LEGAL OPINION:

IMBECILITY OR INSANITY as one of the EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES (their

distinctions, requisites, procedures, circumstances and conditions; and
jurisprudence relating to it)

Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code states that, “Circumstances which exempt
from criminal liability. – The following are exempt from criminal liability: 1. An imbecile or
an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval...”

The quoted-above provision establishes the distinction between imbecility and

insanity, because while the imbecile is exempt in all cases from criminal liability, the
insane is not so exempt if it can be shown that he acted during a lucid interval.
According to the dictionary imbecile is a person marked by mental deficiency while an
insane person is one who has an unsound mind or suffers from a mental disorder.1

Imbecility is having, while advanced in his age, has a mental development

comparable to that of children between two and seven years of age. 2 On the other
hand, insanity has been defined as "a manifestation in language or conduct of disease
or defect of the brain, or a more or less permanently diseased or disordered condition of
the mentality, functional or organic, and characterized by perversion, inhibition, or
disordered function of the sensory or of the intellective faculties, or by impaired or
disordered volition.”3

The exempting circumstance of insanity is not easily available to an accused as a

successful defense.4

What should be the criterion for insanity or imbecility? In order that a person
could be regarded as an imbecile within the meaning of article 12 of the Revised Penal
Code so as to be exempt from criminal liability, he must be deprived completely of
reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime;5
whereas, insanity may be taken as an exempting circumstance when there is complete
deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, the accused is deprived of
reason, he acts without the least discernment.6

1
Viada, Codigo Penal, 4th Ed., p. 92
2
Reyes, Luis B., The Revised Penal Code, 7th Ed., 216
3
Sec. 1039, Revised Administrative Code
4
People of the Philippines vs. Honorio Tibon y Deiso, G.R. No. 188320, June 29, 2010.
5
People vs. Formigonez, 87 Phil. 658, 660
6
People vs. Ambal, G.R. No. 52688, October 17, 1980
 The provisions of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code are copied from and
based on paragraph 1, article 8, of the old Penal Code of Spain. Consequently, the
decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain interpreting and applying said provisions are
pertinent and applicable.7

The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this exempting circumstances
may be taken into account, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing the act, that is, that the accused be deprived of reason; that
there be no responsibility for his own acts; that he acts without the least discernment; 8
that there be a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there be a total
deprivation of freedom of the will. For this reason, it was held that the imbecility or
insanity at the time of the commission of the act should absolutely deprive a person of
intelligence or freedom of will, because mere abnormality of his mental faculties does
not exclude imputability.9

Inasmuch as the defense is insanity, the only question to be determined is,

whether or not the accused was insane at the time of the commission of the crime
charge.10

Insanity is the exception rather than the rule in the human condition. 11 While Art.
12(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that an imbecile or insane person is exempt
from criminal liability, unless that person has acted during a lucid interval, the
presumption, under Art. 800 of the Civil Code, is that every human is sane. Anyone who
pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving it 12 with clear
and convincing evidence.13 It is in the nature of confession and avoidance. An accused
invoking insanity admits to have committed the crime but claims that he or she is not
guilty because of insanity. The testimony or proof of insanity must, however, relate to
the time immediately preceding or coetaneous with the commission of the offense with
which he is charged.14 If there is no sufficient or satisfactory evidence that the accused
was mentally incapacitated when he committed the crime, the conclusion of fact must
be the same presumption established by law, i.e., that he was in right mind, and the
conclusion of law must be that he is criminally liable.

It must be stressed that an inquiry into the mental state of an accused should
relate to the period immediately before or at the precise moment of the commission of
the act which is the subject of the inquiry. 15 His mental condition after that crucial period

7
People vs. Formigonez, supra 5
8
Decision of Supreme Court of Spain of November 21, 1891; 47 Jur. Crim., 413
9
Decision of Supreme Court of Spain of April 20, 1911; 86 Jur. Crim., 94, 97
10
People vs Fausto, L-16381, December 30, 1961, 3 SCRA 863, 866-867
11
People v. Yam-Id, G.R. No. 126116, June 21, 1999, 308 SCRA 651
12
People v. Pambid, G.R. No. 124453, March 15, 2000, 328 SCRA 158; citing People v. Catanyag, G.R. No. 103974,
September 10, 1993, 226 SCRA 293.
13
People v. Florendo, G.R. No. 136845, October 8, 2003, 413 SCRA 132
14
People v. Opuran, G.R. Nos. 147674-75, March 17, 2004, 425 SCRA 654.
15
People v. Domingo, G.R. No. 138453, 29 May 2002, 382 SCRA 581; citing People v. Aquino, G.R. No. 87084, 27
June 1990, 186 SCRA 851, 861;
or during the trial is inconsequential for purposes of determining his criminal liability. 16
Thus the accused, in People vs Opuran 17 case, failed to establish by convincing
evidence his alleged insanity at the time he killed the victims. He is thus presumed
sane, and we are constrained to affirm his conviction.18 He failed to raise insanity at the
earliest opportunity. He invoked it for the first time only after he had already testified on
his defenses of alibi and denial. It has been held that the invocation of denial and alibi
as defences indicates that the accused was in full control of his mental
faculties. 19 Additionally, the trial judge observed that, during the hearings he was
attentive, well-behaved, and responsive to the questions propounded to him. Thus, the
shift in theory from denial and alibi to a plea of insanity, made apparently after the
appellant realized the futility of his earlier defenses, is a clear indication that insanity is a
mere concoction20 or an afterthought.21

