CASE DIGESTS
CONSTI 1
HOMEWORK 2
GOVERNMENT – FUNCTIONS
1. PVTA vs. CIR
FACTS: Private respondents filed a petition
seeking relief for their alleged overtime
services (in excess of their 8 regular hours a
day) and the failure to pay for said
compensation in accordance with
Commonwealth Act No. 444.
Section 1: The legal working day for any
person employed by another shall not be of
more than eight (8) hours daily.
Petitioner denies allegations for lack of a
cause of action and jurisdiction.
Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari on
grounds that the corporation is exercising
governmental functions and is therefore
exempt from CA No. 444 which was denied
and dismissed by RTC and CA. Motion for
Reconsideration were also DENIED.
ISSUE: Whether or not PVTA discharges
governmental and not proprietary functions
and is exempt from CA No. 444.
HELD: It is an inherent state function which
makes government required to support its
people and promote their general welfare.
This case explains and portrays the
expanded role of government necessitated
by the increased responsibility to provide for
the general welfare.
The Court held that the distinction and
between constituent and ministrant
functions, which the Chief Justice points out,
is already irrelevant considering the needs of
the present time. He says that "The growing
complexities of modern society have
rendered this traditional classification of the
functions of government obsolete." The
distinction between constituent and
ministrant functions is now considered
obsolete.
The Court affirms that the Petition as well as
the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration
be DENIED.
2. PHILIPPINE COCONUT DESCICATORS
vs. PHILIPPINE COCONUT AUTHORITY
FACTS: The Philippine Coconut Authority
(PCA) was created by Presidential Decree
No. 232 as an independent public
corporation to promote the rapid integrated
development and growth of the coconut and
other palm oil industry in all its aspects and
to ensure that coconut farmers become
direct participants in, and beneficiaries of,
such development and growth through a
regulatory scheme set up by law.
PCA is also in charge of the issuing of
licenses to would-be coconut plant
operators. In March 1993, however, PCA
issued Board Resolution No. 018-93 which
no longer require those wishing to engage in
coconut processing to apply for licenses as a
condition for engaging in such business. The
purpose of which is to promote free
enterprise unhampered by protective
regulations and unnecessary bureaucratic
red tapes. But this caused cut-throat
competition among operators specifically in
congested areas, underselling, smuggling,
and the decline of coconut-based
commodities. The Association of Philippine
Coconut Desiccators (APCD) then filed a
petition for mandamus to compel PCA to
revoke B.R. No. 018-93.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition should be
granted.
HELD: Yes. Our Constitutions, beginning
with the 1935 document, have repudiated
laissez-faire as an economic principle.
Although the present Constitution enshrines
free enterprise as a policy, it nonetheless
reserves to the government the power to
intervene whenever necessary to promote
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the general welfare. As such, free enterprise
does not call for the removal of “protective
regulations” for the benefit of the general
public. This is so because under Art. 12,
Secs. 6 and 9, it is very clear that the
government reserves the power to intervene
whenever necessary to promote the general
welfare and when the public interest so
requires.
GOVERNMENT – DOCTRINE
OF PARENS PATRIAE
3. GOV’T OF PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs.
MONTE DE PIEDAD
In June 1863 a devastating earthquake
occurred in the Philippines. The Spanish
Government then provided $400,000.00 as
aid for the victims and it was received by the
Philippine Treasury. Out of the said amount,
$80,000.00 was left untouched; it was then
invested in the Monte de Piedad Bank which
in turn invested the amount in jewelries. But
when the Philippine government later tried to
withdraw the said amount, the bank cannot
provide for the amount. The government
then filed a complaint. The bank argued that
the Philippine government is not an affected
party hence has no right to institute a
complaint. The bank argues that the
government was not the intended beneficiary
of the said amount.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine
government is competent to file a complaint
against the respondent bank.
HELD: Yes. The Philippine government is
competent to institute action against Monte
de Piedad, this is in accordance with the
doctrine of Parens Patriae. The government
being the protector of the rights of the people
has the inherent supreme power to enforce
such laws that will promote the public
interest. No other party has been entrusted
with such right hence as “parents” of the
people the government has the right to take
back the money intended for the people.
