[G.R. No. 122749. July 31, 1996.
] 397 s 271
ANTONIO A. S. VALDES, Petitioner, v. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102,
QUEZON CITY, and CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-VALDES, Respondents.
260 SCRA 221
FACTS:
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5
children. Valdez filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their
marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code, which was granted hence,
marriage is null and void on the ground of their mutual psychological
incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of their mother
while the other 3 siblings are free to choose which they prefer.
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the
procedure for the liquidation of common property in “unions without
marriage”. During the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint
affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father.
ISSUE: Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause
thereof, the property relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-
ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed
to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not
participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having
contributed thereto jointly if said party’s efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family.
G.R. No. 143297. February 11, 2003
SPOUSES VIRGILIO and MICHELLE CASTRO, MOISES B. MIAT and ALEXANDER
V. MIAT, petitioners, vs. ROMEO V. MIAT, respondent.
FACTS: Father of two children, Moises, widower (wife died in 1978), originally
intended his two properties, one in Paco and the other in Paranaque for his
offspring but reverted to keeping the latter for himself while in Dubai, UAE.
He modified the original agreement upon return to the Philippines in 1984.
Proof of this was given by Moises’ brother, Cerefino Miat, who said testified
the original agreement that Paco would go to Moises’ sons. This was
reiterated at the death bed of Moises’ wife and affirmed upon Moises’ return
to the Philippines.
The Paco property, being the land in dispute, was paid for on an installment
basis from May 17, 1977 to December 14, 1984. Full payment was made on
the latter date and title was secured under Moises name as widower.
Romeo and Alexander, sons of Moises, lived on the property with their wives
and paid its realty taxes and fire insurance premiums. Alexander and his wife,
however, left the property in August 1985 for personal reasons.
February 1988, Romeo learns from godmother of his wedding that son of
godmother, Virgilio Castro (VC, petitioner), who happens to be Romeo’s
neighbor, that the Paco property was being sold to VC. A thirty thousand peso
downpayment was made by godmother to Moises for her son.
April 1988, Alexander agrees to sell his share of the Paco property for
P42,750.00; a partial payment was made in the sum of P6,000 by Romeo but
Alexander did not execute a deed of assignment in favor of his brother
because “he had lots of work to do and the title was already in Romeo’s
possession.”
Downpayment information corroborated by Virgilio Miat (brother of Moises)
and Pedro Miranda (who worked with Moises in two hotels: Bayview Hotel
and Hotel Filipinas) but Alexander later said that he did not consider the
money to be a downpayment but a personal debt due to Romeo.
Valdez to People vs Vellor | 1
Romeo had possession of the title because he borrowed it from his father
when he mortgaged the land to his friend Lorenzo. But when Moises ran into
financial difficulties, he mortgaged for P30,000.00 the Paco property to
parents of petitioner VC.
December 1, 1988, Romeo and VC met in MTC Manila to discuss status of
Paco property. On the 16th, a letter from petitioner’s lawyer informed Romeo
that the Paco property had been sold to VC by Moises by virtue of a deed of
sale dated Dec. 5, 1988 for P95,000.00. Buyer, petitioner, VC admitted that
the title of the property was with Romeo but bought it anyway on the
assurance of Moises that he’d be able to retrieve it from his son.
Romeo files in the RTC action to nullify sale and compel Moises and Alexander
to execute deed of conveyance/assignment. RTC ordered (1) Alexander to pay
the remaining balance due his brother, (2) Romeo to recognize sale made by
Moises, (3) dismissal of defendant’s counterclaim and (4) defendants to pay
the costs of suit. Both parties appealed to the CA which modified the decision
by saying that: (1) the deed of sale was nullified, (2) Moises and Alexander had
to execute a deed of conveyance, and (3) for defendants to pay cost of suit (as
applied for by the petitioner). VC subsequently brings the action to the SC.
ISSUES/HELD/RATIO:
(1) WON Paco property is conjugal or capital.
Although petitioners allege that property was paid for by Moises and at the
time it was paid, his wife had long been dead, the SC disagrees on the grounds
of the new Civil Code (which was applicable because marriage was celebrated
before FC):
Art 153 (1) -
“The following are conjugal partnership property:
(1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the
common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one
of the spouses; x x x.”
Records show that property was acquired by onerous title during the marriage
out of the common fund. It is clearly conjugal property.
Petitioners also overlook Article 160 of the New Civil Code. It provides that
“all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or
to the wife.” This article does not require proof that the property was
acquired with funds of the partnership. The presumption applies even when
the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear.
In the case at bar (as opposed to petitioner’s reliance on Lorenzo v. Nicolas),
Moises and Concordia bought the Paco property during their marriage —
Moises did not bring it into their marriage, hence it has to be considered as
conjugal.
(2) WON valid oral partition between Moises and his sons involving the said
property is valid.
Yes. The validity of the agreement is apparent in (a) latter of the father to his
sons (the one which stated that he didn’t favor any of his sons), (b) the
testimony (see above) of Moises’ brother, Ceferino, and the oral agreement