In reference to the burden of proof of insanity in criminal cases, where the

defense of insanity is interposed, a conflict of authority exists. At least, all the authorities
are in harmony with reference to two fundamental propositions: First, that the burden is
on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed
the crime; and secondly, that the law presumes every man to be sane. The conflict in
the decisions arises by reason of the fact that the courts differ in their opinion as to how
much evidence is necessary to overthrow this original presumption of sanity, and as to
what quantum of evidence is sufficient to enable the court to say that the burden of
proving the crime beyond a reasonable doubt has been sufficiently borne.22

The rather strict doctrine "that when a defendant in a criminal case interposes the
defense of mental incapacity, the burden of establishing that fact rests upon him," has
been adopted in a series of decisions by this court.23 This will be construed to mean that
the defense must prove that the accused was insane at the very moment the crime was
committed.

Not attempting, therefore, further elucidation of the authorities, we find it more

practicable to dispose cases based on the facts. In one case, People vs. Basco,24 the
court is convinced that the accused was a lunatic, when he committed the grave felony
described in the record and that consequently he is exempt from criminal liability, and
should be confined in an insane asylum, based on the circumstances. The wife of the
accused and his cousin testified that the accused had been more or less continuously
out of his mind for many years. An assistant district health officer, who, by order of the
judge, examined the accused and conducted an investigation, found that the accused is
16
People v. Valledor, G.R. No. 129291, 3 July 2002, 383 SCRA 653, 660-661; citing People v. Bonoan; 64 Phil 87, 93
(1937)
17
People v. Opuran, supra 14
18
People v. Robiños, G.R. No. 138453, 29 May 2002, 382 SCRA 581
19
People v. Ocfemia, G.R. No. 126135, 25 October 2000, 344 SCRA 315
20
People v. Amamangpang, G. R. No. 108491, 2 July 1998, 291 SCRA 638
21
People v. Mengote, G.R. No. 130491, 25 March 1999, 305 SCRA 380
22
People v. Bascos, 44 Phil. 204
23
U. S. vs. Martinez [1916], 34 Phil., 305; citing U. S. vs. Hontiveros Carmona [1910], 18 Phil., 62
24
People v. Bascos, supra 22
a violent maniac and that from the information he had received from the neighbours of
the accused, the latter had been insane for some time. The physician expressed the
opinion that the accused was probably insane when he killed the victim. The official
declaration of the physician in his capacity as acting district health officer was "that this
accused, according to a physical examination and investigation, is a violent maniac, and
that this mental state has continued through many years, constituting a danger both for
himself and for the community." 25 The total lack of motive of the accused to kill the
victim bears out the assumption that the former was insane.

Well-settled is the rule that an inquiry into the mental state of an accused should
relate to the period immediately before or at the very moment the felony is committed.26
In the case of People vs. Aquino,27 the court found the evidence adduced too nebulous
and conjectural to be convincing that the accused was insane immediately before or at
the very moment the crime was committed. While the psychiatrist-witness described the
mental illness of the accused as "organic mental disorder with psychosis" he admitted
that a person suffering from insanity may know that what he is doing is wrong. The
same witness also testified that there is no possibility of the accused having lucid
intervals, but he, however, also observed that the mental illness of appellant came on
and off. The clinical case report also shows that the accused, when interviewed upon
his admission to the mental institution, recalled having taken 120 cubic centimetres of
cough syrup and consumed about 3 sticks of marijuana before the commission of the
crime. This admission substantially affirms his prior extrajudicial confession that he was
under the influence of marijuana when he sexually abused the victim and, on the
occasion thereof, killed her. It is, therefore, beyond cavil that assuming the accused had
some form of mental illness, it did not totally deprive him of intelligence. The presence
of his reasoning faculties, which enabled him to exercise sound judgment and
satisfactorily articulate the aforesaid matters, sufficiently discounts any intimation of
insanity of the accused when he committed the dastardly felonies.

The Supreme Court reiterated the established rule in People vs. Ocfemia,28 when
it ruled that the professed inability of the accused to recall events before and after the
stabbing incident, does not necessarily indicate an aberrant mind but is more indicative
of a concocted excuse to exculpate himself. It is simply too convenient for the appellant
to claim that he could not remember anything rather than face the consequences of his
terrible deed.

