Rafiq vs munshilal

On knowing that the High Court had dismissed his appeal

on the ground that his Advocate was not present in the Court
when the matter was taken up for hearing the appellant moved
an application for the recall of the order dismissing the
appeal and for permission to participate in the hearing of
the appeal. The High Court rejected this application stating
that no satisfactory explanation had been furnished by the
Advocate for his slackness in filing the affidavit for
nearly 15 days after it was drafted.
On the question whether the litigant is entitled to
have his case reheard by the High Court.
^
HELD: It is not proper that an innocent litigant, after
doing everything in his power to effectively participate in
his proceedings by entrusting his case to the Advocate,
should be made to suffer for the inaction, deliberate
omission or misdemeanour of his agent. For whatever reason
the Advocate might have absented himself from the Court, the
innocent litigant could not be allowed to suffer injustice
for the fault of his Advocate. [511 B]
The respondent's costs should be recovered from the
Advocate who absented himself from Court. [511 D]
[The Court directed the appeal to be restored to its
original position in the High Court and heard.]

salil dutt vs t m and m c pvt ltd

The advocate is the agent of the party. His
acts and statements made within the limits of authority
given to him, are the acts and statements of the principal,
i.e., the party who engaged him. It is true that in certain
situations, the Court may, in the interest of justice, set
side a dismissal order or an ex-parte decree notwithstanding
the Negligence and/or misdemeanour of the advocate where It
finds that the client was an innocent litigant, but there is
no such absolute rule that a party can disown its advocate
at any time and seek relief No such absolute immunity can be
recognised. Such an absolute rule would make the working of
the system extremely difficult. [801G]
1.2. The instant case was an on-going suit posted for final
hearing after a lapse of seven years of its institution. It
was not a second appeal riled by a villager residing away
from the city, where the Court is located. The respondent
is also not a justice ignorant villager but a private
limited company with its head-office at the place where the
court is located and managed by educated businessmen who
know where their interest lies. It is evident that when
their interlocutory applications were not disposed of before
taking up the suit for final hearing, they felt piqued and
refused to appear before the court. May be, it was part of
their delaying tactics as alleged by the appellant. May be
not. But one thing is clear they chose to non-cooperate
with the court. Having adopted such a stand towards the
796
Court, the respondent has no right to ask its Indulgence.
Putting the entire blame upon the advocate and trying to
make It out as if they were totally unaware of the nature or
significance of the proceedings Is a theory which cannot be
accepted and ought not to have been accepted. [802A-C]
1.3. It is difficult. to believe that the respondents
implicitly believed their advocate's advice. Being educated
businessmen they would have known that non-participation at
the final hearing of the suit would necessarily result In an
adverse decision. This Court is not prepared to believe
that such an advice was in fact tendered by the advocate.
No advocate worth his salt would give such advice to his
client. Secondly, there are several contradictions in his
deposition. Therefore, the story set up by the respondent-
company in its application under Order 9 Rule 13 is an
after-thought and ought not to have been accepted by the
Division Bench, more particularly, when it had rejected the
very case in its earlier judgment [800G-H, 801AE]
Rafiq and Anr. v. Munshilal and Anr., A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1400,
distinguished.

Mala fides violating the proceedings may be legal or factual. Former arises as a matter of
law where a public functionary acts deliberately in defiance of law without any malicious
intention or improper motive whereas the latter is actuated by extraneous considerations.
But neither can be assumed or readily inferred. It requires strong evidence and
unimpeachable proof. Neither the order passed by the learned Single Judge granting ex
parte order of stay preventing opposite party from going abroad was against provisions of
law nor was the State guilty of acting mala fides in approaching the learned Single Judge by
way of writ petition. The order of the trial Judge could not be challenged before the Division
Bench. Under the rules of the court, the correctness of, the order could be assailed only in
the manner it was done by the State. Any party aggrieved by an order is entitled to
challenge it in a court of law. Such action is neither express malice nor malice in law. 5. A
State counsel with all the aura of office suffers dual
handicap of being looked upon by the other side as the
necessary devil and the courts too at times, rind it easier
to frown upon him. The moral responsibility of a state
counsel, to place the facts correctly, honestly and fairly
before the court, having access to State records, coupled
with his duty to
303
secure an order in favour of his client requires him to
discharge his duty responsibly and sensibly. Even so if a
State lawyer who owes a special duty and is charge with
higher standard of conduct in his zeal or due to pressure,
not uncommon in the present day, adopts a partisan approach
that by itself is not sufficient to warrant a finding of
unfairness or resorting to sharp practice. [309D-E]
6.The public prosecutor may have exhibited more zeal. But
that could not be characterised as unfair. May be it would
have been proper and probably better to inform the Single
Judge about the earlier order passed by the Division Bench.
But assuming the public prosecutor did not inform and
remained content with its disclosure in the body of the
petition she could not be held to have acted dishonestly.
[309F]
7.A Judge of the High Court may have unchallenged and
unfettered power to direct the office to list a case before
him. But that by itself restricts the exercise of power and
calls for strict judicial discipline. If the Judge in the
instant case, would have avoided sending for and deciding
the petition, which as pointed out by the senior counsel for
the State had become infructuous, it would have been more in
keeping with judicial culture. [309H, 310A-B]

P.D. Gupta v. Ram Murti and Anr.

Facts: One Srikishan Dass died leaving behind extensive immovable properties. Claims to the
said properties were made by one Vidyawati claiming to be the sister of the deceased , one
Ram Murti and two others who claimed themselves to be the heir of the deceased.
Later the said properties were purchased by the advocate of Vidyawati knowing them to be
disputed. The advocate thereafter sold the property to a third party and made profit. A
complaint was made against the advocate to the Bar Council of Delhi.

