Submitted by: Joan Veronica S.

Pernes November 18, 2019

11687169

Submitted to: Atty. Crisostomo A. Uribe

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1

A. Persons and Family Relations

a. Foreign Divorce Decree: Article 26, Family Code
i. Republic v. Manalo…………………………………………………………..…1
ii. Morisono v. Morisono…………………………………………………………..2
iii. Juego-Sakai v. Republic……………………………………………………….3
b. Declaration of Presumptive Death: Article 41, Family Code
i. Republic v. Catubag……………………………………………………………4
ii. Tadeo-Matias v. Republic……………………………………………………...5
c. Earnest Efforts toward a Compromise: Article 151, Family Code
i. Moreno v. Kahn………………………………………………………………....6
d. Parental Authority and Custody: Article 214, Family Code
i. Masbate v. Relucio……………………………………………………………..7
B. Succession
a. Notarial Wills
i. Mitra v. Sablan-Guevarra……………………………………………………...8
C. Property
a. Ejectment
i. Eversley Childs Sanitarium v. Spouses Barbarona…………………….…..9
b. Builder in Good Faith
i. Leviste v. Legaspi Towers……………………………………………………10
c. Restitution
i. Van De Brug v. PNB………………………………………………………….12
 EN BANC

[G.R. No. 221029. April 24, 2018.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARELYN TANEDO MANALO

PERALTA, J.:

FACTS:

1. Marelyn Tanedo Manalo filed a petition for cancellation of entry of marriage in the RTC
by virtue of a judgment of divorce rendered by a Japanese court.
2. OSG alleged that the proper action should be a petition for recognition and enforcement
of a foreign judgment.
3. Marelyn moved to admit an Amended Petition, which the RTC granted. She alleged:
a. That she is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national named
Yoshino Minoro; and
b. A case for divorce was filed by Marelyn in Japan and after due proceedings, a
divorce decree was rendered by the Japanese court.
4. RTC denied the petition.
a. Ruling based on Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine law "does not
afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce, whether they are in the country or
living abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated
their marriage in the Philippines or in another country."
5. CA overturned the RTC decision.
a. It would be the height of injustice to consider Marelyn as still married to the
Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer married to her;
b. The fact that it was Marelyn, a Filipino, who filed for divorce is inconsequential.

ISSUE: Whether a Filipino has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a
divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against her alien spouse who is
capacitated to remarry. - YES.

HELD:

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The September 18, 2014
Decision and October 12, 2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076,
are AFFIRMED IN PART. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings
and reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.

1. Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable
decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry
will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or
wife.
2. Article 26 of the Family Code should not make a distinction.
a. It is a means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on
Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operation of the
latter’s national law.
b. There is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a
foreign divorce proceedings and a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon
the instance of his or her alien spouse.
3. A prohibitive view of par. 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than good.
a. If We disallow a Filipino citizen who initiated and obtained a foreign divorce and
still require her to first avail of the existing "mechanisms" under the Family Code,
any subsequent relationship that he or she would enter in the meantime shall be
considered as illicit in the eyes of the Philippine law.
b. Worse, any child born out of such "extra-marital" affair has to suffer the stigma of
being branded as illegitimate.

1
 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 226013. July 2, 2018.]

LUZVIMINDA DELA CRUZ MORISONO v. RYOJI MORISONO and

LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

FACTS:
1. Luzviminda Dela Cruz and Ryoji Morisono were married on December 8, 2009.
2. They lived in Japan. During their married life, they constantly quarreled due to Ryoji’s
philandering ways.
3. They submitted a “Divorce by Agreement” before the City Hall of Mizuho-Ku, Nagoya,
Japan, which was approved and duly recorded in 2012.
4. Luzviminda filed a petition for recognition of the foreign divorce decree before the RTC.
a. She wanted to cancel her husband’s surname in her passport; and
b. She filed it for purposes of remarriage.
5. RTC denied the petition.
a. The foreign divorce decree obtained in Japan by Luzviminda may not be
recognized in the Philippines, as it is not binding on her.
b. As a Filipino citizen, her national law does not allow divorce.

