The Agrarian Myth, the 'New' Populism and the 'New' Right

Author(s): Tom Brass

Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Jan. 25-31, 1997), pp. PE27-PE42
Published by: Economic and Political Weekly
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4405017
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 The Agrarian Myth, the 'New' Populism
and the 'New' Right
Tom Brass

It is argued here that the 'new' populism and the 'new' right, both of which emerged after the 1960s and
consolidated during the 1990s, are structured discursively by the agrarian myth, and with it the reaffirmation
of peasant essentialism. Whereas the earlier variants of the 'new' populism associatad with the views of Marcuse
and Fanon, expressed fears about alienation involving the estrangement from an 'authentic' peasant selfhood,
in the third-worldist discourse which the more recent and postmodern variants of the 'new' populism share with
'new' right, this innate 'peasant-ness' is represented ideologically as the recuperation of a cultural 'otherness7
'difference' that can now be celebrated. Alienation thus metamorphoses into its 'other', 'peasant-ness'-as-
empowerment.
NOTING the way in which the agrarian on the 'new' political right. Whereas the 1990s.6A potentformof ruralismwith roots
myth has emerged and re-emergedover the prefiguringdiscourseof both the 'old' right in romanticand conservative notions of an
pastcenturyin ideology sharedby populism and 'new' populists such as Fanon and organicsociety, agrarianpopulismis'Ihmany
andthepoliticalright,the focus of this article Marcuseidentifiesthe 'estrangement'of the ways themirrorimageof its 'other',Marxism
is on the conceptof an innate 'peasant-ness' peasantryby capitalismas a problem,so that (see Table). Historically, populism has
which informs the cultural identity of of the its more recent postmodern/post- proclaimedthenecessityof an 'abovepolitics'
'othemess'/'difference'thatlies atthecentre coloniallpost-capitalism/'new'right inheri- mobilisation on the basis of the agrarian
of recentandcurrentvariantsof thisdiscourse. tors declare this estrangementto be at an myth,an essentialistideology which in most
Notwithstandingthe varietyin contextually- end, a problemthathas in effect been solved. contexts is defended with reference to the
specific discursive forms (Nohonshugi, Sorelianmyth as a mobilisingdiscoursehas mutually reinforcing aspects of 'peasant-
'Merrie England', volksgemeinschaft, in process become a reality. ness', nationalidentityand culture.7Among
narodnism),both the populism of the 1890s Two points should be made clear at the other things, this discourse has entailed a
andthepopulism/nationalism/fascism which outset about the conceptualisation of critiqueof industrialisation,urbanisationand
emergedinEurope,AmericaandAsiaduring populism adhered to in this presentation. modernitybasedon nostalgiafor a vanishing
the 1920s and 1930s (= the 'old' right)were First,populismis theorisedhereas essentially way-of-life, linked in turnto perceptionsof
all informed by the agrarianmyth.' a mobilising ideology, operatingat the level an idyllic/harmonious/folkloric village
The latterre-emergedtowardsthe end of of consciousness where it serves to deflect existence as an unchanging/unchangeable
the 1960s, in whatmightbe termedthe 'new' discourse from class to non-class identity; 'natural'communityandthus the repository
populismof Fanon, Marcuseand Foucault. the importanceof this aspect of populismis of a similarly immutablenational identity.
Itis arguedherethatthe peasantessentialism evident from the many texts which label it Linked to the latter was the view of the
structuring the agrarian myth has been as rht.oric, or a class consciousness dis- countrysidegenerally as the locus of myths/
consolidatedduringthe 1990s in a discourse placingdiscourse-about.3 Andsecond,unlike legends, spiritual/sacred attributes, non-
aboutthecultural'otherness'/'difference'of other texts which categorise variants of commercial values, and traditionalvirtue.
the so-called thirdworld. In a development populism as compatiblewith the politics of Since it downgrades/deiiiesthe existence
which ought to generate more concern and eitherthe left or the right,populismis asso- of class and accordingly essentialises the
attentionthat it does, this discourse is one ciated here only with the political right.4In peasantry, populism regards smallholding
which the more recent and postmodern short, 'new' populismis not an autonomous proprietors as socio-economically un-
variantsof the 'new' populism(ecofeminism, theory/practice that occasionally (and differentiatedand thus casts them all in the
new social movements, 'the subaltern', accidentally) overlaps with the largely role of 'victims', uniformly oppressed by
'everyday-forms-of-resi stance', '6post- unconnected theory/practiceof the right; large-scale institutions/monopolieslocated
colonialism', 'post-Marxism' and 'post- much rather it is the right, mobilising or in the urban sector (the state, big business
capitalism') share not just with the 'new' mobilised politically.5 and 'foreign' capital). As many Marxists
right but also in many instances with its have pointed out, the political anxiety that
counterpartfrom the 1920s and 1930s.2 I structuresthe discourse-againstof populism
The more recent versions of the 'new' Not Asking the (Agrarian) Question is an underlyingfearof socialism ratherthan
populistagrarianmyth are characterisedby capitalism. For this reason, the populist
two importanttransformations:on the one Generally speaking, populism is an 'a- discourse-againstis directednot so much at
hand revolutionaryagency passes from the political'/'third-way'ideologythathasa long capitalism per se as at its large-scale
proletariatto the peasantry,and then ceases history,and which projectsitself in termsof monopoly/('foreign') variant which gives
even forthelatter;andon theother,'peasant- a discourse-againstthat is simultaneously rise to the very conditions that lead in turn
ness'-as-alienationmetamorphosesinto its anti-capitalistandanti-socialist.In a variety to socialism.
'other', 'peasant-ness'-as-empowerment. of gui es and forms, populismhas emerged Like Marxism,populism also combines a
Accordingly, the discourse-against of andre-emergedperiodicallyas a reactionby pessimismaboutthepresentwithanoptimism
Marcuseand Fanon is characterisedby the (mainly, but not only) peasantsand farmers aboutthe future.Unlike Marxism,however,
domination of non-materialistconcepts of to industrialisation,urbanisationand(again, populism fails to distinguish between a
'alienation' which, unlike the specifically mainly but not only) capitalistcrisis: first in progressive/modernanti-capitalism which
materialist concept of alienation that the 1890s, subsequentlyduring the 1930s, seeks to transcendbourgeois society, and a
structuresMarxism,arealso sharedby those yet again duringthe 1960s and now in the romantic anti- (or post-) modern form the

Economic and Political Weekly January25, 1997 PE-27

rootsof whicharelocatedin agrariannostalgia Wordsworth,but formed the basis for his FROM ALIENATEDTO EMPOWERED
andreactionaryvisions of an innate 'nature'. conservative theory of nationalism."2 'OTHERNESS'
Accordingly,thepessimismwhichstructures Like Rousseau, Wordsworthmaintained
the discourse-againstof populismin general that hulmanitywas essentially 'good', but Although the subjectof much debate,the
andagrarianpopulismin particulargenerates that this 'purestate' had now been lost due 'new' populism which re-emerged during
an optimism which is not forwards-looking to the impositionof an 'artificial'(= 'alien'/ the 1960s andhasbecome entrenchedduring
butmuchratherbackwards-looking,andthus alienating/alienated) existence based on the 1990s encompasses - like its 1890s/
correspondsto anattemptto reinventtradition hierarchy. To recover this lost state of 1920s/1930s counterpart - a number of
in a way thathas been (and continues to be) 'goodness', therefore,it was necessaryto re- recognisable characteristics. Generally
supportiveof conservative, nationalist and establish the context in which it thrived, speaking,therefore,it expressesantagonism
even fascist ideology. when humanitywas closer to Nature.Since towardsthe large-scale,andmoreespecially
the latter was also a context in which an towardspolitics,class, capitalism,socialism
MARGINALITYAS ALIENATION equallypureformof 'generalwill' (= absence and the state; by contrast, it endorses the
of hierarchy) was exercised, this state of innate 'peasant-ness'of the agrarianmyth,
The concept of alienation discharges a Naturefor Wordsworthalso constitutesthe the small-scale, and especially the idea of
crucial role in the discourse of populism basis for the presence of an authenticand non-class-specific common interests ('the
where,unlike Marxismfor which alienation benign nationalidentity. A consequenceof masses', 'thepeople') operatingon the basis
is a specifically materialist phenomenon recuperatingthis 'natural'state, therefore, of grassroots/localinitiatives.14Antagonistic
linked to the reproductionof labour-power, when a 'naturallygood' humanityexercised to Eurocentricmetanarrativespremissedon
it refers generally to a process of cultural a political will that was equally 'pure' and Enlightenment rationality and to Marxist
marginality/estrangementand in particular (hence) benign,would be to bringinto being theory/practicein particular,the romantic
to the impact of the latteron the peasantry a 'natural', 'virtuous' and thus 'authentic' anti-capitalism of the 'new' populism
(andthroughthis on nationalidentity).'The national spirit/identity. influenced by postmodem theory endorses
theoretical and political difficulty with The importanceof this specificallybenign instead a process of 'resistance'/'empower-
alienation-as-estrangement-from-selfhood source/form of nationalism for conserva- ment' based on non-class identities that
and concepts of marginality to which it tive theoryis that it invites popularconsent celebrate 'diversity', 'difference' and
gives rise is that de-objectificationand re- and thus confers legitimacy on action(s) 'choice'.'5
subjectificationcan be eithera materialistor exercised in its name.'3 The same point Such a projectcould be said to structure
an idealist project.9Accordingly, the very about the tradition-invoking ideological muchrecentsocial theoryabouttheso-called
notionof becoming/being-other-than-oneself role of ethnic and/or peasant marginality/ third world.'6 Accordingly, the 'new'
is premissed on the existence of an innate alienation/estrangementcan be made with populism is evident in the concept of an
'selfhood'thatisa-historicalandunchanging, regardto the mobilising discourse not only alienated/marginal'othemess' that informs
a 'natural'identity from which the self has of the 'new' populismbut also of the 'new' the theoryof Marcuse,Fanonand Foucault.
been estrangedand hence transformedinto right. It is also present, albeit with a radically
something 'alien' (= 'other').'0Moreover,
this.definitionof 'selfhood' can extendfrom TABLE
theindividualthroughthegroupto thenation: MARXISM POPULISM
the resultis an all-encompassingconcept of (Agrarian Question) (Agrarian Myth)
'estrangement' that includes not just the (HistoricalSubject)
alienation of labour and its reification as Proletariat Peasantry
commoditybut also Rousseauesque/Words- (PoliticalIdentity)
worthianversions of conservative nationa- Class Ethnicity
lism, varieties of 'marginal' 'abnormal' Economic Cultural
identity declared rationally/socially'other' Internationalism Nationalism
(PoliticalAction)
by Enlightenment discourse, and an Revolution Resistance
'authentic' national/ethnic/peasantidentity Struggle Accommodation
declared culturally/spiritually 'other' by (SystemicEffect)
colonialism. Socialism/Communism Pre-Capitalism/Capitalism
The potentially conservative political (EconomicDiscourse)
linkages between marginality/alienation/ Conflict Harmony
estrangement on the one hand and Change Stasis
Progress Tradition
Rousseauesque/Wordsworthianversions of PoliticalEconomy Nature
nationalismon the other are not difficult to Production Consumption
discern. According to Rousseau, the origin Manufacture Handicrafts
of inequalitylies in a debasementof human Large-scale Small-scale
goodness, an instinctual behaviour from Surplus Subsistence
which humanity had become estranged/ Collective Individual
alienatedandwhich for him was to be found Planning Market
in its 'natural'form in 'Nature' itself. The (Politico-Ideological Discourse)
Rationality Instinct
object, therefore was to return to this Science Religion
'natural','primitive' state which had been History Myth
lost, andwith it an innatelydemocraticform Politics A-Political
of existence based on subsistence." Both State VillageCommunity
thisbelief in andthe necessityof recuperating Urban Rural
the 'natural'goodness of humanitywas not Industry Agriculture
merely shared by the romantic poet International National

PE-28 Econonic and Political Weekly January25, 1997

different meaning, in the tribal/peasant/
gender/ethnic/national 'communities'
impliedin or disclosed by the many variants
of postmodern theory: the discourse of
ecofeminism, new social movements, 'the
subaltern','everyday-forms-of-resistance',
'post-colonialism', 'post-marxism' and
'post-capitalism'. Most of the latter
contextualise empowerment within the
domain of 'popular culture', a procedure
whichchallengesthe notion of passivity by
recognisingthevoice andactionof oppressed
historicalcategories(= 'thosebelow') usually
perceived as mute and/or dominated.
Recuperatinga Rousseauesque notion of a
'generalwill' in a state of Nature, 'popular
culture'becomes identified with the voice-
from-below and anything/everything
associatedwith it can now be celebratedby
postmodern'new' populism as the embodi-
ment of an authentically democratic
expression.'7
One telelogical effect of postmodern
nominalism, whereby the meaning of
languagehas no purchaseon any existence
outside of itself, is the naturalisation of
'culture',a concept which consequentlynot
only no longer needs to be problematised
politically but also (and thereby) becomes
a substitute for economic development.'8
Implicitlyconcedingthe argumentsmadeby
thoseon the political right,thatthereis now
nolongera coherentalternativeto capitalism,
that the latter is consequently here to stay,
and that further opposition to capital is
accordingly pointless, much postmodern
'new'populistdiscoursenow seeksto present
the status quo in the best possible light.'9 In
order to put the best face on the existing
situation, therefore, it is necessary for
postmodern'new' populists to redefine it:
culturalidentity becomes a substitute for
economic identity, as a result of which a
'frombelow' empowermentcan be said to
have alreadybeen accomplished. Insofaras
all 'those below' categories (lumpen-
proletarians,tribals,peasants,women of any/
every ethnic/nationalidentity) previously
alienated/marginalised/estranged have
succeededin realising 'selfhood' within the
domain of 'popular culture', no further
struggle is necessary.
