PEOPLE VS.
MATEO-LEE In the assailed Resolution dated September 6, 2017, the Sandiganbayan
PERALTA, J.:
In this Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the People of the
Philippines, as petitioner, thru the Office of the Special Prosecutor ( OSP) of the Office
of the Ombudsman, seeks the reversal of the Sandiganbayan's Resolution1 dated
September 6, 2017, which granted Mateo Acuin Lee, Jr.' s (Lee) Motion for
Reconsideration and ordered the dismissal of the case against him on the ground of
prescription, and Resolution2 dated October 6, 201 7, which denied petitioner's Motion
for Reconsideration. Lee was charged with Violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 78773
before the Sandiganbayan under an Information that was filed on March 21, 2017. The
Information alleged:
That from February 14, 2013 to March 20, 2014, or sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused MATEO A. LEE, JR. a
public officer, being the Deputy Executive Director of the National
Council on Disability Affairs, committing the offense in relation to
this official functions and taking advantage of his position, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, criminally demand, request or require
sexual favor from Diane Jane M. Paguirigan, an Administrative Aide
VI in the same office and who served directly under the supervision
of accused, thus, accused has authority, influence or moral
ascendancy over her, by asking Ms. Paguirigan in several instances,
when they would check in a hotel, sending her flowers, food and
messages of endearment and continuing to do so even after several
protests from her, visiting her house and church and inquiring about
her from her family, relatives and friends, and even following her on
her way home, which sexual demand, request or requirement resulted
in an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment to Ms.
Paguirigan.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On March 30, 2017, Lee filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable
Cause and Prescription Extinguishing Criminal Liability with Prayer for Outright
Dismissal of the Case which drew a Comment/Opposition dated April 17, 2017, from the
OSP. Lee's motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution dated June 2,
2017.
Lee's counsel, thereafter, filed an Entry of Appearance and Motion for
Reconsideration of the June 16, 2017 (sic) Resolution dated June 29, 2017, seeking
reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan's Resolution dated June 2, 2017. The OSP filed a
Comment/Opposition to Accused Lee's Motion for Reconsideration dated June 29, 2017.
resolved to reconsider and set aside its earlier Resolution dated June 2, 2017 and ordered
the dismissal of the case against Lee on the ground that the offense charged had already
prescribed. On September 18, 2017, the OSP filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Honorable Court's Resolution dated September 8, 2017 (sic), which was subsequently
denied by the Sandiganbayan in a minute Resolution dated October 6, 2017.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that the Sandiganbayan seriously erred in ordering the
dismissal of the case against Lee on the ground of prescription.It asserts that the
Sandiganbayan' s reliance on the case of Jadewell v. Judge Nelson Lidua, Sr. is not on all
fours with Lee's case. Unlike the Jadewell case, which resolved the issue concerning the
reckoning point for the running of the period of prescription of actions for violation of a
city ordinance, the offense involved in Lee's case was for violation of R.A. No. 7877, a
special law. Citing the case of People v. Pangilinan,6 where this Court tackled the issue
of prescription of action pertaining to violation of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22, also a
special law, petitioner insists that the filing of the complaint with the prosecutor's office
interrupts the prescription period.
While admitting that Jadewell is the most recent case law on the contentious
issue of prescription of actions, petitioner nevertheless posits that it cannot be deemed to
have abandoned earlier jurisprudences and the Pangilinan case which categorically ruled
that it is the filing of the complaint with the prosecution's office that tolls the running of
the prescription period for actions involving violations of special penal laws. It explained
that Jadewell merely adopted, insofar as violations of ordinances are concerned, the
doctrine in Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr., that it is the filing of the information in court that
interrupts the running of the prescriptive period not the filing of the complaint with the
prosecutor's office.
In his Comment, Lee asserts that the Petition has no clear statement of the
material dates of receipt of the assailed Resolution dated September 6, 2017 and the
filing of petitioner's motion for reconsideration and motion for extension of time. He
also contends that the certification against forum shopping did not contain an
undertaking that petitioner shall promptly inform the courts and other tribunal or agency
of the filing or pendency of the same or similar action or proceeding. The signatories to
the Verification likewise lacked proof of authority from the Ombudsman that they were
authorized to initiate the present petition.
The Petition is meritorious.
Prescription is one of the modes of totally extinguishing criminal liability.
Prescription of a crime or offense is the loss or waiver by the State of its right to
prosecute an act prohibited and punished by law. On the other hand, prescription of the
penalty is the loss or waiver by the State of its right to punish the convict.
 For felonies under the Revised Penal Code, prescription of crimes is governed
by Articles 90 and 91, which read as follows:
Art. 90. Prescription of crimes. -Crimes punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal shall prescribe in 20
years.
Crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall
prescribe in 15 years.
Those punishable by a correctional penalty shall prescribe
in 10 years; with the exception of those punishable by arresto mayor,
which shall prescribe in 5 years.
The crime of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe
in 1 year.
The offenses of oral defamation and slander by deed shall
prescribe in 6 months.
Light offenses prescribe in 2 months.
When the penalty fixed by law is a compound one, the
highest penalty shall be made the basis of the application of the rules
contained in the first, second, and third paragraphs of this article.
Art. 91. The period of prescription shall commence to run
from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party,
the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing
of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again
when such proceedings terminate without the accused being
convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason
not imputable to him.
The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is
absent from the Philippine Archipelago.
While prescription for violations penalized by special acts and municipal
ordinances is governed by Act 3326, otherwise known as "An Act to Establish Periods
of Prescription for Violations Penalized By Special Laws and Municipal Ordinances,
and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run," as amended by Act 3763. The
pertinent provisions provide that:
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the
time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceeding for
its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted
against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the / proceedings are
dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
Sec. 3. For purposes of this Act, special acts shall be acts defining
and penalizing violations of the law not included in the Penal Code.
Here, it was undisputed that the respondent stands charged with violation of
R.A. No. 7877, a special law otherwise known as the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of
1995. The prescriptive period for violations of R.A. No. 7877 is three (3) years. The
Affidavit-Complaint for sexual harassment against him was filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman on April 1, 2014. The Information against the respondent was,
subsequently, filed before the Sandiganbayan on March 21, 2017. It alleged respondent's
unlawful acts that were supposedly committed "from February 14, 2013 to March 20,
2014, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto." Thus, the issue confronting this Court is
whether the filing of the complaint against the respondent before the Office of the
Ombudsman for the purpose of preliminary investigation halted the running of the
prescriptive period.
The issue of when prescription of a special law starts to run and when it is
tolled was settled in the case of Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice, et al., 10
wherein the Court had the occasion to discuss the set-up of our judicial system during
the passage of Act 3326 and the prevailing jurisprudence at that time which considered
the filing of the complaint before the justice of peace for preliminary investigation as
sufficient to toll period of prescription. Panaguiton also cited cases 11 subsequently
decided by this Court involving prescription of special laws where We categorically
ruled that the prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of proceedings for
preliminary investigation against the accused. The doctrine in the Panaguiton case was
subsequently affirmed in People v. Pangilinan.12 In this case, the affidavit-complaint for
estafa and violation of B.P. Big. 22 against the respondent was filed before the Office of
the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City on September 16, 1997. The complaint stems
from respondent's issuance of nine (9) checks in favor of private complainant which
were dishonored upon presentment and refusal of the former to heed the latter's notice of
dishonor which was made sometime in the latter part of 1995.
On February 3, 2000, a complaint for violation of BP Big. 22 against the
respondent was filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City, after
the Secretary of Justice reversed the recommendation of the OCP of Quezon City
approving the "Petition to Suspend Proceedings on the Ground of Prejudicial Question"
filed by the respondent on the basis of the pendency of a civil case for accounting,
recovery of commercial documents and specific performance which she earlier filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City.
The issue of prescription reached this Court after the Court of Appeals ( CA),
citing Section 2 of Act 326, sustained respondent's position that the complaint against
her for violation of B.P. Big. 22 had prescribed. In reversing the CA's decision, We
emphatically ruled that "(t)here is no more distinction between cases under the RPC
(Revised Penal Code) and those covered by special laws with respect to the interruption
of the period of prescription" and reiterated that the period of prescription is interrupted
by the filing of the complaint before the fiscal' s office for purposes of preliminary
investigation against the accused.
In the case at bar, it was clear that the filing of the complaint against the
respondent with the Office of the Ombudsman on April 1, 2014 effectively tolled the
running of the period of prescription. Thus, the filing of the Information before the
Sandiganbayan on March 21, 2017, for unlawful acts allegedly committed on February
14, 2013 to March 20, 2014, is well within the three (3)-year prescriptive period of R.A.
No. 7877. The court a quo's reliance on the case of Jadewell v. Judge Nelson Lidua,
Sr.,13 is misplaced. Jadewell presents a different factual milieu as the issue involved
therein was the prescriptive period for violation of a city ordinance, unlike here as well
as in the Pangilinan and other above-mentioned related cases, where the issue refers to
prescription of actions pertaining to violation of a special law. For sure, Jadewell did not
abandon the doctrine in Pangilinan as the former even acknowledged existing
jurisprudence which holds that the filing of complaint with the Office of the City
Prosecutor tolls the running of the prescriptive period.
Finally, We note in the attachments to the present Petition that the petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration before the Sandiganbayan was filed on September 18, 201 7.
While the Petition failed to clearly indicate the date of receipt of the Sandiganbayan's
Resolution dated September 6, 2017, it can be deduced, however, that the resolution was
presumptively received by the petitioner, at the latest, on the date when it was issued. It
could not have been received prior to the date of the resolution. Hence, the filing of the
Motion for Reconsideration on September 18, 2017 is well within the period to file the
same.
In one case, the Court laid down the following guidelines with respect to non-
compliance with the requirements on or submission of a defective verification and
certification against forum shopping,
1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement
on or submission of defective verification, and non-compliance with the
requirement on or submission of defective certification against forum
shopping.
2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not
necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order its
submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances
are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order
that the ends of justice may be served thereby.
3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has
ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or
petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have
been made in good faith or are true and correct.
4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a
defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent
submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on
the ground of "substantial compliance" or presence of "special circumstances
or compelling reasons."
5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs
or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as
parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as
when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a
common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the
certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule.
6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the
party-pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable
reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power
of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf. As
discussed earlier, the dismissal of the complaint against the respondent based
on prescription was a result of the court a quo's erroneous interpretation of Our
ruling in Jadewell. The error, if not corrected, would certainly result to a
travesty of justice. Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on
their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer
unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their control,
like the accused's delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the
investigating agencies.
It is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on
account of delays that are not under his control. The only thing the offended must do to
initiate the prosecution of the offender is to file the requisite complaint.
Clearly, there is a need to relax the requirements imposed by the Rule on
certification against forum shopping and verification in the present Petition. The
substantive issue in this case far more outweighs whatever defect in the certification
against forum shopping and in the verification. Procedural rules must be faithfully
followed and dutifully enforced. Still, their application should not amount to "placing the
administration of justice in a straight jacket." An inordinate fixation on technicalities
cannot defeat the need for a full, just, and equitable litigation of claims. After all, the
rules of procedure were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of
justice. It was never meant to subvert the ends of justice.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition is GRANTED.
The Sandiganbayan's Resolutions, dated September 6, 2017 and October 6, 2017, are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is ORDERED to PROCEED
WITH DISPATCH the trial of respondent Mateo Acuin Lee, Jr.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
VIRGILIO AMORA y VISCARRA, Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The qualifying circumstance of treachery does not require that the perpetrator attack his
victim from behind. "Even a frontal attack could be treacherous when une)(pected and
on an unarmed victim who would be in no position to repel the attack or avoid it." 1
On appeal is the August 28, 2009 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 03294, which affirmed with modification the February 21, 2008
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 84, Malolos City, Bulacan. The
RTC convicted Virgilio Amora y Viscarra (appellant) of the crime of murder and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the
victim Romeo Gibaga (Romeo) ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱35,000.00 for funerale)
(penses, and ₱16,770.69 for medical expense.
Factual Antecedents
On November 30, 2004, appellant was charged with murder defined and penalized under
Article248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Pertinent portions of the Information 4 filed
against him read:
That on or about the 12th day of September 2004, in San Jose Del Monte City, province
of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, armed with a deadly weapon and with intent to kill one Romeo Gibaga,
with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said deadly weapon the said Romeo Gibaga,
hitting him on the trunk, thereby inflicting upon him mortal wound[s] which directly
caused his death.
Contrary to law.5
Upon arraignment on January 18, 2006, appellant entered a plea of not guilty to the
offense charged. Thereafter, pre-trial and trial on the merits followed.
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented the testimonies of eyewitnesses Maricris Alidon (Maricris),
Anselmo Benito (Anselmo), and Aurelio Amora (Aurelio). Linda Gibaga (Linda), the
wife of the victim Romeo, and Dr. Felimon C. Porciuncula, Jr. (Dr. Porciuncula), the
Medico-Legal officer who conducted the autopsy on the body of the victim, also testified
for the prosecution. Their testimonies are summarized below.
On September 12, 2004 at around 5:45 p.m., Anselmo, Aurelio, and the victim Romeo
were walking on their way to Sampol Market in San Jose Del Monte City. Maricris and
her son were tailing them about four meters behind. As they were making their way to
the market, they saw appellant in his store located on the right side of the street.
Suddenly, appellant rushed towards them and stabbed Romeo twice - one on the chest
and another on the abdomen. They were all caught by surprise due to the suddenness of
the attack. Romeo fell to the ground while appellant quickly ran away from the scene.
Aurelio chased appellant but failed to catch up with him. Maricriswent to Romeo’s
house to inform his wife Linda about what had just happened.
Upon hearing the news from Maricris, Linda rushedto the scene of the crime but did not
find her husband there as Romeo was already brought by Anselmo to the Sapang Palay
District Hospital. Later on, he was transferred to East Avenue Medical Center where he
died after three days. Linda testified that before Romeo passed away, he told her that
appellant was his assailant.6
Due to Romeo’s injuries and eventualdeath, Linda spent ₱16,770.69 for hospital
expenses, ₱35,000.00 for funeral expenses, and ₱50,000.00 as expenses for the wake.
Dr. Porciuncula testified that Romeo died due to two fatal stab wounds. The first stab
wound penetrated his chest and pierced his heart while the wound on his abdomen
pierced the pancreas and his small intestines. Both stab wounds appeared to have been
caused by a single-bladed weapon.7
Version of the Defense
The appellant was the lone witness presented by the defense.He declared on the witness
stand that on September 12, 2004, at around 5:45 p.m., he was working as a construction
worker in a site 8 to 9 kilometers away from his residence. On his way home, Nestor
Basco, his neighbor, informed him about a stabbing incident that had just taken place
near his home. Upon arriving at his house, his wife and his parents told him that the
stabbing incident took place in front of their store and that the alleged assailant passed
through their yard to the street at the back. The alleged assailant managed to escape, and
the stabbing was wrongly imputed against appellant. On December 9, 2004, appellant
was arrested. He claimed that he does not know Romeo, whom henever met before the
stabbing incident. The only reason he could think of why he is being falsely accused was
that he turned down Anselmo’s request for ₱200.00 to buy shabu. This happened when
they were having a drinking spree with Aurelio the day before the stabbing incident.
According to appellant, Anselmo got infuriated by his refusal and threw a bottle of gin at
him.
 Ruling of the Regional Trial Court THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT OF MURDER DESPITE THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO
On February 21, 2008, the RTC rendered its Decision convicting appellant of the crime PROVE HIS GUILTBEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
of murder. Itfound that the stabbing of Romeo was attended by the qualifying
circumstance of treachery as it was "sudden and unexpected such that [Romeo] was II
unable to react or defend himself from the assault of [appellant]"8
GRANTING ARGUENDOTHAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS CRIMINALLY
The dispositive part of the RTC Decision reads: LIABLE, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY.11
WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, he is hereby sentenced to suffer Our Ruling
the penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetuaand to indemnify the family of the
deceased Romeo Gibaga the following amounts: The appeal has no merit.

