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Is the Philippine “War on Drugs” an Act of Genocide?

Article  in  Journal of Genocide Research · October 2017

DOI: 10.1080/14623528.2017.1379939

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Is the Philippine “War on Drugs” an Act of Genocide?

Dahlia Simangan

This is a post-print or a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of

an article accepted for publication in Journal of Genocide Research
following peer review. The version of record is available at
https://doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2017.1379939

Journal of Genocide Research

Published online first (Oct 2017)
Pages 1-22

E-prints available upon request.

Abstract
Since the newly elected Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte took office in June
2016 more than 7,000 deaths have been linked to his ongoing “war on drugs”.
Despite international condemnation of extrajudicial and vigilante killings the
statistics show no sign of slowing down and the administration remains firm in
eradicating people engaged in illegal drugs. This article inquires whether the
Philippine “war on drugs” is an act of genocide using Gregory H. Stanton’s stages
of genocide. Based on data drawn from news articles, policy issuances, government
briefings, public speeches, and available drug-related statistics, this article argues
that Duterte’s rhetoric and policies satisfy the stages of classification,
symbolization, dehumanization, organization, polarization, preparation,
extermination, and denial. The analysis in this article hopes to send a message to
the international community, civil society, and the Philippine government that the
human rights situation related to the “war on drugs” in the Philippines needs to be
addressed immediately. It also aims to demonstrate the utility of Stanton’s stages in
identifying early warning signs of genocide.

Keywords:

genocide; Philippines; war on drugs; Duterte

1
Introduction

Rodrigo Duterte took oath as the sixteenth president of the Philippines on 30 June 2016.
His campaign platform centered on the eradication of crime in the Philippines,
specifically on eliminating illegal drugs in the country. This attracted voters and gave him
his electoral victory. Known as the heavy-handed mayor who cleaned up the once crime-
infested Davao City,1 Duterte easily won the votes of a population frustrated by the
previous administrations’ inability to address the problems of crime and drugs.2 Within
six months of the start of his presidency, the Philippine National Police (PNP) reported
that the crime rate in the Philippines had dropped by 31.67 per cent.3 The current
administration attributes this decline to Duterte’s campaign against illegal drugs.4
However, previous years had already recorded a declining trend in the crime rate in the
Philippines.5 The same data also show an increase in murder cases of 18.06 per cent.
As of April 2017, Duterte’s “war on drugs” has already claimed more than 7,000
lives and shows no sign of slowing down.6 Human Rights Watch and international news
outlets reported the same number, while Amnesty International estimates that around
9,000 were killed by both police and vigilantes.7 According to an investigation conducted
by Reuters, 100 were shot dead and three injured out of 103 drug suspects, leading to a 97
per cent kill rate. Of the three who were not killed, two played dead and the third was
arrested after trying to flee.8 The Philippine government disputes this number, claiming
that it is an exaggeration propagated by fake news media9 by including homicides that are
still under investigation.10 From their latest data, the PNP announced that 3,451 drug
personalities were killed in anti-drug operations from 1 July 2016 to 26 July 2017, and
out of 12,833 homicide cases from 1 July 2016 to 17 June 2016, 2,098 were drug-related,
2,535 were not, and 8,200 are still under investigation.11 Given this, the numbers related
to drugs presented by the government, the media, and human rights organizations differ.12
The Philippine “war on drugs” caught international attention when graphic photos
of dead bodies started saturating international and local news.13 Several international and
local organizations have raised concerns about drug-related killings in the Philippines,
which could amount to crimes against humanity.14 In April 2017, a Filipino filed a
complaint against Duterte and eleven other government officials to the International
Criminal Court (ICC) requesting an investigation into the situation of mass murder in the
Philippines.15 The UN, the EU, and the US have also condemned Duterte’s “war on
drugs.”16 Within the Philippines human rights advocates are demanding an investigation
into extrajudicial killings. Duterte has responded, “I will include you among [drug users]

2
because you let them multiply.” Duterte has responded, “I will include you among [drug
users] because you let them multiply.”17
Despite international and domestic criticisms and his reputation for cursing and
making rape jokes,18 Duterte still enjoys massive public support. Based on a Pulse Asia
survey conducted in March 2017, seventy-eight per cent of Filipinos appreciate his work
and seventy-six per cent trust him.19 The same survey also revealed that the
administration’s fight against crime received the highest approval rating of seventy-nine
per cent among selected national issues.20 Another survey conducted by Social Weather
Stations shows a +66 net rating (very good) out of +100 for his whole administration and
a +41 net rating (good) for the administration’s fight against crime.21
This article examines Duterte’s “war on drugs” using Gregory H. Stanton’s stages
of genocide. Based on data drawn from news articles, government briefings, public
speeches, and available drug-related statistics, I argue that Duterte’s rhetoric22 and
policies satisfy the stages of classification, symbolization, dehumanization, organization,
polarization, preparation, extermination, and denial. The analysis in this article hopes to
support concerns raised by the international community and civil society that the human
rights situation related to the Philippine “war on drugs” needs to be addressed
immediately. It also aims to demonstrate the utility of Stanton’s stages in identifying
early warning signs of genocide. This article comes at a time when Duterte’s violent
campaign against illegal drugs continues to escalate and his rhetorical and practical
disregard for human rights is increasingly worrying.

Contextual Background: The Problem of Drugs in the Philippines

My father used to tell me when I was growing up, “You can try anything except drugs.”
Whenever there was news of unimaginable crime on TV my mother would always
comment, “Only drug users can do such horrible things.” My parents’ views reflect the
common attitude of Filipinos towards drugs: an adik (a local derogatory term for drug
users) is a good-for-nothing social pest who has tendencies to commit crimes. Whether
this attitude towards drug users is the cause or the consequence of a nationwide campaign
against drugs since the approval of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 was approved,23 it
is an attitude that persists until today.
Narcotic addiction only emerged in the Philippines during the American period
(1901-46) when American forces introduced opium alkaloids, coca plant, and hemp for
medical reasons; later they were locally cultivated and used for drug addiction purposes.24
Based on drug-related arrests in 2015 by the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency

3
(PDEA), illegal drugs in the market are mainly methamphetamine hydrochloride, locally
known as shabu (95.47 per cent), marijuana (4.29 per cent), and other drugs, such as
cocaine, ecstasy, and so on (0.24 per cent).25 In a survey of residential facilities for
rehabilitation in the Philippines conducted in 2015 by the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB)
shabu is the primary drug of abuse (96.74 per cent) followed by marijuana (24.94 per
cent) and cocaine (1.11 per cent).26
According to a DDB survey conducted in 2012 it was estimated that there could
be 1.3 million current drug users in the Philippines.27 In a 2015 survey by the Nationwide
Survey on the Nature and Extent of Drug Abuse in the Philippines the estimated number
of drug users in the Philippines is 1.8 million or 2.3 per cent of the population.28
According to Duterte, though, there are three million drug addicts whom he is “happy to
slaughter.”29 If there are indeed 1.8 million drug users (noting that some of them do not
regularly use drugs or have tried them only once), this does not mean that they are all
addicts and criminals – a false equivalence that Duterte and his administration confidently
portray as true.30
Duterte won the 2016 presidential elections for several reasons. First, he
embodies the Philippine electorate’s concern for order.31 He is known as the mayor who
established order and eliminated crime in Davao City. He allegedly initiated and
supported the Davao Death Squad, a group of vigilantes trained by current and former
police officers, which is responsible for summary executions of suspected criminals.32
Duterte and his supporters claim that Davao City was able to achieve peace and order
because of these executions and this claim was the bedrock of his presidential campaign.
Duterte emphasizes order above law, which is particularly attractive to voters who are
tired of the ineffectiveness of legal institutions in addressing crime and disorder. This
emphasis, however, is particularly dangerous for a country with weak rule of law and
even more dangerous for a politician who has authoritarian tendencies.
Second, Duterte represents public resistance and resentment towards the elite
democracy that came after the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos, the former authoritarian
president of the Philippines who ruled using martial law.33 Duterte’s presidential
campaign slogan, “Change is Coming,” resonated well among Filipinos who felt that the
country had stagnated under the administration of the same political elite. Third, Duterte
is considered to be a political outsider from the Manila-centric elite that has dominated
Philippine politics since Marcos’s dictatorship. His anti-elite and anti-establishment
rhetoric convinced more than sixteen million voters that he was different from the
traditional liberal politician. Fourth, Duterte’s electoral win symbolizes the denouement

4
of the public’s disappointment with the liberal political system’s failure to sustain socio-
economic development and maintain law and order in the country. The Filipino electorate
now wanted to be led by an iron fist even at the cost of liberal values of human rights and
rule of law.
Duterte’s political style is popular because it challenges liberal principles and
institutions.34 As Walden Bello puts it, he is “both a local expression as well as a pioneer
of an ongoing global phenomenon: the rebellion against liberal democratic values and
liberal democratic discourse.”35 Duterte idolizes the Marcos authoritarian style and raised
controversy when he decided to allow Marcos’s burial in the Heroes’ Cemetery. It is
therefore unsurprising that his supporters have downplayed the atrocities committed
during the Marcos dictatorship. Duterte has significant connections with the Marcos
family: his father served in the Marcos administration36 and he is a friend of Marcos’ son,
whom he considered to be his vice-presidential running mate during the presidential
campaign. Duterte’s strongman style, similar to Marcos’s, proved popular in addressing
the crime and order issues in Davao City and he is continuing in the same political style
in the national arena as president of the Philippines.
The PNP started their “Campaign Plan Double Barrel” when Duterte took office.
PNP Director General Ronald dela Rosa described it as, “One touch of the barrel, two
triggers will be set off. There is a barrel that will target from above, the high-value
targets. And there is a barrel that will target from below, the street-level personalities.”37
Dela Rosa used to be Duterte’s chief of the city police force in Davao City where he
started “Operation Tokhang,” which is now being implemented nationwide. In
“Operation Tokhang” police officers approach drug suspects in their homes and talk them
out of their involvement in drugs unless they want to face the consequences.38 As of April
2017 police officers have visited 7.9 million houses from which 1.2 million drug suspects
have surrendered.39 Independent investigations, however, reveal that “police officers
routinely bust down doors in the middle of the night and then kill in cold blood unarmed
[drug suspects]” some of whom were “yelling they will surrender while on their knees or
in another compliant position” before they were shot dead.40 This alarming situation in
the Philippines prompts the question: is the Philippine “war on drugs” an act of genocide?