In thediscourseof anti-/post-colonialism,
alienation is linked conceptually to the
experience of blackness, the definition of
whichwhenconstructedby (colonial) whites
is not - cannot be - represented as an
'authentic'experience.ForFanon,therefore,
alienationcorrespondsto the experience of
estrangementwhereby the colonised is an
'alien'in his/herownnationalenvironment.20
By regainingnational autonomy in the act
of violently displacing/expellingthe 'alien'
coloniser, the post-colonial subject realises
aliberatingselfhood: theactofdecolonisation
effected by a nationalliberationmovement
Economic and Political Weekly January25, 1997
entails among other things the recuperation capitalism. For both Fanon and Marcuse,
by the self of the respectwhichprecededand capitalism has succeeded in buying off its
was negated by the basic 'otherness' of workers.The latter are thereforedismissed
alienation.2' as privileged, and hence no longer revolu-
Much the same applies to the categories tionary.AccordingtoFanon,itisthecolonies
of marginalised/estranged/' alienated' 'wherea real strugglefor freedomhas taken
subjectivityrecuperatedby post-modernism. place', the inferenCebeing that class strug-
Like Fanonand Marcuse,Foucaultnot only gles in the metropolitancapitalistcountries
demonisestheEurocentricmetanarrativesof have either been non-existent or 'unreal'.'
Enlightenmentdiscourse but also romanti- Noting that support for political parties is
cises marginality simply because of its urban, and composed not just of teachers,
'otherness'. To the varieties of 'selfhood' artisansand shopkeepersbut also workers,
established by Enlightenment discourse all of whom 'have begun to profit...fromthe
(reason/rationality/science/knowledge = colonial set-up', Fanon concludes that
'the normal','thesocial'),its relatedpractices workers in particularwant no more than
(gaze/speech = rule/power)and sanctifying wage increases and are thus prepared to
institutionaleffects (sanity/legality/hetero- compromise with colonialism.26
sexuality/life), therefore,Foucaultcounter- This view aboutthe privilegedand hence
poses de-centred 'other' forms of marginal non-revolutionary nature of the urban
'selfhood' (madness/criminality/homo- industrialproletariatin metropolitancapitalist
sexuality/death) which find their expres- contexts is in an importantsense confirmed
sion not merely in a multiplicity of 'other- by Marcuse.27For the latter, as for Fanon,
nesses'/' marginality' but 'othernesses'/ the western industrialproletariathas be-n'
'marginality'which are also taboo (= 'ab- co-opted by capitalism to the degree that it
normal').22The latter are thus alienated by is no longercapable- andperhapsno longer
virtue of being discursively stigmatised as even willing - of realisingits historicaltask
'a-social' (= socially marginal) and ac- of self-emancipation by overthrowingthe
cordinglypolitically/institutionallyexcluded system in a revolutionaryact.28This process
from the realm of scientifically sanctioned of working class incorporation ('introiec! iE.-'*
(= 'rational')formsof social existence (= the of the subjectby its master') is ifr Mmrcuse
'normal'). a 'repressive tolerance' determinedin part
Because he blames Enlightenment by thecapacityof capitalto gencrateartificial
rationalism for inventing 'normality' and (= 'alienating')needs;the resultinigv.orking
thus dbnormality', Foucault attacks the class consumerismis linked by Marcusein
formerin thenameof thelatter.Theinvention turn to the technification of domination(a
of an 'abnormality'simultaneouslylicenses procedurenot dissimilar to Foucault's dis-
thecreationof 'marginality'and'alienation', course/techniques/practice of power).29
since the 'non-normal' is not merely Indeed, insofar as the alienationthat stems
consignedto the marginsof 'the social' (and from the culturalalienationof the worker(=
becomes thereby the 'a-social') but stig- spiritualdisenchantmentwith the existing)
matised as the 'other' that requires social is noteradicable,it now becomesa permanent
regulation.In this process of camivalesque obstacle to emancipation.Like Foucault's
inversion,therefore,notonly is the 'normal'/ 'power', therefore, Marcuse's 'alienation'
'abnormal' distinction dissolved (itself an appearsto be innate and systemically non-
uncontentious procedure) but - more transcendable.20
controversially- marxismis itself inculpa- Intermsof social composition,theelement
ted as part of 'scientistic' and tainted En- of 'marginality' covers a heterogeneous
lightenmentdiscourse that constructedthe ensemble of 'othernesses', extending from
opposition between 'normality' and the alienated deskilled (students, intel-
'abnormality'in the first place.23Moreover, lectuals) in metropolitancapitalistcontexts,
since it is considered by Enlightenment throughvariantsof the 'abnormal'/a-social'
discourseas 'irrational'and thus its 'other', (criminals, prisoners, homosexuals, the
traditional folkloric memory - the em- insane) in both metropolitanand peripheral
bodiment of a 'from-below' discourse and capitalism, to the peasantry and lumpen-
the ce.ntralemplacementof popularculture proletariat in the so-called third world.
- is for Foucaultpartof this same category Although Fanon accepts that peasants and
of 'otherness',and thereforebelongs in the a lumpen-proletariatcomposed of landless
pantheon of stigmatised-to-be-recuperated peasantsare reactionary,anti-modern,anti-
voices.24 urbanin outlook, andcounter-revolutionary
In contrast to Marxism, which allocates in termsof action, for him the revolutionary
society-transformingrevolutionaryagency potential of these alienatedelements stems
to the working class, this same role in the from the fact of their marginality.3'Unlike
'new' populism of Fanon, Marcuse and the urbanproletariat,neither the peasantry
Foucaultis dischargednot by the proletariat nor the lumpen-proletariat have been
but rather by marginal socio-economic 'corrupted'by colonialism;moreover,each
elements that are similarly alienated from retains its spontaneous revolutionary
PE-29
tendencies that derive from its as-yet
undiscarded background (= 'peasant
tradition').32The 'marginality'of Marcuse
is a similarly all-embracing category
composed of 'the underprivileged'. Ac-
cepting that the latter cuts across class
boundaries,he nevertheless identifies it as
revolutionarysimply by virtue of it being
'the mass basis of the national liberation
struggleagainstneo-colonialismin the third
world'.3
Intermsof agency,thealienated/estranged/
marginalis perceivedby much'new' populist
discourse to be the 'natural' locus of an
equally 'natural' innate/spontaneous'resi-
stance' to capitalism. Hence, the peasantry
is for Fanon 'the only spontaneously
revolutionaryforce', while for Marcuseit is
included among the 'underprivileged'
sections in the third world that are the
repositoryof a radical 'pre-revolutionary'
political consciousness.-' As with Fanon,
therefore,the recognitionby Marcuseof the
non- or indeed the counter-revolutionary
potentialof declasse petitbourgeoiselements
or lumpen-proletariatdoes not preventhim
from claiming that - simply on account of
an 'oppressed'status- suchelementspossess
aninnateinterestin challengingthecapitalist
system.33Again like Fanon, the potentially
revolutionarycharacterof this oppositional
disposition is attributedby Marcuseto the
factthatthelumpen-proletariat is imperfectly
incorporatedintocapitalism.Moreover,both
attribute an elemental/(non-rational)
characterto the agency of the alienated/
marginalin the third world. For Fanon the
violenceof themasses (= peasants+ lumpen-
proletariat) is 'innate', almost 'natural',
therebyreproducingthestereotypeof 'native'
= 'savage', while Marcuse similarly notes
the 'instinctual' nature of revolt.2, At the
centre of the 'new' populist discourse of
FanonandMarcuse,therefore,is to be found
a concept of pristine 'peasant-ness' not
dissimilarto that which informs the earlier
versionsof theagrarianmythassociatedwith
the ideology of Nohonshugi, 'Merrie
England' and volksgemeinschaft.
Muchthe same is trueof the 'frombelow'
mobilisation which structures the 'new'
populistpostmodernframeworkof Foucault
and others,for whom the concept of agency
amountsto a politically non-specific form
of individualresistance, 'a certaindecisive
will not to be governed'.1' And just as
Foucault attempts to locate an 'authentic'
system of values as essentially religious,
non-materialistand pre-capitalistin origin,
so he identifies an equally 'authentic'form
of resistancenotin Marxbutratherinreligious
dissentduringthe pre-capitalistera.In many
respects,theprecursorof Foucaultandothers
who adhere to a postmodern concept of
agency is Sorel, for whom the cleansing
violence of the revolutionaryact was more
PE-30
importantthanits socio-economiccause and now opposedto thestate,to the 'Americanisa-
politicaloutcome.3" Like Foucault,Sorel not tion' of the globe, to Christianity,and even
only questioned the possibility/desirability to specific formsof capitalism,therefore,but
of progress but linked mobilisation to a (so theargumentgoes) itspro-third-worldism,
Bergsonian intuitiveness based on myth.39 its espousal of feminism and sexual choice,
The importanceof myth for Sorel is its environmentalism, the right to cultural
specifically anti-intellectualquality:since it 'difference', together with its advocacy of
is basednoton analysis(= 'facts'/'thinking') economic and political decentralisation
buton instinct(= 'intuition'/'feeling'),myth (= 'small-is-beautiful') and local self-
- like religion - is unamenableto rational determination,all constituteevidence of its
critiqueandhence refutation.40 A significant progressive politics, its pluralism,its non-
resultof thisde-objectificationof knowledge authoritarian characterandhencetheveracity
is thatactionlinkedto itbecomescontextually of its self-proclaimed democratic cre-
de-linked,correspondinglyvoluntaristicand dentials.46It is, its supporters/apologists
thus'spontaneous'/'elemental' in character.4' claim, not the politicalrightof old but much
To the extent that the 'new' populism ratheran authenticallynew right.47
generallyarguesfor the mobilisationof all/ By contrast,the continued adherenceby
every category of 'marginal' supposedly those on the left to Eurocentricuniversals
alienated from capitalism, therefore, it (class, science, progress,development,etc)
endorses the realisationof Sorelian myth. andtheirinternationalism,theiradvocacyof
The diificulty with this is that,as in the case anenvironmentallyunsustainablelarge-scale
of 1920s/1930s populism,suchmobilisation industrialisationand defence of the state is
is supportivenotof thepoliticalleft butmuch againwidely seen by thoseon the 'new' right
ratherof the political right. not only as outmoded and correspondingly
unprogressive, but also (and therefore) as
NEW 'RIGHT'OR 'NEW' RIGHT? anti-democraticandultimatelyincompatible
with a variety of sought-afterde-alienated
Inculpatingliberalismfor giving rise to an 'selfhoods'. The sub-text of this argument
egalitarianismthatprefiguressocialism and is unmistakable: since the 'new' right
culminates in communism (= 'totalitaria- possesses fresh ideas thatboth engage with
nism'),the 'new' right-likeits 'old' counter- andoffer solutionsto socio-economicissues
part- identifiesas the targetof its discourse- which neitherthe 'old' left northe 'old' right
against the combined and interrelatedpro- have been able to address or to solve, its
cesses of large-scale urbanisation,indus- views should be taken seriously and
trialisation,capitalism,socialism,modernity, henceforthincorporatedinto the domainof
andtechnology.42 Amongits moresignificant 'acceptable'political discourse.48Linkedto
pre-figuringand/ororganicintellectualsare this are claims about the fragmentednature
Alain de Benoist, Marco Tarchi, Julien of right-wing discourse itself, the sub-text
Freund, Gianfranco Miglio, Henning here being that a consequence of this non-
Eichberg,FriedrichHayek,MiltonFriedman, monolithicpoliticsis a correspondinglynon-
Roger Scruton and John Gray.43 Also threateningdisposition.
