G.R. No. 209031 April 16, 2018 1.
1. WON petitioner can file nullity of marriage with respondent under Article
ABIGAEL AN ESPINA-DAN, petitioner,
vs.
MARCO DAN, respondent.
DOCTRINE/TOPIC: ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE: Psychological
Incapacity as ground for Annulment
FACTS:
Petitioner Abigael An Espina-Dan is a Filipina whereas Marco Dan is an Italian
who met in a internet chatroom on May 2005. Their continuous exchange of letters led to
the respondent’s proposal in November 2005 and the two got married on January 23, 2006
and lived together in Italy from February 23, 2006 until April 18, 2007 when Abigael left
Marco and flew back to the Philippines.
On September 14, 2007 petitioner filed a Petitioner for declaration of nullity of
her marriage with respondent on RTC of Las Pinas on the grounds of the respondent to
have been psychologically incapacitated (Article 36 of the Family Code). From Abigael’s
experience, she told the Court how Marco was sweet, funny and kind during their chatroom
days and when they got married she discovered that he was highly dependent of his mother,
was impatient, short-tempered, addicted to video games and extremely lazy. She even
caught him using marijuana and when she confronted him, respondent pushed her and hit
her arm. On October 2006 Marco’s addiction towards video games and drugs worsened as
he invited his friends over their house for pot sessions and they seldom talked to each other
anymore.
Clinical psychologist Nedy Tayag testified that respondent is suffering from a
Dependent Personality Disorder with Underlying Anti-Social Trait and had arrived to these
findings through clinical assessments and information supplied by the petitioner and the
petitioner’s mother, not from Marco himself and classifies the respondent’s conditions as
severe, long lasting and incurable by any treatment. Nevertheless, the RTC dismissed
the petition in 2010 claiming to have inadequate evidence to prove the alleged
psychological incapacity since they cannot see how the personality disorder would render
him unaware of the basic marital covenants he must dispose. The RTC considers the
psychological evaluation to have only shown incompatibility and irreconcilable
differences between the two which cannot be equated to psychological incapacity.
Petitioner filed an appeal before the CA but they affirmed the RTC’s ruling. She
continued to file an instant Petition, contending that the evidence completely established
her husband’s psychological incapacity.
ISSUE:
36 of the FC.
2. WON the evidence presented satisfied the standards much like in what has
been stated under Republic v. Molina and other prevailing jurisprudence
regarding psychological incapacity.
RULING:
1. No. The Court finds the evidence presented insufficient of proving the
respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity. Despite the clinical expert’s
observation, it is still noted as inconclusive and are purely advisory in
character wherein the court will evaluate their opinion with due care and
judge the application or method which they have assessed the parties.
Furthermore, Dr. Tayag was only able to formulate said disorder from the
petitioner and her mother’s observations, not from observing or talking
with the respondent himself, hence she could have secured a complete
personality profile and an objective opinion regarding the diagnosis of
Marco’s psychological condition.
Furthermore, the appellant also fails to prove the root cause of the alleged
psychological incapacity and to establish the requirements of gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability. Dr. Tayag’s report is incomplete and lacking on the part of
the respondent’s condition on whether it is grave enough to not be able to fulfill the
essential obligations of marriage. Most importantly, Article 36 contemplates downright
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations;
not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant
spouse. Seeing that appellant claims respondent to be lazy, irresponsible and childish, then
it falls down the latter.
2. No. Petitioner’s evidence only consists of her and her mother’s judicial
affidavits and testimonies as well as Dr. Tayag’s which was based solely on
the petitioner’s account while the respondent is in Italy and did not
participate in the proceedings.
In her accounts, petitioner admitted that before and during their marriage,
respondent continued to work and provided money to her and they enjoyed a harmonious
relationship in the past but only drifted apart sometime. Under Article 36, psychological
incapacity should have surfaced or existed at the time of the celebration of marriage and
refers to not just the mental but the physical incapacity to discharge of his marital
responsibilities. As such, the factual findings of the Court rules that said actions do not fall
under psychological incapacity like in the case of Molina.
The petition is DENIED, AFFIRMING the CA’s decision.
NOTES:
ARTICLE 36 of the Family Code
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise
be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Under Republic v. Molina, the Court reiterated Article 36’s requisites:
 The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
 Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. "The
incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations
may emerge only after marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved
 The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision.
 Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, “mild characterological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts” cannot be accepted
as root causes.
Keuppers vs Judge Murcia
BERSAMIN, J.:
A municipal trial judge who solemnizes a marriage outside of his territorial jurisdiction
violates Article 7 of the Family Code, and is guilty of grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service. He should be properly sanctioned.
The Case
This administrative matter commenced from the 1st Indorsement dated November 4,
2009,[1] whereby the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao endorsed to the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for appropriate action the complete records of
the case initiated by affidavit-complaint by complainant Rosilanda Maningo Keuppers
against respondent Judge Virgilio G. Murcia, the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Branch 2, in the Island Garden City of Samal, Davao del Norte. She
thereby charged respondent Judge with estafa; violation of Republic Act No. 6713; and
grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. [2]
The complainant averred in her affidavit-complaint executed on June 6, 2008[3] that on
May 12, 2008, she and her husband, Peter Keuppers, went to the Local Civil Registrar's
Office (LCRO) of Davao City to apply for a marriage license because they wanted to get
married before Peter's departure on May 22, 2008 so that he could bring the marriage
certificate with him back to Germany; that Julie Gasatan, an employee of the LCRO,
explained the process for securing the license, and apprised them that it would be
virtually impossible to solemnize their marriage before May 22, 2008 because of the
requirement for the mandatory 10-day posting of the application for the marriage license;
that Gasatan then handed a note with the advice for the couple to proceed to the office of
DLS Travel and Tours Corporation (DLS Travel and Tours) in Sandawa, Matina, Davao
City to look for a person who might be able to help the couple; that in the office of the
DLS Travel and Tours, Lorna Siega, the owner, told the couple that the marriage
processing fees charged by her office would be higher than the P600.00 fee collected in
the City Hall in Davao City; that Siega assured that the couple would immediately get the
original as well as the National Statistics Office (NSO) copies of the marriage certificate;
that Siega then required the couple to fill up forms but instructed the couple to leave the
spaces provided for the address and other information blank; that the couple paid
P15,750.00 to Siega purportedly to cover the fees of the solemnizing Judge, the
certification fee, the security fee, the City Hall fee, the service fee and the passport fee;
and that Siega later on confirmed to the couple the date, time and place of the
solemnization of the marriage.
According to the complainant, respondent Judge solemnized the marriage on May 19,
2008 in the premises of the DLS Travel and Tours in Davao City; that the staff of the
DLS Travel and Tours later on handed to the couple the copy of the marriage certificate
for their signatures; that on the following day, May 20, 2008, the couple returned to the
DLS Travel and Tours to pick up the documents as promised by Siega; that the couple
was surprised to find erroneous entries in the marriage certificate as well as on the
application for marriage license, specifically: (a) the certificate stating "Office of the
MTCC Judge, Island Garden City of Samal" as the place of the solmenization of the
marriage although the marriage had been solemnized in the office of the DLS Travel and
Tours in Davao City; (b) the statement in the application for marriage license that she and
her husband had applied for the marriage license in Sta. Cruz, Davao City on May 8,
2008 although they had accomplished their application on May 12, 2008 in the office of
the DLS Travel and Tours; and (c) the statement in their application for marriage license
on having appeared before Mario Tizon, the Civil Registrar of Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur,
which was untrue.
In his comment dated February 2, 2010,[4] the respondent professed no knowledge of how
the complainant had processed and secured the documents pertinent to her marriage;
denied personally knowing her and the persons she had supposedly approached to help
her fast-track the marriage; insisted that he had met her only at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage, and that the solemnization of the marriage had been
assigned to him; asserted that the documents necessary for a valid marriage were already
duly prepared; and claimed that he was entitled to the presumption of regularity in the
performance of his duties considering that the documents submitted by her had been
issued by the appropriate government agencies. He contended that he should not be
blamed for the erroneous entries in her certificate of marriage because the same had been
merely copied from her marriage license and from the other documents submitted
therewith, and also because he had not been the person who had prepared the certificate;
and that he had only performed the ministerial duty of solemnizing the marriage based on
the proper documents submitted to him, with the real parties involved having personally
signed the certificate of marriage before him.
Maningo that was the only day, the German fiance was leaving for Germany. So, I
decided to solemnize the marriage in the office of DLS Travel and Tours.
(Emphasis supplied)

The respondent also denied receiving any amount for solemnizing the marriage of the
complainant and her husband; and pointed out that he had not been aware as the The fact that respondent solemnized a marriage outside of his jurisdiction is further
solemnizing officer if any of the documents submitted by her was spurious. He recalled bolstered by his own admission that he solemnized the marriage of complainant and Peter
that she had freely and voluntarily signed the certificate of marriage; and that it was the Keuppers at DLS Travels and Tours and not in his territorial jurisdiction in the Island
same document that had been filed in the Local Civil Registrar's Office of Davao City. Garden City of Samal.
He declared that the marriage certificate itself stated the place of the solemnization of the
marriage; and that he did not alter, modify or amend the entries therein. Indeed, respondent knows the possible consequence of the aforementioned act when he
said:
Report & Recommendation
of the Investigating Justice
A: I was thinking your honor that there was a sanction but because of my honest intention
Upon the recommendation of the OCA,[5] the Court referred the complaint to the Court of to help the parties because they were already begging that the solemnization be
Appeals in Cagayan de Oro City for investigation, report and recommendation. The performed [sic]. I was honest with my intention and my conscience was clear.
complaint, originally assigned to Associate Justice Pamela Ann Abella Maxino for such
purposes, was re-assigned to Associate Justice Maria Elisa Sempio Diy in view of the
However, this Office is also duty bound to specify that respondent had no hand in the
transfer of Associate Justice Maxino to the Cebu Station of the Court of Appeals.
preparation and processing of the documents pertaining to the subject wedding. The
witness for complainant, Lorna Siega, stated:
On August 10, 2012, Investigating Justice Sempio Diy submitted her report and
recommendation as the Investigating Justice,[6] whereby she concluded and recommended
as follows:
Q: Madam, you mentioned a while ago that your establishment was the one who
processed the documents for Rosilanda Maningo Kuppers and Peter Keuppers to get
married, you confirm that?
The undersigned Investigating Officer, in the course of the investigation, has been hurled
with overwhelming evidence that the marriage between complainant and Peter Keuppers
A: Yes, ma'am.
was held only in the premises of DLS Travel and Tours Corporation, Sandawa Road,
Matina, Davao City, and was solemnized by respondent. Several witnesses for
Q: Who prepared the certificate of marriage?
complainant affirmed the same. More importantly, this Office has conducted an ocular
inspection of the premises of DLS Travel and Tours. During said inspection, it was
A: Orlan.
confirmed that the premises shown in Exhibits "G", "G-1", "G-2", "G-3", "G-4", and "G-
5" where respondent is seen solemnizing a wedding, is the same place subject of the
Q: How about the marriage contract?
ocular inspection. Hence, the DLS Travel and Tours building is, in fact, the actual venue
of complainant's wedding.
A: My employee.
It is also of equal importance to note that respondent admitted that he indeed solemnized
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the subject marriage outside of his jurisdiction. In fact, in his testimony, respondent
stated:
Q: Who supplied the entries in the marriage contract?

