CASES With Highlighters - Admin CAses - For OCtober 30 Discussion

MICU MC October 30, 2018 Cases
Admin and Election Laws
EN BANC
KABATAAN PARTY-LIST G.R. No. 189868

REPRESENTATIVE RAYMOND V. Present:
PALATINO, ALVIN A. PETERS,
PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL UNION PUNO, C.J.,
OF STUDENTS OF THE PHILIPPINES CARPIO,
(NUSP), MA. CRISTINA ANGELA CORONA,
GUEVARRA, CHAIRPERSON OF THE CARPIO MORALES,
STUDENT CHRISTIAN MOVEMENT OF VELASCO, JR.,
THE PHILIPPINES (SCMP), VENCER NACHURA,
MARI E. CRISOSTOMO, SECRETARY LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
GENERAL OF KABATAAN PARTY-LIST, BRION,
VIJAE O. ALQUISOLA, PRESIDENT OF PERALTA,
THE COLLEGE EDITORS GUILD OF BERSAMIN,
THE PHILIPPINES (CEGP), DIANNE DEL CASTILLO,
KRISTEL M. ASUELO, SECRETARY ABAD, and
GENERAL OF THE KABATAANG VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
ARTISTA PARA SA TUNAY NA
KALAYAAN (KARATULA), KENNETH
CARLISLE EARL EUGENIO, ANA Promulgated:
KATRINA V. TEJERO, VICTOR LOUIS E.
CRISOSTOMO, JACQUELINE ALEXIS S. December 15, 2009
MERCED, and JADE CHARMANE ROSE
J. VALENZUELA,
Petitioners,
- versus -
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondent.
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
At the threshold once again is the right of suffrage of the sovereign Filipino people the foundation of Philippine
democracy. As the country prepares to elect its next set of leaders on May 10, 2010, the Court upholds this
primordial right.
On November 12, 2008, respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No.
[1]
8514 which, among other things, set December 2, 2008 to December 15, 2009 as the period of continuing voter
registration using the biometrics process in all areas nationwide, except in the Autonomous Region of Muslim
Mindanao. Subsequently, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8585[2] on February 12, 2009 adjusting the
deadline of voter registration for the May 10, 2010 national and local elections to October 31, 2009, instead
of December 15, 2009 as previously fixed by Resolution No. 8514.
The intense public clamor for an extension of the October 31, 2009 deadline notwithstanding, the
COMELEC stood firm in its decision not to extend it, arguing mainly that it needs ample time to prepare for
the automated elections. Via the present Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus filed on October 30,
2009,[3] petitioners challenge the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 8585 and seek a declaration of its nullity.
pg. 1
Petitioner Raymond V. Palatino, a youth sectoral representative under the Kabataan Party-list, sues as
a member of the House of Representatives and a concerned citizen, while the rest of petitioners sue as concerned
citizens.
Petitioners contend that the serious questions involved in this case and potential disenfranchisement
of millions of Filipino voters justify resort to this Court in the first instance, claiming that based on National
Statistics Office (NSO) data, the projected voting population for the May 10, 2010 elections is 3,758,964 for the
age group 18-19 and 8,756,981 for the age group 20-24, or a total of 12,515,945.
Petitioners further contend that COMELEC Resolution No. 8585 is an unconstitutional

encroachment on the legislative power of Congress as it amends the system of continuing voter registration
under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 8189 (RA 8189), otherwise known as The Voters Registration Act of 1996,
reading:
Section 8. System of Continuing Registration of Voters. The personal filing of application of

registration of voters shall be conducted daily in the office of the Election Officer during regular
office hours. No registration shall, however, be conducted during the period starting one
hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and ninety (90) days before a special
election.
They thus pray that COMELEC Resolution No. 8585 be declared null and void, and that the COMELEC be
accordingly required to extend the voter registration until January 9, 2010 which is the day before the 120-day
prohibitive period starting on January 10, 2010.
The COMELEC maintains in its Comment filed on December 7, 2009 that, among other things, the
Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code confer upon it the power to promulgate rules and regulations in order
to ensure free, orderly and honest elections; that Section 29 of Republic Act No. 6646 (RA 6646)[4] and Section 28
of Republic Act No. 8436 (RA 8436)[5] authorize it to fix other dates for pre-election acts which include voter
registration; and that its schedule of pre-election acts shows that the October 31, 2009 deadline of voter registration
was impelled by operational and pragmatic considerations, citing Akbayan-Youth v. COMELEC[6] wherein the
Court denied a similar prayer for an extension of the December 27, 2000 deadline of voter registration for the
May 14, 2001 elections.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The right of suffrage lies at the heart of our constitutional democracy. The right of every Filipino to choose
the leaders who will lead the country and participate, to the fullest extent possible, in every national and local
election is so zealously guarded by the fundamental law that it devoted an entire article solely therefor:
ARTICLE V
SUFFRAGE
SECTION 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise
disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in
the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six
months immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property or other substantive requirement
shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.
pg. 2
SECTION 2. The Congress shall provide a system of securing the secrecy and sanctity
of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disabled and the illiterates to vote without
the assistance of other persons. Until then, they shall be allowed to vote under existing laws and
such rules as the Commission on Elections may promulgate to protect the secrecy of the ballot.
Preserving the sanctity of the right of suffrage ensures that the State derives its power from the
consent of the governed. The paramount importance of this right is also a function of the State policy of people
empowerment articulated in the constitutional declaration that sovereignty resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them,[7] bolstered by the recognition of the vital role of the youth in nation-building and
directive to the State to encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.[8]
It is against this backdrop that Congress mandated a system of continuing voter registration in Section 8 of
RA 8189 which provides:
Section 8. System of Continuing Registration of Voters. The personal filing of application