Held: Since the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of Delhi could not dispose of the
complaint within a period of one year and therefore the proceedings had been transferred
to the Bar Council of India under Section 36-B of the Advocates Act. The disciplinary
committee of the Bar Council of India found him guilty of professional misconduct and
suspended him from practice for period of one year.
P.D. Gupta says that he has washed his hands off the property and thus he is not guilty of
any misconduct. That is not the issue. It is his conduct in buying the property, the subject-
matter of litigation between the parties, from his client on which he could exercise undue
influence especially when there was a doubt cast on his client’s title to the property. Had
P.D. Gupta sold the property back to Vidya Wati and got the sale deed in his favour
cancelled something could have been said in his favour. But that is not so. He sold the
property to a third person, made profit and created more complications in the pending suit.
P.D. Gupta purchased the properties which were the subject-matter of the dispute for
himself and also for his son-in-law at almost throw-away prices and thus he himself became
a party to the litigation. The conduct of P.D. Gupta cannot be said to be above board. It is
not material that Vidya Wati or anyone claiming through her has not complained against
him. We are concerned with the professional conduct of P.D. Gupta as a lawyer conducting
the case for his client. A lawyer owes a duty to be fair not only to his client but also to the
court as well as to the opposite party in the conduct of the case. Administration of justice is
a stream which has to be kept pure and clean. It has to be kept unpolluted. Administration
of justice is not something which concerns the Bench only. It concerns the Bar as well. The
Bar is the principal ground for recruiting Judges. No one should be able to raise a finger
about the conduct of a lawyer. While conducting the case he functions as an officer of the
court. Here, P.D. Gupta in buying the property has in effect subverted the process of justice.
His action has raised serious questions about his fairness in the conduct of the trial touching
his professional conduct as an advocate. By his action he has brought the process of
administration of justice into disrepute.
15. The Bar Council of India and the State Bar Councils are statutory bodies under the Act.
These bodies perform varying functions under the Act and the rules framed thereunder. The
Bar Council of India has laid standards of professional conduct for the members. The code of
conduct in the circumstances can never be exhaustive. The Bar Council of India and the
State Bar Councils are representative bodies of the advocates on their rolls and are charged
with the responsibility of maintaining discipline amongst members and punishing those who
go astray from the path of rectitude set out for them. In the present case the Bar Council of
India, through its Disciplinary Committee, has considered all the relevant circumstances and
has come to the conclusion that P.D. Gupta, Advocate is guilty of misconduct and we see no
reason to take a different view. We also find no ground to interfere with the punishment
awarded to P.D. Gupta in the circumstances of the case.
TC MATHAI CASE
Section 2 of the Power of Attorney Act cannot override the specific provision of a statute
which requires that a particular act should be done by a party in person. When the
Code requires the appearance of an accused in a court it is no compliance with it if a power
of attorney holder appears for him. It is a different thing that a party can be permitted to
appear through counsel. Chapter XVI of the Code empowers the Magistrate to issue
summons or warrant for the appearance of the accused. Section 205 of the Code empowers
the Magistrate to dispense with the personal attendance of accused, and permit him to
appear by his pleader if he sees reasons to do so. Section 273 of the Code speaks of the
powers of the court to record evidence in the presence of the pleader of the accused, in
cases when personal attendance of the accused is dispensed with. But in no case can the
appearance of the accused be made through a power of attorney holder. So the contention
of the appellant based on the instrument of power of attorney is of no avail in this case.

The counsel appearing for the BCMG, who stated that he is its member, submitted that
when the Bar believes that the Chief Justice has committed misconduct, as an elected body
it is its duty to pass a resolution after full discussion demanding the Judge to act in defence
of independence of the judiciary by demitting his office.
9. The learned Attorney General contended that any resolution passed by any Bar
Association tantamounts to scandalising the court entailing contempt of the court. It cannot
coerce the Judge to resign. The pressure brought by the Chief Justice of India upon the
Judge would be constitutional but it should be left to the Chief Justice of India to impress
upon the erring Judge to correct his conduct. This procedure would yield salutary effect. The
Chief Justice of India would adopt such procedure as is appropriate to the situation. He cited
the advice tendered by Lord Chancellor of England to Lord Denning, when the latter was
involved in the controversy over his writing on the jury trial and the composition of the
black members of the jury, to demit the office, which he did in grace.

