Navales PDF

8/13/2017 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 556
Notes.—The rights to indemnification and subrogation

as established and granted to the guarantor by Articles
2066 and 2067 of the Civil Code extend as well to sureties
as defined under Article 2047. (Escaño vs. Ortigas, Jr., 526
SCRA 26 [2007])
What the law requires in an assignment of credit is not
the consent of the debtor, but merely notice to him as the
assignment takes effect only from the time he has
knowledge thereof while conventional subrogation requires
an agreement among the parties concerned—the original
creditor, the debtor, and the new creditor. (Ledonio vs.
Capitol Development Corporation, 526 SCRA 379 [2007])
——o0o——
G.R. No. 167523. June 27, 2008.*
NILDA V. NAVALES, petitioner, vs. REYNALDO

NAVALES, respondent.**
Marriage; Declaration of Nullity; Family Code; A.M. No. 02-

11-10-SC; Let it be stressed that it is the policy of our Constitution
to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous
social institution, and marriage as the foundation of the family—
the Constitution decrees marriage as legally inviolable and
protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties; While the
guidelines in Molina, 268 SCRA 198 (1997) requiring the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) to issue a certification on whether or
not it is agreeing or objecting to the petition for annulment has
been dispensed with by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on the
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages,
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
** The Court of Appeals having been included as a co-respondent, is deleted

from the title pursuant to Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000015ddb5d5008bd549cda003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/22
273
VOL. 556, JUNE 27, 2008 273
Navales vs. Navales
still, Article 48 mandates the appearance and active participation

of the State through the fiscal or the prosecuting attorney.—Let it
be stressed that it is the policy of our Constitution to protect and
strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution,
and marriage as the foundation of the family. The Constitution
decrees marriage as legally inviolable and protects it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. The Family Code under
Article 48 therefore requires courts to order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal assigned, in cases of annulment or declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage, to appear on behalf of the State in
order to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to
take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
Indeed, only the active participation of the Public Prosecutor or
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) will ensure that the
interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings
for annulment and declarations of nullity of marriage by
preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or
suppression of evidence. While the guidelines in Molina, 268
SCRA 198 (1997) requiring the OSG to issue a certification on
whether or not it is agreeing or objecting to the petition for
annulment has been dispensed with by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or
the Rule on the Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, still, Article 48 mandates
the appearance and active participation of the State through the
fiscal or the prosecuting attorney.
Same; Same; Same; Appeals; The principle that the factual
findings of trial courts, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are
binding on the Supreme Court does not apply when the findings of
the appellate court go beyond the issues of the case, run contrary to
the admissions of the parties, fail to notice certain relevant facts
which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion, or
when there is a misappreciation of facts.—The Court finds that
the totality of evidence presented by Reynaldo, contrary to its
appreciation by the RTC and the CA, is insufficient to sustain a
finding that Nilda is psychologically incapacitated. Generally,
factual findings of trial courts, when affirmed by the CA, are
binding on this Court. Such principle however is not absolute,
such as when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the
issues of the case; run contrary to the admissions of the parties;
fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered,
will justify a different conclusion; or when there is a

misappreciation of facts. Such is the case at bar.
274
274 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Navales vs. Navales
Same; Same; Same; Psychological Incapacity; Words and

Phrases; Psychological incapacity, in order to be a ground for the
nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a
serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of marriage—it is a malady that is so grave and
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume;
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.—Psychological
incapacity, in order to be a ground for the nullity of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration
of marriage. It is a malady that is so grave and permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume. As all people may have
certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated traits associated
with certain personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt that
the intention of the law has been to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. In
Santos v. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 20 (1995), the Court held
that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity,
(b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Article 36 contemplates downright
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic
marital obligations—mere “difficulty,” “refusal” or “neglect” in the
performance of marital obligations or “ill will” on the part of the
spouse is different from “incapacity” rooted on some debilitating
psychological condition or illness.—Reynaldo and his witnesses
sought to establish that Nilda was a flirt before the marriage,
which flirtatiousness recurred when she started working as an
aerobics instructress. The instances alleged by Reynaldo, i.e., the
occasion when Nilda chose to ride home with another man instead
of him, that he saw Nilda being kissed by another man while in a
car, and that Nilda allowed other men to touch her body, if true,
would understandably hurt and embarrass him. Still, these acts
by themselves are insufficient to establish a psychological or
mental defect that is serious, incurable or grave as contemplated

