G.R. No.
180168, February 27, 2012, MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT enrichment essentially contemplates payment when there is no duty to pay,
AUTHORITY vs. AVIA FILIPINAS INTERNATIONAL, INC
Facts:
In September 1990, Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA)
entered into a contract of lease with Avia Filipinas International Corporation
(AFIC), with respect to specific portions of land as well as facilities within the
Ninoy Aquino International Airport. The contract was for one (1) year,
beginning September 1, 1990 until August 31, 1991, with a monthly rental of
₱6,580.00.
In December 1990, MIAA issued an administrative order which revised
the rates of fees for the use of its properties, facilities and services within the
airport complex, made effective on December 1, 1990. As a consequence, the
monthly rentals due from AFIC was increased to ₱15,996.50. Nonetheless,
MIAA did not require AFIC to pay the new rental fee. Thus, it continued to pay
the original fee.
After the expiration of the contract, AFIC continued to use the leased
premises paying the original rental fee without protest on the part of MIAA
giving rise to an implied lease contract on a monthly basis.
Three years after the expiration of the original contract of lease, MIAA
informed AFIC, that the monthly rental over the subject premises was
increased to ₱15,966.50 following the expiration of the original contract of
lease. MIAA sought recovery of the difference between the increased rental
rate and the original rental fee the months between September 1, 1991 and
September 31, 1994. Beginning October 1994, AFIC paid the increased rental
fee. However, it refused to pay the sum sought to be recovered by MIAA. For
the continued refusal of AFIC to pay the said lump sum, its employees were
denied access to the leased premises. This, notwithstanding, AFIC continued
paying its rentals. Subsequently, AFIC was granted temporary access to the
leased premises.
AFIC then filed a complaint against MIAA who argues that it is not
guilty of unjust enrichment when it denied respondent access to the leased
premises, because there is nothing unlawful in its act of imposing sanctions
against respondent for the latter's failure to pay the increased rental.
Issue:
Whether or not the principle of unjust enrichment is applicable to the
instant case.
Ruling:
Yes. In accordance with jurisprudence, there is unjust enrichment
when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a
person retains money or property of another against the fundamental
principles of justice, equity and good conscience.13 The principle of unjust
and the person who receives the payment has no right to receive it.14
In the instant case, it is clear that petitioner failed to maintain
respondent in the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the leased premises
by unjustifiably preventing the latter access thereto. Consequently, in
accordance with Article 1658 of the Civil Code, respondent had no duty to
make rent payments. Despite that, respondent still continued to pay the rental
fees agreed upon in the original contract. Thus, it would be the height of
inequity and injustice as well as unjust enrichment on the part of petitioner if
the rental fees paid by respondent during the time that it was denied access to
and prevented from using the leased premises be not returned to it.
Note: Petitioner has no legal basis in requiring respondent to pay
additional rental fees from September 1, 1991 to September 30, 1994; it, thus,
follows that petitioner's act of denying respondent and its employees access
to the leased premises from July 1, 1997 until March 11, 1998, by reason of
respondent's non-payment of the said additional fees, is likewise unjustified.
While it is true that rhe Contract of Lease states that "[a]ny subsequent
amendment which will effect a decrease or escalation of the monthly rental
shall be deemed incorporated herein and shall automatically amend this
Contract insofar as the monthly rental is concerned; this shuld should not be
read in isolation. Rather, it should be read together with the other provisions,
which provide that "[a]ny amendment, alteration or modification of th[e]
Contract shall not be valid and binding, unless and until made in writing and
signed by the parties thereto." It is clear then that the intention of the parties is
to subject such amendment to the conformity of both petitioner and
respondent. In the instant case, there is no showing that respondent gave his
acquiescence to the said amendment or modification of the contract.
It may not be amiss to point out that during the abovementioned
period, respondent continued to pay and petitioner kept on receiving the
original rental without any reservations or protests from the latter. Neither did
petitioner indicate in the official receipts it issued that the payments made by
respondent constitute only partial fulfillment of the latter's obligations.