ISSUE: Whether recognition of a foreign divorce decree procured by a Filipino and her alien
spouse abroad is proper. - YES.

HELD:

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated July 18, 2016 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 105 in SP. PROC. NO. Q-12-71830 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the instant case is REMANDED to the court a quo
for further proceedings, as directed in this Decision.

1. The Court partly granted the petition and remanded the case to the RTC.
a. It was incorrect for the RTC to deny the petition but the Court cannot just order
the grant of Luzviminda's petition for recognition of the foreign divorce decree.
b. Luzviminda has yet to prove the fact of her "Divorce by Agreement" obtained in
Japan and its conformity with prevailing Japanese laws on divorce.
2. Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect
of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the
validity of the dissolution of the marriage.
a. The rationale for this rule is to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as still being
married to his or her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married to the
former because he or she had obtained a divorce abroad that is recognized by
his or her national law.
3. In ​Republic v. Manalo,​ the Court ​En Banc extended the application of Article 26 (2) to
further cover mixed marriages where it was a Filipino citizen who divorced his/her foreign
spouse.
a. It was ruled that foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino and an alien citizen
may already be recognized in this jurisdiction, regardless of who between the
spouses initiated the divorce.
b. However, it was provided that the party petitioning for the recognition of such
foreign divorce decree – presumably the Filipino citizen – must prove the divorce
as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.

2
 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 224015. July 23, 2018.]

STEPHEN I. JUEGO-SAKAI v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

PERALTA, J.:

FACTS:
1. Stephen Juego-Sakai and Toshiharu Sakai were married in 2000 in Japan.
2. After 2 years they agreed to obtain, and were granted a divorce decree in Japan
dissolving their marriage.
3. Stephen filed a Petition for Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment before the RTC.
4. RTC granted the petition and recognized the divorce decree as valid.
5. CA initially affirmed the RTC decision but later recalled and set aside its judgement.
a. It opined that the second requisite under Article 26 of the Family Code was not
present, which was that the divorce decree should be obtained by the alien
spouse. The divorce herein was obtained consensually.
b. Stephen was still a Filipino at the time the divorce was obtained, thus, it could not
be recognized in the Philippines.

ISSUE: Whether a divorce decree obtained abroad by a Filipino spouse and alien spouse
consensually may be recognized in the Philippines. - YES.

HELD:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Amended
Decision dated March 3, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 104253 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further
proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.

1. A recently decided case, ​Republic v. Manalo​,​ ​falls squarely on point with the facts herein.
a. The Court therein ruled that the fact that it was the Filipino spouse who initiated
the divorce proceeding and a decree was granted should not affect the
application nor remove her from the coverage of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code.
2. To interpret the word "obtained" in the said provision to mean that the divorce
proceeding must actually be initiated by the alien spouse, would depart from the true
intent of the legislature and would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the
general purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, which is, specifically, to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse.
a. The subject provision should not make a distinction for a Filipino who initiated a
foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstance as a
Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding.
3. In this case, even if it is assumed that Stephen initiated the same, she must still be
allowed to benefit from the exception provided under Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
a. Consequently, since her marriage to Toshiharu Sakai had already been dissolved
by virtue of the divorce decree, thereby capacitating Toshiharu to remarry, she
shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

3
 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 210580. April 18, 2018.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LUDYSON C. CATUBAG

REYES, JR., J.:

FACTS:

1. Shanaviv Alvarez-Catubag and Ludyson Catubag, prior to the celebration of their

marriage in 2003, had been living together as husband and wife. They have 2 children.
2. In 2001, Ludyson Catubag went overseas for work.
3. On July 12, 2006, Ludyson was informed by his relatives that Shanaviv left their house
and never returned. Ludyson’s relatives took care of the children. He took an emergency
leave and came home to the Philippines.
4. Here, he looked for his wife in Cagayan, inquired about his wife’s whereabouts with
close friends and relatives, and travelled as far as Bicol, where Shanaviv was born and
raised, but he still could not locate her.
5. Later, he sought the help of Bombo Radyo Philippines, to broadcast the fact of his wife’s
disappearance.
6. After almost 7 years have lapsed, Ludyson filed with the RTC a Petition to have his wife
presumptively declared dead. RTC granted the petition.
7. OSG filed an appeal on the ground that Ludyson failed to establish a well-founded belief
that his wife was already dead.