4. CABANAS vs. PILAPIL
Florentino Pilapil insured himself and he
indicated in his insurance plan that his child
will be his beneficiary. He also indicated that
if upon his death the child is still a minor; the
proceeds of his benefits shall be
administered by his brother, Francisco
Pilapil. The child was only ten years of age
when Florentino died and so Francisco then
took charge of Florentino’s insurance
proceeds for the benefit of the child.
On the other hand, the mother of the child
Melchora Cabanas filed a complaint seeking
the delivery of the insurance proceeds in
favor and for her to be declared as the child’s
trustee. Francisco asserted the terms of the
insurance policy and that as a private
contract its terms and obligations must be
binding only to the parties and intended
beneficiaries.
ISSUE: Whether or not the state may
interfere by virtue of “parens patriae” to the
terms of the insurance policy.
HELD: Yes. The Constitution provides for
the strengthening of the family as the basic
social unit, and that whenever any member
thereof such as in the case at bar would be
prejudiced and his interest be affected then
the judiciary if a litigation has been filed
should resolve that case according to the
best interest of that person. The uncle here
should not be the trustee, it should be the
mother as she was the immediate relative of
the minor child and it is assumed that the
mother shall show more care towards the
child than the uncle will. The application
of parens patriae here is in consonance
with this country’s tradition of favoring
conflicts in favor of the family hence
preference to the parent (mother) is
observed.
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 GOVERNMENT – DE JURE and
DE FACTO GOVERNMENT
5. CO KIM CHAN vs. VALDEZ TAN KEH
Facts: Petitioner Co Kim Cham had a
pending Civil Case with the Court of First
Instance of Manila initiated during the time of
the Japanese occupation.
The respondent judge, Judge Arsenio Dizon,
refused to continue hearings on the case
which were initiated during the Japanese
military occupation on the ground that the
proclamation issued by General MacArthur
that “all laws, regulations and processes of
any other government in the Philippines than
that of the said Commonwealth are null and
void and without legal effect in areas of the
Philippines free of enemy occupation and
control” had the effect of invalidating and
nullifying all judicial proceedings and
judgments of the court of the Philippines
during the Japanese military occupation, and
that the lower courts have no jurisdiction to
take cognizance of and continue judicial
proceedings pending in the courts of the
defunct Republic of the Philippines in the
absence of an enabling law granting such
authority.
Respondent, additionally contends that the
government established during the
Japanese occupation were no de facto
government.
Issues:
1. Whether or not judicial acts and
proceedings of the court made during
the Japanese occupation were valid
and remained valid even after the
liberation or reoccupation of the
Philippines by the United States and
Filipino forces.
2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944
proclamation issued by General
MacArthur declaring that “all laws,
regulations and processes of any
other government in the Philippines
than that of the said Commonwealth
are null and void and without legal
effect in areas of the Philippines free
of enemy occupation and control” has
invalidated all judgments and judicial
acts and proceedings of the courts.
3. Whether or not those courts could
continue hearing the cases pending
before them, if the said judicial acts
and proceedings were not invalidated
by MacArthur’s proclamation.
Discussions:
1. Political and international law
recognizes that all acts and
proceedings of a de facto government
are good and valid. The Philippine
Executive Commission and the
Republic of the Philippines under the
Japanese occupation may be
considered de facto governments,
supported by the military force and
deriving their authority from the laws of
war. The doctrine upon this subject is
thus summed up by Halleck, in his work
on International Law (Vol. 2, p. 444):
“The right of one belligerent to occupy
and govern the territory of the enemy
while in its military possession, is one
of the incidents of war, and flows
directly from the right to conquer. We,
therefore, do not look to the
Constitution or political institutions of
the conqueror, for authority to establish
a government for the territory of the
enemy in his possession, during its
military occupation, nor for the rules by
which the powers of such government
are regulated and limited. Such
authority and such rules are derived
directly from the laws war, as
established by the usage of the world,
and confirmed by the writings of
publicists and decisions of courts — in
fine, from the law of nations. . . . The
municipal laws of a conquered territory,
or the laws which regulate private
rights, continue in force during military
occupation, excepts so far as they are
suspended or changed by the acts of
conqueror. . . . He, nevertheless, has
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 all the powers of a de facto
government, and can at his pleasure
either change the existing laws or make
new ones.”
