1ST N.J.

YASASWY NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION,2019 TEAM CODE15

IN THE HONOURABLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA

IN THE MATTER OF :

JANANI & OTHERS…………………………………………………………..PETITIONER

Versus

UNION OF INDIA……………………………………………………………...RESPONDENT

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

MOST RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER

1
ABBREVIATION........................................................................................................................... 4

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES........................................................................................................... 5

INDIAN CASES ......................................................................................................................... 5

BOOKS ....................................................................................................................................... 7

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION............................................................................................... 9

STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................................................... 10

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ....................................................................................................... 12

SUMMARY OF ARGUMNETS .................................................................................................. 14

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED ...................................................................................................... 16

(1.1) That the Special Leave Petition by Hamida is Maintainable............................................ 16

(1.2) THAT HAMIDA IS UNDER ILLEGAL DETENTION ................................................. 16

(1.4) MARRIAGE BETWEEN HAMIDA AND ASLAM IS VALID AS PER MUSLIM LAW
................................................................................................................................................... 18

(1.4.1) HAMIDA HAS GIVEN HER FREE CONSENT ..................................................... 18

(1.5) DEPRIVATION OF MARITAL STATUS OF HAMIDA IS VIOLATIVE OF RIGHT

TO CHOOSE LIFE PARTNER AND RIGHT TO PRIVACY UNDER ARTICLE 21 ....... 19

(1.6) THE HIGH COURT CANNOT EXPAND THE SCOPE OF HABEAS CORPUS
PETITION ............................................................................................................................. 19

(2.1)THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION FILED BY MUMTAZ BEGUM IS MAINTAINABLE

....................................................................................................................................................... 20

(2.2)THE S.5 OF THE MUSLIM WOMEN (PROTECTION OF RIGHTS ON DIVORCE)

ACT, 1986 IS INCONSISTENT WITH PART III OF THE CONSTITUTION AND
UNDERMINES SECULAR CHARACTER OF THE CONSTITUTION ............................... 20

(2.2.1) VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14................................................................................. 20

(2.2.2) Violation of right to life and personal liberty ............................................................ 21

(2.2.3)Violation of Article 15 ................................................................................................ 22

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 (2.2.4) Undermines secular character of the Constitution ..................................................... 23

(3.1) THE PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION FILED BY SALEEMA ALONG WITH

JANANI UNDER ARTICLE 32 IS MAINTAINABLE .............................................................. 23

(3.3) POLYGAMY, NIKAH HALALA, NIKAH MUTAH AND NIKAH MISYAR ARE
VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 14, 15 & 21. .................................................................................... 24

(3.3.1)THE PRACTICE OF POLYGAMY DOES VIOLATE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS .. 26

(3.3.2) NIKAH HALALA DOES VIOLATE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ............................ 27

Nikah Halala in Qur’an.......................................................................................................... 27

(3.3.2.1) NIKAH HALALA IS, ARBITRARY, VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

OF DIGNITY AND RIGHT TO CHOOSE PARTNER ........................................................... 28

.(3.3.3) NIKAH MUTA DOES VIOLATE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT .................................. 28

Nikah Muta in Qur’an............................................................................................................ 28

(3.3.4) NIKAH MISYAR DOES VIOLATE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ............................. 29

(3.4) THE PRACTICES OF POLYGAMY,NIKAH HALALA,NIKAH MUTAH AND

NIKAH MISYAR VIOLATE PUBLIC ORDER, HEALTH AND MORALITY ................... 30

(4.1)THAT PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION FILED BY JANANI UNDER ARTICLE 32

IS MAINTAINABLE ................................................................................................................ 31

(4.2) TALAQ BY HUSBAND DOES VIOLATE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ................. 31

(4.2.1)KHULA CANNOT BE EFFECTED WITHOUT THE HUSBAND’S CONSENT .. 32

(4.3) THAT THE PROVISIONS OF SUNNI AND SHIA LAWS OF INHERITANCE

DISCRIMINATE AGAINST FEMALES OF EQUAL STATUS ONLY ON THE
GROUND OF SEX ............................................................................................................... 33

(4.4)THAT THE MUSLIM PERSONAL LAW WHICH DOESN’T ENABLE A WOMAN

TO BE THE NATURAL GUARDIAN DOES VIOLATE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS........ 34

(4.4.1)Custody(hizanat) is no guardianship ........................................................................... 36

INTERNATIONAL LAW VIOLATIONS ............................................................................... 36

PRAYER…………………………………………………………………………………………………37

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 ZABBREVIATION

 AIR- ……………………………………………………………………All India Reporter

 All-……………………………………………………………………...Allahabad
 art.-……………………………………………………………………...Article
 Art. – …………………………………………………………………...Article
 Bom- …………………………………………………………………... Bombay
 Cal. –……………………………………………………………………Calcutta
 cl. –………………………………………………………………………Clause
 Co- ……………………………………………………………………..Company
 Dec. – …………………………………………………………………. December
 DOC.—………………………………………………………………… Document
 ed. –………………………………………………………………………Edition
 Gau.-…………………………………………………………………….Gauwahati
 G.A……………………………………………………………………...General Assembly
 Guj-……………………………………………………………………...Gujrat
 HP- ……………………………………………………………………...Himachal Pardesh
 I.C.- ……………………………………………………………………..Indian Cases
 Id. –………………………………………………………………………Ibid
 INDIAN CONST. – …………………………………………..INDIAN CONSTITUTION
 J. – ……………………………………………………………………….Justice
 Ker.- ……………………………………………………………………. kerala

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  LJ-………………………………………………………………………. Law Journal
 Ltd.- ……………………………………………………………………..Limited
 Mad. – …………………………………………………………………..Madras
 Mar. - ……………………………………………………………………March
 M. I. A. - ……………………………………………………Moores Indian Appeals
 Mys - …………………………………………………………………… Mysore
 ORS.-……………………………………………………………………. Others
 Q. B. – …………………………………………………………….Queens Bench
 s. - ……………………………………………………………………….section
 SC- ………………………………………………………….SUPREME COURT
 SCC- …………………………………………………………Supreme Court Cases
 SCOR- …………………………………………………..Supreme Court on Record
 Section 125 of code- ……………….Section 125 of Criminal procedure Code, 1973
 trans. – ……………………………………………………………translation
 Sep. – ……………………………………………………… ……September
 v. – ………………………………………………………………….versus
 1986 Act- ……………..The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986
 U.N………………………………………………………………UNITED NATIONS
U.N.T.S………...........................................UNITED NATIONS TREATY SERIES

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

INDIAN CASES
Abdul Aziz v. Nanhe, 29 All 332.
Abdul Sattar Husen v. Mrs. Shahina, AIR 1999 Bom. 25.
Acharya Jagadiswarananda Awadutha v. Commissioner of Police,Calcutta, AIR 1984 512.
Andiappa v. Nallendrani 39 Mad. 473.
Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra,(1999)1 SCC 759.
Bommai v. Union of India, MANU 1994 SC 0444.

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C.C.E v. Standard Motor Products, AIR 1989 SC 1298.
C.C.E v. Standard Products, AIR 1989 SC 1298.
Chunilal Mehta & Sons Ltd. V. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd., AIR 1962 SC
1314.
Common Cause (Registered Society) v. Union of India, (2018) 5 SCC 1.
Danial Lattifi v. Union of India, MANU 2001 SC 0595.
E.P. Royappa v State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1974 SC 555.
Fathima Bi v. Sadhakautalla, AIR 1977 Mad 251.
Francis Coralie Mullin v. Union Territory of Delhi, (1981) 1 SCC 608.
Ghansi Bi v. Ghulam Dastagir ,(1968) 1 Mys LJ 566.
Girish v. Radhamony (2009) 16 SCC 360.
Githa Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India,AIR 1999 SC 1149.
Gurbux v. Rafia, AIR 1979 HP 66.
Imambandi v. Mustadi (1918) 45 Cal 887.
Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala, MANU 2016 SCOR 0810..
Itwari v. Asghari, AIR 1960 All 684.
J. K S Puttuswamy v. Union of India, MANU 2017 SC 1044.
Jagannath Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1961 SC 1245.
Javed v. State of Haryana, AIR 2003 SC 3057.
Jeeja Ghosh v. Union of India, (2016) 7 SCC 761.
Joseph Shine v. Union of India, MANU 2018 SC 1074.
K K Kochunni v. State of Madras, AIR 1959 SC 725.
Kanu Sanyal v. District Magistrate, Darjeeling & Ors., AIR 1954 SC 510.
Khatija Begum v. Ghulam Dastgir (1975) 2 An. 194.
Khursheed Ahmad Khan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 2015 SC 1429.
Maharashtra University of Health Sciences v.Satchikitsa Prasarak Mandal, (2010) 3 SCC 786.
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597.
Masilamani Mudaliar v. Idol of Sri Swaminathaswami, AIR 1996 SC 1697.
Meethiyan Sidhiqu v. Muhammed Kunju Pareeth Kutty (1996) 1 SCR 11..
Mohd Shaheb Mahboob v. Deputy Custodian, AIR 1961 SC 1657.
Monshee Buzul-ul-Rahim v. Lutee Futoon-Nissa (1861)8 M.I.A 379.

