Socialism, Revolution, and Transition: The Ideological Construction of the Romanian Post-

Communist Order

Kevin David Adamson

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Government

University of Essex

October 2004
ABSTRACT

This thesis analyses the construction of political frontiers in communist and post-communist
Romania. Focusing on the ordering of political symbols in political discourses, the thesis shows
how symbols have been used in both maintaining and challenging the political regimes of Romania
in the period 1944-1992. The study identifies key signifiers, including 'the people' and 'the nation',
and looks at how and why the meanings attached to them changed over time. The analysis shows
the contrast between the discourses of the Dej era (1944-1965) that attached a workerist meaning to
'the people', and the Ceausescu era (1965-1989) when a strikingly national meaning was attached to
the notion of 'the people'. These changes are situated within a wider historical perspective. The
thesis also examines the dislocation of the collapse of the Ceausescu regime that had tried to
maintain its grip on the basis of a populist discourse invoking the struggle of 'the Romanian people'.
The emerging myth of 'the revolution' constructed by the National Salvation Front in 1989 through
the re-inscription of the meaning of 'the people' to mobilise popular unity behind the new regime is
analysed. The analysis shows how interpellations of 'the people' built on the re-inscription of a
series of positive and negative elements from communist-era discourse. The study then charts the
crisis of the myth of the revolution by focusing on how the constructed meanings that built a
symbolic unity of the people were affected by transitional economic reforms and the emerging
competitive multi-party system. The study concludes by considering the possibility that the myth of
'revolution' was superseded by a new more powerful myth of 'transition'.
Table of Contents

1
Note on the Text ii

List of Acronyms iii

Acknowledgements

Introduction 1

Chapter One: Historical background, theory and methods 6

Chapter Two: The Romanian communist imaginary 1944-1989: The 53

construction of ‘the people’ and their ‘enemies’

Chapter Three: Dislocation and the emergence of the myth of the 136
revolution

Chapter Four: The revolution myth in crisis: shifting political 212

frontiers of the transition myth

Conclusion 274

Bibliography 280

2
Note on the text

Unless otherwise stated all translations are my own.

In foreign language words diacritics and accents have been omitted.

Translations of the titles of foreign language titles of articles, books and other publications have
been omitted except in those cases where they are deemed useful for comprehension of the text.

3
List of Acronyms

AFPDR Asociatia Fostilor Detinuti Politici din Romania (Association of Former Political
Prisoners)

Comecon Council for Mutual Economic Assurance

CFSN Consiliul Frontului Salvarii Nationale (Council of the National Salvation Front)

CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union

CPUN Consiliul Provizoriu de Uniune Nationala (Provisional Council of National Unity)

EU European Union

FSN Frontul Salvarii Nationale - National Salvation Front

FDSN Frontul Democrat al Salvarii Nationale (Democratic National Salvation Front)

IMF International Monetary Fund

OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

PCR Partidul Comunist Roman (Romanian Communist Party)

PMR Partidul Muncitoresc Roman (Romanian Workers' Party)

PNL Partidul National Liberal (National Liberal Party)

PNL-AT Partidul National Liberal - Aripa Tinara (National Liberal Party - Youth Wing)

PNT Partidul National Taranesc (National Peasant Party - Inter war name)

PNT-cd Partidul National Taranesc - crestin si democrat (National Peasant Party - Christian
Democrat - post 1989 name)

PSD Partidul Social Democrat (Social Democrat Party - Inter war name)

PSDR Partidul Social Democrat din Romania(Social Democratic Party of Romania - Post
1989 name)

UDMR Uniunea Democrata a Maghiarilor din Romania (Democratic Alliance of Hungarians

from Romania)

Acknowledgements

There are a number of people I would like to thank for their help, generosity, and friendship

4
during the researching and writing of this thesis. I would particularly like to thank Aletta
Norval, my doctoral supervisor and principal mentor, to whom I am deeply grateful for her
friendly and constant encouragement and help, her guidance in theoretical and
methodological issues, as well as her skilful criticism of the text. I am greatly indebted also
to Sarah Birch, whose patient guidance and encouragement made such an invaluable
contribution to my work.
My research was supported by the Department of Government at the University of Essex.
This was a stimulating environment in which to conduct my research and I would like to
express my special thanks to my other mentors, Albert Weale and Elinor Scarbrough,
whose positive influence has marked me as a teacher. I thank all of my colleagues from
the Ideology and Discourse Analysis seminar. I would also like to thank other colleagues
from Essex whose presence contributed to what was a very stimulating intellectual
atmosphere: Hugh Ward, David Howarth, Yannis Stavrakakis, Jason Glynos, Mark
Devenney, Tony Clohesy, Jane Hindley, Pam Cox, Frances Millard, Marina Prentoulis,
David Traynier, Emilia Palonen, Marina Popescu and Cristian Bendela.
My fieldwork would not have been possible without the support of the Civic Education
Project. My thanks go to Liana Ghent, Dr Liliana Popescu, Lucian Sarbeanu, Tsvetelina
Popova, and Dr Dave Carter.
The bulk of this thesis was researched and written in Romania, in Bucharest, Timisoara,
and Cluj, and I am indebted to a large number of my Romanian colleagues for their advice,
assistance, and hospitality. I am grateful to a number of librarians, particularly Ileana Petric
of the Library of the Romanian Academy in Bucharest for her help in locating and making
sense of Romanian Communist Party publications in the initial stages of my research. I
would like to thank the staff of the periodicals section at the University of Timisoara library
where I spent a great deal of my fieldwork. I would also like to thank Mr. Traian Orban for
kindly granting me access to the collections of the Museum of the Revolution in Timisoara.
In Bucharest I would like to thank Professor Lavinia Betea, at the University of Bucharest
Institute for Political Research, for her hospitality and for sharing her knowledge of some of
the fascinating psychological aspects of Romanian communism. Anda Calin shared with
me her first-hand knowledge and experience of Romanian communism and the revolution
in Bucharest, and was a constant source of encouragement, support, and humour. I am
grateful to Kinga Sata and Zoltan Palffy of the Faculty of Political Science of the University
of Cluj for their friendship and for sharing with me their expertise in various aspects of
Romanian politics and political history. My sincere thanks go also to Antoine Roger from
Sciences-Po Bordeaux, Wendy Bracewell of the University of London, Dejan Jovic of the
University of Stirling, Antje Wiener of Queen’s University Belfast, Boyan Znepolski and
Boris Kostov of the University of Sofia, and to the late Bledar Islami of the University of
Tirana. Special thanks also to the Budapest circle of young radical philosophers Dan
Zeman, Adi Briciu and Lucian Zagan.
In Timisoara I was privileged to teach and research alongside many distinguished
colleagues. I owe a special debt of gratitude to two remarkable political philosophers,
Adrian Atanasescu and Lucian Vesalon, who offered unparalleled friendship, solidarity,
and intellectual stimulation. Adrian Basaraba, a highly talented political scientist, regularly
corrected my outsider’s ignorance of Romania profunda with patience and unbeatable
humour, debunking many of my naïve assumptions about political motivations both high
and low. I am grateful to Calin Goina, an expert in the anthropology of Romanian
communism and the transition, who read and commented on a great deal of the initial
draft, and through his enthusiasm helped me to maintain my own.
My particular thanks go to Professor Ilona Birzescu for opening up to me the subtle
implications of the work of Foucault. Ioan Bus, Paul Kun, and Octavian Balintfi kindly

5
welcomed me into their collegial circle. During this time I was also fortunate to enjoy
friendship and regular intellectual stimulation from Inigo Amo-Gonzalez and Carole Forja,
both dedicated visiting lecturers at the University of Timisoara, in whose company I was
never short of conversations about ‘the Left’ (in Spain and France, though, not Romania…)
, thus confirming my faith in the potential of the empty signifier.
The burden of analysing communist party documents was eased considerably by my day
to day contact with some remarkable students. I have had the pleasure to teach and to
learn from, among many others, Claudia Barna, Adina Barvinsky, Igor Danilovic, Sergiu
Florean, Raluca Iagher, Nicu Munteanu, Xandra Popescu, Horia Preda, Silvia Stepanescu,
Ina Tcaci, Realdo Tokacs, Toth Zsolt, and Nutu Valea.
Finally, I would like to express my sincere thanks and appreciation to Professor Gabriela
Coltescu of the University of Timisoara. Professor Coltescu welcomed me as a visiting
researcher and teacher to the Faculty of Politics, and since then her expertise has had a
great impact on my work. Over the years, I have been extremely fortunate to enjoy her
friendship, support, and encouragement.

Introduction

This thesis examines and analyses the construction of political frontiers in political discourse in

Romania from the end of World War II until 1992. In so doing this thesis focuses on the role and

importance of political discourse in both building and challenging political regimes. I argue that

such a study is central to an understanding of the meaning and ordering of important symbols and

how they structure politics and political conflict in contemporary Romania.

This study seeks to examine the nature of the construction of post-communist politics in

contemporary Romania. In particular, it seeks to clarify the nature of the crisis of 1989 and the

subsequent institution of a new form of social division, centred around a particular conception of

‘transition’. To do so requires an in-depth understanding of the political landscape in Romania

under communist rule. Hence I start the study by re-examining the construction of communist party

hegemony in order to identify the changing nature of communist era political frontiers. I show how

the discourses of revolt and revolution that emerged in 1989 to destroy the hegemony of the

communist regime were based on a complex reordering of powerful symbols, such as ‘the people’,

‘communism’, and ‘welfare’. Therefore, building on a study of the collapsing ideology of

6
Romanian communism, the thesis proceeds to analyse the beginnings of the symbolic construction

of the post-communist order, focusing in particular on the failed attempt to construct a new

hegemonic order built around the myth of ‘revolution’.

I focus my arguments around a number of key claims, demonstrating these arguments through the

analysis of empirical material in subsequent chapters. The main central claim is that, in contrast to

the idea of a revolution producing a radical break from the past, the ‘revolution’ effectively entailed

the restructuring of symbols that had been central to communist political discourses. It is for this

reason that I argue that the discourses of communist era had a profound influence in shaping the

events of the post-communist era. This central claim is supported by three further claims.

Firstly, I argue that the ideological strategy of the Romanian Communist Party (PCR) under the

leadership of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej was based on discourses of class warfare that drew a

political frontier between ‘the people’ and a series of ‘enemies’. This meant that during the

communist era the signifier of ‘the people’ became a central symbol deployed in political discourse.

During the Ceausescu era, the discourse modified the meaning of the symbol of ‘the people’ by

changing the nature of the political frontier that had constituted class warfare. Henceforth, ‘the

people’ were inserted into a narrative where they were depicted as agents in a struggle linking

national emancipation, industrial development and the welfare of ‘the people’.

Secondly, as Ceausescu’s regime entered into a crisis in the 1980s the signifiers of ‘the people’ and

symbols associated with their welfare were at the centre of the discourses of revolt and revolution.

They were harnessed and re-ordered in the construction of a powerful myth of revolution that

enabled the National Salvation Front (FSN) to take power.

7
Thirdly, I argue that a combination of economic crisis, opposition from new social groups and

parties, and division within the FSN itself over the question of economic reforms led to the failure

of the myth of the revolution to expand. It was at this time, between 1990 and 1992, that the myth

of the ‘transition’ emerged as the new principal space of political contestation, re-ordering the

meanings attached to the revolution in a powerful new discourse of the future.

The thesis is organised in four chapters. In Chapter One I discuss the historical background as well

as theoretical and methodological issues. Focusing on the post World War II era, I highlight

important historical events and processes, and outline the theoretical approach and methodology of

the study.

Chapter Two provides an account of the specificity of the Romanian communist imaginary, tracing

its roots to the dislocatory experience of the Soviet occupation of Romania during and after World

War II. It charts the expansion of the proletarian-internationalist discourse of Stalinism, and its

subsequent subversion by the PCR leadership leading into the 1960s. The chapter proceeds to

identify and analyse the juncture in the early 1960s when elements of national discourse began to be

articulated together with Marxism-Leninism, with the result of foregrounding the national character

of the regime, and of reinscribing the internationalist discourse to provide new national

interpretations of Marxism-Leninism. The development of this Romanian version of Marxism-

Leninism from the 1960s to the late 1980s is outlined and analysed. The economic crisis of the

1980s opens up a space for challenges to what had become of national-communist development.

How the National Salvation Front carried this political project of the revolution forward from the

crisis of the revolt against the regime is the focus of Chapter Three. The contours of the expanding

revolution myth are identified and analysed. In this chapter, I demonstrate how elements of the

8
populist-nationalist-communist rhetoric of the Ceausescu era were re-inscribed, forming the basis of

consent for a new revolutionary regime of ‘freedom’, and ‘welfare’. I analyse how the revolution

myth, for a brief period in 1990, involved the dissemination of new popular identities articulated

into a logic of equivalence that constituted one side of the single, dominant political frontier of ‘the

people’ against ‘Ceausescu’. I then go on to analyse the emergence of the conditions that put this

revolutionary political frontier to the test. In this chapter I argue that the first test that confronted the

myth of the revolution and its political representatives in the National Salvation Front was the

emergence of bitter opposition to the power of the FSN both before and after the May 1990

elections.

Chapter Four builds on this analysis by highlighting the importance of the economic crisis that

challenged the provisional FSN government before the May 1990 elections, and the elected FSN

government that followed. The FSN had obtained an overwhelming victory in these elections, and it

was initially unified in the face of the bitter opposition from other political parties and an emerging

anti-FSN ‘civil society’. However, I pinpoint and analyse the emergence of a crisis within the FSN,

and within the cabinet, over the question of economic reform. I argue that this crisis was so serious

that it led to the appearance of a political frontier within the FSN between ‘reformers’ and

‘conservatives’. This conflict resulted in the eruption of serious politically motivated violence in

1991, and ultimately a rupture that split the NSF into two mutually antagonistic political forces. I

also suggest that the crisis of the revolution myth was accompanied by the emergence of the myth

of the ‘transition’.

Drawing on primary source material that has not previously been analysed, the thesis proposes a

new approach to the study of how the Romanian post-communist political order was built. It builds

on and challenges existing accounts that have largely neglected the importance of political

9
discourse in their analyses of Romanian politics. The thesis contributes to our understanding of the

nature of the Romanian communist regime and the circumstances of its collapse. This is important

in order to bring new insights to bear upon our understanding of how political symbols articulated

in communist discourse came to be central to the construction of post-communist Romanian

politics. The thesis also offers a new approach to established fields of study such as communism,

revolution and transition by viewing them as discourses rather than as objectively definable

phenomena.

Chapter One

Historical background, theory and methods

1: Introduction

In this chapter I deal with the historical background to the period of Romanian politics between the

end of World War II and the beginning of the post-communist period. I also outline the theoretical

approach and methodology used in the analysis to follow. In the sections to follow the main issues

to be raised in the thesis are outlined and discussed from historical, theoretical and methodological

points of view. This thesis is the first substantial study of contemporary Romanian politics to draw

upon discourse theory and techniques of discourse analysis. Thus, in reviewing the existing

literature on Romania, I highlight the role and the importance accorded to ideology in the most

important studies. My aim is to suggest that research from a discourse theory perspective can

provide new insights into Romanian politics by taking seriously the role of ideology in the

constitution of new political orders and in the destruction of old ones.

In this section I briefly set out the purpose of the chapter and its organisation. Section two offers a

short historical background, highlighting important political and socio-economic developments

10
from 1944 until 1992. In section three, I describe the theoretical perspective and the methodology

that have guided the research. Section four outlines the approach taken in studying the communist

imaginary, contrasting my approach to specific questions of ideology with those of other studies. In

section five, I set out my approach to the collapsing communist imaginary, introducing the category

of dislocation, pointing to the emergence of new discourses of revolution and democracy,

highlighting this through a brief analysis of the revolt in Timisoara. The revolt in Timisoara took

place between 16 and 22 December 1989. Although this period is very brief, it was nonetheless an

important set of events in catalysing the dislocation of the communist imaginary, and ushering in a

new regime. An appreciation of the events in Timisoara provide a key thematic grounding for the

analysis in subsequent chapters of both the communist era discourses that culminated in the revolt,

and the post-communist discourses that followed after, which are the principal objects of the

analysis. I propose a new approach to studying the ‘Revolution’ of 22 December 1989, arguing that

it should be analysed from the point of view of its production as a new myth of politics. I conclude

section five by outlining my claim that the revolution myth failed to become hegemonic due to the

appearance of new discourses that expressed divisions that could not be papered over by the popular

unity of the revolution myth.

2: Historical Background

In this section I provide a brief sketch of political and socio-economic developments in post-war

Romania. I concentrate on the major political developments, including changes of leadership and

regime changes, as well as offering a brief summary of the main social changes and economic

developments that took place in the communist and post-communist periods.

11
The People’s Republic of Romania was proclaimed on 30 December 1947, on the same day as the

last remaining symbol of the pre-war order, King Michael, was forced to abdicate. 1 Until the 22

December 1989, the Romanian Communist Party2 (PCR) held power in Romania, named initially

the People’s Republic of Romania, later changed to the Socialist Republic of Romania.3 During this

period, the Romanian communist party had two principal leaders, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej until

1965, and Nicolae Ceausescu from 1965 until 1989. The establishment of a Soviet-style system

based on a Stalinist model served as the basis for the social, economic and political transformations

that took place during these years.

The main policies of the regime were: nationalisation of industries and services; forced

collectivisation of agriculture into co-operatives and state farms; and industrialisation accompanied

by accelerated urbanisation.4 The Romanian communist regime changed the face of the country in

less than half a century. Romania had a period of industrialisation in the inter-war years that was cut

short by the onset of the world economic crisis of 1929, and severe hardship was compounded by

the war that followed.5 Following World War II, state-led industrialisation and collectivisation were
1
See Keith Hitchins, Rumania, 1866-1947, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994, p. 547.
2
Originally the Partidul Comunist din Romania, (PCdR - The Communist Party of Romania).
Following fusion in February 1948 with the Partidul Social Democrat (PSD) the Party changed
its name to Partidul Muncitoresc Roman (PMR) – The Romanian Workers’ Party. In July 1965
at the 9th Party Congress Ceausescu announced the change of name to Partidul Comunist Roman
(PCR) – Romanian Communist Party. See Constantin C. Giurescu, Istoria Romaniei in Date,
Editura Enciclopedica Romana, Bucharest, 1971, p. 397. The significance of these changes is
discussed in Chapter Two. When referring to the Romanian Communist Party, I use the acronym
PCR throughout for the sake of clarity.
3
See Constantin C. Giurescu, Istoria Romaniei in Date, p. 396, p. 431. The change from People’s
Republic to Socialist Republic is discussed in Chapter Two.
4
For accounts of these developments see Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and
National Development: The Case of Romania, 1944-1965, Berkeley CA, University of California
Press, 1971, especially for details primarily concerning the Dej period up to 1965. For the
Ceausescu period from 1965 to 1989 see Trond Gilberg, Nationalism and Communism in
Romania: The Rise and Fall of Ceausescu’s Personal Dictatorship, Boulder, CO, Westview
Press, 1990. For an account covering most of the period, see William Crowther, The Political
Economy of Romanian Socialism, New York, Praeger, 1988.
5
See Henry L. Roberts, Rumania: Political Problems of an Agrarian State, Hamden, CT, Archon
Books, 1969; and Keith Hitchins, Rumania, 1866-1947, for discussions of politics and

12
policies that directly changed the lives of most citizens of Romania. By the end of the 1980s less

than a third of the population were living in rural areas and engaged in agriculture, more than two

thirds lived in towns, working in non-agricultural industrial and service sectors.6

Available data show both the intensity and the speed of the economic and social transformation. In

1950 74 per cent of those employed were involved in agriculture, while just over 25 per cent were

involved in industry and services. By 1960 the percentage for agriculture had declined to 65 per

cent while that for industry and services had increased to around 35 per cent. By 1970 (only five

years following the appointment of Ceausescu as General Secretary), the figure for industry and

services had shot up to 50 per cent. The figures for 1980 show the results of Ceausescu’s industrial

development plans of the 1970s, with 29 per cent involved in agriculture, and 71 per cent in

industries and services.7

As I discuss in detail in Chapter Two, some features of the Romanian Communist regime changed

markedly over this period. Others remained strikingly constant. For example, during the initial

phase, often referred to as the ‘Proletcultist’ period (1947 - early 1960s) there was a preoccupation

on the part of the Romanian Communist party with publicly promoting an image of Romania as a

loyal and constant member of a Soviet-led international socialist system. 8 The idea of the people as

nation was discouraged, and the ‘people’ were given new class identities in the new People’s

development preceding World War II.

6
See Serban Orescu, 'Multilaterally Developed Romania: An Overview', in Vlad Georgescu (ed.)
Romania, Washington DC, Georgetown University, Centre for Strategic and International
Studies, 1985, pp. 12-32.
7
These figures are based on official statistics from the Romanian Anuarul Statistic cited by David
Turnock, and by Andreas C. Tstantis and Roy Pepper. See David Turnock, The Romanian
Economy in the Twentieth Century, London, Croom Helm, 1986, p. 170; Andreas C. Tstantis and
Roy Pepper, Romania: The Industrialisation of an Agrarian Economy under Socialist Planning,
Washington DC, The World Bank, 1979, p. 139.
8
See Vladimir Tismaneanu, Stalinism for All Seasons: A Political History of the Romanian
Communist Party, Berkeley CA, University of California Press, 2003, p. 107.

13
Republic.9 The regime concentrated on the production of proletarian identities (and the elimination

of ‘class enemies’) and a proletarian ethic was promoted in place of a national one. This pro-Soviet

and proletarian ethic nominally guided the regime’s policy until the beginning of the 1960s.10

As Romania’s autonomy from the Soviet Union grew in the late 1950s and the early 1960s,

Marxist-Leninist inspired themes of ‘national emancipation’ and ‘the struggle of underdeveloped

nations against imperialism’ began to take centre stage in PCR documents. These documents

formed part of a discourse that re-inscribed the PCR’s role not as the leader of the proletariat, but as

at the head of a movement for national emancipation and development, at the centre of the struggle

to liberate the subjugated Romanian nation and people from imperialism.11 This shift bridged the

period when Ceausescu took over the leadership of the party following the death of Gheorghiu-Dej

in 1965. The reintroduction of the political relevance of ‘the nation’ coincided with a period of

increased economic development, accelerated urbanisation, and a generalised increase in the

standard of living that lasted until the end of the 1970s.12

The economic crisis of the 1980s, and the foreign debt repayment effort saw a catastrophic and

abrupt decline in the standard of living for the vast majority of Romanians. 13 In the urban

9
Katherine Verdery discusses the suppression of national values in Romania during the
proletcultist period and the parallel encouragement of Russian and Soviet culture, in National
Ideology Under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceausescu’s Romania, Berkeley CA,
University of California Press, 1991.
10
See Robert R. King, History of the Romanian Communist Party, Stanford CA, Hoover
Institution Press, 1980, pp. 135; William Zimmerman, ‘Soviet Relations with Yugoslavia and
Romania’, in Sarah Meiklejohn Terry (ed.), Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe, New Haven CT,
Yale University Press, 1984, pp. 125-154;
11
The key document marking this shift is the Declaration of April, or Declaratia cu privire la
pozitia Partidului Muncitoresc Romin in problemele miscarii comuniste si muncitoresti
internationale, Bucharest, Editura Politica, 1964.
12
The trajectory of Romanian economic development during this period leading to the economic
crisis is analysed in William Crowther, The Political Economy of Romanian Socialism, New
York, Praeger, 1988, pp. 109-146.
13
Vladimir Tismaneanu, Stalinism for All Seasons, p. 188.

14
environment, shortages of electricity, gas, consumer goods, and basic necessities led to the

phenomenon of an imposed lifestyle of perpetual queuing, rationing of basic foodstuffs, and a

generalised effort on the part of Romanians to run the risk of procuring goods through non-legal

means.14 Ceausescu acknowledged the economic crisis, claiming that the culprit was the inequitable

international economic system, and that the solution lay in the sustained effort of the Romanian

‘nation’ to achieve economic independence.15 The debt repayment effort became the symbol of

these efforts.

By early 1989 Ceausescu could announce that the foreign debt had been paid in its entirety, 16 but

conditions failed to improve. It was in this context that a revolt in the western city of Timisoara

grew from a small isolated protest into a fully-fledged popular rebellion against Ceausescu’s

leadership. The rebellion spread to Bucharest, and on 22 December the newly formed National

Salvation Front (Front al Salvarii Nationale, hereafter FSN), under the leadership of Ion Iliescu, a

prominent communist party member, and Petre Roman, the son of a prominent communist party

member, assumed the power of the state with the support of the army.17
14
See Katherine Verdery, ‘What was Socialism and Why did it Fall?’, in Vladimir Tismaneanu,
(ed.) The Revolutions of 1989, London, Routledge, 1999, pp. 63-88.
15
‘In this very short period of history profound changes and exceptional events have taken place
in international life which have aggravated and complicated international relations. The global
economic crisis…which in its proportions is much worse than the 1929-33 crisis….demonstrates
the old contradictions between socialism and capitalism….We must establish how to act in the
years to come in order to diminish the influence of the global economic crisis and to raise our
socialist homeland to new heights of progress and civilisation.’, in Nicolae Ceausescu, Raport cu
privire la stadiul actualal edificarii socialismului, la realizarea Planului national unic de
dezvoltare economico-sociala,la programele speciale si la masurile pentru indeplinirea cu
succes a cincinalului, a hotaririlor Congresului al XII-lea al partidului, Bucharest, Editura
Politica, 1982, pp. 8-9. Pronouncements such as these are analysed in greater detail in Chapter
Two.
16
See Nicolae Ceausescu, Rezolutia Congresului al XIV-lea al Partidului Comunist Roman,
Bucharest, Editura Politica, 1989, p. 9.
17
There is some controversy as to whether the FSN had been formed prior to the events, and
whether they may have been linked to a plan to overthrow Ceausescu. In common with other
aspects of the ‘revolution’, this aspect has remained unclear. See Peter Siani-Davies, ‘The
Revolution after the Revolution’, in David Phinnemore and Duncan Light (eds.), Post-
Communist Romania: Coming to Terms with Transition, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2001, pp 15-34.

15
The new ‘revolutionary’ government of the FSN that was proclaimed ruled in the name of the

people and the revolt. Until the elections were held in May 1990, Romania was governed by a

revolutionary council of the FSN. After the FSN became a political party in January 1990, the name

of this revolutionary council was changed in February to the Provisional Council for National

Unity.

The decision of the FSN to become a political party in time to contest the first free elections meant

that it had even more difficulty in claiming to be an instrument of popular revolutionary

government.18 This development sparked the first serious unrest of the new regime, culminating in

demonstrations and the occupation of University Square in Bucharest by ‘the opposition’ from 22

April until 13 June 1990. These events symbolised a stark political polarisation that broke the

popular unity of the revolution. This divided the political landscape between supporters and

opponents of the FSN Opponents claimed that Iliescu, Roman, and their acolytes, had used the FSN

as a front for the purpose of ‘stealing the revolution’.19

The FSN became the de jure party of government following the tension-ridden elections of May

1990 that gave them an overwhelming victory.20 Although unified initially around the twin

leadership of the charismatic and popular figure of Iliescu and the equally charismatic and

intellectual figure of Roman, the issue of economic reform soon became a source of bitter divisions

within the new party. By the end of 1990 unity had begun to break down. The myth of the
18
The national daily Adevarul from 23 December 1989 through to the elections is a good source of
pro-FSN articles. This topic is discussed in more detail in Chapter Three.
19
The daily Romania Libera became the main press organ of opposition discourse. This period is
discussed in Chapter Two.
20
For extended analysis of the elections and the election results see Petre Datculescu and Klaus
Liepelt (eds.), Renasterea unei Democratii: Alegeriile din Romania de la 20 mai 1990,
Bucharest, IRSOP, 1991.

16
‘revolution’, already tested by the emerging ‘opposition’ to the FSN, was also under severe pressure

due to divisions within the party over the effects of proposed and actual liberalising economic

reforms. Reforms continued, but increasingly the justification for economic reform was drawn from

a new narrative of ‘transition’, and not with reference to the ‘ideals of the revolution’.21

In this section, I have summarised some of the main political and socio-economic developments in

Romania that marked the period between 1947-1992 in order to provide a clearer context for the

later analysis. In the next section I outline the theoretical perspective and research methodology that

have guided the analysis.

3: Theory and Methodology

In this section I detail the key theoretical assumptions upon which this thesis is based, and describe

the methodological approach I have adopted in analysing the politics of Romania in the period

under discussion.

In drawing on discourse theory, this thesis proceeds from several key assumptions about politics

and the nature of the constitution of the political world. In general terms this thesis is concerned

with how meaning is conferred upon objects, events, institutions, and social, political, and

economic practices.22 It is also concerned with the problem of how the attachment of meaning to the

21
For interesting accounts of these divisions see, Lavinia Betea’s interviews with long-standing
communist activist and post-1989 politician Alexandru Birladeanu, in Lavinia Betea, Alexandru
Birladeanu despre Dej, Ceausescu si Iliescu: Convorbiri, Bucharest, Editura Evenimentul
Romanesc, 1998, pp. 228-250; Ion Iliescu, Revolutia si Reforma, Bucharest, Editura
Enciclopedica, 1994; Petre Roman, Marturii provocate: Convorbiri cu Elena Stefoi, Bucharest,
Editura Paideia, 2002.
22
For an concise overview of the discourse theory approach and empirical case studies drawing on
this approach see, David Howarth, Aletta J. Norval and Yannis Stavrakakis, Discourse Theory
and Political Analysis: Identities, Hegemonies and Social Change, Manchester, Manchester

17
types of things mentioned is central to the construction of political phenomena. These can be as

distinct and diverse as political conflict, social divisions, political identities and even political

orders, in the case of this thesis Romanian communism, or the making of a ‘transition’.

The underlying assumption of discourse theory is that ‘all objects and actions are meaningful, and

that their meaning is conferred by historically specific systems of rules.’23 To give an example

related to the present study, the centralised, neo-Stalinist economy of Romanian communism was in

itself simply one among many methods of organising the economic activity of a modern(ising)

state. However, its meaning is another question. It may mean to some a strategy for reducing

individual autonomy from the state by prohibiting private economic activity. To others it could be

viewed as a means through which the state can best secure the maximum appropriation and control

over economic resources for the purpose of modernisation.24 And according to Romanian

communist discourse, its meaning was clear – the centralised economy was an instrument of

economic justice, owned and managed by the workers, the communist state being the instrument of

the political and economic emancipation of the workers.

As Howarth emphasises, the political nature of these discourses is clear. They are a ‘social and

political construction that establishes a system of relations between different objects and practices,

while providing (subject) positions with which social agents can identify’.25 With this in mind I will

illustrate this point through the use of an example from my study. Competing systems of meaning

University Press, 2000.

23
See David Howarth and Yannis Stavrakakis, 'Introducing Discourse Theory and Political
Analysis', in David Howarth, Aletta J. Norval, and Yannis Stavrakakis, (eds.), Discourse Theory
and Political Analysis: Identities, Hegemonies, and Social Change, Manchester, Manchester
University Press, 2000, p. 2.
24
This is a modified version of an example given by Ernesto Laclau to demonstrate the
constructed nature of the ideological conferral of meaning upon objects or practices. See Ernesto
Laclau, ‘The Death and Resurrection of the Theory of Ideology’, in Journal of Political
Ideologies, Vol. 1, no. 3, 1996, pp. 201-220.
25
Howarth and Stavrakakis, ‘Introducing discourse theory and political analysis’, p. 3.

18
conferred upon the neo-Stalinist economy constitute subject positions such as bureaucrat, worker,

political leader, victim of communist expropriation of the means of production, communist activist,

bourgeois enemy of the people, landowner or kulak, and anti-communist activist/resistance fighter,

to name just a few of the possibilities. What these systems of meaning also build are social

divisions by constituting political frontiers between subject positions that are positioned with

reference to a system of meaning, or a discursive field. Thus a discursive field, such as Romanian

communism, or the myth of the Romanian revolution, is populated by subject positions, and the

discourses that create these subject positions are at the same time discourses that unite subject

positions together in alliance or divide them in conflict. In this sense we can see the ideological and

discursive nature of social divisions if we imagine a discursive field criss-crossed by political

frontiers dividing social agents.

According to this viewpoint, one of the main features of a political project is the ‘attempt to weave

together different strands of discourse in an effort to dominate or organise a field of meaning so as

to fix the identities of objects and practices in a particular way.’ 26 Thus new political projects, such

as Romanian communism, or the revolutionary order of the National Salvation Front, attempted

through this re-organisation of meaning to impose new identities and practices over old ones. This

activity is at the heart of the constitution of new political orders given that it is necessary for the

restructuring of relations of power.

Moreover, if discourse theory guides investigations of ‘the way in which social practices articulate

and contest the discourses that constitute social reality’ 27 then it becomes clear that these practices

are central not only to the constitution of new political orders, but also to dissolution of old ones.

Thus an analysis of the collapse of communism must take account of the nature of its construction,
26
Howarth and Stavrakakis, ‘Introducing discourse theory and political analysis’, p. 3.
27
David Howarth and Yannis Stavrakakis, 'Introducing discourse theory and political analysis', p.
3.

19
and of how contestations of that order re-ordered the relations of power through the discursive

constructions of new identities or subject positions. In this way we can avoid the temptation to see

some political orders as more ‘natural’ than others. In my study I draw on these insights to examine

how political orders in Romania have been constructed, or discursively constituted and contested, in

the senses outlined above.

The distinctiveness of this approach is that it sees discourses as central to the constitution of social

reality, and not as a detached set of ideological pronouncements that attempt to represent, mask, or

describe, an ‘objective reality’.

The discussion above has introduced some of the categories that I use in my analysis of Romanian

politics. I will now outline these categories in more detail, illustrating how they are deployed

through the use of examples.

Ideologies are meaningful systems organising political concepts. According to Michael Freeden

they are ‘distinctive configurations of political concepts’.28 According to Ernesto Laclau, ideology

consists of ‘those discursive forms through which society tries to institute itself as such on the basis

of closure, of the fixation of meaning…. The ideological would be the will to “totality” of any

totalizing discourse.’29

Discourses can be defined as ‘systems of meaningful practices that form the identities of subjects

and objects.’30 In this sense, discourse is not merely taken to mean language. For example, when

Ceausescu makes a speech and talks of the need to defend the country from outsiders, this is not just
28
See Michael Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach, Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 1996, p. 48.
29
See Ernesto Laclau, ‘The impossibility of society’, in Canadian Journal of Political and Social
Theory, vol. 7, 1983, p. 24.
30
Howarth and Stavrakakis, ‘Introducing Discourse Theory and Political Analysis’, p. 3-4.

20
language – the speech itself is a meaningful act. Taking this example further, the need to defend the

country was tied to the establishment of the ‘patriotic guards’, the mobilisation in 1968 of a type of

reserve army of Romanian citizens. Thus, discourses are constructed ‘systems of social relations

and practices’ involving the ‘exercise of power’.31 They construct social antagonisms through the

drawing of political frontiers that separate the ‘included’ from the ‘excluded’. For example the

discourse of Romanian Communism set up a new system of meanings and social practices based

around the imaginary of communism and a political frontier separating ‘the people’ from

‘bourgeois-landowning classes’. Another example is the discourse of the revolution, a myth of

politics that emerged to suture the dislocated space of the collapsing communist discourse in

Romania in December 1989. This time the discourse was organised around a political frontier that

separated 'the people' from 'the Ceausescu clan'.

A myth can be defined as a system of meaning that provides a principle of reading of a given

political situation, following the dislocation of an established political order. Laclau argues that the

‘condition for the emergence of myth…is a structural dislocation.’ 32 They create a ‘new objectivity

by means of the rearticulation of the dislocated elements’ of a structure. Howarth and Stavrakakis

point out that myths provide a ‘surface of inscription for a variety of social demands and

dislocations.’33 In this thesis, I refer to revolutionary discourse of the National Salvation Front as a

myth. It emerged during the dislocation of the communist imaginary, and was briefly successful as

a structuring principle of demands for freedom, justice, and democracy.

An imaginary is a political myth, in this case communism, which becomes hegemonic, i.e. it

succeeds in overcoming a dislocation and imposing itself as a new surface of inscription for a wide
31
Howarth and Stavrakakis, ‘Introducing discourse theory and political analysis’, p. 3-4.
32
Ernesto Laclau, cited in Howarth and Stavrakakis, ‘Introducing discourse theory and political
analysis’, p. 15.
33
Ernesto Laclau, cited in Howarth and Stavrakakis, ‘Introducing discourse theory and political
analysis’, p. 15.

21
set of social demands. Other ways of defining an imaginary could include a ‘horizon of

intelligibility’, or ‘hegemonic discursive formation’.34 The important distinction is between ‘myth’

and ‘imaginary’. Romanian communism was a myth that became hegemonic. It began as one of a

number of competing principles of reading the social, but became hegemonic, and thus an

imaginary. It structured and limited meanings of politics, and succeeded in institutionalising

completely new types of social relations, economic practices, political institutions, and individual

and group identities that were part of the strategy of the Romanian Communist Party to build a

society-transforming regime.

A signifier35 is political concept whose meaning is partially fixed by inclusion within a system of

differences. Thus in a particular discourse the signifier of ‘democracy’ can be partially filled with

meaning by being specifically attached to notions of economic equality, workers’ self-management,

or democratic centralism, thus being a different conception of democracy than liberal democracy for

example. Discourses organise meaning by constructing a series of signifiers within a system of

equivalences and differences. For example, the discourse of Romanian communism organised a

series of key signifiers, such as ‘democracy’, ‘freedom’ and ‘development’, around the empty

signifier of ‘communism’.36 Thus the meaning of these contested concepts is partially fixed by

being articulated within a system of meaning organised around the idea of communism. At the same

time, the meaning of ‘communism’ as an imaginary is lent by its articulation together with these

signifiers, whose content as articulated within a discourse becomes filled with specific connotations.

A political frontier describes and accounts for a discursively constituted social division.37 The
34
Ernesto Laclau, New Reflections on the Revolution of our Time, London, Verso, 1990, p. 64.
35
See Ernesto Laclau, ‘Why do empty signifiers matter to politics?’, in Ernesto Laclau,
Emancipation(s), London, Verso, 1996.
36
This is similar to the example used by Slavoj Zizek, in The Sublime Object of Ideology, London,
Verso, 1989, cited by Howarth and Stavrakakis, 'Introducing discourse theory and political
analysis', p. 8.
37
See Ernesto Laclau, New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time, p.160, cited by Aletta J.

22
production of political frontiers structures the political conflict within a given political system. For

example, in Romania in the early 1990s a new political frontier was built that expressed a division

over the issue of liberalising economic transformation between ‘reformers’ and ‘conservatives’

within the ruling National Salvation Front. This led by 1992 to a complete breakdown in the unity

of the party and the subsequent emergence of two mutually antagonistic political forces. Political

frontiers are connected to logics of equivalence and difference.38 Logics of equivalence gather

disparate identities, such as ‘workers’, ‘peasants’, and ‘intellectuals’, and subsume these identities

under a common political identity, such as ‘the people’. Usually this type of logic of equivalence

will be on one side of a political frontier, while a negative logic of equivalence will be on the other.

For instance, 'the people' will be opposed to ‘the oppressive regime.’ An articulation based upon the

logic of difference, on the other hand, seeks to dilute the stark antagonism characterised by

opposing logics of equivalence through the expansion and articulation of differences. This means

emphasising the difference between elements within a chain of equivalence, thus diluting and or

challenging the unity of these elements.

A dislocation39 occurs as the result of a crisis or collapse of a hegemonic discourse. As such, it

makes visible the socially constructed nature of that discourse, when the discourse is fundamentally

challenged by the emergence of new discourses that contest the validity of the meanings and

practices associated with the existing hegemonic order. Romanian communist hegemony was

Norval in her extended discussion of political frontiers: ‘Trajectories of future research in

discourse theory’, in David Howarth, Aletta J. Norval and Yannis Stavrakakis (eds.), Discourse
theory and political analysis, pp. 219-222
38
See Aletta Norval, 'Trajectories of future research in discourse theory', pp. 219-222; Ernesto
Laclau, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, London,
Verso, 1985, pp.127-134.
39
See Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, p. 126 on
dislocation. For dislocation used in the analysis of Romanian politics, see Kevin Adamson, ‘The
construction of Romanian social democracy (1989-1996)’ in David Howarth, Aletta J. Norval
and Yannis Stavrakakis (eds.) Discourse theory and political analysis, p. 121. In the same
collection see Yannis Stavrakakis, ‘On the emergence of Green ideology: the dislocation factor
in Green politics’, pp. 100-118.

23
shattered by the appearance of demonstrations in Timisoara in December 1989 involving large

numbers of individuals who identified themselves as ‘the people’ and ‘the workers’. This

challenged the communist discourse that had constructed a unity between ‘the people’, ‘the

workers’ and ‘the party’ and ‘the leader’.

Methods and data sources

The primary method used in this thesis is qualitative empirical analysis based largely on primary

source materials. Employing the concepts of discourse theory in a qualitative analysis is necessary

for this type of study where the focus of the research is on the production of meaning. Political texts

and speeches as well as relevant articles from the press make up the majority of the empirical

sources. I have identified these sources as important as they allow the study of the production of

meaning in society.

Studying the production of meaning by hegemonic forces in society is necessary in order to

understand how identities are constituted. Therefore, this does not entail simply a study of

‘language’ in its narrow sense. Thus, we must take into account the insights of Foucault in

recognising from the outset the relationships of power instituted through the production of meaning

and identities. In any society the production of discourse is controlled, selected, and organised. This

production is also characterised by procedures of interdiction, division between reason and

madness, and the construction of true-false dichotomies. It is also important to bear in mind that

such discursive procedures that institute inclusion and exclusion have an institutional support.40

Although this thesis is primarily concerned with the analysis of texts, this analysis has been carried

out in the context of my extensive fieldwork in Romania. All aspects of the empirical research in
40
Michel Foucault, L'ordre du discours, Paris, Gallimard, 1971, p. 23.

24
this thesis have relied upon fieldwork. These include basic things such as language skills that are

necessary to do analysis that involves texts, and talking to people. However, there is a much less

tangible side to fieldwork. It implies the involvement or sometimes immersion of the researcher

within the society being studied. This allows the researcher to talk to a variety of people, to gain a

more nuanced picture of a society, to understand the subtleties and specificities of certain identities,

and to have access to the meanings of symbols, histories, words and phrases beyond crude

translation. The texts that are the sources for this analysis have meanings within a specific social

and cultural context. Such meanings are not readily apparent without at least a basic knowledge of

this context. The knowledge that I have gained during my extended periods of residence in Romania

has allowed me as an analyst to situate texts within the social context in which they were produced.

For the communist period, the selection of appropriate empirical sources through which to analyse

the production of meaning is relatively unproblematic, given the existence of an ‘official ideology’

and a regularised infrastructure of ideological production and modification. I rely on the major

official publications of the regime, such as speeches of party leaders, party congresses, special

public party documents and important newspaper articles.

In studying the revolt in Timisoara the selection of sources is somewhat more problematic. The

availability of official discourse was relatively uninterrupted, but during the uprising the ‘unofficial’

discourse of ‘the people’ is difficult to capture. I have relied upon Romanian published works of the

revolts that contain eye-witness accounts. I have focused on two such accounts by Miodrag Milin, a

Timisoara historian who interviewed 60 eye-witnesses and participants. These accounts provide an

overall, if subjective, picture of events. In these accounts the main point of interest lies in tracing

the changing slogans of the demonstrators. During my fieldwork I have also talked to scores of

residents of Timisoara at length, most of whom were involved in some way in the demonstrations.

25
This has allowed me to assess the validity of the published accounts, particularly with regard to the

use of slogans, when they were used, and the nature of the repression.

Primary sources from 22 December 1989 onwards are varied, and include television transcripts,

available until 23 December, and thereafter press reports. These sources do have limitations. The

fact that television transcripts are available for only 24 hours is unfortunate. What is fortunate is

that the 24 hours for which they are available are the crucial 24 hours of the initial institution of the

official FSN discourse of the revolution. Thereafter the press is a reliable source in tracing the

differing positions as they emerged following the initial takeover by the FSN and the army. I have

chosen sources that were publicly available.

The sources that I have chosen have been selected because their analysis provides a picture of the

dominant discourses of the period under discussion. A hegemonic discourse sets out the limits of

what it is and is not possible to say or do in society, and who is permitted (or not) to say or do it.

Central to the discourses that I discuss in this thesis are procedures of exclusion and inclusion, that

involve the construction and marginalisation of certain identities and the privileging of others. I do

not claim that everyone identified with Romanian political discourses, but I do claim that they were

important because they were dominant, were inescapable, and could be enforced. What this thesis

seeks to do is to use these sources to analyse the procedures of inclusion and exclusion that were

involved in the production and subsequent collapse of communist party hegemony, and how these

gave way to new procedures in the post-communist era.41

4: Studying the Romanian Communist imaginary

41
Michel Foucault, L’ordre du discours, p. 23.

26
In this section I contrast the discourse analysis approach that I propose with more traditional ‘area

studies’ approaches to the study of Romanian communism. I then introduce the broader research

questions that have guided my choice and analysis of empirical material to be employed in

subsequent chapters of the thesis, which deal with the Romanian communist and post-communist

imaginaries.

Between 1948 and 1989, the communist system was not seriously threatened, and it remained in

place under the increasingly indirect tutelage of the Soviet Union. Although bitterly contested by

some groups, and not necessarily enjoying the support of all sectors of the public, the existence of

the regime and its authority were widely recognised up until 1989. Justified with reference to the

Leninist principle of democratic centralism, decision-making and planning power was largely the

monopoly of the ruling elite according to the hierarchical principles of the Soviet command system

and a top-down structure of party discipline.42 PCR hegemony lasted for more than four decades,

and consisted of a relatively stable and widely accepted regime of political, economic, and social

organisation, and centrally organised and directed mass participation.

This regime of accelerated development and socialist planning of a neo-Stalinist type forms part of

what is referred to in this thesis as the Romanian communist imaginary. One of the aims of the

present thesis is to provide an analysis of the construction, maintenance, and collapse of the

Romanian communist imaginary between 1944 and 1989. There are two reasons why such a study

of the Romanian communist imaginary is important. Firstly, from a theoretical point of view, there

have been no substantial attempts to analyse contemporary Romanian politics that have been

concerned with an analysis of the key political discourses structuring Romanian society. Secondly,

42
See Daniel N. Nelson, Democratic Centralism in Romania: A Study of Local Communist
Politics, Boulder, CO, East European Monographs, 1980.

27
a proper study of how the Romanian post-communist political order was constructed necessitates a

clearer understanding of the contours of the imaginary that preceded it.

There is a limited specialised literature dealing with the politics of Romania during the communist

period.43 Within this body of scholarship, there are two established ways of accounting for the

power of the Romanian communists. One approach cites the use of violence, linking this to

Marxist-Leninist ideology.44 The other cites the pragmatic use of nationalism as a means of gaining

popular support.45 Common to both of these approaches is a preoccupation with the issue of regime

legitimacy. Discussions of legitimacy in communist regimes tend to try to isolate a specific type of

legitimacy associated with Marxism-Leninism. But these studies do little to analyse the

interpellative character, one that is constantly changing, of the communist ideologies, and that is

specific to each country. According to Ghita Ionescu 'every assertion of sovereignty has to develop

a theory of legitimacy. The specific aspects of the theory of legitimacy of the communist state are:

the class struggle, the mandate of history and the ideology.'46 He continues that ‘it is precisely this

link of allegiance [of the population to the professed motives and values of the regime]…that is

43
See Robert King, The History of the Romanian Communist Party; Ghita Ionescu, Communism
in Rumania, 1944-1962, Oxford University Press, 1964; Vladimir Tismaneanu, Stalinism for All
Seasons; Stephen Fischer-Galati, Twentieth Century Romania, New York, Columbia University
Press, 1991; Dennis Deletant, Ceausescu and the Securitate: Coercion and Dissent in Romania,
1965-1989, New York, M.E. Sharpe, 1995; Mary-Ellen Fischer, Nicolae Ceausescu: A Study in
Political Leadership, Boulder CO, 1989; Vlad Georgescu, The Romanians: A History, Columbus
OH, Ohio State University Press, 1991; Henry L. Roberts, Rumania: Political Problems of an
Agrarian State, Hamden, Connecticut, Archon Books, 1969; Michael Shafir, Romania, Politics,
Economy and Society: Political Stagnation and Simulated Change Boulder, Colorado, Lynne
Rienner publishers, 1985; William Crowther, The Political Economy of Romanian Socialism;
Trond Gilberg, Nationalism and Communism in Romania; Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary
Breakthroughs and National Development; Katherine Verdery, National Ideology Under
Socialism; Antoine Roger, Fascistes, communistes, paysans: Sociologie des mobilisations
identitaires roumaines (1921-1989), Bruxelles, Editions de L’Universite Libre de Bruxelles,
2002.
44
Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development, pp. 73-74.
45
Michael Shafir, Romania, Politics, Economy and Society, pp. 55-58.
46
Ghita Ionescu, The Politics of the European Communist States, Praeger, New York, 1967, p. 24.

28
growing weaker – thus weakening also the legitimacy of the communist states.’ 47 Thus, in drawing

a comparative generalisation, the legitimacy of all Marxist-Leninist states is seen as being based on

core elements of Marxist-Leninist theory that transcend the specific political conditions of each

Marxist-Leninist state. When one takes a closer look at the official ideology of one communist state

such as Romania, it becomes clear that there is a problem with the Ionescu's use of the terminology

of legitimacy. It does not take into account the multiple languages of interpellation used by the

communist regimes, and the existence of wide ideological differences between regimes. Terms such

as allegiance are difficult to put to work in the analysis of communist regimes since there is no way

of studying or evaluating the degree to which the regime benefits from the ‘allegiance’ of the

population.