of registration of voters shall be conducted daily in the office of the Election Officer during
regular office hours. No registration shall, however, be conducted during the period starting one
hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and ninety (90) days before a special
election. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The clear text of the law thus decrees that voters be allowed to register daily during regular offices
hours, except during the period starting 120 days before a regular election and 90 days before a special
election.
By the above provision, Congress itself has determined that the period of 120 days before a regular
election and 90 days before a special election is enough time for the COMELEC to make ALL the necessary
preparations with respect to the coming elections including: (1) completion of project precincts, which is
necessary for the proper allocation of official ballots, election returns and other election forms and paraphernalia;
(2) constitution of the Board of Election Inspectors, including the determination of the precincts to which they shall
be assigned; (3) finalizing the Computerized Voters List; (4) supervision of the campaign period; and (5)
preparation, bidding, printing and distribution of Voters Information Sheet. Such determination of Congress is well
within the ambit of its legislative power, which this Court is bound to respect. And the COMELECs rule-making
power should be exercised in accordance with the prevailing law.[9]
Respecting the authority of the COMELEC under RA 6646 and RA 8436 to fix other dates for pre-election
acts, the same is not in conflict with the mandate of continuing voter registration under RA 8189. This Courts
primary duty is to harmonize laws rather than consider one as repealed by the other. The presumption is against
inconsistency or repugnance and, accordingly, against implied repeal. For Congress is presumed to know the
existing laws on the subject and not to enact inconsistent or conflicting statutes.[10]
Both R.A. No. 6646, Section 29 and R.A. No. 8436, Section 28 grant the COMELEC the power to fix other
periods and dates for pre-election activities only if the same cannot be reasonably held within the period
provided by law. This grant of power, however, is for the purpose of enabling the people to exercise the right of
suffrage the common underlying policy of RA 8189, RA 6646 and RA 8436.
In the present case, the Court finds no ground to hold that the mandate of continuing voter registration
cannot be reasonably held within the period provided by RA 8189, Sec. 8 daily during office hours, except during
pg. 3
the period starting 120 days before the May 10, 2010 regular elections. There is thus no occasion for the
COMELEC to exercise its power to fix other dates or deadlines therefor.
The present case differs significantly from Akbayan-Youth v. COMELEC.[11] In said case, the Court held
that the COMELEC did not commit abuse of discretion in denying the request of the therein petitioners for an
extension of the December 27, 2000 deadline of voter registration for the May 14, 2001 elections. For the therein
petitioners filed their petition with the Court within the 120-day prohibitive period for the conduct of voter
registration under Section 8 of RA 8189, and sought the conduct of a two-day registration on February 17 and 18,
2001, clearly within the 120-day prohibitive period.
The Court in fact suggested in Akbayan-Youth that the therein petitioners could have, but had not, registered during
the period between the December 27, 2000 deadline set by the COMELEC and before the start of the 120-day
prohibitive period prior to the election date or January 13, 2001, thus:
[T]here is no allegation in the two consolidated petitions and the records are bereft of any
showing that anyone of herein petitioners has filed an application to be registered as a voter which
was denied by the COMELEC nor filed a complaint before the respondent COMELEC alleging that
he or she proceeded to the Office of the Election Officer to register between the period starting from
December 28, 2000 to January 13, 2001, and that he or she was disallowed or barred by respondent
COMELEC from filing his application for registration. While it may be true that respondent
COMELEC set the registration deadline on December 27, 2000, this Court is of the firm view
that petitioners were not totally denied the opportunity to avail of the continuing registration
under R.A. 8189.[12] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The clear import of the Courts pronouncement in Akbayan-Youth is that had the therein petitioners filed
their petition and sought an extension date that was before the 120-day prohibitive period, their prayer would
have been granted pursuant to the mandate of RA 8189. In the present case, as reflected earlier, both the
dates of filing of the petition (October 30, 2009) and the extension sought (until January 9, 2010) are prior to
the 120-day prohibitive period. The Court, therefore, finds no legal impediment to the extension prayed for.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. COMELEC Resolution No. 8585 is declared null and void
insofar as it set the deadline of voter registration for the May 10, 2010 elections on October 31, 2009. The
COMELEC is directed to proceed with dispatch in reopening the registration of voters and holding the same
until January 9, 2010. This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
ISSUES :
 WON Resolution No. 8585 adjusting the deadline of voter registration is valid
HELD:
 INVALID, there is no ground to hold that the mandate of continuing voter registration cannot
be reasonably held within the period provided by RA 8189, Sec. 8 daily during office hours, except
during the period starting 120 days before the May 10, 2010 regular elections.
G.R. No. 204828 December 3, 2013
pg. 4
JAIME C. REGIO, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RONNIE C. CO, Respondents.
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
This petition for certiorari filed under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, seeks to nullify and set aside the
Resolution dated December 7, 2012 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC_ EN Banc in EAC
(BRGY-SK) No. 161-2011. The assailed Resolution reversed and set aside the Resolution of the COMELEC
First Division dated August 23, 2011, which, in turn, affirmed the May 4, 2011 Decision in Election Case No.
02480-EC of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 4 in Manila.
The Facts
Petitioner Jaime C. Regio (Regio) and private respondent Ronnie C. Co (Co), among other candidates,
ran in the October 25, 2010 barangay elections in Barangay 296, Zone 28, District III of the City of Manila for
the position of punong barangay. Immediately following the counting and canvassing of the votes from seven
clustered precincts in the adverted barangay, Regio, who garnered four hundred seventy-eight (478) votes, as
against the three hundred thirty-six (336) votes obtained by Co, was proclaimed winner for the contested post of
punong barangay. The detailed tally of the votes per precinct, as reflected in the Statement of Votes, is as
follows:1
Candidate Clustered Precinct Number Total

1302A 1303A 1304A 1305A 1306A 1307A 1307B
Co, Ronnie C. 76 113 48 99 336
Regio, Jaime C. 171 151 73 83 478
On November 4, 2010, Co filed an election protest before the MeTC. He claimed, among other
things, that the Board of Election Tellers (BET) did not follow COMELEC Resolution No. 9030, as it: (1)
did not permit his supporters to vote; (2) allowed "flying voters" to cast votes; and (3) ignored the rules on
appreciation of ballots, resulting in misreading, miscounting, and misappreciation of ballots. Additionally, he
alleged that Regio committed vote-buying, and engaged in distribution of sample ballots inside the
polling centers during the day of the elections.2
Of the seven clustered precincts (CPs) initially protested, Co would later exclude CP Nos. 1304A and 1305A
from the protest. During the preliminary conference, the trial court allowed the revision of ballots. The revision
of ballots occurred on January 13-14, 2011.3 Per the report of the revision committee, the number of votes
obtained by both candidates in the contested precincts, as shown below, indicated a substantial recovery on the
part of Co:
1âw phi1
Candidate Clustered Precinct Number Total