1. Php16,770.69 for medical expenses; Appellant argues that the prosecution has failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. Citing the testimony12 of prosecution witness Aurelio, appellant posits that the
2. Php35,000.00 for funeral services; and eye witnesses could not have possibly identified the true assailant because it was already
5:45 p.m. and the place where the stabbing incident occurred was almost shrouded in
3. Php50,000.00 for civil indemnity. darkness. Appellant also stresses that witness Aurelio, by his own statement, was drunk
at the time of the incident, thereby impairing his perception and making his judgment in
identifying the assailant unreliable. Because there is uncertainty as to the identity of the
SO ORDERED.9 true malefactor, appellant asserts that he is entitled toan acquittal.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals We are not persuaded.

On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the Decision of the RTC. It held in its The RTC is correct in giving weight and credence tothe testimonies of the prosecution
August 28,2009 Decision, thus: witnesses, viz:

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated February 21, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 84, Malolos City is hereby AFFIRMED with modification in that the heirs of the
victim are additionally awarded Php25,000.00 as temperate damages and ₱50,000.00 as
moral damages.
SO ORDERED.10
Faulting the Decision of the CA, appellant now appeals to this Court advancing the same
issues he raised before the CA.
x x x the Court finds the testimonies of the former ([Maricris, Anselmo, and Aurelio])
straightforward and credible, hence, [deserving] recognition and respect as truthful
account of what actually transpired during the incident in question. The Court likewise
noted the assertions of [Maricris, Anselmo, and Aurelio] that they are familiar with or
know the accused and the victim well since they are neighbors in Sapang Palay, San Jose
del Monte City, Bulacan. The Court therefore does not doubt [Maricris, Anselmo, and
Aurelio] in identifying the accused as the attacker and assailant of [Romeo]. Besides, no
evidence was offered to show ulterior motive on the part of [Maricris, Anselmo, and
Aurelio] to testify falsely against the accused.13

Assignment of Errors It bears stressing that the RTC Decision finding appellant guilty of the charge was not
based solely on the testimony of Aurelio. Two other eyewitnesses positively identified
the appellant as the person who stabbed Romeo. Anselmo and Maricris were consistent
Appellant asserts that: in their testimonies identifying appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. Excerpts of their
testimonies are reproduced below:
I
[FISCAL ROQUE:]
Q: You said that you were walking together with Aurelio Amora and Romeo Q: Mr. Witness[,] you mentioned that you were able to see this person who
Gibaga. [W]hile you were walking, what happened if any? stabbed Romeo Gibaga[. I]f he is now present, can you identify him?

[ANSELMO BENITO:] A: Yes, sir.

A: Romeo Gibaga was suddenly stabbed, sir. Q: Kindly look around and point him out?

Q: In relation to you, where was this Romeo Gibaga before he was stabbed? THE INTERPRETER:

A: He was at myleft side, sir. Witness pointed to a person x x x wearing a detainee’s t-shirt who identified
himself as Virgilio Amora.
Q: How about this Aurelio Amora, where was he?
Q: And you mentioned that Romeo Gibaga was stabbed by this accused whom
A: Aurelio was at my right side, sir. you [have just] identified[. W]ere you able to see the weapon that was used in
stabbing Romeo Gibaga?
Q: While this Aurelio Amora was on your right and this Romeo Gibaga on
your left, you mentioned that somebody came and stabbed this Romeo A: No, sir.14
Gibaga[. W]ere you able to see or notice where this assailant came from before
he stabbed Romeo Gibaga? xxxx

A: Yes, sir. [FISCAL ROQUE :]

Q: Where? Q: And while you were there going toSampol Market, do you still recall x x x
any unusual incident that transpired?
A: He came from behind, sir.
[MARICRIS ALIDON:]
xxxx
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Considering your position, are you in a position to tell us whether this
Romeo Gibaga actually saw the assailant before he was stabbed? Q: And what was this unusual incident, Madam witness?