One of the problems that the category of legitimacy carries with it is that, in common with

'allegiance', it is impossible to make a judgement about the possible ‘level of legitimacy’ within

Romanian society of the Romanian communist regime. I suggest and use in this and subsequent

chapters the category of ‘consent’. It avoids the pitfalls of the terminology of legitimacy, which has

occupied centre stage in Western debates on East European communism. This is reflected in

negative assessments of the putative lack of ‘legitimacy’ of communist regimes, rather than

addressing important questions regarding the role of ideology in the institution and normalisation of

new relations of power. It also ignores the specificity and detail of the trajectory of change in

Romanian Communist Party ideology.

Consent can also be thought of in other ways than simply addressing the relationship between the

ruling class and society. The discursive strategy of the PCR was designed as much as anything else

to achieve consent for its activities, and also autonomy from the Communist Party of the Soviet

47
Ghita Ionescu, The Politics of the European Communist States, p. 26.

29
Union (CPSU).48 Seen from this viewpoint, we can begin to examine what kind of discursive

strategies the PCR adopted in their efforts to build the basis for its autonomy of action in its

strategies of transformation. I argue that a study of Romanian communism based on new types of

questions such as these can help us to explain the specific characteristics that marked both the

communist regime and the political order that was constructed following its collapse.

Let us return to the two main approaches to studying Romanian communism. According to the first

approach, violence and ideology are routinely treated as separate objects of analysis, in the sense

that they are viewed as two different political strategies. 49 The presence of violence is seen as

signifying that the Communist party was not overly concerned with ideological mass

communication strategies.50 Although it is acknowledged that ‘ideology’ guided the regime, ‘the

relationship between regime and society was viewed simply as a pattern of domination-

subordination.’51 This is particularly the case for studies of the pre-1965 Gheorghiu-Dej period.52

The assumption underlying many analyses is that coercion, and not ideology, was the foundation

for the regime’s control over citizens, and that this coercion was necessary due to the putative lack

48
See Jonathan C. Valdez, Internationalism and the Ideology of Soviet influence in Eastern
Europe, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 67, p. 71, p. 75. Valdez’s comparative
approach is interesting in that it investigates the effects of Romanian ideology on relations within
the bloc.
49
Robert R. King, A History of the Romanian Communist Party, pp. 99-119; Katherine Verdery,
National Ideology Under Socialism, pp. 100-101
50
Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development; pp. 73-74.
51
Kenneth Jowitt, New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction, Berkeley CA, University of
California Press, 1992, p. 51, comments on writing inspired by the totalitarianism paradigm on
communist states in general. However Jowitt bases his own analysis on a dichotomy between
‘rational’ and ‘non-rational’ regime behaviour. His argument suggests that the presence of
‘rational’ and ‘irrational’ violence in regime behaviour signifies a lack of concern with ideology
and propaganda.
52
See Stelian Tanase, Elite si Societate: Guvernarea Gheorghiu-Dej, 1948-1965, Bucharest,
Humanitas, 1998, p. 40. Tanase discusses the relationship of domination between the communist
elite and society during the Dej era, emphasising that pure domination was necessary given that
the communist party was something alien to society.

30
of legitimacy of communist ideology in society at large.53 This does not take into account of the link

between coercion, violence and ideology. As I discuss in Chapter Two, I see this link as being

rooted in discourses of violence that the communist regime disseminated, and that provided a

reading principle for that violence, such as ‘popular justice’.

According to both Kenneth Jowitt54 and Robert R. King,55 coercion and violence are the principal

strategies of the party’s control and mobilisation of the population before 1965. This is

characterised as being something separate from an ideological strategy. Jowitt claims that the

Romanian party was not concerned with ‘seeking elite-public rapport, except on its own terms –

ruling out compromise, commitments, and public constraints.’56 Jowitt bases his argument on a

distinction between power and authority, authority being linked more closely to ideological

strategies, with coercion being sufficient for the recognition of the party’s power. As far as

Romania is concerned, ideology has been categorised as being specific to the mode of control of the

regime after 1965,57 although some authors claim that this period was one marked by an empty

ideology.58 The theme of empty ideology becomes more accentuated in analyses of the late 1970s

and 1980s. Ideology is seen as having been particularly effective from the mid-1960s until the

53
'Romania was unusual within the bloc for its mode of control. In the early days the Romanian
regime, like most others, controlled its population chiefly by force, which was later relaxed and
briefly supplemented in the 1960s with a few economic incentives. The 1970s ushered in a mode
of control that was primarily symbolic-ideological, supplemented and then overtaken by coercive
measures in the 1980s.', in Katherine Verdery, National Ideology Under Socialism, p. 100.
Verdery’s account of Romanian socialism and ideology follows that of Jowitt (Revolutionary
Breakthroughs and National Development) and King (A History of the Romanian Communist
Party) defining two types of control, ideological-symbolic, and coercive. Their periodisation
largely follows Jowitt’s division between the breakthrough period involving largely coercion and
little interest in mass communication strategies, and later periods when the regime begins to
attempt mass communication of its ideology.
54
Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development, pp. 73-74.
55
Robert R. King, A History of the Romanian Communist Party, p. 100.
56
See Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development, p. 117.
57
See Katherine Verdery, National Ideology Under Socialism, p.100.
58
In the sense that ideology was paid attention to by almost no-one, being devoid of meaning and
irrelevant to reality. See Vladimir Tismaneanu Stalinism for All Seasons, pp. 223-225.

31
beginning of the 1970s, which was seen as the regime’s heyday. This is accounted for by the fact

that the ‘national’ ideology of that time was linked to a period when the standard of living among

Romanians was higher than at any time before or after. Therefore the regime based its ‘legitimacy’

on what Katherine Verdery has termed ‘remunerative control mechanisms’. 59 This type of

explanation has also been used to account for the ‘legitimacy’ of the Hungarian Kadarist regime.60

The second approach, exemplified by the work of Ghita Ionescu, proposes that the link of

allegiance to the communist state grew progressively weaker in Post World War II Eastern Europe.

He argues that ‘pragmatism’ replaced the ‘legitimating ideology’. 61 For example, in common with

many authors writing on Marxist-Leninist regimes, Ionescu refers to Marxism-Leninism as ‘the

legitimating ideology’ (my emphasis), something apparently static.62 Therefore deviations such as

those of Dej and Ceausescu are seen as pragmatism. However, Marxism-Leninism has never been

static. As an international ideology spanning almost a century and the named ideology of a number

of socialist regimes, the re-inscription of Marxism-Leninism has been quite varied, both in terms of

geography and chronology. Marxism-Leninism, as we will see, whether we are referring to the link

between industry and socialism, or to the problems of international relations and international

proletarian solidarity, has been remarkably elastic and adaptable.63

A problem with both of these approaches is that ‘communist power’ is often accounted for by

59
See Katherine Verdery, National Ideology Under Socialism, pp. 100-101.
60
George Schopflin, Politics in Eastern Europe 1945-1992, Oxford, Blackwell, 1993, p. 216.
61
See Ghita Ionescu, The Politics of the European Communist States, p. 26.
62
Ghita Ionescu, The Politics of the European Communist States, p. 25.
63
See Rachel Walker, ‘Marxism-Leninism as Discourse: The Politics of the Empty Signifier and
the Double Bind’, in British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 19, 1989, pp. 161-189, for
discussion of Marxism-Leninism in the Soviet Union, characterised by Walker as a discourse.
Walker’s work is important in indicating ways to think of the multiple contestations of the
meanings, or the politics of the ‘correct’ interpretation of Marxism-Leninism, and the link to this
and political power and the doctrine of democratic centralism that was so central to Leninism.

32
reducing its explanation to a mixture of violence, pragmatism, and the Soviet presence.64 This,

however tends to separate the analysis of ‘what they did’ from that of ‘what they said’. It renders

‘what they said’ relatively unimportant, based on the idea that ideology was redundant as part of the

legitimating strategy of the regimes. Therefore the coercive infrastructure of the neo-Stalinist

regime is often a key factor in accounting for its durability. However, I suggest that it is important

to bear in mind that the PCR succeeded in taking power and instituting far reaching social, political,

and economic reforms in a short period of time, and encountering only limited resistance. The

changes within Romanian society were of a complex and far reaching nature, and the radical

transformation that took place cannot be reduced simply to the use of force, or to the use of

‘pragmatic’ strategies that are somehow separate from ideology. I argue that it is important to

analyse ideology because a closer reading gives us a clearer picture of how ideology was at the

centre of the regime’s strategies to win consent for the changes carried out.

Another feature of the literature on Romanian communism is the dichotomy that has become

commonplace between pre-1964/65 Marxist-Leninist ideology and post-1965 national-communist

ideology.65 This runs parallel to the dichotomy between ‘coercion’ and ‘ideology’. Based on the

tacit assumption that Marxist-Leninist ideology did not enjoy popular legitimacy (and thus required

violence), but that national ideology was legitimate (and therefore linked to ideology), these two

64
While the Soviet presence is a factor that accounts for the rise to governing status of the PCR,
and its ability to make a state, and to destroy rivals, that is only a small part of the politics of the
Romanian communist era. All of the social, economic and political phenomena in a society
where communist ideology was a normal feature of everyday life cannot be reduced to the Soviet
presence alone.
65
While Ceausescu is commonly associated with the deployment of ‘national’ symbols, the pre
1965 Dej era is sometimes seen as having laid the groundwork for this shift from Marxist-
Leninist to national symbols, specifically with regard to the 1964 Declaration of April
(Declaratia cu privire la pozitia Partidului Muncitoresc Romin in problemele miscarii
comuniste si muncitoresti internationale), Bucharest, Editura Politica, 1964, one year preceding
the death of Dej and the ascension of Ceausescu. See Robert R. King, A History of the Romanian
Communist Party; Katherine Verdery, National Ideology Under Socialism; and Vladimir
Tismaneanu, Stalinism for All Seasons.

33
parallel dichotomies link the ‘national’ to legitimation strategies and ideological control, while

linking ‘Marxism-Leninism’ to illegitimacy and violence.66

In the much of the literature I have discussed here, the basic rubric of the regime’s ideology is

described, but the full political and social implications of the ideological strategies of the

Communist party are not explored fully. Departures from some of the stereotypical ‘tenets’ of

Marxism-Leninism are taken to mean, in the case of Romania, deviance from the model, or the

abandonment of Marxism-Leninism, in this case in favour of ‘nationalism’. In fact many

investigations of Romanian socialism, such as Jowitt’s, to King’s, and also Verdery's, have

highlighted this aspect of Romania as a maverick socialist state, and saw nationalism as a

replacement for Marxism-Leninism. Valdez’s approach is based upon the different assumption that

Marxist-Leninist tenets were a focus of intra-bloc bargaining over principles.67 In this way, the

significance of the Romanian Communist Party's attempts to re-inscribe Marxism-Leninism may

have been overlooked. I argue that treating Marxism-Leninism as a discourse, as Walker proposes,
68
helps us to see beyond the politics of Romanian communism as a simple trajectory beginning

with proletcultist orthodoxy and ending with a thinly veiled legitimating ideology of nationalism. In

contrast, I argue that the geo-political circumstances of the leading party of Romanian socialism

imposed a re-inscription of the meanings of Marxism-Leninism, given that the party’s policies were

the subject of dispute amongst the members of the Comecon. This was partly due to the reluctance

of the Romanians to subordinate their policies to supra-national authority.69

66
Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development; Katherine Verdery,
National Ideology Under Socialism.
67
Jonathan C. Valdez, Internationalism and the Ideology of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe.
68
Rachel Walker, ‘Marxism-Leninism as Discourse’.
69
See Jonathan C. Valdez, Internationalism and the Ideology of Soviet Influence in Eastern
Europe, p. 134.

34
In this section I have introduced the idea of studying Romanian communism as an imaginary. I have

argued that Marxist-Leninist discourse was central to this imaginary. I suggest that approaching the

problem of study from this angle allows us to investigate the PCR’s re-inscription of Marxism-

Leninism as a means of building both popular consent, and of building and justifying the autonomy

of the PCR from the CPSU. It is also clear that this took place in the wider context of troubled

relations between communist parties following the expansion of the socialist international system

after World War II. These relations were regulated and defended according to the constant

adaptation and re-articulation of principles of Marxism-Leninism relating to socialist

internationalism. I have contrasted this approach to those of existing studies by highlighting some

of the key assumptions about power in Romanian politics that have dominated until now.

In the next section I discuss further the category of dislocation. I argue that by examining the

collapse of Ceausescu’s regime as a dislocation allows us to investigate the failure of the regime to

support itself on a symbolic level. I will briefly sketch the symbolic contours of the imaginary’s

collapse, pointing to the questions raised by an analysis of how the regime came to be fatally

contested. I then outline the broader issues that will be treated in subsequent chapters that have been

raised in rethinking both the collapse of Romanian communism and how the construction of new

symbols contributed to normalising a new post-communist political order.

5: Elements of a dislocated imaginary in a new myth of politics: The popular revolt and the

emergence and disappearance of the myth of the ‘Revolution’

In this section I briefly outline the argument that the political symbols of the post-communist era

were built upon the discourses of contestation that emerged to challenge the specific meanings

35
produced by political language in the communist era. This challenge included both positive and

negative re-articulations of already existing elements of the communist imaginary. I also sketch and

discuss the discourse of the 1989 revolt that began in Timisoara, indicating how this discourse was

harnessed and transformed into the powerful myth of the revolution. The aim in this section is to

highlight some of the central implications of the production of political meaning during this period,

pointing to the key issues that are analysed in greater depth in the subsequent chapters. I outline the

revolt in Timisoara here in some detail since these events and discourses are central to

understanding both the dislocation of the communist imaginary and the articulation of the

revolution. Therefore this analysis is necessary in order to provide important grounding for the

analysis in subsequent chapters. I conclude this section by briefly outlining the argument that the

myth of the revolution eventually broke down due to two main pressures. The first was serious

social unrest and bitter contestation regarding the National Salvation Front’s account of the events

of 1989. The second, but arguably equally important was the schism that developed within the

National Salvation Front around the issue of reform after the events of December 1989 receded.

The communist imaginary entered into a crisis in the 1980s in all East European countries, although

for a variety of different reasons in each one.70 Each East European communist imaginary was

different, and the precise nature of the contestations that faced these regimes varied from country to

country. This does not mean that there did not exist common elements associated with the crisis of

East European communisms in the 1980s.71 The extent of the dominance of the communist

imaginary until the 1980s in Romania is demonstrated by the fact that the most organised resistance

was not to the communist party from outside, but came from within the communist party and was

70
See, for example, George Schopflin, Politics in Eastern Europe 1945-1992, Oxford, Blackwell,
1993; Joseph Rothschild, Return to Diversity: A Political History of East Central Europe since
World War II, Second edition, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993; Vladimir
Tismaneanu, (ed.) The Revolutions of 1989.
71
See Joseph Rothschild, Return to Diversity.

36
against Ceausescu’s leadership.72 This is linked to the absence of a ‘de-Stalinisation’ process in

Romania, and the existence of very limited and extremely marginalised reformist currents.73

Therefore, in embarking upon the study of the discourses of revolt and those of the subsequent

revolution in Romania in 1989 it is important to highlight this absence of ‘civil society’ under

Romanian communism.74 This is what lent the dislocation of December 1989, until the FSN
75
takeover on 22 December, its popular and undirected flavour. I argue that the development of

Romanian civil society was a post-1989 phenomenon and that the identity of civil society was

forged in the construction of ‘opposition’ discourses contesting the meanings of the revolution. To

put it more simply, the Romanian version of civil society was a product of the revolutionary events,

rather than their stimulus. This is borne out by an analysis of the character of the revolt and the

discourses attached to it.

In Timisoara in December 1989 a barely organised revolt of the popular sectors was in the making,
specifically addressing its demands to the communist state. On 15 December 1989 in Timisoara, a
group of Hungarian Protestants gathered near Piata Maria at the house of Laszlo Tokes, their pastor,
who had been threatened with eviction. This small gathering of parishioners extended over the days
to become an anti-Ceausescu rebellion. By 22 December Ceausescu had been ousted and the
National Salvation Front assumed power under the leadership of Ion Iliescu. Following the

72
This has been discussed by Katherine Verdery, National Ideology Under Socialism, p. 133. The
‘letter of the six’ public protest was in the form of an open letter to Ceausescu broadcast by
Radio Free Europe in March 1989 – all six of the signatories were senior communist figures who
had fallen out of favour with Ceausescu. This is the most prominent instance of collective
opposition to the regime.
73
See Victor Frunza, Istoria Comunismului in Romania, Bucharest, Editura EVF, 1999; cf.
Vladimir Tismaneanu, Stalinism for All Seasons.
74
See Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, ‘Romanian Political Intellectuals before and after the revolution’ in
Andras Bozoki (ed.), Intellectuals and Politics in Central Europe, Budapest, CEU Press, 1999,
pp. 73-100.
75
I use populism in this thesis in a narrow sense to describe discourses that deploy the category of
‘the people’ as an interpellation and as a mobilisational tool. The signifier of ‘the people’ was a
powerful symbol in Romanian political rhetoric and in identity formation during the communist
regime and during the post-communist years. For a discussion of the wider debate on populism
see Yannis Stavrakakis, ‘Antinomies of Formalism: Laclau’s Theory of Populism and the
Lessons from Religious Populism in Greece’ Manuscript, forthcoming.

37
escalation of demonstrations in Timisoara, Ceausescu gave the order on 17 December to shoot the
demonstrators. Several days of repression followed. On 21 December Ceausescu addressed a rally
in Bucharest. He was heckled by the crowd, and the rally was transformed into an anti-Ceausescu
demonstration. Security forces were again ordered to shoot at the demonstrators. On 22 December
Ceausescu once more attempted to address the crowds in Bucharest. Again he was heckled, and the
demonstration became a rebellion. The crowds forced their way inside the Party Central Committee
Building, and the Ceausescus were forced to escape by helicopter from the rooftop.

The revolt was a ‘popular’ one in the sense that it was not apparently organised by an elite of any

sort. The revolt was not the nucleus of a new regime, growing out of an already articulated anti-

communist civil society discourse challenging the state and having instituted a pre-collapse political

frontier between state and society. As late as 20 December 1989, at least six days after the first

demonstrations appeared in Timisoara, the Timisoara revolt produced a political organisation, the

Romanian Democratic Front, which demanded the resignation of Nicolae Ceausescu,

democratisation, an end to the repression, and food.76 But the revolt should not necessarily be read

as an attempt to overthrow the whole regime.77 This organisation negotiated with government

representatives, and did not attempt a revolution - it was not an effort to take over the government.

It was the institutionalisation of protest against the leadership of Ceausescu.

The fact that in a nominally popular regime ‘the people’ began to think the unthinkable and then do

the undoable, without being mobilised by organisations of civil society, give a special quality to the

dislocation of 1989 in Romania. The absence of a developed ‘civil society’, at least one comparable

with other celebrated East European cases, points to the specificity of the Romanian communist

76
See Miodrag Milin, Timisoara, 15-22 decembrie 1989, Timisoara, 1990 for extensive eye-
witness accounts of the revolt. Katherine Verdery notes that ‘the relative neglect of consumer
interests in socialism made consumption deeply political. In Romania in the 1980s (an extreme
case), to kill and eat one’s own calf was a political act.’, in ‘What was socialism and why did it
fall?’, in Vladimir Tismaneanu (ed.), The Revolutions of 1989, p. 72.
77
Authors such as Tom Gallagher tend to support the view that the events of 1989 were an anti-
communist uprising, as if it were self-evident. In fact, Gallagher’s work stands as a re-inscription
of the meaning of the ‘revolt’, with little reference to the language of the revolt itself. See Tom
Gallagher, Romania after Ceausescu, Edinburgh, University of Edinburgh Press, 1995.

38
imaginary. The specificity of this situation has been categorised as the emergence of the ‘authentic’

voice of the people, ‘an exhilarating moment when the authentic voice of freedom-loving

Romanians could be heard calling for “libertate” [freedom]’78. However this posits an artificial

dichotomy between state and society and raises the question of what is authentic and what is not.

Another author, Peter Siani-Davies has raised important questions regarding how we classify these

events, focusing on the controversial debate over whether the Romanian revolution was a revolution

or a coup.79 While the insights of such analyses are valuable, the current study proposes a different

focus, on the articulation of discourses within the context of a dislocatory event, and the resulting

formation of pivotal political frontiers.

I suggest that the imaginary of the communist regime furnished the revolt with the symbols

deployed against it in those few days. The protestors of Timisoara were not representatives of a pre-

constituted ‘civil society’, with opposition to the whole economic and social order already a

developed and expanding discourse against the regime. An important part of the identity of the

demonstrators was constituted partly through the act of demonstrating. The very act of

demonstrating led to the beginning of the construction of a political frontier between the regime and

the people. This political frontier had yet to be constructed. They were a variety of people whose

identity of ‘the people’ was already defined by the sedimented and deeply embedded discourses

associated with the communist regime. It took the revolt and the events of 1989 to re-inscribe the

meaning of ‘the people’, given that ‘civil society’ did not exist in Romania prior to the revolt, this

was not an already present political frontier.80

78
Gallagher, 1995, Romania after Ceausescu, p. 66.
79
See Peter Siani-Davies, 'Romanian Revolution or Coup d'etat? A Theoretical View of the Events
of December 1989', in Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 29, No. 4, 1996, pp. 453-
465; cf. Peter Siani-Davies, 'The Romanian Revolution of 1989: Myth and reality - Myth or
reality', Unpublished Phd Thesis, SSEES, University of London, 1995.
80
See Miodrag Milin, Timisoara 15-22 decembrie 1989, for a day by day account from a large
number of eye witnesses that is especially helpful given the possibility of the cross-referencing
of slogans used during the demonstrations.

39
The study of the slogans of the revolt in Timisoara and other towns in Romania, as detailed more

fully in subsequent chapters, points to the importance of an analysis of the ideology of the

communist regime itself. The fact that they grew into the ‘people’ over the days of the revolt, and

specifically following the repression, shows the lack of prior organisation, and the resort to the

communist discursive category that separated ‘the people’ from the party. This separation was

something that was already a key part of PCR and Marxist-Leninist discourse justifying the leading

role of the party, as discussed in Chapter Two. The re-inscription of the people in the slogan ‘noi

sintem poporul’ (we are the people) implicitly challenged the assumption that the party knew better

than the people, particularly following the repression of demonstrators by the army, and the public

statements of Ceausescu regarding events in Timisoara. ‘Noi sintem poporul’ initially emerged as a

response on the part of the demonstrators to the repression of the army. However, it also became the

opposite slogan of ‘jos cu dictatorul’ (down with the dictator’. Following the army’s change in

strategy of not openly repressing the demonstration, the opposition between Ceausescu and the

people became the clearest slogan. In fact, the demonstrators used the ‘noi sintem poporul’ slogan

to interpellate the armed forces, taunting them with cries of ‘we are the people – who are you

defending?’ 81

Another key slogan of the demonstrations was ‘Vrem piine’ (We want bread). The economic crisis

of the 1980s in Romania turned food into the central, but of course unofficial, political issue. One of

the pillars of the communist regime’s rhetoric was its claim that it alone could organise society and

the economy in such a way as to provide the highest possible level of material well-being.

Ceausescu’s discourses repeatedly referred to the link between PCR leadership and the welfare of

the people, even during the late 1980s. For example:

81
See Miodrag Milin, Timisoara, 15-22 decembrie 1989.

40
 In a relatively short period of time there have taken place great revolutionary transformations

in all domains of economic and social life. Romania has overcome the backwardness in which

it was situated as a result of the policies of the exploiting classes, and of imperialist

domination….with great developments in science, culture, education, and the spiritual and

material welfare of the whole of our people.82

The simple slogan ‘we want bread’, shouted again and again, is loaded with meaning and helps to

demonstrate some important but subtle points about the nature of the regime and of the revolt. The

slogan can be read as an accusation against the regime for the miserable material conditions into

which the population had fallen as a result of the regime’s policy.

The slogans and the responses of the demonstrators in Timisoara to the turn of events and the

reactions of the forces of repression point to the deeply embedded nature of the populist discourses

of the communist regime. It was upon these discourses of welfare for the ‘people’ that the

ideological and institutional structure of Romanian communism was founded. Although authors

such as Verdery and Crowther have pointed to the Romanian neo-Stalinist command economy as

performing specific functions of political control and as building dependence on the regime, I argue

that the whole discourse, policies, and institutions of the Romanian regime were constructed around

82
See Nicolae Ceausescu, Raport la Conferinta Nationala a Partidului Comunist Roman, 14
decembrie 1987, Editura Politica, Bucharest, 1987, p. 7. Although there is no consensus on this
as Verdery (National Ideology Under Socialism, p. 100.) argues that under Romanian socialism
the use of welfare symbols was not an option because 'expenditures on consumption suffered
relative to accumulation, which received the unusually high ratio of about one-third of revenues.
This means that symbolic appeals would not invoke living standards'. But the above quote from
Nicolae Ceausescu, taken from a speech given in the middle of the winter of 1987 (shortages of
food, electricity and gas were widespread, and Romanian winters are extremely cold) shows that
the leader could, and did, claim that there had been advances in the people’s welfare.

41
the idea of welfare for the ‘people’.83

I argue that the revolt drew its power from the very same discourses. To give an example, the

popular nature of the regime also included the all-powerful nature of the state as the state of the

people. It was the party’s responsibility to use the state as a tool, primarily to provide welfare.

Welfare was underpinned by what the party claimed to be an egalitarian and economic reading of

democracy.84 Revolters in Timisoara re-articulated elements from the political and juridical

imaginary of which they were a part. ‘Vrem piine’ (we want bread) signifies in two words that the

issue of welfare was at the centre of the dislocation. The Party’s, and Ceausescu’s, failure to

provide material security meant that it was possible to think ‘vrem piine’. In this system this

popular slogan demonstrates that a dislocation of the communist welfare imaginary was taking

place. The discourse of the revolt also challenged the physical power of the regime. It became

possible to say ‘vrem piine’ in public and to do this in the context of an anti-Ceausescu

demonstration. This signalled a dislocation because, simply put, this was a regime where the leader

constantly stated ‘Avem de toate’ (we have everything). Therefore to say ‘vrem piine’ does not

simply mean that the population are asking for bread. It is an outright denial of an apparent

statement of fact. It implicitly denies the party’s claim to be the leading force in society and the

state.

A related issue in terms of this dislocation is raised if we ask the seemingly straightforward

question: to whom was the slogan ‘vrem piine’ addressed? One of the principal places visited

83
See William Crowther, A Political Economy of Romanian Socialism, p. 87; Katherine Verdery,
National Ideology Under Socialism p. 100.
84
See Nicolae Ceausescu, Raport la cel de-alXIII-lea Congres al Partidului Comunist
Roman,Editura Politica, Bucharest, 1984. ‘The party is responsible for perfecting the activity of
the state and its organs, to guarantee the democratic governance (conducere) of economic and
social life.’, p. 41.

42
repeatedly by the demonstrators was the local communist party headquarters. The people who were

shouting ‘vrem piine’ went to the most obvious site of local political authority and asked for bread,

from the regime, to signify to the regime that the regime was failing. They did not go to take over a

bread factory. They addressed their demands to the regime.

‘Vrem piine’ in fact had resonance in that it symbolised an accusation that the regime had failed

according to its own terms. In the 1980s, the regime had stopped doing what the population

expected it to do.85 Articulated with the demand for bread, the demand for the resignation of

Ceausescu was the essence of a dislocation. Society could be itself again as soon as the regime

started doing again what it was expected to do – provide welfare. The obstacle to this in the

Timisoara demonstrations was not communism, but the leadership of the Ceausescus. This subtle

but often overlooked difference is discussed in Chapters Two and Three. The removal of Ceausescu

and the provision of food would allow society, in this case ‘the people’, to be itself again. The point

that should be clear, with the insistence on this celebrated slogan of the revolt in Timisoara, is that

the failure to provide welfare was at the centre of the revolt. What is important for our study is that

this revolt was also a revolt against the failure of a promise that was embedded in the social

imaginary of Romanian communism during the Ceausescu era. The initial opposition to Ceausescu

only became expanded to include communism after the FSN had taken power. This is discussed in

Chapter Three.

As I argue in the chapters that follow, this discourse of revolt gave way to an organised discourse of

revolution, which can be dated to the formation of the core leadership of the National Salvation
85
The regime was ‘aware’ of this. See Nicolae Ceausescu, Expunere cu privire la unele probleme
ale conducerii activitatii economico-sociale, ale muncii ideologice si politico-educative, precum
si ale situatiei internationale, Editura Politica, Bucharest, 1988, p. 5. Here Ceausescu outlines
the causes of some of the ‘problems’ facing the country. ‘On the whole we can say that the
activities in view of the fulfilment of the five year plan are having positive results, although there
are signs of a series of difficulties in some sectors of activity.’

43
Front in Bucharest on December 22 1989.86 Until 22 December, the day Ceausescu fled from the

roof of the Central Committee building, the anti-Ceausescu discourse was one of revolt. There were

two main competing discourses at this time. One was the popular revolt and its slogans. The other

was the regime’s discourse of repression, sending in the army at the same time as claiming that the

revolt was in actual fact the work of anti-Romanian agents provocateurs from abroad. It was into

this dislocatory event that the National Salvation Front stepped. Two key aspects of this dislocation

allowed the National Salvation Front to assume power extremely speedily while building and

disseminating a myth of the revolution. The first factor was the reaction of the erstwhile authorities

to the amplification of the revolt. By the 22 December, Ceausescu could no longer rely on the army

to put down the revolt with force. The second factor was that the National Salvation Front was

headed by Ion Iliescu, an individual who was widely known, both in Romania and abroad, as an

opponent of Ceausescu and whose communist party career had been detrimentally affected since

1971 when he was publicly criticised by Ceausescu for ‘intellectualism’, and marginalised.87

To return to the first factor, the army gave crucial support to the leadership of the National

Salvation Front from 22 December onwards. This was important in that it allowed the Front to

monopolise the television media. What Iliescu did with this platform was to announce a revolution

(transforming a revolt into an event instituting a new radical direction). To support the revolution,

Iliescu and his cohorts used the mass media to disseminate a new political frontier that had the

Front on the side of the people. In fact in the Front’s revolutionary narrative, the Front was the

leader of the people’s revolution. On the positive side of the political frontier, (what I term Iliescu’s

‘popular front’ political frontier) were ‘the people’, the army, and the National Salvation Front. On

the negative side fell the Ceausescu ‘clan’, and the Security Police, the ‘Securitate’.
86
For accounts of the Romanian revolution, see Peter Siani-Davies, ‘The Revolution after the
Revolution’; Tom Gallagher, Romania After Ceausescu.
87
See Ceausescu’s ‘July Theses’, Nicolae Ceausescu, Expunere la Consfatuirea de lucru a
activului de partid din domeniul ideologiei si al activitatii politice si cultural-educative,
Bucharest, Editura Politica, 1971, p 80.

44
As soon as Ceausescu, now the enemy of the people, had fled, a new conflict erupted, with the army

and the FSN claiming that the Securitate were engaged in an attempted counter-revolution, with the

aim of overthrowing the people’s revolution, the FSN, and of restoring the Ceausescus to power.

The popular unity, and the demobilisation of the revolt were secured at the same time through the

production of demonic images of the ruling couple and their mentally deranged die-hard supporters

from the Securitate, now termed ‘the terrorists’.

The events of this period have been shrouded in secrecy and obscurity ever since. However, as I

discuss in Chapter Two, by examining these events as discourses we can see how the FSN secured a

position of strength that enabled it to monopolise power, by creating unity with the FSN against the

Ceausescu regime. This allowed the FSN to become the provisional government, and to set up a

system of power that was justified by the need to protect the gains of the popular revolution. This

had largely occurred before new political parties could begin to operate or to react. I argue that this

period was one where, for a short time, the myth of the revolution dominated.

However, the negative elements through which this myth was defined, Ceausescu and the

Securitate, gradually took on reduced force as available symbols in the call for revolutionary unity.

The Ceausescus were executed on December 25 following a hasty trial, and with interesting

commonalties to the beginnings of the communist period, this was an exercise in public popular

justice. By the end of December the ‘terrorist threat’ had also receded. The inclusive beginnings of

the FSN gave way to recriminations and discord. Some high profile members of the FSN, such as

Doina Cornea, and Ana Blandiana, who were not associated with political parties, began to voice

concerns about the methods and procedures of decision-making within the FSN. Although the

public face of the FSN was the Council of the National Salvation Front, Iliescu formed a four man

45
(Ion Iliescu, Petre Roman, Silviu Brucan and Dumitru Mazilu - all former members of the

communist ‘aristocracy’) executive body that in actual fact functioned as the government and the

principal decision-making body, bypassing the larger ‘revolutionary council’ type body.88 As I

discuss in Chapter Three, it was claimed by some that the FSN was a populist façade maintained by

Iliescu and his acolytes in order to mask the true nature of post-Ceausescu political power.

Added to this, and in the face of opposition from both within the FSN council and from other

political parties, Iliescu, Brucan, and Roman proceeded with plans to transform the FSN into a

political party. This took place in plenty of time to campaign for the May 1990 elections, which

were scheduled and largely organised by members of the FSN as well as with the help of non-FSN

members of the new CPUN (Provisional Council for National Unity that replaced the FSN after it

became a political party). One important factor to bear in mind is that the FSN could run in these

elections as the party of the revolution, having successfully built all of the symbols associating it

with opposition to Ceausescu and the people’s revolution.

This was arguably the ‘trigger’ that began the process of the failure of the myth of the revolution to

survive and to expand to become the main lens through which Romanian politics would be seen.

One factor, which is discussed in detail in Chapter Three and Three, was that this was the beginning

of the rupture in the temporary revolutionary unity that had been built at the end of December,

bringing together all anti-Ceausescu elements to support the army and the FSN. As I go on to

discuss in Chapter Three, months of political tension, and occasional eruptions of political violence

ensued, most of which was stimulated by the position of the FSN and of Iliescu and Roman. The

polarisation of Romanian politics shifted from ‘the people and the FSN and the army’ versus ‘the

Ceausescu clan’ to a different polarisation that was just as stark. The main battle became that

88
See Lavinia Betea, Alexandru Birladeanu despre Dej, Ceausescu si Iliescu, Bucharest, Editura
Evenimentul Romanesc, 1998, p. 236.

46
between ‘the power’ and ‘the opposition’ but the labels given to the camps depended on which side

of the barrier the label came from. What is important is that although the myth of the revolution was

damaged in the sense that revolutionary popular unity was broken, for the time being (until

September 1991, and the later rupture in 1992 of the FSN) the myth of the revolution remained the

principal myth. I argue in Chapter Two that this can be accounted for by the fact that both sides of

the polarised landscape of Romanian politics claimed to be the true representatives of the

revolutionary values and of the Romanian people.

The events of University Square, referred to in Chapters Three and Four, deepened and amplified

this division, culminating in a three day long wave of violence between the government and some

elements of the opposition in June 1990. The violence associated with the arrival of the miners from

the Jiu Valley during this time ‘to support the revolution and the government’ was a source of

division and acrimony for years to come.

The FSN had however secured a massive victory in the May 1990 elections, and still benefited from

wide public support. The FSN continued to be closely associated in the minds of the many with the

victory of the revolution, and was regarded as a popular government. However, several factors

intervened to break the unity of the FSN as a party. In Chapter Four of the thesis, I examine how the

economic crisis came back to the foreground of Romanian politics, and claim that the FSN myth of

the revolution could offer no unified principle of guidance, and failed to impose unity. There was

no consensus as to the type of economic reforms that would be appropriate or necessary and both

the government and the leadership of the FSN became critically divided over the issue, leading most

notably to the rift between Iliescu and Roman.

In this thesis I argue that the breakdown of the revolution myth occurred largely as a result of both

47
the divisions between the FSN and the other political parties, such as the National Liberal Party and

the National Peasant Party, and also as a result of the divisions within the FSN itself. This division

saw its two principal figureheads, Iliescu and Roman, publicly divided over the nature of

liberalising reforms such as price liberalisation and privatisation of state industries. Crucially, the

breakdown of the revolution myth came at a conjuncture when the discourse of the ‘transition’

began to dominate the political conceptions of the future in the other East European states. As the

FSN broke into two mutually antagonistic political parties in 1992, and Romania became more

dependent upon foreign economic aid in order to lessen the effects of the economic crisis, the

discourse of the transition displaced the discourse of the revolution. This was a signal that politics

would now be defined by reference to such things as ‘Western standards’, ‘European norms’, and

the ‘prerequisites for European integration’, and not by reference to the ‘anti-Ceausescu values of

the revolution.’

In this section I have outlined the key issues associated with the dislocation of the communist

imaginary, and the role of the discourses of revolt in producing that dislocation. I have also

discussed the political implications of the emergence of the myth of the revolution. I have suggested

the factors that caused the decline of the myth of the revolution, and that gave way to the

concomitant rise of the discourse of ‘transition’. I have claimed that a complex set of domestic

political conditions precluded the expansion of the myth of the revolution during this period of

profound and bitter divisions that divided Romanian society into two opposing camps. These were

compounded by an economic crisis that forced the Romanian government to abandon attempts at an

autonomous economic policy, and to embrace new, Western designed and inspired economic

policies broadly associated with ‘transition’ discourse. I argue that this opened up a new political

discourse where the symbols of ‘the nation’ and ‘the people’ would no longer be articulated with

reference to narrow, local historical narratives of events. Henceforth, ‘the nation’ and ‘the people’

48
would be increasingly defined with reference to the signifiers of ‘European integration’ and ‘the

demands of the Global economy’.

6: Conclusion

This chapter has laid the historical, theoretical and methodological groundwork for the study

contained in the chapters to come. It has been argued that it is important to re-examine

contemporary Romanian politics from a discourse theory perspective in order to provide insight into

the nature of the discourses that have constituted society. I have argued that a study of the

constitution of politics in the post-communist era requires an analysis of the discourses that

preceded it, namely, those associated with Romanian communism. The next three chapters of the

thesis provide detailed empirical analysis of the issues raised in this chapter. In the next Chapter, I

continue by providing an analysis of the discourses of Romanian communism, focusing on the

production of political frontiers that linked ‘the people’ and ‘welfare’ in a way that gave a specific

meaning and purpose to the communist regime.

Chapter Two

The Romanian communist imaginary 1944-1989: The construction of ‘the people’ and their

‘enemies’

1: Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the production of political frontiers in Romania during

the Communist era. This study of Romanian communist-era political frontiers in the present chapter

is necessary in order to understand the meaning of the collapse of Ceausescu’s regime and the

49
significance of the popular discourses of the revolution myth. As I argue in later chapters, a

common identity of ‘the people’ was constructed during communism that became so sedimented

and powerful that it became available for re-inscription in a new political frontier that pitted ‘the

people’ against the regime of Ceausescu. However, in order to investigate the production of these

frontiers, it is necessary to ground the analysis in a discussion of the principal features of the

Romanian communist discourses that lent these frontiers broader significance. This wider analysis

is necessary to understand the nature and meaning of the key political frontiers that structured

Romanian political discourse both before and after 1989. Without such an analysis it would be

difficult to understand the nature of the crisis of the communist regime or the significance of the

discourses that emerged to suture the dislocated space of the collapsed imaginary.

Relying on party publications that disseminated official ideology during the period of the regime, I

analyse how the regime attempted to justify its power on the basis of a socialist discourse linking

‘emancipation’ to development and the welfare of ‘the people’. I show how this socialist discourse,

that was based on the principle of proletarian internationalism during the initial stages of the

regime, entailed the construction of a political frontier between ‘the Party and the people’ versus a

series of ‘enemies’. I go on to link together the increasing preoccupation of the regime with

achieving autonomy from the Soviet Union with the production of national symbols justified by

reference to Marxism-Leninism, showing how ‘the people’ came to be inscribed in a battle for

independence against foreign interference. I then argue that during the Ceausescu period, the regime

relied heavily on symbols of the nation as it re-inscribed the meaning of socialism in Romania; this

re-inscription linked emancipation, development, and welfare of ‘the people’ to national

independence and the leadership of Nicolae Ceausescu. This discourse included Nicolae Ceausescu,

the Party and ‘the people’ on one side of a political frontier that claimed national unity in a common

struggle for national independence. I conclude the chapter by giving an overview of the trajectory

50
of change in Romanian communist discourse leading up to the economic crisis and the dislocation

of 1989.

The main aim of this chapter is to show how the changing hegemonic strategies of the PCR from

1944 to 1989 resulted in a constant re-articulation of Marxist-Leninist and national symbols, and

how these symbols were used in the drawing of political frontiers. Central to this re-articulation was

the meaning of the signifier ‘the people’. I argue that accounting for this trajectory involves

identifying changing international and domestic contextual factors to which PCR discourse was a

response. There are several more detailed strands to this argument, which I will briefly outline here.

Firstly I show how the regime of the PCR from 1944 used a combination of violence and ideology

in order to achieve hegemony, and how violence was involved in the construction of a stark

political frontier based on Stalinist orthodoxy as the only discourse available to the Party at the

time. In constructing this political frontier, the meaning of 'the people' was radically altered to

become a proletarian one rather than a national one. Thus it was intended to preclude the solidarity

of the masses with regime opposition, such as the National Peasant Party (PNT) and the National

Liberal Party (PNL), whose main appeal had been to national values or to peasant identity.

Secondly, I show that the increasing importance of national symbols in the regime’s ideology in the

early 1960s should be read in the context of an attempt to ground these symbols in Lenin’s thought

on the specificity of national conditions of socialist revolution. Thus the ‘nationalisation’ of

Romanian communism that began to take place in the 1960s was justified with reference to

principles of Leninism. This change in discursive strategy did alter the political frontier that lent

‘the people’ their identity. The strategy can be seen in the context of the regime’s industrialisation

51
plans that were opposed by its partners in the Comecon. The ‘sovereignty’ of ‘the working people

of Romania’ became linked to the drive for economic and social development. The identity of the

people was transformed in the discourse to become that of a people striving to protect its

independence in order to achieve socialism and development.

Thirdly, I show how Ceausescu developed a more nation-focused discourse of Marxism-Leninism

in the 1970s, reiterating the notion of ‘specific conditions in building socialism’ as an often-used

signifier, especially with reference to intra-bloc relations. Although ethnic minorities were still

included in ‘the people’, the signifiers ‘the Romanian people’ and ‘nation’ became increasingly

interchangeable. The importance of this ethnic national ambiguity in a Marxist-Leninist discourse

was that it allowed Ceausescu to re-inscribe ‘the people’ to fit into a narrative of national history

that had emphasised centuries of foreign imperial domination. Ceausescu attempted through his cult

of personality to be included in a new chain of equivalence that linked ‘the people’, ‘the nation’,

Ceausescu himself, and ‘the Party’ under his guidance, against foreign efforts to dominate Romania.

Fourthly, I look at how Ceausescu modified the relationship between Marxist-Leninist and national

symbols in the context of two developments. The first was the creation of a cult of personality and

the transformation of the Party. The second was that the political frontier was modified during the

1980s as an economic crisis took hold and a debt-repayment programme was launched. The new

political frontier inscribed the solidarity of ‘the nation’ with Ceausescu against a series of economic

difficulties and foreign-inspired obstacles to the emancipation of ‘the nation’ from imperialism.

The chapter is organised in several sections. Section two discusses the main features of Romanian

communism thematically, placing the issues of violence and ideology into historical and theoretical

52
context. Section three examines and analyses the proletcultist phase of the Gheorghiu-Dej era in the

late 1940s and 1950s by analysing the attempt to build a new political frontier based around the

notion of the struggle against fascism. In section four I analyse how Stalin’s death in 1953 and

Krushchev’s secret speech in 1956 impacted upon the discourse of the PCR. These events signalled

that Soviet intervention to change the leadership of the Romanian party was a possibility. There was

a striking continuity in the Party’s discursive strategy during this period that continued to base the

main political frontier on proletarian internationalism. I also show that later developments, such as

the Hungarian uprising in 1956, curbed Krushchev’s appetite for the removal of leaders such as

Gheorghiu-Dej, and that loyalty to the Soviet Union would be repaid with more policy autonomy;

thus ‘the people’ became tied to the quest for autonomy and development. In section five I

concentrate on the beginning of the Ceausescu era, looking at the shifting meanings of the people in

PCR discourse. Focusing in particular on the modification of socialist discourse in the context of

the economic crisis of the 1980s, I show how Ceausescu attempted to rally national unity through

the construction of a new political frontier that separated Romanians from ‘outsiders’ in an epic

centuries-long struggle for independence.

The chapter contains considerable new empirical analysis. Many of the documents that I refer to

have not been analysed before. Although there are many studies of the Romanian communist

period, as I will show in later sections, these studies have not approached the analysis of Romanian

communist ideology from the point of view of how this ideology was constructed. Thus, this

chapter, while being integral and necessary to the study of post-communist politics also seeks to

contribute to the debate on Romanian communism.

2: Historical and theoretical issues

53
In this section I provide a historical and theoretical contextualisation for the empirical analysis of

Romanian communist discourse that follows. I give a brief account of the circumstances of the

PCR’s rise to power in the late 1940s. I then discuss the controversial issue of violence and

hegemony.

In the middle of 1944, towards the end of the Second World War, the Romanian Communist Party

began to prepare itself to occupy a newly privileged place in Romanian politics and society. A

combination of specific historical factors that marked the crisis of the inter-war and wartime

regimes created the possibility for the PCR to enter political life just at the very moment that

Romania was caught up in radically transformed geo-political circumstances. The PCR was central

to Romania’s negotiations with the Soviet Union at the moment the Red Army was occupying the

country. In August 1944 the Romanians changed sides in the war, abandoning their German allies

in order to fight alongside the Soviet Union and its allies. This change of allegiance required a coup

d’etat, and the PCR was involved in the Royal coup of 23 August 1944, the event that signalled the

change by overthrowing the dictatorship of General Ion Antonescu.

The PCR had hitherto constituted only a marginal force engaging for many years only in

clandestine activity after having been declared illegal in April 1924.89 It is commonly agreed (even

by the Romanian communists themselves) that the physical and political dominance of the Soviet

Union in Eastern Europe from the second half of 1944 provided an unprecedented and auspicious

context in which the Romanian Communist Party could take power.90

89
See Robert R. King, A History of the Romanian Communist Party, p. 9; Dinu C. Giurescu,
Istoria Romaniei in Date, Bucharest, Editura Enciclopedica, 2003, p. 383; William Crowther,
The Political Economy of Romanian Socialism, p. 46-47.
90
Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development, p. 83. Jowitt cites
Gheorghiu-Dej as saying in 1945 that the RCP’s position was dependent upon the ‘decisive aid

54
Between 1944 and 1948 the PCR, included in the first post-coup government, steadily secured an

unassailable position through a variety of tactics and became the principal force in the governing

coalition, making liberal use of Soviet support to eliminate its political rivals.91 The party’s strategy

was twofold. One aspect was based on mobilisation of support for radical change. This involved the

mobilisation of workers and peasants. The second strategy aimed at the outright elimination of

potential alternative sources of mobilisation against it. The Party attacked rival parties and

institutions that constituted the core of opposition to Sovietisation and Stalinisation, such as the

National Peasant Party (PNT) and the National Liberal Party (PNL).

As I have mentioned in the Chapter One, violence as a strategy is a key feature of much of the

literature concerning the rise to power and subsequent rule of the Romanian Communist Party. I

now briefly discuss why the traditional interpretations of the category of violence are problematic,

and I argue that it is important to clarify the link between violence and the hegemony of the Party,

especially in the light of the dislocation of December 1989. Although I argue that PCR hegemony

was discursively constituted, this does not entail the claim that violence was not used to institute

and maintain that hegemony. But violence was not sufficient either to achieve or to maintain

hegemony, as the dislocation of 1989 shows. In order to explain this apparent paradox, it is

necessary to analyse violence as a discourse. We must also assume that some discourses of violence

will fit into a successful hegemonic strategy, while others will fail. This is demonstrated by the

study in this chapter. This chapter discusses the rise and fall of PCR hegemony. Both the rise and

the fall were associated with violence. Therefore the discussion of violence that follows aims to

of the Red Army.’

91
Jowitt sees this as a precursor to system building, and not connected with community building. I
argue that ideology was key even then as Romanian politics was flooded with language designed
to marginalise and discredit opponents of the PCR. See Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary
Breakthroughs and National Development, pp. 73-74.

55
contextualise the discussion of the ideological trajectory of the regime and the neglected importance

of the discourse of violence.

According to most interpretations of Romanian communism, particularly those relating to the Dej

period (1947-1965), violence was the main tool employed by the regime to maintain control,

whereas during the Ceausescu period (1965-1989), violence was supplemented by ideology,

particularly national ideology. For example, important research by Dennis Deletant has examined

political violence covering the whole period of the communist regime, and focuses on the use of the

secret police, torture and psychological intimidation of political opponents.92 While I do not dispute

the importance of national ideology during the Ceausescu period, I argue that during the entire

communist era, discourses of violence were inextricably linked to official ideology, and that the

distinction made by many authors between violence and ideology is therefore a false one.

As I have mentioned in the Chapter One, some analysts of the Romanian communist period make

an exclusive distinction between violent methods of achieving submission (terror), and non-violent

methods of achieving consent (legitimacy). Some, such as Kenneth Jowitt, and Robert King,93 posit

that the Dej regime relied on violence to the exclusion of an ideological strategy.