ISSUE: Whether Ludyson complied with the essential requisites of a petition for declaration of
presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code. - NO.

HELD:

WHEREFORE the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated May 23, 2013 of the
Regional Trial Court of Tuao, Cagayan, Branch 11 and the Resolutions dated September 3,
2013 and December 6, 2013 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 131269 are
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Consequently, the petition of private respondent Ludyson
C. Catubag to have his wife, Shanaviv G. Alvarez-Catubag, declared presumptively dead is
DENIED.

1. In ​Republic v. Orcelino-Villanueva, ​the Court ruled that the well-grounded belief required
under the law must result from diligent effort to locate the absent spouse. This entails an
active effort on the part of the present spouse to locate the missing one.
2. The mere absence of a spouse, devoid of any attempt by the present spouse to locate
the former, will not suffice. In ​Republic v. Granada, t​ he mere act of inquiring from
relatives fall short of the diligence required by law.
3. Ludyson’s failure to present any of the persons from whom inquiries were allegedly
made tends to belie a claim of a diligent search. He failed to present any of the alleged
friends or relatives to corroborate his claims.
4. It would still be prudent for the present spouse to seek the aid of the authorities in
searching for the missing spouse. Without this, the present spouse cannot be said to
have actively and diligently searched for the absentee spouse.
5. Also, the broadcasting of his wife’s alleged disappearance does not come close to
establishing a well-founded belief that Shanaviv has already passed away.
6. In total, the present spouse's bare assertions, uncorroborated by any kind of evidence,
falls short of the diligence required to engender a well-founded belief that the absentee
spouse is dead.

4
 THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 230751. April 25, 2018.]

ESTRELLITA TADEO-MATIAS v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

VELASCO, JR., J.:

FACTS:

1. On April 10, 2012, Estrellita Tadeo-Matias filed before the RTC a petition for the
declaration of presumptive death of her husband, Wilfredo N. Matias.
2. She alleged the following:
a. Wilfredo is a member of the Philippine Constabulary and was assigned in Arayat,
Pampanga since August 24, 1967;
b. He never came back from his tour of duty in Arayat, Pampanga.
c. He never made contact or communicated with Estellita nor to his relatives; and
d. He was already declared missing since 1979, according to the service record
issued by the National Police Commission.
3. She alleged that one of the requirements to attain the claim of benefits is for a proof of
death, or at least a declaration of presumptive death, and that this petition is filed not for
any other purpose but solely to claim for the benefit under PD 1638.
4. RTC granted the petition and declared Wilfredo absent or presumptively dead under
Article 41 of the Family Code for purposes of claiming financial benefits due to him as a
former military officer. Republic questioned the RTC decision.

ISSUE: Whether it was proper for Wilfredo to have been declared presumptively dead. - NO.

HELD:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated November 28, 2016 and
Resolution dated March 20, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 129467 are
AFFIRMED. The Court declares that a judicial decision of a court of law that a person is
presumptively dead is not a requirement before the Philippine Veterans' Affairs Office or the
Armed Forces of the Philippines can grant and pay the benefits under Presidential Decree No.
1638.