Conceptual Background: The Definition of Genocide

Genocide studies have grappled with the boundaries of the definition of genocide.
Raphael Lemkin, the Polish Jewish lawyer who coined the term and initiated the
Genocide Convention, defined genocide in a capacious and generic way:41 “a coordinated

5
plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of
national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves.”42 Years later,
debates over the concept of genocide covering perpetrators’ intent, the group-based
identity of victims, threshold numbers of victims, and methods of destruction have paved
the way for either a broad or narrow application of the term.43 On the other hand some
scholars complain that unnecessarily extended debates on definitions, which Israel
Charny calls “definitionalism,” create emotional distance between those who study
genocide and those who have experienced and are experiencing it.44 By emphasizing the
intent of perpetrators and including victim groups outside the legalistic definition, some
studies have led to a broadening of what constitutes genocide.45 Meanwhile, others argue
for a more restricted or careful application of the term in order to prevent negative
consequences for the adjudication of international crimes and to preserve analytical
precision, among other reasons.46
This article is neither an attempt to further muddle the already highly contested
concept of genocide47 nor an addition to existing typologies and categorizations of
genocide.48 I acknowledge that imprecise broadening of the definition of genocide may
lead to what Giovanni Sartori calls “conceptual stretching,” an intellectual exercise that
unintentionally produces vague and amorphous conceptualizations that are not helpful in
confronting problems based on empirical evidence.49 I also agree with Luke Glanville’s
observation that inaction despite the invocation of the term genocide dilutes the ideational
power and legal responsibilities attached to it.50 It is not my deliberate intention to stretch
and devalue the definition of genocide based on hypothetical scenarios. Instead, this
article calls for meaningful action to address the ongoing processes of what seems to be
an act of genocide using real events, pronouncement, and policies. It uses an events-based
analysis to inquire whether an act fulfils the stages of genocide.
Article 2 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide defines genocide as “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part,
a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.”51 This is the most widely used and legal
definition of genocide. Among the acts included in the definition that are applicable to the
Philippine “war on drugs” is obviously the killing of members of the group. The acts of
“causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group” and “deliberately
inflicting on the group conditions of life, calculated to bring about its physical destruction
in whole or in part” may also be applicable.52 Gross overcrowding of jails and
rehabilitation centres53 and illegal detention of drug suspects in inhumane conditions54 are

6
acts that inflict serious physical and mental harm. Drug suspects are unlawfully arrested,
extorted, and tortured.
Using the Genocide Convention’s definition Duterte’s “war on drugs” may not
qualify as genocide because the drug suspects are not a national, ethnic, racial, or
religious grouping. However, Duterte and his supporters collectively label drug suspects
as adik, not human, good for nothing, criminals, rapists, and murderers, among others.
Critical genocide studies veer away from the liberal underpinnings and a rigid and
legalistic understanding of genocide and instead use a dialectical or holistic approach to
shed light on the history and context in which genocide takes place.55 Alexander Laban
Hinton’s anthropological approach to examining genocide proposes that the Genocide
Convention “should have been more broadly defined to include the destruction of any sort
of group defined by the protagonists in the genocide.”56 This echoes Frank Robert Chalk
and Kurt Jonassohn’s formulation of a perpetrator-defined victim group.57 Using a critical
genocide studies lens the adik in the Philippines qualifies as a victim of genocide. The
target group is imagined to be “criminals” rather than an ethnic or religious group. This
relates to how A. Dirk Moses points out the role of fear and security imperatives in the
conduct of genocide in his analysis of the convergence of genocide studies and Holocaust
historiography and studies.

Security imperatives and fear, rather than race hatred, are the operative logics
of genocide. Far from being a massive hate crime, as commonly supposed,
genocide is an extreme form of counterinsurgency or security measure,
marked above all by pre-emption and collective punishment as well as the
destruction of groups suspected of insurgency and collaboration with enemy
forces. It is therefore governed by political logics, rather than solely by racial
logics.58

Using the same definition in the Genocide Convention the intent to destroy is
plain and clear. Duterte has publicly spoken about killing drug suspects on several
occasions and even encouraged others to kill those they suspect to be involved in drugs.
Intent is a unique characteristic of genocide, and one that Duterte’s “war on drugs”
satisfies. Duterte’s vocal intent and ongoing attempts to eradicate drug suspects are
indicative of a process that leads to mass destruction regardless of the number of deaths.59
This proof of intent will be crucial when assigning guilt and responsibility and
establishing historical truth.60 It will support a strong legal case for implicating Duterte
and other government officials involved in implementing this intent.

7
 This article is not the first to analyse the scope and consequences of Duterte’s
“war on drugs” vis-à-vis international law.61 There are also commentaries arguing that
Duterte’s “war on drugs” should be labelled for what it is—an act of genocide.62 This
article will add to this scant but relevant discussion by comparing Duterte’s “war on
drugs” with events leading to and happening after a genocide using Stanton’s stages of
genocide.

Eight stages of genocide in the Philippine “war on drugs” context

Classification

Classification is the first stage of genocide. According to Stanton classification uses

categories to distinguish between “us” and “them.”63 He adds that this classification is
prominent in a polarized society. Examples of this classification are German and Jew in
Nazi Germany and Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda.64 In this article I posit that classification is
not limited to racial or ethnic groups. In Cambodia, the Pol Pot regime weeded out and
annihilated intellectuals. In Timor-Leste, Indonesian forces executed rebel group
sympathizers. These examples are social and political classifications. In the Philippines
Duterte and his administration classify users of illegal drugs as drug addicts, criminals,
rapists, and murderers. In one of his campaign rallies prior to his election he warned,
“You drug pushers, hold-up men and do-nothings, you better go out. Because I would kill
you.”65 He also labelled them as “sons of whores [who] are destroying [Filipino]
children.”66 The false equivalence purported by Duterte and his supporters that drug users
are addicts, rapists, and murderers qualifies as a classification stage of genocide. The
government uses the distinction that drug users are “bad” and therefore different from
“us” to justify the killings. Supporters of this “war on drugs” also invoke this distinction
when they express hatred and apathy towards the victims of these killings. This
distinction between “us” and “them” and “good” and “bad” is evident in public
narratives, such as in social media, and official government statements.

Symbolization

Symbolization is the assignment and active application of names or symbols to the

classifications mentioned above in order to distinguish “us” from “them.” Nazis made
Jews wear armbands with a yellow star and the Khmer Rouge regime made people wear a
blue scarf. In the Philippines, however, symbolization takes a different form. Victims are
often found in the streets with cardboard signs on top of or next to their bodies labelling

8
them as drug pushers, users, or rapists.67 Common labels on these cardboard signs include
“I am a drug pusher. Do not be like me.” This has become everyday news in Philippine
media, which is populated by undignified images of slain victims. Aside from a source of
threat, these cardboard signs are symbols that distinguish those who are involved in
illegal drugs from those who are not.

Dehumanization

Symbolization is harmless unless it is coupled with dehumanization, according to

Stanton. In the Philippines, alleged drug users and dealers are found dead on streets and
roadsides, labelled with cardboard signs, and sometimes with their faces wrapped in
masking tape. These acts can be interpreted as acts of dehumanization. Danilo Andres
Reyes argues that these alleged criminals in the Philippines are used as a “spectacle of
violence” to serve as a threat to others.68 The method of symbolization and
dehumanization applied to the bodies of the victims by both state and non-state
apparatuses “reduces the body to an object as a vehicle to carry political messages”69 that
threats are real for those who are alleged criminals and that safety is provided for law-
abiding citizens.
There is nothing more explicitly dehumanizing than claiming that an individual is
not a human being and therefore is not entitled to human rights. Duterte and his
administration have publicly expressed their rejection of drug users’ humanity and human
rights, claiming that they are not human or less human than law-abiding citizens. In
response to international human rights organization and UN condemnations and
accusations that the “war on drugs” is tantamount to crimes against humanity, Philippine
Justice Secretary Vitaliano Aguirre II, a vocal ally of the president, told reporters, “How
can that be when your war is only against drug lords, drug addicts, drug pushers? You
consider them humanity? No. I believe not.”70 Duterte also parades his rejection of human
rights in several incidents captured in the following statements.
My order is shoot to kill you. I do not care about human rights, you
better believe me.71

That is why I said, “[W]hat crime against humanity?” In the first place, I
would like to be frank with you, are they [drug users] humans? What is
your definition of a human being? Tell me.72

9
 These human rights [advocates] did not count those who were killed
before I became President—the children who were raped and mutilated
[by drug users].73

Duterte bases his acts of dehumanization on the belief that drug use, specifically
that of shabu, shrinks the brain and users are therefore beyond redemption.74
Neuroscientist Carl Hart visited Manila in May 2017 to debunk myths that exaggerate the
link between shabu usage and brain damage.75 During his visit, Hart provided
information about fallacies pertaining to drug use and also took a stance on the
ineffectiveness of Duterte’s policy.
I have given out hundreds of doses of methamphetamine, approaching
thousands. I have never seen anyone become violent… There are people
who rape. And also take amphetamines. But the vast majority of people
who rape do not take amphetamines. So to simply blame the drug? Not
only will you not get to the bottom of rape. But it is just infant thinking.
I do not know what to say to people whose thinking is so remedial. You
certainly do not want them in charge of policies designed to protect
society.76