Jowitt has referred to the late 1940s and early 1950s period as the beginnings of the Communist

party’s ‘breakthrough’ strategy.94 Strategies involving violent tactics are taken by him to signify an

unwillingness on the part of the PCR elite to ‘engage with the masses’ during this period of system

92
See Dennis Deletant, Communist Terror in Romania: Gheorghiu-Dej and the Police State, New
York, St. Martin's Press, 1999; cf. Dennis Deletant, Ceausescu and the Securitate: Coercion and
Dissent in Romania,1965-1989, New York, M.E. Sharpe, 1995.
93
Robert R. King, A History of the Romanian Communist Party, p. 39.
94
Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development, pp. 73-74.

56
consolidation. Engaging with the masses is characterised as a strategy that was adopted later,

following the consolidation through violence of the PCR’s position. According to Jowitt, this

consolidation underpinned by violence includes ‘system-building’ and party-building processes.95

King claims that there are two methods through which a communist party comes to power, one

being as the leader of a popular movement, and dependent upon the support of the masses, and the

other as an imposed regime. According to King, Romania falls into the second category, and as

such the Party ‘is free to pursue its ideological goals with little concern for the effect upon its

popularity.’96 I question this assumption in this chapter, arguing that the Party’s preoccupation with

ideology and autonomy point to a more complex set of circumstances. Many authors do not take

into account the fact that the PCR was mobilised under Dej to interpellate subjects, to articulate the

elements of political discourse into a new myth, and to persuade subjects to participate (or to

acquiesce) in the new transformations of society led by the communist party. 97 Ideology is the

often-ignored side of Romanian communism, although authors do use ‘official ideology’ as a guide

in providing a basic categorisation of the regime type. I argue that the link to violence is not an

‘either-or’, either violence or ideology. The publicly disseminated ideology of the regime included

the use of justified violence by the communist party as a part of its hegemonic strategy. But as we

will see later on, violence against ‘enemies of the people’ was not the only element of this strategy.

It was necessary to construct ‘the people’ in order for their ‘enemies’ to be classified.

It is important therefore to note that, despite the assumptions of much of the literature, the presence

of violence does not mean that the PCR did not succeed in communicating with the masses. It

95
Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development, pp. 73-74, see
footnote 1, p. 74.
96
Robert R. King, A History of the Romanian Communist Party, p. 39.
97
See the discussion in the Chapter One.

57
succeeded in setting a new political agenda in order build a new type of political and economic

society. As will be discussed in greater detail in the sections to follow, strategies of elimination

were not directed against the whole people, only against those elements which the regime defined as

being non co-optable, and/or which were suspected of being possible nuclei of anti-regime

mobilisation.

If we accept that violence and/or terror is not a separate category from ideology, we can investigate

political strategies that explicitly inscribe violence as part of a dominant ideology. For example, at

the beginning of the regime in the 1940s and 1950s, the violence of the regime was successful, and

it had the authority to perpetrate violence. However, as I pointed out in the introductory chapter, in

the closing days of 1989 the regime ordered the violent repression and shooting dead in the streets

of demonstrators in Timisoara and later in other cities. This was not accepted, and became one of

the elements in the anti-Ceausescu discourse of the revolt. In the first case, violence was a

functional part of the regime’s hegemonic strategy (by both physically and ideologically destroying

opposition). In the latter case, violence failed to be an effective part of the hegemonic strategy,

instead becoming part of the discourses that led to the regime’s downfall. This could of course be

linked to the changing geo-political circumstances if we take into account the fact that it was known

for most of the period that the Soviet Union would support the regime, thus denying the possibility

of opposition and effectively underpinning the authority of the regime. Following the rise to power

of Gorbachev in the Soviet Union in 1985, and the concomitant reformism signalled by perestroika

and glasnost, Ceausescu’s Romania looked increasingly anomalous. Ideological strategy was based

on appeals to national solidarity against outsiders, the personality cult of Ceausescu as heroic

national leader, and an increasingly prominent role for the Securitate.

It should be reiterated that neither of these two episodes of violence was separate from discourse.

58
Violence is a discourse. In the 1940s and 1950s, violence was associated with a new moral and

juridical discourse, and with the authority of the state, and it was perpetrated against well-defined

‘enemies of the people’.

In 1989, primarily in Timisoara, the trajectory of the popular revolt as it grew and took shape shows

a different relationship between violence, discourse, and hegemony. The contrast lies in the fact that

the hegemony of Ceausescu’s regime had crumbled to such an extent that an embryonic popular

revolt was possible. The violence that was perpetrated in Timisoara between 17 and 20 December

was viewed by the demonstrators as something shocking, and beyond the bounds of reason. What

was expected was that the political police would arrest those who were involved in organising the

initial demonstrations. What was not expected was that the army would shoot randomly, and

without warning, into the mass of demonstrators and with live ammunition. This was considered to

be an act against the people, and merely inflamed the demonstrators. It was not considered at all

legitimate, and succeeded in diminishing the authority of the regime that was quickly categorised as

criminal and against the people. The following eye witness account from Stefan Cojocnean and

relates to Sunday 17 December 1989 when the Army began to shoot demonstrators:

He started towards the centre, through the market. Turning the corner towards Boulevard of

the Republic he went into the Hotel Banat to phone home. While he was on the phone he

heard shots nearby (at about 9pm). In the lobby of the hotel many had taken refuge, from

where they were shouting 'Criminals! Why are you shooting into us?'98

Mariana Pera's account confirms the existence of the widespread popular slogan 'We are the

98
See Miodrag Milin, Timisoara, 15-22 decembrie 1989, p. 96.

59
people':

She returned to the Calea Girocului (district). The population of the district was on the

streets….The pavement was not blocked and a large group of people had gathered there who

were shouting 'We are the people! Who are you defending?'99

As is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Three, the FSN sought to construct a popular regime

built on the revolt by naming Ceausescu as being ‘against the people’ and as a ‘criminal’, and

filmed the punishment of his execution that took place on Christmas Day 1989, broadcasting the

spectacle to the Romanian public.

The discussion above relates to the domestic aspects of the PCR hegemony. However it is important

to take note of the external constraints that the PCR faced and sought to overcome. The official

ideology shifted during the 1960s from one of Leninist internationalism to a strange hybrid of

Stalinism in economics and ‘manipulation of national symbols’. During the last half century, the

position of ‘the nation’ within the shifting contours of Romanian political mythology has been

extremely varied. There are good grounds for maintaining that the regime was involved in the

‘manipulation’ of national symbols, but it may be that the search for domestic ‘legitimacy’ was not

the principal source of this strategy. In fact, two of the most famous incidences of the ‘manipulation

of national symbols’ by the regime had only a tenuous connection to the question of domestic

‘legitimacy’ or consent, although it can be argued that they had an effect on the popularity of the

regime among citizens. The 1964 Declaration of April and the 1968 Ceausescu speech on the

Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia took place within the context of a continuing debate

99
Miodrag Milin, Timisoara, 15-22 decembrie 1989, p. 93, account of Mariana Pera from Sunday
17 December 1989.

60
between Communist parties concerning the limited sovereignty of the East European states, or the

autonomy of action of the East European communist parties from the CPSU. 100 I argue that rather

than seeing the manipulation of national symbols for a domestic audience, we should countenance

the possibility that the party was engaged in the production of ‘specific conditions’ of building

socialism in order to justify its autonomy and departure from Soviet-defined norms. 101 The

Declaration of April provides the basis for this claim that 'specific conditions' were at the root of the

Party's shift to national symbols:

As is well known, in recent years in the international communist and workers' movement

there have appeared differences of views and interpretations concerning the general line of the

communist movement….At present it is clearer than ever the historic role of the working

class as the most advanced force in society, and the role of the communist and workers'

parties as the vanguard of the popular masses in the struggle for socialism and peace. The

transformations in the contemporary world find a powerful expression in the upsurge of

national liberation movements and in the collapse of the colonial system, in the fight of the

newly independent states for the consolidation of their sovereignty, for peace, and for social

and economic development….The clarification of problems tied to the appreciation of the

contemporary era and their principal characteristics have a special significance both in

principle and in practice. Communist parties elaborate their strategies and tactics, and their

realistic objects of struggle, on the basis of an understanding of the socio-historic context in

which they undertake their activity. Marx, Engels, and Lenin accorded a great deal of

significance to the detailed study of the concrete historical conditions, and asked that the

100
This debate is traced in detail in Johnathan C. Valdez, Internationalism and the ideology of
Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe.
101
See Johnathan C. Valdez, Internationalism and the Ideology of Soviet influence in Eastern
Europe, for a detailed account of the ideological bases of the relations between communist
parties.

61
 communists analyse the transformations in the course of social evolution in order to draw

from this basis appropriate practical and theoretical conclusions.102

To illustrate this point, let us turn to the production of empty signifiers such as ‘nation’, and

‘people’ as they appear in official ideological articulations of the Romanian Communist Party.

These signifiers did not have any intrinsic meaning of their own. They are situated in various texts

of the post-war period, and their meaning is strictly context-dependent. In the above quotation the

meaning of nation is attached to a specific and contextualised instance of popular struggle. The

changing context of the power of the Romanian Communist Party lent widely differing meanings to

representations of the nation in official discourse. For example, language was the arena where the

regime both represented and negotiated the relationship between Marxist-Leninist doctrine and the

nation, with implications for (or perhaps indications of) the degree of ‘independence’ of the

Romanian regime from the hegemony of the Soviet Union. This largely depended on the type of

discursive strategy adopted by the regime in its attempt to prove its moral authority and its leading

role in Romanian society, but also to justify, by reference to Marxist-Leninist doctrine, a self-

defined path towards economic and social development.103 Thus language derives its importance

from its use as a means of control, and of resistance. To whom were these messages about authority

addressed? To two distinct audiences: the external audience to provide a message concerning

Romania’s profile as a state, and its degree of fidelity to or independence from Soviet dominance;

and the internal audience of party members and the population. Therefore language had a dual

function. It was one of the arenas where the communist party exercised its authority, but the

political language produced also served as a means of resistance to the dominance of the Soviet

102
See Declaratia cu privire la pozitia Partidului Muncitoresc Romin in problemele miscarii
comuniste si muncitoresti internationale adoptata de Plenara largita a CC al PMR din aprilie
1964, pp. 15-16.
103
For a more detailed account of the relations between the Romanian Communist Party and the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union see Victor Frunza, Istoria Comunismului in Romania.

62
Union.

The empirical analyses of the socialist era official discourses that follow demonstrate two things.

Firstly, they highlight a complex trajectory that calls into question the validity of the picture painted

by the ‘vain search for public legitimacy of the regime’ theory. Secondly, they show how elements

in political discourse can be re-inscribed with flexibility and deployed and altered to adapt to the

changing circumstances and discursive strategies of political actors. The study analyses the

discourses of the Dej period until 1965, and the discourses of the Ceausescu period from 1965

onwards.

3: Constructing a common front of ‘workers and working peasants’ against fascism

This section provides an analysis of the production of a new political frontier during the Dej era in

the wider context of Romanian communist discourse. I demonstrate that in order to build a new

hegemony, the Party constructed an entirely new meaning of ‘the people’, placing this signifier at

the centre of its discursive strategy. The signifier of 'the people' included the categories of 'the

workers' and 'the working peasantry', together 'the working masses' and 'the people'. In order to

demonstrate how this was carried out, I analyse how the PCR under the leadership of Gheorghe

Gheorghiu-Dej instituted a hegemonic neo-Stalinist regime in Romania after World War II. This

hegemony was associated with the institution of new social norms and deviations constructed

around a political frontier drawn between 'workers and peasants' (the people), and 'fascists and

imperialists' (the enemies of the people). During the period that lasted from the late 1940s to the

early 1960s there was also a marked anti-nationalist rhetoric linked to the discourse of class

warfare. Taken together, these discourses attempted to transform class and national identities, and to

63
weave them together into a narrative of ‘popular struggle against fascism and imperialism’, 104 and

‘for socialism’, under ‘the leadership of the Soviet Union and the Party’.105

Discourses building new social identities defined a majority of ‘included’ categories and a series of

‘excluded’ categories. Included categories were those who had been 'oppressed' and 'exploited',

such as 'workers', 'working peasants', 'soldiers' and 'war widows'.106 Excluded were the 'exploiters'

and their sponsors, the 'bourgeois-landowning classes', and 'Kulaks'. 107

Key features of the creation of the 'excluded' group were the production of violence as a public

spectacle and the dehumanisation of 'enemies of the people'. This violence was often reported in the

press. This was a populist strategy that re-inscribed political violence as due punishment for the

enemies of the ordinary people. Dehumanisation was also a feature of the vilification of enemies in

the press. Ruxandra Cesereanu's study of violent language and Romanian culture includes the

example of the vilification in 1948 in Scanteia, the Communist Party newspaper, of the former

leader of the Social Democratic Party, Titel Petrescu.

Many have forgotten him - if they ever knew him. One must dig deep into the slime to catch a

trace of him, wriggling around at the bottom. How many had not dreamt of this little worm…

worms get into everything, going up and down, hoping that someone will take notice of it. An

ambitious worm - Titel Petrescu.108

104
See Rezolutia Biroului Politic al CC al PMR in Chestiunea Nationala, Editura Partidului
Muncitoresc Roman, Bucharest, 1948, p. 21.
105
Gheorghiu-Dej, Raportul Politic General facut de tov. Gh. Gheorghiu Dej, la Congresul
Partidului Muncitoresc Roman, Bucharest, Editura Partidului Muncitoresc Roman, 1948 p. 4.
106
See Gheorghiu-Dej, Raportul Politic Genera facut de tov. Gh. Gheorghiu Dej, p 19.
107
See Gheorghiu-Dej, 'Raport asupra proiectului de constitutie', in Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej,
Articole si Cuvantari, Bucharest, Editura pentru literatura politica, 1952, p. 183.
108
See Ruxandra Cesereanu, Imaginarul Violent al Romanilor, Bucharest, Editura Humanitas,
2003, p. 79. Cesereanu quotes from Scanteia, 30 October 1948.

64
Popular justice was indeed the discursive basis of all of the new regime’s strategies, and violence

was no exception. As Cesereanu points out, the vilification was in fact:

a justification for repression against 'the enemies of the people' by completely rubbishing

them. The moral…is that to worms you have the right to, and you can, do anything.109

Both agricultural collectivisation and expropriation of the means of production were inscribed as

the end of the exploitation of the masses. In outlining to the public the rationale for nationalisation

of industry, Gheorghiu-Dej stressed the class struggle against the enemies of the people:

Ever since the 23 August 1944, the representatives of the bourgeoisie have sought both in the

political and in the economic domain, within the government and outside the government, to

fight against the strengthening of our democratic regime using all the means at their disposal

in order to sabotage its policies…Leaving the means of production in these hands would

allow the bourgeoisie to replace the people as the political leadership and would allow the

continuation of their policy to destabilise our new economic life, thus compromising the

regime in the eyes of the people.110

The use of violence was grounded in subtle discursive strategies that had the effect of normalising it

and making it seem just and necessary. Dehumanisation was one way of indicating criminality and

109
Ruxandra Cesereanu, Imaginarul Violent al Romanilor, p. 79.
110
See Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, 'Expunere de motive la proiectul de lege pentru nationalizarea
intreprinderilor industriale, miniere, bancare, de asigurari, si de transport', in Scanteia, 13 June
1948.

65
that punishment was due. Narratives of treason were also a common feature. Exploitation and

sabotage were often-deployed as signifying crimes against the people, as the next quotation from

Dej shows:

We have not sufficiently educated the popular masses that the fight against sabotage must

become a war of the whole people, and that saboteurs have no place among people who are

trying to build a new country, and that they must be annihilated without pity.111

Violence was something perpetrated against ‘criminals’, on the basis of newly installed and

hegemonic juridical and social norms. It was perpetrated against ‘criminals’ for a defined reason,

the reason was their ‘crimes’, and the crimes were classified carefully as being always to the

detriment of ‘the people’. Crimes such as sabotage, treason, exploitation, fascism, being a

legionary, chauvinism, capitalist parasite, or spy in the service of Anglo-American imperialism

filled the press during the early years of the regime. Revolutionary popular justice in this sense

functioned as one arena where the ‘other’, the political opponent, was transformed into a common

criminal, with an anti-popular identity, and whose elimination was necessary for society to be itself.

When thought of in terms of the ideological structure of the communist imaginary, the specific

discourse of violence of the time is parallel to the construction of the political frontier that

constituted the ‘people’. This was one of the ways through which the new political frontier

separating ‘the people’ from the old order was drawn. For example:

The organs of the state, helped by the working people, have discovered and choked several
111
See Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, 'Cuvantare rostita in fata alegatorilor din Bucuresti in zuia de 26
martie 1948', in Gheorghiu-Dej, Articole si Cuvantari, p. 177.

66
 counter-revolutionary plots of the Anglo-American imperialists. The enemy is seeking to

attack and sabotage our economy. Even in industry there are still enemy elements, the

remnants of the former bosses…who seek to create difficulties in the supply of provisions to

the working people. Such elements are punished without hesitation.112

Several strategies were used to marginalise those that the party defined as 'enemies'. The party took

care to harass and eliminate opposition, especially organised opposition such as the PNT and the

PNL. By 1946-47 the party was in a position of sufficient strength to begin eliminating opponents

of its revolutionary strategy that involved the elimination of parliamentary democracy. The

Romanian People's Republic was the culmination of this process and the leader Gheorghiu-Dej

spells out why this was a necessary change in this speech from 1948:

The liquidation of the plot organised by the former National Peasant Party leaders represents a

great success of the democratic regime from the point of view of the development of popular

democracy. Take for example the evidence from the trial of the conspirators. This evidence

shows to the whole world in what cesspit of treason to the country these conspirators had

waded, those who the sirens of foreign reaction had called 'democrats' and 'patriots'. It is clear

what the consequences may have been for our young popular democracy if we had not cut off

the tentacles that the foreign secret services were spreading towards us, and if we had allowed

the fascists to regroup and recruit.113

Accommodating itself to parliamentary democracy according to the party’s own conception would

have been a sign of unpreparedness for a socialist revolution of both the people and the leading
112
Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Lupta de clasa in etapa actuala, Bucharest, Editura Partidului
Muncitoresc Roman, 1951, p. 10.
113
See Gheorghiu-Dej, Raportul Politic Genera facut de tov. Gh. Gheorghiu Dej, p. 30.

67
party. Also, in terms of engaging with the masses, the elimination and marginalisation of rivals

involved a number of strategies that often included the mobilisation of large numbers of supporters

to engage in violent demonstrations against ‘enemies of the people’ between 1944 and 1948. 114 This

was part of an attempt to build solidarity and complicity. The presence of the Soviet occupying

force was of course critical in that it gave the PCR the upper hand in these often one-sided

struggles. By 1947 the PCR was in a position of sufficient strength to make full use of this

advantageous position.

The regime certainly made efforts to construct its public identity as the legitimate authority,

transforming the identity of the state at the end of 1947. This was in opposition to its political

enemies who were classed as outright criminals, and not as mere political adversaries. Violence is

discursive in the sense that its meaning is not given but rather needs to be constructed and defended.

Violence against political opponents, implied by the punishment according to the law, was justified

through their criminalisation - they were categorised as being guilty of treason.

One aspect of this strategy of criminalisation was to brand opposition figures as 'traitors' allied with

the West. The following quotations from Dej demonstrate this:

A decisive blow was dealt to the forces of reaction through the trial of the leaders of the ex-

National Peasant Party, unmasked as an agency of American imperialist espionage and

diversion in Romania.115

114
For an account, see Vladimir Tismaneanu, Stalinism for All Seasons, pp. 85-106.
115
See Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, 'Cuvantare rostita in fata alegatorilor din Bucuresti in zuia de 26
martie 1948', p. 171.

68
 The American and English imperialists, furious that they can no longer rob and plunder our

country, try every method to restore capitalism. The governments of the United States and

England intervene in favour of bands of fascists, saboteurs and spies who have been

discovered and punished according to the laws of the Romanian People's Republic.116

The Anglo-American imperialists systematically organise bands of spies and diversionists.

Class warfare takes on increasingly violent forms when the enemy does not hesitate to

assassinate Party members and other democratic elements and to commit the most odious and

base crimes.117

A particular object of criminalisation were the 'Kulaks', a constructed category denoting rich

peasants who were defined as the negative other of the 'working peasantry'. This valorisation of the

'poor peasantry' by the appendage of the term 'working' also served to bring 'good' peasants into a

common social category with 'workers'. This distinction is evident in the following description of

the party's policy towards the peasantry:

In its work in the countryside, the Party relies on the poor peasantry…Kulak elements…have

begun to engage in acts of terrorism and robbing the working peasantry, and have been

attempting to disrupt the work of the collectives. With its characteristic cunning, the Kulak

spreads all sorts of false rumours about collective farms in order to frighten and intimidate the

peasants. In their acts of robbery, the Kulak elements are aided by reactionary elements of the

Roman Catholic clergy, among whom are hidden fascist and legionary elements and Anglo-

American spies. The fight of the Party to strengthen the alliance between the working

116
Gheorghe Gheorgiu-Dej, Lupta de clasa, pp. 8-10.
117
See Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Lupta de clasa, p. 8.

69
 peasantry and the working class by isolating and defeating the Kulaks is becoming

increasingly tense.118

The regime therefore inscribed violence as part of the law, as juridical violence. It is also worthy of

note that the discourse justifying violence is most apparent at the very beginning and again at the

very end of the period of communist rule. At these moments of dislocation, the link between

violence, ideology, and hegemony becomes evident, and contradicts the claims of much of the

literature that paint a picture of an entire society under siege by an openly violent regime. Through

discursive means, the regime divided society into its allies and a minority of 'enemies', who were

marginalised by being stigmatised.

Such language tied violence to the new juridical and political order of the People's Republic, but it

was never articulated as violence against ‘the people’.

The major change that has occurred during this period in our country is that the popular

forces, representing the overwhelming majority of the people, have wrested the power of the

state from the hands of the exploiting classes. The character of our state is determined by the

fact that political power no longer rests in the hands of the big parasitical capitalists or with

the landowners, but rather in the hands of the representatives of the working class, of the

working peasantry and of the people's intellectuals.119

Another strategy used to define 'enemies' was the rereading of history. Included in the 'struggle'
118
See Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Lupta de clasa, p. 13-14.
119
Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, speaking in 1948 at the National Assembly during the debate on the
constitution of the Romanian People's Republic. See 'Raport Asupra Proiectului de constitutie
facut in fata Marii Adunari Nationale 9 Aprilie 1948', p. 183.

70
against enemies was the opposition of all the working people to the Hungarian annexation of

Northern Transylvania between 1940-44 and the wartime regime of Marshal Antonescu in what was

left of Romania.120 This was the era when PCR rhetoric could be most accurately described as

conforming to Stalinist orthodoxy. Following the Tito-Stalin split in 1948 the consequences of

‘nationalist deviation’ became even clearer.121 In the Romanian version of this orthodox discourse

the wartime regimes of Horthy in Hungary and Antonescu in Romania were represented as having

been among many of the reactionary obstacles placed by fascists in the way of the emancipation of

the working class in the history of the class struggle:

They [Communists] revealed the betrayal of the exploiting classes, who prepared the way for

the decision of Vienna [the Vienna ‘diktat’ as it is known in Romanian historiography

whereby Romania was forced to cede Northern Transylvania to Hungary in 1940] through

which they took a part of Transylvania from us. They [Communists] showed the whole

country the betrayal of the bourgeoisie and the landed classes, who brought the Germans to

Romania, and created out of us a base for the [fascist] attack against the Land of Socialism

[Soviet Union].122

According to the PCR, the major crime of Antonescu and Horthy was to use nationalism for the

purposes of fascist expansion, in order to divide the workers:

For hundreds of years Transylvania has been the theatre of many bloody clashes between the

120
See Rezolutia Biroului Politic al CC al PM in Chestiunea Nationala, Editura Partidului
Muncitoresc Roman, Bucharest, 1948, p. 21; also Rezolvarea Problemei Nationale in Republica
Populara Romania: Lupta Partidului Muncitoresc Roman pentru infratirea popoarelor
conlocuitoare impotriva sovinismului si a urii de rasa (Pentru cursurile Activului de partid dela
Tara nr. 12), Editura Partidului Muncitoresc Roman, Bucharest, 1949.
121
See Joseph Rothschild, Return to Diversity, pp. 125-46 for the wider implications of the Tito-
Stalin split for the Peoples’ Democracies.
122
In Rezolvarea Problemei Nationale in Republica Populara Romania, pp. 19-20.

71
 peoples who live there, orchestrated by the Habsburg Monarchy, which operated according to

the principle ‘divide et impera’. The crushing of fascism [Horthy], the liberation of our

country, as well as of our neighbour, Hungary, by the brave Soviet army, and the

establishment in both countries of popular-democratic regimes, has changed the situation

radically, creating new relations of fraternal collaboration between Romanian and Hungarian

working people.123

The Romanian wartime regime of Antonescu was articulated within the same chain of equivalence,

Hitlerism = Fascism = Horthyism = Antonescu regime = oppression and subjugation, as opposed to

Romanian working people = Soviet Army = Soviet Union = liberation. For example:

The common struggle of the vanguard of the working class and the Ploughmens’ Front[124] is

long-standing. The peasants…understood that the common enemy – fascism – united them

and necessitated a common struggle [with the workers]….The working peasantry has

endured, together with the whole working people – the yoke of the Royal dictatorship, then

the yoke of the Antonescu dictatorship and the terrible anti-Soviet war. Liberation came

thanks to the Glorious Soviet Army and the struggle of the patriotic forces. After the

liberation, it was possible to begin the great work of democratisation of the country. In order

to carry this out the peasant masses are fighting next to the working class.125

National difference was thus downplayed in the face of the common enemy:

123
Petru Groza, Sase ani de la eliberare Romaniei, Editura de stat, Bucharest, 1950, p. 6
124
The Ploughmens’ Front was a basically a front for the Communist Party that targeted the
peasants during the inter-war years under the leadership of Petru Groza.
125
Petru Groza, speech in Congresul Partidului Muncitoresc Roman, Bucuresti, 21-23 februarie
1948, Bucharest, Editura Partidului Muncitoresc Roman, 1948, p. 28.

72
 The communists have fought and are determined to fight for brotherhood between the

Romanian people and the cohabiting nationalities, against those enemies, exploiters and

oppressors, whatever their nationality might be.126

Several additional strategies were used to construct solidarity among 'the people' during the Dej era.

Violence had a specific meaning and was attached to the party’s discourses on building a new

society through class warfare:

In the mass of our people - workers, soldiers, peasants, and the best of the intellectuals - the

overthrow of the Antonescu dictatorship produced a profound awakening and provoked a

powerful upsurge of struggle….The popular forces had the same character of fighting action

during one of the most fundamental of the reforms of our democratic regime - agrarian

reform. We must remember that agrarian reform was being carried out on the ground well

before it was legislated, following the call to the peasants of the Communist Party.127

According to the Marxist-Leninist theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat, workers hold a

privileged place within the more general category of 'the people'. Worker identity was at the centre

of the new ‘included’ political identities. The two key categories used in the construction of this

popular alliance were ‘the workers’ and ‘the working peasants’. In building a political frontier

around the ‘working masses’ the Party leadership inscribed its own meaning in politics. This

126
See Rezolvarea Problemei Nationale in Republica Populara Romania, p. 20.
127
See Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Raportul Politic Genera facut de tov. Gh. Gheorghiu Dej, p. 20;
see also Gheorghiu-Dej, 'Partidul Comunist Roman in lupta pentru democratizarea tarii: Raport
informativ facut la consfatuirea reprezentantilor unor partide comuniste care a avut loc in
Polonia la sfarsitul lunii septembrie 1947' in Gheorghiu-Dej, Articole si Cuvantari, p. 101.

73
meaning was lent partly by its association with these categories in a struggle against common

enemies. As we will see ‘the people’ continued to be a central object of political discourse during

the communist era, although the meaning of the signifier changed in the decades to come. While

society was characterised as a struggle between ‘the people’ and its enemies, it is also important to

bear in mind the role of the Party in this discourse. While being associated with ‘the people’ the

Party was nonetheless a separate category given the nature of its mission to lead.

The party's strategy of ‘communicating with the masses’ involved the expansion of party

membership, preparation of cadres for ideological work in key social and economic sectors and the

production of ideological material in Romanian. This effort was already underway by 1945, as the

following quotation from Dej shows:

Not all activists have understood that the political line is given in order to be implemented,

and that the implementation of the political line is impossible without work among the

masses, without mobilising the masses, without lively and permanent contact with the masses.

The method of command can never replace the method of persuasion, and it is not sufficient

to occupy a position in order to have political influence.128

This preoccupation continued into the 1950s:

In the life of our party the verification [of communist party members] was an event of great

significance. Following verification the party was strengthened from an organisational,

ideological and political point of view. The links of the party with the masses were

128
See Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, 'Raportul Politic al Comitetului Central la Conferinta Nationala a
Partidului Comunist Roman', in Scanteia, 20 October 1945.

74
 strengthened, and the capacity for the mobilisation of party organisations increased.129

In 1955 at the Party conference, Dej again underlined the importance of ideological work and the

link between ideology and the mass communication strategy of the party:

One of the essential conditions for victory in the fight to construct socialism is Marxist-

Leninist education of the party members…. Party propaganda must give special attention to

the education of working people in the spirit of socialist patriotism and proletarian

internationalism.130

The communication strategy was one that involved interpellation wherever feasible. By this I mean

that the regime sought something more than simply to create new categories of subject identity

based upon the experience of being repressed by a totalitarian clique. Antoine Roger provides a

good example of one of the most famous episodes cited in the history of PCR violence – the

campaign of agricultural collectivisation. This was one of the central planks of the Party’s industrial

policy. Roger points to the tension between forced and rapid collectivisation as opposed to the use

of policy measures and ideology to encourage peasants to collectivise voluntarily. 131 The strategy of

the regime was to ‘engage’ the masses, and new identities based on inclusion within a new system

were disseminated through political language attached to the radical economic changes that were

taking place. But this strategy embodied a tension between violence and persuasion throughout the

period of collectivisation.

129
See Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, 'Pentru Puritatea Randurilor Partidului', in Pentru Pace Trainica,
pentru Democratie Populara, nr. 25, 23 June 1950.
130
See Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, 'Raportul de Activitate al Comitetului Central al PMR la
Congresul al II-lea al Partidului', in Gheorghiu-Dej, Articole si Cuvantari, p. 149 and 153.
131
Antoine Roger, Fascistes, communistes et paysans, p. 169-170. Roger also points out how this
tension was used in defining conflict between leadership factions within the party.

75
Several empirical factors point to the possibility that this was so. First of all, the growth in party

membership in the period between 1944 and the beginning of the 1950s was rapid and impressive.

Many authors suggest various motives for this, the most commonly cited motive being political

opportunism.132 The party grew from a membership of about 1000 to almost one million by the

1950s, and to nearly 2.5 million (in a population of about 20 million) in the 1970s. 133 This signals an

attempt on the part of the rulers to engage with important sectors through providing membership

opportunities and to use the mass of the party membership for various ideological functions in

society at large. Every public institution, economic enterprise, collective farm, state farm, and

educational establishment had party workers who were involved in the day to day management of

the concern.

What can safely be claimed is that by 1947-48 the party enjoyed a status of sufficient hegemony to

be recognised as the leading political force. Moreover, its strategy had clearly created opportunities

for alignment on the part of large sections of the public who had previously had no connection to

politics at all. The majority of these were workers and peasants who were recruited by the party and

promoted. This can be seen as one of the ways in which the party sought to engage with the masses

– by bringing the masses into politics in such a way as to identify with the party’s project, but above

all membership of the party conferred the political status of inclusion. Opportunities for social
132
‘In the first year after the end of the war RCP leaders (particularly Pauker) were notoriously
active in recruiting those who already possessed political skills that could be put to the RCP’s
uses. This pool of recruits included not only members of the traditional political parties and state
employees intent on retaining their positions, opportunists and careerists as they later came to be
called, but also former Iron Guardists….Of much greater magnitude than this specialized
recruitment, however, was the induction of large numbers of workers and peasants. Some among
these undoubtedly chose to join the communists out of an aspiration to participate in the rapid
advancement that was sure to follow the formation of a new regime….But there is no reason to
doubt that many peasants and workers, disillusioned with the prewar social order, also joined out
of real ideological conviction.’, in William Crowther, The Political Economy of Romanian
Socialism, p. 50-1.
133
See Robert R. King, A History of the Romanian Communist Party, p. 78.

76
advancement were multiplied by membership in the party, especially at this early stage of regime-

building. In fact, discourses interpellating the masses inscribed the economic and political changes

not only as political inclusion of the people, but their wholesale involvement in a society-wide

mobilisation for development.

A second element of ‘engaging with the masses’ was the construction of a completely new

educational infrastructure. Education was a direct target of Party policy, and was attached to a

popular discourse of continually increasing access to opportunity, and social advancement of the

lower classes.134 The educational infrastructure was one of the key loci of political education

according to the Party’s own discourse.135 However, it was also part of a popular discourse allowing

the lower classes the chance to improve themselves through a system of education that had a

developmental as well as a political function. Social progress was seen as being dependent upon

industrialisation and modernisation, and those who would work towards this modernisation would

also see the benefits. Scientific education for the needs of industry and modernisation of the

country’s economy and infrastructure was a central pillar where the needs of political education,

social mobility and industrialisation coincided. As Dej phrased it:

Born in historical conditions that are not terribly different to those in which other communist

parties have been born in recent decades, the Romanian Communist Party assumes for itself

the great and historical mission to reestablish the unity of the working class, to organise and

lead the struggle of the workers, peasants and intellectuals to raise their material, political, and

cultural state, and for a free, democratic and independent Romania. Also the Romanian

Communist Party, guided in is activity by Marxist-Leninist theory, has taken upon itself the

134
See Katherine Verdery, National Ideology Under Socialism, p. 198.
135
See Katherine Verdery, National Ideology Under Socialism, p. 110-11.

77
 task of instructing the working class and the whole people in order to establish a society

where exploitation will disappear. 136

I suggest that the PCR leadership under Dej was extremely concerned with providing the dominant,

and accepted reading of its actions. Precisely due to its historically weak image among the

Romanian ‘public’, it was concerned from the very first moment of taking office in 1944 to build a

progressive image, and to give a progressive justification for the violence that was to follow. Dej

claimed that

The liquidation of all of the fascist remains and the isolation of reactionary circles is a

condition of a durable peace….The establishment in each country of real democracy will be

the best guarantee of peace.137

This dovetailed with Dej’s desire to eliminate the ‘Muscovite’ faction of the Party that was most

closely associated with Ana Pauker. Pauker’s leadership of the agricultural collectivisation

campaign from 1949-50 was one of the issues covered during her ‘show trial’ in 1952. Pauker,

according to her former colleagues from the Party, had combined a ‘rightist deviation’ with an

‘adventurist leftist line’, with reference to the agricultural campaign. 138 Thus a communist show

trial provided the opportunity for the Party publicly to criticise Pauker for the repression of peasant

resistance to forced collectivisation. Therefore, Dej appeared to side with ‘the people’ against his

former Party colleague.

136
See Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, 'Raportul Politic al Comitetului Central la Conferinta Nationala a
Partidului Comunist Roman'; also Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, in Congresul Partidului
Muncitoresc Roman, Bucharest, Editura Partidului Muncitoresc Roman, 1948.
137
Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, 'Raportul Politic al Comitetului Central la Conferinta Nationala a
Partidului Comunist Roman ', p. 8.
138
See Antoine Roger Fascistes, communistes et paysans, pp. 169-70.

78
There was also a strong international dimension to the regime's strategy for creating popular

identities and building solidarity. Marxist-Leninist doctrine (as articulated by Stalin) affirms that

national and ethnic conflicts are the bourgeois means through which the workers can be artificially

divided and thus more effectively oppressed, by being distracted from their true calling as the

progressive class. Stalin provided the critique of false political conflicts thus:

The absence of the exploiting classes, who are the principal organisers of the feud between

nations; the absence of exploiters who cultivate mutual mistrust and stir up nationalist

passions; the fact that the working class are in power, the enemy of all subjugation and the

faithful carrier of the ideas of internationalism; the realisation of mutual aid between peoples

of all sectors of economic and social life; in the end the flowering of national cultures of the

peoples of the Soviet Union - national culture in form, socialist in content - all of these factors

and other similar factors have led to radical change in the physiognomy of the peoples of the

Soviet Union, to the disappearance from their hearts of the sentiments of mutual mistrust and

to the establishment of a true brotherly collaboration of peoples.139

This had international importance as it justified Soviet leadership by giving a specific meaning to

the principle of internationalism, given that ‘proletarian internationalism is the most powerful

weapon of the working class and of all working people’.140 This also had importance as the context

for later shifting political frontiers. This quote, read through the lens of Stalinist orthodoxy, can be

taken to proclaim the advanced socialist consciousness of the masses in the Soviet Union, and thus

the moral superiority of the Soviet Party over other communist parties.

139
Josef Stalin, cited in, Rezolutia Biroului Politic al C.C. al P.M.R. in Chestiunea Nationala, p.
7.
140
In Rezolutia Biroului Politic al CC al PMR in Chestiunea Nationala, p. 9.

79
At the same time, in a state based on Marxism-Leninism such as Romania after 1947, several bitter

social conflicts associated with ethnic polarisation, the pre-war crisis of the democratic regime and

the alliance between Romania and Nazi Germany, now had to be accounted for by drawing on this

very doctrine. The mythology of the anti-fascist struggle of the Romanian Communist Party, a

struggle to emancipate the workers of Romania, irrespective of ethnicity, was articulated around the

signifier of ‘socialism’ that attempted to create an image of workerist unity. History was invoked by

Dej to demonstrate the growth of popular consciousness:

The people grew wise in the course of the anti-Hitlerist struggle, and the struggle for

democracy, they learned to decipher the real aims of those who attempted to give free people

lessons in democracy, but in reality dreamt of the national and social slavery of all peoples. 141

The unity of the workers is of special importance at the moment when a country must create

the basis of a new social and economic order under the leadership of the proletariat.142

These two quotes from Dej show the link between the power of the Party and the political frontier it

articulated. The political frontier defines ‘the people’ and ‘the enemy’ in the context of a narrative

of struggle. The unity invoked by the political frontier is necessary for the leadership of the

proletariat, i.e. the Party, to be effective in building a new order.

This constituted an attempt to associate both Romanian and Hungarian workers with the

Communist party, while disassociating Hungarian Transylvanian workers with Hungarian

nationalist claims to Transylvania. Nationalism is associated with subjugation in this Party

statement on the national question:

141
In Raportul Politic General facut de tov. Gh. Gheorghiu Dej, p. 57.
142
In Raportul Politic General facut de tov. Gh. Gheorghiu Dej, p. 91.

80
 The politics of bourgeois nationalism is a policy of division and subjugation of peoples.

Nationalism is the most dangerous enemy of the unity of those who work in the struggle for

their class interests.143

Nationalism was thus associated with fascist and imperialist plots against ‘the people’, as shown

also by the following quote from the same Party statement:

By the introduction of the party’s line regarding nationalities into the policy of the state, the

party has succeeded in neutralising one after another of the meanest plots of the Romanian

and Hungarian reactionaries in the service of Anglo-American imperialism….Moreover we

must not underestimate the effects of the manoeuvres of the class enemy in the ranks of the

Hungarian population [of Transylvania]. Exploitative elements penetrating the local

leaderships of the Hungarian Popular Union, the democratic organisation of the Hungarian

working masses, have recently been eliminated.144

The PCR inscribed itself as a positive contrast, associating itself with the progress of the working

people, and assuring ‘the people’ that ‘hidden elements’ had been ‘eliminated’. The signifier

‘eliminate’ also demonstrates the inscription of violence as a justified measure in the regulation of

the class conflict at the heart of the political frontier.

The Horthy era in Northern Transylvania, and the Antonescu regime in what was left of

‘independent’ Romania after 1940, were in this way incorporated into a wider internationalist

discourse which drew an equivalence between Horthy, Antonescu, fascism and chauvinism. A party

143
In Rezolutia Biroului Politic al CC al PMR in Chestiunea Nationala, p. 9.
144
In Rezolutia Biroului Politic al CC al PMR in Chestiunea Nationala, p.21.

81
document from 1948 makes this explicit at the same time as warning of the ever-present threat:

The party has…achieved the brotherly cohabitation of the Romanians and Hungarians of

Transylvania…..The policy of nationalism, racism, and chauvinism used by the imperialists

seeks to undermine the international solidarity of the working masses in their struggle against

imperialism, for democracy and socialism…145

This threat was posited against the positivity of socialism and workerism. Petru Groza (Prime

Minister from 1952-1958 and leader of the Ploughmens’ Front) claimed that:

The peasants…and the workers understood that a common danger - fascism - united them in a

common struggle.146

This unity between the peasants (now ‘the working peasantry’) and the workers leads us to one of

the most categorical statements of the nature of the political frontier in which Dej claimed that:

The external conditions in the moment of political, organisational and ideological unification

of the proletariat of Romania, constitutes a categorical confirmation of the realisation that in

international politics there exist two profoundly different tendencies - the imperialist, anti-

democratic tendency, and the anti-imperialist, democratic tendency.147

Thus, as far as the national question in Romania was concerned, the necessity of following Stalinist

orthodoxy meant borrowing a nationality policy from the Soviet Union. This nationality policy
145
In Rezolutia Biroului Politic al C.C. al P.M.R. in Chestiunea Nationala, pp. 8 and 21.
146
Petru Groza, in Congresul Partidului Muncitoresc Roman, Bucuresti 21-23 februarie, 1948, p.
28.
147
Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, in Raportul Politic General facut de Tovarasul Gheorghe
Gheorghiu-Dej p. 54.

82
inspired by the doctrine of proletarian internationalism was an attempt to dissolve the ‘ethnic

problem’ in Transylvania by presenting it as one element in a bourgeois strategy of dividing

workers and thus hiding from them their ‘true’ common interest. 148 Thus nationalism and fascism

were presented as diametrically opposed to the interests of the workers, with the equivalence made

between the power of the party and the interests of the workers. In this period of the ‘Sovietisation’

of Romania, the interests of the Romanian ‘nation’ are not articulated. The party articulates only the

interests of ‘the workers’ and the ‘working peasantry’. This is because the symbolic basis of state

sovereignty has shifted from that of belonging to ‘the nation’ to belonging to ‘the workers’. This

implied that sovereignty now transcended state boundaries according to proletarian

internationalism. The dominant articulations of the Romanian national interest until then had

appealed to the need for Romanian national unity, more precisely the unity of all the Romanians

within one state. The appearance of the national question, or more precisely any articulation of the

national interest, could run the risk of reopening the question of the Soviet re-annexation of the

contested province of Bessarabia. Even without the mention of previously contested territories, the

discourse of the nation could put in question Romania’s loyalty to the Soviet Union, and could have

been used by the Soviet Union to accuse the Romanian Party leadership of prioritising bourgeois

national values over the sacrosanct proletarian internationalism.

In sum, this period represented the attempt of the Romanian Communists to establish the myth of ‘a

common front against fascism’. In this way a very strict political frontier was established between

'good' and 'bad'. On one side were workers, interpellated as workers rather than as Hungarians or

Romanians, allied with peasants, the ‘democratic forces’ and the Party, represented as being

involved in the common struggle against fascism and imperialism. Opposed to this were the ‘class

enemies…the Anglo-American imperialists’, nationalists, chauvinists, the Vatican, and Romanian

and Hungarian bourgeois elements in the service of imperialism. The narrative of this common
148
See Rezolutia Biroului Politic al CC al PMR in Chestiunea Nationala, p. 8.

83
front was represented in terms of a struggle, and the language adopted and repeated followed a

certain pattern and certain themes.149 The struggle of the common front was carried out using the

following methods that all the ‘good people’ had to adopt, such as recognition and love for the

Romanian Workers Party and the Soviet Union, recognising the danger from fascist reactionaries at

all times, the theme of the constant threat, the recognition of duty to the country and to the struggle,

and the need for vigilance.

Through these actions of the common people the ‘brotherhood between workers, peasants and

working people of all nationalities’ could be achieved. This would lead to the construction of ‘peace

and socialism’ implementing the ‘will of the people’ against fascist and imperialist oppression,

which seeks to use the bourgeois-fascist tools of nationalism, chauvinism and racism to fool and

divide the workers, thus obscuring from them their true interest as a class. In this way a new means

of delimiting identity was sought through the construction of a new political frontier.

Since ‘the people’ were no longer so starkly divided by ethnicity and previous class differences

becoming the unified category of ‘the working people’, what was then the relevance of this

discourse for a predominantly agrarian country like Romania? The worker identity was unified

across previously constituted ethno-political boundaries, but the identity of peasants in the new state

was of equal importance. The identity of the workers was expanded to permit a ‘proletarianisation’

of peasant identity, and peasants became ‘allied’ with the workers through their status as the

‘working peasantry’. As Petru Groza claimed:

After the liberation, thanks to the Glorious Soviet Army, it was finally possible to begin the

great work of democratising the country. In order to carry out this work the mass of the
149
I borrow here from the analysis of ‘wooden language’ during the socialist period by Stanescu.
See Stanescu, Flori, 'Regimul instalat la 6 martie 1945: Noul limbaj politic', in Arhivele
Totaritarismului, anul IV, Nr. 11-12, 1996, pp.49-58.

84
 working peasantry fight together with the working classes.150

However an important question remains. Why did the PCR discourse turn its back on the ‘nation’ if,

as some commentators claimed, it was an important source of ‘regime legitimation’? I argue that the

discourses of early Romanian communism suggest two reasons. Firstly, the key strategy of the party

was to achieve consent for its economic policies. In terms of agricultural collectivisation the

category of ‘working peasants’ presented an economic, social and political rationale for

collectivization. It was not simply the case that the regime collectivised the peasantry. First of all, as

detailed above, it transformed them into the ‘working peasantry’ and built excluded categories of

particularly well off peasants who were not the working peasantry, but were labelled ‘kulaks’. It

was an attempt to build a discourse of inclusion and exclusion, and to build new identities, and to

create a perception of involvement in rather than subjection to the new policies of the state.

Secondly, the absence of the ‘nation’ is an indication of the degree of autonomy (or lack of it) of the

PCR during this period, and the degree to which the party was limited by the Soviet Union. The

stark definition of ideological norms through the copying of Soviet dogma meant that any possible

definition of communism according to national conditions could not take place. It was only after

Dej had consolidated his leadership position following the Hungarian uprising of 1956 that the

definition of communism according to national conditions began to be a feature of ideological

production.

Until Stalin’s death, and the beginnings of change in the Soviet Union (collective leadership,

rethinking the nature of Socialist international relations, economic and political reforms known as

de-Stalinisation initiated by Krushchev) ideology concerning Soviet relations with the Peoples’

150
Petru Goza, in Congresul Partidului Muncitoresc Roman, Bucuresti 21-23 februarie 1948, p.
28.

85
Republics in Eastern Europe inscribed Soviet dominance within a revolutionary hierarchy of

peoples, and not a national one. Where party leaderships were factionalised the adoption of

‘national roads to communism’ had negative repercussions for those in Eastern Europe who adopted

this discourse. Workers’ unity crossed borders, and the centre of workers’ unity was the CPSU and

Stalin. The ideology of internationalism that inscribed the Soviet Union as the highest point of the

scale was also supplemented by the Leninist principle of democratic centralism, so that the

dominance of the Soviet Union equalled the dominance of the CPSU, and of the CPSU leadership,

led by Stalin.

In this section we have seen how the construction of conflict was organised around a political

frontier that inscribed the leadership of the Soviet Union, and then the PCR. In the years to come

the PCR would occupy the principal leadership role in this discourse, and latterly Ceausescu

himself. Thus the PCR was also a separate category from ‘the people’, importantly separating the

political elite from the people as the principle of democratic centralism modified the positive chain

of equivalence in the popular political frontier.

4: Romania following Stalin’s death and the independent consolidation of neo-Stalinism: The

growth of the concept of ‘national interest’

As I have discussed above, one of the major features used by the Party to underpin consent for its

rule was the construction of a political frontier associated with a historical narrative that lent the

PCR a pre-eminent role in a process known as ‘liberation’ of the workers and peasants of Romania.

Until the mid 1950s, these discourses constructed an orthodox Stalinist explanation of Romania in

international politics. Thus, a Marxist-Leninist, and above all Stalinist, account of the Romanian

past was articulated. However after 1956 and Krushchev’s de-Stalinisation in the Soviet Union, the

86
original Stalinist framework was gradually supplanted by a more Romania-specific reading of

Marxism-Leninism.151 The regime of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej increasingly relied on articulations

of the ‘independent development of socialist countries’, albeit also with reference to tenets

regarding ‘emancipation of subjugated peoples’ taken from Marxist and Leninist thought. In 1955

this shift in emphasis was evident from a phrase in a Party document on the national question:

The working class is the only class of any revolutionary and progressive consequence. Its

historical aim is to liberate itself and to liberate society from any social exploitation and

national oppression. For this very reason the classics of Marxism-Leninism never considered

the national movements to have their own sense of purpose separate from that of the class

struggle. They [workers] fought against those [national] movements, against the general

interests of the proletarian cause, against the progressive development of the society, as

movements opposed to the interests of the working class, at the same time against the interests

of the working class of the respective nations. However, the working class always supported

and supports always national movements whose aim is to achieve the liberation of subjugated

peoples, all of the national movements who shake the positions of imperialism and strengthen

the forces of socialism, led by the proletariat with the Revolutionary Party at its head.152

This quote articulates a reading of Marxism-Leninism that makes an equation between class

struggle and national liberation struggles. The simultaneous association and separation of the Party

from these struggles is also an important feature. This continues to inscribe the Party as a special

category in the struggle, but in terms of intra-bloc relations between communist parties it is also

151
An instructive and interesting comparison can be made by comparing Rezolutia Biroului Politic
al CC al PMR in Chestiunea Nationala, published in 1948, and Rezolvarea Problemei Nationale
in Republica Populara Romina de catre Partidul Muncitoresc Romin, Bucharest, Editura de stat
pentru literatura politica, 1955.
152
In Rezolvarea Problemei Nationale in Republica Populara Romina de catre Partidul
Muncitoresc Romin, pp. 4-5.

