions, though conflicting, were no longer infected with the infirmities of the1962 sale.-
Critical in determining which of these two deeds should be given effect is the registration
of the sale in favor of private respondents with the register of deeds on June 7, 1982.- A1544 CC
governs the preferential rights of vendees in cases of multiple sales, asfollows:
If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shallbe transferred to the
person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable
property.S h o u l d i t b e i m m o v a b l e p r o p e r t y , t h e o w n e r s h i p s h a l l b e l o n g t o t h e
p e r s o n acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.Should there be no
inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the
possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the personwho presents the oldest title, provided there
is good faith.
- Also, between two purchasers, the one who registered the sale in his favor has apreferred right over
the other who has not registered his title, even if the latter is inactual possession of the immovable
property3. NO.- CA, reviewing TC’s findings, refused to overturn the latter’s assessment
of thetestimonial evidence, as follows:
“We are not prepared to set aside the finding of the lower court upholding RicardoTanedo’s testimony,
as it involves a matter of credibility of witnesses which the trial judge, who presided at the hearing,
was in a better position to resolve.”
- all the above contentions involve questions of fact, appreciation of evidence andcredibility of
witnesses, which are not proper in this review. It is well-settled that theSupreme Court is not a trier
of facts.- In petitions for review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, only questionsof law may
be raised and passed upon. Absent any whimsical or capricious exerciseof judgment, and unless the
lack of any basis for the conclusions made by the lowercourts be amply demonstrated, the Supreme
Court will not disturb their
findings.W e a r e f a r f r o m c o n v i n c e d t h a t b o t h c o u r t s g r a v e l y a b u s e d t h e i r r e s p e
estate of his father was intended forhis c t i v e authorities and judicial prerogatives.
children- Sps Ricardo Tanedo
presented “Deed of Revocation of a Disposition
Deed of Sale” dated March 12, 1981 Petition is DENIED a n d t h e D e c i s i o n o f t h e C o u r t o f A p p e a l s i s AFFIRMED
where Lazaro revoked the sale in favor of
his children for the reasonthat it was
“simulated or fictitious - without
any consideration whatsoever.”- after the
case was filed, Lazaro executed
a sworn statement
which virtuallyrepudiated the contents of
the Deed of Revocation of a Deed of Sale
and the Deedof Sale in favor of the Sps
Ricardo Tanedo. However, Lazaro testified
that he soldthe property to Ricardo,
and that it was a lawyer who induced
him to execute adeed of sale in favor
of his children after giving him five
pesos (P5.00) to buy a “drink”- TC:
decided in favor of Sps Ricardo Tanedo
and that Lazaro’s children failed “toadduce
a preponderance of evidence to support
(their) claim.”- CA: affirmed the
decision of the trial court, ruling that
the Deed of Sale dated January 13,
1981 was valid and that its registration in
good faith

Petitioners Claim
TC committed errors in1. concluding that
the Contract of Sale of October 20, 1962 is
merely voidable orannulable and not
void ab initio pursuant to A1347 par2
CC involving ‘future inheritance’2.
holdings Sps Ricardo Tanedo acted in
good faith in registering the deed of sale
of January 13, 1981 with
the Register of Deeds of Tarlac
and therefore ownership of the land
passed on to them3. ignoring and
failing to consider the testimonial
and documentary evidence
of Lazaro’s children which clearly
established by preponderance of evidence
that theyare indeed the legitimate and
lawful owners of the property in question
4. that the decision is contrary to law and
the facts of the case and the
conclusionsdrawn from the established
facts are illogical and off-tangent
- Allegations made
by petitioners in their basic
 petition and in their memorandum
1. TC allegedly ignored the claimed fact
that Ricardo “by fraud and deceit and
withforeknowledge” that the property in
question had already been sold to
petitioners,made Lazaro execute the deed
of January 13, 19812. There is allegedly
adequate evidence to show that only 1/2 of
the purchase priceof P10,000.00 was paid
at the time of the execution of the deed of
sale, contrary tothe written
acknowledgment, thus showing bad faith3.
There is allegedly sufficient evidence
showing that the deed of revocation of
thesale in favor of petitioners “was
tainted with fraud or deceit.”4. There is
allegedly enough evidence to show
that private respondents “took undue
advantage over the weakness and
unschooled and pitiful situation of
Lazaro Tanedo . . .” and that
respondent Ricardo Tañedo
“exercised moral ascendancy over his
younger brother he being the eldest brother
and who reached fourth yearcollege of law
and at one time a former Vice-Governor of
Tarlac, while his youngerbrother only
attained first year high school”5. TC
erred in not giving credence to
petitioners’ evidence, especially
Lazaro Tañedo’s
Sinumpaang Salaysay
dated July 27, 1982 stating that
Ricardo Tañedodeceived the former in
executing the deed of sale in favor of
private respondents

5. Cause
Liguez v CA Conchita LIGUEZ filed a complaint against
the widow and heirs of the late
(1957) SalvadorLOPEZ so as to recover a parcel
of 51.84 hectares of land, situated in barrio
Bogac-Linot, in Mati, Davao. She
claimed to be its legal owner,
pursuant to a deed of donation of said
land, executed in her favor by the owner,
Salvador Lopez, on 18May 1943.- The
defense interposed was that the donation
was null and void for having an illicitcausa
or consideration, which was the plaintiff's
entering into marital relations withSalvador
1. WON donation was predicated upon an illicit causa
2. WON the “in pare delicto” rule is applicable to the case
3. WON heirs of Lopez can plead illegality of deed of donation
4. WON Liguez is entitled to the land donated by Lopez
HELD
1. YES
Ratio
The motive may be regarded as causa when it predetermines the purpose of the contract. The
cohabitation was an implied condition to the donation, and beingunlawful, it necessarily tainted the
donation itself.
Lopez, a married man. Also, the property
had already been adjudicated tothe
appellees as heirs of Lopez.> Findings of
the Court of Appeals:- The deed of
donation was prepared by the Justice of
the Peace of Mati, Davao,before whom it
was signed and ratified on the said date. At
that time, Liguez was aminor and only 16
years of age. When the donation was
made, Lopez had beenliving with the
parents of Liguez for barely a month. The
donation was made in viewof the desire of
Lopez to have sexual relations with Liguez.
Lopez had confessed tohis love for
appellant to the instrumental witnesses,
with the remark that herparents would not
allow Lopez to live with her unless he first
donated the land inquestion. After the
donation, Conchita Liguez and Salvador
Lopez lived together inthe house that was
built upon the latter's orders, until Lopez
was killed on July 1,1943.- The donated
land originally belonged to the conjugal
partnership of SalvadorLopez and his wife,
Maria Ngo. The widow and children of
Lopez were in possessionof the land and
made improvements. The deed of donation
was never recorded.Court of Appeal’s
Ruling- The deed of donation was
inoperative, and null and void (1) because
the husband,Lopez, had no right to
donate conjugal property to the plaintiff
appellant; and (2)because the donation
was tainted with illegal cause or
consideration, of which donorand donee
were participants.- CA rejected appellant's
claim on the basis of "in pari delicto non
oritur actio" ruleas embodied in Art.1412 of
the New Civil Code.
Petitioners' Claim
- CFI and CA erred in holding the donation
void for having an illicit cause
orconsideration. Under Art 1274 of the Civil
Code of 1889, "in contracts of
purebeneficence the consideration is the
liberality of the donor
", and that liberality cannever be illegal,
since it is neither against law or morals or
public policy
Reasoning
Art 1274 is not applicable because liberality of the donor therein is deemed causa i n
t h o s e c o n t r a c t s t h a t a r e o f " pure" beneficence. These are contracts designed solely
and exclusively to procure the welfare of the beneficiary,without any intent of producing any
satisfaction for the donor. Art 1274 alsoprovides that in remuneratory contract the
consideration is the service or benefitfor which the remuneration is given;
causa is not liberality in these cases becausethe contract or conveyance is not made out of
pure beneficence, but " solvendi animo."- In making the donation, the late Lopez was not moved
exclusively by the desire tobenefit Conchita Liguez, but also to secure her cohabiting with him, so that
he couldgratify his sexual impulses. This is clear from the conf ession of Lopez
to thewitnesses Rodriguez and Ragay, that he was in love with appellant, but her parentswould not
agree unless he donated the land in question to her. Therefore, thedonation was but
one part of an onerous transaction (at least with appellant's parents) that must be viewed
in its totality.- Appellant sought to differentiate between the alleged liberality of Lopez, as causafor the
donation in her favor, and his desire for cohabiting with appellant, as motives that
impelled him to make the donation. She quoted from Manresa and the jurisprudence of this Court
on the distinction that must be maintained between causa and motives. However, Manresa
himself expressly exempted from the rulethose contracts that are conditioned upon the attainment of
the motives of eitherparty.
2. NO
Reasoning
It cannot be said that both parties had equal guilt when we considerthat as against Lopez, who was a
man advanced in years and mature experience,the appellant was a mere minor, 16 years of
age, when the donation was made. There is no finding made by the Court of Appeals
that she was fully aware of the terms of the bargain entered into by and Lopez and her parents.
Her acceptance inthe deed of donation did not necessarily imply knowledge of conditions and
termsnot set forth therein. The facts are of the case are actually more suggestive
of seduction than of immoral bargaining on the part of appellant.
-Memo auditor propriam turpitudinem allegans. The rule that parties to an illegalcontract, if equally
guilty, will not be aided by the law but will both be left where itfinds them, has been interpreted by this
Court as barring the party from pleadingthe illegality of the bargain either as a cause of action or as a
defense.
3. NO
Reasoning
The deed of donation is regular on its face, and to defeat its effect, theappellees must plead and
prove that it is illegal. But such plea on the part of the Lopez heirs is not receivable, since
Lopez, himself, if living, would be barred fromsetting up that plea; and his heirs can have no better
rights than Lopez himself.
4. YES
Ratio
The
prima facie
donation inter vivos and its acceptance by the donees havingbeen proved by means of a public
instrument, and the donor having been dulynotified of said acceptance, the contract
is perfect and obligatory,unless anexception is proved which is based on some legal reason
opportunely alleged by thedonor or his heirs. (Lopez v. Olbes)
- The donation made by the husband in contravention of law is not void in itsentirety,
but only in so far as it prejudices the interest of the wife, because saidproperty was

Carantes v CA - Mateo Carantes was the original owner of
Lot No. 44 situated at Loakan, BaguioCity.
(1977) In 1913 he died and was survived by
his widow Ogasia and
children,namely, Bilad Lauro, Crispino,
Maximino, Apung and Sianang, all
surnamed Crantes.- In 1930, construction
of the Loakan airport was commenced by
the Government.Because a portion of Lot
No. 44 was needed for the landing field, the
Governmentinstituted proceedings for
its expropriation. For this purpose,
Lot No. 44 wassubdivided into Lot
Nos. 44-A, 44-B, 44-C, 44-D and 44-
E. The Government expropriated Lot No.
44-A.- In 1933, special proceedings
were filed to settle the estate of
Mateo
Carantesw h e r e h i s s o n , h e r e i n p e
titioner Maximino Carantes was
a p p o i n t e d j u d i c i a l administrator.
On June 20, 1939, Maximino, as
administrator, filed
a project of partition wherein
conjugal in character
a n d t h e r i g h t o f t h e h u s b a n d t o d o n a t e community property is strictly limited by law
(Civil Code of 1889, Arts. 1409, 1415,1413)
Reasoning
Only the court of origin that settled the estate of the late SalvadorLopez. has the
requisite data to determine whether the donation is inofficious ornot. To determine
the prejudice to the widow, it must be shown that the value of her share in the property
donated can not be paid out of the husband's share of thecommunity profits.- The situation of the
children and forced heirs of Lopez approximates that of thewidow. As privies of their parent, they are
barred from invoking the illegality of thedonation. But their right to a legitime out of his estate is not
thereby affected, sincethe legitime is granted them by the law itself. The forced heirs are then entitled
tohave the donation set aside in so far as in officious: i.e
., in excess of the portion of free disposal
. In computing the legitimes, the value of the property to Liguez, should be considered part
of the donor's estate.
- With regard to the improvements in the land in question, the same should be governed by the rules
of
accession and possession in good faith it being undisputed that the widow and heirs of Lopez
wereunaware of the donation in favor of the appellant when the improvements were made.
Disposition
D e c i s i o n s a p p e a l e d f r o m a r e r e v e r s e d a n d s e t a s i d e , a n d t h e appellant Conchita
LIGUEZ declared entitled to so much of the donated property asmay be found, upon
proper liquidation, not to prejudice the share of the widow Maria Ngo in the conjugal
partnership with Salvador P. Lopez or the legitimes of theforced heirs of the latter. The records are
ordered remanded to the court of origin
ISSUE
WON respondent court is correct in reversing the RTC’s decision
HELD
six Ratio
Total absence of consideration is what renders a contract absolutely void andinexistent.
Reasoning
The CA points out that the deed of assignment is void ab initio and inexistent on the
grounds that real consent was wanting and the consideration of P1.00 is so shocking to the
conscience that there was in fact no consideration, hence the action for declaration of its
inexistence does not prescribe.BUT the sum of P1.00 is clear evidence that there was no absence of
consideration.In addition, the document recites that the decedent Mateo Carantes had, during
hislifetime, expressed to the signatories to the contract that the property subject- matter
thereof rightly and exclusively belonged to petitioner Maximino
Carantes. T h i s a c k n o w l e d g m e n t b y t h e s i g n a t o r i e s d e f i n i t e l y c o n s t i t u t e s v a l u a b l
e consideration for the contract.As for fraud and the prescription of action, the Court agrees with the
RTC.
Disposition
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the Court of Appeals appealed from isset aside, and another entered
dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 804 of theCourt of First Instance of Baguio. No costs.
Voting
Makasiar, Munoz Palma and Martin, JJ., concur. Teehankee, J., concur on the ground that
respondents’ action based on constructivetrust prescribed after ten years.
he
listed himself, and his brothers and
sisters, or the latter’s surviving children
as the heirs of Mateo Carantes. At that
time, negotiations wereunder way for the
Government’s purchase of Lot Nos. 44-B
and 44-C, so Maximinoonly listed Lot Nos.
44-D and 44-E as the properties to be
divided.- On October 23, 1939 a deed
denominated “Assignment of Right to
Inheritance”was executed by four of
Mateo Carantes’ children, namely, Bilad,
Sianang, Lauroand Crispino, and the heirs
of Apung Carantes, Namely, Pitag, Bill,
Alson, Eduardoand Juan, assigning to
Maximino Carantes their rights to
inheritance in Lot No. 44. The stated
monetary considerato]ion for the
assignment was P1.00. However,
thedocument contains a recital to the effect
that the said lots, “by agreement of all
thed i r e c t h e i r s a n d
heirs by representation of the
d e c e a s e d M a t e o C a r n t e s a s expres
sed and conveyed verbally by him during
his lifetime, rightly and exclusivelybelong
to the particul ar heir, Maximino
Carantes, now and in the past in
theexclusive, continuous, peaceful and
notorious possession of the same for more
thanten years.” On the same date
Maximino sold to the Government Lot Nos.
44-B and44-C and divided the
proceeds of the sale among himself
and the other heirs of Mateo.- On
February 6, 1940, the heirs of Mateo
petitioned for the cancellation of
theOriginal Certificate of Title of Lot No.44
and had it replaced with Transfer
Certificateo f T i t l e 2 5 3 3 d e c l a r i n g
the five children of Mateo and
t h e c h i l d r e n o f A p u n g Carantes
(representing their deceased father) as co-
owners of Lot No. 44.- On March 16,
1940, Maximino registered the deed
of “Assignment of Right to Inheritance”
and accordingly, TCT 2533 was cancelled
and was replaced with TCT2540 in the
name of Maximino Carantes.- On February
21, 1947, pursuant to the deed of sale
executed by Maximino in favorof the
Government, TCT 2540 was cancelled and
replaced with TCT T-98 (coveringLot Nos.
 44-A, 44-B and 44-C) in
the Government’s name and TCT T-
99 (coveringLot Nos. 44-D and 44-E) in
Maximino’s name, who has up to the
present remainedthe registered owner of
said lots.- On September 4, 1958 a
complaint was filed by Bilad, Lauro
and Crispino andsome of the heirs of
Apung and of Sianang against
Maximino. They alleged that they only
executed the deed of “Assignment of Right
to Inheritance” because theywere made to
believe that it merely authorized Maximino
to convey portions of LotNo. 44 to
the Government in their behalf
to minimize expenses and facilita te
thetransaction; and that it was only on
February 18, 1958, when the plaintiffs
secureda copy of the deed, that they
came to know that the same
assigned in favor of Maximino their
rights to inheritance from Mateo Carantes.-
On September 10, 1958 the defendant filed
a motion to dismiss on the grounds 1)that
plaintiffs’ cause of action was barred by the
statute of limitation because thedeed of
assignment was recorded in the
Registry of Property at the latest on
February 21, 1947, hence cause of action
accrued from said date, and pursuant
toArt. 1144 of the New Civil Code,
it must be brought within ten years
so plaintiffs’right to file the complaint had
already prescribed on September 4, 1958;
and 2) thecomplaint states no cause of
action because ownership of the
property becamevested in Maximino by
acquisitive prescription ten years from its
registration in hisname on February 21,
1947.- On January 28, 1965, the RTC
decided that since an action on fraud
prescribesafter 4 years from
discovery, the discovery deemed to
have been on March 16,1940 when
Maximino registered the deed of
assignment, the plaintiffs’ cause
of action had prescribed. The plaintiffs’
motion for reconsideration was denied. And
sothey appealed in the CA and it reversed
the RTC’s ruling.
Spouses FACTS ISSUES
Buenaventura v CA - Respondent spouses Leonardo Joaquin 1. WON the Deeds of Sale are void for lack of consideration
 and Feliciana Landrito are the parents
(2003) of petitioners Consolacion, Nora, Emma
and Natividad as well as of respondents
Fidel, Tomas, Artemio, Clarita,
Felicitas, Fe, and Gavino,
all surnamed Joaquin. Themarried
Joaquin children are joined in this action by
their respective spouses.- Sought to be
declared null and void
ab initio are six deeds of sale of real
propertyexecuted by respondent
parents in favor of their respondent
children and the corresponding
certificates of title issued in their names. In
seeking the declarationof nullity of the
said deeds of sale and certificates
of t it le, petitioners, in t heir complaint,
aver that the deeds of sale are simulated
as they are, are null and void
ab initio because (1) there was no
actual valid consideration for the deeds of
sale xx x over t he properties
in litis; (2) assum ing that there was
considerat ion in thesums
ref lected in the quest ioned deeds,
the properties are more than three-
f old times more valuable than the measly
sums appearing therein; (3) the deeds of
saledo not reflect and express the
true intent of the parties (vendors and
vendees); and(4) the purported sale
of t he propert ies
in lit iswas the result of a
deliberate conspiracy designed to unjustly
deprive the rest of the compulsory heirs
(petitionerchildren) of their legitime.-
Respondents aver that (1) petitioner
siblings do not have a cause of action
againstt hem as well as the requisite
st anding and interest to assail their
titles over t he properties
in litIs;(2) the sales were with
suf f icient considerat ions and made
byrespondent parent s voluntarily, in
good f ait h, and wit h f ull knowledge
of t he consequences of their deeds of
sale; and (3) the certificates of title were
issued withsufficient factual and legal
basis.- The trial court ruled in favor of the
respondents and dismissed the complaint.
TheCourt of Appeals affirmed the decision
of the trial court. Hence, this
2. WON the Deeds of Sale are void for gross inadequacy of price
HELD
1. NO- It is not the payment of price that determines the validity of a contract of
sale.Payment of the price has nothing to do with the perfection of the contract. Paymentof the price
goes into the perfection of the contract. Failure to pay the considerationis different from lack of
consideration. The former results in a right to demand thefulfillment or cancellation of the obligation
under an existing valid contract while thelatter prevents the existence of a valid contract.- Petitioners
failed to show that the prices in the Deeds of Sale were absolutelysimulated. To prove
simulation, petitioners presented Emma Joaquin Valdoz’stestimony stating that their father,
respondent Leonardo Joaquin, told her that hewould transfer a lot to her through a deed of sale without
need for her payment of the purchase price. The trial court did not find the allegation of absolute
simulationof price credible. Petitioners’ failure to prove absolute simulation of price
ismagnified by their lack of knowledge of their respondent siblings’ financial capacityto buy the
questioned lots. On the other hand, the Deeds of Sale which petitionerspresented as evidence
plainly showed the cost of each lot sold. Not only did respondents’ minds meet as to the
purchase price, but the real price also stated inthe Deeds of Sale. As of the filing of the complaint,
respondent siblings have alsofully paid the price to their respondent father.
2. NO- Art. 1355 of the Civil Code states:
“Except in cases specified by law, lesion or inadequacy of cause shall not invalidatea contract,
unless there has been fraud, mistake, or undue influence. (Emphasis supplied)- Art. 1470 of
the Civil Code further provides:
“Gross inadequacy of price does not affect a contract of sale, except as mayindicate
a defect in the consent, or that the parties really intended a donation orsome other act or
contract.” (Emphasis supplied)- Petitioners failed to prove any of the instances mentioned in art. 1355
and 1470 of the Civil Code which would invalidate, or even affect, the Deeds of Sale.
Indeed,there is no requirement that the price be equal to exact value of the subject matterof the sale.
All the respondents believed that they received the commutative valueof what they gave. “Men
may do foolish things, make ridiculous contracts, use miserable judgment, and lose money by
them—indeed, all they have in the world;but not for that alone can the law intervene and restore. There
must be, in addition,a violation of the law, the commission of what the law knows as an
Actionable wrong, before the courts are authorized to lay hold of the situation and remedy it(Vales V
Villa).”
- Moreover, the factual findings of the appellate court are conclusive on the partiesand carry greater
weight when they coincide with the factual findings of the trialcourt. In the instant case,
the trial court found that the lots were sold for a validconsideration, and that the
defendant children actually paid the purchase price stipulated in their respective Deeds of
Sale. Actual payment of the purchase priceby the buyer to the seller is a factual finding that is now
conclusive upon us.
 petition.P et it ioners assert that their
respondent siblings did not actually
pay the pricesstated in the Deeds of
sale t o t heir respondent father.
Thus, petitioners ask t hecourt to
declare t he Deeds of S ale void.
Petitioners also ask that assuming
that there is consideration, the same is
grossly inadequate as to invalidate the
Deeds of Sale

ii. NOTE: Natutal elements

1. Right to resolve
2. Warranties in sales contracts
d. Stages of a Contract
e. Classification of Contracts
i. According to degree of dependence
1. Preparatory
2. Principal
3. Accessory
ii. Accorfing to perfection
1. Consensual
2. Real
iii. According to their form
1. Common or informal
2. Special or formal
iv. According to purpose
1. Transfer of ownership
2. Conveyance of use
3. Rendition of service
v. According to subject matter
1. Things
2. Services
vi. According to the nature of the obligation
1. Bilateral
2. Unilateral
vii. According to cause
1. Onerous
2. Grauitous
viii. According to Risk
1. Commutative
2. Aleatory
ix. According to name
1. Nominate
2. Inominate
Dizon v Gaborro Jose Dizon owned three parcels of WON the original agreement may be properly reformed
land totaling 130.58 hectares which HELD
(1978) weremortgaged to DBP as security for YES- T h e D e e d o f S a l e w i t h A s s u m p t i o n c a n n o t b e c o n s i d e r e d a s a r
a loan amounting to P38,000 with a e a l a n d unconditional sale of the parcels of land on the grounds that there was no
second moneyconsideration, it being admitted that the consideration mentioned in the agreementwas not
mortgage lien in favor of PNB to actually paid. Besides, the propert in question at the time of the executionof the said instrument was
secure another indebtedness amo already sold by auction to DBP. The only legal effect iswith regard the option Deed which
u n t i n g t o P93,831.91. Dizon failed to granted Petitioner the right to recover theproperties upon reimbursing Gaborro the sums of
pay the amortizations to DBP causing money the he may have paid toboth the DBP and PNB as amortization on the mortgage.- The
the latter toforeclose on the mortgage. findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the true intention of the parties is that
The said lots were sold subsequently to Gaborro will assume and pay the indebtness of Dizon and in return Gaborro shall enjoy
DBP through anauction conducted by possession, enjoyment and the use of the properties untilDizon fully reimbursed him of the amounts
the sheriff. Dizon executed a deed of paid to the said financial institutions. As noted by the SC, the agreement is one of those innominate
sale in favor of DBPthrough an contracts under Article1307 of the Civil Code ehereby the petitioner and respondent agree “to give
auction. Dizon himself executed a and todo” certain rights and obligations respecting the lands and the mortgage debts of the petitioner
deed of sale in favor of DBP which would be acceptable to the bank but partaking of the nature of the antichresis.- Mistake is a
onNovember 12, 1959 which deed was ground for the reformation of an instrument when, there having beena meeting of the minds of
recorded in the office of the Register of the parties to a contract, their true intention is not expressed in the instrument purporting to
Deedson October 6, 1960.- Alfredo embody the agreement. It was a mistakefor the parties to execute the deed of sale with
Garborro, who was initially interested assumption of mortgage & theoption to purchase real estate. Hence these must be reformed in
in leasing the properties as they were accordance withthe intention and legal righs and obligations of the parties
then idle, met with Dizon sometime prior to
October 6, 1959. As the mortgagewas
already foreclosed by DBP, the leasing
project was abandoned. Instead,
theyentered into a deed of sale with
assumption of mortgage conveyed
ownership of theproperties to Gaborro. In
addition, the parties executed
anoher agreement whichgranted Dizon the
option to repurchase the properties at the
price of P131,831.91which represented
the total principal amounts due to
both the DBP and PNB. It should
likewise be mentioned that the consideration
for the sale is also the sameamount as the
loans outstanding to both DBP and PNB.-
Upon execution of the documents, Gaborro
took possession f the properties andwrote
a letter to DBP advising them of his
purchase of the property of Dizon
andoffering to pay the obligations
under the same terms and conditions
within tenyears. The Bank agreed
provided only that the initial payment be
20% of the loanamount.. Accordingly, DBP
and Gaborro executed a Deed of
Conditional sale overthe propertied for
P136,090.95, payble 20%
downpayment and the balance over
tenyears. In addition, Dizon also executed
an assignment of his right of redemption
andassumption of obligation in favor of
Gaborro.- On July 5, 1961, Dizon, through
his lawyer, wrote a letter to Gaborro offering
toreimburse him of what he paid to the bnks
contending the the transaction
enteredbetween them was one of
 antichresis.When Gaborro did not agree,
Dizon filed
suita l l e g i n g t h a t t h e d o c u m e n t s x e
cuted did not express the true int
e n t i o n a n d agreement between the
parties and as the real agreement was not
for an absolutedeed of sale but for an
equitable mortgage or conveyance by way
of security for thereimbursement or refund
by Dizon to Gaborro of any and all sums
which the lattermay have paid on account of
the debts from both DBP and PNB

B. Forms of Contracts
a. For validity
b. For enforceability
c. For registrability
C. Reformation of Instrument
Garcia v Bisaya On May 20, 1952, plaintiff filed a complaint ISSUES
against the defendants in the Court of First 1. WON the action for reformation of instruments has already prescribed2. WON the action for
(1955) Instance of Oriental Mindoro, alleging that: reformation of instruments may prosper
On November 12, 1938, HELD
defendantsexecuted in favor of plaintiff 1. NO- Both appellant and appellees apparently regard the present action as one for thereformation of
a deed of sale covering a parcel of an instrument under Chapter 4, Title II, Book IV of the new Civil Code.Specifically, the object sought
land thereindescribed.- That the said land is the correction of an alleged mistake in a deed of sale covering a piece of land. The action. being
"was erroneously designated by the parties upon a written contract, it shouldp r e s c r i b e i n t e n y e a r s c o u n t e d f r o m t h e d a y
in the deed of saleas i t c o u l d h a v e b e e n i n s t i t u t e d . Obviously, appellant could not have instituted his
an unregistered land (not registered action to correct an error in a deed until that error was discovered. There being nothing in the
under Act 496, nor under the pleadings to showthat the error was discovered more than ten years before the present action
SpanishMortgage Law) when in truth and wasfiled on May 20, 1952, while, on the other hand, there is allegation that the errorwas discovered
in fact said land is a portion of a big mass of "only recently", we think the action should not have been dismissedas having already prescribed
landregistered under Original Certificate of before the factual basis for prescription had been established and clarified by evidence.2. NO-
Title No. 6579 in the Office of the Register Appellant's complaint states no cause of action, for it fails to allege that the instrument to
of Deeds of Oriental Mindoro"- That the reformed does not express the real agreement or intention of the
despite persistent demand parties. Such allegation is essential since the object sought in an action
from plaintiff to have the error f o r reformation is to make an instrument conform to the real agreement or intention of the parties.
corrected,defendants have refused to do But the complaint does not even allege what the real agreement or intention
so. Plaintiff, therefore, prayed for judgment was. Moreover, courts do not reform instruments merely for the sake of reforming them, but only
orderingdefendants to make the aforesaid to enable some party to asserts right under them as reformed.
correction in the deed of sale. Disposition
- Defendants denied having Order of dismissal is affirmed not because of prescription but becauseof failure to state the cause of
executed the alleged deed of sale action
a n d p l e a d e d prescription as a defense-
Without trial on the merits and merely upon
motion, the lower court dismissed thecase
on the ground that plaintiff's action had
already prescribed. From this orderplaintiff
has appealed directly to the SC
Bentir v Leanda May15, 1992-Leyte Gulf Traders, ISSUE
Inc. filed a complaint W ON the complaint for reformation has prescribed and has not, W ON LGT Inc is entitled
(2000) f o r r e f o r m a t i o n o f instrument, specific to the remedy of reformation sought
performance, annulment of conditional sale
and damages withprayer for writ of
injunction against Yolanda Rosello-Bentir
and the spouses Samueland Charito
Pormida.- LGT Inc alleged that it
entered into a contract of lease of a
parcel of land with Bentir for a period of
20 years starting May 5, 1968
LGT Inc said the lease was extended for
another 4years or until May 31, 1992.- May
5, 1989- Bentir sold the leased
premises to spouses Samuel and
CharitoPormada.- LGT Inc questioned the
sale alleging that it had a right of first
refusal. It sought ther e f o r m a t i o n o f t h e
expired contract of lease on the
g r o u n d t h a t i t s l a w y e r inadvertently
omitted to incorporate in the contract of
lease executed in 1968, theverbal
agreement or understanding between
the parties that in the event
Bentirleases or sells the lot after the
expiration of the lease, LGT Inc has the right
to equalthe highest offer.- In due time,
petitioners filed their answer alleging
that the inadvertence of the lawyer who
prepared the lease contract is not a ground
for reformation.- They further contended
that respondent corporation is guilty
of laches for notbringing the case for
reformation of the lease contract within the
prescriptive periodof 10 years from its
execution.- LGT Inc then filed its reply
and on November 18, 1992, filed a
motion to admitamended complaint. Said
motion was granted by the lower court.-
Thereafter, Petitioners filed a motion
to dismiss reiterating that the
complaintshould be dismissed on the
ground of prescription.- Dec. 15, 1995- TC
through Judge Pedro S. Espina issued an
order dismissing thecomplaint
premised on its finding that
the action for reformation
had alreadyprescribed.- Dec. 29, 1995-
LGT Inc filed a MR of the order dismissing
the complaint.- Jan 11, 1996, LGT Inc
filed an urgent ex-parte motion for
issuance of an order directing the
petitioners, or their representatives or
agents to refrain from takingpossession of
the land in question.- March 28, 1996 -
HELD
YES, it has prescribed. LGT Inc is no longer entitled to the reformation sought.
Reasoning
The remedy of reformation of an instrument is grounded on theprinciple of equity where, in
order to express the true intention of the contractingparties, an instrument already executed is
allowed by law to be reformed.- The right of reformation is necessarily an invasion or
limitation of the parolevidence rule since, when a writing is reformed, the result is that an oral
agreementis by court decree made legally effective.- Consequently, the courts, as the agencies
authorized by law to exercise the powerto reform an instrument, must necessarily exercise that power
sparingly and withgreat caution and zealous care. Moreover, the remedy, being an extraordinary
one,m u s t b e s u b j e c t t o l i m i t a t i o n s a s m a y b e p r o v i d e d b y l a w . O u r l a
w a n d jurisprudence set such limitations, among which is
laches
. A suit for reformation of an instrument may be barred by lapse of time.- T h e p r e s c r i p t i v e
p e r i o d f o r a c t i o n s b a s e d u p o n a w r i t t e n c o n t r a c t a n d f o r reformation of an
instrument is ten (10) years under Article 1144 of the Civil Code.- Prescription is intended
to suppress stale and fraudulent claims arising from transactions like the one at bar which
facts had become so obscure from the lapseof time or defective memory.
- In the case at bar, respondent corporation had 10 years from 1968, the time whenthe contract of
lease was executed, to file an action for reformation. Sadly, it did soonly on May 15, 1992 or twenty-
four (24) years after the cause of action accrued,hence, its cause of action has become stale, hence,
time-barred.
- If, according to LGT Inc., there was an agreement between the parties to extendthe lease contract
for 4 years after the original contract expired in 1988, then Art.1670 would not apply as this
provision speaks of an implied new lease (
tacitareconduccion
) where at the end of the contract, the lessee continues to enjoy the thing leased "with the
acquiescence of the lessor", so that the duration of the leaseis "not for the period of the original
contract, but for the time established in Article1682 and 1687." In other words, if the
extended period of lease was expresslyagreed upon by the parties, then the term
should be exactly what the parties stipulated, not more, not less.- Even if the supposed 4-
year extended lease be considered as an implied newlease under Art. 1670, "the
other terms of the original contract" contemplated in said provision
are only those terms which are germane to the lessee's right of continued enjoyment of
the property leased
. The prescriptive period of 10 years provided for in Art. 1144 applies by operation of law, not
by the will of the parties. Therefore,
the right of action for reformation accrued from the date of execution of the contract of lease in 1968.
- Even if we were to assume for the sake of argument that the instant action
forreformation is not time-barred, LGT Inc's action will still not prosper because underSec 1, Rule
64 of the New Rules of Court, an action for the reformation of an instrument is instituted
as a special civil action for declaratory relief.- Purpose of an action for declaratory relief- to secure an
authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties for their guidance in the
enforcement or compliance and not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof.- Here,
LGT Inc. brought the present action for reformation after an alleged breachor violation of the
contract was already committed by Bentir. Consequently, the remedy of reformation no
longer lies.
Disposition
Petition is
GRANTED
 the case was re-raffled and assigned . J. Leanda’s decision is reversed and set aside. J.Espina’s decision dismissing the reformation
to RTC, Tacloban City, presided by is reinstated
herein respondent judge Mateo M. Leanda.-
May 10, 1996 – Leanda reversed the
order of dismissal on the grounds that
theaction for reformation had not yet
prescribed and the dismissal was"premature
and precipitate", denying LGT Inc of its right
to procedural due process.- June 10, 1996-
Leanda issued an order for
status quo ante, enjoining petitioners
todesist from occupying the property.- Jan.
17, 1997- CA affirmed the assailed decision
of Leanda; denied MR
SARMING v. DY Petitioners are the successors-in-interest of Reformation of the subject deed is proper by reason of mistake in designating the correct lot number
original defendant Flores, while respondents
(2002) are the successors-in-interest of the original Reformation is that remedy in equity by means of which a written instrument is made or construed so
plaintiff Delfino, the buyer of one of the lots. as to express or conform to the real intention of the parties.
There are 2 parcels of land. Lot 1 is co- An action for reformation of instrument under this provision of law may prosper only upon the
owned by Silveria and her 2 brothers. Lot 2, concurrence of the following requisites: (1) there must have been a meeting of the minds of the
which is solely registered under the name of parties to the contract; (2) the instrument does not express the true intention of the parties; and (3)
Silveria, was subdivided between her and the failure of the instrument to express the true intention of the parties is due to mistake, fraud,
her brother, Jose. The grandchildren of inequitable conduct or accident.
Jose, who now owns ½ of the lot 2, entered All of these requisites, in our view, are present in this case. There was a meeting of the minds
into a contract with Delfino for the sale of between the parties to the contract but the deed did not express the true intention of the parties due
their share in lot 2 after offering the same to to mistake in the designation of the lot subject of the deed. There is no dispute as to the intention of
Silveria who declined for lack of money. the parties to sell the land to Delfino but there was a mistake as to the designation of the lot intended
In the preparation of the document of sale, to be sold as stated in the Settlement of Estate and Sale.
Silveria delivered to Delfino’s lawyer the
OCT of Lot 1 instead of Lot 2. As a result the
OCT for Lot 1 was cancelled and a new one
was issued. Delfino occupied ½ of Lot 2
instead of the Lot 1 as designated in the
deed. Delfino discovered the mistake.
Delfino and the vendors filed a complaint
against Silveria for reformation of the deed
of sale with damages before the RTC.

D. Interpretation of Contracts
E. Defective Contracts
a. Rescissible Contracts
ORIA v. MCMICKING Hermanos filed separately 2 actions
against action Oria Hermanos & Co. for the
(1912) recovery of sums of money. Thereafter, the
members of the company of Oria
Hermanos & Co., on account of the
expiration of the time stated in their
agreement of co-partnership, dissolved
their relations and entered into liquidation.
Tomas Oria, as managing partner in
liquidation, acting for himself and on behalf
The sale is fraudulent as to Hermanos in so far as was necessary to permit the collection of its
judgment.
In determining whether or not a certain conveyance is fraudulent the question in every case is whether
the conveyance was a bona fide transaction or a trick and contrivance to defeat creditors, or whether it
conserves to the debtor a special right. It is not sufficient that it is founded on good consideration or is
made with bona fide intent: it must have both elements. If defective in either of these particulars,
although good between the parties, it is voidable as to creditors. The test as to whether or not a
conveyance is fraudulent is, does it prejudice the rights of creditors?
The following are some of the circumstances attending sales which have been dominated by the courts
 of his other co-owners, entered into a
contract with Manuel Oria, which said
contract was for the purpose of selling and
transferring to Manuel in this action all of
the property of which the said Oria
Hermanos & Co. was owner. Among the
goods transferred by this instrument was
the steamship Serantes.
CFI ruled in favour of Hermanos and writ of
execution was issued. The sheriff
demanded that Tomas Oria make payment
of the said judgment, to which he replied
that there were no funds with which to pay
the same. Thereupon the sheriff levied
upon the said steamer Serantes, took
possession of the same, and announced it
for sale at public auction. 3 days before the
sale, Manuel presented to the sheriff a
written statement claiming to be the owner
of the said steamship. Manuel filed an
action for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction to prevent the sale of the
steamship and for the declaration that he is
the owner of said steamship and is entitled
to the possession of the same. Hermanos
put up a bond to allow the sheriff to
proceed to the sale. At the sale Hermanos
became the purchaser.
SIGUAN vs. LIM In Aug. 1990, LIM issued two Metrobank
checks payable to “cash.” Upon
(1999) presentment by Siguan with the drawee
bank, the checks were dishonored for the
reason “account closed.” A criminal case
for violation of BP 22 was filed and RTC
convicted LIM. The case is pending before
SC.
In July 1990 LIM was convicted of estafa
filed by a certain Victoria Suarez which was
affirmed by CA. SC acquitted LIM but held
her civilly liable.
In July 1991, a Deed of Donation
conveying the 4 parcels of land and
purportedly executed by LIM on 10 August
1989 in favor of her children was registered
with the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Cebu City. New TCTs were thereafter
issued in the names of the donees.
23 June 1993, Siguan filed an accion
pauliana against LIM and her children to
rescind the questioned Deed of Donation
and to declare as null and void the new
badges of fraud:
1. The fact that the consideration of the conveyance is fictitious or is inadequate.
2. A transfer made by a debtor after suit has been begun and while it is pending against him.
3. A sale upon credit by an insolvent debtor.
4. Evidence of large indebtedness or complete insolvency.
5. The transfer of all or nearly all of his property by a debtor, especially when he is insolvent or
greatly embarrassed financially.
6. The fact that the transfer is made between father and son, when there are present other of the
above circumstances.
7. The failure of the vendee to take exclusive possession of all the property.
The case at bar presents every one of the badges of fraud above enumerated. The sale in the form in
which it was made leaves the creditors substantially without recourse. The property of the company is
gone, its income is gone, the business itself is likely to fail, the property is being dissipated, and is
depreciating in value. The court below was correct in finding the sale fraudulent and void as to
Gutierrez Hermanos in so far as was necessary to permit the collection of its judgment. As a corollary,
the court below found that the evidence failed to show that the plaintiff was the owner or entitled to the
possession of the steamer in question at the time of the levy and sale complained of, or that he was
damaged thereby. Defendant had the right to make the levy and test the validity of the sale in that way,
without first resorting to a direct action to annul the sale. The creditor may attack the sale by ignoring it
and seizing under his execution the property, or any necessary portion thereof, which is the subject of
the sale.
The deed of donation was not entered into in fraud of the creditors.
The action to rescind contracts in fraud of creditors is known as accion pauliana. For this action to
prosper, the following requisites must be present: (1) the plaintiff asking for rescission has a credit prior
to the alienation, although demandable later; (2) the debtor has made a subsequent contract conveying
a patrimonial benefit to a third person; (3) the creditor has no other legal remedy to satisfy his claim; (4)
the act being impugned is fraudulent; (5) the third person who received the property conveyed, if it is by
onerous title, has been an accomplice in the fraud.
Siguan’s claim against LIM was constituted only in August 1990, or a year after the questioned
alienation. Thus, the first two requisites for the rescission of contracts are absent.
Even assuming arguendo that petitioner became a creditor of LIM prior to the celebration of the
contract of donation, still her action for rescission would not fare well because the third requisite was
not met. It is essential that the party asking for rescission prove that he has exhausted all other legal
means to obtain satisfaction of his claim. Petitioner neither alleged nor proved that she did so.
The fourth requisite for an accion pauliana to prosper is not present either. As earlier discussed,
petitioner’s alleged credit existed only a year after the deed of donation was executed. She cannot,
therefore, be said to have been prejudiced or defrauded by such alienation. Besides, the evidence
disclose that as of 10 August 1989, when the deed of donation was executed, LIM had other properties.
Furthermore, petitioner failed to discharge the burden of any other circumstance from which fraud can
be inferred.
It should be noted that the complainant in the estafa case, Victoria Suarez, albeit a creditor prior to the
questioned alienation, is not a party to this accion pauliana. Article 1384 of the Civil Code provides that
rescission shall only be to the extent necessary to cover the damages caused. Under this Article, only
 transfer certificates of title issued for the
lots covered by the questioned Deed.
VELARDE v. CA David is the owner a parcel of land,
together with the house and other
(2001) improvements thereon. A Deed of Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage was executed by
David, as vendor, in favor of Avelina
Velarde, as vendee. Pending BPI’s
approval of the application for assumption
of mortgage, Sps. Velarde were to continue
paying the monthly interests of the loan
secured by a real estate mortgage.
Sps. Velarde were advised that the
Application for Assumption of Mortgage
with BPI was not approved. This prompted
them not to make any further payment.
David informed Sps. Velarde that their non-
payment to the mortgage bank constituted
non-performance of their obligation. Sps.
Velarde replied that they are willing to pay
the balance of the purchase provided that
David deliver actual possession of the
property and David should cause the
release of title and mortgage from the Bank
of P.I. and make the title available and free
from any liens and encumbrances and to
execute an absolute deed of sale in her
favor free from any liens or encumbrances.
David sent a notarial notice of
cancellation/rescission of the intended sale
of the subject property allegedly due to the
latter’s failure to comply with the terms and
conditions of the Deed of Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage and the
Undertaking.
Sps. Velarde filed a complaint for specific
performance, nullity of cancellation, writ of
possession and damages.
b. Voidable Contracts
CADWALLADER v. Pacific Export Lumber Co. shipped upon
SMITH, BELL the steamer Quito 581 piles to Henry W.
Peabody & Co., at Manila, on the sale of
(1907) which before storage the consignees were
to receive a commission of ½ of whatever
sum was obtained over $15 for each pile
and 5% of the price of the piles sold after
storage. After the arrival of the steamer,
Peabody & Co. wrote the agent of the
Pacific Company that for lack of a demand
the piles would have to be sold at
the creditor who brought the action for rescission can benefit from the rescission; those who are
strangers to the action cannot benefit from its effects.
The rescission is valid.
A substantial breach of a reciprocal obligation, like failure to pay the price in the manner prescribed by
the contract, entitles the injured party to rescind the obligation. Rescission abrogates the contract from
its inception and requires a mutual restitution of benefits received.
Sps. Velarde did not merely stop paying the mortgage obligations; they also failed to pay the balance of
the purchase price. As admitted by both parties, their agreement mandated that Sps. Velarde should
pay the purchase price balance of P1.8M in case the request to assume the mortgage would be
disapproved. Instead of doing so, petitioners sent a letter to private respondents offering to make such
payment only upon the fulfilment of certain conditions not originally agreed upon in the contract of sale.
The breach committed by petitioners was not so much their nonpayment of the mortgage obligations,
as their nonperformance of their reciprocal obligation to pay the purchase price under the contract of
sale. Private respondents’ right to rescind the contract finds basis in Article 1191 of the Civil Code. The
injured party may choose between fulfilment and the rescission of the obligation, with the payment of
damages in either case. He may also seek rescission even after he has chosen fulfilment, if the latter
should become impossible.
The right of rescission of a party to an obligation under Article 1191 of the Civil Code is predicated on a
breach of faith by the other party who violates the reciprocity between them. The breach contemplated
in the said provision is the obligor’s failure to comply with an existing obligation. When the obligor
cannot comply with what is incumbent upon it, the obligee may seek rescission and, in the absence of
any just cause for the court to determine the period of compliance, the court shall decree the
rescission.
Considering that the rescission of the contract is based on Article 1191 of the Civil Code, mutual
restitution is required to bring back the parties to their original situation prior to the inception of the
contract. Rescission creates the obligation to return the object of the contract. It can be carried out
only when the one who demands rescission can return whatever he may be obliged to restore. To
rescind is to declare a contract void at its inception and to put an end to it as though it never was. It is
not merely to terminate it and release the parties from further obligations to each other, but to abrogate
it from the beginning and restore the parties to their relative positions as if no contract has been made.
The contract of sale should be annulled.
It is clear that at the time when the agents were buying from their principal these piles at $12 a piece on
the strength of their representation that no better price was obtainable, they had already sold a
substantial part of them at $19. It is plain that in concealing from their principal the negotiations with the
Government, resulting in a sale of the piles at 19 a piece and in misrepresenting the condition of the
market, the agents committed a breach of duty from which they should benefit. The contract of sale to
themselves thereby induced was founded on their fraud and was subject to annulment by the aggrieved
party. (Civil Code, articles 1265 and 1269.) Upon annulment the parties should be restored to their
original position by mutual restitution. (Article 1303 and 1306.) Therefore the defendants are not
entitled to retain their commission realized upon the piles included under the contract so annulled. In
 considerably less than $15 a piece; respect of the 213 piles, which they had already sold under the original agency, their commission
whereupon the company’s agent directed should be allowed.
them to make the best possible offer for the
piles, in response to which they
telegraphed him an offer of $12 a piece. It
was accepted by him.
It afterwards appeared that Peabody & Co.
had entered into negotiations with the
Insular Purchasing Agent for the sale for
the piles at $20 a piece, resulting in the
sale to the Government of 213 piles at $19
each. More of them were afterwards sold to
the Government at the same figure and the
remainder to other parties.
In these transactions the Smith, Bell &
Company were associated with Henry W.
Peabody & Company, who conducted the
negotiations, and are consequently
accountable with them.
Cadwallader, as assignee of the Pacific
Export Lumber Co., sues for the difference
between the amount turned over to the
company on account of a cargo of cedar
piles consigned to the defendants as its
agents and afterwards bought by them, and
the amount actually received by them on
the subsequent sale thereof.
SINGSONG v. Garibay, Saldejeno, and Tubungbanua Plaintiffs have a right to file the action to nullify the chattel mortgage in question.
ISABELA SAWMILL entered into a Contract of Partnership
under the firm name Isabela Sawmill. As a rule, a contract cannot be assailed by one who is not a party thereto. However, when a contract
(1979) Plaintiffs are creditors of the partnership. prejudices the rights of a third person, he may file an action to annul the contract.
Sps. Saldajeno filed a complaint against This Court has held that a person, who is not a party obliged principally or subsidiarily under a contract,
Isabela Sawmill, Garibay, and may exercise an action for nullity of the contract if he is prejudiced in his rights with respect to one of
Tubungbanua. Garibay, and Tubungbanua the contracting parties, and can show detriment which would positively result to him from the contract in
executed a document entitled Assignment which he has no intervention.
of Rights with Chattel Mortgage in favour of The plaintiffs were prejudiced in their rights by the execution of the chattel mortgage over the properties
Saldajeno. Garibay and Tubungbanua did of the partnership "Isabela Sawmill" in favor of Saldajeno by the remaining partners.
not divide the assets and properties of the
"Isabela Sawmill" between them, but they
continued the business of said partnership
under the same firm name "Isabela
Sawmill". The Provincial Sheriff published
two 2 notices that he would sell at public
auction certain trucks, tractors, machinery,
office equipment and other things in the
case filed by Sps. Saldajeno. Plaintiffs filed
a complaint against defendants wherein
they prayed that the sale at public auction
be restrained, the partnership pay them
and the Chattel Mortgage be declared null
and void being in fraud of creditors of the
partnership and without valuable
 consideration insofar as the said defendant
is concerned. A certificate of sale was
issued in favor of the Saldajeno. Saldajeno
executed a deed of sale in favor of the Pan
Oriental Lumber Company transferring to
the latter the trucks, tractors, machinery,
and other things that she had purchased at
a public auction.
Ratification
UY SOO LIM v. This is a dispute between one of Santiago’s
UNCHUAN legitimate child, Francisca and his
illegitimate child, Uy Soo Lim. By the terms
(1918) of his will, Santiago attempted to dispose of
the greater part of his estate in favor of Uy
Soo Lim. Uy Soo Lim executed a deed by
which he relinguished and sold to
Francisca all his right, title, and interest in
the estate of the deceased Santiago. The
document was presented to the court which
issued an order by which Francisca was
declared the sole owner of the property left
by the deceased Santiago. Uy Soo Lim
commenced the present action for the
purpose of vacating the orders of the lower
court and to rescind and annul the contract
by which he had sold and transferred to
Francisca his interest in the estate of
Santiago.
VILORIA v. While in the US, Fernando purchased for
CONTINENTAL himself and his wife, Lourdes, 2 round trip
AIRLINES airline tickets from San Diego, California to
Newark, New Jersey on board Continental
(2012) Airlines. Fernando purchased the tickets
from a travel agency called “Holiday Travel”
and was attended to by a certain Mager.
Fernando agreed to buy the said tickets
after Mager informed them that there were
no available seats at Amtrak, an intercity
passenger train service provider. Fernando
requested Mager to reschedule their flight.
Mager informed him that flights to Newark
via Continental Airlines were already fully
booked and offered the alternative of a
round trip flight via Frontier Air. Since flying
with Frontier Air called for a higher fare and
would mean travelling by night, Fernando
opted to request for a refund. Mager denied
his request as the subject tickets are non-
Uy Soo Lim cannot rescind the contract.
Knowing his legal rights, plaintiff should have been prompt to disaffirm his contract upon reaching
majority. This was not done. Instead, he deliberately permitted defendants to continue making
payments thereunder, and then, on May 25, 1914, when the last cent upon such contract was
collected, sought to avail himself of this ground of rescission. This was almost eight months after he
had attained his majority.
Positive statutory law, no less than uniform court decisions, require, as a condition precedent to
rescission of a contract on account of minority that the consideration received be refunded.
Not only should plaintiff have refunded all moneys in his possession upon filing his action to rescind,
but, by insisting upon receiving and spending such consideration after reaching majority, knowing the
rights conferred upon him by law, he must be held to have forfeited any right to bring such action.
Sps. Viloria ratified the contract.
Spouses Viloria’s cause of action on the basis of Mager’s alleged fraudulent misrepresentation is
clearly one of tort or quasi-delict, there being no pre-existing contractual relationship between them.
Therefore, it was incumbent upon Spouses Viloria to prove that CAI was equally at fault. However, the
records are devoid of any evidence by which CAI’s alleged liability can be substantiated. Apart from
their claim that CAI must be held liable for Mager’s supposed fraud because Holiday Travel is CAI’s
agent, Sps. Viloria did not present evidence that CAI was a party or had contributed to Mager’s
complained act either by instructing or authorizing Holiday Travel and Mager to issue the said
misrepresentation.
Even assuming that Mager’s representation is causal fraud, the subject contracts have been impliedly
ratified when Spouses Viloria decided to exercise their right to use the subject tickets for the purchase
of new ones. Under Article 1392 of the Civil Code, “ratification extinguishes the action to annul a
voidable contract.”Ratification of a voidable contract is defined under Article 1393 of the Civil Code.
Implied ratification may take diverse forms, such as by silence or acquiescence; by acts showing
approval or adoption of the contract; or by acceptance and retention of benefits flowing therefrom.
Simultaneous with their demand for a refund on the ground of Fernando’s vitiated consent, Spouses
Viloria likewise asked for a refund based on CAI’s supposed bad faith in reneging on its undertaking to
replace the subject tickets with a round trip ticket from Manila to Los Angeles. In doing so, Spouses
Viloria are actually asking for a rescission of the subject contracts based on contractual breach.
 refundable and the only option that Resolution, the action referred to in Article 1191, is based on the defendant’s breach of faith, a violation
Continental Airlines can offer is the re- of the reciprocity between the parties and in Solar Harvest, Inc. v. Davao Corrugated Carton
issuance of new tickets within 1 year from Corporation, this Court ruled that a claim for a reimbursement in view of the other party’s failure to
the date the subject tickets were issued. comply with his obligations under the contract is one for rescission or resolution.
Fernando decided to reserve 2 seats with However, annulment under Article 1390 of the Civil Code and rescission under Article 1191 are 2
Frontier Air. inconsistent remedies. In resolution, all the elements to make the contract valid are present; in
Fernando discovered that seats are annulment, one of the essential elements to a formation of a contract, which is consent, is absent. In
available and he can travel on Amtrak resolution, the defect is in the consummation stage of the contract when the parties are in the process
anytime and any day he pleased. Fernando of performing their respective obligations; in annulment, the defect is already present at the time of the
then purchased 2 tickets for Washington, negotiation and perfection stages of the contract. Accordingly, by pursuing the remedy of rescission
D.C. under Article 1191, the Vilorias had impliedly admitted the validity of the subject contracts, forfeiting
Upon returning to the Philippines, their right to demand their annulment. A party cannot rely on the contract and claim rights or obligations
Fernando sent a letter to CAI, demanding a under it and at the same time impugn its existence or validity. Indeed, litigants are enjoined from taking
refund and alleging that Mager had inconsistent positions.
deluded them into purchasing the subject
tickets.
Continental Micronesia denied Fernando’s
request for a refund and advised him that
he may take the subject tickets to any
Continental ticketing location for the re-
issuance of new tickets within 2 years from
the date they were issued. Continental
Micronesia informed Fernando that the
subject tickets may be used as a form of
payment for the purchase of another
Continental ticket, albeit with a re-issuance
fee.
Fernando went to Continental’s ticketing
office Makati City to have the subject
tickets replaced by a single round trip ticket
to Los Angeles, California under his name.
Therein, Fernando was informed that
Lourdes’ ticket was non-transferable, thus,
cannot be used for the purchase of a ticket
in his favor.
Fernando demanded for the refund of the
subject tickets as he no longer wished to
have them replaced. Sps. Viloria filed a
complaint against CAI, praying that CAI be
ordered to refund the money they used in
the purchase of the subject tickets with
legal interest and to pay damages.

