SPE 86591
"Working Together for Safety”
A project to identify and recommend on use of Best Practices, involving employer’s
organisations, unions and authorities
Erik Wiig “Working Together for Safety” (SfS)
Copyright 2004, Society of Petroleum Engineers Inc.
This paper was prepared for presentation at The Seventh SPE International Conference on
Health, Safety, and Environment in Oil and Gas Exploration and Production held in Calgary,
Alberta, Canada, 29–31 March 2004.
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Abstract
What do you do when there is a gap in the perception of safety
performance and safety standards between management and
employees, authorities and society at large, and the industry
reputation is at stake?
This was the background for why the project ”Working
Together for Safety” (SfS) was established. How trust
gradually was rebuilt between employers, authorities and
employee’s organisations.
This is also about a working program, which was established
and agreed as a result of extensive teambuilding, and the good
results obtained so far.
The main task has been to identify Best Practices and
recommend these to the parties involved who have committed
themselves to implement the recommendations.
The project covers the whole chain of activities within E&P,
comprising drilling, construction, operation, logistics,
maintenance and abandonment.
Introduction
During the last parts of 1990ies the focus on safety was
gradually weakened in the companies working on the
Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS). Rationalisation and
effectiveness were high on the agenda. Gradually priorities
changed while personnel involved perceived that they still
were on a positive trend regarding safety performance. Most
people thought that they could keep the momentum on safety
while at the same time focusing on cost and productivity.
When E&P business was introduced on the NCS in the late
60ies, safety, or HSE for that matter, was not taken as
seriously as we would expect, when handling hydrocarbons.
Bad safety habits and a macho culture became dominant in
many companies. Although technical safety standards were
strict and prescriptive, safety attitudes and safety in operations
was generally poor.
Historically, Norwegian industry in general also had a bad
safety record. Focus had for many years been on the major
task to rebuild the country after the Second World War, and
historically nobody had bothered too much about safety,
except when serious accidents happened.
Typically the LTI frequency rate in some industries was in the
order of 50 to 100 per million man-hours exposure.
Tragic accidents like the capsizing of Alexander Kielland
made the industry, general public and the authorities to
demand better safety performance and safe operations. The
industry had to change.
Large safety campaigns were introduced in the companies and
in the Norwegian Oil Industry Association (OLF). A huge
national safety research programme was launched in mid 80ies
and ran for seven years, aiming at competence development.
The safety performance now improved steadily. Typically the
early improvements were impressive. But as the improvements
got more and more difficult, the safety statistics were
flattening out. The co-operation in OLF on safety issues and
the steady work did not result in notable improvements any
longer and we did not produce safety results, as was expected.
The trend was even turning, and instead of improvements, we
could see a slight negative trend in some companies.
The industry was accused of not taking safety seriously any
more. Employees expressed their concern in public, and the
public at large was very sceptical.
The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) had for a time
expressed their concern, not only based on statistical
measures, but also on an objective review of the situation
through their supervision and audits of the industry.
A debate took place in all media on the topic of safety,
outlining the theme “How safe is safe enough”. While
management representatives from the industry claimed that
there had never been such an excellent safety performance and
high safety standards before, unions, authorities, politicians
and public were of the opinion that safety standards had
deteriorated and that safety statistics published did not give a
true picture. The differences in opinions on the actual situation
gave clear indications that stakeholders were far apart. The
situation culminated when the Norwegian parliament asked for
a “White Paper” on safety to be presented.
This was a very serious situation for the industry regarding our
reputation and had to be managed!
2 SPE 86591