between the brothers to divide the property between themselves (attested to
by extended Family members).
We also hold that the oral partition between Romeo and Alexander is not
covered by the Statute of Frauds. It is enforceable for two reasons. Firstly,
Alexander accepted the six thousand (P6,000.00) pesos given by Romeo as
downpayment for the purchase of his share in the Paco property. Secondly,
Romeo and his witnesses, Ceferino Miat and Pedro Miranda, who testified
regarding the sale of Alexander’s share to Romeo, were intensely questioned
by petitioners’ counsel.
Valdez to People vs Vellor | 2
(3) WON Castro spouses were buyers in good faith.
Ruling of the CA which was affirmed by the SC:
“In the case at bench, the said spouses have actual knowledge of the adverse
claim of plaintiff-appellant. The most protuberant index that they are not
buyers in good faith is that before the sale, Virgilio Castro talked with Romeo
Miat on the supposed sale. Virgilio testified that together with Romeo,
Alexander and Moses Miat, they went to Judge Anunciacion of Manila in order
to find out if Romeo has a right over the property. Romeo told Virgilio in that
meeting that Romeo has a right over the Paco property by virtue of an oral
partition and assignment. Virgilio even admitted that he knew Romeo was in
possession of the title and Romeo then insisted that he is the owner of the
property.
“Virgilio Castro is further aware that plaintiff is in possession of the property,
they being neighbors. A purchaser who was fully aware of another person’s
possession of the lot he purchased cannot successfully pretend to be an
innocent purchaser for value.”
[G.R. No. 97898. August 11, 1997]
FLORANTE F. MANACOP, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and E & L
MERCANTILE, INC., Respondents.
277 SCRA 57
FACTS:
Owing to the failure to pay the sub-contract cost pursuant to a deed of
assignment signed between petitioner's corporation and private respondent
herein, the latter filed on July 3, 1989, a complaint for a sum of money, with a
prayer for preliminary attachment, against the former. As a consequence of
the order on July 28, 1989, the corresponding writ for the provisional remedy
was issued on August 11, 1989 which triggered the attachment of a parcel of
land in Quezon City owned by Manacop Construction President Florante F.
Manacop, herein petitioner.
The petitioner insists that the attached property is a family home, having been
occupied by him and his family since 1972, and is therefore exempt from
attachment.
ISSUE: That the parcel of land is a Family Home and cannot be subject for
attachment.
HELD: Petitioner belief that his abode at Quezon City since 1972 is a family
home within the purview of the Family Code and therefore should not have
been subjected to the vexatious writ. Yet, petitioner must concede that
respondent court properly applied the discussion conveyed by Justice
Gancayco in this regard when he spoke for the First Division of this Court in
Modequillo vs. Breva (185 SCRA 766 [1990]) that:
Article 155 of the Family Code also provides as follows:
Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment except:
(1) For non-payment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such
constitution; and
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen
and others who have rendered service for the construction of the building.
The exemption provided as aforestated is effective from the time of the
constitution of the family home as such, and lasts so long as any of its
beneficiaries actually resides therein.
Valdez to People vs Vellor | 3
In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was constituted WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED, with costs against petitioner.
as a family home whether judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It
became a family home by operation of law under Article 153 of the Family SO ORDERED.
Code. It is deemed constituted as a family home upon the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year after its publication in G.R. No. L-29771 May 29, 1987
the Manila Chronicle on August 4, 1987 (1988 being a leap year).
CONSOLACION LUMAHIN DE APARICIO, Accompanied by her husband
The contention of petitioner that it should be considered a family home from BENITO APARICIO, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. HIPOLITO PARAGUYA, defendant-
the time it was occupied by petitioner and his family in 1969 is not well-taken. appellant.
Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it is provided that "the provisions of this
Chapter shall also govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions
are applicable." It does not mean that Articles 152 and 153 of said Code have
a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to
have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to
the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from execution for the
payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code.
Article 162 simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the
effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are
prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the
Family Code. Article 162 does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title
V have a retroactive effect.

Is the family home of petitioner exempt from execution of the money

judgment aforecited? No. The debt or liability which was the basis of the
judgment arose or was incurred at the time of the vehicular accident on
March 16, 1976 and the money judgment arising therefrom was rendered by
the appellate court on January 29, 1988. Both preceded the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988. This case does not fall under the exemptions
from execution provided in the Family Code. (at pp. 771-772).

Verily, according to petitioner, his debt was incurred in 1987 or prior to the
effectivity on August 3, 1988 of the Family Code (page 17, petition; page 22,
Rollo). This fact alone will militate heavily against the so-called exemption by
sheer force of exclusion embodied under paragraph 2, Article 155 of the
Family Code cited in Modequillo.

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