CRUZ VS MINA

G.R. No. 154207, April 27, 2007

Facts:
Ferdinand A. Cruz filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance, as private
prosecutor, where his father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness.

The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his appearance as
private prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the
ruling of the Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr. that a non-lawyer may appear
before the inferior courts as an agent or friend of a party litigant. The petitioner furthermore
avers that his appearance was with the prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a
written authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the prosecution of the
said criminal case.

However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to
appear as private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law
student practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice
Rule) should take precedence over the ruling of the Court laid down in Cantimbuhan; and set
the case for continuation of trial.

Issue:
Whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an agent or
friend of a party litigant

Ruling:
The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the
issues and procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his
personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138 provides:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace, a party
may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for
that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his
litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or
by a duly authorized member of the bar.

Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party
without the supervision of a member of the bar. (Emphasis supplied)
Pro se representation vs. law student practice rule

In the case of FERDINAND A. CRUZ vs. JUDGE PRISCILLA MIJARES, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City, Metro Manila, G.R. No. 154464, September
11, 2008, the Supreme Court of the Philippines upheld a litigant’s right to pro se
representation under Sec. 34, Rule 138, Rules of Court and clarified its distinction in relation
to the Law Student Practice Rule under Rule 138-A, Rules of Court.

On March 5, 2002, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) sought permission to enter his appearance
for and on his behalf, before the RTC, Branch 108, Pasay City, as the plaintiff in Civil Case
No. 01-0410, for Abatement of Nuisance. Petitioner, a fourth year law student, anchors his
claim on Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court [3] that a non-lawyer may appear
before any court and conduct his litigation personally.

During the pre-trial, Judge Priscilla Mijares required the petitioner to secure a written
permission from the Court Administrator before he could be allowed to appear as counsel for
himself, a party-litigant. Atty. Stanley Cabrera, counsel for Benjamin Mina, Jr., filed a Motion
to Dismiss instead of a pre-trial brief to which petitioner Cruz vehemently objected alleging
that a Motion to Dismiss is not allowed after the Answer had been filed. Judge Mijares then
remarked, “Hay naku, masama ‘yung marunong pa sa Huwes. Ok?” and proceeded to hear
the pending Motion to Dismiss and calendared the next hearing on May 2, 2002.

On March 6, 2002, petitioner Cruz filed a Manifestation and Motion to Inhibit, [4] praying for
the voluntary inhibition of Judge Mijares. The Motion alleged that expected partiality on the
part of the respondent judge in the conduct of the trial could be inferred from the
contumacious remarks of Judge Mijares during the pre-trial. It asserts that the judge, in
uttering an uncalled for remark, reflects a negative frame of mind, which engenders the
belief that justice will not be served. [5]

In an Order [6] dated April 19, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the motion for inhibition stating
that throwing tenuous allegations of partiality based on the said remark is not enough to
warrant her voluntary inhibition, considering that it was said even prior to the start of pre-trial.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration [7] of the said order.

On May 10, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the motion with finality. [8] In the same Order, the
trial court held that for the failure of petitioner Cruz to submit the promised document and
jurisprudence, and for his failure to satisfy the requirements or conditions under Rule 138-A
of the Rules of Court, his appearance was denied.

In a motion for reconsideration, [9] petitioner reiterated that the basis of his appearance was
not Rule 138-A, but Section 34 of Rule 138. He contended that the two Rules were distinct
and are applicable to different circumstances, but the respondent judge denied the same,
still invoking Rule 138-A, in an Order [10] dated July 31, 2002.

On August 16, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the instant petition.

The core issue raised before the Court was whether the respondent court acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied the
appearance of the petitioner as party litigant and when the judge refused to inhibit herself
from trying the case.
Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:

RULE 138-A

LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE

Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. – A law student who has successfully completed
his 3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a
recognized law school's clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme Court,
may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case before any trial
court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of
the law school.

Sec. 2. Appearance. – The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be
under the direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
duly accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or
other papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney for and in behalf of the
legal clinic.

The respondent court held that the petitioner could not appear for himself and on his behalf
because of his failure to comply with Rule 138-A. In denying petitioner’s appearance, the
court a quo tersely finds refuge in the fact that, on December 18, 1986, this Court issued
Circular No. 19, which eventually became Rule 138-A, and the failure of Cruz to prove on
record that he is enrolled in a recognized school’s clinical legal education program and is
under supervision of an attorney duly accredited by the law school.

