ATTY. ALLAN S. MONTAÑO, petitioner, vs. ATTY. ERNESTO C. VERCELES, respondent.

FACTS: - Atty. Montaño worked as legal assistant of FFW Legal Center. Subsequently, he joined the union of rank-and-file
employees,

the FFW Staff Association, and eventually became the employees’ union president. He was likewise designated officer-in-charge of
FFW Legal Center.
 During the 21st National Convention and Election of National Officers of FFW, Atty. Montaño was nominated
for the position of National Vice- President. The Commission on Election (FFW COMELEC) informed him that he is not qualified for
the position as his candidacy violates the 1998 FFW Constitution and By-Laws. Atty. Montaño thus filed an Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration praying that his name be included in the official list of candidates. Election ensued in the National Convention.
Despite the pending motion for reconsideration with the FFW COMELEC, and strong opposition and protest of respondent Atty.
Ernesto C. Verceles (Atty. Verceles), a delegate to the convention and president of University of the East Employees' Association
(UEEA- FFW) which is an affiliate union of FFW, the convention delegates allowed Atty. Montaño's candidacy. He emerged
victorious and was proclaimed as the National Vice-President.

Through a letter to the Chairman of FFW COMELEC, Atty. Verceles reiterated his protest over Atty. Montaño's candidacy which he
manifested during the plenary session before the holding of the election in the Convention. Atty. Verceles sent a follow-up letter to
the President of FFW requesting for immediate action on his protest.

Atty. Verceles, as President of UEEA-FFW and officer of the Governing Board of FFW, filed before the BLR a petition for the
nullification of the election of Atty. Montaño as FFW National Vice-President. The BLR rendered a Decision dismissing the petition
for lack of merit. While it upheld its jurisdiction over the intra-union dispute case and affirmed, as well, Atty. Verceles' legal
personality to institute the action as president of an affiliate union of FFW, the BLR ruled that there were no grounds to hold Atty.
Montaño unqualified to run for National Vice- President of FFW. Atty. Verceles filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied
by the BLR. Atty. Verceles thus elevated the matter to the CA via a petition for certiorari, arguing that the Convention had no
authority under the FFW Constitution and By-Laws to overrule and set aside the FFW COMELEC's Decision rendered pursuant to
the latter's power to screen candidates. The CA set aside the BLR's Decision.

Believing that it will be prejudiced by the CA Decision since its legal existence was put at stake, the FFW Staff Association, through
its president, Danilo A. Laserna, sought intervention. The CA issued a Resolution denying both Atty. Montaño's motion for
reconsideration and FFW Staff Association's motion for intervention/clarification. Hence, the present petition. -In their brief,
petitioner contended the Court of Appeals seriously erred in upholding the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Labor Relations over the
intra-union dispute as well as the collateral attack on the legality of FFW as a legitimate labor organization.

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not BLR has jurisdiction over the intra-union dispute.
 (2) Whether or not Atty. Montano can run legally
and validly for the said position.

HELD: (1) YES, it has jurisdiction over such. Section 226 of the Labor Code clearly provides that the BLR and the Regional
Directors of DOLE have concurrent jurisdiction over inter-union and intra-union disputes. Such disputes include the conduct or
nullification of election of union and workers' association officers. There is, thus, no doubt as to the BLR's jurisdiction over the
instant dispute involving member- unions of a federation arising from disagreement over the provisions of the federation's
constitution and by-laws. TDCAIS We agree with BLR's observation that:

Rule XVI lays down the decentralized intra-union dispute settlement mechanism. Section 1 states that any complaint in this regard
'shall be filed in the Regional Office where the union is domiciled.' The concept of domicile in labor relations regulation is equivalent
to the place where the union seeks to operate or has established a geographical presence for purposes of collective bargaining or
for dealing with employers concerning terms and conditions of employment.

The matter of venue becomes problematic when the intra-union dispute involves a federation, because the geographical presence
of a federation may encompass more than one administrative region. Pursuant to its authority under Article 226, this Bureau
exercises original jurisdiction over intra-union disputes involving federations. It is

well-settled that FFW, having local unions all over the country, operates in more than one administrative region. Therefore, this
Bureau maintains original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from any violation of or disagreement over any provision
of its constitution and by-laws.

(2) NO, he cannot. To begin with, FFW COMELEC is vested with authority and power, under the FFW Constitution and By-Laws, to
screen candidates and determine their qualifications and eligibility to run in the election and to adopt and promulgate rules
concerning the conduct of elections. Under the Rules Implementing the Labor Code, the Committee shall have the power to
prescribe rules on the qualification and eligibility of candidates and such other rules as may facilitate the orderly conduct of
elections. The Committee is also regarded as the final arbiter of all election protests. From the foregoing, FFW COMELEC,
undeniably, has sufficient authority to adopt its own interpretation of the explicit provisions of the federation's constitution and by-
laws and unless it is shown to have committed grave abuse of discretion, its decision and ruling will not be interfered with. The
FFW Constitution and By-laws are clear that no member of the Governing Board shall at the same time perform functions of the
rank-and-file staff. The BLR erred in disregarding this clear provision. The FFW COMELEC's ruling which considered Atty.
Montaño's candidacy in violation of the FFW Constitution is therefore correct.