2. General MacArthur annulled
proceedings of other governments in
his proclamation October 23, 1944, but
this cannot be applied on judicial
proceedings because such a which are not of a political complexion,
construction would violate the law of
nations.
3. If the proceedings pending in the
different courts of the Islands prior to
the Japanese military occupation had
been continued during the Japanese
military administration, the Philippine
Executive Commission, and the so-
called Republic of the Philippines, it
stands to reason that the same courts,
which had become re-established and
conceived of as having in continued
existence upon the reoccupation and
liberation of the Philippines by virtue of
the principle of postliminy (Hall,
International Law, 7th ed., p. 516), may
continue the proceedings in cases then
pending in said courts, without
necessity of enacting a law conferring
jurisdiction upon them to continue said
proceedings. As Taylor graphically
points out in speaking of said principles
“a state or other governmental entity,
upon the removal of a foreign military
force, resumes its old place with its
right and duties substantially
unimpaired. . . . Such political
resurrection is the result of a law
analogous to that which enables elastic
bodies to regain their original shape
upon removal of the external force, —
and subject to the same exception in
case of absolute crushing of the whole
fibre and content.”
Rulings:
1. The judicial acts and proceedings of
the court were good and valid. The
governments by the Philippine
Executive Commission and the
Republic of the Philippines during the
Japanese military occupation being de
facto governments, it necessarily
follows that the judicial acts and
proceedings of the court of justice of
those governments, which are not of a
political complexion, were good and
valid. Those not only judicial but also
legislative acts of de facto government,
remained good and valid after the
liberation or reoccupation of the
Philippines by the American and
Filipino forces under the leadership of
General Douglas MacArthur.
2. The phrase “processes of any other
government” is broad and may refer not
only to the judicial processes, but also
to administrative or legislative, as well
as constitutional, processes of the
Republic of the Philippines or other
governmental agencies established in
the Islands during the Japanese
occupation. Taking into consideration
the fact that, as above indicated,
according to the well-known principles
of international law all judgements and
judicial proceedings, which are not of a
political complexion, of the de facto
governments during the Japanese
military occupation were good and valid
before and remained so after the
occupied territory had come again into
the power of the titular sovereign, it
should be presumed that it was not,
and could not have been, the intention
of General Douglas MacArthur, in using
the phrase “processes of any other
government” in said proclamation, to
refer to judicial processes, in violation
of said principles of international law.
3. Although in theory the authority of the
local civil and judicial administration is
suspended as a matter of course as
soon as military occupation takes
place, in practice the invader does not
usually take the administration of
justice into his own hands, but
continues the ordinary courts or
tribunals to administer the laws of the
country which he is enjoined, unless
absolutely prevented, to respect. An
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 Executive Order of President McKinley
to the Secretary of War states that “in
practice, they (the municipal laws) are
not usually abrogated but are allowed
to remain in force and to be
administered by the ordinary tribunals
substantially as they were before the
occupation. This enlightened practice
is, so far as possible, to be adhered to
on the present occasion.” And Taylor in
this connection says: “From a
theoretical point of view it may be said
that the conqueror is armed with the
right to substitute his arbitrary will for all
pre-existing forms of government,
legislative, executive and judicial. From
the stand-point of actual practice such
arbitrary will is restrained by the
provision of the law of nations which
compels the conqueror to continue
local laws and institution so far as
military necessity will permit.”
Undoubtedly, this practice has been
adopted in order that the ordinary
pursuits and business of society may
not be unnecessarily deranged,
inasmuch as belligerent occupation is
essentially provisional, and the
government established by the
occupant of transient character.
6. LAWYERS’ LEAGUE FOR BETTER
PHILIPPINES vs. AQUINO
FACTS:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon
Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1
announcing that she and Vice President
Laurel were taking power.
On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was
issued providing the basis of the Aquino
government assumption of power by stating
that the "new government was installed
through a direct exercise of the power of the
Filipino people assisted by units of the New
Armed Forces of the Philippines."
ISSUE: Whether or not the government of
Corazon Aquino is legitimate.
HELD:
Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino
government is not a justiciable matter but
belongs to the realm of politics where only
the people are the judge.