G.R. No. 170865, April 25, 2012, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs.
SPOUSES CHEAH CHEE CHONG
Facts:
Ofelia Cheah was approached by Filipina Tuazon, a friend Adelina
Guarin who she was having a conversation with, to ask if she could have
Filipina’s check cleared and encashed for a service fee of 2.5%. The check
was a $300,000.00, Bank of America Check. Because Adelina does not have
a dollar account, she asked Ofelia if she could accommodate Filipina’s request
since she has a joint dollar savings account with her husband Cheah Chee
Chong with PNB Buendia Branch. Ofelia agreed.
They met with the Loans Department who referred them to PNB
Division Chief Garin. Garin discussed with them the process of clearing the
check and they were told that it normally takes 15 days. Assured that the
deposit and subsequent clearance of the check is a normal transaction, Ofelia
deposited Filipina’s check.
PNB then sent it for clearing through its correspondent bank,
Philadelphia National Bank. 5 days later, PNB received a credit advice from
Philadelphia that the proceeds of the subject check had been temporarily
credited to PNB’s account. The following day, PNB Buendia, after deducting
the bank charges, credited $299,248.37 to the account of the spouses
Cheah. Acting on Adelina’s instruction to withdraw the credited amount.
Filipina received all the proceeds.
In the meantime, PNB received a message from Philadelphia,
informing PNB of the return of the check for insufficient funds. Informed about
the bounced check and upon demand by PNB Buendia to return the money
withdrawn, Ofelia immediately contacted Filipina to get the money back. But
the latter told her that all the money had already been given to several people
who asked for the check’s encashment. Criminal charges were then filed
against these suspect beneficiaries.
Subsequently, PNB sent a demand letter to spouses Cheah for the
return of the amount of the check, froze their peso and dollar deposits, and
filed a complaint against them for Sum of Money, invoking the principle of
solution indebiti.
Issue:
Whether or not the principle of solutio indebiti under the Civil Code is
applicable in this case.
Ruling:
No. The requisites of solutio indebiti, are, (a) that he who paid was not
under obligation to do so; and (b) that the payment was made by reason of an
essential mistake of fact.
In the case at bench, PNB cannot recover the proceeds of the check
under the principle it invokes. In the first place, the gross negligence of PNB
can never be equated with a mere mistake of fact, which must be something
excusable and which requires the exercise of prudence. No recovery is due if
the mistake done is one of gross negligence.
PNB’s act of releasing the proceeds of the check prior to the lapse of
the 15-day clearing period was the proximate cause of the loss. Payment of
the amounts of checks without previously clearing them with the drawee bank
especially so where the drawee bank is a foreign bank and the amounts
involved were large is contrary to normal or ordinary banking practice. PNB
miserably failed to do its duty of exercising extraordinary diligence and
reasonable business prudence. This disregard of its own banking policy
amounts to gross negligence.
However, spouses Cheah are guilty of contributory negligence and are
bound to share the loss with the bank. Ofelia failed to observe caution in giving
her full trust in accommodating a complete stranger. Considering that Filipina
was not personally known to her and the amount of the foreign check to be
encashed was $300,000.00, a higher degree of care is expected of Ofelia
which she, however, failed to exercise under the circumstances. Also when a
bank officer called her up to inform that the Bank of America check has already
been cleared way earlier than the 15-day clearing period, this fact contrary to
what Garin told her that clearing takes 15 days should have already put Ofelia
on guard. She should have first verified the regularity of such hasty clearance
considering that if something goes wrong with the transaction, it is she and her
husband who would be put at risk and not the accommodated party. However,
Ofelia chose to ignore the same and instead actively participated in
immediately withdrawing the proceeds of the check.
G.R. No. 173881, December 1, 2010, HYATT ELEVATORS vs.
CATHEDRAL HEIGHTS
Facts:
Petitioner Hyatt Elevators and Escalators Corporation entered into
a Service Agreement with respondent Cathedral Heights Building Complex
Association, Inc., where petitioner was contracted to maintain four
passenger elevators installed in respondent's building. Section D (2) of the
Service Agreement provides that respondent shall pay for the additional
charges incurred in connection with the repair and supply of parts.
