TODA JR. vs.
CA He married Josefa Bosing in 1958 while still married to
183 SCRA 713
FACTS:
Benigno Toda, Jr. and Rose Marie Tuason-Toda were
married on June 9, 1951 and were blessed with two
children. Individual differences and the alleged infidelity
of Benigno, however, marred the conjugal union thereby
prompting Rose Marie to file on December 18, 1979 in
the former Court of First Instance of Rizal, as Civil Case
No. 35566, a petition for termination of conjugal
partnership for alleged mismanagement and dissipation
of conjugal funds against Benigno.
After hearings were held, the parties in order to avoid
further “disagreeable proceedings,” filed on April 1,
1981 a joint petition for judicial approval of dissolution of
conjugal partnership under Article 191 of the Civil Code,
docketed as Special Proceeding No. 9478, which was
consolidated with the aforesaid civil case. This petition
which was signed by the parties on March 30, 1981,
embodied a compromise agreement allocating to the
spouses their respective shares in the conjugal
partnership assets and dismissing with prejudice the
said Civil Case No. 35566, CA-G.R. No. 11123-SP of
the Court of Appeals and G.R. No. 56121 of this Court.
The said petition and the compromise agreement
therein were approved by the trial court in its order of
June 9, 1981.
ISSUE:
Is a compromise agreement sufficient action in
dissolution and partition of property?
HELD:
Supreme Court is in agreement with the holding of the
Court of Appeals that the compromise agreement
became effective only on June 9, 1981, the date when
it was approved by the trial court, and not on March
30,1981 when it was signed by the parties. Under Article
190 of the Civil Code, 14 “In the absence of an express
declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation
of property between spouses during the marriage shall
not take place save in virtue of a judicial order.”
Hence, the separation of property is not effected by the
mere execution of the contract or agreement of the
parties, but by the decree of the court approving the
same. It, therefore, becomes effective only upon judicial
approval, without which it is void.
Furthermore, Article 192 of said Code explicitly provides
that the conjugal partnership is dissolved only upon the
issuance of a decree of separation of property.
BELCODERO vs CA
FACTS:
This case involves the question of ownership over a
piece of property acquired by a husband living with a
paramour and after having deserted his lawful wife and
children.
Alayo Bosing married Juliana Oday in 1927 and had 3
children. In 1946, he abandoned them and lived with
Josefa Rivera whom he acknowleged as a common-law
wife Josefa Bosing. They had one child, Josephine
Bosing, now Josephine Belcodero.
Juliana.
Alayo purchased a land on installment basis in 1949 and
in his deed he named Josefa Bosing as his wife and
transferred the lot in her name. Final deed executed in
1959.
Alayo died in March 1967. In 1970 , Josefa and
Josephine executed a document of extra judicial
partition and sale of the lot, which was described as
conjugal property. Josefa’s share went to Josephine for
P10,000, so Josephine Belcodero had full ownership.
Notice was published.
In October 1980, Juliana (real widow) and 3 children
filed for reconveyance of property. Trial Court and CA
ruled in favor of Juliana.
ISSUE:
Whether or not said property registered under the name
of the common-law wife is not an exclusive property but
a conjugal property of Alayo and his legitimate wife
Juliana.
HELD:
Yes. The property remained as belonging to the
conjugal partnership of Alayo and his legitimate wife
Juliana. Under both the new Civil Code (Article 116) and
the old Civil Code (Article 1407), “all property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife.” This
presumption has not been convincingly rebutted.
It cannot be seriously contended that, simply because
the property was titled in the name of Josefa at Alayo’s
request, she should thereby be deemed to be its owner.
The property unquestionably was acquired by Alayo
and it was just transferred to Josefa.
VALDEZ VS RTC
Facts: Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were
married in 1971. They begot 5 children. In 1992, Valdez
filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity. The trial
court granted the petition, thereby declaring their
marriage null and void. It also directed the parties to
start proceedings on the liquidation of their common
properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code,
and to comply with the provisions of Articles 50, 51 and
52 of the same code.
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the
decision. She asserted that the Family Code contained
no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of
common property in "unions without marriage.
In an Order, the trial court made the following
clarification: "Consequently, considering that Article 147
of the Family Code explicitly provides that the property
acquired by both parties during their union, in the
absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have
been obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and
will be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and
defendant will own their 'family home' and all their other
properties for that matter in equal shares. In the
liquidation and partition of the properties owned in
common by the plaintiff and defendant, the provisions
on co-ownership found in the Civil Code shall apply."