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Nandi Mirza v. Muni Begum,1930 Oudh 411.
National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India & Ors. (2014) 5 SCC 438.
Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, 1985 (3) SCC 545.
P.Ayishakkutty v. Abdul Samad, AIR 2005 Ker 68.
Patel Parshottamdas Narasinbhai v. Bai Dhabu, AIR 1973Guj. 88.
Pawan Kumar v.State of Haryana,(2003) 11 SCC 241.
Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi Administration, (1980) 3 SCC 526.
Prohudas Morajee v. Union of India ,AIR 1966 SC 1044.
Rahima Khatoon v. Saburjanessa, AIR 1996 Gau 33.
Railway Board and Others v. Mrs. Chandrima Das and Others, AIR 2000 SC 988.
Regina v. Gyngall (1893) 1 Q. B. 232.
Sabah Adnan v. Adnan Sami Khan, AIR 2010 Bom 109.
Shabnam v. Union of India, (2015) 6 SCC 702.
Shafin Jahan v. Asokan KM, MANU 2018 SC 0340.
Shafin Jahan v. Asokan, MANU 2018 SC 0340.
Siddiq-un-nissa v. Nizam-uddin (1932) 54 All. 128, 137 I.C. 219.
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Madanlal,(2015) 7 SCC 681.
Sukhdev v. Bhaagt Ram, AIR 1975 SC 1331.
Umar Bibi v. Mohammad Din, AIR 1945 Lah 51.
Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1997 SC 3011.

BOOKS
1 Alamghiri M hd Mohiuddin Aurangazeb, Al-Fatawa al-Hindiyya 283
Dr.Paras Diwan,Muslim Law in Modern India 126 (13th ed. 2018)
Ibn Taymiyah, Al-Insaf 165
Sahih Al Bukhari, Book 2 7(Dr. Muhammad Muhsan Khan trans.,Al-Saaswai Publications
1996).
Sahih Al Bukhari, Kitab al-Ijarah, Ajr al-Samsarah 794(Dr. Muhammad Muhsan Khan trans.,Al-
Saaswai Publications 1996).
Sahih Al Bukhari, Kitab al-Shurut fi al-Mahr, 970 (trans. Muhammad Muhsan Khan trans. Al-
Saaswai Publications 1996

7
Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Hajr al-Asqalani, Fath al-Bari:Victory of the Creator,152(Dr. Muhammad
Isla Waley ed.,Khalid Williams trans.Visions of Reality 2017).
Sir Dinshaw Fardunji Mulla, Principles of Mahomedan Law s.312 (20th ed. Professor Iqbal Ali
Khan, LexisNexis 2013)
Margaret deuter et al., Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary 256 (9th ed.2015).
Mustajaddat fiqhiya 77
Neil B.E. Baille in his ‘A Digest of Anglo-Indian Muslim
Lawhttps://archive.org/stream/in.ernet.dli.2015.216481/2015.216481.A-Digest_djvu.txt)
Quran II : 230:Abdulla Yusuf Ali, The Meaning of the Glorious Quran Text, Translation &
Commentary by:AbdullaYusufAli,TheGloriousQuran(Sept.2,2019,4:08PM),
http://m.islamicbulletin.org/?url+http%3A%2Fwww.islamicbulletin.org%2F&utm_referrer=#28
20

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 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1. PETITON BY HAMIDA
The petitioner herein is Mrs. Hamida under Art. 136 of the Constitution of Indiana,1950, this
Hon’ble Court has been vested, in its discretion, to grant special leave to appeal from any
judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any
court or tribunal in the territory of India. In this case, the petitioner has preferred an appeal
against the impugned order of the Hon’ble High Court of Methi.

2. PETITION BY SALEEMA
The Petitioner has approached the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India under Art. 32 of the
Constitution of Indiana, 1950
Article 32 of the Constitution of Indiana which reads as follows:
Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part-
(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the
rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in
the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may
be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part.”

3. PETITON BY MUMTAZ BEGUM

The petitioner herein is Mrs. Mumtaz Begum under Art. 136 of the Constitution of Indiana,1950,
this Hon’ble Court has been vested, in its discretion, to grant special leave to appeal from any
judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any
court or tribunal in the territory of India. In this case, the petitioner has preferred an appeal
against the impugned order of the Hon’ble High Court.

4. PETITION BY JANANI
The Petitioner has approached the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India under Art. 32 of the
Constitution of Indiana, 1950

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 STATEMENT OF FACTS

BACKGROUND
The Democratic Republic of Indiana is a secular country located in South Asia. Indiana has the
distinction of being the land from where various religions have originated and at the same time
the country is home to several indigenous faiths tribal religions. Regional co-existence of diverse
religious groups in the country makes it really unique. Around 80% of Indicans are Hindus, 14%
Muslims while 2% follow Christianity and remaining 4% follow other religions since time
immemorial. There is no intervention of the State in religious matters. The Constitution of
Democratic Republic of Indiana provides for freedom of religion as a fundamental right, to give
to its people the freedom of worship and religion and to outlaw discrimination on the ground of
religion. All religions are governed by their personal laws which is governing marriage, divorce,
succession, etc. Religious diversity and religious tolerance were both established in the country
by law & custom
PETITION BY HAMIDA
Devi, a Hindu girl of 17 years of age leaves her hometown, Dhali, a remote village in the state of
Methi in southern Indiana, to pursue her graduation in a far away city. She gets heavily
influenced by her classmates and used to visit mosque frequently. One day she informed her
parents that she took Shahada in presence of the Maulana and two witnesses. Hence she has
converted to Islam and she has obtained the Certificate of Conversion. She also adopted a new
name Hamida. Her parents asked her to come back home. After two days on her 18th birthday
she married Aslam. She went home with her husband. Her parents misbehaved with Aslam and
didn’t let her leave home with Aslam. Hamida with the help of “JANANI”, NGO dealing with
women rights, filed a Habeas Corpus in the High Court of Methi. The High Court of Methi held
the conversion to be void as she is a minor and marriage is also held to be void as this can be as
case of brainwashing and an act of ‘love jihad’. Aggrieved by the decision, Hamida approached
before Supreme Court of Indiana.

10
 PETITION BY SALEEMA
Saleema got married in the year 2003 to one Mr. Sultan. All the time when she was at her
matrimonial home, she was tortured, bullied, beaten. After the repeated tortures, she filed a
complaint U/s 498 A of the IPC. Getting infuriated with this, petitioner’s husband sent a letter
giving her ‘Triple Talaq’. She was married for second time in 2014 to Mr. Rizwan, who was
already married. She was given a Talaq in the Hasan form, soon after birth of her second son..
Moved by her own situation and of many other similarly situated Muslim women throughout
Indiana, Saleema along with “JANANI” is before the Supreme Court praying to declare practices
of ‘Polygamy’, ‘Nikah Halala’, ‘Nikah Mutah’; and ‘Nikah Misyar’ as against the basic rights
enshrined under Part III of the Constitution and also against public order, morality and health.
PETITION BY MUMTAZ BEGUM
Mumtaz Begum, wife of Shah Alam, filed a petition under Section 125 of Criminal Procedure
Code, claiming maintenance for herself and for her two minor daughters. During the pendency of
proceedings, Shah Alam divorced the appellant and thereafter the appellant filed an application
under Section 5 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act and preferred to be
governed by the provisions of Section 125-128 of Criminal Procedure Code instead of provisions
of 1986 Act and the said application was rejected by learned magistrate as the consent of the
former husband was absent and the High Court in revision affirmed the order of the Ld.
Magistrate. Mumtaz Begum filed a petition in the Supreme Court in Indiana.s
PETITION BY JANANI
After invalidation of talaq- biddat by Apex Court, JANANI(NGO) filed a writ petition in the
Supreme Court to declare following practices as unconstitutional and violations of Convention
on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women: (i) provisions of Muslim law
which recognizes unilateral talaq given by muslim husbands, (ii) inheritance provisions which
discriminates against females, and (iii) provisions which restricts Muslim women to be natural
guardian, as void and unconstitutional

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 STATEMENT OF ISSUES

(1) PETITION BY HAMIDA

(1.1) WHETHER THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION BY HAMIDA IS MAINTAINABLE

OR NOT?

(1.2) WHETHER HAMIDA IS UNDER ILLEGAL DETENTION OR NOT?

(1.3) WHETHER THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO CHOOSE FAITH IS AVAILABLE

TO MINORS OR NOT?

(1.4) WHETHER THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN HAMIDA AND ASLAM IS VALID OR

NOT?

(1.5) WHETHER THE DEPRIVATION OF MARITAL STATUS OF HAMIDA IS

VIOLATIVE OF HER FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OR NOT?

(1.6) WHETHER THE HIGH COURT CAN EXPAND THE SCOPE OF HABEUS CORPUS
PETITION OR NOT?

(2)PETITION BY MUMTAZ BEGUM

(2.1) WHETHER THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION FILED BY MUMTAZ BEGUM IS

MAINTAINABLE OR NOT?