A: Based on the marriage license.

A: Rosilanda Maningo was really begging that the marriage be performed since that was
the very day of the marriage as the German fiance will be leaving soon. Because of pity, I
-xxx- -xxx- -xxx-
accommodated the parties. I risked your honor because I didn't want that the marriage be
postponed as it was for the best interest of the couple because according to Rosilanda
Q: So, in relation to this case the once [sic] involving Peter Keuppers, I have here the
copy of the marriage contract, have you seen this document, if any?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: You would confirm that the place of marriage typed there is the office of the MTCC
Judge, Branch 2, Island Garden City of Samal?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: And your office supplied the information in the upper portion in the certificate of
marriage which is Davao del Norte, Island Garden City of Samal?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Be that as it may, this Office is of the opinion that notwithstanding that respondent had no
hand in the preparation and processing of the subject marriage, he indeed solemnized a
marriage outside of his territorial jurisdiction, subject to sanctions that the Office of the
Court Administrator may impose.
The above-quoted Article 8 of the Family Code clearly states that a marriage can be held
outside the judge's chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: 1.] at the point
of death; 2.] in remote places in accordance with Article 29; or 3.] upon the request of
both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect.
Inasmuch as respondent's jurisdiction covers only the Island Garden City of Samal, he
was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in Davao City.
In this case, there is no pretense that either complainant or her fiance Peter Keuppers was
at the point of death or in a remote place. Neither was there a sworn written request made
by the contracting parties to respondent that the marriage be solemnized outside his
chambers or a place other than his sala. What in fact appears on record that respondent
took pity on the couple and risked sanctions to attend to the urgency of solemnizing the
marriage of complainant and Peter Keuppers.
In Beso vs. Daguman, the Supreme Court held:
A person presiding over a court of law must not only apply the law but must also live and
abide by it and render justice at all times without resorting to shortcuts clearly uncalled
for. A judge is not only bound by oath to apply the law; he must also be conscientious
and thorough in doing so. Certainly, judges, by the very delicate nature of their office[,]
should be more circumspect in the performance of their duties.
The undersigned Investigating Officer believes that taking pity on the Keuppers couple is
not enough reason for respondent to risk possible sanctions that may be imposed upon
him for not observing the applicable laws under the circumstances. It is his sworn duty to
conscientiously uphold the law at all times despite the inconvenience that it may cause to
others.
Significantly, Canon 6, Section 7 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary mandates:
-xxx- Judges shall not engage in conduct incompatible with the diligent discharge of
judicial duties.
It is likewise worth mentioning that respondent cannot be charged with ignorance of the
law considering that he knew the consequences of his actions and he also cannot be seen
as a judge that demonstrates a lack of understanding of the basic principles of civil law.
Lastly, it also does not appear from the records that he has been previously charged with
any offense or that there is/are any pending administrative case/s against him.
RECOMMENDATION:
The undersigned Investigating Justice finds that indeed respondent is guilty of
solemnizing a marriage outside of his territorial jurisdiction under circumstances not
falling under any of the exceptions as provided for in Article 8 of the Family Code.
Considering, however, the factual milieu of the instant case and the peculiar
circumstances attendant thereto, it is respectfully recommended that respondent be meted
a fine of P5,000.00 with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or a similar
offense in the future will be dealt with severely.
Issue
Was respondent Judge liable for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service?
Ruling of the Court
We hold and find respondent Judge guilty of grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service for solemnizing the marriage of the complainant and her
husband outside his territorial jurisdiction, and in the office premises of the DLS Tour
and Travel in Davao City.
Such place of solemnization was a blatant violation of Article 7 of the Family
Code, which pertinently provides:
Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;
xxxx
Furthermore, in solemnizing the marriage of the complainant and her husband in the
office premises of the DLS Tour and Travel in Davao City despite the foregoing
provision of the Family Code, respondent Judge flagrantly violated the spirit of the law.
Article 8 of the Family Code disallows solemnizing the marriage in a venue other than
the judge's courtroom or chambers, viz.:
Article. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in
open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office the consul-general, consul or
vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages
contracted on the point of death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this
Code, or where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which
case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn
statement to that effect. (57a)
Respondent Judge's explanation of having done so only out of pity for the complainant
after she had supposedly claimed that her German fiancé was soon returning to Germany
and wanted to bring with him the certified copy of the marriage certificate did not
diminish his liability, but instead highlighted his dismissive and cavalier attitude towards
express statutory requirements instituted to secure the solemnization of marriages from
abuse. By agreeing to solemnize the marriage outside of his territorial jurisdiction and at
a place that had nothing to do with the performance of his duties as a Municipal Trial
Judge, he demeaned and cheapened the inviolable social institution of marriage. Article 8
of the Family Code contains the limiting phrase and not elsewhere, which emphasizes
that the place of the solemnization of the marriage by a judge like him should only be in
his office or courtroom. Indeed, the limiting phrase highlighted the nature and status of
the marriage of the complainant and her husband as "a special contract of permanent
union between a man and a woman," and as "the foundation of the family and an
inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by
law and not subject to stipulation."[7] The only exceptions to the limitation are when the
marriage was to be contracted on the point of death of one or both of the complainant and
her husband, or in a remote place in accordance with Article 29 of the Family Code,[8] or
where both of the complainant and her husband had requested him as the solemnizing
officer in writing to solemnize the marriage at a house or place designated by them in
their sworn statement to that effect.
Respondent Judge's offense was not his first act of gross misconduct concerning the
discharge of the office of solemnizing marriages. He had been charged on February 28,
2008 in A.M. No. RTJ-10-2223 entitled Palma v. Judge George E. Omelio, Regional
Trial Court, Br. 14, Davao City (then of Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Br. 4, Davao
City), Judge Virgilio G. Murcia, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Br. 2, et al. with having
affixed his signature as the solemnizing officer on the marriage contract without having
actually solemnized the marriage. The charge was in violation of Administrative Order
No. 125-2007 dated August 8, 2007 (Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the
Members of the Judiciary). The Court declared him guilty of gross misconduct, and fined
him in the amount of P40,000.00.[9] The present offense was committed on May 19, 2008.
Misconduct consists in the transgression of some established and definite rule of action,
or, more particularly, in an unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. It
implies wrongful intention, and must not be a mere error of judgment. Respondent Judge
was guilty of grave, not simple, misconduct because he had at the very least the wilful
intent to violate the Family Code on the venue of a marriage solemnized by a judge, and
to flagrantly disregard the relevant rules for such solemnization set forth in the law. The
office of solemnizing marriages should not be treated as a casual or trivial matter, or as a
business activity. For sure, his act, although not criminal, constituted grave misconduct
considering that crimes involving moral turpitude are treated as separate grounds for
dismissal under the Administrative Code.[10] It is relevant to observe, moreover, that his
acts of grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
seriously undermined the faith and confidence of the people in the Judiciary.
The Investigating Justice recommended the imposition on respondent Judge of the measly
fine of P5,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or a similar offense in
the future would be dealt with severely. The recommendation did not take into account
that the present charge was the second offense respondent Judge committed in relation to
his office of solemnizing marriages. Given that the charge was committed with a wilful
intent to violate the letter and the spirit of Article 7 and Article 8 of the Family Code, and
to flagrantly disregard the relevant rules for the solemnization of marriages set by
the Family Code, the proper penalty was dismissal from the service.
Yet, dismissal from the service can no longer be imposed in view of the intervening
retirement from the service of respondent Judge. Instead, the Court forfeits all his
retirement benefits except his accrued leaves.
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and HOLDS respondent JUDGE VIRGILIO G.
MURCIA, the former Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2,
in the Island Garden City of Samal, Davao del Norte GUILTY of GRAVE
MISCONDUCT and CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE BEST INTEREST OF
THE SERVICE; and, ACCORDINGLY, DECLARES as forfeited all his retirement
benefits, except his accrued leaves, with prejudice to his appointment in the government
service.
 MARY CHRISTINE C. GO-YU, PETITIONER, v. ROMEO A. YU,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court are the Decision1 and the Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on
January 13, 2017 and March 6, 2017, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 05780-MIN. The
assailed CA Decision reversed and set aside the following: (1) the June 20, 2013
Order3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City, Branch 12, in Civil Case No.
33,083-09, which denied herein respondent Romeo A. Yu's Demurrer to Evidence in the
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Dissolution of the Absolute
Community of Property which petitioner Mary Christine C. Go-Yu filed against
respondent; and (2) the July 31, 2013 Order4 of the RTC denying respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
On October 21, 2009, herein petitioner filed with the RTC of Davao City, Branch 12, a
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Dissolution of the Absolute
Community of Property5 against herein respondent, alleging that: she was a child who
was well provided for and taken care of by her parents; she grew up to become a self-
assured, independent and confident person; after finishing college at the University of
British Columbia in Vancouver, Canada, she came back home to the Philippines, worked
in various companies, eventually joined their family business where she started as a
secretary and worked her way to become the Senior Vice President who is in charge of
the day-to-day operations of the company which has in its employ at least 700 personnel;
she and respondent were casually introduced by the former's mother; several months after
their first meeting, respondent asked her out on a date and, after a few months of dating
exclusively, they got married on June 11, 1999; thereafter, they stayed at respondent's
family home where petitioner had to contend with the constant meddling of her mother-
in-law, as well as the latter's intrusion into their privacy; when she complained,
respondent promised her that they will eventually move out; however, his promise was
never fulfilled; petitioner had to make a lot of adjustments which entailed a lot of
sacrifice on her part; she gave up some of the luxuries she had gotten used to when
respondent's financial resources dwindled; she limited her social life and became
withdrawn, maintaining only a small circle of friends; she took on the responsibility of
single-handedly running their household and making all decisions as respondent was too
busy in his involvement with his personal and social activities outside their house; after
their wedding, the parties' sexual activity decreased considerably; petitioner was unable
to conceive and even tried to convince respondent that she undergo in vitro fertilization
but the latter refused; as a result, the parties grew apart as a married couple leading them
to live separate lives even though they stay under the same roof; petitioner was eventually
diagnosed with Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was found to exist before the
parties' marriage; and the fact that petitioner is comfortable with her behavior and sees
nothing wrong with it or the need to change renders treatment improbable. Petitioner
sought the dissolution of the parties' absolute community of properties claiming that their
marriage is governed by the provisions of the Family Code and that they did not enter
into any prenuptial agreement.
In his Amended Answer with Special and Affirmative Defenses, respondent denied the
material allegations of petitioner's Petition and contended that: he offers his love and
affection for petitioner and he desires for them to reconcile and save their marriage in the
spirit of love, forgiveness and Christian values on marriage; and petitioner is not suffering
from psychological incapacity and personality disorder, instead, her problem is
behavioral in the sense that she has difficulty adjusting to married life and in dealing with
respondent's relatives, especially his mother. As to the dissolution of the parties' absolute
community of properties, respondent claimed that the properties adverted to by petitioner
in her Petition are not properties of the parties' absolute community as these are merely
held by respondent in trust for his siblings and relatives; in fact, petitioner had executed
an attestation admitting that the properties she mentioned in her Petition are owned by
respondent's siblings and other relatives.
Subsequently, the case proceeded to trial where petitioner presented her documentary and
testimonial evidence, the latter consisting of the testimonies of petitioner, her friend, her
secretary, and the psychiatrist who examined her.
After petitioner has rested her case, respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence6 claiming
that petitioner's alleged Narcissistic Personality Disorder, which supposedly renders her
psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations, is not
supported by clear evidence.
In its Order7 of June 20, 2013, the RTC denied respondent's Demurrer to Evidence by
holding that petitioner has adduced substantial evidence to show that she is suffering
from a personality disorder and that there is, therefore, a need for respondent to adduce
controverting evidence. Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration 8 but the same was
denied in the Order9 of the RTC dated July 31, 2013.
Respondent then filed with the CA a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court assailing the Orders of the RTC which denied his Demurrer to
Evidence and his subsequent Motion for Reconsideration.10
In its assailed Decision dated January 13, 2017, the CA reversed and set aside the June
20, 2013 and July 31, 2013 Orders of the RTC and granted respondent's Demurrer to
Evidence, thereby dismissing the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and
Dissolution of the Absolute Community of Property filed by petitioner.
The CA held that the evidence presented by petitioner, through the psychological report
and all supporting testimonial evidence, failed to establish any proof of a natal or
supervening disabling factor that effectively incapacitated her from complying with her
essential marital obligations. The CA further ruled that, if at all, what petitioner has
admitted to be afflicted of or materially manifesting in her marriage with respondent is an
obvious refusal, if not neglect, to perform her marital obligations. The CA concluded that
it was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge to have denied the demurrer
to evidence and require respondent to controvert petitioner's evidence which is patently
lacking and, thus, unduly impose unwarranted burden on respondent and his resources,
and, most especially, the docket of the courts.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the CA denied it in its Resolution dated
March 6, 2017.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari based on the following grounds:
I.
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE COURT OF APPEALS MAY HAVE COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT FAILED, OR REFUSED, TO CONSIDER THE
FOLLOWING NEW AND SUBSTANTIAL LEGAL ISSUES RAISED IN THE
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, THAT:
A. RESPONDENT'S PETITION WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65, WHICH IT GRANTED IN
ITS ASSAILED DECISION, HAS IN FACT ALREADY BEEN
MOOTED AND OVERTAKEN BY THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE
TRIAL COURT, WHERE THE TRIAL COURT ORDERED THE
PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE
SUBMITTED FOR DECISION, AFTER RESPONDENT HAD
SUBMITTED HIS OWN CONTROVERTING EVIDENCE AND
RESTED HIS CASE.
B. CONTRARY TO ITS RULING WHICH ADMITTEDLY WAS
BASED ONLY ON THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED THUS FAR AT
THE TIME OF THE FILING OF THE DEMURRER TO
EVIDENCE, THE TOTALITY OF EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY
THE PETITIONER WAS NOT AT ALL "PATENTLY LACKING"
AS IN FACT IT HAS SATISFACTORILY SUPPORTED THE
CASE FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE,
AND WHICH WAS NOT EVEN EFFECTIVELY
CONTROVERTED BY RESPONDENT'S OWN EVIDENCE.
II.
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE COURT OF APPEALS HAD NO FACTUAL AND
LEGAL BASIS TO RULE THAT PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION WAS FILED OUT OF TIME.11
The petition lacks merit.
In her first assigned error, petitioner contends that respondent's petition
for certiorari filed with the CA was rendered moot by reason of the continuation of the
proceedings before the RTC where respondent was able to present his own controverting
evidence and rested his case. Petitioner also argues that, contrary to the assailed ruling of
the CA, the totality of evidence she presented before the trial court was not patently
lacking but, in fact, has satisfactorily supported the case for declaration of nullity of the
parties' marriage.
The Court is not persuaded.
It is settled that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
an original action, independent from the principal action, and not a part or a continuation
of the trial which resulted in the rendition of the judgment complained of. 12 It "is intended
for the correction of errors of jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. Its principal office is only to keep the inferior court within
the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction."13 As a consequence, "a petition
for certiorari pending before a higher court does not necessarily become moot and
academic by a continuation of the proceedings in the court of origin."14 Hence, in the
instant case, the special civil action for certiorari which respondent filed with the CA is
independent from the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by petitioner.
Being independent from the principal action, the petition for certiorari may not, thus, be
rendered moot by the mere continuation of the proceedings in the RTC.
It is true that under Section 7,15 Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a petition
for certiorari shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public
respondent from further proceeding in the case. However, despite the absence of a
temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction which enjoins the RTC
from further proceeding with the case, it appears that the RTC has chosen to follow the
rule on judicial courtesy. Indeed, while the RTC continued in holding trial and, in fact,
allowed the parties to complete the presentation of their evidence, it stopped short of
rendering its decision on the petition even if the same has been submitted for resolution
as early as July 1, 2015.
In this regard, this Court has noted instances where even if there is no writ of preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order issued by a higher court, it would be proper for
a lower court or court of origin to suspend its proceedings on the precept of judicial
courtesy. As this Court explained in Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corp. v. Court of
Appeals:16
Although this Court did not issue any restraining order against the Intermediate Appellate
Court to prevent it from taking any action with regard to its resolutions respectively
granting respondents' motion to expunge from the records the petitioner's motion to
dismiss and denying the latter's motion to reconsider such order, upon learning of the
petition, the appellate court should have refrained from ruling thereon because its
jurisdiction was necessarily limited upon the filing of a petition for certiorari with this
Court questioning the propriety of the issuance of the above-mentioned resolutions. Due
respect for the Supreme Court and practical and ethical considerations should have
prompted the appellate court to wait for the final determination of the petition before
taking cognizance of the case and trying to render moot exactly what was before this
court[.]17
In the subsequent cases of Go v. Judge Abrogar18 and Rep. of the Phils. v. Sandiganbayan
(First Div.),19 this Court has qualified and limited the application of the principle of
judicial courtesy to maintain the efficacy of Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court by
holding that the principle of judicial courtesy applies only if there is a strong probability
that the issues before the higher court would be rendered moot and moribund as a result
of the continuation of the proceedings in the lower court. Thus, the principle of judicial
courtesy remains to be the exception rather than the rule.
In the instant case, the Court finds that the RTC correctly adhered to this principle
because there is a strong probability that the issue raised before the CA - of whether or
not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying respondent's Demurrer to
Evidence, which issue ultimately lies in the determination of whether or not petitioner's
evidence is patently and utterly insufficient to prove her petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage - would be rendered moot as a result of the continuation of the proceedings in
the lower court.
Petitioner further insists that the issue of the presence or absence of psychological,
incapacity on the part of petitioner is a factual matter which requires the examination and
determination of the totality of evidence presented and, as such, the trial court should
have primacy in the determination thereof.
It bears to remind petitioner, however, of the nature of a demurrer to evidence.
"A demurrer to evidence is defined as 'an objection or exception by one of the parties in
an action at law, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is
insufficient in point of law (whether true or not) to make out his case or sustain the issue.'
The demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the plaintiffs evidence to sustain a verdict. In
passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, the court is merely
required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient proof to sustain the
indictment or to support a verdict of guilt."20 Moreover, "[t]he grant or denial of a
demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling on the
matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of such discretion."21
As to whether or not a trial court's denial of a demurrer to evidence may be the subject of
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, this Court, in the case
of Ong, et al. v. People of the Philippines,22 held as follows:
Indeed, the rule generally prevailing is that "certiorari does not lie to review a trial court's
interlocutory order denying a motion to dismiss (or to acquit), which is equivalent to a
demurrer to evidence, filed after the prosecution had presented its evidence and rested its
case. An order denying a demurrer to evidence is interlocutory. It is not appealable.
Neither can it be the subject of a petition for certiorari (Tadeo v. People, 300 SCRA 744
[1998])."
However, Tadeo itself states that "[f]rom such denial (of the demurrer to evidence),
appeal in due time is the proper remedy, not certiorari, in the absence of grave abuse of
discretion or excess of jurisdiction, or an oppressive exercise of judicial authority."
Consequently, if the denial of the demurrer to evidence is attended by grave abuse of
discretion, the denial may be assailed through a petition for certiorari. This exception
was explicitly recognized by the Court in Cruz v. People (303 SCRA 533 [1999]), where
we stated that:
The general rule that the extraordinary writ of certiorari is not available to challenge (the
denial of the demurrer to evidence) may be subject to exceptions. When the assailed
interlocutory orders are patently erroneous or issued with grave abuse of discretion, the
remedy of certiorari lies.
Likewise, in Gutib v. Court of Appeals (312 SCRA 365 [1999]), we declared that "the
rule is not absolute and admits of an exception. Thus where, as in the instant case, the
denial of the motion to dismiss by the trial court was tainted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the aggrieved party may assail the
order of denial on certiorari."
The present case presents one such exception warranting the resort to the remedy
of certiorari, the trial court judge having committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying petitioners' demurrer to evidence. A demurrer
to evidence is an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the
evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not,
to make out a case or sustain the issue. The party demurring challenges the sufficiency of
the whole evidence to sustain.a verdict. The court, in passing upon the sufficiency of the
evidence raised in a demurrer, is merely required to ascertain whether there
is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of
guilt.23
In the instant case, consistent with petitioner's contention, the trial court was given the
opportunity and the primacy in the determination of the merits of respondent's demurrer
to evidence. In other words, the RTC was given precedence in determining whether
petitioner's evidence was enough to sustain the issue. In fact, the RTC has ruled in
petitioner's favor by denying respondent's Demurrer to Evidence on the ground that
petitioner has adduced substantial evidence to show that she is suffering from Narcissistic
Personality Disorder. Hence, petitioner may not claim that, in ruling against respondent's
Demurrer to Evidence, the RTC was not given the chance to make an independent
assessment of the merits of the case, albeit sans the evidence presented by respondent.
But again, as previously discussed, in a demurrer to evidence, the court is merely required
to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient proof to sustain the indictment or to
support a verdict.
In the present petition, this Court is confronted with the main issue of whether or not the
CA correctly held that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied
herein respondent's motion to dismiss on demurrer to evidence. Stated differently, this
Court has to rule whether herein petitioner was able to produce sufficient evidence before
the trial court to make out her Case or to sustain a verdict.
In her petition filed with the RTC, petitioner contends that her marriage to respondent is
null and void from the beginning by reason of her psychological incapacity. However, the
Court agrees with the CA that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
respondent's Demurrer to Evidence because petitioner was unable to present sufficient
evidence to show that she has the right to the relief she seeks.
In this regard, this Court's disquisition and reiteration of settled jurisprudence in Castillo
v. Rep. of the Phils., et al.,24 on what constitutes psychological incapacity as construed
under the law, is instructive, to wit:
Time and again, it was held that "psychological incapacity" has been intended by law to
be confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, i.e., it must be grave and
serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required
in a marriage, (b) juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage, and (c) incurability, i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the
cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, this Court laid down the more
definitive guidelines in the disposition of psychological incapacity cases, viz.:
xxxx
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. x x x
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. x x x
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. x x x
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage, x x x In other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of
the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
the same Code in regard to parents and their children. x x x
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts. x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General
to appear as counsel for the state. x x x
xxxx
The existence or absence of the psychological incapacity shall be based strictly on the
facts of each case and not on a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations.
As held in Ting v. Velez-Ting:
By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and
understandable to give weight to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists
regarding the psychological temperament of parties in order to determine the root
cause, juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the psychological
incapacity. However, such opinions, while highly advisable, are not conditions sine qua
non in granting petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. At best, courts must
treat such opinions as decisive but not indispensable evidence in determining the
merits of a given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examination of
the person concerned need not be resorted to. The trial court, as in any other given case
presented before it, must always base its decision not solely on the expert opinions
furnished by the parties but also on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of
the proceedings.
The presentation of any form of medical or psychological evidence to show the
psychological incapacity, however, did not mean that the same would have automatically
ensured the granting of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. It bears
repeating that the trial courts, as in all the other cases they try, must always base their
judgments not solely on the expert opinions presented by the parties but on the totality of
evidence adduced in the course of their proceedings.25
In the instant case, this Court quotes with approval the discussion made by the CA with
respect to the merits of the psychiatric evaluation made by petitioner's expert witness, Dr.
Agnes S. Borre-Padilla, pertinent portions of which read as follows:
x x x A close scrutiny of Dr. Padilla's seventeen (17) page psychological report (Annex
"F") would show that she devoted a mere one (1) page discussion, if it could be called
that, of the purported Narcissistic Personality Disorder of [herein petitioner] Go-Yu. The
supposed discussion part of the report was in actuality nothing but an incomprehensible
enumeration of the manifestations of an alleged disordered behavior with nary an
explanation or detailed factual narration of events in the life of [petitioner] Go-Yu to
support the good doctor's questionable observations.
Also, it would appear that the good psychiatrist mainly relied on the accounts as relayed
to her by [herein petitioner] Go-Yu herself even if she had the good sense to state through
a belated one (1) sentence footnote at the very end of her report that she ostensibly
interviewed a variety of sources. However, it could never be deduced from the report Go-Yu, who was never even referred to any psychological testing for a clearer and more
from who did the psychiatrist actually obtain any particular information as the report is reliable evaluation.27
full of generalizations detailing only the life story of the estranged couple.
Indeed, contrary to petitioner's claim that she is psychologically incapacitated to perform
the ordinary duties and responsibilities of a married woman, the Court agrees with the
The Supreme Court has on several occasions spoke of credibility or reliability gaps when
observation of the OSG, as well as the respondent, that petitioner's documentary and
it comes to expert opinion evidence in petitions for nullity of marriage cases. In the case
testimonial pieces of evidence prove otherwise — that she is, in fact, fully aware of and
of Suazo v. Suazo, the High Court ruled that "other than this credibility or reliability gap,
has performed the essential obligations of a married individual. The following instances
both the psychologist's report and the testimony simply provided a general description of
prove such capacity: first, petitioner expressed concern over the decrease in their sexual
Angelito's purported anti-social personality disorder, supported by the characterization of
activity after their wedding, that she also has needs and that, unlike her and respondent, it
this disorder as chronic, grave, and incurable. The psychologist was conspicuously silent,
is normal for married couples to have a healthy sexual relationship;28second, she wanted
however, on the bases for her conclusion or the particulars that gave rise to the
to have a baby with respondent because she believes and understands that one of the
characterization she gave. These particulars are simply not in the Report, and neither can
purposes of marriage is procreation29 and she also thought that having a baby could
they be found in her testimony."
somehow save their marriage;30third, she made adjustments and sacrifices by giving up
luxuries she had gotten used to when her husband's financial resources started to
As previously stated, the psychological report in this case is wanting in material facts,
dwindle;31 and fourth, she helped her husband manage their finances and run their
acceptable discussion and analysis, to support the supposed expert opinion of the
household.32 During her cross-examination, she testified thus:
psychiatrist that one of the parties is suffering from a narcissistic personality disorder. As
ruled in the Suazo v. Suazo case, the methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the Q So, is it fair to say that when you noticed that there was a decrease in
required depth and comprehensiveness of examination required to evaluate a party sexual activity, that something was wrong with your marriage with
alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder. In short, this is not the Romeo Yu?
psychological report that the Court can rely on as a basis for the conclusion that
psychological incapacity exists.