Valdes moved for reconsideration of the Order which
was denied. Valdes appealed, arguing that: (1) Article
147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where
the parties are psychological incapacitated; (2) Articles
50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the
Family Code govern the disposition of the family
dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab
initio, including a marriage declared void by reason of
the psychological incapacity of the spouses;
(3) Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to
marriages declared void ab initio on the ground of the
psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same may be
read consistently with Article 129.
Issues:
Whether Art 147 FC is the correct law governing the
disposition of property in the case at bar.
Held:
Yes. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof,
the property relations of the parties during the period of
cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147
or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family
Code.
Article 147 applies when a man and a woman, suffering
no illegal impediment to marry each other, so
exclusively live together as husband and wife under a
void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. Under
this property regime, property acquired by both spouses
through their work and industry shall be governed by the
rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired
during the union is prima facie presumed to have been
obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not
participate in the acquisition of the property shall be
considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said
party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance
of the family household." Unlike the conjugal
partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate
property are not included in the co-ownership.
When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal
impediment to marry or when they do not live
exclusively with each other (as husband and wife), only
the property acquired by both of them through their
actual joint contribution of money, property or industry
shall be owned in common and in proportion to their
respective contributions. Such contributions and
corresponding shares, however, are prima facie
presumed to be equal. The share of any party who is
married to another shall accrue to the absolute
community or conjugal partnership, as the case may be,
if so existing under a valid marriage. If the party who has
acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or
her share shall be forfeited in the manner already
heretofore expressed.
In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on
the settlement of the parties' common property, the trial
court acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court
which has jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity
must be deemed likewise clothed in authority to resolve
incidental and consequential matters. Nor did it commit
a reversible error in ruling that petitioner and private
respondent own the "family home" and all their common
property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that,
in the liquidation and partition of the property owned in
common by them, the provisions on co-ownership under
the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to
Articles 102 and 129, 12 of the Family Code, should
aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the liquidation
of either the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized
for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until
the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation
of the co-ownership that exists between common-law
spouses.
The first paragraph of Articles 50 of the Family Code,
applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and 95) of Article 43,
13 relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable
marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages under
Article 40 14 of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity
of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a
prior void marriage before the latter is judicially declared
void.
Joaquino vs. Reyes
GR No. 154645, July 13, 2004
Facts:
In 1947, Lourdes and Rodolfo Reyes contracted
marriage and produced four children. Out of their
marriage, Rodolfo had an illicit relationship with
Milagros (petitioner) and produce three children.
Rodolfo bought a house and lot and it was named after
Milagros Joaquino.
On the death of Rodolfo in 1981, Lourdes filed for re-
conveyance and damages which the court granted.
In 1982, Milagros filed a petition, stating that the said
property was purchased by her. And for the
convenience, it was only facilitated by Rodolfo.
Issue:Whether or not Milagros is right in claiming the
said property?
Ruling:
The court held no, Milagros was wrong in
claiming said property.
Lourdes and Rodolfo’s marriage was contracted in
1947, therefore CPG regime shall govern.
In this case, the property was purchased while Rodolfo
and Lourdes were legally married. Therefore, this
property is their conjugal property. Hence, Milagros
presented insufficient evidence to prove that the
property was acquired by her.
ATIENZA VS DE CASTRO
Facts:
Lupo Atienza was the President and General Manager
of two corporations. He hired Yolanda de Castro as
accountant for the said corporations. In the course of
time, their relationship became intimate. In 1983,
despite being a married man, Lupo and Yolanda lived
together in consortium. However, after their second
child was born, their relationship turned sour.
In 1992, Lupo filed a complaint against Yolanda for the
judicial partition of a parcel of land registered under the
name of Yolanda, alleging they owned it in common
under the concept of limited co-ownership. He alleged
that Yolanda acquired the same using his exclusive
funds. He did not interpose any objection to
the registration because at the time, their affair was still
thriving. Yolanda contended that she alone was the
owner of the property as she acquired it thru her own
savings as a businesswoman.
The trial court ruled in favor of Lupo by declaring the
contested property as owned in common by him and
Yolanda. The CA reversed the decision as Lupo failed
to prove material contribution in the acquisition of the
same.
Lupo appealed contending that he was not burdened to
prove that he contributed in the acquisition of the
property because with or without contribution he was
deemed a co-owner, adding that under Article 484,
NCC, for as long as they acquired the property during
their extramarital union, such property would be legally
owned by them in common and governed by the rule on
co-ownership.
Issue:
Who owns the subject property? Does Lupo need to
prove that he contributed in the acquisition of the
property?
