CASE DIGEST

LITO CORPUZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 180016 724 SCRA 1 April 29, 2014

TOPIC:
F Separation of Powers; Judicial Power; View that establishing a policy or a rule of
preference towards the unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic
usefulness has always been within the scope of judicial power

FACTS:
F Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and petitioner met at the Admiral Royale Casino in
Olongapo City sometime in 1990. Private complainant was then engaged in the business
of lending money to casino players and, upon hearing that the former had some pieces of
jewelry for sale, petitioner approached him on May 2, 1991 at the same casino and
offered to sell the said pieces of jewelry on commission basis. Private complainant
agreed, and as a consequence, he turned over to petitioner the following items: an 18k
diamond ring for men; a woman's bracelet; one (1) men's necklace and another men's
bracelet, with an aggregate value of ₱98,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt of even date.
They both agreed that petitioner shall remit the proceeds of the sale, and/or, if unsold, to
return the same items, within a period of 60 days. The period expired without petitioner
remitting the proceeds of the sale or returning the pieces of jewelry. When private
complainant was able to meet petitioner, the latter promised the former that he will pay
the value of the said items entrusted to him, but to no avail.

F The petitioner was convicted of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of
the RPC.

F As regards the penalty, while this Court's Third Division was deliberating on this case,
the question of the continued validity of imposing on persons convicted of crimes
involving property came up. The legislature apparently pegged these penalties to the
value of the money and property in 1930 when it enacted the Revised Penal Code. Since
the members of the division reached no unanimity on this question and since the issues
 are of first impression, they decided to refer the case to the Court en banc for
consideration and resolution. Thus, several amici curiae were invited at the behest of the
Court to give their academic opinions on the matter.

ISSUE:
F Whether or not penalties in Estafa do not violate the constitutional prohibition against
cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment

RULING:
F The Supreme Court held that there seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the
range of penalties that the courts continue to impose on crimes against property
committed today, based on the amount of damage measured by the value of money eighty
years ago in 1932. However, this Court cannot modify the said range of penalties because
that would constitute judicial legislation. What the legislature’s perceived failure in
amending the penalties provided for in the said crimes cannot be remedied through this
Court’s decisions, as that would be encroaching upon the power of another branch of the
government. This, however, does not render the whole situation without any remedy.

F No court can exercise judicial power unless real parties come before it for the settlement
of actual controversy and unless the controversy is of the nature that can be settled in a
manner that binds the parties through the application of existing laws. This traditional
concept of judicial power, as the application of law to actual controversies, reflects the
constitutional imperative of upholding the principle of separation of powers, such that the
Judiciary has no power to entertain litigations involving the legality, wisdom, or the
propriety of the conduct of the Executive; neither has it the power to enlarge, alter or
repeal laws or to question the wisdom, propriety, appropriateness, necessity, policy or
expediency of the laws.

F The solution to the present controversy could not be solved by merely adjusting the
questioned monetary values to the present value of money based only on the current
inflation rate. There are other factors and variables that need to be taken into
 consideration, researched, and deliberated upon before the said values could be
accurately and properly adjusted.

F The imposition of a policy on penalties is not far removed from the judicial construction
exercised in the present case. Establishing a policy or a rule of preference towards the
unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness has always been
within the scope of judicial power.

F The constitutional infirmity not only of Article 315 but also of related provisions in the
Code calls for a comprehensive review by Congress of such 82-year old legislation.
Pending such congressional review, this Court should decline to enforce the incremental
penalty in Article 315 because such continued enforcement of the incremental penalty
violates the Cruel Punishment Clause.

F Underlying the doctrine of separation of powers is the general proposition that the whole
power of one department should not be exercised by the same hands that possess the
whole power of the other departments. Within their respective spheres of influence, each
department is supreme and the exercise of its powers to the full extent cannot be
questioned by another department. Outside of their defined spheres of action, none of the
great governmental departments has any power, and nor may any of them validly exercise
the powers conferred upon the others.