We, thus, concur with the CA that Atty. Montaño is not qualified to run for the position but not for failure to meet the requirement
specified under Section 26 (d) of Article VIII of FFW Constitution and By-Laws. We note that the CA's declaration of the illegitimate
status of FFW Staff Association is proscribed by law, owing to the preclusion of collateral attack. We nonetheless resolve to affirm
the CA’s finding that Atty. Montaño is disqualified to run for the position of National Vice- President in view of the proscription in the
FFW Constitution and By- Laws on federation employees from sitting in its Governing Board. Accordingly, the election of Atty.
Montaño as FFW Vice-President is null and void.

INSULAR HOTEL EMPLOYEES UNION V. WATERFRONT HOTEL DAVAO

(2010)

FACTS:
On Nov. 2000, the Hotel sent DOLE a Notice of Suspension of Operations for 6 months due to severe andserious business losses.-
During the suspension, Rojas, Pres. of Davao insular Hotel Free Employees Union (DIHFEU-NFL) the recognized labor
organization in the Hotel, sent the Hotel several letters asking it to reconsider its decision. TheUnion members wanted to keep
their jobs and to help the Hotel, so it suggested several ideas in its Manifesto to solve the high cost on payroll, such as: downsize
manpower structure to 100 rank-and-fileEEs, a new pay scale, etc.

DIHFEU-NFL signed a memorandum of agreement where the Hotel agreed to re-open the hotel. The retained employees
individually signed a “reconfirmation of Employment.”
In June 2001, the Hotel resumed its business operations.
On Aug. 2002, Darius Joves and Debbie Planas, local officers of the National Federation of Labor (NFL), fileda Notice of Mediation
before the NCMB, stating that the Union involved was "DARIUS JOVES/DEBBIEPLANAS ET. AL, National Federation of Labor."
The issue was the diminution of wages and benefitsthrough unlawful MOA. In support of his authority to file the complaint,
Joves, assisted by Atty. Cullo, presented several SPAs which were, undated and unnotarized.

Petitioner and respondent signed a Submission Agreement, where the union stated was "INSULARHOTEL EMPLOYEES UNION-
NFL."- The Hotel filed with the NCMB a Manifestation with Motion for a Second Preliminary Conference, alleging that the persons
who filed the complaint in the name of the Insular Hotel Employees Union-NFL have no authority to represent the Union.

Cullo confirmed that the case was filed not by the IHEU-NFL but by the NFL. When asked to present his authority from NFL, Cullo
admitted that the case was filed by individual employees named in the SPAs.- The Hotel argued that the persons who signed the
complaint were not the authorized representativesof the Union indicated in the Submission Agreement nor were they parties to the
MOA. It filed a Motion to Withdraw, which Cullo then filed an Opposition to where the same was captioned: NATIONAL
FEDERATION OF LABOR and 79 Individual Employees, Union Members, Complainants,-versus-Waterfront Insular Hotel Davao,
Respondent. Cullo reiterated that the complainants were not representing IHEU-NFL.

The Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator (AVA) denied the Motion to Withdraw.- The Hotel submitted its Motion for reconsideration
and stressed that the Submission Agreement was void because the Union did not consent thereto.- Cullo filed a
Comment/Opposition to the Hotel's motion for recomendation. Again, Cullo admitted that the case was not initiated by the IHEU-
NFL, saying that the individual complainants are not representing the union but filing the complaint through their appointed
attorneys-in-fact to assert their individual rights as workers who are entitled to the benefits granted by law and stipulated in the
collective bargaining agreement. There is no mention there of Insular Hotel Employees Union, but only National Federation of
Labor (NFL). The local union was not included as party-complainant considering that it was a party to theassailed MOA.

The AVA denied the Motion. He, however, ruled that the Hotel was correct when it objected to NFL as proper party-complainant, as
the proper one is INSULAR HOTEL EMPLOYEES UNION-NFL. In the submission agreement, the party complainant written is
INSULAR HOTEL EMPLOYEES UNION-NFL and not the NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR and 79 other members. However,
since the NFL is the mother federation of the local union, and signatory to the existing CBA, it can represent the union.

Cullo, in subsequent documents, started using the caption "Insular Hotel Employees Union-NFL, Complainant.

The case was remanded to the NCMB. The Hotel reiterated to the NCMB that the individual union members have no standing. The
Hotel did not appear before the NCMB to select a new AVA. The new AVA decided in favor of cullo, declaring the Memorandum of
agreement invalid.

The Hotel appealed to CA, questioning among others the jurisdiction of the NCMB. The CA ruled in favor of the hotel, declaring the
memorandum of agreement valid and enforceable.

ISSUES:
1. Did CA err in finding that the AVA has no jurisdiction over the case because the notice of mediation does not mention the
name of the local union but only the affiliate federation?
2. Do the individual members of the union have the requisite standing to question the Memorandum of agreement before the
BCMB?
3. If the individual members of the union have no authority to file the case, does the federation to which the local union is
affiliated has the standing to do so?

LAW:
Art. 260, the parties to a CBA shall name or designate their respective representatives to the grievance machinery and if the
grievance is unsettled in that level, it shall automatically be referred to the voluntary arbitrators designated in advance by parties to
a CBA.