impoi antin this regardis the politicaltheory
ofJuliusEvola(1898-1974)andCarlSchmitt II
(1888-1985), eachof whomnotonly rejected
rationalismastheprogenitorofanhumanistic Notwithstandingclaims to the contrary,
liberalism/(socialism/communism)but also therearegood reasonsfor supposingnotjust
constitutesa linkbetweenthe 'old' and'new'
that the 'new' populism is in a numberof
right.'"Centralto muchcontemporarydebate important respects indistinguishablefrom
aboutpoliticaltheory,bothon andwithinthe the 'new' rightbutalso thata crucialelement
'new' right,is the extent to which the latter
in this sharedepistemology is the common
now exercises a politically unchallengeable
endorsementof the agrarianmyth.49First,
hegemony(= transcendenceof the left/rightsome on the 'new' right in some instances
polarity), a result both of distancing itself
define themselves as part of the 'new'
from its past (= decline of the 'old' right)
populism.5"A second point of overlap is
and of the demise of the 'old' left. chronology. Like that of the 'new' right,
Perhapsthe most frequentlyrepeatedof muchof the 'new populistthinkingemerged
contemporarymyths- propagatedmostlyby during the 1960s generally, and in relation
those on the 'new' right itself - is that the
to the events of 1968 in particular.5The
left/rightpoliticaldividehasceasedto possess
combination of an anti-American/anti-
anymeaning,sincethe 'new' righthasbroken capitalist/anti-progress/technophobicdis-
with its undemocraticpast and now shares course-againstandanenvironmentalist/third-
manyof the positionsendorsedby the 'new' worldistdiscourse-forthatcharacterisedthe
left 'iile the 'old' left remains mired in
events of 1968 and the emergence of new
irrelevancy, and increasingly endorses social movements linked to these issues
what arewidely regardedas anti-democraticinfluencedthe political thinkingof those on
positions.'5
Not only is the Europeanright the 'new' right as much as those who were
Economic and Political Weekly January25, 1997
linked to the 'new' populism. Third, and of capitalism-as-American-consumerism to A WORLD
OF'DIFFERENCE
more importantly,both emphasise cultural a critique of the latter as a threat to the
not economic struggle, whereby 'selfhood' cultural specificity of the 'other'. This Certainly the most significant epi-
is realised within the domain of 'popular nationalist sub-text emerges clearly in the stemological - and perhaps the most
culture'. anti-Americanismof the 'new' European important political - component in the
right." Far from being evidence of a theoreticalframeworkshared by the 'new'
DE TE FABULA NARRATUR politically progressive transformation,the populism and the 'new' rightis the concept
anti-Americanismof the European 'new' 'difference'/'otherness' on which cultural
In termsof practice,both the fact and the rightingeneralandof de Benoistin particular empowermentis based. In contrastwith the
extentof theoverlapbetweenthe 'new' right is actually in keeping with that of the political left, for which empowering
and contemporaryvariants of populism is traditionalright on this issue.-1Not only is universals override disempowering alterity
not difficult to discern. For both the 'new' this anti-Americanismgrounded in an at- (= 'otherness'/'difference'), this anti-
rightandthe 'new' populism,struggleis not tempt to protect what is presented as an universalistic espousal of the irreducibility
so much economic or political as cultural. innateculturalidentity- which requiresthe of cultural 'othemess' is a characteristicof
Centralto this process of imbricationis the prevention of a universalising 'American' 'new' populism in general, and of its
appropriationby the former from the latter (= capitalist) influence from undermining postmodernvariantsin particular.Not only
of Gramscian theory/practice of cultural non-Americancultures- butit is also rooted does Fanon himself refer to the colonised
hegemony;like contemporarypopulism,the in the economic competition between 'original inhabitants'of 'native society' as
'new' right now allocates primacy to nationally-specific capitals. 'the others', therefore,but it is preciselythis
conductingits struggle within the domain Another characteristicwhich the 'new' emphasison andendorsementof 'otherness'
notof politicsbutof culture.52 Eachendorses populism shares not just with the European that exponents of postcolonial theory find
existing forms of 'from-below' discourse 'new' rightbutalso withits 'old' counterpart useful in his approach.62 Similarly,in much
simplybecauseit is 'from-below', a position is a pessimistic view about historical pro- of the 'new' populist discourse cultural
which avoids problematisinghow and why gress, and thus about the possibility, the 'difference' is presentedas being at the root
currentideology circulatesamong the grass effectiveness and even the desirability of of underdevelopmentin the so-called third
roots and who or what is responsible for its social change. Like the 'new' right, the world: not merely is industrialisatioisper-
reproduction.The important difference is analytical approachof the 'new' populism ceived as an inappropriate western im-
that, whereas populism has attempted to to socio-economictransformation associated position, but its absence (= underdevelop-
depoliticise its analysis of culturalstruggle,with Enlightenmentnotions of 'progress'is ment) is itself vindicated/celebratedas the
the 'new' righthas by contrastrepoliticised at best equivocal. Fanon not only rejects accomplishmentof a form of culturalem-
this process. While the high/low cultural 'westernvalues' as Eurocentricbut appears powerment specific to the third world
divide remains intact, therefore, low to associate economic development with a 'other'.63
(= 'popular')cultureis now celebratedrather specifically European experience, the Along with many on the 'new' right, de
than denigrated.For the 'new' right, as for implicationbeing thatit has nothingto offer Benoist argues for 'the right to difference',
the 'new' populism,the sole criterionfor the those in the so-called thirdworld." Because a principle which is to operate across all
acceptability of any/every view is that it large-scaleindustrialisationunderminesnot areasof humanactivityandexistence:culture,
currentlycirculates among-(and by impli- just traditionalculture,religion andnational religion, sexuality, ethnicity, politics and
cationenjoysthesupportof) thegrassroots.53 identity,butalso (andthereby)humannature economics." The significanceof this is that,
A similarity of emphasis on cultural and Natureitself, most postmodernvariants unlike the left, for which a specifically
practice notwithstanding,it might still be of the 'new' populism- like the 'new' right internationalidentity/experiencel(conscious-
objected that hardly any similarity exists - aresimilarlytechnophobicand/oropposed ness) of class undermines national/ethnic/
between the 'new' populism and the 'new' to progress."5 culturalparticularism,forthe'new' populism
rightin termsof the political contentof such This questioningof progress(= the denial andthe 'new' rightby contrastit is precisely
struggle.The evidence, however, suggests of modernity)is itself linked historicallyto this national/cultural/(ethnic)
identitywhich
the opposite is true. In certain important the rejectionby conservativeintellectualsof overrides/displaces what is perceived by
respects, therefore, little separates the a linear conceptionof time, and its replace- them as an 'alien'/unfeasible/(undesirable)
discourse-for/discourse-against of the 'new'ment by cyclical notions of time based on internationalism.63
populismand that of the 'new' right, parti- the annual cycle of birth/deathin nature.59 The focus of this 'difference',it is claimed
cularly with regard to on the one hand a In contrast to the political left, for which both by those on the political right and by
common anti-Americanismand a shared progress involves a unilinear process of theirdefenders,is no longerracebutculture,
distrustconcerningthepossibility/desirability technical/mechanical/relational change, and distinctive ethnic/national identities/
of socio-economicprogress,andon theother therefore, for those on the political right practices are now perceived not as racially
an espousalof 'difference' generally and in Nature/time (= particularisticknowledge/ superior/inferiorbut merely as culturally
particularas thisencompassesmultipleforms wisdom/culture)is suspendedin an 'eternal 'other'.'6Such a position is not only com-
of 'otherness'in the so-called third world. present' whichis divinelyand/or'naturally' patible with but actually supportiveof the
To begin with, the discourse-againstof ordained and ordered, and its hierarchy/ invocation and/orexercise by the 'other' of
boththe 'new' populismandthe 'new' right 'difference' (= heterogeneity,diversity) is an analogous form of particularism:the
is characterised by a nationalistic anti- therefore sacred and/or 'natural'.' For de acceptabilityof the latter practice to those
Americanism.Ina waythatwas subsequently BenoistandEvola, therefore,thereis no time on the political right derives from the fact
to be appropriated almostwholesaleby those but the present, into which both past and thatit adheresto the same defining principle
on the 'new' right, therefore, the anti- future are incorporated:all the central and of 'otherness',and is thus to be encouraged
capitalismof Marcuseis expressed in terms interrelated elements of social existence so long as it does not undermineor threaten
of antagonism towards generating and (= farming/tradition/culture/ethnicity)ac- the distinctiveness of those - like a ruling
replicating a specifically north American cordingly exist outside time/(history), un- aristocracy- whose cultureis built on (and
patternof consumption.54In terms of dis- changing and unchangeablein an 'eternal indeedsymbolises) economic power.Itis for
course, it is but a small step from a critique present'61 this reasonthat- historicallyandcurrently

Economic and Political Weekly January25, 1997 P7 I

- those on the political right oppose the
'sameness' implied in the advocacy by the
political left of universals.
A numberof problemsconfrontthose such
as Taguieff who claim to identify a political
breakin the views of de Benoist andthe right
generally, l;etween an explicitly racist/
nationalist/anti-communistposition of the
1960s and a seemingly more enlightened
phase during the 1970s when biologistic
determinism lhas been replaced with an
advocacy of cultural 'otherness'. To begin
with, in a general sense biologistic deter-
minism is not the ideological sine qua non
of the 'old' Europeanright.67Not the least
of the many difficulties facing those who
denythe continuingcomplicity with fascism
of non-biologistic views about 'racial
otherness' (as does Taguieff in the case of
de Benoist),is a failureto considerthe extent
to which views unconnected with race are
also a productof fascism, andthusnotmerely
compatiblewith butactuallysymptomaticof
a politico-ideological project of right-wing
reaction. Only by focusing on the single
issue of race, and maintaining(falsely as it
turns out) that the 'new' right has purged
itself of discreditednotions of 'othemess',
is it possible for those such as Taguieff to
claim that because a particularpolitics is no
longer taintedwith racismit is ipsofacto no
longer fascist and thus acceptable.
More importantly,the 1960s and 1970s
were decades when throughoutEuropeand
North America those belonging to the 'old'
right were re-inventing the definition of
innateness central to their political beliefs
andin the process themselves." And as with
manyotherof its components,this particular
element of 'new' right ideology has a long
genealogy in the discourse of the traditional
right.Thus, it is clear that for some of those
on the political right during the 1930s the
undesirabilityof the historicaltrendtowards
mass society was the eradicationnot just of
cultural 'othemess' itself but - and perhaps
moresignificantly-the capacityto reproduce
this: namely, the materialbase which gives
rise to this specifica diferentia in the first
place.69
Behind the defence by the political right
of a specifically cultural 'difference',
therefore,is to be found a more important
subtext:the defence of the rightto retain.the
economic power on which this cultural
differenceis based,andindeed,which makes
it possible to be 'different'.70In short, it is
a defence not so muchof cultural'otherness'
as of the economic basis of class power: the
ownership of or control over the means of
production which enables the owning/
controllingsubjectto commandbothcultural
resources(art,music, architecture)and - by
withdrawingfrom productive labour - the
time to indulge in them.7'Accordingly, the
advocacy of the desirability of cultural
PE-32
'otherness'by those who continueto regard seauesque/Wordsworthiancombination of
themselvesas politicallyprogressiveignores a 'natural' state of human 'goodness'
the fact thatit is to the advantageof a globalexercised as a 'generalwill' in Natureitself,
capitalismwhichreproducesaneconomically the subaltern studies/post-colonial frame-
uniformclass position to endorse precisely work seeks to recuperatea similarlypristine
this kind of specifica diferentia by em- pre-colonialsubjectwho-oncethe distorting/
phasisingculturalheterogeneityas the basis occluding encrustations of an 'alien'
of national/ethnic'difference', in order to colonialism have been erased- is, it seems,
disguise notmerelythiselementof relational 'naturally'good andthereforeby implication
'sameness' worldwidebut also - and more also possesses a politics that amountsto an
importantly- to preventpoliticalmobilisation equally 'authentic'exercise of the 'general
on the basis of this economic uniformity.72 will'. This attemptto identify the presence
at the grass roots in many ruralthirdworld
A (THIRD) WORLD OF (EMPOWERING) contexts of what is presented as and
'DIFFERENCE' alternative,anti-capitalistand anti-socialist,
and hence new and politically progressive
Both the existence of and the reasons for discourse, is less than persuasive, for two
the third-worldist views of the 'new' reasons in particular.First, the very flimsy
populismandthe 'new' rightderive in each evidence on which the case for this
case fromthe rejectionof whatareperceived 'alternative' discourse rests. And second,
as culturally-erodinguniversals (such as because importantcomponentsof what are
economic development/progress and its identified as an 'alternative'discourse are
concomitant process of large-scale urban in fact nothing other than variants of the
industrialisation), and a corresponding 'new' populism.
endorsement of what is perceived as a A similarly idealised notion of pre-
'natural' culturally-based form of pre- capitalist society informs the work of
capitalist existence (= the 'golden age' of Foucault.His argumentboththatpriorto the
agrarianmyth) which entails the reproduc- 16th century those who were mad were
tion of those traditionalinstitutionalforms toleratedandnotincarcerated,andthatbefore
and a peasanteconomy threatenedby these the modern 'invention' of sexuality what
universals.Inshort,theunderdeveloped/less- modernity subsequently reclassified as
developedcountriesin generalandtheirrural 'unnatural' was accepted as 'natural',
population in particular epitomise the suggests that Foucault does indeed adhere
'otherness'/'difference'which is central to to a Rousseauesque vision of primitive
the 'new'-right/'new'-populistthird-worldist goodness.75 Moreover, not only is pre-
discourse-for. Christianantiquityfor Foucaulta source of
Likv-thediscourse-forofthe'old' populism a new politics, but it also representsa return
andthe 'old' right,most variantsof the 'new' to a pre-/anti-Enlightenment systemof values
populismsubscribeto the agrarianmyth and corresponding to what he refers to as a
thus undertake a backwards looking re- 'politicalspirituality'.' In a similarvein, the
cuperationof (and in the process idealise) backwards-looking'new' populismof those
non-/pre-capitalistrural society in the so- associated with the 'everyday-forms-of-
called thirdworld. Althoughhe accepts that resistance'framework,the SubalternStudies
colonialism 'tribalises' its opponents (with projectandthenew social movementstheory
the object of dividing and conquering),that as well as texts by those such as Latouche,
it 'encourages chieftaincies' (because Shiva, Mies and Omvedt reproduce the
traditional institutions,are complicit with romanticisationof pre-capitalistsociety that
colonialrule),andfurtherthat'townworkers structuresthe agrarianmyth. All maintain
andintellectuals'whosupportpoliticalparties that economic growth per se is an
have no respect for and indeed struggle inappropriateand hence a disempowering
againsttraditionalinstitutions(= 'customary 'western' imposition on less developed
chiefs'), therefore,Fanonneverthelessinsists countries: in order to protect/enhancethe
thatin thecourseof theanti-colonialstruggle position of - and thus empower - a variety
the authorityof chiefs shouldbe supported.73 of third world 'others' (women, tribalsand
The reasons for this are two-fold: because peasants), therefore, such texts advocate
the authorityof tribal chiefs is recognised instead a reversion to a subsistence
(= legitimated) by the peasantry,and also agriculture.77
becau-e it is a sourceof an authenticallypre- Attempts by 'new' populist discourse to
colonial national identity. Marcuse also presentan idealised notion of pre-capitalist
comes close to idealising non-capitalist society as an empowering, new and alter-
society in terms of alreadyexisting 'natural native form of non-capitalist/non-socialist
needs' which do not involve having to go social existence invariably overlooks its
down the capitalist path.74 historicalgenealogy. As the third-worldism
Much the same is trueof the more recent of the 'new' right suggests - this kind of
variantsof the 'new' populism influenced 'alternative'is not only not new, norsimply
by postmodern theory. Like the Rous- compatible with a reactionary(= tradition-
Economic and Political Weekly January25, 1997
 v..oking) form of anti-capitalism 'golden
age' of the agrarian myth, but actually
supportive of the latter. Unsurprisingly,
therefore,the 'new' right evinces a similar
approval of a traditional third-worldist
'otherness'/'difference'that is the basis of
a distinctivenationalidentity and - for this
reason alone - is perceived by it as em-
powering.
