People vs Aminnudin

Criminal Procedure: Warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court
mot justified unless the accused was caught in flagrante or a crime was about to be
committed or had just been committed. The evidence of probable caused should be
determined by a judge and not by law-enforcement agents.
Vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and seizures for violation of the
Customs Law, because theses vehicles may be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction before a warrant can be secured.
A search cannot be considered an incident of a lawful arrest if there is no warrant of
arrest and the warrantless arrest does not come under the exceptions allowed by the Rules
of Court.
The constitutional presumption is that the accused is presumed innocent even if his
defense is weak as long the prosecution is not strong enough to convict him.
If the warrantless search was illegal, the evidence obtained is inadmissible. It is the fruit
of the poisonous tree, to use Justice Holmes’ felicitous phrase.
The Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike
against any manner of high-handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their
intentions.

Malacat vs CA

Criminal Procedure: For purposes of determining appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases,

the maximum of the penalty, and not the minimum, is taken into account. Since the
maximum of the penalty is reclusion perpetua, the appeal therefrom should have been to
us, and not the Court of Appeal, pursuant to Section 9(3) of the Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980 (B.P. Blg. 129), in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948,
Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution and section 3 c of Rule 122 of Rules of
Court. The term “life imprisonment” as used in Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, the Judiciary
Act of 1948, and Section 3 of Rule 122 must be deemed to include reclusion perpetua in
view of section 5 (2) of Article VIII of the Constitution.
We then set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals for having been rendered without
jurisdiction, and consider the appeal as having been directly brought to us, with the
petition for review as petitioner’s Brief for the Appellant, the comment thereon by the
Office of the Solicitor General as the Brief for the Appellee and the memoranda of the
parties as their Supplemental Briefs.
Finally, even assuming that petitioner admitted possession of the grenade during his
custodial investigation by police officer Serapio, such admission was inadmissible in
evidence for it was taken in palpable violation of section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of
the Constitution. Serapio conducted the custodial investigation on petitioner the day
following his arrest. No lawyer was present and Serapio could not have requested a
lawyer to assist petitioner as no PAO lawyer was then available. Thus, even if petitioner
consented to the investigation and waived his rights to remain silent and to counsel, the
waiver was invalid as it was not in writing, neither was it executed in the presence of
counsel.
The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed in
order to validly effect the same. The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable
arrests, searches and seizures refers to those effected without a validly issued warrant,
subject to certain exceptions. As regards valid warrantless arrests, these are found in
section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which reads, in part: Sec.5 – Arrest, without
warrant; when lawful – A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just
been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped. *** A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under section 5
(a) has been denominated as one “in flagrante delicto”, while that under section 5(b) has
been described as a “hot pursuit” arrest.
Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: 1. customs
searches; 2. search of moving vehicles; 3. seizure of evidence in plain view; 4. consent
searches; 5. a search incidental to a lawful arrest; and 6. a “stop and frisk.”
At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a stop and frisk and of
a search incidental to a lawful arrest. Theses two types of warrantless searches differ in
terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their
allowable scope.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of
the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these
cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this
instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made –
the process cannot be reversed. At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer
may search the person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a
weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found which was
used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used
as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or
committing violence.

Arnado vs. Suarin

In administrative proceedings, complainants have the burden of proving by substantial

evidence the allegations in their complaints. Administrative proceedings against judicial
employees are by nature, highly penal in character and are to be governed by the rules
applicable to criminal cases. The quantum of proof required to support the administrative
charges should thus be more substantial and they must be proven beyond reasonable
doubt. In this case, Atty. Arnado not only lacked personal knowledge of the charges but
also failed to substantiate them. He claimed that Sheriff Suarin banged at his gate,
shouted and posted notices at the gate but he failed to mention the details and the dates on
which these infractions ere alleged to have been committed. He presented no witnesses
to prove his claim particularly his employees who had always informed the sheriff that he
and his wife were away each time the notices were served.
People vs Lapura

Criminal Procedure: The sufficiency of the allegations found in the complaint,

conformably with section 6, Rule 110, of the Rules of Court, has not been questioned;
what, instead, is being assailed centers on the supposed failure of the investigating
prosecutor to obtain the prior written authority of the city prosecutor in the manner
required under Section 4, Rule 112, of the rules of Court, before the filing of the case.
This assertion contradicts the certification of the investigating fiscal attesting to the fact
that the information has been duly filed under the authority of the City Fiscal. Absent
convincing evidence to the contrary, the presumption of regularity in the performance
official functions has to be upheld. Moreover, this matter should have been raised below
in a proper motion to quash that appellant could have done but did not.
Relative to the claim that the certification did not fully comply with the requirements of
section 4, Rule 112, of the Rules of Court, we need merely to reiterate the settled rule that
such certification is not an indispensable part of, let alone invalidate even by its absence,
an information. In People vs Marquez, the Court has had occasion to explain: “xxx. It
should be observed that section 3(now section 4) of Rule 110 defines an information as
nothing more than ‘an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense subscribed
by the fiscal and filed with the court.’ Thus it is obvious that such certification is not an
essential part of the information itself and its absence cannot vitiate it as such.
In passing, the question of whether or not a preliminary investigation has been properly
conducted is itself one that should be interposed prior to an arraignment. It does not here
appear that appellant did before entering his plea of “not guilty” to the charge.
The defense could not attach any evil motive on the part of Samson that might have
impelled him to testify falsely against appellant. Absent the most compelling reason, it is
inconceivable why Samson would openly concoct a story that would send an innocent
man to jail. His credibility has likewise been tested and favorably evaluated by the trial
court, a matter which cannot just be ignored.