RULING:
In the notice of mediation filed in the NCMB, it stated that the union involved was darius joves/Debbie Planes et al., National
federation of labor. In the submission agreement, however, it stated that the union involved was Insular Hotel Employees Union-
NFL. Cullo clarified in subsequent documents captioned as National Federation of Labor and 79 individual employees, members,
complainants that the complainants are not representing the union but filing the complaint through their appointed attorneys in fact.
While it is undisputed that the submission agreement was signed by respondent IHEU-NFL, then represented by Joven and Cullo,
this court finds that there are 2 circumstances which affect its validity: first, the Notice of Mediation was filed by a party who had no
authority to do so; second, that respondent had persistently voiced out its objection questioning the authority of Joves, Cullo and
the individual members of the Union to file the complaint before the NCMB.

Procedurally, the first step to submit a case for mediation is to file a notice of preventive mediation with the NCMB. It is only after
this step that a submission agreement may be entered into by the parties concerned.

Section 3, Rule IV of the NCMB Manual of Procedure provides who may file a notice of preventive mediation, to wit:

Who may file a notice or declare a strike or lockout or request preventive mediation. -

Any certified or duly recognized bargaining representative may file a notice or declare a strike or request for preventive mediation in
cases of bargaining deadlocks and unfair labor practices. The employer may file a notice or declare a lockout or request for
preventive mediation in the same cases. In the absence of a certified or duly recognized bargaining representative, any legitimate
labor organization in the establishment may file a notice, request preventive mediation or declare a strike, but only on grounds of
unfair labor practice.

it is clear that only a certified or duly recognized bargaining agent may file a notice or request for preventive mediation. It is cur ious
that even Cullo himself admitted, in a number of pleadings, that the case was filed not by the Union but by individual members
thereof. Clearly, therefore, the NCMB had no jurisdiction to entertain the notice filed before it.

Even though respondent signed a Submission Agreement, it had, however, immediately manifested its desire to withdraw from the
proceedings after it became apparent that the Union had no part in the complaint. As a matter of fact, only four days had lapsed
after the signing of the Submission Agreement when respondent called the attention of AVA Olvida in a "Manifestation with Motion
for a Second Preliminary Conference"51 that the persons who filed the instant complaint in the name of Insular Hotel Employees
Union-NFL had no authority to represent the Union. Respondent cannot be estopped in raising the jurisdictional issue, because it is
basic that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by
estoppel.

Petitioners have not been duly authorized to represent the union.

Art. 260, the parties to a CBA shall name or designate their respective representatives to the grievance machinery and if the
grievance is unsettled in that level, it shall automatically be referred to the voluntary arbitrators designated in advance by parties to
a CBA.

The CBA recognizes that DIHFEU-NFL is the exclusive bargaining representative of all permanent employees. The inclusion of the
word NFL after the name of the local union merely stresses that the local union is NFL’s affiliate. It does not, however, mean that
the local union cannot stand on its own. The local union owes its creation and continued existence to the will of its members and
not to the federation of which it belongs.

A local union does not owe its existence to the federation with which it is affiliated. It is a separate and distinct voluntary association
owing its creation to the will of its members. Merely affiliation does not divest the local union of its own personality; neither does it
give the mother federation the license to act independently of the local union. It only gives rise to a contract of agency, where the
former acts in representation of the latter. Hence local unions are considered principals while the federation is deemed to be merely
their agent.

The petition is hereby denied and affirmed the decision of CA.

G.R. No. 161003 May 6, 2005

FELIPE O. MAGBANUA, CARLOS DE LA CRUZ, REMY ARNAIZ, BILLY ARNAIZ, ROLLY ARNAIZ, DOMINGO SALARDA,
JULIO CAHILIG and NICANOR LABUEN, petitioners,
vs.
RIZALINO UY, respondent.

FACTS:
“As a final consequence of the final and executory decision of the Supreme Court in Rizalino P. Uy v. National Labor Relations
Commission, et. al. (GR No. 117983, September 6, 1996), hearings were conducted to determine the amount of wage differentials
due the eight (8) complainants therein, now [petitioners]. As computed, the award amounted to P1,487,312.69 x x x.

“On February 3, 1997, [petitioners] filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution.

“On May 19, 1997, [respondent] Rizalino Uy filed a Manifestation requesting that the cases be terminated and closed, stating that
the judgment award as computed had been complied with to the satisfaction of [petitioners].Said Manifestation was also signed by
the eight (8) [petitioners]. Together with the Manifestation is a Joint Affidavit dated May 5, 1997 of [petitioners], attesting to the
receipt of payment from [respondent] and waiving allot her benefits due them in connection with their complaint.

“On June 3, 1997, [petitioners] filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution wherein they confirmed that each of them
received P40,000 from [respondent] on May 2, 1997.
“On June 9, 1997, [respondent] opposed the motion on the ground that the judgment award had been fully satisfied. In their Reply,
[petitioners] claimed that they received only partial payments of the judgment award.

Labor Arbiter
issued an order denying the motion for issuance of writ of execution.