After his speech Hart received death threats from Duterte’s supporters, and even Duterte
described him as “that black guy…that son of a bitch who has gone crazy” and accused
him of peddling “bullshit.”77

Organization

“Genocide is always organized, usually by the state, often using militias to provide
deniability of state responsibility.”78 The “war on drugs” in the Philippines is clearly
state-sponsored. It is the cornerstone of Duterte’s policies, carried over from his twenty-
two-year stint as the mayor of Davao City. The “war on drugs” is also highly organized,
for which Duterte mobilizes both the police and the military. As soon as he took office,
the police released a “watch list” for drug suspects. In October 2016 Duterte proudly
waved a list containing anywhere from 600,000 to a million names of people he intends
to eradicate.79 He also publicly read out a list of government officials allegedly involved
in the illegal drug trade. After a closer examination, however, the list appears outdated
and lacks verified information, as it is based on hearsay and includes names of deceased
individuals and names without surnames.80

10
 Duterte also encourages non-state apparatuses, such as vigilante and hired killers,
to eradicate alleged individuals involved in drugs. “If you know of any addicts, go ahead
and kill them yourself as getting their parents do it would be too painful,” he said in a
public speech just after his inauguration.81 Police hire members of clandestine groups and
issue them with a list of targets. While Duterte defends the idea that vigilante killings are
a myth, despite being known as the “Death Squad Mayor,” eyewitness reports of the
killings and even confessions of hired killers prove otherwise. This is further illustrated in
an excerpt from a report by Human Rights Watch:
Relatives, neighbours, and other witnesses told Human Rights Watch
that armed assailants typically worked in groups of two, four, or a
dozen. They would wear civilian clothes, often all black, and have their
faces shielded by balaclava-style headgear or other masks, and baseball
caps, or helmets. They would bang on doors and barge into rooms, but
the assailants would not identify themselves or provide warrants. Family
members reported hearing beatings and their loved ones begging for
their lives. The shooting could happen immediately–behind closed doors
or on the street; or the gunmen might take the suspect away, where
minutes later shots would ring out and local residents would find the
body; or the body would be dumped elsewhere later, sometimes with
hands tied or the head wrapped in plastic. Local residents often said they
saw uniformed police on the outskirts of the incident, securing the
perimeter—but even if not visible before a shooting, special crime scene
investigators would arrive within minutes.82

The report concludes that the Philippine police were directly involved in these
vigilante killings and that Duterte’s open endorsement of extrajudicial executions of drug
suspects implicates him and his senior officials for crimes against humanity.83 However,
the participation of vigilantes in drug operations allows Duterte and the security officers
to claim deniability of state responsibility.

Polarization

Duterte’s “war on drugs” polarizes Philippine society with regard to human rights, the
role of the media, and regional affiliation in the country. Polarization happens when
perpetrators of genocide use propaganda, hate speech, and laws or decrees to divide
society,84 therefore allowing them to continue their activities amidst a lack of public

11
consensus. In her article examining the logics among Duterte’s supporters, Nicole Curato
points out that Duterte’s domestic policy on drugs hinges on penal populism.85 According
to Julian V. Roberts et al., penal populism “consists of a pursuit of a set of penal policies
to win votes rather than to reduce crime or to promote justice.”86 They argue that populist
penal policies are a consequence of intentional exploitation of “public anxiety about
crime and public resentment toward offenders” or a response to “public opinion without
having undertaken an adequate examination of the true nature of public views.”87 In the
case of Duterte’s policy on drugs it is a way of addressing this latent public anxiety and
fear of crime without sufficient examination of the root cause of crime and reasons for
public emotions. Duterte’s policy on drugs also echoes John Pratt’s articulation of penal
populism as an instrumentalization of perceived public sentiments that criminals and
prisoners are favoured over their victims and law-abiding citizens.88
Pratt puts forward the idea that “penal populism feeds on division and dissent
rather than consensus.”89 Curato confirms that the consequence of penal populism in the
Philippines takes the form of exclusion and divisiveness, as it silences the plight of drug
suspects, and the perspectives of those who fight for their human rights, for the purpose
of attending to public frustrations.90 The Filipinos are deeply divided over the issue. A
populist leader like Duterte is obviously backed up by a staunch and outspoken support
base. Social media platforms became forums for Filipinos to express their opinions about
Duterte’s policies. Those who criticize Duterte on social media are labelled as intellectual
elitists and biased human rights supporters who are out of touch with the realities
Filipinos are facing on a daily basis.
Polarization with regard to the Philippine “war on drugs” is also manifested in
how the government parades propaganda information to justify whatever Duterte does.
As Stanton describes it, “motivations for targeting a group are indoctrinated through mass
media.”91 In the Philippines, claims that Duterte will solve the crime problem
consequently target a group of individuals, specifically drug suspects, and therefore
garner support from those who fail to screen the factuality of these claims. Duterte’s
supporters efficiently use social media to attack Duterte’s critics and to glorify him. There
are allegations that Duterte mobilizes a group of online trolls to push his policies.92 These
trolls use fake accounts, pick fights with Duterte’s critics online, propagate fake news,
and constantly promote Duterte’s policies.93 If these allegations are true, active and
intentional polarization of public sentiments about the “war on drugs” in the Philippines
is clearly state-sanctioned.

12
 Online accusations are not one-sided. Duterte’s supporters also accuse
mainstream media and Duterte’s critics of spreading fake news about the president and
highlighting the “war on drugs” victims instead of the victims and would-be victims of
drug suspects. Mocha Uson, for example, a Filipino celebrity and ardent supporter of
Duterte with a huge online following, calls mainstream media “presstitutes” for being
biased against the president. Uson was recently appointed as Assistant Secretary of the
Presidential Communications Operations Office as payback for supporting Duterte’s
presidential campaign. Uson vowed to oppose mainstream media using social media but
her appointment is a manifestation of a state-sanctioned polarization of public sentiment
and propagation of unreliable information given that she has been involved in several
fake news controversies.94 Uson and her fellow Die-Hard Duterte Supporters (DDS), as
they call themselves, use social media to present an illusory sense of nationalism and
pride by calling Duterte “father” and “protector.” They brandish their legitimacy and
representativeness based on their claim of a huge social media following.95 Their
narratives represent the division between “us” (the DDS) and “them” (the adik and those
who defend the adik’s rights). Opposing views, accompanied by heated debates, not only
polarize the public but also fan hatred.

Preparation

Preparation encompasses the previous stages of classification, symbolization,

dehumanization, organization, and polarization. Stanton offers examples used by
perpetrators of genocide that can qualify as a stage of preparation: usage of euphemisms
to downplay grave violations of human rights, indoctrination of fear into the population
using hateful rhetoric and propaganda, mobilization of weapons and troops or militias,
justification based on pre-emptive self-defence, and the creation of political processes as
tools to advance their agenda.96 The previous sections have touched on these
qualifications.
“War on drugs” is a euphemism for extrajudicial killings. It is mass murder in the
name of an illusory war. It is a euphemism enabling the majority to strip away the
humanity of drug suspects and to eradicate them without being held accountable. Duterte
mobilizes both the police and the military to “shoot to kill” drug suspects and employs
vigilante groups to water down the responsibility of officers in their participation in
extrajudicial killings. Police and military officers have become immune to legal
obligations since Duterte has promised that he will protect them. No officers or private

13
individuals have faced charges, while families of the victims and witnesses are silenced
by fear of reprisals.97
Duterte is known for his foul mouth and profanity. He has called drug suspects
“sons of whores.” He spews hateful rhetoric, perpetuates fear, and encourages
divisiveness by maintaining a narrative that the Filipino people will be in a state of
constant victimization if drug suspects are not eradicated. This narrative is similar to
Stanton’s example of leaders claiming that “if we do not kill them, they will kill us.”98
This is justification based on self-defence, thereby indoctrinating fear and obtaining
support for mass killings. The following statements are excerpts from an interview in
which he explains his logic behind mass killings in the Philippines.99
That is not criminal liability. It could not be negligence because you
have to save your life. It could not be recklessness because you have to
defend yourself.

If you destroy my country, I will kill you. That is a legitimate thing. If

you destroy our young children, I will kill you. That is a very correct
statement.

Threatening criminals with death is not a crime and if they are killed by
the thousands, that is not my problem. My problem is how to take care
of the law-abiding, god-fearing young persons of this Republic.

What is more dangerous than what came out in the above statements is that
Duterte’s supporters, who constitute a majority of government officials and the
population, believe in his words. A leader will not be able to stay long in a powerful
position that encourages, commits, and condones extrajudicial mass killings without the
support of its state apparatus and its people. In the Philippines, state security forces
implements Duterte’s “war on drugs,” which generally enjoys public support. “War on
drugs” supporters whom I talked with accept Duterte’s logic that those who are killed are
merely collateral damage in addressing the larger problem of drugs and crime in the
Philippines. Duterte’s divisive fear-mongering among the population and hateful and
dehumanizing rhetoric against drug suspects and their human rights defenders qualify as a
preparation stage of genocide. Classification and symbolization are natural social
activities but they become dangerous if combined with dehumanization.100
A key element, and probably the most dangerous, in the preparation stage is the
creation and utilization of political processes to advance the perpetrators’ agenda. While

14
at a glance this may not seem obvious in the Philippines Duterte has already shown signs
of authoritarianism in the country.101 There has been a pattern in which critics of Duterte
and his policies have been threatened, demeaned, and even jailed. Former justice
secretary and current senator Leila de Lima, a human rights activist and known to be
Duterte’s fiercest critic, is now behind bars for her alleged financial ties with drug
syndicates. In 2009, when she was the chairperson of the Commission on Human Rights
(CHR),102 de Lima investigated Duterte’s links to the Davao Death Squad.103 In 2016 she
called for an end to vigilante killings and urged the Philippine senate to investigate the
incidents.104 Her pursuits made her a target of hate speech and misogynistic attacks by
Duterte and his supporters. To discredit de Lima the president exposed her romantic affair
with her driver who, according to Duterte, was a drug user and served as de Lima’s
collector of financial bribes when she was justice secretary.105 De Lima denied all
allegations but was arrested in February 2017.106 International condemnation of her arrest
followed.107 The independent Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), for example, concluded
that Duterte and Aguirre portrayed de Lima’s guilt before legal proceedings had started
and expressed concern that her arrest was politically motivated.108
It is common knowledge among residents of Davao City that Duterte used to
direct the Davao Death Squad. Some members of this squad have come forward and
confessed their activities.109 Duterte has both denied and admitted his connection with the
Davao Death Squad,110 and prospects for an impartial investigation of his activities by
national legislative bodies filled with those loyal to him remain bleak.111 On the other
hand, de Lima, an opponent of extrajudicial killings, is now in prison for drug allegations.
Duterte swiftly used political processes to silence de Lima but consistently circumvented
them by stating that murdering criminals is not a crime.