What makes matters worse is the fact that it is the [herein petitioner] Go-Yu herself who A Yes because it's really not normal.
claims to be the person psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital obligations.
Hence, whatever she had to say was inherently self-serving and should be held to the
strictest standard of scrutiny. Towards this end, [herein petitioner] Go-Yu miserably
failed.26
Q So, in a way you fully understand that as husband and wife there
The Court likewise notes and agrees with the observations and accompanying discussions must be a healthy sexual relationship?
of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in its Comment to petitioner's petition
for certiorari filed with the CA, to wit:
What is clearly patent in the Petition for certiorari is that [herein petitioner] Go-Yu has
made several allegations in her petition for nullity of marriage that she claims to prove A Yes, now, I know that now.
her psychological incapacity. The evidence she presented however fails to persuade (sic)
the existence of a narcissistic personality disorder that is in fact incurable and which
exists even prior to her marriage with [herein respondent] Yu. What is baffling is that
despite the many positive and admirable traits raised by [herein petitioner] Go-Yu in her Q And you mentioned that you confronted Mr. Yu about that?
petition to describe herself, these same characteristics had been the basis of her witness,
Dr. Padilla, to conclude that she is suffering from a psychological disorder.

Apart from the opinion raised by Dr. Padilla, there appears to be no other competent and
A I discussed with him?
credible proof that the alleged disorder is in fact grave enough to bring about the
disability and that said disorder is permanent or clinically incurable. The testimony of Dr.
Padilla, who is supposed to be the expert witness of [herein petitioner] Go-Yu, at large,
merely established that the parties are having great marital difficulties, which, however,
do not warrant a declaration of nullity of marriage. Worse, the [bases] for Dr. Padilla's Q Yes you discussed it with him?
conclusion were mere interviews with several Individuals, including [herein petitioner]
 A Yah.

A Yah.

Q In fact during your marriage with Mr. Yu, you also wanted to have a
baby?
Q And how did you discuss it with him?

A No, no, no, I think you got it wrong. I said at the last year or
A Oh I would bring it up and say that this is not normal, I also have my something, I said maybe we should give it a try but I'm not saying
needs. That's it. that the whole time I wanted to have a baby.

Q And what is the response of Mr. Yu? Q So, during that moment when you said that both of you must have at
least give it a try, you mean at that point in time you wanted to have
a baby from your husband of course?

A He would go to sleep.

A Obviously.

ATTY.
POLINAR:
Q So, you also fully understand that wanting to have a baby is part of
the purpose of marriage which is to procreate, is that, correct?
Procreation is one of the purposes of marriage?
Q Now, do you agree Ms. Witness that one of the expression of love is
the sexual activity?

A Do I understand?

WITNESS:

ATTY.
POLINAR:
A Do I believe that?

Q Do you [agree] with that?

Q Yes?

WITNESS:
 Q When you say to save what we have, you mean to save your
marriage, is that correct?
A Do I believe in it?

A Yes, perhaps.
Q Yes, that one of the purposes of marriage is procreation?

xxxx
A Yes, I believe it's right.

ATTY.
Q So when you say right, [w]hat do you mean right? POLINAR:

A When you read all the books, when you talk to all the priest, yes it's Q And in fact in paragraph 18 [of your affidavit], you stated that and I
right, but some people get married mot just to have a child. quote: "I then found myself having to make a lot of adjustments
which entailed a lot of sacrifice on my part," is that correct?

Q Apart from the other purposes of marriages you will agree with me
that, apart from all purposes of marriage, one of which is somehow to WITNESS:
have a child with your husband?

xxxx
A No.

A Ah yah.
Q So, what was then your intention when you said that you wanted to
give it a try to have a baby with your husband?

Q You also stated that "I gave up some luxuries I had gotten used to
when his financial resources started to dwindle", correct?
A Because I thought it would give him focus because there was no
focus. He was having his own life. He was too busy having his own
life. I thought that somehow, maybe, just maybe having a child
would somehow save what we have, would get us together again and A Yes.
give us focus.
Q You also stated that "I limited my social life and became withdrawn, Q And in fact you said and I quote: "I also took over all his financial
maintaining only a small circle of friends, you stated that, correct? concerns", is that correct?

A Yes. A Yes.

Q "I took on the responsibility of single-handedly running the xxxx

household and making all decisions, you stated that in your affidavit?

A When I mean I took over all his financial concerns, there was a
A Yes. period that he didn't have any money. The price of coconut was
down. So he would go to my office practically every week he would
borrow money from me just to fund his account. He borrowed from
my own money.
xxxx

Q And you also lent him of course?

Q So, is it fair to say that you shared some responsibilities with your
husband with respect to these matters?

A I lent him. Yes because he was begging, his brothers wouldn't lend
him.
A It was not responsibility, it was just work.

Q Next question. Did you get frustrated with all these sacrifices like
xxxx taking all the responsibilities, and single-handedly running the
household and making all decisions? Did it frustrate you during your
marriage?

Q But is it not a fact Ms. Witness that in paragraph 18 of your affidavit

you said that "I took on the responsibility of single-handedly running
the household and making all decisions", is that correct? A Partially.

A Yes, the household. xxxx

Q You did not think that Mr. Romeo Yu was performing his duties as A Yes.
partner to a marriage?