NLRC:
reversed, holding that a final and executory judgment can no longer be altered and that quitclaims and releases are normally
frowned upon as contrary to public policy.
CA
held that compromise agreements may be entered into even after a final judgment. Thus, petitioners validly released respondent
from any claims, upon the voluntary execution of a waiver pursuant to the compromise agreement.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the final and executory judgment of the Supreme Court could be subject to compromise settlement;

2) Whether or not the petitioners’ affidavit waiving their awards in the labor case executed without the assistance of their counsel
and labor arbiter is valid;

HELD:
1) Yes
A compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties make reciprocal concessions in order to resolve their differences and
thus avoid or put an end to a lawsuit. The issue involving the validity of a compromise agreement notwithstanding a final judgment
is not novel. Jesalva v. Bautista upheld a compromise agreement that covered cases pending trial, on appeal, and with final
judgment. The Court noted that Article 2040 impliedly allowed such agreements; there was no limitation as to when these should
be entered into. There is no justification to disallow a compromise agreement, solely because it was entered into after
final judgment. The validity of the agreement is determined by compliance with the requisites and principles of contracts, not by
when it was entered into. As provided by the law on contracts, a valid compromise must have the following elements: (1) consent of
the parties to the compromise, (2) an object certain that is the subject matter of the compromise, and (3) the cause of the obligation
that is established.

In the present factual milieu, compliance with the elements of a valid contract is not in issue. Pensioners do not challenge the
factual finding that they entered into a compromise agreement with respondent. There are no allegations of vitiated consent.
Instead, petitioners base their argument on the sole fact that the agreement was executed despite a final judgment, which the Court
had previously ruled to be allowed by law. The principle of novation supports the validity of a compromise after final judgment.
Novation, a mode of extinguishing an obligation, is done by changing the object or principal condition of an obligation, substituting
the person of the debtor, or surrogating a third person in the exercise of the rights of the creditor.
For an obligation to be extinguished by another, the law requires either of these two conditions: (1) the substitution is unequivocally
declared, or (2) the old and the new obligations are incompatible on every point. A compromise of a final judgment operates as a
novation of the judgment obligation, upon compliance with either requisite. In the present case, the incompatibility of the final
judgment with the compromise agreement is evident, because the latter was precisely entered into to supersede the former.

2) Yes
The presence or the absence of counsel when a waiver is executed does not determine its validity. There is no law requiring the
presence of a counsel to validate a waiver. The test is whether it was executed voluntarily, freely and intelligently; and whether the
consideration for it was credible and reasonable. Where there is clear proof that a waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or a
gullible person, the law must step in to annul such transaction. In the present case, petitioners failed to present any evidence to
show that their consent had been vitiated.

The law is silent with regard to the procedure for approving a waiver after a case has been terminated. Relevant, however, is this
reference to the NLRC’s New Rules of Procedure:

“Should the parties arrive at any agreement as to the whole or any part of the dispute, the same shall be reduced to writing and
signed by the parties and their respective counsel, or authorized representative, if any, before the Labor Arbiter.

“The settlement shall be approved by the Labor Arbiter after being satisfied that it was voluntarily entered into by the parties and
after having explained to them the terms and consequences thereof.

“A compromise agreement entered into by the parties not in the presence of the Labor Arbiter before whom the case is pending
shall be approved by him, if after confronting the parties, particularly the complaints, he is satisfied that they understand the terms
and conditions of the settlement and that it was entered into freely and voluntarily by them and the agreement is not contrary to law,
morals, and public policy.”

This provision refers to proceedings in a mandatory/conciliation conference during the initial stage of the litigation. Such provision
should be made applicable to the proceedings in the pre—execution conference, for which the procedure for approving a waiver
after final judgment is not stated. There is no reason to make a distinction between the proceedings in mandatory/conciliation and
those in pre-execution conferences.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

Liberty Flour Mills Employees, Biascan and Evaristo v. Liberty Flour Mills (1989)
 Doctrine: The rationale for upholding the validity of union shop clauses in a CBA, even if they impinge upon the individual
employees right or freedom of association, is NOT to protect the union for the unions sake. Laws and jurisprudence promote
unionism and afford certain protections to the certified bargaining agent in a unionized company because a strong and effective
union presumably benefits all employees in the bargaining unit since such a union would be in a better position to demand
improved benefits and conditions of work from the employer.

 Feb 1974: entered into 3-year CBA with Phil. Labor Alliance Council (PLAC), the Union of the rank-and-file employees of
Liberty
 In the CBA, parties agreed to establish a union shop by imposing "membership in good standing for the duration of the CBA as
a condition for continued employment" of workers.
 Oct. 1974: PLAC filed complaint against company for the nonpayment of emergency cost of living allowance (ecola)
 1975: Biascan and Evaristo (B&E) filed similar complaint as regards ecola
 at this point B&E are veering away from PLAC
 1975: B&E organized new Union for rank and file employees of Liberty
 B&E filed petition for certification election as the Union among the rank and file
 PLAC expelled B&E due to disloyalty
 PLAC demanded from Liberty the dismissal from employment of B&E in accordance with the Union Shop clause in the CBA
 The matter of the dismissal of B&E were submitted to compulsory arbitration as well as the demand for ecola
 Meanwhile, the certification election held at the Liberty Flour Mills, Inc. on December 27, 1976, the Ilaw at Buklod ng
Manggagawa (ILAW), with which the union organized by Biascan and Evaristo was affiliated, won overwhelmingly with 441
votes as against the 5 votes cast for PLAC
 In 1977, Liberty’s new CBA was agreed with ILAW
 B&E were terminated and claimed that they were illegally dismissed for organizing a new union opposed to PLAC which they
described as a company union
o B&E’s argument: merely exercising right to self organization
 NLRC ruled in favor of B&E, holding that the CBA was not certified hence “it was not yet in effect and so could not be the basis
of the action taken against B&E”

ISSUE: WON B&E were illegally dismissed as the CBA was not yet certified at the time they were dismissed?