The tri-partite project “Working Together for Safety” confidence among the participants. This was a must in order to
Late autumn 2000 an internal discussion regarding the safety establish co-operation for better safety performance.
situation started in the Norwegian Oil Industry Association A series of meetings and seminars were conducted within the
(OLF). After some consultations a project was established in project task force with experts on organisational issues and
order to build confidence between the parties and to establish a change management as facilitators. Hours and hours were
sustainable safety culture within the industry. spent on talking to each other to create a true team. The
An invitation to participate in this largest tri-partite safety teambuilding was also based on social events like “away
project ever launched in Norway was sent to actual employer days”, lunches and dinners.
associations, the relevant unions and to the NPD. Key persons Gradually a mutual trust was built and one could agree on the
had already prepared a mandate for the project, and now a first activities to take part outside the project task force. First
discussion on the details started. of all it was decided to interview top managers of companies,
The tri-partite project was formally established in January contractors, unions, politicians, academia and relevant
2001, by signing an agreed mandate. The project had the authorities. Teams from the project task force conducted the
following participants: interviews.
The objective of this extensive interview task was to establish
OLF The Norwegian Oil Industry an agreed “baseline” for the safety level, and at the same time
Association assessing remedial actions needed in order to improve.
Needless to say that the interviews revealed many different
NOPEF The Norwegian Oil and opinions and suggestions for improvement. The main task for
Petrochemical Workers’ Union the project team was now to evaluate all interviews, assess the
validity, and draw conclusions.
Lo Industri Norwegian Confederation of Trade
Unions (Industry Cartel) The project team arrived at the following mutual realities:

Lederne Norwegian Association of - Communication feels difficult

Supervisors and Managers - Management has become less focused on safety
- Predictability for the industry and employees is weakened
NR Norwegian Shipowners’ - Employees are treated differently
Association - Safety is under pressure