Extermination

Hitler massacred three million Jews. Now, there are three million drug
addicts. I would be happy to slaughter them. If Germany had Hitler, the
Philippines would have [me].112

These are the chilling words of Duterte in response to international condemnation

of his “war on drugs.”113 The administration was quick to defend Duterte’s words, saying
that his remarks were misinterpreted and that, unlike Hitler, he only intends to kill three
million criminals and not innocent people.114 Duterte has publicly ordered police officers

15
to shoot to kill those who resist arrested and guaranteed presidential protection of officers
involved in killings, as illustrated in the following statements:
If you resist, show violent resistance, my order to police [will be] shoot
to kill. Shoot to kill for organized crime. You heard that? Shoot to kill
for every organized crime.115

Shoot to kill is to shoot and kill him. I do not want the police wasting
bullets.116

For as long as it is done in the performance of the duty by the police and
soldiers, that is my responsibility, that is my official and personal
guarantee.117

If there are police involved in an encounter, do not investigate them

anymore, that is my order.118

Duterte has also encouraged ordinary citizens to conduct their own arrests of
suspected criminals and stated that he would award those citizens a medal if they killed
those who resisted. “Those among you in your respective neighbourhoods, feel free to
call us, the police, or do it yourself if you have the gun, you have my support,” he said at
a public event in June 2016.119 These statements emboldened not only police and military
officers but also ordinary civilians to carry out law and order duties usually meant for
trained officers. The rule of law is no longer exclusive to state forces but has been
disseminated to any armed individual willing to conduct an arrest or to kill. According to
Human Rights Watch, “President Duterte appears to have instigated unlawful acts by the
police, incited citizens to commit serious violence, and made himself criminal[ly] liable
under international law for the unlawful killings as a matter of command
responsibility.”120
In January 2017, the Philippine government had to address the news of the death
of a South Korean businessman, Jee Ick-Joo, at the hands of police officers. Rogue police
officers kidnapped Jee and extorted money from his family based on false allegations that
he was connected to the drug trade in the Philippines.121 Fearing damage to bilateral
relations with South Korea, an important ally for the Philippines, Duterte immediately
ordered the suspension of drug-related police operations.122 While stating that he would
continue his “war on drugs” until the end of his presidential term, the suspension was
supposedly designed to internally cleanse the national police of rogue officers.123

16
According to one Philippine senator vigilante killings coincidentally stopped right after
the suspension.124 However, in another report, unidentified gunmen on a motorcycle
rained bullets on a twenty-four-year-old man in one of Manila’s poor neighbourhoods the
night after the suspension.125
In March 2017, dela Rosa announced the resumption of drug-related police
operations, vowing that it would be less bloody with stricter policies to prevent the
participation of vigilantes.126 The government still claims no accountability for the more
than 7,000 deaths before this shift to a stricter policy and supposedly less bloody
approach despite international calls for an independent investigation.127 However, within
just twenty-four hours of the lifting of the suspension, police operations killed eight
suspects and “justif[ied] those deaths on the dubious basis that the suspects ‘fought
back,’” according to Phelime Kine, deputy director of Human Rights Watch’s Asia
Division.128 Reuters has reported that, since the relaunch of the “Double Barrel”
operation, police officers have become more creative in skewing the death toll by
bringing dead bodies to hospitals to be declared dead on arrival in order to avoid further
investigations that may reveal the incidents as summary executions.129
Dela Rosa also announced that they would include a member of a parish church
to make their campaign credible.130 He reasoned that this plan was a way to safeguard the
operations from abuses. This announcement was clearly an admission that drug-related
police operations before the suspension were bloody with vague policies and participated
in by vigilantes. It also manifests that they want to ensure the façade of credibility of the
“war on drugs” by including priests or representatives of a church, who are not law
enforcement officers, during operations.
Duterte is keeping his promise that he will support and protect officers involved
in drug-related operations.131 To date, the worst punishment for officers proven to be
involved in unlawful killing of drug suspects is a six-month suspension.132 Duterte said
that he would pardon and even promote police officers who were involved in the drug-
related killing of Leyte Mayor Rolando Espinosa.133 With regard to the police officers
involved in Jee’s murder, Duterte ordered their reassignment to conflict zones instead of
suspension during the investigations.134 Duterte formally apologized to Jee’s family and
to South Korea and assured them that those responsible would be brought to justice.135
However, Duterte has not apologized to them, or assured justice to them, or held a
memorial for the more than 7,000 Filipinos who mostly lived in poverty and died without
proof of guilt, and whose families will now live in worse situations.136

17
 Duterte’s “war on drugs” has a single method: the eradication of drug-related
individuals for his purpose of protecting the Filipino people from crimes that might be
committed by those individuals. Duterte considers this campaign as an eradication of
social ills, and not mass killings, calling drug suspects mere parts of the “apparatus” of
illegal drug use137 and thereby stripping them of their humanity. Disturbingly, most
Filipinos buy into his rhetoric of fear and hate, as manifested in his positive approval
ratings and the widespread public support for his “war on drugs.” It is for this rhetoric
that they elected him in the first place. “I do not care if I burn in hell for as long as the
people I serve live in paradise,” he said during the election campaign. Duterte’s
scapegoating and paranoia and his messianic rhetoric of delivering the Filipino people
from evil characterize genocidal regimes in the past. Hitler convinced the Germans that
the Jews were the causes of Germany’s problems in the same way that Duterte blames
drug suspects for crimes in the Philippines. The Turkish government committed genocide
against the Armenian population out of resentment and suspicion. Duterte’s government
has organized mass killings of drug suspects out of resentment for previous crimes
committed by drug users and dealers and a suspicion that individuals related to drugs will
also commit crimes.

Denial

Stanton lists denial as the final stage and as always following the act of genocide. It is an
indicator that genocide has happened but perpetrators try to cover up their actions by
eliminating evidence, intimidating witnesses, and blocking investigations.138 Stanton adds
that their denial is often followed by placing blame on the victims. I will go through these
components of denial, but it must be noted that Duterte has denied allegations of
extrajudicial killings on the record but at the same time has admitted to killings. As
demonstrated in the previous subsections, he has made numerous public speeches in
which he encouraged both state and non-state actors to participate in eradicating drug-
related individuals while assuring them of his presidential protection.
Duterte’s administration maintains that the more than 7,000 deaths often quoted
by news agencies and international human rights organizations are bloated numbers
because they include cases that are still under investigation, requiring witnesses and
forensic examinations.139 However, Human Rights Watch concluded that police reports of
suspects being killed because they resisted depart from eyewitness accounts of murders of
unarmed suspects already in custody. Human Rights Watch also adds that “to bolster their
claims, the police routinely planted guns, spent ammunition, and drug packets next to the

18
victims’ bodies.”140 Moreover, as mentioned earlier, witnesses and families choose not to
speak or press charges out of fear of reprisals.141 These incidents satisfy key components
of the denial stage: covering up evidence and staging the crime scene, placing the blame
on the victims by claiming that they resisted and officers killed them in self-defence, and
inciting fear of reprisal among families and witnesses.
Another component of denial that is present in Duterte’s “war on drugs” is the
active obstruction of an independent investigation. Although Duterte has mentioned that
he is ready to face any complaint against him,142 he has used verbal profanity to threaten
the UN, the EU, the US, and human rights organizations for expressing their concern over
the casualties of his “war on drugs.”143 More recently, Duterte has called for the police to
shoot human rights activists for “obstructing justice” and said that he will also investigate
those who demand investigations into his “war on drugs.”144 Moreover, the government
has previously dismissed inquiries into Duterte and the deaths from his “war on drugs.”145
With a legislative branch filled with Duterte backers, future investigations seem
improbable.146

Summary and Conclusion

This article has analysed Duterte’s “war on drugs” by scoping existing news articles,
government briefings, public speeches, and available drug-related statistics. Duterte’s
“war on drugs” is a textbook case of what the processes of genocide look like. Drug
suspects in the Philippines are classified as “bad” and labelled as criminals through
symbolisms. Duterte, his administration, and his supporters believe that drug suspects are
not human, or less human than them. As it is a state-sanctioned policy the “war on drugs”
is highly organized with both state and non-state actors participating in anti-drug
operations. This drug war is also polarizing, with one side of the debate wanting to get rid
of drug suspects by whatever means possible and the other side wanting to protect their
human rights. Duterte’s administration has created enforcement programmes, mobilized
police and military apparatuses, and silenced or threatened political critics in order to
efficiently exterminate drug suspects. He has also encouraged civilians to participate not
just in reporting drug suspects but also in shooting them. Duterte is happy to slaughter
millions of drug suspects, likening himself to Hitler. He has ordered “shoot-to-kill”
operations and assured officers involved in these operations of his support and protection.
Duterte justifies his policies using a rhetoric of fear, hatred, and paranoia in order
to deny accountability for the deaths from his “war on drugs.” Police officers in anti-drug
operations eliminate evidence that drug suspects were unarmed and compliant. Due to