HELD: Dismissal was valid

 CBA concluded in 1974 was certifiable and was in fact certified on April 11, 1975
 Evaristo and Biascan were dismissed only on May 20, 1975, more than a month after the said certification.
 Even if the new union organized by B&E is the one chosen by the rank and file employees this does not excuse the fact that
the two disaffiliated from PLAC as early as March 1975 and thus rendered themselves subject to dismissal under the union
shop clause in the CBA
 Roselle’s Note: nagpasaway sila habang reign pa ng first union (PLAC)
 Union Shops and closed shops are encouraged by law
purposes could be thwarted if every worker were to choose to go his own separate way instead of joining his co-employees in
planning collective action and presenting a united front when they sit down to bargain with their employers

G.R. No. L-77282 May 5, 1989

ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS (ALU) petitioner,
vs.
HON. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, as Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, Ministry of Labor and Employment;
PHILIPPINE SOCIAL SECURITY LABOR UNION (PSSLU); SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES FEDERATION OF LABOR (SPFL) and
GAW TRADING, INC., respondents.

FACTS
 Petitioner ALU, through a letter dated May 7, 1986, informed GAW Trading, Inc. that majority of the latter's employees have
authorized ALU to be their sole and exclusive bargaining agent (SEBA), and requested a conference with GAW for the execution
of an initial Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).

 ALU received a letter dated May 12th from GAW, which letter set the meeting on the same date. The following day, May 13th,
ALU transmitted to GAW copies of the proposed CBA. 2 days later, ALU and GAW executed the CBA.

 In the meantime, on May 9th, 2 unions in the company (SPFL and NAMGAW) went on strike after it failed to get the management
of GAW Trading Inc. to sit for a conference respecting its demands presented at 11: A.M. on the same day in an effort to pressure
GAW Trading Inc. to make a turnabout of its standing recognition of ALU as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of
its employees.

 After the signing of the CBA, one of the striking unions filed a petition for certification election.

 Med-Arbiter ruled for the holding of a certification election in all branches of GAW Trading Inc. as to which ALU filed a Motion for
Reconsideration.

 Bureau of Labor Relations granted ALU's appeal (Motion for Reconsideration) and set aside the questioned Med-Arbiter Order
on the ground that the CBA has been effective and valid and the contract bar rule applicable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the contract bar rule applies.
HELD:
NO. The subject CBA is defective. The mechanics of collective bargaining are set in motion only when the following jurisdictional
preconditions are present, namely, (1) possession of the status of majority representation by the employees' representative; (2) proof
of majority representation; and (3) a demand to bargain. The standing of ALU as SEBA is dubious, to say the least. The only express
recognition of ALU as SEBA in the records is in the CBA. There was precipitate haste on the part of GAW in recognizing ALU, which
recognition appears to have been based on the self-serving claim of ALU that it had the support of the majority of the employees in
the bargaining unit. At the time of the supposed recognition, GAW was obviously aware that there were other unions existing in the
unit. Respondent company's letter is dated May 12, 1986 while the two other unions, went on strike earlier on May 9, 1986. An
additional infirmity of the collective bargaining agreement involved was the failure to post the same in at least two (2) conspicuous
places in the establishment at least five days before its ratification. Also, about 64% of the workers who "ratified" the CBA now strongly
repudiate the alleged negotiation and ratification of the CBA.
The order for the conduct of a certification election among the rank-and-file workers of respondent GAW Trading Inc. is AFFIRMED

Philippine Skylanders vs NLRC

GR 127374
Facts:

In November 1993 the Philippine Skylanders Employees Association (PSEA), a local labor union affiliated with the Philippine
Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU), won in the certification election conducted among the rank and file employees of
Philippine Skylanders, Inc. (PSI). Its rival union, Philippine Skylanders Employees Association-WATU (PSEA-WATU) immediately
protested the result of the election before the Secretary of Labor.

Several months later, PSEA sent PAFLU a notice of disaffiliation.

PSEA subsequently affiliated itself with the National Congress of Workers (NCW), changed its name to Philippine Skylanders
Employees Association – National Congress of Workers (PSEA-NCW), and to maintain continuity within the organization, allowed
the former officers of PSEA-PAFLU to continue occupying their positions as elected officers in the newly-formed PSEA-NCW.

On 17 March 1994 PSEA-NCW entered into a collective bargaining agreement with PSI which was immediately registered with the
Department of Labor and Employment.

Meanwhile, apparently oblivious to PSEA’s shift of allegiance, PAFLU Secretary General Serafin Ayroso wrote Mariles C. Romulo
requesting a copy of PSI’s audited financial statement. On 30 July 1994 PSI through its personnel manager Francisco Dakila
denied the request citing as reason PSEA’s disaffiliation from PAFLU and its subsequent affiliation with NCW.

Issue: WON PSEA’s disaffiliation is legitimate.