Petitioner claims that during the period of April 1997 to July 1998 it
had incurred expenses amounting to Php 1,161,933.47 in the maintenance
and repair of the four elevators as itemized in a statement of account.
Petitioner demanded from respondent the payment of the aforesaid
amount allegedly through a series of demand letters and supported by
sales invoices, delivery receipts, trouble call reports and maintenance and
checking reports. Respondent, however, refuses to pay the said amount.
Respondent, however, refused to pay the amount arguing that petitioner
had not complied with the Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) following
a breakdown of an elevator. Hence, a case was filed with the RTC.
The RTC held that a contract of sale of goods was entered into
between the parties. Since petitioner was able to fulfill its obligation, the
RTC ruled that it was incumbent on respondent to pay for the services
rendered. On the other hand, the CA reversed the RTC decision ruling that
respondent did not give its consent to the purchase of the spare parts
allegedly installed in the defective elevators and that there was no meeting
of minds upon the price.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a perfected contract of sale between
petitioner and respondent with regards to the spare parts delivered and
installed as to render respondent liable for their prices.

Ruling:
No. There was no perfected contract of sale, in this case. The fixing
of the price can never be left to the decision of one of the contracting
parties. But a price fixed by one of the contracting parties, if accepted by
the other, gives rise to a perfected sale. Petitioner had failed to secure the
necessary purchase orders from respondent's Board of Directors, or
Finance Manager, to signify their assent to the price of the parts to be used
in the repair of the elevators. There would have been a perfected contract
of sale had respondent accepted the price dictated by petitioner even if
such assent was given after the services were rendered. There is,
however, no proof of such acceptance on the part of respondent.
The foregoing findings notwithstanding, the Court ruled that to
deny petitioner's claim would unjustly enrich respondent who had benefited
from the repairs of their four elevators. This Court finds that respondent is
also partly to be blamed for allowing petitioner to conduct the repairs
without the necessary purchase orders. It would certainly be absurd for
respondent to feign knowledge of the repairs, especially since the same
were done within their premises and in the presence of their building
engineer, clerk and guard on duty. It bears to point out that several repairs
were made from 1997 to 1998. During this time, respondent and its
employees never once questioned the authority of petitioner to install
replacement parts during the repairs. Had they done so, then it would have
been likely that things would not have gone out of hand and petitioner
would have been reminded to follow the SOP if such was the case.
Withal, it is indisputable that the repairs made on the elevators
ultimately redounded to the benefit of respondent for without said repairs,
the elevators would not be operational. Under Article 2142 of the Civil
Code, such acts "give rise to the juridical relation of quasi-contract to the
end that no one shall be unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense of
another." It would certainly be unjust for respondent to benefit from the
repairs done by petitioner only to refuse payment because the papers
submitted were not in order.
G.R. NO. 158768, February 12, 2008, TITAN-IKEDA CONSTRUCTION &
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP,
INC.
Facts:
In 1992, Respondent Primetown Property Group, Inc. awarded the
contract for the structural works of its 32-storey Makati Prime Tower (MPT)
to petitioner Titan-Ikeda Construction and Development Corporation.
Upon the completion of MPT's structural works, respondent
awarded the P130,000,000 contract for the tower's architectural works
(project) to petitioner. Thus, on January 31, 1994, the parties executed a
supplemental agreement which covers the detailed construction bid plans
and specifications of the project. The payment terms shall be "full
swapping" or full payment in condominium units where 80% of units will be
given- upon posting and acceptance by [respondent] of the performance
bond and 20% or remaining balance upon completion of the project. The
contract period was set for fifteen (15) months.
Petitioner started working on the project in February 1994. On June
1994, respondent executed a deed of sale (covering condominium units
and parking slots of the MP valued by the parties at P112M) in
favor of petitioner pursuant to the "full-swapping" payment provision of the
supplemental agreement. Shortly thereafter, petitioner sold some of its
units to third persons.