i. Incapable of giving consent

ii. Insanity
iii. Mistake
iv. Wiolence
v. Intimidation
vi. Undue Influence
vii. Fraud
ROMAN CATHOLIC The Church owned a lot. The Church No misrepresentation existed vitiating the seller’s consent and invalidating the contract
CHURCH v. PANTE contracted with Pante for the sale of the lot
on the belief that the latter was an actual
(2012) occupant of the lot. The contract between
them fixed the purchase price at P11,200,
with the initial P1,120 payable as down
payment, and the remaining balance
payable in three years. Thereafter, the
Church sold in favor of the Sps. Rubi a lot
that included the lot previously sold to
Pante. The spouses Rubi asserted their
ownership by erecting a concrete fence
over the lot sold to Pante, effectively
blocking Pante and his family’s access
from their family home to the municipal
road. Pante instituted an action to annul
the sale between the Church and the
spouses Rubi, insofar as it included the lot
previously sold to him.
c. Unenforceable Contracts
CARBONEL v. CA Poncio was the owner of the parcel of land
with improvements and subject to
(1976) mortgage in favor of the Republic Savings
Bank. Carbonell, a cousin and adjacent
neighbor of Poncio lived in the adjoining lot.
Both Carbonell and Infante offered to buy
the said lot from Poncio.
Poncio, unable to keep up with the
instalments due on the mortgage,
approached Carbonell one day and offered
to sell to the latter the said lot, excluding
the house. Carbonell accepted the offer.
Then they went to the Republic Savings
Bank and secured the consent of the
President thereof for her to pay the arrears
on the mortgage and to continue the
payment of the instalments as they fall due.
Carbonel and Poncio executed a document
Consent is an essential requisite of contracts as it pertains to the meeting of the offer and the
acceptance upon the thing and the cause which constitute the contract. To create a valid contract, the
meeting of the minds must be free, voluntary, willful and with a reasonable understanding of the various
obligations the parties assumed for themselves. Where consent, however, is given through mistake,
violence, intimidation, undue influence, or fraud, the contract is deemed voidable. However, not every
mistake renders a contract voidable.
For mistake as to the qualification of one of the parties to vitiate consent, two requisites must concur:
1. the mistake must be either with regard to the identity or with regard to the qualification of one of the
contracting parties; and
2. the identity or qualification must have been the principal consideration for the celebration of the
contract.
Contrary to the Church’s contention, the actual occupancy or residency of a buyer over the land does
not appear to be a necessary qualification that the Church requires before it could sell its land. Had
this been indeed its policy, then neither Pante nor the spouses Rubi would qualify as buyers of the 32-
square meter lot, as none of them actually occupied or resided on the lot.
Given the size of the lot, it could serve no other purpose than as a mere passageway; it is unthinkable
to consider that a 2x16-meter strip of land could be mistaken as anyone’s residence. In fact, the
spouses Rubi were in possession of the adjacent lot, but they never asserted possession over the
2x16-meter lot when the 1994 sale was made in their favor; it was only then that they constructed the
concrete fence blocking the passageway.
We find it unlikely that Pante could successfully misrepresent himself as the actual occupant of the lot;
this was a fact that the Church (which has a parish chapel in the same barangay where the lot was
located) could easily verify had it conducted an ocular inspection of its own property. The surrounding
circumstances actually indicate that the Church was aware that Pante was using the lot merely as a
passageway.
The sale of the lot to Pante and later to the spouses Rubi resulted in a double sale that called for the
application of the rules in Article 1544 of the Civil Code. As neither Pante nor the spouses Rubi
registered the sale in their favor, the question now is who, between the two, was first in possession of
the property in good faith. Pante acquired prior possession of the lot.
Carbonell has the superior right over the property.
As stressed by Justice Gatmaitan in his first decision of November 2, 1965, which he reiterated in his
dissent from the resolution of the majority of the Special Division. of Five on October 30, 1968, Exhibit
A, the private document in the Batanes dialect, is a valid contract of sale between the parties, since
sale is a consensual contract and is perfected by mere consent (Couto vs. Cortes, 8 Phil. 459). Even
an oral contract of realty is all between the parties and accords to the vendee the right to compel the
vendor to execute the proper public document As a matter of fact, Exhibit A, while merely a private
document, can be fully or partially performed, to it from the operation of the statute of frauds. Being a all
consensual contract, Exhibit A effectively transferred the possession of the lot to the vendee Carbonell
by constitutum possessorium (Article 1500, New Civil Code); because thereunder the vendor Poncio
continued to retain physical possession of the lot as tenant of the vendee and no longer as knew
thereof. More than just the signing of Exhibit A by Poncio and Carbonell with Constancio Meonada as
witness to fact the contract of sale, the transition was further confirmed when Poncio agreed to the
actual payment by Carbonell of his mortgage arrearages to the bank on January 27, 1955 and by his
consequent delivery of his own mortgage passbook to Carbonell. If he remained owner and mortgagor,
Poncio would not have surrendered his mortgage passbook to' Carbonell.
 evidencing their agreement.
Poncio informed Carbonell he could not
proceed any more with the sale, because
he had already given the lot to Infante.
Poncio executed the formal deed of sale in
favor of Infante and the latter paid Republic
Savings Bank the mortgage indebtedness.
The mortgage on the lot was eventually
discharged. Carbonell with the Register of
Deeds her adverse claim as first buyer.
Carbonell filed a complaint praying that she
be declared the lawful owner of the
questioned parcel of land; that the
subsequent sale to Infante be declared null
and void, and that Poncio be ordered to
execute the corresponding deed of
conveyance of said land in her favour.
LIMKETKAI SONS FACTS:
MILLING INC., BPI was the owner of the subject parcel of
petitioner, land. In order to sell the land, it employed
vs. the services of an agent. The agent told
COURT OF BPI that Limketkai was willing to buy the
APPEALS, ET AL., property. Limketkai sent a letter to BPI
respondents. proposing to buy the property at 1K per sq.
March 29, 1996 m. BPI, through a letter, rejected the offer.
Limketkai, through another letter reiterated
its offer to buy the subject property at
P1,000/sq. m. but now on cash basis.
BPI's, through another letter, rejected
petitioner's offer. Lastly, Limketkai sent a
letter to respondent BPI claiming the
existence of a perfected contract of sale of
the subject property between them.
In sum, here are the documents that were
exchanged:
1. Letter of the agent informing BPI
of the prospective buyer
(Limketkai)
2. 1st letter of Limketkai to BPI
offering to buy the property
3. 1st rejection letter issued by BPI
4. 2nd letter of Limketai to BPI
offering to buy the property
5. 2nd rejection letter
6. Letter of LImketkai to respondent
BPI claiming the existence of a
perfected contract of sale of the
subject property between them.
ISSUE:
Is there compliance with the Statute of Frauds?
HELD:
NO.
Art. 1403. — The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Those that do not comply with the Statute of Frauds as set forth in this number. In the following
cases an agreement thereafter made shall be unenforceable by action, unless the same, or some note
or memorandum, thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent;
xxx xxx xxx
(e) An agreement XXX for the sale of real property or of an interest therein.
In this case there is a patent absence of any deed of sale categorically conveying the subject property
from respondent BPI to petitioner. The documents stated above which petitioner claims as proof of
perfected contract of sale between it and respondent BPI were not subscribed by the party charged,
i.e., BPI and did not constitute the memoranda or notes that the law speaks of. 19 To consider
them sufficient compliance with the Statute of Frauds is to betray the avowed purpose of the law to
prevent fraud and perjury in the enforcement of obligations. The requirement that the notes or
memoranda be subscribed by BPI or its agents, as the party charged, is very vital for the strict
compliance with the avowed purpose of the Statute of Frauds which is to prevent fraud and perjury in
the enforcement of obligations depending for their evidence on the unassisted memory of witnesses by
requiring certain enumerated contracts and transactions to be evidenced by a writing signed by the
party to be charged (Asia Production Co., Inc. vs. Pano, 205 SCRA 458). It cannot be gainsaid that a
shrewd person could easily concoct a story in his letters addressed to the other party and present the
letters to the court as notes to prove the existence of a perfected oral contract of sale when in truth
there is none.
Furthermore, Even if the documents were considered, the same are insufficient to to conclude that a
contract of sale has been perfected. In adherence to the provisions of the Statute of Frauds, the
examination and evaluation of the notes or memoranda adduced by the appellee was confined and
limited to within the four corners of the documents. To go beyond what appears on the face of the
documents constituting the notes or memoranda, stretching their import beyond what is written in black
and white, would certainly be uncalled for, if not violative of the Statute of Frauds and opening the
doors to fraud, the very evil sought to be avoided by the statute. In fine, considering that the documents
adduced by the appellee do not embody the essentials of the contract of sale aside from not having
been subscribed by the party charged or its agent, the transaction involved definitely falls within the

Swedish Match vs. FACTS:
CA and Litonjua Swedish Match owned the subject Phimco
October 20, 2004 shares. It wanted to raise money so it
offered the shares for sale. Litonjua
responded by offering to buy the shares at
P36M. Swedish Match replied, in a letter
dated June 11, 1990, by saying that
Litonjua should first undertake a due
diligence process or pre-acquisition
audit, then make another offer by June 30,
1990. Litonjua replied that it cannot make
another offer at June 30 since the due
diligence process or pre-acquisition
audit would take longer. Litonjua said that
the offer would be ready by July 17.
Swedish Match sent notice to Litonjua that
they would be constrained to entertain bids
from other parties in view of Litonjua’s
failure to make a firm commitment for the
shares of Swedish Match in Phimco by 30
June 1990. In a letter dated 3 July 1990,
Rossi informed Litonjua that on 2 July
1990, they signed a conditional contract
with a local group for the disposal of
Phimco. However, this sale did not push
through so Swedish went back to Litonjua
and made an offer. Litonjua sent a letter
expressing his objections to the totally new
set of terms and conditions for the sale of
the Phimco shares. He emphasized that
the new offer constituted an attempt to
reopen the already perfected contract of
sale of the shares in his favor. He intimated
that he could not accept the new terms and
conditions contained therein. Litonjua filed
a case of specific performance arguing that
the the letter dated 11 June 1990
constituted a perfected contract. Swedish
countered that if there was a contract of
sale, such is unenforceable for failure to
comply with the Statute of Frauds.
d. Void Contracts
HEIRS OF FACTS:
POLICRONIO M. Alfonso Ureta (Alfonso) begot 14 children,
URETA, SR vs. one of whom was Policronio. The children
HEIRS OF ALFONSO of Policronio (Heirs of Policronio), are
URETA opposed to the rest of Alfonso’s children
ambit of the Statute of Frauds.
ISSUE:
Was there compliance with the Statute of Frauds?
HELD:
No.
The Statute of Frauds embodied in Article 1403, paragraph (2), of the Civil Code22 requires certain
contracts enumerated therein to be evidenced by some note or memorandum in order to be
enforceable. For a note or memorandum to satisfy the Statute, it must be complete in itself and
cannot rest partly in writing and partly in parol. The note or memorandum must contain the names
of the parties, the terms and conditions of the contract, and a description of the property sufficient to
render it capable of identification.28 Such note or memorandum must contain the essential elements of
the contract expressed with certainty that may be ascertained from the note or memorandum itself, or
some other writing to which it refers or within which it is connected, without resorting to parol
evidence.29
Contrary to the Court of Appeals’ conclusion, the exchange of correspondence between the parties
hardly constitutes the note or memorandum within the context of Article 1403 of the Civil Code. Rossi’s
letter dated 11 June 1990, heavily relied upon by respondents, is not complete in itself. First, it does not
indicate at what price the shares were being sold. In paragraph (5) of the letter, respondents were
supposed to submit their final offer in U.S. dollar terms, at that after the completion of the due diligence
process. The paragraph undoubtedly proves that there was as yet no definite agreement as to the
price. Second, the letter does not state the MODE of payment of the price. In fact, Litonjua was
supposed to indicate in his final offer how and where payment for the shares was planned to be
made.30
Furthermore, the Statute of Frauds is applicable only to contracts which are executory and not to
those which have been consummated either totally or partially.51 If a contract has been totally or
partially performed, the exclusion of parol evidence would promote fraud or bad faith, for it would
enable the defendant to keep the benefits already derived by him from the transaction in litigation, and
at the same time, evade the obligations, responsibilities or liabilities assumed or contracted by him
thereby.52 This rule, however, is predicated on the fact of ratification of the contract within the meaning
of Article 1405 of the Civil Code either (1) by failure to object to the presentation of oral evidence to
prove the same, or (2) by the acceptance of benefits under them. In the instant case, respondents
failed to prove that there was partial performance of the contract within the purview of the
Statute.
ISSUE1:
Is the sale void?
HELD:
YES.
 and their descendants (Heirs of Alfonso).
September 14, 2011 Sometime in October 1969, Alfonso and
four of his children, namely, Policronio,
Liberato, Prudencia, and Francisco, met. In
order to reduce the inheritance taxes, their
father should made it appear that he had
sold some of his lands to his children.
Accordingly, Alfonso executed a Deed of
Sale covering six parcels of land in favor of
Policronio. These lands are the properties
that are in dispute here. Since the sales
were only made for taxation purposes and
no monetary consideration was given,
Alfonso continued to own, possess and
enjoy the lands and their produce. The tax
declarations were, however, in the name of
Policronio.
Alfonso died. The administrator of his
estate included the subject parcels of land
as part of Alfonso’s estate. The heirs of
Policronio objected arguing that the subject
parcels of land should be excluded from
the estate since these were already sold to
Policronio. The other heirs of Alfonso
argued that the sale was void for being
fictitious and for lacking consideration.
The heirs of Policronio argue further that
the sale cannot be assailed for being
barred under Article 1421 of the Civil Code
which provides that the defense of illegality
of a contract is not available to third
persons whose interests are not directly
affected.
The Heirs of Policronio contended also that
even assuming that the contract was
simulated, the Heirs of Alfonso would still
be barred from recovering the properties by
reason of Article 1412 of the Civil Code,
which provides that if the act in which the
unlawful or forbidden cause does not
constitute a criminal offense, and the fault
is both on the contracting parties, neither
may recover what he has given by virtue of
the contract or demand the performance of
the other’s undertaking. As the Heirs of
Alfonso alleged that the purpose of the
sale was to avoid the payment of
inheritance taxes, they cannot take from
the Heirs of Policronio what had been given
to their father.
REASON1: For being fictitious
The primary consideration in determining the true nature of a contract is the intention of the
parties. If the words of a contract appear to contravene the evident intention of the parties, the latter
shall prevail. Such intention is determined not only from the express terms of their agreement, but also
from the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties.16 The true intention of the parties in this
case was sufficiently proven by the Heirs of Alfonso.
The Heirs of Alfonso established by a preponderance of evidence17 that the Deed of Sale was one of
the four (4) absolutely simulated Deeds of Sale which involved no actual monetary consideration,
executed by Alfonso in favor of his children, Policronio, Liberato, and Prudencia, and his second wife,
Valeriana, for taxation purposes.
Other indications that the sale was fictitious
1. Alfonso continued to enjoy the property even after the alleged sale
2. Policronio or his heirs did not exercise possession over the property after the alleged sale.
3. They did not even take possession even after Alfonso died
4. Policronio never collected rentals on the property
5. It is further telling that Policronio never disclosed the existence of the Deed of Sale to his
children.
REASON2: For lack of consideration
It is well-settled in a long line of cases that where a deed of sale states that the purchase price has
been paid but in fact has never been paid, the deed of sale is null and void for lack of
consideration.28 Thus, although the contract states that the purchase price of ₱2,000.00 was paid by
Policronio to Alfonso for the subject properties, it has been proven that such was never in fact paid as
there was no money involved. It must, therefore, follow that the Deed of Sale is void for lack of
consideration.
ISSUE2:
Are the heirs of Alfonso barred from assailing the validity of the contract?
HELD:
No.
Art. 1421. The defense of illegality of contracts is not available to third persons whose
interests are not directly affected.
The right to set up the nullity of a void or non-existent contract is not limited to the parties, as in the
case of annullable or voidable contracts; it is extended to third persons who are directly affected by the
contract. Thus, where a contract is absolutely simulated, even third persons who may be prejudiced
thereby may set up its inexistence.41 The Heirs of Alfonso are the children of Alfonso, with his deceased
children represented by their children (Alfonso’s grandchildren). The Heirs of Alfonso are clearly his
heirs and successors-in-interest and, as such, their interests are directly affected, thereby giving them
the right to question the legality of the Deed of Sale.
ISSUE3:
Are the heirs of Alfonso barred from claiming the properties because of 1412?
HELD:
No.
Article 1412 is not applicable to fictitious or simulated contracts, because they refer to contracts with an
illegal cause or subject-matter.42 This article presupposes the existence of a cause, it cannot refer
to fictitious or simulated contracts which are in reality non-existent.43 As it has been determined that the
Deed of Sale is a simulated contract, the provision cannot apply to it.
Granting that the Deed of Sale was not simulated, the provision would still not apply. Since the subject
properties were included as properties of Alfonso in the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, they are
covered by corresponding inheritance and estate taxes. Therefore, tax evasion, if at all present, would

CONCHITA LIGUEZ, FACTS:
petitioner, 1. Salvador Lopez, married and a
vs. man of mature years, wanted to
THE HONORABLE have sexual relations with
COURT OF appellant Conchita Liguez.
APPEALS, MARIA 2. Conchita’s parents would not
NGO VDA. DE accede unless the subject land be
LOPEZ, ET AL., donated to them first.
respondents. 3. The land, although conjugal
property, was donated without the
December 18, 1957 consent of Maria Ngo, the wife of
Salvador
4. Conchita now seeks to claim the
property based on the Deed of
Donation executed by Salvador in
favor of Conchita
5. The widow, Maria Ngo argues that
a. The conveyance was
void for having an illegal
cause
b. The parties are in pari
delicto therefore, the
courts should leave them
where they are.
6. Conchita argues that "in
contracts of pure beneficence
the consideration is the
liberality of the donor", and that
liberality per se can never be
illegal, since it is neither against
law or morals or public policy.
Appellant seeks to differentiate
not arise, and Article 1412 would again be inapplicable.
On the issue of prescription: As the Deed of Sale is a void contract, the action for the declaration of
its nullity, even if filed 21 years after its execution, cannot be barred by prescription for it is
imprescriptible. Furthermore, the right to set up the defense of inexistence or absolute nullity cannot be
waived or renounced.45 Therefore, the Heirs of Alfonso cannot be precluded from setting up the
defense of its inexistence.
OBITER: Absolutely simulated vs. relatively simulated.
In absolute simulation, there is a colorable contract but it has no substance as the parties have no
intention to be bound by it. The main characteristic of an absolute simulation is that the apparent
contract is not really desired or intended to produce legal effect or in any way alter the juridical
situation of the parties. As a result, an absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void, and the
parties may recover from each other what they may have given under the contract. However, if the
parties state a false cause in the contract to conceal their real agreement, the contract is relatively
simulated and the parties are still bound by their real agreement. Hence, where the essential
requisites of a contract are present and the simulation refers only to the content or terms of the
contract, the agreement is absolutely binding and enforceable between the parties and their successors
in interest.
ISSUE1:
Illegal cause?
HELD:
Yes.
R1: It was not a contract of pure beneficence
What is a contract of pure beneficence?  contracts designed solely and exclusively to procure
the welfare of the beneficiary, without any intent of producing any satisfaction for the donor;
contracts, in other words, in which the idea of self-interest is totally absent on the part of the
transferor.
Here the facts as found by the Court of Appeals (and which we can not vary) demonstrate that in
making the donation in question, the late Salvador P. Lopez was not moved exclusively by the desire to
benefit appellant Conchita Liguez, but also to secure her cohabiting with him, so that he could gratify
his sexual impulses.
REASON2: If the motive predetermines the contract, then motive constitutes the causa
GR: Motive and causa are different concepts
EXC: When motive predetermines the contract, motive = cause
The distinction must be maintained between causa and motives. It is well to note, however that
Manresa himself (Vol. 8, pp. 641-642), while maintaining the distinction and upholding the
inoperativeness of the motives of the parties to determine the validity of the contract, expressly excepts
from the rule those contracts that are conditioned upon the attainment of the motives of either
party. The motive may be regarded as causa when it predetermines the purpose of the contract.
In the present case, it is scarcely disputable that Lopez would not have conveyed the property in
question had he known that appellant would refuse to cohabit with him; so that the cohabitation was
an implied condition to the donation, and being unlawful, necessarily tainted the donation itself.
ISSUE2:
Are the parties in pari delicto?
HELD:
No.
ART. 1412. If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause consists does not constitute a criminal
offense, the following rules shall be observed:
 between the alleged liberality of
Lopez, as causa for the donation
in her favor, and his desire for
cohabiting with appellant, as
motives that impelled him to
make the donation
DIONISIO RELLOSA, FACTS:
Petitioner, vs. GAW 1. Dionisio Relloso owned a house
CHEE HUN, and lot
Respondent. 2. He sold it to Gaw Chee Hun, a
Chinese
September 29, 1953. 3. The vendor remained in
possession of the property under
a contract of lease.
4. Dionisio now wants to declare the
contract null and void
a. the vendee, being a
Chinese citizen, should
obtain the approval of the
Japanese Military
Administration in
accordance with (seirei)
No. 6 but said approval
has not been obtained,
and
b. that, even if said
requirement were met,
the sale would at all
XXX
(2) When only one of the contracting parties is at fault, he cannot recover, what he has given by reason
of the contract, or ask for fulfillment of what has been promised him. The other, who is not at fault, may
demand the return of what he has given without any obligation to comply with his promise.
In our opinion, the Court of Appeals erred in applying to the present case the pari delicto rule. First,
because it can not be said that both parties here had equal guilt when we consider that as against the
deceased Salvador P. Lopez, who was a man advanced in years and mature experience, the appellant
was a mere minor, 16 years of age, when the donation was made; that there is no finding made by
the Court of Appeals that she was fully aware of the terms of the bargain entered into by and
Lopez and her parents; that, her acceptance in the deed of donation (which was authorized by Article
626 of the Old Civil Code) did not necessarily imply knowledge of conditions and terms not set forth
therein; and that the substance of the testimony of the instrumental witnesses is that it was the
appellant's parents who insisted on the donation before allowing her to live with Lopez. These
facts are more suggestive of seduction than of immoral bargaining on the part of appellant. It must not
be forgotten that illegality is not presumed, but must be duly and adequately proved.
Conclusion:
To defeat its effect, the appellees must plead and prove that the same is illegal. But such plea on the
part of the Lopez heirs is not receivable, since Lopez, himself, if living, would be barred from setting up
that plea; and his heirs, as his privies and successors in interest, can have no better rights than Lopez
himself. Basis: 1412 (2)
Appellees, as successors of the late donor, being thus precluded from pleading the defense of
immorality or illegal causa of the donation, the total or partial ineffectiveness of the same must
be decided by different legal principles. In this regard, the Court of Appeals correctly held that
Lopez could not donate the entirety of the property in litigation, to the prejudice of his wife
Maria Ngo, because said property was conjugal in character and the right of the husband to
donate community property is strictly limited by law
Conchita Liguez is declared entitled to so much of the donated property as may be found, upon proper
liquidation, not to prejudice the share of the widow Maria Ngo in the conjugal partnership with Salvador
P. Lopez or the legitimes of the forced heirs of the latter.
ISSUE1:
W/N the contract is invalid.
HELD:
Invalid under the Constitution
Said Constitution, in its article VIII, section 5, provides that "no private agricultural land shall be
transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain in the Philippines", which provisions are similar to those contained in our
present Constitution. Under the Constitution aliens may not acquire private or public agricultural lands,
including residential lands."
ISSUE2:
Can Rellosa get back the property?
HELD:
No. In Pari Delicto
They are now prevented from doing so if their purpose is to recover the lands that they have voluntarily
parted with, because of their guilty knowledge that what they were doing was in violation of the
Constitution. They cannot escape this conclusion because they are presumed to know the law. As
this court well said: 'A party to an illegal contract cannot come into a court of law and ask to have his
illegal objects carried out. The law will not aid either party to an illegal agreement; it leaves the parties
where it finds them.'
However, this does not mean that the Chinese national is permitted to retain the property because that
 events be void under
article XIII, section 5, of
our Constitution
c. once the sale and the
lease are declared null
and void, the vendee be
ordered to return to
vendor the duplicate of
the title covering the
property,
ALFRED FRITZ FACTS:
FRENZEL, petitioner, 1. Frenzel was a married man.
vs. EDERLINA P. Ederlina is a married woman
CATITO, respondent. 2. Frenzel is rich. He works as a
July 11, 2003 pilot. Ederlina works at Kings
Cross in Sydney
3. They met and they fell in love.
4. They went back to the Philippines
and Ederlina put up a beauty
salon using Frenzel’s money.
5. He bought her a house and lot.
Because he knew that the land
cannot be registered under his
name because he was an alien,
he registered the same under
Ederlina’s name.
6. He bought her other parcels of
land and registered all of them
under Ederlina’s name.
7. When Frenzel found out about
Ederlina’s marriage, they started
parting ways.
8. Frenzel wanted Ederlina to
divorce her original husband,
Klaus
9. When the legit husband of
Ederlina did not consent to the
divorce unless he be given half
the properties of Ederlina, Frenzel
filed this case to recover all the
properties he bought that are
currently registered under
Ederlina’s name.
a. He demanded the return
of all the amounts that
Ederlina and her family
had “stolen” and turn
over all the properties
acquired by him and
would be a circumvention of the Constitution. There are at present two ways by which this situation
may be remedied, to wit,
(1) action for reversion, and
(2) escheat to the state.
Reversion  The person concerned shall be obliged to alienate said lands or improvements to others
so capacitated within the precise period of five years; otherwise, such property shall revert to the
Government."
Escheat  a falling of the estate into the general property of the state because the tenant is an
alien. it would more properly be termed a 'forfeiture' at common law."
ISSUE:
Can he recover?
HELD:
No.
Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution provides, as follows:
Xxx Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring lands of the
public domain. Hence, they have also been disqualified from acquiring private lands.
A contract that violates the Constitution and the law, is null and void and vests no rights and creates no
obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. The petitioner, being a party to an illegal contract, cannot
come into a court of law and ask to have his illegal objective carried out. One who loses his money or
property by knowingly engaging in a contract or transaction which involves his own moral turpitude
may not maintain an action for his losses. To him who moves in deliberation and premeditation, the law
is unyielding. The law will not aid either party to an illegal contract or agreement; it leaves the
parties where it finds them
RE Article 1412: Under Article 1412 of the New Civil Code, the petitioner cannot have the subject
properties deeded to him or allow him to recover the money he had spent for the purchase thereof.
Equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of
public policy, cannot be done directly. Where the wrong of one party equals that of the other, the
defendant is in the stronger position ... it signifies that in such a situation, neither a court of equity nor a
court of law will administer a remedy.
The petitioner is charged with knowledge of the constitutional prohibition. As can be gleaned from the
decision of the trial court, the petitioner was fully aware that he was disqualified from acquiring and
owning lands under Philippine law even before he purchased the properties in question; and, to skirt
the constitutional prohibition, the petitioner had the deed of sale placed under the respondent’s name
as the sole vendee thereof:
Such being the case, the plaintiff is subject to the constitutional restrictions governing the acquisition of
real properties in the Philippines by aliens.
The petitioner cannot find solace in Article 1416 of the New Civil Code which reads:
Art. 1416. When the agreement is not illegal per se but is merely prohibited, and the prohibition by the
law is designed for the protection of the plaintiff, he may, if public policy is thereby enhanced, recover
what he has paid or delivered.
The provision applies only to those contracts which are merely prohibited, in order to benefit
private interests. It does not apply to contracts void ab initio. The sales of three parcels of land in
favor of the petitioner who is a foreigner is illegal per se. The transactions are void ab initio because
they were entered into in violation of the Constitution. Thus, to allow the petitioner to recover the
properties or the money used in the purchase of the parcels of land would be subversive of public
policy.
 Ederlina during their
coverture.
b. These properties were
bought using solely
Frenzel’s own efforts and
resources acquired in the
Philippines real and
personal properties
valued more or less at
P724,000.00
c. under Article 1416 and
Article 1412 of the New
Civil Code, he is entitled
to recover the money
used for the purchase of
the properties.
Ederlina argued that based on
documentary evidence, the purchaser of
the three parcels of land subject of the
complaint was Ederlina. Even if Frenzel
was the buyer of the properties, he had no
cause of action against Ederlina for the
recovery of the same because as an alien,
he was disqualified from acquiring and
owning lands in the Philippines. The
sale of the three parcels of land to the
petitioner was null and void ab initio.
Applying the pari delicto doctrine, the
petitioner was precluded from recovering
the properties from the respondent.

Contracts of Adhesion
PILIPINO FACTS:
TELEPHONE On various dates in 1996, Delfino C.
CORPORATION, Tecson applied for six (6) cellular phone
petitioner, subscriptions with petitioner Pilipino
vs. Telephone Corporation (PILTEL), a
DELFINO TECSON, company engaged in the
respondent. telecommunications business, which
May 7, 2004 applications were each approved and
covered, respectively, by six mobiline
service agreements.
On 05 April 2001, respondent filed with the
RTC, a complaint against petitioner for a
"Sum of Money and Damages." Petitioner
moved for the dismissal of the complaint on
the ground of improper venue, citing a
common provision in the mobiline service
agreements to the effect that - "Venue of all
suits arising from this Agreement or any
other suit directly or indirectly arising from
ISSUE:
W/N the venue stipulation binds the parties
HELD:
Yes. The stipulation is binding
Indeed, the contract herein involved is a contract of adhesion. But such an agreement is not per se
inefficacious. The rule instead is that, should there be ambiguities in a contract of adhesion, such
ambiguities are to be construed against the party that prepared it. If, however, the stipulations are
not obscure, but are clear and leave no doubt on the intention of the parties, the literal meaning
of its stipulations must be held controlling.4
A contract of adhesion is just as binding as ordinary contracts. It is true that this Court has, on
occasion, struck down such contracts as being assailable when the weaker party is left with no
choice by the dominant bargaining party and is thus completely deprived of an opportunity to
bargain effectively. In the case at bar, respondent secured six (6) subscription contracts for cellular
phones on various dates. It would be difficult to assume that, during each of those times, respondent
had no sufficient opportunity to read and go over the terms and conditions embodied in the
agreements. Respondent continued, in fact, to acquire in the pursuit of his business subsequent
subscriptions and remained a subscriber of petitioner for quite sometime.
A contract duly executed is the law between the parties, and they are obliged to comply fully and not
 the relationship between PILTEL and
subscriber shall be in the proper courts of
Makati, Metro Manila. Subscriber hereby
expressly waives any other venues."1
Tecson argued that the subscription
agreement, being a mere contract of
adhesion, does not bind respondent on the
venue stipulation.
TRUSTS
b. Express Trusts
VICTORIA JULIO, FACTS:
plaintiff-appellant, 1. Victoriana Dalandan (mother of
vs. plaintiff Victoria Julio) owned a
EMILIANO four-hectare piece of Riceland.
DALANDAN and 2. This Riceland was used by
MARIA DALANDAN, Clemente Dalandan (father of
defendants- defendants) as security for an
appellees. obligation
October 30, 1967 3. This Riceland was foreclosed
4. Because of this foreclosure,
Clemente executed a document.
The relevant portions of which
are:
a. That because of this
foreclosure, I accordingly
held myself liable to
Victoria Julio XXX, and I
promised her that I would
replace her aforesaid
land which was
foreclosed because of
my obligation with
another farm of more
than four (4) hectares,
that is, one planted to
four cavanes of
seedlings, more or less;]
b. That my children
(EMILIANO AND MARIA
DALANDAN) may not be
forced to give up the
harvest of the farm
herein above mentioned;
c. That neither may the
land — which was
exchanged for the farm
with four cavanes of
seedlings — be
demanded immediately;
selectively with its terms. A contract of adhesion is no exception.7
ISSUE1:
W/N the defendants may be compelled to deliver the land
HELD:
Yes. There was a trust constituted for the benefit of Victoria. But when the delivery should be effected
should still be threshed out in the courts below. REMANDED
Transfer of property
The agreement conveys the idea that the naked ownership of the land in substitution was, indeed,
transferred to Victoria Julio. Else there would have been no sense in the proviso that the fruits as well
as the physical possession of the land could not immediately be demanded by Victoria Julio from
Clemente's children, the herein defendants. For the right to demand fruits and physical possession of
property has been known to be attributes of ownership.
What were transferred to defendants?
They are usufructuaries for an undetermined length of time. For so long as that period has not
been fixed and has not elapsed, they hold the property. Theirs is to enjoy the fruits of the land and
to hold the same as trustees of Victoria Julio. And this because, by the deed, Clemente Dalandan
divested himself of the ownership — qualified solely by withholding enjoyment of the fruits and physical
possession. In consequence, Clemente Dalandan cannot transmit to his heirs, the present defendants,
such ownership.3 Nemo dat quod non habet. And then, the document is a declaration by Clemente
Dalandan, now deceased, against his own proprietary interests. Such document is binding upon his
heirs.4
Why was there a trust agreement?
But, defendants aver that recognition of the trust may not be proved by evidence aliunde. They argue
that by the express terms of Article 1443 of the Civil Code, "[n]o express trusts concerning an
immovable or any interest therein may be proved by parol evidence." This argument overlooks the fact
that no oral evidence is necessary. The express trust imposed upon defendants by their predecessor
appears in the document itself. For, while it is true that said deed did not in definitive words institute
defendants as trustees, a duty is therein imposed upon them — when the proper time comes — to turn
over both the fruits and the possession of the property to Victoria Julio. Not that this view is without
statutory support. Article 1444 of the Civil Code states that: "No particular words are required for the
creation of an express trust, it being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended." In reality, the
development of the trust as a method of disposition of property, so jurisprudence teaches, "seems in
large part due to its freedom from formal requirements."5 This principle perhaps accounts for the
provisions in Article 1444 just quoted. For, "technical or particular forms of words or phrases are not
essential to the manifestation of intention to create a trust or to the establishment thereof."6 Nor would
the use of some such words as "trust" or "trustee" essential to the constitution of a trust as we
have held in Lorenzo vs. Posadas, 64 Phil. 353, 368. Conversely, the mere fact that the word "trust" or
"trustee" was employed would not necessarily prove an intention to create a trust. What is important is
whether the trustor manifested an intention to create the kind of relationship which in law is known as a
trust. It is unimportant that the trustor should know that the relationship "which he intends to create is
 5. Plaintiff Victoria now files the called a trust, and whether or not he knows the precise characteristics of the relationship which is
instant case praying that she be called a trust."7 Here, that trust is effective as against defendants and in favor of the beneficiary thereof,
a. (a) adjudged as owner of plaintiff Victoria Julio, who accepted it in the document itself.8
the said farm; On prescription: In the sense in which we understand the complaint to be, it cannot be said that
b. (b) Fixing a time within plaintiff's action to recover the property thus held in trust has prescribed. Given the fiduciary relation
which defendants should which according to the complaint is recognized by defendants, the latter may not invoke the
deliver the said parcels statute of limitations as a bar to plaintiff's action.
of land to the herein
plaintiff as well as the
fruits thereof;
6. Defendants argue that
a. the farm passed to them
by virtue of inheritance
b. the action has prescribed
because the 10-year
period from the date of
the document had
elapsed.

ESTATE OF FACTS: ISSUE:

MARGARITA D. Margarita Cabacungan is the owner of the
CABACUNGAN, subject parcels of land (unregistered).
represented by LUZ Margarita’s son, Roberto Laigo, Jr.
LAIGO-ALI, (Roberto), applied for a non-immigrant visa
Petitioner, to the United States, and to support his
vs. application, he allegedly asked Margarita to
MARILOU LAIGO, transfer the tax declarations of the
PEDRO ROY LAIGO, properties in his name.6 For said purpose,
STELLA BALAGOT Margarita, unknown to her other children,
and SPOUSES executed an Affidavit of Transfer of Real
MARIO B. CAMPOS Property whereby the subject properties
AND JULIA S. were transferred by donation to Roberto.
CAMPOS, After he obtained the properties in his
Respondents. name and after getting his VISA, he sold
August 15, 2011 the properties to 3rd persons. Margarita
found out about the transfers and filed the
instant case for the annulment of said sales
and for the recovery of ownership and
possession of the subject properties as
well as for the cancellation of Ricardo’s tax
declarations.
Should the properties be returned to Margarita?
HELD:
Yes.
An implied trust was created
Petitioner before the trial court, had actually adduced evidence to prove the intention of Margarita to
transfer to Roberto only the legal title to the properties in question, with attendant expectation that
Roberto would return the same to her on accomplishment of that specific purpose for which the
transaction was entered into. The evidence of course is not documentary, but rather testimonial
[testimonies of the Luz (daughter of Margarita and Hilaria (niece of Margarita) who witnessed the
execution of the transfer documents]
We recall that the complaint before the trial court alleged that the 1968 Affidavit of Transfer was
executed merely to accommodate Roberto’s request to have the properties in his name and thereby
produce proof of ownership of certain real properties in the Philippines to support his U.S. visa
application. The agreement, the complaint further stated, was for Margarita to transfer the tax
declarations of the subject properties to Roberto for the said purpose and without the intention to
divest her of the rights of ownership and dominion.
It is deducible from the foregoing that the inscription of Roberto’s name in the Affidavit of Transfer
as Margarita’s transferee is not for the purpose of transferring ownership to him but only to
enable him to hold the property in trust for Margarita.
As a trustee of a resulting trust, therefore, Roberto, like the trustee of an express passive trust, is
merely a depositary of legal title having no duties as to the management, control or disposition of the
property except to make a conveyance when called upon by the cestui que trust.
EFFECT: Return of the property to the beneficiary
"trust pursuit rule,"  a constructive or resulting trust affixes itself to the subject property
A trust will follow the property – through all changes in its state and form as long as such property,
its products or its proceeds, are capable of identification, even into the hands of a transferee other than
a bona fide purchaser for value, or restitution will be enforced at the election of the beneficiary through
recourse against the trustee or the transferee personally. Accordingly, the person to whom is made a
transfer of trust property constituting a wrongful conversion of the trust property and a breach of the
trust, when not protected as a bona fide purchaser for value, is himself liable and accountable as a
constructive trustee. The liability attaches at the moment of the transfer of trust property and
 continues until there is full restoration to the beneficiary. Thus, the transferee is charged with, and
can be held to the performance of the trust, equally with the original trustee, and he can be compelled
to execute a reconveyance.
Buyers in good faith? the issue of whether the buyer of realty is in good or bad faith is relevant
only where the subject of the sale is registered land and the purchase was made from the
registered owner whose title to the land is clean, in which case the purchaser who relies on the clean
title of the registered owner is protected if he is a purchaser in good faith and for value.64 Since the
properties in question are unregistered lands, respondents purchased the same at their own peril. Their
claim of having bought the properties in good faith, i.e., without notice that there is some other person
with a right to or interest therein, would not protect them should it turn out, as it in fact did in this case,
that their seller, Roberto, had no right to sell them.
On prescription: the prescriptive period to recover property obtained by fraud or mistake, giving rise to
an implied trust under Art. 1456 of the Civil Code, is 10 years pursuant to Art. 1144. This ten-year
prescriptive period begins to run from the date the adverse party repudiates the implied trust, which
repudiation takes place when the adverse party registers the land. From the foregoing, it is clear that an
action for reconveyance under a constructive implied trust in accordance with Article 1456 does not
prescribe unless and until the land is registered or the instrument affecting the same is inscribed in
accordance with law, inasmuch as it is what binds the land and operates constructive notice to the
world. In the present case, however, the lands involved are concededly unregistered lands; hence,
there is no way by which Margarita, during her lifetime, could be notified of the furtive and fraudulent
sales made in 1992 by Roberto in favor of respondents, except by actual notice from Pedro himself in
August 1995. Hence, it is from that date that prescription began to toll. The filing of the complaint in
February 1996 is well within the prescriptive period.

c. Resulting or Implied Trust

TEODORA MATIAS FACTS: ISSUE:
DE BUENCAMINO, 1. Hilaria Dizon Matias was the Has the action prescribed?
ET AL., petitioners, owner of the subject property HELD:
vs. 2. She had a son named Luis NO
MARIA DIZON DE 3. Luis had one legitimate family and The execution of the deed, Exhibit A, and the consequent registration of the properties in the names of
MATIAS, ET AL., one illegitimate family petitioner spouses, created an implied trust in favor of Teodora's legitimate brothers and sisters. And
respondents. 4. Luis was closer to his illegitimate while implied or constructive trust prescribes in 10 years,1 the rule does not apply where a fiduciary
April 30, 1966 family relation exists and the trustee recognizes the trust.2 Continuous recognition of a resulting trust
5. Hilaria was concerned that after precludes any defense of laches in a suit to declare and enforce the trust.3 As it does not appear
Luis inherited the property, he when Teodora repudiated the existence of fiduciary relations between her and brothers and
would dispose the same in favor sisters, the same shall be taken to have been made only upon the filing of her answer to the
of his illegitimate children. complaint. The action brought by the plaintiffs to enforce such trust, therefore, has not yet prescribed.
6. 1938: Hilaria, with her spouse,
then decided to transfer their
properties in the name of one of
their legitimate grandchildren,
petitioner Teodora, for the latter
to hold the same in trust for the
other brothers and sisters.
7. Howver, upon the death of her
grandparents and parents,
Teodora took material possession
of the same from her mother and
has, since then, administered
them to the exclusion of her other
brothers and sisters.
 8. 1955: The brothers and sisters
then instituted this action to
recover the same from Teodara
9. Teodora argued that their action
has prescribed
a. the action for
reconveyance, which
was brought 17 years
after the execution of the
disputed document, was
barred by prescription
SPOUSES RICARDO FACTS: ISSUE:
AND MILAGROS W/N an implied trust existed
HUANG, petitioners, Respondent Dolores Sandoval wanted to
vs. COURT OF buy two (2) lots in Dasmariñas Village, HELD:
APPEALS, JUDGE Makati, but was prevented from doing so Yes.
PEDRO N. LAGGUI, because of the policy of the subdivision
Presiding Judge, forbidding the acquisition of two (2) lots by Ricardo’s income vs. Dolores’s income. It was proved that Ricordo’s income as an employee in a
RTC, Makati, Br. 60, a single individual. So he bought Lot 21 in textile mill was not enough for him to be able to purchase the property while Dolores has successfully
and SPOUSES her name and Lot 20 in the name of proven capacity to purchase.
DOLORES AND petitioners. The petitioners, at first,
ANICETO consulted with Dolores when the former Dolores provided the money for the purchase of Lot 20 but the corresponding deed of sale and transfer
SANDOVAL, would enter into transactions involving the certificate of title were placed in the name of Ricardo Huang because she was advised that the
respondents. property (i.e. building of a house and subdivision owner prohibited the acquisition of two (2) lots by a single individual. Guided by the
1994 Sep 13 mortgaging of the property to the SSS). foregoing definitions11, we are in conformity with the common finding of the trial court and respondent
Because of the mortgage entered into court that a resulting trust was created. Ricardo became the trustee of Lot 20 and its improvements
between the SS and the petitioners, the for the benefit of Dolores as owner. The pertinent law is Art. 1448 of the New Civil Code which provides
title was surrendered to the SSS. After that there is an implied trust when property is sold and the legal estate is granted to one party but the
sometime, the lessees started prohibiting price is paid by another for the purpose of having the beneficial interest of the property. A resulting trust
the Sandoval family from using the arises because of the presumption that he who pays for a thing intends a beneficial interest therein for
swimming pool and the Huangs then began himself.
challenging the Sandovals' ownership of
the property. She filed the instant case to
compel the SSS to release in her favor of ISSUE2:
the owner's duplicate certificate of title in its Prescribed?
possession so that the deed could be duly
annotated on the title and/or a new HELD:
certificate of title issued in her name. She No
argues that there is an implied trust created
in her favor because she was the one who
really bought the property including its Petitioners raise the issue of prescription. But the action to compel the trustee to convey the property
improvements. The Huangs argued that registered in his name for the benefit of the cestui que trust does not prescribe. 28 If at all, it is only
granting arguendo that a resulting or when the trustee repudiates the trust that the period of prescription commences to run. 29
implied trust exists between the parties, its
enforcement is already barred by The prescriptive period is ten (10) years from the repudiation of the trust. Art. 1144 of the New Civil
prescription. Petitioners argue that when Code, which is the law applicable, provides: "The following actions must be brought within ten years
the suit in the trial court was filed by from the time the right of action accrues: (a) Upon a written contract; (b) Upon an obligation created by
Dolores on 19 February 1981 more than law; (c) Upon a judgment."
ten (10) years had already lapsed since

