sustainability

Article
Case Studies for Dangerous Dust Explosions in South
Korea during Recent Years
Seonggyu Pak 1,† , Seongho Jung 2,† , Changhyun Roh 3,4,5 and Chankyu Kang 6, *
1 Korea Occupational Safety and Health Agency, Major Accident Prevention Center in Chungju, 85 Daerimro,
Chungju, Chungbuk 27477, Korea
2 Department of Environmental and Safety Engineering, Ajou University, Worldcupro 206, Yeongtong-gu,
Suwon 16499, Korea
3 Decommissioning Technology Research Division, Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI),
989-111 Daedukdaero, Yuseong, Daejeon 34057, Korea
4 Advanced Radiation Technology Institute (ARTI), Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI),
Jeonbuk 56212, Korea
5 Quantum Energy Chemical Engineering, University of Science and Technology, 217, Gajeong-ro, Yuseong-gu,
Daejeon 34113, Korea
6 Ministry of Labor and Employment, Chemical Accident Prevention Division, 422 Hannuridae-ro,
Sejong 30117, Korea
* Correspondence: chemnet75@korea.kr; Tel.: +82-44-200-2556
† These authors contributed equally to this work.




Received: 4 August 2019; Accepted: 31 August 2019; Published: 6 September 2019


Abstract: Despite recent extensive research and technical development to prevent and mitigate dust
explosions, processes that produce and handle combustible materials in the form of powders and
dusts, either as a main product or as an undesired by-product, have become a constant dust explosion
threat as they become more sophisticated and complicated. This study analyzed the characteristics of
53 dust explosions that occurred in South Korea over the last 30 years, and investigated the differences
of dust explosions that happened in various countries, such as Japan, the United States, the United
Kingdom, and France. In addition, case studies showed the severity of dust explosions occurring in
South Korea. Through the special focus on the three most recent years of dust explosions, the causes
and processes of the accidents were identified. Analyses of dust explosions in South Korea show that
they were mainly caused by organic matter and metal, and, unfortunately, dust explosions occurred
repeatedly during grinding, mixing, and injection of powder materials into facilities. No reported
accidents occurred during the production processes of wood or paper during the last three years.
Taking these characteristics into account, effective ways to prevent or mitigate dust explosions at
workplaces where many dust explosions occurred were suggested.

Keywords: dust explosions; facility; prevent; mitigate; organic matter; metal

1. Introduction
Many industrial dust explosions occur in powder-processing equipment during crushing, grinding,
conveying, storing, and other processes [1]. These operations are still widely used in industrial plants
and will be applied to new fields of industry, potentially triggering many dust explosions in the
future [2]. As a result, the threat of dust explosions remains a continued risk [3]. Many kinds of
industrial plants use powder manufacturing facilities, which produce several types of dust known
to be explosive, and cause catastrophic loss of life and property [4]. In a plant environment where
finely ground dust spreads in the air, dust explosions may occur immediately, depending on the
source of ignition if certain conditions (i.e., minimum explosive concentration (MEC)) are reached. The

Sustainability 2019, 11, 4888; doi:10.3390/su11184888 www.mdpi.com/journal/sustainability

Sustainability 2019, 11, 4888 2 of 13

types of dust that cause dust explosions are wood, paper products, grain and food, metal and metal
products, power generation, coal mining, and textile manufacturing. Factors such as dust properties,
dust particle size, and the formation of combustion by-products vary the speed and extent of flame
propagation and have a complex mechanism in that they include simultaneous momentum, energy,
and mass transport in reactive multi-phase systems [5,6]. In addition, it is a phenomenon involving
a rapid increase in pressure and heat, accompanied by sound, which is caused by the fact that the
substance burns at a very high rate [7].
Dust explosions seriously destroy human beings, properties, and the environment. Among the
classification of dusts, relative dust explosion severity is classified by the Kst index, divided into four
groups from non-explosive (i.e., St 0) to highly explosive (i.e., St 3) [8]. Several factors, such as dust
concentration, the composition of the dust and moisture content, particle size and shape, type of
dust, and turbulence in the system, affect the degree of ignition and propagation of flame in the dust
cloud [9,10]. This means that substances with a high risk of dust explosion (i.e., smaller sizes and
thin flats of particles, metallic particles, a dust cloud with less oxygen content) need special attention
during process control. Recently, several dust explosions have caused serious damage: (i) 14 deaths
and 38 injuries occurred in the Imperial Sugar refinery in the United States in 2008 [11]; (ii) an accident
occurred at a maize starch plant in China in 2010, killing 21 employees and injuring 47 [12]; (iii) an
HDPE (high density polyethylene) dust explosion occurred in the silo at the Yeosu Industrial Complex
in South Korea, resulting in the deaths of six workers who were in the process of installing a manhole,
and injuring an additional 11 workers on 14 March, 2013; (iv) an aluminum dust deflagration occurred
at an auto parts factory in Jiangsu, China, on 2 August, 2014, resulting in a catastrophic 146 deaths
and 114 injured [13], with the investigation concluding that the bag filters in the dust collection bags
had to be cleaned by mechanical shaking at regular intervals, but the primary deflagration had begun
with the shaking system, which was out of operation for a long period of time; (v) in 2015, 10 people
were killed and 485 were injured by an explosion of a colored, starch-based dust at a party called
“Color Play Asia” in Taiwan [14]. Among various types of dusts, there have been many studies on
aluminum dust because it is the most explosive among metal dusts, and accounted for about 25% of
the metal dusts from 1980 to 2005 in the United States [15–17]. The temperature of metal dust flame
is more than 1000 K higher than organic dust flame, which causes an increase in pressure. The risk
of dust explosion as a result of increased temperatures and pressure has contributed to metal dust
receiving more attention [18]. Meanwhile, coal dust explosions were the most frequent and serious
accidents in China, with 106 cases reported between 1949 and 2007 [19]. Fabiano et al. (2014) analyzed
98 incident statistics related to coal between 2000 and 2011 using data bank FACTS, managed by the
Unified Industrial and Harbor Fire Department of Rotterdam–Rozenburg, NL [20]. Coal and coal dust
caused 171 and 39 fatalities, respectively, and classifying the major accident scenario corresponded to
explosions (56.0%), followed by fires (30.8%) and releases (13.2%). Analysis of the incidents revealed
that two-thirds of them occurred in power and process plants due to human error and technical
failure/malfunction of a component or equipment.
To create a dust explosion, the necessary conditions for dust explosions are well represented by
the explosive pentagon: (i) Fuel, (ii) oxidant, (iii) ignition source, (iv) mixing of the fuel and oxidant,
and (v) confinement of the resulting mixture [21]. There must be a certain density of dispersed dust in
the air so that the dust accumulates. A confined space maintains sufficient pressure for the primary
dust explosion to occur [22]. The consequence of the secondary dust explosion causes disastrous and
uncontrolled explosions, which occur when the blast wave from the primary explosion entrains the
dust layer and propagates through the plant. The dust becomes the fuel of the emerging flame, leading
to extensive explosions due to large amounts of dust and the high energy of ignition [23].
Several controversial issues have recently been solved to provide efficient preventive and mitigatory
measures. Farrell et al. (2013) conducted an experiment with a large-scale test rig, consisting of a 5 m3
vented vessel connected to two 400 mm diameter pipelines, to study dust explosion propagation. This
study showed that the dust explosion was able to move against a process flow at a long distance [24].
Sustainability 2019, 11, 4888 3 of 13