NPD Norwegian Petroleum Directorate Communication. The communication problem was rooted in
(as observer) stakeholders’ different perceptions and knowledge.
Some managers had limited knowledge of safety, and their
perception was limited to “safety equals hard hats and safety
Later the following parties joined: boots”. Other managers had a very good knowledge including
technical integrity details of platforms, safe behaviour of
TBL Federation of Norwegian personnel, emergency preparedness etc.
Manufacturing Industries The employees’ representatives also had a wide band of
perceptions. Some of them mixed safety with comfort or
DSO The Co-operate Organisation welfare, which made some employers defensive.
(Trade union for marine personnel) The employees were all critical to the way safety was
managed and said that the safety standards had deteriorated
OFS Federation of Oil Workers’ Trade over the last decade, without being too specific on how this
Unions was measured. They were familiar with the operational
safety aspects.
To communicate understandable facts is quite simple, but to
OLF had two representatives, one representing the E&P communicate opinions or perceptions can be difficult,
companies and the other representing the contractors, while especially when the other part does not agree or understand!
the other participating organisations had one representative Admitting that you do not understand an issue is difficult.
each. The lesson learned was that we have to focus on an open and
transparent dialogue, involving all parties concerned. We have
In short the mandate spelled out the following tasks: to make sure that there is a common understanding of the issue
in question and we have to be honest with each other.
- Improve safety throughout the offshore petroleum
industry Less focused on safety. The employee perception was that
- Improve confidence to the industry and its employees management had lost focus on safety. Other important
- Strengthen confidence and co-operation between parties business objectives like production volume, cost, taxes and
- Improve the industry’s reputation rationalisation had got their priority. The result was less
maintenance work, more haste, less planning of jobs and
The very first project task was to establish trust and
SPE 86591
above all; corners were cut in order to meet schedules. This
was a common view talking to the employees.
It was hard to establish if this was a general picture, but some
managers admitted that elements of the description could fit
with the present situation.
Later OLF came out as an organisation saying that focus on
safety unfortunately had deteriorated.
Some managers still argued that safety was well taken care of.
Predictability. The business environment changed gradually
in the nineties. The swing from long time contracts to shorter
contracts was evident. Long time personal relations between
parties were substituted with a much more business like
attitude: “Stick to the contract”.
The short time contracts resulted in much more pressure on
cost and efficiency.
Jobs became unsecure and it was difficult to plan for the
future, whether you should plan company- or personal
activities.
The traditional difference between company and contractor
employment was increased.
Employees are treated differently. As a result of the
unpredictable business environment the different categories of
employees also were treated differently. You may think that
this difference in treatment is natural, but in the Norwegian
culture equivalence is a much-appreciated norm, and hence
this phenomena was not well received.
The difference could be expressed in aspects like priority for
homebound flights, priority for single cabins, best equipment,
best tools etc.
There had always been a difference, but now it was
accentuated.
Safety under pressure. The demand for cost efficiency, lower
manning and high production was perceived to mean that
managers consented that “corners could be cut”. This
perception was quite dominant in middle management. They
felt squeezed between the demand from management for lower
cost per barrel and the demand for safe operations from
the workforce.
The normal outcome of such a conflict is that you tend to land
on what your boss is demanding from you.
Remedial actions to improve
Another result of the interviews was that the different opinions
on short and long term remedial actions were flashed out. All
remedial actions were grouped and made more specific.
Five main project groups were identified:
General HSE
Maritime operations
Crane- and lifting operations
Standardising of safety related procedures
Standardising of safety routines
For each project group, several workgroups were identified to
undertake specific tasks.
A process owner was appointed for each project group with
3
the mandate to establish and organise the respective
workgroups, facilitate the work and to report back to the SfS
project manager on status and with the final products.
Before the workgroups were established, the tasks were
thoroughly discussed in SfS in order to give the right
prioritisation and to flash out “low hanging fruits”. By
concentrating on a few tasks with a high likelihood of success
we could secure enthusiasm and faith in SfS.
The SfS members were asked to nominate personnel to
participate in the workgroups.
Deliverables from the workgroups were identified and we also
specified a process for acceptance of the proposals from the
workgroups.
As a tri-partite project we are not in a position to operate any
platform or facility. The main task has been to identify Best
Practices and recommend these to the parties involved who
have committed themselves to implement our
recommendations. If the Recommendation is followed by a
guideline, the guideline becomes mandatory unless you have
very good reasons not to implement. To strengthen the
message NPD is including the SfS recommended guidelines in
their supervisory activities. Hence, not implementing the
guidelines has to be explained to NPD.
The Recommendation is stipulating both scope and schedule
for implementation of the guideline.
Most of the population offshore Norway is “nomads” often
changing workplaces. By having common systems and
standards the safety risk will decrease because of the
uniformity of Best Practice. This is why two of the project
groups have concentrated on standardisation. This
enhancement of standards is also related towards adoption of
international standards where applicable.
The very first challenge in standardisation was the syndrome
of “not invented here”. Some of the facilitators have spent
