G.R. No.
L-23079 February 27, 1970 respondent Benita Cruz, shows a perceptible inclination on her part
RUBEN AUSTRIA, CONSUELO AUSTRIA-BENTA and LAURO
AUSTRIA MOZO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANDRES REYES, Judge, Court of First Instance of
Rizal, PERFECTO CRUZ, BENITA CRUZ-MENEZ ISAGANI
CRUZ, ALBERTO CRUZ and LUZ CRUZ-SALONGA
respondents.
FACTS:
Basilia Austria vda. de Cruz filed a petition for probate, ante mortem,
of her last will and testament. The probate was opposed by the
present petitioners Ruben Austria, Consuelo Austria-Benta and Lauro
Austria Mozo, and still others who, like the petitioner, are nephews
and nieces of Basilia. This opposition was, however, dismissed and
the probate of the will allowed after due hearing.
The bulk of the estate of Basilia, admittedly, was destined under the
will to pass on to the respondents Perfecto Cruz, Benita Cruz-Meñez,
Isagani Cruz, Alberto Cruz, and Luz Cruz-Salonga, all of whom had
been assumed and declared by Basilia as her own legally adopted
children.
Subsequently, the present petitioners filed in the same proceedings a
petition in intervention for partition alleging in substance that they are
the nearest of kin of Basilia, and that the five respondents Perfecto
Cruz, et al., had not in fact been adopted by the decedent in
accordance with law, in effect rendering these respondents mere
strangers to the decedent and without any right to succeed as heirs.
ISSUE:
WON the institution of heirs may be annulled.
RULING:
NO.
Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under Article 850 of
the Civil Code, the following requisites must concur: First, the cause
for the institution of heirs must be stated in the will; second, the
cause must be shown to be false; and third, it must appear from the
face of the will that the testator would not have made such institution
if he had known the falsity of the cause.
Where the decedent’s will does not state in a specific or unequivocal
manner the cause for such institution of heirs, the will cannot be
annulled under Article 850 of the Civil Code. Such institution may be
annulled only when it is clear, after an examination of the will that the
testator clearly would not have made the institution if he had known
the cause for it to be false.
They offer no absolute indication that the decedent would have willed
her estate other than the way she did if she had known that she was
not bound by law to make allowance for legitimes. Her disposition of
the free portion of her estate which largely favored the respondent
Perfecto Cruz, the latter's children, and the children of the
to give to the respondents more than what she thought the law
enjoined her to give to them. Compare this with the relatively small
devise of land which the decedent had left for her blood relatives.
Were we to exclude the respondents Perfecto Cruz and the others
from the inheritance, then the petitioners and the other nephews and
nieces would succeed to the bulk of the testate by intestacy — a
result which would subvert the clear wishes of the decedent.
Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side, especially
where the will evinces an intention on the part of the testator to
dispose of practically his whole estate, as was done in this case.
Moreover, so compelling is the principle that intestacy should be
avoided and the wishes of the testator allowed to prevail, that we
could even vary the language of the will for the purpose of giving it
effect.
G.R. No. L-22595 November 1, 1927
Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO,
administrator, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
ANDRE BRIMO
FACTS:
The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in
question in this case.
The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition.
Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. The
court, however, approved it.
The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in
question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will
which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality,
for which reason they are void as being in violation or article 10 of the
Civil Code.
In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the
exclusion of the herein appellant as a legatee, inasmuch as he is one
of the persons designated as such in will, it must be taken into
consideration that such exclusion is based on the last part of the
second clause of the will, which says:
Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a
Turkish citizen, this citizenship having been conferred upon
me by conquest and not by free choice, nor by nationality
and, on the other hand, having resided for a considerable
length of time in the Philippine Islands where I succeeded
in acquiring all of the property that I now possess, it is my
wish that the distribution of my property and everything in
connection with this, my will, be made and disposed of in
accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine islands,
requesting all of my relatives to respect this wish,
otherwise, I annul and cancel beforehand whatever
disposition found in this will favorable to the person or
persons who fail to comply with this request.
The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition ISSUE:
is that the instituted legatees must respect the testator's will to
distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of his WON the testatrix intend to impose a condition upon the absolute gift
nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the Philippines. which is contained in the will.

ISSUE: RULING:

WON the condition impose is valid. NO.

RULING:
NO. The said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article 792 of
the civil Code provides the following:
Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good
morals shall be considered as not imposed and shall not
prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever,
even should the testator otherwise provide.
And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the
testator's national law when, according to article 10 of the civil Code
above quoted, such national law of the testator is the one to govern
his testamentary dispositions.
Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is
considered unwritten, and the institution of legatees in said will is
unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the
herein oppositor. It results from all this that the second clause of the
will regarding the law which shall govern it, and to the condition
imposed upon the legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law.
Article 790 of the Civil Code provides that testamentary provisions
may be made conditional and article 793 provides that a prohibition
against another marriage may in certain cases be validly imposed
upon the widow or widower. However, the Court construe the will
with reference to all the clauses contained therein, and with reference
to such surrounding circumstances as duly appear in the case, and
after such consideration the Court can not say that it was the
intention of the testatrix that if her husband married again he should
forfeit the legacy above mentioned. In other words, there being no
express condition attached to that legacy in reference to the second
marriage, it can not say that any condition can be implied from the
context of the will. In the case of Chiong Joc-Soy vs. Jaime Vano (8
Phil. Rep., 119), the Court held that the legacy contained in the will
therein mentioned was not conditional. It is true that case arose
under article 797 of the Civil Code, which perhaps is not strictly
applicable to this case, but we think that it may be argued from what
is said in article 797 that, in order to make a testamentary provision
conditional, such condition must fairly appear from the language used
in the will.

G.R. No. L-3891 December 19, 1907

ELENA MORENTE, Petitioner-Appellant, vs. GUMERSINDO DE
LA SANTA, Respondent-Appellee.

FACTS:

The will of Consuelo Morente contains the following clauses:

1. I hereby order that all real estate which may belong to me shall
pass to my husband, Gumersindo de la Santa.
2. That my said husband shall not leave my brothers after my death,
and that he shall not marry anyone; should my said husband have
children by anyone, he shall not convey any portion of the property
left by me, except the one-third part thereof and the two remaining
thirds shall be and remain for my brother Vicente or his children
should he have any.
3. After my death I direct my husband to dwell in the camarin in which
the bakery is located, which is one of the properties belonging to me.
Her husband, Gumersindo de la Santa, married again within four
months of the death of the testatrix. Elena Morente, a sister of the
deceased, filed a petition in the proceeding relating to the probate of
the will of Consuelo Morente in which she alleged the second
marriage of Gumersindo de la Santa and asked that the legacy to
him above-mentioned be annulled. Objection was made in the court
below by the husband to the procedure followed by the petitioner.
The court, however, held that the proceeding was proper. From this
judgment the petitioner appealed.