F Section 1, paragraph 2, Article VIII of the Constitution states that judicial power
“includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable,” as well as to “determine whether or not
there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.” Traditionally, judicial
power has been defined as “the right to determine actual controversies arising between
adverse litigants, duly instituted in courts of proper jurisdiction.” It is “the authority to
settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are enforceable and
 demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violation of such
rights.”

F On the legislature’s exclusive domain, through lawmaking, lies the authority to define
what constitutes a particular crime in this jurisdiction. It is the legislature, as
representative of the sovereign people, that determines which acts or combination of acts
is criminal and what the ordained punishments shall be. Judicial interpretation of penal
laws should be aligned with the evident legislative intent, as expressed primarily in the
language of the law as it defines the crime.

F WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated November 5, 2007 of

petitioner Lito Corpuz is hereby DENIED. Consequently, the Decision dated March 22,
2007 and Resolution dated September 5, 2007 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed
with modification the Decision dated July 30, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
46, San Fernando City, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Estafa under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code, are
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed is the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment ranging from THREE (3) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and
ELEVEN DAYS of prision correccional, as minimum, to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS of
reclusion temporal as maximum.

F Pursuant to Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, let a Copy of this Decision be furnished
the President of the Republic of the Philippines, through the Department of Justice.

CASE DIGEST
RAMON A. GONZALES vs COMELEC
G.R. No. L-28196 21 SCRA 774 November 9, 1967

TOPIC:
F Amendments and revisions; Congress (through ordinary legislative process) have the
power to amend or propose amendment to the Constitution

FACTS:
F On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed the following
resolutions:

F R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, proposing that Section 5, Article VI, of the
Constitution of the Philippines, be amended so as to increase the membership of the
House of Representatives from a maximum of 120, as provided in the present
Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be apportioned among the several provinces as
nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants, although each
province shall have, at least, one (1) member;

F R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose amendments to said Constitution, the

convention to be composed of two (2) elective delegates from each representative district,
to be "elected in the general elections to be held on the second Tuesday of November,
1971;" and

F R. B. H. No. 3, proposing that Section 16, Article VI, of the same Constitution, be
amended so as to authorize Senators and members of the House of Representatives to
become delegates to the aforementioned constitutional convention, without forfeiting
their respective seats in Congress.

F Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President, on June 17,
1967, became Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution
 proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by
the people, at the general elections, which shall be held on November 14, 1967.

ISSUE/S:
F Whether or not a Resolution of Congress — acting as a constituent assembly — violates
the Constitution
F Whether or not may Constitutional Amendments Be Submitted for Ratification in a
General Election

RULING:
F The Supreme Court held notwithstanding that the R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 have been
approved by a vote of three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives voting separately, said resolutions are null and void because Members of
Congress, which approved the proposed amendments, as well as the resolution calling a
convention to propose amendments, are, at best, de facto Congressmen (based upon
Section 5, Article VI, of the Constitution, no apportionment has been made been made by
Congress within three (3) years since 1960. Thereafter, the Congress of the Philippines
and/or the election of its Members became illegal; that Congress and its Members,
likewise, became a de facto Congress and/or de facto congressmen); However, as a
consequence, the title of a de facto officer cannot be assailed collaterally. Referring
particularly to the contested proposals for amendment, the sufficiency or insufficiency,
from a constitutional angle, of the submission thereof for ratification to the people on
November 14, 1967, depends — in the view of those who concur in this opinion, and
who, insofar as this phase of the case, constitute the minority — upon whether the
provisions of Republic Act No. 4913 are such as to fairly apprise the people of the gist,
the main idea or the substance of said proposals, which is — under R. B. H. No. 1 — the
increase of the maximum number of seats in the House of Representatives, from 120 to
180, and — under R. B. H. No. 3 — the authority given to the members of Congress to
run for delegates to the Constitutional Convention and, if elected thereto, to discharge the
duties of such delegates, without forfeiting their seats in Congress. We — who constitute
 the minority — believe that Republic Act No. 4913 satisfies such requirement and that
said Act is, accordingly, constitutional.