1âw phi1
1302A 1304A 1306A 1307A

1303A 1305A 1307B
Co, Ronnie 160 -- 63 98 321
C.
Regio, Jaime 86 -- 62 84 232
C.
During his turn to present evidence, Co limited his offer to the revision committee report, showing that
he garnered the highest number of votes. Regio, on the other hand, denied that the elections were tainted
with irregularities. He claimed that the results of the revision are products of post-elections operations, as the
ballots were tampered with, switched, and altered drastically to change the results of the elections. He presented
as witnesses the following: poll watchers Evangeline Garcia, Cezar Regio, and Ruben Merilles, who all testified
that there were no instances of electoral fraud, irregularities, and anomalies during the day of the
elections. Presented too were volunteers Love Agpaoa and Romy Que, who belied allegations of
miscounting, misreading, and misappreciation of the ballots during the counting, and Dominador Dela
Cruz, Chairperson of the BET for CP Nos. 1302A/1303A, as well as Erlina Hernandez, Chairperson of the
pg. 5
BET for CP No. 1306A, who both testified that they followed the rules and regulations in conducting the
elections in Barangay 296, and that each ballot was correctly tabulated.4
The results of the revision notwithstanding, the trial court, in its Decision of May 4, 2011, dismissed Co’s
protest and declared Regio as the duly-elected punong barangay of Barangay 296. It disposed of the case,
as follows:
WHEREFORE, the proclamation of protestee Jaime C. Regio as the duly elected "Punong Barangay"
or "Barangay Chairman" of Barangay 296, District III, Manila by the Barangay Board of Canvassers is affirmed
by this court. The election protest filed by the protestant Ronnie C. Co is dismissed for lack of merit.5
According to the trial court, before it can accord credence to the results of the revision, it should first be
ascertained that the ballots found in the box during the revision are the same ballots deposited by the
voters. In fine, the court "should first be convinced that the ballots counted during the revision have not been
tampered with before it can declare the ballots a) as superior evidence of how the electorate voted, and b) as
sufficient evidence to set aside the election returns. For the ballots to be considered the best evidence of
how the voters voted, their integrity should be satisfactorily established."6 Invoking Rosal v.
COMELEC,7 the trial court ruled that Co failed to sufficiently show that the integrity of the contested ballots
had been preserved. It then cited the presumption that election returns are genuine, and that the data and
information supplied by the board of election inspectors are true and correct.8
The trial court said:
A closer scrutiny of the premise made by the protestant will reveal that he is trying to prove the
misreading, miscounting, and misappreciation of ballots by introducing as evidence the marked
difference of the results of the revision and of the results in the election returns. This premise is too
presumptuous. The marked difference cannot be used to prove the misreading, miscounting, and
misappreciation of ballots because the misreading, miscounting, and misappreciation of ballots is precisely what
the protestant needs to prove to justify the marked difference in the results. Prudence dictates that the
protestant should first explain where this huge discrepancy is coming from before using it as evidence.
In other words, the misreading, miscounting, and misappreciation of ballots should be proven by other
independent evidence. Without any evidence, the allegation of misreading, miscounting, and misappreciation of
ballots remains a mere allegation without any probative value.9
Traversing the allegations of post-elections tampering, the trial court rejected Co’s allegation that the
ballot boxes were properly locked and sealed. In fact, the trial court said, the envelope containing the ballots
for CP Nos. 1302A/1303A was glued on both sides, prompting protestee’s revisor to comment that the envelope
appears to be re-pasted and tampered. In CP No. 1306A, the report stated that the ballots were not placed in a
sealed envelope.10Corollarily, the trial court stated the observation that Regio has presented credible
witnesses to prove that there were no irregularities or anomalies during the casting and counting of
votes. Aggrieved, Co filed an appeal before the COMELEC, arguing that the trial court erred:
1.) In disregarding the result of the physical count of the revised ballots found in Precinct Nos.
1302A/1303A and 1306A;
2.) In declaring that the protestant appellant was not able to sufficiently show that the integrity of
the contested ballots in Precinct Nos. 1302A/1303A and 1306A was preserved;
3.) In declaring that protestant-appellant was not able to overcome the presumption of regularity of
the election, counting, and canvassing proceedings in the protested precincts of Barangay 296, Manila;
4.) In declaring that the votes obtained by the parties in Precinct Nos. 1302A/1303A and 1306A as
reflected in their respective Election Returns are [the] true and actual results of the elections;
5.) In giving weight to the incredulous and conflicting testimonies of the obviously biased
witnesses of the protestee-appellee;
6.) In refusing to lend credence to the testimony of the expert witness from the Commission on
Elections that the ballots obtained from Precinct Nos. 1302A/1303A and 1306A are genuine ballots; and
7.) In refusing to appreciate the contested and revised ballots for Precinct Nos. 1302A/1303A and
1306A and the appreciation of the contested ballots found in Precinct No. 1307A/1307B.11
pg. 6
In a Resolution dated August 23, 2011, the COMELEC First Division12 dismissed the appeal, noting, as
the MeTC did, that Co failed to show that the integrity of the ballots in question was in fact preserved.
Echoing the trial court, the COMELEC First Division ruled that the absence of any report or record of
tampering of the ballot boxes does not preclude the possibility of ballot tampering.13
It also affirmed the rejection of Co’s reliance on the revision committee report as proof that no post-
election tampering occurred. The COMELEC First Division observed:
We note that protestant-appellant did not offer any evidence to prove his claims of misreading,
miscounting, and misappreciation of the ballots; he posits that the variance between the election results
according to the election documents and the revision of the ballots is in itself enough to prove his allegations
of misreading, miscounting, and misappreciation of the ballots by the Board of Election Tellers. Protestant-
appellant begs the question instead of laying support to his claims. x x x x Since it could not divine the will of
the electorate from the ballots, the trial court had no other recourse other than to rely on the available
election documents. And, We cannot fault the trial court for doing so when there was no question as to
the election documents’ authenticity and validity. Protestant-appellant harps that the election documents
are "mere by-products of the electoral fraud committed to benefit (protestee-appellee) including but not limited
to misreading, miscounting, and misappreciation of ballots by the Chairpersons of the Board of Election
Tellers in order to increase the votes of the Protestee-Appellee and decrease the votes that should have been
properly credited to Protestant-Appellant Co."
(emphasis in the original)
As previously mentioned, protestant-appellant’s assertion is specious x x x. The records of the case is

bereft of any evidence supporting protestant-appellant’s claims of electoral fraud and, thus, We concur with
the trial court stating, "(w)ithout any evidence, the allegation of misreading, miscounting, and
misappreciation of ballots remains a mere allegation without probative value."14
The COMELEC First Division noted that Co could have, but did not, presented testimonies of witnesses
to substantiate his claims of electoral fraud, albeit he attached affidavits of various witnesses in his protest.
The affidavits, the COMELEC First Division said, asserted, in one form or another, the electoral malfeasance
or misfeasance allegedly committed by the BET. In dismissing the arguments of Co for his failure to present
evidence, the COMELEC commented, "[I]t appears that protestant-appellant [Co] rested on laurels after
seeing the result of the physical count of the revised ballots and the conclusion of the Technical Examination.
In fine, protestant-appellant proverbially lost the war for want of a nail."15
The fallo of the COMELEC First Division Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (First Division) RESOLVED, as it hereby

RESOLVES, to DENY the protestant’s Appeal for LACK OF MERIT. The Decision dated 04 May 2011 by
Metropolitan Trial Court – Branch 04 City of Manila is hereby AFFIRMED.16
Co then filed a Motion for Reconsideration. In its assailed December 7, 2012 Resolution, the
COMELEC En Banc17reconsidered the August 23, 2011 Resolution of the First Division, and accordingly
declared Co as the duly elected punong barangay. Vital to the En Banc’s disposition is its finding that the
ballots subjected to revision were genuine. The En Banc found:
x x x [W]e find merit in appellant’s motion for reconsideration. For, protestant [Co] has sufficiently
established that no untoward incident had attended the preservation of the ballots after the termination of the
proceedings of the Board of Election Tellers or from the time the custody of the ballot boxes is transferred
from the BET to the City Treasurer and finally to the trial court. Protestee who cried post-election fraud is
duty- bound to establish that the genuine ballots found inside the boxes were compromised and
tampered at any time during that period and before the revision. However, no such proof has been
adduced by protestee except the discrepancy between the figures in the ERs and the physical count
on revision. But then, said discrepancy could have been caused by errors in the transposition of the
numbers from the ballots to the ERs during the canvassing and not due to tampering. As earlier
intimated, the discrepancy could be attributed to ER manipulation during the canvassing and not because of
the tampering of the ballots which were already found by an expert and independent body to be genuine and
authentic.18
The fallo of the COMELEC En Banc’s Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED as it hereby RESOLVES to