1. First, the Court ruled that Article 41 of the Family Code does not apply in this case
because Estrellita was not seeking to remarry
a. Article 41 shows that the presumption of death established therein is only
applicable for the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent marriage.
2. Estellita, in her petition for the declaration of presumptive death, categorically stated that
the same was filed "not for any other purpose but solely to claim for the benefit under
P.D. No. 1638 as amended."
3. The applicable law is Article 390 and 391 of the New Civil Code is the applicable law.
a. However, jurisprudence declares that:
i. Articles 390 and 391 merely express rules of evidence that only allow a
court or a tribunal to presume that a person is dead upon the
establishment of certain facts.
ii. Thus, an action brought exclusively to declare a person presumptively
dead under either of the said articles actually presents no actual
controversy that a court could decide.
iii. There is no actual rights to be enforced, no wrong to be remedied nor any
status to be established.
iv. Courts do not have authority to take cognizance of a petition that only
seeks to have a person declared presumptively dead under the Civil
Code.
4. It is noteworthy that PVAO and the AFP can decide claims of death benefits of a missing
soldier without requiring the claimant to first produce a court declaration of the
presumptive death of such soldier.
5. If the PVAO or the AFP determines that the evidence submitted by the claimant is
sufficient, they should not hesitate to apply the presumption of death and pay the latter's
claim.

5
 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 217744. July 30, 2018.]

JOSE Z. MORENO v. RENE M. KAHN, CONSUELO MORENO KAHN-HAIRE, RENE LUIS

PIERRE KAHN, PHILIPPE KAHN, MA. CLAUDINE KAHN MCMAHON,
and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MUNTINLUPA CITY

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

FACTS:

1. Jose Moreno alleged that since May 1998, as lessees, he and his family have been
occupying 2 parcels of co-owned by his full-blooded sister, Consuelo and his nephews
and nieces, Rene, Luis, Philippe and Claudine, collectively, the respondents.
2. In 2003, the respondents offered to sell the parcels to Jose. The latter made partial
payments. However, in 2010, Consuelo decided to "cancel" their agreement. She
intended to convert the earlier partial payment as rental payments.
3. In response, Jose expressed his disapproval to Consuelo's plan and demanded that
respondents proceed with the sale, which the latter ignored.
4. In 2011, without his consent, Consuelo, Luis, Philippe, and Claudine sold their shares
over the lands to Rene, thereby consolidating full ownership in him.
5. Jose’s demands were left unheeded, Jose brought the matter to the barangay ​lupon for
conciliation proceedings between him and Rene only, since Consuelo. Luis, Philippe,
and Claudine are all living abroad.
6. As no settlement was agreed upon, Jose was constrained to file a complaint for specific
performance and cancellation of titles with damages.
7. RTC ​motu proprio ordered the dismissal of Jose's complaint for failure to allege
compliance with the provision of Article 151 of the Family Code which requires earnest
efforts to first be made before suits may be filed between family members.

ISSUE: Whether the requirement of earnest efforts to compromise applies to cases which may
not be subject of compromise. - NO.

HELD:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 24, 2014 and the
Resolution dated March 17, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 129232 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, Civil Case No. 12-004 is REINSTATED and
REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 205 for further proceedings.

1. Article 151 of the Family Code does not apply to cases which may not be the subject of
compromise under the Civil Code.
2. In ​Heirs of Favis, Sr. v. Gonzales​, the Court ruled that that non-compliance with the
earnest effort requirement under Article 151 is not a jurisdictional defect which would
authorize the courts to dismiss suits filed before them ​motu proprio.
a. It merely partakes of a condition precedent such that the non-compliance
therewith constitutes a ground for dismissal of a suit should the same be invoked
by the opposing party at the earliest opportunity, as in a motion to dismiss or in
the answer.
b. A motion to dismiss based on this ground is not present in this case. It was also
not assigned as error in the appeal brought before the CA.
c. Thus, there is deemed waiver of the non-jurisdictional defense or objection.
3. Nevertheless, Article 151 is inapplicable to this case.
a. For this provision to apply, the suit must be exclusively between or among
"members of the same family."
b. Once a stranger becomes a party to such suit, the earnest effort requirement is
no longer a condition precedent before the action can prosper.
4. Any person having a collateral familial relation with the plaintiff other than what is
enumerated in Article 150 is considered a stranger. Here, while Jose and Consuelo are
full blooded siblings, Rene, Luis, Philippe, and Claudine, as nephews and niece of Jose
are considered ''strangers'' insofar as Article 151 of the Family Code is concerned.