Held:
It is not disputed that the parties herein were not
capacitated to marry each other because petitioner
Lupo Atienza was validly married to another woman at
the time of his cohabitation with the respondent. Their
property regime, therefore, is governed by Article 148 of
the Family Code, which applies to bigamous marriages,
adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of
concubinage, relationships where both man and woman
are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of
the same married man. Under this regime, only the
properties acquired by both of the parties through
their actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective
contributions ... Proof of actual contribution is required.
As it is, the regime of limited co-ownership of property
governing the union of parties who are not legally
capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless
live together as husband and wife, applies to
properties acquired during said cohabitation in
proportion to their respective contributions. Co-
ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven
actual contribution of money, property or industry.
Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions
and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be
equal.
Here, although the adulterous cohabitation of the
parties commenced in 1983, or way before the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1998, Article
148 thereof applies because this provision was
intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of
the Civil Code. Before Article 148 of the Family Code
was enacted, there was no provision governing property
relations of couples living in a state of adultery or
concubinage. Hence, even if the cohabitation or the
acquisition of the property occurred before the Family
Code took effect, Article 148 governs.
It is the petitioners posture that the respondent, having
no financial capacity to acquire the property in question,
merely manipulated the dollar bank accounts of his two
(2) corporations to raise the amount needed therefor.
In making proof of his case, it is paramount that the best
and most complete evidence be formally entered.
Rather than presenting proof of his actual contribution
to the purchase money used as consideration for the
disputed property, Lupo diverted the burden imposed
upon him to Yolanda by painting her as a shrewd and
scheming woman without the capacity to purchase any
property. Instead of proving his ownership, or the extent
thereof, over the subject property, Lupo relegated his
complaint to a mere attack on the financial capacity of
Yolanda. He presented documents pertaining to the ins
and outs of the dollar accounts of ENRICO and
EURASIAN, which unfortunately failed to prove his
actual contribution in the purchase of the said property.
The fact that Yolanda had a limited access to the funds
of the said corporations and had repeatedly withdrawn
money from their bank accounts for their behalf do not
prove that the money she used in buying the disputed
property, or any property for that matter, came from said
withdrawals.
As we see it, petitioner's claim of co-ownership in the
disputed property is without basis because not only did
he fail to substantiate his alleged contribution in the
purchase thereof but likewise the very trail of
documents pertaining to its purchase as evidentiary
proof redounds to the benefit of the respondent. In
contrast, aside from his mere say so and voluminous
records of bank accounts, which sadly find no relevance
in this case, the petitioner failed to overcome his burden
of proof. Allegations must be proven by sufficient
evidence. Simply stated, he who alleges a fact has the
burden of proving it; mere allegation is not evidence.
True, the mere issuance of a certificate of title in the
name of any person does not foreclose the possibility
that the real property covered thereby may be under co-
ownership with persons not named in the certificate or
that the registrant may only be a trustee or that other
parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the
issuance of the certificate of title. However, as already
stated, petitioner's evidence in support of his claim is
either insufficient or immaterial to warrant the trial courts
finding that the disputed property falls under the purview
of Article 148 of the Family Code. In contrast to
petitioners dismal failure to prove his cause, herein
respondent was able to present preponderant evidence
of her sole ownership. There can clearly be no co-
ownership when, as here, the respondent sufficiently
established that she derived the funds used to purchase
the property from her earnings, not only as an
accountant but also as a businesswoman engaged in
foreign currency trading, money lending and jewelry
retail. She presented her clientele and the promissory
notes evincing substantial dealings with her clients. She
also presented her bank account statements and bank
transactions, which reflect that she had the financial
capacity to pay the purchase price of the subject
property.
FRANCISCO VS. MASTER IRON WORKS
CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION
GR. No. 151967, February 16, 2005
FACTS:
Josefina Castillo was 24 years old when she and
Eduardo Francisco got married on January 1983. The
latter was then employed as Vice President in a Private
Corporation. Josefina acquired two parcels of land
where Imus Bank executed a deed of absolute sale in
favor of Josefina, married to Eduardo. An affidavit of
waiver was executed by Eduardo where he declared
that prior to his marriage with Josefina, the latter
purchased the land with her own savings and that he
waived whatever claims he had over the property.
When Josefina mortgaged the property for a loan,
Eduardo affixed his marital conformity to the deed. In
1990, Eduardo who was then a General Manager,
bought bags of cement from defendant but failed to pay
the same. The latter filed a complaint for recovery and
trial court rendered judgment against Eduardo. The
court then issued a writ of execution and the sheriif
issued a notice of levy on execution over the alleged
property of Josefina for the recovery of the balance of
the amount due under the decision of the trial court.
Petitioner filed a third party claim over the 2 parcels of
land in which she claimed as her paraphernal property.
ISSUE:
WON the subject property is the conjugal property of
Josefina and Eduardo.