(2.2) WHETHER THE S.5 OF THE MUSLIM WOMEN (PROTECTION OF RIGHTS ON

DIVORCE) ACT, 1986 IS INCONSISTENT WITH PART III OF THE CONSTITUTION AND
UNDERMINES SECULAR CHARACTER OF THE CONSTITUTION OR NOT?

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(3) PETITION BY SALEEMA ALONG WITH JANANI

(3.1) WHETHER THE MUSLIM PERSONAL LAW IS ‘LAW IN FORCE’ WITHIN THE
MEANING OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIANA OR NOT?

(3.2) WHETHER THE PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION FILED BY SALEEMA ALONG

WITH JANANI UNDER ARTICLE 32 IS MAINTAINABLE OR NOT?

(3.3) WHETHER THE PRACTICES OF POLYGAMY, NIKAH HALALA,NIKAH

MUTA,NIKAH MISYAR ARE CONSISTENT WITH PART III OF THE CONSTITUTION
OR NOT?

(4) PETITION BY JANANI

(4.1)WHETHER THE PUBLIC INTEREST LITIAGTION FILED BY JANANI UNDER

ARTICLE 32 IS MAINTAINABLE OR NOT?

(4.2)WHETHER THE UNILATERAL TALAQ BY MUSLIM HUSBANDS VIOLATES

ARTICLE 14 OR 15 OF THE CONSTITUTION OR NOT?

(4.3)WHETHER THE PROVISIONS OF SUNNI AND SHIA LAW OF INHERITANCE

DISCRIMINATES AGAINST FEMALES ONLY ON THE GROUND OF SEX OR NOT?

(4.4)WHETHER THE MUSLIM PERSONAL LAW WHICH DOESN’T ENABLE A MUSLIM

WOMEN TO BE THE NATURAL GUARDIAN OFFENDS ARTICLE 14 AND 15 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OR NOT?

13
 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

PETITION BY HAMIDA

It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that, Special leave petition filed by the
petitioner is maintainable as the matter involves violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under
Article 21 and 25 of the Constitution, which is matter of general public importance and therefore
calls for intervention by SC. It is humbly submitted that Hamida is under illegal detention as she
is a major and she has a right to go along with anyone she likes. That conversion of Hamida is
valid as Right to choose faith is a fundamental right. That marriage between Hamida and Aslam
is valid as per Muslim law and therefore deprivation of the same is violative of right to choose
life partner and right to privacy of both Hamida and Aslam. Furthermore, the High Court Order
declaring marriage and conversion of Hamida as void is plainly in excess of judicial power as the
High Court can not expand the scope of Habeas Corpus Petition.

PETITION BY MUMTAZ BEGUM

It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court is that, the Special Leave Petition filed by the
petitioner is maintainable, as the matter involves violation of fundamental rights guaranteed
under Article 14, 15 and 21 of Constitution are violated, which is a matter of general public
importance and therefore calls for intervention by SC. That Section 5 of 1986 Act is inconsistent
with part iii of Constitution for the following reasons: firstly it is arbitrary. Secondly, it
discriminates only against Muslim women on the ground of religion. Thirdly, it violates right to
live with dignity of Muslim divorced women and lastly, it undermines the secular character of
the Constitution.

14
15
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

(1.1) That the Special Leave Petition by Hamida is Maintainable.

It is humbly submitted before this honourable Court that, the special leave petition filed by the
petitioner is maintainable, as the matter involves substantial question of law of general public
importance.1 If this honourable Court does not intervene, it will result in gross injustice and that,
miscarriage of justice has already occurred,2 by the erring of the judgment of the honourable
High Court of Methi, which declared the conversion and marriage of petitioner void, 3 with
complete disregard for the fundamental rights of the petitioner. Therefore, the special leave
petition of petitioner must be accepted, so that the honourable Court can use its wide jurisdiction
conferred under Article 1364to correct the wrong done by the decision given by the honourable
High Court of Methi.
In the instant case, it is humbly submitted that fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 21
and 25 of Constitution are violated, which is a matter of general public importance and therefore,
calls for intervention by the honourable Supreme Court.
(1.2) THAT HAMIDA IS UNDER ILLEGAL DETENTION.
It is humbly submitted that Hamida is illegally restrained of her liberty guaranteed by Article 21
of the Constitution. That the parent of Hamida didn’t let her leave home with Aslam, her
husband.5 That a constitution bench of this honourable Court opined that the object of writ of
habeas corpus is to secure release of a person who is illegally restrained of his liberty. 6 That
while dealing with habeas corpus petition the role of the Court is to see to it that the person is
released from illegal restraint.7

1
Chunilal Mehta & Sons Ltd. V. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1314.
2
C.C.E v. Standard Motor Products, AIR 1989 SC 1298.
3
Moot proposition, para.3, line 13.
4
INDIAN CONST. art. 136,cl.1:Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter,The Supreme Court may, in its discretion,
grant a special leave to appeal from any judgment,decree,determination,sentence or order in any cause or matter
passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India”.
5
Moot proposition,.para 3 line 7.
6
Kanu Sanyal v. District Magistrate, Darjeeling & Ors., AIR 1954 SC 510.
7
Shafin Jahan v. Asokan KM, MANU 2018 SC 0340.

16
It is significant to note that Hamida is a major and she has expressed her desire to go with Aslam,
her husband.8
It is humbly submitted that where the Court concluded that the girl who was major and desired to
go with the man of her choice and whom she has legally married, will be sufficient enough to
allow the writ as she being the major was alone to judge as where she would like to go. 9 That the
same principle was reiterated by this honourable Court in Sonny Gerry v. Gerry Douglas, 10 and
Nandakumar v. State of Kerala.11
In the light of the above submission it is contended that Hamida is under illegal detention.
(1.3) FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO CHOOSE FAITH IS AVAILABLE TO MINORS.
It is humbly submitted that it would be constitutionally unjustified to declare that a 17 year old
girl may have the right to practice religion flowing from Article 25(1) 12 but right to choose faith,
a right which flows from very same Article 25(1) shall not be available to her.
That the rights guaranteed under Article 25 are subject to public order, health and morality and
other provisions of Part III of Constitution and the restriction of age does not fall under any of
the limitation provided under Article 25. Therefore, conversion of a 17 year old is valid and its
invalidation would be constitutionally untenable.
That right to change faith is part of a fundamental right to choice under Article 21.13 This right
cannot be taken away except through a law which is substantively and procedurally fair, just and
reasonable.14 Since there is no such law, the right to change faith cannot be denied to petitioner
here.
That right to privacy is a fundamental right and the freedom of the belief or faith in any religion
is a matter of conscience falling within the zone of purely private thought process and is an
aspect of liberty.15 It is a right which protects the inner sphere of the individual from interference
from both state and non-state actors and allows individuals to make autonomous life choices.16

8
Supra at 5.
9
Shafin Jahan, MANU at 7.
10
Sonny Gerry v. Gerry Douglas, AIR 2018 SC 346.
11
Nandakumar v. State of Kerala, MANU 2018 SC 0505.
12
INDIAN CONST. art.25,cl 1 : Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part,
all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practice and propagate
religion.”
13
Shafin Jahan, MANU at 7.
14
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597.
15
J. K S Puttuswamy v. Union of India, MANU 2017 SC 1044.
16
Id.

17
Freedom of faith is essential to a person’s autonomy.17
In the light of above submission, it is contended that invalidation of conversion by the Court
invades right to privacy of the petitioner.

(1.4) MARRIAGE BETWEEN HAMIDA AND ASLAM IS VALID AS PER MUSLIM

LAW
It is humbly submitted that Hamida and Aslam are adults. Under Muslim law, marriage or nikah
is a contract. Muslim law recognizes the right of adults to marry by their own free will. The
conditions for a valid Muslim marriage are:(i) Both the individuals must profess Islam; (ii) Both
should attain the age of puberty; (iii) There has to be an offer and acceptance and two witnesses
must be present; (iv) Dower and Mehar; and (v) Absence of a prohibited degree of relationship.18
That there is nothing on record that above conditions are not satisfied in the instant case.
Therefore annulment of marriage was contrary to Muslim personal law.

(1.4.1) HAMIDA HAS GIVEN HER FREE CONSENT

It is submitted that annulment of marriage by the honourable High Court was done on the ground
that marriage may be the outcome of brainwashing and the act of love jihad.19 That free consent
of Hadiya is factually proved as she voluntarily converted to Islam, adopted new name, and
married with Aslam out of her free will and once she was not allowed to leave house with
Aslam, she felt aggrieved and approached the honourable High Court. Even after the court has
annulled the marriage, she is now before this honourable Court to undo miscarriage of justice.
The only inference can be drawn from the facts of instant case is that she does have free consent
at the time of marriage and she wish to be in marriage with Aslam.
Furthermore, the literal meaning of ‘brainwashing’ is “the activity of forcing somebody to accept
your ideas or believes for example by repeating the same thing many times or by preventing the
person from thinking clearly.”20 It is submitted that her consent was free from coercion, undue
influence, fraud and an element of force is absent in her consent. Therefore, a plea that marriage
was the outcome of brainwashing suffers from logical inconsistency and hence cannot be
accepted while declaring marriage invalid.