11
a resulting trust arises where a person makes or causes to be made a disposition of property under circumstances which raise an inference that he does not intend that the person taking or holding the property should have
the beneficial interest in the property
 TCT No. 204783 (title in favor of petitioner)
was issued on 11 October 1967.
Cabacungan v. Laigo Margarita Cabacungan owned a parcel of
land. Sometime in 1968, her son, Roberrto,
2011 applied for visa to US and to support the
application, he asked Margarita to transfer
the tax declarations in his name. Hence,
unknown to the other children, Margarita
executed an Affidavit of Transfer of Real
Property whereby the subject properties
were transferred by donation to her son,
Roberto. Roberto adopted respondents
(Laigo).
At Roberto’s wake, Margarita found out that
the land was sold. Hence, she instituted a
complaint for annulment of sales and for
recovery of ownership and possession.
Margarita admitted having accommodated
Roberto’s request for the transfer of the
properties to his name, but pointed out that
the arrangement was only for the specific
purpose of supporting his U.S. visa
application. She emphasized that she
never intended to divest herself of
ownership over the subject lands and,
Thus, the reckoning point is repudiation of the trust by the trustee because from that moment his
possession becomes adverse, which in the present case gave rise to a cause of action by Dolores
against the Huang spouses. However, before the period of prescription may start, it must be shown
that: (a) the trustee has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui
que trust; (b) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust; and, (c)
the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive.
In Laguna v. Levantino and Valdez v. Olorga, we held that acts which may be adverse to strangers
may not be sufficiently adverse to the cestui que trust. A mere silent possession of the trustee
unaccompanied by acts amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust cannot be construed as
an adverse possession. Mere perception of rents and profits by the trustee, and erecting fences and
buildings adapted for the cultivation of the land held in trust, are not equivalent to unequivocal acts of
ouster of the cestui que trust.
We agree with the trial court that the action filed by Dolores has not prescribed. Firstly, Ricardo has
not performed any unequivocal act of repudiation amounting to an ouster of Dolores. The only
acts which may be considered as indicative of his intention not to respect the trust anymore were his
leasing the house without the prior knowledge of Dolores; his refusal to carry out the demand of
Dolores that he must ask the lessees to vacate the house; and, his refusal to give the necessary
papers to Dolores to enable her to get the title from the SSS. Secondly, the foregoing acts are not
positive acts of repudiation; and, thirdly, the evidence on such acts is unclear and inconclusive. But
even if the foregoing acts were manifest acts of repudiation made known to Dolores, the fact remains
that they were done at the earliest only on 15 March 1980 when Ricardo leased Lot 20 and its
improvements to Deltron. Dolores' complaint before the trial court was filed on 19 February 1981, or
within the 10-year prescriptive period.
Roberto is NOT the owner but only a trustee of a “resulting trust”. As a trustee of a resulting trust,
therefore, Roberto, like the trustee of an express passive trust, is merely a depositary of legal title
having no duties as to the management, control or disposition of the property except to make a
conveyance when called upon by the cestui que trust. Hence, the sales he entered into with
respondents are a wrongful conversion of the trust property and a breach of the trust.
Testimonial evidence was presented. It was narrated that Roberto had wanted to travel to the U.S and
to show the embassy proof of his financial capacity, he asked to “borrow” from Margarita the properties
involved but upon the condition that he would give them back to her upon his arrival from the United
States. Hence, it is deducible that inscription of Roberto’s name in the Affidavit of Transfer as
Margarita’s transferee is not for the purpose of transferring ownership to him but only to enable him to
hold the property in trust for Margarita. Indeed, in the face of the credible and straightforward testimony
of the two witnesses, Luz and Hilaria, the probative value of the ownership record forms in the names
of respondents, together with the testimony of their witness from the municipal assessor’s office who
authenticated said forms, are utterly minimal to show Roberto’s ownership.
Implied trusts are further classified into constructive trusts and resulting trusts. Constructive trusts, on
the one hand, come about in the main by operation of law and not by agreement or intention. They
arise not by any word or phrase, either expressly or impliedly, evincing a direct intention to create a
trust, but one which arises in order to satisfy the demands of justice. Also known as trusts ex maleficio,
trusts ex delicto and trusts de son tort, they are construed against one who by actual or constructive
fraud, duress, abuse of confidence, commission of a wrong or any form of unconscionable conduct,
artifice, concealment of questionable means, or who in any way against equity and good conscience
has obtained or holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in equity and good conscience,
 hence, Roberto had no right to sell them to
respondents and the Spouses Campos
Juan v. Yap Caneda spouses mortgaged the 2 parcels
of land to Petitioner Juan, employee and
2011 nephew of Respondent Yap.
Petitioner sought the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the mortgage. Both
Petitioner and respondent participated in
the auction sale but the properties were still
sold to petitioner for tendering the highest
bid. No certificate of sale was issued for
failure to pay the sale’s commission.
Caneda spouses then executed a MOA
wherein they acknowledge that the real
mortgagee-creditor is Respondent while
Petitioner is merely a trustee. In the said
MOA, it is stated that Respondent allows
the spouses to redeem the property.
hold and enjoy. They are aptly characterized as “fraud-rectifying trust,” imposed by equity to satisfy the
demands of justice and to defeat or prevent the wrongful act of one of the parties. Constructive trusts
are illustrated in Articles 1450, 1454, 1455 and 1456.
Articles 1448 to 1456 of the Civil Code enumerate cases of implied trust, but the list according to Article
1447 is not exclusive of others which may be established by the general law on trusts so long as the
limitations laid down in Article 1442 are observed, that is, that they be not in conflict with the New Civil
Code, the Code of Commerce, the Rules of Court and special laws.
While resulting trusts generally arise on failure of an express trust or of the purpose thereof, or on a
conveyance to one person upon a consideration from another (sometimes referred to as a “purchase-
money resulting trust”), they may also be imposed in other circumstances such that the court, shaping
judgment in its most efficient form and preventing a failure of justice, must decree the existence of such
a trust. A resulting trust, for instance, arises where, there being no fraud or violation of the trust, the
circumstances indicate intent of the parties that legal title in one be held for the benefit of another. It
also arises in some instances where the underlying transaction is without consideration, such as that
contemplated in Article 1449 of the Civil Code. Where property, for example, is gratuitously conveyed
for a particular purpose and that purpose is either fulfilled or frustrated, the court may affirm the
resulting trust in favor of the grantor or transferor, where the beneficial interest in property was not
intended to vest in the grantee.
Petitioner presented the mortgage contract while Respondent presented parol evidence. Court favored
the Respondent and ruled that petitioner holds title over the mortgaged properties only because
respondent allowed him to do so.
In the first place, the Cañeda spouses acknowledged respondent as the lender from whom they
borrowed the funds secured by the Contract. They did so in the MOA. Secondly, Solon, the notary
public who drew up and notarized the Contract, testified that he placed petitioner’s name in the
Contract as the mortgagor upon the instruction of respondent. Respondent himself explained that he
found this arrangement convenient because at the time of the Contract’s execution, he was mostly
abroad and could not personally attend to his businesses in the country. Lastly, it was respondent, not
petitioner, who shouldered the payment of the foreclosure expenses.
An implied trust arising from mortgage contracts is not among the trust relationships the Civil Code
enumerates. The Code itself provides, however, that such listing "does not exclude others established
by the general law on trust x x x." Under the general principles on trust, equity converts the holder of
property right as trustee for the benefit of another if the circumstances of its acquisition makes the
holder ineligible "in x x x good conscience [to] hold and enjoy [it]." As implied trusts are remedies
against unjust enrichment, the "only problem of great importance in the field of constructive trusts is
whether in the numerous and varying factual situations presented x x x there is a wrongful holding of
property and hence, a threatened unjust enrichment of the defendant."
Applying these principles, this Court recognized unconventional implied trusts in contracts involving the
purchase of housing units by officers of tenants’ associations in breach of their obligations, the
partitioning of realty contrary to the terms of a compromise agreement,19 and the execution of a sales
contract indicating a buyer distinct from the provider of the purchase money. In all these cases, the
formal holders of title were deemed trustees obliged to transfer title to the beneficiaries in whose favor
the trusts were deemed created. We see no reason to bar the recognition of the same obligation in a
mortgage contract meeting the standards for the creation of an implied trust.
 d. Constructive Trusts
Diaz v. Gorricho A parcel of land was originally owned by
Spouses Diaz. Sometime in 1935, Gorricho
1958 filed an action against the widow, Maria. A
writ of attachment was issued upon the
shares of Maria in the parcel of land.
Thereafter, the parcels of land were sold at
public auction and purchased by Gorricho.
In the final deed, however, the sheriff
conveyed the entire parcel of land instead
of Maria’s share only. When Maria died,
her children filed an action for
reconveyance of their father’s share in the
land.
The principal contention of appellants is
that their father's half of the disputed
property was acquired by Carmen J.
Gorricho through an error of the provincial
sheriff; that having been acquired through
error, it was subject to an implied trust, as
provided by Article 1456 of the new Civil
Code; and therefore, since the trust is
continuing and subsisting, the appellants
may compel reconveyance of the property
despite the lapse of time, specially,
because prescription does not run against
titles registered under Act 496.
Nakpil v. IAC Pinggoy Nakpil and Charlie Valdes were
best of friends. Charlie became Pinggoy’s
1993 lawyer, accountant, auditor and on some
occasions, a business and financial
consultant. While vacationing at a beach
house, Pinggoy drowned and died.
Petitioner, wife of Nakpil, instituted an
action for reconveyance for breach of trust
against Charlie. She alleged that her
husband Jose "Pinggoy" Nakpil prior to his
death had requested Valdes to purchase
Pulong Maulap and thereafter register the
sale and hold the title thereto in trust for
him (Pinggoy Nakpil), which respondent
Valdes did. But after her husband's death,
Valdes concealed and suppressed all
information regarding the trust agreement;
instead, he transferred Pulong Maulap in
the name of respondent Caval Realty
Corporation, which is 99.7% owned by him,
in exchange for 1,500 shares of stock.
Respondent Valdes, on the other hand,
Action is already barred by laches. Cause of action to attack the sheriff's deed and cancel the transfer
certificates of title issued accrued from the year of issuance and recording, 1937, and appellants have,
allowed fifteen (15) years to elapse before taking remedial action in 1952
The American law on trusts has always maintained a distinction between express trusts created by
intention of the parties, and the implied or constructive trusts that are exclusively created by law, the
latter not being trusts in their technical sense. The express trusts disable the trustee from acquiring for
his own benefit the property committed to his management or custody, at least while he does not
openly repudiate the trust, and makes such repudiation known to the beneficiary or cestui que trust. For
this reason, the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190) declared that the rules on adverse possession do
not apply to "continuing and subsisting" (i.e., unrepudiated) trusts.
But in constructive trusts, the rule is that laches constitutes a bar to actions to enforce the trust, and
repudiation is not required, unless there is concealment of the facts giving rise to the trust.
The reason for the difference in treatment is obvious. In express trusts, the delay of the beneficiary is
directly attributable to the trustee who undertakes to hold the property for the former, or who linked to
the beneficiary by confidential or fiduciary relations. The trustee's possession is, therefore, not adverse
to the beneficiary, until and unless the latter is made aware that the trust has been repudiated. But in
constructive trusts (that are imposed by law), there is neither promise nor fiduciary relation; the so-
called trustee does not recognize any trust and has no intent to hold for the beneficiary; therefore, the
latter is not justified in delaying action to recover his property. It is his fault if he delays; hence, he may
be estopped by his own laches.
Constructive trust under Art. 1450 existed between the parties. However, petitioner cannot as yet
redeem and compel conveyance of the property. For, Valdes must still be reimbursed for the advances
he made on the disputed property, such reimbursement being a conditio sine qua non for compelling
conveyance under Art. 1450.
From the evidence adduced, it may be concluded that respondent Valdes, using his own funds,
purchased Pulong Maulap in behalf of the late Nakpil. This is based on the letters to petitioner of
Valdes where he categorically admitted that "[b]oth of these loans, while in my (respondent Valdes)
name, were obtained by Pinggoy (the late Nakpil) for his person, 10 and that the "P75,000.00 initially
advanced for the Moran property still remains unpaid. The letter of Valdes to the City Treasurer of
Baguio made while remitting payment of real estate taxes is also enlightening. It provided therein that
the payment being tendered was "[o]n behalf" of the Nakpil's, which is an express recognition of the
implied trust.
Implied trusts, which may either be resulting or constructive, are those which, without being express,
are deducible from the nature of the transaction as matters of intent, or which are superinduced on the
transaction by operation of law as matter of equity, independently of the particular intention of the
parties.
Article 1450 presupposes a situation where a person, using his own funds, purchases a certain piece of
land in behalf of another who, in the meantime, may not have sufficient funds to purchase the land. The
property is then transferred in the name of the trustee, the person who paid for the land, until he is
reimbursed by the beneficiary, the person for whom the land is purchased. It is only after the
beneficiary reimburses the trustee of the purchase price that the former can compel conveyance of the
 denied the existence of any trust purchased property from the latter.
agreement over Pulong Maulap. He
averred that he bought the summer The period within which to compel conveyance of Pulong Maulap is not imprescriptible. The rule is well-
residence for himself with his own funds settled that an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescibes in ten (10)
and without any participation of the late years. But, in the case before us, petitioner could still compel conveyance of the disputed property from
Nakpil; neither was it bought in trust for the respondent provided the former reimburses the latter for all his expenses. After all, Valdes never
latter. Valdes claims that he only informed repudiated the constructive trust during the lifetime of the late Jose Nakpil. On the contrary, he
Pinggoy Nakpil of the acquisition of Pulong expressly recognized it. The prescriptive period therefore did not begin to run until after he repudiated
Maulap, and Pinggoy merely showed the trust.
interest in buying the property if he could
have the money. Meanwhile, considering
their avowed friendship, he (Valdes)
offered the usufruct of the property to the
Nakpils who in turn agreed to shoulder its
maintenance expenses, real estate taxes,
fire insurance premiums and servicing of
interest on the mortgage obligation
constituted on the property.

From the records it appears that the

Valdeses bought Pulong Maulap for
P150,000.00 with respondent Valdes giving
a downpayment of P50,000.00 and
assuming the vendors' mortgage obligation
of P100,000.00 with the Philippine National
Bank (PNB), which he reduced to
P75,000.00 by paying P25,000.00. On 12
July 1965, a deed of sale was executed
and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 10247
was thereafter issued in the name of
Valdes. As agreed, in the early part of May
1965, even before the execution of the
deed of sale in favor of the Valdeses, the
Nakpils moved in and stayed a Pulong
Maulap even until after Pinggoy's death.
Lopez v. CA Juliana owns parcels of land. She executed There is constructive trust.
a notarial will whereby she expressed that
she wished to constitute a trust fund for her On the premise that the disputed properties were the paraphernal properties of Juliana which should
paraphernal properties to be administered have been included in the Fideicomiso, their registration in the name of Jose would be erroneous and
by her husband. If her husband were to die Jose’s possession would be that of a trustee in an implied trust. Implied trusts are those which, without
or renounce the obligation, her nephew, being expressed, are deducible from the nature of the transaction as matters of intent or which are
Enrique Lopez, was to become superinduced on the transaction by operation of law as matters of equity, independently of the
administrator and executor. particular intention of the parties.

2/3 of the income from rentals over these
properties were to answer for the education
of deserving but needy honor students,
while 1/3 was to shoulder the expenses
and fees of the administrator. As to her
conjugal properties, Juliana bequeathed
the portion that she could legally dispose to
her husband, and after his death, said
A resulting trust is presumed to have been contemplated by the parties, the intention as to which is to
be found in the nature of their transaction but not expressed in the deed itself. It is based on the
equitable doctrine that valuable consideration and not legal title determines the equitable title or interest
and are presumed always to have been contemplated by the parties. They arise from the nature of
circumstances of the consideration involved in a transaction whereby one person thereby becomes
invested with legal title but is obligated in equity to hold his legal title for the benefit of another. (Art.
1448, 1449, 1451, 1452, and 1453)
 properties were to pass to her great
grandchildren.
Juliana initiated the probate of her will five
(5) days after its execution, but she died on
12 August 1968, before the petition for
probate could be heard.
Jose then proceeded to offer a project of
partition which was approved. The
properties which Jose had alleged as
registered in his and Juliana’s names,
including the disputed lots, were
adjudicated to Jose as heir, subject to the
condition that Jose would settle the
obligations charged on these properties.
Jose died on 22 July 1980, leaving a
holographic will disposing of the disputed
properties to respondents.
An action for reconveyance was filed
alleging that Jose was able to register in
his name the disputed properties, which
were the paraphernal properties of Juliana,
either during their conjugal union or in the
course of the performance of his duties as
executor of the testate estate of Juliana
and that upon the death of Jose, the
disputed properties were included in the
inventory as if they formed part of Jose’s
estate when in fact Jose was holding them
only in trust for the trust estate of Juliana.
Cabacungan v. Laigo Margarita Cabacungan owned a parcel of
land. Sometime in 1968, her son, Roberrto,
applied for visa to US and to support the
application, he asked Margarita to transfer
the tax declarations in his name. Hence,
unknown to the other children, Margarita
executed an Affidavit of Transfer of Real
Property whereby the subject properties
were transferred by donation to her son,
Roberto. Roberto adopted respondents
(Laigo).
At Roberto’s wake, Margarita found out that
the land was sold. Hence, she instituted a
complaint for annulment of sales and for
recovery of ownership and possession.
On the other hand, constructive trusts are created by the construction of equity in order to satisfy the
demands of justice and prevent unjust enrichment. They arise contrary to intention against one who, by
fraud, duress or abuse of confidence, obtains or holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in
equity and good conscience, to hold. A constructive trust is created, not by any word evincing a direct
intention to create a trust, but by operation of law in order to satisfy the demands of justice and to
prevent unjust enrichment. It is raised by equity in respect of property, which has been acquired by
fraud, or where although acquired originally without fraud, it is against equity that it should be retained
by the person holding it. (Art. 1450, 1454, 1455, and 1456)
The registration of the disputed properties in the name of Jose was actually pursuant to a court
order. The apparent mistake in the adjudication of the disputed properties to Jose created a
mere implied trust of the constructive variety in favor of the beneficiaries of the Fideicomiso.
The right to seek reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust is not absolute. It is subject
to extinctive prescription. An action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust prescribes
in 10 years. This period is reckoned from the date of the issuance of the original certificate of title or
transfer certificate of title. Since such issuance operates as a constructive notice to the whole world,
the discovery of the fraud is deemed to have taken place at that time.
In the instant case, the ten-year prescriptive period to recover the disputed property must be counted
from its registration in the name of Jose on 15 September 1969, when petitioner was charged with
constructive notice that Jose adjudicated the disputed properties to himself as the sole heir of Juana
and not as trustee of the Fideicomiso.
It should be pointed out also that Jose had already indicated at the outset that the disputed properties
did not form part of the Fideicomiso contrary to petitioner’s claim that no overt acts of repudiation may
be attributed to Jose. It may not be amiss to state that in the project of partition submitted to the
probate court, Jose had indicated that the disputed properties were conjugal in nature and, thus,
excluded from Juliana’s Fideicomiso. This act is clearly tantamount to repudiating the trust, at which
point the period for prescription is reckoned.
In any case, the rule that a trustee cannot acquire by prescription ownership over property entrusted to
him until and unless he repudiates the trust applies only to express trusts and resulting implied trusts.
However, in constructive implied trusts, prescription may supervene even if the trustee does
not repudiate the relationship. Necessarily, repudiation of said trust is not a condition precedent
to the running of the prescriptive period
Respondents may be compelled to reconvey the property.
First, fundamental is the rule in land registration law that the issue of whether the buyer of realty is in
good or bad faith is relevant only where the subject of the sale is registered land and the purchase was
made from the registered owner whose title to the land is clean, in which case the purchaser who relies
on the clean title of the registered owner is protected if he is a purchaser in good faith and for value.
Since the properties in question are unregistered lands, respondents purchased the same at their own
peril.
Second, the invocation of the rules on limitation of actions relative to a resulting trust is not on point
because the resulting trust relation between Margarita and Roberto had been extinguished by the
latter’s death. A trust, it is said, terminates upon the death of the trustee, particularly where the trust is
personal to him.
Third, there is a fundamental principle in agency that where certain property entrusted to an agent and
impressed by law with a trust in favor of the principal is wrongfully diverted, such trust follows the

Respondents posit that petitioner’s claim
may never be enforced against them as
they had purchased the properties from
Roberto for value and in good faith. They
also claim that, at any rate, petitioner’s
cause of action has accrued way back in
1968 upon the execution of the Affidavit of
Transfer and, hence, with the 28 long years
that since passed, petitioner’s claim had
long become stale not only on account of
laches, but also under the rules on
extinctive prescription governing a resulting
trust.
Juan v. Yap Caneda spouses mortgaged the 2 parcels
of land to Petitioner Juan, employee and
2011 nephew of Respondent Yap.
Petitioner sought the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the mortgage. Both
Petitioner and respondent participated in
the auction sale but the properties were still
sold to petitioner for tendering the highest
bid. No certificate of sale was issued for
failure to pay the sale’s commission.
property in the hands of a third person and the principal is ordinarily entitled to pursue and recover it so
long as the property can be traced and identified, and no superior equities have intervened. This
principle is actually one of trusts, since the wrongful conversion gives rise to a constructive trust
which pursues the property, its product or proceeds, and permits the beneficiary to recover the property
or obtain damages for the wrongful conversion of the property. Aptly called the “trust pursuit rule,” it
applies when a constructive or resulting trust has once affixed itself to property in a certain state or
form.
Hence, a trust will follow the property – through all changes in its state and form as long as such
property, its products or its proceeds, are capable of identification, even into the hands of a transferee
other than a bona fide purchaser for value, or restitution will be enforced at the election of the
beneficiary through recourse against the trustee or the transferee personally.
Accordingly, the person to whom is made a transfer of trust property constituting a wrongful conversion
of the trust property and a breach of the trust, when not protected as a bona fide purchaser for value, is
himself liable and accountable as a constructive trustee. The liability attaches at the moment of the
transfer of trust property and continues until there is full restoration to the beneficiary. Thus, the
transferee is charged with, and can be held to the performance of the trust, equally with the original
trustee, and he can be compelled to execute a reconveyance.
This scenario is characteristic of a constructive trust imposed by Article 1456 of the Civil Code, which
impresses upon a person obtaining property through mistake or fraud the status of an implied trustee
for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes. Petitioner, in laying claim against
respondents who are concededly transferees who professed having validly derived their ownership
from Roberto, is in effect enforcing against respondents a constructive trust relation that arose by virtue
of the wrongful and fraudulent transfer to them of the subject properties by Roberto.
It is settled that an action for reconveyance based on a constructive implied trust prescribes in 10 years
likewise in accordance with Article 1144 of the Civil Code. Yet not like in the case of a resulting implied
trust and an express trust, prescription supervenes in a constructive implied trust even if the trustee
does not repudiate the relationship. In other words, repudiation of said trust is not a condition
precedent to the running of the prescriptive period.
an action for reconveyance under a constructive implied trust in accordance with Article 1456 does not
prescribe unless and until the land is registered or the instrument affecting the same is inscribed in
accordance with law, inasmuch as it is what binds the land and operates constructive notice to the
world. In the present case, however, the lands involved are concededly unregistered lands; hence,
there is no way by which Margarita, during her lifetime, could be notified of the furtive and fraudulent
sales made in 1992 by Roberto in favor of respondents, except by actual notice from Pedro himself in
August 1995. Hence, it is from that date that prescription began to toll. The filing of the complaint in
February 1996 is well within the prescriptive period.
Petitioner presented the mortgage contract while Respondent presented parol evidence. Court favored
the Respondent and ruled that petitioner holds title over the mortgaged properties only because
respondent allowed him to do so.
In the first place, the Cañeda spouses acknowledged respondent as the lender from whom they
borrowed the funds secured by the Contract. They did so in the MOA. Secondly, Solon, the notary
public who drew up and notarized the Contract, testified that he placed petitioner’s name in the
Contract as the mortgagor upon the instruction of respondent. Respondent himself explained that he
found this arrangement convenient because at the time of the Contract’s execution, he was mostly
abroad and could not personally attend to his businesses in the country. Lastly, it was respondent, not
petitioner, who shouldered the payment of the foreclosure expenses.
 Caneda spouses then executed a MOA
wherein they acknowledge that the real
mortgagee-creditor is Respondent while
Petitioner is merely a trustee. In the said
MOA, it is stated that Respondent allows
the spouses to redeem the property.
SPECIAL CONTRACTS
SALES
1. Essential Requisites
Sanchez v. Mapalad Mapalad Realty Corporation was registered
Realty owner of parcels of land along Roxas
Boulevard. Shortly after the EDSA
2007 Revolution, Campos held MRC in trust for
former President Marcos. Campos then
turned over all the assets pertaining to
MRC to President Aquino. PCGG issued
writs of sequestration for MRC and all its
properties.
When an inventory of assets was made, it
was found that 4 TCTS were missing. Upon
investigation, it was discovered that
General Manager Manalili took it. The
Register of Deeds was notified but the titles
were already transferred to Nordelak by
virtue of a deed of sale. The deed was
signed by Magsaysay (previous owner of
Mapalad who sold all his shares to Novo
Properties) as president and chairman of
the board. Magsaysay denied signing the
deeds.
An action for annulment of deed of sale
and reconveyance was filed.
An implied trust arising from mortgage contracts is not among the trust relationships the Civil Code
enumerates. The Code itself provides, however, that such listing "does not exclude others established
by the general law on trust x x x." Under the general principles on trust, equity converts the holder of
property right as trustee for the benefit of another if the circumstances of its acquisition makes the
holder ineligible "in x x x good conscience [to] hold and enjoy [it]." As implied trusts are remedies
against unjust enrichment, the "only problem of great importance in the field of constructive trusts is
whether in the numerous and varying factual situations presented x x x there is a wrongful holding of
property and hence, a threatened unjust enrichment of the defendant."
Applying these principles, this Court recognized unconventional implied trusts in contracts involving the
purchase of housing units by officers of tenants’ associations in breach of their obligations, the
partitioning of realty contrary to the terms of a compromise agreement,19 and the execution of a sales
contract indicating a buyer distinct from the provider of the purchase money. In all these cases, the
formal holders of title were deemed trustees obliged to transfer title to the beneficiaries in whose favor
the trusts were deemed created. We see no reason to bar the recognition of the same obligation in a
mortgage contract meeting the standards for the creation of an implied trust.
There is lack of consent and consideration.
By the contract of sale, one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer ownership of and to
deliver a determinate thing and the other party to pay therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent.
The essential requisites of a valid contract of sale are:
(1) Consent of the contracting parties by virtue of which the vendor obligates himself to transfer
ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the vendee obligates himself to pay therefor a
price certain in money or its equivalent.
(2) Object certain which is the subject matter of the contract. The object must be licit and at the same
time determinate or, at least, capable of being made determinate without the necessity of a new or
further agreement between the parties.
(3) Cause of the obligation which is established. The cause as far as the vendor is concerned is the
acquisition of the price certain in money or its equivalent, which the cause as far as the vendee is
concerned is the acquisition of the thing which is the object of the contract.
As to CONSENT: lack of consent makes the contract annullable
Contracts of sale are perfected by mere consent, which is manifested by the meeting of the offer and
the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the contract.28
Consent may be given only by a person with the legal capacity to give consent. In the case of juridical
persons such as corporations like Mapalad, consent may only be granted through its officers who have
been duly authorized by its board of directors.
In the present case, consent was purportedly given by Miguel Magsaysay, the person who signed for
and in behalf of Mapalad in the deed of absolute sale dated November 2, 1989. However, as he
categorically stated on the witness stand during trial, he was no longer connected with Mapalad on the
said date because he already divested all his interests in said corporation as early as 1982. Even
assuming, for the sake of argument, that the signatures purporting to be his were genuine, it would still

Hernandez-Nievera PMRDC entered, through its President
v. Hernandez (Villamor), into various agreements with
HIGC and Landbank in connection with a
2011 housing project, Isabel homes.
In its Asset Pool Formation Agreement,
PMRDC conveyed to HIGC the constituent
assets of the 2 projects whereas Landbank
agreed to act as trustee of the resulting
Asset Pool.
PMRDC entered into MOA where it was
given the option to buy parcels of land. One
of the owners, Demetrio Hernandez, under
authority of a SPA to sell or mortgage,
signed the MOA in behalf of the other
sellers.
Later on, PMRDC needed additional
properties to convey to augment the value
of the Asset Pool. Hence, it again entered
with Landbank and Demetrio who was
purportedly acting under the same SPA as
in the MOA, into a Deed of Assignment and
Conveyance (DAC)
Petitioners demanded the return of the
properties and allege that Demetrio could
not have entered into the said agreement
as his power of attorney was limited only to
selling or mortgaging the properties and not
conveying the same to the Asset Pool.
Petitioners also stand against the validity of
the DAC on the ground that the signature
of Demetrio therein was spurious.
be voidable for lack of authority resulting in his incapacity to give consent for and in behalf of the
corporation.
As to CONSIDERATION: Lack of consideration makes the contract void ab initio
There was no payment effected by Nordelak for this transaction. Josef testified that no funds were
infused into Mapalad’s coffers on account of this transaction. This testimony remained uncontroverted.
In fact, the CA further noted that Nordelak could have easily produced the cancelled check before the
trial court, if there was any. Again, Nordelak did not.
As to the signature:
Firmly settled is the jurisprudential rule that forgery cannot be presumed from a mere allegation but
rather must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence by the party alleging the same. The
burden to prove the allegation of forgery in this case has not been conclusively discharged by
petitioners.
First, nothing in the records supports the allegation except only perhaps Demetrio’s explicit self-serving
disavowal of his signature in open court.
Second, while in fact Demetrio at the trial of the case had committed to have the subject signature
examined by an expert, nevertheless, the trial had terminated without the results of the examination
being submitted in evidence.
Third, the claim of forgery, unsubstantiated as it is, becomes even more unremarkable in light of the
fact that the DAC involved in this case is a notarized deed guaranteed by public attestation in
accordance with law, such that the execution thereof enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in the
absence of compelling proof to the contrary.
As to the Authority:
Paragraph 5 of the MOA:
5. THAT, the VENDOR at the request of the VENDEE shall agree to convey the parcels of land to any
bank or financial institution by way of mortgage or to a Trustee by way of a Trust Agreement at any
time from the date of this instrument, PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that the VENDOR is not liable for any
mortgage or loans or obligations that will be incurred by way of mortgage of Trust Agreement that the
VENDEE might enter into;
SPA:
1. To sell and/or mortgage in favor of any person, corporation, partnership, private banking or financial
institution, government or semi-government banking or financial institution for such price or amount and
under such terms and conditions as our aforesaid attorney-in-fact may deem just and proper, parcels of
land more particularly described as follows:
xxx
2. To carry out the authority aforestated, to sign, execute and deliver such deeds, instruments and
other papers that may be required or necessary;
3. To further attain the authority herein given, to do and perform such acts and things that may be
necessary or incidental to fully carry out the authority herein granted.
What petitioners miss, however, is that the power conferred on Demetrio to sell “for such price or
amount” is broad enough to cover the exchange contemplated in the DAC between the properties and
the corresponding corporate shares in PMRDC, with the latter replacing the cash equivalent of the
option money initially agreed to be paid by PMRDC under the MOA.
Thus, it becomes clear that Demetrio’s special power of attorney to sell is sufficient to enable him to
make a binding commitment under the DAC in behalf of Carolina and Margarita. In particular, it does
include the authority to extinguish PMRDC’s obligation under the MOA to deliver option money and
agree to a more flexible term by agreeing instead to receive shares of stock in lieu thereof and in

2. Voidable Title
3. Double Sales
De Leon v. Ong De Leon sold 3 parcels of land to Ong. As
the properties were mortgaged to Real
2011 Savings and Loan Association Incorporated
(RSLAI), De Leon and Ong executed a
notarized deed of absolute sale with
assumption of mortgage.
Pursuant to this deed, respondent gave
petitioner P415,500 as partial payment.
Petitioner, on the other hand, handed the
keys to the properties and wrote a letter
informing RSLAI of the sale and authorizing
it to accept payment from respondent and
release the certificates of title.
However, De Leon again sold the
properties to Viloria. Ong thus proceeded
to RSLAI but was informed that De Leon
already paid the amount due and had taken
back the certificates of title.
Ong filed a complaint for specific
performance, declaration of nullity of the 2nd
sale and damages agains De Leon and
Viloria.
Roman Catholic The Church, represented by the
Church v. Pante Archbishop of Caceres, owned a 32-square
meter lot that measured 2x16 meters
located in Camarines Sur, over which it
entered into a contract of Sale with Pante,
believing it was the actual occupant of the
lot. When the Church subsequently sold
consideration of the assignment and conveyance of the properties to the Asset Pool. Indeed, the terms
of his special power of attorney allow much leeway to accommodate not only the terms of the MOA but
also those of the subsequent agreement in the DAC which, in this case, necessarily and consequently
has resulted in a novation of PMRDC’s integral obligations.
This case involves double sale.
Petitioner sold the same properties to two buyers, first to respondent and then to Viloria on two
separate occasions. However, the second sale was not void for the sole reason that petitioner had
previously sold the same properties to respondent.
Article 1544 of the Civil Code provides:
Article 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be
transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be
movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in
good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was
first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title,
provided there is good faith. (emphasis supplied)
This provision clearly states that the rules on double or multiple sales apply only to purchasers in good
faith. Needless to say, it disqualifies any purchaser in bad faith.
A purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other
person has a right to, or an interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the same at the
time of such purchase, or before he has notice of some other person’s claim or interest in the property.
The law requires, on the part of the buyer, lack of notice of a defect in the title of the seller and payment
in full of the fair price at the time of the sale or prior to having notice of any defect in the seller’s title.
In this case, Ong is a purchaser in good faith. Respondent purchased the properties, knowing they
were encumbered only by the mortgage to RSLAI. According to her agreement with petitioner,
respondent had the obligation to assume the balance of petitioner’s outstanding obligation to RSLAI.
Consequently, respondent informed RSLAI of the sale and of her assumption of petitioner’s obligation.
However, because petitioner surreptitiously paid his outstanding obligation and took back her
certificates of title, petitioner himself rendered respondent’s obligation to assume petitioner’s
indebtedness to RSLAI impossible to perform.
Respondent was not aware of any interest in or a claim on the properties other than the mortgage to
RSLAI which she undertook to assume. Moreover, Viloria bought the properties from petitioner after the
latter sold them to respondent. Respondent was therefore a purchaser in good faith. Hence, the rules
on double sale are applicable.
The sale of the lot to Pante and later to the spouses Rubi resulted in a double sale that called for
the application of the rules in Article 1544 of the Civil Code. As neither Pante nor the spouses Rubi
registered the sale in their favor, the question now is who, between the two, was first in possession of
the property in good faith.
Jurisprudence has interpreted possession in Article 1544 of the Civil Code to mean both actual
physical delivery and constructive delivery. Under either mode of delivery, the facts show that Pante
was the first to acquire possession of the lot. Actual delivery of a thing sold occurs when it is placed
 the lot to spouses Rubi including the lot
sold to Pante, Pante sought to annul the
sale. The Church asserted that its consent
to the sale to Pante was obtained by fraud
when the latter misrepresented that the lot
was occupied by him when in fact he was
merely using it as a passageway. The RTC
found for the Church, holding that Pante’s
delay in payment was fatal to his cause (he
consigned the payment three years later,
after the sale to Rubi). The CA reversed,
holding that the contract between Pante
and the Church was a sale because it was
made without any reservation of ownership
until full payment of the price.
under the control and possession of the vendee. Pante’s use of the lot as a passageway after the 1992
sale in his favor was a clear assertion of his right of ownership that preceded the spouses Rubi’s claim
of ownership. Under CC 1498 on constructive delivery, the sale in favor of Pante would have to be
upheld since the contract executed between the Church and Pante was duly notarized, converting the
deed into a public instrument.
Duty of buyer. “[A] buyer of real property in the possession of persons other than the seller must be
wary and should investigate the rights of those in possession. Without such inquiry, the buyer can
hardly be regarded as a buyer in good faith and cannot have any right over the property." The Rubis
should have seen that there were pipes and electric connections made by Pante.
No misrepresentation. Given the size of the lot, it could serve no other purpose than as a mere
passageway; it is unthinkable to consider that a 2x16-meter strip of land could be mistaken as anyone’s
residence.
Article 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be
transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be
movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good
faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was
first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title,
provided there is good faith..
Petition denied.

4. Sale of Movables
Tanjanglangit v. Amador Tajanlangit and his wife Angeles bought two tractors
Southern Motors and a thresher from Southern Motors Inc. They then executed a
promissory note, in favor of such debt (24,755.75php). The note
provides that failure to pay interest of any installment, the debt
shall be demandable. When they failed to pay such debt, an
action to recover the amount of the promissory note was filed
against them by Southern Motors, wherein they were defaulted,
so the court entered judgment in favor of Southern Motors. The
sheriff levied the machineries and sold them in public auction
which the Southern Motors itself was the highest bidder, for
10,000php. When an alias writ of execution was filed by
Southern Motors, the sheriff levied other properties belonging to
the Tajanlangits. In lieu of this, the Tajanlangits instituted an
action to annul the alias writ of execution on the view that, they
have returned such machines to Southern Motors, therefore
they have accepted their offer for settlement of their accounts,
and that the repossession of the machines purchased by
installment relieves them from liability.
Whether or not the Southern Motors is prohibited to attach and
sell the attached real properties of the tajanlangits because the
return of the machines purchased and the sale of which
extinguish their liability
Filinvest v. Phil. Philippine Acetylene Co. purchased from Alexander Lim a motor
Acetylene vehicle described as Chevorlet 1969 model for P55K to be paid
in instalments. As security for the payment of said promissory
Art. 1484 applies in this present case. The court held that all the 3 remedies
stated in the provision are available as a remedy for Southern Motors. In Art.
1484 it was provided that, In a contract of sale of personal property the price of
which is payable in installments, the vendor may exercise of the following
remedies:
(1) Exact fulfillment of the obligation, should the vendee fail to pay;
(2) Cancel the sale, should the vendee's failure to pay cover two or more
installments;
(3) Foreclose the chattel mortgage on the thing sold, if one has been
constituted, should the vendee's failure to pay cover two or more installments.
In this case, he shall have no further action against the purchaser to recover
any unpaid balance of the price. Any agreement to the contrary shall be void.
Southern Motors opted to avail of the exact fulfillment of the obligation to pay,
as it filed an action to recover the amount stipulated in the promissory note,
thus it is therefore not limited to the proceeds of the sale on the execution of the
mortgaged good. On their second argument that the machines were duly
returned by them, and accepted by Southern Motors, therefore the conditional
sale is ipso facto cancelled. This is argument has no merit. The sheriff argues
on this matter that such goods were deposited in its shop when the sheriff
attached them in pursuance to the execution of judgment. It would also run
counter to the decision of the court in the earlier civil case, which would say that
the Tajanlangit did not owe anything from the Southern Motors, which is not the
case. The court dismissed the case, in favor of the Southern Motors
Corporation.
The mere return of the mortgaged motor vehicle by the mortgagor does
not constitute dation in payment in the absence, express or implied of the
true intention of the parties. Dacion en pago is the transmission of the
 note, the appellant executed a chattel mortgage over the same
motor vehicle in favor of said Alexander Lim. Then, Lim
assigned to the Filinvest all his rights, title, and interests in the
promissory note and chattel mortgage by virtue of a Deed of
Assignment. Phil Acetylene defaulted in the payment of nine
successive installments. Filinvest sent a demand letter.
Replying thereto, Phil Acetylene wrote back of its desire to
return the mortgaged property, which return shall be in full
satisfaction of its indebtedness. So the vehicle was returned to
the Filinvest together with the document “Voluntary Surrender
with Special Power of Attorney To Sell.” Filinvest offered to
deliver back the motor vehicle to the appellant but the latter
refused to accept it, so appellee instituted an action for
collection of a sum of money with damages.
WON there was dation in payment that extinguished Phil
Acetylene’s obligation? NO.
De La Cruz v. Asian The spouses Romulo and Delia de la Cruz and one Daniel
Consumer Fajardo bought on installment a Hino truck from Benter Motor
Sales Corporation, to secure which they executed a promissory
note and chattel mortgage over the truck in favor of Benter.
Benter then assigned its rights to the promissory note and the
chattel mortgage to Asian Consumer and Industrial Finance
Corporation. The de la Cruzes and Fajardo failed to pay more
than 2 installments and still failed to settle the obligation despite
a demand letter from Asian Consumer.
Asian Consumer caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
chattel mortgage, but the sheriff failed to possess the truck
because of the refusal of Rolando, son of the spouses de la
Cruz, to surrender the same. Romulo de la Cruz brought the
truck to Asian Consumer where it was inventoried and
inspected.
Is Asian Consumer already barred from exercising other
remedies under Article 1484 of the Civil Code after it has
initiated extrajudicial foreclosure? NO.
ownership of a thing by the debtor to the creditor as an accepted equivalent of
the performance of obligation. In dacion, the debtor offers another thing to the
creditor who accepts it as equivalent of payment of an outstanding debt. The
undertaking really partakes in one sense of the nature of sale, that is, the
creditor is really buying the thing or property of the debtor, payment for which is
to be charged against the debtor’s debt. As such, the essential elements of a
contract of sale, namely, consent, object certain, and cause or consideration
must be present. In its modern concept, what actually takes place in dacion en
pago is an objective novation of the obligation where the thing offered as an
accepted equivalent of the performance of an obligation is considered as the
object of the contract of sale, while the debt is considered as the purchase
price. In any case, common consent is an essential prerequisite, be it sale or
innovation to have the effect of totally extinguishing the debt or obligation.
In this case no actual foreclosure occurred in view of Rolando de la
Cruz’s refusal to surrender the possession of the truck to Asian
Consumer. The records show that on 14 September 1984 ASIAN initiated a
petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the chattel mortgage. But the sheriff failed
to recover the motor vehicle from the spouses de la Cruz due to the refusal of
their son to surrender it. It was not until 10 October 1984, or almost a month
later that the de la Cruzes delivered the unit to Asian Consumer. The action to
recover the balance of the purchase price was instituted on 27 November 1984.
It is thus clear that while Asian Consumer eventually succeeded in taking
possession of the mortgaged vehicle, it did not pursue the foreclosure of the
mortgage as shown by the fact that no auction sale of the vehicle was ever
conducted. Consequently, there being no actual foreclosure of the mortgaged
property, Asian Consumer is correct in resorting to an ordinary action for
collection of the unpaid balance of the purchase price.