C ravichandra vs bhaattacharya
The petitioner in a well-documented petition stated and argued with commitment that the
news published in various national newspapers does prove that Respondents 2 to 4 had
pressurised the 1st respondent to resign from the office as Judge for his alleged
misbehaviour. The Constitution provides for independence of the Judges of the higher
courts, i.e., the Supreme Court and the High Courts. It also lays down in proviso (a) to clause
(2) of Article 124; so too in Article 217(1) proviso (a) and Article 124(4), procedure for
voluntary resignation by a Judge, as well as for compulsory removal, respectively from office
in the manner prescribed therein and in accordance with the Act and the Rules made
thereunder. The acts and actions of Respondents 2 to 4 are unknown to law, i.e., removal by
forced resignation, which is not only unconstitutional but also deleterious to the
independence of the judiciary. The accusations against the 1st respondent without proper
investigation by an independent agency seriously damage the image of judiciary and efficacy
of judicial adjudication and thereby undermine credibility of the judicial institution itself.
Judges are not to be judged by the Bar. Allowing adoption of such demands by collective
pressure rudely shakes the confidence and competence of judges of integrity, ability, moral
vigour and ethical firmness, which in turn, sadly destroys the very foundation of democratic
polity. Therefore, the pressure tactics by the Bar requires to be nipped in the bud.
question is whether a Bar Council or Bar Association is entitled to pass resolution
demanding a Judge to resign, what is its effect on the independence of the judiciary and
whether it is constitutionally permissible. Shri Nariman contended that the Supreme Court
and the High Court are two independent constitutional institutions. A High Court is not
subordinate to the Supreme Court though constitutionally the Supreme Court has the
power to hear appeals from the decisions or orders or judgments of the High Courts or any
Tribunal or quasi-judicial authority in the country. The Judges and the Chief Justice of a High
Court are not subordinate to the Chief Justice of India. The constitutional process of removal
of a Judge as provided in Article 124(4) of the Constitution is only for proved misbehaviour
or incapacity. The recent impeachment proceedings against Justice V. Ramaswami and its
fall out do indicate that the process of impeachment is cumbersome and the result
uncertain. Unless corrective steps are taken against Judges whose conduct is perceived by
the Bar to be detrimental to the independence of the judiciary, people would lose faith in
the efficacy of judicial process. Bar being a collective voice of the court concerned has
responsibility and owes a duty to maintain the independence of the judiciary. It is its
obligation to bring it to the notice of the Judge concerned the perceived misbehaviour or
incapacity. Shri Nariman also cited the instance of non-assignment of work to four Judges of
the Bombay High Court by its former Chief Justice when some allegations of misbehaviour
were imputed to them by the Bar. He, however, submitted that in the present case the
allegations were against the Chief Justice himself, and so, he could not have been
approached. He urged that if some guidelines could be laid down by this Court in such cases,
the same would be welcomed. The learned Attorney General contended that any resolution
passed by any Bar Association tantamounts to scandalising the court entailing contempt of
the court. It cannot coerce the Judge to resign. The pressure brought by the Chief Justice of
India upon the Judge would be constitutional but it should be left to the Chief Justice of
India to impress upon the erring Judge to correct his conduct. This procedure would yield
salutary effect. The Chief Justice of India would adopt such procedure as is appropriate to
the situation. He cited the advice tendered by Lord Chancellor of England to Lord Denning,
when the latter was involved in the controversy over his writing on the jury trial and the
composition of the black members of the jury, to demit the office, which he did in grace.
Rule of Law and Judicial Independence -Why need to be preserved?
10. The diverse contentions give rise to the question whether any Bar Council or Bar
Association has the right to pass resolution against the conduct of a Judge perceived to have
committed misbehaviour and, if so, what is its effect on independence of the judiciary. With
a view to appreciate the contentions in their proper perspective, it is necessary to have at
the back of our mind the importance of the independence of the judiciary. In a democracy
governed by rule of law under a written constitution, judiciary is sentinel on the qui vive to
protect the fundamental rights and to poise even scales of justice between the citizens and
the State or the States inter se. Rule of law and judicial review are basic features of the
Constitution. As its integral constitutional structure, independence of the judiciary is an
essential attribute of rule of law. In S.P. Gupta v. Union of India [1981 Supp SCC 87], this
Court held that if there is one principle which runs through the entire fabric of the
Constitution it is the principle of the rule of law, and under the Constitution it is the judiciary
which is entrusted with the task of keeping every organ of the State within the limits of the
law and thereby making the rule of law meaningful and effective. Judicial review is one of
the most potent weapons in the armoury of law. The judiciary seeks to protect the citizen
against violation of his constitutional or legal rights or misuse or abuse of power by the
State or its officers. The judiciary stands between the citizen and the State as a bulwark
against executive excesses and misuse or abuse of power by the executive. It is, therefore,
absolutely essential that the judiciary must be free from executive pressure or influence
which has been secured by making elaborate provisions in the Constitution with details. The
independence of judiciary is not limited only to the independence from the executive
pressure or influence; it is a wider concept which takes within its sweep independence from
any other pressure and prejudices. It has many dimensions, viz., fearlessness of other power
centres, economic or political, and freedom from prejudices acquired and nourished by the
class to which the judges belong.
The Founding Fathers of the Constitution advisedly adopted a cumbersome process of
impeachment as a mode to remove a Judge from office for only proved misbehaviour or
incapacity which implies that impeachment process is not available for minor abrasive
behaviour of a Judge. It reinforces that independence to the Judge is of paramount
importance to sustain, strengthen and elongate rule of law. Parliament sparingly resorts to
the mechanism of impeachment designed under the Constitution by political process as the
extreme measure only upon a finding of proved misbehaviour or incapacity recorded by a
committee constituted under Section 3 of the Act by way of address to the President in the
manner laid down in Article 124(4) and (5) of the Constitution, the Act and the Rules made
thereunder. Our Constitution permits removal of the Judge only when the motion was
carried out with requisite majority of both the Houses of Parliament recommending to the
President for removal. In other words, the Constitution does not permit any action by any
agency other than the initiation of the action under Article 124(4) by Parliament. In Sub-
Committee on Judicial Accountability v. Union of India [(1991) 4 SCC 699], this Court at p. 54
held that the removal of a Judge culminating in the presentation of an address by different
Houses of Parliament to the President, is committed to Parliament alone and no initiation of
any investigation is possible without the initiative being taken by the Houses themselves. At
p. 71 it was further held that the constitutional scheme envisages removal of a Judge on
proved misbehaviour or incapacity and the conduct of the Judge was prohibited to be
discussed in Parliament by Article 121. Resultantly, discussion of the conduct of a Judge or
any evaluation or inferences as to its merit is not permissible elsewhere except during
investigation before the Inquiry Committee constituted under the Act for this purpose.
Thereby, equally no other agency or authority like the CBI, Ministry of Finance, the Reserve
Bank of India (Respondents 8 to 10) as sought for by the petitioner, would investigate into
the conduct or acts or actions of a Judge. No mandamus or direction would be issued to the
Speaker of Lok Sabha or Chairman of Rajya Sabha to initiate action for impeachment. It is
true, as contended by the petitioner, that in K. Veeraswami v. Union of India [(1991) 3 SCC
655], majority of the Constitution Bench upheld the power of the police to investigate into