A: Yes, sir. A: The stabbing incident thathappened to Romeo Gibaga, sir.

Q: What did he do? Q: And were you able to see who stabbed him?

A: None, sir. A: Yes, sir.

Q: Why was he not able to react before he was stabbed? Q: Who was he?

A: Because he was not aware, sir. A: Virgilio Amora, sir.

Q: If he is present today, will you be able to identify him?

 A: Yes, sir.
Q: Kindly look around and point him out?
THE INTERPRETER:
The witness pointed to a person who identified himself as Virgilio Amora. 15
It is clear that the witnesses have properly identified the appellant as the perpetrator of
the crime. Astestified to by the witnesses and correctly ruled by the RTC and the CA, he
was the person who attacked, stabbed and killed Romeo.
Appellant tried to impeach the testimonies of Anselmo and Aurelio claiming that their
motive for falsely testifying against him was because of his refusal to give them money
for shabu.
The Court finds that appellant’s assertion is a mere speculation that deserves scant
consideration. His explanation is neither supported by evidentiary proof nor buttressed
by established facts. We have consistently ruled that positive identification by credible
witnesses prevails over self-serving statements of the accused. Such statements cannot
be given greater evidentiary weight over affirmative declarations of eyewitnesses.
Finally, appellant claims that at the time of the commission of the crime, he was working
at a construction site 8 to 9 kilometers away from the scene of the crime. He argues that
it was thus impossible for him to be the person who stabbed and killed Romeo.
Appellant’s defenses of denial and alibi must likewise fail.
For the defense of alibi to prosper, "the accused must prove(a) that he was present at
another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically
impossible for him tobe at the scene of the crime"16 during its commission. "Physical
impossibility refers to distance and the facility of access between the situs criminisand
the location of the accused when the crime was committed. He must demonstrate that he
was so far away and could not have been physically present at the scene of the crime and
its immediate vicinity when the crime was committed."17
In this case, the appellant failed to satisfy these requirements. While a distance of 8 to 9
kilometersis quite far, appellant was not able to satisfactorily substantiate his claims
regarding his whereabouts. Aside from his own testimony, appellant did not bother to
present the testimony of other witnesses or any other proof to support his defense. Since
he claimed that his parents and wife saw the stabbing incident and that the assailant
allegedly even entered their yard, it is puzzling why he did not present them as witnesses
to bolster his denial.
In any case, eyewitnesses positively identified the appellant to be present at the scene of
the crime. "Time and again, this Court has consistently ruled that positive identification
prevails over alibi since the latter can easily be fabricated and is inherently unreliable."18
The Court finds no reason to disturb the factual findings of the RTC. The rule is well-
settled that factual findings of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses are
accorded great weight and utmost respect given that trial courts have firsthand
observation of the witnesses’ demeanor while testifying in court. We shall not supplant
our own interpretation of the witnesses’ testimonies for that of the trial judge since he is
in the best position to determine the issue of credibility of witnesses. Moreover, in the
absence of misapprehension of facts or grave abuse of discretion, and especially when
the CA, asin this case, has affirmed the findings of the trial judge, the assessments and
conclusions of the trial court shall not be overturned.
Treachery
Paragraph 16, Article 14 of the RPC provides that"[t]here is treachery when the offender
commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in
the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution, without
risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make." Thus in
order for the qualifying circumstance of treachery to be appreciated, the following
requisites must be shown: (1) the employment of means, method, or manner of execution
would ensure the safety of the malefactor from the defensive or retaliatory acts of the
victim, no opportunity being given to the latter to defend himself or to retaliate, and (2)
the means, method, or manner of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted by
the offender. "The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in
a swift,deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and
unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape."19
In this case, the appellant’s suddenattack on Romeo amply demonstrates that treachery
was employed in the commission of the crime.1âwphi1 The eyewitnesses were all
consistent in declaring that the appellant in such a swift motion stabbed Romeo such that
the latter had no opportunityto defend himself or to fight back.20 The deliberate swiftness
of the attack significantly diminished the risk to himself that may be caused by the
retaliation of the victim.
It is of no consequence that appellant was in front of Romeo when he thrust the knife to
his torso. Records show that appellant initially came from behind and then attacked
Romeo from the front. In any event, "[e]ven a frontal attack could be treacherous when
unexpected and on an unarmed victim who would be in no position to repel the attack or
avoid it,"21 as in this case. Undoubtedly, the RTC and CA correctly held that the crime
committed was murder under Article 248 of the RPC by reason of the qualifying
circumstance of treachery.
Penalties and Awards of Damages
The penalty for the crime of murder is reclusion perpetuato death. The RTC, as affirmed
by the CA, is correct in holding that the appellant must suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, the lower of the two indivisible penalties, by reason of the absence of any
aggravating circumstance. "It mustbe emphasized, however, that [appellant is] not
eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 which states that
‘persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences
will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for
parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as
amended."22
With regard to the award of civil indemnity ex delicto, the same must be increased from
₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence. 23 Civil indemnity is
mandatory and is granted without need of evidence other than the commission of the
crime.24 We uphold the CA in awarding moral damages to the heirs of Romeo in the
amount of ₱50,000.00. "As borne out by human nature and experience, a violent death
invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the
victim’s family."25 We likewise award exemplary damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00
since the qualifying circumstance of treachery was proven by the prosecution. When a
crime is committed with an aggravating circumstance, whether qualifying or generic, an
award of exemplary damages is justified under Article 2230 of the New Civil
Code.26 The CA however erred in awarding temperate damages in lieu of actual damages
in the amount of ₱25,000.00. Records show that the RTC already awarded the heirs of
the victim actualdamages consisting of ₱16,770.69 as medical expenses and ₱35,000.00
as funeral expenses. These expenses were fully supported by receipts.27
Lastly, all damages awarded shall be subject to 6% per annuminterest from the finality
of this Resolution until fully paid, also in line with prevailing jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The August 28, 2009 Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03294, which affirmed with modification the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 84, Malolos, Bulacan, finding appellant
Virgilio Amora y Viscarra guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetuais AFFIRMED with the
following modifications:
(1) the appellant is not eligible for parole;
(2) the award of civil liability ex delictois increased from ₱50,000.00 to
₱75,000.00;
(3) the appellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of Romeo Gibaga the amount
of ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages;
(4) the award of ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages is DELETED; and
(5) the appellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of Romeo Gibaga interest at
the legal rate of 6% per annumon all the amounts ofdamages awarded,
commencing from the date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid.
Costs against appellant.
JOSE "JINGGOY" E. ESTRADA, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
A law may not be constitutionally infirm but its application to a particular party may be
unconstitutional. This is the submission of the petitioner who invokes the equal
protection clause of the Constitution in his bid to be excluded from the charge of plunder
filed against him by the respondent Ombudsman.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In November 2000, as an offshoot of the impeachment proceedings against Joseph
Ejercito Estrada, then President of the Republic of the Philippines, five criminal
complaints against the former President and members of his family, his associates,
friends and conspirators were filed with the respondent Office of the Ombudsman.
On April 4, 2001, the respondent Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution 1 finding
probable cause warranting the filing with the Sandiganbayan of several criminal
Informations against the former President and the other respondents therein. One of the
Informations was for the crime of plunder under Republic Act No. 7080 and among the
respondents was herein petitioner Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada, then mayor of San Juan,
Metro Manila.
The Information was amended and filed on April 18, 2001. Docketed as Criminal Case
No. 26558, the case was assigned to respondent Third Division of the Sandiganbayan.
The arraignment of the accused was set on July 10, 2001 and no bail for petitioner’s
provisional liberty was fixed.
On April 24, 2001, petitioner filed a "Motion to Quash or Suspend" the Amended
Information on the ground that the Anti-Plunder Law, R.A. No. 7080, is unconstitutional
and that it charged more than one offense. Respondent Ombudsman opposed the motion.
On April 25, 2001, the respondent court issued a warrant of arrest for petitioner and his
co-accused. On its basis, petitioner and his co-accused were placed in custody of the law.
On April 30, 2001, petitioner filed a "Very Urgent Omnibus Motion"2 alleging that: (1)
no probable cause exists to put him on trial and hold him liable for plunder, it appearing
that he was only allegedly involved in illegal gambling and not in a "series or
combination of overt or criminal acts" as required in R.A. No. 7080; and (2) he is
entitled to bail as a matter of right. Petitioner prayed that he be excluded from the
Amended Information and be discharged from custody. In the alternative, petitioner also
prayed that he be allowed to post bail in an amount to be fixed by respondent court. 3
On June 28, 2001, petitioner filed a "Motion to Resolve Mayor Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada’s
Motion To Fix Bail On Grounds That An Outgoing Mayor Loses Clout An Incumbent
Has And That On Its Face, the Facts Charged In The Information Do Not Make Out A
Non-Bailable Offense As To Him."4
On July 3, 2001, petitioner filed a "Motion to Strike Out So-Called ‘Entry of
Appearance,’ To Direct Ombudsman To Explain Why He Attributes Impropriety To The
Defense And To Resolve Pending Incidents."5
On July 9, 2001, respondent Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioner’s
"Motion to Quash and Suspend" and "Very Urgent Omnibus Motion."6 Petitioner’s
alternative prayer to post bail was set for hearing after arraignment of all accused. The
court held:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby DENIES for lack of merit
the following: (1) MOTION TO QUASH AND SUSPEND dated April 24, 2001 filed by
accused Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada; (2) MOTION TO QUASH dated June 7, 2001 filed by
accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada; and (3) MOTION TO QUASH (Re: Amended
Information dated 18 April 2001) dated June 26, 2001 filed by accused Edward S.
Serapio.
Considering the denial of the MOTION TO QUASH AND SUSPEND of accused Jose
‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, his VERY URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION, praying that he be: (1)
dropped from the information for plunder for want of probable cause and (2) discharged
from custody immediately which is based on the same grounds mentioned in this
MOTION TO QUASH AND SUSPEND is hereby DENIED. Let his alternative prayer
in said OMNIBUS MOTION that he be allowed to post bail be SET for hearing together
with the petition for bail of accused Edward S. Serapio scheduled for July 10, 2001, at
2:00 o’clock in the afternoon after the arraignment of all the accused."7
The following day, July 10, 2001, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the
Resolution. Respondent court denied the motion and proceeded to arraign petitioner.
Petitioner refused to make his plea prompting respondent court to enter a plea of "not
guilty" for him.8
Hence, this petition. Petitioner claims that respondent Sandiganbayan acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
in:
"1) not declaring that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on its face and, as
applied to petitioner, and denying him the equal protection of the laws;
2) not holding that the Plunder Law does not provide complete and sufficient
standards;
3) sustaining the charge against petitioner for alleged offenses, and with
alleged conspirators, with which and with whom he is not even remotely
connected - contrary to the dictum that criminal liability is personal, not
vicarious - results in the denial of substantive due process;
4) not fixing bail for petitioner for alleged involvement in jueteng in one count
of the information which amounts to cruel and unusual punishment totally in
defiance of the principle of proportionality."9
We shall resolve the arguments of petitioner in seriatim.
I.
Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to
him and denies him the equal protection of the laws.10
The contention deserves our scant attention. The constitutionality of R.A. No. 7080, the
Anti-Plunder Law, has been settled in the case of Estrada v. Sandiganbayan.11 We take
off from the Amended Information which charged petitioner, together with former
President Joseph E. Estrada, Atty. Edward Serapio, Charlie "Atong" Ang, Yolanda T.
Ricaforte and others, with the crime of plunder as follows:
"AMENDED INFORMATION
The undersigned Ombudsman Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB Office of the
Ombudsman, hereby accuses former PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Joseph Ejercito Estrada a.k.a. "ASIONG SALONGA" AND a.k.a "JOSE
VELARDE", together with Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, Charlie ‘Atong’ Ang, Edward
Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio
Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and
John DOES & Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under
R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, in the Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito
Estrada, THEN A PUBLIC OFFICER, BEING THEN THE PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by
himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO
ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR
CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR
OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL
POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and
acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the