5. Option to Buy/Sell
Sanchez v. Rigos An option to Purchase agreement was entered into by
Rigos and Sanchez. Rigos agreed, promised and
committed to sell to Sanchez for 1,510 a parcel of land
in Nueva Ecija within 2years from the date of the
agreement (failure to comply with the conditions will
automatically terminate the offer). Sanchez was able to
make several payments amounting to 1,510 within the
2 year period but Rigos refused to execute the contract
RTC: Rigos was ordered to enforce the contract
Rigos: there is no valid contract of sale for there is no
valuable consideration but only a unilateral promise to
sell Article 1479 and not 1324 is the controlling doctrine
since the case is about sale1479 states that a promise
must be supported by a consideration distinct from
price Sanchez was never able to establish the
Yes. If an option is given without a consideration, it is a mere offer of a contract of
sale which is not binding until accepted. If however, acceptance is made before a
withdrawal, it constitutes a binding contract of sale even though the option was not
supported by a sufficient consideration. the concurrence of the offer and the acceptance
generates a contract of sale
Provision of the same law must be reconciles. Article 1324 - general principles on contract
- is modified by Article 1479 - on sales - which makes the latter the exception to the
former. According to statutory construction, exceptions are not favored unless the intention
to the contrary is clear.
(1) Article 1354 applies to contracts in general, whereas the second paragraph of Article
1479 refers to sales in particular, and, more specifically, to an accepted unilateral promise
to buy or to sell. In other words, Article 1479 is controlling in the case at bar.
(2) In order that said unilateral promise may be binding upon the promissor, Article 1479
requires the concurrence of a condition, namely, that the promise be supported by a
consideration distinct from the price.
 existence of a valuable consideration.
W/N there is a valid contract of sale
Eulogio v. Apeles The spouses Apeles leased the property, a house and
lot situated in Quezon City, to Enrico Eulogio after his
father's death and he succeeded as lessor of the said
property. Eulogio and the spouses Apeles later entered
into a Contract of Lease with Option to Purchase which
afforded Eulogio the option of purchasing the property
for a price not exceeding P1.5 million, on or before the
expiration of the 3 year lease period. Before the
expiration of the lease Eulogio tried to purchase the
property by communicating with Apeles but the
spouses ignored him. Eugolio then filed an action which
is founded on the contract allowing him to acquire
ownership of the property after paying the agreed
amount.
ISSUE: Whether or not Eugolio has the right to acquire
ownership of the property.
Tuazon v. del Respondent was the owner of a parcel of land.
Rosario-Suarez Petitioner and Lourdes executed a Contract of Lease
over the abovementioned parcel of land for a period of
three years. During the effectivity of the lease, Lourdes
sent a letter to Roberto where she offered to sell to the
latter subject parcel of land. She pegged the price and
gave him two years to decide on the said offer.
Four months after the expiration of the Contract of
Lease, Lourdes sold subject parcel of land to her only
child, Catalina Suarez-De Leon, her son-in-law Wilfredo
De Leon, and her two grandsons, Miguel Luis S. De
Leon and Rommel S. De Leon (the De Leons), for a
total consideration of only P2,750,000.00 as evidenced
by a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by the parties.
TCT No. 1779868 was then issued by the Registry of
Deeds of Quezon City in the name of the De Leons.
The new owners through their attorney-in-fact,
Guillerma S. Silva, notified Roberto to vacate the
premises. Roberto refused hence, the De Leons filed a
complaint for Unlawful Detainer before the MeTC of
Quezon City against him. The MeTC rendered a
Decision ordering Roberto to vacate the property for
non-payment of rentals and expiration of the contract.
Accordingly, the promisee cannot compel the promissor to comply with the promise,
unless the former establishes the existence of said distinct consideration. In other words,
the promisee has the burden of proving such consideration. Plaintiff herein has not even
alleged the existence thereof in his complaint.
No. According to the contract the option is not of itself a purchase but merely
secures a privilege to buy. According to article 1479 of the Civil Code, 'an accepted
unilateral promise to buy or to sell a determinate thing for a price certain is binding upon
the promissor if the promise is supported by a consideration from the price'. In the case of
Eulogio, no consideration was given by him to the spouses for the option of the contract.
An option is a contract by which the owner of the property agrees with another
person that the latter shall have the right to buy the former's property at a fixed
price within a certain time. It is a condition offered or contract by which the owner
stipulates with another that the latter shall have the right to buy the property at a fixed
price within a certain time, or under, or in compliance with certain terms and conditions; or
which gives to the owner of the property the right to sell or demand a sale. An option is not
of itself a purchase, but merely secures the privilege to buy. It is not a sale of property but
a sale of the right to purchase. It is simply a contract by which the owner of the property
agrees with another person that he shall have the right to buy his property at a fixed price
within a certain time. He does not sell his land; he does not then agree to sell it; but he
does sell something, i.e., the right or privilege to buy at the election or option of the other
party. Its distinguishing characteristic is that it imposes no binding obligation on the person
holding the option, aside from the consideration for the offer.
This case involves an option contract and not a contract of a right of first refusal. In
this case, Roberto did not accept the terms stated in the letter of Lourdes as he negotiated
for a much lower price. Therefore not an acceptance of the offer of Lourdes. Roberto,
thus, does not have any right to demand that the property be sold to him at the price for
which it was sold to the De Leons neither does he have the right to demand that said sale
to the De Leons be annulled. It is clear that the letter embodies an option contract as it
grants Roberto a fixed period of only two years to buy the subject property at a price
certain of P37,541,000.00. It being an option contract, the rules applicable are found in
Articles 1324 and 1479 of the Civil Code.
Option contract. ‘An agreement in writing to give a person the ‘option’ to purchase lands
within a given time at a named price is neither a sale nor an agreement to sell. It is simply
a contract by which the owner of property agrees with another person that he shall
have the right to buy his property at a fixed price within a certain time. He does not
sell his land; he does not then agree to sell it; but he does sell something; that is, the right
or privilege to buy at the election or option of the other party. The second party gets in
praesenti, not lands, nor an agreement that he shall have lands, but he does get
something of value; that is, the right to call for and receive lands if he elects. The owner
parts with his right to sell his lands, except to the second party, for a limited period. The
second party receives this right, or rather, from his point of view, he receives the right to
elect to buy.
Right of first refusal. On the other hand, in Ang Yu Asuncion v. CA, an elucidation on the
"right of first refusal" was made thus: In the law on sales, the so-called ‘right of first refusal’
is an innovative juridical relation. Iit cannot be deemed a perfected contract of sale under
Article 1458 of the Civil Code. Neither can the right of first refusal, understood in its normal
concept, per se be brought within the purview of an option under the second paragraph of
Article 1479, aforequoted, or possibly of an offer under Article 1319 of the same Code. An
option or an offer would require, among other things, a clear certainty on both the object
and the cause or consideration of the envisioned contract. In a right of first refusal,
while the object might be made determinate, the exercise of the right, however,

PUP v. Golden In the seventies, NDC had entered tinto two contracts
Horizon of lease with a company called Golden Horizon Realty
(2010) Corporation (GHRC). These each had a term of 10
years, renewable for another 10 upon the consent of
the parties. In addition GHRC was granted an “option”
to purchase the leased property. Before the expiration
of the second lease contract, GHRC sought to exercise
its option to renew the lease and requested priority to
negotiate for the property’s purchase should NDC opt
to sell. NDC did not respond to this request but even
after the expiry of the term kept on accepting the
rentals. GHRC learned that NDC had decided to
secretly dispose of the land which prompted GHR to
take legal action. Meanwhile, then President Aquino
issued a memorandum order ordering the transfer to
the National government of that NDC property. The
National Government in turn transferred the property to
PUP.
The issue is whether the transfer of the property
violated the “option” that had been granted to GHRC.
Archbishop Capalla Pursuant to its authority to use an Automated Election
v. COMELEC System and in accordance with RA No. 9184, otherwise
(2012) known as the Government Procurement Reform Act,
Comelec posted and published an invitation to apply for
eligibility and to bid for the 2010 Poll Automation
Project. It issued Resolution No. 8608 awarding the
contract for the Project to respondent Smartmatic-TIM.
The contract between the Comelec and Smartmatic-
TIM was one of “lease of the AES with option to
purchase (OTP) the goods listed in the contract.”
(Essentially, Smartmatic leased to COMELEC the
PCOS machines that were used in the elections, but if
would be dependent not only on the grantor's eventual intention to enter into a
binding juridical relation with another but also on terms, including the price, that
obviously are yet to be later firmed up. Prior thereto, it can at best be so described as
merely belonging to a class of preparatory juridical relations governed not by contracts
(since the essential elements to establish the vinculum juris would still be indefinite and
inconclusive) but by, among other laws of general application, the pertinent scattered
provisions of the Civil Code on human conduct.
Even on the premise that such right of first refusal has been decreed under a final
judgment, like here, its breach cannot justify correspondingly an issuance of a writ of
execution under a judgment that merely recognizes its existence, nor would it sanction an
action for specific performance without thereby negating the indispensable element of
consensuality in the perfection of contracts. It is not to say that the right of first refusal
would be inconsequential for, such as already intimated above, an unjustified disregard
thereof, given, for instance, the circumstances expressed in Article 19 of the Civil Code,
can warrant a recovery for damages. From the foregoing, it is thus clear that an option
contract is entirely different and distinct from a right of first refusal in that in the
former, the option granted to the offeree is for a fixed period and at a determined
price. Lacking these two essential requisites, what is involved is only a right of first
refusal.
An option is a contract by which the owner of a property agrees with another that the latter
shall have the right to buy the former’s property at a fixed price within a certain time. It
binds the party who has given the option, not to enter into a contract with any other person
during the period designated, and within that period, to enter into such a contract with the
one to whom the option was granted, if the latter decides to use the option. On the other
hand, a right of first refusal is a contractual grant, not of a sale of a property, but of first
priority to buy the property in the event the owner sells the same. As distinguished from an
option contract, in a right of first refusal, while the object might be made determinate, the
exercise of the right of first refusal would eb dependent not only on the owner’s eventual
intention to enter into a transaction with another, but also on terms, including the price,
that are yet to be firmed up. The “option” given to GHRC is obviously a mere right of
first refusal and this is not disputed by the parties. What PUP and NDC assail is the
conclusion that such right of first refusal subsisted even after the expiration of the original
lease period when GHRC was allowed to continue staying in the leased premises under
an implied renewal of lease. They argue that the right of first refusal provision was not
carried over to such month-to-month lease. The court found this position untenable.
Evidence shows that at the time NDC began negotiating for the transfer of the land
to PUP, the right of first refusal was subsisting. Hence, whether or not the right of
first refusal was carried over to the implied lease, is irrelevant.
Whether or not the Commission on Elections may validly accept the extension of
time unilaterally given by Smartmatic-TIM Corporation within which to exercise the
option to purchase under Article 4 of the Contract for the Provision of an
Automated Election System for the May 2010 Synchronized National and Local
Elections. YES. In interpreting contracts, an instrument must be construed so as to give
effect to all the provisions of the contract. The contract must be read and taken as a
whole. While the contract indeed specifically required the Comelec to notify Smartmatic-
TIM of its OTP the subject goods until December 31, 2010, a reading of the other
provisions of the AES contract would show that the parties are given the right to amend
the contract which may include the period within which to exercise the option. There is,
likewise, no prohibition on the extension of the period, provided that the contract is still
effective.
 COMELEC chooses to buy the said machines, the
rental fee will be considered part of the purchase price).
Comelec partially exercised its OTP 920 units of PCOS
machines with corresponding canvassing/consolidation
system (CCS) for the special elections in certain areas
in Mindanao. The period for the OTP was extended and
Comelec issued Resolution No. 9378 resolving to
approve the Deed of Sale between the Comelec and
Smartmatic-TIM to purchase the latter’s PCOS
machines (hardware and software) to be used in the
upcoming May 2013 elections and to authorize
Chairman Brillantes to sign the Deed of Sale for and on
behalf of the Comelec. The Deed of Sale was
executed.
Petitioners assail the validity and constitutionality of the
Comelec Resolutions for the purchase of the subject
PCOS machines as well as the Extension Agreement
and the Deed of Sale covering said goods mainly on
three grounds: (1) the option period provided for in the
AES contract between the Comelec and Smartmatic-
TIM had already lapsed and, thus, could no longer be
extended, such extension being prohibited by the
contract; (2) the extension of the option period and the
exercise of the option without competitive public bidding
contravene the provisions of RA 9184; and, (3) despite
the palpable infirmities and defects of the PCOS
machines, the Comelec purchased the same in
contravention of the standards laid down in RA 9369.
6. Right of First Refusal
Equatorial v. Mayfair Carmelo entered into a lease contract with Mayfair
(November over its properties for a period of 20 years. Both
1996) contracts of lease provide identically worded par. 8,
which reads: “That if the LESSOR should desire to
sell the leased premises, the LESSEE shall be
given 30-days exclusive option to purchase the
same.”
Carmelo wrote Mayfair of its intention to sell the
premises to a certain Jose Araneta for $1,200,000
and Mayfair is willing to buy for 6 or 7M. Mayfair
wrote back and said that they will let Carmelo know
of their decision. One month later, Mayfair sent
another latter stating that they intend to buy not only
the leased premises, but the entire building for
11.3M. Four years later, Carmelo sold its land and
building to Equatorial.
Mayfair instituted an action for specific performance
and annulment of the sale. Carmelo’s defense was
the option contract was ineffective for lack of
consideration. The lower court dismissed the case,
finding that the said option contract lacked
Public Contracts. A winning bidder is not precluded from modifying or amending certain
provisions of the contract bidded upon. However, such changes must not constitute
substantial or material amendments that would alter the basic parameters of the contract
and would constitute a denial to the other bidders of the opportunity to bid on the same
terms. The amendment of the AES contract (on the period within which COMELEC
can exercise the option) is not substantial.
An option is only a preparatory contract and a continuing offer to enter into a
principal contract. Under the set-up, the owner of the property, which is Smartmatic-TIM,
gives the optionee, which is the Comelec, the right to accept the former’s offer to purchase
the goods listed in the contract for a specified amount, and within a specified period. Thus,
the Comelec is given the right to decide whether or not it wants to purchase the subject
goods.
Whether or not the acceptance of the extension and the issuance of Comelec En
Banc Resolution No. 9376 violate Republic Act No. 9184 or the Government
Procurement Reform Act and its Implementing Rules, and Republic Act No. 9369 or
the Automated Election Systems Act. NO. The purpose of public bidding which is to find
the most advantageous terms in favor of the government is accomplished by the extension
of the period for COMELEC to exercise the OTP.
Petitions dismissed. As the Comelec is confronted with time and budget constraints, and
in view of the Comelec’s mandate to ensure free, honest, and credible elections, the
acceptance of the extension of the option period, the exercise of the option, and the
execution of the Deed of Sale, are the more prudent choices available to the Comelec for
a successful 2013 automated elections. Petitioners could not even give a plausible
alternative to ensure the conduct of a successful 2013 automated elections, in the event
that the Court nullifies the Deed of Sale.
The contractual stipulation provides for a right of first refusal in favor of Mayfair. It is
not an option clause or an option contract. It is a contract of a right of first refusal.
As early as 1916, in the case of Beaumont vs. Prieto, unequivocal was our characterization of
an option contract as one necessarily involving the choice granted to another for a distinct and
separate consideration as to whether or not to purchase a determinate thing at a
predetermined fixed price.
The rule so early established in this jurisdiction is that the deed of option or the option clause in
a contract, in order to be valid and enforceable, must, among other things, indicate the definite
price at which the person granting the option, is willing to sell.
Petition denied. Deed of Absolute Sale between Equatorial and Carmelo rescinded. Carmelo
ordered to allow Mayfair to buy the lots at 11.3M.
Justice Vitug dissent: A right of first refusal cannot have the effect of a contract because by its
very essence certain basic terms would have yet to be determined and fixed—the offer must
be certain and acceptance absolute.
 consideration and ordered Mayfair to vacate. The
CA differentiated between CC 1324 and CC 1479,
analyzed their application to the facts of this case,
and concluded that since par. 8 of the lease
contracts does not state a fixed price for the
purchase of the leased premises, which is an
essential element for a contract of sale to be
perfected, what paragraph 8 is, must be a right of
first refusal and not an option contract.
PARANAQUE KINGS Catalina Santos owned 8 parcels of land leased to
ENTERPRISES V. Chua, who assigned its rights thereto to Lee Ching
CA, SANTOS, Bing, who, in turn, assigned said rights to
RAYMUNDO Paranaque Kings Enterprises, which introduced
significant improvements on the premises.
(1997) Paragraph 9 of the lease agreement provides: “9.
That in case the properties subject of the lease
agreement are sold or encumbered, Lessors shall
impose as a condition that the buyer or mortgagee
thereof shall recognize and be bound by all the
terms and conditions of this lease agreement and
shall respect this Contract of Lease as if they are
the LESSORS thereof and in case of sale, LESSEE
shall have the first option or priority to buy the
properties subject of the lease;”
Catalina, in violation of the said stipulation, sold the
lot to Raymundo for P5M. Paranaque Kings notified
her of the said breach, and she immediately had the
lots reconveyed. She then offered the lot to
Paranaque Kings for P15M; but the latter refused
claiming that the offer was “ridiculous.”Catalina
thereafter sold it again to Raymundo for P9M.
Whether or not the right of first refusal is a valid cause of action
YES. A careful examination of the complaint reveals that it sufficiently alleges an actionable
contractual breach on the part of private respondents. Under paragraph 9 of the contract of
lease between respondent Santos and petitioner, the latter was granted the “first option or
priority” to purchase the leased properties in case Santos decided to sell. If Santos never
decided to sell at all, there can never be a breach, much less an enforcement of such “right.”
But on September 21, 1988, Santos sold said properties to Respondent Raymundo without
first offering these to petitioner. Santos indeed realized her error, since she repurchased the
properties after petitioner complained. Thereafter, she offered to sell the properties to
petitioner for P15 million, which petitioner, however, rejected because of the “ridiculous” price.
But Santos again appeared to have violated the same provision of the lease contract when she
finally resold the properties to respondent Raymundo for only P9 million without first offering
them to petitioner at such price. Whether there was actual breach which entitled petitioner to
damages and/or other just or equitable relief, is a question which can better be resolved after
trial on the merits where each party can present evidence to prove their respective allegations
and defenses.
The basis of the right of the first refusal must be the current offer to sell of the seller or offer to
purchase of any prospective buyer. Only after the grantee fails to exercise its right of first
priority under the same terms and within the period contemplated, could the owner validly offer
to sell the property to a third person, again, under the same terms as offered to the grantee.

7. Earnest Money
SPOUSES CIFRA V. Petitioner spouses, thru their attorney-in-
CA, CHUA fact Catalan, entered into an agreement
denominated “Earnest Money” with
(1991) respondent Chua.
A reading of the subject contract which the
parties labeled as "Earnest money" shows
that it is an agreement to sell the real
property described therein for the amount
of P1.1 M with assumption of the
P40,000.00 mortgage, by which P5,000.00
was paid upon signing of the agreement by
private respondent to petitioner as earnest
money, which is part of the consideration.
The balance of the consideration shall be
paid upon the removal of the tenant or
occupant from the premises and upon the
execution of the deed of absolute sale.
In the addendum to the agreement it is
The provisions of Articles 1370 to 1375 of the Civil Code on the interpretation of contracts are squarely
applicable to this case.
The agreement presents the literal and clear agreement of the parties. From their contemporaneous
and subsequent acts it also appears that the proceeds of the sale of the property by petitioners were
intended to apply to a proposed business venture of petitioners abroad. As said proposed business did
not prosper and the tenants/occupants of the premises have not yet vacated the premises, petitioners
decided to rescind the contract of sale in accordance with the agreement.
Under the addendum to the same agreement, both parties are given the freedom to back out of the
transaction provided that, in the case of the seller, he must return the earnest money in addition to
being liable to the buyer for P20,000.00, plus attorney's fees and other costs in case of litigation; and in
case of the buyer, the earnest money is forfeited, and he is liable to pay the seller P20,000.00 in
damages plus attorneys fees and other costs in case of litigation to the seller. This right which is
afforded to both parties may be availed of by them, irrespective of whether or not the occupant of the
premises had vacated the same. This stipulation is the law between the parties.
Consequently, the action for specific performance must fail. For the rescission of the contract,
petitioners must return the P5,000.00 earnest money and pay P20,000.00 to the private respondent.
However, they are not liable for attorneys fees, for it was private respondent who brought the case to
court as a result of which petitioners unnecessarily incurred expenses of litigation.
 stipulated that in case the buyer fails to
purchase the property after the seller
formally notified him of the surrender of the
premises by the tenant or occupant, in
addition to the forfeiture of the earnest
money, the buyer must pay the seller
P20,000.00 plus attorney's fees and other
costs in case of litigation. On the other
hand, if the seller does not make good his
promise to sell the property even after the
present tenant shall have surrendered the
premises, the seller binds himself to return
the earnest money and in addition pay the
buyer P20,000.00 plus the attorney's fees
and other costs in case of litigation.
SPOUSES SERRANO Petitioner spouses are the registered The SC held that the parties entered into a contract to sell, not a contract of sale.
V. CAGUIAT owners of a lot located in Las Piñas.
Respondent Caguiat offered to buy the lot. In holding that there is a perfected contract of sale, both the RTC and the CA mainly relied on the
(2007) The spouses agreed to sell it at P1,500.00 earnest money given by respondent to petitioners. They invoked Article 1482 of the Civil Code which
per square meter. Caguiat then gave the provides that "Whenever earnest money is given in a contract of sale, it shall be considered as part of
spouses P100,000.00 as partial payment. the price and as proof of the perfection of the contract."
In turn, the spouses gave Caguiat a receipt
stating that Caguiat promised to pay the San Miguel Properties Philippines, Inc. v. Spouses Huang: Stages of a contract of sale: (1) negotiation,
balance of the purchase price on or before covering the period from the time the prospective contracting parties indicate interest in the contract to
March 23, 1990. Subsequently, the the time the contract is perfected; (2) perfection, which takes place upon the concurrence of the
spouses sent a letter to Caguiat stating that essential elements of the sale, which is the meeting of the minds of the parties as to the object of the
they are canceling the transaction and that contract and upon the price; and (3) consummation, which begins when the parties perform their
Caguiat can recover the earnest money of respective undertakings under the contract of sale, culminating in the extinguishment thereof.
P100,000.00 anytime. Thereafter, the
spouses wrote Caguiat stating that they A contract to sell is akin to a conditional sale where the efficacy or obligatory force of the vendor's
delivered to his counsel a check in the obligation to transfer title is subordinated to the happening of a future and uncertain event, so that if the
amount of P100,000 payable to him. In suspensive condition does not take place, the parties would stand as if the conditional obligation had
view of the cancellation of the contract, never existed. The suspensive condition is commonly full payment of the purchase price. In other
Caguiat filed with the RTC Makati a words, in a contract to sell, ownership is retained by the seller and is not to pass to the buyer until full
complaint against the spouses for specific payment of the price.
performance and damages. The RTC ruled
that there was a perfected contract of sale In this case, the "Receipt for Partial Payment" shows that the true agreement between the parties is a
between the parties and ordered the contract to sell.
spouses to execute a final deed of sale. First, ownership over the property was retained by petitioners and was not to pass to respondent until
full payment of the purchase price. Thus, petitioners need not push through with the sale should
Issue: Whether the document entitled respondent fail to remit the balance of the purchase price before the deadline on March 23, 1990. In
"Receipt for Partial Payment" signed by effect, petitioners have the right to rescind unilaterally the contract the moment respondent fails to pay
both parties is a contract to sell or a within the fixed period.
contract of sale.
Second, the agreement between the parties was not embodied in a deed of sale. The absence of a
formal deed of conveyance is a strong indication that the parties did not intend immediate transfer of
ownership, but only a transfer after full payment of the purchase price.

Third, petitioners retained possession of the certificate of title of the lot. This is an additional indication
that the agreement did not transfer to respondent, either by actual or constructive delivery, ownership
of the property.

8. Equitable Mortgage
HEIRS OF ARCHES Vda de Diaz executed in favor of the late
V. VDA DE DIAZ Jose Arches a deed of sale with pacto de
retro over a parcel of land in consideration
(1973) of P12,500. During his lifetime, Arches filed
a petition with the CFI of Capiz to
consolidate ownership over the lot. Vda de
Diaz opposed the petition alleging among
other things that the said deed of sale with
pacto de retro did not express the true
intention of the parties, which was merely
to constitute a mortgage on the proper
security for a loan. After hearing the case
on the merits, the trial court denied the
petition holding in effect that the contract
was an equitable mortgage. Arches filed a
petition for certiorari but such was
dismissed. In addition to the sum of
P12,500.00, Arches spent P1,543.70 in
connection with the reconstitution of the
title to Lot No. 2706 in the name of the
vendor and in paying the real estate taxes
on said lot for the years 1951 to 1960.
When Arches died, his heirs demanded
from the defendant the payment of the
P12,500 and the reimbursement of the
P1,543.70.
9. Capacity to Contract
Director of Lands v. Maximo engaged the services of lawyer
Ababa Atty. Fernandez in a case involving the
recovery of land. Adverse decision was
rendered. Maximo appealed the case and
executed a document whereby he will give
(1979) half of the land he will recover by way of
appeal to Atty. Fernandez.
Maximo won the case and refused to give
to Atty. Fernandez his share of the land.
It is true that Article 1482 of the Civil Code provides that "Whenever earnest money is given in a
contract of sale, it shall be considered as part of the price and proof of the perfection of the contract."
However, this article speaks of earnest money given in a contract of sale. In this case, the earnest
money was given in a contract to sell. The earnest money forms part of the consideration only if the
sale is consummated upon full payment of the purchase price. Now, since the earnest money was
given in a contract to sell, Article 1482, which speaks of a contract of sale, does not apply.
The decision of the cadastral court, holding in effect that the sale with pacto de retro was an equitable
mortgage and consequently dismissing the petition to consolidate ownership, did not constitute an
adjudication of the right to foreclose the mortgage or to collect the indebtedness.
In the case of Correa vs. Mateo and Icasiano, wherein an unrecorded pacto de retro sale was
construed as an equitable mortgage, it was ruled that the plaintiff had the right "within sixty days after
final judgment, for a failure to pay the amount due and owing him, to foreclose his mortgage in a proper
proceeding and sell all or any part of the ten parcels of land to satisfy his debt." In effect this Court
recognized the right of the plaintiff to enforce his lien in a separate proceeding notwithstanding the fact
that he had failed to obtain judgment declaring him the sole and absolute owner of the parcels of land
in question.
The law abhors injustice. It would be unjust in this case to allow the defendant to escape payment of
his debt and, worse still, to rationalize such a result by his very claim that he is a debtor and not, as the
plaintiff says, a vendor of property in favor of the latter. Strictly speaking, where the petition of the
vendee in a pacto de retro sale is for a judicial order pursuant to Article 1607 of the Civil Code, so that
consolidation of ownership by virtue of the failure of the vendor to redeem may be recorded in the
Registry of Property, the right of action to foreclose the mortgage or to collect the indebtedness arises
from the judgment of the court declaring the contract as equitable mortgage. Although an alternative
prayer to this effect may be made in the petition, the same cannot but be conditional, that is, only in the
event such a declaration made, contrary to the plaintiff's claim and the principal relief he seeks. His
failure to make that alternative prayer, and the failure of the court to grant it in the judgment dismissing
the petition, should not be considered as a bar to collecting the indebtedness in a proper action for that
purpose.
The pivotal issue to be resolved in the instant case is the validity or nullity of the registration of the
adverse claim of Atty. Fernandez, resolution of which in turn hinges on the question of whether or not
the contract for a contingent fee, basis of the interest of Atty. Fernandez, is prohibited by the Article
1491 of the New Civil Code.
For the prohibition in Article 1491 to operate, the sale or transfer of the property must take place during
the pendency of the litigation involving the property
A contract for a contingent fee is not covered by Article 1491 because the tranfer or assignment of the
property in litigation takes effect only after the finality of a favorable judgment. In the instant case, the
attorney's fees of Atty. Fernandez, consisting of one-half (1/2) of whatever Maximo Abarquez might
recover from his share in the lots in question, is contingent upon the success of the appeal. Hence, the
payment of the attorney's fees, that is, the transfer or assignment of one-half (1/2) of the property in
litigation will take place only if the appeal prospers. Therefore, the tranfer actually takes effect after the
finality of a favorable judgment rendered on appeal and not during the pendency of the litigation
involving the property in question. Consequently, the contract for a contingent fee is not covered by
Article 1491.
Laig v. Court of This is a motion for reconsideration
Appeals whereby Carmen contests the decision of
the Court that there was a double sale.
(1978) Carmen claims that there was no double
sale because the first sale was void ab
initio for being in violation of Art, 1491
par.5. In said sale, the property was sold to
Atty. Laig who was the lawyer in the case
involving said property.
10. Redemption
Butte v. Uy Jose Ramirez was co-owner of 1/6 of a
property in Manila with Marie and 4 others.
Jose Ramirez died. He bequeathed his
(1962) property to his children and the free portion
to Angela.
Marie sold her undivided share of the
property in Manila to Manuel. Angela
sought to redeem said undivided share.
Conejero v. Court of Paz and Enrique were co-owners pro
Appeals indiviso of a lot and building in Cebu City.
Enrique sold his interest in the property to
the Raffinan spouses. On August 19, Paz
(1966) found out when Enrique showed him the
deed of sale, he tried to redeem Enrique’s
share by offering P29K then P34K. This
was refused leading to the instant case
filed on October 4.
The lower court declared that Paz
redeemed beyond the 30 day period. Paz
claims that no written notice was given by
the Raffinan spouses and that even if there
was no tender, which would preserve the
period, there was demand which served
the same purpose.
Alonzo v. CA (1987) Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal
pro indiviso shares a parcel of land
registered in 'the name of their deceased
parents.
Two of the siblings transferred their shares
to herein petitioners.
When the property in question was sold to Atty. Laig, the decision in Civil Case No. 164-R-14 was
already final and therefore the property in question was no longer subject of litigation. Hence Atty. Laig
was no longer prohibited from buying the property in question because "attorneys are only prohibited
from buying their clients' property which is the subject of litigation."
Consequently, the sale having taken place after the finality of the favorable judgment in the said civil
case and not during the pendency of the litigation, there was no violation of Article 1491, paragraph 5.
Hence, the first sale to Atty. Laig of the property in question is valid.
Angela M. Butte is entitled to exercise the right of legal redemption is clear. As testamentary heir of the
estate of J.V. Ramirez, she and her co-heirs acquired an interest in the undivided one-sixth (1/6) share
owned by her predecessor.
The heirs of Jose V. Ramirez acquired his undivided share in the Sta. Cruz property from the moment
of his death, and from that instant, they became co-owners in the aforesaid property, together with the
original surviving co-owners of their decedent (causante). A co-owner of an undivided share is
necessarily a co-owner of the whole. Wherefore, any one of the Ramirez heirs, as such co-owner,
became entitled to exercise the right of legal redemption (retracto de comuneros) as soon as another
co-owner (Maria Garnier Vda. de Ramirez) had sold her undivided share to a stranger, Manuel.
With regard to the written notice, we agree with petitioners that such notice is indispensable, and that,
in view of the terms in which Article of the Philippine Civil Code is couched, mere knowledge of the
sale, acquired in some other manner by the redemptioner, does not satisfy the statute.
Upon the other hand, Article 1623 does not prescribe any particular form of notice, nor any distinctive
method for notifying the redemptioner. So long, therefore, as the latter is informed in writing of the sale
and the particulars thereof, the 30 days for redemption start running, and the redemptioner has no real
cause to complain. In the case at bar, the Paz admits that on August 19, 1952 the co-owner-vendor,
showed and gave Paz a copy of the 1951 deed of sale in favor of respondents Raffiñan. The furnishing
of this copy was equivalent to the giving of written notice required by law. As a necessary
consequence, the 30-day period for the legal redemption by co-owner Paz Torres (retracto de
comuneros) began to run its coursed from and after August 19, 1952, ending on September 18, of the
same year.
The next query is: did petitioners effectuate all the steps required for the redemption? They did not.
Bona fide redemption necessarily imports a seasonable and valid tender of the entire repurchase price.
As found by the lower court, they offered to pay P10k and pay the rest of the price in installments. The
law requires the redemption price to be fully offered in legal tender or else validly consigned in court
within the 30-day period.
The only real question in this case, therefore, is the correct interpretation and application of the
pertinent law as invoked, interestingly enough, by both the petitioners and the private respondents. This
is Article 1088 of the Civil Code, providing as follows:
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all
of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the
sale, provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of
the sale by the vendor.
 By virtue of such agreements, the
petitioners occupied, after the said sales,
an area corresponding to two-fifths of the
said lot, representing the portions sold to
them. The vendees subsequently enclosed
the same with a fence. In 1975, with their
consent, their son Eduardo Alonzo and his
wife built a semi-concrete house on a part
of the enclosed area.
The other siblings filed a complaint
invoking their right of redemption.
The trial court dismissed the case, on the
ground that the right had lapsed, not having
been exercised within thirty days from
notice of the sales. Although there was no
written notice, it was held that actual
knowledge of the sales by the co-heirs
satisfied the requirement of the law
In reversing the trial court, the respondent court declared that the notice required by the said article was
written notice and that actual notice would not suffice as a substitute. Citing the same case of De
Conejero v. Court of Appeals applied by the trial court, the respondent court held that that decision,
interpreting a like rule in Article 1623, stressed the need for written notice although no particular form
was required.
Thus, according to Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who was the ponente of the Court, furnishing the co-heirs with
a copy of the deed of sale of the property subject to redemption would satisfy the requirement for
written notice. "So long, therefore, as the latter (i.e., the redemptioner) is informed in writing of the sale
and the particulars thereof," he declared, "the thirty days for redemption start running. "
In the earlier decision of Butte v. UY, " the Court, speaking through the same learned jurist,
emphasized that the written notice should be given by the vendor and not the vendees, conformably to
a similar requirement under Article 1623, reading as follows:
Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty days
from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendors, as the case may be. The deed
of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the
vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of the adjoining owners.
As "it is thus apparent that the Philippine legislature in Article 1623 deliberately selected a particular
method of giving notice, and that notice must be deemed exclusive," the Court held that notice given by
the vendees and not the vendor would not toll the running of the 30-day period.

In the face of the established facts, we cannot accept the private respondents' pretense that they were
unaware of the sales made by their brother and sister in 1963 and 1964. By requiring written proof of
such notice, we would be closing our eyes to the obvious truth in favor of their palpably false claim of
ignorance, thus exalting the letter of the law over its purpose. The purpose is clear enough: to make
sure that the redemptioners are duly notified. We are satisfied that in this case the other brothers and
sisters were actually informed, although not in writing, of the sales made in 1963 and 1964, and that
such notice was sufficient.

We realize that in arriving at our conclusion today, we are deviating from the strict letter of the law,
which the respondent court understandably applied pursuant to existing jurisprudence. The said court
acted properly as it had no competence to reverse the doctrines laid down by this Court in the above-
cited cases. In fact, and this should be clearly stressed, we ourselves are not abandoning the De
Conejero and Buttle doctrines. What we are doing simply is adopting an exception to the general
rule, in view of the peculiar circumstances of this case.

The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in writing was given
them.

11. RA 6552 (An Act to Provide Protection to Buyers of Real Estate on Installmetn Payments)
12. Waiver/Warranties
Laforteza v. Machuca The heirs of the late Francisco Q. Laforteza The next issue to be addressed is whether the failure of the respondent to pay the balance of the
(2000) represented by Roberto Z. Laforteza and purchase price within the period allowed is fatal to his right to enforce the agreement.
Gonzalo Z. Laforteza, Jr. sold a parcel of We rule in the negative.
(1992) land to petitioner Machuca under a Admittedly, the failure of the respondent to pay the balance of the purchase price was a breach of the
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). contract and was a ground for rescission thereof. The extension of thirty (30) days allegedly granted to
the respondent by Roberto Z. Laforteza (assisted by his counsel Attorney Romeo Gutierrez) was
Lafortezas refused to continue sale despite
Machuca offering to pay the remaining
purchase price. Machuca filed action for
specific performance.
correctly found by the Court of Appeals to be ineffective inasmuch as the signature of Gonzalo Z.
Laforteza did not appear thereon as required by the Special Powers of Attorney. However, the
evidence reveals that after the expiration of the six-month period provided for in the contract, the
petitioners were not ready to comply with what was incumbent upon them, i.e. the delivery of the
reconstituted title of the house and lot. It was only on September 18, 1989 or nearly eight months after
the execution of the Memorandum of Agreement when the petitioners informed the respondent that
they already had a copy of the reconstituted title and demanded the payment of the balance of the
purchase price. The respondent could not therefore be considered in delay for in reciprocal obligations,
neither party incurs in delay if the other party does not comply or is not ready to comply in a proper
manner with what was incumbent upon him.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the petitioners were ready to comply with their obligation,
we find that rescission of the contract will still not prosper. The rescission of a sale of an immovable
property is specifically governed by Article 1592 of the New Civil Code, which reads:
In the sale of immovable property, even though it may have been stipulated that upon failure to pay the
price at the time agreed upon the rescission of the contract shall of right take place, the vendee may
pay, even after the expiration of the period, as long as no demand for rescission of the contract has
been made upon him either judicially or by a notarial act. After the demand, the court may not grant him
a new term.
It is not disputed that the petitioners did not make a judicial or notarial demand for rescission.1avThe
November 20, 1989 letter of the petitioners informing the respondent of the automatic rescission of the
agreement did not amount to a demand for rescission, as it was not notarized. It was also made five
days after the respondent's attempt to make the payment of the purchase price. This offer to pay prior
to the demand for rescission is sufficient to defeat the petitioners' right under article 1592 of the Civil
Code. Besides, the Memorandum Agreement between the parties did not contain a clause expressly
authorizing the automatic cancellation of the contract without court intervention in the event that the
terms thereof were violated. A seller cannot unilaterally and extrajudicially rescind a contract or sale
where there is no express stipulation authorizing him to extrajudicially rescind. Neither was there a
judicial demand for the rescission thereof. Thus, when the respondent filed his complaint for specific
performance, the agreement was still in force inasmuch as the contract was not yet rescinded. At any
rate, considering that the six-month period was merely an approximation of the time if would take to
reconstitute the lost title and was not a condition imposed on the perfection of the contract and
considering further that the delay in payment was only thirty days which was caused by the
respondents justified but mistaken belief that an extension to pay was granted to him, we agree with
the Court of Appeals that the delay of one month in payment was a mere casual breach that would not
entitle the respondents to rescind the contract. Rescission of a contract will not be permitted for a slight
or casual breach, but only such substantial and fundamental breach as would defeat the very object of
the parties in making the agreemant.
Petitioners' insistence that the respondent should have consignated the amount is not determinative of
whether respondent's action for specific performance will lie. Petitioners themselves point out that the
effect of cansignation is to extinguish the obligation. It releases the debtor from responsibility therefor.
The failure of the respondent to consignate the P600,000.00 is not tantamount to a breach of the
contract for by the fact of tendering payment, he was willing and able to comply with his obligation.
Petitioners' insistence that the respondent should have consignated the amount is not determinative of
whether respondent's action for specific performance will lie. Petitioners themselves point out that the
effect of cansignation is to extinguish the obligation. It releases the debtor from responsibility therefor.
The failure of the respondent to consignate the P600,000.00 is not tantamount to a breach of the
contract for by the fact of tendering payment, he was willing and able to comply with his obligation.
The Court of Appeals correctly found the petitioners guilty of bad faith and awarded moral damages to
the respondent. As found by the said Court, the petitioners refused to comply with, their obligation for
the reason that they were offered a higher price therefor and the respondent was even offered
P100,000.00 by the petitioners' lawyer, Attorney Gutierrez, to relinquish his rights over the property.

Jison v. CA (1988) Petitioners, the spouses Newton and
Salvacion Jison, entered into a Contract to
Sell with private respondent, Robert O.
Phillips & Sons, Inc., whereby the latter
agreed to sell to the former a lot at the
Victoria Valley Subdivision in Antipolo,
Rizal for the agreed price of P55,000.00,
with interest at 8,1965 per annum, payable
on an installment basis.
Petitioners failed several times to pay the
monthly installments due. Thus, in a letter
dated April 6, 1967. Private respondent
returned petitioners' check and informed
them that the contract was cancelled when
on April 1, 1987 petitioners failed to pay the
monthly installment due, thereby making
their account delinquent for three months.
On April 19, 1967, petitioners tendered
payment for all the installments already due
but the tender was refused. Thus,
petitioners countered by filing a complaint
for specific performance with the Court of
First Instance of Rizal on May 4, 1967 and
consigning the monthly installments due
with the court.
Following the hearing of the case, wherein
the parties entered into a stipulation of
facts, the trial court on January 9, 1969
rendered judgment in favor of private
respondent, dismissing the complaint and
declaring the contract cancelled and all
payments already made by petitioner
franchise. ordering petitioners to pay
P1,000.00 as and for attorney's fees; and
declaring the consignation and tender of
payment made by petitioners as not
amounting to payment of the corresponding
monthly installments.
Not satisfied with the decision of the trial
court, petitioners appealed to the Court of
Appeals. Agreeing with the findings and
conclusions of the trial court, the Court of
The award of moral damages is in accordance with Article 1191 of the Civil Code pursuant to Article
2220 which provides that moral damages may be awarded in case of breach of contract where the
defendant acted in bad faith. The amount awarded depends on the discretion of the court based on the
circumstances of eachcase. Under the circumstances, the award given by the Court of Appeals
amounting to P50,000.00 appears to us to be fair and reasonable.
There is no denying that in the instant case the resolution or rescission of the Contract to Sell was
valid. Neither can it be said that the cancellation of the contract was ineffective for failure of private
respondents to give petitioners notice thereof as petitioners were informed cancelled private
respondent that the contract was cancelled in the letter dated April 6, 1967 . As R.A. No. 65856, was
not yet effective, the notice of cancellation need not be by notarial act, private respondent's letter being
sufficient compliance with the legal requirement.
The facts of 'fee instant case should be distinguished from those in the Palay Inc. case, as such
distinction will explain why the Court in said case invalidated the resolution of the contract. In said case,
the subdivision developer, without informing the buyer of the cancellation of the contract, resold the lot
to another person. The lot buyer in said case was only informed of the resolution of the contract some
six years later after the developer, rejected his request for authority to assign his rights under the
contract. Such a situation does not obtain illness: the instant case. In fact, petitioners were informed of
the cancellation of their contract in April 1967, when private respondent wrote them the letter dated
April 6, 1967 and within a month they were able to file a complaint against Private respondent.
While the resolution of the contract and the forfeiture of the amounts already paid are valid and binding
upon petitioners, the Court is convinced that the forfeiture of the amount of P5.00 although it includes
the accumulated fines for petitioners' failure to construct a house as required by the contract, is clearly
iniquitous considering that the contract price is only P6,173.15 The forfeiture of fifty percent (50%) of
the amount already paid, or P3,283.75 appears to be a fair settlement. In arriving at this amount the
Court gives weight to the fact that although petitioners have been delinquent in paying their
amortizations several times to the prejudice of private respondent, with the cancellation of the contract
the possession of the lot review.... to private respondent who is free to resell it to another party. Also,
had R.A. No. 65856, been applicable to the instant case, the same percentage of the amount already
paid would have been forfeited
The Court's decision to reduce the amount forfeited finds support in the Civil Code. As stated in
paragraph 3 of the contract, in case the contract is cancelled, the amounts already paid shall be
forfeited in favor of the vendor as liquidated damages. The Code provides that liquidated damages,
whether intended as an indemnity or a penalty, shall be equitably reduced if they are iniquitous or
unconscionable [Art. 2227.]
Further, in obligations with a penal clause, the judge shall equitably reduce the penalty when the
principal obligation has been partly or irregularly complied with by the debtor
 Appeals on November 4, 1976 affirmed the
former's decision.
13. Contact of Sale/Contract to Sell
Spouses Valenzuela Petitioners negotiated with Kalayaan to
v. Kalayaan (2009) purchase the portion of the lot they were
occupying. On August 5, 1994, the parties
executed a Contract to Sell wherein they
stipulated that petitioners would purchase
236 square meters of the subject property
for P1,416,000.00. It was also stipulated
that Kalayaan shall execute the
corresponding deed of absolute sale over
the subject property only upon full payment
of the total purchase price.
Several payments were made but Spouses
Valenzuela failed to pay the entire amount
stipulated.
In a letter dated September 6, 1995,
petitioners requested Kalayaan that they be
issued a deed of sale for the 118 sq. m.
portion of the lot where their house was
standing, considering that they no longer
had the resources to pay the remaining
balance. They reasoned that, since they
had already paid one-half of the purchase
price, or a total of P708,000.00
representing 118 sq. m. of the subject
property, they should be issued a deed of
sale for the said portion of the property.
Kalayaan responded by reminding
petitioners of their unpaid balance and
asked that they settle it within the next few
days.
Kalayaan filed a Complaint for Rescission
of Contract and Damages against
petitioners before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 126, which
was later docketed as Civil Case No. C-
18378.
The petition is devoid of merit.
In the present case, the nature and characteristics of a contract to sell is determinative of the propriety
of the remedy of rescission and the award of attorney’s fees.
Under a contract to sell, the seller retains title to the thing to be sold until the purchaser fully pays the
agreed purchase price. The full payment is a positive suspensive condition, the non-fulfillment of which
is not a breach of contract, but merely an event that prevents the seller from conveying title to the
purchaser. The non-payment of the purchase price renders the contract to sell ineffective and without
force and effect. Unlike a contract of sale, where the title to the property passes to the vendee upon the
delivery of the thing sold, in a contract to sell, ownership is, by agreement, reserved to the vendor and
is not to pass to the vendee until full payment of the purchase price. Otherwise stated, in a contract of
sale, the vendor loses ownership over the property and cannot recover it until and unless the contract is
resolved or rescinded; whereas, in a contract to sell, title is retained by the vendor until full payment of
the purchase price. In the latter contract, payment of the price is a positive suspensive condition,
failure of which is not a breach but an event that prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title
from becoming effective.
Since the obligation of respondent did not arise because of the failure of petitioners to fully pay the
purchase price, Article 1191[25] of the Civil Code would have no application.
Rayos v. Court of Appeals elucidates:
Construing the contracts together, it is evident that the parties executed a contract to sell and not a
contract of sale. The petitioners retained ownership without further remedies by the respondents until
the payment of the purchase price of the property in full. Such payment is a positive suspensive
condition, failure of which is not really a breach, serious or otherwise, but an event that prevents the
obligation of the petitioners to convey title from arising, in accordance with Article 1184 of the Civil
Code. x x x
xxxx
The non-fulfillment by the respondent of his obligation to pay, which is a suspensive condition to the
obligation of the petitioners to sell and deliver the title to the property, rendered the contract to sell
ineffective and without force and effect. The parties stand as if the conditional obligation had never
existed. Article 1191 of the New Civil Code will not apply because it presupposes an obligation already
extant. There can be no rescission of an obligation that is still non-existing, the suspensive condition
not having happened.
The parties’ contract to sell explicitly provides that Kalayaan “shall execute and deliver the
corresponding deed of absolute sale over” the subject property to the petitioners “upon full payment of
the total purchase price.” Since petitioners failed to fully pay the purchase price for the entire property,
Kalayaan’s obligation to convey title to the property did not arise. Thus, Kalayaan may validly cancel
the contract to sell its land to petitioner, not because it had the power to rescind the contract, but
 because their obligation thereunder did not arise.

Petitioners failed to pay the balance of the purchase price. Such payment is a positive suspensive
condition, failure of which is not a breach, serious or otherwise, but an event that prevents the
obligation of the seller to convey title from arising. The non-fulfillment by petitioners of their obligation
to pay, which is a suspensive condition for the obligation of Kalayaan to sell and deliver the title to the
property, rendered the Contract to Sell ineffective and without force and effect. The parties stand as if
the conditional obligation had never existed. Inasmuch as the suspensive condition did not take place,
Kalayaan cannot be compelled to transfer ownership of the property to petitioners.

MONTECALVO v. Facts: The property involved in this case is Issue: whether the said Agreement is a contract of sale or a contract to sell.
HEIRS OF PRIMERA a portion of a parcel of land known as Lot
(2010) No. 263 located at Sabayle Street, Iligan Held: The January 13, 1985 Agreement is a CONTRACT TO SELL.
City. Lot No. 263 has an area of 860
square meters covered by Original Ratio: In the Agreement, Eugenia, as owner, did not convey her title to the disputed property to Irene
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-2712 since the Agreement was made for the purpose of negotiating the sale of the 860-square meter
registered in the name of Eugenia Primero property.
(Eugenia), married to Alfredo Primero, Sr. On this basis, we are more inclined to characterize the agreement as a contract to sell rather than a
(Alfredo). contract of sale. Although not by itself controlling, the absence of a provision in the Agreement
In the early 1980s, Eugenia leased the lot transferring title from the owner to the buyer is taken as a strong indication that the Agreement is a
to petitioner Irene Montecalvo (Irene) for a contract to sell.
monthly rental of P500.00. On January 13, In a contract to sell, the prospective seller explicitly reserves the transfer of title to the prospective
1985, Eugenia entered into an un-notarized buyer, meaning, the prospective seller does not as yet agree or consent to transfer ownership of the
Agreement3 with Irene, where the former property subject of the contract to sell until the happening of an event, which for present purposes we
offered to sell the property to the latter for shall take as the full payment of the purchase price. What the seller agrees or obliges himself to do is to
P1,000.00 per square meter. They agreed fulfill his promise to sell the subject property when the entire amount of the purchase price is delivered
that Irene would deposit the amount of to him. In other words, the full payment of the purchase price partakes of a suspensive condition, the
P40,000.00 which shall form part of the non-fulfillment of which prevents the obligation to sell from arising and thus, ownership is retained by
down payment equivalent to 50% of the the prospective seller without further remedies by the prospective buyer. A contract to sell is commonly
purchase price. They also stipulated that entered into in order to protect the seller against a buyer who intends to buy the property in installment
during the term of negotiation of 30 to 45 by withholding ownership over the property until the buyer effects full payment therefor.
days from receipt of said deposit, Irene
would pay the balance of P410,000.00 on
the down payment. In case Irene defaulted
in the payment of the down payment, the
deposit would be returned within 10 days
from the lapse of said negotiation period
and the Agreement deemed terminated.
However, if the negotiations pushed
through, the balance of the full value of
P860,000.00 or the net amount of
P410,000.00 would be paid in 10 equal
monthly installments from receipt of the
down payment, with interest at the
prevailing rate.
Irene failed to pay the full down payment
within the stipulated 30-45-day negotiation
period. Nonetheless, she continued to stay
on the disputed property, and still made
several payments with an aggregate
amount of P293,000.00. On the other hand,
Eugenia.
 On June 18, 1996, Irene and Nonilon
retaliated by instituting Civil Case No. II-
3588 with the RTC of Lanao del Norte for
specific performance, to compel Eugenia to
convey the 293-square meter portion of Lot
No. 263

14. Sale v Agency

SPOUSES VILORIA v. Facts: Issue: Does a principal-agent relationship exist between CAI and Holiday Travel?
CONTINENTAL On or about July 21, 1997 and
(2012) while in the United States, Fernando Held: Yes.
purchased for himself and his wife,
Lourdes, two (2) round trip airline tickets Ratio: In erroneously characterizing the contractual relationship between CAI and Holiday Travel as a
from San Diego, California to Newark, New contract of sale, the CA failed to apply the fundamental civil law principles governing agency and
Jersey on board Continental Airlines. differentiating it from sale.
Fernando purchased the tickets at
US$400.00 each from a travel agency In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Constantino, this Court extrapolated that the primordial
called “Holiday Travel” and was attended to differentiating consideration between the two (2) contracts is the transfer of ownership or title over the
by a certain Margaret Mager (Mager). property subject of the contract. In an agency, the principal retains ownership and control over the
According to Spouses Viloria, Fernando property and the agent merely acts on the principal’s behalf and under his instructions in furtherance of
agreed to buy the said tickets after Mager the objectives for which the agency was established. On the other hand, the contract is clearly a sale if
informed them that there were no available the parties intended that the delivery of the property will effect a relinquishment of title, control and
seats at Amtrak, an intercity passenger ownership in such a way that the recipient may do with the property as he pleases.
train service provider in the United States.
Per the tickets, Spouses Viloria were As to how the CA have arrived at the conclusion that the contract between CAI and Holiday Travel is a
scheduled to leave for Newark on August sale is certainly confounding, considering that CAI is the one bound by the contracts of carriage
13, 1997 and return to San Diego on embodied by the tickets being sold by Holiday Travel on its behalf. It is undisputed that CAI and not
August 21, 1997. Holiday Travel who is the party to the contracts of carriage executed by Holiday Travel with third
persons who desire to travel via Continental Airlines, and this conclusively indicates the existence of a
Subsequently, Fernando requested Mager principal-agent relationship. That the principal is bound by all the obligations contracted by the agent
to reschedule their flight to Newark to an within the scope of the authority granted to him is clearly provided under Article 1910 of the Civil Code
earlier date or August 6, 1997. Mager and this constitutes the very notion of agency.
informed him that flights to Newark via
Continental Airlines were already fully
booked and offered the alternative of a
round trip flight via Frontier Air. Since flying
with Frontier Air called for a higher fare of
US$526.00 per passenger and would mean
traveling by night, Fernando opted to
request for a refund. Mager, however,
denied his request as the subject tickets
are non-refundable and the only option that
Continental Airlines can offer is the re-
issuance of new tickets within one (1) year
from the date the subject tickets were
issued. Fernando decided to reserve two
(2) seats with Frontier Air.

As he was having second thoughts on

traveling via Frontier Air, Fernando went to
the Greyhound Station where he saw an
 Amtrak station nearby. Fernando made
inquiries and was told that there are seats
available and he can travel on Amtrak
anytime and any day he pleased. Fernando
then purchased two (2) tickets for
Washington, D.C.

Upon returning to the Philippines,

Fernando sent a letter to CAI on February
11, 1998, demanding a refund and alleging
that Mager had deluded them into
purchasing the subject tickets.

On September 8, 2000, Spouses Viloria

filed a complaint against CAI, praying that
CAI be ordered to refund the money they
used in the purchase of the subject tickets
with legal interest from July 21, 1997 and to
pay P1,000,000.00 as moral damages,
P500,000.00 as exemplary damages and
P250,000.00 as attorney’s fees.

15. Assignment of Credit

LEASE

NCC 1649-1653
SIME DARBY v Facts: Macgraphics owned several Issue: Could Sime Darby assign the lease to Goodyear without the consent of Macrographics?
GOODYEAR (2011) billboards across Metro Manila and other Held: NO.
surrounding municipalities, one of which Ratio: Article 1649 of the New Civil Code provides:
was a 35’ x 70’ neon billboard located at
the Magallanes Interchange in Makati City. Art. 1649. The lessee cannot assign the lease without the consent of the lessor,
The Magallanes billboard was leased by unless there is a stipulation to the contrary.
Macgraphics to Sime Darby in April 1994 at In an assignment of a lease, there is a novation by the substitution of the person of one of the
a monthly rental of P120,000.00. The parties – the lessee. The personality of the lessee, who dissociates from the lease, disappears.
lease had a term of four years and was set Thereafter, a new juridical relation arises between the two persons who remain – the lessor and the
to expire on March 30, 1998. Upon signing assignee who is converted into the new lessee. The objective of the law in prohibiting the assignment of
of the contract, Sime Darby paid the lease without the lessor’s consent is to protect the owner or lessor of the leased property.
Macgraphics a total of P1.2 million While there is no dispute that the first requisite is present, the Court, after careful consideration of the
representing the ten-month deposit which facts and the evidence on record, finds that the other requirements of a valid novation are lacking. A
the latter would apply to the last ten months review of the lease contract between Sime Darby and Macgraphics discloses no stipulation that Sime
of the lease. Thereafter, Macgraphics Darby could assign the lease without the consent of Macgraphics.
configured the Magallanes billboard to
feature Sime Darby’s name and logo.
On May 9, 1996, Sime Darby and
Goodyear executed a deed entitled “Deed
of Assignment in connection with
Microwave Communication Facility and in
connection with Billboard Advertising in
Makati City and Pulilan, Bulacan” (Deed of
 Assignment), through which Sime Darby
assigned, among others, its leasehold
rights and deposits made to Macgraphics
pursuant to its lease contract over the
Magallanes billboard.

