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Sovereignty
Author(s): Stephen D. Krasner
Source: Foreign Policy, No. 122 (Jan. - Feb., 2001), pp. 20-22+24+26+28-29
Published by: Slate Group, LLC
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/3183223
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Foreign Policy
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THINK
AGAIN
By Stephen D. Krasner
SOVEREIGNTY
The idea of states as autonomous, independent entities
the combined onslaught of monetary unions, CNN, the I
20 FOREIGN POLICY
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Sovereignty Means Final Authority
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Think Again
in the Holy Roman Empire. The Duke of Saxony, the cities with mixed populations would share offices.
Margrave of Brandenburg, the Count of Palatine, Religious issues had to be settled by a majority of
and the Duke of Bavaria were affirmed as electors both Catholics and Protestants in the diet and courts
who (along with the archbishops of Mainz, Trier,
of the empire. None of the major political leaders in
and Cologne) chose the emperor. They did notEurope endorsed religious toleration in principle,
become or claim to be kings in their own right. but they recognized that religious conflicts were so
Perhaps most important, Westphalia established volatile that it was essential to contain rather than
rules for religious tolerance in Germany. The treaties repress sectarian differences. All in all, Westphalia is
gave lip service to the principle (cuius regio, eius a pretty medieval document, and its biggest explicit
religio) that the prince could set the religion of his ter-innovation-provisions that undermined the power
ritory-and then went on to violate this very princi-of princes to control religious affairs within their
ple through many specific provisions. The signatories territories-was antithetical to the ideas of national
agreed that the religious rules already in effect would sovereignty that later became associated with the
stay in place. Catholics and Protestants in Germanso-called Westphalian system.
22 FOREIGN POLICY
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Think Again
24 FOREIGN POLICY
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Think Again
notion that an individual should be a citizen of one monetary affairs, and claims to loyalty has declined,
and only one country, and that the state has exclusive overall government activity, as reflected in taxation
claims to that person's loyalty. For many states, there and government expenditures, has increased as a per-
is no longer a sharp distinction between citizens andcentage of national income since the 1950s among
noncitizens. Permanent residents, guest workers, the most economically advanced states. The extent
refugees, and undocumented immigrants are entitledof a country's social welfare programs tends to go
to some bundle of rights even if they cannot vote. The hand in hand with its level of integration within
ease of travel and the desire of many countries to the global economy. Crises of authority and control
attract either capital or skilled workers have increased have been most pronounced in the states that have
incentives to make citizenship a more flexible category.been the most isolated, with sub-Saharan Africa
Although government involvement in religion, offering the largest number of unhappy examples.
To some extent. Transnational nongovern- been limited when compared to governments, inter-
mental organizations (NGOs) have been around national
for organizations, and multinational corpora-
quite awhile, especially if you include corporations. In The United Fruit Company had more influence
tions.
the 18th century, the East India Company possessed
in Central America in the early part of the 20th cen-
tury than any NGO could hope to have anywhere in
political power (and even an expeditionary military
force) that rivaled many national governments. the contemporary world. The International Monetary
Fund and other multilateral financial institutions
Throughout the 19th century, there were transnational
now routinely
movements to abolish slavery, promote the rights of negotiate conditionality agreements
women, and improve conditions for workers.that involve not only specific economic targets but
also domestic
The number of transnational NGOs, however, has institutional changes, such as pledges
grown tremendously, from around 200 in 1909 to crack
to down on corruption and break up cartels.
over 17,000 today. The availability of inexpensive Smaller,
and weaker states are the most frequent tar-
very fast communications technology has made gets ofitexternal efforts to alter domestic institutions,
easier for such groups to organize and make an but more powerful states are not immune. The open-
impact
ness of the U.S. political system means that not only
on public policy and international law-the interna-
tional agreement banning land mines being aNGOs, recent but also foreign governments, can play some
case in point. Such groups prompt questionsrole in political decisions. (The Mexican government,
about
sovereignty because they appear to threaten for instance,
the lobbied heavily for the passage of the
North
integrity of domestic decision making. Activists whoAmerican Free Trade Agreement.) In fact, the
permeability
lose on their home territory can pressure foreign gov- of the American polity makes the Unit-
ernments, which may in turn influence decision edmak-
States a less threatening partner; nations are more
ers in the activists' own nation. willing to sign on to U.S.-sponsored international
arrangements because they have some confidence
But for all of the talk of growing NGO influence,
thathas
their power to affect a country's domestic affairs they can play a role in U.S. decision making.