by Article 36 of the Family Code. Article 36 contemplates
downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to
assume basic marital obliga-
275
VOL. 556, JUNE 27, 2008 275
Navales vs. Navales
tions. Mere “difficulty,” “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance

of marital obligations or “ill will” on the part of the spouse is
different from “incapacity” rooted on some debilitating
psychological condition or illness. Indeed, irreconcilable
differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity
and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a
finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same
may only be due to a person’s refusal or unwillingness to assume
the essential obligations of marriage and not due to some
psychological illness that is contemplated by said rule.
Same; Same; Same; Same; An admission of a good and
harmonious relationship during the early part of the marriage
weakens the assertion of psychological defect existing at the time of
the celebration of the marriage which deprived the party of the
ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its
concomitant responsibilities.—As admitted by Reynaldo, his
marriage with Nilda was not all that bad; in fact, it went well in
the first year of their marriage. As in other cases, an admission of
a good and harmonious relationship during the early part of the
marriage weakens the assertion of psychological defect existing at
the time of the celebration of the marriage which deprived the
party of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and
its concomitant responsibilities. In determining the import of
“psychological incapacity” under Article 36, the same must be
read in conjunction with, although to be taken as distinct from,
Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 of the Family Code that would likewise,
but for different reasons, render the marriage void ab initio; or
Article 45 that would make the marriage merely voidable; or
Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal separation. These
various circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the
law were indifferent on the matter. Indeed, Article 36 should not
be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not
be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence,
moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment
and the like.
Same; Same; Same; Same; While it is true that the Court

relies heavily on psychological experts for its understanding of the
human personality, and that there is no requirement that the
defendant spouse be personally examined by a physician or
psychologist before the nullity of marriage based on psychological
incapacity may be
276
Navales vs. Navales
declared, still, the root cause of the psychological incapacity must

be identified as a psychological illness, its incapacitating nature
fully explained, and said incapacity established by the totality of
the evidence presented during trial.—Reynaldo also presented
Clinical Psychologist Vatanagul to bolster his claim that Nilda is
psychologically incapacitated. While it is true that the Court
relies heavily on psychological experts for its understanding of the
human personality, and that there is no requirement that the
defendant spouse be personally examined by a physician or
psychologist before the nullity of marriage based on psychological
incapacity may be declared, still, the root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological
illness, its incapacitating nature fully explained, and said
incapacity established by the totality of the evidence presented
during trial. The Court finds that the psychological report
presented in this case is insufficient to establish Nilda’s
psychological incapacity. In her report, Vatanagul concluded that
Nilda is a nymphomaniac, an emotionally immature individual,
has a borderline personality, has strong sexual urges which are
incurable, has complete denial of her actual role as a wife, has a
very weak conscience or superego, emotionally immature, a social
deviant, not a good wife as seen in her infidelity on several
occasions, an alcoholic, suffers from anti-social personality
disorder, fails to conform to social norms, deceitful, impulsive,
irritable and aggressive, irresponsible and vain. She further
defined “nymphomia” as a psychiatric disorder that involves a
disturbance in motor behavior as shown by her sexual
relationship with various men other than her husband. The report
failed to specify, however, the names of the men Nilda had sexual
relationship with or the circumstances surrounding the same. As
pointed out by Nilda, there is not even a single proof that she was
ever involved in an illicit relationship with a man other than her
husband.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A marriage, no matter how

unsatisfactory, is not a null and void marriage.—While Reynaldo
and Nilda’s marriage failed and appears to be without hope of
reconciliation, the remedy, however, is not always to have it
declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.
A marriage, no matter how unsatisfactory, is not a null and void
marriage. And this Court, even as the highest one, can only apply
the letter and spirit of the law, no matter how harsh it may be.
277
VOL. 556, JUNE 27, 2008 277

Navales vs. Navales
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Aquilino C. Felicitas, Jr. for petitioner.
Fermin O. Poloyapoy for private respondent.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari

assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 76624 promulgated on February 16, 2005
which affirmed the Judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) Branch 59 of Toledo City, in Civil Case No. T-799
dated January 2, 2002, declaring the nullity of the
marriage of Reynaldo and Nilda Navales on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
The facts are as follows:
Reynaldo Navales (Reynaldo) and Nilda Navales (Nilda)
met in 1986 in a local bar where Nilda worked as a
waitress. The two became lovers and Nilda quit her job,
managed a boarding house owned by her uncle and studied
Health Aide financed by Reynaldo. Upon learning that
Nilda’s uncle was prodding her to marry an American,
Reynaldo, not wanting to lose her, asked her to marry him.
This, despite his knowledge that Nilda was writing her
penpals and was asking money from them and that she had
an illegitimate son by a man whose identity she did not
reveal to him.3 The two got married on December 29, 1988,
before the Municipal Trial Court Judge of San Fernando,
Cebu.4
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Arsenio J. Magpale and concurred in by