17
Shafin Jahan v. Asokan, MANU 2018 SC 0340.
18
Id.
19
Moot proposition, para 3 line 14.
20
Margaret deuter et al., Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary 256 (9th ed.2015).

18
That there is no evidence of act of ‘love jihad’ and therefore, same cannot be taken as a ground
to declare marriage invalid.21

(1.5) DEPRIVATION OF MARITAL STATUS OF HAMIDA IS VIOLATIVE OF RIGHT

TO CHOOSE LIFE PARTNER AND RIGHT TO PRIVACY UNDER ARTICLE 21
It is submitted that the right of an individual to choose life partner is absolute. 22 Neither the state
nor the law can dictate a choice of partners or limit the free ability of every person to decide in
matters of marriage.23 That, intimacies of marriage lie within a core zone of privacy, which is
invioble.24 This honourable Court in a decision of nine judge bench held that the ability to make
decisions on matters close to one’s life is an invioble aspect of human personality. 25 The family,
marriage, procreation and sexual orientation are all integral to the dignity of the individual.26
Hence, it is submitted that the annulment of marriage between Hamida and Aslam was violative
of fundamental rights.

(1.6) THE HIGH COURT CANNOT EXPAND THE SCOPE OF HABEAS CORPUS
PETITION
It is humbly submitted that in Girish v. Radhamony K27, a two judge bench of this honourable
Court declared that in a habeas corpus petition, all that is required to find out and produce in
court the person who is stated to be missing. Once the person appeared and she stated that she
had gone for her own free will, the High Court had no further jurisdiction to pass the impugned
order in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The same principle
was reiterated by three judge bench of this honourable Court in Shafin Jahan v. Asokan.28
That there was no warrant for the High Court to proceed in the exercise of its jurisdiction under
Article 226 to declare conversion and marriage of Hamida void. The honourable High Court has
entered into a domain which is alien to its jurisdiction in a habeas corpus petition. The exercise

21
Rajesh Ahuja, NIA Ends Kerala Probe, Oct. 18, 2014 at A1.
22
Shafin Jahan v.MANU at 7.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Puttuswamy , MANU at 15.
26
Id.
27
Girish v. Radhamony (2009) 16 SCC 360.
28
Shafin Jahan, MANU at 7.

19
of the jurisdiction to declare the marriage null and void, while entering a petition for habeas
corpus is plainly in excess of judicial power.29
(2.1)THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION FILED BY MUMTAZ BEGUM IS
MAINTAINABLE.
It is humbly submitted before this honourable Court that, the special leave petition filed by the
petitioner is maintainable, as the matter involves a substantial question of law of ‘general public
importance.’30 If this honourable Court does not intervene, it will result in gross injustice and
that, miscarriage of justice has already occurred,31 by the erring judgment of learned Magistrate
and the same was affirmed by the honourable High Court in revision, which rejected the
application filed under Section 5 of the Act,32 with complete disregard for the fundamental rights
of the petitioner. Therefore, the special leave petition of the petitioner must be accepted, so that
the honourable Court can use its wide jurisdiction conferred under Art. 136,33 to correct the
wrong done by the decision given by learned Magistrate and honourable High Court.
In the instant case, it is humbly submitted that fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 14,
15 and 21 of the Constitution are violated, which is a matter of general public importance and
therefore, calls for intervention by this honourable court.
(2.2)THE S.5 OF THE MUSLIM WOMEN (PROTECTION OF RIGHTS ON DIVORCE)
ACT, 1986 IS INCONSISTENT WITH PART III OF THE CONSTITUTION AND
UNDERMINES SECULAR CHARACTER OF THE CONSTITUTION.

(2.2.1) VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14.

It is humbly submitted that it was held in Prohudas Morajee v. Union of India,34 that it cannot be
too strongly emphasized that to make out a case of denial of the equal protection of the laws
under Article 14 of the Constitution, a plea of differential treatment is by itself not sufficient. An
applicant pleading that Article 14 has been violated must make out that not only he had been
treated differently from others but he has been so treated from persons similarly circumstanced
without any reasonable basis, and such differential treatment is unjustifiably made.

29
Id.
30
Pawan Kumar v.State of Haryana,(2003) 11 SCC 241.
31
C.C.E v. Standard Products, AIR 1989 SC 1298.
32
Moot proposition. para. 6, line 6.
33
INDIAN CONST. Art.136, cl.2.
34
Prohudas Morajee v. Union of India ,AIR 1966 SC 1044.

20
It is submitted that here as far as maintenance under §125 of Criminal Procedure Code is
concerned, all the women including the Muslim women constitute a similar class or they are
similarly situated because they are unable to maintain themselves. Here, only Muslim women are
being differently treated as they cannot invoke proceedings under § 125 of Criminal Procedure
Code without the consent of the husband. Further, this differential treatment is unjustifiably
made as the sole basis is only religion. And religion cannot only be a ground for discrimination
as envisaged by Article 15. Moreover, this differential treatment is arbitrary as § 125 comes
under criminal proceeding as it is a strict rule of criminal liability that the consent of the subject
is irrelevant.
It is submitted that classification which excludes divorced Muslim women alone from the
protection which all other divorced women enjoy under section 125 is unreasonable and
arbitrary. There is neither any real and substantial difference between the situation faced by the
indigent women, both the Hindu and Muslim, following a divorce, nor any justification for
differentiating women in such a situation on the basis of religion. It certainly cannot be
contended that Muslim women are any less in need of the protection afforded by § 125 than
women of all other religion or no religion at all.

(2.2.2) Violation of right to life and personal liberty

It is humbly submitted that the impugned provision will have to be decided on the touchstone of
Article 21 of the Constitution. That denial of right to life and liberty is exasperated by the fact
that the impugned provision operates oppressively, unequally and unreasonably only against one
class of women. That § 5 of the Act makes the availability and applicability of the remedy as
provided by § 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code dependent upon the whim, caprice, choice
and option of the husband
That such deprivation of the divorced Muslim women of their right to maintenance from their
former husbands under the beneficial provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure which are
otherwise available to all other women in India cannot be stated to have been effected by a
reasonable, right, just and fair law and since these provisions are less beneficial than the
provisions of Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a divorced Muslim woman has
obviously been unreasonably discriminated and got out of the protection of the provisions of the

21
general law as indicated under the Code which are available to Hindu, Buddhist, Jain, Parsi or
Christian women or women belonging to any other community.35
It is submitted that this honourable Court in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation36 and
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India37 held that the concept of right to life and personal liberty
guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution would include the right to live with dignity.
It is submitted that the right to live with dignity under Article 21 is violated as even a divorced
women who is no longer married is considered as a property owned by the husband. While no
consent of the husband is necessary in case of other women, mandatory consent of the husband
under Muslim personal law is against the patriarchal notion that a woman is a man’s property
and in the worst scenario even after divorce.

(2.2.3)Violation of Article 15
That section 5 is also violative of Article 15 of the Constitution which prohibits any
discrimination on the ground of religion as the Act will obviously apply to Muslim divorced
women only and solely on the ground of their belonging to the Muslim religion.
That a wife’s right to be maintained by the husband has been recognized by all personal law in
varying degrees. So far as Muslim wives are concerned, the position is same. But, when it comes
to the claim of divorced wife is concerned, law is different on this issue.
That Muslim law as well as all other matrimonial laws except Special Marriage Act, 1954 apply
to persons only on the grind of professing a particular religion and if all such laws grant to the
divorced wives such larger right to post-divorce maintenance, but the Muslim law denies such
right,the Muslim wives have obviously been discriminated against and that too because they are
professing Muslim religion and such denial is violative of Article 15(1) of the Constitution of
Indiana.
It is submitted that prior to the Act, all divorced Indiana women were subject to single national
law embodied in § 125 of the Code, irrespective of what additional different rights might be
available to under their respective personal laws. To exclude a section of women, identified by
religion only, from the scope of national law to which they are previously subject to, is
discrimination on the ground of religion contrary to Article 15.

35
Danial Lattifi v. Union of India, MANU 2001 SC 0595.
36
Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, 1985 (3) SCC 545.
37
Maneka Gandhi, AIR at 14.

22
That § 5 of the Act exempts Muslim husbands from the obligation imposed on men of all other
religions, by § 125 of the code. Therefore, it is violative of Article 15 as it exempts only Muslim
husband.