aggregate amount OR TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN
MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY
THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS [P4,097,804,173.17], more or
less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT
THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination OR
A series of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS,
described as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL
INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE
HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE
OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT,
SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF
PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connivance with co-
accused CHARLIE ‘ATONG’ ANG, Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, Yolanda T.
Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AN (sic) JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in
consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL
GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating,
converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR
THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE
HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS [P130,000,000.00], more or less,
representing a portion of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS
[P200,000,000] tobacco excise tax share allocated for the Province of
Ilocor Sur under R.A. No. 7171, BY HIMSELF
AND/OR in CONNIVANCE with co-accused Charlie ‘Atong’ Ang, Alma
Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr.
Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES AND
JANE DOES;
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN
AND BENEFIT, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO
PURCHASE 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCK MORE OR LESS, and
the Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK
MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE
AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO
MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,102,965,607.50] AND
MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX
HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY
PESOS [P744,612,450.00], RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE
OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN
MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY
SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,847,578,057.50]; AND BY
COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY
HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE
DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID
PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE
HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS [P189,700,000.00], MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE
CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE
EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME "JOSE
VELARDE";
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS,
SHARES, PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF
PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND
JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION
TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND
SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS [P3,233,104,173.17] AND DEPOSITING THE
SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME "JOSE VELARDE" AT THE
EQUITABLE-PCI BANK.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Manila for Quezon City, Philippines, 18 April 2001"12
Petitioner’s contention that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional as applied to him is
principally perched on the premise that the Amended Information charged him with only
one act or one offense which cannot constitute plunder. He then assails the denial of his
right to bail.
Petitioner’s premise is patently false. A careful examination of the Amended
Information will show that it is divided into three (3) parts: (1) the first paragraph
charges former President Joseph E. Estrada with the crime of plunder together with
petitioner Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada, Charlie "Atong" Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda
Ricaforte and others; (2) the second paragraph spells out in general terms how the
accused conspired in committing the crime of plunder; and (3) the following four sub-
paragraphs (a) to (d) describe in detail the predicate acts constitutive of the crime of
plunder pursuant to items (1) to (6) of R.A. No. 7080, and state the names of the accused
who committed each act.
Pertinent to the case at bar is the predicate act alleged in sub-paragraph (a) of the
Amended Information which is of "receiving or collecting, directly or indirectly, on
several instances, money in the aggregate amount of ₱545,000,000.00 for illegal
gambling in the form of gift, share, percentage, kickback or any form of pecuniary
benefit x x x." In this sub-paragraph (a), petitioner, in conspiracy with former President
Estrada, is charged with the act of receiving or collecting money from illegal gambling
amounting to ₱545 million. Contrary to petitioner’s posture, the allegation is that he
received or collected money from illegal gambling "on several instances." The phrase
"on several instances" means the petitioner committed the predicate act in
series. To insist that the Amended Information charged the petitioner with the
commission of only one act or offense despite the phrase "several instances" is to
indulge in a twisted, nay, "pretzel" interpretation.
It matters little that sub-paragraph (a) did not utilize the exact words "combination" or
"series" as they appear in R.A. No. 7080. For in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,13 we held
that where these two terms are to be taken in their popular, not technical, meaning, the
word "series" is synonymous with the clause "on several instances." "Series" refers to a
repetition of the same predicate act in any of the items in Section 1 (d) of the law. The
word "combination" contemplates the commission of at least any two different predicate
acts in any of said items. Plainly, sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information
charges petitioner with plunder committed by a series of the same predicate act
under Section 1 (d) (2) of the law.
Similarly misleading is petitioner’s stand that in the Ombudsman Resolution of April 4,
2001 finding probable cause to charge him with plunder together with the other accused,
he was alleged to have received only the sum of P2 million, which amount is way below
the minimum of P50 million required under R.A. No. 7080. The submission is not borne
out by the April 4, 2001 Resolution of the Ombudsman, recommending the filing of
charges against petitioner and his co-accused, which in pertinent part reads:
"x x x xxx xxx
Respondent Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, the present Mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila,
appears to have also surreptitious collection of protection money from jueteng operations
in Bulacan. This is gleaned from the statements of Gov. Singson himself and the fact that
Mayor Estrada, on at least two occasions, turned over to a certain Emma Lim, an
emissary of the respondent governor, jueteng haul totalling P2 million, i.e., P1 million in
January, 2000 and another P1 million in February, 2000. An alleged "listahan" of
jueteng recipients listed him as one "Jingle Bell," as affirmed by Singson [TSN 8 & Dec.
2000 SICt/17 Oct. 2000 SBRC/SCI]."14
Hence, contrary to the representations of the petitioner, the Ombudsman made the
finding that P2 million was delivered to petitioner as "jueteng haul" on "at least two
occasions." The P2 million is, therefore, not the entire sum with which petitioner is
specifically charged. This is further confirmed by the conclusion of the Ombudsman
that:
"x x x xxx xxx
It is clear that Joseph Ejercito Estrada, in confabulation with Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada,
Atty. Edward Serapio and Yolanda Ricaforte, demanded and received, as bribe money,
the aggregate sum of P545 million from jueteng collections of the operators thereof,
channeled thru Gov. Luis ‘Chavit’ Singson, in exchange for protection from arrest or
interference by law enforcers; x x x."15
To be sure, it is too late in the day for the petitioner to argue that the Ombudsman failed
to establish any probable cause against him for plunder. The respondent Sandiganbayan
itself has found probable cause against the petitioner for which reason it issued a warrant
of arrest against him. Petitioner then underwent arraignment and is now on trial. The
time to assail the finding of probable cause by the Ombudsman has long passed. The
issue cannot be resurrected in this petition.
II.
Next, petitioner contends that "the plunder law does not provide sufficient and complete
standards to guide the courts in dealing with accused alleged to have contributed to the
offense."16 Thus, he posits the following questions:
"For example, in an Information for plunder which cites at least ten criminal acts, what
penalty do we impose on one who is clearly involved in only one such criminal act? Is
it reclusion perpetua? Or should it be a lesser penalty? What if another accused is shown
to have participated in three of the ten specifications, what would be the penalty
imposable, compared to one who may have been involved in five or seven of the
specifications? The law does not provide the standard or specify the penalties and the
courts are left to guess. In other words, the courts are called to say what the law is rather
than to apply what the lawmaker is supposed to have intended."17
Petitioner raises these hypothetical questions for he labors hard under the impression
that: (1) he is charged with only one act or offense and (2) he has not conspired with the
other accused named in sub-paragraphs (b) to (d) of the Amended Information, ergo, the
penalty imposable on him ought to be different from reclusion perpetua to death. R.A.
No. 7080, he bewails, is cloudy on the imposable penalty on an accused similarly
situated as he is. Petitioner, however, overlooks that the second paragraph of the
Amended Information charges him to have conspired with former President Estrada in
committing the crime of plunder. His alleged participation consists in the commission of
the predicate acts specified in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information. If these
allegations are proven, the penalty of petitioner cannot be unclear. It will be no different
from that of the former President for in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of the other.
The imposable penalty is provided in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080, viz:
"Section 2. Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with the members of
his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or
other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination
or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1(d) hereof in the aggregate
amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of
the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person
who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense
contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the
imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered
by the court."
III.
Petitioner also faults the respondent Sandiganbayan for "sustaining the charge against
petitioner for alleged offenses and with alleged conspirators, with which and with whom
he is not even remotely connected – contrary to the dictum that criminal liability is
personal, not vicarious – results in the denial of substantive due process."18
The Solicitor General argues, on the other hand, that petitioner is charged not only with
the predicate act in sub-paragraph (a) but also with the other predicate acts in sub-
paragraphs (b), (c) & (d) because he is indicted as a principal and as co-conspirator of
the former President. This is purportedly clear from the first and second paragraphs of
the Amended Information.19
For better focus, there is a need to examine again the allegations of the Amended
Information vis-à-vis the provisions of R.A. No. 7080.
The Amended Information, in its first two paragraphs, charges petitioner and his other
co-accused with the crime of plunder. The first paragraph names all the accused, while
the second paragraph describes in general how plunder was committed and lays down
most of the elements of the crime itself. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) describe in detail
the predicate acts that constitute the crime and name in particular the co-
conspirators of former President Estrada in each predicate act. The predicate acts
alleged in the said four sub-paragraphs correspond to the items enumerated in
Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080. Sub-paragraph (a) alleged the predicate act of receiving,
on several instances, money from illegal gambling, in consideration of toleration or
protection of illegal gambling, and expressly names petitioner as one of those who
conspired with former President Estrada in committing the offense. This predicate act
corresponds with the offense described in item [2] of the enumeration in Section 1 (d) of
R.A. No. 7080. Sub-paragraph (b) alleged the predicate act of diverting, receiving or
misappropriating a portion of the tobacco excise tax share allocated for the province of
Ilocos Sur, which act is the offense described in item [1] in the enumeration in Section 1
(d) of the law. This sub-paragraph does not mention petitioner but instead names other
conspirators of the former President. Sub-paragraph (c) alleged two predicate acts - that
of ordering the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and the Social Security
System (SSS) to purchase shares of stock of Belle Corporation, and collecting or
receiving commissions from such purchase from the Belle Corporation which became
part of the deposit in the "Jose Velarde" account at the Equitable-PCI Bank. These two
predicate acts fall under items [2] and [3] in the enumeration of R.A. No. 7080, and was
allegedly committed by the former President in connivance with John Does and Jane
Does. Finally, sub-paragraph (d) alleged the predicate act that the former President
unjustly enriched himself from commissions, gifts, kickbacks, in connivance with John
Does and Jane Does, and deposited the same under his account name "Jose Velarde" at
the Equitable-PCI Bank. This act corresponds to the offense under item [6] in the
enumeration of Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080.
From the foregoing allegations of the Amended Information, it is clear that all the
accused named in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d), thru their individual acts, conspired with
former President Estrada to enable the latter to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten
wealth in the aggregate amount of P4,097,804,173.17. As the Amended Information is
worded, however, it is not certain whether the accused in sub-paragraphs (a) to
(d) conspired with each other to enable the former President to amass the subject ill-
gotten wealth. In light of this lack of clarity, petitioner cannot be penalized for the
conspiracy entered into by the other accused with the former President as related in the
second paragraph of the Amended Information in relation to its sub-paragraphs (b) to
(d). We hold that petitioner can be held accountable only for the predicate acts he
allegedly committed as related in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information which
were allegedly done in conspiracy with the former President whose design was to amass
ill-gotten wealth amounting to more than P4 billion.
We hasten to add, however, that the respondent Ombudsman cannot be faulted for
including the predicate acts alleged in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) of the Amended
Information in one, and not in four, separate Informations. A study of the history of