19
this state-sponsored violence, witnesses and family members are intimidated out of
speaking for the victims. Duterte and his administration continue to block independent
investigations and threaten critics of his policies while putting into positions of power
people Duterte feels indebted to despite their lack of qualifications and experience.
Considering all these factors, Duterte’s “war on drugs” satisfies the stages of genocide as
Stanton describes them. It may not fully satisfy the legal definition of genocide but it has
the characteristics found in stages of classification, symbolization, dehumanization,
organization, polarization, preparation, extermination, and denial. This approach departs
from limiting genocide to its legalistic definition and considers a more contextual analysis
of what constitutes an act of genocide.
The analysis in this article also reveals that stages of genocide can be overlapping,
interconnected, and non-linear. First, in Duterte’s “war on drugs,” symbolization happens
simultaneously with extermination when drug suspects are killed and labelled with
cardboard signs. Second, the dehumanization stage traverses other stages. Drug suspects
are dehumanized in the classification, symbolization, and extermination stages. Third,
these stages can also be non-linear. After the deaths of drug suspects, Duterte and his
administration propagate rhetoric that polarizes the public in their opinions of human
rights, crime, and public policy on drugs.
Inquiring whether the Philippine “war on drugs” is an act of genocide produces
two opposing but not mutually exclusive answers. The answer is no if the inquiry is kept
within the confines of the legalistic definition of genocide. The answer is yes based on
Stanton’s stages of genocide and other broader definitions of genocide. Applying
Stanton’s stages of genocide is an alternative approach to explaining genocidal events
that may not fall under the traditional or conventional conceptualization of genocide. The
problem with this approach, as Moses warns, is that “it may identify situations as at least
‘pre-genocidal’ that it does not intend to highlight.”147 However, in the case of the
Philippine “war on drugs” the stages of genocide have already all been fulfilled. Some
may also argue that Duterte may be responsible for crimes against humanity but not
genocide. While this may be true, how does one reconcile the fact that the Philippine
“war on drugs” fulfils all the stages of genocide? Perhaps it is at this point that it is more
rational to depart from definitionalism and instead focus on what must be done to avert
this humanitarian crisis, whatever name one prefers to give it. As Stanton laments,
“debating whether mass killing fits the conventional definition of genocide is most often
an excuse for non-action.”148 Even if one does not accept that the Philippine “war on
drugs” is an act of genocide, using Stanton’s stages adds to existing discussions and

20
measures on genocide prevention. It sheds light on events related to and hopes to set an
alarm for the state-sponsored humanitarian crisis in the Philippines. It is also a
particularly useful analytical lens for explaining how perpetrators of genocide operate and
a confirmation that genocide is a process,149 a progression of events, and a series of
planned methods operated by organized actors and agencies.
Calling the mass murder of drug suspects in the Philippines a “war on drugs”
removes its human toll. It must be called what it is—a mass murder of unarmed, often
poor civilians suspected of using drugs. At his command, Duterte’s administration has
successfully incited, if not wholly organized, the killings of more than 7,000 Filipinos out
of fear and a hatred of heinous crimes previously committed by either suspected or
proven drug users. They have justified the killing of drug suspects by claiming that if they
were not killed, they would kill. It is murdering the “murderer” before the murder
happens.

ORCID

Dahlia Simangan http://orcid.org/0000-0001-9418-969X

Notes on contributor
Dahlia Simangan is a Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS)
postdoctoral fellow at the United Nations University-Centre for Policy Research,
Tokyo. While her main research examines the cases of post-conflict peacebuilding
in Cambodia, Kosovo, and Timor-Leste in the areas of security, justice and
reconciliation, and development, she is also interested in issues related to
democratic governance, rule of law, and human rights. Dahlia is the recipient of the
2015 Dissertation Award from the Academic Council on the United Nations
System (ACUNS) and the co-founder and former executive director of Peace
Perspectives.

Endnotes

1
See Oude Breuil, Brenda Carina, and Ralph Rozema, "Fatal Imaginations: Death Squads in Davao
City and Medellín Compared," Crime, Law and Social Change 52, no. 4 (2009): 414-418.
2
Julio C. Teehankee, "Weak State, Strong Presidents: Situating the Duterte Presidency in Philippine
Political Time," Journal of Developing Societies 32, no. 3 (2016): 306.
3
This decrease in crime rate was also recorded during the previous administration. "PNP: Crime Rate
Down, But Murder Rate Up," ABS-CBN, December 19, 2016, http://news.abs-
cbn.com/news/12/19/16/pnp-crime-rate-down-but-murder-rate-up.

21
4
Kyodo News, "Philippines' Crime Rate Falls 13 Percent in 2016," ABS-CBN, February 13, 2017,
http://news.abs-cbn.com/news/02/13/17/philippines-crime-rate-falls-13-percent-in-2016.
5
There is a decreasing trend in index crimes and the decline rate from 2015 to 2016 was 30.84 per
cent. Philippine National Police, 2012 Annual Accomplishment Report (2012); Philippine National
Police, 2013 Annual Accomplishment Report (2013); Philippine National Police, 2014 Annual
Accomplishment Report (2014); Philippine National Police, 2015 Annual Accomplishment Report
(2015); and Philippine National Police, 2016 Annual Accomplishment Report (2016).
6
Michael Bueza, "In Numbers: The Philippines' 'War on Drugs'," Rappler, April 23, 2017,
http://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/145814-numbers-statistics-philippines-war-drugs. Recently, the
country witnessed another spike in the death toll during the second week of August 2017 when eighty
people were killed and 200 were arrested in Manila. One of them was Kian delos Santos, a seventeen-
year-old student who was dragged from his home, given a gun, asked to run, and shot dead by the
police, according to witnesses and CCTV footage. The police officers, however, claimed that delos
Santos resisted arrest and opened fire. Delos Santos’s death sparked large protests and multiple
investigations, and “galvanized what had previously been limited opposition to [Duterte’s] war on
drugs.” Andrew R. C. Marshall and Neil Jerome Morales, "Shot and Dumped by a Pigsty: A Schoolboy
Killed in Philippines Drugs War," Reuters, August 25, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
philippines-drugs-student-idUSKCN1B51U2.
7
"Philippines 'War on Drugs': Credible and Impartial Investigations Needed after ‘Secret Jail Cell’
Revealed," Amnesty International, April 28, 2017,
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/04/philippines-credible-and-impartial-investigations-
needed-after-secret-jail-cell-revealed/.
8
Clare Baldwin, Andrew R.C. Marshall, and Damir Sagolj, "Police Rack up an Almost Perfectly
Deadly Record in Philippine Drug War," Reuters, December 5, 2016,
http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/philippines-duterte-police/.
9
"Cayetano: PH War on Drugs Exaggerated by Fake News," ABS-CBN, May 5, 2017, http://news.abs-
cbn.com/news/05/05/17/cayetano-ph-war-on-drugs-exaggerated-by-fake-news.
10
Buena Bernal, Zahra Ullah, and James Griffiths, "Philippines Police Claim Drug War Deaths
Exaggerated," CNN, May 2, 2017, http://edition.cnn.com/2017/05/02/asia/philippines-police-drug-war-
deaths/index.html.
11
Dharel Placido, "Duterte: Kian’s Death 'Bad,' But Drug War to Continue," ABS-CBN, August 23,
2017, http://news.abs-cbn.com/news/08/23/17/duterte-kians-death-bad-but-drug-war-to-continue.
12
It is important to note that reports about the “war on drugs” should be scrutinized considering that
the government accuses the media and human rights organizations of miscategorizing drug cases and
therefore bloating the numbers of casualties on one hand while citing government data on the other.
Several news agencies also argue that the data presented by the government are flawed and inaccurate.
See, for example, the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, "Flawed, Fuzzy Numbers in the
War on Drugs," Philippine Star, June 8, 2017,
http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2017/06/08/1707985/flawed-fuzzy-numbers-war-drugs; Vera Files,
"Duterte Skews War on Drugs Figures; Aquino Gets It Wrong Too," Vera Files, August 15, 2017,
http://verafiles.org/articles/vera-files-fact-check-duterte-skews-war-drugs-figures-aquino.
13
See, for example, Daniel Berehulak, "'They Are Slaughtering Us Like Animals,'" New York Times,
December 7, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/12/07/world/asia/rodrigo-duterte-
philippines-drugs-killings.html.
14
Human Rights Watch, Philippines: Police Deceit in “Drug War” Killings, March 2, 2017,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/03/02/philippines-police-deceit-drug-war-killings; and Amnesty
International, "If You Are Poor, You Are Killed": Extrajudicial Executions in the Philippines' "War on
Drugs" (London, 2017).
15
"Full Text: Criminal Complaint Filed vs Duterte before the International Criminal Court," Philippine
Star, April 24, 2017, http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2017/04/24/1693506/full-text-criminal-
complaint-filed-vs-duterte-international-criminal.
16
European Union, Joint Motion for a Resolution on the Philippines - the Case of Senator Leila M. De
Lima, March 15, 2017; Felipe Villamor, "UN Rights Expert, on Visit to Philippines, Denounces 'War
on Drugs' Approach," New York Times, May 5, 2017,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/05/world/asia/philippines-agnes-callamard-duterte.html; and David
Brunnstrom, Yeganeh Torbati, and Manuel Mogato, "US Troubled by Increasing Extrajudicial Killings
in Philippines," Reuters, April 21, 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-drugs-usa-
idUSKBN17M2KQ.