much effort in convincing the participants that they were not
necessarily always in possession of best practice. Others, even
outside Norway, may have come across good ideas well worth
implementing!
RESULTS
The 18 workgroups established have worked hard on their
tasks and so far we have issued 11 Recommendations, some
followed by a guideline:
Recommendation 001 “Renovation of Derrick”. Basically
the derrick should be free of any surplus equipment. The
remaining equipment and the location/securing of it shall be
justified after careful consideration and analyses.
SfS has through discussions, workshops and the project
Falling Objects reached the conclusion that the entire industry
must jointly implement immediate measures, and make sure
that in time procedures are implemented to ensure that no
objects fall on the drilling area.
This entails:
- Identify and check the equipment as well as location and
securing of it in derricks
- Evaluate/analyse the need and remove unnecessary
equipment
- Move equipment into safe areas
4 SPE 86591
- Make equipment more easily accessible in order to reduce
the use of personnel in manriders in connection with
inspections and preventive maintenance
- Reduce the need for scaffolding
- Remove or move equipment that represents a danger in
connection with an operation (for example winch
operation)
- Check the viability of established inspection and
maintenance procedures
It is recommended to establish a separate project group for
each unit consisting of personnel from the unit's own drilling
personnel, technical personnel and professional climbers
whose primary job is to secure the removal and moving of
equipment.
Recommendation 002 “Transfer of experience, derrick”.
SfS recommends that the individual drilling contractor and
equipment supplier (main supplier) establish a procedure for
the transfer of information and experience so that the
conditions for safe operation of derricks with equipment are
maintained in all stages.
Over the years actions have been taken in the individual
companies to reduce accidents and incidents caused by falling
objects in the drilling area. Statistics from the NPD and
feedback from the stakeholders indicate that these measures
have not been sufficient. SfS has through discussions,
workshops and the project Falling objects reached the
conclusion that the entire industry must jointly implement
immediate measures and make sure that in time procedures are
implemented to ensure that no objects fall on the drilling area.
In this work it is important that suppliers and other users of the
equipment are involved.
This entails:
- Establish better procedures for the flow of information
between drilling contractor, supplier and other users of the
equipment
- Ensure that defects/flaws are reported to the equipment
supplier, are followed-up properly and that any measures
taken are reported back to the users
- Establish procedures to assess the quality of the measures
implemented and make sure that procedures for a uniform
process are established and followed-up if changes occur
- Ensure that maintenance- and operating manuals are
updated when changes take place
Recommendation 003 “Statutory and regulatory imposed
HSE conditions in contracts”. The project recommends the
individual tender owners to establish procedures to ensure that
no contract has a wording, which could result in having the
HSE-work and the work within the safety delegate scheme to
become subject to competition.
This entails:
- Statutory and regulatory HSE conditions that are relevant
for safety and the working environment during work must
be identified and be included in the contract as a fixed
price element. Welfare measures essential to the working
environment in that particular assignment must also be
described (teambuilding customer/supplier).
- Customer should describe the scope of work after input
from the tendering companies early in the tender stage.
The safety delegates shall be involved in this work.
- Scope of work should comprise training and participation
in the Working Environment Committees and safety
delegate services.
- Establish procedures to estimate the scope of the HSE and
the safety delegate service's work
- Ensure that the scope of work is regulated in a fixed price
format, or in a reimbursable element, which shall be
removed as a competition exposed element in the tender.
- Establish procedures for follow-up during the work.
Recommendation 004 “Falling objects in the drilling and
wellhead area”. The project recommends that the players
establish a procedure for follow-up of incidents caused by
falling objects in the drilling and wellhead area as a follow-up
of Recommendation 001 and 002
This entails:
- Meetings at least twice a year between the operator and
drilling contractor. The operator for permanent
installations and rig-owner/operating company for mobile
installations will be responsible for planning and carrying
out these meetings
- Review all incidents of "falling objects" within the area
- Safeguard transfer of experience by inviting the
equipment suppliers to participate when relevant
Recommendation 005 “Use of Manrider”. Through its
project “Use of Manrider”, SfS has reached the conclusion that
the entire industry must implement immediate measures in
connection with the use of manrider.
A separate guideline has therefore been prepared,
OLF/NSA 078,
The use of manrider should be restricted, and must never be
regarded as a routine operation.
Recommendation 006 “Introduction of personnel
offshore”. SfS, through its sub-project "Introduction on
board", has reached the conclusion that the entire industry
must implement procedures to harmonise activities related to
introduction of new personnel offshore.
A separate guideline, OLF /NSA 080, has therefore been
prepared for the introduction of personnel. The content is also
included in guideline OLF/NSA 002 "Guidelines for Safety
and Emergency training"
The purpose of OLF/NSA Guideline for " Introduction of
personnel offshore" is to contribute towards achieving a
common practice for informing new personnel and at the same
time contribute towards creating positive awareness of safe
conduct. After having received information and being taken on
a familiarisation tour of the installation, the personnel will
recognise the attitudes towards HSE expected.
Recommendation 007 “Safe use of vessels”. Two guidelines
have been prepared: OLF/NSA 061 and 061-A.
SPE 86591
The Guideline OLF/NSA 061 is a governing document, which
inter alia covers activities related to offshore service vessel
operations. The document OLF/NSA 061-A "Guidelines for