People vs Mendoza

Criminal Procedure: Aggravating and qualifying circumstances must be categorically

alleged in the information; otherwise, they cannot be appreciated. In this case, as
contended by both the defense counsel and the OSG, appellant cannot be convicted of
rape qualified by the use of a deadly weapon, since that circumstance was not alleged in
the Informations. He cannot be punished for an offense graver than that for which he was
charged.
It is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that the findings of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to the highest respect and will
not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear showing that it overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance that
would have affected the result of the case. Having seen and heard the witnesses
themselves and observed their behavior and manner of testifying, it was ion a better
position to decide the question of credibility.
The rape is not negated by the absence of testimony stating that Michelle bled as a result
of the carnal knowledge, or that she rewashed the clothes that she dropped in the struggle.
Her act of finishing her laundry chores after the incident did not destroy her credibility
either. It is not uncommon for a young girl to conceal for some time as assault on her
virtue because of the rapist’s threat to her life. There is no uniform behavior that can be
expected from those who have undergone harrowing experiences. Because different
people cope differently, it is not unusual for someone abused to act normally in order to
hide for the meantime what happened to her, while internally trying to sort out and cope
with the experience.
On the other hand, the alleged rape incident on Aug. 11, 1995 was not established by
sufficient evidence. Proof of carnal knowledge with the use of force, violence or
intimidation was not clear. In her testimony, Michelle merely stated that the appellant
had raped her on Aug. 11, 1995, without going into details or explaining exactly what had
done to her. Whether or not he raped her is the fact in issue which the court must
determine based on the evidence offered. Testimony to that effect is not evidence, but
simply a conclusion, the proof of which is the very purpose of the trial. “It is not
competent for a witness [in this case Michelle] to express an opinion, conclusion or
judgment thereon.”
The guiding principles in reviewing rape cases are: 1. an accusation for rape can be made
with facility – though it may be difficult for the accuser to prove, it is even more difficult
for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; 2. in view of the intrinsic nature of
the crime of rape, in which only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the
complainant is scrutinized with extreme caution; and 3. the evidence for the prosecution
stands or falls on its own strength and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of that for the defense.

Duduaco vs Laquindanum

In administrative proceedings, complainants have the burden of proving by substantial

evidence the allegations in their complaints. Administrative proceedings against judicial
employees are by nature, highly penal in character and are to be governed by the rules
applicable to criminal cases. The quantum of proof required to support the administrative
charges should thus be more substantial and they must be proven beyond reasonable
doubt.
To constitute gross ignorance of the law, the acts complained of must not only be contrary
to existing law and jurisprudence but were motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty and
corruption. On the other hand, misconduct is any unlawful conduct on the part of a
person concerned in the administration of justice prejudicial to the rights of parties or to
the right determination of the cause. It generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful
conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. Respondent’s
refusal to pay the deductible franchise was justified. Her insistence that the demand to
pay be in writing, together with her refusal to affix her signature in the blank form, did
not amount to grave misconduct, abuse of judicial office or gross ignorance of the law.
She was only exercising her legal right. Had respondent signed the blank form, she would
be deemed to have waived her earlier protest and would have lost the right to claim for
refund.
We agree with OCA’s recommendation that complainant be sanctioned for filing this
unfounded complaint. Indeed, no person should be penalized for the exercise of the right
to litigate. This right, however, must be exercised in good faith. During the formal
investigation, she admitted that she was absent when the event transpired on June 23,
2001, which means that she has no personal and direct knowledge knowledge of the
incident. Yet, in the verification portion of the complaint, she claimed that all the
allegations therein were true and correct of her own knowledge and belief. Significantly,
she also went to respondent’s office and apologized. Human nature dictates that redress
for a wrong done is ordinarily sought by the aggrieved with zeal. Yet, it appears that it
was more than eight (8) months after the incident that complainant and Toyota-Davao
filed this complaint against an alleged “erring” member of the bench. Verily, the delay
militates against the veracity of their allegations.
The filing of the instant administrative complaint was not done in good faith. In
complainant’s letter dated January 21, 2002, she informed this court about a similar
complaint filed before the Judicial and Bar Council “for the purpose of objecting to
(respondent’s) application for appointment as Regional Trial Court in Midsayap, North
Cotabato or elsewhere.” Clearly, this administrative case was filed not for the purpose of
obtaining justice to the aggrieved persons, however mistaken it may be, but for the sole
purpose of degrading respondent’s reputation and exposing her to public ridicule. This
should not be countenanced.
This Court will not shirk from its responsibility of imposing discipline upon erring
members of the bench. At the same time, however, the Court should not hesitate to shield
them from unfounded suits that only serve to disrupt rather than promote the orderly
administration of justice. This Court could not be the instrument that would destroy the
reputation of any member of the bench, by pronouncing guilt on mere speculation.