Q You also stated that respondent and I quote "did not seem to want to
A As the man in the house. be intimate with me anymore", is that correct?

Q When you say man in the house, what do you mean? A Gradually.

A The man in the house is the one suppose to face the problem first not x x xx
me. face his problem. The man in the house, you know in the old
days, he is supposed to go fishing and the wife is suppose to cook the
fish[.] I'm not supposed to do the fishing.
Q Now, you said x x x that you were partially frustrated having to take
over some of the responsibilities, household responsibilities. Is it not
a fact that because of your frustrations with him that you do not want
ATTY. anymore [to] live with him, with Mr. Romeo Yu?
POLINAR:

A Am I driven by frustrations?
Q Can you tell the court what is the role of the wife, in the marriage?

Q Yes?
WITNESS:

A What's the question?

A She is suppose to cook the fish, and if she happens to be the
fisherman herself then well and good. Then there is more fish in the
house but I don't believe the guy should stop fishing and stick from
the wife's fish that she earn. Q Did your frustrations somehow reached the point that you cannot live
with him anymore?

Q Now, in paragraph 19, you stated that and I quote: "After our
wedding, our sexual activity considerably decreased in frequency." A Live with as [i]n[?]

Q One house with him?
A In the same house?
Q Yes as couple?
A As a couple in a marriage?
Q Yes.
A No, it is. not just frustration, it's discovering that you don't have
anything in common at all.33
All the foregoing clearly show that petitioner unquestionably recognizes both spouses'
obligations to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, render mutual help
and support, provide for the support of the family, and manage their household. The fact
that she gradually became overwhelmed by feelings of disappointment or disillusionment
toward her husband and their marriage is not a sufficient ground to have such marriage
declared null and void.
Petitioner claims to be afflicted with Narcissistic Personality Disorder, which is defined
as a mental condition in which people have an inflated sense of their own importance, a
deep need for excessive attention and admiration, troubled relationships, and a lack of
empathy for others.34 The psychiatrist who examined petitioner confirmed this definition
by stating that in layman's terms, a person who is suffering from Narcissistic Personality
Disorder is one "who is self-centered and [who] has prioritized [his/]her needs over the
other or significant person."35 Based on the above definitions alone, how can petitioner
claim that she is suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder when, as previously
discussed, through her own statements and admissions in her petition and in her
testimony in court, she has displayed full knowledge and understanding of her and her
husband's obligations and has, in fact, committed positive acts towards building and
sustaining a family?
As to petitioner's contention that respondent admitted in his original Answer with Special
and Affirmative Defenses the allegations in the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage, suffice it to say that respondent's original Answer has been amended. Settled is
the rule that "pleadings superseded or amended disappear from the record, lose their
status as pleadings and cease to be judicial admissions."36 "Where an amended answer is
complete in itself, it supersedes the original answer, which no longer remains a part of the
record."37 Moreover, even granting that respondent admitted that petitioner was indeed
suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder, such admission may not be used as basis
for the court's judgment because under Article 48 of the Family Code, in all cases of
annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of mairiage, "no judgment shall be based
upon a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment." Stated differently, notwithstanding
any admission made by respondent, it is still incumbent upon petitioner to prove the
nullity of their marriage by evidence other than such admission. Having failed to do so,
this Court agrees with the CA in ruling that:
Indeed, it was capricious for [the RTC] to deny the demurrer to evidence and require
[herein respondent] to controvert evidence totally wanting and unduly impose
unwarranted burden on the part of the [respondent] and his resources and most especially
to the docket of the courts.38
The Court understands and commiserates with petitioner's frustration over her marital
woes. However, "[t]o be tired and to give up on one's situation and on one's [spouse] are
not necessarily signs of psychological illness; neither can falling out of love be so
labeled. When these happen, the remedy for some is to cut the marital knot to allow the
parties to go their separate ways. This simple remedy, however, is not available to us
under our laws. Ours is x x x a limited remedy that addresses only a very specific
situation — a relationship where no marriage could have validly been concluded because
the parties, or [where] one of them, by reason of a grave and incurable psychological
illness existing when the marriage was celebrated, did not appreciate the obligations of
marital life and, thus, could not have validly entered into a marriage. Outside of this
situation, this Court is powerless to provide any permanent remedy."39
An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage. This Court has repeatedly
stressed that Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that
cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a
serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the
duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. Resultantly, it
has always been held that mere irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in
no wise constitute psychological incapacity.40
Lastly, our Constitution "set out a policy of protecting and strengthening the family as the
basic social institution, and the marriage was the foundation of the family. Marriage, as
an inviolable institution protected by the State, cannot be dissolved at the whim of the
parties. In petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to show the
nullity of marriage lies with the plaintiff. Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a
situation where the parties, or one of them, could not have validly entered into a marriage
by reason of a grave and serious psychological illness existing at the time it was
celebrated, the Court is compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie."41 This
is the case here.
Finally, having ruled that the CA did not err in reversing and setting aside the assailed
June 20, 2013 Order of the RTC and in consequently dismissing petitioner's Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Dissolution of the Absolute Community of
Property, the Court no longer finds any need to discuss the other assigned errors.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on January 13, 2017 and March 6,
2017, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 05780-MIN are AFFIRMED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner
vs.
KATRINA S. TOBORA-TIONGLICO, Respondent
DECISION
TIJAM, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 dated May 27, 2015 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 101985, which affirmed the May 8, 2012
Decision2 rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Imus Cavite, Branch 20,
granting the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of Article 36 of
the Family Code and declaring the marriage of Katrina S. Tabora-Tionglico and
Lawrence C. Tionglico void ab initio.
Respondent Katrina S. Tabora-Tionglico (Katrina) filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of her marriage with Lawrence C. Tionglico (Lawrence) on the ground of
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Katrina and Lawrence met sometime in 1997 through a group of mutual friends. After a
brief courtship, they entered into a relationship. When she got pregnant, the two panicked
as both their parents were very strict and conservative. Lawrence did not receive the news
well as he was worried how it would affect his image and how his parents would take the
situation.3 Nevertheless, they got married on July 22, 2000.4
Even during the early stage of their marriage, it was marred by bickering and quarrels. As
early as their honeymoon, they were fighting so much that they went their separate ways
most of the time and Katrina found herself wandering the streets of Hong Kong alone. 5
Upon their return, they moved into the home of Lawrence's parents until the birth of their
child, Lanz Rafael Tabora Tionglico (Lanz), on December 30, 2000. 6 Lawrence was
distant and did not help in rearing their child, saying he knew nothing about children and
how to run a family.7 Lawrence spent almost every night out for late dinners, parties and
drinking sprees.8 Katrina noticed that Lawrence was alarmingly dependent on his mother
and suffered from a very high degree of immaturity.9 Lawrence would repeatedly taunt
Katrina to fight with him and they lost all intimacy between them as he insisted to have a
maid sleep in their bedroom every night to see to the needs of Lanz.10
Lawrence refused to yield to and questioned any and all of Katrina's decisions-from the
manner by which she took care of Lanz, to the way she treated the household help. Most
fights ended up in full blown arguments, often in front of Lanz. One time, when Katrina
remembered and missed her youngest brother who was then committed in a substance
rehabilitation center, Lawrence told her to stop crying or sleep in the rehabilitation center
if she will not stop.11
In 2003, due to their incessant fighting, Lawrence asked Katrina to leave his parents'
home and never to come back. They have been separated in fact since then. 12
Katrina consulted with a psychiatrist, Dr. Juan Arellano (Dr. Arellano), who confirmed
her beliefs on Lawrence's psychological incapacity. Dr. Arellano, based on the narrations
of Katrina, diagnosed Lawrence with Narcissistic Personality Disorder, that is
characterized by a heightened sense of self-importance and grandiose feelings that he is
unique in some way.13
Dr. Arellano determined that this personality disorder is permanent, incurable, and deeply
integrated within his psyche;14 and that it was present but repressed at the time of the
celebration of the marriage and the onset was in early adulthood. His maladaptive and
irresponsible behaviors interfered in his capacity to provide mutual love, fidelity, respect,
mutual help, and support to his wife.15
The RTC granted the petition and declared the marriage of Katrina and Lawrence as
void ab initio. It disposed, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of Katrina S.
Tabora-Tionglico and Lawrence C. Tionglico Ito (sic) as void ab initio. As a necessary
consequence of this pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using the surname of her
husband having lost the right over the same and so as to avoid the misconception that she
is still the legal wifo of respondent. Custody over the couple's· minor child is awarded to
petitioner, with reasonable visitation rights accorded to respondent, preferably Saturday
and Sunday, or as the parties may agree among themselves.
Furnish a copy of this decision the Office of the Solicitor-General, the National Statistics
Office and the Local Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite who, in turn, shall endorse a copy of
the same to the Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong City, ·Metro Manila, so that the
appropriate amendment and/or cancellation of the parties' marriage can be effected in its
registry. Furnish, likewise, the parties and counsel.
SO ORDERED.16
The CA affirmed the RTC decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 20, in Civil Case No. 4903-11dated8 May 2012 is hereby
AFFIRMED.17
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) points out that there has been a myriad of
cases declaring that psychological assessment based solely on the information coming
from either party in a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is considered as
hearsay evidence. It is evident that in this case, the psychiatrist obtained his data, in
concluding that Lawrence is psychologically incapacitated, exclusively from Katrina.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) points out that there has been a myriad of
cases declaring that psychological assessment based solely on the information coming
from either party in a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is considered as
hearsay evidence. It is evident that in this case, the psychiatrist obtained his data, in
concluding that Lawrence is psychologically incapacitated, exclusively from Katrina.
Katrina counters that the facts, bases and surrounding circumstances of each and every
case for the nullity is different from the other and must be appreciated for its
distinctiveness. She points out that the psychological report of Dr. Arellano clearly
outlined well-accepted scientific and reliable tests18 to come up with his findings. In any
case, the decision must be based not solely on the expert opinions but on the totality of
evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings, which the RTC and the CA have
found to have been sufficient in proving Lawrence's psychological incapacity.
The issue before Us is plainly whether the totality of evidence presented by Katrina
supports the findings of both the RTC and the CA that Lawrence is psychologically
incapacitated to perform his essential marital obligations, meriting the dissolution of his
marriage with Katrina.
Contrary to the findings of both the RTC and the CA, We rule in the negative.
Time and again, it has been held that "psychological incapacity" has been intended by
law to be confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, i.e., it must be
grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in a marriage, (b) juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may
emerge only after the marriage, and (c) incurability, i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it
were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. 19
The case of Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals20has set out the guidelines
that has been the core of discussion of practically all declaration of nullity of marriage on
the basis of psychological incapacity cases that We have decided:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. xxx
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. xxx
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration"
of the marriage. xxx
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable. xxx
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party
to assume the essential obligations of marriage. xxx
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up
to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles
220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. xxx
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. xxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down
unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition. xxx21
Using these standards, We find that Katrina failed to sufficiently prove that Lawrence is
psychologically incapacitated to discharge the duties expected of a husband.
Indeed, and We have oft-repeated that the trial courts, as in all the other cases they try,
must always base their judgments not solely on the expert opinions presented by the
parties but on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of their proceedings. 22 Here,
We find the totality of evidence clearly wanting.
First, Dr. Arellano's findings that Lawrence is psychologically incapacitated were based
solely on Katrina's statements.1âwphi1 It bears to stress that Lawrence, despite notice,
did not participate in the proceedings below, nor was he interviewed by Dr. Arellano
despite being invited to do so.