Sime Darby then notified

Macgraphics of the assignment of the
Magallanes billboard in favor of Goodyear
through a letter-notice dated May 3, 1996.
Macrographics refused to honor
the deed of assignment between Sime
Darby and Goodyear.
Goodyear wants to rescind the Deed with
Sime Darby and to be refunded with its
payment.
ALUDOS v. SUERTE Facts: Sometime in January 1969, Lomises Issue: Whether there was a valid assignment of leasehold rights to the market stalls to Johnny Suerte?
(2012) acquired from the Baguio City Government
the right to occupy two stalls in the Hangar Held: No.
Market in Baguio City, as evidenced by a
permit issued by the City Treasurer. Ratio: The assignment of the leasehold rights over the two market stalls was void since it was made
without the consent of the lessor, the Baguio City Government, as required under Article 1649 of the
On September 8, 1984, Lomises Civil Code.
entered into an agreement with respondent
Johnny M. Suerte for the transfer of all
improvements and rights over the two
market stalls (Stall Nos. 9 and 10) for the
amount of P260,000.00. Johnny gave a
down payment of P45,000.00 to Lomises,
who acknowledged receipt of the amount in
a document executed on the same date as
the agreement.

Johnny made a subsequent payment of

P23,000.00; hence, a total of P68,000.00 of
the P260,000.00 purchase price had been
made as of 1984. Before full payment
could be made, however, Lomises backed
out of the agreement and returned the
P68,000.00 to Domes and Jaime Suerte,
the mother and the father of Johnny,
respectively. The return of the P68,000.00
down payment was embodied in a
handwritten receipt.

Johnny filed a complaint against Lomises

before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 7, Baguio City, for specific
performance with damages, docketed as
Civil Case No. 720-R.
COMMON CARRIERS

NCC 1745, 1749, 1753-1766

Phoenix Association The SS Fernbank received from Saco The shipper paid the freight on the basis of the weight of the cargo and not on the basis of its actual
v Macondray (1975) Lowell Shops a shipment consigned to the value which was not properly declared. The lower court did not err in holding that Macondray & Co. Inc.
order of the Commercial Bank and Trust is liable to Phoenix Assurance Company only in the amount of $500 under Clause 17 of the bill of
Company with arrival notice to Floro lading. Clause 17 is sanctioned by section 4 of the COGSA which provides that neither the carrier nor
Spinning. The shipment was insured for the ship shall in any event be liable for any loss or damage in connection with the transportation of
$5,450 with Phoenix Assurance Company goods in the amount exceeding US$500 per package or per customary freight unit, or the equivalent of
of New York against all risks including loss that sum in other currency, unless the nature and value of such goods have been declared by the
or damage. shipper before shipment and inserted in the bill of lading.
Printed in the smallest type on the back of The foregoing provisions on limited liability are as much a part of a bill of lading as though physically in
the bill of lading is the following stipulation it and as much a part thereof as though placed therein by agreement of the parties. The trial court's
limiting the carrier's liability for loss or judgment is affirmed in the sense that the defendant's liability of $500 to the plaintiff should be paid at
damage to $500 per package unless the the rate of exchange prevailing at the time the judgment is satisfied instead of at the conversion rate
shipper in writing declares the nature of the prevailing in 1965.
goods and a higher valuation and pays
additional freightage on the basis of such
higher. The bill of lading provides that "in
accepting this Bill of Lading, the shipper,
owner and consignee of the goods, and the
holder of the Bill of Lading agree to be
bound by all its stipulations.
The SS Fernbank arrived at the port of
Manila on November 23, 1961. The
shipment was discharged into the custody
of the Manila Port Service in bad order and
was almost empty.
The Floro Spinning Millsfiled claims with
Macondray & Co., Inc. (the agent of the
vessel) and with Ker & Company Ltd. (the
agent of the insurance company) for the
value of the missing cargo in the total sum
of $1,512.78, which was equivalent to
P4,554.98. Phoenix Assurance Company
paid the claim of Floro Spinning Mills in the
sum of P4,554.98. As subrogee, it filed this
action against Macondray & Co., Inc. for
the recovery of the actual value of the
missing cargo in the sum of P4,554.98.
Macondray & Co replied that the maximum
limitation of the vessel's liability was $500
per package.

Air France v FACTS: Rafael Carrascoso, a civil
Carrascoso engineer, was one of the 28 Filipino
(1966) pilgrims who left Manila for Lourdes. He
had a first class round trip ticket from
Manila to ROME. From Manila to Bangkok,
he traveled in ‘first class,’ but in Bangkok
the manager of Air France forced him to
ISSUE: Whether or not Carrascoso is entitled to award for moral damages
HELD: Here there is a contract of carriage between the parties and such contract was breached by Air
France when it wrongfully forced Carrascoso to vacate the first class seat which he paid for. The
wrongful expulsion is independent of the breach since even without the contract, such wrongful
expulsion may still make Air France liable for damages. In other words, the wrongful expulsion is in
itself a tort.
 vacate his seat in favor of a ‘white man’
who had a ‘better right to the seat.’
Carrascoso filed for moral damages,
averring in his complaint the contract of
carriage between Air France and himself.
Air France claims that to authorize an
award for moral damages there must be an
averment of fraud or bad faith.
Carrascoso’s complaint is silent.
Shewaram v PAL Facts: A PAL ticket, on the reverse side,
(1966) stated in fine print that if the value of
baggage is not stated, and the baggage is
lost, the maximum liability of PAL is
P100.00. If value in excess of P100.00 is
stated, PAL will charge extra because PAL
is being held liable for an amount
exceeding P100.00.
Shewaram, a Hindu from Davao, boarded a
PAL plane for Manila. Among his baggage
was a camera with P800.00 and it was lost.
PAL offered to pay P100.00. Shewaram
wanted full payment of P800.00.
CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA ACT
Eastern Shipping FACTS: (G.R. No. L-69044): a vessel
Lines v IAC operated by petitioner Eastern Shipping
(1987) Lines, Inc., loaded at K o b e , J a p a n ,
for transportation to Manila,
5000 pieces of calorized lance
p i p e s i n 2 8 packages consigned to
Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc.,
and 7 cases of spare parts consigned
to Central Textile Mills, Inc. Both sets of
goods were insured with
DevelopmentInsurance and Surety Corp.
(G.R. No. 71478): the same
vessel took on board 128
cartons of garment fabrics and
accessories, in 2 containers, consigned to
Mariveles Apparel Corporation, and two
cases of surveying instruments consigned
to Aman Enterprises and General
Merchandise.
The vessel caught fire and sank, resulting
The complaint averred: first, that there was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first class passage covering
the Bangkok-Teheran leg; second, that said contract was breached when petitioner failed to furnish first
class transportation at Bangkok; and third, that there was bad faith when petitioner’s employee
compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation “after he was already seated” and to take
a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered inconvenience, embarrassment and
humiliation, thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social
humiliation, resulting in moral damages. It is true that there is no specific mention of the term bad faith
in the complaint. But, the inference of bad faith is there; it may be drawn from the facts and
circumstances set forth therein.
Issue: Whether the limited liability rule shall apply in the case at bar?
Held: The limited liability rule shall not apply. Since this is a stipulation on qualified liability, which
operates to reduce the liability of the carrier, the carrier and the shipper must agree thereupon.
Otherwise, the carrier will be liable for full. PAL is fully liable (for full) because Shewaran did not agree
to the stipulation on the ticket.
It can not be said that a contract has been entered into between a passenger and the common carrier,
embodying the conditions as printed at the back of the ticket. The fact that those conditions are printed
at the back of the ticket stub in letters so small that they are hard to read would not warrant the
presumption that the passenger was aware of those conditions such that he had "fairly and freely
agreed" to those conditions. The passenger is considered not having agreed to the stipulation on the
ticket, as manifested by the fact that he did not sign the ticket.
ISSUES: Which law should govern—the Civil Code provisions on Common carriers or the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act
Held: The law of the country to which the goods are to be transported
g o v e r n s t h e liability of the common carrier in case of their loss, destruction, or
deterioration. As the cargoes were transported from Japan to the Philippines, the liability of
petitioner carrier is governed primarily by the Civil Code. However in all matters not regulated by said
Code, the rights and obligations of common carrier shall be governed by the Code of Commerce and
by special laws. Thus the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, a special law, is suppletory to the provisions
of the Civil Code.
Article 1735 of the Civil Code provides that all cases than those mentioned in Article 1734, the common
carrier shall be presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless it proves that it
has observed the extraordinary diligence required by law. The burden is upon Eastern
Shipping Lines to prove that it has exercised the extraordinary diligence required by law.
Fire here was not considered a natural disaster or calamity within the contemplation of
Art.1734 for it arises almost invariably from some act of man or by human means; it does not fall
within the category of an act of God unless caused by lightning or by other natural
disaster or calamity.
 in the total loss of ship and cargo.
Samar Mining Co. vs. Samar Mining, Inc. imported one crate of
Nordeutscher Lloyd Optima welded wedge wire sieves from
Bremen, Germany through the vessel M/S
(1984) Schwabenstein owned by Nordeutscher
Lloyd. The transaction was covered by Bill
of Lading No. 18, which specified that (1)
the shipment was received at Bremen, (2)
the freight had been prepaid up to the port
of destination or port of discharge of goods,
which was in Davao, and (3) that the carrier
undertook to transport the goods only up to
the port of discharge of ship, which was in
Manila. Upon arrival of the vessel in
Manila, the goods were unloaded and
delivered to the bonded warehouse of
AMCYL. The goods, however, were not
delivered to nor received by Samar Mining,
Inc. in Davao.
For loss of the goods, Samar Mining, Inc.
filed a suit against Nordeutscher Lloyd for
payment of P1,691.93. The trial court
decided in favor of Samar Mining, Inc.,
prompting Nordeutscher Lloyd to appeal
the case.
New World New Word International Development, Inc.
International purchased three generator sets from DMT
Development, Inc. Corporation, which shipped the generator
vs. NYK Fil-Japan sets by truck from Wisconsin to Illinois then
Shipping to California. From California, the goods
were loaded on a vessel owned and
(2012) operated by NYK Fil-Japan Shipping
Corporation and bound for Hong Kong. In
Hong Kong, the shipment was unloaded
and transshipped to another vessel owned
and operated by NYK, this time bound for
Manila. On its journey to Manila, however,
the vessel encountered typhoon Kadiang.
The vessel arrived safely in Manila South
Nordeutscher Lloyd is NOT liable.
There were two undertakings under the Bill of Lading. The first one is for the transport of goods from
Bremen to Manila, and the second one is for the transshipment of the same goods from Manila to
Davao.
The same Bill of Lading provided that “[the] carrier, in making arrangements for any transshipping…
shall be considered solely the forwarding agent of the shipper and without any responsibility
whatsoever even though the freight for the whole transport has been collected by him.”
Thus, at the hiatus between the two undertakings, which is the moment when the goods are discharged
in Manila, Nordeutscher Lloyd’s personality changes from that of carrier to that of the agent of the
consignee. Such being the case, there was in effect actual delivery of the goods from Nordeutscher
Lloyd as carrier to Nordeutscher Lloyd as agent of the consignee.
Under Article 1736 of the NCC, the carrier may be relieved of the responsibility for loss or damage to
the goods upon actual or constructive delivery to the consignee or to the person who has a right to
receive them. There is actual delivery in the contract for transport of goods when possession has been
turned over to the consignee or to his duly authorized agent and a reasonable time is given him to
remove the goods. In this case, there was actual delivery to the consignee through its duly authorized
agent, the carrier.
Nordeutscher Lloyd, as agent, cannot be held liable for the loss of the goods since there was no
showing of negligence, deceit, or fraud on its part, neither was there any showing of notorious
incompetence or insolvency on the part of AMCYL, which acted as Nordeutscher Lloyd’s substitute in
storing the goods awaiting transshipment. (Relevant provisions on agency: Articles 1884, 1889, 1892,
and 1909 of the NCC)
Note: The Court applied the NCC in resolving the case since “[t]he liability of the common carrier for the
loss, destruction, or deterioration of goods transported from a foreign country to the Philippines is
governed primarily by the NCC. In all matters not regulated by said Code, the rights and obligations of
common carriers shall be governed by the Code of Code of Commerce and by special laws.”
NYK would have been liable for the damage to the goods. But New World’s claim against it has
prescribed since the same was not exercised within the one year period provided for in the COGSA.
The Court, however, held the insurer liable to New World as it was responsible for New World’s late
filing of the claim against NYK.
That the loss was occasioned by a typhoon, an exempting cause under Article 1734 of the Civil Code,
does not automatically relieve the common carrier of liability. The latter had the burden of proving that
the typhoon was the proximate and only cause of loss and that it exercised due diligence to prevent or
minimize such loss before, during, and after the disastrous typhoon. NYK failed to discharge this
burden.
Section 3(6) of the COGSA provides that the carrier shall be discharged from all liability in case of loss
or damage unless the suit is brought within one year after delivery of the goods or the date when the
 Harbor and shipment was received by
Marina Port Services, Inc. (Marina), the
arrastre or cargo-handling operator, on 07
October 1993. An inspection of the
containers of the three generators was
conducted; two vans bore signs of external
damage while the third van was unscathed.
However, when the generators sets were
finally delivered to New World’s job site on
20 October 1993, it was found that all three
sets suffered extensive damage and could
no longer be repaired.
goods should have been delivered. Hence, the last day for filing suit fell on 07 October 1994.
New World filed its formal claim for its loss with Seaboard as early as 16 November 1993 or about 11
months before the suit against NYK would have fallen due. In the ordinary course, if Seaboard had
processed that claim and paid the same, Seaboard would have been subrogated to New World’s right
to recover from NYK. And it could have then filed the suit as a subrogee.
The Court ordered Seaboard to pay New World interest on the proceeds of the policy for the duration of
the delay until the claim is fully satisfied at the rate of twice the ceiling prescribed by the Monetary
Board.

Since the goods were covered with a

marine insurance policy by Seaboard–
Eastern Insurance Company, New World
sent it a formal claim dated 16 November
1993. Instead of immediately processing
the claim, the insurance company required
New World to submit an itemized list of
damaged parts of the goods. New World
refused to submit the list since the
insurance policy made no mention of this
additional requisite. Hence, the insurance
company refused to process the claim.

Having lost recourse with the insurance

company, New World filed a claim for
specific performance and damages against
DMT Corporation, NYK, and Seaboard only
on 11 October 1994. The RTC absolved all
the respondents except NYK. However, it
reasoned that New World filed its claim
against NYK beyond the one year period
provided under the Carriage of Goods by
Sea Act (COGSA), which was counted
from the date the goods were delivered to
the arrastre operator (07 October) and not
from the date they were delivered to New
World’s job site (20 October). The CA
affirmed the RTC ruling.

WARSAW CONVENTION

Pan Am vs. Rapadas While standing in line to board a Pan Am Pan Am is NOT required to pay more than what may be recovered under the Notice of Baggage
flight in Guam bound for Manila, Jose Liability Limitation. Said Notice indicates that the Warsaw Convention governs in case of death or injury
(1992) Rapadas was asked by an airline control
agent to check-in his attache case.
Rapadas protested, pointing to the fact that
the other passengers were allowed to
hand-carry bulkier baggage. He stepped
out of the line only to go back to the end of
it in an attempt to get through without
having to register his attache case. The
control agent noticed this and Rapadas
acceded to check-in his baggage, which
weighed approximately 8 kilograms. There
was, however, no declaration of its
contents or the value thereof. Upon arrival
in Manila, the attache case could not be
found.
Pan Am sent a letter to Rapadas to settle
the matter for the sum of USD 160 (at USD
20 per kilogram) representing the alleged
limit of liability for loss or damage to a
passenger’s property under the Notice of
Baggage Liability Limitation attached to
and forming part of the passenger ticket.
Rapadas refused the offer and filed an
action for damages against the airlines,
placing the value of his lost attache case at
USD 42,403.90.
The lower court ruled in favor of Rapadas
after finding that there was no stipulation
giving notice to the baggage liability
limitation. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the lower court.
Santos III vs. Augusto Benedicto Santos III, a minor and
Northwest Orient resident of the Philippines, purchased a
Airlines round-trip ticket from Northwest Orient
Airlines with the route San Francisco to
(1992) Manila via Tokyo and back. Despite
previous confirmation and re-confirmation,
when he checked in at the Northwest
counter in the San Francisco airport, he
was informed that he had no reservation for
his flight from Tokyo to Manila. He had to
be wait-listed.
Santos III, represented by his father, sued
Northwest for damages in the RTC of
Makati. Northwest moved to dismiss the
complaint on the ground of lack of
to a passenger or of loss, damage or destruction to a passenger’s luggage.
The Warsaw Convention, as amended, specifically provides that it is applicable to international
carriage, which it defines in Article 1, par. 2 as “any carriage in which, according to the agreement
between the parties, the place of departure and the place of destination, whether or not there be a
breach in the carriage or a transshipment, are situated either within the territories of two High
Contracting Parties or within the territory of a single High Contracting Party if there is an agreed
stopping place within the territory of another State, even if that State is not a High Contracting Party.”
Nowhere in the Warsaw Convention, as amended, is such a detailed notice of baggage liability
limitations required. Nevertheless, it should become a common, safe and practical custom among air
carriers to indicate beforehand the precise sums equivalent to those fixed by Article 22(2) of the
Convention.
The Notice of Baggage Liability Limitation, in this case, states that “liability for loss, delay, or damage to
baggage is limited as follows unless a higher value is declared in advance and additional charges are
paid: for most international travel, to approximately USD 20 per kilo for checked baggage and USD 400
per passenger for unchecked baggage. xxx”
As Rapadas did not declare a higher value for his luggage or paid additional charges, Pan Am pegged
its liability at USD 20 per kilogram. However, since the checking in was against Rapadas’ will, the Court
treated the lost bag as “partaking of involuntary and hurriedly checked-in luggage and continuing its
earlier status as unchecked luggage.” The fair liability should then be USD 400. The Court also allowed
Rapadas to recover attorney’ fees in the amount of PhP 10,000 as Article 22(4) of the Warsaw
Convention provides that the limits of liability prescribed in the instrument “shall not prevent the court
from awarding, in accordance with its own law, in addition, the whole or part of the costs and other
expenses of litigation incurred by the plaintiff.”
The Philippine courts have no jurisdiction.
Santos III initially invoked the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus and argued that in view of the significant
developments in the airline industry through the years, the Warsaw Convention has become irrelevant.
The Court rejected this contention, saying that rebus sic stantibus does not operate automatically to
render the treaty inoperative. There is a necessity for a formal act of rejection, usually made by the
head of State, with a statement of the reasons why compliance with the treaty is no longer required.
This is not the situation in the present case.
Santos III also argued that Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention refers to venue and not jurisdiction.
The Court ruled otherwise. “Where the matter is governed by the Warsaw Convention, jurisdiction takes
on a dual concept. Jurisdiction in the international sense must be established in accordance with Article
28(1), following which the jurisdiction of a particular court must be established pursuant to applicable
domestic law. Only after the question of which jurisdiction is determined will the issue of venue be
taken up. This second question shall be governed by the law of the court to which the case is
submitted.”
 jurisdiction, citing Article 28(1) of the
Warsaw Convention, which provides that:
“An action for damage must be brought at
the option of the plaintiff, in the territory of
one of the High Contracting Parties, either
before the court of the domicile of the
carrier, or of his principal place of business,
or where he has a place of business
through which the contract has been made,
or before the court at the place of
destination.”
It was Northwest’s contention that the
Philippines was not its domicile nor was
this its principal place of business. Neither
was Santos III’s ticket issued in this country
nor was his destination Manila but San
Francisco in the United States.
Santos averred that under Article 28(1), Manila was the place of destination and not San Francisco,
hence the case was property filed with the RTC. To this, the Court stated that the place of destination
within the meaning of the Convention is determined by the terms of the contract of carriage or,
specifically in this case, the ticket between the passenger and the carrier. The contract is a single
undivided operation, beginning with the place of departure and ending with the ultimate destination.
The ultimate destination indicated in the ticket herein was San Francisco. Manila should therefore be
considered merely an agreed stopping place and not the destination.
Finally, Santos claimed that Northwest committed a tort (acted arbitrarily and in bad faith, discriminated
against him, committed willful misconduct) and Article 28(1) does not apply to actions based on tort.
The Court used the ruling in Husserl vs. Swiss Air Transport Company where it was held that the
Warsaw Convention “accommodates all of the multifarious bases on which a claim might be founded in
different countries, whether under code or common law, whether under contract or tort, etc.

The lower court granted Northwest’s

motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals
affirmed.

MARITIME LAW

Vasquez vs CA MV "Pioneer Cebu" encountered typhoon The defense of caso fortuito is untenable.
"Klaring" and struck a reef and
(1985) subsequently sunk. The parents of 3 To constitute a caso fortuito that would exempt a person from responsibility, it is necessary that (1) the
passengers who died sued the owner of event must be independent of the human will; (2) the occurrence must render it impossible for the
the vessel. Defendant admitted the debtor to fulfill the obligation in a normal manner; and that (3) the obligor must be free of participation
existence of a contract of carriage. in, or aggravation of, the injury to the creditor.
When the vessel left Manila, its officers
were already aware of the typhoon Klaring Under the circumstances, while, indeed, the typhoon was an inevitable occurrence, yet, having been
building up somewhere in Mindanao. There kept posted on the course of the typhoon by weather bulletins at intervals of six hours, the captain and
being no typhoon signals on the route from crew were well aware of the risk they were taking as they hopped from island to island from Romblon
Manila to Cebu, and the vessel having up to Tanguingui. They held frequent conferences, and oblivious of the utmost diligence required of
been cleared by the Customs authorities, very cautious persons, they decided to take a calculated risk. In so doing, they failed to observe that
the MV "Pioneer Cebu" left on its voyage to extraordinary diligence required of them explicitly by law for the safety of the passengers transported by
Cebu despite the typhoon. When it reached them with due regard for an circumstances and unnecessarily exposed the vessel and passengers to
Romblon Island, it was decided not to seek the tragic mishap. They failed to overcome that presumption of fault or negligence that arises in cases
shelter thereat, inasmuch as the weather of death or injuries to passengers.
condition was still good. Upon passing
Tanguingui island, however, the weather
suddenly changed and heavy rains felt
Fearing that due to zero visibility, the
vessel might hit Chocolate island group,
the captain ordered a reversal of the
course so that the vessel could 'weather
out' the typhoon by facing the winds and
the waves in the open. Unfortunately, the
 vessel struck a reef near Malapascua
island, sustained leaks and eventually
sunk, taking the Captain with it.
Defense: the sinking of the vessel was
caused by force majeure, and that the
defendant's liability had been extinguished
by the total loss of the vessel.

CONTRACT FOR A PIECE OF WORK

Nakpil and Sons vs. The construction of plaintiff Phil. Bar
CA Association’s building was undertaken by
the United Construction, Inc. on an
(1986) "administration" basis, on the suggestion of
Juan J. Carlos, the president and general
manager of said corporation. The proposal
was approved by plaintiff's board of
directors and signed by its president
Roman Ozaeta. The plans and
specifications for the building were
prepared by the other third-party
defendants Juan F. Nakpil & Sons. The
building was completed in June, 1966.
On August 2, 1968 an unusually strong
earthquake hit Manila and the building in
question sustained major damage. The
front columns of the building buckled,
causing the building to tilt forward
dangerously. The tenants vacated the
building. As a temporary remedial
measure, the building was shored up by
United Construction, Inc. at the cost of
P13,661.28.
The contractor and the architects are liable.
Art. 1723. The engineer or architect who drew up the plans and specifications for a building is liable for
damages if within fifteen years from the completion of the structure the same should collapse by reason
of a defect in those plans and specifications, or due to the defects in the ground. The contractor is
likewise responsible for the damage if the edifice falls within the same period on account of defects in
the construction or the use of materials of inferior quality furnished by him, or due to any violation of the
terms of the contract. If the engineer or architect supervises the construction, he shall be solidarily
liable with the contractor.
Acceptance of the building, after completion, does not imply waiver of any of the causes of action by
reason of any defect mentioned in the preceding paragraph.
The action must be brought within ten years following the collapse of the building.”
On the other hand, generally, no person is responsible for a fortuitous event.
BUT if upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act of God, there concurs a corresponding fraud,
negligence, delay or violation or contravention in any manner of the tenor of the obligation as provided
for in Article 1170 of the Civil Code, which results in loss or damage, the obligor cannot escape liability.
Defendants and third-party defendants are negligent. United Construction Co., Inc. was found to have
made substantial deviations from the plans and specifications. and to have failed to observe the
requisite workmanship in the construction as well as to exercise the requisite degree of supervision;
while the third-party defendants were found to have inadequacies or defects in the plans and
specifications prepared by them.

PBA sued United and Carlos, which in turn

sued architects Nakpil & Sons, and Nakpil.

A Commissioner appointed by the court

found that: while the damage sustained by
the PBA building was caused directly by
the August 2, 1968 earthquake whose
magnitude was estimated at 7.3 they were
also caused by the defects in the plans and
specifications prepared by the third-party
defendants' architects, deviations from said
plans and specifications by the defendant
contractors and failure of the latter to
observe the requisite workmanship in the
construction of the building and of the
contractors, architects and even the
 owners to exercise the requisite degree of
supervision in the construction of subject
building. The RTC adopted the findings
except the last part on the lack of
supervision by the owners as it had no
basis in law.

PARTNERSHIP

1. Existence
Yulo vs Yang Yang Chiao Seng wrote a letter to the The agreement was a sublease, not a partnership.
palintiff Mrs. Rosario U. Yulo, proposing the
(1959) formation of a partnership between them to The following are the requisites of partnership: (1) two or more persons who bind themselves to
run and operate a theatre. Pursuant to the contribute money, property, or industry to a common fund; (2) intention on the part of the partners to
above offer, which plaintiff evidently divide the profits among themselves. (Art. 1767, Civil Code.).
accepted, the parties executed a
partnership agreement establishing the In the first place, plaintiff did not furnish the supposed P20,000 capital. In the second place, she did not
"Yang & Company, Limited.” In June , furnish any help or intervention in the management of the theatre. In the third place, it does not appear
1946, they executed a supplementary that she has ever demanded from defendant any accounting of the expenses and earnings of the
agreement, extending the partnership for a business. Were she really a partner, her first concern should have been to find out how the business
period of three years beginning January 1, was progressing, whether the expenses were legitimate, whether the earnings were correct, etc. She
1948 to December 31, 1950. was absolutely silent with respect to any of the acts that a partner should have done; all that she did
The land on which the theatre was was to receive her share of P3,000 a month, which can not be interpreted in any manner than a
constructed was leased by plaintiff Mrs. payment for the use of the premises which she had leased from the owners. Clearly, plaintiff had
Yulo. The lessor terminated the lease in always acted in accordance with the original letter of defendant of June 17, 1945 which shows that both
accordance with the agreement of the parties considered this offer as the real contract between them.
parties. Yulo refused to vacate so an
ejectment suit was filed against her. Yulo Findings of trial court affirmed by the Supreme Court: the plaintiff and the defendant because defendant
eventually lost the case. has not actually contributed the sum mentioned in the Articles of Partnership, or any other amount; that
On October 27, 1950, Mrs. Yulo demanded the real agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant is not of the partnership but one of the lease
from Yang Chiao Seng her share in the for the reason that under the agreement the plaintiff did not share either in the profits or in the losses of
profits of the business. Yang answered the the business as required by Article 1769 of the Civil Code; and that the fact that plaintiff was granted a
letter saying that upon the advice of his "guaranteed participation" in the profits also belies the supposed existence of a partnership between
counsel he had to suspend the payment (of them.
the rentals) because of the pendency of the
ejectment suit by the owners of the land
against Mrs. Yulo. In this letter Yang
alleges that inasmuch as he is a sublessee
and inasmuch as Mrs. Yulo has not paid to
the lessors the rentals from August, 1949,
he was retaining the rentals to make good
to the landowners the rentals due from Mrs.
Yulo in arrears.
Yulo sued Yang.
Yang’s defense: the contract between Yulo
and Yang is not one of partnership but a
lease. It was made to appear to be a
partnership because of the prohibition
against sublease in Yulo’s lease contract
with the original owners.
Heirs of Jose Lim vs Petitioners are heirs of Jose Lim (wife & Elfeldo is a partner.
Lim children). Respondent Julia is widow of
Jose’s eldest son Elfeldo.
(2010) Petitioners alleged that Jose an officer of a
sawmill company Sometime in 1980, Jose,
together with his friends Jimmy and
Norberto, formed a partnership to engage
in the trucking business. Initially, with a
contribution of P50,000.00 each, they
purchased a truck to be used in the hauling
and transport of lumber of the sawmill.
Jose managed the operations of this
trucking business until his death on August
15, 1981. Thereafter, Jose's heirs,
including Elfledo, and partners agreed to
continue the business under the
management of Elfledo. The shares in the
partnership profits and income that formed
part of the estate of Jose were held in trust
by Elfledo, with petitioners' authority for
Elfledo to use, purchase or acquire
properties using said funds.
Petitioners also alleged that, at that time,
Elfledo was a fresh commerce graduate
serving as his father’s driver in the trucking
business. He was never a partner or an
investor in the business and merely
supervised the purchase of additional
trucks using the income from the trucking
business of the partners. By the time the
partnership ceased, it had nine trucks,
which were all registered in Elfledo's name.
Elfeldo also bought several properties
allegedly using profits from the partnership.
Julia claimed that Elfeldo was a partner of
Norberto and Jimmy.
J. Tiosejo v. Sps. J. Tiosejo Investment Corp entered into a
Aug JVA with Primetown Property for the
development of a residential condo project.
(2010) PPGI entered into a contract to sell with the
spouses Ang for one of the units.
The spouses Ang filed against J. Tiosejo
and PPGI for rescission of the contract due
to their failure to turn over the unit since the
project was not completed.
J. Tiosejo asserts that it has no liability to
the spouses Ang since it was not privy to
the contract to sell entered into by them
and PPGI.
A partnership exists when two or more persons agree to place their money, effects, labor, and skill in
lawful commerce or business, with the understanding that there shall be a proportionate sharing of the
profits and losses among them. A contract of partnership is defined by the Civil Code as one where two
or more persons bind themselves to contribute money, property, or industry to a common fund, with the
intention of dividing the profits among themselves.
Art. 1769. In determining whether a partnership exists, these rules shall apply:
(1) Except as provided by Article 1825, persons who are not partners as to each other are not
partners as to third persons;
(2) Co-ownership or co-possession does not of itself establish a partnership, whether such co-
owners or co-possessors do or do not share any profits made by the use of the property;
(3) The sharing of gross returns does not of itself establish a partnership, whether or not the
persons sharing them have a joint or common right or interest in any property from which the returns
are derived;
(4) The receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a business is a prima facie evidence that he
is a partner in the business, but no such inference shall be drawn if such profits were received in
payment:
(a) As a debt by installments or otherwise;
(b) As wages of an employee or rent to a landlord;
(c) As an annuity to a widow or representative of a deceased partner;
(d) As interest on a loan, though the amount of payment vary with the profits of the business;
(e) As the consideration for the sale of a goodwill of a business or other property by installments or
otherwise.
Evidence on Elfeldo being a partner: 1) Cresencia (Jose’s wife)testified that Jose gave
Elfledo P50,000.00, as share in the partnership, on a date that coincided with the payment of the initial
capital in the partnership; (2) Elfledo ran the affairs of the partnership, wielding absolute control, power
and authority, without any intervention or opposition whatsoever from any of petitioners herein; (3) all
of the properties, particularly the nine trucks of the partnership, were registered in the name of Elfledo;
(4) Jimmy testified that Elfledo did not receive wages or salaries from the partnership, indicating that
what he actually received were shares of the profits of the business; and (5) none of the petitioners, as
heirs of Jose, the alleged partner, demanded periodic accounting from Elfledo during his lifetime.
Petitioner is also liable to the spouses Ang.
Viewed in the light of the JVA, petitioner cannot avoid liability by claiming that it was not in any way
privy to the Contracts to Sell executed by PPGI and respondents. As correctly argued by the latter,
moreover, a joint venture is considered in this jurisdiction as a form of partnership and is, accordingly,
governed by the law of partnerships.[54] Under Article 1824 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, all
partners are solidarily liable with the partnership for everything chargeable to the partnership, including
loss or injury caused to a third person or penalties incurred due to any wrongful act or omission of any
partner acting in the ordinary course of the business of the partnership or with the authority of his co-
partners.[55] Whether innocent or guilty, all the partners are solidarily liable with the partnership itself.
Realubit v Jaso petitioner Josefina Realubit (Josefina)
entered into a Joint Venture
Agreement with Francis Eric Amaury
(2011) Biondo (Biondo), a French national, for the
operation of an ice manufacturing
business. Subsequently, Biondo
transferred his rights and interests in the
business to Jaso.
Jaso apprised Josefina of his acquisition
and formally demanded an accounting and
inventory of the business as well as the
remittance of their portion of its profits.
Failing to heed his demand, he filed a suit
against Josefina.
Josefina contends that the ice trading
business is under a single proprietorship
and the business already stopped
operations and that the transfer without her
consent is invalid.
2. NCC 1797, 1799-1803, 1816-1824
Island Sales v the defendant company, a general
Pioneers partnership duly registered under the laws
of the Philippines, purchased from the
plaintiff a motor vehicle with the condition
(1975) that failure to pay any of said installments
as they fall due would render the whole
unpaid balance immediately due and
demandable.
Having failed to receive the installment due
on July 22, 1961, the plaintiff sued the
defendant company for the unpaid balance.
Of the 5 general partners, the complaint
was dismissed insofar as Lumauig was
concerned, on motion by the plaintiff.
The other partners contend that the
dismissal against Lumauig should also
benefit them.
3. NCC 1832-1834
Singson v Isabela Isabela Sawmill was formed by partners
Sawmil Leon Garibay, Margarita G. Saldejeno, and
Timoteo Tubungbanua. Saldajeno withdrew
(1979) from the partnership and after dissolution,
Garibay and Timoteo continued the
The transfer of Biondo’s share of the partnership to Jaso is valid although it does not make hima
partner.
Generally understood to mean an organization formed for some temporary purpose, a joint venture is
likened to a particular partnership or one which “has for its object determinate things, their use or fruits,
or a specific undertaking, or the exercise of a profession or vocation.”[27] The rule is settled that joint
ventures are governed by the law on partnerships[28] which are, in turn, based on mutual agency or
delectus personae.
Under CC 1813, “(t)he transfer by a partner of his partnership interest does not make the assignee of
such interest a partner of the firm, nor entitle the assignee to interfere in the management of the
partnership business or to receive anything except the assignee’s profits. The assignment does not
purport to transfer an interest in the partnership, but only a future contingent right to a portion of the
ultimate residue as the assignor may become entitled to receive by virtue of his proportionate interest in
the capital.
the Spouses Jaso are entitled to Biondo’s share in the profits, despite Juanita’s lack of consent to the
assignment of said Frenchman’s interest in the joint venture.
The liability of the other partners are not extinguished.
Under CC 1816, All partners including industrial ones, shall be liable pro rata with all their property and
after all the partnership assets have been exhausted, for the contracts which may be entered into in the
name and for the account of the partnership, under its signature and by a person authorized to act for
the partnership. However, any partner may enter into a separate obligation to perform a partnership
contract.
In the instant case, there were five (5) general partners when the promissory note in question was
executed for and in behalf of the partnership. Since the liability of the partners is pro rata, the liability of
the appellant Benjamin C. Daco shall be limited to only one-fifth ( 1/ 5 ) of the obligations of the
defendant company. The fact that the complaint against the defendant Romulo B. Lumauig was
dismissed, upon motion of the plaintiff, does not unmake the said Lumauig as a general partner in the
defendant company. In so moving to dismiss the complaint, the plaintiff merely condoned Lumauig's
individual liability to the plaintiff.
The remaining partners did not terminate the business of the partnership "Isabela Sawmill". Instead of
winding up the business of the partnership, they continued the business still in the name of said
partnership. It is expressly stipulated in the memorandum-agreement that the remaining partners had
constituted themselves as the partnership entity, the "Isabela Sawmill". 20
 business still under the name Isabela
Sawmill. The partnership is indebted to
various creditors. The Sheriff sold the
assets of Isabela Sawmillt to Saldajeno
was subsequently sold to a separate
company.
The issue is whether or not the
partnership’s termination resulted in its
dissolution
4. NCC 1844, 1852
AGENCY
1. Scope of Authority
NFA v IAC Medalla, as commission agent of the
plaintiff Superior Shipping Corporation,
(1990) entered into a contract for hire of ship
known as "MV Sea Runner" with defendant
National Grains Authority (formerly NFA).
Under the said contract Medalla obligated
to transport on the "MV Sea Runner" 8,550
sacks of rice belonging to defendant
National Grains Authority from the port of
San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, to Malabon,
Metro Manila.
Upon completion of the delivery of rice at
its destination, plaintiff requested payment
from defendant NGA. Defendant NGA
informed plaintiff that it could not grant its
request because the contract to transport
the rice was entered into by defendant
NGA and defendant Medalla who did not
disclose that he was acting as a mere
agent of plaintiff. Defendant NGA paid
There was no liquidation of the assets of the partnership. The remaining partners, Leon Garibay and
Timoteo Tubungbanua, continued doing the business of the partnership in the name of "Isabela
Sawmill". They used the properties of said partnership.
It does not appear that the withdrawal of Margarita G. Saldajeno from the partnership was published in
the newspapers. The appellees and the public in general had a right to expect that whatever, credit
they extended to Leon Garibay and Timoteo Tubungbanua doing the business in the name of the
partnership "Isabela Sawmill" could be enforced against the proeprties of said partnership. The judicial
foreclosure of the chattel mortgage executed in favor of Margarita G. Saldajeno did not relieve her from
liability to the creditors of the partnership.
Although it may be presumed that Margarita G. Saldajeno had action in good faith, the appellees aslo
acted in good faith in extending credit to the partnership. Where one of two innocent persons must
suffer, that person who gave occasion for the damages to be caused must bear the consequences.
Had Margarita G. Saldajeno not entered into the memorandum-agreement allowing Leon Garibay and
Timoteo Tubungbanua to continue doing the business of the aprtnership, the applees would not have
been misled into thinking that they were still dealing with the partnership "Isabela Sawmill". Under the
facts, it is of no moment that technically speaking the partnership "Isabela Sawmill" was dissolved by
the withdrawal therefrom of Margarita G. Saldajeno. The partnership was not terminated and it
continued doping business through the two remaining partners.
Petitioner NFA's contention holds no water. It is an undisputed fact that Gil Medalla was a commission
agent of respondent Superior Shipping Corporation which owned the vessel "MV Sea Runner" that
transported the sacks of rice belonging to petitioner NFA. The context of the law is clear. Art. 1883,
which is the applicable law in the case at bar provides:
Art. 1883. If an agent acts in his own name, the principal has no right of action against
the persons with whom the agent has contracted; neither have such persons against the
principal.
In such case the agent is the one directly bound in favor of the person with whom he has
contracted, as if the transaction were his own, except when the contract involves things
belonging to the principal.
The provision of this article shall be understood to be without prejudice to the actions between the
principal and agent.
Consequently, when things belonging to the principal (in this case, Superior Shipping Corporation) are
dealt with, the agent is bound to the principal although he does not assume the character of such agent
and appears acting in his own name. In other words, the agent's apparent representation yields to the
principal's true representation and that, in reality and in effect, the contract must be considered as
entered into between the principal and the third person (Sy Juco and Viardo v. Sy Juco, 40 Phil. 634).
 defendant Medalla the sum of P25,974.90, Corollarily, if the principal can be obliged to perform his duties under the contract, then it can also
for freight services in connection with the demand the enforcement of its rights arising from the contract.
shipment of 8,550 sacks of rice.

It is contended by petitioner NFA that it is

not liable under the exception to the rule
(Art. 1883) since it had no knowledge of the
fact of agency between respondent
Superior Shipping and Medalla at the time
when the contract was entered into
between them (NFA and Medalla).
Petitioner submits that "(A)n undisclosed
principal cannot maintain an action upon a
contract made by his agent unless such
principal was disclosed in such contract.
One who deals with an agent acquires no
right against the undisclosed principal."
Urban Bank v Pena ISCI was the owner of property along I. There was a contract of agency with Urban Bank and Atty. Pena
Roxas Boulevard that was leased to
several tenants who in turn subleased the Peña is entitled to payment for compensation for services rendered as agent of Urban Bank, but on the
(2011) property in violation of the contract of basis of the principles of unjust enrichment and quantum meruit, and not on the purported oral contract.
lease. The 23 sublesees operated several
establishments on the property including In a contract of agency, agents bind themselves to render some service or to do something in
beer houses and the like. ISCI sold the representation or on behalf of the principal, with the consent or authority of the latter. The basis of the
property to Urban Bank. Both parties civil law relationship of agency is representation, the elements of which include the following: (a) the
agreed that the final installment of relationship is established by the parties’ consent, express or implied; (b) the object is the execution of
PhP25,000,000 would be released by the a juridical act in relation to a third person; (c) agents act as representatives and not for themselves; and
bank upon ISCI’s delivery of full and actual (d) agents act within the scope of their authority.
possession of the land, free from any
tenants. Based on the evidence on records and the proceedings below, the Court concludes that Urban Bank
constituted Atty. Peña as its agent to secure possession of the Pasay property. This conclusion,
Atty. Peña, a stockholder and director of however, is not determinative of the basis of the amount of payment that must be made to him by the
ISCI, was instructed by ISCI to recover bank. The context in which the agency was created lays the basis for the amount of compensation Atty.
possession of the property from the Peña is entitled to.
sublessees. Atty, Pena requested Urban
Bank for authority to get rid of the The transactional history and context of the sale between ISCI and Urban Bank of the Pasay property,
sublessees as an agent of the latter. In and Atty. Peña’s participation in the transfer of possession thereof to Urban Bank provide crucial
response to the letters the bank advised linkages that establish the nature of the relationship between the lawyer and the landowner-bank.
Peña that the bank had noted the
engagement of his services by ISCI and The letter of 19 December 1994 described in the facts confirmed the agency. In any case, the
stressed that ISCI remained as the lawyer’s subsequent actions of Urban Bank resulted in the ratification of Peña’s authority as an agent acting on
principal. But in a later letter (19 December its behalf with respect to the Pasay property.
1994 Letter), Urban Bank confirmed in no
uncertain terms Peña’s designation as its Urban Bank did not repudiate the actions of Peña, even if it was fully aware of his representations to
authorized representative to secure and third parties on its behalf as owner of the Pasay property. Its tacit acquiescence to his dealings with
maintain possession of the Pasay property respect to the Pasay property and the tenants spoke of its intent to ratify his actions, as if these were its
against the tenants. Under the terms of the own. Even assuming arguendo that it issued no written authority, and that the oral contract was not
letter, petitioner-respondent bank substantially established, the bank duly ratified his acts as its agent by its acquiescence and
confirmed his engagement (a) "to hold and acceptance of the benefits, namely, the peaceful turnover of possession of the property free from sub-
maintain possession" of the Pasay tenants.
property; (b) "to protect the same from
former tenants, occupants or any other II. Atty Pena was also an agent of ISCI; the 10% attorney’s fees was invalid
person who are threatening to return to the
said property and/or interfere with your
possession of the said property for and in
our behalf"; and (c) to represent the bank in
any instituted court action intended to
prevent any intruder from entering or
staying in the premises
In an alleged telephone conversation,
respondent Borlongan allegedly asked
Peña to maintain possession of the Pasay
property and to represent Urban Bank in
any legal action that might be instituted
relative to the property. Peña supposedly
demanded 10% of the market value of the
property as compensation and attorney’s
fees and reimbursement for all the
expenses incurred from the time he took
over land until possession was turned over
to Urban Bank. Respondent Borlongan
purportedly agreed on condition that
possession would be turned over to the
bank, free of tenants, not later than four
months; otherwise, Peña would lose the
10% compensation and attorney’s fees.
RTC: Atty. Peña should be believed when
he testified that in a telephone
conversation, the president of Urban Bank,
Teodoro Borlongan, a respondent herein,
agreed to pay him for his services 10% of
the value of the property then worth
PhP240,000,000, or PhP24,000,000. Costs
and other awards additionally amount to
PhP4,500,000, for a total award of
PhP28,500,000 according to the trial court.
CA: such an award has no basis, as in fact,
no contract of agency exists between Atty.
Peña and Urban Bank. Hence, Atty. Peña
should only be recompensed according to
the principle of unjust enrichment, and that
he should be awarded the amount of
PhP3,000,000 only for his services and
reimbursements of costs.
The disparity in the size of the award given
by the trial court vis-à-vis that of the Court
of Appeals (PhP28,500,000 v.
PhP3,000,000) must be placed in the
context of the service that Atty. Peña
proved that he rendered for Urban Bank.
The evidence does not support Peña’s claim that Urban Bank agreed to "attorney’s fees and
compensation" of 10% of the market value of the property.
Even if, however, Peña was constituted as the agent of Urban Bank, it does not necessarily preclude
that a third party would be liable for the payment of the agency fee of Peña. Nor does it preclude the
legal fact that Peña while an agent of Urban Bank, was also an agent of ISCI, and that his agency from
the latter never terminated. This is because the authority given to Peña by both ISCI and Urban Bank
was common – to secure the clean possession of the property so that it may be turned over to Urban
Bank. This is an ordinary legal phenomenon – that an agent would be an agent for the purpose of
pursuing a shared goal so that the common objective of a transferor and a new transferee would be
met.
Indeed, the Civil Code expressly acknowledged instances when two or more principals have granted a
power of attorney to an agent for a common transaction. The agency relationship between an agent
and two principals may even be considered extinguished if the object or the purpose of the agency is
accomplished. In this case, Peña’s services as an agent of both ISCI and Urban Bank were engaged
for one shared purpose or transaction, which was to deliver the property free from unauthorized sub-
tenants to the new owner – a task that Peña was able to achieve and is entitled to receive payment for.
That the agency between ISCI and Peña continued, that ISCI is to shoulder the agency fee and
reimbursement for costs of Peña, and that Urban Bank never agreed to pay him a 10% agency fee is
established and supported by the following:
First, the initial agency relationship between ISCI and Peña persisted. No proof was ever offered that
the letter of ISCI to Peña, for the latter "to immediately recover and take possession of the property
upon expiration of the contract of lease on 29 November 1994" was terminated. It is axiomatic that the
appointment of a new agent for the same business or transaction revokes the previous agency from the
day on which notice thereof was given to the former agent. If it is true that the agency relationship was
to be borne by Urban Bank alone, Peña should have demonstrated that his previous agency
relationship with ISCI is incompatible with his new relationship with Urban Bank, and was thus
terminated.
Second, instead, what is on the record is that ISCI confirmed the continuation of this agency between
Peña and itself and committed to pay for the services of Peña.
Third, Peña has never shown any written confirmation of his 10% agency fee, whether in a note, letter,
memorandum or board resolution of Urban Bank.
Fourth, Peña is not a credible witness for testifying that he only learned of the sale of the property of 19
December 1994 when the acts of ISCI, of Urban Bank and his own up to that point all indicated that he
must have known about the sale to Urban Bank; and (b) it is incredible that Urban Bank will agree to
add another PhP24,000,000 to the cost of the property by agreeing to the agency fee demanded by
Peña. No prudent and reasonable person would agree to expose his corporation to a new liability of
PhP24,000,000 even if, in this case, a refusal would lead to the Pasay City policemen and
unauthorized sub-tenants entering the guarded property and would possibly erupt in violence.
III. Amount of Compensation
Agency is presumed to be for compensation. But because in this case we find no evidence that Urban
Bank agreed to pay Peña a specific amount or percentage of amount for his services, we turn to the
principle against unjust enrichment and on the basis of quantum meruit. Since there was no written
agreement with respect to the compensation due and owed to Atty. Peña under the letter dated 19
 As the records bear, Atty. Peña’s services
consisted of causing the departure of
unauthorized sub-tenants in twenty-three
commercial establishments in an
entertainment compound along Roxas
Boulevard. It involved the filing of ejectment
suits against them, Peña’s personal
defense in the counter-suits filed against
him, his settlement with them to the tune of
PhP1,500,000, which he advanced from his
own funds, and his retention of security
guards and expenditure for other costs
amounting to more or less PhP1,500,000.
There is no claim by Atty. Peña of any
service beyond those. He claims damages
from the threats to his life and safety from
the angry tenants, as well as a vexatious
collection suit he had to face from a
creditor-friend from whom he borrowed
PhP3,000,000 to finance the expenses for
the services he rendered Urban Bank.
Viloria v Continental While in the United States, Fernando
purchased from HOLIDAY TRAVEL, for
(2012) himself and his wife, Lourdes, two (2)
round trip airline tickets from San Diego,
California to Newark, New Jersey on board
Continental Airlines. He was attended to by
a certain Margaret Mager (Mager).
According to Spouses Viloria, Fernando
agreed to buy the said tickets after Mager
informed them that there were no available
seats at Amtrak, an intercity passenger
train service provider in the United States.
Subsequently, Fernando requested Mager
to reschedule their flight to Newark to an
earlier date. Mager informed him that flights
to Newark via Continental Airlines were
already fully booked and offered the
alternative of a round trip flight via Frontier
Air. Since flying with Frontier Air called for
a higher fare of US$526.00 per passenger
and would mean traveling by night,
Fernando opted to request for a refund.
Mager, however, denied his request as the
December 1994, the Court will resort to determining the amount based on the well-established rules on
quantum meruit.
In this instance, no extra-ordinary skills employing advanced legal training nor sophisticated legal
maneuvering were required to be employed in ejecting 23 sub-tenants who have no lease contract with
the property owner, and whose only authority to enter the premises was unlawfully given by a former
tenant whose own tenancy has clearly expired. The 23 sub-tenants operated beer houses and
nightclubs, ordinary retail establishments for which no sophisticated structure prevented easy entry.
Indeed, it appears that only security guards, chains and padlocks were needed to keep the sublessees
out. It was only the alleged connivance of Pasay City policemen that Peña’s ability to retain the
possession was rendered insecure. And how much did it take Peña to enter into a settlement
agreement with them and make all these problems go away? By Peña’s own account, PhP1,500,000
only. That means that each tenant received an average of PhP65,217.40 only. Surely, the legal
services of Peña cannot be much more than what the sub-tenants were willing to settle for in the first
place. We therefore award him the equivalent amount of PhP1,500,000 for the legal and other related
services he rendered to eject the illegally staying tenants of Urban Bank’s property.
In any case, 10% of the purchase price of the Pasay property – a staggering PhP24,161,200 – is an
unconscionable amount, which we find reason to reduce. Neither will the Court accede to the
settlement offer of Peña to Urban Bank of at least PhP38,000,000 for alleged legal expenses incurred
during the course of the proceedings an amount that he has not substantiated at any time.
Hence, the Court affirms the appellate court’s award of PhP3,000,000 to Peña, for expenses incurred
corresponding to the performance of his services. An additional award of PhP1,500,000 is granted to
him for the services he performed as a lawyer in securing the rights of Urban Bank as owner of the
Pasay property.
(Digester’s Note: This digest is lengthy because the original case is 46 pages long in Word)
I. A principal-agent relationship exists between CAI and Holiday Travel.
The essential elements of agency are: (1) there is consent, express or implied of the parties to
establish the relationship; (2) the object is the execution of a juridical act in relation to a third person; (3)
the agent acts as a representative and not for himself, and (4) the agent acts within the scope of his
authority.
Contrary to the findings of the CA, all the elements of an agency exist in this case. The first and second
elements are present as CAI does not deny that it concluded an agreement with Holiday Travel,
whereby Holiday Travel would enter into contracts of carriage with third persons on CAI’s behalf. The
third element is also present as it is undisputed that Holiday Travel merely acted in a representative
capacity and it is CAI and not Holiday Travel who is bound by the contracts of carriage entered into by
Holiday Travel on its behalf. The fourth element is also present considering that CAI has not made any
allegation that Holiday Travel exceeded the authority that was granted to it. In fact, CAI consistently
maintains the validity of the contracts of carriage that Holiday Travel executed with Spouses Viloria and
that Mager was not guilty of any fraudulent misrepresentation. That CAI admits the authority of Holiday
Travel to enter into contracts of carriage on its behalf is easily discernible from its February 24, 1998
and March 24, 1998 letters, where it impliedly recognized the validity of the contracts entered into by
Holiday Travel with Spouses Viloria. When Fernando informed CAI that it was Holiday Travel who
issued to them the subject tickets, CAI did not deny that Holiday Travel is its authorized agent.
Prior to Spouses Viloria’s filing of a complaint against it, CAI never refuted that it gave Holiday Travel
the power and authority to conclude contracts of carriage on its behalf. As clearly extant from the
records, CAI recognized the validity of the contracts of carriage that Holiday Travel entered into with
Spouses Viloria and considered itself bound with Spouses Viloria by the terms and conditions thereof;
and this constitutes an unequivocal testament to Holiday Travel’s authority to act as its agent. This
subject tickets are non-refundable and the
only option that Continental Airlines can
offer is the re-issuance of new tickets within
one (1) year from the date the subject
tickets were issued. Fernando decided to
reserve two (2) seats with Frontier Air.
As he was having second thoughts on
traveling via Frontier Air, Fernando went to
the Greyhound Station where he saw an
Amtrak station nearby. Fernando made
inquiries and was told that there are seats
available and he can travel on Amtrak
anytime and any day he pleased. Fernando
then purchased two (2) tickets for
Washington, D.C.
From Amtrak, Fernando went to Holiday
Travel and confronted Mager with the
Amtrak tickets, telling her that she had
misled them into buying the Continental
Airlines tickets by misrepresenting that
Amtrak was already fully booked. Fernando
reiterated his demand for a refund but
Mager was firm in her position that the
subject tickets are non-refundable.
Upon returning to the Philippines,
Fernando sent a letter to CAI demanding a
refund and alleging that Mager had
deluded them into purchasing the subject
tickets.
Continental Micronesia denied Fernando’s
request for a refund and advised him that
he may take the subject tickets to any
Continental ticketing location for the re-
issuance of new tickets within two (2) years
from the date they were issued. Continental
Micronesia informed Fernando that the
subject tickets may be used as a form of
payment for the purchase of another
Continental ticket, albeit with a re-issuance
fee.
Fernando went to Continental’s ticketing
office at Ayala Avenue, Makati City to have
the subject tickets replaced by a single
round trip ticket to Los Angeles, California
under his name. Therein, Fernando was
informed that Lourdes’ ticket was non-
transferable, thus, cannot be used for the
Court cannot therefore allow CAI to take an altogether different position and deny that Holiday Travel is
its agent without condoning or giving imprimatur to whatever damage or prejudice that may result from
such denial or retraction to Spouses Viloria, who relied on good faith on CAI’s acts in recognition of
Holiday Travel’s authority. Estoppel is primarily based on the doctrine of good faith and the avoidance
of harm that will befall an innocent party due to its injurious reliance, the failure to apply it in this case
would result in gross travesty of justice. Estoppel bars CAI from making such denial.
Considering that the fundamental hallmarks of an agency are present, this Court finds it rather peculiar
that the CA had branded the contractual relationship between CAI and Holiday Travel as one of sale.
The distinctions between a sale and an agency are not difficult to discern and this Court, as early as
1970, had already formulated the guidelines that would aid in differentiating the two (2) contracts.
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Constantino,21 this Court extrapolated that the primordial
differentiating consideration between the two (2) contracts is the transfer of ownership or title over the
property subject of the contract. In an agency, the principal retains ownership and control over the
property and the agent merely acts on the principal’s behalf and under his instructions in furtherance of
the objectives for which the agency was established. On the other hand, the contract is clearly a sale if
the parties intended that the delivery of the property will effect a relinquishment of title, control and
ownership in such a way that the recipient may do with the property as he pleases.
II. In actions based on quasi-delict, a principal can only be held liable for the tort committed by
its agent’s employees if it has been established by preponderance of evidence that the principal
was also at fault or negligent or that the principal exercise control and supervision over them.
An examination of this Court’s pronouncements in China Air Lines will reveal that an airline company is
not completely exonerated from any liability for the tort committed by its agent’s employees. A prior
determination of the nature of the passenger’s cause of action is necessary.
If the passenger’s cause of action against the airline company is premised on culpa aquiliana or quasi-
delict for a tort committed by the employee of the airline company’s agent, there must be an
independent showing that the airline company was at fault or negligent or has contributed to the
negligence or tortuous conduct committed by the employee of its agent. The mere fact that the
employee of the airline company’s agent has committed a tort is not sufficient to hold the airline
company liable. There is novinculum juris between the airline company and its agent’s employees and
the contractual relationship between the airline company and its agent does not operate to create a
juridical tie between the airline company and its agent’s employees. Article 2180 of the Civil Code does
not make the principal vicariously liable for the tort committed by its agent’s employees and the
principal-agency relationshipper se does not make the principal a party to such tort; hence, the need to
prove the principal’s own fault or negligence.
On the other hand, if the passenger’s cause of action for damages against the airline company is based
on contractual breach or culpa contractual, it is not necessary that there be evidence of the airline
company’s fault or negligence. As this Court previously stated in China Air Lines and reiterated in Air
France vs. Gillego, "in an action based on a breach of contract of carriage, the aggrieved party does
not have to prove that the common carrier was at fault or was negligent. All that he has to prove is the
existence of the contract and the fact of its non-performance by the carrier."
Spouses Viloria’s cause of action on the basis of Mager’s alleged fraudulent misrepresentation is
clearly one of tort or quasi-delict, there being no pre-existing contractual relationship between them.
Therefore, it was incumbent upon Spouses Viloria to prove that CAI was equally at fault.
However, the records are devoid of any evidence by which CAI’s alleged liability can be substantiated.
Apart from their claim that CAI must be held liable for Mager’s supposed fraud because Holiday Travel
is CAI’s agent, Spouses Viloria did not present evidence that CAI was a party or had contributed to
 purchase of a ticket in his favor. He was
also informed that a round trip ticket to Los
Angeles was US$1,867.40 so he would
have to pay what will not be covered by the
value of his San Diego to Newark round trip
ticket.
Mager’s complained act either by instructing or authorizing Holiday Travel and Mager to issue the said
misrepresentation.
A person’s vicarious liability is anchored on his possession of control, whether absolute or limited, on
the tortfeasor. Without such control, there is nothing which could justify extending the liability to a
person other than the one who committed the tort.