F One of the issues raised in this case was the validity of the submission of certain
proposed constitutional amendments at a plebiscite scheduled on the same day as the
regular elections. Petitioners argued that this was unlawful as there would be no proper
submission of the proposal to the people who would be more interested in the issues
involved in the election. Pursuant to Article 15 of the 1935 Constitution, the Supreme
Court held that there is nothing in this provision to indicate that the election therein
referred to is a special, not a general election. The circumstance that the previous
amendment to the Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratification in special
elections merely shows that Congress deemed it best to do so under the circumstances
then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments for
ratification in general elections.

**J Reyes dissented. “Plebiscite should be scheduled on a special date so as to facilitate “Fair
submission, intelligent consent or rejection”. They should be able to compare the original
proposition with the amended proposition.
CASE DIGEST
MAQUILING VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 195649 696 SCRA 420 April 16, 2013

TOPIC:
F Loss and Reacquisition of Citizenship: (i) Section 3, Article IV; (ii) Commonwealth Act
No. 63

FACTS:
F Arnado was a natural born Filipino citizen, but lost his citizenship upon naturalization as
citizen of United States of America. Sometime on 2008 and 2009, his repatriation was
granted and he subsequently executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of foreign citizenship.
On November 2009, Arnando filed for a certificate of candidacy and won the said
election. But prior from his declaration as winner, a pending action for disqualification
was filed by Balua, one of the contenders for the position. Balua alleged that Arnando
was not a citizen of the Philippines, with a certification issued by the Bureau of
Immigration that Arnando’s nationality is USA-American and a certified true copy of
computer-generated travel record that he has been using his American passport even after
renunciation of American citizenship. A division of the COMELEC ruled against
Arnando but this decision was reversed by the COMELEC en Banc stating that continued
use of foreign passport is not one of the grounds provided for under Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 63 through which Philippine citizenship may be lost.
Meanwhile, Maquiling petition that should be declared winner as he gained the second
highest number of votes.

ISSUE:
F Whether or not continued use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship
affects one’s qualifications to run for public office.

RULING:
 F The Supreme Court held that the use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign
citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality and
citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants
the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position which
makes him dual citizen. Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of
identity that comes with attendant civil and political rights accorded by the state to its
citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant duty to maintain allegiance to one’s flag
and country. While those who acquire dual citizenship by choice are afforded the right of
suffrage, those who seek election or appointment to public office are required to renounce
their foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public trust. Holding public office
demands full and undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no other. It is a continuing
requirement that must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or
assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required
qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. Therefore, the Court held
Arnando disqualified for any local elective position as provided by express
disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code. Popular vote does
not cure this ineligibility of the candidate. Otherwise, substantive requirements set by the
Constitution are nugatory.

F Furthermore, there is no second-placer to speak of because as reiterated in the case of

Jalosjos v. COMELEC, when the ineligibility was held to be void ab initio, no legal effect
is produced. Hence among the qualified candidates for position, Maquiling who garnered
the highest votes should be declared as winner.

CASE DIGEST
VICTORINO ALDABA VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No.188078 611 SCRA 137 Jan. 25, 2010

TOPIC:
F Apportionment; Creating a legislative District of Malolos
F Population should not be based on projection and certification must be issued by head of
the Philippine Statistics Authority, formerly, National Statistics Office (NSO)

FACTS:
F This is an original action for Prohibition to declare unconstitutional Republic Act No.
9591 (RA 9591), creating a legislative district for the city of Malolos, Bulacan, for
violating the minimum population requirement for the creation of a legislative district in
a city.
F On 1 May 2009, RA 9591 lapsed into law, amending Malolos City Charter,2 by creating a
separate legislative district for the city. The population of Malolos City was 223,069. The
population of Malolos City on 1 May 2009 is a contested fact but there is no dispute that
House Bill No. 3693 relied on an undated certification issued by a Regional Director of
the National Statistics Office (NSO) that “the projected population of the Municipality of
Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78
between 1995 to 2000.”

ISSUE:
F Whether or not RA 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population
threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit representation in Congress as provided under
Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the 1987 Constitution?