26 FOREIGN POLICY
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Think Again
rules has made it harder to solve some problems. either side would even know what a tributary state
There is, for instance, no conventional sovereignty and even if the leaders of Tibet worked out some kin
solution for Jerusalem, but it doesn't require much of settlement that would give their country more sel
imagination to think of alternatives: Divide the city government, there would be no guarantee that th
into small pieces; divide the Temple Mount vertically could gain the support of their own constituents.
with the Palestinians controlling the top and the If, however, leaders can reach mutual agreemen
Israelis the bottom; establish some kind of interna- bring along their constituents, or are willing to
tional authority; divide control over different issues coercion, sovereignty rules can be violated in inventiv
(religious practices versus taxation, for instance) ways. The Chinese, for instance, made Hong Kong
among different authorities. Any one of these solu- special administrative region after the transfer fr
tions would be better for most Israelis and British rule, allowed a foreign judge to sit on
Palestinians than an ongoing stalemate, but Court of Final Appeal, and secured acceptance
political
leaders on both sides have had trouble delivering a
other states not only for Hong Kong's participation
settlement because they are subject to aattacks number byof international organizations but also
counterelites who can wave the sovereignty separate
flag. visa agreements and recognition of a d
Conventional rules have also been problematic for Kong passport. All of these measures v
tinct Hong
Tibet. Both the Chinese and the Tibetans mightlatebeconventional
bet- sovereignty rules since Hong Ko
does not
ter off if Tibet could regain some of the autonomy have juridical independence. Only by inve
it had
as a tributary state within the traditional ing Chinese
a unique status for Hong Kong, which involved th
empire. Tibet had extensive local control, butacquiescence of other states, could China claim so
symbol-
ereignty
ically (and sometimes through tribute payments) while simultaneously preserving the con
rec-
ognized the supremacy of the emperor. Today, dence of on
few the business community.
28 FOREIGN POLICY
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alliance that could effectively oppose the Soviet Union imagine that other regional powers such as China,
than it was in any potential European challenge to Japan, or Brazil, much less the United States, would
U.S. leadership. Germany, one of the largest states in have any interest in tying their own hands in similar
the European Union, has been the most consistent ways. (Regional trading agreements such as Merco-
supporter of an institutional structure that would sur and NAFTA have very limited supranational pro-
limit Berlin's own freedom of action, a reflection of visions and show few signs of evolving into broader
the lessons of two devastating wars and the attrac- monetary or political unions.) The EU is a new and
tiveness of a European identity for a country still unique institutional structure, but it will coexist with,
grappling with the sins of the Nazi era. It is hard to not displace, the sovereign-state model. IU
For some examples of the conventional view that sovereignty is a mechanistic process that cons
state behavior, see Hedley Bull's classic The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Po
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1977) and Robert Jackson's Quasi-states: Sovereignty,
national Relations and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). The m
forceful recent presentations of the constructivist perspective, which emphasizes the importan
ideas, are Alexander Wendt's Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge Un
versity Press, 1999) and John Ruggie's Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International I
tutionalization (London: Routledge, 1998).
More skeptical views about the impact of sovereignty on state behavior can be found in Step
D. Krasner's Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999) a
Michael Fowler and Julie Marie Bunck's Law, Power, and the Sovereign State: The Evoluti
Application of the Concept of Sovereignty (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press,
Hendrik Spruyt's The Sovereign State and Its Competitors (Princeton: Princeton Unive
Press, 1994) and Charles Tilly's Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 99ggo-z992 (Cambri
Blackwell Publishers, 1992) emphasize economic and military considerations in their excellent
torical analyses of the evolution of the sovereign-state system. Quentin Skinner's The Founda
of Modern Political Thought, Volume 2, The Age of Reformation (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ
sity Press, 1978) is a superlative treatment of the relationship between the ideas of the Reform
and the development of the modem state.
Paul Gordon Lauren offers historical insight into international efforts to safeguard human rights in
Evolu*in oflnteemational Human Rights: Visions Seen (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1
For a treatment of the almost forgotten Versailles minority-rights regimes established after World War
Inis L. Claude Jr.'s National Minorities: An International Problem (New York: Greenwood Press,
Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink investigate the growing significance of transnational
governmental organizations in Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International P
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), and Jeremy Rabkin discusses the anxiety they provoke i
Sovereignty Matters (Washington: AEI Press, 1998). Anyone interested in globalization and its n
al political underpinnings must read Kevin H. O'Rourke and Jeffrey G. Williamson's Globalizatio
History: The Evolution of a Nineteenth-Century Atlantic Economy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 19
?For links to relevant Web sites, as well as a comprehensive index of related FOREIGN P
articles, access www.foreignpolicy.com.
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