Vogl and Radandt (2005) carried out the experiment and concluded that powder handling plants
Sustainability 2019, 11, x FOR PEER REVIEW 3 of 12
should be cautious with design and operation because of the possibility of dust explosion propagation,
even with small-diameter
dust explosion propagation, pipes
even[25].
withValiulis et al. (1999)
small-diameter pipesand[25].Farrell et al.
Valiulis (2013)
et al. (1999)concluded
and Farrellthat
et
aal.dust explosion can propagate if there is little to no dust at all in the
(2013) concluded that a dust explosion can propagate if there is little to no dust at all in the connected pipes [24,26].
Recently,
connectedthe development
pipes of advanced
[24,26]. Recently, numerical models
the development has played
of advanced an important
numerical models rolehasin providing
played an
guidelines on the stable and optimized design of process equipment
important role in providing guidelines on the stable and optimized design of process equipment to mitigate or prevent dustto
explosions [27]. However, controversial subjects, such as explosion venting and
mitigate or prevent dust explosions [27]. However, controversial subjects, such as explosion venting secondary explosions,
are
andstill unsatisfactory
secondary because
explosions, these
are stillissues are subjectbecause
unsatisfactory to increased
thesecomplexity
issues areand process
subject to variability
increased
due to process automation.
complexity and process variability due to process automation.
The
The purpose
purpose of of this
this study
study isis to
to provide
provide information
information on on dust
dust explosions
explosions that
that occurred
occurred in in South
South
Korea, and to compare them with dust explosions in Japan, the United States,
Korea, and to compare them with dust explosions in Japan, the United States, the United Kingdom, the United Kingdom,
and
and France.
France. The The characteristics
characteristics of dust explosions
of dust explosions areare presented
presented through
through analysis
analysis of of their
their causes
causes over
over
30
30 years in South Korea. Case studies of catastrophic dust explosions in South Korea present the
years in South Korea. Case studies of catastrophic dust explosions in South Korea present the
severity
severity and damage of the accidents. Special focus on the last three years of dust explosions is to
and damage of the accidents. Special focus on the last three years of dust explosions is to
identify
identify thethecauses
causesand andprocess
processof dust explosions,
of dust and to
explosions, andsuggest effective
to suggest ways toways
effective preventto or mitigate
prevent or
them in workplaces.
mitigate To the best
them in workplaces. Tooftheour knowledge,
best this is thethis
of our knowledge, first
is study to study
the first introduce several cases
to introduce of
several
dust accidents and suggest preventive measures because there is little awareness
cases of dust accidents and suggest preventive measures because there is little awareness and little and little information
about dust explosions
information about dustinexplosions
South Korea. in South Korea.

2. Dust Explosions in South Korea from 1984 to 2018

2. Dust Explosions in South Korea from 1984 to 2018
2.1. Dust Explosions for South Korea
2.1. Dust Explosions for South Korea
From 1984 to 2018, 53 combustible dust- and flammable solid-related fire explosions were reported
From 1984 to 2018, 53 combustible dust- and flammable solid-related fire explosions were
in South Korea. Figure 1 identifies dust explosions by type of industry and their main cause. According
reported in South Korea. Figure 1 identifies dust explosions by type of industry and their main cause.
to the analysis of dust explosions based on the types of industries shown in Figure 1a, 30% of all dust
According to the analysis of dust explosions based on the types of industries shown in Figure 1a, 30%
explosions occurred in the metal industry, 25% in the chemical industry, and 21% in the food industry.
of all dust explosions occurred in the metal industry, 25% in the chemical industry, and 21% in the
Dust explosions in wood and paper industries were as low as 9%. As reflected in the industrial
food industry. Dust explosions in wood and paper industries were as low as 9%. As reflected in the
structure, the major cause of dust explosions, shown in Figure 1b, was metal, which accounted for 44%
industrial structure, the major cause of dust explosions, shown in Figure 1b, was metal, which
of all dust explosions. Plastic and food sources each cause 19% of dust explosions. The number of
accounted for 44% of all dust explosions. Plastic and food sources each cause 19% of dust explosions.
accidents due to combustible metal dusts was the highest, but explosions caused by plastics accounted
The number of accidents due to combustible metal dusts was the highest, but explosions caused by
for about 50% of deaths and about 47% of injuries. Deaths due to weakly explosive plastic dusts were
plastics accounted for about 50% of deaths and about 47% of injuries. Deaths due to weakly explosive
over three times more than those of strong explosive metal dusts, presumably due to the establishment
plastic dusts were over three times more than those of strong explosive metal dusts, presumably due
of government safety guidelines and industrial characteristics.
to the establishment of government safety guidelines and industrial characteristics.