the disproportionate assets alleged to be possessed by a Judge, an offence under Section 5
of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 subject to prior sanction of the Chief Justice of
India to maintain independence of the judiciary. By interpretive process, the Court carved
out primacy to the role of the Chief Justice of India, whose efficacy in a case like one at hand
would be considered at a later stage
Duty of the Judge to maintain high standard of conduct. Its judicial individualism — Whether
protection imperative?
21. Judicial office is essentially a public trust. Society is, therefore, entitled to expect that a
Judge must be a man of high integrity, honesty and required to have moral vigour, ethical
firmness and impervious to corrupt or venial influences. He is required to keep most
exacting standards of propriety in judicial conduct. Any conduct which tends to undermine
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the court would be deleterious to the
efficacy of judicial process. Society, therefore, expects higher standards of conduct and
rectitude from a Judge. Unwritten code of conduct is writ large for judicial officers to
emulate and imbibe high moral or ethical standards expected of a higher judicial
functionary, as wholesome standard of conduct which would generate public confidence,
accord dignity to the judicial office and enhance public image, not only of the Judge but the
court itself. It is, therefore, a basic requirement that a Judge’s official and personal conduct
be free from impropriety; the same must be in tune with the highest standard of propriety
and probity. The standard of conduct is higher than that expected of a layman and also
higher than that expected of an advocate. In fact, even his private life must adhere to high
standards of probity and propriety, higher than those deemed acceptable for others.
Therefore, the Judge can ill-afford to seek shelter from the fallen standard in the society.
Scope and meaning of ‘misbehaviour’ in Article 124(4)
24. Article 124(4) of the Constitution sanctions action for removal of a Judge on proved
misbehaviour or incapacity. The word ‘misbehaviour’ was not advisedly defined. It is a vague
and elastic word and embraces within its sweep different facets of conduct as opposed to
good conduct. Krishna Swami case, one of us, K. Ramaswamy, J., considered the scope of
‘misbehaviour’ in Article 124(4) and held in para 71 that:
Every act or conduct or even error of judgment or negligent acts by higher judiciary per se
does not amount to misbehaviour. Wilful abuse of judicial office, wilful misconduct in the
office, corruption, lack of integrity, or any other offence involving moral turpitude would be
misbehaviour. Misconduct implies actuation of some degree of mens rea by the doer.
Judicial finding of guilt of grave crime is misconduct. Persistent failure to perform the
judicial duties of the Judge or wilful abuse of the office dolus malus would be misbehaviour.
Misbehaviour would extend to conduct of the Judge in or beyond the execution of judicial
office. Even administrative actions or omissions too need accompaniment of mens rea.
25. Guarantee of tenure and its protection by the Constitution would not, however, accord
sanctuary for corruption or grave misbehaviour. Yet every action or omission by a judicial
officer in the performance of his duties which is not a good conduct necessarily, may not be
misbehaviour indictable by impeachment, but its insidious effect may be pervasive and may
produce deleterious effect on the integrity and impartiality of the Judge. Every
misbehaviour in juxtaposition to good behaviour, as a constitutional tautology, will not
support impeachment but a misbehaviour which is not a good behaviour may be improper
conduct not befitting to the standard expected of a Judge. Threat of impeachment process
itself may swerve a Judge to fall prey to misconduct but it serves disgrace to use
impeachment process for minor offences or abrasive conduct on the part of a Judge.
TheRole of the Bar Council or Bar Associations - Whether unconstitutional?
27. The Advocates Act, 1961 gave autonomy to a Bar Council of a State or Bar Council of
India and Section 6(1) empowers them to make such action deemed necessary to set their
house in order, to prevent fall in professional conduct and to punish the incorrigible as not
befitting the noble profession apart from admission of the advocates on its roll. Section
6(1)(c) and rules made in that behalf, Sections 9, 35, 36, 36-B and 37 enjoin it to entertain
and determine cases of misconduct against advocates on its roll. The members of the
judiciary are drawn primarily and invariably from the Bar at different levels. The high moral,
ethical and professional standards among the members of the Bar are preconditions even
for high ethical standards of the Bench. Degeneration thereof inevitably has its eruption and
tends to reflect the other side of the coin. The Bar Council, therefore, is enjoined by the
Advocates Act to maintain high moral, ethical and professional standards which of late is far
from satisfactory. Their power under the Act ends thereat and extends no further. Section
2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, defines “criminal contempt” to mean publication
whether by words spoken or written, signs, visible representations or otherwise of any
matter or the doing of any act whatsoever which scandalises or tends to scandalise, lowers
or tends to lower the authority of any court or prejudices or interferes or tends to interfere
with the due course of any judicial proceeding, or interferes or tends to interfere with or
obstructs or tends to obstruct the administration of justice in any other manner. Freedom of
expression and duty of Advocate
31. It is true that freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) of the
Constitution is one of the most precious liberties in any democracy. But equally important is
the maintenance of respect for judicial independence which alone would protect the life,
liberty and reputation of the citizen. So the nation’s interest requires that criticism of the
judiciary must be measured, strictly rational, sober and proceed from the highest motives
without being coloured by partisan spirit or pressure tactics or intimidatory attitude. The
Court must, therefore, harmonise constitutional values of free criticism and the need for a
fearless curial process and its presiding functionary, the Judge. If freedom of expression
subserves public interest in reasonable measure, public justice cannot gag it or manacle it;
but if the court considered the attack on the Judge or Judges scurrilous, offensive,
intimidatory or malicious, beyond condonable limits, the strong arm of the law must strike a
blow on him who challenges the supremacy of the rule of the Brahma Prakash Sharma v.
State of U.P. [AIR 1954 SC 10], the Bar Association passed resolutions and communicated to
the superior authorities that certain judicial officers were incompetent due to their conduct
in the court and High Court took action for contempt of the court. The question was
whether the members of the Executive Committee of the Bar Association had committed
contempt of the court? This Court held that the attack on a Judge is a wrong done to the
public and if it tends to create apprehension in the minds of the people regarding the
integrity, ability or fairness of the Judge and to deter actual and prospective litigants from
placing complete reliance upon the court’s administration of justice, or if it is likely to cause
embarrassment in the mind of the Judge himself in the discharge of his judicial duties, it
would be scandalising the court and be dealt with accordingly. Therefore, proper care
should be taken by the Bar Association concerned. First, it should gather specific, authentic
and acceptable material which would show or tend to show that conduct on the part of a
Judge creating a feeling in the mind of a reasonable person doubting the honesty, integrity,
impartiality or act which lowers the dignity of the office but necessarily, is not impeachable
misbehaviour. In all fairness to the Judge, the responsible office-bearers should meet him in
camera after securing interview and apprise the Judge of the information they had with
them. If there is truth in it, there is every possibility that the Judge would mend himself. Or
to avoid embarrassment to the Judge, the office-bearers can approach the Chief Justice of
that High Court and apprise him of the situation with material they have in their possession
and impress upon the Chief Justice to deal with the matter appropriately.
Primacy of the Chief Justice of India
35. It is true that this Court has neither administrative control over the High Court nor
power on the judicial side to enquire into the misbehaviour of a Chief Justice or Judge of a
High Court. When the Bar of the High Court concerned reasonably and honestly doubts the
conduct of the Chief Justice of that Court, necessarily the only authority under the