Associate Justices Sesinando E. Villon and Vicente L. Yap, Rollo, pp. 28-
35.
2 Judge Gaudioso D. Villarin, Records, pp. 359-372.
3 Rollo, p. 29 (CA Decision); Records, p. 363 (RTC Decision).
4 Id.; Records, p. 249.
278

Navales vs. Navales
Reynaldo claims that during the first year of their

marriage, their relationship went well. Problems arose,
however, when Nilda started selling RTWs and cosmetics,
since she could no longer take care of him and attend to
household chores.5 Things worsened when she started
working as an aerobics instructor at the YMCA, where,
according to Reynaldo, Nilda’s flirtatiousness and
promiscuity recurred. She wore tight-fitting outfits,
allowed male clients to touch her body, and introduced
herself as single. Reynaldo received phone calls from
different men looking for Nilda. There was also a time
when Nilda chose to ride with another man instead of
Reynaldo; and another when Nilda went home late, riding
in the car of the man who kissed her. Reynaldo also claims
that Nilda refused to have a child with him, as it would
destroy her figure.6 On June 18, 1992, Reynaldo left Nilda
and never reconciled with her again.7
On August 30, 1999, Reynaldo filed a Petition for
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage and Damages
before the RTC, Toledo City, Cebu, docketed as Civil Case
No. T-799 claiming that his marriage with Nilda did not
cure Nilda’s flirtatiousness and sexual promiscuity, and
that her behavior indicates her lack of understanding and
appreciation of the meaning of marriage, rendering the
same void under Article 36 of the Family Code.8
Reynaldo testified in support of his petition and
presented telephone directories showing that Nilda used
her maiden name “Bacon” instead of “Navales.”9 Reynaldo
also presented Josefino Ramos, who testified that he was
with Reynaldo
_______________
5 Records, p. 364 (RTC Decision).

6 Rollo, pp. 29-30 (CA Decision).
7 Records, p. 364 (RTC Decision).
8 Records, pp. 1, 3.
9 Exhibit “B,” machine copy of page 13 of the telephone directory for
the year 1993-1994, Records, p. 250; Exhibit “C,” machine copy of page 15
of the telephone directory for the year 1994-1995, id., at p. 251.
279
VOL. 556, JUNE 27, 2008 279

Navales vs. Navales
when Reynaldo first met Nilda at the bar called

“Appetizer,” and that he (Ramos) himself was attracted to
Nilda since she was sexy, beautiful, and jolly to talk with.10
Reynaldo also presented Violeta Abales, his cousin, who
testified that she was a vendor at the YMCA where Nilda
worked and was known by her maiden name; that she
knows Nilda is sexy and wears tight fitting clothes; that
her companions are mostly males and she flirts with them;
and that there was one time that Reynaldo fetched Nilda at
YMCA but Nilda went with another man, which angered
Reynaldo.11
Finally, Reynaldo presented Leticia Vatanagul, a
Clinical Psychologist and Social Worker who drafted a
Psychological Assessment of Marriage dated March 28,
2001.12 In said Assessment, Vatanagul concluded that
Nilda is a nymphomaniac, who has a borderline
personality, a social deviant, an alcoholic, and suffering
from anti-social personality disorder, among others, which
illnesses are incurable and are the causes of Nilda’s
psychological incapacity to perform her marital role as wife
to Reynaldo.13
Nilda, for her part, claims that Reynaldo knew that she
had a child before she met him, yet Reynaldo continued
courting her; thus, their eventual marriage.14 She claims
that it was actually Reynaldo who was linked with several
women, who went home very late, kept his earnings for
himself, and subjected her to physical harm whenever she
called his attention to his vices. She worked at the YMCA
to cope with the needs of life, and she taught only female
students. Reynaldo abandoned her for other women, the
latest of whom was Liberty Lim whom she charged,
together with Reynaldo, with concubinage.15 Nilda
presented a certification from the YMCA
_______________
10 TSN, October 17, 2000, pp. 6-8; Records, pp. 520-522.