Figure 1. Analysis
Figure 1. Analysis of
of dust
dust explosions
explosions in
in South
South Korea.
Korea. (a)
(a) Occurrence
Occurrence of
of dust
dust explosions
explosions by
by type
type of
of
industry;
industry; (b)
(b) Cause
Cause of
of dust
dust explosions.
explosions.

2.2. Recent Dust Explosions

Table 1 presents examples of dust explosions from May 2015 to May 2018. Dust explosions
caused by organic matters and metal caused significant property loss as well as human loss. Analysis
of major accident processes reveals that accidents occurred repeatedly during grinding, mixing, and
Sustainability 2019, 11, 4888 4 of 13

2.2. Recent Dust Explosions

Table 1 presents examples of dust explosions from May 2015 to May 2018. Dust explosions caused
by organic matters and metal caused significant property loss as well as human loss. Analysis of major
accident processes reveals that accidents occurred repeatedly during grinding, mixing, and injection of
powder materials into facilities, while no accidents occurred in the production process of wood or
paper during the last three years.

Table 1. Dust explosion in South Korea (May 2015 to May 2018).

Year/Month Equipment Hazard Material Accident Process

2018/5 Rocket propulsion plant Ammonium perchlorate Grinding
2018/5 Dust collector Zirconium oxide Grinding
2018/4 Dissolution Tungsten oxide alloy Injection of metal powder
2018/4 Alloy Manufacturing Co–Cr alloy Manufacture of alloy powder
2017/7 Silo Polypropylene PP pellet transfer
2016/1 Mixer Propanoic acid Mixing process
2015/10 Silo Terephthalic acid Welding and cutting of manhole
2015/9 Chemical Manufacturing Aluminum oxide mixture Mixing process
2015/3 Reactor Terephthalic acid Injection of Terephthalic acid into reactor
2015/5 Melting furnace Waste Aluminum Injection of waste aluminum into furnace

3. Case Studies
There are many severe dust explosions in South Korea, and these accidents occur not only
in chemical plants but also in general storage facilities. Through three case studies, the problems
and characteristics of those dust explosions, which caused many casualties and property loss, can
be identified.

3.1. HDPE (High Density Polyethylene) Explosions

On 14 March, 2013, an explosion occurred in the HDPE silo at Yeosu Industrial Complex, killing
six workers during a manhole installation and injuring eleven workers. In addition to human loss,
it caused property damage to nearby factories and destroyed three silos at the factory. The accident
investigation revealed that HDPE powder was attached to the inner wall of the silo body, which was
filled with air, and the bag filter. During the manhole installation work, some powder dust fell off
the lower side and created a deposit due to the vibration caused by tools. The primary explosion
happened when the flammable material inside the silo was ignited by the welding sparks during the
manhole installation. Heat and shock waves generated in the first silo, as shown in Figure 2, and
spread to neighboring silos through the piping connected to the outlet of the HDPE powder bag filter,
resulting in the2019,
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11, x FOR PEER REVIEW 5 of 12

Figure 2. (a)2.The
Figure (a) silo
Thewhere the dust
silo where explosion
the dust firstfirst
explosion began; (b) Image
began; of silo
(b) Image bottom
of silo duedue
bottom to sudden impact.
to sudden
impact.

3.2. PP (Polypropylene) Silo Explosions

An explosion occurred inside the polypropylene silo at the Yeosu Industrial Complex, causing
a fire in the polypropylene stored inside the silo, resulting in the burning of one aluminum silo on 10
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Details of the accident are as follows: Welding was carried out at six different positions in the silo
where the fire was ignited. In general, welding is known to be a very powerful ignition source that
ignites all types of explosive mixtures. Aluminum alloy, which the silo was made of, has a thermal
conductivity three to five times higher than that of iron alloy. Polyethylene dust attached to the inside
of the silo and the bag filter acted as a combustible material and was ignited by welding sparks,
resulting in fire. Generally, combustible dust can cause an explosion if the particle size is less than 420
µm. At this time, the polyethylene dust collected inside the silo had an average size of about 60 µm,
which is a condition that easily causes an explosion. It is assumed that an explosive environment had
been created because of the accumulation of dust and flammable gas. To summarize the progress of
the explosion in the silo: (i) The occurrence of fire during welding, (ii) the diffusion on the wall, and
(iii) an explosion in the upper position. During the work after the initial gas measurement, continuous
Figureand
ventilation 2. (a)measurement
The silo where
ofthe
gasdust
mustexplosion firstout.
be carried began; (b) Image of the
Unfortunately, silo organization’s
bottom due to sudden
permission
impact.
to work without ensuring that no explosive mixtures were present in the silo caused the dust explosion.