87
significant. As this section will show, previous chains of equivalence that constituted a popular

political frontier linking ‘revolutionary parties’ to the ‘leadership of the Soviet Union’ was now

replaced by a reference to the Revolutionary Party in the national context.

In the previous section it was demonstrated how the terms of the identity of the Romanian state (and

thus ‘identity politics’) were fixed according to Stalinist principles as interpreted by the CPSU.

Romanian national identity was reinscribed, accompanied by the reinscription of competing

national identities, particularly Transylvanian Hungarian identity. While acknowledging the

continued existence, for the time being, of ethnic groups, the political relevance of ethnic identity

was denied, and replaced by an articulation of identity based upon class. Thus ethnic groups were

given discrete political status within the discourse, but each ethnic status was equal. Class status

was redefined, and the basis of the state sovereignty was built upon class (the working class plus the

Party), and not 'the Romanian nation'. In this way also, the historical state identity of Romania as a

sovereign nation-state, and its role in Romanian history was re-articulated in a negative light, its

function represented as the antithesis of the emancipatory role it had previously been attributed.

With Stalin’s death, the external factor in Romania’s identity politics (in this case the popular

conception as to what formed the basis of the regime and its power) came once again to the fore.

The consequences of Kruschev’s secret speech and his criticism of Stalin’s policies indicated the

beginning of the process known as de-Stalinisation, meaning a reorientation away from the absolute

power of centralised and personalised ‘doctrinal interpretation’. It appeared as if the way was clear

for a more open arena within the communist and workers’ parties for the interpretation and

application of Marxist-Leninist doctrine in society. This was also implied for the East European

satellite states. Before the contents of the secret speech were made public, the Soviets initiated a

rapprochement with Tito’s Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia had been expelled153 from the Cominform in
153
Cited in Joseph Rothschild, Return to Diversity, p. 148.

88
1948 amid accusations by Stalin of various deviations. Krushchev’s rapprochement with Tito

implicitly negated the right of the Soviet communists to impose the correct line on other communist

parties. This is visible in a phrase from the Yugoslav-Soviet joint declaration of 2 June 1955:

'Questions of internal structure, differences of social systems, and difference of concrete forms in

developing socialism are exclusively a matter for the peoples of the different countries.'154

Tito also demanded that other East European countries de-Stalinise, and as Rothschild points out,

this was not a popular call to East European leaders who had built their power upon Stalinist

methods. It was for this reason, according to Rothschild, that they began to plead ‘special national

considerations.’ He further notes that ‘Krushchev was thus caught in a triadic dilemma among his

perceived need to reintegrate Yugoslavia into the Communist world, his craving to dismantle

political Stalinism, and the Soviet Union’s stake in averting the destabilisation and possible loss of

its client states.’155

The Stalinisation of Romania had taken place largely under the guidance and dominance of

Gheorghiu-Dej. Moreover he had won the battle for supremacy in the party by using tried and tested

methods of purges and denunciations, always based on accusations of ‘revisionism’ and

‘deviationism’.156 Two cases in point of senior party figures liquidated at the behest of Dej on the

grounds of being ‘enemies of the people’ were Ana Pauker and Lucretiu Patrascanu. Kruschev’s

allegations and denunciation of Stalin had obvious implications for the future of Dej as Romanian

Party leader.157 Dej’s use of ‘national conditions’ in Party discourse would become more effective

as the implosion of the Hungarian Workers’ Party in 1956 took its dramatic course. Henceforth,

internal de-Stalinisation of East European communist parties would be of relatively little

154
Joseph Rothschild, Return to Diversity, p. 149.
155
See Joseph Rothschild, Return to Diversity, 1993, p. 149.
156
Victor Frunza, Istoria Comunismului in Romania, pp. 355-64.
157
Vlad Georgescu, Istoria Romanilor, de la origini pina in zilele noastre, Bucharest, Humanitas,
1992, p. 261.

89
importance next to the Soviet preference for avoiding more armed intervention to prop up loyalty to

the Soviet Union. I argue that this conjunctural use of ‘national conditions’ opened up the

possibility for its more extensive later use in Party discourse, given its negation of the earlier

proletarian internationalist principle. But this also had implications for the meaning of ‘the people’

whose emancipation was now lent a specifically national character.

This is where the story of Romania’s so-called ‘independent path’ begins. As Victor Frunza

observes, Dej had only two alternatives.158 One was to maintain the Romanian party’s complete

subordination to the Soviet Party, and therefore risk his almost certain denunciation from within the

party as a Stalinist criminal.159 The other possibility was to maintain the Stalinist direction, moving

the party and the symbolic appeal for the legitimacy of its rule onto a terrain separate to that of

Moscow. While the events of the early 1950s (Krushchev’s Yugoslav and de-Stalinisation policies)

represented a threat to East European Stalinists such as Dej, the implications of the Hungarian

uprising represented an opportunity to reinforce Stalinism in return for qualified loyalty. This would

see the modification of the key political frontier in Romanian society, reinscribing the nature of the

workers’ struggle, thus with clear implications for internal political identities. Dej’s discursive

reordering of socialist international relations involved the PCR in a rearticulation of the rationales

for policy based on ‘specific national conditions’. This led to a reinscription of the meaning of the

Romanian workers’ movement that was gradually transformed into an autonomous movement for

national and social emancipation.

This was carried out by means of a discursive strategy that provided an ideological justification for

Bucharest’s deviation from Moscow’s new line, while at the same time masking the deviation and

articulating socialist solidarity and friendship with the Soviet Union. At this point, by the middle of

158
Victor Frunza, Istoria Comunismului in Romania, pp. 355-64.
159
Vlad Georgescu, Istoria Romanilor, p. 261.

90
the 1950s, party publications began to supplement the class discourse of Stalinism with the concept

of the ‘national emancipation’, demonstrated by the following quote from a party document in

1955: 'The working class supports national movements that fight for the emancipation of subjugated

peoples, and movements that destroy imperialism and strengthen socialism.'160

In order to fit the concept of the nation into the shifting official doctrine, while maintaining

adherence to Marxism-Leninism (thus avoiding accusations of bourgeois deviationism, and

maintaining the appearance of loyalty to Moscow), the discursive context for the articulation of the

nation had to come from a Marxist-Leninist doctrine theory of emancipation, and the place of

emancipation movements in the history of class struggle against imperialism. In 1955 a new Party

document was issued that characterised the problem thus:

Starting from the fundamental ideas of Marx and Engels on this [national] problem, Lenin

elaborated the theoretical bases of the national problem. Leninist theses concerning the

national question were further creatively developed by the decisions of the Communist Party

of the Soviet Union and by Stalin. Lenin and Stalin showed that in the era of imperialism the

national problem can no longer be limited – as the leaders of the Second International did – to

a few oppressed nations in Europe, but must be linked to the Global problem of the liberation

of peoples from dependent countries and colonies from the yoke of imperialism. In these

conditions it [the national problem] becomes a national colonial problem. They [Lenin and

Stalin] teach us that the problem of the liberation of oppressed peoples in the colonial era

becomes an integrated part of the general cause of the workers of the world in its

revolutionary fight for the destruction of the bourgeoisie and for communism.161

160
See Rezolvarea Problemei Nationale In Republica Populara Romina de catre Partidul
Munitoresc Romin, p. 5.
161
Rezolvarea Problemei Nationale In Republica Populara Romina de catre Partidul Munitoresc
Romin, p. 4.

91
What the policy therefore implied was a middle way - adherence to Marxism-Leninism and a

continued policy of adhering to the Warsaw Pact and political and economic co-operation between

socialist states. Thus in external matters, Romania remained faithful to Moscow. But on the other

hand, Dej led the Romanian party to a continued Stalinisation, thus deviation from the line of

Moscow at that time, albeit deviation justified by the deployment of Marxist-Leninist principles. 162

Class unity no longer transcended national distinctions, and thus the political frontier based on

internationalism became modified. The working people of Romania had specific conditions.

The Soviet decision to withdraw all of its troops from Romania in 1958 followed an impressive and

public display of loyalty to the Soviet Union on the part of the Romanian Communist Party with

regard to the Hungarian revolution of 1956, albeit qualified somewhat without the desired de-

Stalinisation and replacement of Dej.163 Indeed it may be that such continuity was comfortable in

the light of the consequences of the Hungarian de-Stalinisation culminating in the crushing of the

Hungarian revolution in 1956. King has characterised the new focus on ‘national conditions’ as the

result of the realisation on the part of the Soviets that local parties should make closer links with

their people, rather than relying on Soviet power alone. He argues that:

The Hungarian revolution indicated the difficulty and cost of maintaining communist parties

in power in Eastern Europe principally by means of Soviet power. After 1956 there was

greater emphasis on each party developing closer links with the local population. It was in this

context that the Romanian party first began to turn toward a more national orientation and

began to minimize the non-Romanian aspects of its past.164

162
Florin Constantiniu, O istorie sincera a poporului roman, Bucharest, Editura Univers
Enciclopedic, 1997, pp. 490-501.
163
Florin Constantiniu, O istorie sincera a poporului roman, p. 489.
164
Robert R. King, A History of the Romanian Communist Party, p. 130.

92
However this does not account for the change in emphasis visible in Party documents at least one

year earlier in 1955, therefore King’s account of the shift to the ‘national’ is problematic.

Tismaneanu goes into more detail on the implications of the Hungarian uprising for the Romanian

Party:

After the uprising had been put down by Soviet troops, the Romanian Stalinists supported the

Soviet and Hungarian security forces’ use of terror against the revolutionaries. On November

21, 1956, a delegation at the highest level, headed by Gheorghiu-Dej…went to Budapest to

discuss what needed to be done to completely crush the revolutionary spirit persisting in

Hungary with Kadar….It is thus legitimate to assume that tactical perspicacity and tenacious

opposition to revisionist tendencies in the fall of 1956 allowed Gheorghiu-Dej to consolidate

his dwindling prestige within the Soviet bloc after the Twentieth Congress [of the CPSU in

February 1956 when Krushchev gave his secret speech]. After the crushing of the Hungarian

revolution, Dej seemed a trustworthy comrade to the most conservative among the Kremlin

leaders.165

I argue that the emphasis on the national was a bid for autonomy that was initiated before the

Hungarian uprising, and therefore is not related to a putative need for ‘closer links’ with the

population as King suggests. I also argue that Dej’s reaction of supporting the Soviet Union’s

reaction to the Hungarian uprising gave the Party the leeway to take this national line, if we also

take into consideration the change in doctrine implied by the Yugoslav-Soviet communique of June

1955.

165
Vladimir Tismaneanu, Stalinism for All Seasons, pp. 154-5.

93
The ambiguity and tension between the proletarian and national ethics is evident in the discourse of

this time. One of the rationales behind the chain of equivalence holding together the ‘working

people’ in unity against enemies and obstacles is the need to struggle. This struggle included,

besides class warfare, the need to construct socialism. The Romanian party’s decision to proceed

with a policy of massive industrialisation continued to be justified and articulated on the basis of an

evolving Marxist-Leninist discourse, albeit with an increasing accent on ‘independence’. In the

following quote from a speech by Gheorghiu-Dej demonstrating the rights of ‘the working people’

over the ‘resources of the country’, we must bear in mind that the autonomy of ‘the working

people’ of a country rests on the leadership and autonomy of the Communist Party of that country

according to the principle of democratic centralism:

The historically significant achievements of this period illustrate the immense creative force

of the working people liberated from exploitation, conscious that only it [the working people]

is the master of the resources of the country [my emphasis] and that it [the working people]

works for its own benefit…In the elaboration of the plan for electrification for a more

extended period, our party has followed the teachings of the great Lenin regarding the

necessity of the development of energy production.166

As this quote demonstrates, it could be argued that the national accent had become more

pronounced following the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1958. As previously discussed, the move

towards ‘national emancipation’ as a justification for Dej’s refusal to follow a policy of de-

Stalinisation was probably the only available option at the time. However, following the Hungarian

revolution of 1956, it became clear that continuity in the satellite states was preferable to change
166
Gheorghiu-Dej, Gheorghe, 'Raportul CC al PMR cu privire la activitatea partidului in perioada
dintre congresul al II-lea si congresul al III-lea al partidului cu privire la planul de dezvoltare a
economiei nationale pe anii 1960-1965 si la schita planului economic de perspectiva pe 15 ani',
in, Congresul al III-lea al Partidul Muncitoresc Romin, 20-25 iunie, 1960, Editura politica,
Bucharest, 1960, pp. 19 and 14.

94
which could run out of control. It is in this sense that the Romanian leadership had greater

possibilities for autonomy. Continuity, however justified, could be presented as the better option in

a society where opposition to communism and to the Soviet Union could easily reappear given the

right conditions. Dej’s hegemony in the Romanian Party undoubtedly ensured such continuity.167

Anti-Soviet demonstrations had occurred in Romania on the occasion of the Hungarian revolution,

and Dej’s regime had proved to the Soviet Union that it was more than capable and willing to deal

with such tendencies in a ruthless manner, including keeping a firm hand on the party leadership.168

The growth of the Sino-Soviet dispute in the early 1960s provided another opportunity for the

Romanian Party to consolidate its relatively free hand in internal matters, by positioning itself as the

fraternal communist party in the role of ideological mediator. This culminated in the Party’s famous

Declaration of April (1964), through which the Party took a position concerning the Soviet-Chinese

split and of the need for international socialist unity.169 However, according to the PCR, the means

of achieving this international socialist unity would not be the traditional Soviet ideological

hegemony. Unity could only be achieved only through brotherly dialogue between fraternal

communist parties, and the appropriate attention paid to ‘national specific conditions of the struggle

for socialism’. Reiterating the theme that had been made possible by the Soviet-Yugoslav

rapprochement, the Declaration stated that:

The transformations in the contemporary world have found a powerful expression in the

activity of national liberation movements, and in the collapse of the colonial system, in the

fight for new independent states and for the consolidation of their sovereignty, for peace,

economic development and socialism….Marx, Engels and Lenin accorded a great deal of

167
Vlad Georgescu, Istoria Romanilor, p. 264.
168
Vladimir Tismaneanu, Stalinism for All Seasons, p. 155.
169
Declaratia cu privire la pozitia Partidului Munictoresc Romin in problemele miscarii comuniste
si muncitoresti internationale adoptata de Plenara largita a CC al PMR din Aprilie 1964, 1964.

95
 significance to the profound study of concrete historical conditions, to analyse the

transformations which appear in the course of social evolution, in order to draw theoretical

and practical conclusions from this basis.170

This message therefore meant to take advantage of the Sino-Soviet conflict in order to press home

the idea that within the limits of Marxism-Leninism, doctrinal interpretation would have to be

subject to agreement between the fraternal socialist parties. Disagreements and attempts to impose

doctrinal interpretations would lead to division and harm socialist unity and the construction and

advance of socialism globally. This was presented in the following passage:

Today the international conditions for the struggle for social and national liberation of peoples

are better than ever before. The bitter public polemic in the communist movement is an

obstacle in the path of the full use of these conditions, diminishes the role and influence of the

world socialist system, distracts communist and workers’ parties from their major tasks and

damages the unity of the struggle of the international working class and the national liberation

movement, and disorients the masses.171

Doctrinal interpretation, which had been the Soviet pretext for the imposition of its hegemony and

absolute control in the internal construction of socialism in the satellite states, became a subject of

debate within the international socialist movement, and thus put into question the legitimate source

of such interpretation.

The Declaration of April provides a clear indication that already, one year preceding the death of
170
Declaratia cu privire la pozitia Partidului Munictoresc Romin in problemele miscarii comuniste
si muncitoresti internationale adoptata de Plenara largita a CC al PMR din Aprilie 1964, pp.
15, 17-18.
171
Declaratia cu privire la pozitia Partidului Munictoresc Romin in problemele miscarii comuniste
si muncitoresti internationale adoptata de Plenara largita a CC al PMR din Aprilie 1964, p. 18.

96
Dej and the ascendancy of Ceausescu, national symbols were central to Romanian political

discourse. The basis on which Ceausescu would continue to redraw the political frontier upon

which popular unity was based would be a combination of both national and class discourses. In the

Dej era, as early as 1955, there was a clear use of national symbolism in the construction of the

political frontier that gave an additional national meaning to the Romanian class struggle. Dejist

discourse did use the signifiers of ‘autonomy’ and ‘independence’ to justify state policies that were

at odds with Soviet attempts to impose policy directions. These discourses also implied a change in

the rationale for the ‘social and economic emancipation of Romanian society’ while still claiming to

adhere to ‘the teachings of Marx and Lenin’. It was from this vantage point that the Romanian Party

had launched its critique of plans for the transformation of Comecon into a supranational economic

planning body.172 In the Ceausescu era, the use of the signifiers ‘autonomy’ and independence were

increasingly and overtly linked to the Romanian nation, and not solely to the autonomy and

independence of the working class.

Therefore, by the time of Dej’s death, the Romanian Party’s relations with the Soviet Party had

entered a trajectory that ensured the prominence of ‘the nation’ in public discourse. Victor Frunza

has argued that this national accent proved to be a very useful means through which the party could

gain public support.173 This view is shared by Vladimir Tismaneanu, who claims that ‘the Dejites

tried to resist de-Stalinization by devising a nationalist strategy to entice the intelligentsia and

bridge the gap between the party elite and the population.’174 I suggest other possible interpretations.

Firstly, the appearance of 'the nation' in public discourse can be seen as an indication of a greater

degree of internal autonomy for the Romanian Communist Party. This also has to be taken into

consideration together with the Party’s emphasis on the need for the development of heavy industry.
172
Victor Frunza, Istoria Comunismului in Romania, pp. 383-93; Florin Constantiniu, O istorie
sincera a poporului roman, pp. 493-501; Katherine Verdery, National Ideology Under
Socialism, pp. 82-5.
173
Victor Frunza, Istoria Comunismului in Romania, pp. 392-3.
174
See Vladimir Tismaneanu, Stalinism for All Seasons, p. 168.

97
As we will discuss in the next section, the introduction of the discourse of the nation involved a

move away from the political frontier based on class struggle, and a move toward a discourse of

development and welfare.

5: The Ceausescu era: Forging Romanian national unity

In the previous section we saw how the regime of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej had challenged the

Soviet Union’s ‘version’ (or rather its unchallenged right to dominance based on doctrinal

interpretation) of Marxism-Leninism, particularly the doctrine of socialist internationalism. It was

shown how the Romanian party took the initiative in the early 1960s of challenging the Soviet

viewpoint with reference to Marxism-Leninism, thus implicitly challenging Soviet dominance both

in East European states domestic politics, and in the international scene. This had been achieved by

deploying a discourse of socialist emancipation of subjugated peoples, and inverting the anti-

imperialist discourse of Marxism-Leninism to become an ideological weapon against the Soviet

Union. This implied a clear denial of the Soviet right to impose a direction from ‘the centre’

(Moscow) on all East European satellite states. This discourse operated from the basis of the

signifiers of ‘freedom’ and ‘sovereignty’, freedom being equal to and indivisible from sovereignty.

Although in this pre-1965 period, it remained the case that it was the freedom and the sovereignty

of workers that was at stake, and not yet that of 'the nation'. This discourse was supported by the

creation of categories such as ‘independent workers movements’ and ‘peoples historically

subjugated by imperialism’. Commitment to the construction of socialism, as an aim in order to

provide freedom and sovereignty of independent workers’ movements meant that 'communism'

remained until 1965 the signifier around which the discourse was ordered.

In this section I outline the shift from Dej’s rather ambiguous discourse to Ceausescu’s policy of

98
privileging the signifier of ‘the nation’ in political discourse. This involved shifting the political

frontier by re-inscribing the meaning of ‘the people’ as a signifier, to become 'the Romanian

people', a signifier that became effectively interchangeable with ‘the nation’. The context for these

changes was the ascension of Ceausescu to the Party leadership in 1965. This moment also marked

a clear re-mapping of the discourse of Romanian state sovereignty. As Ceausescu put it at his first

party congress as leader in 1965:

The nation and the state will continue to constitute the basis of the development of socialist

society for some time to come. The development of the nation and the strengthening of the

socialist state correspond to the objective needs of social life. Not only is this not in

contradiction with the interests of socialist internationalism, in fact it fully corresponds to

these interests, to the cause of international workers' solidarity and to the cause of socialism

and peace.175

This important quote shows the re-inscription of the meaning of ‘the nation’, which now joined the

workers as the social element in whose name state sovereignty was exercised, and in whose name

the Party claimed to lead the struggle for socialism. I argue that 'the nation' and 'the people' became

interchangeable during the Ceausescu era due to Ceausescu's repeated references to 'the Romanian

people' on the one hand, and 'the Socialist nation' on the other. For example, in the same text,

Ceausescu states that: 'Our party continues the best traditions of centuries of the struggle of the

Romanian people for national and social freedom, it [the Party] embodies the advanced features of

the proletariat, and has deep roots in the workers' movement of Romania.'176 This must be

contrasted with the former content of 'the people' in Romanian communist discourse that tied

175
See Nicolae Ceausescu, Congresul al IX-lea al Partidului Comunist Roman, 19-24 iulie 1965,
Bucharest, Editura Politica, 1965, p. 69.
176
Nicolae Ceausescu, Congresul al IX-lea, p. 74.

99
together peasants and workers to make the 'working people' rather than the Romanian people, as

discussed in previous sections.

It was around the symbol of the ethnically and historically defined nation that the dominant, and as

I will argue constitutive, political frontier of Romanian politics would be based until 1989. Through

this redrawing of imaginary political boundaries, came the entry of new categories and modes of

ideological argumentation narrated around the historical struggle of the Romanian nation for

emancipation, unity and independence, and socialism. Moreover, despite the collapse of the

Ceausescu regime ‘the people’ thereafter remained a key signifier of Romanian politics. As I argue

in this section, 'the welfare of the people' was routinely invoked in Ceausescu's discourse contrary

to Verdery's claim that symbols of welfare were not available to the Party to deploy in their

discourse.177 For example, even in the middle of the economic crisis of the 1980s, Ceausescu

heralded the aims of the Romanian Communist Party as being about the provision of welfare, as

demonstrated by this quote from his speech to the 1984 Party Congress:

In comparison with 1945, the industrial production of the country is more than one hundred

times greater in 1984. Agricultural production is more than seven times greater. The intensity

of the rhythm of development of the whole national economy has led to the growth in social

produce of 28 times and of the national wealth by 32 times. On this basis the uninterrupted

raising of the standard of living of the whole people has taken place. In the course of the four

decades [since 1944] consumption has increased by 22 times, there have been created 6

million new jobs, and around 80% of the population live in new housing. 178

177
Katherine Verdery, National Ideology Under Socialism, p. 100.
178
Nicolae Ceausescu, Raportul la Cel de-al XIII-lea Congres al Partidului Comunist Roman,
Bucharest, Editura Politica, 1984, p. 6.

100
It is arguable that by 1965 Marxist-Leninist discourse in Romania had entered a new era of re-

inscription concerning the global nature of the workers' struggle. Party documents continued to

repeat the necessity of taking into account the concrete conditions of building socialism. For

example, Ceausescu claimed that:

Life has confirmed fully the justice of the policy of the party of socialist industrialisation,

founded on the creative application of Marxist-Leninist teachings to the concrete conditions

of our country.179

Qualifying this further, Ceausescu went on to say that:

The experience of the Romanian people, as well as the history of human development

demonstrates that industrialisation is the only way to raise the standard of living, and ensure

national independence and sovereignty.180

The concrete conditions to which Ceausescu referred in this case, as in many others, was the

historical experience of the Romanian people (in contrast to the 'working people'). Also worthy of

note is the goal of party policy - to take note of the experience of the Romanian people in order to

secure national sovereignty and independence. Referring to the role of the party in a 1967 speech,

Ceausescu elaborated this new, more national theme:

Our party knows which strategies and tactics to adopt that are necessary to implement the

179
Nicolae Ceausescu, Congresul al IX-lea, p. 35.
180
Nicolae Ceausescu, Congresul al IX-lea, p. 35.

101
 social development of Romania. Continuing the best traditions of struggle of the people for

social and national emancipation, the Romanian Communist Party is fulfilling with honour its

great historical mission to lead the whole nation to the heights of human civilisation - the

communist society.181

Ceausescu became increasingly preoccupied with ideological work that would emphasise

Romania's specific conditions for building socialism. For example in 1967 he highlighted the role of

ideological education in the building of socialism:

Life has confirmed and continued to confirm the correctness of the line of our Party. The

success of the activity of any communist party…is determined by the existence of a general

political line that applies the principles of Marxism-Leninism in conformity with the historical

conditions of the country in question….In recent years there has been an intense activity in

view of the ideological and political training of party members, in order to enrich their

theoretical knowledge, to study and learn the concepts of dialectical materialism and historical

materialism and to assimilate the basic principles of the Romanian Communist Party….The

creation of the Academy of Social and Political Sciences and the Institute of Historical,

Social, and Political Studies of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party,

raises to a higher level the ideological preparation of party activists and the work of Marxist-

Leninist propaganda.182

In terms of building socialism, theorists began to refer more often to the teachings of Comrade

181
See Nicolae Ceausescu, Rolul conducator al partidului in etapa desavirsirii constructiei
socialismului, Bucharest, Editura politica, 1967, pp. 5-6.
182
Nicolae Ceausescu, Rolul conducator al partidului, pp. 11, 23-24.

102
Ceausescu than to those of Marx and Lenin. While this is often, and justifiably, taken as an example

of the extension of the cult of personality, it is also indicative of the Party’s insistence on the

specificity of national conditions, such that Ceausescu produced an oeuvre numbering dozens of

volumes on the construction of Romanian socialism.183 More theoretical volumes drew on his work

in discussing the construction of socialism in Romania.184 Thus, this served to underline the

precedence of the local over the global, and in Ceausescu's discourse of the 'national' over the

'international'.

183
Nicolae Ceausescu's volumes are entitled Romania pe drumul construirii societatii socialiste
multilateral dezvoltate and Romania pe drumul desarvirsirii constructiei socialiste, and number
30 volmes, published by Editura Politica between 1968 and 1989.
184
See Din Gindirea Social-Politica a Presedintelui Romaniei Nicolae Ceausescu: Statul
Democratiei muncitoresti revolutionare, no author, Bucharest, Editura Politica, 1986; See also
for example Ion Tudosescu and Aculin Cuzacu (eds.), Democratia Socialista: Realitati si
perspective, Bucharest, Editura Politica, 1983.

103
As I have mentioned it has been suggested that a ‘national’ accent in politics, albeit a subtle accent

based on Marxist-Leninist doctrine, would render the party more popular support, while the

adherence to Marxism-Leninism on the surface formed part of a strategy of the Party to keep

interference from the Soviet Union at bay.185 Others have suggested that the PCR used nationalism

as a bulwark against de-Stalinisation.186 In July 1965, at Ceausescu’s first party conference as

leader, following Dej’s death, the step was taken to rename the Party, from the Romanian Workers’

Party to the Romanian Communist Party. The 1965 Congress publication outlines the reason for this

decision, which was articulated in both Marxist-Leninist and national terms, with the emphasis laid

upon the moment as part of the history of the Romanian nation in its construction of socialism. As

Ceausescu claimed: ‘This [name change of the party] constitutes an historic turning point in the

history of the workers' movement of Romania, and in the life of the Romanian people’.187

References to 'the Romanian people' continued to be supplemented with more frequent references to

the ‘nation’. For example: ‘The antifascist resistance [fought] for freedom and independence, and to

defend the nation's existence.’188

Below, I present some of the evidence upon which I base my claim that the appropriation of 'the

nation' as a symbol by the party was a careful strategy of the negotiation of Marxism-Leninism. In

the next lengthy quote, we see how Ceausescu carefully outlined and prioritised the need of the

Party to pay attention to local and specific conditions in building socialism. This justification of a

separate policy was usually tied to rhetoric about the need for industrialisation:

185
See Katherine Verdery, National Ideology Under Socialism, pp. 121-136.
186
Vladimir Tismaneanu, Stalinism for All Seasons, p. 190.
187
Nicolae Ceausescu, in Congresul al IX-lea, p. 75.
188
Nicolae Ceausescu, Raportul Comitetului Central al Partidului Comunist Roman cu Privire la
Activitatea PCR in Perioada dintre Congresul al IX-lea si Congresul al X-lea si Sarcinile de
viitor ale Partidului, Bucharest, Editura Politica, 1969, p. 7.

104
 It is an absolute necessity for the party to study, unceasingly and with great care, the

phenomena of social life, and to elaborate its political line on this basis. In the period after the

liberation, the period of intense construction of socialism, our party was faced with an

enormous set of problems and new tasks. Although we obtained great successes there were

also some failures. Sometimes we lacked the experience and the knowledge necessary to find

and adopt the most appropriate solutions. This was because in the years in which the party

operated secretly, it did not accord enough attention to the study of the problems of the social

and economic development of Romania, of the concrete particularities and the balance of

forces in Romanian society.189

The celebration of 50 years of Romanian unification in 1968 is the source of the next quote, where

Ceausescu highlights and glorifies 'the nation' and its history in a wide ranging narrative on the

importance of national liberation:

This session of the Great National Assembly is dedicated to the anniversary of 50 years since

the unification of Transylvania with Romania - an historical event of great significance in the

life of our people that led to the realisation of the Romanian national unitary state, and opened

the way to the unified development of our nation.190

This glorification of national unity as a goal in itself was completely new in comparison with the

socialist-internationalist discourse of Gheorghiu-Dej on Transylvania in particular, and on the issue

of the nation in general. Ceausescu continued in this speech by attaching the glorious national past

to a glorious national future:

189
See Nicolae Ceausescu, Rolul conducator al partidului, pp. 11-12.
190
Nicolae Ceausescu, Expunere la sedinta jubilara a Marii Adunari Nationale consacrata
sarbatoririi semicentenarului unirii Transilvaniei cu Romania, 29 noiembrie 1968, Bucharest,
Editura Politica, 1968, p. 5.

105
 Under the leadership of the Romanian communist Party, the fearless flagbearer of national

interests, Romania has thrown off the chains of imperialist domination forever, and has

gained full state independence; the Romanian people, taking its destiny into its own hands, is

freely shaping a new life as it wishes - socialist life.191

1968, it must be mentioned, was a year of great significance for Nicolae Ceausescu in terms of

building his image as a Romanian nationalist. In the previous quote the reference to 'chains of

imperialist domination' articulated in opposition to 'state independence' was disseminated only three

months after Ceausescu's outright and public condemnation of the Soviet-led invasion of

Czechoslovakia in August.192 Thus the nuance of the speech on Transylvania could be read as an

anti-Soviet one. Putting the theory of socialism into a national historical context, in 1969 Ceausescu

went into greater detail on the meaning of the socialist nation:

The nation does not stop playing a role, even after the proletarian revolution. On the contrary,

the passage from capitalism to socialism sees the nation rise to a new and qualitatively

superior level. Based on the liquidation of exploitation and oppression, on the establishment

of social justice and equality, the socialist nation promotes the interests and the aspirations of

all classes and all members of society for the first time…channelling the energy of the people

in the direction of progress and prosperity. The formation of the Romanian nation is

illuminating in this regard, which due to foreign domination, took place in quite difficult

historical conditions. Only after the liberation of the country, and after the takeover of power

by the working class, could the energy and creative capacity of our nation be fully set free,

191
Nicolae Ceausescu, Expunere la sedinta jubilara a Marii Adunari Nationale, p. 25.
192
Nicolae Ceausescu, in Romania pe drumul desavirsirii constructiei socialiste, vol. 3, Bucharest,
Editura Politica, 1969, pp. 415-417.

106
 becoming a truly dynamic force for progress and civilisation in Romania.193

In the quotes that follow, I indicate that throughout the Ceausescu period, the emphasis on the

nation continued to become ever more pronounced. The discourse developed during the Ceausescu

era to become unambiguously concerned with the Romanian nation as the principal character and

purpose in the story of the workers’ movement. Until the late Dej era, discussed in earlier sections

of this chapter, the ‘nation’ was only very subtly evoked in party discourse noticeably, but

nevertheless tangentially, to indicate the required justification for an independent line on the basis

of the need to take account of specific conditions. At this point the discourse including the nation

alongside the workers was connected with the struggle in the language arena between the Romanian

party and the Soviet Union. However, it is clear from the Ceausescu period that the stronger accent

put on the nation was also tied to the question of autonomy by being part of a mobilising discourse

of development and welfare. ‘The nation’ was positioned in the discourse in a way that changed the

symbolic basis of the Romanian state from a state of the workers, to a socialist state of the

Romanian nation. In the title of one of Ceausescu's public speeches in 1982, he referred to the

'Historical Achievements of the Romanian People in the years of the construction of Socialism',

rather than referring to 'the working people', or just 'the people'.194 There is no doubt about the

meaning of the Romanian people, when we look at how this signifier is placed in another piece of

Ceausescu's discourse from around the same period:

I have said more than once in relation to the national problem that Romania has, besides the

Romanian people (my emphasis) other nationalities, such as the Germans, and the

193
Nicolae Ceausescu, Raportul Comitetului Central al Partidului Comunist Roman cu privire la
activitatea PCR in perioada dintre congresul al IX-lea si congresul al X-lea si sarcinile de viitor
ale partidului, 6 august 1969, Bucharest, Editura Politica, 1969, pp. 71-2.
194
See 'Realizarile istorice obtinute de poporul roman in anii constructiei socialiste', in Nicolae
Ceausescu, Raport la Conferinta Nationala a Partidului Comunist Roman, Bucharest, Editura
Politica, 1982, p. 10.

107
 Hungarians, who have lived side by side with the Romanian people for centuries.195

It should be mentioned that although there was an increased emphasis on 'the nation' as the basis of

socialism, and an ethnic distinction introduced to separate 'the people', Ceausescu did not label

ethnic minorities as 'enemies'. In this next quote, the emphasis on the national is also something that

is more general to communism according to Ceausescu:

To be a communist means to always be on the side of the peoples who are fighting for their

national independence.196

In the next quote, Ceausescu outlines the importance of 'traditions'. This can be read in the context

of accusations of 'dogmatism' and 'intellectualism' levelled against those (such as Ion Iliescu)197 who

took a more universalistic view of Marxism-Leninism:

In the organisation of education and of scientific activities there have been mistakes and

tendencies to neglect to take into account traditions and concrete conditions in Romania.198

It is necessary to understand that Marxism-Leninism is a set of teachings that is alive and that

is constantly being renewed; its revolutionary character lies in the fact that it is constantly

enriched with the scientific conclusions of social development, and that it does not elaborate

195
Nicolae Ceausescu, Expunere la consfatuirea de lucru a activului de partid din domeniul
ideologiei si al activitatii politice si cultural-educative, Bucharest, Editura Politica, 1971, pp. 29-
30.
196
See Nicolae Ceausescu, Plenara Comitetului Central al Partidului Comunist Roman, 3-5
noiembrie 1971, Bucharest, Editura Politica, 1971, pp. 24-5.
197
See Nicolae Ceausescu, Expunere la consfatuirea de lucru a activului de partid din domeniul
ideologiei si al activitatii politice si cultural-educative 9 iulie 1971, Bucharest, Editura Politica,
1971, p. 80.
198
See Nicolae Ceausescu, Plenara Comitetului Central al Partidului Comunist Roman, 3-5
noiembrie 1971, pp. 24-5.

108
 rigid theses, given once and for all, but helps to research and understand events in their new

economic, social, national, and historical context.199

After the 9th Party Congress in 1965, it became clear that communism as a nodal point was replaced

by ‘national independence and sovereignty’. For example, Ceausescu in his report to the congress

outlined the new ideology very clearly:

Life has fully confirmed the correctness of the policy of our Party of socialist

industrialisation, with the application of Marxist-Leninist teachings to the concrete conditions

of our country. The experience of the Romanian people, as well as the history of the

development of human society, demonstrates that industrialisation is the only way to achieve

progress and civilisation to raise the standard of living, and to assure in deed the national

independence and sovereignty.200

The party's policy, in the speech quoted from above, is socialist industrialisation, which had been its

policy from the moment the PCR took power. In more orthodox Marxist-Leninist discourses, such

as those of the earlier Dej era, the objective of socialist industrialisation is the development of a

socialist society. However, we can see that for Ceausescu the point of socialist industrialisation is

not the 'emancipation of the workers', but the building of 'national independence and sovereignty'.

We can also see that the line of the Party is clearly linked to development and the standard of living.

This had implications for the identity of ‘the people’. In the years between 1965 and 1989 ever

greater numbers of Romanians would become part of the mobilisation engendered by

industrialisation and urbanisation. The shift to the national connotations for ‘the people’ involved
199
See Nicolae Ceausescu, Plenara Comitetului Central al Partidului Comunist Roman, 3-5
noiembrie 1971, p. 36.
200
Nicolae Ceausescu, 'Raportul Comitetului Central al PCR cu privire la activitatea partidului in
perioada dintre congresul al VIII-lea si congresul al IX-lea al PCR', in Congresul al IX-lea al
Partidului Comunist Roman, 19-24 iulie, 1965, editura politica, Bucharest, 1965, p. 35.

109
their interpellation as participants in a siege inscribed in a heroic national narrative.

The invasion of Czechoslovakia by Soviet-led Warsaw Pact forces in August 1968 provided the

opportunity for Ceausescu to win a public profile as an heroic fighter in the cause of national

defence. His 1968 speech became a legend of heroism and risk taking.201 Ceausescu had by this time

assured himself of the tacit support of Western powers for his stance against Moscow’s interference

in East European states’ internal matters.202 While defending socialism, Ceausescu maintained the

1964 line of the Declaration that it was the business of independent states to define their paths to

socialism. Ceausescu went further to announce to the population that if the nation’s independence

was threatened, the Romanian people would be mobilised to defend their homeland from

aggressors:

Our relations with the socialist countries, as with all countries of the world, should be based

on respect for national independence and sovereignty, the full equality of rights, and the

principle of not interfering in internal affairs [of another state].203

The ‘patriotic guards’ were established as 'armed detachments of workers, peasants, and

intellectuals, defenders of the independence of our socialist homeland'204, thus a sort of reserve force

of civilians for the purpose of defending Romania against an attack. Although it was not specified

that an attack was expected from the Soviet Union, the Patriotic Guards were formed within days of

201
Nicolae Ceausescu, 1968 speech on the invasion of the Warsaw Pact, see Romania pe drumul
desavirsirii constructiei socialiste, vol. 3, Bucharest, Editura politica, 1969.
202
See Robert R. King, A History of the Romanian Communist Party, pp. 135-150.
203
Passage from Ceausescu's speech of 21 August 1968, delivered at a mass rally in Palace of the
Republic Square in Bucharest. Text of the speech partially cited in Dinu C. Giurescu, Istoria
Romaniei in Date, p. 602.
204
Passage from Ceausescu's 21 August speech cited in Katherine Verdery, National Ideology
Under Socialism, p. 123. Full text of speech in Nicolae Ceausescu, Romania pe drumul
desavirsirii constructiei socialiste, vol. 3, Bucharest, Editura Politica, 1969, pp. 415-417; See
also Dinu C. Giurescu, Istoria Romaniei in Date, p. 603.

110
Ceausescu's speech condemning the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.205 It is beyond any doubt

that this national defence stance assured Ceausescu a massive degree of public approval, which

meant that the regime felt secure that appealing to national solidarity was an efficient way to

mediate relations between the party and the public.206 The patriotic guards were a form of

mobilisation that were attached to increasingly nationalist exhortations to patriotic duty.

By 1969 the discourse had developed to the point where Marxist-Leninist doctrine was merely a

policy supplement to the needs of the Romanian nation. The Romanian communist party was now

portrayed as the liberator of the Romanian nation, the point of socialism being the method through

which the Romanian nation would become a truly free and sovereign entity. Whereas in previous

eras the Communist party had claimed to be the party of the workers of all nationalities against

fascism and bourgeois nationalism, now Ceausescu could claim that:

Many of those present in this room remember the situation in which Romania found itself as a

result of the anti-national policies (my emphasis) of the reactionary bourgeois-landowner

circles. In our country the last democratic liberties were liquidated and a military fascist

regime was installed, Romania being thrown into the arms of German imperialism and drawn

into a war against the Soviet Union.’207

Thus what was important in the Romanian struggle for socialism were policies that were anti-

205
See Decret privind constituirea, organizarea si functionarea garzilor patriotice, September 4
1968.
206
See Katherine Verdery, National Ideology Under Socialism, p. 123. Verdery claims that 'it is
true that after this speech thousands of Romanians flocked to join the Party who would never
have conceived of such a thing the day before.' Between 1965 and 1975 party membership
increased by one million. See Robert R. King, History of the Romanian Communist Party, p. 78.
207
Nicolae Ceausescu, 'Raportul Comitetului Central al Partidului Comunist Roman cu privire la
activitatea PCR in perioada dintre congresul al IX-lea si congresul al X-lea si sarcinile de viitor
ale partidului' in Congresul al X-lea al partidului Comunist Roman, 6-12 August, 1969, Editura
politica, Bucharest, 1969, p. 20.

111
national representing a radical departure.

The political context of the time is marked by Romania’s effort to draw away from Soviet

hegemony. This began with Gheorghe Gheorghiu Dej’s effort to avoid replacement as party leader

following Kruschev’s de-Stalinisation. However, the appointment of Ceausescu as party leader

confirmed the continuity of this line.208 Moreover, the nature of the PCR’s relations with the CPSU

and the other East European communist parties was also determined somewhat by the PCR’s policy

of heavy industrialisation which went against the Soviet Union’s directives and necessitated an

independent stance.

As has been discussed earlier in the chapter, the construction of the independent line was in tune

with the policy of Bucharest at the time to secure as much Western political support as possible.

This was viewed as a counter-balance to a possible intervention of the Soviet Union in Romania to

re-establish its hegemony, as it had proved willing to do in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia

in 1968. The 1969 party conference is significant in that it outlined clearly Romania’s independent

policy based on national sovereignty, allowing Ceausescu to do two things. Firstly Ceausescu could

wrap himself in the Romanian tricolour for the benefit of the anti-Russian Romanian public, by

appearing to stand up to Moscow, and thus appearing as a statesman fighting for national interests.

Secondly, the stand was designed and was successful in gaining support from countries such as

France and the United States.209 Indeed, Ceausescu’s public speech of reaction to the Warsaw Pact

invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 was exactly the opposite of the reaction of Dej to the invasion

of Hungary. Whereas Dej had followed a policy of justifying an independent line, friendship and a

measure of loyalty to Moscow was built into the discourse. However, Ceausescu openly criticised

208
See also Florin Constantiniu, O istorie sincera a poporului roman, p. 502.
209
Florin Constantiniu, O istorie sincera a poporului roman, pp. 506-10.

112
the Soviet Union and his rhetoric at that time called for vigilance against a possible attack on

Romanian sovereignty. Moreover, the theme of a foreign attack to destroy Romanian independence

and 'the national being' of the Romanians remained a central part of Party discourse until the last

days of the regime in 1989. Thus, 'the nation' was placed on one side of a political frontier, posited

against the vague threat to the independence of Romania.

Ceausescu continued during the 1970s to promote the national character of the Romanian state and

the national nature of Romanian socialism and of the Romanian Communist Party. For example, in

1974 at the Eleventh Party Congress of the PCR, the policies of the Party were credited with

helping to build 'national independence', as is shown by this next passage:

As a result if the unceasing application of our socialist policies - the basis of the development

of the whole economy, of the general progress of the country, and of insuring real national

independence - industrial production has risen in this period [since 1944] by around 30

times.210

Continuing the line of national independence, Ceausescu emphasised during the 1970s the national

goals of Romanian socialism, pointing to the welfare-providing achievements of Romanian

socialism. This is not surprising given that it is commonly accepted that the 1970s was a decade of

relative economic comfort for Romanians, in sharp contrast to the shock that awaited them with the

onset of the 1980s. Ceausescu claimed that the Party, while assuring national independence, was

also capable of providing welfare: 'We are able to affirm that…our Party has proved itself to be the

only party in the troubled history of Romania that has put above anything else the independence,

welfare and happiness of the whole people.'211

210
Nicolae Ceausescu, Raport la cel de-al XI-lea Congres al Partidului Comunist Roman,
Bucharest, Editura Politica, 1974, pp.7-8.
211
Nicolae Ceausescu, Raport la cel de-al XI-lea Congres al Partidului Comunist Roman, p. 11.

113
Referring to the Party's new programme, Ceausescu claimed that the 'programme of the Party can

be rightly named the 'Programme of the Romanian people to raise their country to new heights of

communist civilisation.'212 He went on to claim that:

It is for the first time that the Party has elaborated a programme for the future that has unitary

perspective, based on the theory of historical and dialectical materialism, from the

generalisation of the experience of other countries, applying creatively general truths,

universally valid, to the concrete historical, social and national conditions of Romania….In

the elaboration of the first programme of the Party it has been necessary to begin with an

appreciation of the history of our people, of its struggles for social progress, against national

and social oppression, against foreign domination, for the defence of the national existence,

for freedom, and for a better life.213

However, by the 1980s the continued articulation of the national interest as a means of appealing to

the Romanian public by invoking their need to sacrifice for the benefit of national independence

was beginning to show signs of crisis. In a speech in 1981 celebrating 60 years since the foundation

of the PCR, Ceausescu outlined the Party's mission in the most national terms possible. This

coincided with the beginning of the debt crisis and severe restrictions on consumption imposed on

Romanians by the Party:

Dear Comrades, The Romanian Communist Party is the inheritor and the bearer of the highest

traditions of the struggle of the popular masses for the formation of the Romanian people, for

the development of its own culture and language, for the affirmation of the Romanian nation
212
Nicolae Ceausescu, Raport la cel de-al XI-lea Congres al Partidului Comunist Roman, p. 99.
213
Nicolae Ceausescu, Raport la cel de-al XI-lea Congres al Partidului Comunist Roman, pp. 100-
101.

114
 and of the national unitary state - Romania. We are proud of and honour all those who have

fought and have given their lives for the affirmation and the liberty of our people. In this

spirit, last year we celebrated 2050 years since the formation of the first centralised state of

the Dacians, about whom the historians of that time said 'that they are the bravest and the

most just of all the Thracians.' Long and hard was the road travelled by the descendants of

Burebista and Decebal [Dacian tribal leaders, Burebista reigned from 80-44 BC, Decebal

from 87-106 AD] and after by the descendants [Romans] of Traian [Marcus Ulpius Trajanus,

98-117 AD.]. In the difficult struggles and in the co-existence for centuries between the

Dacians and the Romans a new people was formed [kneaded, s-a plamadit], that kept and

developed its own culture and the best virtues of its ancestors.214

Although the debt repayment programme that arguably launched the deepest crisis of Romanian

politics began in 1980, the second shock to the Ceausescu regime came in 1985. This was of the

ascension of Gorbachev to power in the Soviet Union, and the renunciation of the Brezhnev

doctrine of the assurance of Soviet military and material intervention to support East European

socialist regimes. As Gorbachev expressed in a speech to the CPSU Congress in 1988:

In the priority area of relations with the socialist countries, we, along with our friends, have

begun in a comradely manner to clean away the accretions of formalism and ostentation and

have actually linked the principles of equality, independence and non-interference with

objective reality - the diversity of national forms of socialist society. 215

214
Nicolae Ceausescu, 60 de ani de slujire devotata a poporului, de lupta pentru dreptate sociala
si libertate nationala, pentru construirea socialismului si ridicarea bunastarii maselor, pentru
independenta patriei, colaborare internationala si pace, Bucharest, Editura Politica, 1981, p. 7.
215
Mikhail Gorbachev, in Pravda, 27 May 1988, cited in Silvia Woodby, Gorbachev and the
Decline of Ideology in Soviet Foreign Policy, San Francisco and Boulder, Westview Press, 1989,
p. 101.

115
Ceausescu now relied heavily on a discourse that had become redundant. This was because the main

‘threat to national independence’ around which he had built his discourse and his image as protector

of the nation, that of Soviet intervention, had now evaporated.

At the PCR congress of 1984 another change in the party’s rhetorical strategies became clear and

can be related to the economic crisis and the consequences of the debt repayment programme.

Previous shifts towards ‘the nation’ clearly fit with the context I have posited of doctrinal conflict

over socialist internationalism with the Soviet Union. The 1980s saw the importance of internal

consent, as the regime’s image failed due to the economic crisis and the failure of the promises of

welfare. The 1980s nationalist discourse supplemented national development and the historical

necessity of the unity and independence of the Romanian nation with the idea of the struggle of the

Romanian nation against difficulties imposed by conditions external to the nation and the Party.

Our glorious communist party, which fulfils with honour it historical mission to organise and

guide the fight and the work of the Romanian people on the road to the construction of a new

regime, demonstrates through all of its activity that it works without hesitation in the vital

interests of the nation.216

The life of the Romanian nation thus became represented as an epic struggle, led by the Party.

It is clear that a shift in the balance of function of the Party discourse had taken place during the

1980s. The regime had to take account of growing social discontent with Party rule and the results

of the debt repayment policy, which reduced material conditions and the standard of living of

Romanians to appalling levels. And the contrast with Gorbachev’s reforming spirit following 1985

meant that, arguably for the first time in the history of Communist Romania, a Soviet leader became
216
Congresul al XIII-lea al PCR, 19-22 noiembrie 1984, Editura politica, Bucharest, 1985.

116
a symbol of discontent.