R.A. No. 7080 will show that the law was crafted to avoid the mischief and folly of
filing multiple informations. The Anti-Plunder Law was enacted in the aftermath of
the Marcos regime where charges of ill-gotten wealth were filed against former
President Marcos and his alleged cronies. Government prosecutors found no
appropriate law to deal with the multitude and magnitude of the acts allegedly
committed by the former President to acquire illegal wealth. 20 They also found that
under the then existing laws such as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the
Revised Penal Code and other special laws, the acts involved different transactions,
different time and different personalities. Every transaction constituted a separate
crime and required a separate case and the over-all conspiracy had to be broken
down into several criminal and graft charges. The preparation of multiple
Informations was a legal nightmare but eventually, thirty-nine (39) separate and
independent cases were filed against practically the same accused before the
Sandiganbayan.21 R.A. No. 7080 or the Anti-Plunder Law22 was enacted precisely to
address this procedural problem. This is pellucid in the Explanatory Note to Senate Bill
No. 733, viz:
"Plunder, a term chosen from other equally apt terminologies like kleptocracy and
economic treason, punishes the use of high office for personal enrichment, committed
thru a series of acts done not in the public eye but in stealth and secrecy over a period of
time, that may involve so many persons, here and abroad, and which touch so many
states and territorial units. The acts and/or omissions sought to be penalized do not
involve simple cases of malversation of public funds, bribery, extortion, theft and
graft but constitute plunder of an entire nation resulting in material damage to the
national economy. The above-described crime does not yet exist in Philippine statute
books. Thus, the need to come up with a legislation as a safeguard against the possible
recurrence of the depravities of the previous regime and as a deterrent to those with
similar inclination to succumb to the corrupting influence of power."
There is no denying the fact that the "plunder of an entire nation resulting in material
damage to the national economy" is made up of a complex and manifold network of
crimes. In the crime of plunder, therefore, different parties may be united by a
common purpose. In the case at bar, the different accused and their different criminal
acts have a commonality—to help the former President amass, accumulate or acquire ill-
gotten wealth. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) in the Amended Information alleged the
different participation of each accused in the conspiracy. The gravamen of the
conspiracy charge, therefore, is not that each accused agreed to receive protection
money from illegal gambling, that each misappropriated a portion of the tobacco excise
tax, that each accused ordered the GSIS and SSS to purchase shares of Belle Corporation
and receive commissions from such sale, nor that each unjustly enriched himself from
commissions, gifts and kickbacks; rather, it is that each of them, by their individual
acts, agreed to participate, directly or indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation and
acquisition of ill-gotten wealth of and/or for former President Estrada.
In the American jurisdiction, the presence of several accused in multiple conspiracies
commonly involves two structures: (1) the so-called "wheel" or "circle" conspiracy, in
which there is a single person or group (the "hub") dealing individually with two or more
other persons or groups (the "spokes"); and (2) the "chain" conspiracy, usually involving
the distribution of narcotics or other contraband, in which there is successive
communication and cooperation in much the same way as with legitimate business
operations between manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer, and then
retailer and consumer.23
From a reading of the Amended Information, the case at bar appears similar to a "wheel"
conspiracy. The hub is former President Estrada while the spokes are all the accused,
and the rim that encloses the spokes is the common goal in the overall conspiracy, i.e.,
the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth.
IV.
Some of our distinguished colleagues would dismiss the charge against the petitioner on
the ground that the allegation of conspiracy in the Amended Information is too general.
The fear is even expressed that it could serve as a net to ensnare the innocent. Their
dissents appear to be inspired by American law and jurisprudence.
We should not confuse our law on conspiracy with conspiracy in American
criminal law and in common law. Under Philippine law, conspiracy should be
understood on two levels. As a general rule, conspiracy is not a crime in our
jurisdiction. It is punished as a crime only when the law fixes a penalty for its
commission such as in conspiracy to commit treason, rebellion and sedition. In
contrast, under American criminal law, the agreement or conspiracy itself is the
gravamen of the offense.24 The essence of conspiracy is the combination of two or more
persons, by concerted action, to accomplish a criminal or unlawful purpose, or some
purpose not in itself criminal or unlawful, by criminal or unlawful means. 25 Its elements
are: agreement to accomplish an illegal objective, coupled with one or more overt acts in
furtherance of the illegal purpose; and requisite intent necessary to commit the
underlying substantive offense.26
A study of the United States Code ought to be instructive. It principally punishes
two (2) crimes of conspiracy27 – conspiracy to commit any offense or to defraud the
United States, and conspiracy to impede or injure officer. Conspiracy to commit offense
or to defraud the United States is penalized under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 371,28 as follows:
"Sec. 371. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States. If two or more
persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud
the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or
more of such persons to any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of the conspiracy, is a
misdemeanor only, the punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum
punishment provided for such misdemeanor."
Conspiracy to impede or injure officer is penalized under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 372, viz:
"Sec. 372. Conspiracy to impede or injure officer. If two or more persons in any State,
Territory, Possession, or District conspire to prevent, by force, intimidation, or threat,
any person from accepting or holding any office, trust or place of confidence under the
United States, or from discharging any duties thereof, or to induce by like means any
officer of the United States to leave the place, where his duties as an officer are required
to be performed, or to injure him in his person or property on account of his lawful
discharge of the duties of his office, or while engaged in the lawful discharge thereof, or
to injure his property so as to molest, interrupt, hinder, or impede him in the discharge of
his official duties, each of such persons shall be fined not more than $5,000 or
imprisoned not more than six years, or both."
Section 371 of 18 U.S.C. punishes two acts: (1) conspiracy to commit any offense
against the United States; and (2) conspiracy to defraud the United States or any agency
thereof. The conspiracy to "commit any offense against the United States" refers to an
act made a crime by federal laws.29 It refers to an act punished by
statute.30 Undoubtedly, Section 371 runs the whole gamut of U.S. Federal laws,
whether criminal or regulatory.31 These laws cover criminal offenses such as perjury,
white slave traffic, racketeering, gambling, arson, murder, theft, bank robbery, etc. and
also include customs violations, counterfeiting of currency, copyright violations, mail
fraud, lotteries, violations of antitrust laws and laws governing interstate commerce and
other areas of federal regulation.32 Section 371 penalizes the conspiracy to commit any
of these substantive offenses. The offense of conspiracy is generally separate and
distinct from the substantive offense,33 hence, the court rulings that acquittal on the
substantive count does not foreclose prosecution and conviction for related conspiracy. 34
The conspiracy to "defraud the government" refers primarily to cheating the United
States out of property or money. It also covers interference with or obstruction of its
lawful governmental functions by deceit, craft or trickery, or at least by means that are
dishonest.35 It comprehends defrauding the United States in any manner whatever,
whether the fraud be declared criminal or not.36
The basic difference in the concept of conspiracy notwithstanding, a study of the
American case law on how conspiracy should be alleged will reveal that it is not
necessary for the indictment to include particularities of time, place, circumstances
or causes, in stating the manner and means of effecting the object of the
conspiracy. Such specificity of detail falls within the scope of a bill of particulars. 37 An
indictment for conspiracy is sufficient where it alleges: (1) the agreement; (2) the
offense-object toward which the agreement was directed; and (3) the overt acts
performed in furtherance of the agreement.38 To allege that the defendants conspired is,
at least, to state that they agreed to do the matters which are set forth as the substance of
their conspiracy. To allege a conspiracy is to allege an agreement. 39 The gist of the
crime of conspiracy is unlawful agreement, and where conspiracy is charged, it is
not necessary to set out the criminal object with as great a certainty as is required
in cases where such object is charged as a substantive offense.40
In sum, therefore, there is hardly a substantial difference on how Philippine courts
and American courts deal with cases challenging Informations alleging conspiracy
on the ground that they lack particularities of time, place, circumstances or causes.
In our jurisdiction, as aforestated, conspiracy can be alleged in the Information as a
mode of committing a crime or it may be alleged as constitutive of the crime itself.
When conspiracy is alleged as a crime in itself, the sufficiency of the allegations in
the Information charging the offense is governed by Section 6, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. It requires that the information for this crime
must contain the following averments:
"Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information.- A complaint or information is
sufficient if it states the name of the accused, the designation of the offense given by the
statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of
the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place
where the offense was committed.
When the offense was committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included
in the complaint or information."
The complaint or information to be sufficient must state the name of the accused,
designate the offense given by statute, state the acts or omissions constituting the
offense, the name of the offended party, the approximate date of the commission of the
offense and the place where the offense was committed.
Our rulings have long settled the issue on how the acts or omissions constituting the
offense should be made in order to meet the standard of sufficiency. Thus, the offense
must be designated by its name given by statute or by reference to the section or
subsection of the statute punishing it.41 The information must also state the acts or
omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances.42 The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is
sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended
to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. 43 No information for
a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the
crime charged.44 Every element of the offense must be stated in the information.45 What
facts and circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined by
reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified crimes.46 The requirement of
alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature
of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The
presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that
constitute the offense.47
To reiterate, when conspiracy is charged as a crime, the act of conspiring and all
the elements of said crime must be set forth in the complaint or information. For
example, the crime of "conspiracy to commit treason" is committed when, in time of
war, two or more persons come to an agreement to levy war against the Government or
to adhere to the enemies and to give them aid or comfort, and decide to commit it. 48 The
elements of this crime are: (1) that the offender owes allegiance to the Government of
the Philippines; (2) that there is a war in which the Philippines is involved; (3) that the
offender and other person or persons come to an agreement to: (a) levy war against the
government, or (b) adhere to the enemies, to give them aid and comfort; and (4) that the
offender and other person or persons decide to carry out the agreement. These elements
must be alleged in the information.
The requirements on sufficiency of allegations are different when conspiracy is not
charged as a crime in itself but only as the mode of committing the crime as in the
case at bar. There is less necessity of reciting its particularities in the
Information because conspiracy is not the gravamen of the offense charged. The
conspiracy is significant only because it changes the criminal liability of all the accused
in the conspiracy and makes them answerable as co-principals regardless of the degree
of their participation in the crime.49 The liability of the conspirators is collective and
each participant will be equally responsible for the acts of others,50 for the act of one is
the act of all.51 In People v. Quitlong,52 we ruled on how conspiracy as the mode of
committing the offense should be alleged in the Information, viz:
"x x x. In embodying the essential elements of the crime charged, the information must
set forth the facts and circumstances that have a bearing on the culpability and liability
of the accused so that the accused can properly prepare for and undertake his defense.
One such fact or circumstance in a complaint against two or more accused persons is that
of conspiracy. Quite unlike the omission of an ordinary recital of fact which, if not
excepted from or objected to during trial, may be corrected or supplied by competent
proof, an allegation, however, of conspiracy, or one that would impute criminal
liability to an accused for the act of another or others, is indispensable in order to
hold such person, regardless of the nature and extent of his own participation,
equally guilty with the other or others in the commission of the crime. Where
conspiracy exists and can rightly be appreciated, the individual acts done to perpetrate
the felony becomes of secondary importance, the act of one being imputable to all the
others (People v. Ilano, 313 SCRA 442). Verily, an accused must know from the
information whether he faces a criminal responsibility not only for his acts but also for
the acts of his co-accused as well.
A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the components of conspiracy
or allege all the details thereof, like the part that each of the parties therein have
performed, the evidence proving the common design or the facts connecting all the
accused with one another in the web of the conspiracy. Neither is it necessary to
describe conspiracy with the same degree of particularity required in describing a
substantive offense. It is enough that the indictment contains a statement of facts
relied upon to be constitutive of the offense in ordinary and concise language, with
as much certainty as the nature of the case will admit, in a manner that can enable