The case of Nicolas S. Matudan v. Republic of the Philippines and Marilyn B.
Matudan23is instructive on the matter:
Just like his own statements and testimony, the assessment and finding of the clinical
psychologist cannot [be] relied upon to substantiate the petitioner-appellant's theory of
the psychological incapacity of his wife.
It bears stressing that Marilyn never participated in the proceedings below. The clinical
psychologist's evaluation of the respondent-appellee's condition was based mainly on the
information supplied by her husband, the petitioner, and to some extent from their
daughter, Maricel. It is noteworthy, however, that Maricel was only around two (2) years
of age at the time the respondent left and therefore cannot be expected to know her
mother well. Also, Maricel would not have been very reliable as a witness in an Article
36 case because she could not have been there when the spouses were married and could
not have been expected to know what was happening between her parents until long after
her birth. On the other hand, as the petitioning spouse, Nicolas' description of Marilyn's
nature would certainly be biased, and a psychological evaluation based on this one-sided
description can hardly be considered as credible. The ruling in Jocelyn Suazo v. Angelita
Suazo, el al., is illuminating on this score:
We first note a critical factor in appreciating or evaluating the expert opinion evidence -
the psychologist's testimony and the psychological evaluation report - that Jocelyn
presented. Based on her declarations in open court, the psychologist evaluated Angelito's
psychological condition only in an indirect manner - she derived all her conclusions from
information coming from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause cannot of course be doubted.
Given the source of the information upon which the psychologist heavily relied upon, the
court must evaluate the evidentiary worth of the opinion with due care and with the
application of the more rigid and stringent set of standards outlined above i.e., that there
must be a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert,
for a conclusive diagnosis of a psychological incapacity that is grave, severe and
incurable.
xxxx
From these perspectives, we conclude that the psychologist, using meager information
coming from a directly interested party, could not have secured a complete personality
profile and could not have conclusively formed an objective opinion or diagnosis of
Angelito's psychological condition. While the report or evaluation may be conclusive
with respect to Jocelyn's psychological condition, this is not true for Angelito's. The
methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness
of examination required to evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a psychological
disorder. In short, this is not the psychological report that the Court can rely on as basis
for the conclusion that psychological incapacity exists.
In the earlier case of Rowena Padilla-Rumbaua v. Edward Rumbaua, it was similarly
declared that '[t]o make conclusions and generalizations on the respondent's
psychological condition based on the information fed by only one side is, to our mind, not
different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of
such evidence.'
At any rate, We find the report prepared by the clinical psychologist on the psychological
condition of the respondent-appellee to be insufficient to warrant the conclusion that a
psychological incapacity existed that prevented Marilyn from complying with the
essential obligations of marriage. In said report, Dr. Tayag merely concluded that Marilyn
suffers from. Narcissistic Personality Disorder with antisocial traits on the basis of what
she perceives as manifestations of the same. The report neither explained the
incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder, nor showed that the respondent-appellee was
really incapable of fulfilling her duties due to some incapacity of a psychological, not
physical, nature. (Emphasis Ours)
The same could be said in this case, where the various tests conducted by Dr. Arellano
can most certainly be conclusive of the psychological disposition of Katrina, but cannot
be said to be indicative of the psychological condition of Lawrence. There was simply no
other basis for Dr. Arellano to conclude that Lawrence was psychologically incapacitated
to perform his essential marital obligations apart from Katrina's self-serving statements.
To make conclusions and generalizations on a spouse's psychological condition based on
the information fed by only one side, as in the case at bar, is, to the Court's mind, not
different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of
such evidence.24
Second, the testimony of Katrina as regards the behavior of Lawrence hardly depicts the
picture of a psychologically incapacitated husband. Their frequent fights, his
insensitivity, immaturity and frequent night-outs can hardly be said to be a psychological
illness. These acts, in our view, do not rise to the level of the "psychological incapacity"
that the law requires, and should be distinguished from the "difficulty," if not outright
"refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations that characterize
some marriages.25 It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility
and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of
doing so due to some psychological illness. The psychological illness that must afflict a
party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to
deprive the party of his or her awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond he or she was then about to assume.26
Although We commiserate with Katrina's predicament, We are hardpressed to affirm the
RTC and CA when the totality of evidence is clearly lacking to support the factual and
legal conclusion that Lawrence and Katrina's marriage is void ab initio. No other
evidence or witnesses were presented by Katrina to prove Lawrence's alleged
psychological incapacity. Basic is the rule that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by
evidence, are not equivalent to proof, i.e., mere allegations are not evidence.27 Here, we
reiterate that apart from the psychiatrist, Katrina did not present other witnesses to
substantiate her allegations on Lawrence's psychological incapacity. Her testimony,
therefore, is considered self-serving and had no serious evidentiary value.28
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The
Decision dated May 27, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 101985, which
affirmed the May 8, 2012 Decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Imus Cavite,
Branch 20, granting the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
Article 36 of the Family Code and declaring the marriage of Katrina S. Tabora-Tionglico
and Lawrence C. Tionglico void ab initio, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage docketed as Civil Case No. 4903-11 is
hereby DISMISSED.
MARIA CONCEPCION N. SINGSON a.k.a. CONCEPCION N.
SINGSON, Petitioner
vs.
BENJAMIN L. SINGSON, Respondent
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 are the August 29, 2013 Decision2 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) and its January 6, 2014 Resolution3 in CA-G.R. CV No.
96662, which reversed and set aside the November 12, 2010 Decision 4 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque City, Branch 260, in Civil Case No. 07-0070.
Factual Antecedents
On February 27, 2007, Maria Concepcion N. Singson a.k.a. Concepcion N. Singson
(petitioner) filed a Petition5 for declaration of nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of
the Family Code of the Philippines6 (Family Code). This was docketed as Civil Case No.
07-0070.
It was alleged therein that on July 6, 1974, petitioner and Benjamin L. Singson
(respondent) were married before the Rev. Fr. Alfonso L. Casteig at St. Francis Church,
Mandaluyong, Rizal; that said marriage produced four children, all of whom are now of
legal age; that when they started living together, petitioner noticed that respondent was
"dishonest, unreasonably extravagant at the expense of the family's welfare, extremely
vain physically and spiritually,"7 and a compulsive gambler; that respondent was
immature, and was w1ab1e to perform his paternal duties; that respondent was also
irresponsible, an easy-going man, and guilty of infidelity; that respondent's abnormal
behavior made him completely unable to render any help, support, or assistance to her;
and that because she could expect no help or assistance at all from respondent she was
compelled to work doubly hard to support her family as the sole breadwinner.
Petitioner also averred that at the time she filed this Petition, respondent was confined at
Metro Psych Facility,8 a rehabilitation institution in Pasig City; and that respondent's
attending psychiatrist, Dr. Benita Sta. Ana-Ponio (Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio), made the
following diagnosis on respondent:
Based on history, mental status examination and observation, he is diagnosed to be
suffering from Pathological Gambling as manifested by:
a. preoccupation with gambling, thinking of ways to get money with
which to gamble as seen in his stealing and pawning jewelries and
appliances[;]
b. needs to gamble with increasing amounts of money in order to
achieve the desired effect[;]
c. lies to family members or others to conceal the extent of [his]
involvement with gambling[;]
d. committed illegal acts such as forging the signature of his wife,
issuing bouncing checks in order to finance his gambling[;]
e. has jeopardized his relationship with his wife, lost the respect of his
children, lost a good career in banking because of gambling[;]
f. [relies] on his parents, his wife, and siblings to provide money to
relieve a desperate fmancial situation caused by gambling[;]
While he apparently had Typhoid fever that resulted [in] behavioral changes as a young
boy, it would be difficult to say that the psychotic episodes he manifested in 2003 and
2006 [are] etiologically related to the general medical condition that occurred in his
childhood.
Furthermore, [respondent] manifests an enduring pattern of behavior that deviates
markedly from the expectations of our culture as manifested in the following areas:
a. his ways of perceiving and interpreting [his own] self, other people,
and events[;]
b. his emotional response[;]
 c. his poor impulse control[;]
Such pattern is inflexible and pervasive and has led to significant impairment in social,
occupational and interpersonal relationship. In [respondent's] case, this has persisted for
several years, and can be traced back [to] his adolescence since he started gambling while
in high school. He is therefore diagnosed to be suffering from Personality Disorder.
All these[,] put together, [hinder respondent] from performing his marital obligations. 9
Petitioner moreover asserted that respondent came from a "distraught" family and had a
"dysfunctional" childhood;10 that respondent had all the love, care, and protection of his
parents as the youngest child for some time; but that these parental love, care and
protection were, however, transferred to his youngest brother who was born when
respondent was almost five years old; and that these factors caused respondent emotional
devastation from which he never recovered.
Petitioner added that unknown to her, respondent even as a high school student, was
already betting on jai alai. She also claimed that she tried to adjust to respondent's
personality disorders, but that she did not attain her goal.
Finally, petitioner claimed that she and respondent did not enter into any ante-nuptial
agreement to govern their prope1ty relations as husband and wife and that they had no
conjugal assets or debts.
On June 19, 2007, respondent filed his Answer.11
Traversing petitioner's allegations, respondent claimed that "psychological incapacity"
must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability, which are not
present in the instant case because petitioner's allegations are not supported by facts.
Respondent further averred that it was not true that he failed to render any help, support
or assistance to petitioner and their family; that the family home where petitioner and
their children are living was in fact his own capital property; that his shortcomings as
mentioned by petitioner do not pertain to the most grave or serious cases of personality
disorders that would satisfy the standards required to obtain a decree of nullity of
marriage; that petitioner's complaint is nothing more than a complaint of a woman with
an unsatisfactory marriage who wants to get out of it; that contrary to petitioner's claim
that he is a good-for-nothing fellow, he has a college degree in business administration,
and is a bank employee, and, that it was money problem, and not his alleged personality
disorder, that is the wall that divided him and petitioner.
Respondent also claimed that petitioner failed to lay the basis for the conclusions of the
psychiatrist to the effect that he is suffering from pathological gambling and personality
disorder; that petitioner's allegation that he came from a distraught family and that he
suffered emotional devastation is vague, and bereft of particular details, and even
slanderous; and that assuming that he had not acted the way petitioner expected him to
conduct himself, his actions and behavior are not psychological illnesses or personality
disorders, but simply physical illnesses of the body, akin to hypertension and allied
sicknesses, and that these physical illnesses are not at all incurable psychiatric disorders
that were present at the time of his marriage with petitioner.
Respondent furthermore claimed that he and petitioner had conjugal assets and debts; that
the land where their family home is built came from his earnings, hence the family home
is their conjugal property; that he and petitioner also have a house and lot in Tagaytay
City, as well as bank accounts that are in petitioner's name only; and he and petitioner
also have investments in shares of stocks, cars, household appliances, furniture, and
jewelry; and that these are conjugal assets because they came from petitioner's salaries
and his (respondent's) own inheritance money.
Respondent moreover alleged that before the filing of the present Petition, petitioner had
caused him to be admitted into the Metro Psych Facility for treatment; that on account of
his confinement and treatment in this psychiatric facility, he has incurred medical
expenses and professional medical fees; and that since it is petitioner who manages all
their finances and conjugal assets it stands to reason that he should be awarded '"spousal
support."
On July 25, 2007, the RTC issued its Pre-Trial Order.12
Trial thereafter ensued. Petitioner's witnesses included herself, her son, Jose Angelo
Singson (Jose), and Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio.
On February 23, 2010, petitioner filed her Formal Offer of Evidence which included a
photocopy of the marriage contract; the birth certificates of their four children; her son
Jose’s Judicial Affidavit dated April 2, 2008; a photocopy of Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's
Judicial Affidavit dated June 25, 2008; Clinical Summary of respondent issued by Dr.
Sta. Ana-Ponio dated February 11, 2007 (Clinical Summary); her (petitioner's) own
Judicial Affidavit dated April 2, 2008; a photocopy of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 179751 registered in the names of the parties' four children:, and a notarized
document entitled "Summary of Sources and Uses of Funds for tJ1e period November
1999 to March 31, 2008" executed by petitioner and described as a detailed summary of
expenses paid for with the proceeds of respondent's share in the sale of the latter's house
in Magallanes Village.13
Respondent filed his Comment thereon.14
On March 29, 2010, the RTC admitted petitioner’s exhibits.15
On May 13, 2010, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss16 "on the ground that the totality