Although by 1989 this discourse was proven to have failed, as shown by the catastrophic demise of

the regime, the attempt symbolically to represent material suffering as a national struggle, and the

attempt to achieve a minimal level of consent by means of this discursive strategy are unmistakable.

By 1989, the epic proportions of the struggle of the Romanian nation were presented thus:

The Romanian people, which in its millenial existence has fought hard and heroic battles to

preserve and defend its own being, and which as never ever capitulated, has held the flag of

the struggle and has done everything to assure its future descendants the dignified and bright

future of our free country, independent and sovereign.217

Moreover only a few weeks before the downfall of the Ceausescu regime, the debt repayment

programme, which was partly the cause of much of the hatred for the regime, was presented in the

following terms:

The congress notes with full satisfaction and justified patriotic pride, the great victory of the

Romanian people - the liquidation in its entirety of the external debt - which demonstrates

eloquently the profoundly scientific policy of our party, and the potential and vitality of our

economy. For the first time in its entire multi-milenial history, Romania no longer pays tribute

to anyone, becoming truly independent, politically and economically.218

Ending the discussion of the Ceausescu era here, it is instructive to look at the final public discourse

217
Rezolutia Congresului al XIV-lea al Partidului Comunist Roman, Editura politica, Bucharest,
1989, p. 9.
218
Rezolutia Congresului al XIV-lea al Partidului Comunist Roman, Editura politica, Bucharest,
1989 p. 15.

117
of the Party leader, published in Romania Libera, on 21 December 1989. This gives us some of the

flavour of how the national defence discourse had expanded its chains of equivalence in an attempt

to forge Romanian national solidarity with the Party and with Ceausescu, by the invocation of

mysterious dangers and unnamed enemies:

It is the duty of all the citizens of the Socialist Republic of Romania to act with all the means

at their disposal against all those who, in the service of foreign interests, of espionage, of

reactionary imperialist circles, would sell the country for a handful of dollars or any other

money. We must give a firm response against those who want to dismember Romania, to

liquidate the integrity and independence of our homeland.219

References to territorial dismemberment can only be read as an attempt to mobilise national

solidarity against the threat of national irredentism, and an attempt to associate the events in

Timisoara with Hungarian nationalists. Occurring in the context of the rupture caused to the regime

by the events of December in Timisoara, Ceausescu gave a desperate, but utterly unsuccessful

response by attempting to appeal to Romanian national solidarity. However, Ceausescu’s Romanian

national solidarity discourse was already fatally subverted by two new empty signifiers, ‘Timisoara’

and ‘Revolution’.

6: Conclusion: Workers the nation and the symbolic basis of state sovereignty in Romania

This chapter has examined and documented the changing discursive strategies of the Romanian

socialist regimes between 1944 and 1989. Focusing on discourses concerning the nation, the study

has analysed the early period of proletcultist discourse in the late 1940s and early 1950s, a discourse

219
'Cuvintarea tovarasului Nicolae Ceausescu la posturile de radio si televiziune', in Romania
Libera, Bucharest, 21 December, 1989, p. 1.

118
of the socialist state based on the Stalinist ideological model. This was in sharp contrast to the

party’s ideological production from the late 1950s onwards. Specific attention has been given to the

definitive switch to the ‘nation’ which took place in 1965, changing the symbolic basis of state

sovereignty from the ‘workers’ to the ‘nation’. It was argued that the modification of this language

served two functions. Initially it attempted to build a symbolism of ‘independent socialist state

sovereignty’. Later, following the definitive shift in 1965, the ‘independent and sovereign’

discourse was founded on the Romanian nation, and not on the idea of the ‘workers state’. It was

argued that this was necessary for two reasons. Firstly, it provided a source of support for the Party

among the general public. Secondly, it formed part of Romania’s construction of its international

image as a maverick socialist state.

What this shows moreover is how social conflict was represented and domesticated by a hegemonic

articulation, in this case the attempt of the post-war Romanian regimes to paint a picture of reality

which offered individuals the choice of two ready-made subject positions, or identities. One was a

progressive identity, the other was a reactionary identity. The hegemony of the Romanian

Communist Party, or more precisely the ability of both Dej and Ceausescu to maintain dominance

within the Party partly relied on this ideologically produced over-simplification of the field of social

conflict, which was organised by the production of the political frontiers analysed in this chapter.

The crisis of the regime came when social conflict could no longer be convincingly represented or

effectively domesticated by Party discourse. In 1989, the Party fell victim to a social movement

motivated and interpellated by an identity based on a new positive chain of equivalence, that of the

Romanian people = freedom = Revolution, with the negative chain of equivalence on the other side

of the political frontier being Ceausescu, Socialism and the Party, = oppression of the Romanian

nation.

Chapter Three

119
Dislocation and the emergence of the myth of the revolution

1: Introduction: myth, ideology and power

We are living in a historic moment. The Ceausescu Clan, which brought the country to

disaster, has been eliminated from power….At this turning point we have decided to

found the National Salvation Front, which is supported by the Romanian Army and

which groups together all of the healthy forces of the country, irrespective of nationality,

all those groupings and organisations who rose up with courage to defend liberty and

dignity during the years of totalitarian tyranny.220

This chapter seeks to investigate the production of the myth of one of the most emblematic events

of 1989 - the Romanian revolution. It is argued that the Romanian revolution was the first

Romanian post-communist political myth to emerge to compete for hegemony. It was the first myth

to signify and give an ever-expanding range of meanings to the collapse of the Ceausescu order and

the future after Ceausescu.

In ‘The death and resurrection of the theory of ideology’221 Ernesto Laclau highlights an important

mechanism through which ideas or systems of ideas become ideology. The author describes how, in

a hypothetical third world country, nationalisation of basic industries is proposed. On its own,

nationalisation is just one of a number of means of running an economy. It becomes ideology when

it is rhetorically invoked in discourse to become ‘something more and different from itself; for

220
‘Comunicatul Catre Tara al Consiliului Frontului Salvarii Nationale’, read on Romanian
Television on 22 December 1989 and printed in Romania Libera, 23 December 1989. The main
people involved in the production of the text were Ion Iliescu, Petre Roman, Silviu Brucan and
Dumitru Mazilu. It was read on television by Ion Iliescu.
221
Ernesto Laclau, ‘The death and resurrection of the theory of ideology’, in Journal of Political
Ideologies, vol. 1, no. 3, 1996, pp., 201-220.

120
instance, the emancipation from foreign domination, the elimination of capitalist waste, the

possibility of social justice for excluded sections of the population, etc.’222

I cite Laclau’s article because it aids us in understanding the ideological processes that were at work

in the creation of the myth of the Romanian revolution, and the rhetorical strategy that transformed

this myth into part of an ideology, and into a temporarily hegemonic discourse. This mechanism is

central to an understanding of how the production of certain new images was a key component in a

process whereby power relations were reordered, and consent for the creation of a specific new

political order was forged.

In order to demonstrate this let us look again at the very first governing programme of the FSN, the

Comunicatul Catre Tara (Announcement to the Country), from which I quoted at the start of the

chapter. This communiqué, read out on television on 22 December, the day the FSN assumed

power, was the first statement that constituted ‘the revolution’ as part of a wider narrative that

articulated the future after Ceausescu. It was also the first statement to give meaning to the FSN as

the ‘grouping together’ of ‘all healthy forces’ opposed to the ‘Ceausescu clan’ and ‘against

tyranny’. The FSN inscribed 'the people' within a new chain of equivalence including ‘heroism’,

‘the Romanian Army’, ‘struggle’, ‘dignity’, and ‘uprising’.223 For example: 'On the tanks there were

soldiers in brotherhood with the citizens under the folds of the tricolour' was Adevarul's depiction of

a scene in central Bucharest on the 25 December 1989.224 Tied to this discourse is the FSN’s claim

to power. Iliescu in his New Year message of 31 December 1989 tied this popular unity to the FSN

thus:

222
Ernesto Laclau, ‘The death and resurrection of the theory of ideology’, p. 206.
223
Cited from 'Sprijinul intregii tarii', Adevarul, 26 December 1990; also 'Armata alaturi de
poporul, poporul alaturi de armata', Adevarul, 27 December 1989.
224
'Lupta crincena, eroism, munca, speranta!', Adevarul, 26 December, 1989.

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 The most remarkable fact of this revolutionary turning point is the wide consensus of the

whole people, expressed in the wide support for the platform of the National Salvation Front -

the expression of the will of the people for the renewal and reconstruction of Romania.225

Laclau points out that a signifier becomes ideology when it is invoked, or articulated together with

other signifiers, as ‘something more and different from itself.’226 In this chapter I show how the FSN

did exactly this as its leaders set about building the discourse of revolution into a myth – they

rhetorically invoked the FSN as meaning more than itself – emancipation, freedom, elimination of

tyranny, justice, and revolution.

In explaining how this came about, the chapter seeks to show what positive and negative images

were constructed during the period of dislocation, and how they formed the basis of the revolution

myth. I show how images of Ceausescu and his era were important negative components of the

Romanian myth of the revolution, as both the ‘other’ and at the same time, the ‘beginning’ of the

revolution. It was Ceausescu’s last speech from the balcony of the Central Committee building that

‘boiled the blood in the veins of the demonstrators.’227 The image of Ceausescu was used countless

times in this way to depict the moment when the ‘people’s anger spilled over into revolution’.228

On the other hand, a combination of articulations involving images of ‘the Romanian people’, the

‘National Salvation Front’ and ‘the Army’ was also of great significance in delimiting the political

meaning of the revolution. These images were used to define the Romanian revolution by defining

what it was and what it was not. More than this, the image of Ceausescu, as I show later in the

225
Ion Iliescu, New Year Speech broadcast 31 December 1989, published in 'Discursul rostit cu
prilejului anului nou de presedintele Consiliului Frontului Salvarii Nationale Ion Iliescu, la
posturile romanesti de radio si televiziune.', Adevarul, 4 January 1990.
226
Ernesto Laclau, ‘The death and resurrection of the theory of ideology’, p. 206.
227
See ‘Ceasuri de Speranta’ (Hours of Hope), Romania Libera, 23 December, 1989.
228
‘Uriasa izbinda a poporului’ Romania Libera, 23 December 1989.

122
chapter, was one of the keys to understanding the political frontiers that characterised Romanian

politics during the period when the revolution myth entered into crisis. Ideological conflict over the

meaning of Ceausescu and the communist past in general became one of the principal political

battlegrounds of the early 1990s.

In 1989 images of Ceausescu became the negative other of the discourse of Romanian popular unity

that emerged as the main discursive strategy of the National Salvation Front in response to the

dislocation that occurred during the events of the revolt. Later, as the political frontiers created

around the popular unity discourse of the National Salvation Front began to break down, the

signifiers of ‘Ceausescu’ and ‘communism’ were increasingly a focus of dispute. The signifier of

‘communism’ was not attached to the signifier of ‘Ceausescu’ in the negative chain of equivalence

in the FSN discourse that built the political frontier. It later became attached by the newly formed

opposition to a negative chain of equivalence linking Ceausescu, communism and the FSN. I argue

that the contested meaning of Ceausescu was at the centre of the eventual crisis of the myth of the

revolution.

The chapter describes and analyses the formation of the myth of the revolution and the stark popular
political frontier that the National Salvation Front succeeded in building in the weeks following 22
December 1989, before the myth entered into crisis. This is an important period to analyse, in order
to understand how the myth became for a time dominant, and to understand the later conditions in
which the myth began to weaken and enter into crisis.

The chapter is organised in several sections. In the following section, I describe the factual context
of the revolutionary period (15 December 1989-20 May 1990). In section three, I discuss the
problems associated with studying the Romanian revolution, contrasting my approach with other
accounts. I show how the myth of the revolution, in building a new political frontier, was based on a
populist discourse that allowed the FSN to harness support for its rule. In a section devoted to the
symbol of Ceausescu, I focus on the centrality of the demonisation of the negative other in the
production of this myth. I then go on to analyse how the revolution was transformed from an object
of discourse into a myth, looking at its attachment to an expanding series of signifiers. I look at the
role of the ‘terrorist threat’ as an opportunity for the FSN to demobilise demonstrators involved in
the revolt, and as a platform for the FSN’s claim to authority. A final section concludes.

123
2: The context of the revolution

In this section I outline some of the key events of this period, which is known as the Romanian
revolution. I concentrate on events that took place between 15 December 1989 and 20 May 1990,
when the first elections took place.

During the demonstrations in Timisoara detailed in Chapter One, Petre Roman was among the
demonstrators who entered the Central Committee and from the balcony he announced the fall of
the dictatorship. On the afternoon of 22 December the newly-formed FSN announced its
assumption of power,229 effectively taking control of the mass media, and taking over the army as
well as all other state institutions.

On the afternoon of the same day, however, a series of violent acts labelled ‘the counter-revolution
of the terrorists’ began. According to the FSN and the army, these events, which lasted until 1
January 1990, were led by units of the security service, though it is still unclear who the ‘terrorists’
really were and what form their actions took. In response to the ‘terrorist threat’, the FSN called on
the solidarity of the population, but the new chief of the army, General Stefan Gusa, told the
population to ‘withdraw’ from the streets in order to allow the army to deal with the threat.230 The
events of the revolution remain controversial to this day. Before 22 December 1989, 160 people
died and 1107 people were injured in the anti-Ceausescu demonstrations. Following the FSN’s rise
to power on 22 December, 944 people died and 2214 were injured during the army’s campaign
against the ‘terrorists’.231

Prior to the elections of May 1990, several key events occurred. The first of these events was the
execution of the Ceausescu couple on Christmas day, following a hasty military tribunal in which
they were found guilty of genocide, of undermining the state and the economy and of attempting to
flee abroad. On 26 December, the FSN issued a decree abolishing several laws, including the law
forbidding abortion and several censorship laws. On 27 December they established the legal basis
for local administrative organs.

Between the end of December and the end of January 1990, the most important new political parties
were formed. These included the UDMR (Democratic Union of Hungarians from Romania), the
PNTcd (National Christian Democratic Peasant Party), the PNL (National Liberal Party) and the
FSN (which transformed itself into a party on 23 January). The FSN announced on 23 January that
it would run in free elections to be held on 20 May 1990. Following this announcement, the
Provisional Council for National Unity (CPUN) was formed as the provisional government by 112
members of the FSN, 27 members representing national minorities and three members of the
AFDPR (Association of Former Political Prisoners).

The date of 23 January marked the end of revolutionary unity. The FSN’s announcement that it
would participate in the May elections produced a bitter division. The election campaign was
marred by a great deal of violence, and a massive demonstration against the FSN lasted through the
229
See 'Comunicatul Catre Tara.'
230
Dinu C. Giurescu, Istoria Romaniei in date, Bucharest, Editura Enciclopedica, 2003 p. 744.
231
Dinu C. Giurescu, Istoria Romaniei in date, p. 745.

124
election period, from April until June. The main FSN policies during the period when it dominated
the provisional government were to abolish laws associated with Ceausescu, to increase
consumption, to increase wages, and to keep prices down.232 As detailed in the next chapter, the
results of the parliamentary elections were an overwhelming victory for the FSN.

3: Redefining the problematic: Revolution as discourse

In the only major English-language monograph on Romanian post-communist politics, Tom

Gallagher documents the dramatic nature of the popular revolt in Timisoara, the events of the

revolution, and the coming to power of the FSN. 233 His account is based upon two assumptions that

should be closely re-examined. Firstly it attempts to categorise the revolt and the revolution as anti-

Communist.234 Secondly, he sees the arrival of the FSN to power as somehow distorting the course

the ‘revolution’. He alleges that they deliberately downplayed its status as a revolution.235

These broad concerns form part of a narrative of the Romanian revolution that largely dovetail with

the Romanian opposition counter-myth of the revolution as it was disseminated to contest the FSN

version.236 This interpretation is also shared by other authors.237 The opposition characterised the

events as an anti-communist popular uprising. They claimed that the uprising had been hijacked by

a group of leading communist party apparatchiks, who successfully deployed the symbols of the

revolution, mainly due to their control of the means of mass communication, to lie to the people,
232
Stan Stoica, Romania 1989-2002, O istoria cronologica, Bucharest, Editura Meronia, 2002, pp.
17-18, 21.
233
Tom Gallagher, Romania After Ceausescu: The Politics of Intolerance, Edinburgh, Edinburgh
University Press, 1995.
234
See Tom Gallagher, Romania after Ceausescu, p. 73 where he mentions the ‘anti-regime
demonstrators’ in Timisoara between 15 and 20 December 1989. The most that the
demonstrators became in Timisoara before the fall of Ceausescu was anti-Ceausescu
demonstrators.
235
‘The NSF [FSN] placed itself at the head of the revolutionary movement the better to contain it’,
in Tom Gallagher, Romania after Ceausescu, p.73.
236
See Dan Pavel and Iulia Hossu, 'Nu putem reusi decat impreuna': O istorie analitica a
Conventiei Democratice, 1989-2000, Iasi, Editura Polirom, 2003, pp. 62-109.
237
See, for example, Minton F. Goldman, Revolution and Change in Central and Eastern Europe:
Political, Economic, and Social Challenges, New York and London, M.E. Sharpe, 1997, p. 278-
282, who stresses continuities between the FSN and the Ceausescu regimes.

125
and distort the truth of the revolution.238 According to this account, this was carried out so that the

FSN could pretend to be a revolutionary organisation while installing a neo-communist order.239

This representation of the events raises some problematic issues for the researcher of Romanian

politics today. Such a narrative seeks to provide a historically objective analysis based on a

constructed division between a ‘true’ revolution (which was hijacked) and a ‘false’ one. 240 The false

one was imposed by means of a campaign to instil a false consciousness to mask what was actually

taking place (communist restoration).241 This is a highly partisan account that is also the account of

the Romanian ‘opposition’ between 1990 and 1996.242 As Tismaneanu has observed, ‘in the opening

months of 1990, the self-appointed Council of the National Salvation Front (NSF), with Iliescu as

its leader, ruled Romania. Political parties, movements, and civic associations emerged. Critical

intellectuals called for rapid decommunization and lambasted the Iliescu team’s efforts to stay in

power, accusing the NSF of hijacking the revolution and establishing a “crypto-communist”

regime.’243

These accounts also raise questions concerning the focus of existing research, which has tended to

avoid closer analysis of the thorny, politicised issue of consent for the new regime. Most analyses

look at the rise to power of the FSN as involving a neo-communist effort to prevent change. This

effort is seen as taking advantage of a democratically immature or uneducated electorate, involving

238
Vladimir Tismaneanu, Stalinism for All Seasons, p. 234.
239
Gallagher’s account conforms to this narrative.
240
Peter Siani-Davies, for example, investigates whether the Romanian revolution was a revolution
or a coup d’etat, concluding that it is too early to tell. Peter Siani-Davies, ‘Romanian Revolution
or Coup d’etat?: A Theoretical View of the Events of December 1989’ in Communist and Post-
Communist Studies, Vol. 29, no. 4, pp. 453-465.
241
‘In 1989, Ion Iliescu, who scorned Ceausescu but believed in a reformed communist Romania,
succeeded Ceausescu as head of the state bureaucracy….Many old faces, such as Iliescu,
remained in power, after skillfully donning new masks.’, in Vladimir Tismaneanu, Stalinism for
All Seasons, p. 233-234; See also Milton F. Goldman, Revolution and Change, p. 278.
242
See Tom Gallagher, Romania after Ceausescu, p. 73-74.
243
Vladimir Tismaneanu, Stalinism for All Seasons, p. 234.

126
‘millions of people, particularly poorly-educated ones living in small towns and villages’.244 Often a

political culture based on clientelism rather than democratic values, or a historical tendency of

Romanian political culture towards authoritarianism, are cited to account for popular support for the

FSN. Misha Glenny, for example, writing in one of the first pieces to be published about Romania

following the revolution claims that the ‘conservative, politically uneducated’ Romanian ‘working

class’ was effectively bought off by the FSN welfare policies, ‘ready to believe politicians who give

cast-iron promises of social security.’245 The problem with this type of explanation is that the

existence of widespread support or consent for the FSN regime is not examined in sufficient detail.

Glenny even suggests that the results of the election were so overwhelming in their support of the

FSN that they were ‘an indication of a very unhealthy sociological balance.’246

These accounts, moreover, do not help us in explaining how the FSN took power, and how they
succeeded in holding on to that power after elections in May 1990. The causal factors they cite are
largely the ‘poorly-educated people’ and the FSN-dominated media campaign of ‘distortion’247.
This type of explanation also builds a dichotomy between the ‘bad’ FSN and the ‘good’ opposition.
Goldman refers to the opposition political parties as the ‘democratic parties’ in his account of
Romania that casts the FSN as undemocratic and with ‘a neo-communist bent’.248

The overwhelming victory of the FSN in the parliamentary elections was crowned by an even more
overwhelming victory of the FSN leader Ion Iliescu for the country’s presidency. I argue that these
elections provide proof of a high level of consent for the leadership of Ion Iliescu, and justify a re-
examination of how this level of consent was produced. I do not rely on causal explanations that are
supported by the supposed social or educational backwardness of the Romanian electorate. I claim
that in order to have a better understanding of the victory of the FSN and the importance of symbols
of revolution, it is necessary to look in more detail at the discourses surrounding these events in
their context.

It is my contention that the FSN succeeded in building consent for its regime and its policies. These

policies were marked by their difference from the pattern of transition in other Central European

244
See Tom Gallagher, Romania after Ceausescu, p. 100.
245
See Misha Glenny, The Rebirth of History: Eastern Europe in the Age of Democracy, London,
Penguin, 1990, p. 102.
246
Misha Glenny, The Rebirth of History, p. 99.
247
Tom Gallagher, Romania after Ceausescu, p. 100.
248
Milton F. Goldman, Revolution and Change, pp. 281 and 279.

127
countries, particularly with regard to privatisation of state enterprises.249

In order to understand how this consent was forged, and thus how it allowed the FSN to govern,

without relying on stereotypes depicting the authentic meaning of the revolution, it is important to

investigate the actual symbolic construction of the politics of the time. As I argue in this chapter,

the FSN succeeded in building and then expanding the myth of the revolution as the primary

surface of inscription for a wide array of social demands and positions. The research in this chapter

has therefore been guided by the following questions:

1) How did the FSN succeed in harnessing itself to the symbols of the revolt?

2) How did this emerge as a myth of 'the revolution'?

3) How did this provide a basis for building and maintaining consent?

4) How did they succeed in largely marginalising the emerging opposition?

A discourse theory perspective allows us to approach the question of the Romanian revolution from

a different perspective by focusing on the production of meaning and through this the production of

political power. This points to the impossibility of stabilising the objective meaning of the

revolution. This study relies on the category of dislocation, in this case the dislocation that occurred

during the collapse of the Ceausescu imaginary discussed in the previous chapter. From our

perspective, the revolution represented a series of events of a type that could only emerge during the

collapse of a regime. During this period of dislocation a space opened up for the articulation of new

narratives to give meaning to, or to vie for, the position of dominant or principal of reading of
249
See for example, Karen Henderson and Neil Robinson, Post-Communist Politics: An
Introduction, London, Prentice Hall, 1997, pp. 219-221; Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, (eds.)
The Consolidation of Democracy in East Central Europe, Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 1997, p. 9, and p. 15, for discussion of the specificities of the Romanian case; See Ivan T.
Berend, Central and Eastern Europe 1944-1993: Detour from the Periphery to the Periphery,
Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 331-333 where he discusses Romanian exceptionalism
from an economic perspective.

128
politics and society that were to follow the collapse of the Ceausescu political edifice. Thus, the

question addressed by this chapter concerns the discourses and contextual factors that allowed one

of a multitude of narratives of the revolution to emerge as the most politically relevant, that is with

the force to re-order power relations and build a new consent. It is quite clear that the FSN assumed

power on 22 December.250 What is important to reiterate is the argument of this chapter that the

FSN built its political identity around the myth of the revolution and that, aided by the alleged

‘terrorist threat’, they were in a position to build consent for their authority. The FSN did become

the torchbearer of the popular uprising, but this symbolism was unambiguously tied to its claim to

exercise authority. My account also stresses the need to consider the popular nature of the consent

that the FSN succeeded in creating.

In the next section, I begin my empirical analysis of the revolution discourses by examining ‘the

others’ of the Romanian revolution. The use of symbols of Ceausescu was crucial to the

construction of a positive image for the FSN. The theme of the ‘threat to the revolution’ was

encapsulated by the discourse of the counter-revolutionary terrorist threat launched by die-hard

renegade supporters of Ceausescu from the Securitate, a narrative disseminated by the FSN and the

army. I show how this discourse was important in keeping the threat of Ceausescu’s return in the

air, and how it displaced attention from the new leaders.

4: Ceausescu as the ‘other’ of popular solidarity and the image of the ‘counter-revolution’ by the

terrorists

In this section I elaborate the means through which images of Ceausescu and the ‘terrorists’ were

used together in expanding the FSN’s populist political frontier. I also suggest how the drama of the

‘terrorist’ threat temporarily focused attention away from the FSN leadership. Drawing on the
250
‘Comunicatul Catre Tara’.

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discourse of the time, I show how the line dividing ‘good’ from ‘bad’ was maintained.

In terms of the link between myth, ideology and power, I claim that the image of Ceausescu was

extremely important for different reasons at different times following the revolution. During the

period of the revolution, while the FSN were consolidating their power, symbols of ‘the uprising’

were already being inserted into a narrative of ‘the people and the FSN’ fighting against ‘the

Ceausescu clan’. This shows how a political frontier was built, and how this political frontier was at

the centre of the myth of the revolution constructed by the FSN to justify its act of assuming power

in the name of ‘the people’. Thus, the examination of the political act of constructing a symbolic

frontier shows the link that can be made between the construction of myths and the establishment of

particular forms of political domination. In this case, symbols of Ceausescu were used in an

interpellative mechanism that succeeded in building consent for a new domination. This is also how

the identity of the FSN was built, by constructing a link between a small group of people (the FSN)

and ‘the people’, by claiming that ‘The programme of the National Salvation Front is to establish

democracy, liberty and dignity for the Romanian people.’251 It must be borne in mind that a

dislocation is also a moment of confusion, as is shown by the transcript of the television broadcasts

on 22 December. The events were named as a ‘revolution’ on national television just hours before

the announcement of the establishment of the National Salvation Front.

I argue that this involved linking a series of signifiers into a myth that included a series of

interpellations as a principle of reading of the revolution. Since Ceausescu was quickly and

convincingly constructed as the principal problem, the revolution and the FSN came along and

‘together with the people and the army eliminate[d] him from power’.252 So that the revolution

251
'Comunicatul Catre Tara'.; cf. ‘NOI SINTEM POPORUL!’ (WE ARE THE PEOPLE!),
Romania Libera, 23 December 1989.
252
‘Comunicatul Catre Tara'.

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could continue, it was necessary for ‘all state power to be taken over by the FSN’. 253 This rhetoric

also had within it a call for the recently mobilised demonstrators to demobilise. This was possible

because of two interpellations that are very interesting. One is that the dictator fled from the fury of

the people (but implicitly not from the fury of the FSN). But the second point is more interesting.

While interpellating people to defend the revolution from the terrorists seemed to be a mobilising

discourse, it was in fact a subtle interpellation to allow the FSN-led army to assume revolutionary

authority from ‘the people’. The FSN called on people to defend the revolution, but the army told

them to withdraw from the streets. This was constructed as the taking over of the power of the

revolt in order to organise counter-terrorism measures ‘to protect the people’. The existence of the

‘terrorists’ suddenly produced the necessity for ‘order and discipline’, and subordination to the

interpellations of the Council of the Front of National Salvation, led by Ion Iliescu. It became

extremely dangerous to be out of doors. Iliescu called on the people, saying that:

the greatest danger at the moment would be an outbreak of anarchy. There are already signs

that disorganised and undisciplined group of citizens are destroying shops and smashing

windows. This is not a good sign for change because the transformations that are taking place

today in this country need the people to act as a disciplined and organised force so that it can

be seen that here order is being made.254

On the other side, ‘the people’ and now had a momentary new identity as ‘revolutionaries’ during

the dislocation, and who might have been possible to lead in other ways, since a number of

discourses of popular sovereignty were circulating at the time.255 The discourse of the FSN
253
‘Comunicatul Catre Tara’.
254
Television address by Ion Iliescu, 22 December, 1989, cited in Revolutia Romana in Direct,
Bucharest, TVR, 1990, p. 46.
255
See Dinescu’s interpellations to the people on Romanian TV on 22 December to participate in a
kind of united front, by sending delegations to Bucharest. This took place before the arrival of an
army representative, Mihai Lupoi, and the slightly later announcement of the formation of the
FSN and the 'Comunicatul Catre Tara' of the FSN which claimed a revolutionary mandate,

131
confirmed the fall of Ceausescu, and the drama on the TV also removed large numbers of people

from the streets to their living rooms and their televisions. Therefore the binary division between

the ‘Ceausescu clan’ and ‘the revolution’ was a constructed narrative which signalled the end of the

need for continued demonstrations. This division based on the negative chain of equivalence linking

Ceausescu to a ‘clan’ and a ruling ‘clique’ was expanded on the afternoon of 22 December to

include ‘the terrorists’. Initially the interpellation to 'the people’ to keep order and give way to the

army to ‘do its duty’ called on demonstrators to remember that the ‘world is watching’.256

Later in the afternoon, around 5pm, gunfights began between the army and ‘the counter-

revolutionary terrorists’. The FSN interpellated the public in such a way as to invest them with the

power to take things further and to protect the hard won gains of the revolution by being organised

and disciplined’. ‘The people’ needed to let the army fight the 'terrorists', and to trust the army since

it was under the control of the anti-Ceausescu FSN.

In a television broadcast on 22 December presenter Petre Popescu called on the people to remain

calm in the face of the 'terrorist threat' and to allow the FSN and the army to deal with the situation:

Dear viewers, in the course of this evening, the Committee of National Salvation will meet in

order to establish the first measures to maintain order in the period between the dictatorship

and democracy. We make an appeal to the military units that if the population leaves the

grounds of the television station, the army will defend our institution, that, as you see, has an

important role in the consolidation of the victory of the people through the news that we are

communicating to you. We again appeal to the whole population of the country, to the young

although the distinction is not apparent unless one looks closely at the structures of the
interpellations made on the day. See Revolutia Romana in Direct and ‘Communicatul Catre
Tara’.
256
Military spokesperson Mihai Lupoi, speaking for the army on television on 22 December, 1989,
cited in Revolutia Romana in Direct, p. 29.

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 and the elderly, to men and women, regardless of political affiliation or profession, to be

calm, to contribute to peace and order, that are more necessary now than ever in order to

consolidate this victory of the people and for the destruction of the dictatorship.257

A spokesman for the army, Mihai Lupoi, called on 'the people' to allow the army to pass in

armoured vehicles in order to defend the television station, the Central Committee, and the

telephone building:

I have a communication from the National Defence Committee [army]. Because of recent

developments, special measures have been taken in order to control and defend the radio and

television, the Central Committee, the Palace of the Republic, and the telephone building.

You must understand that these buildings are vital to the functioning of the country. For this

reason, the army will send armoured vehicles in order to defend these places…these targets.

Their aim is not aggressive. They will carry tricolour flags. You will be able to recognise

them by these flags. They will not shoot on the population. Make it possible for them to

occupy the sites that they must defend. If you create disorder, if you are not with us, and you

do not help us, then you will see that the blood has flowed for nothing. Do not forget that you

have spilled your blood for a just cause. Help us to take this to a conclusion. And to try the

guilty.258

The terrorist threat thus represented an interpellation on the basis of a fear of the possible

restoration to power of ‘the Ceausescu Clan’.

In symbolic terms the revolution was not over when the take-over of power by the FSN was
257
Revolutia Romana in Direct, p. 66.
258
Address by Mihai Lupoi in television, 22 December, 1989, Revolutia Romana in Direct, pp. 63-
4.

133
announced on Romanian TV on 22 December 1989. The popular revolt had largely ended, but the

revolution as myth continued after the flight of Ceausescu as a battle between the ‘forces of the

people’ and the ‘forces of Ceausescu’. In analysing the 'Comunicatul Catre Tara' it is clear that the

FSN was claiming power and that it was supported by the army, which had been inserted into the

chain of equivalence including ‘the people’ as late as 22 December.

The threat from security forces loyal to Ceausescu was presented to the public as battles between

the ‘terrorists’ who were supposedly randomly assassinating the people in the hope of saving the

Ceausescu regime, versus the National Salvation Front and the 'loyal' army trying to protect the

people from a restoration of the Ceausescu regime.

Press reports emphasised the beastly nature of the 'terrorists' and their activities. They were depicted

as mad and bloodthirsty, and as being willing to stoop to any method in order to create panic and to

harm the people, hoping to salvage the odious regime through murder:

They shot into the apartments of peaceful people, resulting in many child victims. The

children were playing at home, but the beasts were firing without the most basic judgement or

reason. The first days of the children's holiday were stained with blood. During the days of the

revolution, next to the army, the youth and people of good faith did not get frightened, they

went out into the street to contribute to the victory that came at such a high price.259

The resistance of some elements loyal to the odious dictatorship do not limit themselves to

gunshots, fired from who knows which hiding place, but have turned to circulating rumours,

attempts to poison the souls of the young people and to provoke vendettas and revenge.260

259
'Recviem pentru copii revolutiei', Adevarul, 26 December, 1989.
260
'Demnitatea tineretii' Adevarul, 28 December, 1989.

134
The army, under orders from the FSN, was empowered to take measures to protect the people from

attack. In emotive contemporary press reports, the people were represented as being unified in their

disgust towards these events and in their support of the FSN's fight against the 'terrorists'. At the

same time as being presented as revolutionary fighters, they were also presented as innocent victims

of a battle between the army and the 'terrorists', who were attempting to attack the headquarters of

the army:

In front of the building of the Ministry of National Defense, passers-by, over a thousand

people, watch by the light of day the hallucinogenic results of the fighting from last night.

Here, a group of terrorists, heavily armed and cornered, attempted in their madness to storm

the ministry building. They killed innocent people. They forcibly entered into people's

apartments. They fired without pity. Now, their bodies, or at least what remains of their

bodies, can be found spread around of the concrete, torn apart by the bullets of the soldiers.

From among the peaceful people, now an individual, with the movements of a cornered

lizard, is attempting to escape. He's caught. And held down. Tied by a stocking to his right

leg, there was found a loaded pistol. There was also a full round of bullets in his belt. There is

only one just judgement for the criminals - that of the people.261

The shadows of the evening have fallen. Around the blocks of flats there is agitation. The

inhabitants are beginning their rounds on the night guard against the infiltration of the

terrorists. It is the fourth night of tension. In some places there can be heard gunshots. But it

won't be much longer - the heads of the hydra are falling one after another. The final victory,

peace, is so near.262

261
'Vii si morti, ciracii ucigasi', Adevarul, 26 December, 1989.
262
'Incontinuare, pe frontul luptei, pe frontul munci', Adevarul, 26 December, 1989.

135
The presentation of 'the people' as victims being defended from the 'terrorists' by the strategy of the

FSN had practical political consequences. The FSN began to issue directives and instructions to the

people on how to protect themselves and the revolution from the 'terrorists':

Citizens are asked to understand one thing and we are sure that they will understand this with

the same devotion with which they won and defended the revolution. Petrol stations and

petrol stores are objectives that the terrorists have in their sights. Added to this, we make

another statement. Citizens who have stocked quantities of petrol are asked to take them out

of their houses and off their balconies and to put them in a safe place so that they do not

become the target of the terrorist bullets.263

The series of events in December involving ‘terrorists’ are in fact a direct interpellation to ‘the

people’ to take the side of the FSN and the army. It is a direct call for the necessity of unity with the

FSN as a political force, given the continued existence of a common negative other. But given the

demobilising aspect of the call for solidarity, it is in fact an interpellation that was one of the first

symbolic bases upon which consent for the rule of the FSN was built.

It is perhaps surprising in an analysis of the transition from communism in Romania to nominate

Ceausescu as one of the most important images in the building of post-communist political order,

but he and his era were undoubtedly so. This is because the Romanian revolution was first

conceived as the overthrow of the Ceausescu era rather than of communism. Thus the symbol of

Ceausescu functioned as the negative ‘other’ of the revolution.

From the moment the Ceausescu regime began to crumble, negative images of the leader were
263
'Batjocura cu benzina a luat sfirsit', Adevarul, 26 December, 1989.

136
constructed and used as a means of separating the present from the past, and creating a specific

mythological image of the salvation of the revolution.264 For example, a report in Adevarul on 31

December 1989 evoked the image of Ceausescu speaking thus:

No-one has of course forgotten, although it is not a pleasure for anyone to remember, how we

used to begin our new year: on TV they announced with sombre tones that the miserable N.

C. [Nicolae Ceausescu], who for almost an hour syllabified the same stupid, insipid text,

telling year on year the same lies and empty promises. This year the text mentioned was read

in the same sombre atmosphere, only ten days earlier than usual - he always had a mania for

fulfilling [things] before the deadline. Upon seeing his odious face, disfigured by fear, we all

knew that now his moments were numbered, that his time had come.265

Similarly, Petre Roman depicted the monstrosity of the regime as emanating from Ceausescu's

personal construction of an apparatus of repression and terror: 'It is very difficult for you to imagine

what monstrous apparat, equal to the monstrosities of his regime, that Nicolae Ceausescu

constructed in order to spy on and to terrorise this people, us.' 266 Orha Petru, writing in Adevarul,

also described the horrors of the former regime in very personal terms as 'the cruel dictatorship

imposed by the odious Ceausescu family and by their numerous clan who were hungry for titles,

power, and the good life in our country'.267

This was a period of dislocation in which new political identities were being constituted, and thus

negative images of Ceausescu played a role in functioning as the negative other of the new

identities, for example ‘ceausist’ or ‘securist’ as opposed to ‘revolutionar’ or ‘democrat’.

264
Gabriela Adamesteanu, ‘Prefata’, in Raoul Girardet, Mituri si Mitologii Politice, Iasi, Editura
Institutul European, 1997, p. vii.
265
'La multi ani, demnitate! La multi ani, democratie', Adevarul 31 December, 1989.
266
'Cuvintul rostit de primul - ministru Petre Roman', Adevarul, 27 December, 1989.
267
'Cuvintul liber al cetateanului liber', Adevarul, 30 December, 1989.

137
‘The revolution’ was the political myth that emerged temporarily to address all of the political and

economic crises facing Romania. ‘The revolution’ was necessary because, according to the negative

imagery of revolution discourse, these crises were all attributable to Ceausescu. The image of

Ceausescu contributed to the narrative of the revolution’s sufficiency in dealing with all social

problems through the elimination of Ceausescu. His elimination from power would lead to ‘justice’,

‘freedom’ and ‘welfare’. This is corroborated by a reading of the articulations that interpellate ‘the

people’ to identify with the revolution. The single goal was to get rid of Ceausescu. The following

quotation shows how Iliescu himself constructed the singular guilt of Ceausescu in emotive terms:

The regime…was responsible for the catastrophic socio-economic situation of the country

and for the political tension and is in the final instance guilty of the hated crimes against the

people. The principal guilty party is Ceausescu (Voice from off - ‘It is so!’) This man,

without heart, soul, brain (Voice from off - ‘reason’) without reason…Because the mad

clique of Ceausescu pushed us into chaos and disorder. Our people must demonstrate

maturity in these moments so that we can reorganise ourselves on a democratic basis. We

will form in the course of today a Committee of National Salvation that will begin to impose

order…(applause). I call now, it is 2.45pm…to those responsible to come to the Central

Committee at around 5pm, who can engage in this great work of construction that we must

start beginning from today.268

Iliescu’s narrative above shows how some of the central elements of the revolution myth were

linked from the beginning. Ceausescu and the ‘mad Ceausescu clique’ are responsible for the

‘catastrophe’, ‘chaos’, and ‘disorder’. In a phrase reminiscent of the communist era, he was also
268
Ion Iliescu, Speaking on Romanian television for the first time during the revolution, 14.45, 22
December 1989. Cited in Revolutia Romana in Direct Full transcript of broadcasts from 10.50, 22
December 1989 - 0.00, 23 December, 1989.

138
responsible for ‘crimes against the people’. To solve this situation requires ‘order’, ‘maturity’ and a

‘Committee of National Salvation’ to re-impose ‘order’. Part of the imposition of order was the

execution of the Ceausescus. Popular justice was dispensed, relying on juridical terminology from

the Romania of the late 1940s. There were five main areas in which Ceausescu’s culpability was

established:

1. Genocide (60,000 victims)

2. Undermining of the power of the state by organising armed action against the people

3. Destruction of the patrimony

4. Undermining of the national economy

5. An attempt to flee the country in order to reach more than one billion dollars salted away in

foreign banks269

Not only was the terminology reminiscent of communist-style accusations, but the charges depicted

a classic ‘enemy of the people’.

Silviu Brucan, a prominent and powerful figure in the FSN, continued the demonisation of

Ceausescu, who was singularly guilty according to the picture of the communist monarchy, that was

strangely characterised as feudal and absolutist:

What sense did it have to talk about socialism, a socialist state, or a socialist republic in a

country ruled by a type of absolutist monarchy, belonging, historically, to feudalism, and in

which per capita GDP was and is three or four times smaller than in West European

countries that are part of the capitalist system. In this context, only an uncultivated idiot like

Nicolae Ceausescu would dare to talk about communism as if it was just waiting around the
269
Information from 'Comunicat'', Adevarul, 26 December 1989.

139
 corner, waiting only for us to hold out our hand to it!270

The above quotation is one of many that painted an image of Ceausescu as the idiot, absolutist

leader, which is common in revolutionary and post-revolutionary discourse.271 What is interesting

about the article from which this passage comes is first of all that the author was an extremely

prominent communist politician and intellectual. Secondly, he became a dissident and a Radio Free

Europe star before the 1989 revolution, and thirdly he was one of the four leading members of the

National Salvation Front Executive Committee during the days of the revolution and after.

Moreover, Brucan was one of the six signatories to the Scrisoarea celor sase in March 1989, an

open letter of criticism addressed to Ceausescu.272 All six signatories had been high-ranking

communist party members, some of them from the inter-war period. This fact is significant in itself,

as it signified a difference between Ceausescu and the Communist party. The fact that Brucan, a

prominent communist, was so prominent during the revolution as a critic of Ceausescu signified an

attempt to preclude the inclusion of the whole communist party within the negative chain of

equivalence of the Ceausescu myth. The only references to a complicit institution were to ‘the

Ceausescu clan’ and ‘the Securitate’.

In this piece, published shortly after the revolution, Brucan actually links the ‘birth’ of the National

Salvation Front with the nature of the Ceausescu regime and the type of revolution that he

articulates. ‘The Ceausist dictatorship was so overwhelming in its repression of any dissidence or

opposition that the popular explosion that overthrew the dictatorship did not and could not have a

political leadership. In fact, this leadership was forged in the fire of the revolution, and this is how

the National Salvation Front was born.’273 This is the classic statement of the meaning of the
270
Silviu Brucan, ‘Fara Isme, si Fara Partid’, in Romania Libera, 23 December, 1989.
271
Cf. 'Pentru luptatorii baricadelor capitalei', Adevarul, 28 December, 1989; 'Alaturi, cu inima si
sufletul', Adevarul, 30 December, 1989; see also Revolutia Romana in Direct.
272
See Vladimir Tismaneanu, Stalinism for all Seasons, pp. 227-8.
273
Silviu Brucan, ‘Fara isme, si fara partid’.

140
political power of the FSN following the revolution according to its leadership. It is worth noting in

this metaphorically loaded phrase (mixing metaphors of explosion, fire and birth) that the FSN was

the child of the revolution. Incidentally, this image presents us with the idea of chaos, a revolt

without political leadership (although the revolt in Timisoara became increasingly organised and

spawned a leadership), to which ‘the birth’ of the FSN leadership was a response.

Ceausescu the idiot was characterised as someone who completely lacked any human qualities,

apart from that of being an idiot. He inexplicably held on to power for 25 years, and was allowed to

rule as he wished. Finally, ‘the people’ lost their patience with this mad, monstrous tyrant, and he

was forced to flee from their wrath. He abandoned the state with which he so carefully identified

himself. The narratives also provide an answer to the question of what led him to abandon the state

and to flee. This is an important issue, since his flight signified the end of his power, and was equal

to the symbol of ‘freedom’ for ‘the Romanian people’. The headline in Adevarul on 31 December

announced that 'The dictatorship has fallen the people decide! Long live free Romania'.

The narrative of Ceausescu’s flight also depicted the FSN in the leading role, presenting a leader

fleeing from ‘justice’, which was what the FSN was claiming it would establish. From 22 December

onward on television and 23 December in the press, the calls were for justice for the people. The

following sequence of dialogue from Romanian TV on 22 December highlights this link between

the leader fleeing from justice and the meaning of justice that was emerging from the revolutionary

discourses:

(Teodor Brates, presenter): We are broadcasting again from Studio 4. I want to tell you [the

viewers] that we have received information that the car of the tyrant [Ceausescu], the former

dictator, is 2-DB-305 [vehicle registration number]…he must not be allowed to leave the

141
 country….The borders must be guarded. No one must leave [the country] that still must

answer to the people. They have false passports….I now introduce a young person, the

representative of those who defended our freedom last night…

(Florin Filipoiu, representative of group 'Social Justice'): I am part of a group that last night

put up the barricade at the Inter [Intercontinental Hotel in centre of Bucharest]. This was

when we formed the group 'Social Justice' and those in the first line wrote their demands.274

It was held that Ceausescu had to be tried not only for his ‘criminal’ acts against the Romanian

people over 25 years, but also for his attempt to suppress the will of the people during the

revolution. This was constructed in extremely emotive language that invokes a series of innocent

victims of the regime and the repression of 1989. For example, on 26 December, a journalist,

writing in Adevarul, cited 'revolted passers-by with tears in their eyes' as saying that:

that bloody dictatorship made us transform children's play areas into graves for heroes. We

went into a flower shop. They had brought fresh chrysanthemums. Buyers gathered rapidly.

Some people asked for three, five, seven, nine stems. Of course it's a holiday, it's Christmas!

When someone asked for four, six, eight, or even ten stems, the others look on with pain,

sadness, and respect. It means that the flowers will be placed on a fresh grave. The grave of a

hero of these heroic days.275

On the opposite side of Ceausescu were the people, including the ‘innocent victims of the

repression’. Justice was sought for those who ‘sacrificed their lives’ for the ‘freedom of the

Romanian people’. The National Salvation Front claimed to be the first new political institution that

274
Revolutia Romana in Direct, p. 53. Among the demands were the halting of food exports, the
supply of foodstuffs to the population, freedom for political prisoners, and the right to free
association.
275
'In continuare, pe frontul luptei, pe frontul muncii', Adevarul, 26 December, 1989.

142
articulated this necessity - the call of the people - and as such became, through its own articulation,

the institutionalisation of the revolution. The positive meaning of the revolution was articulated as

‘justice’, ‘freedom’ and ‘providing for the people’. The meaning of the National Salvation Front

was to achieve justice and freedom, as the only political instrument of the will of the people, to

which all other state institutions must be subordinated. This relied on several mechanisms of

interpellation connected with the negative symbolism of Ceausescu, closely identifying the

revolution with the National Salvation Front. Therefore we can see that the emotive language of the

demonstrations against Ceausescu reappeared as a series of empty signifiers within the National

Salvation Front’s discourse.

This served to do two things. Firstly, it disseminated a new official discourse claiming to represent

the authentic meaning of the revolution. In this way the National Salvation Front wove together,

appropriated, attached itself to, and re-articulated revolutionary narratives. Secondly, these

narratives were brought together in such a way as to be attached and then welded into a new

political rhetoric explaining the new situation with regard to political power. The institution of the

popular front inscribed through the ‘grouping together of all healthy forces’ 276, created and led by

the National Salvation Front, thus relied on the re-inscription of revolutionary empty signifiers in an

organised political discourse. This constructed the necessity of the link between the achievement of

justice and freedom, and support for the National Salvation Front.

In this way, a theory of the revolution was created that situated the National Salvation Front in the

position of vanguard of the revolution, as its necessary organisation and institutionalisation. It was

claimed that the revolution could not have succeeded without the FSN due to the disparate and

disorganised nature of the revolt, ‘an explosion’. This story claimed that the National Salvation

Front provided a focus for the temporary but inevitably waning force of a disorganised popular
276
‘Comunicatul Catre Tara’.

143
revolt, and gave it the power to change politics by becoming a revolution. To put it more clearly,

the National Salvation Front emerged as a mythical necessity. The demonstrations in favour of the

overthrow of Ceausescu sought ‘bread’, ‘justice’ and ‘freedom’, as seen in Chapter One. According

to FSN discourse this necessitated a revolution. Thus, the National Salvation Front created an image

of itself as the necessary link, without which these achievements would have been lost. This

represents two things. Firstly it was a straightforward claim by the FSN that it had authority and

that it exercised sovereignty in the name of ‘the people’. Secondly, it was an interpellative strategy

inviting subjects to identify with the National Salvation Front. They were given reasons why the

various vague instructions of the FSN had to be acted upon. For example, the phrase ‘disciplined

and organised’277 for the good of the revolution was a deployment of the traditional metaphors of

battle common to class warfare discourse. Another example was Ion Iliescu's call on the people to

evacuate the area that was under attack from the 'terrorists': 'Dear Citizens,….citizens in apartment

blocks in dangerous zones where the terrorists are active, especially around the television station,

and the Radio we advise where possible to evacuate the buildings in order to make easier the work

of our military units’.278 The situation was ‘unstable’ and therefore the FSN could create the need

for ‘the people’ to listen to their revolutionary guidance. For example, Ion Iliescu, appealing to the

people on 22 December, said:

Dear citizens! The process that has begun is irreversible, the Securitate practically no longer

exists. The organs of the Interior Ministry are now subordinated to the army. We are making

an appeal for your support and understanding for the following period of organisation. We

will have some provisional structures that will assure the functioning of our society. We ask

you to support the organs of public order in order to guard what is valuable to us, that which

277
Television address by Ion Iliescu, 22 December, 1989, cited in Revolutia Romana in Direct, p.
46.
278
Scinteia Poporului, 24 December 1989.