People vs Mengote

These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest
in question, the accused-appellant was merely “looking from side to side” and “holding
his abdomen,” according to the arresting officers themselves. There was apparently no
offense that had just been committed or was being actually committed or at least being
attempted by Mengote in their presence. The Solicitor General submits that the actual
existence of an offense was not necessary as long as Mengote’s acts “created a reasonable
suspicion on the part of the arresting officers and induced in them the belief that an
offense had been committed and that the accused-appellant had committed it.” The
question is, What offense? What offense could possibly have been suggested by a person
“looking from side to side” and “holding his abdomen” and in a place not exactly
forsaken?
On the other hand, there could have been a number of reasons, all of them innocent, why
his eyes were darting from side to side and he was holding his abdomen. If they excited
suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers, as the prosecution suggests, it has
nevertheless not been shown what their suspicion was all about. In fact, the policemen
themselves testified that they were dispatched to that place only because of the telephone
call from the informer that there were “suspicious-looking” persons in that vicinity who
were about to commit a robbery at North Bay Boulevard. The caller did not explain why
he thought the men looked suspicious nor did he elaborate on the impending crime.
The truth is that they did not know then what offence, if at all, had been committed and
neither were they aware of the participation therein of the accused-appellant. It was only
later, after Danganan had appeared at the police headquarters, that they learned of the
robbery in his house and of Mengote’s supposed involvement therein. As for the illegal
possession of the firearm found on Mengote’s person, the policemen discovered this only
after he had been searched and the investigation conducted later revealed that he was not
its owner nor was he licensed to possess it.

Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.

Civil Procedure: The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest
not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines; All the requisites for the filing of
a valid class suit under Section 12 Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present.
Petitioner’s personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based
on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned. This case, however, has a special and novel element.
Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet
unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their
generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in
behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned. Such a right, as herinafter expounded, considers the “rhythm and harmony of
nature.”

Newsweek, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

Civil Procedure: As a general rule, an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely

interlocutory and cannot be subject of appeal until final judgment or order is rendered.
The ordinary procedure to be followed in such a case is to file an answer, go to trial and if
the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment. The same
rule applies to an order denying the motion to quash, except that instead of filing an
answer a plea is entered and no appeal lies from a judgment of acquittal.
This general rule is subject to exceptions. If the court, in denying the motion to dismiss or
motion to quash, acts without or in excess of jurisdiction of with grave abuse of
discretion, then certiorari or prohibition lies. The reason is that it would be unfair to
require the defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the court
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense, or is not the court of proper venue,
or if the denial of the motion to dismiss or motion to quash is made with grave abuse of
discretion or a whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment. In such cases, the ordinary
remedy of appeal cannot be plain and adequate.

Polytrade Corporation vs. Blanco

Civil Procedure: The stipulation that “the parties agree to sue and be sued in the courts of
manila,” does not preclude the filing of suits in the residence of plaintiff or defendant
under section 2(b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, in the absence of qualifying and
restrictive words in the agreement which would indicate that Manila alone is the venue
agreed upon by the parties. That agreement did not change or transfer venue. It is simply
permissive. The parties solely agreed to add the courts of Manila as tribunals to which
they may resort. Renuntiatio non praesumitur.

Calalas vs. Court of Appeals

Civil Procedure: The principle of res judicata does not apply where a party in a pending
case was never a party in a previous one.

FGU Insurance Corporation vs. G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation

Criminal Procedure: If a demurrer to evidence is granted but on appeal the order of

dismissal is reversed, the movant shall be deemed to have waived the right to present
evidence. Thus, the respondent may no longer offer proof to establish that it has exercised
due care in transporting the cargoes of the assured so as to warrant a remand of the case
to the trial court.

San Lorenzo Village Association, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

Civil Procedure: The Rules of Court requires that the complaint must make a concise
statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action. A fact is
essential if it cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement of the cause of action
insufficient. A complaint states a cause of action where it contains 3 essential elements of
a cause of action, namely: (1) the legal right of the plaintiff, (2) the correlative obligation
of the defendant, and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal
right. If these elements are absent, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to
dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. If the allegations are vague,
indefinite, or in the form of conclusions, the defendant’s recourse is not a motion to
dismiss but a bill of particulars.
It is not “lack or absence of cause of action” that is a ground for dismissal of the
complaint, but rather, that “the complaint states no cause of action.”
A motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action in the complaint
hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged therein; The admission does not extend
to conclusions or interpretations of law; nor does it cover allegations of facts the falsity of
which is subject to judicial notice.