RULING:
F The Supreme Court grant the petition and declare RA 9591 unconstitutional for being
violates the Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.
 F The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district, the city must
have “a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand.” House Bill No. 3693 cites the
undated Certification of Regional Director Alberto N. Miranda of Region III of the
National Statistics Office (NSO) as authority that the population of the City of Malolos
“will be 254,030 by the year 2010.” The Certification states that the population of
“Malolos, Bulacan as of May 1, 2000 is 175,291.” The Certification further states that it
was “issued upon the request of Mayor Danilo A. Domingo of the City of Malolos in
connection with the proposed creation of Malolos City as a lone congressional district of
the Province of Bulacan.”

F First, certifications on demographic projections can be issued only if such projections are
declared official by the National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB). Second,
certifications based on demographic projections can be issued only by the NSO
Administrator or his designated certifying officer. Third, the population projections must
be as of the middle of every year. Moreover, the Certification states that “the total
population of Malolos, Bulacan as of May 1, 2000 is 175,291.” The Certification also
states that the population growth rate of Malolos is 3.78% per year between 1995 and
2000. Based on a growth rate of 3.78% per year, the population of Malolos of 175,291 in
2000 will grow to only 241,550 in 2010. Any population projection forming the basis for
the creation of a legislative district must be based on an official and credible source. That
is why the OSG cited Executive Order No. 135, otherwise the population projection
would be unreliable or speculative.

CASE DIGEST
JOSELITO R. MENDOZA VS COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND ROBERTO M.
PAGDANGANAN
G.R. No. 191084 616 SCRA 443 March 25, 2010

TOPIC:
F Electoral Tribunal: Sections 17 and 19, Article VI

FACTS:
F Petitioner Joselito R. Mendoza was proclaimed winner in the May 14, 2007 for Governor
race in the Province of Bulacan. Respondent Roberto M. Pagdanganan who opposed him
filed an election protest with the COMELEC questioning the election results in all the
5,066 precincts in the province due to massive electoral fraud that Mendoza allegedly
committed. On December 1, 2009 the COMELEC Second Division decided the election
protest and proclaimed Pagdanganan as the duly elected Governor of Bulacan. Mendoza
opposed Pagdanganan’s motion for execution of the decision before the Second Division
and filed a motion for reconsideration of that decision with the COMELEC En Banc. On
February 8, 2010 the COMELEC En Ban denied Mendoza’s motion for reconsideration.
Reacting to it, he filed an urgent motion to recall the February 8 resolution on the ground,
among others, that the En Banc issued such resolution (a) without the concurrence of the
majority of its members and (b)without conducting a rehearing under Section 6, Rule18
of the COMELEC rules of procedure. Only three Commissioners voted to deny his
motion for reconsideration. A commissioner dissented while three others took no part. On
February 10, 2010 the COMELEC En Banc issued an Order for the rehearing of the
motion for reconsideration on February 15, 2010. Meanwhile, on February 12 Mendoza
filed with this Court the present petition, raising the same grounds which he cited in the
urgent motion to recall that he earlier filed with the COMELEC En Banc. Following its
February 15 rehearing, the members of the COMELEC En Banc maintained their votes.
On March 4, 2010 the En Banc issued an order directing the immediate execution of the
Second Division’s decision. This prompted Mendoza to file a supplement to his petition
before this Court, bringing up the recent developments in the case.
ISSUE:
 F Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion under the Rule 18,
sec. 6 of the COMELEC Rules of procedure

RULING:
F The Supreme Court that there is a difference in the result of the exercise of jurisdiction by
the COMELEC over election contests. The difference inheres in the kind of jurisdiction
invoked, which in turn, is determined by the case brought before the COMELEC. When
a decision of a trial court is brought before the COMELEC for it to exercise appellate
jurisdiction, the division decides the appeal but, if there is a motion for reconsideration,
the appeal proceeds to the banc where a majority is needed for a decision. If the process
ends without the required majority at the banc, the appealed decision stands affirmed.
Upon the other hand, and this is what happened in the instant case, if what is brought
before the COMELEC is an original protest invoking the original jurisdiction of the
Commission, the protest, as one whole process, is first decided by the division, which
process is continued in the banc if there is a motion for reconsideration of the division
ruling. If no majority decision is reached in the banc, the protest, which is an original
action, shall be dismissed. There is no first instance decision that can be deemed
affirmed.