6
 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 235498. July 30, 2018.]

RENALYN A. MASBATE and SPOUSES RENATO MASBATE

and MARLYN MASBATE v. RICKY JAMES RELUCIO

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

FACTS:

1. Spouses Marlyn and Renato Masbate are the parents of Renalyn Masbate.
2. Renalyn and Ricky James had been living in the house of Marlyn and Renato without the
benefit of marriage. Renalyn and Ricky have a daughter named Queenie.
3. 3 years after the birth of Queenie, the relationship between Renalyn and Ricky ended.
4. Renalyn went to Manila and left the custody of Queenie to Ricky.
5. A few months after the separation, Marlyn and Renato took Queenie from the school
where Ricky enrolled her and refused to return Queenie to Ricky.
6. At that time, Queenie was just 3 years old.
7. The basis of their taking was a Special Power of Attorney executed by Renalyn in favor
of Marlyn and Renato granting full parental rights, authority, and custody over Queenie.
8. Ricky filed a petition for habeas corpus.
9. RTC ruled that custody over Queenie rightfully belongs to Renalyn under Article 213 of
the Family Code.
10. CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision.

ISSUE: Whether the father should have custody over his 3-year old illegitimate child. - NO.

HELD:

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated January 12, 2017 and
the Omnibus Resolution dated October 3, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
144406 are hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION deleting the grant of limited and
temporary custody for lack of legal and factual basis. The grant of visitation rights of two (2)
days per week shall be maintained. Respondent Ricky James Relucio may take his daughter,
Queenie Angel M. Relucio, out but only with the written consent of petitioner Renalyn A.
Masbate in accordance with this Decision.
The Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, Albay, Branch 8 is DIRECTED to immediately proceed
with hearing Special Proceeding No. FC-15-239 upon notice of this Decision.

1. As a general rule, the father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over
the persons of their common children.
2. However, insofar as illegitimate children are concerned, Article 176 of the Family Code
states that illegitimate children shall be under the parental authority of their mother,
which in this case is Renalyn.
3. It is the mother who is entitled to keep their illegitimate children in their company, and the
Court will not deprive them of custody, absent any imperative cause showing the
mother's unfitness to exercise such authority and care.
4. Article 213 which gives the mother parental authority for their child under 7 years of age
does not apply in this case. This only applies to a situation in which the parents of the
minor are married to each other but are separated either by virtue of a decree of legal
separation or because they are living separately de facto.
a. In the present case, it has been established that the parents were never married.
5. Further, even if there are compelling reasons to separate Queenie from her mother,
Ricky would still not acquire custody over Queenie because there is no provision of law
granting custody rights to an illegitimate father.
6. If Renalyn is found unfit or unsuitable to care for her daughter, Article 214 mandates that
substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent.

7
 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 213994. April 18, 2018.]

MARGIE SANTOS MITRA v. PERPETUA L. SABLAN-GUEVARRA,

REMEGIO L. SABLAN, ET AL.

REYES, JR., J.:

FACTS:

1. Margie Mitra filed a petition for the probate of the notarial will of Remedios Legaspi y
Reyes alleging:
a. Mitra is the de facto adopted daughter of Legaspi;
b. Mitra, Castro, and Sablan are instituted as her heirs, legatees and devisees; and
c. Remedios left properties with a total value of P1,032,237.00.
2. Perpetua and Remegio Sablan opposed the petition, alleging:
a. The will was not executed with the formalities required by law;
b. The acknowledgement was not signed by Remedios and her instrumental
witnesses;
c. The attestation clause failed to state the number of pages upon which the will
was written; and
d. Remedios executed the will under undue and improper pressure.
3. The probate court granted the petition for the probate of the Huling Habilin.