HELD:
The Court ruled that petitioner failed to prove that she
acquired the property with her personal funds before her
cohabitation with Eduardo and that she was the sole
owner. The Deed of Absolute Sale on record showed it
was issued after her marriage. Their case fall under
Article 148 and since they got married before the Family
Code, the provision, pursuant to Art 256, can be applied
retroactively if it does not prejudice vested rights.
Petitioner likewise failed that she had any vested right.
Where the parties are in a void marriage due to a legal
impediment that invalidates such marriage, Art 148
should be applied. In the absence of proof that the
wife/husband has actually contributed money, property,
or industry to the properties acquired during such union
the presumption of co-ownership will not arise.
The petition was denied for lack of merit. The decision
of CA that the property was conjugal was affirmed.
DINO VS DINO
FACTS:
Alain M. Diño (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L.
Diño(respondent) got married on 14 January 1998
before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Piñas City. On 30
May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage against respondent, citing
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code.Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag) submitted a
psychological report establishing that respondent was
suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which
was incurable and deeply ingrained in her system since
her early formative years.
The trial court granted the petition on the ground that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations at the time
of the celebration of the marriage and declared their
marriage void ab initio. It ordered that a decree of
absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued upon
compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code.
Trial court, upon motion for partial reconsideration of
petitioner, modified its decision holding that a decree of
absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued after
liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:Whether the trial court erred when it ordered that
adecree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be
issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the
parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
HELD:
Yes. The trial court’s decision is affirmed with
modification. Decree of absolute nullity of the marriage
shall be issued upon finality of the trial court’s decision
without waiting for the liquidation, partition, and
distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of
the Family Code.
RATIO:
The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC that in a void
marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations
of the parties during the period of cohabitation is
governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the
Family Code. Article 147 of the Family Code applies to
union of parties who are legally capacitated and not
barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but
whose marriage is nonetheless void, such as petitioner
and respondent in the case before the Court.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following
elements must be present:
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry
each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband
and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their
marriage is void.
All these elements are present in this case and there is
no question that Article 147 of the Family
Code applies to the property relations between
petitioner and respondent.
The trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute
nullity of marriage shall be issued only after liquidation,
partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under
Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling has
no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not
apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of
the Family Code. Section 19(1) of the Rule provides:
Sec. 19. Decision. – (1) If the court renders a decision
granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the
decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall
be issued by the court only after compliance
with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as
implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition
and Distribution of Properties.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section
19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages which are
declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment
under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short,
Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to
marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article
36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void
without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the
parties.
In both instances under Articles 40 and 45, the
marriages are governed either by absolute community
of property or conjugal partnership of gains unless the
parties agree to a complete separation of property in a
marriage settlement entered into before the marriage.
Since the property relations of the parties is governed
by absolute community of property or conjugal
partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate,
partition and distribute the properties before a decree of
annulment could be issued. That is not the case for
annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code because the marriage is governed by the ordinary
rules on co-ownership.
In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was
declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code and
not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the
liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner
and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In
Valdes, the Court ruled that the property relations of
parties in a void marriage during the period
of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or
Article 148 of the Family Code. The rules on co-
ownership apply and the properties of the spouses
should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code
provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of
the Civil Code, “[p]artition may be made by agreement
between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x.” It
is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the
spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of
nullity of marriage.
AGAPAY vs. PALANG
276 SCRA 341
FACTS:
Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage Carlina (or
Cornelia) Vallesterol. A few months after the wedding,
he left to work in Hawaii. They had 1 child Herminia
Palang. Miguel returned twice but he stayed with his
brother, not his wife and child. It was found that as early
as 1957, Miguel had attempted to divorce Carlina in
Hawaii.
In 1973, 63 year-old Miguel contracted second marriage
with 19 year-old Erlinda Agapay. Miguel and Erlinda
jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land, with the
TCT issued in their names and a house and lot with the
TCT issued in Erlinda’s name. Miguel and Erlinda’s
cohabitation produced a son Kristopher.
Miguel and Cornelia Palang executed a Deed of
Donation as a form of compromise agreement to settle
a case filed by the latter. They agreed to donate their
conjugal property consisting of six parcels of land to
their only child, Herminia Palang.
In 1979, Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of
Concubinage upon Carlina’s complaint. Two years later,
Miguel died. Carlina and her daughter instituted an
action for recovery the rice land and the house and lot
both purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with
Erlinda.
ISSUE:
Does Carlina have the right to recover the properties
acquired during Miguel and Erlinda’s cohabitation?
HELD:
While Miguel and Erlinda contracted marriage, said
union was void because the marriage with Carlina was
subsisting and unaffected by the de facto separation.