(2.2.4) Undermines secular character of the Constitution

It is submitted that the impugned provision has the potential suffocating the Muslim women and
it undermines the secular character, which is the basic feature of the Constitution38; that there is
no rhyme or reason to deprive the Muslim women from the applicability of the provisions of §
125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
That Indiana being a secular country treats all religion and its people equal in the eyes of law and
no one is above or exempt from law. Criminal Procedure Code is codified law which is equally
applicable to all. Exempting a particular religion from its protection will undermine the secular
character which is the basis tenet and feature of our Constitution.
(3.1) THE PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION FILED BY SALEEMA ALONG WITH
JANANI UNDER ARTICLE 32 IS MAINTAINABLE.
It is humbly submitted before this honourable Court that the practices of Polygamy, Nikah
Halala, Nikah Muta and Nikah Misyar are violative of fundamental rights conferred by Part III of
the Constitution of Indiana. The petitioner seeks the enforcement of these fundamental rights
against the state. That a PIL can be filed against the state for violation of fundamental rights.39
That the alternative remdies are ineffective and insufficient therefore they cannot be availed.
Thus, the writ petition is maintainable.Furthermore, the mere existence of an adequate alternative
legal remedy cannot per se be a good and sufficient ground for throwing out a petition under
Article 32 if the existence of a fundamental right and breach, actual or threatened, of such right
and is alleged prima facie established on the petition.40
In the light of the above submission, it is contended that PIL is maintainable.
(3.2) THE MUSLIM PERSONAL LAW IS “LAW IN FORCE” WITHIN THE
MEANING OF ARTICLE 13 OF CONSTITUTION OF INDIANA.

38
Bommai v. Union of India, MANU 1994 SC 0444.
39
Sukhdev v. Bhaagt Ram, AIR 1975 SC 1331.
40
K K Kochunni v. State of Madras, AIR 1959 SC 725. .

23
It is submitted that The Muslim Personal (Sharia) Law Act, 1937 by virtue of being a statute falls
under the definition of “laws in force” under Article 13(3)(a)41 and Article 372 of the Indian
Constitution and thus can be challenged under Article 32 for being violative of fundamental
rights of equality and life.
It is submitted that the section 2 of the Act gives binding force to Muslim Personal Law
enforceable by the State and the Courts and is hence “law in force” within the meaning of Article
13. Being so, it is capable of challenge although the actual content of the Sharia remains
uncodified. After the passing of The Muslim Personal (Sharia) Law Act, 1937, it is irrelevant
whether the said law is codified or uncodified customary or non customary, based on religion or
otherwise, since it is the said Act which gives it the character of “law in force” and recognition
by the Sate. It must therefore pass the test of Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
It is submitted that there can be no governing Muslim Personal Law in relation to marriage and
divorce outside the framework of Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 and to
that extent the claim that the imugned practices are part of Muslim Personal Law is nothing but a
claim that the impugned practices are protected under the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat)
Application Act, 1937. The said law is therefore capable of constitutional challenge.
In C.Masilamani Mudaliar v. Idol of Sri Swaminathaswami42 this honourable Court held
“Personal laws are derived not from the Constitution but from the religious scriptures. The laws
thus derived must be consistent with the Constitution lest they become void under Art. 13 if they
violate fundamental rights.
Hence, it is submitted that personal law is ‘law in force’under Article 13.

(3.3) POLYGAMY, NIKAH HALALA, NIKAH MUTAH AND NIKAH MISYAR ARE
VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 14, 15 & 21.
It is submitted that only those practices which are the cornerstones of a religion are protected.43

41
INDIAN Const. art.13,cl.2: “laws in force includes laws passed or made by Legislature or other competent
authority in the territory of India before the commencement of this Constitution and not previously repealed,
notwithstanding that any such law or any part thereof may not be then in operation either at all or in particular
areas.”
42
Masilamani Mudaliar v. Idol of Sri Swaminathaswami, AIR 1996 SC 1697.
43
Javed v. State of Haryana, AIR 2003 SC 3057; Acharya Jagadiswarananda Awadutha v. Commissioner of
Police,Calcutta, AIR 1984 512.

24
The practices of Polygamy,44 Nikah Halala, Nikah Muta and Nikah Misyar are not integral parts
of Islam. But, the integral parts of Islam are: “On the authority of Abdullah, the son of Umar ibn
al-Khattab, who said: I heard the Messenger of Allah say, “Islam has been built on five [pillars]:
testify that there is no deity worthy of worship except Allah and that Muhammad is the
Messenger of Allah, estapblishing the salah (prayer), paying the zakat (obligatory charity),
making the hajj (pilgrimage) to the House, and fasting in Ramadhan.”45 Even those practices
which are integral but do not conform to the constitutional ethos must not have constitutional
protection.46
It is humbly submitted that the equal protection of laws postulate the application of the same
laws alike and without discrimination to all persons similarly situated47. As this honourable
Court reiterated in Joseph shine v. Union of India48, man and woman are equal partners to the
marriage. But, Muslim law doesn’t treat them so. Thus, violates Article 14 and 15(1).
Right to choose partner is a fundamental right.49 By making unreasonable restrictions to the same
will tarnish the fundamental right of an individual under Article 19 and 21.
To live is live with dignity50 . It is a facet of Article 21.51Human dignity is beyond definition.52
Life without dignity is like a sound that is not heard.53 It is humbly submitted that in Joseph
Shine v. Union of India54 it is stated that : “Any system treating a woman with indignity, inequity
and inequality or discrimination invites the wrath of the Constitution.” It is submitted that in
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Madanlal55 this honourable Court held that “Dignity of a woman is a
part of her non-perishable and immortal self and no one should ever think of painting it in clay.
There cannot be a compromise or settlement as it would be against her honour which matters the

44
Khursheed Ahmad Khan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 2015 SC 1429.
45
1 Sahih Al Bukhari, Book 2 7(Dr. Muhammad Muhsan Khan trans.,Al-Saaswai Publications 1996).
46
Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala, MANU 2016 SCOR 0810.(Chandrachud J.).
47
Jagannath Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1961 SC 1245 ; Mohd Shaheb Mahboob v. Deputy Custodian,
AIR 1961 SC 1657.
48
Joseph Shine v. Union of India, MANU 2018 SC 1074.
49
Puttaswamy, MANU at 15 ; Shafin Jahan, MANU at 7.
50
Puttaswamy, MANU at 15.
51
Id.; Joseph Shine, MANU at 48.;Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi Administration, (1980) 3 SCC 526;Francis Coralie
Mullin v. Union Territory of Delhi, (1981) 1 SCC 608;Maharashtra University of Health Sciences v.Satchikitsa
Prasarak Mandal, (2010) 3 SCC 786;Shabnam v. Union of India, (2015) 6 SCC 702;Jeeja Ghosh v. Union of India,
(2016) 7 SCC 761.
52
Common Cause (Registered Society) v. Union of India, (2018) 5 SCC 1.
53
Id.
54
Joseph Shine, MANU at 49.
55
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Madanlal,(2015) 7 SCC 681.

25
most.” Thus, it is submitted that the practices which fail the test of dignity of an individual is
violative of Article 21.

(3.3.1)THE PRACTICE OF POLYGAMY DOES VIOLATE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

It is submitted that this honourable Court held that equality is antithesis to arbitrariness. Where
an act is arbitrary, it is implicit in it that it is unequal both according to political logic and
constitutional law is therefore violative of Article 14 of Constitution.56
The practice of polygamy permits a male spouse an unqualified right to marry while first
marriage is subsisting. The husband could marry without the disclosure of any reason, and in
fact, even in the absence of reasons. The second marriage performed by husband would be valid
under Muslim personal law with the female spouse having no say at all. This practice vests an
arbitrary right in the husband, and as such, violates the equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of
the Constitution.
Furthermore, it is submitted that the Constitution postulates through Article 15(1), a clear
restraint on discrimination on the ground of sex and polygamy which vests an absolute right in
the husband only and not in wife, to perform another marriage while the first marriage is
subsisting, violates the aforesaid fundamental right, which postulates equality between men and
women. While Muslim male has right to marry up to four woman, Muslim wife can marry only
after divorce or death of husband. This is blatant violation of Article 15(1).
That the practice of polygamy places the man at the centre of marriage as an institution. It seeks
to degrade women to a position inferior to that of men. It treats women as men’s chattel, and
reduces their status to an object of desire to be possessed by men. Consequently, it offends the
core ideal of equality of status.
That the practice of polygamy without giving any opportunity to the wife of reconciliation leaves
her in utter distress and destituteness and thereby violates her basic human right to live with
dignity57 guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.
That Muslim Personal Law of polygamy contravenes Article 21 of the Constitution. Firstly, the
discrimination between men and women as regards the permission to have multiple spouses
grossly offends the right to dignity of women, which has been recognized as an integral part of

56
E.P. Royappa v State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1974 SC 555.

26
the right to life and personal liberty under Art.21. Firstly, such a distinction has the effect of
reducing the woman’s status to one much inferior to that of the man. By considering the woman
but an object of the man’s desire, such a system of polygamy causes gross affront to the dignity
of women. Secondly, in Itwari v. Asghari58, it has been held that the actions of a Muslim man in
marrying a second woman would constitute cruelty as against the first wife and furnish a ground
for dissolution of marriage. It has also been held that in such situations, Courts should refuse to
grant the husband’s prayers of restitution of conjugal rights, for the second marriage is a
“continuing wrong” to the first wife. It is submitted that the first wife undergoes severe mental
agony when her husband marries a second woman. The existence of different personal laws
would make no difference to this anguish.
Therefore, it is submitted that the system of polygamy in Muslim Personal Law interferes with
the right conferred byArt.21 of the Constitution.
Hence, the part of Muslim Personal Law sanctioning the practice of polygamy stands in
contravention of Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution, and is void for that reason.