11 TSN, February 12, 2001, pp. 6-9; id., at pp. 510-513.
12 TSN, March 28, 2001, pp. 2, 8; id., at pp. 475, 254-263.

13 Id., at pp. 260-263.
14 Id., at p. 13.
15 Records, pp. 12-13; see also Rollo, p. 30 (CA Decision).
280

Navales vs. Navales
dated October 17, 2001 stating that she was an aerobics

instructress for a program that was exclusively for ladies,16
as well as a statement of accounts from PLDT showing that
she used her married name, Nilda B. Navales.17
On January 2, 2002, the RTC rendered its Decision
disposing as follows:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby

rendered in the above-entitled case declaring defendant Nilda B.
Navales as psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her marital
obligations with plaintiff Reynaldo V. Navales and further
declaring their marriage contracted on December 29, 1988, before
the Municipal Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of San
Fernando, Cebu, as null and void.”18
The RTC held that:
“x x x From the testimonies and evidences x x x adduced, it was

clearly established that the defendant had no full understanding
of [the] effects of marriage and had no appreciation of [the]
consequences of marriage as shown by her x x x act of concealing
her marital status by using her maiden name “Nilda T. Bacon,”
augmenting her pretense of being still single through the
telephone directories; by her refusal to accompany with [sic] her
husband despite of the latter’s insistence, but rather opted to ride
other man’s jeep, whose name her husband did not even know; by
her act of allowing a man other than her husband to touch her
legs even in her husband’s presence; by allowing another man to
kiss her even in the full view of her husband; by preferring to loss
[sic] her husband rather than losing her job as aerobic
instructress and on top of all, by refusing to bear a child fathered
by her husband because it will destroy her figure, is a clear
indication of the herein defendant’s psychological incapacity.”19
_______________
16 Exhibit “2,” Records, p. 343.

17 Exhibit “3,” “4,” “5,” “6,” “7,” “8” and “9,” id., at pp. 344-350.
18 Records, p. 372.
19 Id., at pp. 370-371.
281
VOL. 556, JUNE 27, 2008 281

Navales vs. Navales

Nilda filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the RTC
denied on April 10, 2002.20
The CA dismissed Nilda’s appeal, ruling that the RTC
correctly held that Nilda concealed her marital status, as
shown by the telephone listings in which Nilda used her
maiden name; that nymphomania, the condition which the
expert said Nilda was afflicted with, was a ground for
psychological incapacity; and that the RTC correctly gave
weight to the four pieces of testimonial evidence presented
by Reynaldo vis-a-vis the lone testimony of Nilda.21
Nilda now comes before the Court alleging that:
I
The petitioner is not psychologically incapacitated to comply
[with] her marital obligations as a wife.
II
Psychological incapacity, if ever existing, of the wife is NOT
PERMAMENT or INCURABLE and was NEVER EXISTING AT
THE TIME OF THE CELEBRATION OF MARRIAGE.
III
The petitioner is not a nymphomaniac.
IV
The effort of herein petitioner into the case shows that she is
consciously and nobly preserving and continue to believe that
marriage is inviolable rather [sic].
V
The guidelines of Molina case in the application of Article 36 of
the New Family Code has not been strictly complied with.22
_______________
20 Id., at pp. 400-402; 423.

21 Rollo, pp. 32-34.
22 Id., at pp. 15-16.
282

Navales vs. Navales
Nilda claims that she did not fail in her duty to observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity; that she never had any
illicit relationship with any man; that no case for inchastity
was initiated by Reynaldo against her, and that it was
actually Reynaldo who had a pending case for
concubinage.23 She questions the lower courts’ finding that
she is a nymphomaniac, since she was never interviewed
by the expert witness to verify the truth of Reynaldo’s
allegations. There is also not a single evidence to show that
she had sexual intercourse with a man other than her
husband while they were still living together.24
Nilda also avers that the guidelines in Republic of the
Philippines. v. Molina25 were not complied with. The RTC
resolved the doubt on her motive for using her maiden
name in the telephone directory in favor of the dissolution
of the marriage instead of its preservation. The expert
opinion was given weight, even though it was baseless to
establish that petitioner had psychological incapacity to
comply with her marital obligations as a wife; and that,
assuming that such incapacity existed, it was already
existing at the time of the marriage; and that such
incapacity was incurable and grave enough to bring about
the disability of the wife to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.26
Reynaldo, for his part, argues that while the petition is
captioned as one under Rule 45, it is actually a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65, since it impleads the CA as
respondent and alleges that the CA acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction.27 Reynaldo
also claims that the issues raised by Nilda necessarily
require a review of the factual findings of the lower courts,
which matters have al-
_______________
23 Id., at pp. 17-19.