Dabuco vs. Court of Appeals

Civil Procedure: The distinction between the two grounds for dismissal of an action:
failure to state a cause of action, on the one hand, and lack of cause of action, on the other
hand. The former refers to the insufficiency of allegation in the pleading, the latter to the
insufficiency of factual basis for the action. Dismissal for failure to state a cause can be
made at the earliest stages of an action. Dismissal for lack of cause is usually made after
questions of fact have been resolved on the basis of stipulations, admissions or evidence
presented.
In dismissal for failure to state a cause, the inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity,
of the material allegations. The test is whether the material allegations, assuming to be
true, state ultimate facts which constitutes plaintiff’s cause of action, such that plaintiff is
entitled to a favorable judgment as a matter of law. The general rule is that inquiry is
confined to the four corners of the complaint.

Swagman Hotels and Travel, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

Civil Procedure: Cause of action is defined as “the act or omission by which a party
violates the right of another.” Its essential elements are as follows: 1. A right in favor of
the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; 2. An
obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and
3. Act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter
may maintain an action for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief. It is, thus,
only upon the occurrence of the last element that a cause of action arises, giving the
plaintiff the right to maintain an action in court for recovery of damages or other
appropriate relief.
The curing effect of Section 5 of Rule 10 is applicable only if a cause of action in fact
exists at the time the complaint is filed, but the complaint is defective for failure to allege
essential facts.
A complaint whose cause of action has not yet accrued cannot be cured or remedied by an
amended or supplemental pleading alleging the existence or accrual of a cause of action
while the case is pending. Such an action is prematurely brought and is, therefore, a
groundless suit, which should be dismissed by the court upon proper motion seasonably
filed by the defendant. The reason behind this rule is that a person should not be
summoned before the public tribunals to answer for complaints which are immature.

Bases Conversion and Development Authority vs. Uy

Civil Procedure: While Rule 45 and 65 are petitions for certiorari, the former is a petition
for review while the latter is an original special civil action for certiorari. The foregoing
provisos clearly does not require the filing of a motion for reconsideration as a condition
precedent unlike certiorari under Rule 65.
The signature of only one petitioner in the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping satisfies the requirement of Section 2 Rule 42 of the Rules of Court where one
signing is a member of the Investment Committee of the Corporation, and is himself a
principal party in the case.
The ambit of prohibition against the issuance of TRO’s and writs of preliminary
injunction against the implementation of specified government projects only temporary
restraining orders but not decisions on the merits granting permanent injunctions.
Considering that these laws trench on judicial power, they should be strictly construed.
De Guia vs De Guia

Civil Procedure For the guidance of both bench and bar, therefore, the court in
reaffirming the ruling that notice of pre-trial must be served separately upon the party and
his counsel of record, restates that while service of such notice to party may be made
directly to the party, it is best that the trial courts uniformly serve such notice to party
through or care of his counsel at counsel’s address with then express imposition upon
counsel of the obligation of notifying the party of the date, time and place of the pre-trial
conference and assuring that the party either appear thereat or deliver counsel a written
authority to represent the party with power to compromise the case, with the warning that
a party who fails to do so may be non-suited or declared in default.
The absence of notice of pre-trial upon the counsel and his client renders the proceedings
void, and the judgment rendered therein cannot acquire finality and may be attacked
directly or collaterally.
While court does not condone the shortcomings of a party’s counsel, it cannot simply
ignore the merits of the claim. With regard to the absence of a certification of non-forum
shopping, substantial justice behooves us to agree with the disquisition of the appellate
court. We do not condone the shortcomings of respondents’ counsel, but we simply
cannot ignore the merits of their claim. Indeed, it has been held that it is within the
inherent power of the Court to suspend its own rules in a particular case in order to do
justice.

Hamilton vs. Levy

Civil Procedure: Where the issue is the propriety of the service of summons made upon a
party at a particular address, and summons is found to have been improperly served, then
the 60-day reglementary period within which to file a petition for certiorari is not deemed
to have commenced to run if service of the questioned order was made at that address.
The rule that a motion for reconsideration is required before the filing of a petition for
certiorari admits of exceptions, among which is where the controverted act is patently
illegal or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction.
Where a party was abroad when the petition for certiorari was filed, this is a reasonable
cause to exempt them from compliance with the requirement that they personally execute
the certification on non-forum shopping.