However, the petitioner insisted that the basis of his appearance was Section 34 of Rule
138, which provides:

Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may
conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that
purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation
personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly
authorized member of the bar.

and is a rule distinct from Rule 138-A.

From the clear language of this provision of the Rules, it will have to be conceded that the
contention of the petitioner has merit. It recognizes the right of an individual to represent
himself in any case to which he is a party. The Rules state that a party may conduct his
litigation personally or with the aid of an attorney, and that his appearance must either be
personal or by a duly authorized member of the Bar. The individual litigant may personally
do everything in the course of proceedings from commencement to the termination of the
litigation. [14] Considering that a party personally conducting his litigation is restricted to the
same rules of evidence and procedure as those qualified to practice law, [15] petitioner, not
being a lawyer himself, runs the risk of falling into the snares and hazards of his own
ignorance. Therefore, Cruz as plaintiff, at his own instance, can personally conduct the
litigation of Civil Case No. 01-0410. He would then be acting not as a counsel or lawyer, but
as a party exercising his right to represent himself.
The trial court must have been misled by the fact that the petitioner is a law student and
must, therefore, be subject to the conditions of the Law Student Practice Rule. It erred in
applying Rule 138-A, when the basis of the petitioner’s claim is Section 34 of Rule 138. The
former rule provides for conditions when a law student may appear in courts, while the latter
rule allows the appearance of a non-lawyer as a party representing himself.

The conclusion of the trial court that Rule 138-A superseded Rule 138 by virtue of Circular
No. 19 is misplaced. The Court never intended to repeal Rule 138 when it released the
guidelines for limited law student practice. In fact, it was intended as an addendum to the
instances when a non-lawyer may appear in courts and was incorporated to the Rules of
Court through Rule 138-A.

It may be relevant to recall that, in respect to the constitutional right of an accused to be

heard by himself and counsel, [16] this Court has held that during the trial, the right to
counsel cannot be waived. [17] The rationale for this ruling was articulated in People v.
Holgado, [18] where we declared that “even the most intelligent or educated man may have
no skill in the science of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and without counsel, he
may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish
his innocence.”

The case at bar involves a civil case, with the petitioner as plaintiff therein. The solicitous
concern that the Constitution accords the accused in a criminal prosecution obviously does
not obtain in a civil case. Thus, a party litigant in a civil case, who insists that he can, without
a lawyer’s assistance, effectively undertake the successful pursuit of his claim, may be given
the chance to do so. In this case, petitioner alleges that he is a law student and impliedly
asserts that he has the competence to litigate the case himself. Evidently, he is aware of the
perils incident to this decision.

In addition, it was subsequently clarified in Bar Matter 730, that by virtue of Section 34, Rule
138, a law student may appear as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without need of the
supervision of a lawyer, before inferior courts. Here, we have a law student who, as party
litigant, wishes to represent himself in court. We should grant his wish.

Additionally, however, petitioner contends that the respondent judge committed manifest
bias and partiality by ruling that there is no valid ground for her voluntary inhibition despite
her alleged negative demeanor during the pre-trial when she said: “Hay naku, masama ‘yung
marunong pa sa Huwes. Ok?” Petitioner avers that by denying his motion, the respondent
judge already manifested conduct indicative of arbitrariness and prejudice, causing
petitioner’s and his co-plaintiff’s loss of faith and confidence in the respondent’s impartiality.

We do not agree.

It must be noted that because of this incident, the petitioner filed an administrative case [19]
against the respondent for violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which we dismissed for
lack of merit on September 15, 2002. We now adopt the Court’s findings of fact in the
administrative case and rule that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge
Mijares when she did not inhibit herself from the trial of the case.

In a Motion for Inhibition, the movant must prove the ground for bias and prejudice by clear
and convincing evidence to disqualify a judge from participating in a particular trial, [20] as
voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and addressed to the sound discretion
of the judge. The decision on whether she should inhibit herself must be based on her
rational and logical assessment of the circumstances prevailing in the case before her. [21]
Absent clear and convincing proof of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the judge, this
Court will rule in favor of the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.

In fine, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the petition, modified the assailed Resolution and
Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City, and directed it to ADMIT the
Entry of Appearance of petitioner in Civil Case No. 01-0410 as a party litigant.