24 Id., at p. 20.
25 335 Phil. 664; 268 SCRA 198 (1997).
26 Rollo, pp. 21-23.
27 Id., at p. 45.
283
VOL. 556, JUNE 27, 2008 283

Navales vs. Navales
ready been decided and passed upon, and factual findings

of the courts a quo are binding on this Court; that only
questions of law may be raised before this Court; that the
RTC, in reaching its decision, complied with the
requirements of Molina; that the Solicitor General was
represented by the City Prosecutor of Toledo City; and that
Reynaldo discharged the burden of proof to show the
nullity of his marriage to Nilda.
Reynaldo further averred that he testified on his behalf;
presented corroborating witnesses, one of whom is an
expert clinical psychologist, as well as documentary
evidence in support of his cause of action; that Molina did
not require that the psychologist examine the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated; that Nilda did not
rebut the psychologist’s findings and did not present her
own expert to disprove the findings of Vatanagul; that
Nilda’s psychological incapacity, caused by nymphomania,
was duly proven to have been existing prior to and at the
time of her marriage to Reynaldo and to have become
manifest during her marriage, based on the testimonies of
Reynaldo and his witnesses; and that such incapacity was
proven to be incurable, as shown by the report of
Vatanagul.28
Nilda filed a Reply, and both parties filed their
respective memoranda reiterating their arguments.29
Simply stated, the issue posed before the Court is
whether the marriage between Reynaldo and Nilda is null
and void on the ground of Nilda’s psychological incapacity.
The answer, contrary to the findings of the RTC and the
CA, is in the negative.
Preliminarily, let it be stressed that it is the policy of our
Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the
basic autonomous social institution, and marriage as the
founda-
_______________
28 Rollo, pp. 46-50.

29 Id., at pp. 58-60; 66-95; 98-110.
284

Navales vs. Navales
tion of the family.30 The Constitution decrees marriage as

legally inviolable and protects it from dissolution at the
whim of the parties.31 The Family Code under Article 4832
therefore requires courts to order the prosecuting attorney

or fiscal assigned, in cases of annulment or declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage, to appear on behalf of the
State in order to take steps to prevent collusion between
the parties and to take care that the evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed. Indeed, only the active
participation of the Public Prosecutor or the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) will ensure that the interest of the
State is represented and protected in proceedings for
annulment and declarations of nullity of marriage by
preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication
or suppression of evidence.33
While the guidelines in Molina requiring the OSG to
issue a certification on whether or not it is agreeing or
objecting to the petition for annulment has been dispensed
with by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on the
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages,34 still, Article 48
mandates the appearance and active
_______________
30 Republic v. Cuison-Melgar, G.R. No. 139676, March 31, 2006, 486
SCRA 177, 184-185.
31 Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris, G.R. No. 162368, July 17, 2006, 495
SCRA 396, 403.
32 Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity
of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent
collusion between the parties and to take care the evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall
be based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment.
33 Republic v. Cuison-Melgar, supra, note 30, at pp. 187-188.
34 Took effect on March 15, 2003; see also Antonio v. Reyes, G.R. No.
155800, March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA 353, 375; Carating-Siayngco v.
Siayngco, G.R. No. 158896, October 27, 2004, 441 SCRA 422, 435.
285
VOL. 556, JUNE 27, 2008 285

Navales vs. Navales
participation of the State through the fiscal or the

prosecuting attorney.35
In this case, contrary to the assertion of the RTC that
the OSG actively participated in the case through the
Office of the City Prosecutor, records show that the State’s

participation consists only of the Report dated November
29, 1999 by Assistant City Prosecutor Gabriel L. Trocio, Jr.
stating that no collusion exists between the parties;36 the
OSG’s Opposition to the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage dated June 2, 2000;37 and the cross-examination
conducted by Prosecutor Trocio on Reynaldo38 and his
witness Abales.39 There were no other pleadings, motions,
or position papers filed by the Public Prosecutor or OSG;
and no controverting evidence presented by them before
the judgment was rendered. Considering the interest
sought to be protected by the aforestated rules, the Court
finds the State’s participation in this case to be wanting.40
But even on the merits, the Court finds that the totality
of evidence presented by Reynaldo, contrary to its
appreciation by the RTC and the CA, is insufficient to
sustain a finding that Nilda is psychologically
incapacitated.
Generally, factual findings of trial courts, when affirmed
by the CA, are binding on this Court. Such principle
however is not absolute, such as when the findings of the
appellate court go beyond the issues of the case; run
contrary to the admissions of the parties; fail to notice
certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will
justify a different conclusion; or when there is a
misappreciation of facts.41 Such is the case at bar.
_______________
35 Antonio v. Reyes, supra note 34.