3.2. PP
3.2. PP (Polypropylene)
(Polypropylene) Silo
Silo Explosions
Explosions
An explosion
An explosion occurred
occurredinside
insidethe thepolypropylene
polypropylenesilo siloatatthetheYeosu
YeosuIndustrial
IndustrialComplex,
Complex, causing
causing a
a fire in the polypropylene stored inside the silo, resulting in the burning
fire in the polypropylene stored inside the silo, resulting in the burning of one aluminum silo on 10 July, of one aluminum silo on 10
July, 2017.
2017. Fortunately,
Fortunately, there wastherenowashumanno human
injury due injury dueshift
to the to the
time.shift time.
A fire and Aexplosion,
fire and explosion,
as shown in as
shown3,incaused
Figure Figuredamage
3, caused to damage
the top oftothethesilo
top(about
of the12 silo
m).(about 12 m). Itthat
It is possible is possible that the
the unreacted unreacted
components,
such as propylene and ethylene impregnated in the polypropylene powders, were desorbedwere
components, such as propylene and ethylene impregnated in the polypropylene powders, and
desorbed andinaccumulated
accumulated the silo during in the
the synthesis
silo during the synthesis
process because process because thewas
the polypropylene polypropylene
synthesized was in a
synthesized
spherical shapein aaround
spherical theshape around
catalyst. thethere
In fact, catalyst.
was In fact, there
a danger that was a danger that
the flammable gasthe flammable
concentration
gasthe
in concentration
storage silo could in the increase
storage silo
withcould
time. increase
The flammablewith time. gas The
wasflammable
measured to gas wasppm
3764 measured
after theto
3764suppression.
fire ppm after the fire suppression.
Although Although themeter
the gas concentration gas concentration
for measuring meter for measuring
propylene propylene
concentration was
concentration was present in the process, the calibration of the gas sensor
present in the process, the calibration of the gas sensor was set without multiplying the gas correction was set without multiplying
the gasfor
value correction
methane,value and it forwas
methane,
mistakenlyand itassumed
was mistakenly
that it did assumed
not exceedthat itthedidlower
not exceed the lower
explosion limit
explosion
(LEL) at thatlimit
time.(LEL)As atthethat time.
pellet As the
product waspellet product
conveyed bywas conveyedfriction
air pressure, by air between
pressure,the friction
pipe
between the pipe and the pellet occurred. As a result, friction static
and the pellet occurred. As a result, friction static electricity was generated and polypropylene dust electricity was generated and
floating in the silo was charged. Under normal conditions, it was transported to the silo, and even to
polypropylene dust floating in the silo was charged. Under normal conditions, it was transported if
the silo, and
charged, the even
residualif charged,
fine dust thewas
residual fine dust
discharged was discharged
through through an
an air purification air purification
device. However,device.
it was
However, that
presumed it wasdustpresumed
with static that dust with
electricity was static electricity
introduced intowas
the introduced
storage silo,into the storage
the lower part ofsilo,
whichthe
lower
was partatofthe
open which
time wasof theopen at the and
accident, timethe of discharged
the accident, and product
pellet the discharged
acted aspellet product
an ignition actedfor
source as
an ignition source for the flammable gas stagnation space. Estimation
the flammable gas stagnation space. Estimation of the oxidant suggested that air blowers were used to of the oxidant suggested that
air blowers
transport thewere
productusedtotothe transport the product
polypropylene storage to silo,
the polypropylene
and pellets were storage silo, and
discharged pellets
to the bottom wereof
discharged
the accidentto the bottom
storage silo, soofthat
the air
accident storage silo, being
was continuously so thatintroduced
air was continuously
through thebeing upperintroduced
vent pipe.
through the upper vent pipe.

Figure 3. (a) Image of fire after silo explosion; (b) Image of upper platform deviating from silo.
Figure 3. (a) Image of fire after silo explosion; (b) Image of upper platform deviating from silo.
on site. The explosion occurred during the opening of the discharge valve of the mixer bowl, which
was the preparation of the propellant charge.
The accident investigation was carried out through analysis of the three basic elements of fire.
The propellant used a binder that had such physical properties as plastic or rubber, and was intended
to bond the2019,
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11, 4888 of the propellant to each other. It can also be used as a fuel when burning. 6 of 13
The propellant contained 86% ammonium perchlorate, which was used as a powerful oxidizer, and
can possibly expand damage in case of a fire. Sources of energy that can act as ignition sources include
3.3. Dustenergy
thermal Explosion by fire,
(i.e., Ammonium Perchlorate surface), mechanical energy (i.e., friction, shock), and
high temperature
electrical energy (i.e.,
An accident staticinelectricity,
occurred a combustionelectrical spark).
chamber As charging
while a result of the accident
slurry ammonium investigation,
perchlorate it
was found in
propellant that
thethe discharge
mixer valve
ball into the was not opentube,
combustion during the charging
causing of the
a disastrous combustion
explosion. Thistube, so a
accident
worker used a rubber hammer to open the discharge valve. It was estimated that
occurred on 29 May, 2018, in the Daejeon area, as shown in Figure 4. A sudden fire occurred in the a fire occurred in
the propellant
propellant, due to
resulting inthe
the impact
deaths of of five
hitting the wooden
workers rod of
and injuries onfour
the workers,
dischargewho valve
werehead with the
working on
rubber
site. Thehammer inside
explosion the mixer
occurred duringball
thecontaining
opening ofthe
thepropellant.
discharge Therefore,
valve of theitmixer
was presumed thatwas
bowl, which an
impulse exceeding the propellant
the preparation of the propellant charge. impact sensitivity was generated in the slurry propellant by the
impact, and a fire occurred in the propellant.

Figure 4.
Figure (a) Front
4. (a) Front image
image of
of the
the place
place where
where the
the accident
accident occurred;
occurred; (b)
(b) Image
Image of
of accident
accident equipment.
equipment.