Like 19th centuryromanticismand 20th
centuryfascism, the European 'new' right
invokesasits 'goldenage' anidealisedvision
of an ancient Indo-European/'Aryan'
civilisation,when subsistence-orientedand
economicallyself-sufficienttribalcultivators
lived 'naturally'in harmonywith Nature.78
In the case of Evola, this third-worldist
discourse is linked to his Orientalist
engagementwiththeeasterncultural'other'.
Turningaway from the 'decadent' materia-
lismof'thewest',the'new' rightromanticises
what it takes to be an organic and thus
culturallypure 'otherness' of the east that
is the source of its own primordialIndo-
Europeanpast. This redemptivemyth of a
'golden age', which structuresthe ideology
of Nohonshugi, 'Merrie England' and
volksgemeinschaft,is also present in the
symbols, rites, and religious customs/
ceremonies of most pre-capitalist social
formations,whereit involves the ideological
attemptto replace the mortalityof profane
time (= history) with the immortality of
sacred time (= the eternal present in the
Gardenof Eden).79In the discourse of the
'new' right, therefore, underdeveloped
(= 'primitive'/peasant)societies representa
lost innocence, a desirable purity and an
harmonious existence (= 'primitive
goodness') thatit perceives as empowering
andthuswishes to recuperate.Forthose such
as de Benoist, such a process of recovering
a lost past entails an alliance between the
European'new' right and the mainly rural
populationsof the third world (where this
'primitive goodness' still survives in the
form of peasant economy) against the
undesirable universalising/de-naturing
processes emanating from the US.80
Also supportive of this third-worldist
discourse-foris the religiouspluralismof the
European'new' right, which derives from
the perceptionof Christianityas partof the
Judeao-Christian'other'; as in the case of
Foucault, therefore, Christian beliefs are
deprivilegedanddisplaced in the discourse-
for the European 'new' right by an earlier
- and what for it is thus a more 'authentic'
form of religious belief - paganism.8'Not
only is this consistent with 'new'-populist/
'new'-rightviews regardingthe ruralgrass
roots practice of an empowering form of
'popularculture', but the endorsement of
any/all religious belief also constitutes a
negation of Enlightenmentrationality.Just
as the 'new' right subscribes to a form of
Economic and Political Weekly January25, 1997
ancient religious faith that predates a its cause are thereby banished from this
universalisingChristianity,therefore, so it discourse.
acceptsthatthesamecanbe trueof 'different'
pre-C,.ristianmythicalbelief systems which CONCLUSION
are culturally specific to the third world
'other'. Like the 'new' right (and indeed the 'old'
Neitheris thereany mysteryaboutthe fact right), the 'new' populism subscribes to a
thatthe ecological beliefs now espoused by numberof essentialistidentitiessaid both to
the 'new' rightandthe 'new' populismalike predate and be alienated/marginalised/
similarlyupholdtheirthird-worldistviews.,2 estranged by the discourse of rationalism.
To begin with, ecological theory and its Each endorses the continued existence of
practice, environmentalpreservation,con- many 'traditional'institutionalforms linked
stitutesa potentdiscourse-foraboutthesame to a supposedabilityto meetbasic grassroots
kind of Nature-based 'naturalness' that needs.Mostsignificantly,the 'new' populism
structures the gender/peasant/national and the 'new' rightalso sharea belief in the
identity that is at the root of third world undesirabilityof change that substantially
'otherness'/'difference'. Environmentalist transformsexisting (= 'traditional')property
discourseis also supportiveof (andlicensed relations. The resulting displacement of
by) the powerfullycombinedanti-state/anti- working class revolutionaryagency effec-
industrial/anti-modern/anti-progress/techno- tively precludes the possibility of systemic
phobicdiscourse-againstsharedbythe 'new' transformation/emancipation associatedwith
populism and the 'new' right.Accordingly, the agrarianquestionof Marxism.Like those
'new'-populist/'new'-right discourse on the political right, therefore, exponents
maintainsthatinsofaras identity/'difference' of the 'new' populismimply thatcapitalism
is detKrmined by space/place, change that cannot be transcended.
undermines ecology also threatens the At the centre of this shared discourse is
traditional institutions/organisations/ the agrarianmyth. The 'new' populism of
'community'of thethirdworld 'other'.X For Fanon and Marcuse, however, expresses a
this reason,therefore,environmentalism-as- fear about the way in which the peasantry
preservation-of-Nature confirmsthe 'new'- expriences alienation, as a result of which
populist/'new'-right view that economic it is deprivedof an 'authentic'selfhood and
growth is not a desirableobjective for third reconstituted as other-than-peasants. By
world countries." contrast,thepostmodernvariantsof the 'new'
Not only is thisthird-worldismcompatible populism announce that the recuperation
withthepluralisticendorsementof religious/ signalled as desirable by the agrarianmyth
ethnic/nationalheterogeneityon the partof has in fact been realised.The same essential
the 'new' right and the 'new' populismbut identity of 'peasant-ness' is now projected
the discourse-forof both the latterhas con- in a positive discursivemode, andcelebrated
vertedthe elementof a politicallyunaccept- as having survived due to its culturally
able (= economically disempowering) indissoluble 'natural'character.Declaredby
culturalsubordinationandeconomicexploi- postmodem 'new' populistsno longer to be
tationassociatedwithalienationintoa neutral underthreatofalienation,thisinnate'peasant-
form of 'otherness'.The distinctivenessof ness' is (re-) presented as an empowered
the so-calledthirdworld 'other'has,in short, form of cultural 'otherness'/'difference'
been reconstructedas an empoweringform firmly rooted in 'Nature'.
of cu'tural 'difference'. Economic 'dif- This overlapping discourse about the
ference' as a form of 'otherness'/'not-us'is agrarianmythis itselfstructured by a similarly
displaced by cultural 'difference' as the shared third-worldism.Instead of a racial
definition of identity, the consequence of hierarchyin which the ruralpopulationsof
which is that economic 'difference' is no the so-called third world are dismissed as
longerperceivedas alienatingorexploitative inferior, they are merely recategorisedin a
butmerelyorganisationally'other';not only discourse which the 'new' right shareswith
does economic 'difference' no longer have the 'new' populismas 'other'/'different'.In
to be explained or changed, but it is keeping with its espousal of inter-national
epistemologically reduced to and in effect pluralismand an acceptanceof polytheism,
becomes part of 'cultural' difference, therefore, this replacement by the 'new'
henceforth to be celebrated as such. The rightof racial hierarchy with a concept of
'new'-populist/'new'-right discourse is cultural 'difference' is not merely not
accordingly a relativistic analytical anomalousbut in keeping with the specific
frameworkin which it is possible to assert form taken by third-worldismin the dis-
that the rich and powerful are simply course of the political right generally, not
culturally 'different' from the poor and least because for it Orientalism is a re-
powerless, andthe economic 'difference'of affirmation of that mysterious 'othemess'
the latteris not merely partof their culture (= the unknown,the unknowable)which is
but much rathera form of empowerment. in fact historically central to conservative
Both the fact of economic 'difference' and philosophy.
PE-33
 The politically disempowering effect of
thisdiscoursegenerally,andin particularthe
conceptualshift to a culturallyempowered
peasant essentialism, is unmistakeable.
Hencetheconceptof 'difference'/'otherness'
fuses with andis supportiveof a reactionary
'new'-populist/'new'-right third-worldismin
contrastto theagrarianquestionof Marxism,
which focuses on the way peasanteconomy
changes,the agrarianmyth of populism and
thepoliticalrightseeks to recuperatepeasant
essentialism by shifting the focus onto the
way in which peasant culture (= the root of.
'othemess'/'difference') remains the same.
Precisely because it operateslargely within
the domain of 'the cultural', the discourse-
for/discourse-against of both the 'new'
populismandthe 'new' rightrecognises and
simultaneously negates the threat that
emanatesfrom'marginality'and 'alienation':
by re-definingthe latteras 'difference',each
ceases to be a problem.
Notes
I This article is a much shortened version of
Brass (forthcoming). Here most of the
quotationshave been omitted,as has a section
examining the agrarianmyth in the 'popular
culture' both of populism/nationalismin the
latterhalf of the 19thcenturyandof populism/
nationalisn/fascism during the 1920s and
1930s. The terms Nohonshugi, 'Merrie
England', volksgemeinschaft,and narodnism
referto the contextually-specificforms taken
by the agrarianmythover this periodin Japan,
England, Germanyand Russia. In the longer
versionit is arguedthatthepeasantessentialism
structuring the agrarian myth in all these
contexts licenses what is a politically
conservative nationalist discourse the
continuities of which extend from the 'old'
populismandthe'old' righttothethird-worldist
'new' populism and the 'new' right.Only the
connectionbetween the last two is considered
below.
2 Giventhereceivedwisdomthatpostmodernism
and right-wingtheory/politicsare not merely
unconnected but antinomic, pointing to the
existence of a connection - let alone an
epistemological affinity - is a controversial
undertaking.Although it is obviously the case
that currentexponents of postmodernismare
not fascistically inclined, the same cannot be
said abouta numberof importantprecursors:
for the fascist sympathies/complicity of
Heidegger,Blanchot, de Man and McLuhan,
see Farias (1989), Ferry and Renaut (1990),
Kermode (1991: 102-18), Lehman (1991),
Marchand (1989), Mehlman (1983),
Hamacher,Hertz and Keenan (1989), Norris
(1990: 222ff), Ott (1993), and Sluga (1993).
The following kind of 'new' populist/
postmodernargument[e g, Chakravarty1995]
is typicalof muchrecentwritingaboutthe rise
of nationalism and its political implications
forso-calledthirdworldcontexts.Since fascism
is a Europeanphenomenon and an historical
one at that, and as it emanates conceptually
fromEurocentricdiscoursegenerally andthat
of liberalism in particular,for these reasons
alone,the 'new' populists/postmodemsclaim,
PE-34
it is impossibleto speak of its actual/potential
presencein non-Europeancontexts.Nationalist
discourselinkedto traditionsandculturalforms
which areauthenticallyindigenousto the third
world, it is furtherclaimed, arenot merelynot
inherently or potentially reactionary but
actually a bulwarkagainst the rise/spreadin
such contexts of fascism. The prevailing
discursive dominance of an emancipatory
postmodemism(advocatingdiversity/plurality,
upholding the rights of 'the marginal', and
opposed to power in general and that of the
statein particular),togetherwith the vigilance
of scholars influenced by this, it is inferred,
is itself a guarantee against the political
legitimisationof fascist ideology. Among the
many objections to this kind of complacency
isthefactthat,whileit is truethatwithliberalism
comes capitalism,andwithcapitalismfascism,
it is neverthelessincorrectto conclude from
this that hankering after a traditional/
indigenous/(non-socialist) alternative to
capitalismprecludesfascism. Muchratherthe
opposite,since it is preciselyon this samekind
of mythic/folkloric/('blood-and-soil') nost-
algia that fascism draws in orderto construct
its own discourse-for. Another text [Vanaik
1994] thatis not postmodernbut nevertheless
similarly dismissive of the fascist label is a
more serious approachto the issue, and an
altogethermore interestingtheoreticalpiece,
notwithstandingits somewhat contradictory
conclusion that a non-fascistic 'Hindutva
[constitutes] a reactionary rightwing and
dangerouslyauthoritarianform of populism'.
In the view of this writerthe latterdefinition
is in fact perfectlycompatiblewith (not to say
an "xcellent description of) fascism.
3 On this point see, for example, Kazin (1995:
1, 2, 3, 248, 266), who defines populism as
'a flexible mode of persuasion',and Dolbeare
and Dolbeare (1976: 115, 119, 121).
4 Texts which implicitly/explicitly attributea
politically dual identity to populism include
DolbeareandDolbeare(1976: Ch7), Canovan
(1981), Phillips (1982: 33), Lasch (1991),
Kazin (1995) and Harrison (1995: 9ff).
Revisionist critics [such as Goodwyn 1976,
1978, 1986, 1991; Lasch 1991] currently
attempting to rehabilitate populism as the
authenticgrassrootsversionof NorthAmerican
democracy, discount the earlier critique of
populismby Hofstadter( 1962) because of the
'end of ideology' context in which the latter
was made. Hofstadter's argument was that
populism wouldn't work because no kind of
utopia was possible, and that therefore one
should stick with existing (bourgeois)
democracy. Unsurprisingly, revisionism
opposes Hofstadter'sclaim that populism is
conservativebecausethisis incompatiblewith
the -evisionists' own view thatit corresponds
to a non-bourgeois/non-socialistformof grass
roots democracy. Marxists, by contrast, are
critical of both the revisionist attempt to
rehabilitate populism and of Hofstadter's
teleology. Although sharing with Hofstadter
the critique of populism as conservative,
therefore,a Marxistargumentpartscompany
with his over the absolute impossibility of
utopia: unlike Hofstadter, therefore, for
Marxisma socialist outcomeis bothdesirable
and feasible. For the theoretical impact on
Hofstadterof the end-of-ideology debate,see
Morton (1972: 109ff).