Held:
At the outset, let it be noted that the issue of disaffiliation is an inter-union conflict the jurisdiction of which properly lies with the
Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) and not with the Labor Arbiter.

We upheld the right of local unions to separate from their mother federation on the ground that as separate and voluntary
associations, local unions do not owe their creation and existence to the national federation to which they are affiliated but, instead,
to the will of their members. Yet the local unions remain the basic units of association, free to serve their own interests subject to
the restraints imposed by the constitution and by-laws of the national federation, and free also to renounce the affiliation upon the
terms laid down in the agreement which brought such affiliation into existence.

There is nothing shown in the records nor is it claimed by PAFLU that the local union was expressly forbidden to disaffiliate from
the federation nor were there any conditions imposed for a valid breakaway. As such, the pendency of an election protest involving
both the mother federation and the local union did not constitute a bar to a valid disaffiliation.

It was entirely reasonable then for PSI to enter into a collective bargaining agreement with PSEA-NCW. As PSEA had validly
severed itself from PAFLU, there would be no restrictions which could validly hinder it from subsequently affiliating with NCW and
entering into a collective bargaining agreement in behalf of its members.

Policy considerations dictate that in weighing the claims of a local union as against those of a national federation, those of the
former must be preferred. Parenthetically though, the desires of the mother federation to protect its locals are not altogether to be
shunned. It will however be to err greatly against the Constitution if the desires of the federation would be favored over those of its
members. That, at any rate, is the policy of the law. For if it were otherwise, instead of protection, there would be disregard and
neglect of the lowly workingmen.
Cirtek Employees Labor Union vs Cirtek Electronics
GR 190515
Facts:
This resolves the motion for reconsideration and supplemental motion for reconsideration filed by respondent, Cirtek Electronics,
Inc., of the Court’s Decision dated November 15, 2010.
Respondent-movant maintains that the Secretary of Labor cannot insist on a ruling beyond the compromise agreement entered into
by the parties; and that, as early as February 5, 2010, petitioner Union had already filed with the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) a resolution of disaffiliation from the Federation of Free Workers resulting in the latter’s lack of personality to
represent the workers in the present case.
Issue: WON petitioner lost its personality to represent the workers because of its disaffiliation from the Federation of Free Workers.
Held:
The issue of disaffiliation is an intra-union dispute which must be resolved in a different forum in an action at the instance of either
or both the FFW and the Union or a rival labor organization, not the employer.
Indeed, as respondent-movant itself argues, a local union may disaffiliate at any time from its mother federation, absent any
showing that the same is prohibited under its constitution or rule. Such, however, does not result in it losing its legal personality
altogether. Verily, Anglo-KMU v. Samahan Ng Mga Manggagawang Nagkakaisa Sa Manila Bay Spinning Mills At J.P. Coats
enlightens:
A local labor union is a separate and distinct unit primarily designed to secure and maintain an equality of bargaining power
between the employer and their employee-members. A local union does not owe its existence to the federation with which it is
affiliated. It is a separate and distinct voluntary association owing its creation to the will of its members. The mere act of affiliation
does not divest the local union of its own personality, neither does it give the mother federation the license to act independently of
the local union. It only gives rise to a contract of agency where the former acts in representation of the latter. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
MR denied.

TROPICAL HUT EMPLOYEES’ UNION-CGW et al vs.TROPICAL HUT FOOD MARKET, INC., et al

G.R. No. L-43495-99

January 20, 1990

FACTS: The rank and file workers of the Tropical Hut Food Market Incorporated (respondent company) organized a local union
called the Tropical Hut Employees Union (THEU) and immediately sought affiliation with the National Association of Trade Unions
(NATU). The NATU accepted the THEU application for affiliation.
The CBA between respondent company and THEU-NATU contains a union security clause:
xx
Union Membership and Union Check-off
Sec. 1 —. . . Employees who are already members of the UNION at the time of the signing of this Agreement or who become so
thereafter shall be required to maintain their membership therein as a condition of continued employment.
Xx
Attached to the Agreement is a check-off Authorization Form, the terms of which are as follows:
We, the undersigned, hereby designate the NATU, of which the THEU is an affiliate as sole collective bargaining agent in all
matters relating to salary rates, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment in the Tropical Hut Food Market,
Inc…xx
Later on, NATU received a letter jointly signed by the incumbent officers of the local union informing the NATU that THEU was
disaffiliating from the NATU federation. The employees were dismissed because, as respondent company contended, they violated
the union security clause.
ISSUE: Was the disaffiliation of the local union from the national federation valid?
HELD: YES
The right of a local union to disaffiliate from its mother federation is well-settled. A local union, being a separate and voluntary
association, is free to serve the interest of all its members including the freedom to disaffiliate when circumstances warrant. This
right is consistent with the constitutional guarantee of freedom of association
The inclusion of the word NATU after the name of the local union THEU in the registration with the Department of Labor is merely
to stress that the THEU is NATU’s affiliate at the time of the registration. It does not mean that the said local union cannot stand on
its own. Neither can it be interpreted to mean that it cannot pursue its own interests independently of the federation. A local union
owes its creation and continued existence to the will of its members and not to the federation to which it belongs.
Further, there is no merit in the contention of the respondents that the act of disaffiliation violated the union security clause of the
CBA and that their dismissal as a consequence thereof is valid. A perusal of the CBAs shows that the THEU-NATU, and not the
NATU federation, was recognized as the sole and exclusive collective bargaining agent for all its workers and employees in all
matters concerning wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment. Although NATU was designated as
the sole bargaining agent in the check-off authorization form attached to the CBA, this simply means it was acting only for and
in behalf of its affiliate. The NATU possessed the status of an agent while the local union remained the basic principal union
which entered into contract with the respondent company. When the THEU disaffiliated from its mother federation, the former
did not lose its legal personality as the bargaining union under the CBA. Moreover, the union security clause embodied in the
agreements cannot be used to justify the dismissals meted to petitioners since it is not applicable to the circumstances obtaining in
this case. The CBA imposes dismissal only in case an employee is expelled from the union for joining another federation or for
forming another union or who fails or refuses to maintain membership therein. The case at bar does not involve the withdrawal of
merely some employees from the union but of the whole THEU itself from its federation. Clearly, since there is no violation of the
union security provision in the CBA, there was no sufficient ground to terminate the employment of petitioners.