22
17
Agence France-Presse, "Duterte Threat to Kill Rights Defenders Alarms Groups," ABS-CBN,
November 30, 2016, http://news.abs-cbn.com/news/11/30/16/duterte-threat-to-kill-rights-defenders-
alarms-groups.
18
"Philippines' Duterte under Fire for Second Rape Joke," BBC, May 27, 2017,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-40072315; and Pia Ranada, "A Foul-Mouthed 2016: The Year in
Duterte's Curses," Rappler, December 10, 2016, http://www.rappler.com/nation/155102-duterte-curses-
2016.
19
Pulse Asia, March 2017 Nationwide Survey on Presidential Performance and Trust Ratings (2017),
http://www.pulseasia.ph/march-2017-nationwide-survey-on-presidential-performance-and-trust-
ratings/.
20
Pulse Asia, March 2017 Nationwide Survey on National Urgent Concerns and the Performance
Ratings of the Duterte Administration (2017), http://www.pulseasia.ph/march-2017-nationwide-survey-
on-national-urgent-concerns-and-the-performance-ratings-of-the-duterte-administration/.
21
Social Weather Stations, First Quarter 2017 Social Weather Survey: Net Satisfaction Rating of the
Duterte National Administration at "Very Good" +66, May 29, 2017,
https://www.sws.org.ph/swsmain/artcldisppage/?artcsyscode=ART-20170524165852
22
I thank the anonymous reviewers for suggesting to contextualize Duterte’s rhetoric. Conducting a
critical reading of Duterte’s pronouncements is relevant and fruitful in understanding his personality
and political style. However, such an exercise is challenging considering that Duterte is known for
contradicting his own words. For example, he said both that he is a killer and not a killer in separate
instances. Some may raise caution over taking Duterte’s words literally and it is therefore important to
place his pronouncements in a wider context. The contextual background of this article briefly explains
how Duterte’s popularity and his policy on drugs fit against the socio-political backdrop in the
Philippines. On the other hand, this article argues against overly cautious responses towards Duterte’s
rhetoric. Duterte loyalists within the government have advised national and international media against
taking Duterte’s words literally. However, this advice is often a form of damage control for Duterte’s
controversial and politically incorrect pronouncements. For example, when Duterte said that “if
Germany had Hitler, the Philippines would have [me],” his administration defended his words and
blamed the previous administration for originally comparing Duterte to Hitler and accused the media of
“vilifying [Duterte] in the eyes of the world” ("Duterte’s Hitler Comparison: The President’s
Outrageous Mistake," Center for Media Freedom and Responsibility, October 4, 2016, http://cmfr-
phil.org/in-context/dutertes-hitler-comparison-the-presidents-outrageous-mistake/). Duterte often uses
vague and confusing narratives but, as the president, his words must be taken literally. The police and
vigilantes are acting out Duterte’s message of killing anyone involved in drugs, even if only suspected.
This article takes into account the rhetoric and policies that have prompted the killings of thousands in
the Philippine “war on drugs.”
23
Republic of the Philippines, “The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,” April 4, 1972. See also,
Dangerous Drugs Board, 'History,' http://www.ddb.gov.ph/about-ddb/history.
24
Ricardo M. Zarco, "A Short History of Narcotic Drug Addiction in the Philippines, 1521-1959,"
Philippine Sociological Review 43, no. 1-4 (1995): 1-15.
25
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, 2015 Annual Report (Quezon City, 2015), 14.
26
Dangerous Drugs Board, “2015 Statistics,” http://www.ddb.gov.ph/research-statistics/statistics/45-
research-and-statistics/287-2015-statistics.
27
Dangerous Drugs Board, 2012 Nationwide Survey on the Current Nature and Extent of Drug Abuse
in the Philippines (2012). https://www.ddb.gov.ph/45-research-and-statistics?start=20
28
Jodesz Gavilan, "DDB: Philippines Has 1.8 Million Current Drug Users," Rappler, September 19,
2016, http://www.rappler.com/nation/146654-drug-use-survey-results-dangerous-drugs-board-
philippines-2015.
29
Karen Lema and Manuel Mogato, "Philippines' Duterte Likens Himself to Hitler, Wants to Kill
Millions of Drug Users," Reuters, October 1, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-
duterte-hitler-idUSKCN1200B9.
30
There are conflicting reports about the survey but according to an online article the survey includes
individuals who used illegal drugs at least once. Gideon Lasco, "Just How Big Is the Drug Problem in
the Philippines Anyway?," The Conversation, October 13, 2016, https://theconversation.com/just-how-
big-is-the-drug-problem-in-the-philippines-anyway-66640.
31
Thomas Pepinsky, "Southeast Asia: Voting against Disorder," Journal of Democracy 28, no. 2
(2017): 120-131.
32
Human Rights Watch, "You Can Die Anytime": Death Squad Killings in Mindanao (2009)
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/philippines0409webwcover_0.pdf.

23
33
Ramon C. Casiple, "The Duterte Presidency as a Phenomenon," Contemporary Southeast Asia 38,
no. 2 (2016): 179-184.
34
Mark R. Thompson, "The Early Duterte Presidency in the Philippines," Journal of Current Southeast
Asian Affairs 35, no. 3 (2016): 39-68.
35
Bello, "Duterte Fascism and Naked Force Ruling Philippines," Asia Pacific Report, March 8,
2017, https://asiapacificreport.nz/2017/03/08/walden-bello-duterte-fascism-and-naked-force-
ruling-philippines/. See also Nicole Curato "Flirting with Authoritarian Fantasies? Rodrigo
Duterte and the New Terms of Philippine Populism," Journal of Contemporary Asia 47, no. 1
(2017): 142-153.
36
Trefor Moss, "Philippine Strongman Rodrigo Duterte Revives Memories of Ex-Dictator
Marcos," Wall Street Journal, September 2, 2016, https://www.wsj.com/articles/strongmans-
legacy-stirs-passions-in-the-philippines-1472856476.
37
Bea Cupin, "Warning to Drug Dealers: PNP Has 'Double Barrel' Plan," Rappler, June 29, 2016,
http://www.rappler.com/nation/138049-dela-rosa-pnp-plan-drugs.
38
Ibid.
39
Bueza, "In Numbers."
40
Amnesty International, "If You Are Poor," 7.
41
Michael A. McDonnell and A. Dirk Moses, "Raphael Lemkin as Historian of Genocide in the
Americas," Journal of Genocide Research 7, no. 4 (2005): 501-529; A. Dirk Moses, "Toward a Theory
of Critical Genocide Studies," in Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence, ed. Jacques Samelin (April
18, 2008), http://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/toward-
theory-critical-genocide-studies; and A. Dirk Moses, "Revisiting a Founding Assumption of Genocide
Studies," Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal 6, no. 3 (2011): 287-300.
42
Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation – Analysis of Government – Proposals
for Redress (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944), 80.
43
For a discussion of these debates, see Adrian Gallagher, Genocide and Its Threat to Contemporary
International Order (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 13-39.
44
Charny, "Towards a Generic Definition of Genocide," in Genocide: Conceptual and Historical
Definitions, ed. George J. Andreopoulos (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994), 91.
45
For example, Ben Kiernan, Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and Extermination from
Sparta to Darfur (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007); Frank Robert Chalk and Kurt
Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1990); and Martin Shaw, What Is Genocide? 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Polity Press,
2015).
46
For example, Leo Kuper, Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century (Harmondsworth:
Penguin Books, 1981); and William A. Schabas, "The International Legal Prohibition of Genocide
Comes of Age," Human Rights Review 5, no. 4 (2004): 46-56.
47
See, for example, Paul Boghossian, "The Concept of Genocide," Journal of Genocide Research 12,
no. 1-2 (2010): 69-80; Eric D. Weitz, "Genocide and the Rigor of Philosophy: A Comment on Paul
Boghossian," Journal of Genocide Research 12, no. 1-2 (2010): 101-4; and Berel Lang, "Response to
Paul Boghossian, 'The Concept of Genocide,'" Journal of Genocide Research 12, no. 1-2 (2010): 81-
89.
48
See, for example, Barbara Harff and Ted Robert Gurr, "Toward Empirical Theory of Genocides and
Politicides: Identification and Measurement of Cases since 1945," International Studies Quarterly 32,
no. 3 (1988): 359-371; Henry R. Huttenbach, "From the Editor: Towards a Conceptual Definition of
Genocide," Journal of Genocide Research 4, no. 2 (2002): 167-175; and Christian P. Scherrer,
"Towards a Theory of Modern Genocide. Comparative Genocide Research: Definitions, Criteria,
Typologies, Cases, Key Elements, Patterns and Voids," Journal of Genocide Research 1, no. 1 (1999):
13-23.
49
Sartori, "Concept Misinformation in Comparative Politics," The American Political Science Review
64, no. 4 (1970): 1033-53.
50
Glanville, "Is 'Genocide' Still a Powerful Word?" Journal of Genocide Research 11, no. 4 (2009):
467-486.
51
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (New York, December 9,
1948), United Nations Treaty Series 78, no. 1021, 280,
https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%2078/volume-78-i-1021-english.pdf.
52
Ibid.
53
"142,000 Held in Philippine Jails Built for 20,000 as Duterte's Drug War Intensifies," South China
Morning Post, May 14, 2017, http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/southeast-asia/article/2094273/142000-