ISSUE: Whether the failure to state in the attestation clause, the number of pages comprising
the will makes the will defective – NO.

HELD:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 22,
2013 and Resolution dated August 15, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 93671
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated February 23, 2009 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 128 of Caloocan City in SP. Proc. Case No. C-3450 is
REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

1. The attestation clause failed to state the number of pages comprising the will.
a. However, as was the situation in ​Taboada v. Hon. Rosal,​ the omission was
supplied in the acknowledgment specifying therein the number of pages that
composed the will.
2. Remedios’ last will and testament has substantially complied with all the formalities
required of a notarial will.
a. It has been proven that Legaspi and the instrumental witnesses signed on every
page of the will, except on the last, which refers to the acknowledgment page.
The original copy of the will was offered before the probate court, where it was
shown that the instrumental witnesses signed on the left margin of every page of
the will except the last, as did Remedios.
b. With regard to the omission of the number of pages in the attestation clause, this
was supplied by the acknowledgment of the will itself without the need to resort to
extrinsic evidence.

8
 THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 195814. April 4, 2018.]

EVERSLEY CHILDS SANITARIUM, represented by DR. GERARDO M. AQUINO, JR.

(now DR. PRIMO JOEL S. ALVEZ) CHIEF OF SANITARIUM v.
SPOUSES ANASTACIO and PERLA BARBARONA

LEONEN, J.:

FACTS:

1. Eversley Childs Sanitarium is a public health facility operated by the DOH. It occupied a
portion of a land in Jagobia, Mandaue City, Cebu.
2. Spouses Barbarona filed an unlawful detainer case before the MTC.
3. Eversley Childs Sanitarium alleged that since they had been in possession of the
property for more than 70 years, the case was effectively one for recovery of possession,
thus, the case filed by the Spouses was beyond the jurisdiction of the MTC.
4. It also claimed that the Spouses were guilty of laches since it took more than 60 years
for them to seek the issuance of a torrens title over the property.
5. Last, it was argued that the Spouses’ certificate of title was void since Eversley, the
actual inhabitants of the property, were never notified of its issuance.
6. MTC ruled in favor of Spouses Barbarona and ordered the occupants to vacate the
property because they were occupying it by mere tolerance.

ISSUE: Whether the complaint of Spouses Barbarona against Eversley Childs Sanitarium was
one properly for unlawful detainer. - NO.

HELD:

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The February 17, 2011 Decision and August 31, 2011
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 02762 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Temporary Restraining Order dated May 13, 2011 is made PERMANENT.

1. Spouses Barbarona failed to state when Eversley’s possession of the land was initially
lawful, and how and when their dispossession started, which are essential allegations in
an unlawful detainer case.
2. All that appears from the Complaint is that Eversley’s occupation "is illegal and not
anchored upon any contractual relations with respondents.”
a. This is insufficient to determine if the action was filed within a year from
dispossession, as required in an ejectment case.
3. Spouses Barbarona alleged that Eversley’s occupation was illegal from the start, hence
the proper remedy should have been an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria to
assert their right of possession or their right of ownership, respectively, and not the
present ejectment case.
4. The Court also ruled that Spouses Barbarona only derived their title to the property
through a Deed of Full Renunciation of Rights,Conveyance of Full Ownership and Full
Waiver of Title and Interest executed in their favor by the heirs of the Spouses Gonzales,
to whom they derived their title from.
a. This is is insufficient to prove conveyance of property since no evidence was
introduced to prove that ownership over the property was validly transferred.