Economic and Political Weekly
5 A frequentmistake made by those occupying
many different positions on the political
spectrum is that populism constitutes a
leftwards movement by the political right
(whichis whatthoseassociatedwiththejoumal
Telos seem to think); namely, the right is
becoming politically more progressive. It is
arguedhere that the opposite is the case: it is
not the right that has shifted leftwards but
muchratherthe left thathasshiftedrightwards,
in the process becoming less progressive
politically.It is importantto note in this regard
thatthe merepresencein new socialmovements
of activists from the political left cannot of
itself be taken as evidence for the advocacy
of socialist policies. Muchratherthe contrary,
since thereis lots of evidence (from Indiaand
elsewhere) to suggest that what happens in
these circumstances is that, rather than
advocatinga specifically socialistprogramme,
those on the left {or perhapsmore accurately
'left') simply lock onto existing policy/
programmes.Inotherwords,whatis frequently
accepted at face value as socialism is not
actuallysocialist but much rathera varietyof
populism,its emanationfromleft-wingcircles
notwithstanding [about which see Brass
1995b].
6 The re-emergenceof populistdiscoursein the
late 1960s is of course an exception to the
connectionbetweenthepopulismandcapitalist
crisis.
7 Although the focus here is on the cultural
discourseof populism, it must be emphasised
thatthe agrarianmythis also structuredby and
indeed dependent on economic and political
arguments.Historically,therefore,theagrarian
myth has also had an important economic
component,wherebyagriculturewas presented
as the basis of social organisationandpeasant
farming as the source of national food self-
sufficiency.Thisdiscourseaboutthe centrality
to the nationaleconomy of the peasantfamily
farmcontinuesto be important,anditsinfluence
can be traced from an intellectual precursor
like A V Chayanov (1966), via neo-classical
economists [Lipton 1977, Richards1985] for
whomruralpovertyin theso-calledthirdworld
is an effect of adversetermsof trade(= 'urban
bias') forpeasantproduce,to recentandcurrent
populist leaders/politiciansin India such as
CharanSingh, M S Tikait, M D Nanjunda-
swamy and Sharad Joshi [about whom see
Byres 1988 and the contributionsto Brass
1995c]. The same is true of the political
component of populist discourse, which
involved claims about the peasantryboth as
upholdersof the existing hierarchy- andthus
as a bulwark against the spread of socialist
ideas and the guarantorsof political stability
- and also as the source of militarypersonnel
and thus the defence of the nation.
8 It is importantto note that for Marxismthe
concept 'alienation' has always been
theoretically problematic, not least because
the political right has always laid claim to it
[Bell 1962; Feuer 1963]. Maintainingthat
'[s]ince the 1930s Marx's Early Workshave
been a war-horse for petty-bourgeois
intellectualsintheirstruggleagainstMarxism',
Althusser(1969: 1Off)dismisses the concept
alienationas a pre-Marxistvestigeof Hegelian
idealism, an existentialist anomaly
characteristic of the period before the
epistemological break of 1844 that signalled
January25, 1997
 the emergence of the 'mature' Marx. Much
the same pointis madeby Mattick(1978: 160-
62).
9 In much contemporary social theory this
processof de-objectification/de-privileging of
attemptsto constructan existence beyond the
self amountsat times to solipsism. One effect
is to fragmentreality,which is reducedto the
epistemologicalstatus of an epiphenomenon
of the 'self'. A de-objectified 'reality' that
does not - indeedcannot- extend beyond the
perceptionof the individualbecomes thereby
whateverany/everysubjectclaims it to be. Not
only is this 'reality' now reducible to the
individual,butit is also deemedto be the basis
of a subjectively-based process of self-
empowerment,simply by virtue of 'being-
mine/being-yours'.There is accordingly no
longer an 'out there' to be perceived, only
competingperceptionsof an 'outthere'.Instead
of objectivity, therefore, there are now only
contesting subjectivities, each of which
advances rival claims to truth, and between
which one is no longer able to judge. A
consequence of an 'out-there' objective
'reality' being non-existent is it cannot be
changed, a position that is so convenient for
ownersof realestate. In additionto valorising
the view of the indigenous subject in relation
to that of the coloniser, therefore, such de-
objectification/de-privileging also confers
political acceptability on landlords' or
capitalists'view of existence, now deemed to
be as 'valid' as that of a tenant or worker.
10 Theconcept'alienation'asestrangement-from-
an-essentialist-peasantnessis central to the
Chayanovianexegesis of Netting(1993:328ff),
for whom capitalistdevelopmentis perceived
as a process of (mainly cultural) dislocation
thatnotonly 'threatenedthe stabilityof peasant
equilibrium' but also prevented the middle
peasantfrom realising what is posited as the
'authentic selfhood' of petty commodity
production.
11 In seeking to explain this loss, Rousseau 14 Examplesofthequasi-mysticalbeliefby'new'
invokes the element of 'chance', which gives
rise to the development that dissipates
'primitivegoodness'inthecourseofgenerating
inequality [Broome 1963: Ch III]. He
distinguishesbetween what he categorises as
a benign 'self-interest' (amourde soi), which
is compatible with a 'natural' state of
'goodness', and 'selfish interest' (amour-
propre),which is not. Accordingto Rousseau
theformeris a harmlesskindof self-centredness
(= egocentricity-relative-to-the-self),whereas
the latter by contrast is an altogether less
benignegocentricitythatis exercisedin relation 15 The libera/neo-liberal/(anti-Marxist)genea-
to others,and thus at the root of competitive
behaviourand the conflict it generates. The
distinction is untenable, however, since the
allegedly benign form of self-interested
nationalism (= 'pro-self) is in the end no
different from less benign selfish variant
(= 'anti-other'):the only difference is thatthe
formeris implicitlyexclusionarywhereasthe
latter is explicitly so, a point confirmed for
exampleby the 'transformed'utterancesof the
Klu Klux Klan (see note 68).
12 On this point see Brinton (1926: 58), who
observes that 'in 1809 Wordsworth had
sketched as completely as Mazzini ever did
a theory of nationalismthat was to become
the political faith of the century'.
13 Both historicallyand contemporaneously,the
Economic and Political Weekly January25, 1997
advantageof such a discourse for the better-
off peasantryis thatit enablesthemto operate
politically and ideologically on two fronts:
againstpoorpeasantsandagricultural labourers
as well as landlordsand/orinternational
capital.
The success of this hinges in turn on the
displacement of class categories, whereby
agrariansubjectswho are defined in terms of
ownershipof or separationfrom given means
of productionare redefinedin populistterms
simply as 'peasants'/'cultivators'/'farmers',
or petty commodity producers in contexts
where thereis actuallygreatvariationin both
relationsand the scale of production.Such a
discursive fusion permits agrariancapitalist
producers to claim not only that all rural
inhabitants experience a uniform level of
sufferingin the face of urbanand/or'foreign'
exploitationbut also thateconomic growthis
locatedin andconfinedlargelyto towns/cities/
industryand/orothernations.By suppressing
reference to socio-economic differentiation
arising from the process of capitalist
development, therefore, rich peasants can
challenge landlordsand/orimperialismin the
nameofthe peasantryas awhole, whichpermits
them not merely to reinforce and reproduce
in discourse shared with poor peasants and
agriculturallabour the mythic yet politico-
ideologicallypotentimageof anhomogeneous
peasantrybutalso to claim thatthey represent
thereby the voice of 'the people' (= the
peasantry), and thus the nation itself. Two
important consequences follow from this
nationalist discourse, each of which is
supportiveof thepopulistcamouflageadopted
by rich peasants.First, that empowermentis
effected at the expense of a foreign and not
an indigenouscapitalistclass; andsecond,that
'popular culture' becomes identified un-
problematicallywith the 'voice from below',
andactionbasedon this is accordinglydeemed
to constitute an authentic expression of a
Rousseauesquedemocraticwill.
populist texts in the efficacy of any/all
discourse/action-from-below includeCanovan
(1981: 257), Sinha, Greenbergand Gururani
(forthcoming), Scott (1990) and - most
importantly- many of the contributorsto
Guha(1982-89). The subalternstudiesproject
associatedwith the work of the latteris by no
meansconfinedto the historiographyof India,
and now extends to AfricaandLatinAmerica
(Latin American Subaltern Studies Group
1993; Prakash 1994; Mallon 1994; Cooper
1994].
logy of 'choice' in 'new' populist discourse
is unmistakeable.For an existentialist like
Sartre (who endorsed Fanon's argument),
therefore, it was possible to choose a
revolutionary agent. Because the urban
industrial proletariat, both in metropolitan
capitalistandcolonial contexts,can no longer
be considered a revolutionary subject
committed to self-emancipation and the
emancipationofthe 'other',it beconmes possible
simply to select (= choose) a replacement.
Accordingly, for Fanon and Marcuse, the
lunten-proletariatandthepeasantryarechosen
as revolutionary agents, interested in and
capable of accomplishing the revolutionary
taskswhichthe urbanworkingclass is no
longer willing or able to carry out.
Unsurprisingly,in view both of its rejection
of any/all forms of government and/or
regulation and its emphasis on individual
choice-making,Foucaultwas alsosympathetic
to liberalismgenerallyandto thatof von Mises
and Hayekin particular.Forthe attractiveness
to Foucaultof liberalism,not least because it
licensed choice in the domain of sexualityas
muchas in otherareas,see Miller(1993: 310-
II, 327). The latterconcludes that '[a]s much
as any figure of his generation, [Foucault]
helped inspire a resurgentneo-liberalismin
France in the 1980s' [Miller 1993: 315].
16 This social theory, heavily influenced by
postmodemism,hasasits neo-liberaleconomic
counterpart the similarly designated 'new
political economy', the equally class-specific
politialobjectof whichis totheoreticallyjustify
- and thus contribute to the ideological
legitimationof - the economic redistribution
of resourcesfrom the poorto the rich [Bagchi
1993; Leys 1996; Vieux and Petras 1996].
17 The currentdangers in endorsing what is in
effect a de-politicised 'popular culture' are
clear from the following examples. Right-
wing Christiangroups in North America are
mobilising politically on the basis of popular
culture,the objectbeing to achieve 'crossover
into the mainstreammarket' in videos, pop
music, television, films and books, all forms
borrowedfrom their secularcounterpartsbut
given an explicitly non-secularandpolitically
reactionarycontent. Much the same is trueof
a de-politicised notion of 'empowerment',a
concept which similarlycan be appliedto any
andevery kindof activity.Itbecomespossible,
therefore, for Rodriguez (1994) to celebrate
religious faith in Our Lady of Guadaloupe,a
traditionalicon of conservative Catholicism
in Mexico, as evidence of gender empower-
ment. Similarly,in the case of Italy the 'post-
fascist' Gianfranco Fini was invited by the
PDS (the ex-CommunistParty)to its annual
conferenceinJuly 1995,wherehe wasreceived
with raptureand applause:both the invitation
and the reception were justified by the PDS
leadership in terms of the fact that Gini
representsa grass roots movement. This too
is a familiarargument,loved by and sympto-
matic of the postmodem 'new' populism.
Because a view comes 'from below' or has
grass roots support, therefore, this it is
claimed is enoughto makeit acceptable.Such
a position, which postmodemismshareswith
the 'old' populism and the 'new' right, fails
to ask what the politics of these grass roots
views are.On this 'logic', it wouldbe possible
to endorse not only fascism but also genocide
and racism.
18 Notonly doesthecolonial/postcolonialduality
signals its nationalistepistemological under-
pinnings, but it is clear from texts by its
exponents [Bhabha 1991; Prakash1995] that
postcolonialism addresses mainly - and in
most cases only - questions of ideology; that
is, of the way in which the colonised other'
is (mis-) representedin the discourse of the
coloniser. Because it depicts the colonised
'other' as passive (= victim), postcolonial
theoryeschews the domainof 'the economic'
(= 'sociology of underdevelopment''depen-
dency') as this encompasses the specifically
economicdimensionofthe coloniser/colonised
relationship.Foraparticularlyeffectivecritique
of postcolonialism, whichpointsouttheway
PE-35
 in which it has been inflated in temporal/
spatial terms, see Ahmad (1995).
9 Like all the postmodernvariantsof the 'new'
populism,those which maintainthatsocieties
are now 'post-capitalist' and can only be
understoodin termsof a 'post-Marxist'theory
adhereto an analyticalframeworkfromwhich
class, class formationand class struggle have
all beenbanished,andin whichethnic/'tribal'/
national identities are regarded as innate.
Proponentsof 'post-capitalism' [Dahrendorf
1959:241ff;Bell 1971;Drucker1993]maintain
that,as productionhas bow been displacedby 24 On the displacement of rationalism by the
knowledge as a source of value in the global
economy, the resulting knowledge-intensive
societyis nolongerpremissedon theopposition
between capitaland labour.The anti-Marxist
natureof thisparticularagendawas accurately
delineatedsome 30 years ago by Macpherson
(1972: 18),who observedthat:'thereis agood
deal of loose writing these days [1964] about
somethingcalled "post-capitalism".The same
publicistsand theoristswho use this term are
apt to talk also aboutpost-Marxism.The idea
in both cases is the same: to suggest that the
thing now hyphenatedhas in fact disappeared
and has been replaced by something really 25 Fanon (1963: 37).
quite different. If one cannot deny, in either 26 On these points, see Fanon (1963: 47). 'It
case, that something superficially similar to
the old thing is still around,one can perhaps
exorcise its spirit by calling it "post-".Thus,
as capitalism, old-style, has become
increasinglydifficultto justify in termsof any
acceptable social ethic, it becomes highly
advantageousto find that it has given way to
something else. And as Marxism, old-style,
continuesto give trouble,it can perhapsmore
easily be dealt with by announcingits demise
and replacement.'