G.R. No. L-22228 February 27, 1969

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU) SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-
PAFLU, AL FAJARDO AND ALL THE OTHER MEMBERS AND OFFICERS OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY AND EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION-PAFLU v. THE SECRETARY OF LABOR, THE DIRECTOR OF LABOR RELATIONS and THE REGISTRAR OF
LABOR ORGANIZATIONS
FACTS: The Registration of Labor Organization (Registrar) rendered a decision cancelling the SSSEA’s Registration Certificate
No. 1-IP169 for failure to submit the following:
1. Failure to furnish the Bureau of Labor Relations with copies of the reports on the finances of that union duly verified by affidavits
which its treasurer or treasurers rendered to said union and its members covering the periods from September 24, 1960 to
September 23, 1961 and September 24, 1961 to September 23, 1962, inclusive, within sixty days of the 2 respective latter dates,
which are the end of its fiscal year; and

2. Failure to submit to this office the names, postal addresses and non-subversive affidavits of the officers of that union within sixty
days of their election in October (1st Sunday), 1961 and 1963, in conformity with Article IV (1) of its constitution and by-laws.

On the following day, Manuel Villagracia, Assistant Secretary of the SSSEA filed with the Office of the Registrar, a letter enclosing
documents that supposed to comply with the abovementioned requirements, but the Registrar found out that the following are still
not complied with:

1. Non-subversive affidavits of Messrs. Teodoro Sison, Alfonso Atienza, Rodolfo Zalameda, Raymundo Sabino and Napoleon
Pefianco who were elected along with others on January 30, 1962.

2. Names, postal addresses and non-subversive affidavits of all the officers who were supposedly elected on October (1st Sunday),
of its constitution and by-laws.

Alfredo Fajardo, president of the SSSEA moved for a reconsideration of said decision and prayed for time, up to November 15,
within which to submit the requisite papers and data. An opposition thereto having been filed by one Paulino Escueta, a member of
the SSSEA, upon the ground that the latter had never submitted any financial statement to its members, said motion was heard on
November 27, 1963. Subsequently, or on December 4, 1963, the Registrar issued an order declaring that the SSSEA had “failed to
submit the abovementioned requirements and granting the SSSEA 15 days from notice to comply with said requirements, as well
as meanwhile holding in abeyance the resolution of its motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether or not the effect of Section 23 of Republic Act No. 875 (“Any labor organization, association or union of workers
duly organized for the material, intellectual and moral well being of its members shall acquire legal personality and be entitled to all
the rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations within thirty days of filing with the office of the Secretary of
Labor notice of its due organization and existence and the following documents, together with the amount of five pesos as
registration fee, except as provided in paragraph “d” of this section:”) unduly curtails the freedom of assembly and association
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights.
RULING: There is no incompatibility between Republic Act No. 875 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Upon the other
hand, the cancellation of the SSSEA’s registration certificate would not entail a dissolution of said association or its suspension.
The existence of the SSSEA would not be affected by said cancellation, although its juridical personality and its statutory rights and
privileges — as distinguished from those conferred by the Constitution — would be suspended thereby.
To be registered, pursuant to Section 23(b) of Republic Act No. 875, a labor organization, association or union of workers must file
with the Department of Labor the following documents:

(1) A copy of the constitution and by-laws of the organization together with a list of all officers of the association, their addresses
and the address of the principal office of the organization;

(2) A sworn statement of all the officers of the said organization, association or union to the effect that they are not members of the
Communist Party and that they are not members of any organization which teaches the overthrow of the Government by force or
by any illegal or unconstitutional method; and

(3) If the applicant organization has been in existence for one or more years, a copy of its last annual financial report.