9
 FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 199353. April 4, 2018.]

LEVISTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, INC. v. LEGASPI TOWERS 200, INC.,

and VIVIAN Y. LOCSIN and PITONG MARCORDE

LEONARDO- DE CASTRO, J.:

FACTS:
1. Legaspi Towers is a condominium building located at Paseo de Roxas, Makati City. It
consists of seven (7) floors, with a unit on the roof deck and two levels above said unit
called Concession 2 and Concession 3.
2. The use and occupancy of the condominium building is governed by the Master Deed.
3. Lemans, through Mr. Conrad Leviste, bought Concession 3. Lemans decided to build
another unit (Concession 4) on the roof deck of Concession 3.
4. Despite Legaspi Corporation's notice that the construction of Concession 4 was illegal,
Lemans refused to stop its construction.
5. Lemans filed the Complaint with the RTC, praying among others that a writ of mandatory
injunction be issued to allow the completion of the construction of Concession 4. The
RTC issued the writ prayed for by Lemans.
6. Later, Legaspi Corporation filed the Third Party Complaint to nullify the building permit
issued in favor of Lemans for the construction of Concession 4.
7. RTC applied Article 448 of the Civil Code to the present case.
a. Lemans is not the owner of the air space above its unit. Its claim of ownership is
without basis in fact and in law. The air space which it claims is not on top of its
unit but also on top of the condominium itself, owned and operated by Legaspi
Towers.
b. Since it appears that both parties were in good faith, it finds the applicability of
the ruling in ​Depra v. Dumlao​.

ISSUE: Whether Article 448 of the Civil Code and the ruling in ​Depra v. Dumlao are applicable
to the parties’ situation. - NO.

HELD:

WHEREFORE, the Petition in G.R. No. 199353 is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Petition
in G.R. No. 199389 is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 26, 2011 and Resolution dated
November 17, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88082 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Leviste Management System, Inc. is ORDERED to remove Concession 4 at its
own expense.

1. First, it is Legaspi Towers which owns the air space above Concession 3. The air space
wherein Concession 4 was built is not only above Concession 3, but above the entire
condominium building. Lemans’ ownership of Concession 3 does not necessarily extend
to the area above the same, which is actually the "air space" of the entire condominium
building.
2. RA 4726, The Condominium Act states that what a unit includes is only the four walls,
ceilings, windows and doors thereof. It does not include the roof or the areas above it.
3. In ​Depra,​ the defendant constructed his house on his lot but, in good faith, encroached
on an area of 34 square meters of the property of plaintiff on which defendant's kitchen
was built.
a. The Court ruled that pursuant to Article 448 of the Civil Code, plaintiff, as the
owner of the land, has the ​option either to pay for the encroaching part of the
kitchen, or to sell the encroached 34 square meters of his lot to the defendant,
the builder in good faith.
4. The construction by Lemans of Concession 4 contravenes the Master Deed by adding a
third level above the roof deck. The Master Deed was never amended to reflect the
building of Concession 4.
5. Furthermore, Lemans failed to procure the consent of the registered owners of the
condominium project as required in the last paragraph of Section 4 of the Condominium
Act.
a. Lemans merely had an internal arrangement with the then president of Legaspi
Towers.

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6. LEMANS argues that the internal arrangement shows its good faith in the construction of
Concession 4.
7. Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code on builders in good faith are inapplicable in cases
covered by the Condominium Act where the ​owner of the land and the ​builder are
already bound by specific legislation on the subject property (the Condominium Act), and
by contract (the Master Deed and the By-Laws of the condominium corporation).
a. Thus, Legaspi Towers has the right to demolish Concession 4 at the expense of
Lemans.

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 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 207004. June 6, 2018.]

ASTRID A. VAN DE BRUG, MARTIN G. AGUILAR and GLENN G. AGUILAR v.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK

CAGUIOA, J.:

FACTS:

1. The late spouses Romulus and Evelyn Aguilar sugar crop loans were secured by REM
over four registered parcels of land.
2. They failed to pay their obligations with PNB, thus, the mortgage was foreclosed.
3. With the enactment of RA 7202 on February 29, 1992, the late Romulus Aguilar wrote
[PNB], and he stated: "Since our indebtedness with the PNB had been foreclosed, we
are asking your good Office for a reconsideration of our account based on the Sugar
Restitution Law."
4. After the death of Romulus, his spouse, the late Evelyn, received a letter from [PNB],
which stated that while the subject loan account was covered by the provisions of RA
7202 and have been audited by the COA, the late Evelyn Aguilar was still required to
comply with the following matters: (1) to arrange and implement restructuring of
accounts within sixty (60) days from receipt of the notice, (2) to signify her conformity to
the computation of the account, and (3) to submit the ten (10) year crop production for
the period 1974/1975 to 1984/1985.
5. Plaintiffs-appellees [the Aguilars] claimed that subsequently, [PNB] furnished them [with]
Statements of Account, which reflected a P2,236,337.91 total amount due.
6. LBP issued the Memorandum of Valuation of agricultural Lot No. 3749 for
P1,254,328.17, and for agricultural Lot No. 3587 in the amount of P1,957,684.31.
7. The Aguilars filed a case for implementation of RA 7202.
8. [PNB] emphasized that [the Aguilars] failed to comply with the requirements enumerated.
Hence, [the Aguilars] have no cause of action against [PNB] because whatever rights
[the Aguilars] have under RA 7202 were already forfeited when they failed to comply with
the requirements.
9. The non-compliance by [the Aguilars] of the requirements was confirmed by the Chief of
[PNB's] Loans Department, Edgardo Miraflor.
10. During the rebuttal stage, Glenn Aguilar, one of the children of the late Spouses, claimed
that [the Aguilars] did not sign the restructuring agreement primarily because of the
exclusion of the value of the agricultural lands, which were already conveyed to the
DAR, in the recomputation of the account of the late spouses Aguilar.

ISSUE: Whether it the Aguilars are entitled to restitution, absent any excess payments after the
recomputation of the account of the late spouses Aguilar. - NO.

HELD:

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated
March 23, 2012 and, consequently, Resolution dated April 1, 2013 in CA-G.R. CV No. 00708
are hereby AFFIRMED.

1. The entitlement of the Aguilars to the benefits of RA 7202 has been correctly recognized
by the CA.
2. As provided in Section 3 of RA 7202 and Section 6 of the IRR, the Aguilars are entitled
to: … (2) recomputation of their sugar crop loans, and if there is interest in excess of
12% per annum, interests, penalties and surcharges, application of the excess payment
as an offset and/or as payment for the late spouses Aguilar's outstanding loan
obligations; …
3. The CA found that PNB recomputed the RA 7202 accounts of the late spouses Aguilar,
which were audited and certified by the COA, and the recomputation resulted in the
absence of any excess payment.
4. Seemingly, absent any excess payment after the recomputation of the account of the
late spouses Aguilar based on 12% per annum interest rate, [the Aguilars] were not
entitled to restitution under RA 7202.

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5. The computation of the CA is disputed by the Aguilars because it did not "include the
sums and amounts which accrued to [PNB] from DAR's payment on account of [their]
properties."
6. The Aguilars take the position that the total amount of P3,212,012.48, which PNB
received from the LBP based on the Memorandum of Valuation should be deducted from
their total outstanding loan obligations (for RA 7202 and non-RA 7202 accounts) in the
amount of P2,236,337.91 as of the date of foreclosure of the collaterals.
a. There is an overage of P975,674.57, which should be returned to them by the
terms of the IRR.
7. This position of the Aguilars cannot be justified under RA 7202 and its IRR. To recall,
Section 6 of the IRR, in part, provides that:
a. x x x where sugar producers have ​no outstanding loan balance with said financial
institutions as of the date of effectivity of RA No. 7202 (i.e., sugar producers who
have ​fully paid their loans x x x through x x x foreclosure of collateral x x x), ​said
producers shall be entitled to the benefits of recomputation in accordance with
Sections 3 and 4 of RA No. 7202, ​but the said financial institutions, instead of
refunding the interest in excess of twelve (12%) per cent per annum, interests,
penalties and surcharges, apply the excess payment as an offset and/or as
payment for the producers' outstanding loan obligations.​ x x x
8. And, based on PNB's recomputation which the CA upheld, there is no excess payment
made by the late spouses Aguilar that has to be restituted to the Aguilars.

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