20 On this point, see Fanon (1968).
21 A parallel could be made here with the
postmoderntheoryof Prakash( 1992: 18), for
whom underneath the externally-imposed 27 Marcuse'sdenialsnotwithstanding(1976: 71),
colonial encrustationthere lies an 'authentic'
Indian-ness,a pristineidentityof 'self-hood'
which colonialism neither affected nor
disturbed.Marcuse(1970:104-05)alsoimplies
thatthe negation of the establishedorderwill
take place on the basis of an appeal to 28 On this point, see Marcuse (1976: 66).
Rousseauesque/Burkean 'natural rights'
(= ancient principle).
22 UnlikeFoucault,for Marcuse(1970: 81) there
is such a thing as rationalauthority,but like
Foucault he endorses 'a new dimension of
protest,which consists in the unity of moral-
sexual andpolitical rebellion' [Marcuse1970:
921. In the light of his sadomasochism, his
thanatological disposition and his somatic
reductionism[on which see Miller 1993], the
detailed descriptionby Foucault (1977: 1-6)
of all the distressingminutiaeof the execution
in 1757 of the regicide Damiens appears 29 On the significance for accumulationof this
worryingly to be more a celebration than a
critiqueof this event. For Foucault, it seems,
deathis notjust the ultimatebut perhapseven
the only form of empowerment - a very
religious sentimentindeed. Alternatively,the
fact that his descriptioncan be read either as
critiqueor as celebrationis perhapsno more
than a measure of the extent of Foucault's 30 Since for Foucault power is everpresent,for
postmodernaporia.
23 Fortheequationby FoucaultofEnlightenment
rationalismas the 'other' of freedom, and his
dismissal of Marxism as a variant of En-
lightenment 'scientism', see Foucault (1991:
118) and Rabinow (1984: 52-53). The
PE-36
specifically anti-Marxist epistemology of
Foucault was recognised by Sartre in 1966
(Eribon1992: 164);moregenerally,Foucault's
vehement anti-communism is well known,
and a matterof extensive record [see Eribon
1992: 136]. In the case of Marcuse,there can
be no doubt about his Marxist commitment.
The case of Fanon is more problematic:
althoughcharacterisedby Caute(1970: 52) as
a socialist, it is evident from what Fanon
(1963: 78) himself writesthathe was as much
anti-socialist as anti-capitalist.
'from-below'discourseoftraditionalfolkloric
memory,Foucaultis unambiguous:'Unreason
would be the long memory of peoples', he
observes, 'their greatest fidelity to the past' 31 Forhis views on the peasantryandthelumpen-
[cited in Eribon 1992: 118]. Unsurprisingly,
much the same kind of reification of spon-
taneity/elementalismas a 'natural'(and thus
non-transformable) aspectof humanexistence
haslong beenthe stock-in-tradeofthe political
right.LikeFoucault,therefore,OrtegayGasset
(1961) invokes the authorityof Nietzsche for
his view that rationalismis necessarily and
always displaced by an innate irrationalism.
cannot be too strongly stressed', he observes
(1963: 88), 'thatin the colonial territoriesthe
proletariatis the nucleus of the colonised
populationwhich has been most pamperedby
the colonialregime.Theembryonicproletariat
of :`e towns is in a comparativelyprivileged
position. [It] has everything to lose...'
According to Fanon (1963: 48), the result is
the emergence of an urban proletariatthe
members of which 'fight under an abstract
watchword: "Governmentby the workers",
and...;forget that in their countryit should be
nationalist watchwordswhich are the first in
the field' (original emphasis).
thathe no longerperceivedthe rubanindustrial
working class in metropolitan capitalist
contexts as a revolutionaryagent is clear from
many of his texts [see Marcuse 1969: 14-15;
1970: 99-100].
Ironically,thiskindofthinkingalso lies behind
the postmoderncelebration of what used to
be regardedas alienation:not only is social
fragmentation(= alienation)invertedand re-
presented by postmodernism as the em-
powerment of identity politics, but the
generationby capitalismof artificial(= alien)
demands amountingto consumerism-as-the-
nepation-of-selfhoodis similarlyrebornin its
'other' postmodernform of consumerism-as-
the-realisation-of-selfhood(= 'shop-till-you- 32 Hence, theview (Fanon 1963:103) that:'...the
drop').
capacity to generate seemingly endless
demand,and its connection with the political
integrationof the proletariatinto metropolitan
capitalism, see Marcuse (1976: 66-67). For
this reason, moreover, social transformation
mustbe precededby a changein the definition
of needs [Marcuse 1969; 4, 18-19; 1970: 80].
this reason alone there can be no process of
emancipation. For different reasons, the
concept 'repressive tolerance' is faced with
similar problems. Hence, the pessimism of
Marcuse(1970: 100-101; 1976:66) aboutthe
implicationsfor working class emancipation
Economic and Political Weekly
of this process of incorporationstemmed in
part from the conjuncturalperception- also
shared by the end-of-ideology theory - that
capitalism had in the short-termsolved the
problem of crisis (_ overproduction).
Consequently,for those on both the political
right and left, the urban proletariat in
metropolitancapitalistcountrieswas regarded
as no longer having a reason to oppose the
capitalist system. The responses from both
ends of the political spectrum,however, was
different:thoseon thepoliticalrightproclaimed
the end-of-ideology (= a foreclosureon class
and class struggle), while some of those on
theleftsearchedforanalternativerevolutionary
subject.
proletariat,see Fanon (1963: 90-91, 93, 95-
96, 103-5, 109). It must be emphasised that
this kind of anti-colonialdiscourseassociated
with the 'new' populism,involvingthe search
for an alternativerevolutionarysubjectthatis
neither urban, working class nor tainted by
capitalism, is not in fact new. Many of the
central ideological components which re-
emerged as Fanonist, Marcusian and
Foucauldianvariantsof populism duringthe
1960s havea long lineage in colonialcontexts:
in the case of India, for example, they were
prefiguredin the views expressed not just by
MahatmaGandhi but also by Dev (1946) in
the late 1930s andby Ranga(1946) andLohia
(1963) duringthe early 1940s. AlthoughDev
and Lohia were regardedinitiallyas socialists
ofsome sort,thediscourseofeach wasbasically
populist and nationalist.Hence, the exploiter
is depicted by them as external, the Indian
peasant is equated with 'nature' (= 'pure'/
untainted-by-the-city) and is accordingly
regarded as an uncorrupted and thus a
revolutionarysubject. By contrast,the urban
worker is 'tainted-by-the-city',corruptedby
colonialism,andthusno longera revolutionary
subject.The urbanproletariatin metropolitan
capitalismis in theirperceptiondoublytainted:
simplyby virtueof its combinedurban/colonial
'otherness', therefore, it can no longer be
considered revolutionary.The latter mantle
haspassedinsteadto 'colonialtoilers'ingeneral
and peasantsin particular,who in the view of
populists such as Lohia would challenge and
destroy capitalism. It is perhapsnot without
significance that Ranga resigned from the
Congress Party in the early 1950s, accusing
it of being againstfarmers,andwenton to form
first his own peasants'party,the KrishakLok
Dal, and then in 1959 the conservative
SwatantraParty,of which he remainedleader
until the early 1970s [Erdman 1967].
rebellion,whichbeganin the countrydistricts,
will filter into the towns throughthatfraction
of the peasantpopulationwhich is blockedon
the outer fringe of the urban centres, that
fractionwhich hasnotyet succeededin finding
a bone to gnaw in the colonial system. The
men whom the growing population of the
country districts and colonial expropriation
have broughtto desert their fanily holdings
circle tirelessly around the different towns,
hoping that one day or anotherthey will be
allowed inside. It is within this mass of
humanity,this people of the shantytowns, at
the core of the lumpen-proletariatthat the
rebellionwill find its urbanspearhead.Forthe
lumpen-proletariat, thathordeof starvingmen
January25, 1997
 uprootedfrom theirtribe and from their clan,
constitutesone of the most spontaneousand
the most radically revolutionaryforces of a
colonised people.' Not only does this
romanticisation of theurbanlumpen-proletariat
aspotentiallyrevolutionarycontinueto pervade
analyses of the contemporaryurbaninformal
sector economy in the so-called third world
[e g, Scott 1994], but- like the 'peasant-ness'
of the agrarian myth as perceived by
postmodern 'new' populism - this kind of
alienated/marginal existenceis also represented
as a locus where the poorly-remuneratedand 38
highly exploited self-employed realise
'empowerment'[eg, Scott 1985a:191ff;Nunez
1993; Sherman 1992: 73-74, 179; Latouche
1993: 127ff].
33 Marcuse (1970: 85): 'These masses', he
continues,'can perhapsnow be consideredthe
new proletariatand as such they are today a
realdangerfortheworldsystemof capitalisin'. 39
For similar claims, see also Marcuse (1970:
93, 94-95, 100-101; 1976; 72), where he
recognises notjust thatsuch oppositionmight
be mobilised as easily by the political right
asbytheleftbutalsothata successfuloverthrow
of the capitalistsystem can only be achieved
by the combined opposition in metropolitan
and third world contexts.
34 On these points, see Fanon (1963: 99) and
Marcuse (1969: 56-57). About the revolu-
tionaryroleof a peasantryignoredordisdained
by political parties,Fanon (1963: 48) notes:
'it is clear that in the colonial countries the 40
peasantsalonearerevolutionary,forthey have
nothing to lose and everything to gain. The
starvingpeasant,outside the class system, is
the first among the exploited to discover that
only violence pays'. 41
35 For the denial of the lumpen-proletariatas a
-revolutionaryforce, see Marcuse (1969: 51;
1970:73). Acceptingthat it may '[regress]to
bourgeois or, even worse, aristocraticideo-
logies', Marcuse (1969: 52) nevertheless
persistsin identifyingthe lumpen-proletariat
as thebearerof'ane'v,spontaneoussolidarity'.
Thereis muchhistoricalevidence to the effect
that not only is the lumpen-proletariatnot
revolutionarybutthatit is muchrathercounter-
revolutionary.In the case of Johannesburgin
theearly20th century[van Onselen 1977], for
example,the criminalactivity (= 'resistance')
of urbangangs whose members were a de-
peasantised lumpen-proletariat resisting
proletarianisation andseekinginsteadaprocess
of re-peasantisation, was directedagainstblack
migrantworkers(from whom they stole and
by whomnthey were feared).
36 On these points, see Fanon( 1953: 56-57) and
Marcuse(1969: 9).
37 Fortheepistemologyof this 'resistance'based
on what Foucault similarly categorises as a
politically non-specific process of individual
'critique',see Miller(1993: 301-305). Inwhat
he accepts is 'a celebration of the petite
bourgeoisie', Scott (1985a: 185, 186) places
the agency of the latter at the centre of his
ubiquitous 'everyday-forms-of-resistance'
theory and similarly invokes 'a libertarian
reason'forbelievingthat'thepettybourgeoisie
representsa precious zone of autonomy and
freedom in state systems increasingly
dominatedby huge bureaucraticinstitutions'.
The extent of theoretical/politicalconfusion
is evident from the fact that for Scott (I 985a:
(=thepeasantry)
196-97)thepettybourgeoisie
Economic and Political Weekly January25, 1997
are the 'natural'bearersof socialism, a view
which he derives in turn from the mistaken
belief that'thepopularownershipofthemeans
of production' is the same as common
ownership. Unsurprisingly, therefore,
socialism is for Scott simply the resultof non-
class-specific 'from-below' grass roots
mobilisationby 'the popular',a view which
ignores the fact that peasant smallholding
entails (individual/private)propertyrelations
which are incompatible with common
ownership of the means of production.
The same is true of Bataille (1985; 1991;
1994), anotherpostmodernprecursorwho not
only lamented the loss of myth entailed in
progress/modernitybut also celebrated the
cleansing effect of 'primitive' violence as a
'natural're-affirmation of mythinpre-capitalist
soe;al formations akin to the elemental/
destructive force of 'Nature' itself.
For his critiqueof progress,see Sorel (1969).
For the link between Sorel's theory and the
Frenchpolitical right, see Wilde (1985). The
descriptionof Sorel(Wilde 1985:16)as 'neither
a politicalorsocialtheoristbutmerelya critic...
his views regardingthedistributionof political
andeconomic powerarelimitedto abhorrence
of the status quo... he remains firmly on the
side of intuitionwhendealingwiththepotential
forces for liberationfrom the strangleholdof
democratic society' might apply just as
accuratelyto many'new' populistlpostmodern
texts.
For the importanceof myth, see Sorel ( 1916:
22ff); for the centrality of the invocation of
mythical/traditional/religious/sacred themesto
the processof fascist mobilisation,see Mosse
(1978).
Not only does this 'spontaneous'/'elemental'
characterisationapply also to the way post-
modernism and 'resistance' theory interpret
agency but, the claims to accuratelyrepresent
an authentically'frombelow' discourseabout
mo3ilisationnotwithstanding,boththe former
share what is actually a patronisingattitude
towards'those below' (= talking-down-to-the
'other'), a position that is not just politically
disempoweringbutalso wrong.Muchthesame
point about talking-down-to-the-'other'has
been made by Larsen(1993: 282, 285), who
observes: 'Those super-exploited and
oppressedat the periphery...become pegged
with a sort of sub-politicalconsciousness, as
if they couldn't or needn't see beyond the
sheer fact of survival...[postmodernism]rests
on an intellectualdistrustof the masses,a view
of the mass as beyondthe reachof reasonand
hence to be guided by myth. The Latin
Americanmasses have a long historyof being
stigmatisedin this way by both imperialand
creole elites... [I]n the era of "postmodernity"
we are being urged.in exchange for a cult of
alterity, to relinquishthis conception of the
masses as the rational agents of social and
historicalchange, as the bearersof progress.