The accident investigation was carried out through analysis of the three basic elements of fire.
4. Discussion
The propellant used a binder that had such physical properties as plastic or rubber, and was intended
to
4.1.bond
Dustthe components
Explosion of the
for Other propellant to each other. It can also be used as a fuel when burning.
Countries
The propellant contained 86% ammonium perchlorate, which was used as a powerful oxidizer, and
Figure 5expand
can possibly showsdamage
the results of of
in case 87a cases of dustofexplosions
fire. Sources energy thatin canJapan
act asfrom 1987
ignition to 2003
sources [27].
include
Approximately 51% of dust explosions were caused by metal dust, followed by 17% of
thermal energy (i.e., fire, high temperature surface), mechanical energy (i.e., friction, shock), and the accidents
being caused
electrical by wood.
energy Dustelectricity,
(i.e., static explosions occurredspark).
electrical in 16%As and 8% of of
a result thethe
accidents
accidentcaused by plastic
investigation, it
and food, respectively. According to the Japan Institute for Occupational Safety and
was found that the discharge valve was not open during the charging of the combustion tube, so a Health (JNIOSH),
metal, wood,
worker used aand plastic
rubber dust account
hammer for about
to open the 85%valve.
discharge of theItdust
wasexplosions.
estimated that a fire occurred in the
propellant due to the impact of hitting the wooden rod on the discharge valve head with the rubber
hammer inside the mixer ball containing the propellant. Therefore, it was presumed that an impulse
exceeding the propellant impact sensitivity was generated in the slurry propellant by the impact, and a
fire occurred in the propellant.

4. Discussion

4.1. Dust Explosion for Other Countries

Figure 5 shows the results of 87 cases of dust explosions in Japan from 1987 to 2003 [27].
Approximately 51% of dust explosions were caused by metal dust, followed by 17% of the accidents
being caused by wood. Dust explosions occurred in 16% and 8% of the accidents caused by plastic
and food, respectively. According to the Japan Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (JNIOSH),
metal, wood, and plastic dust account for about 85% of the dust explosions.
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Figure 5. Cause of dust explosions in Japan from 1987 to 2003.

Figure 5. Cause
Figure 5. Cause of
of dust
dust explosions
explosions in
in Japan
Japan from
from 1987
1987 to
to 2003.
2003.
Figure 6a
Figure 6a presents combustible
combustible dust dust fires
fires and
and explosions
explosions from from 1980 1980 to to 2005
2005 in in the
the United
United States.
They Figure
identified6a presents
presents
119 combustible
deaths in 78 of dust
the 281fires
dust and explosions
explosions from
[28]. An 1980 to 2005
average of indeaths,
5 the United States.
States.
29 injuries,
They
They identified
identified 119 deaths
119 deaths in 78 of the 281
in 78 of annually, dust
the 281 dust explosions
explosions [28]. An average
[28]. (Chemical of
An averageSafety 5 deaths,
of 5 deaths, 29 injuries, and
29statistical
injuries,
and
10 10
dust dust explosions occurred according to CSB Board)
and 10 explosions
analysis. dust
Although
occurred
explosionsno property
annually,
occurred damages
according
annually,have
to CSB (Chemical
according
been reported to CSB Safety Board)
(Chemical
by governments Safety statistical
Board)
or entities,
private
analysis.
statistical
entities, FM
Although
analysis. no property
Although damages
no property have
damages beenhavereported by
beendollars governments
reported by governmentsor private or private FM Global
entities, FM
Global
Insurance Insurance
Company Company
reported reported over
over 1 million 1 million
dollarsdollars
of propertyof property losses
losses losses
from 22 fromdust 22 dust explosions
Global
from Insurance
1983 to 2003 Company
[29]. reported
According to over
the 1 million
distribution of of property
combustible dust from
explosions, 22explosions
dust
food
from
explosions
products,
1983
from to 2003 [29].
1983 2003According to the to distribution of combustible dust explosions, food products, wood,
wood,
and andto
metals metals
account
[29].
account
for
According
more forthan
more 65%
the distribution
than
of 65% of explosions,
explosions,
of combustible
and andaccounts
plastic plasticdust explosions,
accounts
for 14%. for
More
foodMore
14%. products,
than 73% than
of
wood,
73% of and
the metals
accidents account
were forcaused
more than by 65% of explosions,
combustible dusts. and plastic
The CSB alsoaccounts
reported for 14%.
that More than
equipment
the
73% accidents were caused
of the accidents were bycaused
combustible by were dusts. The CSB
combustible dusts. also
The reported
CSB also thatreported
equipment thatmalfunctions
equipment
malfunctions
caused by dust caused
collectorsby dust
were collectors
the most common the most common
accidents in allaccidents
industries. in all industries.
Figure 6b Figurethe
classifies 6b
malfunctions
classifies the caused
dust by
generateddust collectors
in industries werein the
the most
United common
States accidents
for two in
years, all
withindustries.
more Figure
than 60% 6b
in
dust generated
classifies thefood
dustin generated
industries in in industries
the UnitedinStates the for two
United years,
States forwithtwo more
years, than
with 60%
more inthan
combining
60% in
combining
food and wood and
products woodamong products among
176 cases 176
[30]. cases [30].
In 2016,[30].a totalIn 2016, a total of 31 accidents occurred.
combining
With respect food and wood
to materials,
combustible products
materials, among
wood 176
andcasesfood In of
products
31 accidents
2016, a total offor
accounted
occurred.
31more
accidents With respect
occurred.
thanmetal
60%, and and
to
Withcombustible
respect to accounted
combustible wood and
materials, food
wood products
and accounted
foodexplosions for
products accounted more than 60%,
for more and
than 60%, and
metal
coal and
accounted coal for 9%. Analysis for 9%. Analysis of the dust from equipment showed that 19%
metal
occurredandincoal dustaccounted
collectors, for16% 9%.of in
the dustofexplosions
Analysis
storage silos/hoppers,
from equipment
the dust explosions and 10% fromin
showed that
equipment
elevators/conveyors.showed19% occurred
that 19%
In cases
2017,
in dust collectors,
occurred in dust 16% in storage
collectors, 16% silos/hoppers,
in storage and 10% in
silos/hoppers, andelevators/conveyors.
10% in elevators/conveyors.In 2017, 145 In 2017,
145 cases
were were and
reported, reported, and theofnumber
the number of dust explosions
dust explosions increased,
increased,increased,
but blowout but blowout panels were
145 cases
installed were
in reported,
equipment and
to the number
make smaller of explosions
dust explosions and reduce but panels
disastrous blowout werepanels
explosions.
installed
were
The
in equipment
installed in to make smaller
equipment to makeexplosions
smaller and reduce disastrous
explosions and reduceexplosions.
disastrous The explosions.
classificationThe of
classificationmaterials
combustible of combustiblethat materials
caused the that caused
accidents was thesimilar
accidents to wasofsimilar
that 2016, to that
with wood of 2016,
and with
food
classification
wood and of products
food combustible materialsforthat
accounting more caused
than the
55%,accidents
and metal was similar by
accidents to that
8%. of 2016, with
However, the
products
wood and accounting
food for more
products than 55%,for
accounting andmoremetal accidents
than 55%, by 8%.
and metal However,
accidents theby type 8%. ofHowever,
equipmentthe in
type
the of equipment
accidents in
was slightly the accidents
different from was slightly
2016, with different
17% in dust from 2016,
collectors, with 17%
14% in dust
ininstorage collectors,
silos/hoppers, 14%
type of equipment
in storage in the and
silos/hoppers, accidents
8%Frominwas slightly different
elevators/conveyors. from
From 2016,
Figure with
6b, 17%
it can bedust
seen collectors,
that thefrom 14%
ratio
and
in 8%
storagein elevators/conveyors.
silos/hoppers, and 8% in Figure 6b,
elevators/conveyors.it can be seen
From that
Figure the ratio
6b, it of
can dust
be explosions
seen that the ratio
of dust explosions from food products has increased, but dust explosions from metal have decreased,
food
of products
dust explosions has increased,
from but dust explosions from metal have decreased,fromcompared
metal haveto Figure 6a.
compared to Figure 6a.food
Detailedproducts has increased,
statistics information but dust
is explosions
provided in Supplementary decreased,
Information
Detailed
compared statistics
to Figure information
6a. Detailed is provided
statisticsininformation
Supplementary Information
is provided (SI.1 and SI.2). Information
in Supplementary
(SI.1 and SI.2).
(SI.1 and SI.2).