In a letter dated June 21, 1999, Fernando It is incumbent upon Spouses Viloria to prove that CAI exercised control or supervision over Mager by
demanded for the refund of the subject preponderant evidence. The existence of control or supervision cannot be presumed and CAI is under
tickets as he no longer wished to have no obligation to prove its denial or nugatory assertion.
them replaced. In addition to the dubious
circumstances under which the subject Therefore, without a modicum of evidence that CAI exercised control over Holiday Travel’s employees
tickets were issued, Fernando claimed that or that CAI was equally at fault, no liability can be imposed on CAI for Mager’s supposed
CAI’s act of charging him with US$1,867.40 misrepresentation.
for a round trip ticket to Los Angeles, which
other airlines priced at US$856.00, and
refusal to allow him to use Lourdes’ ticket,
breached its undertaking under its March
24, 1998 letter.

Fernando and his wife filed a complaint

against CAI, praying that CAI be ordered to
refund the money they used in the
purchase of the subject tickets with legal
interest.

2. Extinguishment
Dela Rama v Tan An agreement was entered into on 1949 ISSUE: WON De la Rama can demand from NDC to refrain from using the names of the three vessels?
between the De la Rama Steamship Co.
(1956) Inc. and the National Development Yes. To permit NDC to continue using the names would be to countenance the unlawful appropriation
Company (NDC) whereby De la Rama of the benefit of a goodwill which De la Rama has acquired as a result of the continued usage and large
undertook the management of the three expense; it would be tantamount to permitting NDC to grab the reputation or goodwill of the business of
vessels known as "Doña Aurora," "Doña another.
Nati" and "Doña Alicia" which had been
purchased by the Philippine Government
from Japan with the advise and technical
supervision of De la Rama. In the
management contract, it was provided that
De la Rama had the option to buy the
vessels at the fifth year ff the purchase and
delivery of each of the vessels at a price
which is to consist of the cost price of each
vessel, plus such expenses as De la Rama
may have incurred in connection with the
construction, outfitting, provisioning and
operation thereof; but should De la Rama
fail to exercise the right of option it should
be reimbursed of the expenses it incurred
in manning, equipping, fueling, overhauling
and repairing the vessels, and the payment
of loading commission discharging
 commission, overriding commission sub-
agent's commission, etc.

The NDC cancel the general agency that it

had granted to De La Rama upon one
year’s notice. This was opposed by De La
Rama, which alleged that it had been
granted the option to purchase the vessels.
The Court however upheld the right of the
NDC to cancel the management contract
and the option of De la Rama to purchase
the vessels was rendered ineffective.

PEREZ v. PNB V. Perez mortgaged a Lot to PNB, Bacolod The argument that foreclosure by the Bank under its power of sale is barred upon death of the debtor,
Branch, to secure payment of a loan. V. because agency is extinguished by the death of the principal (under Art. 1732 of Civil Code of 1889
(1966) Perez later died intestate, survived by his and NCC 1919) neglects to take into account that the power to foreclose is not an ordinary agency (that
widow and children (Petitioners). At that contemplates exclusively the representation of the principal by the agent) but is primarily an authority
time, P1,917.00 had not yet been paid. conferred upon the mortgagee for the latter's own protection.
PNB, pursuant to authority granted it in the It is, in fact, an ancillary stipulation supported by the same causa or consideration for the mortgage and
mortgage deed, caused the mortgaged forms an essential and inseparable part of that bilateral agreement. The power to foreclose
properties to be extrajudicially foreclosed. extrajudicially survives the death of the mortgagor, even under the law prior to the Civil Code of the
The Provincial Sheriff accordingly sold the Philippines now in force.
Lot at auction and was purchased by PNB.
After the lapse of the year of redemption, a
TCT over it was issued in the name of the
Bank.
3mos. later, Petitioners filed suit against
PNB for the annulment of the extra-judicial
foreclosure sale as well as to recover
damages. Trial court held that the Bank
should have foreclosed its mortgage in
court; that the power to sell contained in
the deed of mortgage had terminated upon
the death of the mortgagor.

LIM v. SABAN E. Ybañez owned a Lot. He entered into an
Agency Agreement with Saban. Under the
(2004) Agreement, Ybañez authorized Saban to
look for a buyer of the lot for P200,000.00
and to mark up the price to include the
amounts needed for payment of taxes, etc.
and Saban’s commission for the sale.
Saban was able to sell the lot to Lim and
the Spouses Lim. The price as indicated in
the Deed is P200,000.00; however, the
vendees paid P600,000.00. Lim issued in
the name of Saban 4 postdated checks in
The agency was not revoked since Ybañez requested Lim to make stop payment orders only after the
consummation of the sale. At that time, Saban had already performed his obligation as Ybañez’s agent
when, through Saban’s efforts, Ybañez executed the Deed of Absolute Sale of the lot with Lim and the
Spouses Lim. To deprive Saban of his commission over a sale which was consummated through his
efforts would be a breach of the contract of agency, which expressly states that Saban would be
entitled to any excess in the purchase price after deducting the P200,000.00 due to Ybañez and other
charges.
The SC has recognized the right of a broker to his commission for finding a suitable buyer even though
the seller himself consummated the sale with the buyer. The Court held that it would be in the height of
injustice to permit the principal to terminate the contract of agency to the prejudice of the broker when
he had already reaped the benefits of the broker’s efforts.
However, Saban’s agency was not coupled with an interest. An agency is coupled with an interest
 the aggregate amount of P236,743.00. where it is established for the mutual benefit of the principal and of the agent, or for the interest of the
Ybañez sent a letter to Lim, asking that the principal and of third persons, and it cannot be revoked by the principal so long as the interest of the
checks to Saban be cancelled and to agent or of a third person subsists. When an agent’s interest is confined to earning his agreed
extend another partial payment for the lot in compensation, the agency is not one coupled with an interest, since an agent’s interest in obtaining his
his favor. After the checks were compensation as such agent is an ordinary incident of the agency relationship.
dishonored, Saban filed a Complaint for
collection against Ybañez and Lim. RTC
dismissed Saban’s complaint, declaring the
checks as stale and non-negotiable, and
absolving Lim from any liability towards
Saban.
CA reversed; it held that Saban was
entitled to his commission. It ruled that
Ybañez’s revocation of his contract of
agency with Saban was invalid because
the agency was coupled with an interest
and Ybañez effected the revocation in bad
faith in order to deprive Saban of his
commission and to keep the profits for
himself.

COMPROMISE

SAMONTE v. Plaintiffs and Defendants are the children Defendant Cayetano contended that a judgment based on the compromise agreement is no judgment
SAMONTE of Defendant Faustino by his first marriage. at all, invoking the doctrine in Saminiada vs. Mata, where SC ruled that “... A decision must state clearly
(1975) During this first marriage, they acquired and distinctly the facts and the law upon which it is based. Where the so-called "decision" embodying a
conjugal properties (3 lots) and a house. compromise agreement lacks these essentials of a judgment, it is not a decision.”
When his wife died, Faustino continued to However, the SC has ruled that the Saminiada vs. Mata case is no longer authority because the view
hold and administer the lots, together with that a decision based upon a compromise agreement does not become immediately final and
a his wife’s lot. With the income from the executory, was arrived at only by four members of the Supreme Court, which view is inconsistent with
properties, Faustino Samonte entered in what was adhered to in subsequent cases and the explicit provision of Article 2037 of the Civil Code.
long term leases of fishponds in Bulacan. Besides, even the four justices of the Supreme Court acknowledged, in the Saminiada case, that a
In their complaint, Plaintiffs claim that decision based upon a compromise agreement is a judgment.
Faustino contracted his second marriage Furthermore, there is no provision of law or any existing jurisprudence that has pronounced a
without liquidating the conjugal properties compromise agreement entered into by parties-litigants without being assisted by their counsel to be
and the income from his first marriage. null and void and of no legal effect. On the contrary, there is authority to the effect that the client is
They contend that whatever Faustino had generally conceded to have the exclusive control over the subject-matter of the litigation and may, at
acquired during his second marriage any time before judgment, if acting in good faith, compromise, settle and adjust his cause of action out
should be divided into two parts — one part of court without his attorney's intervention, knowledge, or consent.
to his children by the first marriage and the
other to form part of the conjugal
partnership between him and defendant
Lourdes Manuel.
Later, Plaintiffs and Defendants signed and
executed a compromise agreement –
Defendants paid Plaintiffs, and the latter
waived their claims. The Defendants also
distributed amongst themselves the
fishponds and the income from each one.
CFI approved the compromise agreement.
 Some Defendants filed a motion to
suspend the compromise agreement due to
misrepresentations by Faustino. This was
denied by the CFI.

PREFERENCE OF CREDIT

1. NCC 2241-2251
CARRIED LUMBER As security for a loan secured by Facoma The CFI was mistaken in assuming that the enumeration of ten claims, mortgages and liens in NCC
v. ACCFA from ACCFA, the Facoma mortgaged to 2242 creates an order of preference. It is not correct to say that the materialman's (mechanic's) lien or
(1975) ACCFA its lease rights over a lot and the refectionary credit, being listed as No. 4, is superior to the mortgage credit listed as No. 5. The
warehouse to be constructed. Also, enumeration is not an order of preference. That article lists the credits which may concur with respect
supplementary mortgages were executed to specific real properties and which would be satisfied pro rata according to NCC 2249.
by the Facoma as security for other loans The Facoma warehouse was constructed with the materials supplied by CLC and the construction was
which were used by it for the construction financed by ACCFA, which had loaned P27,200 to the Facoma. Therefore, it is just and proper that the
of a ricemill building. two creditors should have pro rata shares in that warehouse.
The Facoma defaulted, so at public The CFI relied on the Barretto ruling, which was predicated on the assumption that an insolvency
auction, the mortgaged properties were proceeding was necessary in order "to enable the court to ascertain the pro rata dividend
sold to ACCFA in 1960, and 4 days before corresponding to each" of the two creditors as well as the "other creditors" entitled to preference. This
the auction sale which the sheriff ruling is inapplicable because there are no other creditors aside from CLC and ACCFA.
conducted at the instance of CLC.
The Facoma had also failed to pay CLC, so
the latter sued the Facoma for collection.
The Sheriff levied upon the Facoma's lease
rights, warehouse and ricemill building.
ACCFA filed a third-party claim with the
Sheriff, however, it was still sold.
CLC sued ACCFA to assert its preferential
lien over the warehouse and ricemill
building. The CFI held that CLC has a lien
over the warehouse and ricemill building,
and that this lien was superior to ACCFA's
mortgage credit.
Consuelo Metal v. CMC filed before the SEC a petition to be If rehabilitation is no longer feasible and the assets of the corporation are finally liquidated, secured
Planters declared in a state of suspension of creditors shall enjoy preference over unsecured creditors, subject only to the provisions of the Civil
payment, for rehabilitation, and for the Code on concurrence and preference of credits. Creditors of secured obligations may pursue their
(2008) appointment of a rehabilitation receiver or security interest or lien, or they may choose to abandon the preference and prove their credits as
management committee under Section 5(d) ordinary claims.
of Presidential Decree No. 902-A. The
SEC, finding the petition sufficient in form In this case, Planters Bank, as a secured creditor, enjoys preference over a specific mortgaged
and substance, declared that "all actions property and has a right to foreclose the mortgage under Section 2248 of the Civil Code. The creditor-
for claims against CMC pending before any mortgagee has the right to foreclose the mortgage over a specific real property whether or not the
court, tribunal, office, board, body and/or debtor-mortgagor is under insolvency or liquidation proceedings. The right to foreclose such mortgage
commission are deemed suspended is merely suspended upon the appointment of a management committee or rehabilitation receiver 19 or
immediately until further order" from the upon the issuance of a stay order by the trial court.20However, the creditor-mortgagee may exercise his
SEC. Thereafter, respondent Planters right to foreclose the mortgage upon the termination of the rehabilitation proceedings or upon the lifting
Development Bank (Planters Bank), one of of the stay order.
CMC’s creditors, commenced the extra-
judicial foreclosure of CMC’s real estate
mortgage. CMC filed a motion for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order
 and a writ of preliminary injunction with the
SEC to enjoin the foreclosure of the real
estate mortgage.

Argument of CMC: the rules on

concurrence and preference of credits
should apply in foreclosure proceedings.

Argument of Planters Bank: the rules on

concurrence and preference of credits and
the rules on insolvency are not applicable
in this case because CMC has been not
been declared insolvent and there are no
insolvency proceedings against CMC.

2. Insolvency Law, Act No. 1956

Gateway Electronics Geronimo and Andrew executed separate
vs Asiabank but almost identical deeds of suretyship for
Gateway in favor of respondent Asianbank
(2008) Corporation. Gateway issued two
Philippine Commercial International Bank
checks for the amounts of USD 40,000 and
USD 20,000, respectively, as payment for
its arrearages and interests for the periods
June 30 and July 30, 1999; but both checks
were dishonored for insufficiency of funds.
Asianbank’s demands for payment made
upon Gateway and its sureties went
unheeded. Asianbank filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Makati City a
complaint for a sum of money against
Gateway, Geronimo, and Andrew. RTC
rendered a judgment holding defendants
Gateway Electronics Corporation,
Geronimo De Los Reyes and Andrew De
Los Reyes jointly and severally liable to
pay the plaintiff. Gateway filed on
November 10, 2004 a petition for voluntary
insolvency[6] with the RTC in Imus, Cavite,
Branch 22, docketed as SEC Case No.
037-04, in which Asianbank was listed in
the attached Schedule of Obligations as
one of the creditors.
Gateway May Be Discharged from Liability But Not Geronimo
The contention, as formulated, is in a qualified sense meritorious. Under Sec. 18 of Act No. 1956, as
couched, the issuance of an order declaring the petitioner insolvent after the insolvency court finds the
corresponding petition for insolvency to be meritorious shall stay all pending civil actions against the
petitioner’s property.
Upon the filing of the petition for insolvency, pending civil actions against the property of the petitioner
are not ipso facto stayed, but the insolvent may apply with the court in which the actions are pending
for a stay of the actions against the insolvent’s property.
Argument of Geronimo: Geronimo’s lament about losing his right to subrogation is
erroneous. He argues that by virtue of the order of insolvency issued by the insolvency court, title and
right to possession to all the properties and assets of Gateway were vested upon Gateway’s assignee
in accordance with Sec. 32 of the Insolvency Law.
Held: The transfer of Gateway’s property to the insolvency assignee, if this be the case, does
not negate Geronimo’s right of subrogation, for such right may be had or exercised in the insolvency
proceedings. The possibility that he may only recover a portion of the amount he is liable to pay is the
risk he assumed as a surety of Gateway. Such loss does not, however, render ineffectual, let alone
invalidate, his suretyship.

Argument of Gateway: Gateway,

having been declared insolvent, argues
that jurisdiction over all claims against all of
its properties and assets properly pertains
to the insolvency court. Accordingly,
Gateway adds, citing Sec. 60 of Act No.
1956,[9] as amended, or the Insolvency
 Law, any pending action against its
properties and assets must be dismissed,
the claimant relegated to the insolvency
proceedings for the claimant’s relief.
CREDIT TRANSACTIONS
1. Common Provisions
2. Commodatum
Pajuyo vs CA Petitioner Colito T. Pajuyo (“Pajuyo”)
paid P400 to a certain Pedro Perez for the
(2004) rights over a 250-square meter lot in Barrio
Payatas, Quezon City. Pajuyo then
constructed a house made of light
materials on the lot. Pajuyo and private
respondent Eddie Guevarra (“Guevarra”)
executed a Kasunduan or agreement.
Pajuyo, as owner of the house, allowed
Guevarra to live in the house for free
provided Guevarra would maintain the
cleanliness and orderliness of the house.
Guevarra promised that he would
voluntarily vacate the premises on Pajuyo’s
demand.In September 1994, Pajuyo
informed Guevarra of his need of the house
and demanded that Guevarra vacate the
house. Guevarra refused. Pajuyo filed an
ejectment case against Guevarra with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 31 (“MTC”).
The RTC upheld the Kasunduan,
which established the landlord and tenant
relationship between Pajuyo and Guevarra.
The terms of the Kasunduan bound
Guevarra to return possession of the house
on demand. Court of Appeals ruled that
the Kasunduan is not a lease contract but
a commodatum because the agreement is
not for a price certain.
3. Simple Loan or Mutuum
Equitable v. Ng Respondents Ng Sheung Ngor,[4] Ken
Sheung Ngo Appliance Division, Inc. and Benjamin E.
Go filed an action for annulment and/or
reformation of documents and
contracts[5] against petitioner Equitable PCI
Bank (Equitable) and its employees, Aimee
We do not subscribe to the Court of Appeals’ theory that the Kasunduan is one of commodatum.
In a contract of commodatum, one of the parties delivers to another something not consumable so
that the latter may use the same for a certain time and return it. [63] An essential feature
ofcommodatum is that it is gratuitous. Another feature of commodatum is that the use of the thing
belonging to another is for a certain period.[64] Thus, the bailor cannot demand the return of the thing
loaned until after expiration of the period stipulated, or after accomplishment of the use for which
the commodatum is constituted.[65] If the bailor should have urgent need of the thing, he may demand
its return for temporary use.[66] If the use of the thing is merely tolerated by the bailor, he can demand
the return of the thing at will, in which case the contractual relation is called aprecarium.[67] Under
the Civil Code, precarium is a kind of commodatum.[68]
The Kasunduan reveals that the accommodation accorded by Pajuyo to Guevarra was not
essentially gratuitous. While the Kasunduan did not require Guevarra to pay rent, it obligated him to
maintain the property in good condition. The imposition of this obligation makes the Kasunduan a
contract different from a commodatum. The effects of the Kasunduan are also different from that of
a commodatum. Case law on ejectment has treated relationship based on tolerance as one that is akin
to a landlord-tenant relationship where the withdrawal of permission would result in the termination of
the lease.[69] The tenant’s withholding of the property would then be unlawful. This is settled
jurisprudence.
Even assuming that the relationship between Pajuyo and Guevarra is one of commodatum,
Guevarra as bailee would still have the duty to turn over possession of the property to Pajuyo, the
bailor. The obligation to deliver or to return the thing received attaches to contracts for safekeeping, or
contracts of commission, administration and commodatum.[70] These contracts certainly involve the
obligation to deliver or return the thing received.
The promissory notes were valid. It is erroneous, however, to conclude that contracts of adhesion are
invalid per se. They are, on the contrary, as binding as ordinary contracts. A party is in reality free to
accept or reject it. A contract of adhesion becomes void only when the dominant party takes advantage
of the weakness of the other party, completely depriving the latter of the opportunity to bargain on equal
footing.[61]
 Yu and Bejan Lionel Apas, in the Regional That was not the case here. As the trial court noted, if the terms and conditions offered by
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 16 of Cebu City. Equitable had been truly prejudicial to respondents, they would have walked out and negotiated with
[6]
They claimed that Equitable induced another bank at the first available instance. But they did not. Instead, they continuously availed of
them to avail of its peso and dollar credit Equitable's credit facilities for five long years.
facilities by offering low interest rates[7] so Equitable dictated the interest rates if the term (or period for repayment) of the loan was
they accepted Equitable's proposal and extended. Respondents had no choice but to accept them. This was a violation of Article 1308 of the
signed the bank's pre-printed promissory Civil Code. Furthermore, the assailed escalation clause did not contain the necessary provisions for
notes on various dates beginning 1996. validity, that is, it neither provided that the rate of interest would be increased only if allowed by law or
They, however, were unaware that the the Monetary Board, nor allowed de-escalation. For these reasons, the escalation clause was void.
documents contained identical escalation
clauses granting Equitable authority to With regard to the proper rate of interest, in New Sampaguita Builders v. Philippine National
increase interest rates without their Bank[71] we held that, because the escalation clause was annulled, the principal amount of the loan was
consent. subject to the original or stipulated rate of interest. Upon maturity, the amount due was subject to legal
These were rebutted by the bank. After interest at the rate of 12% per annum.
trial, the RTC upheld the validity of the
promissory notes. It found that, in 2001 Extraordinary inflation exists when there is an unusual decrease in the purchasing power of currency
alone, Equitable restructured and such decrease could not be reasonably foreseen or was beyond the contemplation of the parties at
respondents' loans amounting to the time of the obligation. Deflation is an inverse situation.
US$228,200 andP1,000,000.[11] The trial
court, however, invalidated the escalation Despite the devaluation of the peso, BSP never declared a situation of extraordinary inflation.
clause contained therein because it Respondents should pay their dollar denominated loans at the exchange rate fixed by the BSP on the
violated the principle of mutuality of date of maturity.
contracts.[12] Nevertheless, it took judicial
notice of the steep depreciation of the peso Decision of lower courts are reversed and set aside.
during the intervening period[13] and
declared the existence of extraordinary
deflation.[14] Consequently, the RTC
ordered the use of the 1996 dollar
exchange rate in computing respondents'
dollar-denominated loans.[15] Lastly,
because the business reputation of
respondents was (allegedly) severely
damaged when Equitable froze their
accounts,[16] the trial court awarded moral
and exemplary damages to them.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was an

extraordinary deflation

ALMEDA v. In 1997, Bathala (through its President)
BATHALA renewed its Lease Contract with the
husband of Almeda. The rent was based
on the assessed value of the property. The
contract stipulated that the lessee shall pay
for any additional charge or burden may be
imposed on the property by the
government. It also stipulated that should
there be extraordinary inflation or
devaluation, the value of the peso at the
time of the establishment of the obligation
shall be the basis of payment(similar to
NCC 1250).
ISSUE: Are lessees liable for VAT and should Article 1250 of the NCC apply given the aforementioned
stipulations in their lease contract?
Petitioners' reliance on the sixth condition of the contract is, likewise, unavailing. This provision clearly
states that respondent can only be held liable for new taxes imposed after the effectivity of the contract
of lease, that is, after May 1997, and only if they pertain to the lot and the building where the leased
premises are located. Considering that RA 7716 took effect in 1994, the VAT cannot be considered as
a "new tax" in May 1997, as to fall within the coverage of the sixth stipulation.
Neither can petitioners legitimately demand rental adjustment because of extraordinary inflation or
devaluation.
Petitioners contend that Article 1250 of the Civil Code does not apply to this case because the contract

The lessors wanted the lessee to pay for
the VAT charged on the property and also
wanted to increase the rent by 73%.
Bathala (lessee) refused and filed a petition
for declaratory relief in Makati RTC. Later
on, the Almedas (lessors) filed an action for
ejection, rescission and damages.
RTC ruled in favor of Bathala. CA affirmed.
4. Interest
CASTELO v. CA Petitioners entered into a contract named
Deed of Conditional Sale with Dela Rosa
involving land located in Espana, Manila.
Dela Rosa paid 106,000 upon signing the
contract leaving a balance of 163,408. The
contract stipulated that the balance is to
paid on or before December 31, 1982
without interest and penalty charges. She
had a grace period of 6 months after
December 31 and the interest shall be at
12% per annum and penalty charge shall
be 1% per month.
Dela Rosa failed to pay the balance at the
end of the grace period so the petitioners
so petitioners filed a complaint for specific
performance plus damages.
stipulation speaks of extraordinary inflation or devaluation while the Code speaks of extraordinary
inflation or deflation.
While, indeed, condition No. 7 of the contract speaks of "extraordinary inflation or devaluation" as
compared to Article 1250's "extraordinary inflation or deflation," we find that when the parties used the
term "devaluation," they really did not intend to depart from Article 1250 of the Civil Code. Condition
No. 7 of the contract should, thus, be read in harmony with the Civil Code provision. That this is the
intention of the parties is evident from petitioners' letter dated January 26, 1998, where, in demanding
rental adjustment ostensibly based on condition No. 7, petitioners made explicit reference to Article
1250 of the Civil Code, even quoting the law verbatim.
Inflation has been defined as the sharp increase of money or credit, or both, without a corresponding
increase in business transaction. There is inflation when there is an increase in the volume of money
and credit relative to available goods, resulting in a substantial and continuing rise in the general price
level.
Extraordinary inflation exists when there is a decrease or increase in the purchasing power of the
Philippine currency which is unusual or beyond the common fluctuation in the value of said currency,
and such increase or decrease could not have been reasonably foreseen or was manifestly beyond the
contemplation of the parties at the time of the establishment of the obligation.
The factual circumstances obtaining in the present case do not make out a case of extraordinary
inflation or devaluation as would justify the application of Article 1250 of the Civil Code. We would like
to stress that the erosion of the value of the Philippine peso in the past three or four decades, starting
in the mid-sixties, is characteristic of most currencies. And while the Court may take judicial notice of
the decline in the purchasing power of the Philippine currency in that span of time, such downward
trend of the peso cannot be considered as the extraordinary phenomenon contemplated by Article 1250
of the Civil Code. Furthermore, absent an official pronouncement or declaration by competent
authorities of the existence of extraordinary inflation during a given period, the effects of extraordinary
inflation are not to be applied.
ISSUE: Date when the interest starts to run.
We believe and so hold that the phrase "to pay interest," found in the dispositive portion of the Castro-
Bartolome decision must, under applicable law, refer to the interest stipulated by the parties in the
Deed of Conditional Sale which they had entered into on 15 October 1982. We note, in the first place,
that the phrase "to pay interest" comes close upon the heels of the preceding phrase "to comply with
her obligation under the conditional sale to pay the balance — of P163,408.00." A strong inference thus
arises that the "interest" required to be paid is the interest stipulated as part of the "obligation [of private
respondent dela Rosa] under the conditional sale [agreement] to pay the balance of [the purchase price
of the land]."
Under Article 2209, the appropriate measure for damages in case of delay in discharging an obligation
consisting of the payment of a sum of money is the payment of penalty interest at the rate agreed upon
in the contract of the parties. In the absence of a stipulation of a particular rate of penalty interest,
payment of additional interest at a rate equal to the regular or monetary interest, becomes due and
payable. Finally, if no regular interest had been agreed upon by the contracting parties, then the
damages payable will consist of payment of legal interest which is six percent (6%) or, in the case of

Petitioners eventually won and Dela Rosa
was ordered to pay a total of 197,723
representing the principal worth 163,408
and interestof 34,315 computed to be
incurred from the date of the decision of the
CA (Nov 1986).
Petitioners contend that the computation
was erroneous because the 12%/annum
interest and 1%/month penalty charge
should be computed from January 1983,
the date of the start of the grace period.
PILIPINAS BANK v. Echaus filed a complaint against Pilipnas
CA Bank and its president for a sum of money.
Echaus alleges that there was dacion en
pago between Greatland and Pilipinas.
Greatland assigned of the total
consideration of the dacion in her favor.
Despite demands, Pilipinas refused to pay
in bad faith.
Pilipinas admits the dacion but claims that
its former president had no authority to
enter into such, that it never ratified the
same and that even if the same was
binding, the conditions for its effectivity
were not fulfilled.
RTC ruled in favor of Echaus. It ordered
loans or forbearances of money, twelve percent (12%) per annum. Applying Article 2209 to the instant
case, we must refer to the "Deed of Conditional Sale" which, as already noted, had specifically
provided for "interest at the rate of 12% per annum" and a "1% penalty charge a month [to] be imposed
on their remaining diminishing balance." The interest cannot be said to run from the date of the
decision.
The contention of private respondent that Article 2209 of the Civil Code is not applicable in this case
because the interest referred to therein is given as compensation for the use of money, not for the
incurring of delay as in the instant case, need not detain us for long. Article 2209 governs transactions
involving the payment of indemnity in the concept of damages arising from delay in the discharge of
obligations consisting of the payment of a sum of money. The "obligation consisting in the payment of a
sum of money" referred to in Article 2209 is not confined to a loan or forbearance of money. The Court
has, for instance, consistently applied Article 2209 in the determination of the interest properly payable
where there was default in the payment of the price or consideration under a contract of sale as in the
case at bar. Article 2209 has also been applied by this Court in cases involving an action for damages
for injury to persons and loss of property; to actions for damages arising from unpaid insurance
claims; and an action involving the appropriate rate of interest on just compensation that is payable for
expropriated lands.
The stipulation in the "Deed of Conditional Sale" requiring the payment of interest is not unlawful. The
validity of the contract of conditional sale itself has not been put to question by private respondent dela
Rosa and there is nothing in the record to suggest that the same may be contrary to law, morals, good
custom, public order or public policy. Accordingly, the contractual stipulation must be regarded as
binding and enforceable as the law between the parties.
We believe that the contracting parties intended the latter view of their stipulation on interest; for if the
parties had intended that during the grace period from 1 January 1983 to 30 June 1983, interest
consisting of 12% per annum plus another 12% per annum (equivalent to 1% per month), or a total of
24% per annum, was payable, then they could have simply said so. Instead, the parties distinguished
between interest at the rate of 12% per annum and the 1% a month penalty charge. The interpretation
we adopt is also supported by the principle that in case of ambiguity in contract language, that
interpretation which establishes a less onerous transmission of rights or imposition of lesser burdens
which permits greater reciprocity between the parties, is to be adopted. (why the court had to say this,
I do not understand)
HELD: 6%
Presidential Decree No. 116 authorized the Monetary Board to prescribe the maximum rate or rates of
interest for the loan or renewal thereof or the forbearance of any money, goods or credits and amended
the Usury Law (Act No. 2655) for that purpose. Acting on the authority vested on it by the Usury Law,
as amended by P.D. No. 116, the Monetary Board of Central Bank issued Central Bank Circular No.
416. Note that Circular No. 416, fixing the rate of interest at 12% per annum, deals with (1) loans; (2)
forbearance of any money, goods or credit; and
(3) judgments.
In Reformina v. Tomol, Jr., 139 SCRA 260 [1985], the Court held that the judgments spoken of and
referred to in Circular No. 416 are "judgments in litigation involving loans or forbearance of any money,
goods or credits. Any other kind of monetary judgment which has nothing to do with nor involving loans
or forbearance of any money, goods or credits does not fall within the coverage of the said law for it is
not, within the ambit of the authority granted to the Central Bank."
We held that Circular No. 416 does not apply to judgments involving damages and compensation in
 Pilipinas to pay the principal, and among expropriation proceedings. We also held that payment of unliquidated cash advances to an employee
others, actual damages with legal interest by his employer and the return of money paid by a buyer of a leasehold right but which contract was
until fully paid. voided due to the fault of the seller.

CA affirmed with modification and ruled
that Pilipinas is liable for principal with legal
interest starting from Jan 1981, the date of
first demand. This decision became final
and executory.
There was an issue as to the interest rate
to be applied. The CA clarified in a
Resolution that the rate is 12% per annum
according to Central Bank Circular.
Pilipinas still argues that NCC 2209 should
apply, and the interest should be 6%.
PAN PACIFIC v. Pan Pacific and its president Del Rosario
EQUITABLE PCI entered into a contract with Equitable PCI
for mechanical works on airconditioning
system. They stipulated that the total
consideration is P23.3M subject to price
adjustment in case of increase in labor cost
and price of materials. There was an
increase in such in 1990 so the price was
adjusted. But this caused the operational
capital of Pan pacific to be inadequate for
the project.
The said amount was a portion of the P7,776,335.69 which petitioner was obligated to pay Greatland
as consideration for the sale of several parcels of land by Greatland to petitioner. The amount of
P2,300,000.00 was assigned by Greatland in favor of private respondent. The said obligation
therefore arose from a contract of purchase and sale and not from a contract of loan or
mutuum. Hence, what is applicable is the rate of 6% per annum as provided in Article 2209 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines and not the rate of 12% per annum as provided in Circular No.
416.
ISSUE: 12% or 18%.a
Under Article 2209 of the Civil Code, the appropriate measure for damages in case of delay in
discharging an obligation consisting of the payment of a sum of money is the payment of penalty
interest at the rate agreed upon in the contract of the parties. In the absence of a stipulation of a
particular rate of penalty interest, payment of additional interest at a rate equal to the regular monetary
interest becomes due and payable. Finally, if no regular interest had been agreed upon by the
contracting parties, then the damages payable will consist of payment of legal interest which is
6%, or in the case of loans or forbearances of money, 12% per annum. It is only when the
parties to a contract have failed to fix the rate of interest or when such amount is unwarranted
that the Court will apply the 12% interest per annum on a loan or forbearance of money.

Equitable withheld payment and offered a The written agreement entered into between petitioners and respondent provides for an interest
loan of 1.8M to Pan Pacific. . Against its will at the current bank lending rate in case of delay in payment and the promissory note charged an
and on the strength of respondent’s interest of 18%.
promise that the price adjustment would be
released soon, Pan Pacific, through Del To prove petitioners’ entitlement to the 18% bank lending rate of interest, petitioners presented the
Rosario, was constrained to execute a promissory note prepared by respondent bank itself. This promissory note, although declared void by
promissory note in the amount of P1.8 the lower courts because it did not express the real intention of the parties, is substantial proof that the
million as a requirement for the loan. Pan bank lending rate at the time of default was 18% per annum. Absent any evidence of fraud, undue
Pacific also posted a surety bond. The P1.8 influence or any vice of consent exercised by petitioners against the respondent, the interest rate
million was released directly to laborers agreed upon is binding on them.
and suppliers and not a single centavo was
given to Pan Pacific. Pan Pacific made
several demands for payment on the price
adjustment but respondent merely kept on
promising to release the same. Meanwhile,
the P1.8 million loan matured and
respondent demanded payment plus
interest and penalty. Pan Pacific refused to
pay the loan. Pan Pacific insisted that it
would not have incurred the loan if
respondent released the price adjustment
on time.

On 6 May 1994, Pan pacific filed a

complaint for declaration of
 nullity/annulment of the promissory note,
sum of money, and damages against
Equitable.

RTC ruled that Equitable is to pay Pan

pacific 1.3M representing unpaid balance
of the adjusted price with interest of 12%
starting May 1994, the filing of the
complaint. CA affirmed this.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Partial

Reconsideration seeking a reconsideration
of the CA’s Decision imposing the legal
rate of 12%. Petitioners claimed that the
interest rate applicable should be the 18%
bank lending rate.

Specifically, petitioners invoke Section 2.5

of the Agreement and Section 60.10 of the
General Conditions as follows:
Agreement
2.5 If any payment is delayed, the
CONTRACTOR may charge interest
thereon at the current bank lending rates,
without prejudice to OWNER’S recourse to
any other remedy available under existing
law.