Constitution that could be tapped is the Chief Justice of India, who in common parlance is
known as the head of the judiciary of the country. It is of importance to emphasise here that
impeachment is meant to be a drastic remedy and needs to be used in serious cases Chief
Justice of India is the first among the Judges. Under Articles 124(2) and 217(1), the President
of India always consults the Chief Justice of India for appointment of the Judges in the
Supreme Court and High Courts. Under Article 222, the President transfers Judges of High
Courts in consultation with the Chief Justice of India. In Supreme Court Advocates-on-
Record Assn. v. Union of India [(1993) 4 SCC 441], it was reinforced and the Chief Justice of
India was given centre stage position. The primacy and importance of the office of the Chief
Justice was recognised judicially by this Court in Veeraswami case. This Court, while
upholding power to register a case against a retired Chief Justice of the High Court,
permitted to proceed with the investigation for the alleged offence under Section 5 of the
Prevention of Corruption Act. The Constitution Bench per majority, however, held that the
sanction and approval of the Chief Justice of India is a condition precedent to register a case
and investigate into the matter and sanction for prosecution of the said Judge by the
President after consultation with the Chief Justice of India.
36. In Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability also the same primacy had been accorded
to the Chief Justice at p. 72 thus:
“It would also be reasonable to assume that the Chief Justice of India is expected to find a
desirable solution in such a situation to avoid embarrassment to the learned Judge and to
the institution in a manner which is conducive to the independence of judiciary and should
the Chief Justice of India be of the view that in the interests of the institution of judiciary it is
desirable for the learned Judge to abstain from judicial work till the final outcome under
Article 124(4), he would advise the learned Judge accordingly. It is further reasonable to
assume that the concerned learned Judge would ordinarily abide by the advice of the Chief
Justice of India.”
40. Bearing all the above in mind, we are of the considered view that where the complaint
relates to the Judge of the High Court, the Chief Justice of that High Court, after verification,
and if necessary, after confidential enquiry from his independent source, should satisfy
himself about the truth of the imputation made by the Bar Association through its office-
bearers against the Judge and consult the Chief Justice of India, where deemed necessary,
by placing all the information with him. When the Chief Justice of India is seized of the
matter, to avoid embarrassment to him and to allow fairness in the procedure to be
adopted in furtherance thereof, the Bar should suspend all further actions to enable the
Chief Justice of India to appropriately deal with the matter. This is necessary because any
action he may take must not only be just but must also appear to be just to all concerned,
i.e., it must not even appear to have been taken under pressure from any quarter. The Chief
Justice of India, on receipt of the information from the Chief Justice of the High Court, after
being satisfied about the correctness and truth touching the conduct of the Judge, may
tender such advice either directly or may initiate such action, as is deemed necessary or
warranted under given facts and circumstances. If circumstances permit, it may be salutary
to take the Judge into confidence before initiating action. On the decision being taken by
the Chief Justice of India, the matter should rest at that. In case the allegations are against
Chief Justice of a High Court, the Bar should bring them directly to the notice of the Chief
Justice of India. On receipt of such complaint, the Chief Justice of India would in the same
way act as stated above qua complaint against a Judge of the High Court, and the Bar would
await for a reasonable period the response of the Chief Justice of India.
42. It would thus be seen that yawning gap between proved misbehaviour and bad conduct
inconsistent with the high office on the part of a non-cooperating Judge/Chief Justice of a
High Court could be disciplined by self-regulation through in-house procedure. This in-house
procedure would fill in the constitutional gap and would yield salutary effect. Unfortunately,
recourse to this procedure was not taken in the case at hand, may be, because of absence of
legal sanction to such a procedure.
D.P. CHADDHA VS TRIYUGI NARAYAN MISHRA
The term “misconduct” has not been defined in the Act. However, it is an expression with a
sufficiently wide meaning. In view of the prime position which the advocates occupy in the
process of administration of justice and justice delivery system, the courts justifiably expect
from the lawyers a high standard of professional and moral obligation in the discharge of
their duties. Any act or omission on the part of a lawyer which interrupts or misdirects the
sacred flow of justice or which renders a professional unworthy of right to exercise the
privilege of the profession would amount to misconduct attracting the wrath of disciplinary
jurisdiction.
It has been a saying as old as the profession itself that the court and counsel are two wheels
of the chariot of justice. In the adversarial system, it will be more appropriate to say that
while the Judge holds the reigns, the two opponent counsel are the wheels of the chariot.
While the direction of the movement is controlled by the Judge holding the reigns, the
movement itself is facilitated by the wheels without which the chariot of justice may not
move and may even collapse. Mutual confidence in the discharge of duties and cordial
relations between Bench and Bar smoothen the movement of the chariot. As responsible
officers of the court, as they are called - and rightly, the counsel have an overall obligation
of assisting the courts in a just and proper manner in the just and proper administration of
justice. Zeal and enthusiasm are the traits of success in profession but overzealousness and
misguided enthusiasm have no place in the personality of a professional.
25. An advocate while discharging duty to his client, has a right to do everything fearlessly
and boldly that would advance the cause of his client. After all he has been engaged by his
client to secure justice for him. A counsel need not make a concession merely because it
would please the Judge. Yet a counsel, in his zeal to earn success for a client, need not step
over the well-defined limits or propriety, repute and justness. Independence and
fearlessness are not licences of liberty to do anything in the court and to earn success to a
client whatever be the cost and whatever be the sacrifice of professional norms.
26. A lawyer must not hesitate in telling the court the correct position of law when it is
undisputed and admits of no exception. A view of the law settled by the ruling of a superior
court or a binding precedent even if it does not serve the cause of his client, must be
brought to the notice of court unhesitatingly. This obligation of a counsel flows from the
confidence reposed by the court in the counsel appearing for any of the two sides. A
counsel, being an officer of court, shall apprise the Judge with the correct position of law
whether for or against either party.
28. We are aware that a charge of misconduct is a serious matter for a practising advocate.
A verdict of guilt of professional or other misconduct may result in reprimanding the
advocate, suspending the advocate from practice for such period as may be deemed fit or
even removing the name of the advocate from the roll of advocates which would cost the
counsel his career. Therefore, an allegation of misconduct has to be proved to the hilt. The
evidence adduced should enable a finding being recorded without any element of
reasonable doubt. In the present case, both the State Bar Council and the Bar Council of
India have arrived at, on proper appreciation of evidence, a finding of professional
misconduct having been committed by the appellant. No misreading or non-reading of the
evidence has been pointed out. The involvement of the appellant in creating a situation
resulting into recording of a false and fabricated compromise, apparently detrimental to the
interest of his client, is clearly spelled out by the findings concurrently arrived at with which
we have found no reason to interfere. The appellant canvassed a proposition of law before
the court by pressing into service such rulings which did not support the interpretation
which he was frantically persuading the court to accept. The provisions of Rule 3 of Order 23
are clear. The crucial issue in the case was not the authority of a counsel to enter into a
compromise, settlement or adjustment on behalf of the client.