F It is easy to understand the reason for the difference in the result of the two protests, one
as original action and the other as an appeal, if and when the protest process reaches the
COMELEC En Banc. In a protest originally brought before the COMELEC, no
completed process comes to the banc. It is the banc which will complete the process. If,
at that completion, no conclusive result in the form of a majority vote is reached, the
COMELEC has no other choice except to dismiss the protest. In a protest placed before
the Commission as an appeal, there has been a completed proceeding that has resulted in
a decision.

F So that when the COMELEC, as an appellate body, and after the appellate process is
completed, reaches an inconclusive result, the appeal is in effect dismissed and
resultantly, the decision appealed from is affirmed.
 F The petition is GRANTED. The election protest of respondent Roberto M. Pagdanganan
is hereby DISMISSED.

CASE DIGEST
BENGZON VS. DRILON
G.R. 103524 208 SCRA 133 April 15, 1992
TOPIC:
F Messaged Veto versus Pocket Veto: Section 27, Article VI compare with Section 20,
Article VI of the 1935 Constitution

FACTS:
F Petitioners are retired justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who are
currently receiving pensions under RA 910 as amended by RA 1797. President Marcos
issued a decree repealing section 3-A of RA 1797 which authorized the adjustment of the
pension of retired justices and officers and enlisted members of the AFP. PD 1638 was
eventually issued by Marcos which provided for the automatic readjustment of the
pension of officers and enlisted men was restored, while that of the retired justices was
not. RA 1797 was restored through HB 16297 in 1990. When her advisers gave the
wrong information that the questioned provisions in 1992 GAA were an attempt to
overcome her earlier veto in 1990, President Aquino issued the veto now challenged in
this petition. It turns out that PD 644 which repealed RA 1797 never became a valid law
absent its publication, thus there was no law. It follows that RA 1797 was still in effect
and HB 16297 was superfluous because it tried to restore benefits which were never
taken away validly. The veto of HB 16297 did not also produce any effect.

ISSUE:
F Whether or not the veto of the President of certain provisions in the GAA of FY 1992
relating to the payment of the adjusted pensions of retired Justices is constitutional or
valid.

RULING:
F The Supreme Court held that the veto of these specific provisions in the GAA is
tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary of its funds should be utilized, which is clearly
repugnant to fiscal autonomy. Pursuant to constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must
enjoy freedom in the disposition of the funds allocated to it in the appropriations law. Any
argument which seeks to remove special privileges given by law to former Justices on the
ground that there should be no grant of distinct privileges or “preferential treatment” to
 retired Justices ignores these provisions of the Constitution and in effect asks that these
Constitutional provisions on special protections for the Judiciary be repealed.

F The petition is granted and the questioned veto is illegal and the provisions of 1992 GAA
are declared valid and subsisting.

CASE DIGEST
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. RAMOS
P.E.T. Case No. 001 253 SCRA 559 February 13, 1996

TOPIC:
 F Executive Department - The President - Qualifications, Election, Term and Oath -
Election Contest- Miriam abandoned her electoral protest case when she ran and took
office as Senator after the 1995 elections. Consequently, the case has become moot and
academic.

FACTS:
F Miriam Defensor-Santiago (Miriam) ran for President in the 1992 elections and lost
against Fidel V. Ramos (Ramos). Miriam prayed that the revision of ballots 1 in the
remaining precincts of the pilot areas be dispensed with and the revision process in the
pilot areas be deemed completed.

F The Supreme Court deferred its action on that motion and required Miriam and Ramos to
submit their respective memoranda on the issue of whether or not the case has been
rendered moot and academic by the election of Miriam as a Senator in the May 1995
election and her assumption of office on June 30, 1995.

F Miriam's side: They should decide on the election contest because:

 Election contest confirms the true choice of the electorate.
 The case at hand is imbued with public interest.
 It is only moot if the term of office has expired.
 Her election as Senator and assumption of office does not mean she abandoned
the protest.