reconsider its Resolution dated August 23, 2011 and proclaim protestant-appellant as the duly elected
Punong Barangay of Barangay 296, District III, Manila.19
pg. 7
Thus, the present recourse, on the argument that the COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it arbitrarily set aside the Decision of the MeTC
and the Resolution of the COMELEC First Division, in the choice between the revision results in the protested
precincts and the official vote count recorded in the election returns. Petitioner further argues that the
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it demanded from protestee direct proof of actual tampering of
ballots to justify consideration of the use of the election returns in determining the winning candidate in the
elections. In fine, petitioner questions the ruling of the COMELEC giving precedence to the results of
the revision over the official canvassing results.
The Issues
I. WHETHER THE RESPONDENT COMMISSION COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN RULING THAT
PRIVATE RESPONDENT CO HAD SUCCESSFULLY DISCHARGED THE BURDEN OF
PROVING THE INTEGRITY OF THE BALLOTS SUBJECTED TO REVISION.
II. WHETHER THE RESPONDENT COMMISSION COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN REVERSING THE
RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION, TO THE EFFECT THAT PETITIONER REGIO
IS THE DULY-ELECTED PUNONG BARANGAY.
The Court’s Ruling
At the outset, it must be noted that the protest case is dismissible for being moot and academic. A
case becomes moot when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful
purpose can be served in passing upon the merits. Generally, courts will not determine a moot question
in a case in which no practical relief can be granted.20
In Malaluan v. COMELEC,21 this Court settled the matter on when an election protest case becomes moot and
academic:
When the appeal from a decision in an election case has already become moot, the case being an election
protest involving the office of mayor the term of which had expired, the appeal is dismissible on that ground,
unless the rendering of a decision on the merits would be of practical value. (emphasis added)
In the case now before the Court, the position involved is that of a punong barangay. The governing law,
therefore, is Republic Act No. (RA) 9164, as amended by RA 9340. Sec. 4 of the law states:
Sec. 4. Assumption of Office. - The term of office of the barangay and sangguniang kabataan officials
elected under this Act shall commence on August 15, 2002, next following their elections. The term of office of
the barangay and sangguniang kabataan officials elected in the October 2007 election and subsequent elections
shall commence at noon of November 30 next following their election. (emphasis added)
The court takes judicial notice of the holding of barangay elections last October 28, 2013. Following the
elections, the new set of barangay officials already assumed office as of noon of November 30, 2013. It goes
without saying, then, that the term of office of those who were elected during the October 2010 barangay
elections also expired by noon on November 30, 2013. In fine, with the election of a new punong barangay
during the October 28, 2013 elections, the issue of who the rightful winner of the 2010 barangay elections
has already been rendered moot and academic. Notwithstanding the mootness of the case, We find the need
to decide the petition on its merits, in view of the finding of the COMELEC En Banc that protestant Co should
have been declared the winner for the post of punong barangay for the term 2010-2013. We find that the grave
abuse of discretion committed by the COMELEC En Banc, specifically in ignoring the rules on evidence, merits
consideration. Still in line with the Court’s decision in Malaluan22 to the effect that the Court can decide on the
merits a moot protest if there is practical value in so doing, We find that the nullification of the COMELEC En
Banc’s Resolution is in order, due to its gross contravention of established rules on evidence in election protest
cases. We shall discuss the issues jointly, related as they are to the finding of the COMELEC En Banc giving
primacy to the results of the revision proceedings over the results of the canvassing as reflected in the election
returns.
The doctrine in Rosal v. COMELEC23 and considering the results of the revision vis-à-vis the results
reflected in the official canvassing In Rosal, this Court summarized the standards to be observed in an
election contest predicated on the theory that the election returns do not accurately reflect the will of
pg. 8
the voters due to alleged irregularities in the appreciation and counting of ballots. These guiding
standards are:
(1) The ballots cannot be used to overturn the official count as reflected in the election returns
unless it is first shown affirmatively that the ballots have been preserved with a care which precludes the
opportunity of tampering and suspicion of change, abstraction or substitution;
(2) The burden of proving that the integrity of the ballots has been preserved in such a manner is on the
protestant;
(3) Where a mode of preserving the ballots is enjoined by law, proof must be made of such substantial
compliance with the requirements of that mode as would provide assurance that the ballots have been kept
inviolate notwithstanding slight deviations from the precise mode of achieving that end;
(4) It is only when the protestant has shown substantial compliance with the provisions of law on the
preservation of ballots that the burden of proving actual tampering or likelihood thereof shifts to the
protestee; and
(5) Only if it appears to the satisfaction of the court of COMELEC that the integrity of the ballots has been
preserved should it adopt the result as shown by the recount and not as reflected in the election returns. In the same
case, the Court referred to various provisions in the Omnibus Election Code providing for the safe-keeping and
preservation of the ballots, more specifically Secs. 160, 217, 219, and 220 of the Code.
Rosal was promulgated precisely to honor the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
functions. Following Rosal, it is presumed that the BET and Board of Canvassers had faithfully performed the
solemn duty reposed unto them during the day of the elections. Thus, primacy is given to the official results of the
canvassing, even in cases where there is a discrepancy between such results and the results of the revision
proceedings. It is only when the protestant has successfully discharged the burden of proving that the re-counted
ballots are the very same ones counted during the revision proceedings, will the court or the Commission, as the
case may be, even consider the revision results. Even then, the results of the revision will not automatically be
given more weight over the official canvassing results or the election returns. What happens in the event of
discrepancy between the revision results and the election returns is that the burden of proof shifts to the
protestee to provide evidence of actual tampering of the ballots, or at least a likelihood of tampering. It is only
when the court or the COMELEC is fully satisfied that the ballots have been well preserved, and that there had been
no tampering of the ballots, that it will accord credibility to the results of the revision. In Varias v. COMELEC, the
Court said:
The Rosal ruling, to be sure, does not involve issues merely related to the appreciation or calibration of
evidence; its critical ruling is on the propriety of relying on the revision of ballot results instead of the election returns
in the proclamation of a winning candidate. In deciding this issue, what it notably established was a critical guide in
arriving at its conclusion – the need to determine whether the court or the COMELEC looked at the correct
considerations in making its ruling.24 This Court had long stated that "[u]pholding the sovereignty of the people is
what democracy is all about. When the sovereignty of the people expressed thru the ballot is at stake, it is not
enough for this Court to make a statement but it should do everything to have that sovereignty obeyed by
all. Well done is always better than well said."25
This is really what the Rosal doctrine is all about. The Rosal doctrine ensures that in election protest cases, the
supreme mandate of the people is ultimately determined. In laying down the rules in appreciating the conflicting
results of the canvassing and the results of a revision later made, the Court has no other intention
but to determine the will of the electorate. The Rosal doctrine is also supplemented by A.M. No.
07-4-15-SC,26 establishing the following disputable presumptions:
SEC. 6. Disputable presumptions. - The following presumptions are considered as

facts, unless contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
(a) On the election procedure:

(1) The election of candidates was held on the date and time set and in the polling place determined by the
Commission on Elections;
(2) The Boards of Election Inspectors were duly constituted and organized;
pg. 9
(3) Political parties and candidates were duly represented by pollwatchers;
(4) Pollwatchers were able to perform their functions; and
(5) The Minutes of Voting and Counting contains all the incidents that transpired before the Board of Election
Inspectors.
(b) On election paraphernalia:

(1) Ballots and election returns that bear the security markings and features prescribed by the Commission
on Elections are genuine;
(2) The data and information supplied by the members of the Boards of Election Inspectors in the
accountable forms are true and correct; and
(3) The allocation, packing and distribution of election documents or paraphernalia were properly and
timely done.
(c) On appreciation of ballots:

(1) A ballot with appropriate security markings is valid;
(2) The ballot reflects the intent of the voter;
(3) The ballot is properly accomplished;
(4) A voter personally prepared one ballot, except in the case of assistors; and
(5) The exercise of one’s right to vote was voluntary and free.
Private respondent Co has not proved that the integrity of the ballots has been preserved
Applying Rosal, viewed in conjunction with A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, this Court rules that the COMELEC En Banc
committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that private respondent had successfully discharged the burden of
proving that the ballots counted during the revision proceedings are the same ballots cast and counted during the
day of the elections. That is the essence of the second paragraph in the Rosal doctrine. It is well to note that the
respondent Co did not present any testimonial evidence to prove that the election paraphernalia inside the protested
ballot boxes had been preserved. He mainly relied on the report of the revision committee. There was no
independent, direct or indirect, evidence to prove the preservation of the ballots and other election paraphernalia.
This leads Us to no other conclusion but that respondent Co failed to discharge his burden under the Rosal
doctrine. With no independent evidence to speak of, respondent Co cannot simply rely on the report of the
revision committee, and from there conclude that the report itself is proof of the preservation of the ballots. What he
needs to provide is evidence independent of the revision proceedings. Without any such evidence, the
Court or the COMELEC, as the case may be, will be constrained to honor the presumption
established in A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, that the data and information supplied by the members of the Boards of Election
Inspectors in the accountable forms are true and correct.
Respondent Co admits having, under the Rosal doctrine, the burden of proving the preservation of the
ballots, and corollarily, that their integrity have not been compromised before the revision
proceedings. He, however, argues that he had successfully discharged that burden. And how?
First, he pointed out that from the moment the various BETs placed the counted official ballots inside the
ballot boxes until they were transported for canvassing, and until they were transmitted to the Election Officer/City
Treasurer of Manila for storage and custody, no irregularities or ballot-box snatching were reported; neither was
there any news or record of ballot box tampering in the protested precincts.
Second, no untoward incident or irregularity which may taint or affect the integrity of the ballot boxes
was ever reported when they were transported to the storage area of the trial court.
Third, the storage place of the ballot boxes was at all times tightly secured, properly protected, and well
safeguarded.
pg. 10
Fourth, all the protested ballot boxes were properly locked and sealed.
Fifth, the petitioner never questioned or raised any issue on the preservation of the integrity of the
protested ballot boxes. And
sixth, the Technical Examination Report signed by the COMELEC representative confirmed the
genuineness, authenticity, and integrity of all the ballots found during the revision.27
We hold, however, that the foregoing statements do not, by themselves, constitute sufficient evidence
that the ballots have been preserved. Respondent Co cannot simply rely on the alleged absence of evidence of
reports of untoward incidents, and from there immediately conclude that the ballots have been preserved. What he
should have presented are concrete pieces of evidence, independent of the revision proceedings that will tend to
show that the ballots counted during the revision proceedings were the very same ones counted by the BETs during
the elections, and the very same ones cast by the public. He cannot evade his duty by simply relying on the absence
of reports of untoward incidents that happened to the ballot boxes. At best, this reliance on the condition of the ballot
boxes themselves is speculative; at worst, it is self-serving. Without presenting to the court any evidence outside of
the proceedings, respondent Co as protestant may simply claim that the ballot boxes themselves are the proof that
they were properly preserved. This goes contrary to the doctrine in Rosal.
The respective custodians of the ballot boxes, from the time they were used in the elections until they
were delivered to the court, were not, to stress, presented in court. They could have testified as to the security
afforded the ballot boxes while in their custody. Moreover, no witness at all was presented by respondent Co during
the proceedings in the trial court. The Court reminds respondent Co that the trial court’s consideration of the case is
confined to whatever evidence is presented before it. This is amply stated in Rule 13, Sec. 2 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC:
Sec. 2. Offer of evidence. – The court shall consider no evidence that has not been formally offered. Offer of
1âwphi1
evidence shall be done orally on the last day of hearing allowed for each party after the presentation of the last
witness. The opposing party shall be required to immediately interpose objections thereto. The court shall rule on the
offer of evidence in open court. However, the court may, at its discretion, allow the party to make an offer of evidence
in writing, which shall be submitted within three days. If the court rejects any evidence offered, the party may make a
tender of excluded evidence.
Unfortunately for respondent Co, the witnesses whose affidavits he attached to his Protest were
never presented during trial. While he again raised the tenor of these affidavits in his Comment filed before Us,
those cannot be considered anymore due to his failure to present them before the trial court. Respondent cannot
simplistically insist on the consideration of said affidavits, the trial court not having been given the opportunity to
observe their testimonies, and petitioner not having been accorded the opportunity to cross-examine them. The fact
that respondent attached the affidavits in his Protest does not mean that the trial court is bound to consider them,
precisely because they have not been formally offered before the court. The attachments to the Protest will not be
considered unless formally offered. The Court notes that respondent Co has offered no explanation whatsoever why
he failed to present his witnesses. Nevertheless, he would have this Court consider as evidence their purported
testimonies. This would be incongruously unfair to petitioner, who endeavored to prove his case by presenting
evidence before the trial court. Neither can respondent Co disclaim responsibility on the argument that the petitioner
never raised as an issue the preservation of the ballot boxes. Inherent in all election protest cases is the duty of the
protestant to provide evidence of such preservation. The failure of the protestee to raise that as an issue will not
ipso facto mean that protestant need not present evidence to that effect. Moreover, the Technical Examination
Report, is not, without more, evidence of preservation. The Report merely states that the ballots are genuine. What
the protestant should endeavor to prove, however, in presenting evidence of preservation, is not that the ballots
themselves are genuine or official, but that they are the very same ones cast by the electorate. The Report cannot
possibly determine that. While it may be that the ballots themselves are official ballots, there is still a dearth of
evidence on whether or not they were the same official ballots cast by the public during the elections. The Report,
therefore, cannot be considered as evidence of the preservation, as required by Rosal. The fact of preservation is
not, as respondent Co claims, "incontrovertible." In fact, there is total absence of evidence to that effect. The
incontrovertible fact is that private respondent, during the proceedings before the trial court, did not present any
independent evidence to prove his claim. Without any independent evidence, the trial court, the COMELEC, as well
as this Court, is constrained to affirm as a fact the disputable presumption that the ballots were properly counted
during the counting and canvassing of votes. In sum, We find that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in
ruling that private respondent had discharged the burden of proving the integrity of the ballots. We rule, on the
contrary, that there is utter lack of evidence to that effect.
Petitioner need not prove actual tampering of the ballots Corollarily, the COMELEC En Banc had ruled that
petitioner, as protestee, failed to adduce evidence that the ballots found inside the ballot boxes were
compromised and tampered. This strikes us as baseless and a clear departure from the teachings of Rosal.
pg. 11
The duty of the protestee in an election contest to provide evidence of actual tampering or any likelihood
arises only when the protestant has first successfully discharge the burden or providing that the ballots have been
secured to prevent tampering or susceptibility of charge, abstraction or substitution. Such need to present proof of
tampering did not arise since protestant himself failed to provide evidence of the integrity of the ballots.
A candidate for a public elective position ought to familiarize himself with election laws, pertinent
jurisprudence, and COMELEC resolutions, rules and regulations. Alternatively, he should have an experienced and
knowledgeable election lawyer to guide him on the different aspects of election. Sans comment legal advice and
representation a victory in the elections may turn out to be a crushing defeat for the candidate who actually got the
nod of the electorate. Unfortunately for respondent Co, he committed several miscues that eventually led to his
debacle in the instant election protest.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Petition for Certiorari is GRANTED. The Resolution dated December 7,
2012 of the COMELEC En Banc in EAC (BRGY-SK) No. 161-2011 is hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The
Resolution of the COMELEC First Division dated August 23, 2011, affirming the Decision in Election Case No.
02480-EC of the MeTC. Branch 4 in Manila is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
ISSUE: who is the rightful winner of the 2010 barangay elections has already been rendered moot and
academic
HELD/RULINGS: Regio, who garnered four hundred seventy-eight (478) votes, as against the three hundred
thirty-six (336) votes obtained by Co, since protestee failed to adduce evidence that the ballots found inside the
ballot boxes were compromised and tampered
failed to provide evidence of the integrity of the ballots or Without any such evidence, the Court or the
COMELEC, as the case may be, will be constrained to honor the presumption established in A.M.
No. 07-4-15-SC, that the data and information supplied by the members of the Boards of Election Inspectors in the
accountable forms are true and correct
[G.R. No. 128877. December 10, 1999]
ROLANDO ABAD, JR., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; HON. OCTAVIO

A. FERNANDEZ, JR., Presiding Judge, Second Metropolitan Circuit Trial Court,
General Natividad, Nueva Ecija; and SUSANITO SARENAS, JR., respondents.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to annul the COMELEC En Banc Resolution in SPR No. 45-96,
dated April 29, 1997. Petitioner ABAD had sought COMELECs review of respondent Judges orders issued in the
election protest filed against private respondent SARENAS. In said Resolution, the COMELEC denied review,
decreeing thus:
WHEREFORE, considering that the June 3, 1996 Order of the Court a quo had already attained finality at the time
of the filing of this Petition, thus, must remain undisturbed, and there being no showing that the drawing of lots
mandated by the Courts Order dated October 3, 1996, was attended by fraud or irregularities, the Commission En
Banc RESOLVED to DISMISS the Petition for lack of merit.[1]
The factual antecedents are as follows:

Petitioner Abad and private respondent Sarenas were both candidates for Sangguniang Kabataan (SK)
chairman of Barangay Sta. Barbara, Llanera, Nueva Ecija, during the May 6, 1996, SK elections.
pg. 12
Petitioner emerged as winner with 66 votes as against private respondents 62 votes. Petitioner was thus
proclaimed SK chairman of Sta. Barbara.[2]
Private respondent soon thereafter filed an election protest alleging fraud on the part of petitioner
through the registration of four unqualified voters. Three voters were allegedly underaged while one lacked the
required residency in the barangay. Private respondent asked for a recount of the votes cast.[3]
The election protest was filed before the Second

Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Gen. Natividad,
Nueva Ecija, presided over by respondent Judge.
In his answer, petitioner claimed that private respondent was barred from questioning the qualifications
of the four voters because he failed to ask for their exclusion from the voters list as provided for under Section
22 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824, the Rules and Regulations Governing the May 6, 1996 Elections of the SK;
and Section 2 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2832, the Instructions for the Registration of Voters in connection with
the SK elections. Petitioner contended that the permanent registry list of voters is conclusive on the question
of who has the right to vote in an election under the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner also claimed that a
recount is not justified under the provisions of the same Code.
In addition, petitioner charged private respondent with vote-buying. He further alleged error on the part
of the Board of Election Tellers in the appreciation of votes.
In an Order dated June 3, 1996, respondent MCTC Judge Fernandez ruled in favor of private
respondent. According to Judge Fernandez, while the registry list of voters is indeed conclusive as to who can vote,
this must be disregarded if justice were to prevail. Moreover, said Judge Fernandez, a recount of the votes would not
be determinative of who actually won the SK chairmanship. Instead, he ordered that four votes, representing the
votes of those persons whose qualification as voters were questioned, be deducted from petitioner.[4]
As this resulted in a 62-62 tie between petitioner and private respondent, Judge Fernandez ordered that the
winner be determined via drawing of lots or toss of a coin.[5]
Petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 26 which, however, dismissed
his appeal, since under COMELEC Resolution No. 2824, the decision of the MCTC insofar as the SK election is
concerned can only be elevated to the COMELEC en banc through a petition for review and only in meritorious
cases. The RTC through Acting Presiding Judge Johnson L. Ballutay ordered remand of the case to the court of
origin.[6]
The drawing of lots ordered by the MCTC proceeded on October 3, 1996. Petitioner was absent although he
was duly notified of the proceeding.[7] Private respondent Sarenas emerged as winner in the drawing of lots. In an
order issued on the same day, the MCTC directed him to take his oath of office and to assume his duties as SK
chairman.
Thus petitioner Abad then filed a petition for review with the COMELEC en banc.
In its Resolution dismissing the petition, the COMELEC said:
On the basis of the facts presented the Commission En Banc holds that the June 3, 1996 Order of the
Municipal Trial Court had, as of the filing of the Petition for Review already become final. In
short, the Petition as regards said Order had prescribed. Records show that the decision of the Trial
Court annulling the proclamation of Abad and declaring a tie between him and Sarenas, to be broken
by a drawing of lots, was received by Abad on June 5, 1996. Though he appealed said Order to the
Regional Trial Court, the remedy availed of was not the one obtaining under COMELEC Resolution
2824, Section 49 of which provides:
Finality of Proclamation. The proclamation of the winning candidates shall be final. However, the
Metropolitan Trial Courts/Municipal Trial Courts/Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall have original
jurisdiction over all election protest cases, whose decision shall be final. The Commission En Banc
in meritorious cases may entertain a petition for review of the decision of the MeTC/MTC/MCTC
pg. 13
in accordance with the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. An appeal bond of P2,000.00 shall be
required which shall be refundable if the appeal is found meritorious.
More properly, and conformably with said provision, Petitioner should have directed his Petition to
the Commission En Banc within thirty days from June 5, 1996, the date the decision was served upon
him. Even if we assume that his procedural lapse was justifiable thus permit his appeal to the RTC to
stay the running of the prescriptive period, he should have rectified his error upon receipt of the Order
of the RTC dismissing his Appeal on July 10, 1996. Petitioner had several opportunities to avail of
the correct remedy. Yet, he procrastinated and acted only when he lost the drawing of lots to
respondent. Considering therefore that Petitioner failed to question the propriety of the Order
of the Court a quo dated June 3, 1996, the same had become final and executory.
The October 3, 1996 Order of the MTC, is issued in implementation of the June 3, 1996 Order, declaring a tie
between Petitioner and Respondent Sarenas and directing a drawing of lots to break it. Having become executory
as of October 3, 1996, its implementation become mandatory. Records show that Petitioner was duly notified
of the proceedings. He did not appear despite notice. He can not invoke his non-appearance as an excuse for
questioning the proceedings. The same was conducted in public. No irregularity or anomaly attending the
proceeding was proven by Petitioner. There is therefore no cogent reason to warrant the setting aside of the result
thereof.[8]
Hence, this petition. While petitioner raises principally the issue of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
COMELEC for not declaring as null and void the challenged orders of the trial court, the more fundamental issue
here, in our view, involves the COMELECs own jurisdiction. The Court cannot proceed further in this case
without resolving that issue.
Note that from the trial court, petitioner proceeded directly to the COMELEC en banc. Apparently, he was
proceeding pursuant to Section 49 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824, which provides:
xxx The Commission en banc in meritorious cases may entertain a petition for review of the decision
of the MetC/MTC/MCTC in accordance with the Comelec Rules of Procedure. xxx
But we find this rule not in accord but in conflict with Article IX-C, Section 3 of the Constitution, which
states that:
Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its
rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation
controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided
that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc. (Emphasis
supplied.)
we ruled that the COMELEC,

In Sarmiento v. Commission on Elections,[9]
sitting en banc, does not have the requisite authority to hear and
decide election cases in the first instance. This power pertains to the divisions of the
Commission. Any decision by the Commission en banc as regards election cases decided by it in the first instance
is null and void.
In the recent case of Zarate v. COMELEC,[10] this rule has been reiterated. We nullified the decision of the
COMELEC en banc in Zarate, which incidentally also concerns a 1996 SK election case appealed
directly from the MTC. We remanded the case and ordered it assigned to an
appropriate division of the COMELEC.
Thus, consistent with the rulings in Zarate and Sarmiento cases, we are now constrained to declare as null
and void the questioned resolution of the COMELEC en banc in this case of Abad (SPR No. 45-96).
pg. 14
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The decision of the COMELEC en banc in SPR No. 45-96
Commission is ordered to assign the case to one of its
is SET ASIDE and the
Divisions for prompt resolution.
SO ORDERED
ISSUE:
WON the MCTC or the COMELEC en banc has the authority to decide election cases
HELD/RULINGS:
NO, neither the MCTC nor the comelec en banc has the authority to hear and decide election cases.
Article IX-C, Section 3 of the Constitution provides that All such election cases shall be heard and decided in
division provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc
MINERVA GOMEZ-CASTILLO G.R. No. 187231