In September 1995, respondent engaged the services of
Integratech, Inc. (ITI) to evaluate the progress of the project. In its report,
ITI informed respondent that petitioner, at that point, had only
accomplished 31.89% of the project (or was 11 months and six days
behind schedule).
Meanwhile, petitioner and respondent were discussing the
possibility of the latter's takeover of the project's supervision. Despite
ongoing negotiations, respondent did not obtain petitioner's consent in
hiring ITI as the project's construction manager. Neither did it inform
petitioner of ITI's report. On October 12, 1995, petitioner sought to confirm
respondent's plan to take over the project. Respondent’s authorized
representatives signed the letter.
Petitioner repudiated the figure as reported by ITI but qualifiedly
admitted that it did not finish the project. Records showed that respondent
did not merely take over the supervision of the project but took full control
thereof.
Petitioner consequently conducted an inventory. On the basis
thereof, petitioner demanded from respondent the payment of its balance
of 2M. It demanded from respondent the delivery of MPT's management
certificate and the keys to the condominium units and the payment of its
(respondent's) balance. Respondent ignored petitioner's demand and
instead sent a demand letter to petitioner asking it to reimburse the actual
costs incurred in finishing the project (or P70M).
Issue:
Whether or not respondent was entitled to recover the value of the
unfinished portion of the project under the principle of unjust enrichment.
Ruling:
 Yes. The parties first entered into a contract for a piece of work condominium units and parking slots in excess of the value of its actual
when they executed the supplemental agreement. The supplemental accomplishment (i.e., the amount due to it) as of October 12, 1995. If these
agreement was reciprocal in nature because the obligation of respondent properties include units and/or slots already sold to third persons, petitioner
to pay the entire contract price depended on the obligation of petitioner to shall deliver the proceeds of the sale thereof or assign the actions for
complete the project (and vice versa). collection to respondent as required by Article 2160.
Thereafter, the parties entered into a second contract. They agreed
to extinguish the supplemental agreement by the letter-agreement which
was duly acknowledged by their respective representatives. While the
letter-agreement stated that respondent was to take over merely the
supervision of the project, it actually took over the whole project itself.
Thus, they were no longer required to fully perform their respective
obligations. However, respondent, by executing the June 1994 deed of
absolute sale, was deemed to have paid P112M. Nevertheless, because
petitioner applied part of what it received to respondent's outstanding
liabilities, it admitted overpayment.
Because petitioner acknowledged that it had been overpaid, it was
obliged to return the excess to respondent. The principle of solution indebiti
then applies.
The following are its requisites:
1. The absence of a right to collect the excess sums; and
2. The payment was made by mistake.
With regard to the first requisite, because the supplemental
agreement had been extinguished by the mutual agreement of the parties,
petitioner became entitled only to the cost of services it actually rendered
(i.e., that fraction of the project cost in proportion to the percentage of its
actual accomplishment in the project). It was not entitled to the excess (or
extent of overpayment).
On the second requisite, respondent paid part of the contract price
under the assumption that petitioner would complete the project within the
stipulated period. However, after the supplemental agreement was
extinguished, petitioner ceased working on the project. Therefore, the
compensation petitioner received in excess of the cost of its actual
accomplishment as of October 12, 1995 was never due. The condominium
units and parking slots corresponding to the said excess were mistakenly
delivered by respondent and were therefore not due to petitioner.
Stated simply, respondent erroneously delivered excess units to
petitioner and the latter was obliged to the return them to respondent. One
who receives payment by mistake in good faith is, as a general rule, only
liable to return the thing delivered. If he benefited therefrom, he is also
liable for the impairment or loss of the thing delivered and its accessories
and accessions.60 If he sold the thing delivered, he should either deliver
the proceeds of the sale or assign the action to collect to the other party.61
What exactly must petitioner give back to respondent? Under
Article 2160 in relation to Article 2154, it should return to respondent the