a person of common understanding to know what is intended, and with such
precision that the accused may plead his acquittal or conviction to a subsequent
indictment based on the same facts. It is said, generally, that an indictment may be
held sufficient "if it follows the words of the statute and reasonably informs the accused
of the character of the offense he is charged with conspiring to commit, or, following the
language of the statute, contains a sufficient statement of an overt act to effect the object
of the conspiracy, or alleges both the conspiracy and the contemplated crime in the
language of the respective statutes defining them (15A C.J.S. 842-844).
xxx xxx xxx
x x x. Conspiracy arises when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy comes to life at the very
instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith to
actually pursue it. Verily, the information must state that the accused have
confederated to commit the crime or that there has been a community of design, a
unity of purpose or an agreement to commit the felony among the accused. Such an
allegation, in the absence of the usual usage of the words "conspired" or
"confederated" or the phrase "acting in conspiracy," must aptly appear in the
information in the form of definitive acts constituting conspiracy. In fine, the
agreement to commit the crime, the unity of purpose or the community of design
among the accused must be conveyed such as either by the use of the term
"conspire" or its derivatives and synonyms or by allegations of basic facts
constituting the conspiracy. Conspiracy must be alleged, not just inferred, in the
information on which basis an accused can aptly enter his plea, a matter that is not
to be confused with or likened to the adequacy of evidence that may be required to
prove it. In establishing conspiracy when properly alleged, the evidence to support it
need not necessarily be shown by direct proof but may be inferred from shown acts and
conduct of the accused.
xxx xxx x x x."
Again, following the stream of our own jurisprudence, it is enough to allege
conspiracy as a mode in the commission of an offense in either of the following
manner: (1) by use of the word "conspire," or its derivatives or synonyms, such as
confederate, connive, collude, etc;53 or (2) by allegations of basic facts constituting the
conspiracy in a manner that a person of common understanding would know what is
intended, and with such precision as would enable the accused to competently enter a
plea to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts.54
The allegation of conspiracy in the information must not be confused with the
adequacy of evidence that may be required to prove it. A conspiracy is proved by
evidence of actual cooperation; of acts indicative of an agreement, a common purpose or
design, a concerted action or concurrence of sentiments to commit the felony and
actually pursue it.55 A statement of this evidence is not necessary in the information.
In the case at bar, the second paragraph of the Amended Information alleged in
general terms how the accused committed the crime of plunder. It used the words "in
connivance/conspiracy with his co-accused." Following the ruling in Quitlong, these
words are sufficient to allege the conspiracy of the accused with the former President in
committing the crime of plunder.
V.
We now come to petitioner’s plea for bail. On August 14, 2002, during the pendency of
the instant petition before this Court, petitioner filed with respondent Sandiganbayan an
"Urgent Second Motion for Bail for Medical Reasons." Petitioner prayed that he be
allowed to post bail due to his serious medical condition which is life-threatening to him
if he goes back to his place of detention.1âwphi1 The motion was opposed by
respondent Ombudsman to which petitioner replied.
For three days, i.e., on September 4, 20 and 27, 2001, respondent Sandiganbayan
conducted hearings on the motion for bail. Dr. Roberto V. Anastacio, a cardiologist of
the Makati Medical Center, testified as sole witness for petitioner.
On December 18, 2001, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court an "Urgent Motion for
Early/Immediate Resolution of Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada’s Petition for Bail on
Medical/Humanitarian Considerations." Petitioner reiterated the motion for bail he
earlier filed with respondent Sandiganbayan.56
On the same day, we issued a Resolution referring the motion to respondent
Sandiganbayan for resolution and requiring said court to make a report, not later than
8:30 in the morning of December 21, 2001.
On December 21, 2001, respondent court submitted its Report. Attached to the Report
was its Resolution dated December 20, 2001 denying petitioner’s motion for bail for
"lack of factual basis."57 Basing its finding on the earlier testimony of Dr. Anastacio, the
Sandiganbayan found that petitioner "failed to submit sufficient evidence to convince the
court that the medical condition of the accused requires that he be confined at home and
for that purpose that he be allowed to post bail."58
The crime of plunder is punished by R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Section 12 of R.A.
No. 7659, with the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. Under our Rules, offenses
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment are non-bailable when the
evidence of guilt is strong, to wit:
"Sec. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, not bailable. – No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution."59
Section 7, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on Section 13,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution which reads:
"Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right
to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required."
The constitutional mandate makes the grant or denial of bail in capital offenses hinge on
the issue of whether or not the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong. This
requires that the trial court conduct bail hearings wherein both the prosecution and the
defense are afforded sufficient opportunity to present their respective evidence. The
burden of proof lies with the prosecution to show strong evidence of guilt. 60
This Court is not in a position to grant bail to the petitioner as the matter requires
evidentiary hearing that should be conducted by the Sandiganbayan. The hearings on
which respondent court based its Resolution of December 20, 2001 involved the
reception of medical evidence only and which evidence was given in September 2001,
five months ago. The records do not show that evidence on petitioner’s guilt was
presented before the lower court.
Upon proper motion of the petitioner, respondent Sandiganbayan should conduct
hearings to determine if the evidence of petitioner’s guilt is strong as to warrant the
granting of bail to petitioner.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed for failure to show that the respondent
Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.
FELIXBERTO A. ABELLANA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and Spouses SAAPIA B. ALONTO and DIAGA
ALONTO, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The only issue that confronts this Court is whether petitioner Felixberto A. Abellana
could still be held civilly liable notwithstanding his acquittal.
Assailed before this Court are the February 22, 2006 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 78644 and its August 15, 2006 Resolution 2 denying the motion
for reconsideration thereto. The assailed CA Decision set aside the May 21, 2003
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 13, in Criminal Case
No. CBU-51385 and acquitted the petitioner of the crime of falsification of public
document by a private individual because the Information charged him with a different
offense which is estafa through falsification of a public document. 4 However, the CA
still adjudged him civilly liable.5
Factual Antecedents
In 1985, petitioner extended a loan to private respondents spouses Diaga and Saapia
Alonto (spouses Alonto),6 secured by a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over Lot Nos.
6471 and 6472 located in Cebu City.7 Subsequently, or in 1987, petitioner prepared a
Deed of Absolute Sale conveying said lots to him. The Deed of Absolute Sale was
signed by spouses Alonto in Manila. However, it was notarized in Cebu City allegedly
without the spouses Alonto appearing before the notary public. 8 Thereafter, petitioner
caused the transfer of the titles to his name and sold the lots to third persons.
On August 12, 1999,9 an Information10 was filed charging petitioner with Estafa through
Falsification of Public Document, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 9th day of July, 1987, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent, and
with intent to defraud, did then and there falsify a public document consisting of a Deed
of Absolute Sale of a parcel of land consisting of 803 square meters executed before
Notary Public Gines N. Abellana per Doc. No. 383, Page No. 77, Book No. XXIII,
Series of 1987 of the latter’s Notarial Register showing that spouses Saapia B. Alonto
and Diaga Alonto sold their parcel of land located at Pardo, Cebu City, for a
consideration of ₱130,000.00 in favor of accused by imitating, counterfeiting, signing or
[causing] to be imitated or counterfeited the signature[s] of spouses Saapia B. Alonto
and Diaga Alonto above their typewritten names in said document as vendor[s], when in
truth and in fact as the accused very well knew that spouses Saapia B. Alonto and Diaga
Alonto did not sell their aforestated descri[b]ed property and that the signature[s]
appearing in said document are not their signature[s], thus causing it to appear that
spouses Saapia B. Alonto and Diaga Alonto participated in the execution of said
document when they did not so participate[. Once] said document was falsified, accused
did then and there cause the transfer of the titles of said land to his name using the said
falsified document, to the damage and prejudice of spouses Saapia B. Alonto and Diaga
Alonto in the amount of ₱130,000.00, the value of the land .
CONTRARY TO LAW.11
During arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty".12 After the termination of
the pre-trial conference, trial ensued.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its Decision dated May 21, 2003, the RTC noted that the main issue for resolution was
whether petitioner committed the crime of estafa through falsification of public
document.13 Based on the evidence presented by both parties, the trial court found that
petitioner did not intend to defraud the spouses Alonto; that after the latter failed to pay
their obligation, petitioner prepared a Deed of Absolute Sale which the spouses Alonto
actually signed; but that the Deed of Absolute Sale was notarized without the spouses
Alonto personally appearing before the notary public. From these, the trial court
concluded that petitioner can only be held guilty of Falsification of a Public Document
by a private individual under Article 172(1)14 in relation to Article 171(2)15 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) and not estafa through falsification of public document as
charged in the Information.
The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Felixberto Abellana
GUILTY of the crime of falsification of public document by private individuals under
Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code and sentences him to an indeterminate penalty of
TWO (2) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of Prision Correccional, as minimum, to
SIX (6)YEARS, as maximum.
He is directed to institute reconveyance proceedings to restore ownership and possession
of the real properties in question in favor of private complainants. After private
complainants shall have acquired full ownership and possession of the aforementioned
properties, they are directed to pay the accused the sum of ₱130,000.00 [with] legal
interest thereon reckoned from the time this case was instituted.
Should the accused fail to restore full ownership and possession in favor of the private
complainants [of] the real properties in question within a period of six (6) months from
the time this decision becomes final and executory, he is directed to pay said
complainants the sum of ₱1,103,000.00 representing the total value of the properties of
the private complainants.
He is likewise directed to pay private complainants the following:
1. ₱15,000.00 for nominal damages;
2. ₱20,000.00 for attorney’s fees;
3. ₱50,000.00 as and for litigation expenses;
4. ₱30,000.00 as and for exemplary damages;
plus the cost of this suit.
SO ORDERED.16
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, petitioner raised the issue of whether an accused who was acquitted of the
crime charged may nevertheless be convicted of another crime or offense not
specifically charged and alleged and which is not necessarily included in the crime or
offense charged. The CA, in its Decision dated February 22, 2006, ruled in the
negative.17 It held that petitioner who was charged with and arraigned for estafa through
falsification of public document under Article 171(1) of the RPC could not be convicted
of Falsification of Public Document by a Private Individual under Article 172(1) in
relation to Article 171(2). The CA observed that the falsification committed in Article
171(1) requires the counterfeiting of any handwriting, signature or rubric while the
falsification in Article 171(2) occurs when the offender caused it to appear in a
document that a person participated in an act or proceeding when in fact such person did
not so participate. Thus, the CA opined that the conviction of the petitioner for an
offense not alleged in the Information or one not necessarily included in the offense
charged violated his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.18 Nonetheless, the CA affirmed the trial court’s finding with
respect to petitioner’s civil liability. The dispositive portion of the CA’s February 22,
2006 Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, We resolve to set aside the Decision dated May
21, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court, 7th Judicial Region, Branch 13, Cebu City only
insofar as it found the petitioner guilty of a crime that is different from that charged in
the Information. The civil liability determinations are affirmed.
SO ORDERED.19
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in the Resolution dated
August 15, 2006.
Hence, petitioner comes before us through the present Petition for Review on Certiorari
raising the lone issue of whether he could still be held civilly liable notwithstanding his
acquittal by the trial court and the CA.
Our Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
It is an established rule in criminal procedure that a judgment of acquittal shall state
whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the
accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 20 In either case, the
judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise
did not exist.21 When the exoneration is merely due to the failure to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt, the court should award the civil liability in favor of
the offended party in the same criminal action.22 In other words, the "extinction of the
penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil
[liability] might arise did not exist."23
Here, the CA set aside the trial court’s Decision because it convicted petitioner of an
offense different from or not included in the crime charged in the Information. To recall,
petitioner was charged with estafa through falsification of public document. However,
the RTC found that the spouses Alonto actually signed the document although they did
not personally appear before the notary public for its notarization. Hence, the RTC
instead convicted petitioner of falsification of public document. On appeal, the CA held