The Court further held that:
 The people have accepted the
Aquino government which is in
effective control of the entire country;
 It is not merely a de facto government
but in fact and law a de jure
government; and
 The community of nations has
recognized the legitimacy of the new
government.
SOVEREIGNITY
7. LAUREL vs. MISA
Facts: In G. R. No. L-409, Anastacio Laurel
vs. Eriberto Misa, etc., the Court, acting on
the petition for habeas corpus filed by
Anastacio Laurel and based on the theory
that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the
enemy giving the latter aid and comfort
during the Japanese occupation cannot be
prosecuted for the crime of treason defined
and penalized by article 114 of the Revised
Penal Code, for the reason that the
sovereignty of the legitimate government in
the Philippines and, consequently, the
correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens
thereto was then suspended.
Issue: Whether or not the sovereignty of the
legitimate government in the Philippines was
then suspended
Held: No. The absolute and permanent
allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory
occupied by the enemy to their legitimate
government or sovereign is not abrogated or
severed by the enemy occupation, because
the sovereignty of the government or
sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby
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to the occupier, and if it is not transferred to
the occupant it must necessarily remain
vested in the legitimate government; that the
sovereignty vested in the titular government
(which is the supreme power which governs
a body politic or society which constitute the
state).
8. PERALTA vs. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
FACTS: William Peralta was prosecuted for
the crime of robbery and was sentenced to
life imprisonment as defined and penalized
by Act No. 65 of the National Assembly of the
Republic of the Philippines. The petition for
habeas corpus is based on the contention
that the Court of Special and Exclusive
Criminal Jurisdiction created by Ordinance
No. 7 was a political instrumentality of the
military forces of Japan and which is
repugnant to the aims of the Commonwealth
of the Philippines for it does not afford fair
trial and impairs the constitutional rights of
the accused.
ISSUE:
Whether the creation of court by Ordinance
No. 7 is constitutional.
HELD: Yes, it is constitutional. There is no
room for doubt to the validity of Ordinance
No. 7 since the criminal jurisdiction
established by the invader is drawn entirely
from the law martial as defined in the usages
of nations. It is merely a governmental
agency. The sentence rendered, likewise, is
good and valid since it was within the power
and competence of the belligerent occupant
to promulgate Act No. 65. All judgments of
political complexion of the courts during
Japanese regime ceased to be valid upon
reoccupation of the Islands, as such, the
sentence which convicted the petitioner of a
crime of a political complexion must be
considered as having ceased to be valid.
9. RUFFY vs. CHIEF OF STAFF
FACTS: During the Japanese insurrection in
the Philippines, military men were assigned
at designated camps or military bases all
over the country. Japanese forces went to
Mindoro thus forcing petitioner and his band
move up the mountains and organize a
guerilla outfit and call it the "Bolo area". A
certain Capt. Beloncio relieved Ruffy and
fellow petitioners of their position and duties
in the "Bolo area" by the new authority vested
upon him because of the recent change of
command. Capt. Beloncio was thus allegedly
slain by Ruffy and his fellow petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were
subject to military law at the time the offense
was committed, which was at the time of war
and the Japanese occupancy.
HELD: The Court held that the petitioners
were still subject to military law since
members of the Armed Forces were still
covered by the National Defense Act,
Articles of War and other laws even during
an occupation. The act of unbecoming of an
officer and a gentleman is considered as a
defiance of 95th Article of War held
petitioners liable to military jurisdiction and
trial. Moreover, they were operating officers,
which makes them even more eligible for the
military court's jurisdiction.
In consideration of the foregoing, the petition
has no merit and should be dismissed. Thus,
the petition is hereby DENIED.
10. PEOPLE vs. PERFECTO
FACTS: The issue started when the
Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando
Guerrero, discovered that the documents
regarding the testimony of the witnesses in
an investigation of oil companies had
disappeared from his office. Then, the day
following the convening of Senate, the
newspaper La Nacion – edited by herein
respondent Gregorio Perfecto – published an
article against the Philippine Senate. Here,
Mr. Perfecto was alleged to have violated
Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code –
provision that punishes those who insults the
Ministers of the Crown. Hence, the issue.