144
 belongs to the people.279

These two strategies were based on construction of the meanings of specific events that relied on re-

articulating already available signifiers like ‘discipline’ and ‘enemies’. In this context of panic, the

FSN effectively produced subordination to itself as the new authority.

FSN discourse therefore tied a number of disparate elements together into a new system of

meaning. The elements included the ‘Ceausescu era’, ‘the uprising’, ‘the repression’, ‘the dead’,

and ‘unity’. These elements were used to organise a political frontier that imposed unity against the

elements associated with Ceausescu. The unity was given meaning and purpose by being associated

with the need for the FSN to consolidate the revolution. Invoking battle imagery was a familiar

means of interpellating the Romanian public, and concomitantly producing fear. But the symbol of

the battle between the two sides of the new political frontier demonstrated to the public that the

‘popular revolt’ was over, and that the FSN and the army were doing the job of destroying the

regime.

It is clear that the FSN leadership went to great trouble to appear to be the instrument of popular

authority, by being the principal expression of the meaning of the revolution. Made up of a small

group of prominent figures with careers in the communist party, it went to great lengths to keep

images of Ceausescu separate from any broader critical narrative of the communist past by

constituting its very first programme (‘Comunicatul Catre Tara’) as the opposite of 'the Ceausescu

clan' and against the 'structures of power of the Ceausescu clan'. 280 Nowhere in this document is the

word 'communism' mentioned, nor is here reference made to any period preceding Ceausescu's

leadership. Another example is that the opposition between 'the dictatorship' and 'the people' was
279
Ion Iliescu speaking on Romanian television, 22 December, 1989, cited in Revolutia Romana in
Direct, pp. 84-5.
280
‘Comunicatul Catre Tara’.

145
common, and in FSN discourse, 'the dictatorship' referred specifically to Nicolae Ceausescu's rule.

The front page of Adevarul on the 31 December 1989 proclaims 'the fall of the dictatorship', and not

of communism.281

It must be emphasised that the FSN did not create the opposition to Ceausescu. The slogans and

images of the revolt, and the popular reaction to famous television broadcast of Ceausescu’s speech

show that the focus of discontent was already Ceausescu. The FSN attached itself to an already

available discourse, re-articulating this discourse in the process. After assuming power, the FSN

attached itself to the revolt by generating and continuing to saturate the mass media with images of

Ceausescu, juxtaposing these with images of the people and the Front, who were united on ‘the

barricades’ (imagery used often reminiscent of the Paris commune). Petre Roman, for example,

repeatedly referred to his revolutionary experience ‘at the barricade’. Petre Roman still went to

great lengths to emphasise what are usually referred to in Romanian parlance as ‘revolutionary

credentials’. In retelling his story of 21 December, Roman says the following:

At four o’clock, it wasn’t yet dark, I went towards the Inter [Intercontinental Hotel]. When I

arrived there I saw an unbelievable scene. Dead bodies lying there covered with plastic

sacks…an army bus, some totally confused soldiers, and another line of soldiers blocking the

traffic and the entrance to the University. And then, since I absolutely wanted to go where I

had heard that there was a barricade, I did a very comical thing that turned out to be

successful. I made a detour around the Intercontinental and went through [to the cordoned-off

zone] by the front of the National Theatre without any resistance whatsoever…At that

moment, when I arrived, there weren’t very many people, but a barricade had already been

raised. Of course we shouldn’t imagine something like the barricade of the Paris

281
'Istoria Romaniei 1989: Dictatura a cazut, poporul hotaraste! Traiasca Romania Libera',
Adevarul, 31 December 1989.

146
 Commune…282

Political authority was constructed and conveyed in a slightly different way. Ceausescu himself, by

trying to suppress the revolt had provoked a crisis of his authority. Although they were expressed as

inevitable aspects of the ‘explosion’, the repression and revolts amounted to ‘disorder’. The FSN

thus portrayed itself as the mediator between ‘the Revolution’ of ‘the people’ and the

representatives of various state institutions such as the army, and foreign states, to put the case for

the revolt. Thus it accorded itself the role of the people’s advocate. Institutions could not

subordinate themselves to the revolution in a situation of popular revolt and chaos; they needed to
283
be ‘disciplined and organised'. The FSN was recognised by several institutions, the most

important being the army, as the authority of the state, its authority deriving from its revolutionary

credentials as the leader of the people.284 Through association with the FSN, the authority of

institutions such as the army was salvaged. It had only been a matter of hours before the

announcement of the formation of an FSN government that the army was engaged in the repression

of demonstrators on the orders of Ceausescu. By being tied to the FSN, the army quickly re-

inscribed itself as part of the anti-Ceausescu political movement. Thus as the institutions of the state

distanced themselves from Ceausescu, so centralised political authority could be based on an anti-

Ceausescu political frontier which included everything except Ceausescu.

In this section of the chapter, I have shown how the strategy of the FSN relied heavily upon the

construction of images that flooded the mass media in December 1989 and January 1990 depicting

Ceausescu as the common enemy. In drawing this political frontier between Ceausescu and ‘the

people’, the FSN was the only political organisation that was known throughout the country and
282
Elena Stefoi, Transformari, inertii, dezordini: Andrei Plesu si Petre Roman in dialog cu Elena
Stefoi, Iasi, Editura Polirom, 2002, p. 16.
283
Television address by Ion Iliescu, 22 December, 1989, cited in Revolutia Romana in Direct, p.
46.
284
'Comunicatul Catre Tara'.

147
that was associated with the revolution. I suggest that the power and authority of the FSN relied

upon their careful construction of their ‘revolutionary credentials’ (as in the case of Roman) or

‘dissident credentials’ as (in the case of Iliescu, Brucan, Mazilu, Birladeanu), as well as attaching

themselves to known non-party dissidents such as Doina Cornea285 and Ana Blandiana.286 The

crucial absence of competing discourses from other organisations left the field completely open to

the FSN to disseminate its narratives of revolution from 22 December onwards. In this head start

position it also maintained its dominance in the mass media and in central and local state

institutions long after the formation of many other competing political groups and parties. This

narrative created the political frontier around which the FSN could organise its power, based on

discursively constructing itself as being the opposite of all the negative images of Ceausescu that

were produced during this period. This section has shown the importance of the construction of

Ceausescu as a multifaceted negative symbol. This was central to the drawing of a boundary that

provided a clear rationale for the assumption of power by the FSN. By reducing society to the logic

of one simple antagonism of Ceausescu versus the people, the FSN was able to fit itself into a

populist narrative as ‘the people’s salvation from evil’.

5: How the revolution became a myth

In order to examine how the myth of the revolution was built, expanded, and then increasingly lost

ground, it is necessary first of all to identify the initial reading of the revolution as it emerged and as

it was articulated on Romanian television, radio, and in the press from 22 December 1989 until the

middle of January 1990. This version of the myth was the first ‘officially sanctioned’ version, and

drew together many different strands into a coherent FSN narrative. The FSN was in a privileged

position, and was capable of transforming astounding events into a coherent narrative. As we shall
285
Renowned professor of French literature from the University of Cluj, frequent and outspoken
critic of Ceausescu during the 1980s.
286
Famous dissident poet.

148
see, very early on this myth of the revolution gave a very clear and specific meaning to the events as

far as the political future was concerned. It was upon a reassembled symbolic order of the

revolution that the FSN was inscribed as the key actor in bringing about the downfall of Ceausescu.

Later contestations of the FSN’s revolution narrative were based on the presumption that the

revolution had largely been a stage-managed affair to mask the ambitions for political power of a

coterie of communist party personalities and their clients, merely aping the form and content of a

popular revolt. However, it is worth bearing in mind that the dominant revolution narrative at the

time was the one created by the FSN. At that time, to say that the revolution was a coup, or a stage-

managed affair was risky in that Ceausescu had endeavoured to convince the Romanian people of

the very same thing concerning the uprising in Timisoara using a foreign plot scenario. He had said

on 20 December that:

It is the duty of all the citizens of the Socialist Republic of Romania to act with all the means

at their disposal against all those who, in the service of foreign interests, of espionage, of

reactionary imperialist circles, would sell the country for a handful of dollars or any other

money. We must give a firm response against those who want to dismember Romania, to

liquidate the integrity and independence of our homeland.287

The revolution was often presented as a revolt that had been brewing for some time due to the

growing popular hatred of Ceausescu and his rule. It was viewed as having been provoked at the

end of 1989 by an explosion of popular anger in response to Ceausescu’s attempt to repress

demonstrations in Timisoara. As one newspaper account put it:

287
See Nicolae Ceausescu, ‘Cuvintarea tovarasului Nicolae Ceausescu la posturile de radio si
televiziune’, in Romania Libera, 21 December, 1989.

149
 The witnesses of the genocide are living. There are more than 300,000 of them and no-one

can erase from their retinas the awful images of the fiery days when the dignity of the people

was set free, the people humiliated for decades, thus lighting the flame of the revolution.288

At the same time it was also seen as having been brought forward by the expression of revulsion

from the demonstration Ceausescu attempted to address in Bucharest on 21 December. Another

newspaper article is worth quoting at length in this context:

A phrase from a presidential discourse, such as those that the people did not want for the 24

years of terror and dictatorship was interrupted. A powerful explosion in one of the

loudspeakers interrupted the lying phraseology of the dictator and the ‘heroes’ fled from the

balcony like partridges. After a relative calm, frightened, confused, scared to death, the

dictator tries to use his usual reserves, throwing to the whole starving people a handful of

bones, carefully wrapped in a presidential decree. It was the last drop, the lump in the throat,

the moment of suffocation, the decisive moment when no-one can be patient any longer. The

masses move. Slogans begin to become mixed up. The fury that erupts in the crowd can no

longer be stopped. ‘Ceausescu-PCR’ fades, ‘Ceausescu and the people’ is no longer, since it

never was a slogan of truth. Thousands of voices shout ‘down with the dictator’, ‘Criminal,

Assasin!’ and ‘Bucharest - Timisoara!’. Hearing the name of this town [Timisoara] a sea of

people was unleashed. The bloodbath in the square at Timisoara, in the heart of Banat, begins

to boil symbolically in the veins and the arteries of the people.’289

In the popular narrative of the time, the possibility of the revolution successfully taking place was

epitomised by one of the key slogans of the revolution, ‘armata e cu noi’ (‘the army is with us’).
288
‘Timisoara - Flacara revolutiei romane’ (‘Timisoara - the flame of the Romanian revolution’), in
Romania Libera, 6 January 1990.
289
‘Ceasuri de speranta’ (‘Hours of Hope’) Romania Libera, 23 December 1989.

150
‘The Romanian Army could not have prioritised any order above that of THE GREAT PEOPLE

from which it comes.’290 This was because the army refused after 22 December to carry out the

order to repress the demonstrations. Therefore in the popular narrative of the revolution, the

revolution was won the moment that the army deserted Ceausescu and became ‘the people’s army’.

This slogan symbolised the power behind the revolution as a popular movement, before the

appearance on the television screens of the FSN. The army in this sense was articulated as the

symbol of the power of the people against tyranny. One of the most famous Romanian actors, Ion

Caramitru, made the first announcement of ‘the revolution’ taking over the television, with the

‘help of the army’, on 22 December 1989, at around 2 pm. ‘Brothers, by the Grace of God, we are

here in the studio of the Television. We succeeded in arriving here behind tanks, with the army,

with the students and the people you see now, and with thousands and thousands of Romanians and

other nationalities who brought us here.’ After several minutes the famous poet Mircea Dinescu

spoke again to announce that ‘the army in Bucharest is with us.’291

This narrative, which made up a significant part of the myth of the revolution, was relatively

uncontentious, and has largely remained so given the co-optation of the army to the FSN

provisional government. ‘At this moment, when we are at a crossroad, we decided to establish the

National Salvation Front which relies on the Romanian army, and which groups together all healthy

forces of the country’.292 This accorded an heroic role to ‘the people’ and ‘the army’ who risked

their lives in demonstrating against the regime, and at the same time popularised the army as the

‘people’s army’. The army remains to this day a far more popular institution than any other in

Romania (alongside the Orthodox Church), more popular than, for example, parliament or the

presidency, enjoying astoundingly high levels of popular approval according to successive opinion
290
See Major Petru Camarasan, ‘Armata e cu noi’ (‘The army is with us’) in Adevarul, 4 January
1990; See also ‘Armata va fi intotdeauna cu noi’ (‘The army will always be with us’) in
Romania Libera, 23 December 1989.
291
See Revolutia Romana in Direct, p.
292
See ‘Comunicatul Catre Tara’.

151
polls.293

However, in order to see how the myth expanded, it is necessary to examine how the FSN built on

this popular narrative. It is important to note that the FSN effectively appropriated the symbols of

the ‘revolt’. It was this aspect of the making of ‘the revolution’ that was subject to some of the

fiercest contestation, and around which the second major dividing line of Romanian politics would

be later drawn. There are several reasons for this. The myth of the revolution did not expand further

than it did to become a new imaginary for a democratising Romania due to the particular way that

the FSN articulated itself into the revolutionary myth. By equating itself with the revolution and the

whole people, the FSN pitted itself against nascent political movements competing for influence

and who bitterly contested the monopoly on political power that the FSN had established during the

period of the provisional government. The announcement was unequivocal:

From this moment, all of the structures of power of the Ceausescu clan are dissolved. The

Government has resigned, the Council of State and its institutions no longer function. The

whole of the power in the state has been taken over by the Council of the Front of National

Salvation. The Superior Military Council is subordinate to the Council of the Front of

National Salvation (my emphasis).294

Furthermore, the revolution myth did not survive as a surface of inscription for the wide array of

social demands that emerged in Romanian society. This was due to the debate over the economic

crisis and the reforms that coincided with the emergence of a division between the FSN government

and the opposition. The revolution myth gave way also to the heightened economic aspirations of

293
See William Mishler and Richard Rose, ‘Trust in Untrustworthy Institutions: Culture and
Institutional Performance – Post-Communist Societies’, Studies in Public Policy Paper No 310,
Glasgow, Centre for Public Policy Studies, University of Strathclyde, 1998, P. 33.
294
‘Comunicatul Catre Tara’.

152
Romanians, who felt that the revolution was in large part a fight for freedom from poverty and a

miserable standard of living in comparison with other European countries.

The very FSN articulation of the Romanian revolution from 22 December onwards, best

exemplified by the statements of Ion Iliescu and Silviu Brucan, expanded the meaning of the

revolution to accentuate popular and political unity, and to minimise the moral authority of

alternative political forces. The FSN identified itself so unequivocally with the revolution that it

almost became the same thing as the revolution itself. It is worth quoting at length the newspaper

article of Ion Manzatu. It shows how the images were deployed by supporters of the FSN in

building the equivalence between the FSN and the revolution, and how the subtle denigration of the

opposition took place. Manzatu complains that he may have been cited as being a member of the

newly-reformed National Peasant Christian Democratic Party (PNT-cd) without having been

asked.295

We are living now those moments in our national history that a people of 23 million souls (my

emphasis) waited for with immense trust and impatience - a Romanian and European people,

a nation of the world, proud and human, a whole country humiliated without reason and

tyrannised with criminal premeditation…In these moments, when the economic and social life

of the country re-enters its normal course, when the first signs of liberty are to be found in the

heating in apartments, in the beginnings of the filling of the shelves with food, when children

no longer cry in vain for sweets or oranges, when the liberty of the press, radio and television

is no longer a lie, when people relieved of tyranny speak openly, finding words long forgotten

and they express their ideas and proposals without fear, when the draconian laws of lives and
295
This may be an allusion to the erstwhile Communist Party practice of sending letters of
acceptance within the party to people who had not applied to join, along the lines of
‘Congratulations, your application to become a member of the Romanian Communist Party has
been accepted.’ Thus attempting to make a subtle equivalence between the political methods of
the new PNT-cd and the Communist Party in the Ceausescu era.

153
 life have been abolished…we all have some fundamental obligations, imposed only by our

love of the country and of our people….Personally, I am obliged to make clear some points

about the moments of these days - moments of the construction of liberty and of national

renewal. I insist again as a professional and competent person, perfectly free of any political

dogma, and I declare myself in complete accord with the platform elaborated by the National

Salvation Front (my emphasis). But there still exist those who would fish in troubled

waters…I have been informed that…a group that wants to form a new political party, the

National Christian Peasant Party circulated a pamphlet in which I was named. In the spirit of

the liberty that we now enjoy, I would like to inform the promoters of the group to which I

have referred…that some among us wish to keep our liberty…and that our only political

party is the country, and that the only policy to which we adhere is love for the country (my

emphasis).296

After 22 December, the signifier of the revolution for a short time could not be articulated without

some mention of the FSN and its revolutionary activities, policies or strategies. For example,

Brucan claimed that:

The popular revolution against the Ceausist tyranny created for the National Salvation Front

an incontestable legitimacy that does not need any party, nor is there a need for a new ‘ism’.

The Ceausist dictatorship was so total in its repression of any dissidence or opposition that the

popular explosion that removed it from power did not have and could not have had a political

leadership. In fact, this leadership was created in the fire of the revolution and thus was born

296
Ion Manzatu, ‘Partidul meu e Tara’ (‘The Country Is My Party’), Romania Libera, 31 December
1989. Manzatu became a member of the executive bureau of the CPUN from 13 February 1990.
It is also worth noting that this is the same issue of Romania Libera where Silviu Brucan of the
National Salvation Front outlines his political theory of the lack of the need for parties and
ideologies with the exception of the FSN.

154
 the National Salvation Front.297

The main consequence of this astoundingly rapid mutation of a popular narrative, co-opted to

become part of the self-justifying rhetoric of a new political force was that it attempted to limit the

possibility for other actors to identify themselves with the revolution.298

The signifier 'freedom' was one of the earliest and most important components of FSN discourse.

The use of the signifier 'freedom' served a number of important discursive functions. Firstly, it

linked the FSN to the slogans of the popular revolt in Timisoara and later Bucharest. Secondly, as

we have seen, freedom was inscribed as the opposite of Ceausist tyranny. Thirdly, use of 'freedom'

as an empty signifier meant that is was possible for the FSN to attach itself to a popular discourse

that described a unity of purpose between 'the people' and the FSN, but at the same time

subordinated the people to the FSN. In a television broadcast on 22 December, FSN member

Professor Ion Minzatu appealed to Romanian youth, encouraging them to think of freedom in terms

of self-discipline and not take too much into their own hands, but rather leave the leadership of the

revolution in the hands of the FSN:

Dear citizens of Romania, dear youths…we have had and we have the fantastic chance to live

this moment in which freedom has appeared again on Romanian soil. From this point of view,

the beginning has been done. But we cannot do this only with slogans or with breaking

windows, or by making too much noise. You must understand that not revenge or destruction

will characterise the beauty of these moments, but the fact that we must learn to cherish

national values and of course as happened a few minutes earlier, when the leaders of the

National Salvation Committee announced what I am also going to tell you, that we need to
297
Silviu Brucan, ‘Fara Isme si Fara Partid’, Romania Libera, 31 December 1989.
298
The articulation that the FSN was formed in the ‘fire of the revolution’ was used to make the
FSN the revolutionary organisation in distinction to those parties.

155
 prepare and to enthrone justice in all domains, but before everything in the protection of

national values….With you, slowly, and with patience, we will be able to get out of this hole

and to do what should have been done a long time ago for this people. I hope that you will

have the power to go slowly and with patience along a new road which many of you do not

know, that is the road of freedom. Freedom means, above all else, honour, self-discipline, and

the wish to do good.299

Freedom thus came to mean more specifically the necessity of FSN leadership and opposition to the

Ceausescu regime.

Freedom formed part of a narrative. It had been denied to the Romanian people by the tyrant; the

revolution that had been secured by the FSN and the army became associated with the freedom of

'the people'. An article in Adevarul on 31 December inscribes the first day of the rule of the FSN as

the first day of freedom:

The day of 22 December is the day of our freedom, of the rebirth of the new Romania, of a

new democratic Romania, that finally and truly belongs to its people. Each moment of our

freedom overwhelms us and overwhelms our souls with happiness.300

Freedom was spoken of in euphoric terms, as exemplified by the following passage from an article

in. In an issue of Adevarul whose banner headline read 'ROMANIA 1990: FREEDOM, DIGNITY,

OPTIMISM', the editorial claimed that:

Everything that the FSN has tried to do up to now shows its will to promote democracy in all

299
Revolutia Romana in Direct, pp. 72-3.
300
'La multi ani, deminitate! La multi ani, democratie', Adevarul, 31 December, 1989.

156
 spheres of social life. This orientation was clear when the FSN abolished the anti-popular

laws imposed by the old regime, those laws and decrees which seriously curtailed the freedom

of the individual and the rights of man.301

Similarly, the text of the lead article in Adevarul on 31 December ran as follows:

Thousands and thousands, millions and millions of arms, the bloody arms of the whole

country raised upwards in the same sign of the struggle of our bloodied people against

tyranny: 'V' - 'victory'! The sign written for centuries in the history of the martyred Romanian

people. 'V' - the sign that changed the history of our much tried people, sticking itself into the

nest of national shame, opening us towards the infinite road to the establishment of the sacred

ideals of Romanian freedom and dignity. 'V' - the sacred sign of the victory of the revolution

that starts in every Romanian soul, the belief sign of the unity of everyone in the glory of our

heroic nation.302

An article from 4 January was similar in tone:

The popular revolution has definitively triumphed in Romania. The popular revolution is

invincible. Under the sign of this fundamental truth, the Romanian people has stepped into the

new year, 1990, the first year of its freedom, of its so-dearly paid for freedom, the year of the

beginning of an authentic democratic life, governed by truth, dignity, unity and equality.303

The 'terrorist threat' attached to the signifier 'Ceausescu' formed part of an interpellation that

freedom for the people was in danger of being taken away again. A journalist writing in Adevarul
301
Adevarul, 4 January, 1990.
302
'Istoria Romuniei 1989', Adevarul, 31 December, 1989.
303
'Valorile democratiei', Adevarul, 4 January, 1990.

157
on 26 December said:

I was overwhelmed by the mass of young people and of workers who had come to defend the

Romanian television, of great significance for the maintenance of the link with the country

and for the victory of our revolution. 'Here it is calm and there is order' they said; 'the army

and the people are on top of the situation'. Here, where we must defend the revolution, one

with so much blood, and to decisively defeat the terrorist hordes put together by the ex-

dictator to annihilate the people, we are keeping the most priceless prize, true freedom.304

Thus, the terrorist component of the revolution narrative was a second interpellation regarding the

necessity of continued support for the FSN and the army, due to the continued threat, even after the

flight of the Ceausescus, and after their execution. Therefore, while the Ceausescu execution was a

moment of liberation, when 'in Romania freedom ha[d] triumphed',305 this moment was again

prominent due to the threat of loss of freedom embodied in the 'terrorist' activities.

The way in which the FSN succeeded in associating itself so closely with the revolution is related to

two major contextual circumstances that must be outlined in order to understand the rapidity of the

apparently unchallenged rise to power of the FSN. These contextual circumstances had a positive

bearing on the ability of the FSN effectively and convincingly to articulate its claim to political

power, to define what politics would be and what it would not be.

The first circumstance was speed. The FSN was the first nation-wide political force to take shape.

Although a variety of revolutionary committees sprang up in provincial cities, notably the

Romanian Democratic Front in Timisoara, they were quickly marginalised before the execution of

304
'Sprijinul intregii tarii', Adevarul, 26 December, 1989.
305
Headline in Adevarul, 31 December, 1989.

158
Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu that took place on 25 December 1989. The famous poet Mircea

Dinescu mentioned the Frontul Unit Muncitoresc (United Workers Front) on Romanian Television

(22 December 1989). This discourse took place shortly before the arrival of Ion Iliescu and the

announcement of the existence of the National Salvation Front programme, and called for

revolutionaries to come from all parts of Romania to gather together in Bucharest to make a

preliminary programme. Dinescu’s revolutionary discourse interpellating revolutionary organs from

all over the country was fairly rudely interrupted by army spokesperson Mihai Lupoi who arrived at

the TV station shortly after broadcasting began by the newly baptised Free Romanian Television.

Lupoi was a representative of the army who called for unity and calm and the necessity of making a

programme as quickly as possible for reasons of national security. He did talk of the revolution, but

stressed that it was the army’s role to impose ‘order’, referring to what was taking place in the

country as ‘disorder’. It was not clear what link he had to the FSN, but it was clear that he

interrupted Dinescu deliberately because he did not like what he was proposing. Dinescu and others

failed to resume their discourses by the time Petre Roman, and then Ion Iliescu had arrived at the

TV station to appropriate it for the FSN.306 The speed with which the FSN’s organisational strategy

was put into place meant that they had a great advantage over their opponents, and therefore an

opportunity to disseminate a received wisdom of the revolution before any other group. This

rapidity, coupled with organisational effectiveness, meant that the FSN had established itself as the

provisional government in Bucharest and at the local level before other forces had organised

themselves and before the tumultuous events of the ‘revolution’ had played themselves out.307

Briefly put, this speedy assumption of the reins of power and the formation of a territorial

organisational capacity was articulated as none other than the institutionalisation of the revolution

in order to ‘maintain order, discipline and revolutionary unity.’ 308 But as I have outlined above, this
306
See Revolutia Romana in Direct, p. 25-33.
307
See Scinteia Poporului, 24 December 1989: ‘Citizens, Members of the Patriotic Guards! Join
together with our army. All those who can use a weapon - call to arms!’
308
See ‘Comunicatul Catre Tara’: ‘These organs [FSN] will take all necessary measures to assure
the supply of provisions and food to the population, electric energy, heat and water, to assure the

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speed was important in the sense that the revolution of the people against Ceausescu was

transformed into a new revolution of ‘the people, the FSN, and the army’ against the ‘terrorists’ and

Ceausescu. In a subtle way, the FSN changed the chronology of the revolution by its articulation of

the counter-revolution of ‘the terrorists’. They took power on 22 December after Ceausescu had

fled, and after the revolution had already been named by the army as a revolution. On 23 December,

Iliescu informed the public that the revolution had to be defended, implying that the return of the

common enemy, Ceausescu, was still a possibility. This announcement put the FSN at the centre of

the defence. To maintain the ‘revolution’, the new power constructed the old power as a still-

present threat.

One consequence of the speed of the take-over of the mass media, during this period of dislocation,

is related to the concept of ‘suture’. The FSN was in a position to take advantage of a moment of

dislocation to provide the necessary elements with which to suture the broken identity of the

community/nation. The FSN succeeded in partially suturing the dislocation brought about by the

fall of the Ceausescu regime, by providing itself as a focus for the production of new revolutionary

identities based on belonging to the people, and at the same time on the rearticulation of national

values. Revolution was a patriotic act. Ceausescu became an alien, a ‘bad Romanian’. The

revolutionary identities provided for by the FSN strategy allowed the inclusion of all citizens, no

matter how deeply involved with the Ceausescu regime, through the express avoidance of the

stigmatisation of communist party membership. Only the highest echelons of Ceausescu’s ‘court’

and anti-revolutionary bands of ‘securisti-teroristi’ were excluded from assuming such a new

identity. Thus the process of suturing the dislocation took the form of symbolising social

antagonisms as being between ‘the people’ and a small category of ‘others’ who were to blame for

all ills.

normal process of the whole of economic and social life, and for the provision of transport and
medical assistance.’

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The second and most important factor that allowed the FSN to build such a powerful myth in such a

short space of time was the form in which the different elements were tied together. The articulation

of the meaning of the revolution produced a space and the conditions for the comprehensive

assumption of political authority by the FSN. The myth produced involved a series of new

narratives. Narratives of ‘the people’, ‘the nation’, of ‘Ceausescu’, ‘freedom’, of ‘democracy’, were

successfully woven together in a new way. This process provided a temporary but all-encompassing

surface of inscription for the explosion of demands, all of which was carefully centred around the

centrality and necessity of the power of the FSN. Moreover, the FSN-revolution myth succeeded in

re-articulating the signifiers embedded in the slogans of the popular revolt, and the signifier of

‘uprising’ itself, deftly supplanting ‘the people’ with ‘FSN and the people’. For this it was

necessary to give the first coherent narrative of the immediate past that was centred on the signifier

of Ceausescu. Thus, the form of the FSN myth of the revolution succeeded remarkably quickly in

establishing a new political frontier. This frontier effectively marked a boundary between

Ceausescu and the rest, and between the present and the past. It established what was relevant in the

present and the past, and designated good leadership as opposed to bad leadership. This created an

enormous, albeit temporary, reservoir of solidarity with the FSN. In this way we can draw the

primary link between the construction of the myth of the revolution, and the necessary condition of

the revolution - the FSN’s assumption of power, and unmediated and unchecked authority. For a

short period stretching into January 1990, consent was forged through this very discourse. Owing to

the solidarity created and the authority accumulated by the FSN, the demobilisation of the popular

revolt was possible by producing voluntary popular subordination to the FSN and the army.

The revolution myth, as a surface of inscription for social demands that emerged during the revolt

(as detailed in Chapter One), also owed its efficacy to the FSN policy of maintaining ‘social and

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economic stability’ and the continued uninterrupted functioning of state institutions. This could be

seen as the antithesis of a revolutionary discourse. What this meant in practice was that the

character and face of the Romanian state institutions were modified in that they were given new

‘revolutionary’ identities. Thus, they were included within the positive chain of equivalence

separating the revolution from Ceausescu, owing to the fact that they were now ‘subordinated to the

Council of the FSN’. In fact the name of the FSN was regularly invoked to denote the power of the

people, when in fact the power of the state was held in the hands of the Council of the FSN.

Thus, the revolution myth allowed the production of a number of new identities and transformed

others. Include within 'the people', there were a number of more specific identities that had been in

use during the communist period to categorise different groups within the social structure, for

example, 'citizens' could be used as a general identity; as discussed in the previous chapter,

'workers' and 'peasants' were somewhat more specific; 'students' and 'youths' were often

interpellated separately during the revolution; and other identities interpellated during the revolution

were 'miners' and 'soldiers'. As I have said, these identities were in constant use during Ceausescu's

rule. However, during the revolution these vague identities became attached to positive discourses

that filled these identities with revolutionary meaning.

For example, On the afternoon of 22 December, Ion Iliescu spoke on television, calling on the

citizens in general to side with the revolution by contributing to the maintenance of the order

necessary for the FSN to continue its struggle: ‘Citizens, I call on you to organise and to assure that

the public property is defended, defend the shops [from vandalism and theft], defend all public

institutions, that is to say defend everything that is necessary for the normal continuation of our

activities.’309

309
Revolutia Romana in Direct, p. 47.

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Similarly, press articles in pro-FSN newspaper Adevarul routinely appealed to the self-image of

youths by praising them for their maturity or their calm-headed heroism, as in the following

example:

Calmly, without violence, thousands of youths have risen to put an end to the humiliations,

the abuses, and the illegalities to which they, their parents, their brothers and the whole people

were subjected. They rose with the peace with which you know that you are fulfiling a

commandment of history, a great justice that must absolutely come to pass. 310

Contrasting revolutionary identities with negative portrayals of the 'terrorists', the following

depiction of a student is a good example of many articles that praised the students for their

revolutionary activity:

I am in a hurry to be in front of the television station by 5pm to see for myself if the terrorists

will respect the ultimatum given, stop firing and give themselves up. The criminals are still

criminals until the last moment of their lives, and soon they will see that last moment', a

furious student tells us.311

The new minister for agriculture, Victor Surdu, said that it was necessary to 'look to the peasants

with trust and respect', depicting the revolutionary identity of the peasant, again praising the 'spirit

of honour and probity that have always characterised the peasant'.312 Interpellating the workers,

Iliescu appealed to their revolutionary identity in a speech broadcast on 7 January, 1990, entitled

'Now revolution means work'. The text of the broadcast includes 'a warm appeal to all workers in

industry, transport, construction, to the whole peasantry, to prove their great patriotic conscience
310
'Demnitatea tineretii' (The Dignity of the Youths), Adevarul, 28 December, 1989.
311
'In continuare, pe frontul luptei, pe frontul muncii', Adevarul, 26 December, 1989.
312
'Sa-i privim cu incredere si respect pe tarani', Adevarul, 4 January, 1990.

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and human solidarity in work and in assuring the smooth functioning of production processes and

the fulfilment of all contractual obligations.'313

Mining coal was also a revolutionary duty. As Adevarul put it in an article entitled 'Good luck

miners!': 'In these historic days, the miners of the country are doing their duty. The great coal

mining centres have proved, since the first moment of national rebirth that they have fully

understood the necessity of extracting and delivering the lignite that is so necessary for the power

stations'.314

Soldiers were included as a positive identity, since they were in the front line against 'attacks by the

bandits and the terrorists' and made up an important part of what was referred to as 'the healthy

forces of the nation'.315 The collective identity of the soldiers was of course positively encapsulated

by the slogan 'the army is with the people, the people is with the army'.316

As we can see from the selection of examples above, the revolution involved the interpellation of

anyone with a revolutionary identity through the use of a combination of vague or specific new

subject positions. Both positive and negative identities formed the basis of interpellations, which in

a sense was signalling the need to react differently to a new configuration of political power, and

the prime importance of exercising solidarity of the people with the Front and the army against a

series of enemies of the people and the country: ‘Enemies of the country, traitors to the people’ was

on the front page of Scinteia to refer to the pro-Ceausescu terrorists who were carrying out actions

‘against the people’.317

313
'Revolutia inseamna, acum, munca', Adevarul, 9 January, 1990.
314
'Noroc bun, mineri!' Adevarul, 26 December, 1989.
315
'Armata alaturi de popor, poporul alaturi de armata', Adevarul, 27 December, 1989.
316
Major Petru Camarasan, ‘Armata e cu noi’ (‘The army is with us’) in Adevarul, 4 January 1990;
See also ‘Armata va fi intotdeauna cu noi’ (‘The army will always be with us’) in Romania
Libera, 23 December 1989.
317
Headline from Scinteia Poporului, 24 December 1989.

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Moreover, every act was inscribed with revolutionary meaning; it was a surface of inscription for

the most important to the most banal of demands or activities of groups or individuals. Suddenly

any activity could become a ‘revolutionary act of heroism’, or mean participation in ‘revolutionary

solidarity’ (hypothetically the administrator of the block (a sort of concierge) changing the lightbulb

on the staircase of the apartment block could have been an act that temporarily overflowed with

revolutionary meaning because it would have allowed the revolutionary bread factory workers and

students to find their way down the stairs if a revolutionary electric power failure meant that there

was not enough voltage for the lift in the block to work).

Examples of the pervasiveness of revolutionary meaning include the following passages from

television transcripts. ‘I am Dr Popescu from the Emergency Room. In these difficult moments, I

ask all medical personnel to come to work to help with those who have been shot….We must give

them help immediately, to these heroes of our homeland.’318. Television presenter Petre Popescu

appealed to the workers thus: 'We must be organised. The bread factories must continue to work

normally to provide for the population, supplies to be delivered as normal.’319 The television

presenter again interpellated viewers with a new piece of revolutionary information:

Dear Viewers! Beware that the voltage from the power stations has started to fall, we risk that

out radio and television broadcasts may no longer be able to be transmitted. Workers to their

workplaces [where the FSN might be explained to them]! The bread factories to work

normally, to supply the population! At Jilava [prison for political prisoners in communist

times?] they are asking for urgent medical assistance. Doctors!, with what they have and how

they can should go to Jilava.320

318
Revolutia Romana in Direct, p. 33.
319
Revolutia Romana in Direct, p. 34.
320
Revolutia Romana in Direct, p. 47.

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January 1990 was its highest point, when unity, and the lack of alternative political forces meant

that potential antagonisms were temporarily avoided. The myth survived as long as the signifier of

reform (discussed in the following chapter) was not a focus of re-articulation. Once this signifier

began to gain prominence, the battle for control over its meaning superseded the revolution myth

that had built temporary unity. However, the revolution as a signifier soon provided a focus for

competing claims rather than unity. This was due to the monopolisation of power by the Council of

the FSN, and the decision of the FSN to become a political party and remain, practically speaking,

the interim state authority. Together with conflict over the meaning of reform, the possibility of

using the revolution as a focus of unity receded quickly as January 1990 drew to a close.

This discourse was of great importance as it was the first 'theory' explaining the meaning of the

revolution to emerge. Its significance lay in the ability of this discursive strategy to disseminate a

set of seemingly transparent ‘truths’ tied to an obvious conclusion. The importance of this discourse

is also rooted in the fact that it provided the first coherent interpretation of the meaning of the

events that led to the fall of the Ceausescu regime. At the same time, the discourse symbolised

emancipation. It was at this moment of crisis that not only the destruction, but also the

reconstitution of political power became visible. From 22 December 1989, the National Salvation

Front effectively became a provisional revolutionary government and all state institutions

recognised it as such almost immediately. This was helped by the National Salvation Front’s

strategy to create an image of itself as a popular movement, and as the same thing as the revolution,

as the leadership of the revolution. Ironically, it constructed itself as the epitome of opposition

following its assumption of power. I argue that the power of this strategy was drawn from the FSN’s

ability effectively to harness the symbol of Ceausescu and to extend its range of significance, thus

mobilising and channelling the hatred for Ceausescu in its favour. As long as the symbol of

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Ceausescu could be used as symbol of a present threat, the FSN strategy was successful. Moreover,

albeit temporarily, reference to the communist party heritage of some of the members of the Front,

such as Ion Iliescu, Silviu Brucan, and Alexandru Birladeanu321 was positive, since it was well

known that they were effectively ‘internal dissidents’ of the Party. After ‘the threat’ receded, so did

their dissident status in the eyes of some. They became the symbols of restoration rather than of

revolution.

If we look at the balance sheet of the revolution, what the National Salvation Front was able to do

was to forge consent for it to carry out a number of things. First of all it forged consent to take over

the provisional running of the state administration. Secondly it created a provisional parliament (the

CPUN), deciding who would be included. Thirdly, it organised itself as a recognisable and popular

political force. Fourthly, it created an image of itself as a legitimate authority. Fifthly, it attributed

the end of the Ceausescu regime to the FSN, not to the revolution directly. This is implicit in

statements such as that by Brucan, which attribute such importance to the revolutionary leadership

role of the FSN that he claimed was ‘forged in the fire of the revolution’.322

This section has shown in detail how the FSN built popular unity around the myth of the revolution,

suggesting how it marginalised opposition and succeeded in harnessing popular revolutionary

sentiment in its favour.

6: The broadcast media as instrument of revolution

In this section I discuss the central place of Romanian television in the construction of the myth of

the revolution. All Romanian media became pro-revolution by 23 December 1989, and at this time
321
Both Brucan and Birladeanu had been high ranking communist politicians in the Dej era, and
were two of the six signatories to the open letter criticising Ceausescu in March 1989.
322
Silviu Brucan, ‘Fara isme si fara partid’.

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it can be seen as having three principal roles: the position of the television should be noted as both

an instrument of the revolution and as a revolutionary symbol in its own right; it also served to

create a 'community of revolutionaries'.

The FSN immediately recognised the importance of relaunching the moribund Romanian mass

media as a vehicle for its message.323 One of the most interesting aspects of the Romanian

revolution was that it was televised. Following the break of signal during Ceausescu’s famous

speech from the balcony of the Central Committee on 21 December - where the broadcast was

abruptly interrupted as he was heckled by an immense crowd of erstwhile communist supporters -

even watching television became in a sense a revolutionary act. From 22 December, the FSN

organised the transmission of the ‘events’ of the revolution live on TV. Communist Party

newspapers were likewise transformed into revolutionary organs from 23 December, and even a

cursory glance shows that they exclusively presented the revolution from the FSN perspective

described.324 They were in effect vehicles through which ordinary citizens were being interpellated

to identify with the revolution - but in identifying with the revolution, one had to identify with the

FSN - since the FSN was the instrument and voice of the revolution. Once again, the very control of

the press, radio and television by the FSN was an act of political power. This act of political power

was also given revolutionary meaning, emphasised by the FSN as a necessary revolutionary act, and

given credence through the renaming of the television as televiziunea romana libera (Free

Romanian Television). The revolution was the same as the people, the same as the FSN, the same as

323
A reading the transcript of the first moments of free Romanian television, until the declarations
of Ion Iliescu and the announcement of the assumption of power by the National Salvation Front,
gives a real sense of the confusion, the dislocation and the temporary absence of any one
hegemonic discourse other than the negative anti-Ceausescu and pro-popular unity messages. By
the middle of 22 December, within a matter of hours, Iliescu had read the FSN’s ‘Comunicatul
Catre Tara’ on television, announcing the unconditional revolutionary authority of the National
Salvation Front. Press and radio followed suit immediately.
324
‘The Odious Dictatorship has fallen! Romania remains Romania’, in Romania Libera, 23
December 1989: ‘In the course of the evening radio and television stations announced the
establishment and bringing together of the Committee of National Salvation.’

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freedom. The naming of Free Romanian Television, nominally independent, though in fact

dominated by the FSN, made broadcasting itself into a revolutionary act of iconoclasm by

destroying the medium for the Ceausescu personality cult. Iconoclasm was also one of the principal

features of television broadcasting that portrayed the destruction and profanation of the icons of ‘the

dictator’.

Indeed, the speed of the take-over is important, as the FSN took control of the mass media during a

moment of profound dislocation. This had important consequences. The FSN performed its first

revolutionary act through changing the entire tone, colour, content and form of broadcasting and

print news overnight. The FSN claimed that it would defend the free Romanian television as one of

the key institutions of the revolution. In doing so, and in associating itself with iconoclasm, the FSN

was creating and was at the same time a part of the televising of a new reality. Thus, the moment of

popular revolt was over as the FSN moved to centralise and ‘revolutionise’ the meaning of

demonstrations in Bucharest and other cities. The elimination of Ceausescu’s interminable and

(universally acknowledged as such) dull mass media production - half of which was devoted to the

promotion of the personality cult of the leader and his wife - of nationalist-communist propaganda

from the airwaves and the print media was an act associated at the time with the benign intervention

of the FSN. The new format introduced a heady mix of populist declarations from prominent

personalities in Romanian life, at the same time as giving airtime to the voice of the masses,

reporting on demonstrations and citizens’ solidarity with the revolution. The egalitarian tone of the

television in particular was epitomised by the newly rehabilitated use of the appellative and form of

address ‘cetatean’ (citizen) instead of ‘tovaras’ (comrade). Thus the astonishing contrast with

Ceausescu’s media meant that the FSN performed the delivery of the mass media for the expression

of the ‘authentic vox populis’, in opposition to the turgid, moribund simulation of the vox populis

expressed through the Ceausescu mass media. Thus, technically speaking, it was relatively simple

169
to construct the link between the FSN and the expression and implementation of the popular will.

The first role of the television was therefore as the medium used as a means of unidirectional

communication from the FSN to 'the people'. The FSN controlled much of the media during this

period and used it to transmit important messages to the revolutionary spectators 325 of Romanian

television. The message transmitted was one of moral and political authority. Moral authority was

constructed by the Front through its recognition of the democratic nature of the popular revolt, and

by firmly placing itself as part of this revolt. But also the means and the form of the communication

through the television are very important, since it was through television that the Romanian people

first became aware that the Ceausescu regime was in crisis. Although many people were aware of

the revolt in Timisoara before it spread to Bucharest, they were equally aware of the repression, and

did not necessarily expect the regime to crumble as it did. The crisis was symbolised above all by

Ceausescu’s inability to control the crowd at a rally that he had called on 21 December, an

unprecedented and dramatic event.

The Romanian revolution from 21 December onwards was a televised drama, which can be

separated into three narrative segments or acts, all of which contributed to the structuring of the

symbols of Ceausescu in later revolutionary discourse. The first part of the drama took place during

the broadcast of the faltering speech of the dictator faced with a demonstration against him. The

second part was the flight of Ceausescu by helicopter from the roof of the Central Committee

building on 22 December.

The third part was the institutionalisation and constitution of the anti-Ceausescu revolution through

television, thus giving anti-Ceausescu credentials to the National Salvation Front. By the time
325
As I mention elsewhere, watching television became, briefly, a revolutionary act. If one could
not make it to the ‘barricades’ watching television was a proxy by means of which one could
express one’s solidarity.

170
Iliescu appeared to announce the formation of the FSN, the anti-Ceausescu revolutionary credibility

of the television broadcasts had been established by two hours of unprecedented broadcasting. At

2.45pm on 22 December, Ion Iliescu made his first appeal on behalf of the National Salvation Front,

thus linking the Front and its programme with the revolutionary activity of all of those associated

with the television on that day.

The broader and well-publicised membership of the FSN was constructed in such a way as to give a

clear space to well-known personalities, such as Ion Caramitru (actor), Sergiu Nicolaescu (actor and

director), Mircea Dinescu (poet), Doina Cornea (professor of French literature), Ana Blandiana

(poet), Andrei Plesu (philosopher), and Ion Iliescu. Petre Roman gained prominence as a politician

during this period by being a ‘telegenic revolutionary’. He was one of the founders of the National

Salvation Front and had a prominent role in the televised drama.

What was happening was that the drama was being televised, the narratives were being constructed

and disseminated, not necessarily only by political leaders, but by people who were stars in

Romania. In many previous roles in their history as actors, poets, philosophers, writers, film

directors and professors, they represented something familiar and not directly associated with

politics. Thus, they were symbols of cultural authority and could easily become emblematic of ‘the

people’ by lending eloquent voices, seeming to speak for the people. They were the very depiction

of the representative make-up of the FSN. The FSN was speaking in the name of the people, but the

voice of the FSN was ciphered in order to emanate from people who enjoyed a huge social,

political, cultural, artistic or intellectual capital, but who later were proven to possess little political

power.

Secondly, the television station itself became a central symbol of the revolution in its own right. As

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the television studios were attacked by 'the terrorists', defence of the television studios became

synonymous with the defence of the revolution. The television became the focus of the revolution,

from the first non-Ceausescu broadcasts and the renaming of Romanian TV as ‘Free Romanian

Television’, and the studios of the television becoming the place where the revolution was

discussed and formed, through official declarations and the adoption of the tactic of making

announcements by the National Salvation Front to the people through the medium of television.

Indeed during the period of the ‘terrorist threat’ (23-27 December), the television studios became in

themselves a symbol of the need to ‘defend’ the revolution, as an organ of the ‘people’s revolution’,

and the inhabitants of Bucharest were interpellated to defend the television station from attacks by

‘terrorists’. Ion Caramitru, a famous actor, was the first to announce just after 14.00 that the

television studios had been taken over by a group of revolutionaries, who had come with tanks from

the army, and the students. Poet Mircea Dinescu then announced that in a short time an appeal to

the people would be read.326

From the transcript of the television of 22 December there were a series of calls to revolutionaries,

and countless people made revolutionary announcements in the studio, calling for the participation

of all democratic forces in defending the revolution, and in linking this to the television as the nerve

centre of the revolution.327 The broadcast on 22 December highlighted the interpellation to solidarity

with the television station. Costin Tugui, a citizen who has entered the television station, said live

on television: 'Don't interrupt the broadcast. Two thousand terrorists are heading towards the

television [station]. Help us. The population should go out on the streets. Somebody should defend

us. The army should defend us'.328 The broadcast was then interrupted. Television presenter Teodor

326
Revolutia Romana in Direct, p.21.
327
For example, Revolutia Romana in Direct, p. 21, Mircea Dinescu: ‘The Television is with us!
We have overcome!’.
328
Revolutia Romana in Direct, p. 65.

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Brates then continued: 'The terrorists are heading towards the television. The army should do its

duty…Do not panic. The television is still in the hands of the people and we hope that it will

continue to be so… please believe us that this is the situation. We will begin broadcasting again in

an hour.'329 After some time, the broadcast began again, with Brates saying: 'We will keep you up-

to-date with how the events are going, so that we are able to consolidate through the united work

and the united fight, and through our common action of the whole people, today's historic

victory'.330

On 23 December a television presenter said: ‘Our colleagues are transmitting the heroic progress of

our liberating revolution every hour, every minute, under gunfire.’ 331 Journalism was transformed

into a dramatic, heroic and dangerous revolutionary activity. In an article that appeared on 24

December, a journalist describes similar events at the radio studio:

On Friday evening we were in the radio news broadcast studio…Everything seemed to be in

order. But in a few moments all hell broke loose. There was heavy firing from Strada

Temisana. Those around kind of smiled as a way of saying ‘nothing unusual, the terrorists are

shooting’. Moreover, around 22.00, the situation got worse [news broadcasts on the hour]. It

was a sort of war of nerves with timely precision. From the Radio, one could neither get in

nor get out. The attacks were repeated every hour.332

Although at the same time the terrorist threat was a threat against the people, so the people had to

let the FSN and the army defend them, the television and the revolution. Defending the revolution

329
Revolutia Romana in Direct, pp. 65-6.
330
Revolutia Romana in Direct, pp. 66.
331
Transcript from television broadcast of 23 December, printed in ‘Revolutia in Direct’
(Revolution Live), Scinteia Poporului, 24 December 1989.
332
‘Gloante in linistea studioului de radio’ (Bullets in the quiet of the radio studio), Scinteia
Poporului, 24 December 1989.

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was thus qualified as a mobilising interpellation by its call for the population living in the area

around the television to take cover or to evacuate due to the danger from ‘security-terrorists loyal to

Ceausescu’.