Moreover, paragraph (d) of said-Section ordains that:

The registration and permit of a legitimate labor organization shall be cancelled by the Department of Labor, if the Department has
reason to believe that the labor organization no longer meets one or more of the requirements of paragraph (b) above; or fails to file
with the Department Labor either its financial report within the sixty days of the end of its fiscal year or the names of its new officers
along with their non-subversive affidavits as outlined in paragraph (b) above within sixty days of their election; however, the
Department of Labor shall not order the cancellation of the registration and permit without due notice and hearing, as provided
under paragraph (c) above and the affected labor organization shall have the same right of appeal to the courts as previously
provided.
S.S. VENTURES INTERNATIONAL, INC., PETITIONER, VS. S.S. VENTURES LABOR UNION (SSVLU) AND DIR. HANS LEO
CACDAC, IN HIS CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS (BLR), RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 161690, July 23, 2008
FACTS:
Petitioner S.S. Ventures International, Inc. (Ventures), a PEZA- registered export firm with principal place of business at Phase I-
PEZA- Bataan Export Zone, Mariveles, Bataan, is in the business of manufacturing sports shoes. Respondent S.S. Ventures Labor
Union (Union) is a labor organization registered with the DOLE.

March 21, 2000, the Union filed with DOLE-Region III a petition for certification election in behalf of the rank-and-file employees

August 21, 2000, Ventures filed a Petition to cancel the Union’s certificate of registration alleging that the Union deliberately and
maliciously included the names of more or less 82 former employees no longer connected with Ventures in its list of members who
attended the organizational meeting and in the adoption/ratification of its constitution and by-laws; that No organizational meeting
and ratification actually took place; and the Union’s application for registration was not supported by at least 20% of the rank-and-
file employees of Ventures.

Regional Director of DOLE- Region III favored Ventures and resolved to Cancel the Certificate of the union. On appeal, the BLR
Director granted the Union’s appeal and reversing the decision of RD. Ventures went to the CA. The CA dismissed Ventures’
petition as well as the MR. Hence, this petition for review

ISSUE:
Whether the registration of the Union must be cancelled.

RULING:
NO. The right to form, join, or assist a union is specifically protected by Art. XIII, Section 3 of the Constitution and such right,
according to Art. III, Sec. 8 of the Constitution and Art. 246 of the Labor Code, shall not be abridged. Once registered with the
DOLE, a union is considered a legitimate labor organization endowed with the right and privileges granted by law to such
organization. While a certificate of registration confers a union with legitimacy with the concomitant right to participate in or ask for
certification election in a bargaining unit, the registration may be canceled or the union may be decertified as the bargaining unit, in
which case the union is divested of the status of a legitimate labor organization. Among the grounds for cancellation is the
commission of any of the acts enumerated in Art. 239(a) of the Labor Code, such as fraud and misrepresentation in connection with
the adoption or ratification of the union’s constitution and like documents. The Court, has in previous cases, said that to decertify a
union, it is not enough to show that the union includes ineligible employees in its membership. It must also be shown that there was
misrepresentation, false statement, or fraud in connection with the application for registration and the supporting documents, such
as the adoption or ratification of the constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto and the minutes of ratification of the
constitution or by-laws, among other documents.
The evidence presented by Ventures consist mostly of separate hand-written statements of 82 employees who alleged that they
were unwilling or harassed signatories to the attendance sheet of the organizational meeting. However these evidence was
presented seven months after the union filed its petition for cancellation of registration. Hence these statements partake of the
nature of withdrawal of union membership executed after the Union’s filing of a petition for certification election on March 21, 2000.
We have said that the employees’ withdrawal from a labor union made before the filing of the petition for certification election is
presumed voluntary, while withdrawal after the filing of such petition is considered to be involuntary and does not affect the same.
Now then, if a withdrawal from union membership done after a petition for certification election has been filed does not vitiate such
petition, it is but logical to assume that such withdrawal cannot work to nullify the registration of the union. The Court is inclined to
agree with the CA that the BLR did not abuse its discretion nor gravely err when it concluded that the affidavits of retraction of the
82 members had no evidentiary weight.

The registration or the recognition of a labor union after it has submitted the corresponding papers is not ministerial on the part of
the BLR. It becomes mandatory for the BLR to check if the requirements under Art. 234 of the Labor Code have been sedulously
complied with. If the union’s application is infected by falsification and like serious irregularities, especially those appearing on the
face of the application and its attachments, a union should be denied recognition as a legitimate labor organization. The issuance
to the Union of Certificate of Registration, in the case at bar, necessarily implies that its application for registration and the
supporting documents thereof are prima facie free from any vitiating irregularities.

The relevance of the 82 individuals’ active participation in the Union’s organizational meeting and the signing ceremonies thereafter
comes in only for purposes of determining whether or not the Union, even without the 82, would still meet what Art. 234(c) of the
Labor Code requires to be submitted, requiring that the union applicant must file the names of all its members comprising at least
twenty percent (20%) of all the employees in the bargaining unit where it seeks to operate.

In its union records on file with this Bureau, respondent union submitted the names of 542 members. This number easily complied
with the 20% requirement, be it 1,928 or 2,202 employees in the establishment. Even subtracting the 82 employees from 542
leaves 460 union members, still within 440 or 20% of the maximum total of 2,202 rank-and-file employees of the employer Venture.
Whatever misgivings the petitioner may have with regard to the 82 dismissed employees is better addressed in the inclusion-
exclusion proceedings during a pre-election conference. The issue surrounding the involvement of the 82 employees is a matter of
membership or voter eligibility. It is not a ground to cancel union registration.
For fraud and misrepresentation to be grounds for cancellation of union registration under Article 239, the nature of the fraud and
misrepresentation must be grave and compelling enough to vitiate the consent of a majority of union members.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.