BHUPINDER KUMAR SAXENA VS BAR ASSOCIATION PATHANKOAT

Whether or not applicant was engaged or has ever been engaged in any trade, business or
profession, if so the nature of such trade, business/profession and the place where it is or
was carried on. The answer submitted by the appellant Advocate is as under:
‘No, not applicable.’ ”
10. According to the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India, the appellant had
not only procured enrolment by submitting the false declaration but also suppressed the
material fact; otherwise the appellant would not have been enrolled at all. In the said order,
it is further stated that as a matter of fact, besides it being a case of misconduct, it is also a
case where the name of the appellant could be removed for suppressing the material fact;
anyhow, since the reference had not been made for the same, it is left open to the State Bar
Council to take such action under Section 26 of the Act.
Having persuade both orders and evidence placed on record Supreme Court was the view
that the finding recorded and thereby held appellant guilty of professional misconduct is
supported by and based on cogent and convincing evidence and the charge is proved
beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence on record was properly appreciated by both the
Disciplinary Committees.

Supreme Court called for report from the learned sub-judge at Pathankot to see
whether the Cabin in which photocopying machine is installed, the name of petitioner as
"Bhupendra Photostat Center and whether such inscription was there till yesterday and is
continuing as of today. The learned Sub-judge shall also furnish the details regarding the
allotment of place within the court compound wherein this has been put up. The report will
be submitted within 4 weeks. The learned Sub-judge submitted a report which goes against
Appellant.

Decision on Quantum of Punishment : Whether the punishment is imposed on the

Appellant is grossly disproportionate ?

Held :

Having regard to the nature of misconduct and taking note of Handicap of Appellant, the
Supreme Court is of opinion that debarring Appellant from practicing for all time is too hard.
It is just an appropriate to modify the punishment to debar Appellant from practicing upto
the end of December 2006.

Principles Propounded :

If an advocate carries on any business other than his legal practice, he is liable for
professional misconduct under the provisions of the Advocate Act,1961.

R D SAXENA VS BALRAM PRASAD SHARMA

The Supreme Court observed that the main issue of lien over papers for non-payment of
fees had not been decided by the Bar Council of India, and proceeded to address this issue.
The Court observed that under section 171 of the Indian Contract Act permits attorneys of a
High Court to retain any goods bailed to them as a security for a general balance of account.
For this purpose it was necessary to understand the meaning of the terms goods and
bailment. The definition of goods, under section 2 (7) of the Sale of Goods Act means every
kind of movable property other than actionable claims and money, and includes stock and
shares, growing crops, grass and things attached to or forming part of the land which are
agreed to be severed before sale or under a contract of sale.
The definition of bailment under section 148 of the Indian Contract Act is the delivery of
goods by one person to another for some purpose, upon a contract that they shall be
returned or disposed of according to the directions of the person delivering them when such
purpose is accomplished.
The Supreme Court interpreted these definitions and held that goods should have
marketability and the person to whom they have been bailed should be in a position to
dispose of the goods in consideration of money. Files containing copies of records and case
papers and original documents cannot be equated with goods, and there is no bailment that
they shall be returned or disposed of under a contract.
The Court also observed that Rule 24 of the Bar Council of India Rules, prohibits an advocate
from adjusting the fees payable to him by a client against his own personal liability to the
client.
The Supreme Court also considered the ramifications if an advocate were to claim lien on
the case papers. The cause in a court/tribunal, which is far more important than the right of
the legal practitioner for his remuneration, would be adversely affected and impeded if such
retention of records is permitted.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that no professional could be given the right to
withhold the returnable records relating to the work done by him with his clients matter on
the strength of any claim for unpaid remuneration. It was open to the professional
concerned to take recourse to legal remedies to claim any unpaid remuneration. (RD Saxena
v/s Balram Prasad Sharma AIR 2000 SC 2912).

Anees Ahmed and Anr. vs University Of Delhi and Ors AIR 2002 Delhi 440 Delhi High Court
upheld the ban on the practicing of another profession along with advocacy and remarked,
“If such simultaneous practices of professionals who want to carry on more than one
profession at a time are permitted, the unflinching devotion expected by the legal
profession from its members is bound to be adversely affected. If the peers being chosen
representatives of the legal profession constituting the State Bar Council, in their wisdom,
had thought it fit not to permit such entries of dual practitioners to the legal profession it
cannot be said that they have done anything unreasonable or have framed an arbitrary or
unreasonable rule." The Court found that that procedure has been found to be well
sustained under Article 19(1)(g) read with Article 19(6). Once that conclusion is reached the
absolute requirement of Article 21 would be out of the way. It was held that the full time
law teachers of the law Faculty of the Delhi University could not have enrolled themselves
as advocates and, therefore, enrollment given to the said teachers by the State Bar Council
was per so void and illegal and any action taken by the Bar Council of India to rectify the said
mistake in exercise of its power cannot be said to be bad or illegal. Court also held that a
part time teacher of law could be enrolled as an advocate and also that an advocate after
being enrolled could take up part time law teaching.

The appellant and another advocate were found guilty of

professional misconduct by the Disciplinary Committee of the
Bar Council of India by its order dated April 23, 1976. The
gravamen of the charge against them related to the giving of
improper legal advice on two specific counts. The
Disciplinary Committee held them guilty on both counts and
ordered the suspension of the appellant from practice for a
period of four months-and the other advocate for a period of
two months.
Allowing the appeal in part, the Court
^
HELD: 1.1 This Court would not, as a general rule, in
an appeal under s. 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961, interfere
with the concurrent findings of fact reached by the
Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India and of
the State Bar Council unless they are based on no evidence
or proceed on mere conjectures and surmises. Finding in such
disciplinary proceedings must be sustained by higher degree
of proof than that required in civil suits, yet falling
short of the proof required to sustain a conviction in
criminal prosecution. There should be convincing
preponderance of evidence [419 B-C
2.1 The test of what constitutes "grossly improper
conduct in the discharge of professional duties" was been
laid down in many cases. The test to be applied is whether
an advocate, in the pursuit of his profession, has done
something with regard to it which would be reasonably
regarded as disgraceful or dishonorable by his professional
brethren. what is to say, whether the proved misconduct of
the advocate is such that he must be regarded as unworthy to
remain as member of the honorable profession to which he has
been admitted and unfit to be entrusted with the responsible
duties that an advocate is called upon to perform. [419 E;
420 B-C]
415
In re: A. Solicitor Exparte the law society [1912] 1
K.B. 302; Allinson v. General Council of Medical Education
and Registration [19841 1 Q.B. 750; Geogre , Friar Grahame
v. Attorney General, Fiji AIR 1936 P.C. 224 quoted with
approval.
2.2 Charges of professional misconduct must be clearly
proved and should not be inferred from mere ground for
suspicion, however reasonable, or what may be error of
judgment or indiscretion. [420 C]
A pleader v. The Judges of the High Court of Madras,
AIR 1930 P.C. 144; referred to.
2.3 There is a distinction between the giving of
improper legal advice and the giving of wrong legal advice.
Mere negligence unaccompanied by any moral delinquency on
the part of an advocate in the exercise of his profession
does not amount to professional misconduct. There must be
proved that the advocate was guilty of moral turpitude or
that there was any moral delinquency on his part. [420 D-E]
In re: G. Mayor Cooke [1889] 33 Sol. Journal 397,
quoted with approval.
In re: A Vakil ILR [1925] 49 Mad 523, In re, An
Advocate, ILR [1935] 62 Cal 158: In the matter of an
Advocate of Agra ILR [1940] All 386 approved.
In the matter of P an Advocate [1964] 1 S.C.R. 697
applied.
For an advocate to act towards his client otherwise
than with utmost good faith is unprofessional. When an
advocate is entrusted with a brief, he is expected to follow
the norms of professional ethics and try to protect the
interests of his client in relation to whom he occupies a
position of trust. Counsel's paramount duty is to the
client. When a person consults a lawyer for his advice, he
relies upon his requisite experience, skill and knowledge as
a lawyer, and the lawyer is expected to give proper and
dispassionate legal advice to the client for the protection
of his interests. An advocate stands in a loco parentis
towards the litigants and therefore follows that the client
is entitled to receive disinterested, sincere and honest
treatment especially where the client approaches the
advocate for succor in times of need. The members of the
legal profession should stand free from suspicion. [121 A-C]
3.2 Nothing should be done by any member of the legal
fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the
confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and
integrity of the profession. For an advocate to act towards
his client otherwise than with the utmost good faith is
unprofessional. It is against professional etiquette for a
lawyer to give that an advocate should accept employment
with such motive, or so long as his client has such
understanding for his purpose. It is professionally improper
for a member of the Bar to prepare false documents or to
draw pleadings knowingly that the, allegations made are
untrue to his knowledge. [421 F-H]
416
On merits, held that the evidence adduced by the
complainants falls short of the required proof although the
circumstances appearing do give rise to considerable
suspicion about the manner in which the advocates had been
conducting their affairs. It was accordingly held that the
Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India erred in
holding the advocates guilty of professional misconduct. The
proceedings drawn against them under sub-s (1) of s 35 of
the Act were accordingly dropped with an expression of hope
that they would not by their conduct or behaviour prove
themselves to be unworthy to remain as members of the legal
profession.