F The Court has abandoned the view that just because a case has been declared moot, it
should be dismissed.

F Miriam referred to 3 cases to bolster her arguments:

 Sibulo vda. de De Mesa vs. Mencias - the death of the protestee did not stop the
proceedings in the protest filed against him. A protest survives the death of the
respondent, and must be prosecuted to final judgment.
 Lomugdang vs. Javier- If the protest succeeds and the protestee is unseated =
NOT a ground for dismissal of the protest.
 De Castro vs. Ginete- Just because a losing candidate concedes to the winner, it
doesn't mean that the losing candidate is barred from questioning the validity of
the election of the winner.

1
  (Cited by the SC in line with Miriam's cases) Moraleja vs. Relova- The
acceptance by the repondent of an appointment to another position is NOT a
ground for dismissal of the protest.
F Supreme Court's rebuttal to Miriam:
 The cases she cited does not concur with the case at hand. These are the
differences:
 Sibulo vda. de De Mesa vs. Mencias - the respondent had been
proclaimed as the winner and assumed office, and then DIED when the
election protest was ongoing.
 Lomugdang vs. Javier- the protestant DIED during the ongoing
protest.
 De Castro vs. Ginete- the protestant congratulated the respondent after
the respondent won.
 Moraleja vs. Relova-the election protest survived the protestant's
acceptance of TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT during the ongoing
election protest.
F Ramos' side: There is strong legal basis for the PET to rule that Miriam is deemed to
have abandoned the protest because of the ruling in Dimaporo vs. Mitra. They should
decide on the election contest because:
 Public interest requires that the protest must be resolved because a) it involves a
matter of paramount and grave public interest, and b) the protest was filed in bad
faith.
 A resolution of the case would confirm his victory in the 1992 Presidential
elections and prove that Miriam's protest is unfounded.
 Resolving the case would establish guiding and controlling principles or doctrines
with respect to presidential election protest cases, thereby educating the bench and
the bar and prevent the indiscriminate filing of baseless protest cases.
F Supreme Court's rebuttal to Ramos:
 SC doesn't accept his view that just because Miriam filed her certificate of
candidacy, Miriam forfeited her claim to the office of the President.
 Dimaporo case does not apply to Miriam.
 There is no logic to Ramos' reasoning that the case should be resolved because
of bad faith. Also, there is no reason to proceed with the case just to establish
guidelines regarding election protests involving the office of the President or
the Vice-President.
ISSUE:
F Whether or not this case has been rendered moot by the election of Miriam as a Senator
in the May 1995 election and her assumption of office on June 30, 1995

RULING:
F The Supreme Court held that Miriam ran for Senator in the 1995 elections without any
qualification, condition or reservation. This means that her running was not conditional
based on any circumstances (e.g. her pending presidential election protest) and that she
was fully prepared to enter into a political contract with the electorate to serve as a
Senator.

F Supreme Court cited the case of Moraleja (see case 4 in the cases cited above), saying she
abandoned her "determination to protect and pursue the public interest involved in the
matter of who is the real choice of the electorate". In short, in assuming the office of
Senator, Miriam abandoned and withdrew her protest.

F The Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal cite 5 instances in dismissing an electoral
protest. The SC reasoned that if you can dismiss a protest on TECHNICAL grounds (like
the Rules), it can also be dismissed for a stronger reason (Miriam running and winning as
Senator) if it became moot due to Miriam abandoning the protest (which the SC implies
she did when she ran for Senator).

F Also, the Supreme Court says that since Miriam decided to waive her revision of the
remaining ballots from over 4,000 precincts in pilot areas, the SC resolved to: A) Order
the revision of the remaining ballot boxes. Regarding to Miriam has not informed the
PET about presenting evidence. The SC took it as an indication that she no longer
intended to do so.

F SC also said that revision of ballots is NOT a resolution of the said protest. Hence, a
dismissal of the protest is inevitable.