24
held-philippine-jails-built-20000-dutertes-drug-war; and Alberto Maretti, "Prisons and Rehab
Overcrowding in the Philippines," Al Jazeera, December 14, 2016,
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/inpictures/2016/12/prisons-rehab-overcrowding-philippines-
161207091046623.html.
54
Eloisa Lopez, "CHR Team Finds Detainees in 'Secret' Police Cell," Rappler, April 27, 2017,
http://www.rappler.com/nation/168172-chr-free-detainees-secret-cell-tondo-police-station; and Phelim
Kine, "Philippine 'Drug War' Spawns Unlawful Secret Jail: Police Implicated in For-Profit Abduction,
Torture, and Extortion Operation," Human Rights Watch, April 27, 2017,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/04/27/philippine-drug-war-spawns-unlawful-secret-jail.
55
Moses, "Toward a Theory of Critical Genocide Studies."
56
Hinton, "Critical Genocide Studies," Genocide Studies and Prevention 7, no. 1 (2012): 9.
57
Chalk and Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide.
58
Moses, "Revisiting a Founding Assumption," 293.
59
Nehemiah Robinson, The Genocide Convention: A Commentary (New York: Institute of Jewish
Affairs, 1960), 58-9.
60
Guenter Lewy, "Can There Be Genocide without the Intent to Commit Genocide?" Journal of
Genocide Research 9, no. 4 (2007): 672.
61
Human Rights Watch, Philippines: Police Deceit; and Amnesty International, "If You Are Poor."
62
For example, Akash Goel and Andrew Goldstein, "The World Needs to Wake Up and Call Rodrigo
Duterte's Brutal War on Drug Addicts What It Is: Genocide," Quartz, December 12, 2016,
https://qz.com/859674/president-rodrigo-dutertes-brutal-war-on-drug-addicts-in-the-philippines-is-a-
genocide/; and Maia Szalavitz, "Why We Ignore Thousands of Killings in the Philippines: The Victims
Were Drug Users," The Washington Post, October 6, 2016,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/10/06/why-we-ignore-thousands-of-
killings-in-the-philippines-the-victims-were-drug-users/?utm_term=.8c76bc13be6f.
63
Although Stanton has added two stages to the original eight stages, this article does not include the
stages of discrimination and persecution. Discrimination is the denial of the rights of the powerless
group through law, custom, and political power. Persecution precedes extermination and it is at this
stage that victims are separated, forced to wear symbols, and deprived of rights and resources. The
extrajudicial killings in the Philippines satisfy both discrimination and persecution, but since they are
already discussed under organization and extermination there are no separate subsections for these two
stages. Gregory H. Stanton, "The Ten Stages of Genocide," Genocide Watch,
http://genocidewatch.net/genocide-2/8-stages-of-genocide/.
64
Ibid.
65
"Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte in Quotes," BBC, September 30, 2016,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-36251094.
66
"Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte Urges People to Kill Drug Addicts," The Guardian, July 1,
2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/01/philippines-president-rodrigo-duterte-urges-
people-to-kill-drug-addicts.
67
Kate Lamb, "Thousands Dead: The Philippine President, the Death Squad Allegations and a Brutal
Drugs War," The Guardian, April 2, 2017,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/02/philippines-president-duterte-drugs-war-death-
squads.
68
Reyes, "The Spectacle of Violence in Duterte's 'War on Drugs,'" Journal of Current Southeast Asian
Affairs 35, no. 3 (2016): 111.
69
Ibid., 117.
70
Agence France-Presse, "Criminals Are Not Human-Aguirre," Inquirer, February 1, 2017,
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/867331/criminals-are-not-human-aguirre.
71
Associated Press, "In Philippine Drug War, a Family Struggles to Stay Safe," Inquirer, October 20,
2016, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/828035/in-philippine-drug-war-a-family-struggles-to-stay-safe.
72
Marlon Ramon, "'Junkies Are Not Humans'," Inquirer, August 28, 2016,
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/810395/junkies-are-not-humans.
73
Ibid.
74
Ibid.
75
For example, Carl L. Hart et al., "Is Cognitive Functioning Impaired in Methamphetamine Users? A
Critical Review," Neuropsychopharmacology 37, no. 3 (2012): 586-608.
76
Patrick Winn, "Neuroscientist Carl Hart Says 'Infant Thinking' Drives Philippines Meth War,"
GlobalPost, June 6, 2017, https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-06-06/neuroscientist-carl-hart-says-infant-
thinking-drives-philippines-meth-war.

25
77
Ibid.
78
Stanton, "The Ten Stages of Genocide."
79
Patrick Symmes, "President Duterte's List," New York Times, January 10, 2017,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/10/magazine/president-dutertes-list.html?_r=0.
80
"The Duterte List: Judges, Mayors, Police Officials Linked to Drugs," Rappler, August 7, 2016,
http://www.rappler.com/nation/142210-duterte-list-lgu-police-officials-linked-drugs.
81
Will Worley, "Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte Tells People to 'Go Ahead and Kill' Drug
Addicts," Independent, July 2, 2016, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/philippines-
president-rodrigo-duterte-tells-people-to-go-ahead-and-kill-drug-addicts-a7116456.html.
82
Human Rights Watch, License to Kill: Philippine Police Killings in Duterte's "War on Drugs"
(2017), 8, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/philippines0317_web_1.pdf.
83
Ibid.
84
Stanton, "The Ten Stages of Genocide."
85
Curato, "Politics of Anxiety, Politics of Hope: Penal Populism and Duterte's Rise to Power," Journal
of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 35, no. 3 (2016): 91-109.
86
Roberts et al., Penal Populism and Public Opinion: Lessons from Five Countries (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2003), 5.
87
Ibid., 3.
88
Pratt, Penal Populism, Key Ideas in Criminology Series (Oxon: Routledge, 2007), 12.
89
Ibid., 13.
90
Curato, "Politics of Anxiety," 106.
91
Stanton, "The Ten Stages of Genocide."
92
Dana Roberson and Anna Pratt, "The Filipino President Has Deployed a 'Social Media Army' to
Push His Agenda," Public Radio International, January 10, 2017, https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-01-
10/filipino-president-has-deployed-social-media-army-push-his-agenda; and Eric S. Caruncho,
"Confessions of a Troll," Inquirer, August 28, 2016, http://lifestyle.inquirer.net/236403/confessions-of-
a-troll/.
93
Maria A. Ressa, "Propaganda War: Weaponizing the Internet," Rappler, October 4, 2016,
http://www.rappler.com/nation/148007-propaganda-war-weaponizing-internet; Chay F. Hofileña,
"Fake Accounts, Manufactured Reality on Social Media," Rappler, October 15, 2016,
http://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/investigative/148347-fake-accounts-manufactured-reality-social-
media; and Kate Lamble and Megha Mohan, "Trolls and Triumph: A Digital Battle in the Philippines,"
BBC, December 7, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-38173842.
94
"Mocha Uson Vows to Fight 'Fake News' Via Palace Social Media," Inquirer, May 10, 2017,
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/895687/mocha-uson-vows-to-fight-fake-news-via-palace-social-media; and
Leila B. Salaverria, "Mocha Embroiled in Another Fake News Controversy," Inquirer, May 31, 2017,
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/901157/mocha-embroiled-in-another-fake-news-controversy.
95
I thank Ma. Criselda Sto. Domingo for her inputs and views on this matter and for directing me to
information supporting this discussion. Criselda provided her assistance in checking the facts of some
of the news materials cited in this article.
96
Stanton, "The Ten Stages of Genocide."
97
Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 2016/17: The State of the World's Human
Rights (London, 2017), 295.
98
Stanton, "The Ten Stages of Genocide."
99
Kristine Guerra, "Duterte Has a Name for Innocent People Killed in the Philippines' Drug War:
Collateral Damage," Washington Post, October 18, 2016,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/10/18/duterte-has-a-name-for-innocent-
people-killed-in-the-philippines-drug-war-collateral-damage/?utm_term=.0dd3869924c4.
100
Stanton, "The Ten Stages of Genocide."
101
For example, some commentators argue that the declaration of martial law in Mindanao in
response to extremist attacks is a rehearsal for authoritarianism. Maria Feona Imperial, "Martial
Law in Mindanao 'Dress Rehearsal' for Authoritarian Rule," Vera Files, May 28, 2017,
http://verafiles.org/articles/martial-law-mindanao-dress-rehearsal-authoritarian-rule-mons; and
Christopher Woody, "Rodrigo Duterte's Martial-Law Declaration Appears to Fulfill Some of
His Previous Ominous Declarations," Business Insider, May 24, 2017),
http://www.businessinsider.com/rodrigo-duterte-martial-law-in-philippines-authoritarianism-
2017-5.
102
In an attempt to silence Duterte’s critics, the Philippine House of Representatives voted to give the
CHR, a government agency critical of Duterte’s “war on drugs,” a budget of only PhP 1,000 or around