[24A. Disqualification for enrolment.―(1) No person shall be admitted as an advocate on a State

roll― (a) if he is convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude; (b) if he is convicted of an offence
under the provisions of the Untouchability (Offences) Act, 1955
1 [(c) if he is dismissed or removed from employment or office under the State on any charge
involving moral turpitude. Explanation.―In this clause, the expression “State” shall have the
meaning assigned to it under article 12 of the Constitution:] Provided that the disqualification for
enrolment as aforesaid shall cease to have effect after a period of two years has elapsed since his 2
[released or dismissal or, as the case may be, removal.] (2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall
apply to a person who having been found guilty is dealt with under the provisions of the Probation
of Offenders Act, 1958 (20 of 1958).]

[26A. Power to remove names from roll.―A State Bar Council may remove from the State roll the
name of any advocate who is dead or from whom a request has been received to that effect.
RIGHT TO PRACTISE
29. Advocates to be the only recognised class of persons entitled to practise law.―Subject to the
provisions of this Act and any rules made thereunder, there shall, as from the appointed day, be only
one class of persons entitled to practise the profession of law, namely, advocates.
30. Right of advocates to practise.―Subject to the provisions of this Act, every advocate whose
name is entered in the 3 [State roll] shall be entitled as of right to practise throughout the territories
to which this Act extends,― (i) in all courts including the Supreme Court; (ii) before any tribunal or
person legally authorised to take evidence; and (iii) before any other authority or person before
whom such advocate is by or under any law for the time being in force entitled to practise.
31. [Special provision for attorneys.].―Omitted by the Advocates (Amendment) Act, 1976 (107 of
976), s. 7 (w.e.f. 1-1-1977)
. 32. Power of court to permit appearances in particular cases.―Notwithstanding anything contained
in this Chapter, any court, authority, or person may permit any person, not enrolled as an advocate
under this Act, to appear before it or him in any particular case.
33. Advocates alone entitled to practise.―Except as otherwise provided in this Act or in any other
law for the time being in force, no person shall, on or after the appointed day, be entitled to practise
in any court or before any authority or person unless he is enrolled as an advocate under this Act.

CONDUCT OF ADVOCATES
35. Punishment of advocates for misconduct.―(1) Where on receipt of a complaint or otherwise a
State Bar Council has reason to believe that any advocate on its roll has been guilty of professional
or other misconduct, it shall refer the case for disposal to its disciplinary committee. 3 [(1A) The
State Bar Council may, either of its own motion or on application made to it by any person
interested, withdraw a proceeding pending before its disciplinary committee and direct the inquiry
to be made by any other disciplinary committee of that State Bar Council.] (2) The disciplinary
committee of a State Bar Council 4 *** shall fix a date for the hearing of the case and shall cause a
notice thereof to be given to the advocate concerned and to the Advocate-General of the State. (3)
The disciplinary committee of a State Bar Council after giving the advocate concerned and the
Advocate-General an opportunity of being heard, may make any of the following orders, namely:―
(a) dismiss the complaint or, where the proceedings were initiated at the instance of the State Bar
Council, direct that the proceedings be filed; (b) reprimand the advocate; (c) suspend the advocate
from practice for such period as it may deem fit; (d) remove the name of the advocate from the
State roll of advocates. (4) Where an advocate is suspended from practice under clause (c) of sub-
section (3), he shall, during the period of suspension, be debarred from practising in any court or
before any authority or person in India. (5) Where any notice is issued to the Advocate-General
under sub-section (2), the Advocate-General may appear before the disciplinary committee of the
State Bar Council either in person or through any advocate appearing on his behalf. 5
[Explanation.―In this section, 3 [section 37 and section 38], the expressions “Advocate-General” and
“Advocate-General of the State” shall, in relation to the Union territory of Delhi, mean the Additional
Solicitor General of India.]
36. Disciplinary powers of Bar Council of India.―(1) Where on receipt of a complaint or otherwise
the Bar Council of India has reason to believe that any advocate 6 *** whose name is not entered on
any State roll has been guilty of professional or other misconduct, it shall refer the case for disposal
to its disciplinary committee. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Chapter, the disciplinary
committee of the Bar Council of India may, 7 [either of its own motion or on a report by any State
Bar Council or on an application made to it by any person interested], withdraw for inquiry before
itself any proceedings for disciplinary action against any advocate pending before the disciplinary
committee of any State Bar Council and dispose of the same. (3) The disciplinary committee of the
Bar Council of India, in disposing of any case under this section, shall observe, so far as may be, the
procedure laid down in section 35, the references to the Advocate-General in that section being
construed as references to the Attorney-General of India. (4) In disposing of any proceedings under
this section the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India may make any order which the
disciplinary committee of a State Bar Council can make under sub-section (3) of section 35, and
where any proceedings have been withdrawn for inquiry 1 [before the disciplinary committee of the
Bar Council of India], the State Bar Council concerned shall give effect to any such order.
37. Appeal to the Bar Council of India.―(1) Any person aggrieved by an order of the disciplinary
committee of a State Bar Council made 3 [under section 35] 4 [or the Advocate-General of the State]
may, within sixty days of the date of the communication of the order to him, prefer an appeal to the
Bar Council of India. (2) Every such appeal shall be heard by the disciplinary committee of the Bar
Council of India which may pass such order 4 [(including an order varying the punishment awarded
by the disciplinary committee of the State Bar Council)] thereon as it deems fit: 4 [Provided that no
order of the disciplinary committee of the State Bar Council shall be varied by the disciplinary
committee of the Bar Council of India so as to prejudicially affect the person aggrieved without
giving him reasonable opportunity of being heard.]
38. Appeal to the Supreme Court.―Any person aggrieved by an order made by the disciplinary
committee of the Bar Council of India under section 36 or section 37 1 [or the Attorney-General of
India or the Advocate-General of the State concerned, as the case may be,] may, within sixty days of
the date on which the order is communicated to him, prefer an appeal to the Supreme Court and the
Supreme Court may pass such order 1 [(including an order varying the punishment awarded by the
disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India)] thereon as it deems fit: 1 [Provided that no order
of the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India shall be varied by the Supreme Court so as
to prejudicially affect the person aggrieved without giving him a reasonable opportunity of being
heard.]