36 Records, pp. 40-41.
37 Id., at pp. 109-110.
38 Id., at pp. 527-537.
39 Id., at pp. 498-503.
40 See Republic v. Cuison-Melgar, supra note 30, at p. 187.
41 Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris, supra note 31, at p. 400.
286

Navales vs. Navales
Psychological incapacity, in order to be a ground for the

nullity of marriage under Article 3642 of the Family Code,
refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party
even before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady that
is so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness
of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond

one is about to assume. As all people may have certain
quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated traits associated with
certain personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt
that the intention of the law has been to confine the
meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.43
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,44 the Court held that
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.45 In
Republic of the Philippines v. Molina,46 the Court further
set forth guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Article 36 of the Family Code, thus:
“1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage

belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. x x x
2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
_______________
42 Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.
43 Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris, supra note 31, at pp. 400-401.
44 310 Phil. 21; 240 SCRA 20 (1995).
45 Id., at p. 39; p. 33. See also Republic v. Iyoy, G.R. No. 152577, September 21,
2005, 470 SCRA 508, 521; Republic v. Cuison-Melgar, supra note 30, at p. 188.
46 Supra note 25.
287
VOL. 556, JUNE 27, 2008 287

Navales vs. Navales
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the

decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological—not physical, although its
manifestation and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known that obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit
the application of the provision under the principle ejusdem

generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained.
Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.
3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of
the celebration” of the marriage. The evidence must show that the
illness was existing when the parties exchanged their “I do’s.” The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time,
but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption
of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
x x x.
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, “mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts” cannot be accepted as
root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In
other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in
the person, an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
6. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced
by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
288

Navales vs. Navales
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by

evidence and included in the text of the decision.
7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by
our courts. x x x.”47
In this case, Reynaldo and his witnesses sought to

establish that Nilda was a flirt before the marriage, which
flirtatiousness recurred when she started working as an

aerobics instructress. The instances alleged by Reynaldo,
i.e., the occasion when Nilda chose to ride home with
another man instead of him, that he saw Nilda being
kissed by another man while in a car, and that Nilda
allowed other men to touch her body, if true, would
understandably hurt and embarrass him. Still, these acts
by themselves are insufficient to establish a psychological
or mental defect that is serious, incurable or grave as
contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code.
Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or
inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital
obligations.48 Mere “difficulty,” “refusal” or “neglect” in the
performance of marital obligations or “ill will” on the part
of the spouse is different from “incapacity” rooted on some
debilitating psychological condition or illness.49 Indeed,
irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion,
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do
not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological
incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to
a person’s refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential
obligations of marriage and not
_______________
47 Id., at pp. 676-678.

48 Republic v. Iyoy, supra note 45, at p. 525.
49 Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris, supra note 31, at p. 402; Republic v. Court
of Appeals and Molina, supra note 25, at p. 674; p. 207; Republic v. Iyoy,
supra note 45, at p. 525; Navarro, Jr. v. Cecilio-Navarro, G.R. No. 162049,
April 13, 2007, 521 SCRA 121, 129.
289
VOL. 556, JUNE 27, 2008 289

Navales vs. Navales
due to some psychological illness that is contemplated by

said rule.50
As admitted by Reynaldo, his marriage with Nilda was
not all that bad; in fact, it went well in the first year of
their marriage. As in other cases, an admission of a good
and harmonious relationship during the early part of the
marriage weakens the assertion of psychological defect
existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage
which deprived the party of the ability to assume the
essential duties of marriage and its concomitant
responsibilities.51
In determining the import of “psychological incapacity”

under Article 36, the same must be read in conjunction
with, although to be taken as distinct from, Articles 35,52
37,53 3854 and 4155 of the Family Code that would likewise,
but for different reasons, render the marriage void ab
initio; or Article 45 that would make the marriage merely
voidable; or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal
separation.56 These various circumstances are not applied
so indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the
matter.57 Indeed, Article 36 should not be equated with
legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted
in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral
pressure, moral corruption, civil
_______________
50 Republic v. Iyoy, supra note 45, at p. 525.