(3.3.2) NIKAH HALALA DOES VIOLATE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS.

Nikah Halala in Qur’an

“So if a husband divorces his wife (irrevocably), he cannot, after that, re-marry her until after she
has married another husband and he has divorced her in that case there is no blame on either of
them. If they re-unite, provided they feel that they can keep the limits ordained by God.Such are
the limits ordained by God, which He makes plain to those who understand.”59Thus, Nikah
Halala is applicable when the talak becomes irrevocable despite of its form.60 Further, this gets
recognition from : “If a man marries a woman unconditionally [i.e. without it being limited to a
specified time], and it is in his intention to remain with her for a time that he intends [and then

58
Itwari v. Asghari, AIR 1960 All 684.
59
QuranII:230: The Meaning of the Glorious Quran Text, Translation and Commentary by:Abdulla Yusuf Ali, The
GloriousQuran(Sept.2,2019,4:08PM),http://m.islamicbulletin.org/?url+http%3A%2Fwww.islamicbulletin.org%2F&
utm_referrer=#2820.
60
Sir Dinshaw Fardunji Mulla, Principles of Mahomedan Law s.312 (20th ed. Professor Iqbal Ali Khan, LexisNexis
2013).

27
divorce her],then the marriage is valid..”61; “As for when the husband marries and it is in his
intention to divorce her after a period that he intends, then the marriage is valid”62
(3.3.2.1) NIKAH HALALA IS, ARBITRARY, VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS OF DIGNITY AND RIGHT TO CHOOSE PARTNER.
It is humbly submitted that Nikah Halala makes women a property of man or husband. When the
husband divorces the wife she is forced to go through the ‘procedures’ so that husband may
suffer with regret of divorcing her. That is why it is applicable only in the case of Talaq. Thus,
the rationale,if any, of the provision suffers from the absence of logicality of approach and
therefore it suffers from the vice of Article 14 of the Constitution being manifestly arbitrary.
It is submitted that in Nikah Halala practice marriage must be consummated before divorce for
its validity. Thus, such a practice, where woman is considered as a sex tool is against the dignity
of a woman which is the facet of Article 21.
Right to choose partner is a fundamental right.63 It is humbly submitted that when Nikah Halala
unreasonably prohibits man and woman from remarrying until the ‘procedure’ is followed, it
violates the said fundamental right of both the parties.
Hence it is submitted Nikah Halala is violative of Article 14,19 and 21.
.(3.3.3) NIKAH MUTA DOES VIOLATE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT.
Nikah Muta in Qur’an.
“[Forbidden to you] are married woman, except what your right hand possesses. This Allah has
written for you,and all other women besides these are permitted to you, so that you may seek
them out with your wealth, seeking chastity and not fornication. So when you have contracted
temporary marriage [istimt’atum] with them, then give them their words. There is no sin on you
for whatever you agree to after this.Indeed,Allah is Knowing, Wise.”64 Nikah Muta discriminates
between similarly situated people. Unlike woman in permanent marriage, woman in temporary
marriage can claim neither inheritance rights65, nor maintenance rights66 and she cannot institute

61
1 Alamghiri Mohd Mohiuddin Aurangazeb, Al-Fatawa al-Hindiyya 283( partlty trans.(1865)Neil B.E. Baille in his
‘A Digest of Anglo-Indian Muslim Lawhttps://archive.org/stream/in.ernet.dli.2015.216481/2015.216481.A-
Digest_djvu.txt).
62
3 Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Hajr al-Asqalani, Fath al-Bari:Victory of the Creator,152(Dr. Muhammad Isla Waley
ed.,Khalid Williams trans.Visions of Reality 2017).
63
Shafin Jahan, MANU at 7.
64
Yusuf Ali, supra, Quran IV:24.
65
Mulla, supra, 345.
66
Id.

28
divorce proceedings against her temporary husband67 although some ‘temporary marriage’ may
last longer than ‘permanent marriage. Thus, it is submitted that temporary marriage violates
Article 14.
It is humbly submitted that nikah muta is based on the belief that woman is a chattel thanks to
the rights of women in such marriage. Man contracts cohabitation with woman for a specific
period for some dower.68 Such specific period can be a day, a month, a year or term of years. 69 It
creates no marital obligation towards each other. Unlike ‘permanent marriage’ it doesn’t require
witnesses.70These make temporary marriage as a ‘legal lease of women’. Since, there is no ban
on number of temporary marriage by man, he may have any number of temporary marriage that
too in addition to the permanent marriage. Thus, it is submitted that temporary marriage violates
the dignity of women protected under Article 21.
(3.3.4) NIKAH MISYAR DOES VIOLATE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS.
A woman in misyar marriage71 does not enjoy all the rights given to a woman in a ‘normal’
72
marriage. She has to sacrifice one or more rights. Once she surrenders it she cannot claim it
back73. Such prohibition on claiming the right back is based on the following ahadith:
“The Muslims should maintain their conditions.”74
“The best of conditions to fulfil are those committed during marriage, by which you consummate
and make her halal for you.”75
Hence, the wife in a misyar marriage is not equally protected like a wife under ‘normal’
marriage. Thus, it is arbitrary and violative of Article 14.
It is humbly submitted that position of women in misyar marriage, approved by sunni Muslims,
is no different to the position of women in nikah muta which is approved by the shia sect of
Muslims. Without having the rights and obligation of marriage it is simply a sale of woman. It is

67
Id.
68
id. At 344.
69
Id..
70
Id.
71
Misyar marriage literally means ‘traveller’s marriage’.It is a kind of marriage where women agree to give up some
of their rights to enter into marriage. It is a kind of marriage where women agree to give up some of their rights:
Shaikh Muhammad Saalih al-Munajjad,Misyaar marriage : definition and rulings, ISLAM QUESTION &
ANSWER(Aug. 21,2018,8:47 AM), https://islam qa.info/en/answers/82390/misyar-marriage-definition-and-rulings.
72
Mustajaddat fiqhiya 77.
73
8 Ibn Taymiyah, Al-Insaf 165.
74
2 Sahih Al Bukhari, Kitab al-Ijarah, Ajr al-Samsarah 794(Dr. Muhammad Muhsan Khan trans.,Al-Saaswai
Publications 1996).
75
2 Sahih Al Bukhari, Kitab al-Shurut fi al-Mahr, 970 (trans. Muhammad Muhsan Khan trans. Al-Saaswai
Publications 1996)

29
submitted that misyar marriage treats women only as an object to fulfil man’s sexual needs.
Under sunni sects, stating the term of marriage in nikah nama or otherwise makes the marriage
muta thus, void. But, it is possible to contract a marriage with an intention to divorce. “If a man
marries a woman unconditionally [i.e. without it being limited to a specified time], and it is in his
intention to remain with her for a time that he intends [and then divorce her],then the marriage is
valid..”76; “As for when the husband marries and it is in his intention to divorce her after a period
that he intends, then the marriage is valid”77. Thus, it is submitted that misyar marriage is sunni
sect’s counterpart of muta marriage. And they are nothing more than an age old suppression of
the rights and thoughts of women emerged from the patriarchal notion of the society.
Thus,it is humbly submitted that it is violative of the fundamental right-live with dignity-under
Article 21.
It is humbly submitted that in Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal v. State of Gujrat (2013) 2 SCALE 198
it was held that marital relationship means the legally protected marital interest of one spouse to
another which include marital obligation to another like companionship, living under the same
roof, sexual relation and the exclusive enjoyment of them, to have children, their up-bringing,
services in the home, support, affection, love, liking and so on. That Nikah Mutah and Nikah
Misyar both are considered a valid marriage under Islam but they do not fit in the very basic
definition of marriage given by the Court. Therefore these practices can’t be protected as
marriage.
(3.4) THE PRACTICES OF POLYGAMY,NIKAH HALALA,NIKAH MUTAH AND
NIKAH MISYAR VIOLATE PUBLIC ORDER, HEALTH AND MORALITY.
Further, it is submitted that the morality means constitutional morality,78 since these practices, as
afore stated, are at the cost of the constitutional ethos they are against the constitutional morality.
It is submitted that no freedom can flourish in a state of disorder. It is submitted that public order
is equated with public peace, safety and tranquility.79 Each and every breach of tranquillity can
involve breach of public order if the act can affect even tempo of a community or society.80 The
above said practices are derived from a common source and hence, practicing in the society and
it leads to of women as an object only for pleasure, for whom the constitution has made specific

76
Aurangazeb, supra, 283.
77
Asqalani, supra 152.
78
Navtej Singh Johar & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.,MANU 2018 SC 0947.
79
Kanu Biswas v. State of West Bengal,AIR 1972 SC 1656.
80
Ram Manohar Lohya v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1968 All 100.