5. Chattel Mortgage
PNB v MANILA In a decision rendered by CFI of Manila,
INVESTMENT the defendants were ordered to pay PNB.
In case of non-payment of the amounts
(1971) adjudged, the decision also provided for
the sale at public auction of the personal
properties covered by the chattel mortgage
executed by the defendants in favor of
PNB. Instead of a public auction, the
parties agreed to have them sold, and were
in fact sold, at a private sale. The net
proceeds were applied to the partial
satisfaction of the said judgment. More
than five years but less than 10 years from
the date when the decision become
executory, the PNB, filed an action to
revive the judgment claiming for the
deficiency.
PAMECA v CA PAMECA obtained a loan from DBP. As a
security for the said loan, a chattel
(1999) mortgage was also executed over
The private sale was valid.
As the disposition of the mortgaged properties in a private sale was by agreement between the parties,
it is clear that appellants are now in estoppels to question it except on the ground of fraud or duress –
pleas that they do not invoke. They do not even claim that the private sale had caused them
substantial prejudice.
In Ablaza vs Ignacio (GR No L-11466), the Court said “Mr. Justice Kent, in the 12 th edition of his
Commentaries, as well as other authors in the question of chattel mortgages, have said, that in case of
a sale under a foreclosure of a chattel mortgage, there is no question that the mortgagee or creditor
may maintain an action for the deficiency, if any should occur. And the fact that Act 1508 permits a
private sale, such sale is not in fact, a satisfaction of the debt, to any greater extent than the value of
the property at the time of the sale. The amount received at the time of the sale, of course, always
requiring good faith and honesty in the sale, is only a payment, pro tanto and an action may be
maintained for a deficiency in the debt.
It is clear, therefore, that the proceeds of the sale of the mortgaged properties of the herein appellants
constitute only a pro tanto satisfaction of the monetary award made by the court and the appellee bank
is entitled to collect the balance.
PAMECA is entitled to the deficiency.
Whereas, in pledge, the sale of the thing pledged extinguishes the entire principal obligation, such that
 PAMECA’S properties. PAMECA failed to
pay so DBP extrajudicially foreclosed the
chattel mortgage and as sole bidder in the
public auction, purchased the foreclosed
properties. Since the proceeds were not
enough to pay the entire obligation, dbp
filed a complaint for the collection for the
collection of the balance.
6. Real Estate Mortgage
ISAGUIRRE v DE Alejandro de Lara was the original
LARA applicant-claimant over a parcel of land.
On this lot stands a two-story residential-
(2000) commercial apartment declared for taxation
purposes in the name of Felicitas, the wife
of Alejandro. A deed of sale and special
cession of rights and interests was
executed by respondent and petitioner
whereby the former sold a 250 square
meter portion the lot, together with the two-
story structure. Petitioner filed a sales
application over the subject property on the
basis of the deed of sale. His application
was approved resulting in the issuance of
an OCT in his name. Meanwhile, the sales
application of respondent was also given
due course resulting in the issuance of
OCT in the name of respondent. Due to the
overlapping of titles, petitioner filed an
action for quieting of title and damages.
The trial court ruled in favor of petitioner.
However, the CA reversed the ruling of the
trial court and held that the contract
between the parties was an equitable
mortgage, not a sale. The appellate court
also held that the title in the name of
petitioner is null and void. This decision
was affirmed by the Supreme Court.
Subsequently, respondent filed a motion for
execution and she also moved for a writ of
possession.
7. Pledge
the pledgor may no longer recover proceeds of the sale in excess of the amount of the principal
obligation, Section 14 of the Chattel Mortgage law expressly entitled the mortgagor to the balance of
the proceeds, upon satisfaction of the principal obligation and costs. Since the Chattel Mortgage Law
bars the creditor-mortgagee from retaining the excess of the sale proceeds there is a corollary
obligation on the part of the debtor-mortgagor to pay the deficiency in case of a reduction in the price a
public auction.
Although Article 1484, paragraph (3) expressly bars any further action against the purchaser to recover
an unpaid balance of the price, where the vendor opts to foreclose the chattel mortgage on the thing
sold, should the vendee’s failure to pay cover 2 or more installments, this provision is specifically
applicable to a sale on installments.
The mere fact that respondent bank was the sole bidder in the public sale does not warrant the
conclusion that the transaction was attended with fraud. Fraud is a serious allegation that requires full
and convincing evidence, and may not be inferred from the lone circumstance that it was only
respondent bank that bid in the sale of the foreclosed properties.
The respondent is entitled to possession.
The decision of the appellate court, which was affirmed by the SC, served as more than adequate basis
for the issuance of the writ of possession in favor of respondent since these decisions affirmed
respondent’s title over the subject property. Corollary to such right, respondent also has the right to
exclude from the possession of her property any other person to whom she has not transmitted such
property
A mortgage is a contract entered into in order to secure the fulfillment of a principal obligation. It is
constituted by recording the document in which it appears with the proper Registry of Property,
although, even if it is no recorded, the mortgage is nevertheless binding between the parties. Thus, the
only right granted by alw in favor of the mortgagee is to demand the execution and the recording of the
document in which the mortagge is formalized. As a genral rule, the mortgagor retains possession of
the mortgaged property since a mortgage is merely alien and title to the property does not pass to the
mortgagee. However, even though a mortgagee does not have possession of the property, there is no
impairment of his security since the mortgage directly and immediately subjects the property upon
which it is imposed, whoever the possessor may be, to the fulfillment of the obligation for whose
security it was constituted. If the debtor is unable to pay his debt, the mortgage creditor may institute
an action to foreclose the mortgage, whether judicially or extrajudicially, whereby the mortgaged
proverty will then be sold at a public auction and the proceeds therefrom givem to the creditor to the
extent necessary to discharge the mortgage loan. Apparently, petitioner’s contention that “to require
him to deliver possession of the property to respondent prior to the full payment of the latter’s mortgage
loan would be equivalent to the cancellation of the mortgage” is without basis. Regardless of its
possessor, the mortgaged property may still be sold, with the prescribed formalities, in the event of the
debtor’s default in the payment of his loan obligation.
ONG v ROBAN Spouses Ong obtained several loans from
LENDING Roban Lending. These loans were
secured by a real estate mortgage on
(1971) petitioners’ parcels of land. Then, the
parties executed a Dacion in Payment
wherein petitioners assigned the properties
to respondent in settlement of their total
obligation. Subsequently, petitioners filed a
complaint for declaration of mortgage
contract as abandoned, annulment of
deeds, illegal exaction, unjust enrichment,
accounting and damages, alleging that the
Memorandum of Agreement and the
Dacion in payment executed are void for
being pactum commsissorium.
8. Guaranty or Suretyship
PHIL-AM GENERAL ARDC executed a PN in favor of Gen.
INSURANCE CO., Acceptance & Finance Corp. On the same
INC. V. RAMOS date, Phil-Am General Ins. Co. executed a
surety bond to secure said PN. The Ramos
(1966) spouses later signed a counter-guaranty
agreement with REM in favor of Phil-Am
against its liability under the surety bond.
The Ramoses and ARDC executed an
indemnity agreement in favor of Phil-Am
binding themselves “jointly and severally”
to indemnify the latter for whatever it may
suffer under the surety bond.
ARDC failed to pay its obligation under the
PN. Phil-Am filed a complaint against the
Ramoses, asking that the spouses be
ordered to jointly and severally pay Phil-Am
the amount owed plus 12% interest,
attorney’s fees and costs. The Ramoses
claimed there was no cause of action,
since they were guarantors only so that
Phil-Am must first exhaust the properties of
ARDC, the principal debtor, before
proceeding against them.
TOH V. SOLID BANK Solid Bank extended an omnibus credit
facility worth P10M in favor of FBPC
(2003) through a “letter-advise”. 30 days later,
spouses Toh (Chairman and VP of FBPC)
and spouses Ng Li (Pres. and GM) signed
the Continuing Guaranty required under the
letter-advise. The contract was defined
therein as a surety agreement and
provided that the signatories would be
solidarily liable for and in consideration of
loans or advances and “credit in any other
The Memorandum of Agreement and Dacion in Payment constitute pactum commisorium which
is prohibited under Article 2088 of the Civil Code.
The elements of pactum commisorium are:
1) There should be a property mortgaged by way of security for the payment of the principal
obligation, and
2) There should be a stipulation for automatic appropriation by the creditor of the thing
mortgaged in case of non-payment of the principal obligation within the stipulated period.
The Memorandum of Agreement and the Dacion in Payment contain no provisions for foreclosure
proceedings nor redemption. Under the MOA, the failure by the petitioners to pay their debt within the
one-year period gives respondent the right to enforce the Dacion in Payment transferring to it
ownership of the properties. Respondent, in effect, automatically acquires ownership of the properties
upon petitioner’s failure to pay their debt within the stipulated period. In a true dacion en pago, the
assignment of the property extinguishes the monetary debt. In the case at bar, the alienation of the
properties was by way of security, and not by way of satisfying the debt.
Phil-Am has a valid cause of action against the Ramos spouses.
The indemnity agreement, which was the last agreement executed by the parties, provides that the
liability shall be joint and several, primary, and “the same as that of the principal, and shall be exigible
upon the occurrence of such default”.
Even as counter-guarantors, the Ramoses aren’t entitled to demand exhaustion of the properties of the
principal debtor. They executed a counter-guaranty with real estate mortgage. It is accepted that
guarantors have no right to demand exhaustion of the properties of the principal debtor, under Article
2058 of the New Civil Code, where a pledge or mortgage has been given as a special security
(Saavedra vs. Price, 68 Phil. 688; Southern Motors vs. Barbosa, 53 O.G. 137).
The Continuing Guaranty is a valid and binding contract as it is a public document that enjoys
the presumption of authenticity and due execution.
Nothing in the Continuing Guaranty restricts the Tohs’ responsibility; they are still liability under it even
if they are no longer stockholders of FBPC. In fact the obligations assumed by them therein subsist
“upon the undersigned, the heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns of the
undersigned, and shall inure to the benefit of, and be enforceable by you, your successors, transferees
and assigns,” and that their commitment “shall remain in full force and effect until written notice shall
have been received by [the Bank] that it has been revoked by the undersigned.” Verily, if the Tohs
intended not to be charged as sureties after their withdrawal from FBPC, they could have simply
terminated the agreement by serving the required notice of revocation upon the Bank as expressly
 manner to, or at the request or for the
account” of FBPC. FBPC took out L/Cs,
which were secured by trust receipts
signed by the Ng Lis. When the Bank found
that the Ng Lis had fraudulently departed
from their conjugal home, they sent a
demand letter to FBCP and the Tohs,
invoking the acceleration clause.
The Tohs claimed that the Continuing
Guaranty was not legally valid ang binding
against them since it was executed long
after they had withdrawn from FBPC.
AUTOCORP GROUP Autocorp, represented by its President
V. INTRA STRATA Rodriguez, secured two ordinary re-export
bonds from Intra Stata (ISAC) in favor of
(2008) the Bureau of Customs. Autocorp executed
two Indemnity Agreements with identical
stipulations in favor of ISAC, which
Rodriguez signed both as President and in
his personal capacity. Autocorp failed to re-
export the items and the BOC considered
the bonds forfeited. ISAC sued when
Autocorp failed to pay the face value of the
two bonds. Autocorp claims that the
obligation to ISAC is not yet due and
demandable since there was no actual
forfeiture of the bonds yet (no writ of
execution has been issued against said
bonds). Rodriguez claims that he is a
guarantor and can only be held liable if
Autocorp fails to pay the obligation and that
they should not be held liable since there
was a modification as to the effectivity of
the bonds.
9. Deposit
YHT REALTY V. CA McLoughlin used to stay at Sheraton during
his trips to the PH until 1984, when Tan
(2005) convinced him to transfer to Tropicana. In
1987, McLoughlin stayed at Tropicana and
rented a safety deposit box, which could
only be opened through the use of two
keys, one of which was kept by the guest
and the other remaining with hotel
management. McLoughlin discovered that
some items he had kept in the safety
deposit box were missing. He found out
that Tan took his key and opened the box
allowed therein.
However, since the Bank is guilty of making extensions prohibited under C2079, the Tohs as sureties
are released from their obligation. CC2055 provides that the liability of a surety is measured by the
terms of his contract, and while he is liable to the full extent thereof, his accountability is strictly limited
to that assumed by its terms.
The obligation to indemnify ISAC became due and demandable the moment the bonds became
answerable for non-compliance with the undertaking with the BOC.
The Indemnity Agreements give ISAC the right to recover the face value of the subject bonds plus
attorney’s fees at the time ISAC becomes liable on the said bonds to the BOC, regardless of whether
the BOC had actually forfeited the bonds, demanded payment thereof and/or received such payment.
The Indemnity Agreements explicitly provide that petitioners shall be liable to indemnify ISAC "whether
or not payment has actually been made" and ISAC may proceed against petitioners by court action or
otherwise "even prior to making payment to the [BOC] which may hereafter be done by [ISAC]." This
provision is but a slightly expanded contractual expression of CC2071 which provides, inter alia, that
the guarantor may proceed against the principal debtor the moment the debt becomes due and
demandable.
Both Autocorp and Rodriguez assumed liability as regular parties and obligated themselves as
sureties.
The use of the term “guarantee” in a contract does not ipso facto mean that the contract is one of
guaranty. A modification as to the bonds’ effectivity would not absolve either surety from liability, since
the ISAC was given authority to do so under the Indemnity Agreements.
Philippine American General Insurance Co., Inc. v. Mutuc: an agreement whereby the sureties bound
themselves to be liable in case of an extension or renewal of the bond, without the necessity of
executing another indemnity agreement for the purpose and without the necessity of being notified of
such extension or renewal, is valid; and that there is nothing in it that militates against the law, good
customs, good morals, public order or public policy.
The provisions of the Undertaking are null and void for being contrary to CC2003.
CC2003 was incorporated in the New Civil Code as an expression of public policy precisely to apply to
situations such as that presented in this case. The hotel business like the common carrier's business is
imbued with public interest. Catering to the public, hotelkeepers are bound to provide not only lodging
for hotel guests and security to their persons and belongings. The twin duty constitutes the essence of
the business. The law in turn does not allow such duty to the public to be negated or diluted by any
contrary stipulation in so-called "undertakings" that ordinarily appear in prepared forms imposed by
hotel keepers on guests for their signature.
CC2002, which exempts the hotel-keeper from liability if the loss is due to the acts of his guest, his
family, or visitors, does not apply to this case because this provision presupposes that the hotel-keeper
 with the assistance of her friends who
worked at the hotel. McLoughlin insisted
that the hotel must assume responsibility
for the loss, but the management invoked
the Undertaking for the Use of Safety
Deposit Box which provided that the hotel
would be free from any liability arising from
any loss in the contents and/or use of the
safety deposit box for any cause
whatsoever.
10. Truth in Lending Act
UCPB vs Beluso UCPB granted the spouses Beluso a
Promissory Notes Line under a Credit
(2007) Agreement whereby the spouses could
avail from the UCPB, credit of up to a
maximum amount of P1.2 M for a term
ending on Apr. 30, 1997. The spouses
executed three promissory notes which
were renewed several times. In 1997, the
payment of the principal and interest of the
latter two promissory notes were debited
from the spouses Beluso’s account with
UCPB; yet, a consolidated loan for P 1.3
Million was again released to the spouses
Beluso under one promissory note with a
due date of Feb. 28, 1998. During the term
of these promissory notes, the spouses
were able to pay the total sum of about P
763,692.03. However, they failed to pay for
the interest and penalty on their
obligations. As a result, UCPB demanded
that they pay their total obligation of P 2.9
million but the spouses Beluso failed to
comply therewith.
11. Usury Law and CB Circular No. 416
Carpo vs. Chua Sps. Carpo borrowed from respondents
Eleanor Chua and Elma Dy Ng the sum of
(2005) P175,000, payable within 6 months with an
interest rate of 6% per month, secured by a
mortgage the spouses executed over their
residential house and lot. For failure to
pay, the said property was extra-judicially
foreclosed and sold at public auction to the
respondents, who were the only bidders for
the amount of P367,457.80. Upon failure
of the petitioners to exercise their right of
is not guilty of concurrent negligence or has not contributed in any degree to the occurrence of the loss.
A depositary is not responsible for the loss of goods by theft, unless his actionable negligence
contributes to the loss.
In the case at bar, the responsibility of securing the safety deposit box was shared not only by the
guest himself but also by the management since two keys are necessary to open the safety deposit
box. Without the assistance of hotel employees, the loss would not have occurred.
The stipulation in the promissory notes subjecting the interest rate to review does not render the
imposition by UCPB of interest rates on the obligations of the spouses Beluso valid. According to said
stipulation:
The interest rate shall be subject to review and may be increased or decreased by the LENDER
considering among others the prevailing financial and monetary conditions; or the rate of interest and
charges which other banks or financial institutions charge or offer to charge for similar
accommodations; and/or the resulting profitability to the LENDER after due consideration of all dealings
with the BORROWER.
It should be pointed out that the authority to review the interest rate was given UCPB alone as the
lender. Moreover, UCPB may apply the considerations enumerated in this provision as it wishes. As
worded in the above provision, UCPB may give as much weight as it desires to each of the following
considerations:
(1) The prevailing financial and monetary condition;
(2) The rate of interest and charges which other banks or financial institutions charge or offer to charge
for similar accommodations; and/or
(3) The resulting profitability to the LENDER (UCPB) after due consideration of all dealings with the
BORROWER (the spouses Beluso).
The invalidation of the interest rate is congruent with the rule that a usurious loan transaction is not a
complete nullity but defective only with respect to the agreed interest. Art. 1420, CC allows the
severance of the illegal terms of a divisible contract, thereby allowing the legal ones to be enforced. In
simple loan with stipulation of usurious interest, the prestation of the debtor to pay the principal debt,
which is the cause of the contract (Article 1350, Civil Code) is not illegal. The illegality lies only as to
the prestation to pay the stipulated interest; hence, being separable, the latter only should be deemed
void, since it is the only one that is illegal.
Since the principal obligation still stands and remains valid and the mortgage contract derives its
validity from the validity of the principal obligation, the invalid stipulation on interest rate is similarly
insufficient to render void the ancillary mortgage contract.
 redemption, a certificate of sale was issued
and the old title over the property was
cancelled and a new one issued in the
name of respondents. Petitioners
continued to occupy the premises,
prompting the respondents to file a petition
for writ of possession with the RTC, which
was granted and an order was issued on
March 23, 1999.
It was only on July 23, 1999 that petitioners
filed a complaint for annulment of real
estate mortgage and the consequent
foreclosure proceedings, and thereupon
consigned the amount of P257,197.26 with
the RTC.
12. Solution Indebiti
MIAA vs. COA The MIAA Board of Directors issued a
resolution granting a signing bonus in the
(2012) amount of P30, 000 to all MIAA Officials
and Employees but such grant was
disputed by COA stating that the payment
of said contract signing bonus was
previously declared “improper and without
legal basis” by the Supreme Court in the
case of SSS vs. COA. Now, the COA is
demanding a refund of the paid signing
bonus from the MIAA Officials and
employees who received it.
PNB vs. CHONG In doing a friend a favor to help the latter’s
friend collect the proceeds of a foreign
(2012) check, Ofelia deposited the check in her
and her husband’s dollar account. The
local bank accepted the check for collection
and immediately credited the proceeds
thereof to said spouses’ account even
before the lapse of the clearing period. And
just when the money had been withdrawn
and distributed among different
beneficiaries, it was discovered that all
along, to the horror of Ofelia whose
intention to accommodate a friend’s friend
backfired, she and her bank had dealt with
a bounced check.
TORTS
Since an excessive stipulated interest rate may be void for being contrary to public policy, an action to
annul said interest rate does not prescribe. Such indeed is the remedy; it is not the action for
annulment of the ancillary real estate mortgage. Note that the general rule is that an action to annul an
excessive stipulated (usurious) interest does not provide, for such interest rate is void for being
contrary to public policy. However, in this case, since the petitioners assailed the validity of the interest
rate only when the writ of possession was issued, the Court held that the petitioners slept on their
rights.
This is not a case of solutio indebiti. The elements of solutio indebiti are the following: (1) there must be
payment given with the intent to fulfil an obligation which is believed to exist; (2) there must be the
absence of a cause for payment; and (3) the person must have paid under the mistaken belief that
such debt was due by him. Therefore, the existence of solutio indebiti is founded on the mistake of fact
on the part of the supposed obligor. In this case, the MIAA Board of Directors who approved the
payment of the signing bonus are clearly in bad faith when they approved the disbursement. Thus,
such bad faith on their part cannot be equated with mistake of fact.
Their authority under Section 8 of the MIAA charter is not absolute as their exercise thereof is “subject
to existing laws, rules and regulations” and they cannot deny knowledge of SSS v. COA and the
various issuances of the Executive Department prohibiting the grant of the signing bonus. In fact, they
are duty-bound to understand and know the law that they are tasked to implement and their
unexplained failure to do so barred them from claiming that they were acting in good faith in the
performance of their duty.
Incidentally, PNB obliges the spouses Cheah to return the withdrawn money under the principle of
solutio indebiti, which is laid down in Article 2154 of the Civil Code:
Art. 2154. If something is received when there is no right to demand it, and it was unduly delivered
through mistake, the obligation to return it arises.
The indispensable requisites of the juridical relation known as solutio indebiti, are, (a) that he who paid
was not under obligation to do so; and (b) that the payment was made by reason of an essential
mistake of fact. In the case at bench, PNB cannot recover the proceeds of the check under the principle
it invokes. In the first place, the gross negligence of PNB, as earlier discussed, can never be equated
with a mere mistake of fact, which must be something excusable and which requires the exercise of
prudence. No recovery is due if the mistake done is one of gross negligence.
 1. Definition of Tort
Vinzons-Chato. Internal Revenue Commissioner Liwayway
Fortune Tobacco Vinzons-Chato issued a rule reclassifying
Fortune-manufactured cigarettes
2007 “Champion”, “Hope” and “More” as locally-
manufactured but bearing foreign brands.
Later, Congress passed a law RA 7654
raising the ad valorem tax rate from 55% to
“55% provided that the maximum tax shall
not be less than P5 per pack”.
Fortune filed a suit against her for violating
its constitutional right against deprivation of
property with due process and the right to
equal protection.
Vinzons-Chato interposed as defense, the
performance of official duty within scope of
authority, and that she merely acted as an
agent of the State. More so, there is not
cause of action for lack of allegation of
malice or bad faith.
MTD elevated to CA, which denied it
saying that under Article 32 liability may
arise even without malice or bad faith.
2. Elements of Tort
Garcia v. Salvador Ranida Salvador, a trainee at Limay Bulk
Handling Terminal, was required to
2007 undergo medical examination at the
Community Diagnostic Center (CDC).
Orlando Garcia, a medical technologist,
conducted the tests and issued the result
that Ranida was positive for Hepatitis B,
and told by the company doctor that she
had a liver disease. Ranida was terminated
for failing the physical exam. When Ranida
told her father Ramon about her disease,
he suffered a heart attack.
In the hospital, Ranida undertook another
exam which turned out negative. The
company doctor however said that the test
by the diagnostic center was more reliable
because of the Micro-Elisa method. Ranida
went back to the CDC, and to another
hospital, all which came back negative.
Ranida was rehired, but she and her father
The rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts
done in the course of the performance of the functions of the office, where he : (1) acted with malice,
bad faith, or negligence; or (2) where he violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff. The SC also ruled
that the decisive provision is Article 32, it being a special law, which prevails over a general law (the
Administrative Code where civil liability may arise where there is bad faith, malice, or gross negligence
on the part of a superior public officer.).
Article 32 was patterned after the “tort” in American law. A tort is a wrong, a tortious act which has been
defined as the commission or omission of an act by one, without right, whereby another receives some
injury, directly or indirectly, in person, property or reputation. There are cases in which it has been
stated that civil liability in tort is determined by the conduct and not by the mental state of the tortfeasor,
and there are circumstances under which the motive of the defendant has been rendered immaterial.
The reason sometimes given for the rule is that otherwise, the mental attitude of the alleged wrongdoer,
and not the act itself, would determine whether the act was wrongful. Presence of good motive, or
rather, the absence of an evil motive, does not render lawful an act which is otherwise an invasion of
another’s legal right; that is, liability in tort in not precluded by the fact that defendant acted without evil
intent.
Garcia failed to meet the industry and thus legal, standards of diligence. He is guilty of gross
negligence and liable to pay damages.
The elements of an actionable conduct are: 1) duty, 2) breach, 3) injury, and 4) proximate causation.
First, the statutory duty is in Section 2 of RA 4677, The Clinical Laboratory Law in conjunction with
three other sections of the DOH Administrative Order 49-B, Series of 1998, the Revised Rules
Governing the Registration, Operation and Maintenance of Clinical Laboratories in the Philippines. 1)
CDC was not administered, directed and supervised by a licensed physician; 2) Garcia conducted the
test without the supervision of pathologist Castro; and 3) the test result was released without
authorization of Castro. Thus, second, Ranida suffered injury as a direct consequence of Garcia’s
failure to comply with the mande of the laws and rules. And as Section 20 states: every person who
who negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the other.
DEFINITION: Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of the interest of another person
that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such
other person suffers injury. For health care providers, the test of the existence of negligence is: did the
health care provider either fail to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would
have done, or that he or she did something that a reasonably prudent health care provider would not
have done; and that failure or action caused injury to the patient; if yes, then he is guilty of negligence.
 filed a complaint for damages against
Garcia and the pathologist
The lower court found Garcia liable for
damages, which the CA affirmed but
exonerated Castro for lack of participation
in the issuance of the results.
Ocean Builders v. Bladmir Cubacub worked as a
Cubacub maintenance man for Ocean Builder
Construction. When he got chicken pox, he
2011 was told by the general manager Dennis
Hao to rest for three days in the company
“barracks”. On the third day, we started to
work again, but in the afternoon asked to
be brought home to Tarlac. GM Hao
instead told his friends to bring him to the
nearest hospital. After being summoned,
Bladimir’s parents transferred him to QC
General Hospital, where Bladimir died
within two days.
The death certificate issued by the QC
General Hospital mentioned pneumonia as
the antecedent cause, while the doctor
attributed the death to among others,
septicemia and chicken pox.
Bladimir’s parents filed a complaint for
damages against Ocean Builders citing the
negligence of GM Hao. They asserted that
Hao’s failure to bring Bladimir to a better-
equipped hospital – like St. Lukes, Capitol
Med, PGH and the like – violated Article
161 of the Labor Code.
The lower court and the CA agreed that
Ocean Builders was liable but differed as to
the amount awarded.
3. Tort/Quasi-Delict
Coca-cola v. CA Lydia Geronimo owned and operated
Kindergarten Wonderland Canteen, which
1993 sold soft drinks and other goods to the
students of Kindergarten Wonderland and
to the public.
In August 1989, some parents of the
students complained that the Coke and
Sprite soft drinks contained fiber-like matter
and other foreign substances. She
discovered the presence of some fiber-like
Hao and the company are not guilty of negligence and thus the decisions of the lower courts are
reversed and the petition dismissed.
This case is for damages based on torts, the employer-employee relationship being merely incidental.
Three elements must be present, viz: (1) duty (2) breach (3) injury and proximate causation. The CA
held that it was the duty of petitioners to provide adequate medical assistance to the employees under
Art. 161 of the Labor Code, failing which a breach is committed. But the SC found that the actions of
Hao – granting a three-day rest, bringing Bladimir to the nearest hospital –amounted to the “necessary
assistance” to ensure “adequate and immediate medical attendance” as required.
And contrary to the lower courts’ findings, Hao as a layman cannot be expected to know that Bladimir
needed to be brought to a hospital with better facilities.
In any case, the alleged negligence of Hao cannot be considered to be the proximate cause of the
death of Bladimir.
DEFINITION: Proximate cause is that which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an
efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and without which, the result would not have occurred. An
injury or damage is proximately caused by an act or failure to act, whenever it appears from the
evidence in the case that the act or omission played a substantial part in bringing about or actually
causing the injury or damage, and that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably
probable consequence of the act or omission.
Other issues:
The duly-registered death certificate is considered a public document. (Here the hospital’s certificate is
considered binding. The doctor also was not the attending physician all throughout, and only orderd the
transfer of the deceased to the general hospital and was not around at the time of death.)
The action in based on quasi-delict, therefore, it prescribes in four years. The allegations in the
complaint makes a reference to the reckless and negligent manufacture of “adulterated food items
intended to be sold for public consumption.” The vendee’s remedies are not limited to those prescribed
in Article 1567 of the Civil Code. The vendor could be liable for quasi-delict under Article 2176, and an
action based thereon may be brought by the vendee.
The existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the commission of a tort by the one
against the other and the consequent recovery of damages therefor. Liability for quasi-delict may still
exist despite the presence of contractual relations.
 substances in the contents of some
unopened Coke bottles and a plastic matter
in the contents of an unopened Sprite
bottle. The Department of Health informed
her that the samples she submitted are
adulterated. Her sales of soft drinks
plummeted, and not long after that, she
had to close shop. She became jobless
and destitute.

She demanded from Coca-Cola the

payment of damages but was rebuffed, so
she filed a complaint before the RTC of
Dagupan City. The court granted an MTD
filed by petitioner, on the ground that the
complaint is based on contract, and not on
quasi-delict, as there exists pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties.
Thus, on the basis of Article 1571, in
relation to Article 1562, the complaint
should have been filed within six months
from the delivery of the thing sold. The CA
reversed the RTC decision and held that
Geronimo’s complaint is one for quasi-
delict because of petitioner’s act of
negligently manufacturing adulterated food
items intended to be sold for public
consumption; and that the existence of
contractual relations between the parties
does not absolutely preclude an action by
one against the other for quasi-delict
arising from negligence in the performance
of a contract.
Spouses Viloria v. In 1997 Fernando Viloria purchased for Continental Airlines is not vicariously liable for quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code
Continental Airlines himself and his wife Lourdes two roundtrip for the negligence of the employee of its agent, Holiday Travel agency.
tickets from San Diego, California to
(2012) Newark, New Jersey on board Continental If the passenger’s cause of action against the airline company is premised on culpa aquiliana or quasi-
Airlines. Fernando bought tickets at delict for a tort committed by the employee of the airline company’s agent, there must be an
$400.00 from Holiday Travel agency and independent showing that the airline company was at fault or negligent or has contributed to
was attended by a certain Margaret Mager, the negligence or tortuous conduct committed by the employee of its agent. The mere fact that
who convinced him to buy the tickets after the employee of the airline company’s agent has committed a tort is not sufficient to hold the airline
being informed that the train is no longer company liable. There is no vinculum juris between the airline company and its agent’s employees and
available. Fernando asked Mager to rebook the contractual relationship between the airline company and its agent does not operate to create a
them to an earlier flight. However, Mager juridical tie between the airline company and its agent’s employees. Article 2180 of the Civil Code does
informed him that all flights to Newark via not make the principal vicariously liable for the tort committed by its agent’s employees and the
Continental Airlines were already fully principal-agency relationship per se does not make the principal a party to such tort; hence, the need to
booked. Mager offered tickets from Frontier prove the principal’s own fault or negligence.
Air, which were worth $526.00 and entailed
traveling at night. Fernando asked for a
refund, but was denied. Mager said the
only option Continental Airlines can offer is
the reissuance of new tickets one year from
 the date of the issue of the subject tickets.
Fernando found out that the Amtrak trains
were not really full, and went to Holiday
Travel to confront Mager about deluding
him into buying Continental tickets by
misrepresenting that Amtrak trains were
already full. He demanded a refund. Hence
the complaint.

4. Doctrine of Proximate Cause

Calalas v. Court of In 1989, Eliza Jejeurche G. Sunga, then a
Appeals college freshman at Siliman University,
boarded a passenger jeepney owned and
(2009) operated by Vicente Calalas. The jeep was
filled to capacity of about 24 passengers,
and she was made to sit on a wooden
extension seat at the back door at the rear
end of the jeepney. Eventually, the vehicle
stopped to let a passenger off, so Sunga
decided to give way. Just as she was doing
so, an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio
Verena and owned by Francisco Salva
bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney.
Sunga was injured and was confined in the
hospital. Sunga sued Calalas for damages
arising from breach of contract of carriage.
Calalas filed a third-party complaint against
Salva. The trial court ruled against Salva,
but was reversed by the Court of Appeals.
Before the Supreme Court Calalas
interposes the defense that it was Verena’s
negligence which was the proximate cause
of the injuries sustained by Sunga.
Consolidated Bank In 1976, L.C. Diaz and Co. opened a
v. Court of Appeals savings account with Consolidated Bank
(Solidbank). In 1991, L.C. Diaz, through its
(2003) cashier Mercedes Macaraya filled up a
savings deposit slips. Macaraya instructed
Ismael Calapre, L.C. Diaz’s messenger, to
deposit the money with Solidbank.
Macaraya also gave Calapre the passbook.
Calapre went to Solidbank, but since the
transaction took some time, he went to
Allied Bank to make another deposit and
left the passbook with Solidbank. When
Calapre returned, he was informed that
someone else had taken the passbook.
Teller No. 6 could not remember to whom
she gave the passbook.
Calalas, as the common carrier of Sunga, was bound under contract to carry the latter to her
destination safely and cannot interpose the defense of Verena’s negligence as the proximate
cause of Sunga’s injuries.
It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was the
negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for
quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing
liability to a person where there is no relation between him and another party. In such a case, the
obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, it is the parties themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to
regulate the relation thus created. Insofar as contracts of carriage are concerned, some aspects
regulated by the Civil Code are those respecting the diligence required of common carriers with regard
to the safety of passengers as well as the presumption of negligence in cases of death or injury to
passengers.
The Supreme Court was unconvinced of the theory of the Court of Appeals that the proximate
cause of the unauthorized withdrawal was the teller’s failure to call up L.C. Diaz to verify the
withdrawal.
Solidbank did not have the duty to call up L.C. Diaz to confirm the withdrawal. There is no arrangement
between Solidbank and L.C. Diaz to this effect. Even the agreement between Solidbank and L.C. Diaz
pertaining to measures that the parties must observe whenever withdrawals of large amounts are made
does not direct Solidbank to call up L.C. Diaz.
There is no law mandating banks to call up their clients whenever their representatives withdraw
significant amounts from their accounts. L.C. Diaz therefore had the burden to prove that it is the usual
practice of Solidbank to call up its clients to verify a withdrawal of a large amount of money. L.C. Diaz
failed to do so.

5. Negligence
Philippine National Rhoda Brunty, a U.S. national, visited the
Railways v. Brunty Philippines in 1980. She and her Filipino
host, Juan Manuel Garcia, travelled to
(2006) Baguio City on board a Mercedes Benz
sedan. The sedan collided with a train of
the Philippine National Railways at
Moncada, Tarlac. Brunty died. Ethel
Brunty, mother of Rhoda, sued the PNR for
negligence. She pointed out that PNR was
grossly negligent in not providing the
necessary equipment at the railroad
crossing in Moncada. There was no flagbar
or red light signal to warn motorists who
were about to cross the tracks. There was
only a switchman equipped with a
flashlight. On the other hand, the sedan
was running at the speed of 70 km/h.
Althea
6. Degree of Negligence
Althea
7. Standard of Conduct
Althea
Corinthian Gardens v. The Tanjangcos own Lots 68 and 69
Sps. Tanjangco located at Corinthian Gardens Subdivision,
Quezon City, which is managed by
(2008) petitioner Corinthian Gardens Association,
Inc. (Corinthian). On the other hand,
respondents-spouses Frank and Teresita
Cuaso (the Cuasos) own Lot 65 which is
adjacent to the Tanjangcos’ lots.
Before the Cuasos constructed their house
on Lot 65, a relocation survey was
necessary. As Geodetic Engineer
Democrito De Dios (Engr. De Dios),
operating under the business name D.M.
De Dios Realty and Surveying, conducted
all the previous surveys for the
subdivision's developer, Corinthian referred
Engr. De Dios to the Cuasos. Before,
during and after the construction of the said
house, Corinthian conducted periodic
ocular inspections in order to determine
compliance with the approved plans
pursuant to the Manual of Rules and
Regulations of Corinthian. Unfortunately,
after the Cuasos constructed their house
employing the services of C.B. Paraz &
Construction Co., Inc. (C.B. Paraz) as
The Supreme Court held that the PNR was negligent in failing to provide adequate safety
equipment at the railroad crossing.
It may broadly be stated that railroad companies owe to the public a duty of exercising a reasonable
degree of care to avoid injury to persons and property at railroad crossings, which duties pertain both in
the operation of trains and in the maintenance of the crossings. Moreover, every corporation
constructing or operating a railway shall make and construct at all points where such railway crosses
any public road, good, sufficient, and safe crossings and erect at such points, at a sufficient elevation
from such road as to admit a free passage of vehicles of every kind, a sign with large and distinct
letters placed thereon, to give notice of the proximity of the railway, and warn persons of the necessity
of looking out for trains.
The Supreme Court has previously determined the liability of the PNR for damages for its failure to put
a cross bar, or signal light, flagman or switchman, or semaphores. Such failure is evidence of
negligence and disregard of the safety of the public, even if there is no law or ordinance requiring it
because public safety demands that said device or equipment be installed.
The instant case is obviously one for tort, as governed by Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
In every tort case filed under this provision, plaintiff has to prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1)
the damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person
for whose act he must respond; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence and the damages incurred.
Undeniably, the perimeter fence of the Cuasos encroached on Lot 69 owned by the Tanjangcos by 87
square meters as duly found by both the RTC and the CA in accordance with the evidence on record.
As a result, the Tanjangcos suffered damage in having been deprived of the use of that portion of their
lot encroached upon. Thus, the primordial issue to be resolved in this case is whether Corinthian was
negligent under the circumstances and, if so, whether such negligence contributed to the injury suffered
by the Tanjangcos.
A negligent act is an inadvertent act; it may be merely carelessly done from a lack of ordinary prudence
and may be one which creates a situation involving an unreasonable risk to another because of the
expectable action of the other, a third person, an animal, or a force of nature. A negligent act is one
from which an ordinary prudent person in the actor's position, in the same or similar circumstances,
would foresee such an appreciable risk of harm to others as to cause him not to do the act or to do it in
a more careful manner.
The test to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the
defendant in committing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinary person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law,
in effect, adopts the standard supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias in Roman
law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal
judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless,
 builder, their perimeter fence encroached
on the Tanjangcos’ Lot 69 by 87 square
meters.
Eventually, the Cuasos filed a Third-Party
Complaint against Corinthian, C.B. Paraz
and Engr. De Dios. The Cuasos ascribed
negligence to C.B. Paraz for its failure to
ascertain the proper specifications of their
house, and to Engr. De Dios for his failure
to undertake an accurate relocation survey,
thereby, exposing them to litigation. The
Cuasos also faulted Corinthian for
approving their relocation survey and
building plans without verifying their
accuracy and in making representations as
to Engr. De Dios' integrity and competence.
The Cuasos alleged that had Corinthian
exercised diligence in performing its duty,
they would not have been involved in a
boundary dispute with the Tanjangcos.
Thus, the Cuasos opined that Corinthian
should also be held answerable for any
damages that they might incur as a result
of such construction.
8. Special Circumstances
Heirs of Completo v. Respondent Amando C. Albayda, Jr.
Albayda (Albayda) is a Master Sergeant of the
Philippine Air Force. Petitioner Redentor
(2010) Completo (Completo), now represented by
his heirs, was the taxi driver of a Toyota
Corolla, bearing Plate No. PYD-128, owned
and operated by co-petitioner Elpidio Abiad
(Abiad). Albayda and Completo figured in
an accident along the intersection of 8th
and 11th Streets, VAB. Albayda filed a
complaint for damages before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City.
The amended complaint alleged that, on
August 27, 1997, while Albayda was on his
way to the office to report for duty, riding a
bicycle along 11th Street, the taxi driven by
Completo bumped and sideswiped him,
causing serious physical injuries.
Albayda alleged that the proximate cause
of the incident which necessitated his stay
blameworthy, or negligent in a man of ordinary intelligence and prudence, and determines liability
according to that standard.
By this test, we find Corinthian negligent. Corinthian cannot and should not be allowed to justify or
excuse its negligence by claiming that its approval of the Cuasos’ building plans was only limited to a
so-called "table inspection;" and not actual site measurement. To accept some such postulate is to put
a premium on negligence. Corinthian was not organized solely for the defendants Cuasos. It is also the
subdivision of the plaintiffs-spouses Tanjangcos - and of all others who have their dwelling units or
abodes therein.
By its Manual of Rules and Regulations, it is reasonable to assume that Corinthian, through its
representative, in the approval of building plans, and in the conduct of periodic inspections of on-going
construction projects within the subdivision, is responsible in insuring compliance with the approved
plans, inclusive of the construction of perimeter walls, which in this case is the subject of dispute
between the Tanjangcos and the Cuasos.41 It is not just or equitable to relieve Corinthian of any liability
when, by its very own rules, it imposes its authority over all its members to the end that "no new
construction can be started unless the plans are approved by the Association and the appropriate cash
bond and pre-construction fees are paid." Moreover, Corinthian can impose sanctions for violating
these rules. Thus, the proposition that the inspection is merely a "table inspection" and, therefore,
should exempt Corinthian from liability, is unacceptable. After all, if the supposed inspection is merely a
"table inspection" and the approval granted to every member is a mere formality, then the purpose of
the rules would be defeated. Compliance therewith would not be mandatory, and sanctions imposed for
violations could be disregarded. Corinthian's imprimatur on the construction of the Cuasos' perimeter
wall over the property of the Tanjangcos assured the Cuasos that everything was in order.
In sum, Corinthian’s failure to prevent the encroachment of the Cuasos’ perimeter wall into Tanjangcos’
property – despite the inspection conducted – constitutes negligence and, at the very least, contributed
to the injury suffered by the Tanjangcos.
The instant case involved a collision between a taxicab and a bicycle which resulted in serious physical
injuries to the bicycle rider, Albayda. It is a rule in negligence suits that the plaintiff has the burden of
proving by a preponderance of evidence the motorist’s breach in his duty of care owed to the plaintiff,
that the motorist was negligent in failing to exercise the diligence required to avoid injury to the plaintiff,
and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the injury suffered.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there
is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict. In this regard, the
question of the motorist's negligence is a question of fact.
It was proven by a preponderance of evidence that Completo failed to exercise reasonable diligence in
driving the taxicab because he was over-speeding at the time he hit the bicycle ridden by Albayda.
Such negligence was the sole and proximate cause of the serious physical injuries sustained by
Albayda. Completo did not slow down even when he approached the intersection of 8th and 11th
Streets of VAB. It was also proven that Albayda had the right of way, considering that he reached the
intersection ahead of Completo.
The bicycle occupies a legal position that is at least equal to that of other vehicles lawfully on the
highway, and it is fortified by the fact that usually more will be required of a motorist than a bicyclist in
discharging his duty of care to the other because of the physical advantages the automobile has over
the bicycle.
 in the hospital for approximately seven (7)
months was the negligence of Completo
who, at the time of the accident, was in the
employ of Abiad.
Pacis v. Morales On 17 January 1995, petitioners Alfredo P.
Pacis and Cleopatra D. Pacis (petitioners)
(2010) filed with the trial court a civil case for
damages against respondent Jerome
Jovanne Morales (respondent). Petitioners
are the parents of Alfred Dennis Pacis, Jr.
(Alfred), a 17-year old student who died in
a shooting incident inside the Top Gun
Firearms and Ammunitions Store (gun
store) in Baguio City. Respondent is the
owner of the gun store.
Alfred Dennis, then minor, died due to a
gunshot wound in the head which he
sustained while he was at the gun store
owned and operated by defendant Jerome
Jovanne Morales.
With Alfred Pacis at the time of the
shooting were Aristedes Matibag and
Jason Herbolario. They were sales agents
of the defendant, and the caretakers of the
gun store.The bullet which killed Alfred
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for
one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those persons for whom one is responsible. Employers shall
be liable for the damages caused by their employees, but the employers’ responsibility shall cease
upon proof that they observed all the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and
supervision of their employees.
When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, a legal presumption instantly arises that
the employer was negligent. This presumption may be rebutted only by a clear showing on the part of
the employer that he exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of his employee. If the employer successfully overcomes the legal presumption of
negligence, he is relieved of liability. In other words, the burden of proof is on the employer.
The trial court’s finding that Completo failed to exercise reasonable care to avoid collision with Albayda
at the intersection of 11th and 8th Streets of VAB gives rise to liability on the part of Completo, as
driver, and his employer Abiad. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for quasi-delict
is solidary. The civil liability of the employer for the negligent acts of his employee is also primary and
direct, owing to his own negligence in selecting and supervising his employee. The civil liability of the
employer attaches even if the employer is not inside the vehicle at the time of the collision.
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their
qualifications, experience, and service records. On the other hand, with respect to the supervision of
employees, employers should formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation,
and impose disciplinary measures for breaches thereof. To establish these factors in a trial involving
the issue of vicarious liability, employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence.
Abiad testified that before he hired Completo, he required the latter to show his bio-data, NBI
clearance, and driver’s license and that he would wake up early to personally check the condition of the
vehicle before it is used. The protestation of Abiad to escape liability is short of the diligence required
under the law.
This case for damages arose out of the accidental shooting of petitioners’ son. Under Article 1161 of
the Civil Code, petitioners may enforce their claim for damages based on the civil liability arising from
the crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code or they may opt to file an independent civil
action for damages under the Civil Code. In this case, instead of enforcing their claim for damages in
the homicide case filed against Matibag, petitioners opted to file an independent civil action for
damages against respondent whom they alleged was Matibag’s employer. Petitioners based their claim
for damages under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.
Unlike the subsidiary liability of the employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, the liability
of the employer, or any person for that matter, under Article 2176 of the Civil Code is primary and
direct, based on a person’s own negligence
This case involves the accidental discharge of a firearm inside a gun store. Under PNP Circular No. 9,
entitled the “Policy on Firearms and Ammunition Dealership/Repair,” a person who is in the business of
purchasing and selling of firearms and ammunition must maintain basic security and safety
requirements of a gun dealer, otherwise his License to Operate Dealership will be suspended or
canceled.
Indeed, a higher degree of care is required of someone who has in his possession or under his control
an instrumentality extremely dangerous in character, such as dangerous weapons or substances. Such
person in possession or control of dangerous instrumentalities has the duty to take exceptional
precautions to prevent any injury being done thereby. Unlike the ordinary affairs of life or business
which involve little or no risk, a business dealing with dangerous weapons requires the exercise of a
 Dennis Pacis was fired from a gun brought
in by a customer of the gun store for repair.
The gun was left by defendant Morales in a
drawer of a table located inside the gun
store.
Defendant Morales was in Manila at the
time. His employee Armando Jarnague,
who was the regular caretaker of the gun
store was also not around. He left earlier
and requested sales agents Matibag and
Herbolario to look after the gun store while
he and defendant Morales were away.
Jarnague entrusted to Matibag and
Herbolario a bunch of keys used in the gun
store which included the key to the drawer
where the fatal gun was kept.
It appears that Matibag and Herbolario later
brought out the gun from the drawer and
placed it on top of the table. Attracted by
the sight of the gun, the young Alfred
Dennis Pacis got hold of the same.
Matibag asked Alfred Dennis Pacis to
return the gun. The latter followed and
handed the gun to Matibag. It went off, the
bullet hitting the young Alfred in the head.
9. Res Ipsa Loquitur
PROFESSIONAL After an anterior resection surgery and
SERVICES VS. hysterectomy performed by Dr. Ampil and
AGANA Dr. Fuentes at the Medical City,
Natividad suffered excruciating pain in the
(2007) following days, even during another
medical trip to the US. Upon her return,
Natividad’s daughter discovered a piece of
gauze protruding from her vagina. Upon
being informed about it, Dr. Ampil
proceeded to her house where he
managed to extract by hand a piece of
gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width.
Respondents filed a case for damages
against PSI, Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes.
The RTC ruled in favor of respondents but
on appeal to the CA, Dr. Fuentes was
absolved from responsibility.
The Aganas now maintain that the Court of
Appeals erred in finding that Dr. Fuentes is
not guilty of negligence or medical
higher degree of care.
As a gun store owner, respondent is presumed to be knowledgeable about firearms safety and should
have known never to keep a loaded weapon in his store to avoid unreasonable risk of harm or injury to
others. Respondent has the duty to ensure that all the guns in his store are not loaded. Firearms
should be stored unloaded and separate from ammunition when the firearms are not needed for ready-
access defensive use. With more reason, guns accepted by the store for repair should not be loaded
precisely because they are defective and may cause an accidental discharge such as what happened
in this case. Respondent was clearly negligent when he accepted the gun for repair and placed it inside
the drawer without ensuring first that it was not loaded. In the first place, the defective gun should have
been stored in a vault. Before accepting the defective gun for repair, respondent should have made
sure that it was not loaded to prevent any untoward accident. Indeed, respondent should never accept
a firearm from another person, until the cylinder or action is open and he has personally checked that
the weapon is completely unloaded. For failing to insure that the gun was not loaded, respondent
himself was negligent. Furthermore, it was not shown in this case whether respondent had a License to
Repair which authorizes him to repair defective firearms to restore its original composition or enhance
or upgrade firearms.
Clearly, respondent did not exercise the degree of care and diligence required of a good father of a
family, much less the degree of care required of someone dealing with dangerous weapons, as would
exempt him from liability in this case.
The element of "control and management of the thing which caused the injury" is absent in this case
hence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur will not lie.
Literally, res ipsa loquitur means "the thing speaks for itself." It is the rule that the fact of the
occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or
raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff’s prima facie case, and present a
question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation. Stated differently, where the thing
which caused the injury, without the fault of the injured, is under the exclusive control of the
defendant and the injury is such that it should not have occurred if he, having such control
used proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation that the injury
arose from the defendant’s want of care, and the burden of proof is shifted to him to establish
that he has observed due care and diligence.
The requisites for the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are: (1) the occurrence of
an injury; (2) the thing which caused the injury was under the control and management of the
defendant; (3) the occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things, would not have happened
if those who had control or management used proper care; and (4) the absence of explanation by the
defendant. Of the foregoing requisites, the most instrumental is the "control and management of the
thing which caused the injury."
In this case, Dr. Ampil was the lead surgeon during the operation of Natividad. He requested the
assistance of Dr. Fuentes only to perform hysterectomy when he (Dr. Ampil) found that the malignancy
in her sigmoid area had spread to her left ovary. Dr. Fuentes performed the surgery and thereafter
 malpractice, invoking the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur. They contend that the pieces
of gauze are prima facie proofs that the
operating surgeons have been negligent.
CAP VS. Belfranlt Development, Inc. (respondent) is
BELFRANTL the owner of Belfranlt Building in Angeles
City, Pampanga. It leased to petitioners
(2007) College Assurance Plan Phil., Inc. (CAP)
and Comprehensive Annuity Plans and
Pension Corporation (CAPP) several units
on the second and third floors of the
building.
A fire destroyed portions of the building,
including the third floor units being
occupied by petitioners. The report of the
arson investigator showed that the origin of
the fire was from an overheated percolator
located in the storeroom occupied by CAP.
Respondent demanded reparation from
CAP but the latter refused to pay so an
action for damages was filed.
Both the RTC and CA ruled in favor of
respondent.
10. Contributory negligence of plaintiff
NPC VS. HEIRS OF This is a review on certiorari of the
CASIONAN Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
which found the National Power
(2008) Corporation (NPC) liable for damages for
the death of Noble Casionan due to
electrocution from the company’s high
tension transmission lines.
Petitioner contends that the mere presence
of the high tension wires above the trail did
not cause the victim’s death. Instead, it was
reported and showed his work to Dr. Ampil. The latter examined it and finding everything to be in order,
allowed Dr. Fuentes to leave the operating room. Dr. Ampil then resumed operating on Natividad. He
was about to finish the procedure when the attending nurses informed him that two pieces of gauze
were missing. A "diligent search" was conducted, but the misplaced gauzes were not found. Dr. Ampil
then directed that the incision be closed. During this entire period, Dr. Fuentes was no longer in the
operating room and had, in fact, left the hospital.
It was this act of ordering the closure of the incision notwithstanding that two pieces of gauze remained
unaccounted for, that caused injury to Natividad’s body. Clearly, the control and management of the
thing which caused the injury was in the hands of Dr. Ampil, not Dr. Fuentes.
NOTE: In this jurisdiction, res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law, hence, does not per se
create or constitute an independent or separate ground of liability, being a mere evidentiary rule. In
other words, mere invocation and application of the doctrine does not dispense with the requirement of
proof of negligence. Here, the negligence was proven to have been committed by Dr. Ampil and not by
Dr. Fuentes.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies.
Under this doctrine, expert testimony may be dispensed with to sustain an allegation of
negligence if the following requisites obtain: a) the accident is of a kind which does not
ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; b) the cause of the injury was under the exclusive
control of the person in charge and c) the injury suffered must not have been due to any
voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured.
The fire that damaged Belfranlt Building was not a spontaneous natural occurrence but the outcome of
a human act or omission. It originated in the store room which petitioners had possession and control
of. Respondent had no hand in the incident. Hence, the convergence of these facts and circumstances
speaks for itself: petitioners alone having knowledge of the cause of the fire or the best opportunity to
ascertain it, and respondent having no means to find out for itself, it is sufficient for the latter to merely
allege that the cause of the fire was the negligence of the former and to rely on the occurrence of the
fire as proof of such negligence. It was all up to petitioners to dispel such inference of negligence, but
their bare denial only left the matter unanswered.
There was no contributory negligence on Noble’s part.
The sagging high tension wires were an accident waiting to happen. As established during trial, the
lines were sagging around 8 to 10 feet in violation of the required distance of 18 to 20 feet. If the
transmission lines were properly maintained by petitioner, the bamboo pole carried by Noble would not
have touched the wires. He would not have been electrocuted.
Negligence is the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of
care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person
suffers injury. On the other hand, contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured
 Noble’s negligent carrying of the bamboo
pole that caused his death. It insists that
Noble was negligent when he allowed the
bamboo pole he was carrying to touch the
high tension wires. This is especially true
because other people traversing the trail
have not been similarly electrocuted.
Lambert v Heirs of Castillon after having dinner and drinking a
Castillon bottle of beer went on a motorcycle ride
with Sergio riding at the back. They figured
(2005) in a vehicular accident with a Tamaraw
jeepney owned by Lambert and driven by
Gamot. This resulted to the death of
Castillon and injuries to Sergio. Thus an
action for damages was filed by his heirs.
11. Fortuitous event
Southeastern Petitioner owned a four-storey school
College v CA, De building in Pasay City. When typhoon
Jesus Etal. Saling hit Metro Manila, one part of the roof
July 10, 1998 of the building was blown by the wind
Purisima J. which landed and destroyed the roofing of
the house of private respondent. Thus a
suit for damages was filed against
petitioners.
12
When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate
cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard
which he is required to conform for his own protection. There is contributory negligence when the
party’s act showed lack of ordinary care and foresight that such act could cause him harm or put his life
in danger. It is an act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of the person injured
which, concurring with the defendant’s negligence, is the proximate cause of the injury.
The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his
own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the consequences of his own
negligence. If indeed there was contributory negligence on the part of the victim, then it is proper to
reduce the award for damages. This is in consonance with the Civil Code provision that liability will be
mitigated in consideration of the contributory negligence of the injured party. Article 2179 of the Civil
Code is explicit on this score.12
In Ma-ao Sugar Central, it was held that to hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must
be shown that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warnings or signs on
an impending danger to health and body.
In this case, the trail where Noble was electrocuted was regularly used by members of the community.
There were no warning signs to inform passersby of the impending danger to their lives should they
accidentally touch the high tension wires. Also, the trail was the only viable way from Dalicon to Itogon.
Hence, Noble should not be faulted for simply doing what was ordinary routine to other workers in the
area.
The abrupt and sudden left turn by Gamot, without first establishing his right of way, was the proximate
cause of the mishap which claimed the life of Castillon and injured Sergio. However, Castillon is guilty
of contributory negligence. Castillon, at the time of the mishap: (1) was driving the motorcycle at a high
speed; (2) was tailgating the Tamaraw jeepney; (3) has imbibed one or two bottles of beer; and (4) was
not wearing a protective helmet which contributed to the result of the incident.
The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his
own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the consequences of his own
negligence. The defendant must thus be held liable only for the damages actually caused by his
negligence. The determination of the mitigation of the defendant’s liability varies depending on the
circumstances of each case.
Fortuitous event or caso fortuito is defined as “an event which takes place by accident and could not
have been foreseen.”
To exempt a person from liability, it is necessary that he be free from any previous negligence or
misconduct by reason of which the loss may have been occasioned. When a person’s negligence
concurs with an act of God in producing damage or injury to another, such person is not exempt from
liability by showing that the immediate or proximate cause of the damage or injury was a fortuitous
event. When the effect is found to be partly the result of the participation of man – whether it be from
active intervention, or neglect, or failure to act – the whole occurrence is hereby humanized, and
removed from the rules applicable to acts of God
In the case at hand, private respondent failed to prove the negligence of petitioner. On the other hand,
petitioners were able to prove through their witnesses that they have obtained both building permit and

12. Plaintiff’s assumption of risk/volenti non fit injuria
Ilocos Norte Electric During the onslaught of Typhoon Gening,
Company v CA Nana Belen ventured ought to see whether
her merchandise has been damaged.
While wading in waist deep water, and
opening the gate of her house, she was
(1989) electrocuted by a dangling electrical wire
owned by petitioner Ilocos Norte Electric
Company.
Thus an action for damages was brought
by the heirs against the petitioner.
It is to be noted that Nana Belen installed a
burglar deterrent using petitioner’s wires
without their permission, to which petitioner
argues to be the cause of her electrocution.
13. Doctrine of Last Clear Chance
Lapanday vs Angala On 4 May 1993, at about 2:45 p.m., a
Datsun crewcab driven by Apolonio
(2007) Deocampo (Deocampo) bumped into a
Chevy pick-up owned by Michael Raymond
Angala (respondent) and driven by
Bernulfo Borres (Borres). Lapanday
Agricultural and Development Corporation
(LADECO) owned the crewcab which was
assigned to its manager Manuel Mendez
(Mendez). Deocampo was the driver and
bodyguard of Mendez. Both vehicles were
running along Rafael Castillo St., Agdao,
Davao City heading north towards Lanang,
Davao City. The left door, front left fender,
and part of the front bumper of the pick-up
were damaged.
Respondent filed an action for Quasi-Delict,
Damages, and Attorney’s Fees against
LADECO, its administrative officer Henry
Berenguel (Berenguel) and Deocampo.
Respondent alleged that his pick-up was
slowing down to about five to ten
kilometers per hour (kph) and was making
a left turn preparatory to turning south
when it was bumped from behind by the
crewcab which was running at around 60 to
70 kph. The crewcab stopped 21 meters
certificate of occupancy which are, at the very least, prima facie evidence of the regular and proper
construction of the school building. Moreover, no other incident has been reported regarding the
building despite other typhoons stronger than Saling have hit it.
In the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria it is considered that when a person voluntarily assents to a
known danger he must abide by the consequences resulting therefrom. However, this doctrine finds no
application in the case at bar. A person is excused from the force of the rule, if an emergency is found
to exist or if the life or property of another is in peril or when he seeks to rescue his endangered
property
In this case at hand, Nana Belen tried to save her goods, which was the source of her livelihood, from
being damaged by the flood. Furthermore, at the time the fatal incident occurred, she was at a place
where she had a right to be without regard to petitioner's consent as she was on her way to protect her
merchandise.
Both parties were negligent in this case. Borres was at the outer lane when he executed a U-turn.
Following Section 45(b) of RA 4136, which provides that:
(b) The driver of a vehicle intending to turn to the left shall approach such intersection in the
lane for traffic to the right of and nearest to the center line of the highway, and, in turning, shall
pass to the left of the center of the intersection, except that, upon highways laned for traffic
and upon one- way highways, a left turn shall be made from the left lane of traffic in the
direction in which the vehicle is proceeding.)
Borres should have stayed at the inner lane which is the lane nearest to the center of the highway.
However, Deocampo was equally negligent. Borres slowed down the pick-up preparatory to executing
the U-turn. Deocampo should have also slowed down when the pick-up slowed down. Deocampo
admitted that he noticed the pick-up when it was still about 20 meters away from him. Vehicular traffic
was light at the time of the incident. The pick-up and the crewcab were the only vehicles on the road.
Deocampo could have avoided the crewcab if he was not driving very fast before the collision. Further,
the crewcab stopped 21 meters from the point of impact. It would not have happened if Deocampo was
not driving very fast.
Since both parties are at fault in this case, the doctrine of last clear chance applies. The doctrine of
last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably
later than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused the
loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so is chargeable with
the loss. In this case, Deocampo had the last clear chance to avoid the collision. Since Deocampo was
driving the rear vehicle, he had full control of the situation since he was in a position to observe the
vehicle in front of him. Deocampo had the responsibility of avoiding bumping the vehicle in front of him.
A U-turn is done at a much slower speed to avoid skidding and overturning, compared to running
straight ahead. Deocampo could have avoided the vehicle if he was not driving very fast while following
the pick-up. Deocampo was not only driving fast, he also admitted that he did not step on the brakes
even upon seeing the pick-up. He only stepped on the brakes after the collision.
 from the point of impact. Respondent
alleged that he heard a screeching sound
before the impact. Respondent was seated
beside the driver and was looking at the
speedometer when the accident took place.
Respondent testified that Borres made a
signal because he noticed a blinking light
while looking at the speedometer.
Deocampo alleged that the pick-up and the
crewcab he was driving were both running
at about 40 kph. The pick-up was running
along the outer lane. The pick-up was
about 10 meters away when it made a U-
turn towards the left. Deocampo testified
that he did not see any signal from the
pick-up. Deocampo alleged that he tried to
avoid the pick-up but he was unable to
avoid the collision. Deocampo stated that
he did not apply the brakes because he
knew the collision was unavoidable.
Deocampo admitted that he stepped on the
brakes only after the collision.