that petitioner’s conviction cannot be sustained because it infringed on his right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. 24 The CA, however,
found no reversible error on the civil liability of petitioner as determined by the trial
court and thus sustained the same.25
We do not agree.
In Banal v. Tadeo, Jr.,26 we elucidated on the civil liability of the accused despite his
exoneration in this wise:
While an act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to
civil liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another.
Viewing things pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise to the civil liability
is really the obligation and moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the damage
caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or
negligently, whether or not the same be punishable by law. x x x
Simply stated, civil liability arises when one, by reason of his own act or omission, done
intentionally or negligently, causes damage to another. Hence, for petitioner to be civilly
liable to spouses Alonto, it must be proven that the acts he committed had caused
damage to the spouses.
Based on the records of the case, we find that the acts allegedly committed by the
petitioner did not cause any damage to spouses Alonto.
First, the Information charged petitioner with fraudulently making it appear that the
spouses Alonto affixed their signatures in the Deed of Absolute Sale thereby facilitating
the transfer of the subject properties in his favor. However, after the presentation of the
parties’ respective evidence, the trial court found that the charge was without basis as the
spouses Alonto indeed signed the document and that their signatures were genuine and
not forged.
Second, even assuming that the spouses Alonto did not personally appear before the
notary public for the notarization of the Deed of Absolute Sale, the same does not
necessarily nullify or render void ab initio the parties’ transaction.27 Such non-
appearance is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of the truthfulness of the
statements contained in the deed. "To overcome the presumption, there must be
sufficient, clear and convincing evidence as to exclude all reasonable controversy as to
the falsity of the [deed]. In the absence of such proof, the deed must be upheld." 28 And
since the defective notarization does not ipso facto invalidate the Deed of Absolute Sale,
the transfer of said properties from spouses Alonto to petitioner remains valid. Hence,
when on the basis of said Deed of Absolute Sale, petitioner caused the cancellation of
spouses Alonto’s title and the issuance of new ones under his name, and thereafter sold
the same to third persons, no damage resulted to the spouses Alonto.1avvphi1
Moreover, we cannot sustain the alternative sentence imposed upon the petitioner, to
wit: to institute an action for the recovery of the properties of spouses Alonto or to pay
them actual and other kinds of damages. First, it has absolutely no basis in view of the
trial court’s finding that the signatures of the spouses Alonto in the Deed of Absolute
Sale are genuine and not forged. Second, "[s]entences should not be in the alternative.
There is nothing in the law which permits courts to impose sentences in the
alternative."29 While a judge has the discretion of imposing one or another penalty, he
cannot impose both in the alternative.30 "He must fix positively and with certainty the
particular penalty."31
In view of the above discussion, there is therefore absolutely no basis for the trial court
and the CA to hold petitioner civilly liable to restore ownership and possession of the
subject properties to the spouses Alonto or to pay them ₱1,103,000.00 representing the
value of the properties and to pay them nominal damages, exemplary damages,
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The February 22, 2006 Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78644 and its August 15, 2006 Resolution are
AFFIRMED insofar as they set aside the conviction of the petitioner for the crime of
falsification of public document. The portion which affirmed the imposition of civil
liabilities on the petitioner, i.e., the restoration of ownership and possession, the payment
of ₱1,103,000.00 representing the value of the property, and the payment of nominal and
exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, is deleted for lack of factual
and legal basis.
MIRIAM ARMI JAO YU, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
May an accused found guilty of violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 1 be made to suffer
subsidiary imprisonment in case he fails to pay the fines imposed by the trial court for
such violations? This is the lone issue raised in this petition for review on certiorari. 2
On March 25, 1991, petitioner was charged with 19 counts of violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 91, Quezon City, docketed as
Criminal Cases Nos. 19468 to 19486.
Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty. After hearing, the trial court
rendered a Decision finding her guilty of the charges and imposing upon her the
following penalties:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding
accused Miriam Armi Jao Yu guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and sentencing her as follows:
1. Crim. Case No. 19468 – to pay a fine of ₱200,000.00 and
indemnify Susan Andaya in the amount of ₱300,000.00;
2. Crim. Case No. 19469 – to pay a fine of ₱150,000.00 and
indemnify Susan Andaya in the amount of ₱150,000.00;
3. Crim. Case No. 19470 – to pay a fine of ₱200,000.00 and
indemnify Susan Andaya in the amount of ₱200,000.00;
4. Crim. Case No. 19471 – to pay a fine of ₱200,000.00 and
indemnify Susan Andaya in the amount of ₱385,000.00;
5. Crim. Case No. 19472 – to pay a fine of ₱15,000.00 and
indemnify Susan Andaya in the amount of ₱15,000.00;
6. Crim. Case No. 19473 – to pay a fine of ₱15,000.00 and
indemnify Susan Andaya in the amount of ₱300,000.00;
7. Crim. Case No. 19474 – to pay a fine of ₱200,000.00 and
indemnify Susan Andaya in the amount of ₱350,000.00;
8. Crim. Case No. 19475 – to pay a fine of ₱200,000.00 and
indemnify Susan Andaya in the amount of ₱385,000.00;
9. Crim. Case No. 19476 – to pay a fine of ₱200,000.00 and
indemnify Susan Andaya in the amount of ₱300,000.00;
10. Crim. Case No. 19477 – to pay a fine of ₱200,000.00 and
indemnify Susan Andaya in the amount of ₱300,000.00;
11. Crim. Case No. 19478 – to pay a fine of ₱15,000.00 and
indemnify Susan Andaya in the amount of ₱15,000.00;
12. Crim. Case No. 19479 – to pay a fine of ₱15,000.00 and
indemnify Susan Andaya in the amount of ₱15,000.00;
13. Crim. Case No. 19480 – to pay a fine of ₱200,000.00 and
indemnify Susan Andaya in the amount of ₱450,000.00;
14. Crim. Case No. 19481 – to pay a fine of ₱25,000.00 and
indemnify Susan Andaya in the amount of ₱25,000.00;
15. Crim. Case No. 19482 – to pay a fine of ₱200,000.00 and
indemnify Susan Andaya in the amount of ₱500,000.00;
16. Crim. Case No. 19483 – to pay a fine of ₱17,500.00 and
indemnify Susan Andaya in the amount of ₱17,500.00;
 17. Crim. Case No. 19484 – to pay a fine of ₱13,475.00 and
indemnify Susan Andaya in the amount of ₱13,475.00;
18. Crim. Case No. 19485 – to pay a fine of ₱15,000.00 and
indemnify Susan Andaya in the amount of ₱15,000.00;
19. Crim. Case No. 19486 – to pay a fine of ₱15,000.00 and
indemnify Susan Andaya in the amount of ₱15,000.00;
to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-payment of the fine in
each of the above-entitled cases and to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED." (Underscoring ours)
Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial court’s Decision.
Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Appellate Court
in its Resolution dated May 29, 1998.
In the instant petition, petitioner contends that Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22,
which reads:
"Section 1. Checks without sufficient funds. – Any person who makes or draws
and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of
issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank
for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or
credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished
by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or
by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check
which fine shall in no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such
fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who, having sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a
check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full
amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the
date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.
Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or
persons who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable
under this Act.
Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or
persons who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable
under this Act." (Underscoring ours)
provides only the imposition of imprisonment or fine, or both, in cases of violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. Thus, she should not suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of
non-payment of the fines imposed by the trial court.
The Solicitor General disagrees with petitioner and prays that the Decision of the Court
of Appeals be affirmed.
The petition must fail.
The imposition of subsidiary imprisonment is expressly provided under Articles 38 and
39 of the Revised Penal Code, thus:
"ART. 38. Pecuniary liabilities – Order of payment. – In case the property of
the offender should not be sufficient for the payment of all his pecuniary
liabilities, the same shall be met in the following order:
1. The preparation of the damage caused.
2. Indemnification of consequential damages.
3. The fine.
4. The costs of the proceedings. (Underscoring ours)
"ART. 39. Subsidiary penalty. – If the convict has no property with which to
meet the fine mentioned in paragraph 3 of the next preceding article, he shall
be subject to a subsidiary personal liability at the rate of one day for each eight
pesos, subject to the following rules:
1. If the principal penalty imposed be prision correccional or arresto
and fine, he shall remain under confinement until his fine referred in
the preceding paragraph is satisfied, but his subsidiary imprisonment
shall not exceed one-third of the term of the sentence, and in no case
shall it continue for more than one year, and no fraction or part of a
day shall be counted against the prisoner.
2. When the principal penalty imposed be only a fine, the subsidiary
imprisonment shall not exceed six months, if the culprit shall have
been prosecuted for a grave or less grave felony, and shall not
exceed fifteen days, if for a light felony.
 3. When the principal penalty imposed is higher than prision
correccional no subsidiary imprisonment shall be imposed upon the
culprit.
4. If the principal penalty imposed is not to be executed by
confinement in a penal institution, but such penalty is of fixed
duration, the convict, during the period of time established in the
preceding rules, shall continue to suffer the same deprivation as
those of which the principal penalty consists.
5. The subsidiary personal liability which the convict may have
suffered by reason of his insolvency shall not relieve him from the
fine in case his financial circumstances should improve."
(Underscoring ours)
We hold that the above provisions on subsidiary imprisonment can be applied
suppletorily to Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 pursuant to Article 10 of the same Code, which
provides:
"ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. – Offenses
which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject
to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such
laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary." (Underscoring
ours)1awphil.net
As early as 1959, this Court, in People vs. Cubelo,3 held:
"Appellant’s contention that the trial court committed error in ordering him to
serve subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in the payment of fine
with the reason that Act No. 4003, which prohibits fishing with the use of
explosive, fails to provide for such subsidiary imprisonment, and that being a
special law, it is not subject to the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, is
untenable. The second paragraph of Article 10 of the said Code provides that
‘this Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should
specially provide the contrary.’ Articles 100 (civil liability) and 39 (subsidiary
penalty) are applicable to offenses under special laws (People vs. Moreno, 60
Phil. 178; Copiaco vs. Luzon Brokerage, 66 Phil. 184)."
Indeed, the absence of an express provision on subsidiary imprisonment in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 does not and cannot preclude its imposition in cases involving its
violations.
It bears stressing that on February 14, 2001, we issued Administrative Circular No. 13-
2001 clarifying the imposition of imprisonment for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
and subsidiary imprisonment upon the accused found guilty but is unable to pay the fine
he is sentenced to pay. In clarifying the imposition of subsidiary imprisonment, the
Circular states that if the accused is unable to pay the fine imposed by the trial court,
"there is no legal obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal Code provisions on
subsidiary imprisonment." The full text of the Circular reads:
"Administrative Circular No. 13-2001
To : All Judges
subject : clarification of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 on the penalty
for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, Otherwise known as the bouncing
checks law
Clarification has been sought by concerned Judges and other parties regarding
the operation of Administrative Circular 12-2000 issued on 21 November
2000. In particular, queries have been made regarding the authority of Judges
to
1. Impose the penalty of imprisonment for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22; and
2. Impose subsidiary imprisonment in the event that the accused, who is found
guilty of violating the provisions of B.P. Blg. 22, is unable to pay the fine
which he is sentenced to pay considering that Administrative Circular No. 12-
2000 adopted the rulings in Eduardo Vaca v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No.
131714, 16 November 1998, 298 SCRA 656) and Rosa Lim v. People of the
Philippines (G.R. No. 130038, 18 September 2000) as a policy of the Supreme
Court on the matter of the imposition of penalties for violations of B.P. Blg.
22, without mentioning whether subsidiary imprisonment could be resorted to
in case of the accused’s inability to pay the fine.
The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to
remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of
preference in the application of the penalties provided for in B.P. Blg. 22.
The pursuit of this purpose clearly does not foreclose the possibility of
imprisonment for violators of B.P. Blg. 22. Neither does it defeat the
legislative intent behind the law.
Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in
the application of the penal provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 such that where the
circumstances of both the offense and the offender clearly indicate good faith
or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine
alone should be considered as the more appropriate penalty. Needless to say,
the determination of whether the circumstances warrant the imposition of a
 fine alone rests solely upon the Judge. Should the Judge decide that Administrative Circular No. 13-2001 and our Decision in Felicito Abarquez vs. Court of
imprisonment is the more appropriate penalty, Administrative Circular No. 12- Appeals and People of the Philippines should now lay to rest the controversy at
2000 ought not be deemed a hindrance. bar.lawphil.net