E. B. VILLAROSA & PARTNER CO., LTD., petitioner, vs. HON. HERMINIO I.

BENITO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 132, Makati City and
IMPERIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Summons; Jurisdiction; The designation of persons or

officers who are authorized to accept summons for a domestic corporation or partnership
is now limited and more clearly specified in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.-The designation of persons or officers who are authorized to accept summons
for a domestic corporation or partnership is now limited and more clearly specified in
Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule now states “general
manager” instead of only “manager”; “corporate secretary” instead of “secretary”; and
“treasurer” instead of “cashier.” The phrase “agent, or any of its directors” is
conspicuously deleted in the new rule.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The liberal construction rule cannot be invoked and utilized
as a substitute for the plain legal requirements as to the manner in which summons
should be served on a domestic corporation.-It should be noted that even prior to the
effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, strict compliance with the rules has been
enjoined. In the case of Delta Motor Sales Corporation vs. Mangosing, the Court held:
“A strict compliance with the mode of service is necessary to confer jurisdiction of the
court over a corporation. The officer upon whom service is made must be one who is
named in the statute; otherwise the service is insufficient. x x x. The purpose is to render
it reasonably certain that the corporation will receive prompt and proper notice in an
action against it or to insure that the summons be served on a representative so integrated
with the corporation that such person will know what to do with the legal papers served
on him. In other words, ‘to bring home to the corporation notice of the filing of the
action.’ x x x. The liberal construction rule cannot be invoked and utilized as a substitute
for the plain legal requirements as to the manner in which summons should be served on
a domestic corporation. x x x.” (underscoring supplied).

Same; Same; Same; Same; Service of summons upon persons other than those mentioned
in Section 13 of Rule 14 (old rule) has been held as improper.-Service of summons upon
persons other than those mentioned in Section 13 of Rule 14 (old rule) has been held as
improper. Even under the old rule, service upon a general manager of a firm’s branch
office has been held as improper as summons should have been served at the firm’s
principal office. In First Integrated Bonding & Ins. Co., Inc. vs. Dizon, it was held that
the service of summons on the general manager of the insurance firm’s Cebu branch was
improper; default order could have been obviated had the summons been served at the
firm’s principal office.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Court rules that the service of summons upon the branch
manager of petitioner at its branch office at Cagayan de Oro, instead of upon the general
manager at its principal office at Davao City is improper.- Accordingly, we rule that the
service of summons upon the branch manager of petitioner at its branch office at Cagayan
de Oro, instead of upon the general manager at its principal office at Davao City is
improper. Consequently, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside
from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary
appearance.”- Before, the rule was that a party may challenge the jurisdiction of the
court over his person by making a special appearance through a motion to dismiss and if
in the same motion, the movant raised other grounds or invoked affirmative relief which
necessarily involves the exercise of the jurisdiction of the court, the party is deemed to
have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court.30 This doctrine has been
abandoned in the case of La Naval Drug Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,31
which became the basis of the adoption of a new provision in the former Section 23,
which is now Section 20 of Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules. Section 20 now provides that “the
inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.” The emplacement
of this rule clearly underscores the purpose to enforce strict enforcement of the rules on
summons. Accordingly, the filing of a motion to dismiss, whether or not belatedly filed
by the defendant, his authorized agent or attorney, precisely objecting to the jurisdiction
of the court over the person of the defendant can by no means be deemed a submission to
the jurisdiction of the court. There being no proper service of summons, the trial court
cannot take cognizance of a case for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
Any proceeding undertaken by the trial court will consequently be null and void.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. MARCELO MENDOZA, appellant.

Criminal Law; Rape; Criminal Procedure; Right to be Informed; Informations;

Aggravating circumstances and qualifying circumstances must be categorically alleged
in the Information; otherwise they cannot be appreciated. An accused cannot be punished
for an offense graver than that for which he was charged.-Aggravating and qualifying
circumstances must be categorically alleged in the Information;14 otherwise, they cannot
be appreciated. In this case, as contended by both the defense counsel and the OSG,
appellant cannot be convicted of rape qualified by the use of a deadly weapon, since that
circumstance was not alleged in the Informations. He cannot be punished for an offense
graver than that for which he was charged.

Same; Same; Witnesses; The findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and
their testimonies are entitled to the highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in
the absence of any clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some
facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would have affected the result of the
case.- It is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that the findings of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to the highest respect and will
not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear showing that it overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance that
would have affected the result of the case. Having seen and heard the witnesses
themselves and observed their behavior and manner of testifying, it was in a better
position to decide the question of credibility.

EDGARDO PINGA, Petitioner, - versus - THE HEIRS OF GERMAN

SANTIAGO represented by FERNANDO SANTIAGO, Respondents.

Remedial Law; The constitutional faculty of the Court to promulgate rules of practice
and procedure necessarily carries the power to overturn judicial precedents on points of
remedial law.- The constitutional faculty of the Court to promulgate rules of practice and
procedure necessarily carries the power to overturn judicial precedents on points of
remedial law through the amendment of the Rules of Court. One of the notable changes
introduced in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is the explicit proviso that if a complaint
is dismissed due to fault of the plaintiff, such dismissal is “without prejudice to the right
of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action.”[2] The
innovation was instituted in spite of previous jurisprudence holding that the fact of the
dismissal of the complaint was sufficient to justify the dismissal as well of the
compulsory counterclaim

Same; Actions; the dismissal of the complaint due to the fault of plaintiff does not
necessarily carry with it the dismissal of the counterclaim.- We hold that under Section 3,
Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the dismissal of the complaint due to the
fault of plaintiff does not necessarily carry with it the dismissal of the counterclaim,
compulsory or otherwise. In fact, the dismissal of the complaint is without prejudice to
the right of defendants to prosecute the counterclaim.