F DISMISS the election protest because it has been rendered MOOT and ACADEMIC by
the abandonment/withdrawal of Miriam as a consequence of her election and assumption
of office as Senator
CASE DIGEST
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO VS JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC)
G. R. No. 191002 618 SCRA 639 (2010)

TOPIC:
F Powers and Functions of the President; Appointment and qualifications: Sections 7(1),
8(5) and 9, Article VIII

FACTS:
F These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming
compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the
presidential election.

F Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that “vacancy shall be filled
within ninety days from the occurrence thereof” from a “list of at least three nominees
prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.”

F Also considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution
prohibits the President or Acting President from making appointments within two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except
 temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

F The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the
process of filling up the position of Chief Justice.

F The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice,
because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply
to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court
must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII
of the Constitution; that had the framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme
Court appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the Constitution, which
explains why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive Department) was not written
in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the framers also incorporated in Article
VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the President’s power to appoint members of the
Supreme Court to ensure its independence from “political vicissitudes” and its “insulation
from political pressures,” such as stringent qualifications for the positions, the
establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the President shall appoint a
Supreme Court Justice.

ISSUE:
F Whether or not the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno
upon his retirement.

RULING:
F The Supreme Court held that the prohibition against presidential appointments under
Section 15, Article VII does not extend to appointments in the Judiciary.

F Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to
the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so—
they could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions.

F The usage in Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution of the word shall—an
imperative, operating to impose a duty that may be enforced—should not be disregarded;
 Section 4(1) imposes on the President the imperative duty to make an appointment of a
Member of the Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy—the
failure by the President to do so will be a clear disobedience to the Constitution; The 90-
day limitation fixed in Section 4(1), Article VIII for the President to fill the vacancy in
the Supreme Court was undoubtedly a special provision to establish a definite mandate
for the President as the appointing power.

CASE DIGEST
RE: FAILURE OF FORMER JUDGE ANTONIO A. CARBONELL TO DECIDE CASES
SUBMITTED FOR DECISION AND TO RESOLVE PENDING MOTIONS IN
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BR. 27, SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION
700 SCRA 806, July 09, 2013 (A.M. No. 08-5-305-RTC)

TOPIC:
F Mandatory period for deciding cases: Section 15, Article VIII; Paragraph 3, Section 18,
Article VII; Sections 12 to 14, Article XVIII

FACTS:
F This administrative case originates from the judicial audit conducted by the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) on March 3 and 4, 2008 in the Regional Trial Court of San
Fernando, La Union, Branch 27, in view of the disability retirement of Presiding Judge
Antonio A. Carbonell on December 31, 2007. According to the Audit Team’s Report,
Branch 27 had a total caseload of 231 cases, consisting of 147 criminal cases and 84 civil
cases, and Judge Carbonell failed to decide 41 criminal cases (one inherited) and 22 civil
cases (four inherited). Judge Carbonell was also reported to have failed to resolve
pending motions or incidents in four criminal cases and 12 civil cases. The OCA
recommended to the Court that a fine of P50,000.00 be imposed upon Judge Carbonell
for gross inefficiency for failing to promptly decide the cases and to resolve pending
motions and incidents.
ISSUE:
F Whether or not Judge Carbonell is liable for gross inefficiency for failing to promptly
decide the cases and to resolve pending motions and incidents.

RULING:
F As a frontline official of the Judiciary, a trial judge should at all times act with efficiency
and probity. He is duty-bound not only to be faithful to the law, but also to maintain
professional competence. The pursuit of excellence ought always to be his guiding
principle. Such dedication is the least that he can do to sustain the trust and confidence
that the public have reposed in him and the institution he represents.

F The Court cannot overstress its policy on prompt disposition or resolution of cases. Delay
in the disposition of cases is a major culprit in the erosion of public faith and confidence
in the judicial system, as judges have the sworn duty to administer justice without undue
delay. Thus, judges have been constantly reminded to strictly adhere to the rule on the
speedy disposition of cases and observe the periods prescribed by the Constitution for
deciding cases, which is three months from the filing of the last pleading, brief or
memorandum for lower courts. To further impress upon judges such mandate, the Court
has issued guidelines (Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated January 15, 1999) that
would insure the speedy disposition of cases and has therein reminded judges to
scrupulously observe the periods prescribed in the Constitution.