Given the increasing prevalence of such
aristocratism,however it may devise radical
cre-4entialsfor itself, it becomes possible... to
be seducedby the false Nietzscheanregardfor
the masses as capableonly of an unconscious,
'instinctual political agency'. Significantly,
this observation about 'instinctual political
agency' applies with particularforce not just
to Foucault or indeed to Marcusebut also to
the Sorelianconceptof mythandits mobilising
role.
42 Textsabout/bythe 'new' rightgenerallyinclude
Phillips(1982:46ff), Levitas(1986b),Gottfried
andFleming(1988), Gamble(1988),Habermas
(1989), Gunn (1989), Sunic (1990), Cheles et
a] (1991), Hoeveler (1991), Ford (1992),
Eatwell and O'Sullivan (1992), Basu et al
(1993), Gray(1993), Diggins (1994), Gingrich
(1995), SarkarandButalia(1995), Mazumdar
(1995) and Eatwell (1995).
43 For the theoretical importanceand political
influence of de Benoist, see Sheehan (1980;
1981),O'Sullivan(1992: 174ff),Sunic(1990),
Taguieff(1994);forTarchi,seeSacchi(1994);
for Freund,see Sunic (1990: 158) and Ulmen
(1995); for Miglio, see Campi (1994) and
Gottfried(1994); forEichberg,see Bodemann
(1986) and Biehl (1995); for Hayek and
Friedman,see Gamble(1988) and Shackleton
and Locksley (1981: 53ff, 87ff); for Scruton
and Gray, see Gamble (1988: 161-62) and
O'Sullivan (1992: 175ff). In terms of the
practice linked to this theory, the North
American right has exercised influence not
only throughperiodicals such as The Public
Interest,Commentary,andTheNew Criterion,
but also via foundations/institutes(Heritage
Foundation, American Enterprise Institute);
de Benoist was instrumentalin the foundation
ofthe umbrellagroupfortheEuropeanpolitical
right, Groupementde Recherche et d'Et'zc"
pour la Civilisation Europeenne (GRECE)
while Scruton(and others)exercised agenda-
setting influence on Thatcheritediscourse in
Britainvia rightwing 'think-tanks'[or; w, ii.;:
see Cockett 1995].
44 For the influence on the 'new' righl of Evola
and Schmitt, together with their general
theoretical/politicalimportance,sck Sheehan
(1981), Sunic ( 990: 43ff), Bendersky(196A \
Ward (1992: Ch 8), Sacchi (1994: 72ff) and
Eatwell (1995: 202ff).
45 For an example of this kind of argument,see
among many others Phillips(1982), Gottfried
and Fleming (1988; vii-viii), Sunic (1990:
6-7), Piccone(1994:7,9-10, 11-12,20),Sacchi
(1994: 71), Latouche [Sacchi 1994: 76; de
Benoist 1995: 79], Benvenuto (1994), de
Benoist(1995:73ff),andTarchi(1995: 181ff).
Significantly,theclaimthattheleft/rightdivide
no longer informs political theory/practice
emanates invariably from texts which sub-
scribeto a 'new'-populist/'new'-rightposition.
Equally unsurprisingis the fact that in place
of the left/right opposition such texts offer
the 'a-political'/'above-politics'/('common-
sense') interpretationbased on (in economic
terms a tension-free) 'community' where
'otherness' takes the form of cultural
'difference'.
46 The most sustainedclaim for the existence of
a political/episteinological break between
'new' and 'old' right discourse relates to the
questionof gender/sexualidentity,issues over
which the traditionalright has exercised an
authoritarianhold. Althoughadheringto what
is ostensibly an enlightenedview on issues of
genderandsexualidentity,theEuropean'new',
rightneverthelessincorporatesthis withinthe
frameworkof thehistoricalright.Accordingly,
the European 'new' right attributes female
oppression and homophobia specifically to
Christianity,and claims thatpaganismwould
result in a 'natural'process of gender/sexual
empowerment [Wegierski 1994: 59-60].
47 Accepting the presence of continuitiesin the
discourseof
the'old'and'new'right,apologists
E-37
 forthelatterhastento utterstridentdisclaimers
which nevertheless fail to persuade. Hence,
the assertionby Piccone( 1994:22) that:'[Flar
fromconstitutingany kind of public danger...
the French New Right, notwithstandingits
obsessive opposition to any kind of admini-
strativelyimposed equality(which may be its
only remaininglink with the Old Right) has
made a significant contribution [to current
political debate]at a time when originalideas
are hard to come by. As such, it dserves to
betakenseriously...'Adler(1994:26) similarly
maintainsthat the 'new' right 'has nothing
whatsoeverto do with "fascism"as such', as 50 For the equationby those on the 'new' right
do Wegierski (1994: 69) and Gottfried
(1990: x), while Taguieff (1994: 34-35, 39)
insistson thepresenceof a divergencebetween
the early/fascismand late/'anti-fascism'of de
Benoist, claimingthatthe currentemphasisof
the latteron 'otherness'-as-culturerepresents
notjust an epistemologicalbutalso a political
breakwith his previous view of 'otherness'-
as-biology. The views of de Benoist have
received endorsemnent not only from Jean-
MarieLe Pen, leader of the French National
Front,but also from RaymondAron, the cold
warriorof old, who now defends the right
of de Benoist 'to be heard' [Taguieff 1994:
49-50; Marcus1995: 22-24]. Unsurprisingly,
GianfrancoFini, leader of the far-rightMSI/
AN (Movimento Sociale Italiano/Alleatnza
Nazionale), now proclaims himself a 'post-
fascist', and Marco Tarchi, another Italian 51 The link between the events of 1968, which
'new'rightleader,hasarguedthatit is necessary
to stresstheterm'new' andnotthe term'right'
[Wegierski 1994: 55].
48 Somewhatingenuously,Wegierski( 1994:65)
proteststhatthe European'new' right 'cannot
be held responsiblefor the adoptionof some
of its ideasby groupssuchas Le Pen's National
Front,or the Anglo-Americanor Germanfar
right'. Just why traditionally right-wing
politicalpartieswould incorporatethe 'fresh'
ideas of 'new' rightintellectualsif these were 22), Katsiaficas( 1987:22, 126, 223, 229-30),
in any way fundamentally opposed to or
incompatiblewith theproject of the historical
(= 'old') rightis a questionthatis rarelyasked. criticism of the political legacy of the events
Since the combined discourse-for/discourse-
againstof the right is above all a mobilising
ideology,whatseems to haveactuallyoccurred
is that the politically-unacceptableviews of
the 'old' righthavebeennotso muchdiscarded
as hidden. This is borne out by a numberof
sources, not least the observationthat during
the mid-1970stheltalian'new' rightcontinued
to endorse 'an organicistconcept of the world
foundedon a rankorderamongidentitiesthat
differ because of their origins, development
and functions' [Sacchi 1994: 74].
49 Because the discourse of the 'new' populism
is cloaked in the ideology of 'common sense'
(= a 'naturalness' that denies the efficacy/
existence of political alternatives),the occur- futureleaders of the ItalianNew Right) who
rence and extent of its rightwards shift
frequentlygoes unrecognisedby many 'new'
populiststhemselves.Theresponseof thelatter
to anyonewho points out the affinitybetween
the 'new' populismand the 'new' rightis thus
one of incredulity,or worse. Shortlyaftermy
review [Brass 1995a] of the 'impasse'
appeared,I was left in no doubt as to what
'worse'mightentail.Inanacademicequivalent
of road rage, one of the exponents of the'
impasse'criticisedon precisely these grounds
personallyconfrontedme in my faculty room
in Cambridgeand,havingburstunannounced/
PE-38
uninvitedthroughmy door utteringabuseand
threats (his aggressive body language
suggestingthatphysicalassaultwasimminent),
proceededto expostulateat length about the
review. Althoughhe claimed that it had gone
beyond the acceptedboundaries,when asked
what these were. who defines them and how,
hewas unableto provideanyanswers.Agreeing
that, as had been pointed out in the review,
he had failed to mention the importancefor
politicalchangeof propertyrelations,andthat
he should have in fact done so, he finally
departedin a rathermore subdued manner.
of their own views with populism, see for
example,GottfriedandFleming(1988; 21-22,
77ff, 92ff), Glendening(1994), and Taguieff
( 995). This self-identificationis also true of
some postmoderntexts,wherea 'new' populist
influenceis tacitlyacknowledged.Forexample,
Isaacman (1993: 264), who edits and
contributesan essay on ruralsocial protestin
Africato a collection [Cooper,Mallon,Stem,
Isaacman, Roseberry 1995] advocating the
replacementof Marxist theory about deve-
lopmentby postmodemism,acknowledgesthe
influence of Boyte (1986), a prominentcom-
mentator on and' exponent of the 'new'
poi ilism [for detailsof which see Reed 1992:
167-68, 197-981. This is reciprocated by
Boyte (1986: ix) himself, in an acknowledge-
mentof Isaacman'sinfluenceon hisown views.
signalled the global emergence of new social
movements,andthe 'new' populismis a matter
of record[see. forexample,Kazin 1995:Ch 8].
On the importanceof 1968 for Foucault,and
of Foucault for 1968, see among others
Rabinow(1984: 58), Foucault( 1991: 135-36),
and Eribon(1992: 122, 124, 135-36); for the
1968/Fanon connection, see Katsiaficas
(1987:74) andFraser(1988: 70); on the 1968/
Marcuseconnection, see Marcuse (1969: ix,
andFraser(1988:49, 106-7,124-25, 141,143,
144). It must be emphasised that, unlike
of 1968 which identifies it as too left-wing,
the position taken here is that by contrastit
was not left-wing enough. For the emergence
of the 'new' rightduringthe 1960s and early
1970s, see Phillips (1982: 46), Gottfriedand
Fleming (1988; 37ff, 59ff, 77ff), Wegierski
(1994: 56), and Kazin (1995: 222ff). The
conjuncturally-specificorigin of this 'new'
right/'new'populistconvergenceis also noted
by Sacchi (1994: 72-73), who observes that:
'Evola'sphilosophybecameanimportantpoint
of reference... for a younger generation of
political activists who grew up in the middle
of the economic boom of the late 1950s and
1960s.Forthese people (includingmostof the
chose the wrong side, Evola provided an
organic and coherent weltanschlauung to
oppose their peers in the mainstreamculture
in the 1960s. Of course, the fascinationwith
Evola's work in esoteric easternculturesalso
hadto do with the spiritof the times - a period
when there was a quest among the young for
alternatives to western materialism and
bourgeois lifestyles'. Although the received
wisdomisthatthe'new' rightinNorthAmerica
emerged as a. reaction against the events of
1968, such a view overlooks the extent to
which the formerwas able to incorporatethe
Economic and Political Weekly
latter. Insofaras it entailed opposition to the
expansion of large-scale factory production
and its accompanyingprocess of urbanisation
on the one hand, and on the other advocated
a decentralisationto and restorationof rural,
community-basedartisanproduction('small-
is-beautiful'),therefore,right-winglibertarians
[e g, Rothbard 1970: 291] had no difficulty
in identifyingwith muchof theideology which
characterised the events of 1968. What is
frequentlyoverlooked is that anarchistviews
about the desirability of political
decentralisationand individualfreedom/self-
empowermentcoincide with the view of the
libertarianrightconcerningthe imnportance of
the competitive 'choice-makingindividualin
the context of the 'minimal' state.
52 On the primacyof culturalstrugglegenerally
andthe'GramsciismofhteRight'in particular,
see Levitas (1986a), Sunic (1990: 29ff),
Wegierski (1994: 63), Sacchi (1994: 71) and
Kazin (1995: 246, 248). Wegierski makes it
clear that it is not the Marxistbut the populist
content of Gramsciantheory which has been
appropriated,while Sunic (1990: 4, 35ff)
displays evident confusion aboutthis process
by implying that such an appropriation
constitutesevidence of the extentto whichthe
'new' rightis politicallyprogressivein outlook
(= 'EuropeanLeftist Conservatives').
53 The potentiallyreactionarypolitical implica-
tions of this populist approachare nowhere
better illustrated than in the admission by
Piccone (1994: 20-21 note 19) that the
unproblematic endorsement of any/every
'from-below' discourse may indeed involve
the acceptance/advocacy of slavery and/or
racism.
54 See, for example, Marcuse (1969: vii). The
opposition by many postmodern 'new'
populists to the current spread into the so-
called third world of North American or
Eurocentriccultural universalsoverlooks the
fact that the latterare themselves the product
of a universal economic process, capitalism.
55 For the anti-Americanismof de Benoist and
the European'new' right,see Taguieff( 1994:
48) and Wegierski (1994: 68).
56 Forexample,duringthe 1930sOswaldMosley
(1932: 62-66), leader of the British Union of
Fascists,notonly espousedanti-Americanism
but did so for precisely the same reasons as
the European 'new' right does now. Just as
the anti-Americanismof the BUF was linked
to increasedcompetitionfrom the US capital
in marketstraditionallydominatedby Britain,
therefore,that of the European'new' right is
similarly linked to current inter-capitalist
rivalry in internationalmarkets.
57 On these points, see Fanon(1963: 75ff; 1967:
125).