Safe Anchor Handling and Towing" is a supporting document
of OLF/NSA 061 and describes best practice related to Anchor
Handling and Towing.
Recommendation 008 “Apprentice scheme for crane
operators”. SfS, through the project "Crane and Lifting
operations, Falling objects", has reached the conclusion that
the entire industry must instigate measures to ensure
recruitment of new crane operators.
The apprentice scheme for crane operators gives the operators
and rig-owners an opportunity to recruit new crane operators
who will be trained in a systematic way in their profession.
Operators and rig-owners have to contact the Training Council
for Oil-Related Disciplines (ORO) and together ensure that
apprenticeships are established offshore for a class of
approximately 15 students.
Recommendation 009 “Review of the breathing air
systems”. Based on previous working accidents offshore, SfS
recommends that each offshore unit review its systems and
procedures for use of breathing air on board.
The breathing air must be free of odour and taste, and must as
a minimum satisfy the requirements for oxygen, carbon
dioxide, carbon monoxide, oil and water stipulated in
NS-EN 12021 and the Directorate of Labour Inspection's order
no. 441. Details concerning requirements for hoses and fittings
are stated in NS-EN-139.
SfS recommends the following working procedure for
reviewing the breathing air systems (including the mobile
ones):
- Conduct a risk analysis - which standards and barriers are
used?
- Define responsibilities and training needs
- Review of procedures, which describe training,
maintenance, monitoring, use and labelling.
Recommendation 010 “Standardised Permit to Work and
Safe Job Analysis” (PtW and SJA). SfS through its working
group “Permit to Work and Safe Job Analysis” recommends
that the industry must implement routines to harmonise the
nomenclature and a common process for PtW and SJA.
SfS is of the opinion that the introduction of common
processes for PtW and SJA will enhance and simplify the
risk control.
The implementation of common PtW and SJA processes will
reduce the present need for introduction and training to
understand and practise the different systems. With a common
system one can expect a better efficiency and at the same time
reduce the risk of incidents.
Recommended process: Operators to start introduction of new
systems described in Guidelines OLF 088 and 089, when the
training package is ready by 15.11.2003. Old procedures and
forms have to be phased out a.s.a.p. and latest by 01.07.2004.
5
Recommendation 011 “Checking in on helicopters”. SfS
through its working group “Checking in on helicopters”
recommends that the industry must implement a harmonised
check-in procedure on helicopter to/from offshore. A separate
guideline, OLF 087 has been established.
The content has been harmonised with "Guidelines for
helicopter flights to petroleum installations" (OLF 66),
"Guidelines for operating companies regarding check of
passport and work and residence permits for offshore
personnel south of N62 degree latitude" (OLF 050) and
"Guidelines for security checks at helicopter terminals"
(OLF 003A).
The objective for the OLF Guideline 087 "Checking in on
helicopters" is to attend to the requirement regarding uniform
check-in procedures for all personnel travelling to/from the
shelf. This to avoid misunderstandings, delays and
unnecessary denial of personnel.
Seminars. Another important aspect of the SfS activities has
been to arrange various seminars.
Two different seminar topics shall be mentioned:
Management of offshore platforms and Safety delegate (SD)
role and responsibilities. It has been important to support the
offshore installation managers (OIM). The seminar therefore
included both the OIMs and onshore suport and line staff.
These seminars will continue in the future.
As important was the issue around safety delegates roles and
responsibilities. These aspects are described in the present law
and its regulations. The theme in said seminars was more on
local interpretation of the regulation and to build confidence in
the group of SDs. The fourth seminar for SDs will be arranged
later this year.
Future work
There is still a number of workgroups who are supposed to
deliver their conclusions within 2004. These are looking into
standardisation of definitions for Key Performance Indicators
(KPIs). An agreement has to be made with relevant Norwegian
Authorities and the industry to come up with meaningful
indicators with an international recognition and avoid national
definitions and notions.
“Barriers” is another topic being worked at. The Norwegian
regulation is stipulating that barriers are identified and
controlled in order to maintain a safe workplace. Physical
barriers seem to be easy to understand. The work group shall
come up with definitions for a set of non-physical barriers, and
the suggested use of these “soft” barriers. As a result of their
work we also have asked for a proposed text for the revised
regulation.
The most difficult task will be to expand on the topic of HSE
Culture. Here we can see advisory work to be done both
within organisations as well as for individuals. We are in the
process of defining our role in this context and hopefully we
will be able to facilitate excellent examples of good
HSE culture.
Conclusions
The SfS project has become a “permanent” body in as much as
it has been decided that SfS shall identify and describe Best
Practice in industry. As Best Practice is dynamic in its nature,
6 SPE 86591

SfS will continuously monitor and suggest improvements.

Focus has been on standardisation of work practises to ease
the situation for most of the personnel working offshore. This
has given both bonuses on efficiency and reduced the
safety risk.
In the aspect of creating good working relations and hence
facilitating a good HSE culture, SfS and its work has
demonstrated that through a tri-partite process we have been
able to develop and maintain a good HSE culture within the
SfS team, despite the starting point.
Lessons learned from this process are now available to
all participants.

Acknowledgements
The author would like to acknowledge all personnel who have
participated in the SfS workgroups. They have identified Best
Practices, and made SfS recommendations possible.
My sincere thanks also go to the SfS Steering Committee.
Their co-operation has been fundamental for our success.

References
Visit our web site on www.samarbeidforsikkerhet.no where
you will find both a Norwegian and an English version.

Regarding the OLF Guidelines you can find them on

www.olf.no under Reports/Guidelines.