51 See Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris, supra note 31, at p. 401; Republic v.
Cuison-Melgar, supra note 30, at p. 190; Navarro v. Cecilio-Navarro,
supra note 49.
52 Art. 35. (Marriages that are void from the beginning).
53 Art. 37. (Marriages that are incestuous and void from the
beginning).
54 Art. 38. (Marriages that are void from the beginning for reasons of
public policy).
55 Art. 41. (Void subsequent marriage, unless spouse presumptively
dead).
56 Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris, supra, note 31, at p. 405.
57 Id.
290

Navales vs. Navales
interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual

infidelity, abandonment and the like.58
Reynaldo presented telephone directories in which Nilda
used her maiden name “Bacon” to prove that Nilda
represented herself as single. As noted by the CA, however,
the telephone listings presented by Reynaldo were for the
years 1993 to 1995,59 after Reynaldo admittedly left Nilda
on June 18, 1992. Apart from Reynaldo and Abalales’s
testimony, therefore, Reynaldo has no proof that Nilda
represented herself as single while they were still living
together. The Court cannot agree with the RTC, therefore,
that said telephone listings show that Nilda represented
herself to be single, which in turn manifests her lack of

understanding of the consequences of marriage.
Reynaldo also presented Clinical Psychologist Vatanagul
to bolster his claim that Nilda is psychologically
incapacitated. While it is true that the Court relies heavily
on psychological experts for its understanding of the
human personality,60 and that there is no requirement that
the defendant spouse be personally examined by a
physician or psychologist before the nullity of marriage
based on psychological incapacity may be declared,61 still,
the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be
identified as a psychological illness, its incapacitating
nature fully explained,62 and said incapacity established by
the totality of the evidence presented during trial.63
The Court finds that the psychological report presented
in this case is insufficient to establish Nilda’s psychological
incapacity. In her report, Vatanagul concluded that Nilda
is a
_______________
58 Id.; Republic v. Cuison-Melgar, supra note 30, at pp. 193-194.

59 Rollo, p. 32 (CA Decision).
61 Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840, 850; 343 SCRA 755, 764 (2000).
63 Marcos v. Marcos, supra note 61; see also Republic v. Cuison-Melgar,
supra note 30, at p. 190.
291
VOL. 556, JUNE 27, 2008 291

Navales vs. Navales
nymphomaniac, an emotionally immature individual, has a

borderline personality, has strong sexual urges which are
incurable, has complete denial of her actual role as a wife,
has a very weak conscience or superego, emotionally
immature, a social deviant, not a good wife as seen in her
infidelity on several occasions, an alcoholic, suffers from
anti-social personality disorder, fails to conform to social
norms, deceitful, impulsive, irritable and aggressive,
irresponsible and vain.64 She further defined “nymphomia”
as a psychiatric disorder that involves a disturbance in
motor behavior as shown by her sexual relationship with
various men other than her husband.65
The report failed to specify, however, the names of the

men Nilda had sexual relationship with or the
circumstances surrounding the same. As pointed out by
Nilda, there is not even a single proof that she was ever
involved in an illicit relationship with a man other than
her husband. Vatanagul claims, during her testimony, that
in coming out with the report, she interviewed not only
Reynaldo but also Jojo Caballes, Dorothy and Lesley who
were Reynaldo’s sister-in-law and sister, respectively, a
certain Marvin and a certain Susan.66 Vatanagul however,
did not specify the identities of these persons, which
information were supplied by whom, and how they came
upon their respective informations. Indeed, the conclusions
drawn by the report are vague, sweeping and lack
sufficient factual bases. As the report lacked specificity, it
failed to show the root cause of Nilda’s psychological
incapacity; and failed to demonstrate that there was a
“natal or supervening disabling factor” or an “adverse
integral element” in Nilda’s character that effectively
incapacitated her from accepting, and thereby complying
with, the essential marital obligations, and that her
psychological or mental malady existed even
_______________
64 Records, pp. 260-263.