Petitioner,
Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
-versus - BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ, and
MENDOZA, JJ.:
COMISSION ON ELECTIONS Promulgated:
and STRIKE B. REVILLA,
Respondents. June 22, 2010
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Petitioner Minerva Gomez-Castillo (Castillo) hereby seeks to nullify the orders dated January
30, 2009 and March 11, 2009[1] issued in EAC No. A-01-2009 by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC).
pg. 15
Antecedents
Castillo and respondent Strike P. Revilla ran for Municipal Mayor of Bacoor, Cavite during
the May 14, 2007 local elections. After the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Revilla
as the elected Municipal Mayor of Bacoor, Cavite, Castillo filed an Election Protest Ad
Cautelam[2] in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Bacoor, Cavite, which was eventually raffled
to Branch 19.
Through his Answer, Revilla sought the dismissal of the election protest, alleging that it was filed
in the wrong Branch of the RTC. He pointed out that Supreme Court Administrative Order
(SCAO) No. 54-2007 designated Branch 22 of the RTC in Imus, Cavite and Branch 88 of the
RTC in Cavite City to hear, try and decide election contests involving municipal officials in
Cavite; and that contrary to SCAO No. 54-2007, Castillo filed his protest in the RTC in Bacoor,
Cavite, which was not the proper court.
On November 21, 2008, Branch 19 dismissed Castillos election protest for being violative of
SCAO No. 54-2007.
On December 23, 2008, Castillo presented a notice of appeal.[3] Thereupon, the RTC ordered that
the complete records of the protest be forwarded to the Election Contests Adjudication Department
(ECAD) of the COMELEC.[4]
The First Division of the COMELEC dismissed the appeal for being brought beyond the
five-day reglementary period, noting that although Castillo had received the November 21, 2008
order of the RTC on December 15 , 2008, she filed her notice of appeal on December 23, 2008, a
day too late to appeal, to wit:
Pursuant to Section 3, Rule 22 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which requires the appellant to
file her notice of appeal within five (5) days after promulgation of the decision of the court xxx and
considering further that jurisprudence holds that perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the
period laid down by law is not only mandatory but JURISDICTIONAL, this Commission, First
Division, RESOLVES to DISMISS the instant appeal for appellant's failure to file her Notice of
Appeal within the five (5) day reglementary period.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Castillo moved for the reconsideration of the dismissal of her appeal, but the
COMELEC denied the motion because she did not pay the motion fees required under Sec. 7(f),
Rule 40 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended by COMELEC Resolution No. 02-
0130, viz:
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by protestant-appellant Minerva G. Castillo, thru registered
mail on 13 February 2009 and received by this Commission on 4 March 2009, seeking reconsideration
of the Commission's (First Division) Order dated 30 January 2009, is hereby DENIED for failure of
the movant to pay the necessary motion fees under Sec. 7(f), Rule 40 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure[6] as amended by Comelec Resolution no. 02-0130.[7]
Castillo has brought the present recourse, contending that the COMELECs orders dismissing
her appeal and denying her motion for reconsideration were issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
pg. 16
Parties Arguments
Castillo insists that her notice of appeal was seasonably filed; otherwise, the RTC would not have
given due course to his appeal; that Section 3, Rule 22 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, cited
in the assailed order dated January 30, 2009, did not apply to her case, because Section 2 of Rule I
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that:
Sec. 2. Applicability.- These rules, except Part VI, shall apply to all actions and proceedings brought
before the Commission. Part VI shall apply to election contests and Quo Warranto cases cognizable
by courts of general jurisdiction.
that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure applied only to actions and proceedings brought
before the COMELEC, not to actions or proceedings originating in courts of general
jurisdiction; that even assuming that the appeal was belatedly filed, the rules on election contests
should be liberally construed to the end that mere technical objections would not defeat the will of
the people in the choice of public officers; that the Court relaxed on numerous occasions the
application of the rules in order to give due course to belated appeals upon strong and compelling
reasons; that an electoral contest like hers was imbued with public interest, because it involved the
paramount need to clarify the real choice of the electorate; that Section 4 of Rule I of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure even allows the COMELEC to suspend its own rules of procedure in order to
obtain a speedy disposition of all matters pending before the COMELEC; and that the COMELEC
should not have dismissed her motion for reconsideration for her mere failure to pay the
corresponding filing fee, but should have considered the soundness of her argument to the effect
that SCAO No. 54-2007 continued to vest jurisdiction to try and decide election contest involving
elective municipal officials in the RTC as a whole, rendering the designation of the RTC branches
to handle election protests akin to a designation of venue.
Castillo further insists that Section 12 of Rule 2 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides
that assignment of cases to the specially designated courts should be done exclusively by raffle
conducted by the executive judge or by the judges designated by the Supreme Court; and that her
protest was thus duly raffled to the RTC in Bacoor, Cavite, considering that SCAO 54-2007 should
be construed as a permissive rule that cannot supersede the general rule that jurisdiction over
election contests is vested in the RTC.
In his comment,[8] Revilla submits that the COMELEC correctly dismissed Castillos appeal for
being filed beyond the five-day reglementary period prescribed in Section 3 of Rule 22 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, thus:
Section 3. Notice of Appeal. - Within five (5) days after promulgation of the decision of the court,
the aggrieved party may filed with said court a notice of appeal, and serve a copy thereof upon the
attorney of record of the adverse party.
that A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, otherwise known as The Rules of Procedure in Election Contests
Involving Elective Municipal and Barangay Officials, clearly and categorically directed:
pg. 17
Section 8. Appeal. - An aggrieved party may appeal the decision to the commission on Elections,
within five days after promulgation, by filing a notice of appeal with the court that rendered the
decision, with copy served on the adverse counsel or party if not represented by counsel.
that the period for filing an appeal is not a mere technicality of law or procedure and the right to
appeal is merely a statutory privilege that may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the
law; that the notice of appeal, even on the assumption that it was filed on time, still remained futile
due to the petitioners failure to pay the corresponding fee for the motion for reconsideration; that
the failure to pay the filing fee rendered the motion for reconsideration a mere scrap of paper,
because it prevented the COMELEC from acquiring jurisdiction over the protest; and that the
COMELEC could not be faulted for applying its procedural rules to achieve a just and expeditious
determination of every proceeding brought before it.
Issues
Does Section 13 of Rule 2 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC designate the RTC Branch that
has jurisdiction over an election contest, or does it merely designate the proper venue for filing?
In case the RTC was incorrect, is the error enough to warrant the reversal of its order of
dismissal despite its having attained finality?
Ruling
The petition has no merit.
A
Error of Petitioner in filing the protest in
RTC in Bacoor, not jurisdictional
It is well-settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law. As such, jurisdiction cannot be fixed by the
will of the parties; nor be acquired through waiver nor enlarged by the omission of the parties; nor
conferred by any acquiescence of the court. The allocation of jurisdiction is vested in Congress, and
cannot be delegated to another office or agency of the Government.
The Rules of Court does not define jurisdictional boundaries of the courts. In promulgating
the Rules of Court, the Supreme Court is circumscribed by the zone properly denominated as the
promulgation of rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts;[9] consequently,
the Rules of Court can only determine the means, ways or manner in which said jurisdiction, as
fixed by the Constitution and acts of Congress, shall be exercised. The Rules of Court yields to the
substantive law in determining jurisdiction.[10]
The jurisdiction over election contests involving elective municipal officials has been vested in
the RTC by Section 251, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code).[11]On the other
hand, A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, by specifying the proper venue where such cases may be filed and
heard, only spelled out the manner by which an RTC with jurisdiction exercises such jurisdiction.
Like other rules on venue, A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC was designed to ensure a just and orderly
pg. 18
administration of justice,[12] and is permissive, because it was enacted to ensure the exclusive and
speedy disposition of election protests and petitions for quo warranto involving elective municipal
officials.[13]
Castillos filing her protest in the RTC in Bacoor, Cavite amounted only to a wrong choice of venue.
Hence, the dismissal of the protest by Branch 19 constituted plain error, considering that her wrong
choice did not affect the jurisdiction of the RTC. What Branch 19 should have done under the
circumstances was to transfer the protest to Branch 22 of the RTC in Imus, Cavite, which was
the proper venue. Such transfer was proper, whether she as the protestant sought it or not, given
that the determination of the will of the electorate of Bacoor, Cavite according to the process set
forth by law was of the highest concern of our institutions, particularly of the courts.
B
Castillos tardy appeal should be dismissed
Section 8 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC provides that:
Section 8. Appeal. - An aggrieved party may appeal the decision to the Commission on
Elections within five days after promulgation by filing a notice of appeal with the court that
rendered the decision with copy served on the adverse counsel or party if not represented by counsel.
Although Castillo had received the November 21, 2008 order of the RTC on December 15, 2008,
she filed her notice of appeal only on December 23, 2008, or eight days after her receipt of the
decision. Her appeal was properly dismissed for being too late under the aforequoted rule of
the COMELEC.
Castillo now insists that her appeal should not be dismissed, because she claims that the five-
day reglementary period was a mere technicality, implying that such period was but a trivial
guideline to be ignored or brushed aside at will.
Castillos insistence is unacceptable. The period of appeal and the perfection of appeal are not
mere technicalities to be so lightly regarded, for
they are essential to the finality of judgments, a notion underlying the stability of our judicial
system.[14] A greater reason to adhere to this notion exists herein, for the short period of five days as
the period to appeal recognizes the essentiality of time in election protests, in order that the will of
the electorate is ascertained as soon as possible so that the winning candidate is not deprived of the
right to assume office, and so that any doubt that can cloud the incumbency of the truly deserving
winning candidate is quickly removed.
Contrary to Castillos posture, we cannot also presume the timeliness of her appeal from the
fact that the RTC gave due course to her appeal by its elevating the protest to the COMELEC. The
presumption of timeliness would not arise if her appeal was actually tardy.
It is not trite to observe, finally, that Castillos tardy appeal resulted in the finality of the RTCs
dismissal even before January 30, 2002. This result provides an additional reason to warrant the
assailed actions of the COMELEC in dismissing her appeal. Accordingly, the Court finds that the
pg. 19
COMELECs assailed actions were appropriate and lawful, not tainted by either arbitrariness or
whimsicality,
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Issue:
 WON an appeal for being filed beyond the five-day reglementary period is valid?
 WON Non-payment of motion fees is tantamount to the denial of the motion.
Held/ruling:
 No, it is not valid,