26
USD 20, rendering it inoperative starting in 2018. Marc Jayson Cayabyab, "House Gives Commission
on Human Rights P1,000 Budget for 2018," Inquirer, September 12, 2017,
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/930106/house-budget-deliberations-chr-p1000-budget-speaker-alvarez.
103
For details about the investigations related to the Davao Death Squad, see Jodesz Gavilan,
"Timeline: Probing into the Davao Death Squad," Rappler, June 30, 2017,
https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/171312-timeline-davao-death-squad-probe-hearing-
investigations-rodrigo-duterte.
104
Christine O. Avendaño, "Leila Seeks Immediate Probe," Inquirer, July 11, 2016,
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/795314/leila-seeks-immediate-probe.
105
Michael Bueza and Katerina Franciso, "Timeline: De Lima – from Drug Probe to Arrest," Rappler,
February 24, 2017, http://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/162416-leila-de-lima-arrest-timeline-drug-
probe; and Lian Buan, "Explainer: What Is Leila De Lima Being Accused Of?" Rappler, February 26,
2017, http://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/162354-explainer-leila-de-lima-accusations-drug-trade.
106
Felipe Villamor, "Leila De Lima, Critic of Duterte, Is Arrested in the Philippines," New York Times,
February 23, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/23/world/asia/arrest-duterte-leila-de-lima.html;
and CNN Philippines Staff, "Sen. Leila De Lima Arrested over Drug Charges," CNN Philippines,
February 24, 2017, http://cnnphilippines.com/news/2017/02/24/leila-de-lima-arrested-over-drug-
charges.html.
107
European Union, "The Challengers: Leila De Lima," Foreign Policy, 2016,
https://gt.foreignpolicy.com/2016/profile/leila-de-lima?df8f7f5682=.
108
Inter-Parliamentary Union, "Philippines: Decision Adopted Unanimously by the IPU Governing
Council at Its 200th Session," April 5, 2017, http://www.ipu.org/hr-e/200/phi08.pdf.
109
Oliver Holmes, "Philippines President Ordered Murders and Killed Official, Claims Hitman," The
Guardian, September 15, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/15/philippines-
president-drug-dealers-rodrigo-duterte-extrajudicial-killings-crocodile.
110
"Philippines' Duterte Admits Personally Killing Suspects," BBC, December 14, 2016,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-38311655; and Giovanni Nilles, "Duterte Denies Involvement in
Davao Death Squad," Philippine Star, September 23, 2016,
http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2016/09/23/1626561/duterte-denies-involvement-davao-death-
squad.
111
Martin Petty and Manuel Mogato, "Citing Lack of Proof, Philippine Senators End Duterte 'Death
Squad' Inquiry," Reuters, March 6, 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-drugs-senate-
iduskbn16d0dx.
112
Karen Lema and Manuel Mogato, "Philippines' Duterte Likens Himself to Hitler, Wants to Kill
Millions of Drug Users," Reuters, October 1, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-
duterte-hitler-idUSKCN1200B9.
113
"Duterte: I'm Being Portrayed as a 'Cousin of Hitler,'" Rappler, September 30, 2016,
http://www.rappler.com/nation/147797-duterte-portrayed-hitler-cousin. Before the 2016 elections,
former president Benigno Aquino III delivered a warning that Duterte’s rise to power was similar to
that of Hitler. Agence France-Presse, "PNoy Parallels Rise of Duterte and Hitler," ABS-CBN, May 8,
2016, http://news.abs-cbn.com/halalan2016/nation/05/07/16/pnoy-parallels-rise-of-duterte-and-hitler.
114
"Duterte Rejects Hitler Label, Abella Says," ABS-CBN, October 1, 2016, http://news.abs-
cbn.com/news/09/30/16/duterte-rejects-hitler-label-abella-says.
115
Agence France-Presse, "Duterte to Order 'Shoot-to-Kill' for Criminals, Reinstate Death Penalty,"
Inquirer, May 16, 2017, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/785766/duterte-to-order-shoot-to-kill-for-
criminals-reinstate-death.
116
Nestor Corrales, "Duterte, Palace Defend Shoot-to-Kill Order," Inquirer, August 5, 2016,
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/803274/duterte-palace-defend-shoot-to-kill-order.
117
Ibid.
118
Ibid.
119
Katerina Franciso, "Shoot to Kill? Duterte's Statements on Killing Drug Users," Rappler, October 5,
2016, http://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/148295-philippines-president-rodrigo-duterte-statements-
shoot-to-kill-drug-war.
120
Human Rights Watch, License to Kill, 82.
121
Felipe Villamor, "Philippine Police Are Accused of Killing South Korean Businessman," New York
Times, January 19, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/19/world/asia/philippines-police-south-
korean-killing.html; and Dharel Placido, "'Tokhang-for-Ransom': Timeline of South Korean
Businessman's Abduction, Killing," ABS-CBN, January 20, 2017, http://news.abs-

27
cbn.com/focus/01/20/17/tokhang-for-ransom-timeline-of-south-korean-businessmans-abduction-
killing.
122
Karen Lema and Martin Petty, "Death of a Businessman: How the Philippines Drugs War Was
Slowed," Reuters, February 13, 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-drugs-southkorea-
idUSKBN15R121.
123
Juliet Perry, "Philippines' Duterte Orders Police to 'Cleanse' Ranks Amidst Murder Scandal," CNN,
January 30, 2017, http://edition.cnn.com/2017/01/30/asia/duterte-south-korean-murder-
corruption/index.html; and "Philippines: Police 'Drug War' Killings Need Independent Probe," Human
Rights Watch, January 30, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/01/30/philippines-police-drug-war-
killings-need-independent-probe.
124
Camille Diola, "Vigilante Killings Disappear after Halt in Police Drug Efforts," Philippine Star,
January 31, 2017, http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2017/01/31/1667701/vigilante-killings-disappear-
after-halt-police-drug-efforts.
125
Martin Petty, "Shadowy Killings Persist in Manila after Police Quit Drugs War," Reuters, February
1, 2017, http://in.reuters.com/article/philippines-drugs-police-idinkbn15g414.
126
Lara Tan, "PNP Relaunches 'Less Bloody' Oplan Tokhang," CNN Philippines, March 7, 2017,
http://cnnphilippines.com/news/2017/03/06/Oplan-Tokhang-Part-2-war-on-drugs-PNP.html .
127
"Philippines: Police 'Drug War' Killings."
128
Ibid.
129
Baldwin and Marshall, "Duterte's War on Drugs."
130
Delfin Mallari Jr. and Philip C. Tubeza, "'Oplan Tokhang' Back Nationwide," Inquirer, March 6,
2017, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/877688/oplan-tokhang-back-nationwide.
131
Maan Macapagal, "Duterte Clearance Needed to Probe Soldiers, Police for Drug War Deaths," ABS-
CBN, September 8, 2017, http://news.abs-cbn.com/news/09/08/17/duterte-clearance-needed-to-probe-
soldiers-police-for-drug-war-deaths-dilg.
132
Romina Cabrera, "Police Chief, 5 Others Suspended over 'Tanim-Droga'," Philippine Star, May 19,
2017, http://www.philstar.com/metro/2017/05/19/1701364/police-chief-5-others-suspended-over-
tanim-droga; and Alfred Dalizon, "PNP-IAS Recommends 6-Month Suspension, Not Dismissal, for 19
Cops in Espinosa's Slay," Journal Online, April 17, 2017,
http://www.journal.com.ph/news/provincial/pnp-ias-recommends-6-month-suspension-not-dismissal-
for-19-cops-in-espinosa-s-slay.
133
Philip C. Tubeza, "IAS: Dismiss Cops in Espinosa, Jee Slay," Inquirer, April 4, 2017,
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/886211/ias-dismiss-cops-in-espinosa-jee-slay.
134
"Philippines: Anti-Drugs Units to Disband after South Korean Man Killed by Police," The
Guardian, January 29, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/29/philippines-disband-
police-anti-drugs-units-war-rodrigo-duterte-south-korea.
135
Catherine S. Valente, "Jee Killers Will Pay," The Manila Times, January 27, 2017,
http://www.manilatimes.net/jee-killers-will-pay/309023/.
136
Neil Jerome Morales, Martin Petty, and Robert Birsel, "Memorial in Philippines for South Korean
Whose Murder Stunted Drugs War," Reuters, February 6, 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
philippines-southkorea-iduskbn15l1bv?il=0.
137
Dharel Placido, "Drug War Only Targeting the Poor? That's How It Is, Says Duterte," ABS-CBN,
March 8, 2017, http://news.abs-cbn.com/news/03/08/17/drug-war-only-targeting-the-poor-thats-how-it-
is-says-duterte.
138
Stanton, "The Ten Stages of Genocide."
139
Gerg Cahiles, "Gov't Forum Clarifies Numbers in Duterte's War on Drugs," CNN Philippines, May
3, 2017, http://cnnphilippines.com/news/2017/05/03/statistics-Duterte-war-on-drugs.html.
140
Human Rights Watch, License to Kill, 4.
141
Amnesty International Report 2016/17, 295.
142
V.J. Bacungan, "Duterte on Facing Another Complaint in ICC: 'Go Ahead,'" CNN Philippines, May
16, 2017, http://cnnphilippines.com/news/2017/05/16/duterte-complaint-icc-go-ahead.html.
143
Charlotte England, "Philippines' Rodrigo Duterte Threatens to Burn Down United Nations over
Human Rights Abuse Accusations," Independent, December 23, 2016,
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/philippines-rodrigo-duterte-burn-down-un-united-
nations-anti-drug-killingshuman-rights-abuse-a7492261.html; Neil Jerome Morales and Enrico dela
Cruz, "EU Are 'Sons of Bitches,' Says Philippines President," Independent, March 24, 2017,
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/eu-sons-of-bitches-rodrigo-duterte-philippines-
president-hypocrisy-war-on-drugs-a7647581.html; Marina Koren, "The Philippine President's Vulgar
Warning to Obama," The Atlantic, September 5, 2016,

28
 https://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2016/09/duterte-obama-extrajudicial-killings/498710/; and
"Full Text of Duterte's State of the Nation Address 2017," July 25, 2017, Philippine Star,
http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2017/07/25/1721355/full-text-dutertes-state-nation-address-2017
144
Phelime Kine, "Philippines: Duterte Threatens Human Rights Community," Human Rights Watch,
August 17, 2017 https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/08/17/philippines-duterte-threatens-human-rights-
community.
145
Felipe Villamor, "Philippines Kills Impeachment Complaint against Rodrigo Duterte," New York
Times, May 15, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/15/world/asia/rodrigo-duterte-philippines-
impeachment.html; and Avendaño, "Leila Seeks Immediate Probe."
146
Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, "Extrajudicial Killings Prompt Suit against Duterte at the International
Criminal Court," Foreign Policy, April 24, 2017, http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/04/24/extrajudicial-
killings-prompt-suit-against-duterte-at-the-international-criminal-court/; and Patrick Quintos, "ICC
Complaint vs Duterte Difficult If PH Doesn't Cooperate: Expert," ABS-CBN, May 2, 2017,
http://news.abs-cbn.com/focus/05/02/17/icc-complaint-vs-duterte-difficult-if-ph-doesnt-cooperate-
expert.
147
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