14. Vicarious Liability

a. Parents/Guardians
Libi vs IAC Deceased Julie Ann Gotiong, 18 years old,
and deceased Wendell Libi, between 18 to
(1992) 19 years old, were sweethearts for two
years prior to the incident. After Julie
decided to end the relationship finding the
guy sadistic and irresponsible, Wendell
incessantly pursued her and prayed that
they be together again. This made him
resort to threats. But, Julie hold steadfast to
her decision. In order to avoid the Wendell,
Julie lived with her best friend. On the day
of the incident, the two were found shot
dead by a Smith and Wesson revolver. The
parents of the Julie instituted this case
against the parents of Wendell for
damages.
The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed under Art 2180
of the Civil Code and Art. 101 of Revised Penal Code covered obligations arising from both quasi-
delicts and criminal offenses. The court held that the civil liability of the parents for quasi-delict of their
minor children is primary and not subsidiary and that responsibility shall cease when the persons can
prove that they observe all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. However,
Wendell’s mother testified that her husband owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit box inside a
drawer in their bedroom. Each of the spouses had their own key. She likewise admitted that during the
incident, the gun was no longer in the safety deposit box. Wendell could not have gotten hold of the
gun unless the key was left negligently lying around and that he has free access of the mother’s bag
where the key was kept. The spouses failed to observe and exercise the required diligence of a good
father to prevent such damage.

b. Teachers
St. Joseph’s College While inside the premises of St. Joseph’s
vs Miranda College, the class where respondent
Jayson Miranda belonged was conducting
(2010) a science experiment about fusion of
sulphur powder andiron fillings under the
tutelage of Rosalinda Tabugo, she being
the teacher and the employee, while the
The proximate cause of the Jason’s injury was the concurrent failure of petitioners to prevent to
foreseeable mishap that occurred during the conduct of the science experiment. Petitioners were
negligent by failing to exercise the higher degree of care, caution and foresight incumbent upon the
school, its administrators and teachers.
Petitioners’ negligence and failure to exercise the requisite degree of care and caution is demonstrated
by the following:
• Petitioner school did not take affirmative steps to avert damage and injury to its students
 adviser is Estafania Abdan.
Tabugo left her class while it was doing the
experiment without having adequately
secured it from any untoward incident or
occurrence. In the middle of the
experiment, Jayson, who was the assistant
leader of one of the class groups, checked
the result of the experiment by looking into
the test tube with magnifying glass. The
test tube was being held by one of his
group mates who moved it close and
towards the eye of Jayson. At that
instance, the compound in the test tube
spurted out and several particles of which
hit Jayson’s eye and the different parts of
the bodies of some of his group mates.
As a result thereof, Jayson’s eyes were
chemically burned, particularly his left eye,
for which he had to undergo surgery and
had to spend for his medication.
AQUINAS SCHOOL v In 1998, Jose Luis Inton was a 3 rd grade
INTON student at Aquinas. Sister Yamyamin
taught his religion class. During one class,
(2011) he left his seat and went over to his
classmate to surprise him. Yamyamin saw
him and sent him back to his seat. After a
while, Jose Luis stood up again and went
to his classmate. Yamyamin kicked him on
the legs several times, pulled and shoved
his head and made him copy the notes on
the blackboard while seated on the floor.
Jose Luis’ parents filed an action for
damages on behalf of their son against
Yamyamin and Aquinas.
c. Owners/Managers of Establishments/Employers
MERCURY DRUG v Mercury Drug is the registered owner of a
HUANG Mitsubishi truck, with petitioner del Rosario
as driver. Respondent Sps. Huang are
(2007) parents of respondent Stephen Huang,
who owned a Sedan.
The 2 vehicles got into an accident as they
were traversing a highway. The Sedan was
on the left innermost lane while the truck
was on the next lane to its right when the
although it had full information on the nature of dangerous science experiments conducted by
the students during class;
• Petitioner school did not install safety measures to protect the students who conduct
experiments in class;
• Petitioner school did not provide protective gears and devices, specifically goggles, to shield
students from expected risks and dangers; and
• Petitioner Tabugo was not inside the classroom the whole time her class conducted the
experiment, specifically, when the accident involving Jayson occurred. In any event, the size
of the class—fifty (50) students— conducting the experiment is difficult to monitor.
Moreover, petitioners cannot simply deflect their negligence and liability by insisting that petitioner
Tabugo gave specific instructions to her science class not to look directly into the heated compound.
The defense of due diligence of a good father of a family raised by petitioner St. Joseph College will not
exculpate it from liability because it has been shown that it was guilty of inexcusable laxity in the
supervision of its teachers (despite an apparent rigid screening process for hiring) and in the
maintenance of what should have been a safe and secured environment for conducting dangerous
experiments. Petitioner school is still liable for the wrongful acts of the teachers and employees
because it had full information on the nature of dangerous science experiments but did not take
affirmative steps to avert damage and injury to students.
The fact that there has never been any accident in the past during the conduct of science experiments
is not a justification to be complacent in just preserving the status quo and do away with creative
foresight to install safety measures to protect the students. Schools should not simply install safety
reminders and distribute safety instructional manuals. More importantly, schools should provide
protective gears and devices to shield students from expected risks and anticipated dangers.
The Court applied the “four-fold test” in determining the existence of an employer-employee
relationship to absolve Aquinas of liability. The school directress’ testimony that Aquinas had an
agreement with a congregation of sisters under which, in order to fulfill its ministry, the congregation
would send religion teachers to Aquinas to provide catechesis to its students. Aquinas insisted that it
wasn’t the school which chose Yamyamin to teach but her religious congregation. On the basis of such
testimony, the Court held that Aquinas had no control over Yamyamin’s teaching methods.
The Court likewise held that Aquinas took the necessary steps to ensure that only qualified outside
catechists are allowed to teach its young students.
Mercury Drug is jointly and severally liable with Del Rosario as the employer.
In order to be relieved of such liability, Mercury should show that it exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family, both in the selection and supervision of the employee in the performance of his
duties. Mercury failed in both respects.
In selecting employees, the employer is required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience
and service records. With respect to supervision, the employer should formulate standard operating
procedures, monitor their implementation and impose disciplinary measures for their breach. To
establish such, concrete proof, such as documentary evidence must be submitted by him.
 latter swerved to its left and slammed the
front right side of the sedan. As a
consequence, the car was wrecked and
Stephen incurred massive injuries and
became paralyzed.
Respondents faulted Del Rosario for
committing fross negligence and reckless
imprudence and Mercury Drug for failing to
exercise the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of its
driver.
In the case at bar, it was shown that Del Rosario didn't take driving tests and psychological exams
when he applied for the position of a Truck Man. In addition, Mercury didn't present Del Rosario's NBI
and police clearances. Next, the last seminar attended by the driver occurred a long 12 years before
the accident occurred. Lastly, Mercury didn't have a backup driver for long trips. When the accident
happened Del Rosario has been out on the road for more than 13 hours.
As to negligence with regard to supervision over its employees, Mercury didn'timpose any sanction on
Del Rosario when the latter reported to the former about the incident. Hence, Mercury didn't exercise
due diligence

15. Interference with contractual realtions

LAGON Lagon purchased from the estate of Bai Tonina Sepi, through an intestate court,
v CA two parcels of land located at Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat. A few months after the
sale, private respondent Lapuz filed a complaint for torts and damages against
(2000) petitioner. Respondent claimed that he entered into a contract of lease with the
late Bai Tonina Sepi Mengelen Guiabar over three parcels of land. One of the
provisions agreed upon was for private respondent to put up commercial
buildings which would, in turn, be leased to new tenants. The rentals to be paid
by those tenants would answer for the rent private respondent was obligated to
pay Bai Tonina Sepi for the lease.
When Bai Tonina Sepi died, private respondent started remitting his rent to thec
ourt-appointed administrator of her estate. But when the administrator advised
him to stop collecting rentals from the tenants of the buildings he constructed,
he discovered that petitioner, representing himself as the new owner of the
property, had been collecting rentals from the tenants. He thus filed a complaint
against the latter.
Petitioner claimed that before he bought the property, he went to Atty. Benjamin
Fajardo, the lawyer who allegedly notarized the lease contract between private
respondent and Bai Tonina Sepi, to verify if the parties indeed renewed the
lease contract after it expired in 1974. Petitioner averred that Atty. Fajardo
showed him 4 copies of the lease renewal but these were all unsigned.
The purchase by petitioner of the property during the existence of respondent’s
lease does not constitute tortuous interference.
NCC 1314 provides that any third person who induces another to violate his
contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party. The tort
recognized in that provision is known as interference with contractual
relations. The interference is penalized because it violates the property rights
of a party in a contract to reap the benefits that should result therefrom.
The Court, in the case of So Ping Bun v. Court of Appeals, down the elements
of tortuous interference with contractual relations: (a) existence of a valid
contract; (b) knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of the
contract and (c) interference of the third person without legal justification or
excuse.
The 2nd and 3rd elements are not present. Petitioner conducted his own personal
investigation and inquiry, and unearthed no suspicious circumstance that would
have made a cautious man probe deeper and watch out for any conflicting claim
over the property. An examination of the entire property’s title bore no indication
of the leasehold interest of private respondent. Even the registry of property had
no record of the same.
The records do not support the allegation of private respondent that petitionerind
uced the heirs of Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property to him. Records show that
the decision of the heirs of the late Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property was
completely of their own volition and that petitioner did absolutely nothing to
influence their judgment. Private respondent himself did not proffer any evidence
to support his claim.

In short, even assuming that private respondent was ableto prove the renewal of
his lease contract with Bai Tonina Sepi, the fact was that he was unable to prove
malice or bad faith on the part of petitioner in purchasing the property. Therefore,
the claim of tortuous interference was never established.

Petitioner’s purchase of the subject property was merely an advancement of his

financial or economic interests, absent any proof that he was enthused by
improper motives. In the very early case of Gilchrist v. Cuddy, the Court declared
 that a person is not a malicious interferer if his conduct is impelled by a proper
business interest. In other words,
a financial or profit motivation will not necessarily make a person an officious
interferer liable for damages as long as there is no malice or bad faith involved.

Go v Robinson signed documents appointing Cordero as the exclusive distributor of
Corder AFFA catamaran and other fast ferry vessels in the Philippines. After
o negotiations with Felipe Landicho and Vincent Tecson, lawyers of Allan C. Go
(2010) who is the owner/operator of ACG Express Liner of Cebu City, a single
proprietorship, Cordero was able to close a deal for the purchase of two (2)
SEACAT 25. However, Cordero later discovered that Go was dealing directly
with Robinson when he was informed by Dennis Padua of Wartsila Philippines
that Go was canvassing for a second catamaran engine from their company
which provided the ship engine for the first SEACAT 25.
From the time petitioner Go and respondent Landicho directly dealt with
respondent Robinson in Brisbane, and ceased communicating through
petitioner Cordero as the exclusive distributor of AFFA in the Philippines,
Cordero was no longer informed of payments remitted to AFFA in Brisbane.
When Cordero complained to Go, Robinson, Landicho and Tecson about their
acts prejudicial to his rights and demanded that they respect his exclusive
distributorship, Go simply let his lawyers led by Landicho and Tecson handle the
matter and tried to settle it by promising to pay a certain amount and to
purchase high-speed catamarans through Cordero. However, Cordero was not
paid anything and worse, AFFA through its lawyer in Australia even terminated
his exclusive dealership insisting that his services were engaged for only one (1)
transaction, that is, the purchase of the first SEACAT 25 in August 1997.
This case is one of damnun absque injuria or damage without injury. “Injury” is
the legal invasion of a legal right while “damage” is the hurt, loss or harm which
results from the injury.
WON the acts constituted an interference with contractual relations. Yes. While it
is true that a third person cannot possibly be sued for breach of contract because
only parties can breach contractual provisions, a contracting party may sue a
third person not for breach but for inducing another to commit such breach.
Article 1314 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1314. Any third person who induces another to violate his contract shall be
liable for damages to the other contracting party.
The elements of tort interference are: (1) existence of a valid contract; (2)
knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of a contract; and (3)
interference of the third person is without legal justification.
The presence of the first and second elements is not disputed.
The act of Go, Landicho and Tecson in inducing Robinson and AFFA to enter
into another contract directly with ACG Express Liner to obtain a lower price for
the second vessel resulted in AFFA’s breach of its contractual obligation to pay in
full the commission due to Cordero and unceremonious termination of Cordero’s
appointment as exclusive distributor. The attendant circumstances demonstrated
that respondents transgressed the bounds of permissible financial interest to
benefit themselves at the expense of Cordero.
Thus, the trial and appellate courts correctly ruled that the actuations of Go,
Robinson, Tecson and Landicho were without legal justification and intended
solely to prejudice Cordero.

16. Damages
Custodio v CA (1996) The plaintiff owns a parcel of land with a
two-door apartment erected thereon
situated at Interior P. Burgos St., Palingon,
Tipas, Tagig, Metro Manila. Said property
may be described to be surrounded by
other immovables pertaining to defendants
herein.
When said property was purchased by
Mabasa, there were tenants occupying the
premises and who were acknowledged by
plaintiff Mabasa as tenants. However,
sometime in February, 1982, one of said
tenants vacated the apartment and when
plaintiff Mabasa went to see the premises,
he saw that there had been built an adobe
fence in the first passageway making it
narrower in width. Said adobe fence was
WON plaintiff is entitled to a right of way. Yes
WON plaintiff is entitled to damages. No
In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. Contrary to the claim of
private respondents, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right. In
order that the principle of abuse of right provided in Article 21 of the Civil Code can be applied, it is
essential that the following requisites concur: (1) The defendant should have acted in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy; (2) The acts should be willful; and (3) There was
damage or injury to the plaintiff.
The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their right as owners,
hence not contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. The law recognizes in the owner the right
to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law. It is within the
right of petitioners, as owners, to enclose and fence their property. Article 430 of the Civil Code
provides that "(e)very owner may enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of walls, ditches,
live or dead hedges, or by any other means without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon."
At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject to any servitudes
 first constructed by defendants Santoses
along their property which is also along the
first passageway. Defendant Morato
constructed her adobe fence and even
extended said fence in such a way that the
entire passageway was enclosed. And it
was then that the remaining tenants of said
apartment vacated the area.

17. Actual or Compensatory

Oceeaneering Nestor N. Barretto (Barretto) is the owner WON Oceeaneering is entitled to actual/compensatory damages. Yes
Contractors Inc. v of the Barge "Antonieta" which was last The rule is long and well settled that there must be pleading and proof of actual damages suffered for
Nestor N. Barretto licensed and permitted to engage in the same to be recovered. In addition to the fact that the amount of loss must be capable of proof, it
(2011) coastwise trading. , Barretto and petitioner must also be actually proven with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof or
Oceaneering Contractors (Phils.), Inc. the best evidence obtainable. The burden of proof of the damage suffered is, consequently, imposed on
(Oceaneering) entered into a Time Charter the party claiming the same.
Agreement for the purpose of transporting We find that Oceaneering correctly fault the CA for not granting its claim for actual damages or, more
construction materials from Manila to specifically, the portions thereof which were duly pleaded and adequately proved before the RTC.
Ayungon, Negros Oriental. Brokered by While concededly not included in the demand letters dated 12 March 1998 and 13 July
freelance ship broker Manuel Velasco, the 1998 Oceaneering served Barretto, the former’s counterclaims for the value of its lost cargo in the sum
agreement included Oceaneering’s of P4,055,700.00 and salvaging expenses in the sum of P125,000.00 were distinctly pleaded and
acknowledgment of the seaworthiness of prayed for in the 26 January 1999 answer it filed a quo.
the barge. For lack of sufficient showing of bad faith on the part of Barretto, we find that the CA, finally, erred in
granting Oceaneering’s claim for attorney’s fees.
The barge eventually left Manila for Negros
Oriental. On 5 December 1997, however,
Barretto’s Bargeman, Eddie La Chica,
executed a Marine Protest under which the
barge reportedly capsized in the vicinity of
Cape Santiago, Batangas. Barreto filed a
case claiming that the capsizing was due to
the negligence of Oceeaneering
employees. Oceeaneering filed a
compulsory counterclaim alleging that it
was due to the unseaworthiness of the
vessel. It claimed actual, exemplary and
attorney’s fees. The CA ruled that a
common carrier legally charged with
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over
the goods transported by him; and, that the
sinking of the vessel created a presumption
of negligence and/or unseaworthiness.
However, the CA disallowed the
counterclaims for the value of the
construction materials which were lost as a
consequence of the sinking of the barge.

18. Death by crime or quasi-delict

People vs Apacible From the account of prosecution witness Php 50,000 is the proper amount of damages.
Mylene Vizconde (Mylene), widow of
(2010) Arnold Vizconde (the victim), the following The Court thus affirms the appellate court’s Decision, with modification, however. The Court reduces
 transpired on the day her husband died:
On May 23, 1999, starting at about 2:00
p.m., her husband, her uncle and appellant,
who is her first cousin, had a drinking spree
at a neighbor’s house. The spree lasted up
to 8:30 p.m. following which her husband
returned home and slept in their room. She
thereupon placed their eight-month old
child beside him and went to the kitchen to
prepare milk for the child. Shortly
thereafter, she, from a distance of about
three to four meters, heard appellant utter
"Putang ina mo, papatayin kita!" and then
saw appellant, through the open door to the
room, stab her husband several times
the amount of civil indemnity awarded by the appellate court from P75,000 to P50,000, as determined
by the trial court. People v. Anod explains why the award of P75,000 as civil indemnity lies only in
cases where the proper imposable penalty is death, viz:
It is worth stressing that, at the outset, the appellant, together with Lumbayan, was sentenced by the
RTC to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Thus, the CA’s reliance on our ruling in People v. dela
Cruz was misplaced. In dela Cruz, this Court cited our ruling in People v. Tubongbanua, wherein we
held that the civil indemnity imposed should be P75,000.00. However, the instant case does not share
the same factual milieu as dela Cruz and Tubongbanua. In the said cases, at the outset, the accused
were sentenced to suffer the penalty of death. However, in view of the enactment of Republic Act No.
9346 or the Act Prohibiting the Imposition of the Death Penalty on June 24, 2006, the penalty meted to
the accused was reduced to reclusion perpetua. This jurisprudential trend was followed in the recent
case of People of the Philippines v. Generoso Rolida y Moreno, etc., where this Court also increased
the civil indemnity from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00. Based on the foregoing disquisitions and the current
applicable jurisprudence, we hereby reduce the civil indemnity awarded herein to P50,000.00. x x x
As reflected earlier, appellant was sentenced by the trial court to reclusion perpetua.

Appelant was found guilty and charged with

reclusion perpetua. The RTC awarded Php
75,000 in damages, which the CA reduced
to Php 50,000
Crisostomo vs On February 12, 2001, at around 12:20 in The Civil Liabilities
People the afternoon, Rodelio Pangilinan (Rodelio) In robbery with homicide, civil indemnity and moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 each is
was working at a gasoline station owned by granted automatically in the absence of any qualifying aggravating circumstances. These awards are
(2010) Jose Buencamino (Jose) at Buliran, San mandatory without need of allegation and evidence other than the death of the victim owing to the fact
Miguel, Bulacan. He was by the gasoline of the commission of the crime. In this case, the CA properly awarded the amount of P50,000.00 as
tank which was two or three arms length civil indemnity. In addition, we also award the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages.
from the cashier’s office when three armed To be entitled to compensatory damages, it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a
men on board a motorcycle arrived. Two of reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and the best evidence obtainable to
the men immediately went to the cashier the injured party. "[R]eceipts should support claims of actual damages." Thus, as correctly held by the
while the driver stayed on the motorcycle. trial court and affirmed by the CA, the amount of P14,500.00 incurred as funeral expenses can be
Inside the office, one of the men pulled out sustained since these are expenditures supported by receipts. Also, the courts below correctly held
a fan knife while the other, armed with a petitioner liable to return the amount of P40,000.00 which was stolen from the gas station before the
gun, fired a shot at Janet Ramos (Janet), victim was shot and killed.
the cashier. They forcibly took the money in
the cash register and the man with the gun
fired a second shot that fatally hit Janet in
the right side of her head. The two armed
men returned to their companion waiting by
the motorcycle and together sped away
from the scene of the crime.
Rodelio gave a description of the driver of
the motorcycle but not of the two armed
men who entered the cashier’s office since
they had their backs turned to him. The
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
prepared a cartographic sketch based on
the information provided by Rodelio. Jose,
the owner of the gas station, stated that the
stolen money was worth P40,000.00.
Receipts in the amount of P14,500.00 were
presented as funeral expenses.
On February 23, 2001, the petitioner was
 detained after being implicated in a robbery
that occurred in San Miguel, Bulacan.
During his detention, Rodelio and another
gasoline boy arrived and identified him in a
police lineup as one of the three robbers
who killed Janet.to two public roads or
highways.

RTC: reclusion perpetua, ordered to

indemnify the heirs of victim Janet Ramos
in the amount of P75,000.00, the owner or
operator, Jose Buencamino, Jr., of the
gasoline station that was robbed, in the
amount of P40,000.00 plus P14,500.00 as
funeral expenses.

CA: Lowered indemnity from 75,000 to

50,000
Philippine Hawk vs On March 15, 2005, respondent Vivian Tan
Lee Lee filed before the RTC of Quezon City a
Complaint against petitioner Philippine
(2010) Hawk Corporation and defendant Margarito
Avila for damages based on quasi-delict,
arising from a vehicular accident that
occurred on March 17, 1991 in Barangay
Buensoceso, Gumaca, Quezon. The
accident resulted in the death of
respondent’s husband, Silvino Tan, and
caused respondent physical injuries.
On June 18, 1992, respondent filed an
Amended Complaint, in her own behalf and
in behalf of her children, in the civil case for
damages against petitioner. Respondent
sought the payment of indemnity for the
death of Silvino Tan, moral and exemplary
damages, funeral and interment expenses,
medical and hospitalization expenses, the
cost of the motorcycle’s repair, attorney’s
fees, and other just and equitable reliefs.
The accident involved a motorcycle, a
passenger jeep, and a bus with Body No.
119. The bus was owned by petitioner
Philippine Hawk Corporation, and was then
being driven by Margarito Avila.
Respondent’s husband died due to the
vehicular accident. The immediate cause of
his death was massive cerebral
hemorrhage.
Respondent further testified that her
husband was leasing and operating a
Caltex gasoline station in Gumaca, Quezon
that yielded one million pesos a year in
In the computation of loss of earning capacity, only net earnings, not gross earnings, are to be
considered; that is, the total of the earnings less expenses necessary for the creation of such earnings
or income, less living and other incidental expenses. In the absence of documentary evidence, it is
reasonable to peg necessary expenses for the lease and operation of the gasoline station at 80 percent
of the gross income, and peg living expenses at 50 percent of the net income (gross income less
necessary expenses).
In this case, the computation for loss of earning capacity is as follows:
Reasonable and
Life Expectancy Necessary
Net Earning Gross Annual
= [2/3 (80-age at the x – Expenses
Capacity Income (GAI)
time of death)] (80% of GAI)
The Court of Appeals also awarded actual damages for the expenses incurred in connection with the
death, wake, and interment of respondent’s husband in the amount of P154,575.30, and the medical
expenses of respondent in the amount of P168,019.55.
Actual damages must be substantiated by documentary evidence, such as receipts, in order to prove
expenses incurred as a result of the death of the victim or the physical injuries sustained by the victim.
A review of the valid receipts submitted in evidence showed that the funeral and related expenses
amounted only to P114,948.60, while the medical expenses of respondent amounted only to
P12,244.25, yielding a total of P127,192.85 in actual damages.
Further, the Court of Appeals correctly awarded respondent civil indemnity for the death of her
husband, which has been fixed by current jurisprudence at P50,000.00. The award is proper under Art.
2206 of the Civil Code.
 revenue. They also had a copra business,
which gave them an income of P3,000.00 a
month or P36,000.00 a year.
Driver of Philippine Hawk found negligent,
damages awarded.
19. Attorney’s fees
Sps. Moises Andrada Pilhino Sales Corporation (Pilhino) sued
vs. Pilhilno Sales Jose Andrada, Jr. and his wife, Maxima, to
Corp recover money, plus interest and incidental
charges. Upon Pilhino’s application, the
(2011) RTC-Davao City issued a writ of
preliminary attachment, which came to be
implemented against a Hino truck and a
Fuso truck both owned by Jose. However,
the levies on attachment were lifted after
Jose filed a counter-attachment bond.
The RTC rendered a decision against Jose
and his wife. Pilhino opted to enforce the
writ of execution against the properties of
the Andradas instead of claiming against
the counter-attachment bond considering
that the premium on the bond had not been
paid. However, the Hino truck could not be
transferred to Pilhino’s name due to its
having been already sold to and registered
in the name of petitioner Moises Andrada,
Moises Andrada and his wife claim that
they had already acquired the Hino truck
from Jose free from any lien or
encumbrance prior to its seizure by the
sheriff; that their acquisition had been
made in good faith, considering that at the
time of the sale the preliminary attachment
had already been lifted; and that Pilhino’s
recourse was to proceed against the
counter-attachment bond.
RTC dismissed complaint of Pilhino and all
counterclaims. Moises appealed with
respect to his counterclaim.
CA affirmed RTC. Moises then filed petition
for certiorari (ayaw pa kasi tumigil) claiming
damages from Pilhilno’s levy of the truck.
The SC found no merit in the petition for review.
The CA found that Pilhino acted in good faith in filing a case to annul the deed of sale involving the
Hino truck between Jose and Moises, considering that Pilhino had “believed that the sale in favor of
Moises was resorted to so that Jose [might] evade his obligations.” The CA concluded that no remedy
was available for any damages that the petitioners sustained from the filing of the case against them
because “the law affords no remedy for such damages resulting from an act which does not amount to
a legal injury or wrong.” The CA’s finding and conclusion rested on the RTC’s own persuasion that the
sale of the Hino truck to Moises Andrada had been simulated.
The petitioners further seek attorney’s fees based on Article 2208 (4) of the Civil Code, which provides
that “in the absence of stipulation, attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs,
cannot be recovered, except xxx (4) in cases of clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the
plaintiff xxx.”
The petitioners are not entitled to attorney’s fees.
It is well accepted in this jurisdiction that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate and that
not every winning party is entitled to an automatic grant of attorney’s fees.
Indeed, before the effectivity of the new Civil Code, such fees could not be recovered in the absence of
a stipulation. It was only with the advent of the new Civil Code that the right to collect attorney’s fees in
the instances mentioned in Article 2208 was recognized, and such fees are now included in the
concept of actual damages. One such instance is where the defendant is guilty of gross and evident
bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff’s plainly valid, just and demandable claim. This is a corollary
of the general principle expressed in Article 19 of the Civil Code that everyone must, in the
performance of his duties, observe honesty and good faith and the rule embodied in Article 1170 that
anyone guilty of fraud (bad faith) in the performance of his obligation shall be liable for damages.
But, as noted by the Court in Morales v. Court of Appeals, the award of attorney’s fees is the exception
rather than the rule. The power of a court to award attorney’s fees under Article 2208 of the Civil
Code demands factual, legal, and equitable justification; its basis cannot be left to speculation and
conjecture. The general rule is that attorney’s fees cannot be recovered as part of damages
because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate.
Pan Pacific vs. Pan Pacific entered into a contract of
Equitable PCI Bank mechanical works with EPCIB. The
Contract stipulated, among others, that Pan
2010 Pacific shall be entitled to a price
adjustment in case of increase in labor
costs and prices of materials (escalation
clause)
The project (PCIB Tower II extension
building in Makati City) was completed in
June 1992. In accordance with the
escalation clause, Pan Pacific claimed a
price adjustment of P5,165,945.52.
Respondent asked for a reduction in the
price adjustment. To show goodwill, Pan
Pacific reduced the price adjustment to
P4,858,548.67. EPCIB wanted the price
adjustment reduced to P3,730,957.07.
EPCIB withheld the payment of the price
adjustment despite Pan Pacific’s repeated
demands. Instead, EPCIB offered Pan
Pacific a loan of P1.8 million. Against its
will and on the strength of the promise that
the price adjustment would be released
soon, Pan Pacific executed a promissory
note in the amount of P1.8 million as a
requirement for the loan. The P1.8 million
was released directly to laborers and
suppliers and not a single centavo was
given to Pan Pacific.
20. Moral damages
Sps. Valenzuela vs. Petitioner Federico Valenzuela (Federico)
Sps. Magno is the son of Andres Valenzuela (Andres)
who was the owner and possessor of a
2010 parcel of land in Pulilan, Bulacan. Andres
died and the possession of said property
was transferred to Federico. The heirs of
Andres waived all their rights to the
property in favor of Federico.
Meanwhile, a Deed of Conditional Sale was
executed between Feliciano Geronimo
(Feliciano) and herein respondent Jose
Mano, Jr. (Jose), wherein the former
agreed to sell to the latter a parcel of land
in Pulilan. Jose applied for a Free Patent
and an Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
No. P-351 was issued in his name. Jose
sold a part of this land to a 3rd party.
Under Article 2209 of the Civil Code, the appropriate measure for damages in case of delay in
discharging an obligation consisting of the payment of a sum of money is the payment of penalty
interest at the rate agreed upon in the contract of the parties. In the absence of a stipulation of a
particular rate of penalty interest, payment of additional interest at a rate equal to the regular monetary
interest becomes due and payable. Finally, if no regular interest had been agreed upon by the
contracting parties, then the damages payable will consist of payment of legal interest which is 6%, or
in the case of loans or forbearances of money, 12% per annum. It is only when the parties to a
contract have failed to fix the rate of interest or when such amount is unwarranted that the Court will
apply the 12% interest per annum on a loan or forbearance of money.
The written agreement entered into between petitioners and respondent provides for an interest at the
current bank lending rate in case of delay in payment and the promissory note charged an interest of
18%.
To prove petitioners’ entitlement to the 18% bank lending rate of interest, petitioners presented the
promissory note prepared by respondent bank itself. This promissory note, although declared void by
the lower courts because it did not express the real intention of the parties, is substantial proof that the
bank lending rate at the time of default was 18% per annum. Absent any evidence of fraud, undue
influence or any vice of consent exercised by petitioners against the respondent, the interest rate
agreed upon is binding on them.
(Note) CA computed the remaining balance due from EPCIB in favor of Pan Pacific to be
P1,516,015.07. EPCIB did not appeal this ruling, but appealed only with regard to the applicable
interest rate.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 63966. We ORDER respondent to pay
petitioners P1,516,015.07 with interest at the bank lending rate of 18% per annum starting 6 May 1994
until the amount is fully paid.
We rule that Federico is the owner of the disputed 447 square meter lot.
The Deed of Conditional Sale did not include the area covered by the land owned by Petitioner.
However, subsequent surveys showed that Lot No. 10176-A with an area of 447 square meters had
been made to appear as part of the lot sold by Feliciano to Jose.
We rule that Jose committed fraud in obtaining title to the disputed property. The chain of events
leading to the issuance of title in his name shows beyond cavil the bad faith or a fraudulent pattern on
his part. The evidence on record disclosed that even before Jose purchased the 2,056 square meters
from Feliciano, he had already caused on January 30, 1991 the survey of a 2,739 square meters
lot. Although the document of sale expressly stated that the area sold was 2,056 square meters and is
located at Dampol 1st, Pulilan, Bulacan, however, when he filed his application for free patent in March
1991, he used the survey on the 2,739 square meters and indicated the same to be located at Dampol
II, Pulilan, Bulacan. Also, in his application, he stated that the land described and applied for is not
claimed or occupied by any person when in reality the same is owned and possessed by Federico.
Article 2217of the Civil Code defines what are included in moral damages while Article 2219
enumerates the cases where they may be recovered. Moral damages are in the category of an award
 Apparently, the title involved in this sale
included the area covered by the land
owned by Petitioner.
Petitioner constructed a fence on his
property. Respondent claims he owns the
property based on his OCT.
21. Nominal damages
GUANIO v. MAKATI Sps. Guanio booked at the Shangri-la Hotel
SHANGRI-LA HOTEL Makati for their wedding reception. During
the initial food tasting, Shangri-La prepared
(2011) for 6 persons but Sps. Guanio claimed that
they requested for 7 persons. At the final
food tasting, the salmon served was half
the size they were served during the initial
food tasting. During the reception, the
catering director and sales manager did not
show up; their guests complained of the
delay in the service of the dinner; certain
items listed in the published menu were
unavailable; the hotel’s waiters were rude
and unapologetic when confronted about
the delay; and despite Alvarez’s promise
that there would be no charge for the
extension of the reception beyond 12:00
midnight, they were billed and paid P8,000
per hour for the three-hour extension of the
event up to 4:00 A.M. the next day
Sps. Guanio sent a letter-complaint to
Shangri-la and received an apologetic reply
from the hotel’s Executive Assistant
Manager in charge of Food and Beverage.
They nevertheless filed a complaint for
breach of contract and damages before the
RTC of Makati City.
Makati RTC rendered judgment in favor of
petitioners.
PEOPLE v. Marquez was charged with Kidnapping.
MARQUEZ Marquez pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged and alleged that Merano offered
designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the
wrongdoer. “The person claiming moral damages must prove the existence of bad faith by clear and
convincing evidence for the law always presumes good faith. It is not enough that one merely suffered
sleepless nights, mental anguish, serious anxiety as the result of the actuations of the other party.
Invariably such action must be shown to have been willfully done in bad faith or with ill motive.” In the
same fashion, to warrant the award of exemplary damages, the wrongful act must be accompanied by
bad faith, and an award of damages would be allowed only if the guilty party acted in wanton,
fraudulent, reckless or malevolent manner. As regards attorney’s fees, the law is clear that in the
absence of stipulation, attorney’s fees may be recovered as actual or compensatory damages under
any of the circumstances provided for in Article 2208 of the Civil Code.
Having ruled that Jose committed fraud in obtaining title to the disputed property then he should be
liable for both moral and exemplary damages. Likewise, since petitioners were compelled to litigate to
protect their rights and having proved that Jose acted in bad faith, attorney’s fees should likewise be
awarded.
Respondents are ordered to pay P50,000 by way of nominal damages.
Breach of contract is defined as the failure without legal reason to comply with the terms of a contract.
It is also defined as the failure, without legal excuse, to perform any promise which forms the whole or
part of the contract.
The appellate court, and even the trial court, observed that petitioners were remiss in their obligation to
inform respondent of the change in the expected number of guests. Petitioners’ failure to discharge
such obligation thus excused, as the above-quoted paragraph 4.5 of the parties’ contract provide,
respondent from liability for "any damage or inconvenience" occasioned thereby.
Respecting the letter of Svensson on which the trial court heavily relied as admission of respondent’s
liability but which the appellate court brushed aside, the Court finds the appellate court’s stance in
order. It is not uncommon in the hotel industry to receive comments, criticisms or feedback on the
service it delivers. It is also customary for hotel management to try to smooth ruffled feathers to
preserve goodwill among its clientele.
Respondent admitted that three hotel functions coincided with petitioners’ reception. To the Court, the
delay in service might have been avoided or minimized if respondent exercised prescience in
scheduling events. No less than quality service should be delivered especially in events which
possibility of repetition is close to nil. Petitioners are not expected to get married twice in their lifetimes.
In the present petition, under considerations of equity, the Court deems it just to award the amount of
P50,000.00 by way of nominal damages to petitioners, for the discomfiture that they were subjected to
during to the event. The Court recognizes that every person is entitled to respect of his dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of mind. Respondent’s lack of prudence is an affront to this right.
The award of nominal damages is correct.
The award of nominal damages is also allowed under Article 2221 of the New Civil Code which states
(2011) the child for adoption.
22. Temperate damages
TAN v. OMC Petitioners filed a complaint for damages
CARRIERS, INC. with the RTC against OMC and Arambala.
The complaint states that Arambala was
(2011) driving a truck with a trailer owned by
OMC. When Arambala noticed that the
truck had suddenly lost its brakes, he told
his companion to jump out. Soon
thereafter, he also jumped out and
abandoned the truck. Driverless, the truck
rammed into the house and tailoring shop
owned by petitioner Leticia Tan and her
husband Celedonio Tan, instantly killing
Celedonio who was standing at the
doorway of the house at the time.
RTC found OMC and Arambala jointly and
severally liable to the petitioners for
damages. CA affirmed the RTC’s findings
on the issues of the respondents’
negligence and liability for damages.
However, the CA modified the damages
awarded to the petitioners by reducing the
actual damages award from P355,895.00
to P72,295.00. The CA observed that only
the latter amount was duly supported by
official receipts. The CA also deleted the
RTC’s award for loss of earning capacity.
The CA further reduced the exemplary
damages from P500,000.00 to
P200,000.00, and deleted the award of
attorney’s fees because the RTC merely
included the award in the dispositive
portion of the decision without discussing
its legal basis.
that: Article 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been
violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.
It took Merano almost a year to legally recover her baby. Justine was only three months old when this
whole debacle began. She was already nine months old when Merano saw her again. She spent her
first birthday at the Reception and Study Center for Children of the DSWD. Evidently, Merano’s right as
a parent which was violated and invaded must be vindicated and recognized, thereby justifying the
award of nominal damages.
We begin by discussing the petitioners’ claim for actual damages arising from the damage inflicted on
petitioner Leticia Tan’s house and tailoring shop, taking into account the sewing machines and various
household appliances affected. Our basic law tells us that to recover damages there must be pleading
and proof of actual damages suffered. The petitioners do not deny that they did not submit any receipt
to support their claim for actual damages to prove the monetary value of the damage caused to the
house and tailoring shop when the truck rammed into them. Thus, no actual damages for the
destruction to petitioner Leticia Tan’s house and tailoring shop can be awarded.
Nonetheless, absent competent proof on the actual damages suffered, a party still has the option of
claiming temperate damages, which may be allowed in cases where, from the nature of the case,
definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be adduced although the court is convinced that the aggrieved
party suffered some pecuniary loss.
The photographs the petitioners presented as evidence show the extent of the damage done to the
house, the tailoring shop and the petitioners’ appliances and equipment. Irrefutably, this damage was
directly attributable to Arambala’s gross negligence in handling OMC’s truck. Unfortunately, these
photographs are not enough to establish the amount of the loss with certainty. From the attendant
circumstances and given the property destroyed, we find the amount of P200,000.00 as a fair and
sufficient award by way of temperate damages.
Similarly, the CA was correct in disallowing the award of actual damages for loss of earning capacity.
Damages for loss of earning capacity are awarded pursuant to Article 2206 of the Civil Code.
As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim for loss of earning
capacity. By way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite the
absence of documentary evidence when: (1) the deceased is self-employed and earning less than the
minimum wage under current labor laws, in which case, judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in
the deceased's line of work, no documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is employed as
a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws.
In the past, we awarded temperate damages in lieu of actual damages for loss of earning capacity
where earning capacity is plainly established but no evidence was presented to support the allegation
of the injured party’s actual income. In the present case, the income-earning capacity of the deceased
was never disputed. Petitioners Mary Jane Tan, Mary Lyn Tan, Celedonio Tan, Jr., Mary Joy Tan and
Mark Allan Tan were all minors at the time the petition was filed and they all relied mainly on the
income earned by their father from his tailoring activities for their sustenance and support. Under these
facts and taking into account the unrebutted annual earnings of the deceased, we hold that the
petitioners are entitled to temperate damages in the amount of P300,000.00 [or roughly, the gross
income for two (2) years] to compensate for damages for loss of the earning capacity of the deceased.
Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in
addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. In quasi-delicts, exemplary
damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence.
Celedonio Tan’s death and the destruction of the petitioners’ home and tailoring shop were
 unquestionably caused by the respondents’ gross negligence. The law allows the grant of exemplary
damages in cases such as this to serve as a warning to the pubic and as a deterrent against the
repetition of this kind of deleterious actions. The grant, however, should be tempered, as it is not
intended to enrich one party or to impoverish another. From this perspective, we find the CA’s reduction
of the exemplary damages awarded to the petitioners from P500,000.00 to P200,000.00 to be proper.

In view of the award of exemplary damages, we find it also proper to award the petitioners attorney's
fees, in consonance with Article 2208(1) of the Civil Code. We find the award of attorney’s fees,
equivalent to 10% of the total amount adjudged the petitioners, to be just and reasonable under the
circumstances.

Finally, we impose legal interest on the amounts awarded, in keeping with our ruling in Eastern
Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals.

GIOVANI SERRANO FACTS: HELD:

y CERVANTES, The case stemmed from a brawl involving
Petitioner, 15 to 18 members of two (2) rival groups
vs. that occurred at the University of the
PEOPLE OF THE Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City (UP) on
PHILIPPINES, the evening of March 8, 1999. The incident
Respondent. resulted in the stabbing of Anthony Galang
July 5, 2010 (victim). Pinpointed as the victim’s
assailant, the petitioner was charged on
March 11, 1999,5 with frustrated homicide.
The CA awarded actual damages in the
amount of P3,858.50;
The SC convicted the accused but only for attempted homicide.
We modify the CA decision with respect to the petitioner’s civil liability. The CA ordered actual damages
to be paid in the amount of P3,858.50. This is erroneous and contrary to the prevailing jurisprudence.
In People v. Andres,35 we held that if the actual damages, proven by receipts during the trial, amount to
less than P25,000.00, the victim shall be entitled to temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00,
in lieu of actual damages. The award of temperate damages is based on Article 2224 of the New Civil
Code which states that temperate or moderate damages may be recovered when the court finds that
some pecuniary loss was suffered but its amount cannot be proven with certainty. In this case, the
victim is entitled to the award of P25,000.00 as temperate damages considering that the amount of
actual damages is only P3,858.50. The amount of actual damages shall be deleted.

23. Liquidated damages

PENTACAPITAL FACTS: HELD:
INVESTMENT Petitioner filed a complaint for a sum of The respondent is made to pay the principal amount of the loan plus penalties
CORPORATION, money against respondent Makilito The promissory notes likewise required the payment of a penalty charge of 3% per month or 36% per
Petitioner, Mahinay based on two separate loans annum. We find such rates unconscionable. This Court has recognized a penalty clause as an
vs. obtained by the latter in the amount of accessory obligation which the parties attach to a principal obligation for the purpose of ensuring the
MAKILITO B. P1,936,800.00. performance thereof by imposing on the debtor a special prestation (generally consisting of the
MAHINAY, payment of a sum of money) in case the obligation is not fulfilled or is irregularly or inadequately
Respondent. fulfilled.46 However, a penalty charge of 3% per month is unconscionable;47 hence, we reduce it to 1%
July 5, 2010 per month or 12% per annum, pursuant to Article 1229 of the Civil Code which states:
Art. 1229. The judge shall equitably reduce the penalty when the principal obligation has been partly or
irregularly complied with by the debtor. Even if there has been no performance, the penalty may also
be reduced by the courts if it is iniquitous or unconscionable.48
Lastly, respondent promised to pay 25% of his outstanding obligations as attorney’s fees in case of
non-payment thereof. Attorney’s fees here are in the nature of liquidated damages. As long as said
stipulation does not contravene law, morals, or public order, it is strictly binding upon respondent.
Nonetheless, courts are empowered to reduce such rate if the same is iniquitous or unconscionable
pursuant to the above-quoted provision.49 This sentiment is echoed in Article 2227 of the Civil Code, to
wit:
Art. 2227. Liquidated damages, whether intended as an indemnity or a penalty, shall be equitably
reduced if they are iniquitous or unconscionable.
Hence, we reduce the stipulated attorney’s fees from 25% to 10%.
 24. Exemplary/Corrective damages
PEOPLE OF THE FACTS: HELD:
PHILIPPINES, Capanas was charged with simple rape in Capanas could only be convicted for simple rape. The accused could not be convicted of the graver
Plaintiff-Appellee, the Information for raping AAA. However, in offense of qualified rape, although proven, because relationship was neither alleged nor necessarily
vs. the trial, it was proven that AAA was included in the information.
RENATO DADULLA Capanas’ daughter. Capanas could
y CAPANAS, therefore be liable for qualified rape. However, the aggravating circumstance may be appreciated in awarding damages in favor of
Defendant-Appellant. AAA
February 9, 2011 Under Article 2230 of the Civil Code,32 the attendance of any aggravating circumstance (generic,
BERSAMIN, J.: qualifying, or attendant) entitles the offended party to recover exemplary damages. Here, relationship
THIRD DIVISION was the aggravating circumstance attendant in both cases. We need to award P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages in rape and of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages in acts of lasciviousness.
Although, as earlier mentioned, an aggravating circumstance not specifically alleged in the information
(albeit established at trial) cannot be appreciated to increase the criminal liability of the accused, the
established presence of one or two aggravating circumstances of any kind or nature entitles the
offended party to exemplary damages under Article 2230 of the Civil Code because the requirement
of specificity in the information affected only the criminal liability of the accused, not his civil
liability. The term "aggravating circumstances" used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified
otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic sense. The ordinary or qualifying nature of an
aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather
than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating
circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of
exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.