The third role of the broadcast media was to create an imaginary ‘community of revolutionaries’, a

community linked together by Free Romanian Television. The following declaration by television

presenter Petre Popescu 22 December (at approximately 14.15) exemplifies this strategy:

Brothers, Dear Viewers…the workers of the television and from the radio are in the service of

the people. We want to repair the mistakes we have made over the last 25 years [the

Ceausescu years, not the whole communist period] and to present to you now only the truth.

All those who want to present their opinions - we are for the plurality of opinions - may have

access to the radio and television….I ask also that all correspondents of television and radio

from all of the counties to telephone us and to inform us correct and verified details of what is

happening in the whole country, so that we for our part can inform you [the viewers].333

Several minutes later Petre Popescu again exclaimed: ‘Do not stop demonstrating! Rally to the

Radio and Television and defend them!334 This strategy is also evident in the following appeal by

Ion Iliescu on television on 23 December:

Citizens, Members of the Patriotic Guards - Join and act with decisiveness together with the

units of our army: All who can use an arm - TO ARMS! - Appeal from the Council of the

National Salvation Front presented on the television by Ion Iliescu - Measures and

recommendations for the speedy liquidation of the illegalities of the terrorists - The former

333
Revolutia Romana in Direct, p. 32.
334
Revolutia Romana in Direct, p. 34.

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 dictator and the servants of his Clan have been arrested. 335

This community was invested with religious overtones by the language employed by television

presenters. God is invoked (only by some) and the revolution is a collective act involving prayer or

looking to God as revolutionary Romanians. Ion Caramitru, the first voice on television at around

14.00, used language evocative of a religious vigil to appeal to the Romanian people:

Brothers, Thanks to God [he crosses himself] we are here in the television studios….We are

emotional, tired, and we wish the whole of the Romanian people, of any nationality, who has

fought with an arm in their hand in the sense that they had in their souls the divine inspiration

of God and the finally broken patience of the Romanian people, to listen in a moment to the

words of Mircea Dinescu….336

Mircea Dinescu continued in a similar vein: ‘In ten minutes we will make an appeal to the

population. Please keep calm, these are moments when God has turned his face toward the

Romanians. Let us look to God for some moments before we speak,…to make our appeal to all the

forces of our army.’337

In summing up this section, it is important to note the importance of the television as a focus of

appeals to the population from the new revolutionary authority that was the FSN. What is clear is

that the TV station was a strategic revolutionary focal point, and served as a means through which

the FSN could build solidarity and authority in the country. I also served very subtly as a means of

demobilising demonstrators, since to be informed about the events, one had to be watching the

335
Transcript from television broadcast of 23 December, printed in ‘Revolutia in Direct’
(Revolution Live), Scinteia Poporului, 24 December 1989.
336
Revolutia Romana in Direct, p. 21.
337
Revolutia Romana in Direct, p. 21.

175
television. The television was able to function in this way since it was transformed overnight into a

symbol of the revolution in its own right, discarding quickly its association with the dissemination

of the Ceausescus cult of personality.

7: Conclusion

The popular revolt of 1989, was, I claim, undecidable, unpredictable, and eventually coagulated

around the mutually contradictory meanings of the most dominant discourses available. Over the

years since the revolution, economic reform in Romania has gathered momentum as a process and

as a discourse which have had severe social and economic consequences. Although the misery of

the Ceausescu era is often rhetorically invoked to posit the improvements brought about by the

revolution, the high expectations of the majority of Romanians have not been fulfilled by the

policies of the transition. The revolution myth expressed the call for improvements in the standard

of living that briefly materialised, but were subsumed by the discourse of economic transition and

political conflict. The economic changes affecting the structure of social differentiation and the

distribution of wealth brought new social identities into play that expressed growing material

differences between Romanians. As we shall see in the next chapter, these narratives of transition

left behind the myth of the revolution that became one contested signifier in competing discourses

of the history and meaning of the ‘transition’. The revolution as a myth palpably failed to expand to

find a response to such differentiation while maintaining the symbolic unity and egalitarian nature

of the citizens’ revolution, particularly in the face of mounting poverty for large proportions of the

population.

In summary, I will briefly tie together some of the points that have been made in the preceding

discussion. Firstly, it is necessary to reiterate the main contours of the revolution myth as it

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occupied the discursive field from December 1989 to January 1990. This will aid us in recognising

how the myth of the revolution was central to the construction of a new political order. This new

political order was based upon the solidarity created by a new political frontier which succeeded in

representing Romanian society as unified behind the FSN program except for some ‘bad’, excluded

elements. This political frontier was not just a question of political language. It was the

symbolisation and the rationalisation of a certain type of political behaviour, the symbolisation of

the front of a struggle by good against bad. On the bad side of the new frontier a series of empty

signifiers were equated with each other and were given their structural and contextual coherence

through the construction of the symbol of Ceausescu as a key signifier linking them together in a

system of meaning. Ceausescu was at the head of (and the cause of) a chain of equivalence which

linked a series of empty signifiers together which could be identified as negative through their anti-

revolutionary connotations. Thus the chain can be described thus: Ceausescu = repression = tyranny

= madness = irrationality = securisti = terrorists = dictatorship = poverty = national humiliation =

godlessness = feudalism = against the people = injustice. On the other side of the political frontier

were the signifiers articulated during the days of the revolution, and largely co-opted by the

discourse of the FSN. The FSN succeeded in articulating itself as the positive counterpart to the

negative signifier of Ceausescu in the opposing chain of equivalence. This positive chain of

equivalence was articulated thus: Revolution = FSN = freedom = justice = national dignity =

national renewal = end to dictatorship = end to suffering = rationality = law = morality =

government for the people = national unity = economic rationality = rational (functional)

government.

Several of these signifiers were to become objects of fierce contestation leading to the profound
political polarisation that followed. The source of the contestations were the newly emerging
political alliances and parties of ‘the opposition’, that disseminated their own radical revolutionary
discourses. This polarisation, particularly during the period 1990-1992, coincided with the

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beginnings of economic reform. This was accompanied by the appearance of new forms of social
problems associated with economic hardship and poverty. By contrast, a well-placed minority of
beneficiaries were in a position to take advantage of the economic reforms and to accumulate an
enormous quantity of wealth. These developments were difficult, if not impossible to accord
meaning through the popular solidarity of the revolution myth. The next chapter details the gradual
fragmentation of the myth of the revolution and suggests its replacement by myths of transition.

Chapter Four
The revolution myth in crisis: shifting political frontiers of the transition myth

1: Introduction

On May 20 1990, elections took place in Romania, resulting in an overwhelming victory for the

FSN, with around 66 per cent of the votes for parliamentary candidates, and a massive 85 per cent

for presidential candidate Ion Iliescu. Following the elections, on June 28, Petre Roman, the new

prime minister, presented the FSN government’s programme in parliament. This period had partly

coincided with the demonstration of ‘the opposition’ in the centre of Bucharest at Piata Universitatii

(University Square), who had declared a zone ‘free of neo-communism’. Within a year and a half,

in September 1991, the government of Petre Roman was ousted following mob violence - but this

violence was not at all associated with the self-named ‘democratic opposition’ to the FSN.

Although the circumstances that led to the violence are still contested, it is clear that opposition

from within the FSN was far more important for the position of the government than the

‘opposition’ created by the ‘historic parties’ and ‘civil society’. By the end of March 1992, the FSN

went through an acrimonious split, becoming two parties, the main split occurring due to broad

differences of opinion over the economic reform process.

In the sections that follow I analyse the divisions that emerged between the opposition and the FSN.

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I then go on to focus on the divisions within the FSN itself. In section two I provide an account of

the political, economic, and social background to the period between the May 1990 elections and

1992. This situates the discussion of the impact of opposition discourses on the FSN government. In

section three I give an account of the main approaches to the study of the period. I propose that

more attention should be given to internal divisions within the FSN than hitherto. In section four I

analyse the shifting political frontiers of the period, showing how the stark frontiers of the pre-

electoral ‘revolutionary’ period were transformed into a more complex set of divisions over the

question of economic reforms. In section five I focus on the key aspects of the internal divisions

within the FSN and look at how conflict over economic reform led to a breakdown in the unity of

the party, culminating in the overthrow of Petre Roman’s government in September 1991.

The focus of the chapter is on how the political conflicts during this period indicated a shift from

discourses concerning revolution to those concerning transition and reform. The broad thrust of the

chapter investigates this shift in an attempt to account for the loss of power of the reformist cabinet

of Petre Roman only a year and four months after a landslide election victory for the FSN. I

question some of the dominant approaches informing the most influential studies of Romanian

politics of this period, and suggest some alternative questions and explanations. Before going on to

define the issues at stake more specifically, it is necessary to outline the broad social, economic and

political background to these events.

2: Political, Social, and Economic Context

In this section I give an account of the context in which the ‘revolution’ took on a new direction. I

discuss the elections of May 1990 that produced an overwhelming victory for the FSN. I also look

at the domestic and international context of the government’s reform agenda.

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The provisional government formed in December 1989 had lasted for five months, and had been

almost entirely dominated by the FSN.338 The provisional government was empowered with the

administration of two phases of Romanian politics. The first was to take over the state

administration and govern, protecting the revolution until a democratically legitimate representative

parliament could be elected. The second was to design and organise the elections for seats in

parliament and the elections for the institution of president. The parliament elected on the basis of

these elections was itself provisional in a sense, since it had a limited mandate of only two years. Its

task was, on the basis of the fact that it had a democratic mandate, to decide upon a new

constitution.339

Throughout the election period, Bucharest and other major cities, particularly Timisoara, Brasov

and Cluj, were the scenes of continuous demonstrations by ‘civil society’ against the authority of

the FSN. Particularly in Bucharest, owing to the two-month occupation of Piata Universitatii, the

opposition had a very high profile.

The opposition to the FSN grew owing to the number of social groups and associations that sprang

up from around the beginning of January once the violence of the revolution had subsided. There

were several types of group. Most focused on the necessity to investigate either the Ceausescu

regime, or the events of the revolution and the immediate political implications of these events and

their interpretation. For example on 2 January 1990, the Association of Former Political Prisoners

(Asociatia Fostilor Detinuti Politici Din Romania, AFDPR) was established, grouping together

those who had been persecuted for political reasons during the communist period. This group
338
See Tom Gallagher, Romania after Ceausescu.
339
See William Crowther and Steven D. Roper, ‘Comparative Analysis of Institutional
Development in the Romanian and Moldovan Legislatures’ in David M. Olson and Philip Norton
(eds.), The New Parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe, London and Portland, OR, Frank
Cass, 1996, pp. 135-6.

180
deserves a special mention for being the first high profile association of civil society formed after

the revolution, (not counting the numerous citizens’ revolutionary groups that had sprung up during

the revolution (like the Frontul Democrat Roman – Romanian Democratic Front, in Timisoara) but

which were soon overshadowed by the FSN). The importance of something like the AFDPR can be

seen if we compare it to the revolutionary groups that sprung up, dissolving differences and

coagulating around the idea of unity against Ceausescu. This first major group in civil society, the

AFDPR, focused on a particular identity, the political prisoner of the communist regime. This was a

signal that the unity of the people maintained against the other of Ceausescu could not last, that the

people could be divided into a variety of subject positions. This seemingly obvious move by former

prisoners in fact implied that the relationship of the Romanian people to the past was a more

complex affair than the FSN would have it. By establishing the issue of political prisoners as a

campaign issue, the opposition extended the negative chain of equivalence to include the whole

communist period. This was possible because the practice of political prisons was associated more

with the Dej era than with the Ceausescu era. The establishment of the AFDPR therefore signalled

that the political frontier of the united people against the enemy of Ceausescu would dissolve.

Also in this period, three major ‘historic parties’ established themselves, the PNT-cd (National

Peasant Party), the PNL (National Liberal Party), and the PSDR (Social Democrat Party of

Romania). They were historical parties in that they claimed to be the reactivation of the inter-war

parties of the same name that had been banned under communism. Indeed, many of the members of

these parties did end up as political prisoners under the communist regime. Other smaller parties

were also established, such as the MER (Miscarea Ecologista din Romania - Romanian Ecology

Movement), and the PDAR (Partidul Democrat Agrar din Romania – Romanian Democratic

Agrarian Party), and many others, during the months of January and February 1990. But what came

to be known as the ‘opposition’ began to take shape in response to attitudes to the leadership of the

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FSN, and its role in the revolution, and the post-revolutionary distribution of political power.

The FSN won the May 1990 elections with a comfortable margin; see Table 1. Ion Iliescu was

elected president with 85 per cent of the popular vote. In institutional terms, Romania’s first

democratically elected parliament gave roughly two thirds of the seats to the FSN. It was therefore

with a solid parliamentary majority that the FSN government set about its legislative programme,

mostly concerned with economic reforms. The government held a majority of 65 seats in the 396-

seat chamber of deputies. The FSN held 263 seats, and all of the other parties together held only

133 seats. The ‘historic parties’, the National Liberal Party, (PNL), the National Peasant Christian

Democrat Party, (PNT-cd), and the Romanian Social Democratic Party (PSDR), held only 10

percent in total, translating into only 43 seats. Many of the 133 deputies not members of the FSN

nevertheless were allies of the FSN.

The main players in the opposition at the time of the 1990 elections were the presidential candidates

for the PNL and the PNT-cd, Radu Cimpeanu and Ion Ratiu. Both parties succeeded in entering

parliament, but with very low numbers of seats (see Table 1). The poor performance of the three

‘historic parties’, the PNL, PNT and PSDR, which had fought the elections on the basis of an anti-

communist platform was a bitter disappointment to the emerging ‘opposition’.

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 Table 1: Results of the Elections of 20 May 1990

Presidential results

Candidate Percentage

Ion Iliescu (FSN) 85.07%

Radu Cimpeanu (PNL) 10.64%
Ion Ratiu (PNT-cd) 4.29%

Results for Chamber of Deputies

Party340 Percentage Number of seats

FSN 66.31% 263

UDMR 7.23% 29
PNL 6.41% 29
MER 2.62% 12
PNT-cd 2.56% 12
AUR 2.12% 9
PDAR 1.83% 9
PER 1.69% 8
PSDR 1.05% 5

Results for the Senate

Party Percentage Number of seats

FSN 67.02% 91
UDMR 7.20% 12
PNL 7.06% 10
PNT-cd 2.50% 1
MER 2.45% 1
AUR 2.15% 2
PDAR 1.59% -
PER 1.38% 1
PSDR 1.10% -

Source: Petre Datculescu and Klaus Liepelt, (eds.) Renasterea unei Democratii: Alegerile din
Romania de la 20 mai 1990, Bucharest, IRSOP, 1991.

340
Party names are, FSN - Frontul Salvarii Nationale (National Salvation Front), UDMR - Uniunea
Democrata Maghiara din Romania (Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania), PNL - Partidul
National Liberal (National Liberal Party), MER - Miscarea Ecologista din Romania (Ecologist
Movement of Romania), PNT-cd - Partidul National Taranesc - crestin si democrat (National
Peasant Party - Christian Democrat), AUR - Alianta Pentru Unitatea Romanilor (Alliance for the
Unity of Romanians), PDAR - Partidul Democrat Agrar din Romania (Democratic Agrarian
Party of Romania), PER - Partidul Ecologist Roman (Romanian Ecology Party), PSDR - Partidul
Socialist-Democrat Roman (Romanian Socialist-Democratic Party).

183
The overwhelming majority won by the FSN at the May elections did not put an end to the political

conflicts outlined in the previous chapter. The demonstrations in University Square that had begun

in April continued following the elections, despite the withdrawal of some of the participating civil

society groups, including the People’s Alliance, the Independent Group for Democracy, the 21st of

December Association, and the Students’ League.341 Between June 13-15, the centre of Bucharest

was the scene of violent confrontations between the police, who were ordered to clear Piata

Universitatii, and the demonstrators. Later, thousands of miners arrived in Bucharest from the Jiu

Valley to support the government by engaging in a campaign of brutal violence against the

opposition (an event referred to as the ‘mineriada’).342 These events were notorious throughout the

world and called into question the status of Romania’s democracy with Western countries.343 The

events led to a further polarisation of opinion and a deepening of the division between the FSN and

the opposition, who were now even more radicalised. The FSN, Iliescu and Roman accused the

opposition of attempting a coup d’etat.344 The events built on the antagonism between the

‘Fesenisti’ (adherents of the FSN) and the opposition, and were used by both sides as proof of ill

will and anti-democratic credentials.

But the complexity of the political situation cannot be reduced to the simplicity of this division.

First of all, the ‘historic parties’ were not directly involved in the demonstrations. Secondly, many

recognised groups representing ‘civil society’ withdrew from the demonstrations following the

elections.345 So the unity of the ‘opposition’ is in question.

Yet the overwhelming victory of the FSN encouraged some opposition political parties to attempt to
341
Dinu C. Giurescu, Istoria Romaniei in date, p. 751.
342
See Stan Stoica, Romania 1989-2002: O istorie cronologica, p. 25.; also Dinu C. Giurescu,
Istoria Romaniei in date, pp. 752-3.
343
See David Pinnemore, ‘Romania and Euro-Atlantic Integration since 1989: A Decade of
Frustration?’, p. 252.
344
See Petre Roman’s account in Elena Stefoi, Transformari inertii, dezordini’, pp. 66-81; Ion
Iliescu, Revolutie si Reforma, Bucharest, Editura enciclopedica, 194, p. 36.
345
Dan Pavel and Iulia Hossu, Nu putem reusi decat impreuna.

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form a united front. As Pavel has remarked, this was no easy task given that the three main ‘historic

parties’ represented social democrat, liberal and conservative programmes.346 Their common point

of understanding was that they had to unite since the power of the FSN was so overwhelming that

there was no chance of ousting them without an ‘anti-communist’ coalition. The mainstay of the

coalition was the PNT-cd, with a variety of other smaller parties and organisations becoming

involved, the PNL joining and leaving before the 1992 elections and then giving support to the

FDSN led government after the elections.

In September 1991, the miners arrived in Bucharest again. This time they came not to protect the

government but to oust it. This succeeded, and the Roman government fell. It was replaced by a

caretaker government headed by Theodor Stolojan who remained Prime Minister until the elections

of September 1992.347

The situation was no clearer for the FSN. The stark division between government and opposition

lasted no longer than a year, and was replaced by a much more complex set of divisions and the

unity of the FSN during this period was also in question. In April 1991, a division in the party took

place with prominent members of parliament from the FSN forming a splinter group called ‘FSN 20

May’. They claimed that the policies of the government did not reflect the pre-electoral programme,

saying that in contrast the policies were liberal and not social-democratic.348 The FSN split

definitively into two parties in April 1992 into pro-Roman FSN, and pro-Iliescu FDSN (Democratic

National Salvation Front).

The economic problems of the Ceausescu era inherited by the government remained unresolved

346
Dan Pavel and Iulia Hossu, Nu putem reusi decat impreuna.
347
See Stan Stoica, Romania 1989-2002, pp. 39-40.
348
Stan Stoica, Romania 1989-2002, pp. 33-34.

185
following the May 1990 elections.349 Although during Ceausescu’s regime the entire foreign debt

had been repaid, the government had to face other economic problems, at the same time as having

to cope with rising public pressure to raise significantly the living standards of ordinary Romanians.

Salaries remained low in comparison to prices and inflation associated with economic reforms

combined with wage policies meant an overall fall in consumer buying power over the period.

Efforts were made to offset the harshest consequences of the reforms by instituting a social safety

net.350

Almost the entire productive economy was state owned and centrally controlled, with the exception

of agricultural small-holdings and cooperative farms (as opposed to state farms which were state

owned). The salaries of the majority of working Romanians were therefore paid from the state

budget.351 Export markets in the developing world and in the former Comecon were no longer

functional.352 Another problem was energy supplies to industry and for consumers. Under Comecon

arrangements, energy under non-market conditions had been supplied, but this ceased to be the case

during this period. The principal supplier, the Soviet Union, began to operate a system of hard

currency payments for energy supplies.353 Overall, a key problem was the falling amount of

resources available to the government to balance the budget.354 Demands for increased salaries came

at the same time as both a drop in production and a contraction of exports, as well as the third

important factor, the need to invest capital in investment starved productive enterprises. In the short

term the government could rely on some financial aid from the European Community for example,

better trade conditions through selective opening of markets to Romanian products (as agreed on

349
For a sketch of Ceausescu’s economic legacy, see Romania: Human Resources and the
Transition to a Market Economy, Washington, DC, World Bank, 1992, pp. 1-2.
350
See Romania: An Economic Assessment, Paris, OECD, 1993, pp. 11-18.
351
See Romania: An Economic Assessment, p. 68.
352
Alan Smith, ‘The Transition to a Market Economy in Romania and the Competitiveness of
Exports’ in David Phinnemore and Duncan Light (eds.), Post-Communist Romania: Coming to
terms with Transition, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2001, pp. 127-133.
353
Romania: An Economic Assessment, p. 20.
354
Alan Smith, ‘The Transition to a Market Economy in Romania’, pp. 131-2.

186
October 22, Agreement on Economic and Trade Cooperation between Romania and the European

Community signed in Luxembourg.). The government also allowed the foreign debt to increase

significantly over this two year period, by increasing the amount of imports for industry and for

household consumption. It was, however, dependent on the IMF and the World Bank. It was widely

recognised that the export potential of the Romanian economy as a whole, and taking into

consideration circumstances such as the reorientation of trade towards the west, was weak.355

Economic indicators showed a sharp decrease in both productivity and output in both agricultural

and industrial production.356 Politicians of all sides agreed that there was a serious economic crisis,

and that some kind of economic reforms were necessary to boost output, quality and productivity.

Increasing productivity was in general envisaged in terms of capital injection and investment in

technology rather than increases in worker productivity. The source of the needed capital would be

the advanced industrial nations, since the Romanian government could not envisage financing

investment from the state budget during the economic crisis. Increasing worker productivity, which

had been the policy of Ceausescu’s government, instead of allowing investment, had been

abandoned. The government pursued foreign investment.357

Romania’s reorientation towards Western Europe, both economically and politically following 1989

was evident from the flurry of diplomatic activity at the highest level involving visits abroad of the

Prime Minister and the President. Romania conducted bilateral negotiations with Western states,

conducted negotiations for a trade agreement with the European Community, conducted

negotiations for financial aid packages from the G-24 group of industrialised nations, negotiated

agreements with the IMF and the World Bank, participated in the inauguration of the European

Bank For Reconstruction and Development, withdrew from the Comecon, withdrew from the

355
Alan Smith, ‘The Transition to a Market Economy in Romania’, p. 128.
356
Alan Smith, ‘The Transition to a Market Economy in Romania’, p. 131.
357
An OECD report (Romania: An Economic Assessment, Paris, OECD, 1993, p. 21) refers to
increased absorption and decreased productivity.

187
Warsaw Pact, conducted negotiations with NATO representatives on security cooperation and

negotiated with the Council of Europe to become a member. Despite all of this activity, ‘anti-

communist’ readings of Romanian politics of the time pick out the signing of a new treaty in April

1991 with the Soviet Union of friendship and good neighbourliness 358 as a sign of the crypto-

communist nature of the government and particularly President Iliescu.359 However there were still

some outstanding questions in Soviet-Romanian relations, such as the unresolved issue of the

Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, and the Soviet occupation of the province of Bessarabia. Post-communist

resurgent Romanian nationalism was again raising the question of territories now belonging to

Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova.

The diplomatic efforts mentioned above are part of the international context within which

Romanian political debates, particularly regarding economic reforms, were framed. Hurried

liberalisation and privatisation were encouraged by Western states and organisations, and were a

condition for Western financial and political involvement.360

3: Redefining the problematic: ‘Reform’, ‘transition’ and questioning the ‘communist-anti-

communist paradigm’

In this section I give an account of how the politics of this period has been analysed by other

authors. I argue that a shift in focus is necessary in order to re-evaluate he importance of discourses

that shaped the internal divisions within the FSN, and the changing discourses associated with the

opposition to the FSN.

358
See Stan Stoica, Romania 1989-2002, p. 34.
359
Romania Libera, 17 April, 1991.
360
See Peter Gowan, ‘Neo-Liberal Theory and Practice in Eastern Europe’, New Left Review, No.
213, Sept/Oct 1995, pp. 3-60.

188
There is little consensus in the literature on the nature of the FSN, or the characterisation of key

conflicts. The only major English-language monograph on post-1989 Romania, that by Tom

Gallagher,361 is hampered by the tendency of the author to promote the polemics of the Romanian

opposition. In the literature generally, splits in the FSN are not given due attention with studies

tending to focus on the struggle between ex-communist apparatchiks, grouped together in the FSN,

and ‘the dissident opposition' of ‘civil society’ and the ‘historic parties’ fighting against the FSN. In

fact, many of the academic studies of post-communist Romanian politics tend to be based on this

stereoptype, representing the politics of the period as being largely determined by an emerging

communist-anti-communist cleavage.362

For example, Birch et al. characterise the political situation following the fall of Ceausescu as an

‘unequal balance between a strong communist-successor party and a weak, often incoherent, anti-

communist opposition.’363 Crowther claims that Romanian politics had a ‘clear cleavage structure’,

and that the character of these cleavages has played a crucial role in determining electoral

competition and party political outcomes’364 following Lipset and Rokkan’s365 paradigm of the

translation of underlying social conflicts into party systems. He goes on to characterise this by

saying that ‘immediately after the fall of the RCP [PCR] dictatorship, elite level politics resolved

into a contest between forces associated with the previous regime and an initially ineffective liberal

opposition’. This repeats the formula of ‘communist - anti-communist’ found in the majority of the

361
Tom Gallagher, Romania after Ceausescu.
362
Sarah Birch, Frances Millard, Marina Popescu and Kieran Williams, Embodying Democracy:
Electoral System Design in Post-Communist Europe, Basingstoke, Palgrave-Macmillan, 2002;
William Crowther, ‘Romania’ in Sten Bergland, Frank Aarebrot and Tomas Hellen (eds.),
Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe, London, Edward Elgar, 1998, 297; Tom
Gallagher, Romania after Ceausescu, p. 66.
363
Sarah Birch et al., Embodying Democracy: Electoral System Design in Post-Communist Europe,
p. 91.
364
William Crowther, ‘Romania’, pp. 295-6.
365
Seymour M Lipset,. and Stein Rokkan, ‘Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter
Alignments’, in Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan (eds.), Party Systems and Voter Alignments:
Cross-National Perspectives, New York, The Free Press, 1967, pp. 1-64.

189
literature. An exception is to be found in the work of Katherine Verdery, who characterised the FSN

as a ‘mass political movement’, divided between ‘older reformist party apparatchiks and younger

technocrats’.366

Crowther is among those who simplify matters by concluding that ‘at the time of Romania’s initial

transitional elections, state power was already effectively in the hands of a successor communist

party which, while decrying Ceausescuism and publicly breaking with the most compromised

leaders of the dictatorship, incorporated into itself substantial elements of the former power

structure, including a large part of its network of rural local officials.’ 367 There is some difficulty

here, since Crowther talks of the Romanian Communist Party dictatorship and not the Ceausescu

dictatorship, whose analysis is based on the premise that the state and the party were the same thing

even in the time of the FSN. Daniel Barbu looks more carefully at the discourses and their links

with the institutions, taking care to distinguish between the FSN and ‘the state’.368 While the FSN is

not characterised in the work of Barbu as a communist continuity movement, his critique of the

flaws of post-communist Romanian democracy includes the observation that the constitution

adopted in 1991 ensured the continuity of the administrative structure of the state that existed under

communism, but with pluralism enshrined as a fundamental principle, and with different

representative institutions.

Tom Gallagher’s anti-communism is most strident, and sees the FSN as largely promoting

continuity, of course within new Western-imposed limits. Describing the FSN as ‘officials groomed

by the Ceausescu regime whose power was challenged but not broken’ he describes the revolution

as ‘the people’s revolt of 1989’ that was ‘quickly smothered by these political insiders who

366
Katherine Verdery, What Was Socialism, and What Comes Next?, Princeton, NJ, Princeton
University Press, 1996, p. 109.
367
William Crowther, ‘Romania’, p. 298.
368
Daniel Barbu, Republica absenta, Bucharest, Editura Nemira, 1999.

190
managed to carry out an internal coup, disposing of Ceausescu in the process’.369 The struggle for

power of the FSN is attributed by Gallagher to the fact that ‘membership of the government elite

still offers opportunities for enrichment, as a flawed privatisation of some state assets has enriched

former members of the communist establishment.’370 Despite much evidence to the contrary and the

fact that the FSN was a ‘broad church’, Gallagher claims that the FSN agenda was one of ‘limited

change…pursued by reluctant democrats who have bowed to prevailing circumstances rather than

voluntarily renouncing authoritarian behaviour and embracing pluralism.’371 This is at odds with the

reformist platform of the FSN embraced pluralism as early as 23 December 1989 in 'Comunicatul

Catre Tara'372, announcing the FSN provisional takeover of the government. Gallagher admits that

‘critics have described the NSF [FSN] as ‘neo-communist’ but this description may be of limited

usefulness…a case could be made for describing the NSF as essentially a non-ideological grouping

which had emerged from the party apparatus with the aim of protecting a set of caste interests in

new conditions.’373 And perhaps, according to Gallagher, this could be understood by reference to

some historical determinants: ‘The NSF’s desire to retain a political monopoly reflects deep-seated

trends in political history’.374

Henderson and Robinson, like Verdery, do indicate the diverse nature of the FSN, and indicate that

the fragile unity of this organisation foundered when it came to the formulation of a programme of

reforms.375 But the characterisation of the FSN as a neo-communist organisation protecting the

interests of former party apparatchiks precludes the need to investigate the process of the break-up

of the FSN, and the central role of the reconfiguration of ideologies and political identities in this

369
Tom Gallagher, Romania after Ceausescu, p. 1.
370
Tom Gallagher, Romania after Ceausescu, pp. 1-2.
371
Tom Gallagher, Romania after Ceausescu, p. 8.
372
See ‘Comunicatul Catre Tara’.
373
Tom Gallagher, Romania after Ceausescu, p. 233.
374
Tom Gallagher, Romania after Ceausescu, p. 233.
375
Karen Henderson and Neil Robinson, Post-Communist Politics: An Introduction, Prentice-Hall,
1997.

191
period of flux. Gallagher’s claim, cited above, that the FSN represented a group with clear material

interests to defend and had nothing to do with ideology, but described as neo-communist

nonetheless too, reinforces the argument in favour of a different approach to the study of the FSN.

An influential study by Linz and Stepan echoes the concerns of the majority of authors in

categorising the FSN as a neo-communist organisation, and drawing the conclusion that the FSN

was a promoter of the continuity of the Romanian Communist system. 376 The fact that Ion Iliescu

had held high positions in the Communist Party is generally assumed to indicate that after 1989 the

FSN led by him was somehow ‘pretending’ to promote reform. This brings to light the problems

that dog analyses of Romanian politics where the party heritage of the FSN is said to be a

communist-successor party, and its reformist credentials are therefore dismissed.

These analyses point to three main problems raised by the existing studies. Firstly, that the FSN was

a communist-successor party and the evaluation on the basis of this ‘statement of fact’ that the FSN

was attempting to save as much of the old system as possible. There is an important distinction

between the claim that the FSN was the successor party to the Communist Party, and the obvious

observation that many of the prominent members of the FSN had held important functions in the

communist party. The term successor party implies continuity of policy and programme. However,

both Roman and Stolojan had been communist party members, but it would be impossible to

maintain that they participated in a government that was trying to salvage Romanian communism.

Everyone in the FSN was attached through membership to promoting a programme of democratic

pluralism and market reforms. Even Iliescu’s position, often characterised as the embodiment of

apparatchik neo-communist class, cannot be interpreted in this light, since he was the principal

architect of the FSN system that allowed the Roman cabinet to take office.
376
Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation:
Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1996, p. 359-362; cf Vladimir Tismaneanu, Stalinism for all Seasons, p. 29.

192
The second dominant characteristic present in the literature is the stereotype that Romanian politics

after 1989 was defined by a communist - anti communist struggle. This introduces a blind spot in

analyses, and does not take account of the fact that the communist imaginary had collapsed and that

Romania was entering a period where liberal democratic discourses held sway. This

characterisation is based on the acceptance of the view that the opposition to the FSN was

‘democratic’ and that the FSN was ‘not democratic’, being a party for the defence of the communist

system. This line of analysis is in fact similar to the platform constructed by the opposition for the

May 1990 elections.377 But this does not take account of the fact that the FSN was not the same

thing as the communist party, and did not stand on a communist platform in the elections. It stood

on a platform of gradual reforms (that are discussed in greater detail in section five), and the

elections it designed allowed the participation of other parties, and never promoted a return to the

past.

This brings us to the third characteristic of the problematic literature on Romania. In relation to the

FSN, some analyses refer to a fight in the FSN emerging between ‘reformists’ and ‘conservatives’.

This is reflected in the post-1992 discourse of Petre Roman.378 Although the literature tends to take

this further than Petre Roman by creating a picture of the FSN as an organisation where a faction of

reformists eventually broke away to form a new party taking the name of the FSN (Roman’s party)

leaving the neo-communist kernel of the FDSN (Iliescu’s faction) with a hold on power. This

implies through the use of ‘conservative’ that the FSN was against reforms. This ignored the fact

that the main conflict within the FSN was over what the contents and phasing of reforms should be.

However, although the FSN split into two in the run up to this split there were at least three

377
Opposition electoral slogans included the phrase ‘Down with communism’, together with
‘Freedom’, ‘Timisoara’ and ‘Down with the nomenklatura’; see Dinu C. Giurescu, Istoria
Romaniei in date, p. 751.
378
Petre Roman, Marturii provocate: convorbiri cu Elena Stefoi, Bucharest, Editura Paideia, 2002.

193
factions. These included those, such as Stolojan, who supported speedy liberalisation; those who

advocated phased liberalisation, such as Roman; and those who proposed a socialist market, such as

Birladeanu. These factions and their importance are discussed in more detail in section five.

I claim that these events were much too complex to be reduced to the rather simple dichotomy

between pro- and anti-communists present in much of the literature. This dichotomy does not, for

example, help us to explain major events, such as the fall of the Roman government in September

1991, a government that had survived the pressure of the opposition parties for most of 1990, and

was beginning by 1991 even to enjoy their qualified support for the reform programme. In an

October 1990 article, Ion Ratiu of the PNT-cd is quoted as saying that:

The report presented by the Prime Minster represents a declaration of intentions which is

largely in line with the ideas that I and my party advocated during the election campaign…

.Mr. Iliescu spoke then about the 'Swedish model', the 'Japanese model', and of an 'original

Romanian model'. All of these seem to have been abandoned, and the talk is now clearly of

the stimulation of massive investment from the West that we need.379

Iliescu, interviewed in the same article, says: ‘the programme is wide ranging because otherwise it

is impossible. Here it is not the issue of whether this is someone’s subjective option. The old

structures have failed, and have become the main obstacle and the source of the crisis in which

Romanian society is at the moment.’380 Dinu Patriciu from a break-away ‘youth wing’ of the PNL

endorses the Roman report in the same article says ‘the report presented to us proves the firm will

of the government to progress rapidly on the road of transition, of economic reform.’ 381 Similarly,

379
‘Va primi guvernul imputerniciri speciale? Starea economiei in opiniile unor personalitati
politice’, Adevarul, 20 October, 1990.
380
'Va primi guvernul imputerniciri speciale?'
381
'Va primi guvernul imputerniciri speciale?'

194
Radu Cimpeanu of the PNL says in the opposition paper, Romania Libera, ‘We are asking for an

acceleration of reforms’, in contradiction to the PNL-AT (Aripa Tinara, youth wing) and the leader

of the PNT-cd.382

Another important aspect relates to how the FSN, which had been so powerful and unified in

resisting the repeated and tenacious contestation of its political legitimacy from the ‘democratic

opposition’, literally imploded as a political force less than two years after the revolution. In order

to give a more adequate account of one of the most important political events of the time, it is

necessary to study the discourses emanating from within the FSN and the opposition more closely.

In this way we shall recognise that the complexity of the political divisions of this time cannot be

accounted for through the simple dichotomy communist - anti-communist.

In the previous chapter, I analysed the new political frontier that the FSN built around the myth of

the revolution. We also suggested ways in which this had been useful in the FSN’s successful

attempts to consolidate, and for a time monopolise, political power. This enabled the FSN to move

ahead with its post-revolutionary political project of consolidating the provisional government, thus

being in the strongest position of any organised grouping in Romanian society by the time of the

first elections in May 1990.383

In the next section we look more closely at events during the two years following the elections of

May 1990. The stark political frontier of the revolution, based on an expanding chain of

equivalence to include almost the whole of society, was drastically transformed in this period. The

emergence of new political positions and platforms made the populist political frontier, crafted

during the revolution by the FSN, impossible to maintain. From June 1990 onwards, cracks in the
382
Romania Libera, 20 October, 1990.
383
For announcement of elections, see ‘La 20 mai - Alegerile: Comunicat din partea Consiliului
Frontului Salvarii Nationale’, in Adevarul, 24 January 1990.

195
unity of the FSN began to appear as other political parties became more organised and worked

together (in the crisis-ridden Democratic Convention,384 which seemed to hold together despite

numerous splits), such as the PNT-cd and the PNL, and the newly elected government began to

implement reforms.

4: The 1990 elections and shifting political frontiers

Building on the analysis in the previous section, in this section I offer an account of how the

political frontiers of the pre-electoral period became transformed by the conflict surrounding

economic reform. I argue that the importance of ‘opposition’ discourses receded relative to the

emergence of internal divisions within the FSN.

The 1990 Elections

The decision of the FSN to transform itself into a political party and contest the elections was taken

by the Council of the FSN on 23 January 1990. Capitalising on the position they had gained in the

revolution, the FSN sought during the electoral campaign to portray themselves as the party of

stability, welfare, and legality. Their programme for the May 1990 elections did not talk about

‘difficulties’ and ‘social costs’ of transition. Instead, in March 1990, it claimed that ‘the

fundamental aim of the FSN economic policy is to ensure the welfare of the entire people and the

quality of life in all respects. The Front considers that this objective can be reached under the

circumstances of the gradual transformation of the Romanian economy into a market economy.’ 385

This 'gradual transformation' was understood as involving a change from excessively planned and
384
The Democratic Convention was an electoral coalition of the main opposition parties, led by he
PNT-cd.
385
FSN Platforma program, Bucharest, March 1990, cited in Alin Teodorescu, ‘The future of a
failure: the Romanian economy’, in Orjan Sjoberg and Michael L. Wyzan, (eds.) Economic change
in the Balkan states: Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia, London, Pinter, 1991.p. 78.

196
centralised system to a liberalised and decentralised economy based on the principle of making state

firms profitable, and on the mechanisms of the market economy: Specifically, the FSN supported:

subsidies of foodstuffs, energy supplies and domestic fuel; the promotion, alongside public

property, of forms of private, co-operative and mixed property ownership; maintaining state

property in sectors of the national economy that are vital to the public interest, while

integrating these within market mechanisms; creating conditions for state enterprises to

become self-managing; the formation of joint stock companies, partly through the attraction

of foreign capital.386

The opposition’s primary aim during the electoral campaign was to discredit the FSN’s claim to

legitimacy and to portray it as a neo-communist formation. During the pre-electoral period, the

opposition used mass demonstrations to express displeasure with the FSN. Unhappy with what they

claimed was the ‘anti-democratic’, ‘neo-communist’ character of the FSN, and its unclear role in

the events of December, on January 12 1990 a demonstration gathered in the centre of Bucharest to

commemorate the victims of the revolution. However, this was more than a commemoration. It was

also a protest against the leadership functions of former communist activists in the FSN. The

commemoration turned into a demonstration that approached the government building and made

several demands. They demanded that the communist party be banned, and demanded an

investigation into the events of the revolution, asking 'who were the terrorists?'

The FSN decision to transform itself into a political party galvanised the opposition into action. For

the opposition, it was undemocratic and un-revolutionary that, as the provisional authority, the FSN

should now organise elections, and run as a political party in those elections. On 26 January the
386
Crisan Iliescu and Cristina Roman, 'Sintezele platformelor electorale ale partidelor care au
obtinut peste 1% din voturi', in Petre Datculescu and Klaus Liepelt (eds.), Renasterea unei
democratii, p. 177.

197
PNT-cd, the PLN and the PSDR made a joint declaration in which they expressed their

disagreement with the decision of the FSN to participate in the elections as a political party.

In this declaration, the opposition parties mentioned above several main points of contention that

had been raised as a result of the FSN announcement to participate as a party in the forthcoming

elections. First of all they accused the FSN of abusing its role as a provisional authority by

monopolising power and access to media and material resources, as the following passage from the

declaration shows:

Through this decision, the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as a provisional government

as well as its credibility vis-à-vis public opinion. How can there be talk of free elections and

equitable conditions for all political formations when the FSN holds a monopoly on all of the

levers of the state in a completely totalitarian manner. The Front has discretionary access to

funds and economic means, to television, radio, and newspapers; the people are subject to

biased information and disinformation.387

They also decried the FSN's methods of taking over the state administration, local government, and

even the permeation of industrial enterprises by FSN councils, claiming that this was a further

abuse of power reminiscent of communist tactics:

Moreover, the FSN has already begun to put pressure on the electorate through government

measures, through local councils, through ministries, through enterprises, through institutions,

all formed by the Front in an undemocratic way, using the old ruling strata of the communist

dictatorship so hated by the people.388

387
See 'Dupa Anuntarea Hotaririi Frontului Salvarii Nationale de a participa la Alegeri: Pozitii ale
unor partide', in Adevarul, 26 January 1990.
388
'Dupa Anuntarea Hotaririi Frontului Salvarii Nationale de a participa la Alegeri'

198
In an implied contrast with some of the leading members of the opposition parties, who had

suffered persecution at the hands of the new communist regime in the 1940s, the statement attacked

the legitimacy of the key figureheads of the FSN. It was claimed that their status as anti-Ceausescu

dissidents was more than questionable, and of no significance, and had only been used as a tactic in

order to position themselves as legitimate leaders of the revolution:

The FSN does not have the right to hold political power in the country under the pretext that

some of its members were last-minute dissidents because they were marginalised by the

whims of the former dictator. Basically, their suffering is totally insignificant compared to the

decades of imprisonment and barbaric persecutions to which members of our parties and the

whole people were subjected. 389

A further accusation that was levelled was of disingenuousness. They claimed that the FSN had

used its initial limited programme to attract a wide range of prestigious figures to the FSN solely for

the purpose of gaining legitimacy:

In this newly-created situation, the FSN has put itself obviously contradictory position vis-à-

vis its own minimal programme that it initially announced, and through which it obtained the

support of public opinion, including our parties, as well as the moral endorsement of several

prestigious personalities without partisan affiliation, who offered to the FSN moral support

and gave legitimacy to their provisional political platform.390

Contrasting the false revolutionism and dissidence of the FSN leadership with the real values of the

389
'Dupa Anuntarea Hotaririi Frontului Salvarii Nationale de a participa la Alegeri'
390
'Dupa Anuntarea Hotaririi Frontului Salvarii Nationale de a participa la Alegeri'

199
revolution was another message of the statement that invoked images of the youth, the students and

the workers who had really made the revolution:

The anti-communist insurrection that through unequalled sacrifices achieved a victory over

tyranny is undoubtedly thanks to the heroism of the young generation of pupils, students, and

workers who sacrificed their lives for liberty and democracy.391

The accusation of seizing or stealing a revolution was levelled at the FSN in the following passage,

claiming that the victory belonged to 'the people', and had been simply 'confiscated' by the FSN:

This superb victory belongs to the whole people and cannot be confiscated by anyone. No-one

can appropriate it in order to assume legitimacy or to seize political power and to avoid the

control by the people. 392

The previous accusations were the basis for the opposition's demands to have the nature of the

provisional government altered in a more inclusive manner, by involving the political parties, and

the FSN withdrawing from the government, and that one of the qualifications for participation

should be anti-communist credentials:

Therefore, the PNT-cd, PNL, and PSDR demand (a) that the FSN and the government that it

created should immediately withdraw from leading the state and the administration; (b) in

place of the Front and of the current government, a provisional government should be formed,

invested with legislative power, which will govern Romania until the coming elections; (c)

the provisional government should be made up of representatives of active political parties;

391
'Dupa Anuntarea Hotaririi Frontului Salvarii Nationale de a participa la Alegeri'
392
'Dupa Anuntarea Hotaririi Frontului Salvarii Nationale de a participa la Alegeri'

200
 prestigious personalities who have proved themselves in the 45-year fight against communist

dictatorship; and youth representatives.393

The practical response of the opposition came shortly afterwards. The PNTcd and the PNL together

called a demonstration on 28 January to protest against the decision of the FSN to participate in the

elections. At the same time as the demonstration, pro-FSN demonstrators turned out into the streets

to support the government. Demonstrators from the PNTcd and the PNL were accused of

‘attacking’ the government building.394 The response of supporters of the FSN came on the next

day. They attacked the party offices of the PNTcd and PNL, not only in Bucharest but also in other

cities. For the first time, a pro-government mineriada took place as miners from the Jiu Valley in

Southern Romania came to the capital to deal with the anti-government protesters violently.

The opposition continued their demonstrations and a standoff on 28 February 1990 ended with the

second mineriada. The government, for its part, accused the opposition of instigating the violence.

According to the pro-FSN newspaper Adevarul:

People are called on to the street and are taught to master the street … the street is again

manipulated. Disorder, uncontrolled howling, brutality, aggressiveness, moral pressure, all

come together in a single unstoppable torrent, and this does not mean anything other than

another face of dictatorship. Of a dictatorship protected by anonymity, encouraged by

darkness, and provoked by subversive intentions.395

The violence was followed by the outbreak of an acute and bitter conflict and polemics between the

FSN provisional government, and ‘the democratic opposition’. This conflict resulted in a two-
393
'Dupa Anuntarea Hotaririi Frontului Salvarii Nationale de a participa la Alegeri'
394
Stan Stoica, Romania 1989-2002, p. 20.
395
See 'Manipularea strazii?', Adevarul, 30 January, 1990.

201
month demonstration contesting the legitimacy of the new government.396 This was symbolised by

the occupation of Piata Universitatii by demonstrators from 22 April until 13 June, which was

declared a ‘neo-communist free zone’.397 This factor became even more acute as the conflict came

to a head between 13 and 15 June 1990, one month after the elections. The government claimed that

certain groups among the demonstrators had attempted a coup d’etat. In Iliescu's words:

As the serious events of last week show, some extremists and minority political groups are

threatened by [the new political process]. On 13 June, several state institutions were attacked

and devastated. Many lives were lost and there were a large number of injured. There was

also damage to property. There are numerous elements which allow us to talk of a pre-

meditated action, organised and co-ordinated according to a scenario of destabilisation.398

Similarly, according to Adevarul, 'the facts show that the attempted coup d'etat has been in

preparation for some time'.399 This was followed by another mineriada, a march on the capital of the

miners from the Jiu Valley, who responded to an appeal from the President Iliescu to come to the

aid of the government to protect it from a counter-revolutionary coup d’etat. Justifying this move,

Iliescu said:

The leadership of the state and of the government was faced with direct provocation and

found itself unable to respond efficiently. Under these circumstances, the appeal was

broadcast to the population to come and support the authorities, an appeal to which the
396
See Adevarul, 20 May, 1990, the front page of which is blank except for an interpellation on
behalf of the government ‘Avem nevoie de liniste, oameni buni!’ meaning, ‘Good people, we
need peace’, this being a reference to the continuing demonstrations against the FSN that were
taking place.
397
See Romania Libera, 23 April 1990. This lasted for some time; Romania Libera became a sort
of media vigil for this protest, while Adevarul stuck up for the government and tried to
marginalise the demonstration.
398
See Iliescu's investiture speech, 'Domnul Iliescu se adreseaza tarii', Adevarul, 21 June 1990.
399
'Ieri in capitala', Adevarul, 15 June 1990.

202
 citizens of the capital and from other counties, including the miners, who came from different

parts of the country, responded massively.400

These events are important because the emergence of opposition in January, the organised

demonstration beginning on 22 April in University Square, and the clearing of the University

Square in June dominated politics in this period. The existence of such a resilient opposition could

not be brushed aside easily, the occupation of the square lasting for several months as a direct

challenge to the legitimacy of the revolutionary settlement offered by the FSN. Also many

prominent intellectuals were involved in the demonstration as well as being associated with the

other political parties. The FSN and Iliescu did try to brush aside the opposition by labelling them

‘golani’ (ruffians – from the Romanian for naked - and hooligans). Iliescu later retracted this.401

These events devastated the basis of the FSN’s revolution myth. On the other hand, we have the fact

that the FSN won the elections in May with an overwhelming majority. These events forced the

FSN to expand the chain of equivalence relating to anti-revolutionary forces to include the

opposition element on the other side of Iliescu’s revolutionary political frontier, which was initially

based on a division between the people/FSN and Ceausescu. Thus the others became more

numerous but difficult to equate with the simple symbol of Ceausescu. In this way the simple

picture of Romanian unity against enemies became difficult to sustain.

Thus, the opposition began by contesting the FSN version of the revolution, and also by extending

object of hatred to the whole communist period, rather than just Ceausescu himself. Not only did

the opposition claim that the FSN leadership were not dissidents, it accused some of the FSN

members of outright complicity in the carrying out of crimes during the 'communist dictatorship'

400
See 'Domnul Ion Iliescu se adreseaza tarii'.
401
Ruxandra Cesereanu, Imaginarul violent al romanilor, Bucharest, Humanitas, 2003, p. 89.

203
lasting half a century, thus not only referring to the Ceausescu era:

On top of this, some of them [the FSN members] personally contributed to the indictment and

persecution of the best sons of the Romanian people, to the installation and maintenance of

the dictatorship that lasted for half a century.402

The opposition’s strategy therefore was to ‘reorganise’ the people, creating new positive and

negative identities. The first consequence of this strategy was to contest the unity of the identity of

‘revolutionaries’ that the FSN had attempted to monopolise. They created a set of new identities

that collectively formed an anti-communist people in opposition to the FSN, which became the

principal ‘other’, and included in a chain of equivalence alongside Ceausescu and communism.