58 Texts by 'new' populists which for these
reasons either explicitly or implicitly ques-
tion/dismiss the possibility/desirability of
progressincludeShiva( 1988;1991),Latouche
(1993) and Richards (1985). For the
technophobiaand opposition to progresson
the part of the 'new' right, see Wegierski
(1994: 56).
59 See Bailey (1958) for the significance of the
rejection by Nietzsche, Spengler, Pareto,
Ortega y Gasset and Le Bon of a linear
conceptionof historyandtheirviews regarding
the non-achievieability of progress as
characterisedby the riseof 'mass society' and
a civlitsation in decline.
January25, 1997
60 Unlike the political left, both the 'new' unit - whether large or small - is based on discursively places limits on this process). If
populism and the 'new' right maintain that a 'natural'kinship/ethnic/nationalidentity. 'others'or 'thosebelow' wantinturntoinvoke
since the grass roots are 'naturally' con- 66 'Thusthe"nativeFrenchhada rightto preserve andexercise ananalogousformof 'difference'
servative,there is consequentlylittle point in the integrity of their culture against the - a specifically culturalone - thenin the view
attemptingto radically change the existing 'invasion' of third world immigrants, the of those on the political right this is not just
structure.The very possibility of 'progress' primarysource of all France's ills. This was fine but- since it adheresto the sameprinciple
is therebydeemednot merely undesirablebut a new and highly effective way of rendering - is actually to be encouraged,so long as it
unrealisable. While the political left also racism (illegitimate in its biological- does not undermine or threaten the 'dis-
accepts that the grass roots may currentlybe hierarchicalform) acceptable;it became the tinctiveness' of the existing rulingclass (like
conservative,it partscompany with both the basis of the [French] National Front's an aristocracy),the culture of which is built
'new' populismand the 'new' right in that it programme"[Adler 1994: 26]. For the claim on (and indeed symbolises) its own economic
contextualises/historicisesthis situation,with that, with the exception of 'extreme fringe power. Two points can be made in this
a view to changing it. In short, unlike either elements',Americanconservatismis no longer connection. First, this is one of the reasons
the 'new' populismorthe'new' right,Marxists racist, see Gottfriedand Fleming (1988: xii). why historicallythe righthas always objected
see nothing 'natural'or enduring about this 67, On this point one commentator[Soucy 1995: (in termsof a culturally-erodingimpositionof
conservatism. 152] observes: '[lIt would be unhistoricalto 'sameness') to the invocationby those on the
61 Fortherejectionof historicallinearityby Evola, makeracisma litmustest for all fascism...The left of universals.And second,this is precisely
see Sacchi( 1994:72) andEatwell( 1995:202). major bonds between German, Italian and the way in which the political right imbues
62 On this point, compareFanon (1963: 33) and Frenchfascismbefore1940wereanti-marxism its discourse with a spuriously 'democratic'
Bhabha(1987). The irreducibilityof cultural and anti-liberalism, not racism and anti- vener: by invoking the right to 'cultural
'otherness'/'difference'was of course a prin- semitism'. It is anyway necessaryto note that difference' in this mannerit not only protects
ciple which those on the 'old' right extended 'scientific' racism associated with the 'old' the ec(nomic interestsof the ruling class but
to colonial subjects.Ask.d whetherhe would right has not only not disappearedbut is now does so in a way that is apparentlyinnocent
imposea culturally'other'educationon coloni- in the process of making a comeback [on politically and even disinterestedlyplebeian
sed India, for example, Mosley (1936: 86) which see Kohn 1995]. - the basis of the 'new' populism, in other
replied:'We [the BUF1will certainlyattempt 68 Intwo importanttexts aboutthe epistemology words.
the educationof the Indianmasses, but not on of what he termed the new racism, Barker 72 It comes as no surprise that 'new' populist
western lines. The mistake has been the (1979; 1981) attributesits (re-)formulationin argumentsabout cultural'otherness are now
impositionof westerncultureon orientallife... British politics to the last of three speeches being deployed by those on the political right
Under Fascism, Indian leaders will arise to made by Enoch Powell in 1968, in which the to defend the employmentof unfreelabourin
carryforwardtheirown traditionsandcultures latterstatedthat 'difference' was 'a matterof the so-called thirdworld. Thus, for exasmple,
withinthe frameworkof Empire...' (emphasis cultureand assimilation,not race' (1981: 39- at the Europeanunion and Asian suilnit in
added).Thesameprineipleinformedthepolicy 40). Interviewedon Britishtelevision in 1969, March1996,headsof governmentin thetorner
of 'separatedevelopment' that structuredthe Powell denied that he was in fact a racist, were warnedby theircounterp;,rts r China.
trfn
apartheidsystem in white South Africa. since: '[I]f by racist you mean a man who Japan,South Koreaandtne ASEAN counties
63 For examples of 'new' populist texts which despises a human being because he belongs not to raise as an issue the question of cheap
attributeunderdevelopmentin the so-called to another race, or a man who believes that labour, child labour and poor working
thirdworldto a non-transcendental 'difference' one race is inherentlysuperiorto anotherin conditionsin the lattercontextson the ground.
which is equatedwith culturalempowerment, civ:isation, then the answer is emphatically thatthese were 'cultural'is specific tv the
seeLatouche( t993), Shiva( 1988),Scott( 1985; no'. In the US during the mid-1970s, the nationsconcerned [on which 'scttJohn Pilger,
1990) andthose associatedwith the Subaltern ideology of the KluKluxKlanwas undergoing 'Tales from Tigerland', New Stuf#o.rwsvi and
Studies, the new social movements and the asimilarkindofmetamorphosis[Sargent1995: Society, February 16, 1996]. To awl;mptto
'impasse' framework [on which, see Brass 142]: 'The Klan hclieves in England for apply universal standardson child labour, it
1991; 1993; 1995a; 1995b]. Englishman,France for Frenchmen,Italy for was argued,was a Eurocentricimpositionon
64 For the views of de Benoist and the French Italians,and Americafor Americans:Is there Asian contexts of inappropriate(= 'other')
National Front concerning 'difference', see anythingobjectionableabout this? The Klan 'cultural'values. In much the same vein, one
Piccone( 1994: 10) and Adler( 1994:26ff); for is notanti-Catholic,anti-Jew,anti-Negro,anti- neo-liberal economist [Bhagwati 1995] has
the centrality to conservatism generally of foreign, the Klan is pro-W-otestant, and pro- suggestedthatlegislationwhich outlawschild
'difference', see Epstein (1970: 115) and American'. labouris a discriminatorypracticethatis anti-
Gottfriedand Fleming (1988; ix-x). In fact, 69 Writingin the 1930s, Ortegay Gasset (1950: competitiveandthus an obstacle to free trade.
it is difficultto thinkof a right-wingdiscourse 12-13) gives classic expression to this fear of Accordingly, he endorses the use of child
- either 'old' or 'new' - which does not imply massman'andthelossofcultural'difference'/ labour, which in many so-called third world
the existence of 'difference'; it is clear, for 'otherness'. contexts is unfree,since in his view it rightly
example,thatthe 'perspectivism' (= 'point of 70 Boththeease andthesignificanceof extending permitsthoseemployerswho use it to undercut
view' = pluralityof perception) of Ortega y the principleof 'difference' from the domain and outcompetethose who do not, a situation
Gasset(1961: 86ff) is an earlierinvocationof of 'the cultural' to that of 'the economic' of competitive advantage which many less
'difference'. That the seemingly neutral should 'not be underestimated.Just as the developedcountriesgenerally- butnotalways
conceptof 'citizenship'which is ideologically relativismof 'popularculture' in the realmof - have over metropolitancapitalism.Whatis
centraltothenew socialmovementsframework ideology licenses postmodern aporia, so particularlysignificant about this is the way
is similarly compatible with appeals to relativismin the realm of economics confers in whichsuchexploitationisjustified:claiming
'difference'in the mobilising discourseof the acceptabilityon and thus licenses the laissez- that'diversityof labourpracticesandstandards
,new' right is clear from Kazin (1995: 227, faire doctrineof neo-classicaleconomictheory is widespreadandreflects...diversityofcultural
246), who shows how the populism of the (i e. untoeach his/herown - or no 'meddling' values', therefore,Bagwati (1995: 28) - like
American 'new' right has been informed by ihe state). theheadsofgovemmentattheAsia/EUsummit
(among other things) by a notion of white 71 This view is implicit in much conservative - defends unfree labour in the name of a
citizenship. writing.In the case of Ortegay Gasset (1950: culturally-specificformofnational'otherness'.
65 Accordingto Wegierski(1994:61), therefore, 13-14), forexample,the perceptionof a threat 73 On these points, see Fanon (1963: 73, 88-89,
'The ultimategoal [of the 'new' right] is the posed by (and hence opposition to) the 109). 'The traditionalchiefs are ignored', he
Europe o?fa Hundred Flags - a patchwork emergence of 'mass man' is clearly linked to complains(1963:91), 'theoldinen,surrounded
quilt of colourful, traditional principalities' (and indeed,a reactionby) his own 'radically by respectinall traditionalsocietiesandusually
(original emphasis). His claim that such aristocraticinterpretationof history'. It must invested with unquestionablemoralauthority,
emphasison small-scaleas distinctfromlarge be emphasisedthatsuch 'aristocratism'is not are publicly held up to ridicule.'
'homogenising' territorialunits constitutes a incompatible with an endorsement of grass 74 Marcuse (1970:75).
departurefrom the ideology of the 'old' right rootsempowerment,muchratherthecontrary: 75 On this point, see Foucault (1971; 1978).
is wrong,since whatis centralto the discourse it does, however, insist on a particularkind 76 Miller (1993:324. Symptomatically, in
forofthepoliticalrightis thatanmyorganisational of grass roots empowerment (and thus expressing support for mass mobilisation

Economic and Political Weekly January25, 1997 PE-39

 againstthe Shahin Iranduring 1978, Foucault
endorsedthesubsequentexercise of theocratic
ruleas a formof 'politicalspirituality'[Miller
t993:306ffl. WhatwasimportantforFoucault,
therefore, was the fact that Iranians were
attempting 'to change not only the form of
governmentbut the shape of their everyday
lives, casting off "the weight of the order of
the entire world". Inspiredby a "religion of
combat and sacrifice", they had forced an
authentically "collective will"... [Miller
1993:309]. Not only did this constitute an
idealist as distinct from a materialist inter-
pretationof the Iranianrevolution, but what
Foucaultappearsto have foundmost desirable
in this 'resistance' was precisely its most
reactionary element(= death/sacrifice/religion/
mysticism).Insofaras it involves for Foucault
the rejection by those 'from below' of
modernity in the name of a pre-modern
ideology, this suggests that - like Rousseau
- Foucault subscribes to a notion of a pre-
capitalist'generalwill' thatwas bothgood and
rooted in an instinctive/elemental force of
'nature'.
77 For more details on these points, see Brass
(1991; 1993; 1995a; 1995b).
78 For a similarly orientalist invocation of the
'Asiatic soul' as instinctively 'different', the
tradition-embedded'other'of rationalism,see
Ortegay Gasset ( 1961:49, 64-65, 68, 74, 79).
'Thisromanticisedpastis important',observes
Wegierski (1994: 58), 'because many of the
[the European'new' right) referents,such as
paganism,naturalism,particularism,a sort of
feminism, and ecology, are predicatedon it'.
That the origins of much contemporary
academicconservativethird-worldismarestill
to be found in the agrarianmyth is clear from
many sources, not least those written by
conservatives themselves. A prominent
exponentof conservativethird-worldistviews
[Berger 1979:168-69] observes: 'One funny
thing that happenedto me in the third world
was that I developed a strongsympathy with
tribalism...I gained an enormous respect for
the positive values of such intact premodern
communities as still exist in the third world
- communitiesof kinship,tribe, locality, and
region - and the frequentlymoving efforts to
preservethese communitiesunderthe violent
pressure of modernisation'.
79 For the elements composing the discourse
abouta pre-capitalist'golden age', see Eliade
(1954)
80 Onthe linkbetweenthe anti-Americanismand
pro-third-worldismn of the European 'new'
right,see Taguieff(1994), Wegierski(1994:63-
64), and Sacchi ( 1994-72). It should be noted
that the American 'new' right also espouses
what it regards as pro-third-worldistviews
[Gottfried and Fleming 1988:68]
81 On this point,see Wegierski(1994:57-58) and
Taguieff (1994:48). Not only does Lyotard
equate postmodemism with paganismbut he
also appearsto identify the latteras the basis
for an instinctual/innate form of political/
ethical/aesthetic judgment [Lyotard and
Thebaud 1985:15-16]. It is clear that some
elements on the 'old' right [eg, Mosley
1936:#10]also espouseda formof polytheism.
It is not without significance that polytheism
is also compatiblewithanexistentialistconcept
of 'choice' that is not dissimilar to the self-
empowering choice-making subject at the
centre of neo-classical economic theory.
PE-40
82 For the pre-ecologicaVenvironmental-preser-
vationist views of individuals/institutionson
the European'new' right- such as Evola, de
Benoist,GRECE,andHenningEichberg- see
Bodemann(1986), Taguieff (1994:35 note 7)
and Wegierski (1994:56, 62-63).
83 The 'new nationalists'of the 'new' right,such
as Eichberg,oppose 'statecentralistindustrial
[= socialist] societies [since] highly techno-
logical industrialsystemscolonise the peoples
in theworld[and]deprivethemoftheirnational
and cultural identity [cited in Bodemann
1986:151].
84 Linkedto this is the fact that,since ecological
theory/practicein its currentform is largely
incompatible with development, it posits
'natural'limitstoeconomicgrowthandthereby
handsthecontrolofresourcesto specificethnic/
cultural groups, also deemed 'natural'.
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