Same; Same; Dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint is without prejudice to the right of he
defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or separate action.-The express
qualification in the provision that the dismissal of the complaint due to the plaintiff’s
fault, as in the case for failure to prosecute, is without prejudice to the right of the
defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or separate action. This stands in
marked contrast to the provisions under Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court which were
superseded by the 1997 amendments. In the 1964 Rules, dismissals due to failure to
prosecute were governed by Section 3, Rule 17

Same; If the court dismisses the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the
compulsory counterclaim must also be dismissed as it is merely ancilliary to the main
action and no jurisdiction remained for any grant of relief under the counterclaim.-We
should not ignore the theoretical bases of the rule distinguishing compulsory
counterclaims from permissive counterclaims insofar as the dismissal of the action is
concerned. There is a particular school of thought that informs the broad proposition in
Dalman that “if the civil case is dismissed, so also is the counterclaim filed therein,”[63]
or the more nuanced discussions offered in Metals, International Container, and BA
Finance. The most potent statement of the theory may be found in Metals,[64] which
proceeds from the following fundamental premises—a compulsory counterclaim must be
set up in the same proceeding or would otherwise be abated or barred in a separate or
subsequent litigation on the ground of auter action pendant, litis pendentia or res judicata;
a compulsory counterclaim is auxiliary to the main suit and derives its jurisdictional
support therefrom as it arises out of or is necessarily connected with the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the complaint;[65] and that if the court dismisses
the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the compulsory counterclaim must
also be dismissed as it is merely ancilliary to the main action and no jurisdiction
remained for any grant of relief under the counterclaim.

Same; Counterclaim bears the same integral characteristics as a complaint; namely a

cause (or causes) of action constituting an act or omission by which a party violates the
right of another.-Whatever the nature of the counterclaim, it bears the same integral
characteristics as a complaint; namely a cause (or causes) of action constituting an act or
omission by which a party violates the right of another. The main difference lies in that
the cause of action in the counterclaim is maintained by the defendant against the
plaintiff, while the converse holds true with the complaint. Yet, as with a complaint, a
counterclaim without a cause of action cannot survive.

Same; Allegations that form the counterclaim are rooted in an act or omission of the
plaintiff other than the plaintiff’s very act of filing the complaint.- It would then
seemingly follow that if the dismissal of the complaint somehow eliminates the cause(s)
of the counterclaim, then the counterclaim cannot survive. Yet that hardly is the case,
especially as a general rule. More often than not, the allegations that form the
counterclaim are rooted in an act or omission of the plaintiff other than the plaintiff’s
very act of filing the complaint. Moreover, such acts or omissions imputed to the plaintiff
are often claimed to have occurred prior to the filing of the complaint itself. The only
apparent exception to this circumstance is if it is alleged in the counterclaim that the very
act of the plaintiff in filing the complaint precisely causes the violation of the defendant’s
rights. Yet even in such an instance, it remains debatable whether the dismissal or
withdrawal of the complaint is sufficient to obviate the pending cause of action
maintained by the defendant against the plaintiff.

Same; Words and Phrases; A compulsory counterclaim arises out of or is connected with
the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing party’s
claim, does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties, and stands
within the jurisdiction of the court both as to the amount involved and the nature of the
claim.- A compulsory counterclaim arises out of or is connected with the transaction or
occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim, does not require
for its adjudication the presence of third parties, and stands within the jurisdiction of the
court both as to the amount involved and the nature of the claim.[68] The fact that the
culpable acts on which the counterclaim is based are founded within the same transaction
or occurrence as the complaint, is insufficient causation to negate the counterclaim
together with the complaint. The dismissal or withdrawal of the complaint does not
traverse the boundaries of time to undo the act or omission of the plaintiff against the
defendant, or vice versa. While such dismissal or withdrawal precludes the pursuit of
litigation by the plaintiff, either through his/her own initiative or fault, it would be
iniquitous to similarly encumber the defendant who maintained no such initiative or fault.
If the defendant similarly moves for the dismissal of the counterclaim or neglects to
timely pursue such action, let the dismissal of the counterclaim be premised on those
grounds imputable to the defendant, and not on the actuations of the plaintiff.

Same; The terms “ancillary” or “auxiliary” may mislead in signifying that a complaint
innately possesses more credence than a counterclaim, yet there are many instances
wherein the complaint is trivial but the counterclaim is meritorious.-The other
considerations supplied in Metals are anchored on the premise that the jurisdictional
foundation of the counterclaim is the complaint itself. The theory is correct, but there are
other facets to this subject that should be taken into account as well. On the established
premise that a counterclaim involves separate causes of action than the complaint even if
derived from the same transaction or series of transactions, the counterclaim could have
very well been lodged as a complaint had the defendant filed the action ahead of the
complainant.[69] The terms “ancillary” or “auxiliary” may mislead in signifying that a
complaint innately possesses more credence than a counterclaim, yet there are many
instances wherein the complaint is trivial but the counterclaim is meritorious. In truth, the
notion that a counterclaim is, or better still, appears to be merely “ancillary” or
“auxiliary” is chiefly the offshoot of an accident of chronology, more than anything else.