The opposition spoke of the FSN as being the principal obstacle in the way of democratisation,

portraying the FSN's strategies as a direct threat to the future of democracy: 'The intention

[pretentia] of the FSN to compete in the elections puts the future of democracy in Romania in

danger!'403 They challenged the right of former Communist Party apparatchiks or activists to hold

democratically elected office. Article 8 of the Proclamation of Timisoara, 11 March 1990, a

declaration of principles made by a coalition of anti-communist groups, proposed that by law the

candidacy of ex-communist activists and security officers in legislative elections should be

prohibited. They also called for the same law to stipulate that former communist activists (such as

Ion Iliescu) should be disallowed from running for election as President.404 The ‘declaration’ of the

organisers of the Piata Universitatii (The League of Students, The Alliance of the People, The 16-21

December Association, The Independent Group for Democracy, The Romanian Anti-Totalitarian

Front), launched on 22 April 1990, accused Ion Iliescu of being the most guilty for undermining the
402
'Dupa Anuntarea Hotaririi Frontului Salvarii Nationale de a participa la Alegeri'.
403
'Dupa Anuntarea Hotaririi Frontului Salvarii Nationale de a participa la Alegeri'.
404
Romania Libera, 12 March, 1990.

204
true anti-communist nature of the revolution,405 and echoed Article 8 of the Timisoara declaration.

On 18 May 1990, two days before the elections, a Romania Libera report on the demonstrations in

Piata Universitatii entitled ’Piata Universitatii: Revolutia continua AICI’ (The Revolution continues

HERE) contained photographs of the demonstrators, several of whom were holding a banner which

held the slogan ‘We support the declaration of Timisoara: We don’t want neo-Communism’.

Thus, the period up until the elections of 20 May was one where the violence was inspired by these

two opposing positions concerning the legitimacy of the government. Demonstrations served as

mobilising symbols and points of identification for the rival groups of supporters. These

demonstrations and the two competing discourses created a situation whereby society appeared to

be divided down the middle. Both sides claimed to represent 'the people'.

For the FSN, the results of the elections represented a resounding victory, and a sign of the

democratic legitimacy of their rule, both before and after the May elections. It was seen as

confirming their ‘revolutionary legitimacy’.406 The 85 per cent vote for president Iliescu in the first

round of presidential balloting was taken as a sign of overwhelming popular approval for the FSN.

The opposition took this as a sign that the people had been manipulated by a neo-communist

government, which had not organised elections on a level playing field.407

Therefore, as far as elections were concerned, the picture was one of extraordinary success for the

FSN in many respects. It remained a unified party organisation, both centrally and territorially, that

succeeded in mobilising support on a massive scale in the elections. It had achieved this despite the

claims of the opposition that the FSN was an illegitimate participant in the elections. It won the

elections on the platform of revolution and reform, to which the party seemed to be committed. It
405
Romania Libera, 23 April, 1990.
406
‘Domnul Ion Iliescu se adreseaza tarii’.
407
See Revolutie + Alegeri = Democratie?’, Romania Libera, 22 May 1990.

205
benefitted from the leadership of two extremely charismatic figures who were indelibly associated

with images of the revolution, Ion Iliescu and Petre Roman (Petre Roman was legendary, there were

even pop songs about him being a housewife heartthrob!). The FSN began its career as a party

whose members were known to have been communists, with a large majority of support, in a

country where ‘the opposition’ claimed that an anti-communist popular revolution had occurred.

For the FSN it was also important that the opposition they faced was divided between several

parties and had weak support, and no clear strategy apart from ‘decommunisation’.

For a time, the ‘historic parties’ and the ‘civil society’ organisations nonetheless continued to

maintain that the legitimacy of the results was in question due to the circumstances through which

the FSN had dominated and ‘abused’ their power as a merely provisional authority. 408 In the words

of a journalist sympathetic to the opposition, ‘a revolution and elections do not add up to

democracy!’.409 The main complaints were that the FSN was a clique of former communist

apparatchiks who had stolen the revolution, and that during the election campaign the FSN had

controlled the principal means of mass communication, including the only television channel in

existence.

Yet each of these parties had a lower level of support than the Democratic Union of Hungarians

from Romania (UDMR). This affected their ability to claim that the opposition represented

anything except a minority of Romanians, a fact that was not lost on the victors in the FSN. It also

affected their claim that the FSN was merely a masked continuation of the dictatorship. It was clear

that the historical parties had not managed to achieve significant levels of support on the basis of

this anti-communist platform.410

408
See Adevarul, and Romania Libera, 29 January, 1990
409
‘Revolutie + Alegeri = Democratie?’; see also Dumitru Ceausu, ‘Victorie: Importrivacui?’,
Romania Libera, 22 May 1990.
410
Dan Pavel and Iulia Hossu, Nu putem reusi decat impreuna; Silviu Brucan, one of the most
prominent figures in the FSN also interviewed by The Guardian (19 May 1990) concludes that ‘I

206
The Post-Electoral Period

After the elections the government attempted to maintain its hegemony by articulating the necessity

of reform within the context of an economic transition. Using elements of the revolution myth, the

reform signifier was placed by the FSN within a narrative blaming the Ceausescu legacy for the

economic crisis.411 The opposition, on the other hand, painted a picture of a political crisis, the

source of which was the FSN’s iron grip on power and anti-democratic tendencies.412 The

background to this struggle for dominance between the FSN and the opposition, between opposition

parties and groups, and within the FSN itself, includes the conflict over the elections, and the

economic crisis, which bring to light the variety and complexity of the responses to the political and

economic crises as they were articulated by the leading protagonists.

In order to comprehend the significance of the rearticulation of the political frontiers analysed in the

previous chapter, it is necessary to come to grips with the discourse of transition and reform as it

emerged to dominate the internal politics of the FSN. It was through the engagement by political

actors with this new discourse that the logics of equivalence upon which the previous political

frontiers had been built began to dissolve. Thus transition and reform, as a new discourse distinct

from that of the revolution, can be seen as a space where new discursive strategies were forged that

displaced those of the immediate post-revolutionary period.

I argue that a discourse of transition emerged as part of the response of all parties to the crisis.

Though, as I will show in detail, ‘transition’ was understood in very different senses by the main

consider that the revolution of 22 December 1990…to have been against Ceausescu…It was not
an uprising against the post-war experience of Communism’.
411
See ‘Domnul Ion Iliescu se adreseaza tarii’ in Adevarul, 21 June 1990.
412
See ‘Privatizarea la ora actuala: Noi de aici nu plecam’, Romania Libera, 31 May 1990.

207
political parties, and even differently between factions of the same party. First of all, transition

emerged as the response on the part of the opposition to the FSN to the political crisis, the need for

democratisation being central to opposition discourse.

The results of the May 1990 elections were much discussed much in the pages of anti-FSN

Romania Libera. It is worth noting that the idea of democratisation took on an extended meaning

following the elections, to mean a reform that would raise the democratic consciousness of the

people. After the elections pro-opposition commentators admitted that the opposition campaign was

flawed and had not taken account of social realities and the predictable reactions of the majority of

the electorate. Also evident were divisions and recriminations between the main opposition parties.

Dumitru Ceausu, writing on 22 May 1990 in Romania Libera, says the following:

A solid analysis of the results of the elections of 20 May 1990 can be done only after the

official results are known, and only after serious sociological investigations have been carried

out by specialists in mass psychology… The historic parties have participated in the victory of

the FSN without wanting to, having committed two serious errors. On the one hand, they let

themselves be influenced by extremist forces in a campaign not only against communism but

also against former communists. They ignored the fact that the majority of the electors were

either simple card carriers of the Communist party, or were or still are materially dependent

on the present communist type economic and administrative structures, created by

communists and still run by (ex?) communists. The aged and intransigent leftovers of the ex-

historical parties, particularly in the PNT-cd, showed a complete lack of political sense and

orientation, believing that they could tie together again a policy interrupted through falsehood

and violence in 1946. They ignored the realities of the Romania of 1990, the fact that the

social-economic base of the electorate of today is completely different to that which existed

208
 four and a half decades ago….We have had free elections. The first free elections for more

than five decades. But how free could these elections have been in the socio-political and

economic conditions of today?….The value of this collective choice is true to the present

level of political civilisation of the electorate and must be accepted and respected.413

The substance of the opposition discourse changed after the elections to measured critique of

government policy, rather than the failed campaign to force the FSN to renounce its grip, since

the historic parties largely accepted participation within the new institutions. 414 Secondly,

economic transition also emerged as the response of the FSN government to the economic crisis.

But since the FSN had claimed to have largely instituted democracy already, they regarded the

transition as primarily concerning economic reform. In Iliescu’s presidential oath, the new

elected president outlines his meaning of the transition, stressing the centrality of the economic

aspect, in sharp contrast to the opposition discourse on the ‘distorted by communism socio-

political base’. Iliescu states that:

the elections in May have closed the first phase of great importance of our revolution,

highlighting, in political terms, the break with the totalitarian system and its ideology, and the

opening of the road to the creation of a free and democratic society, based on the respect…for

fundamental human rights…In the short time since the revolution…the first measures have

been taken which commit us to the road of transition towards a free and democratic society.415

The use of the term 'transition' in the above quote by Iliescu is striking in that he does not refer to
413
Romania Libera, 22 May 1990.
414
A survey of the main newspapers show that the reports on parliament contain details of the
involvement of the opposition parties in the day to day business of legislating. Cited in Dan
Pavel and Iulia Hossu, Nu putem reusi decat impreuna, who claim that even the liberal party
leader, Radu Cimpeanu, despite his ‘anti-communism’ was desperate to be invited to participate
in government.
415
Adevarul, 21 June, 1990.

209
 transition as an economic process associated with market reforms. This could be understood not

as an admission of the imperfection of Romanian democracy due to the FSN, but as indicating

the legacy of the Ceausescu years as being a difficult one to overcome, but also as a criticism of

the opposition, who the president claimed were working against democracy, and had

characterised as constituting one of the main opponents to the FSN instituted democracy.

Significantly, differences of emphasis regarding the meaning of transition were highlighted

following the split between the Roman faction and the Iliescu faction of the FSN in 1992:

The populist policy of some elements of the [Roman] government led to a loss of control of

the social and economic situation, and to their under-appreciation of the role of the state in the

promotion of reform, and the organisation and leadership of society in the transition period.416

In 1990 this was already evident as a close reading of the following quote from a speech by Petre

Roman shows. He concentrated more on the economic aspects from the beginning of his

mandate following the elections, stating that:

The Declaration of the Government has as its core direction the social protection of the most

exposed social groups in the context of the transition to a market economy, the next two years

of which being decisive and which will come with social and economic costs, and

concommitantly in the circumstances of the profound economic crisis inherited from the old

regime.417

Thus, we can see that Roman articulated the meaning of the 'transition' differently, as a process
416
From the programme of the newly split Iliescu wing of the FSN (anti-Roman) Democratic
National Salvation Front (FDSN) in 1992, FDSN, Sa Construim Impreuna Viitorul Romaniei:
Platforma-Program a FDSN, Bucharest, 1992.
417
‘Discursul Domnului Prim Ministru Petre Roman in Parlamentul Tarii la presentarea noului
cabinet.’, in Adevarul, 29 June, 1990.

210
leading to a market economy, and tied this to 'social costs' rather than Iliescu's emphasis on

transition tied to fundamental rights. Importantly, transition was the discourse promoted by Western

states and international organisations as a response to both the economic and political crises. 418 The

most important consequence of this shift to a discourse of transition was that the proliferation of

new subject positions dissolved the unity of ‘the people’. The carefully constructed popular unity

was most definitely called into question, and certainly after the elections, by the Prime Minster

himself. Talk of a social safety net to mitigate the worst effects of the economic reforms were

articulated alongside the idea that some groups, sectors or social classes would be more exposed

and adversely affected by the reforms than others.419 This unity had been symbolised by the

discourse of the revolution myth. The discourse of Romanian politics was henceforth characterised

by a much more complex and cross-cutting set of antagonisms.420 The ‘opposition’421, nonetheless,

did continue to attempt to create an alternative discourse of a political frontier uniting the ‘anti-

communist people’ against the ‘neo-communists’, but after the elections the fragmentation of the

opposition meant that they fought each other as much as they fought the FSN. But at the same time,

within the FSN itself important new political frontiers were also being created between rival

factions supporting different programs of reform. By March 1991, divisions within the FSN led the

party to split in two, the FSN and the FDSN.422

418
See Per Ronnas, ‘The economic legacy of Ceausescu’, in Orjan Sjoberg and Michael L. Wyzan,
(eds.), Economic Change in the Balkan States: Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia,
London, Pinter, 1991; also, Marvin Jackson, ‘Rehabilitation of the Romanian Economy’, in
PlanEcon Report, vol. 6, no. 5, 1990.
419
See ‘Discursul Domnului Prim Ministru Petre Roman in Parlamentul Tarii', where he mentions
that 'the most exposed layers of society must be protected from the effects of reform.'
420
A good example of new subject positions and identities is the emergence of the derogatory term
‘bisnitar’ (meaning a sort of wheeler-dealer deriving from the English ‘business’). Whereas the
‘social costs’ of transition would hit the most ‘exposed social groups’, ‘unscrupulous ‘bisnitari’
would profit off the backs of everyone else. This was a popular theme of the discussions on the
transition to the market economy in the pages of Adevarul. See Gheorghe Ionita, ‘Bisnitarii’, in
Adevarul, 7 April 1990, who describes the appearance of such characters as being ‘like
mushrooms after a rainfall’.
421
I use the term opposition in brackets since it is difficult to talk of a unified opposition; Dan
Pavel and Iulia Hossu, Nu putem reusi decat impreuna.
422
See Stan Stoica, Romania 1989-2002, p. 46.

211
Thus the symbolic landscape of politics became even more complex. At the same time, the adoption

of the constitution in 1991, and the stabilisation of all party participation in the new political

institutions, meant that the multiple political frontiers shifted from ‘pro-system (FSN) versus anti-

system (opposition)’ to ‘divided government versus divided opposition’, therefore something more

characteristic of a liberal democracy. This is partly due to the decision of the opposition to contest

the power of the government by participating in the political process rather than attempting to

mobilise a new social movement to try to press for a restoration of the ‘real revolution’. This

contrasts with the change of tone after the elections, the results of which were accepted by the most

important parts of the opposition. In fact, how to confront the FSN was one of the main sources of

fragmentation within the opposition, although at the same time, the existence of the FSN provided

the symbol around which opposition unity could be rallied. As has been mentioned by Pavel,

opposition leaders were conscious of the necessity as they saw it of ‘inventing’ the FSN as a

communist or neo-communist force.423 This was probably due to the failure of the strategy of the

opposition to effect change by contesting the fundamental legitimacy of the institutions designed

and dominated by the FSN.424 This failure can be attributed to the strident ‘anti-communist’

discourse of the opposition in a country where approximately one out of seven citizens had been

communist party members (proportionally the highest of any communist country).425 The FSN on

the other hand, called for national reconciliation, and concentrated on the fact that the FSN had rid

Romania of Ceausescu. Iliescu, speaking on 20 June, claimed that reconciliation was his personal

responsibility:

As the president of Romania, I believe that it is my responsibility to be a force for equilibrium

423
Dan Pavel and Iulia Hossu, Nu putem reusi decat impreuna.
424
This is discussed in Dan Pavel and Iulia Hossu, Nu putem reusi decat impreuna, but also in
Ceausu’s article in Romania Libera, 22 May 1990.
425
Stephen White, John Gardner and George Schopflin, Communist Political Systems: An
Introduction, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1982, p. 123.

212
 and mediation of the interests and actions of the political and social forces involved in the

rebirth of the country, and a force for their reconciliation in the context of the new democratic

structures in our country.426

Examining the formation and proliferation of political frontiers in this period contributes to our

understanding of how the emergence of a pluralist multi-party competitive system was possible.

This occurred by the gradual breaking down of the simplistic representation of society through the

communist-anti-communist political frontier (as the ‘anti-communists’ saw things) or the

revolution-anti-revolution frontier (as the FSN characterised the conflict). What I argue is that the

unity of both the FSN and of the opposition foundered on the question of reform. This was serious

for the FSN who were faced with the problem as the governing party. Just how serious is

demonstrated by the disintegration of their unity within two years of the revolution, during their

mandate. The opposition on the other hand, already fragmented but given unity by their common

struggle against the FSN system, failed to maintain this unity once their struggle shifted back to

Parliament. Events following the elections of 1996 when the opposition entered government as a

coalition formed under the Democratic Convention showed the importance for their unity of the

power of the FSN. Once they entered government, and became ‘the power’, the fragile unity that

they had created as the opposition crumbled.427

What follows is a discussion of how the debate on the economic reforms of the government led to

the emergence of three currents or ideological responses to the problem of transition to a market

economy that crossed over the FSN-opposition frontier.

5: The development of new political divisions within the FSN: The problem of reform

426
'Domnul Ion Iliescu se adreseaza tarii'.
427
Dan Pavel and Iulia Hossu, Nu putem reusi decat impreuna.

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In this section I focus more closely on the post-electoral debate within the FSN, looking at how

the need for economic reform, domestic constraints, and international pressures produced a

variety of competing discourses within the FSN, eventually leading to the overthrow of the Prime

Minister in 1991, and the split in the party in 1992.

As I have argued, the myth of the revolution allowed the FSN to forge consent for its rule, both

before and after the May 1990 elections. However, the myth of the revolution, along with the

popular optimism for the future which had accompanied it, soon faded in 1990 due to a variety of

factors, of which I now pick out what appear to have been the most important. The first factor

was the growing economic crisis, to which the government had to respond with new policies. The

second factor was the emergence of opposition to the government within the FSN. These will be

considered in turn.

To measure up to the criteria of this largely Western discourse of transition, the Romanian

government made ambitious attempts to begin the process of radical economic reform early, to

prove that it had entered the phase of ‘post-communism’ and that it was indeed engaged in building

what was seen as the most important foundation for democracy - free-market capitalism. The

government was very aware that both its rhetoric and its reforms were being carefully watched from

abroad. The government claimed that a new modernising transformation of Romanian society was

necessary to cope with the legacy of the neo-Stalinist economic model. The scope of the

‘modernisation’ program would be based on the key policy of ‘marketisation’.

The most important aspect of the emergence of the transition myth came with the moment

following the election of a new government when the first steps towards a substantial economic

214
liberalisation were taken by the new government. On 28 June 1990, Petre Roman presented the

Government’s economic reform programme to Parliament (Declaratia-Program).428 He outlined

the new policies including the installation of a democratic regime, and enacting the necessary

political and economic reforms for a market economy. The three pillars of the reform

programme were price deregulation (referred to as ‘price liberalisation’),429 phased privatisation

of state enterprises, and the encouragement of foreign investment.

One of the first policies of Petre Roman’s government had been to reduce the working week and

increase salaries. 430 The government could not sponsor a massive investment strategy, or an

ambitious industrial policy of its own, for two reasons. The first was that income did not cover

spending. Secondly, in this situation where in fact there were no profits to reinvest, the diversion

of budgetary resources of the scale necessary into industrial investment (and thus away from

salaries and consumption) would have been deeply unpopular. The solution was therefore the

attraction of foreign capital for investment in industry and infrastructure to raise productivity

and quality through technology gains, thus increasing export potential. This appreciation of the

economic crisis came within the context of transformed policies of Western states and financial

institutions towards East European countries.431 Lending was now conditioned upon appropriate

reforms being launched and implemented. Foreign capital could not be obtained for investment

428
‘Discursul Domnului Prim-Ministru Petre Roman in fata Parlamentului Tarii'.
429
This was announced in the governing programme of Petre Roman. See ‘Raportul Roman’ in Azi,
19 October 1990.
430
As Alin Teodorescu points out, in the period immediately following the revolution, the
government had also increased salaries, but with the overall economic recession, which began at
that time, wages could not keep up with inflation. See Alin Teodorescu, ‘The future of a failure:
the Romanian economy’. As we see later, the market economy part was not in question, but the
use of 'transformation' of the economy instead of the later adopted 'transition' signifies that
something much slower was being indicated prior to May than what Roman’s program envisaged
after the elections, justified by his diagnosis of the economic situation.
431
See David Phinnemore ‘Romania and Euro-Atlantic Integration since 1989: A Decade of
Frustration?’, in David Phinnemore and Duncan Light (eds.), Post-Communist Romania, for an
overview of Western policy. See Peter Gowan, ‘Neo-Liberal Theory and Practice for Eastern
Europe’.

215
(theoretically) without economic and political reforms, principally geared to the total

privatisation of the state industrial sector. It was widely accepted that some type of reform to

adopt a market system was necessary. But not everyone agreed that there should be social costs

associated with the reforms. Even Iliescu said that ‘we must not accept a fall in living standards

under any circumstances’.432 Petre Roman, on the other hand, talked of the difficulties but

stressed the necessity of reforms.433 It was therefore within this particular set of restraints and

understandings of the economic crisis that the issue of economic reform became central to the

political battles of the early 1990s. By November the effects of the reforms were being felt, and

the first price reforms took place, attracting the approval of the historic parties and international

opinion, but not attracting the solidarity of some within the FSN. The reforms continued into

1991.

Romania was during this period under considerable pressure from the West to pursue these

economic reform policies. Romania’s relations with its new Western partners, in the European

Union, the Council of Europe, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank were

clearly of great importance.434 By the end of 1990, not only was the FSN still facing criticisms

and doubts over its legitimacy from within Romania, it also faced questions regarding its

democratic credentials from abroad.435 Adevarul, reported the Brussels meeting with the

Commission of East European foreign ministers, citing Frans Andriessen, Commissioner for

External Relations, who declared that:

432
See ‘Domnul Ion Iliescu se adreseaza tarii’.
433
Petre Roman, ‘De aici porneste totul’, Adevarul, 29 June 1990.
434
David Phinnemore, ‘Romania and Euro-Atlantic Integration since 1989: A Decade of
Frustration?’, p. 249. For analyses of Romania’s relations with foreign institutions, see David
Phinnemore, ‘Romania and Euro-Atlantic Integration since 1989: A Decade of Frustration?’. For
Romania’s relations with international financial institutions, see Alan Smith, ‘The Transition to a
Market Economy in Romania and the Competitiveness of Exports’. For dates of the various
international agreements, see Stan Stoica, Romania 1989-2002.
435
David Phinnemore ‘Romania and Euro-Atlantic Integration since 1989: A Decade of
Frustration?’.

216
 The situation in Romania, and especially the use of force following the elections, calls into

doubt for the moment the existence of the necessary conditions for the implementation of

coordinated assistance [such as the PHARE program]. The European Commission is

closely monitoring the situation…Although there have of course taken place visible

improvements since the last meeting and there are encouraging indications in the political

declaration in Parliament of the new government, there still exist a considerable

uncertainty concerning the will of the authorities to permit the full development of political

and economic liberties.436

These international pressures had considerable influence on the responses made by Romanian

politicians, and especially on internal divisions within the FSN. In order to understand the events

inside the FSN, it is necessary to look more closely at how the political debate took shape over

the months that followed.

The government’s rhetorical strategy can be seen as having four important audiences. Its strategy

was first of all geared to maximise Western approval of the government, given the usefulness that

Western approval would give in the situation of opposition from different quarters. It was also

geared towards convincing the supporters and sympathisers of the anti-FSN opposition. This is

undoubtedly why Roman presented the seriousness of the government’s reform programme in an

effort to convince them of the government’s democratic credentials by not living up to the neo-

communist label. On the other hand, the construction of the FSN’s social democratic identity had

two antagonistic audiences within the FSN itself. Firstly, in defining the party as a left of centre

social democratic party, and tying this to policies not only of liberalisation but also of ‘social

protection’, the Prime Minister emphasised the madness and nonviability of the state command
436
‘Pozitia celor 24 in problema ajutoarelor pentru Romania’, Adevarul, 6 July 1990.

217
model.437 This meant that liberalisation could still play an important part in the discourse by

challenging conservatives to accept that the policies were in keeping with social democracy. It

could also be presented to liberalisers in the FSN and to Western financial institutions and

governments alike as part of a transition approach to free-market democracy.

This programme received qualified praise from the opposition parties;438 at the same time, it

produced a crisis within the FSN. The fact that the governing team adopted policies already

advocated by foreign advisers to other countries in Central and Eastern Europe showed to some

observers that there was already a gulf between the ambitions of the new government, and the

more mildly reformist aspirations of the bulk of the FSN. There was a conflict as to whether the

government should be adopting the same policies as other east European countries that were

embarking on ‘transition’.

For example, the pro-FSN Adevarul did not give unqualified support to the government’s

decision to go ahead with price liberalisation on 1 November 1990. For about two weeks,

Adevarul gave a great deal of prominence to criticisms of how the price liberalisation had

adverse effects on the people unforeseen by the government. The fact that the pro-FSN major

national daily Adevarul at that time criticised the government can be taken to mean that

significant groups within the FSN disagreed with the government’s agenda. FSN parliamentary

deputy Petrisor Moraru claimed that the ‘liberalisation of prices at this moment could lead to a

deterioration in the standard of living of numerous categories of citizen’.439 On the other hand,

Ghe Oana, a senior civil servant at the Ministry of Finance, speaking for the policy, said that

437
'Discursul Domnului Prim-Ministru Petre Roman in fata Parlamentului Tarii'.
438
See ‘Raportul Roman’, published in Azi, 19 October 1990; Also ‘Va primi guvernul
imputerniciri speciale: Starea economiei in opiniile unor personalitati politice’, in Adevarul, 20
October, 1900; See also ‘Raportul Roman: o iarba a fiarelor?’, in Romania Libera, 19 October,
1990.
439
See Adevarul, 14 October 1990.

218
‘price liberalisation will provide an exit from the profound crisis in which we find ourselves’.440

A division appeared within the FSN between those who adhered to the idea of quick reform like

the shock therapy model adopted by Poland, those who thought reform should take slightly

longer, and those who opposed the reforms as being too liberal. The Roman programme was

criticised in Parliament by some members of the FSN for its liberalism.441

This type of criticism surfaced from within the FSN at various times until the fall of the Roman

government during the mineriada of 24-28 September 1991. What started as an industrial dispute

was transformed into an organised movement to oust the government. What is interesting is that

the arrival of thousands of miners from the Jiu Valley had to be organised in terms of transport,

using trains and buses.442 This suggests that there were forces within the FSN and the state who

helped this event happen. Petre Roman attributes the violence to unnamed forces, but does not

associate it directly with Ion Iliescu, but talks rather of ‘conservatives’ versus ‘reformists’ within

the FSN, the result of the September mineriada according to him being the ascendancy of the

‘conservatives’ in Romanian politics until 1996. 443

Analysis of this period suggests that the FSN was internally divided between three groups:

440
Adevarul, 18 October 1990. Adevarul reported in 1 November 1990 that ‘Parliament had
requested that the government postpone price liberalisation measures’. The newspaper published
an article in reaction to Roman’s report, entitled ‘Market Economy: The Time of the Jackals’, on
23 October 1990. The title of the piece is reminiscent of phrases such as ‘wild capitalism’ used
by Iliescu. In 1991, Alexander Birladeanu claimed that the price liberalisation was really only an
increase, but that he had been ‘silenced’ when he attempted to speak his mind in 1990. See
Adevarul, 30 March 1991.
441
While the Romanian press, particularly the pro-FSN Adevarul, did not report any criticisms
whatsoever within the FSN in reaction to Roman’s government programme, Stoica cites ‘some
members of the FSN’ who ‘criticised the report as having some liberal accents.’ See Stan Stoica,
Romania: O istorie cronologica 1989-2002, Bucharest, Editura Meronia, 2002, p. 25-26.
442
See Adevarul, various editions, 24-30 September 1991, where these events are charted.
443
See Petre Roman and Elena Stefoi, Petre Roman - Marturii Provocate, Convorbiri cu Elena
Stefoi, Bucharest, Editura Paideia, 2002, p. 15.

219
‘conservatives’, ‘speed reformers’, and 'cautious reformers'. While the movement towards some

type of market economy was accepted, different factions within the FSN proposed different ideas

of what ‘market reforms’ could encompass.

Conservatives, led by Alexandru Birladeanu, articulated concern about the adverse social effects of

reforms. Birladeanu’s position is made clear early on in January 1990, when he proposes ‘a socialist

market economy’.444 On 1 November Adevarul reported that parliament had called on the

government to delay the liberalisation of prices until the means and the consequences could be

studied more carefully. Birladeanu led those who proposed the idea of continued state ownership of

big industries. In reference to the price liberalisation on the first of November 1990, another

conservative, Senator Adrian Motiu, declared that ‘It is clear that a market economy cannot exist

without price liberalisation, but I think that another moment should be chosen for price

liberalisation, such as when there might exist a sufficient number of economic agents to make the

game of supply and demand viable. Now, liberalisation will lead to an aggravation of the material

situation of the majority of the population.’445 The conservative opposition within the FSN did not

Roman’s reforms as social democratic reforms, they saw it as part of a strategy of liberalisation. On

16 and 17 March 1991 the FSN held its National Convention. The party’s programme for

government named Un viitor pentru Romania (A future for Romania) and drafted by Petre Roman

claimed that the FSN was a ‘left of centre social democratic party.’ However this was not to the

liking of nine deputies who left the FSN the next day to form a new party, complaining that the

programme was ‘liberal and not social democratic’. On 20 March 1991 Anton Vatasescu (Deputy

Prime Minister), Theodor Stolojan (Minister of Finance), and Mihai Zisu (Minister of Industry) left

the government. They stated that the reforms were too slow. They had wanted the total

liberalisation of prices by 1 April 1991. 446

444
See ‘Domnul Alexandru Birladeanu vorbeste’, Adevarul, 7 January 1990.
445
Adevarul, 2 November 1990.
446
See Stan Stoica, Romania 1989-2002, p. 33.

220
Those who advocated speedy reforms claimed that the short-term adverse effects of economic

reform would resolve themselves in the long run by the functioning of the market. This was

articulated as the solution to the problem of Romania’s failing economic performance. The

‘speed reformers’ were led by Theodor Stolojan, Minister of Finance, who later became Prime

Minister after the fall of the Roman government in September 1991. Stolojan favoured rapid

economic reforms, including ‘the total liberalisation of prices’.447 The fact that a more radical

reformer than Roman took over following his ousting for being too radical could point to the

consequences of the mineriada in September 1991 when Romania’s relations with important

institutions was again put into question.

The third stream, that of ‘cautious reformers’, was led by Prime Minister Petre Roman. Roman fell

into the middle of the two other positions, his reforms being too fast for some, and too slow for

others.448 For pro-market reformers within the FSN such as Roman, the notion of ‘transition’ was

not a goal in itself. It was merely a temporary phase of economic reforms, but it also was an attempt

to paper over the disunity over the economic reforms by claiming that, although there were

differences over the substance and the pace, all were agreed on the necessity of ‘marketisation’ of

some description.

Throughout the Roman government’s period in office (May 1990 - September 1991) rhetorical

strategies emphasised the necessity of radical economic reforms. This was built around the

signifiers - ‘economic crisis’ and ‘reform’. Romania's economic problems were attributed to the

legacy of communism. In Ion Illiescu's words, ‘The old structures are the main source of the

447
Stolojan (Minister of Finance) and Anton Vatarescu (Deputy Prime Minister) resigned on 20
March 1991. See Adevarul, 21 and 22 March 1991.
448
See ‘Raportul Roman’, Azi, 19 October 1990.

221
crisis.’449 The problems inherited from the past were then portrayed as justifying stringent measures;

as Petre Roman put it, ‘transition to the market economy has its own social and economic costs,…

in the economic crisis that we have inherited from the old regime’.450

A solution was to be sought in the economic reforms described above. These reforms were seen as

being necessary to democratic society.451 Referring to the economic reforms, Roman outlined their

importance thus: ‘Romanian society finds itself in a decisive phase of its entry into democracy and

modernity. In this phase the foundations of the renewal of society, even of its renaissance, are being

built’.452 An unreformed economy came to be seen as one of the principal obstacles to

democratisation. Roman stated that 'liberalisation, privatisation and decentralisation of the economy

are necessary due to excessive centralism and corruption.' 453 Therefore, possibly in order to attempt

to marginalise the internal opposition in the FSN, Roman shifted the discourse on economic reform

onto the terrain of the transition by making market reforms a necessary part of the democratisation

process, and thus not strictly one of several possible routes out of economic crisis. In these

discourses, the economic realm became central to the discourse of post communist ‘social’

democracy. This tied the government’s reforms to the need for the financial assistance of

international organisations. It has to be borne in mind that Petre Roman saw the improvement of

relations with the West as a fundamental aspect of successful reforms.454 It was because of Petre

Roman that the government’s discourse relied on approval from the West, faced as he was with

such strong internal opposition.

449
Adevarul, 20 October, 1990.
450
Petre Roman, 28 June 1990, ‘declaratia’ reported in Adevarul on 29 June. See also, 'Raportul
Roman'.
451
‘Raportul Roman’.
452
'Raportul Roman'.
453
Petre Roman’s report to parliament, 26 February 1991,‘Raportul cu privire la stadiul reformei’
Adevarul, 27 February 1991.
454
‘Raportul Roman’, Azi, 19 October 1990.

222
‘Transition’ as a myth, therefore served to introduce the idea that a ‘market economy’ was the only

route to the principal goal of economic reform. This served to make the debate over the respective

merits of capitalist or social democratic economic models shift in focus onto what form and speed

the transition to the market necessitated. Over the years all parties participated in this debate. By

saying that the idea of transition emerged now and was to become dominant, I mean that, despite

opposition from certain groups within the FSN and anti-reform parties,455 the transition policies of

the Romanian governments continued with roughly the same rationale.

During 1990 and 1991, the government was faced with periodic but serious social unrest.

Sometimes this was organised political opposition to the FSN, not only in Bucharest but also in

other large cities of Romania. At other times the newly re-organised trades unions were actively

showing their muscle, for example the miners in the Jiu Valley, who were nominally pro-FSN,

but whose leaders and managers were unhappy with the direction of some of the reforms and the

implications of the privatisation of state industries.

There was also high profile pressure on the government from other political parties. Many

prominent opponents of the government, such as Ana Blandiana, later went on to found the

Civic Alliance. These were the most damaging since they were prominent opponents of the

Ceausescu regime, and had been original members of the FSN and of the CFSN (The executive

council of the FSN) before the FSN became a political party and what had been done by the FSN

was taken over by the CPUN (Council for Provisional National Unity, dominated by the FSN).

On October 18 1990, less than a year after the revolution, the Prime Minister, Petre Roman, made a

high-profile report to Parliament after ‘100 days of government’. 456 Roman proposed to continue a
455
See Antoine Roger, ‘Les partis anti-systeme dans la Roumanie post-communiste’ in Revue
d’Etudes Comparatives Est-Ouest, vol. 31, no. 2, 2000, pp. 101-36.
456
‘Raportul Roman’.

223
liberalisation program. The essence of this policy was to begin a process whereby the ‘market’

rather than the state would set prices. He warned of a deteriorating economic situation including a

‘fall in industrial production by approximately one quarter’, and a fall in investments and exports of

around one half as compared with the situation one year before.457 What is important in terms of the

conflict that followed and my claim that the FSN was moved very early on onto the discursive

terrain of the transition was Roman’s articulation of solutions to the problems. He advocated an

acceleration of the following economic reforms: providing the framework for the attraction of

foreign investment and capital; devaluation of the national currency to the dollar to decrease

consumer spending; liberalisation of some prices; liberalisation of salaries; the privatisation of 50

per cent of the national economy within three years. Concurrently, other reforms were being

undertaken to prepare Romania’s economy for ‘integration’, i.e. reducing barriers to trade.

Reducing barriers to trade with the West was presented as providing increased opportunities for

export led growth by increasing the share of Romanian exports to the West.

The activity of the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister show that during 1990 and 1991 that

there were intense efforts made so that Romania could become associated with international

institutions. As Petre Roman said, ‘The government has been concerned to assure external finance,

in the first instance from…the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The recent visit to

Bucharest of the President of the IMF shows that our efforts are producing concrete results with

regard to the financial assistance of these institutions'.458 This was a response to the end of Comecon

and the socialist bloc system of trading and the crisis in the Soviet Union. The early policies of the

Roman government show the influence on the Romanian government during this period of the main

terms of the ‘Washington consensus’.

457
'Raportul Roman'.
458
‘Raportul Roman’.

224
This meant that the power of the reform agenda was not merely an internal matter, but that the

power of international institutions could not be discounted and that their framework of transition

had to become the main Romanian discourse of reform. In order to maintain the confidence of

these institutions, Romanian governments had to speak their language of reform and implement

their programs in order to receive anything. To put it another way, the conservatives in the FSN

succeeded with the help of the miners in deposing Roman, but it was Stolojan, considered an

arch liberalising reformer (who later went to work for the World Bank as a senior economist

from 1992-1999), who replaced him as prime minister (1991-1992) following the international

outcry, not a conservative. While the ousting of the Roman faction could be interpreted as a

victory for the conservatives, the appointment as Prime Minister of the former Minister of

Finance who had resigned citing the slow pace of liberalisation could be regarded as a victory

for the radical reformers.

What conclusions can be drawn from this apparently confusing state of affairs? I conclude that

the fall of the Roman government was indeed connected to opposition from conservatives to the

government’s reform programme. However, the international reaction to the events of September

1991 indicated to the conservatives that the Western countries were watching very closely, and

that therefore the appointment of Stolojan was a move designed to avoid adverse reactions from

abroad to the possible appointment of a more conservative figure. As David Phinnemore has

pointed out, ‘such concerns about Romania’s commitment to democracy and political reform

were not short-lived. Despite popular approval of a new constitution in December 1991 and a

second set of presidential and parliamentary elections in September 1992, Romania’s democratic

credentials remained in question. This was certainly the view of the European Parliament’. 459 In

fact, it has been recognised that during Stolojan’s premiership of about one year, very little in the

459
David Phinnemore, ‘Romania and Euro-Atlantic Integration since 1989: A Decade of
Frustration?’, p. 254.

225
way of reforms was actually carried out.460

It is therefore not surprising when we consider these events and the groups implicated in them that

transition came to take a central place in Romanian politics very early following the revolution.

Those who held institutional power in the FSN were divided, and although the FSN was made up of

an important contingent of conservatives, using a new platform of social democracy, they did not

prevail. They had two antagonistic discourses to confront. They had an internal liberalising

opposition within their own party who held the key positions of executive power. There was also

the ‘democratic opposition’ of the revitalised historical parties and a nascent civil society opposing

the FSN, and challenging the claim of the FSN to be democrats. And there was the question of the

necessity of adopting the political positions necessary to attract the political support from abroad.

This support was used to help legitimise the FSN government.461 The economic co-operation and

assistance that the government believed to be crucial to its economic reforms appeared to be

threatened by any appearance of a return to conservatism. Thus the transition became the language

and the policy agenda which dominated, with the concept of reform and the market firmly at its

centre.

6: Conclusion

In the discourse of the transition myth that developed from these three antagonistic groupings, new

political subject positions were created: ‘revolutionary’, ‘reformer’, or ‘conservative/neo-

communist’. The fact that the government embarked upon free-market reforms is one matter, but

what concerns us just as much is how these reforms were articulated, and how these articulations

situated the government within the overall discursive field of Romanian politics. To add to this, the
460
Alan Smith, ‘The Transition to a Market Economy in Romania and the Competitiveness of
Exports’, p. 133.
461
‘Raportul Roman’.

226
subject positions mentioned above could not be maintained given the divisions within the FSN and

the government’s policy. Reformers and democrats could be found within the ranks of the FSN, not

only within the opposition.

The construction of the position of the government, facing opposition on a number of fronts, is

important. Their articulation of reforms attempted to challenge this multi-faceted opposition.

Reforms were articulated as being a necessary part of a transitional phase of Romanian

development, which would lead not only to a market economy, but also to a democratic system. The

continued involvement of the democratic state would provide social protection, not against

capitalism, but against the adverse effects of reform. This is because liberalisers, even those who

claimed to be social democrats, did not focus on social democracy as a system that mitigates the

excesses of capitalism. This common element of social democracy was missing, the government

outlining the transition as containing adverse effects inherent to transition, not to capitalism as such.

Adverse effects were blamed on the neo-Stalinist legacy, being difficult to cope with in a transition.

This meant building a picture of the neo-Stalinist economy. Building a picture of the neo-Stalinist

economy as being negative and as the principal cause of adverse effects was a useful device for

liberalisers in their attempt to marginalise conservative opposition. They were part of a transition

promise that had meanings borrowed from the revolution myth concerning the Ceausescu era,

which became expanded to include all of the communist period (allowing the binary divide to be

introduced between communist tyranny and capitalist democracy). Also, although not discussed in

this thesis, the transition myth expanded to include the mythology of Europeanisation. So while the

government drew heavily on European symbols to legitimise its position, this was combined with

symbols of the ‘native’ FSN transition. Reform was conceived in the sense of reform from

something (the Ceausescu system) rather than reform to something (free-market), thus the meaning

was to produce from the existing basis an economic and political system that would eliminate the

227
dysfunctional aspects of the Ceausescu years. Therefore in many ways, the myth of the transition

was initially given a specific form and content through the articulations of the Romanian

government, largely different from the Western transition discourses, which talked of shock

therapy, necessary unemployment, closure of state-run enterprises, development of an enterprise

culture, all of which were largely unpopular discourses with significant categories of the Romanian

population who perceived the neo-liberal discourse as an attack on their economic security and

social standing. The adoption by the Romanian government of its own reform process which was

transitional meant a different thing entirely, sending signals abroad (from a government supremely

conscious of its international image)462 that efforts would be made by the government to integrate

Romanian industry within the global economy. However this would be achieved by ‘restructuring

and investments’ rather than closure. Thus the Roman government came to be known as a reformist

cabinet, which was at odds with the ‘conservatives’ within the FSN who wanted little reform as

adherents of the centralised economic system.

The discussion above is of relevance, because one of the most remarkable events of Romanian

politics, that had wide-ranging repercussions, was the overthrow of the Roman government in

September 1991 by a mineriada. And while the opposition had hoped to overthrow what it saw as

an illegitimate government it was the political frontiers that were generated within the FSN by

conflicting positions on the question of economic reform that had the most surprising outcome.

In this chapter I have analysed some of the main discourses of the debate surrounding 'reform' and

particularly its economic aspects following the elections of May 1990, leading to the overthrow of

the Roman government in September 1991. These were important events in that they shattered the

unity of the FSN, and led to the eventual fragmentation of the emerging Romanian party system.

462
See Elena Stefoi’s published interviews with Petre Roman and Andrei Plesu, Transformari,
inertii, dezordini.

228
Conclusion

In this thesis I have analysed the discursive production of political frontiers in Romania between

December 1947 and September 1992. The main purpose of the investigation has been to identify the

key political discourses that have shaped Romanian politics, focusing in particular on the trajectory

of populist discourses that were central to communist and post-communist political strategies. I

have looked at how this populist discourse built and modified a political frontier between ‘the

people’ and its ‘enemies’. It has also been shown how this notion of ‘the people’ was central to the

mobilisation, and eventually the demobilisation, of demonstrators during the period of the

‘revolution’ in 1989. The study ends with an analysis of how the populist political frontier was

broken down following the 1990 elections as the signifier of ‘the people’ began to lose its rhetorical

force and was diluted into new identities associated with ‘transition’.

In Chapter One, I outlined the theoretical and methodological approach to the thesis, and put the

issues in historical context.

In Chapter Two I argued that ideology was central to the Romanian communist regime’s efforts to

build hegemony from the end of World War II. This view challenged accounts that rely on ‘raw

power’ as a principal explanation. I also claimed that the economic failure of the Romanian

communist regime by the 1980s led to the emergence of new discourses of opposition that

contested, above all other things, the leadership of Nicolae Ceausescu.

In Chapter Three, I argued that the ‘revolution’ of December 1989 cannot be fruitfully treated as an

objectively definable event. Rather, it should be viewed as a political myth that was built and

229
harnessed by a new political elite by re-articulating the meaning of a popular revolt that developed

into a movement against the leadership of Nicolae Ceausescu. I have shown how the myth of the

revolution was built around a new populist political frontier that produced popular solidarity with

the FSN against Ceausescu.

The myth of the revolution expanded in the days, weeks, and months following the execution of the

presidential couple. I have concentrated on how the FSN articulated the revolution in a wider sense

from January 1990 onwards, when faced with the challenge mounted by new political parties who

were overtly hostile to the FSN, and who articulated radical solutions, and offered more radical

interpretations of the Romanian revolution. I show two things. Firstly, how the FSN tended to use

the revolution as a myth upon which it could institute two opposing chains of equivalence,

signifying good versus bad. Secondly, I show how they continually attempted to expand these

chains. This led to an increasing expansion of the ‘revolution’ signifier, around which detailed and

specific forms of meaning were articulated. These included the nature of appropriate collective

action, policy options, the behaviour of citizens, the proper and improper expression of political

conflict, the nature of democracy, national identity, and the role of the state. All areas of social life,

it appeared, could be given a revolutionary meaning. By this I mean to say that according to the

model, for example by saying that a given mode of behaviour, or a policy, is in conformity with ‘the

ideals of the revolution’, this can apply and be extended to almost anything. What the FSN did,

almost inevitably, was to call repeatedly upon the symbolic resources of the revolution to justify

what they were doing, and to criticise the opposition.

The myth of the revolution expanded, paradoxically, into areas that were easier to contest due to the

very expansion, for example the definition of the correct (revolutionary) economic policy. These

230
areas were ripe for contestation by the newly organising political parties. Particularly with regard to

the problem of economic reform, the problem of the FSN was compounded by the fact that it had no

clear or coherent blueprint for reform in the economy, other than using the state to raise and attempt

to maintain the standard of living through ‘economic reform’.

Another important factor was that the myth of the revolution expanded in such a way that new

political frontiers emerged around the contested signifiers within the FSN articulations of the

meaning of the revolution. The first revolutionary political frontier, which was based around the

symbolisation of the struggle between Ceausescu and the people, began to give way to new political

frontiers. These expressed antagonisms primarily between the FSN and the opposition, but more

importantly between different factions of the FSN. It was during this period that the myth of the

revolution began to enter a long crisis. Fortunately, at least from the point of view of the FSN, their

carefully constructed popular front, created around the principal political frontier of Ceausescu

versus the people and the FSN revolution, did not entirely succumb - it merely for the time being

faced a serious challenge in the form of the opposition’s actions aimed at deconstructing the

legitimacy of the provisional government.

The elections of May 1990 gave a boost to the image of a new regime that was indeed based on

popular consent, and that the period of provisional government had been legitimate after all. It

seemed as if, despite the protests, symbolised by the Piata Universitatii demonstrations calling for

what would have amounted to a second anti-Communist revolution against the FSN, that the myth

of the revolution according to the FSN had proven for the time being to be sufficiently powerful to

succeed in the aim of marginalising opposition. This was carried out through the expansion of the

negative chain of equivalence within the myth of the revolution, the chain containing Ceausescu as

the nodal point, to include the demonstrators, and contest their claims to be the democratic

231
opposition, by naming them anti-democratic and anti-revolutionary. Thus the FSN attempted to

keep alive the myth of the revolution by actively inscribing new social conflicts within its system of

the negative chain of equivalence. Thus the negative chain of equivalence began to include anyone

who opposed the FSN, and therefore opposed the revolution according to the logic of the political

frontier at the centre of the myth of the revolution.

What eventually led to the creation of a new political frontier was the galvanised and apparent unity

of the opposition, paradoxically a unity partly produced by their collective stigmatisation as anti-

revolutionary hooligans by the FSN. This collective stigmatisation succeeded in both radicalising

and unifying the opposition responses to the FSN, and it is largely this that produced the concept of

‘the opposition’, instead of unqualified ‘opposition’. Together these new political forces emerged

from this stigmatisation to become a relatively unified anti-FSN opposition to the elected FSN

government. The new political frontier that would emerge was based on a reconstitution of the

symbols of the Romanian revolution and Romanian history, to present Romanian society as being

divided between anti-Communist democrats and neo-communist authoritarian apparatchiks.

In Chapter Four I showed how the myth of the ‘revolution’ was confronted by so many challenges

in the early 1990s that it failed to expand to become the basis of a new hegemonic order. I indicate

that in place of the revolution myth, the myth of the ‘transition’ emerged as the new principal space

of political contestation for all competing groups involved in vying for the chance to define the

process of ‘reform’ in the new the post-Ceausescu state. I point to the emergence of important

divisions within the FSN, and chart how these eventually led to the overthrow of the government of

Petre Roman. I have shown the roots of this breakdown in unity, and suggesting how it led to the

weakening of the revolution myth.

232
In this thesis I have relied upon the theory of discourse and the methods of discourse analysis. The

aim was for this study to contribute to a growing number of studies of East European politics that

focus on identities, their production, and their centrality to politics. In terms of Romanian politics,

the thesis is offered as a contribution that prioritises discourse in political analysis and

acknowledges discourses as crucial to understanding political action and conflict, the building of

alliances, and the exclusion of adversaries.

This thesis has focussed largely on the production of political frontiers, and therefore has named the

identities involved articulated and given political meaning through these divisions. But the thesis

does point to areas that could benefit from further analysis. The main one that I suggest in this

thesis is the study of the ‘transition’ as a myth. I have shown in this thesis that the myth of the

revolution gave way to the myth of the transition as a new principal of reading for Romanian

politics. It is my view that the transition is an imaginary, that the metaphor of transition has

structured the meanings of politics, increasingly so after 1989.

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