30
provision for protection, marr the tranquillity of Muslim women at large as a ‘public’, and thus,
consequently against public order and health.
Hence, it is submitted that the practices of Polygamy, Nikah Halala, Nikah Muta and Nikah
Misyar are violative of Part III of the Constitution and also against public order, morality and
health.
(4.1)THAT PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION FILED BY JANANI UNDER ARTICLE
32 IS MAINTAINABLE.
It is humbly submitted before this honourable Court that Muslim Personal law which enables a
Muslim male to give unilateral Talaq to his wife without her consent and without resort to
judicial process of courts offends Article 14 and 15 of the Constitution.
That Muslim personal law, which doesn’t enable Muslim women to be the natural guardian,
offends Article 14 and 15 of Constitution. That provisions of Sunni and Shia laws of inheritance
which discriminate against females in their share as to the share of males of the same status,
offends Article 14 of Constitution.
The petitioner seeks the enforcement of these fundamental rights against the State. That a PIL
can be filed against the State for the violation of Fundamental rights.81
That the alternative remedies are ineffective abznd insufficient therefore they can not be availed.
Thus the writ petition is maintainable. Furthermore, The mere existence of an adequate
alternative legal remedy cannot per se be a good and sufficient ground for throwing out a petition
under Art.32 if the existence of a fundamental right and breach, actual or threatened, of such
right and is alleged prima facie established on the petition.82
In the light of above submissions, it is contended that instant PIL is maintainable.
(4.2) TALAQ BY HUSBAND DOES VIOLATE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS.
It is humbly submitted that Muslim law gives husband unilateral power to divorce his wife
without the intervention of the court unlike wife. The different modes of divorce propounded
under Muslim law do not give equal right to wife in divorce. Incompatibility of temperaments
and hatred of the wife for her husband are not recognized by Muslim law as grounds of
divorce.Inimsasaut740983

81
Sukhdev, AIR at 39..
82
Kochunniv, AIR at 40.
83
Mulla, supra, 332.

31
It is submitted that the wife cannot divorce herself from her husband without his consent, except
under a contract whether made before or after marriage but she may, in some case, obtain a
divorce by judicial decree.84 .”
It is submitted that man and woman are equal in marriage and divorce.85 ‘No gender should have
extra-privilege over the other.It is humbly submitted that the equal protection of laws postulate
the application of the same laws alike and without discrimination to all persons similarly
situated86. As this honourable court reiterated in Joseph shine v. Union of India, 87 man and
woman are equal partners to the marriage. But, Muslim law of divorce doesn’t treat them so.
Thus, violates Article 14 and 15(1).
(4.2.1)KHULA CANNOT BE EFFECTED WITHOUT THE HUSBAND’S CONSENT.
It is submitted that a khula divorce is effected by an offer from wife to compensate the husband
if he releases her from her marital rights, and acceptance by the husband of the offer. 88 Thus,
khula is divorce based on agreement, where offer comes from wife. 89 It is humbly submitted that
in Zohara Khatoon v. Mohammad Ibrahim90, this honourable court described khula as a form of
divorce initiated by the wife, which becomes valid only after the husband gives his consent. 91
Therefore it is submitted that khula by women is not equivalent to talaq by husband and that all
the other modes of divorce outside the judicial process also need the consent of husband since
that can be effective only through contract between the parties.92
Thus, it is submitted that divorce provisions under Muslim law do not treat both the parties
equally and discriminates wife only on sex and hence violates Article 14 and 15(1).

84
Mulla, supra, 307.
85
Joseph Shine, MANU at 48.
86
Jagannath Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1961 SC 1245 ; Mohd Shaheb Mahboob v. Deputy Custodian,
AIR 1961 SC 1657.
87
Joseph Shine,MANU at 48.
88
Mulla, supra, s.319(2).
89
Mony]ukka shee Buzul-ul-Rahim v. Lutee Futoon-Nissa (1861)8 M.I.A 379 ; Umar Bibi v. Mohammad Din, AIR
1945 Lah 51;Ghansi Bi v. Ghulam Dastagir ,(1968) 1 Mys LJ 566..
90
AIR 1981 SC 1243.
91
Sabah Adnan v. Adnan Sami Khan, AIR 2010 Bom 109. (“[A] divorce by khula is complete if the following
conditions are satisfied : (i) if it is at the instance of the wife or there must be an offer from the wife; (ii) she gives or
agrees to give a consideration to the husband for her release; and (iii) acceptance by the husband of the offer.)
92
ulla, supra, s. 314,319(3).
,..,.

32
(4.3) THAT THE PROVISIONS OF SUNNI AND SHIA LAWS OF INHERITANCE
DISCRIMINATE AGAINST FEMALES OF EQUAL STATUS ONLY ON THE
GROUND OF SEX
It is respectfully submitted that the sunni and shia law of inheritance is constructed upon the
anachronistic belief that men are superior to women. Clear cut violation under Article 15(1) can
be proved through the case by case analysis of the shares of men and women of the same
status.93
1)Husband/widower(H) and wife/widow(W):Husband’s maximum share is ½ and minimum is
¼ .Whereas wife’s maximum share is ¼ and minimum share is 1/8.Maximum and minimum
depend on certain conditions.94Illustrations:
a) i) H-6/24--- F-4/24-- S-14/24 ii) W-3/24---F-4/24----S-17/24
b) i) H-1/2---F-1/2 ii) W-1/4----F-3/4.
These are some of the circumstances which reflect the dichotomous approach the Muslim law
has taken in deciding the shares of a widow or widower. It is submitted that under Muslim law a
father is not bound to maintain his son’s widow.95 Even then father gets more share than the
widow. It itself indicates the plain violation of Article 15(1). Hence, it is submitted that the
husband and wife’s right to inherit under Muslim law discriminates wife/widow only on the
ground of sex.
2) Son(S) and Daughter(D)96:It is humbly submitted that under Muslim personal law, though
the daughter is a sharer and son is a residuary, son is getting more than daughter and when they
are together son gets double of daughter. Illustrations:
a) i)sW-3/24—F-4/24---S-17/24 ii) W-3/24---F-9/24---D-12/24 b) i) F-1/6---S-5/6 ii) F-3/6-
--D-3/6 c) S-2/3—D-1/3 d) S-2/9---S-2/9---S-2/9---D-1/9---D-1/9---D-1/9 e) i) S-2/4---
D-1/4---D-1/4 ii)S-2/5---S-2/5---D-1/5
Hence, it is submitted that this discrimination is only based on sex and thus violates Article
15(1).
3) Father(F) and Mother(M)

93
Shia and sunni laws of inheritance have no conflict in fundamental concept since they are derived from Qur’an.
However, their approaches sometimes find different paths.
94
Mulla, supra, s.64.
95
Mulla, supra, s.373.
96
Yusuf Ali, supra, Quran IV:11: ““Allah thus commands you concerning your children: the share of the male is
like that of two females”.

33
It is submitted that though mother is getting comparatively better treatment than the aforesaid
two sharers, when it really matters Muslim law leans towards father rather than mother.
Illustration:
H-3/6----F-1/6----M-2/6
The abovementioned will be the picture when the rules apply normally. But, Muslim law cannot
tolerate when a woman is getting more than a man. Thus, the real distribution of shares
according to Muslim law is:
H-3/6---F-2/6---M-1/6
Muslim law does this discriminatory act by giving mother 1/3 of remaining ½ after
husband.97Further. it is submitted that Muslim law considers the line only of male is purer than
the line which includes female too. This can be explained with the following illustration:
Illustration:
A Mahomedan dies leaving a daughter’s son’s daughter(DSD) and daughter’s daughter’s son
(DDS)98:
DSD-2/3---DDS-1/3
Here, son is getting less than daughter because son’s line doesn’t include a male while daughter’s
line has a male. It implies the double standard of Muslim law.
For the reasons stated aforesaid it is humbly submitted that Muslim law’s inheritance law doesn’t
stand the test of time, though in 6th C.E it was revolutionary. In the modern world where man and
woman are equally sharing responsibilities by recognizing the equal status of both of them, this
rule of inheritance stands as a blemish. Hence, it is submitted that the Muslim law of inheritance
discriminates woman only on sex thus violates Article15(1).

(4.4)THAT THE MUSLIM PERSONAL LAW WHICH DOESN’T ENABLE A WOMAN

TO BE THE NATURAL GUARDIAN DOES VIOLATE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS.
It is humbly submitted that mother is not considered as a natural guardian under Muslim personal
law. Mother in all schools of Muslim law is not recognized as a guardian, natural or otherwise,
even after the death of the father.99 Since the mother is not the legal guardian of her minor

97
Mulla, supra, s.63.
98
Mulla, supra, s.71.
99
Dr.Paras Diwan,Muslim Law in Modern India 126 (13th .Iy jdved. 2018).

34
children, she has no right to enter into a contract to alienate the minor’s property.100 In the
absence of father, the guardianship of person and property of minor is to the paternal relations of
minor.101Mother is only entitled to the custody of children up to a certain age102 and/or until her
remarriage.103 Here, Muslim law makes restriction to her fundamental right of right to choose her
partner under Article 21.The reason provided by the Muslim law for this restriction is that if a
woman marries a man not closely related to the child, the child may not be treated kindly104. The
irony is that same reason does not apply when father remarries.105 It is submitted that mother has
no power of a legal guardian even if she is a widow.106 A transfer of immovable property of a
minor by mother is not merely voidable, but void.107
It is submitted that the father’s right of guardianship exists even when the
mother, or any other female, is entitled to the custody of the minor.108 Father has the right to
control the education and religion of minor children.109.So long as the father is alive, he is the
sole and supreme guardian of his minor children. This concept of, mother not being the guardian
arose from the conventional concept that women are weak, easily exploited and meant only to be
confined under 3. Ppbhe roof. She has no say in her child’s life rather than taking care of him.
This honourable Court’s decision in Githa Hariharan & Anr. V. Reserve Bank of India & Anr.110
states if a mother is not considered as natural guardian during the life time of the father it will be
a violation of fundamental rights. In Muslim law, mother never comes into the picture of
guardian. In absence of father it will go Equabdyr to the paternal relations. Lord Esher in the
Regina v. Gyngall111 stated: “Every wise man would say that, generally speaking, the best place
for a child is with its parent...”