Article 148 of the Family Code provides that for cases
of cohabitation when parties are not capacitated to
marry each other, the properties acquired by both of the
parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property or industry shall be owned by them in common
in proportion to their respective contributions.
Erlinda failed to prove that she actually contributed
money to buy the rice land. Consequently, the rice land
should revert to the conjugal partnership property of the
deceased Miguel and private respondent Carlina
Palang.
 As to the house and lot, testimonies reveal that
Miguel Palang provided the money for the
purchase and directed that Erlinda’s name be
placed as the vendee. This too should revert to
the conjugal partnership.
 As to Kristopher Palang’s status and claim as
an illegitimate son and heir to Miguel’s estate
should be ventilated in the proper probate court
or in a special proceeding instituted for the
purpose.
JACINTO SAGUID vs. CA, RTC, BRANCH 94, BOAC,
MARINDUQUE and GINA S. REY
October 25, 2012 § Leave a comment
FACTS:
Seventeen-year old Gina S. Rey was married, but
separated de facto from her husband, when she met
and cohabited with petitioner Jacinto Saguid In 1996,
the couple decided to separate and end up their 9-year
cohabitation. private respondent filed a complaint for
Partition and Recovery of Personal Property with
Receivership against the petitioner. She prayed that she
be declared the sole owner of these personal properties
and that the amount of P70,000.00, representing her
contribution to the construction of their house, be
reimbursed to her.
ISSUE: WON there are actual contributions from the
parties
HELD:
it is not disputed that Gina and Jacinto were not
capacitated to marry each other because the former
was validly married to another man at the time of her
cohabitation with the latter. Their property regime
therefore is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code,
which applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous
relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage,
relationships where both man and woman are married
to other persons, and multiple alliances of the same
married man. Under this regime, “…only the properties
acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be
owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions …” Proof of actual contribution
is required.
Even if cohabitation commenced before family code,
article 148 applies because this provision was intended
precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil
Code.
The fact that the controverted property was titled in the
name of the parties to an adulterous relationship is not
sufficient proof of co-ownership absent evidence of
actual contribution in the acquisition of the property.
In the case at bar, the controversy centers on the house
and personal properties of the parties. Private
respondent alleged in her complaint that she
contributed P70,000.00 for the completion of their
house. However, nowhere in her testimony did she
specify the extent of her contribution. What appears in
the record are receipts in her name for the purchase of
construction materials.
HELD:
In the instant case, the transfer of land from Agro-Macro
Development Corporation to Jambrich, who is an
Austrian, would have been declared invalid if
challenged, had not Jambrich conveyed the properties
to the petitioner who is a Filipino citizen. While the
acquisition and the purchase by Wilhelm Jambrich of
the properties under litigation were void ab initio since
they were contrary to the Constitution of the Philippines,
the acquisition of these properties by plaintiff who is a
Filipino citizen from him, has cured the flaw in the
original transaction and the title of the transferee is valid.
As the property in dispute is already in the hands of a
qualified person, a Filipino citizen, there would be no
more public policy to be protected. The objective of the
constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino
hands has been achieved.

While there is no question that both parties contributed

in their joint account deposit, there is, however, no
sufficient proof of the exact amount of their respective
shares therein. Pursuant to Article 148 of the Family
Code, in the absence of proof of extent of the parties’
respective contribution, their share shall be presumed
to be equal.

CAMILO BORROMEO V. ANTONIETTA DESCALLAR

FACTS:
Petitioner appealed the reversal by the CA of the trial
court’s ruling in his favor which declared the titles of
respondent as null and void.
Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, and respondent fell in
love and decided to live together. Eventually, however,
they went their separate ways as respondent found a
new boyfriend while Jambrich began to live with another
woman. Jambrich met petitioner who was engaged in
the real estate business and built and repaired
speedboats as a hobby. Jambrich purchased an engine
and some accessories for his boat from petitioner, for
which he became indebted to the latter. To pay for his
debt, he sold his rights and interests in the Agro-Macro
properties to petitioner as evidenced by a “Deed of
Absolute Sale/Assignment.” When petitioner sought to
register the deed of assignment, he discovered that
titles to the three lots have been transferred in the name
of the respondent and that the subject property has
already been mortgaged.
Petitioner imputes error on the judgment of the CA for
holding that Jambrich has no title to the titles in question
and may not, therefore, transfer and assign any rights
or interests in favor of the petitioner.
ISSUE:
Having found that the true buyer of the disputed house
and lots was the Austrian Wilhelm Jambrich, what now
is the effect of registration of the properties in the name
of respondent?