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ISSUE: Whether or not Article 256 of the
Spanish Penal Code (SPC) is still in force
and can be applied in the case at bar?
HELD: No. The Court stated that during the
Spanish Government, Article 256 of the SPC
was enacted to protect Spanish officials as
representatives of the King. However, the
Court explains that in the present case, we
no longer have Kings nor its representatives
for the provision to protect. Also, with the
change of sovereignty over the Philippines
from Spanish to American, it means that the
invoked provision of the SPC had been
automatically abrogated. The Court
determined Article 256 of the SPC to be
‘political’ in nature for it is about the relation
of the State to its inhabitants, thus, the Court
emphasized that ‘it is a general principle of
the public law that on acquisition of territory,
the previous political relations of the ceded
region are totally abrogated.’ Hence, Article
256 of the SPC is considered no longer in
force and cannot be applied to the present
case. Therefore, respondent was acquitted.
11. MACARIOLA vs. ASUNCION
FACTS: On August 6, 1968 Bernardita R.
Macariola charged respondent Judge Elias
B. Asuncion of the Court of First Instance of
Leyte, now Associate Justice of the Court of
Appeals, with “acts unbecoming a judge
when the latter purchased a property which
was previously the subject of litigation on
which he rendered decision. Respondent
and his wife were also members of Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc. to
which their shares and interests in said
property were conveyed.
According to the petitioner, respondent
allegedly violated Article 1491, par. 5, of the
New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a
portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of
those properties involved in in a case
decided by him and that he likewise violated
Article 14, par. 1 and 5 of the Code of
Commerce, Section 3, par. H, of R.A. 3019,
Sec. 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules,
and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics, by associating himself with the
Traders Manufacturing and Fishing
Industries, Inc., as a stockholder and a
ranking officer while he was a judge of the
Court of First Instance of Leyte.
ISSUES
I. Whether or not respondent Judge violated
Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil
Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of
Lot No. 1184-E.
II. Whether or not respondent Judge violated
paragraphs 1 and 5, Article 14 of the Code of
Commerce when he associated himself with
the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing
Industries, Inc.
HELD
I. NEGATIVE. [The Court] find that there is
no merit in the contention of complainant that
respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion violated
Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil
Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of
Lot No. 1184-E which was one of those
properties involved in Civil Case No. 3010.
The prohibition in the aforesaid Article
applies only to the sale or assignment of the
property which is the subject of litigation to
the persons disqualified therein. In the case
at bar, when the respondent Judge
purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of Lot
1184-E, the decision in Civil Case No. 3010
which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was
already final because none of the parties
therein filed an appeal; hence, the lot in
question was no longer subject of the
litigation.
Finally, while it is. true that respondent Judge
did not violate paragraph 5, Article 1491 of
the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase
a portion of Lot 1184-E which was in litigation
in his court, it was, however, improper for him
to have acquired the same. He should be
reminded of Canon 3 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics which requires that: “A judge’s
official conduct should be free from the
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appearance of impropriety, and his personal
behavior, not only upon the bench and in the
performance of judicial duties, but also in his
everyday life, should be beyond reproach.”
II. NEGATIVE. Respondent Judge cannot be
held liable under [paragraphs 1 and 5, Article
14 of the Code of Commerce] because there
is no showing that respondent participated or
intervened in his official capacity in the
business or transactions of the Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. In
the case at bar, the business of the
corporation in which respondent participated
has obviously no relation or connection with
his judicial office. The business of said
corporation is not that kind where respondent
intervenes or takes part in his capacity as
Judge of the Court of First Instance.
It is [the Court’s] considered view that
although [paragraphs 1 and 5, Article 14] is
incorporated in the Code of Commerce
which is part of the commercial laws of the
Philippines, it, however, partakes of the
nature of a political law as it regulates the
relationship between the government and
certain public officers and employees, like
justices and judges.
Article 14 of the Code of Commerce partakes
more of the nature of an administrative law
because it regulates the conduct of certain
public officers and employees with respect to
engaging in business: hence, political in
essence. It is significant to note that the
present Code of Commerce is the Spanish
Code of Commerce of 1885, with some
modifications made by the “Commission de
Codificacion de las Provincias de Ultramar,”
which was extended to the Philippines by the
Royal Decree of August 6, 1888, and took
effect as law in this jurisdiction on December
1, 1888.
Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain
to the United States and later on from the
United States to the Republic of the
Philippines, Article 14 of this Code of
Commerce must be deemed to have been
abrogated because where there is change of
sovereignty, the political laws of the former
sovereign, whether compatible or not with
those of the new sovereign, are
automatically abrogated, unless they are
expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the
new sovereign.
Likewise, in People vs. Perfecto (43 Phil.
887, 897 [1922]), this Court stated that: “It is
a general principle of the public law that on
acquisition of territory the previous political
relations of the ceded region are totally
abrogated.”
There appears no enabling or affirmative act
that continued the effectivity of the
aforestated provision of the Code of
Commerce after the change of sovereignty
from Spain to the United States and then to
the Republic of the Philippines.
Consequently, Article 14 of the Code of
Commerce has no legal and binding effect
and cannot apply to the respondent, then
Judge of the Court of First Instance, now
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals.
12. THE HOLY SEE vs. ROSARIO
FACTS: Petition arose from a controversy
over a parcel of land. Lot 5-A, registered
under the name Holy See, was contiguous to
Lot 5-B and 5-D under the name of Philippine
Realty Corporation (PRC). The land was
donated by the Archdiocese of Manila to the
Papal Nuncio, which represents the Holy
See, who exercises sovereignty over the
Vatican City, Rome, Italy, for his residence.
Said lots were sold through an agent to
Ramon Licup who assigned his rights to
respondents Starbright Sales Enterprises,
Inc.
When the squatters refuse to vacate the lots,
a dispute arose between the two parties
because both were unsure whose
responsibility was it to evict the squatters
from said lots. Respondent Starbright Sales
8
Enterprises Inc. insists that Holy See should
clear the property while Holy See says that
Respondent Corporation should do it or the
earnest money will be returned. With this,
Msgr. Cirilios, the agent, subsequently
returned the P100,000 earnest money.
The same lots were then sold to Tropicana
Properties and Development Corporation.
Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc. filed a suit
for annulment of the sale, specific
performance and damages against Msgr.
Cirilios, PRC as well as Tropicana Properties
and Development Corporation. The Holy See
and Msgr. Cirilos moved to dismiss the
petition for lack of jurisdiction based on
sovereign immunity from suit. RTC denied
the motion on ground that petitioner already
"shed off" its sovereign immunity by entering
into a business contract. The subsequent
Motion for Reconsideration was also denied
hence this special civil action for certiorari
was forwarded to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Holy See can invoke
sovereign immunity.
HELD: The Court held that Holy See may
properly invoke sovereign immunity for its
non-suability. As expressed in Sec. 2 Art II of
the 1987 Constitution, generally accepted
principles of International Law are adopted
by our Courts and thus shall form part of the
laws of the land as a condition and
consequence of our admission in the society
of nations.
Furthermore, it shall be understood that in
the case at bar, the petitioner has bought and
sold lands in the ordinary course of real
estate business, surely, the said transaction
can be categorized as an act jure gestionis.
However, petitioner has denied that the
acquisition and subsequent disposal of the
lot were made for profit but claimed that it
acquired said property for the site of its
mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the
Philippines.
The Holy See is immune from suit because
the act of selling the lot of concern is non-
propriety in nature. The lot was acquired
through a donation from the Archdiocese of
Manila, not for a commercial purpose, but for
the use of petitioner to construct the official
place of residence of the Papal Nuncio
thereof. The transfer of the property and its
subsequent disposal are likewise clothed
with a governmental (non-proprietal)
character as petitioner sold the lot not for
profit or gain rather because it merely cannot
evict the squatters living in said property.
In view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby
GRANTED and the complaints were
dismissed accordingly.

It was noted in Article 31(A) of the 1961

Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
that diplomatic envoy shall be granted
immunity from civil and administrative
jurisdiction of the receiving state over any
real action relating to private immovable
property. The Department of Foreign Affairs
(DFA) certified that the Embassy of the Holy
See is a duly accredited diplomatic
missionary to the Republic of the Philippines
and is thus exempted from local jurisdiction
and is entitled to the immunity rights of a
diplomatic mission or embassy in this Court.