Thus, the Formigones29 standard was analyzed into two distinguishable tests: (a)
the test of cognition – whether there was a "complete deprivation of intelligence in
committing the criminal act" and (b) the test of volition – whether there was a "total
deprivation of freedom of the will."30 We observed that our case law shows common

25
People v. Bascos, supra 22
26
People v. Catanyag, supra 12
27
People v. Aquino, supra 15
28
People v. Ocfemia, supra 19
29
People v. Formigonez, supra 5
30
People v. Rafanan, Jr.,G.R. No. 54135, 21 November 1991, 204 SCRA 65
reliance on the test of cognition, rather than on the test of volition, and has failed to turn
up any case where an accused is exempted on the sole ground that he was totally
deprived of the freedom of the will, i.e., without an accompanying "complete deprivation
of intelligence." This is expected, since a person’s volition naturally reaches out only
towards that which is represented as desirable by his intelligence, whether that
intelligence be diseased or healthy.31

Since the basis of insanity or imbecility is based on complete absence of

intelligence, an element of voluntariness, other cases may be covered by the term
“insanity” such as Dementia praecox or Schizophrenia, Epilepsy, committing a crime
while in a dream, committing a crime while suffering from malignant malaria. 32
Establishing the insanity of an accused often requires opinion testimony which may be
given by a witness who is intimately acquainted with the accused; has rational basis to
conclude that the accused was insane based on his own perception; or is qualified as
an expert, such as a psychiatrist.33

Medical books describe schizophrenia as a chronic mental disorder

characterized by inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality and often
accompanied by hallucinations and delusions. Formerly called dementia praecox, it is
the most common form of psychosis.34 When a person is suffering from this form of
psychosis, homicidal attack is common, because of delusions that he is being interfered
with sexually, or that his property is being taken. During the period of excitement, such
person has no control of his acts.35 Schizophrenics have lucid intervals during which
they are capable of distinguishing right from wrong. Hence the importance of adducing
proof to show that the accused was not in his lucid interval at the time he committed the
offense. Evidence on the alleged insanity must refer to the time preceding the act under
prosecution or to the very moment of its execution.36

Another condition is epilepsy, which is a chronic nervous disease characterized

by fits, occurring at intervals, attended by convulsive motions of the muscles and loss of
consciousness. The defense of lack of free will of the accused, who is an epileptic,
cannot be sustained. While he, as an epileptic, was susceptible to nervous attacks that
may momentarily deprive him of his mental faculties and lead him to unconsciously
attempt to take his own life and the lives of others, nevertheless, it has not been shown
that he was under the influence of an epileptic fit before, during, and immediately after
the aggression.37

31
People v. Medina, G.R. No. 113691, 6 February 1998, 286 SCRA 44; citing People v. Magallano, No. L-32978, 30
October 1980, 100 SCRA 570.
32
Reyes, Luis B., The Revised Penal Code, 7th Ed., p. 220-224
33
People v. Madarang, G.R. No. 132319, 12 May 2000, 332 SCRA 99
34
People v. Madarang, G.R. No. Supra 33
35
People v. Bonoan; Supra 16
36
People v. Madarang, Supra 33
37
People v. Mancao and Aguilar, 49 Phil. 887
 Taking the third condition that falls into the term “insanity”, one who, while
sleeping, suddenly got up, got a bolo, and upon meeting his wife, whom she loved so
dearly, who tried to stop him, wounded her and also attacked other persons, the
defendant here is not criminally liable for lack of motives to voluntarily commit the acts
complained of, but also motives for not committing said acts. An expert psychiatric-
witness in this case, is also of the same opinion. The doctor stated that considering the
circumstances of the case, the defendant acted while in a dream, under the influence of
hallucination and not in his right mind. 38 When the acts of the person afflicted are
automatic, it is embraced in the plea of insanity and must clearly be proven.39

Another illness, malignant malaria, affects the nervous system and causes
among others such complication as acute melancholia and insanity at times, thus a
person who commits a crime suffering from it, is not criminally liable for lack of
intelligence as explained in the preceding conditions.40

As for the procedure when the imbecile or the insane committed a felony,
paragraph 2 of the same provision states that, “When the imbecile or an insane person
has committed an act which the law defines as a felony (delito), the court shall order his
confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for persons thus afflicted,
which he shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the
same court.”

In Chin Ah Foo vs. Concepcion41 case, it was held that the court, however, has
no power to permit the insane person to leave the asylum without first obtaining the
opinion of the Director of Health that he may be released without danger, pursuant to
Section 1048 of the Administrative Code stating that, “When in the opinion of the
Director of Health any patient in any Government hospital or other place for the insane
is temporarily or permanently cured, or may be released without danger, he may
discharge such patient, and shall notify the Judge of the Court of First Instance who
ordered the commitment, in case the patient is confined by order of the court.”

The ruling in the said case was reiterated in at least two cases, United States vs.
Guendia42 and People vs. Bascos43, when it concluded with this order: "The defendant
shall be kept in confinement in the San Lazaro Hospital or such other hospital for the
insane as the Director of Health may direct, and shall not be permitted to depart
therefrom without the prior approval of the Court of First Instance of the Province of
Iloilo (Pangasinan)."

38
People v. Taneo, 58 Phil. 255
39
People v. Gimena, 55 Phil. 604
40
People v. Lacena, 69 Phil. 350
41
G.R. No. L-33281, March 31, 1930, 54 Phil 775
42
37 Phil., 337, [1917]
43
Supra 22