of evidence presented by petitioner did not establish [his] psychological incapacity x x x
to comply with the essential martial obligations x x x".17 Petitioner filed her
Opposition18 thereto, and respondent tendered his Comment thereon.19
On May 17, 2010, the RTC denied respondent’s Motion to Dismiss and stood pat on its
March 29, 2010 Order.20
During the September 30, 2010 hearing, respondent’s counsel manifested that his client
was waiving the right to present countervailing evidence. Respondent’s counsel also
moved that the Petition at bar be submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence
already on the record. The RTC thus declared the case submitted for decision. 21
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its Decision of November 12, 2010, the RTC granted the Petition and declared the
marriage between petitioner and respondent void ab initio on the ground of the latter’s
psychological incapacity. The RTC disposed thus-
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is GRANTED.
Judgment is hereby rendered[:]
1. DECLARING null and void ab initio the marriage between MARIA
CONCEPCION v. SINGSON a.k.a. CONCEPCION N. SINGSON and BENJAMIN L
SINGSON solemnized on JULY 6, 1974 in Mandaluyong City or any other marriage
between them on the ground of psychological' incapacity of the respondent.
2. ORDERING the Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong City and the National Statistics
Office to cancel the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent as appearing in
the Registry of Marriage.
There are no other issues in this case.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrars ofMandaluyong City
and Parañaque City, the Office of the Solicitor General, the Office of the Civil Register
General (National Statistics Office) and the Office of the City Prosecutor, Parañaque
City.
SO ORDERED.22
The RTC ruled that the requisites warranting a finding of psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the family Code are present in the instant case because the totality of
evidence showed that respondent is suffering from a psychological condition that is
grave, incurable, and has juridical antecedence.
The RTC also found that the combined testimonies of petitioner and Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio
convincingly showed that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential marital obligations; that respondent's inability to perform his marital
obligations as set out in Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code, was essentially due to a
psychological abnormality arising from a pathological and utterly irresistible urge to
gamble.
The RTC cited "[Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's] findings [which] reveal that respondent is
suffering from Personality Disorder known as Pathological Gambling."23 It ruled that it
has been shown that this personality disorder was present at the time of celebration of
marriage but became manifest only later; that because of this personality disorder
respondent had already jeopardized his relationship with his family; and that
respondent's psychological disorder hinders the performance of his obligations as a
husband and as a father.
Lastly, the RTC found that the only property owned in common by spouses was donated
in favor of the parties' children as evidenced by TCT No.
Respondent moved for reconsideration of this verdict.
But in its older dated January 6, 2011,24 the RTC denied respondent's motion for
reconsideration. It reiterated that the expert witness had adequately established that
respondent is suffering from "Pathological Gambling Personality Disorder'' which is
grave, permanent, and has juridical antecedence. On February 4, 2011, respondent filed
a Notice of Appeal25 which was given due course by the RTC in its order26 dated
February 28, 2011.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision of August 29, 2013, the CA overturned the RTC, and disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 12 November 2010 issued
by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 260, Parañaque City in Civil Case No. 07-0070,
declaring the marriage between Maria Concepcion N. Singson and Benjamin L. Singson
null and void ab initio, is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Instead, the Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.27
The CA held that the totality of evidence presented by petitioner failed to establish
respondent's alleged psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations,
which in this case, was not at all proven to be grave or serious, much less incurable, and
furthermore was not existing at the time of the marriage. What is more, the CA declared
that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage, and against its dissolution and nullity, in obedience to the mandate of the
Constitution and statutory laws; and that in this case, petitioner failed to discharge the
burden of proving that respondent is suffering from a serious or grave psychological
disorder that completely disables or incapacitates him from understanding and
discharging the essential obligations of the marital union.
According to the CA, psychological incapacity is the downright or utter incapacity or
inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations. The CA did
not go along with the RTC, which placed heavy reliance on Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's finding
that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital
obligations due to a personality disorder known as pathological gambling. The CA held
that, contrary to petitioner's claim that respondent's pathological gambling was grave or
serious, the evidence in fact showed that the latter was truly capable of carrying out the
ordinary duties of a married man because he had a job, had provided money for the
family from the sale of his own property, and he likewise provided the land on which the
family home was built, and he also lives in the family home with petitioner and their
children.
On top of these, the CA ruled that it is settled that mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the
performance of marital obligations, or ill will on the part of a spouse, is different from
incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness; that the
evidence at bar showed that respondent's alleged pathological gambling arose after the
marriage; that in fact petitioner admitted that she was not aware of any gambling by
respondent before they got married; that petitioner moreover acknowledged that
respondent was a kind and a caring person when he was courting her; that petitioner
likewise admitted that respondent also brought petitioner to the hospital during all four
instances when she gave birth to their four children.
In other words, the CA found that respondent's purported pathological gambling was not
proven to be incurable or permanent since respondent has been undergoing treatment
since 2003 and has been responding to the treatment.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration28 of the CA's Decision. But her motion was denied
by the CA in its Resolution of January 6, 2014.29
Issue
Hence, the instant recourse with petitioner raising the following question –
[WHETHER] THE [CA] ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE [RTC].30
Petitioner's Arguments
In praying for the reversal of the assailed CA Decision and Resolution, and in asking for
the reinstatement of the RTC Decision, petitioner argues in her Petition, 31 Reply,32 and
Memorandum33 that respondent's psychological incapacity had been duly proved in court,
including its juridical antecedence, incurability, and gravity.
First, petitioner maintains that respondent failed to perform the marital duties of mutual
love, respect, and support; that Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's expert findings are corroborated by
the testimonies of petitioner end her son Jose both of whom demonstrated that
respondent’s psychological incapacity is grave or serious rendering him incapable to
perform the essential marital obligations; that for his pan, respondent had adduced no
proof that he (respondent) is capable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a
marriage for the reason that everything that the family had saved and built had been
squandered by respondent; and that respondent's confinement at the rehabilitation facility
is itself proof of the gravity or seriousness of his psychological incapacity.
Second, petitioner contends that respondent’s psychological incapacity preceded the
marriage, as shown in Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio’s Clinical Summary, which pointed out that
such psychological incapacity, which included pathological gambling, can be traced back
when respondents was already betting on jai alai even in high school, and this was not
known to his family; that the Clinical Summary was based on information provided not
only by petitioner, but by respondent’s sister, and by respondent himself; that such
juridical antecedence was neither questioned nor overthrown by countervailing evidence;
and that the root cause could be traced back to respondent’s flawed relationship with his
parents which developed into a psychological disorder that existed before the marriage.
Third, petitioner insists that this Court can take judicial notice of the fact that personality
disorders are generally incurable and permanent, and must continuously be treated
medically; that in this case the Clinical Summary; had pointed out that respondent's
understanding of his gambling problem is only at the surface level; and that in point of
fact Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio had affirmed that personality disorders are incurable.
Respondent’s Arguments
In his Comment34 and Memorandum,35 respondent counters that the assailed CA Decision
should be affirmed. He argues that the grounds cited by petitioner are the self-same
grounds raised by petitioner before the RTC and the CA; that petitioner's evidence indeed
failed to prove convincingly that he (respondent) is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations, hence there is no basis to declare the
parties' marriage void ab initio.
Our Ruling
The Petition will not succeed.
It is axiomatic that the validity of marriage and the unity of the family are enshrined in
our Constitution and statutory laws, hence any doubts attending the same are to be
resolved in favor of the continuance and validity of the marriage and that the burden of
proving the nullity of the same rests at all times upon the petitioner. 36 "The policy of the
Constitution is to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social institution, and
marriage as the foundation of the family. Because of this, the Constitution decrees
marriage as legally inviolable and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties."37
Article 1 of the Family Code describes marriage as "a special contract of permanent
union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life" and as "the foundation of the family and an
inviolable social institution."
In the instant case, petitioner impugns the inviolability of this social institution by suing
out pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code, which provides that:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization. (As amended by Executive Order 227)
Petitioner's case will thus be examined in light of the well-entrenched case law rulings
interpreting and construing the quoted Article, to wit:
'Psychological incapacity,' as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental - not merely physical - incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in
Article 68 of the Family Code, among others, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly
any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. In Santos v. CA (Santos), the Court first declared that psychological incapacity
must be characterized by: (a) gravity (i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party
would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage); (b)
juridical antecedence (i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage); and (c)
incurability (i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be
beyond the means of the party involved). The Court laid down more definitive guidelines
in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code in Republic of the
Phils. v. CA, x x x [also known as the Molina guidelines]. These guidelines incorporate
the basic requirements that the Court established in Santos.38
In setting aside the RTC's ruling, the CA in this case held that petitioner failed to prove
that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations because she failed to establish that such incapacity was grave and serious, and
that it existed at the time of the marriage, and that it is incurable. We agree.
At the outset, this Court is constrained to peruse the records because of the conflicting
findings between the trial court and the appellate court.39 We thus did peruse and review
the records, and we are satisfied that the CA correctly found that respondent has the
capability and ability to perform his duties as a husband and father as against the RTC' s
rather general statement that respondent's psychological or personality disorder hinders
the performance of his basic obligations as a husband and a father.
We agree with the CA that the evidence on record does not establish that respondent's
psychological incapacity was grave and serious as defined by jurisprudential parameters
since "[respondent] had a job; provided money for the family from the sale of his
property; provided the land where the family home was built on; and lived in the family
home with petitioner-appellee and their children."40
Upon the other hand, petitioner herself testified that respondent had a job as the latter
"was working at a certain point."41 This is consistent with the information in Dr. Sta.
Ana-Ponio's Clinical Summary and testimony, which were both included in petitioner's
formal offer of evidence, respecting the parties' relationship history that petitioner and
respondent met at the bank where petitioner was applying for a job and where respondent
was employed as a credit investigator prior to their courtship and their marriage. 42
It is significant to note moreover that petitioner also submitted as part of her evidence a
notarized summary dated February 18, 2010 which enumerated expenses paid for by the
proceeds of respondent's share in the sale of his parents' home in Magallanes, Makati City
which amounted to around ₱2.9 million. Although petitioner was insinuating that this
amount was insufficient to cover the family expenses from 1999 to 2008, we note that she
admitted under oath that the items for their family budget, such as their children's
education, the payments for association dues, and for electric bills came from this money.
And no less significant is petitioner's admission that respondent provided the land upon
which the family home was built, thus -
[Respondent's counsel to the witness, petitioner]
Q: Does [respondent] [own] any real property?
A: No.
Q: He does not [own] any real property?
A: No.
Q: Showing to you Transfer Certificate of Title No. 413513 of the Register of Deeds of
Rizal which has been transferred with the Register of Deeds of Paranaque and is now re-
numbered as S-25470, which is in the name of [respondent], Filipino, of legal age, single.
xxxx What's more, petitioner and respondent likewise lived together as husband and wife since
their marriage on July 6, 1974 (and in the company of their four children, too). In fact,
[COURT to the witness, petitioner] shunting aside the time that respondent was under treatment at the Metro Psych Facility,
petitioner did not allege any instance when respondent failed to live with them.
Q: Who owned this property?
To the foregoing, we ought to add the fact that petitioner herself admitted, that respondent
likewise brought her to the hospital during all four instances that she gave birth to their
A: Based on the document, it's Benjamin Singson. children.44