Same; Dismissal of the compulsory counterclaim upon the dismissal of the complaint,
whether upon the initiative of the plaintiff or of the defendant.- The formalistic distinction
between a complaint and a counterclaim does not detract from the fact that both of them
embody causes of action that have in their end the vindication of rights. While the
distinction is necessary as a means to facilitate order and clarity in the rules of procedure,
it should be remembered that the primordial purpose of procedural rules is to provide the
means for the vindication of rights. A party with a valid cause of action against another
party cannot be denied the right to relief simply because the opposing side had the good
fortune of filing the case first. Yet this in effect was what had happened under the
previous procedural rule and correspondent doctrine, which under their final permutation,
prescribed the automatic dismissal of the compulsory counterclaim upon the dismissal of
the complaint, whether upon the initiative of the plaintiff or of the defendant.

Same; Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 17 ordains a more equitable disposition of the

counterclaims by ensuring that any judgment thereon is based on the merit of the
counterclaim itself and not on the survival of the main complaint.-The present rule
embodied in Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 17 ordains a more equitable disposition of the
counterclaims by ensuring that any judgment thereon is based on the merit of the
counterclaim itself and not on the survival of the main complaint. Certainly, if the
counterclaim is palpably without merit or suffers jurisdictional flaws which stand
independent of the complaint, the trial court is not precluded from dismissing it under the
amended rules, provided that the judgment or order dismissing the counterclaim is
premised on those defects. At the same time, if the counterclaim is justified, the amended
rules now unequivocally protect such counterclaim from peremptory dismissal by reason
of the dismissal of the complaint.

SPOUSES EFREN MASON and DIGNA MASON, petitioners,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and COLUMBUS PHILIPPINES BUS
CORPORATION, respondents.

Remedial Law; Summons; Jurisdiction; Question of whether the substantial compliance

rule is still applicable under Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure has
been settled in Villarosa which applies squarely to the instant case.- The question of
whether the substantial compliance rule is still applicable under Section 11, Rule 14 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure has been settled in Villarosa which applies squarely to
the instant case. In the said case, petitioner E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co. Ltd. (hereafter
Villarosa) with principal office address at 102 Juan Luna St., Davao City and with
branches at 2492 Bay View Drive, Tambo, Parañaque, Metro Manila and Kolambog,
Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City, entered into a sale with development agreement with
private respondent Imperial Development Corporation. As Villarosa failed to comply with
its contractual obligation, private respondent initiated a suit for breach of contract and
damages at the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Summons, together with the complaint,
was served upon Villarosa through its branch manager at Kolambog, Lapasan, Cagayan
de Oro City. Villarosa filed a Special Appearance with Motion to Dismiss on the ground
of improper service of summons and lack of jurisdiction. The trial court denied the
motion and ruled that there was substantial compliance with the rule, thus, it acquired
jurisdiction over Villarosa. The latter questioned the denial before us in its petition for
certiorari. We decided in Villarosas favor and declared the trial court without jurisdiction
to take cognizance of the case.1awphi1

Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of substantial compliance must be deemed overturned by

Villarosa, which is the later case.- Neither can herein petitioners invoke our ruling in
Millenium to support their position for said case is not on all fours with the instant case.
We must stress that Millenium was decided when the 1964 Rules of Court were still in
force and effect, unlike the instant case which falls under the new rule. Hence, the cases15
cited by petitioners where we upheld the doctrine of substantial compliance must be
deemed overturned by Villarosa, which is the later case.

Same; Same; Same; The service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of
due process.-At this juncture, it is worth emphasizing that notice to enable the other party
to be heard and to present evidence is not a mere technicality or a trivial matter in any
administrative or judicial proceedings. The service of summons is a vital and
indispensable ingredient of due process.16 We will deprive private respondent of its right
to present its defense in this multi-million peso suit, if we disregard compliance with the
rules on service of summons.

MARIO FL. CRESPO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. LEODEGARIO L. MOGUL, Presiding Judge, CIRCUIT CRIMINAL
COURT OF LUCENA CITY, 9th Judicial Dist., THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by the SOLICITOR GENERAL, RICARDO
BAUTISTA, ET AL., respondents.