It is, therefore, understood that WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

1. Administrative Circular 12-2000 does not remove imprisonment SO ORDERED.

as an alternative penalty for violations of B.P. Blg. 22;

2. The Judges concerned may, in the exercise of sound discretion,

and taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances of each
case, determine whether the imposition of a fine alone would best
serve the interests of justice or whether forbearing to impose
imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work
violence on the social order, or otherwise be contrary to the
imperatives of justice;

3. Should only a fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay

the fine, there is no legal obstacle to the application of the Revised
Penal Code provisions on subsidiary imprisonment.

The issuance of this Administrative Circular was authorized by the Court En

Banc in A.M. No. 00-11-01-SC at its session of 13 February 2001.

The Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court and the Court Administrator shall
immediately cause the implementation of this Administrative Circular.

This Administrative Circular shall be published in a newspaper of general

circulation not later than 20 February 2001.

Issued this 14th day of February, 2001.

(Sgd.)

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice" (Underscoring ours)

In Felicito Abarquez vs. Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines promulgated on
August 7, 20034 – a case which involves the application of penalties for violations of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 – we did not only modify the amount of the fines imposed by
the Court of Appeals in Criminal Cases Nos. D-8137, D-8176 and D-8177, but also
imposed "subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in accordance with Article 39
of the Revised Penal Code" in each case.