65 Id., at p. 260.
66 TSN, June 27, 2001, pp. 5-6, 14; Records, pp. 459-460, 468.
292

Navales vs. Navales
before the marriage.67 Hence, the Court cannot give weight

to said assessment.
The standards used by the Court in assessing the
sufficiency of psychological reports may be deemed very
strict, but that is only proper in view of the principle that
any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage and the indissolubility of the marital vinculum.68
Reynaldo also claims that Nilda does not want to get
pregnant which allegation was upheld by the trial court. A
review of the records shows, however, that apart from the
testimony of Reynaldo, no other proof was presented to
support such claim. Mere allegation and nothing more is
insufficient to support such proposition. As petitioner
before the trial court, it devolves upon Reynaldo to
discharge the burden of establishing the grounds that

would justify the nullification of the marriage.69
While Reynaldo and Nilda’s marriage failed and appears
to be without hope of reconciliation, the remedy, however,
is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the
ground of psychological incapacity. A marriage, no matter
how unsatisfactory, is not a null and void marriage.70 And
this Court, even as the highest one, can only apply the
letter and spirit of the law, no matter how harsh it may
be.71
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76624
promulgated on February 16, 2005 and the Decision dated
January 2, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59 of
Toledo City, in Civil Case No. T-799 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The petition for declaration of absolute nullity
of
_______________
67 See Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris, supra note 31, at p. 402.

68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id., at p. 403.
71 Republic v. Cuison-Melgar, supra note 30, at p. 195.
293
VOL. 556, JUNE 27, 2008 293

Navales vs. Navales
marriage and damages, docketed as Civil Case No. T-799,

is DISMISSED.
Costs against respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Chico-Nazario,

Nachura and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, assailed decision reversed and set

aside.
Notes.—The purpose of the active participation of the

Public Prosecutor or the Solicitor General is to ensure that
the interest of the State is represented and protected in
proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of
marriages by preventing collusion between the parties, or
the fabrication or suppression of evidence. (Maquilan vs.

Maquilan, 524 SCRA 166 [2007])
One who is not a real party in interest in a complaint for
declaration of nullity of marriage cannot ask for the setting
aside of the decision therein—his invocation of the State’s
interest in protecting the sanctity of marriage does not give
him the standing to question the decision. (Salmingo vs.
Rubica, 527 SCRA 1 [2007])
——o0o——
© Copyright 2017 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

Navales PDF

Загружено:

Сведения о документе

Оригинальное название

Авторское право

Доступные форматы

Поделиться этим документом

Поделиться или встроить документ

Параметры публикации

Этот документ был вам полезен?

Это неприемлемый материал?

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

Navales PDF

Загружено:

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

8/13/2017 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 556

Notes.—The rights to indemnification and subrogation

G.R. No. 167523. June 27, 2008.*

NILDA V. NAVALES, petitioner, vs. REYNALDO

Marriage; Declaration of Nullity; Family Code; A.M. No. 02-

** The Court of Appeals having been included as a co-respondent, is deleted

VOL. 556, JUNE 27, 2008 273

Navales vs. Navales

still, Article 48 mandates the appearance and active participation

will justify a different conclusion; or when there is a

274 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Navales vs. Navales

Same; Same; Same; Psychological Incapacity; Words and

mental defect that is serious, incurable or grave as contemplated

VOL. 556, JUNE 27, 2008 275

Navales vs. Navales

tions. Mere “difficulty,” “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance

Same; Same; Same; Same; While it is true that the Court

276 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Navales vs. Navales

declared, still, the root cause of the psychological incapacity must

Same; Same; Same; Same; A marriage, no matter how

VOL. 556, JUNE 27, 2008 277

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari

1 Penned by Associate Justice Arsenio J. Magpale and concurred in by

278 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Reynaldo claims that during the first year of their

5 Records, p. 364 (RTC Decision).

VOL. 556, JUNE 27, 2008 279

when Reynaldo first met Nilda at the bar called

10 TSN, October 17, 2000, pp. 6-8; Records, pp. 520-522.

12 TSN, March 28, 2001, pp. 2, 8; id., at pp. 475, 254-263.

280 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

dated October 17, 2001 stating that she was an aerobics

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby

The RTC held that:

“x x x From the testimonies and evidences x x x adduced, it was

16 Exhibit “2,” Records, p. 343.

VOL. 556, JUNE 27, 2008 281

20 Id., at pp. 400-402; 423.

282 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

23 Id., at pp. 17-19.

VOL. 556, JUNE 27, 2008 283

ready been decided and passed upon, and factual findings

28 Rollo, pp. 46-50.

284 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

tion of the family.30 The Constitution decrees marriage as

therefore requires courts to order the prosecuting attorney

VOL. 556, JUNE 27, 2008 285

participation of the State through the fiscal or the

Office of the City Prosecutor, records show that the State’s

35 Antonio v. Reyes, supra note 34.

286 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Psychological incapacity, in order to be a ground for the

of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond

“1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage

VOL. 556, JUNE 27, 2008 287

sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the

the application of the provision under the principle ejusdem

288 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by

In this case, Reynaldo and his witnesses sought to