Criminal Procedure; A court that grants a motion of the fiscal to dismiss a case commits
no error and the fiscal’s view thereon, in a clash of views with the judge or complainant,
should normally prevail.-Thus, a fiscal who asks for the dismissal of the case for
insufficiency of evidence has authority to do so, and Courts that grant the same commit
no error. 26 The fiscal may re-investigate a case and subsequently move for the dismissal
should the re-investigation show either that the defendant is innocent or that his guilt may
not be established beyond reasonable doubt. 27 In a clash of views between the judge who
did not investigate and the fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and the offended party or
the defendant, those of the Fiscal's should normally prevail. 28 On the other hand, neither
an injunction, preliminary or final nor a writ of prohibition may be issued by the courts to
restrain a criminal prosecution 29 except in the extreme case where it is necessary for the
Courts to do so for the orderly administration of justice or to prevent the use of the strong
arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner.

Same; Once an information is filed in court, the court’s prior permission must be secured
if fiscal wants to reinvestigate the case.-The preliminary investigation conducted by the
fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the
prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper
court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of said information sets in motion the criminal
action against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a
reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured.
After such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be
submitted to the Court for appropriate action. 34 While it is true that the fiscal has the
quasi judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in
court or not, once the case had already been brought to Court whatever disposition the
fiscal may feel should be proper in the rase thereafter should be addressed for the
consideration of the Court, 35 The only qualification is that the action of the Court must
not impair the substantial rights of the accused. 36 or the right of the People to due process
of law.

Same; Same; Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a
reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to
dismiss was submitted to the Court, the Court in the exercise of its discretion may grant
the motion or deny it and require that the trial on the merits proceed for the proper
determination of the case.

Same; Where the court refuses to grant the fiscal’s motion to dismiss, including a case
where the Secretary of Justice ordered the fiscal to move to dismiss the case, the fiscal
should continue to appear in the case although he may turn over the presentation of the
evidence to the private prosecutor.- However, one may ask, if the trial court refuses to
grant the motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal upon the directive of the Secretary of
Justice will there not be a vacuum in the prosecution? A state prosecutor to handle the
case cannot possibly be designated by the Secretary of Justice who does not believe that
there is a basis for prosecution nor can the fiscal be expected to handle the prosecution of
the case thereby defying the superior order of the Secretary of Justice. The answer is
simple. The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as We all know is to see that justice is done
and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused before the Courts.
Thus, in spite of his opinion to the contrary, it is the duty of the fiscal to proceed with the
presentation of evidence of the prosecution to the Court to enable the Court to arrive at its
own independent judgment as to whether the accused should be convicted or acquitted.
The fiscal should not shirk from the responsibility of appearing for the People of the
Philippines even under such circumstances much less should he abandon the prosecution
of the case leaving it to the hands of a private prosecutor for then the entire proceedings
will be null and void. 37 The least that the fiscal should do is to continue to appear for the
prosecution although he may turn over the presentation of the evidence to the private
prosecutor but still under his direction and control.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
BENIGNO ANG and ROSAURO MAGISTRADO, accused-appellants.

Remedial Law; Evidence; Criminal Law; Robbery with Homicide; taking of such
testimony is the prudent and proper course to follow to substantiate the attendance of the
alleged aggravating circumstances and for the purpose of establishing not only the guilt
but, as well the precise degree of culpability of an accused.-There is no law prohibiting
the taking of testimony after a plea of guilty has been entered especially where a grave
offense is charged. In fact, the taking of such testimony is the prudent and proper course
to follow to substantiate the attendance of the alleged aggravating circumstances and for
the purpose of establishing not only the guilt but, as well the precise degree of culpability
of an accused. 4 This is precisely what the trial Court had done for which it cannot be
faulted even if in the course of receiving evidence other aggravating circumstances
should surface.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Generic aggravating circumstances, even if not alleged in the
Information, may be proven during the trial over the objection of the defense.- Generic
aggravating circumstances, even if not alleged in the Information, may be proven during
the trial over the objection of the defense and may be appreciated in imposing the
sentence. 5 Such evidence merely forms part of the proof of the actual commission of the
offense and does not violate the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the
nature and cause of accusation against him. 6 Notably, the trial Court also received
evidence as to such mitigating circumstance as could be appreciated in favor of the
accused.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and abuse of superior
strength , appreciated, as they were sufficiently alleged in the information.-We find no merit in
the defense contention that nocturnity and abuse of superior strength were not duly and
properly alleged because the Information contains "no allegation of ultimate facts" to
substantiate them. In fact, during the reception of evidence before the Court, the defense
admitted that those circumstances were sufficiently alleged. 7 Besides, the evidence
establishes that although nighttime was not especially sought by the offenders as they
were merely strolling when they decided to rob any house, they took advantage of the
darkness of the night to break open the window, enter the house, and facilitate the
commission of the crime. Abuse of superior strength was likewise present since both
accused were armed with deadly weapons when they attacked and killed the victims who
were unarmed and thus helpless to defend themselves.
VICENTA PANTALEON, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
HONORATO ASUNCION, defendant-appellant.

Actions in Personam; Jurisdiction Over Defendant, How Acquired.-In an action

strictly in personam, like the one at bar, personal service of summons, within the forum,
is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, who does
not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court. In other words, summons by
publication cannot ? consistently with the due process clause in the Bill of Rights ?
confer upon the court jurisdiction over said defendant.