16. Senior and other advocates.―(1) There shall be two classes of advocates, namely, senior
advocates and other advocates. (2) An advocate may, with his consent, be designated as senior
advocate if the Supreme Court or a High Court is of opinion that by virtue of his ability, 3 [standing at
the Bar or special knowledge or experience in law] he is deserving of such distinction. (3) Senior
advocates shall, in the matter of their practice, be subject to such restrictions as the Bar Council of
India may, in the interests of the legal profession, prescribe. (4) An advocate of the Supreme Court
who was a senior advocate of that Court immediately before the appointed day shall, for the
purposes of this section, be deemed to be a senior advocate: 4 [Provided that where any such senior
advocate makes an application before the 31st December, 1965 to the Bar Council maintaining the
roll in which his name has been entered that he does not desire to continue as a senior advocate,
the Bar Council may grant the application and the roll shall be altered accordingly.]

Persons who may be admitted as advocates on a State roll.―(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act,
and the rules made thereunder, a person shall be qualified to be admitted as an advocate on a State
roll, if he fulfils the following conditions, namely:― (a) he is a citizen of India: Provided that subject
to the other provisions contained in this Act, a national of any other country may be admitted as an
advocate on a State roll, if citizens of India, duly qualified, are permitted to practise law in that other
country; (b) he has completed the age of twenty-one years; (c) he has obtained a degree in law— (i)
before the 1 [12th day of March, 1967], from any University in the territory of India; or (ii) before the
15th day of August, 1947, from any University in any area which was comprised before that date
within India as defined by the Government of India Act, 1935; or 2 [(iii) after the 12th day of March,
1967, save as provided in sub-clause (iiia), after undergoing a three-year course of study in law from
any University in India which is recognised for the purposes of this Act by the Bar Council of India; or
(iiia) after undergoing a course of study in law, the duration of which is not less than two academic
years commencing from the academic year 1967-68 or any earlier academic year from any University
in India which is recognised for the purposes of this Act by the Bar Council of India; or] 3 [(iv) in any
other case, from any University outside the territory of India, if the degree is recognised for the
purposes of this Act by the Bar Council of India; or] 4 [he is a barrister and is called to the Bar on or
before the 31st day of December, 1976; 5 [or has passed passed the article clerk's examination or
any other examination specified by the High Court at Bombay or Calcutta for enrolment as an
attorney of that High Court;] or has obtained such other foreign qualification in law as is recognised
by the Bar Council of India for the purpose of admission as an advocate under this Act]; 6 * * * * *
(e) he fulfils such other conditions as may be specified in the rules made by the State Bar Council
under this Chapter; 7 [(f) he has paid, in respect of the enrolment, stamp duty, if any, chargeable
under the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (2 of 1899), and an enrolment fee payable to the State Bar Council
of 8 [six hundred rupees and to the Bar Council of India, one hundred and fifty rupees by way of a
bank draft drawn in favour of that Council:] Provided that where such person is a member of the
Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes and produces a certificate to that effect from such
authority as may be prescribed, the enrolment fee payable by him to the State Bar Council shall be 1
[one hundred rupees and to the Bar Council of India, twenty-five rupees.] 2 [Explanation.―For the
purposes of this sub-section, a person shall be deemed to have obtained a degree in law from a
University in India on the date on which the results of the examination for that degree are published
by the University on its notice board or otherwise declaring him to have passed that examination.]
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), 3 [a vakil or a pleader who is a law
graduate] may be admitted as an advocate on a State roll if he— (a) makes an application for such
enrolment in accordance with the provisions of this Act, not later than two years from the appointed
day; and (b) fulfils the conditions specified in clauses (a), (b), (e) and (f) of sub-section (1). 4 [(3)
Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) a person who— (a) 5 *** has, for at least
three years, been a vakil or a pleader or a mukhtar, or was entitled at any time time to be enrolled
under any law 6 *** as an advocate of a High Court (including a High Court of a former Part B State)
or of a Court of Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory; or 7 [(aa) before the 1st day of
December, 1961, was entitled otherwise than as an advocate to practise the the profession of law
(whether by way of pleading or acting or both) by virtue of the provisions of any law, or who would
have been so entitled had he not been in public service on the said date; or] 8 * * * * * (c) before the
1st day of April, 1937, has been an advocate of any High Court in any area which was comprised
within Burma as defined in the Government of India Act, 1935 (25 & 26 Geo. 5 C 42); or (d) is
entitled to be enrolled as an advocate under any rule made by the Bar Council of India in this behalf,
may be admitted as an advocate on a State roll if he— (i) makes an application for such enrolment in
accordance with the provisions of this Act; and (ii) fulfils the conditions specified in clauses (a), (b),
(e) and (f) of sub-section (1).] 9 *