Figure 6. (a) Distribution of types of dust explosions in the United States (%) from 1980 to 2005; (b)
Figure 6. (a) Distribution of types of dust explosions in the United States (%) from 1980 to 2005; (b)
Distribution
Figure 6. (a) of types of dust
Distribution of occurring
types in the
of dust United States
explosions in the(%) from States
United 2016 to(%)
2017.
from 1980 to 2005; (b)
Distribution of types of dust occurring in the United States (%) from 2016 to 2017.
Distribution of types of dust occurring in the United States (%) from 2016 to 2017.
Sustainability 2019, 11, 4888 8 of 13

Sustainability
Sustainability2019,
2019,11,
11,xxFOR
FORPEER
PEERREVIEW
REVIEW 88ofof12
12

Figure 7 showed the analysis of 303 dust explosions in the United Kingdom from 1979 to 1988 [31].
Figure
Figure77showed
showedthe theanalysis
analysisofof303
303dust
dustexplosions
explosionsininthetheUnited
UnitedKingdom
Kingdomfrom from1979
1979toto1988
1988
Sixty-nine cases by paper/wood, 55 cases by metal dusts, and 43 cases by food products were reported,
[31].
[31].Sixty-nine
Sixty-ninecases
casesby bypaper/wood,
paper/wood,55 55cases
casesby bymetal
metaldusts,
dusts,and
and43
43cases
casesby
byfood
foodproducts
productswere
were
as shown in Figure 7a. Those materials caused more than 50% of dust explosions. In addition, 227 cases
reported,
reported, as
as shown
shown inin Figure
Figure 7a.
7a. Those
Those materials
materials caused
caused moremore than
than 50%
50% ofof dust
dust explosions.
explosions. In
In
(74% of 303 cases) were caused by combustible dusts. Analysis of 303 dust explosions with respect to
addition,
addition, 227
227 cases
cases (74%
(74% ofof 303
303 cases)
cases) were
were caused
caused byby combustible
combustible dusts.
dusts. Analysis
Analysis ofof 303
303 dust
dust
equipment, as shown Figure 7b, revealed that 53 cases of accidents occurred in a mill/grinder, 47 cases
explosions
explosions with
with respect
respect toto equipment,
equipment, as as shown
shown Figure
Figure 7b,
7b, revealed
revealed that
that 53
53 cases
cases of
of accidents
accidents
of accidents in a filter, and 43 cases of accidents in a dryer. Meanwhile, 19 cases of dust explosions in a
occurred
occurred in a mill/grinder, 47 cases of accidents in a filter, and 43 cases of accidents in aa dryer.
in a mill/grinder, 47 cases of accidents in a filter, and 43 cases of accidents in dryer.
silo/hopper accounted for 6.3% of total accidents.
Meanwhile,
Meanwhile,19 19cases
casesof ofdust
dustexplosions
explosionsininaasilo/hopper
silo/hopperaccounted
accountedforfor6.3%
6.3%of
oftotal
totalaccidents.
accidents.

Figure 7.7.(a)
Figure Distribution of types of dust explosions occurring in the United Kingdom; (b) Distribution
Figure 7. (a)(a) Distribution
Distribution ofof types
types ofof dust
dust explosions
explosions occurring
occurring inin the
the United
United Kingdom;
Kingdom; (b)
(b)
of dust explosion
Distribution by equipment.
Distributionofofdust
dustexplosion
explosionby byequipment.
equipment.
Figure 8 shows 37 cases of dust explosions from 2000 to 2018 in France. Wood products and plastic
Figure
Figure88shows
shows3737cases
casesofofdust
dustexplosions
explosionsfrom
from2000
2000toto2018
2018ininFrance.
France.Wood
Woodproducts
productsandandplastic
plastic
dusts accounted for half of the dust explosions, followed by metal and food products at 19% each [32].
dusts
dusts accounted for half of the dust explosions, followed by metal and food products at 19%each
accounted for half of the dust explosions, followed by metal and food products at 19% each
More than 50% of dust explosions occurred in silos/hoppers and filters/dust collectors. About 90% or
[32].
[32].More
Morethan
than50%
50%of ofdust
dustexplosions
explosionsoccurred
occurredin insilos/hoppers
silos/hoppersand andfilters/dust
filters/dustcollectors.
collectors.About
About
more of accidents were caused by combustible dusts. Compared with the previous Japanese accident
90%
90%or ormore
moreofofaccidents
accidentswere
werecaused
causedby
bycombustible
combustibledusts.
dusts.Compared
Comparedwith withthe
theprevious
previousJapanese
Japanese
analysis, this shows a similar characteristic for dust explosions.
accident analysis, this shows a similar characteristic for dust explosions.
accident analysis, this shows a similar characteristic for dust explosions.