Q: Where is this property located? By contrast, petitioner did not proffer any convincing proof that respondent’s mere
confinement at the rehabilitation center confirmed the gravity of the latter’s psychological
A: It is located in United Paranaque. incapacity.

Q: Where in United Paranaque? Neither does petitioner’s bare claim that respondent is a pathological gambler, is
irresponsible, and is unable to keep a job, necessarily translate into unassailable proof that
A: No. 2822 Daang Hari. respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. It
is settled that "[p]sychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code
contemplates an incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital
Q: Are you staying in that property? obligations, and is not merely the difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of
marital obligations or ill will."45 "[I]t is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet
A: We are staying in that property. his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he or she must be
shown to be incapable of doing so because of some psychological, not physical,
illness."46
xxxx

Nor can Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's testimony in open court and her Clinical Summary be taken
[Respondent's counsel to the Witiress, petitioner]
for gospel truth in regard to the charge that respondent is afflicted with utter inability to
appreciate his marital obligations. That much is clear from the following testimony –
Q: How about the house there, in the United Parañaque [property], who owns it?
[Petitioner's counsel to the witness, Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio]
A: It was donated to the children.
Q: Madam Witness, do you know the respondent in this case, Benjamin Singson?
xxxx
A: Yes. [S]ir, [respondent] has been my patient since 2003, during his first admission and
[COURT to the witness, petitioner] again [in] 2006, [S]ir.

Q: Based on the document, who is the registered owner? Q: So, he was confined twice in your facility, [M]adam witness?

A: It says there, [respondent], Your Honor. A: Yes, [S]ir.

Q: Who owns it now? Q: Why was he confined, Madam witness?

A: The children because it was donated [to them].43 A: He was initially confined because of problems with gambling and subsequently
because of [behavioral] problem, [S]ir.
 xxxx
Q: What was the cause of his second confinement, Madam [W]itness?
A: Initially, he was able to cope after discharged. However, [in] September of 2006, he
knocked on the doors of the maids in the middle of the night. And in one occasion, he got
his car in the garage and drove out bumping the car parked right across the garage and he
[also kept] takfr1g things out from his cabinet. And if the maids would clean [these], he
[would] immediately take them out again. So, he was brought to the facility in October
because of his uncontrolled behavior, [S]ir.
xxxx
Q: So, what [were] your clinical findings on the state of the respondent, Benjamin
Singson, Madam witness?
A: Based on history, mental status examination and observations during his stay, I found
that [respondent] is suffering from pathological gambling. Also, with his history of
typhoid fever when he was younger, it is difficult to attribute the behavioral changes that
he manifested in 2003 and 2006. Aside from pathological gambling, [respondent] is
suffering from a personality disorder, [S]ir.
Q: What are the results or symptoms of this personality disorder with [regard] to
[respondent's dealings] with other people, with his wife and his family, [M]adam
witness?
A: Your Honor, may I read from my report to refresh my memory.
COURT: Go ahead.
A: Because of his maladaptive behavior, [respondent] sees [sic] his problems which
[makes] his personal[,] family[,] and social life[,] and even his vocational pleasure
[suffer]. He was pre-occupied with gambling, thinking of ways to get money with which
to gamble as seen in his stealing and pawning jewelries and appliances. He needs to
amble with increasing amounts of money in order achieve his desired effects into
gambling, [S]ir.
COURT: Your findings, Dr., are incorporated in your report?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
xxxx
[Cross-examination of Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio by respondent’s counsel]
Q: Who were the ones who made the examination, Madam witness?
A: I made the examination, [S]ir, and also the psychologist did the psychological testing,
[S]ir.
Q: Now, in your opinion as an expert witness, Madam witness, which we would like to
request [from] this Honorable Court, later on, that you present your credentials as expert
witness, you concluded that the respondent is suffering from personality disorder?
A: Yes,[S]ir.
Q: What does this mean in layman’s language, [M]adam witness?
A: Personality disorder is a maladaptive pattern of behavior that has distracted his ability
to perform his functions as a married man to his wife as a father to his children and as a
person who is supposed to be employed productively, [S]ir. 47
Futhermore, "[h]abitual drunkenness, gambling and failure to find a job, [while
undoubtedly negative traits are nowhere nearly the equivalent of ‘psychological
incapacity’], in the absence of [incontrovertible] proof that these are manifestations of an
incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness."48
We now turn to the second point. Again, in view of the contrasting findings of the trial
court and appellate court,49 we take recourse to the records to assist us in evaluating the
perspective postures taken by the parties.
Here again, well-entrenched is the rule that "there must be proof of a natal or supervening
disabling factor that effectively incapacitated the respondent spouse from complying with
the basic marital obligations x x x."50 "A cause has to be shown and linked with the
manifestations of the psychological incapacity."51
Again we agree with the CA that the RTC did not clearly or correctly lay down the bases
or premises for this particular finding relative to respondent's psychological incapacity,
thus:
Second, there is also sufficient evidence to prove that the respondent's inabilities to
perform his marital obligations was a result of not mere intentional refusal on his part
but are caused by psychological abnormality. Such psychological incapacity of the
respondent has been shown as already present at the time of celebration of marriage but
became manifest only after the solemnization. x x x.52
As heretofore mentioned, the medical basis or evidence adverted to by the RTC did not "'Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where the parties or one of
specifically identify the root cause of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity. In them, by reason of a grave and incurable psychological illness existing at the time the
fact, Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio did not point to a definite or a definitive cause, viz. "with his marriage was celebrated, was incapacitated to fulfill the obligations of marital life (and
history of typhoid fever when he was younger, it is difficult to attribute the behavioral thus could not then have validly entered into a marriage), then we are compelled to
changes that he manifested in 2003 and 2006."53 Besides, Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio admitted uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie."60 This is the situation here.
that it was not she herself, but another psychologist who conducted the tests. 54 And this
psychologist was not presented by petitioner. More than that, Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The August 29, 2013 Decision and January 6,
testimony regarding respondent's alleged admission that he was allegedly betting on jai 2014 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96662 are AFFIRMED.
alai when he was still in high school is essentially hearsay as no witness having personal
knowledge of that fact was called to the witness stand. And, although Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio
claimed to have interviewed respondent's sister in connection therewith, the latter did
testify in court. And we are taught that "[t]he stringency by which the Court assesses the
sufficiency of psychological evaluation reports is necessitated by the pronouncement in
our Constitution that marriage is an inviolable institution protected by the State."55

Equally bereft of merit is petitioner's claim that respondent's alleged psychological

incapacity could be attributed to the latter's family or childhood, which are circumstances
prior to the parties' marriage; no evidence has been adduced to substantiate this fact. Nor
is there basis for upholding petitioner's contention that respondent's family was
"distraught" and that respondent's conduct was "dysfunctional"; again, there is no
evidence to attest to this. These are very serious charges which must be substantiated by
clear evidence which, unfortunately, petitioner did not at all adduce. Indeed, Dr. Sta.
Ana-Ponio did not make a specific finding that this was the origin of respondent's alleged
inability to appreciate marital obligations.

Needless to say, petitioner cannot lean upon her son Jose's testimony that his father's
psychological incapacity existed before or at the time of marriage.1âwphi1 It has been
held that the parties' child is not a very reliable witness in an Article 36 case as "he could
not have been there when the spouses were married and could not have been expected to
know what was happening between his parents until long after his birth."56

To support her Article 36 petition, petitioner ought to have adduced convincing,

competent and trustworthy evidence to establish the cause of respondent's alleged
psychological incapacity and that the same antedated their marriage.57 If anything,
petitioner failed to successfully dispute the CA's finding that she was not aware of any
gan1b1ing by respondent before they got married and that respondent was a kind and
caring person when he was courting her.58

Against this backdrop, we must uphold the CA's declaration that petitioner failed to prove
that respondents alleged psychological incapacity is serious or grave and that it is
incurable or permanent.

To be sure, this Court cannot take judicial notice of petitioner's assertion that "personality
disorders are generally incurable" as this is not a matter that courts are mandated to take
judicial notice under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. 59