100
Fathima Bi v. Sadhakautalla, AIR 1977 Mad 251; Gurbux v. Rafia, AIR 1979 HP 66.
101
Mulla, supra, s.359.
102
xMulla, supra s.357.(“the father is entitled to the custody of a boy over seven years of age and of an unmarriejd
girl who has attained puberty”).
103
Mulla, supra, s.354.The same was approved in Abdul Sattar Husen v. Mrs. Shahina, AIR 1999 Bom. 25; Rahima
Khatoon v. Saburjanessa, AIR 1996 Gau 33.
104
Mulla, supra, s.354.
105
Siddiq-un-nissa v. Nizam-uddin (1932) 54 All. 128, 137 I.C. 219; Khatija Begum v. Ghulam Dastgir (1975) 2
An. 194;Andiappa v. Nallendrani 39 Mad. 473; P.Ayishakkutty v. Abdul Samad, AIR 2005 Ker 68.
106
Patel Parshottamdas Narasinbhai v. Bai Dhabu, AIR 1973Guj. 88; Meethiyan Sidhiqu v. Muhammed Kunju
Pareeth Kutty (1996) 1 SCR 11.
107
Mulla, supra, s.364.
108
Diwan, supra 128.
109
Abdul Aziz v. Nanhe, 29 All 332; Nandi Mirza v. Muni Begum,1930 Oudh 411.
110
Githa Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India,AIR 1999 SC 1149.
111
Regina v. Gyngall (1893) 1 Q. B. 232.

35
Thus, it is submitted that by making mother ineligible for the child’s custody after certain age
and/or mother’s remarriage reflects that she is considered as mere care taker under Muslim law
and such adiscrimination is unreasonable and arbitrary thus violating Articles 14 and 15(1) and
21.
(4.4.1)Custody(hizanat) is no guardianship.
It is humbly submitted that in Imambandi v. Mustaddi112 their Lordships of the Privy Council
said: “It is perfectly clear that under the Mahomedan law the mother is entitled only to the
custody of the person of her minor child upto a certain age according to sex of the child. But she
is not the natural guardian ; the father alone, or if he is dead, his executor (under the Sunni law )
is the guardian.”
It is submitted that the right of hizanat under Muslim law can never be equated with the
guardianship of person. The right of hizanat does not carry with it all the powers which a
guardian of the person of a minor has under the Guardian and Wards Act,1890.113
Hence, it is submitted that Muslim law fails to provide rational basis(it is impossible to provide
one) for according an inferior position to the mother in matter of guardianship. It discloses an
anti-feminine bias. It reveals age old superiority for men and inferiority for women. Even if there
was some justification in the past, it is deleterious and callus to continue the same after the lofty
rights enshrined under Part III of the Constitution i.e., Article 14 and 15(1) and 21.
INTERNATIONAL LAW VIOLATIONS.
It is humbly submitted that the discrimination of women in Muslim laws as aforestated violates
international laws: Articles 2(e), 5(a),6 ,15(1),16(c) & (d) of Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms Discrimination against Women114, Articles 23 and 26 of International Covenant on

112
. Imambandi v. Mustadi (1918) 45 Cal 887.
113
Mulla, supra, 435.
114
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,art.2,5&6 entered into force Sep.
3,1981,1249, U.N.T.S.1: “Article 2: State Parties condemn discrimination against women in all its forms, agree to
pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating against women and, to this end,
undertake:.. (e) To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws,
regulations, customs, and practices which constitute discrimination against women”;
“Article 5: “State Parties shall take all appropriate measures: (a) To modify the social and cultural patterns of
conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other
practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped
roles for men and women .”; “Article 6: State Parties shall take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to
suppress all forms of traffic in women and exploitation of prostitution of women.”;“Article 15 : “1. States parties
shall accord to women equality with men before the law.”;“Article 16: “1. States Parties shall take all appropriate
measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations and in
particular shall ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women:(c)The same rights and responsibilities during

36
Civil and Political Rights115 & Articles 1,7,16 of Universal Declaration of Human Rights.116It is
humbly submitted that though, the violation of international law cannot ipso facto invalidates a
law, any international convention not inconsistent with the fundamental rights and in harmony
with its spirit must be read into these provisions to enlarge the meaning and content thereof, to
promote international obligations.117 This is implicit from Article 51(c)118 and the enabling
power of Parliament to enact laws for implementing international conventions and norms by
virtue of Article 253 with Entry 14 of the Union list in the Seventh Schedule of the
Constitution.119Further, it is submitted that this honourable court pointed out that the
international conventions which were not inconsistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed by
the Constitution must be recognized and followed.120
Hence, it is respectfully submitted that the fundamental rights are to be interpreted in resonance
with the international laws.

marriage and at its dissolution;(d)The same rights and responsibilities as parents, irrespective of their marital status ,
in matters relating to their children; in all cases the interests of the children shall be paramount; ((f) The same rights
and responsibilities with regard to guardianship, wardship, trusteeship and adoption of children, or similar
institutions where these concepts exist in national legislation; in all cases the interests of the children shall be
paramount;
115
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art.23& 26 entered into force Mar. 23,1976,999,U.N.T.S
14668: “Article 23:……The right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and to found a family shall be
recognized…….State Parties to the Present Covenant shall take appropriate steps to ensure equality of rights and
responsibilities of spouses as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution…..”;“Article 26 : “All persons are
equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect,
the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against
discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political, or other opinion, national or
social origin, property, birth or other status.”
116
Universal Declaration of Human Rights G.A. 217(III), U.N. DOC. A/RE s odjjbeings are free and equal in
dignity and rights.....”; “Article 7 : All are equal before the law and are entitled to equal protection against any
discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.”Article 16: Men
and Women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to
found a family . They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution........”
117
Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1997 SC 3011; Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra,(1999)1
SCC 759; Chairman Railway Board and Others v. Mrs. Chandrima Das and Others, AIR 2000 SC 988.
118
INDIAN Const. art.51,cl.(c):foster respect for international law and treaty obligations in the dealings of
organized peoplws with one another;…”
119
Id.
120
National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India & Ors. (2014) 5 SCC 438;Puttuswamy, MANU at 15.

37
 PRAYER
In light of the issues raised, arguments advanced, and authorities cited, the counsel for the
Petitioner humbly prays that the Hon’ble Court be pleased to:
A. Issue a Writ / Order or Direction setting aside the judgment and order of High Court of
Methi, which declared conversion and marriage of Hamida as void;
B. Issue a Writ / Order or Direction to Respondents to set Hamida at liberty and allow her to
go along with Aslam, her husband;
C. Issue a Writ / Order or Direction in the nature of mandamus to the Union of Indiana
declaring section 5 of the Muslim Women (Protection on Rights of Divorce) Act, 1986
unconstitutional and violative of Articles 14, 15 and 21of the Constitution;
D. Issue a Writ / Order or Direction setting aside the impugned judgment and order of
learned Magistrate, which was affirmed by the Hon’ble High Court in revision
E. Issue a Writ / Order or Direction in the nature of mandamus to the Union of Indiana
declaring the practices of Polygamy, Nikah Halala, Nikah Mutah and Nikah Misyar as
against the basic rights enshrined under Part III of the Constitution and also against the
public order, morality and health;
F. Issue a Writ / Order or Direction in the nature of mandamus to the Union of Indiana to
declare :

38
 a. Muslim Personal Law which enables a Muslim male to give unilateral Talaq without
her consent and without resort to judicial process of courts as void offending Article
13, 14 and 15 of the Constitution;
b. Provisions of Sunni and Shia Laws of Inheritance which discriminates against
females in their share as compared to the share of the males of the same status, void
as discriminating against females only on the ground of sex;
c. Muslim Personal Law which doesn’t enable a Muslim woman to be natural guardian
as void, offending Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution;
G. Pass any other or future order(s) as this Hon’ble Court deems fit in the facts and
circumstances of the present case.

AND FOR THIS ACT OF KINDNESS THE PETITIONER AS IN DUTY BOUND SHALL
ALWAYS PRAY.

COUNSELS FOR THE PETITONER

39