Figure 8. Dust explosions in France over 18 years. (a) Distribution of types of dust involved in
Figure
Figure8.8.Dust
Dust explosions
explosionsininFrance
Franceover
over18
18years.
years.(a)
(a)Distribution
Distributionofoftypes
typesofofdust
dustinvolved
involvedinin
explosion; (b) Distribution of dust explosion by equipment.
explosion; (b) Distribution of dust explosion by equipment.
explosion; (b) Distribution of dust explosion by equipment.
4.2. Characteristics of Dust Explosions between South Korean and Other Countries
4.2.
4.2.Characteristics
CharacteristicsofofDust
DustExplosions
Explosionsbetween
betweenSouth
SouthKoreanKoreanand
andOther
OtherCountries
Countries
Accident analysis of dust explosions in South Korea and other countries found that the causes
Accident
Accident
and types analysis
of industry of
ofdust
analysisdiffer
dust
fromexplosions
country in
explosions inSouth
to SouthKorea
country. Korea
Withand
theother
and other countries found
countriesof
development found that
thatthe
the heavy thecauses
causes
chemical
and
andtypes
typesof
industries, ofindustry
dustindustry differ
differ
explosions from
from
were country
country
mainly totocountry.
caused country.
by metal,With
With the
thedevelopment
development
plastic, and food. The of
ofthe
theheavy
main heavy
cause chemical
chemical
of dust
industries,
industries,dust
explosions dust
in explosions
Japanexplosions were
exhibitedwere mainly caused
mainlypattern
a similar causedto by metal,
bySouth
metal, plastic,Itand
plastic,
Korea. and food.
food.The
is estimated main
Thethat
main
thecause
cause of
ofdust
geographicdust
explosions
proximity in
explosionsandinJapan
Japanexhibited
exhibited
industrial aasimilar
structure similar pattern
pattern
are similar totoSouth
to those South Korea.
Korea.
of South ItItisisestimated
Korea. that
thatthe
estimatedspecial
However, the geographic
geographic
care must be
proximity
proximity
taken and
and
for dust industrial
explosions structure
industrialfrom
structure are
metals,are similar
similar
since totothose
thoseof
the explosiveness ofSouth
South Korea. However,
Korea.dust
of metallic However,
can alsospecial
be an care
special caremust
must
important
be taken
be taken
cause for dust explosions
for explosions.
of dust dust explosions
On thefrom
from metals,
metals,
other since
hand,since the explosiveness
the explosiveness
the sources of metallic
of metallic
of dust explosions dust
in thedust can also
can States
United be
also be an
andan
important
importantcause
causeof ofdust
dustexplosions.
explosions.On Onthetheother
otherhand,hand,the
thesources
sourcesof ofdust
dustexplosions
explosionsininthetheUnited
United
States
States and
and the
the United
United Kingdom
Kingdom were were food,
food, wood/paper,
wood/paper, and and metallic
metallic materials,
materials, although
although theythey
Sustainability 2019, 11, 4888 9 of 13

the United Kingdom were food, wood/paper, and metallic materials, although they occurred with
different frequency. The main sources of dust explosions in France were wood, plastic, and metal.
As the recent dust explosions in silos were mentioned in the case studies, many dust explosions
were caused by equipment, such as silos/hoppers, filters/dust collectors, and mills/grinders in other
countries. The workplace should strive to prevent dust explosions and train workers before use to
raise safety awareness about the risk of dust explosions.