F Nonetheless, the Court has been mindful of the plight of our judges and understanding of
circumstances that may hinder them from promptly disposing of their businesses. Hence,
the Court has allowed extensions of time to decide cases beyond the 90-day period. All
that a judge needs to do is to request and justify an extension of time to decide the cases,
and the Court has almost invariably granted such request.

F Without a doubt, Judge Carbonell’s failure to decide several cases within the
reglementary period, without justifiable and credible reasons, constituted gross
 inefficiency, warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions, like fines. The fines
imposed have varied in each case, depending chiefly on the number of cases not decided
within the reglementary period and other factors, including the presence of aggravating or
mitigating circumstances like the damage suffered by the parties from the delay, the
health condition and age of the judge, etc. Thus, in one case, the Court mitigated the
liability of a Judge who had been suffering from illnesses and who had later retired due to
disability, and imposed upon him a fine of P20,000.00 for failure to decide 31 cases.

CASE DIGEST
DENNIS FUNA VS REYNALDO VILLAR
GR. No. 192791 670 SCRA 579 April 24, 2012

TOPIC:
F Composition and Qualifications of Commissioners: Section 1(1), Article IX-D;
Paragraph 2, Section 13, Article VII

FACTS:
F On February 15, 2001, Pres Arroyo appointed Carague as Chairman of the COA for a
term of 7 years. Carague’s term of office started on February 2, 2001 to end on February
2, 2008. On February 7, 2004, Villar was appointed as the third member of the COA for a
term of 7 years starting February 2, 2004 until February 2, 2011.

F Following the retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008 and during the fourth year of
Villar as COA Commissioner, Villar was designated as Acting Chairman of COA from
February 4, 2008 to April 14, 2008. Subsequently, on April 18, 2008, Villar was
nominated and appointed as Chairman of the COA. Shortly thereafter, the Commission
on Appointments confirmed his appointment. He was to serve as Chairman of COA, as
expressly indicated in the appointment papers, until the expiration of the original term of
his office as COA Commissioner or on February 2, 2011.

ISSUE:
 F Whether or not a promotional appointment from the position of Commissioner to
Chairman is constitutionally permissible and does NOT constitute reappointment as
barred by the Article IX (D), Sec 1 (2) of the Constitution?

F Whether or not the appointment of Villar to the position of COA Chairman which is
made vacant by the expiration of term of the predecessor is valid?

RULING:
F On the first issue, the Supreme Court held that a commissioner who resigns after serving
in the Commission for less than seven years is eligible for an appointment to the position
of Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term of the departing chairman. Such
appointment is not covered by the ban on reappointment, provided that the aggregate
period of the length of service as commissioner and the unexpired period of the term of
the predecessor will not exceed 7 years and provided further that the vacancy in the
position of Chairman resulted from death, resignation, disability or removal by
impeachment. Reappointment found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a movement to one
and the same office (Commissioner to Commissioner or Chairman to Chairman). On the
other hand, an appointment involving a movement to a different position or office
(Commissioner to Chairman) would constitute a new appointment and, hence, not, in the
strict legal sense, a reappointment barred under the Constitution.

F On the second issue, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution clearly provides that if
the vacancy results from the expiration of the term of the predecessor, the appointment of
a COA member shall be for a fixed 7-year term. Here, the vacancy in the position of
COA chairman left by Carague in February 2, 2008 resulted from the expiration of his 7-
year term. Under that circumstance, there can be no unexpired portion of the term of the
predecessor to speak of. Hence, in light of the 7-year aggregate rule, Villar’s
appointment to a full term is not valid as he will be allowed to serve more than seven 7
years under the constitutional ban. Villar had already served 4 years of his 7-year term as
COA Commissioner. A shorter term, however, to comply with the 7-year aggregate rule
would also be invalid as the corresponding appointment would effectively breach the
clear purpose of the Constitution of giving to every appointee so appointed subsequent to
the first set of commissioners, a fixed term of office of 7 years.