4.3. Effective Protective/Mitigatory Measures of Dust Explosions

Protective/mitigatory measures of dust explosions play a significant role in minimizing human
and property losses. As of today, explosion isolation, partial inerting, explosion venting, explosion
suppression, and preventing secondary explosions outside process equipment are well-known
preventive measures.
Explosion isolation is an important prevention technique to prevent spreading from a primary
explosion to other processes. Lunn et al. (1996) conducted a coal dust explosion experiment in a system
of linked vessels connected by a pipe [33]. Holbrow et al. (1999) conducted a similar experiment and
presented a quantitative guide for design and protective methods, such as explosion containment and
explosion venting in interconnected process systems [34]. Taveau (2017) reported that large-scale testing
required verifying explosion isolation systems and needed to place the explosion isolation device
in the correct position [35]. Partial inerting decreases the oxygen concentration in the atmosphere,
rather than the complete removal of oxygen, thereby reducing both the ignition sensitivity and the
combustion rate of the dust cloud, as well as substantially increasing the minimum ignition energy
(MIE) [36]. Several studies have been conducted experimentally on the effect of oxygen content of
MIE on various types of dust. Ackroyd et al. (2011) measured the MIE of organic powders at reduced
oxygen concentration and correlated it with the oxygen concentration of the atmosphere [37]. Choi
et al. (2015) reported that MIE increased in all the powders used in the experiment as the N2 in the
air increased, though it varied depending on the type of powder [38]. Explosion venting is the most
efficient and widely used method to mitigate the effects of dust explosions, and many studies have
been conducted on it. Tascon et al. (2016) carried out dust explosion experiments. Four vessels with
different geometries in a silo were used to analyze the effect of the length/diameter (L/D) ratio, and
it was recommended to increase the vent area in elongated vessels when L/D is greater than 1 [39].
Tascon (2017) analyzed the effectiveness of inertia in three different venting systems and presented
practical recommendations for vent area design in silos [40]. Explosions in industrial plants usually
occur mainly in tanks, reactors, and technical systems, and then extend to the entire system before
emerging outside. Active explosion suppression for mitigation of dust explosion is complex and
expensive, and is used only when a simple and inexpensive method does not apply. An effective
way to minimize the loss of these explosions was to suppress the explosion in the plant and localize
the losses. Moore (1987) developed automatic explosion suppression systems and designed early
detection of developing explosions. Dust explosions usually last from several tens to several hundred
milliseconds in a tank that has a volume of several cubic meters. The extinguishing agent was sprayed
at a high speed of about 100 m/s to suppress the explosion for several milliseconds from the beginning
to prevent dust explosions [41]. Recently, active explosion suppression using extinguishing powders
or water in occupational safety zones is becoming more widespread [42,43]. Based on computational
fluid dynamics (CFD), Morgan (2000) confirmed the applicability of numerical models of complex
explosion suppression processes and designed novel suppressant injection nozzles [44]. The remaining
issues of all efforts to fight the hazards of dust explosions are preventing secondary explosions outside
process equipment and are closely related to the impact of the accidents. Cybulski et al. (1993) reported
that relatively weak secondary dust explosions in short and narrow tunnels in grain elevators were
extinguished by an appropriate design and triggered by water barriers [45]. Eckhoff (2003) claimed that
extensive secondary explosions could be removed by freeing dust from outside process equipment [10].
Sustainability 2019, 11, 4888 10 of 13

Although many studies are in progress, efficient design of venting arrangements is one of the hardest
tasks to prevent propagation of dust explosions in complex coupled-process systems.

5. Conclusions
Since dust explosions cause not only human and property loss, but also secondary dust explosions,
this study investigated various cases of dust explosions that occurred in South Korea and several other
countries. It was found that not only the cause of dust, but also the industrial structure changed as
time passed. Therefore, these situations should be identified, and appropriate preventive or mitigating
methods should be presented.
In this study, 53 combustible dust- and flammable solid-related fire explosions from 1984 to 2018
in South Korea were reported, with the causes of the dust explosions being similar to those in Japan.
For instance, metal dust accounted for 44%, and plastic and food causes accounted for 19%, which was
considered to reflect industrial characteristics. There were 176 cases of accidents in the United States
between 2016 and 2017, and more than 60% were caused by food and wood products. In 2016, a total
of 31 accidents occurred. Analysis of the dust explosion equipment showed that 30% occurred in dust
collectors, 12% in storage silos, and 6% in grinding equipment. In 2017, 145 cases were reported, and
the number of dust explosions increased, but blowout panels were installed in equipment to make
a smaller explosion and reduce disastrous explosion. The equipment that caused the accidents was
identified as 18% being dust collectors, 14% storage silos, and 8% elevators/conveyors. There were 303
dust explosions in the United Kingdom from 1979 to 1988. Among them, 53 cases of dust explosions
occurred in mills/grinders, 47 cases of accidents in filters, 43 cases in dryers, and 19 cases occurred in
silos/hoppers, which are increasingly used in South Korea. Dust explosions from 2000 to 2018 in France
showed that wood products and plastic dusts accounted for half of the dust explosions, followed
by metal and food products at 19% each. Dust explosions during the last three years were caused
by organic matters and metal, and unfortunately, dust explosions have occurred repeatedly during
grinding, mixing, and injection of powder materials into facilities. There were no accidents reported
during the production process of wood or paper during the last three years.
Dust explosions represent catastrophic accidents, but can be mitigated easily if the mechanism
of the dust explosion is identified. Therefore, understanding of basic knowledge contributes to
reducing the risk of dust explosions. In addition, prevention measures for dust explosions should be
presented, based on recent accident characteristics and the complexity of the process. Taking these
facts into account, the following are measures to prevent dust explosions in chemical plants where
dust explosions mainly occur:

(i) Good housekeeping is necessary to prevent accumulation and scattering of dust on the floor of
the building;
(ii) Dust generating facilities should be improved by means of installment of the lid or a sealed
structure so that dust is not scattered to the outside;
(iii) A metal separator must be installed at the crusher inlet to prevent sparks;
(iv) All dust generation facilities should be connected to the damping system, and if there is a risk of
heat accumulation due to internal fixation, a thermometer should be installed;
(v) If the gas used to calibrate the sensor differs from the actual measurement of the gas concentration,
the manufacturer provides the correction value, and the user must apply the correction value to
set the sensor sensitivity and alarm;
(vi) Silos used in the production and storage of various resin products must be evaluated and
monitored for the occurrence of gas concentrations at a normal time, due to process characteristics;
(vii) Oxygen concentrations must be lower than the explosion minimum concentration through the
inclusion of an inert gas, such as nitrogen. If a change in oxygen concentration is observed, it is
considered to be a dangerous situation, and the operation should be immediately stopped until
the problem is resolved;
Sustainability 2019, 11, 4888 11 of 13

(viii) High-speed operation valves, explosion pressure vents, and explosion suppression devices should
be installed to protect against dust explosions.

Supplementary Materials: The following are available online at http://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/11/18/4888/s1,

Title: Case Studies for Dangerous Dust Explosions in South Korea during Recent Years.
Author Contributions: Conceptualization, C.K., S.J.; methodology, S.P., C.R.; formal analysis, S.J., C.R.;
writing—original draft preparation, C.K., S.J.
Funding: This research received no external funding.
Acknowledgments: This paper cites data from the Korea Occupational Safety and Health Agency (KOSHA) and
the Korea Ministry of Employment and Labor.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.

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