Section 3 of Rule 22 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure,
Section 3. Notice of Appeal. - Within five (5) days after promulgation of the decision of the court,
the aggrieved party may filed with said court a notice of appeal, and serve a copy thereof upon the
attorney of record of the adverse party.
Section 8 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC provides that:

Section 8. Appeal. - An aggrieved party may appeal the decision to the Commission on
Elections within five days after promulgation by filing a notice of appeal with the court that
rendered the decision with copy served on the adverse counsel or party if not represented by counsel.
 Yes, payment is necessary and non-payment of motion fees is tantamount to the denial of the
motion, Under Sec. 7(f), Rule 40 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure[6] as amended by Comelec
Resolution no. 02-0130
THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD VS

COMELEC (2015)
26 Nov 2017
[G.R No. 205728, January 21, 2015] Constitutional Law| Bill of Rights| Freedom of Speech| Freedom of Religion|
Freedom of Expression
THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, represented by the Most Rev. Bishop Vicente Navarra
vs. COMELEC
FACTS:
On February 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within the compound of San Sebastian Cathedral of
Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately 6×10 in size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral
within public view.
pg. 20
The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH Law” referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012
or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the
heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH)/ Team Buhay” or “(Pro-RH)/Team Patay”.
The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of the RH Law. Those who voted
for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted
against it form “Team Buhay”:
TEAM BUHAY TEAM PATAY

Estrada, JV Angara, Juan Edgardo
Honasan, Gregorio Casiño, Teddy
Magsaysay, Mitos Cayetano, Alan Peter
Pimentel, Koko Enrile, Jackie
Trillanes, Antonio Escudero, Francis
Villar, Cynthia Hontiveros, Risa
*Party List Legarda, Loren
Party List Buhay Gabriela, Akbayan, Bayan Muna, Anak Pawis Party List Ang Pamilya
Respondent Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon, as Election Officer of Bacolod City, issued a Notice to Remove Campaign
Materials addressed to petitioner Most Rev. Bishop Vicente M. Navarra, otherwise, COMELEC will be
constrained to file an election offense against the petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether the act of the COMELEC infringes the Freedom of Religion and Freedom of Speech.
HELD:
On Freedom of Religion. As aptly argued by COMELEC, the tarpaulin, on its face, “does not convey any
religious doctrine of the Catholic church.” That the position of the Catholic church appears to coincide with the
message of the tarpaulin regarding the RH Law does not, by itself, bring the expression within the ambit of
religious speech. On the contrary, the tarpaulin clearly refers to candidates classified under “Team Patay” and
“Team Buhay” according to their respective votes on the RH Law.
On Freedom of Speech. Embedded in the tarpaulin, are opinions expressed by petitioners. It is a specie of
expression protected by our fundamental law. There are several theories and schools of thought that strengthen the
need to protect the basic right to freedom of expression.
First, this relates to the right of the people to participate in public affairs, including the right to criticize
government actions. Speech that promotes dialogue on public affairs, or airs out grievances and political
discontent, should thus be protected and encouraged.
Second, free speech should be encouraged under the concept of a market place of ideas.
Third, free speech involves self-expression that enhances human dignity.
Fourth, expression is a marker for group identity.
Fifth, the Bill of Rights, free speech included, is supposed to “protect individuals and minorities against
majoritarian abuses perpetrated through [the] framework [of democratic governance]. ”
Lastly, free speech must be protected under the safety valve theory. In order to avoid this situation and prevent
people from resorting to violence, there is a need for peaceful methods in making passionate dissent. Free speech
must, thus, be protected as a peaceful means of achieving one’s goal, considering the possibility that repression of
nonviolent dissent may spill over to violent means just to drive a point.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they
are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such priority “gives these
liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions.”
THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M.

NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY, Petitioners,
vs.
pg. 21
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY.

MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, Respondents.
G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015
PONENTE: Leonen
TOPIC: Right to expression, right to political speech, right to property
FACTS:
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound
housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6′)
by ten feet (10′) in size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first
tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH Law” referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012
or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains
the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with
a check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The electoral candidates were
classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH
Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,”
while those who voted against it form “Team Buhay.”
Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any candidate.
Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names of candidates for the 2013 elections,
but not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not candidates for that election.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the tarpaulin is a political question, hence not
within the ambit of the Supreme Court’s power of review.
2. Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as the case
was not brought first before the COMELEC En Banc or any if its divisions.
3. Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private citizens.
4. Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin violated petitioners’
fundamental right to freedom of expression.
5. Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or content-neutral regulation.
6. Whether or not there was violation of petitioners’ right to property.
7. Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious speech.
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE: No.
The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the exercise of prudence or modesty. There
is no political question. It can be acted upon by this court through the expanded jurisdiction granted to
this court through Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution.
The concept of a political question never precludes judicial review when the act of a constitutional
organ infringes upon a fundamental individual or collective right. Even assuming arguendo that the
COMELEC did have the discretion to choose the manner of regulation of the tarpaulin in question, it
cannot do so by abridging the fundamental right to expression.
Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of whether an issue involves a truly
political and non-justiciable question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then
our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly
acted within such limits.
pg. 22
A political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no constitutionally imposed
limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. Hence, the existence of constitutionally
imposed limits justifies subjecting the official actions of the body to the scrutiny and review of this court.
In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right to free speech. Any instance
that this right may be abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It does not fall squarely into any doubt that a
political question brings.
SECOND ISSUE: No.
The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not proper in this
case.
Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear that the controversy is
already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness is the “prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished
or performed by either branch or in this case, organ of government before a court may come into the
picture.”
Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech, given the message and their medium, had
understandable relevance especially during the elections. COMELEC’s letter threatening the filing of the
election offense against petitioners is already an actionable infringement of this right. The impending
threat of criminal litigation is enough to curtail petitioners’ speech.
In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as COMELEC suggested
in their pleadings prolongs the violation of their freedom of speech.
THIRD ISSUE: No.
Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their position that they
had the power to regulate the tarpaulin. However, the Court held that all of these provisions pertain to
candidates and political parties. Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do they belong to any political
party. COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom
of expression exercised by a non-candidate in this case.
FOURTH ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political consequences enjoys a high degree
of protection.
Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is election propaganda, being
petitioners’ way of endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law and rejecting those who voted for
it, holds no water.
The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named
candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin
was not paid for or posted “in return for consideration” by any candidate, political party, or party-list
group.
By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not included, while sponsored
messages are covered.
The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech
Political speech refers to speech “both intended and received as a contribution to public deliberation about
some issue,” “fostering informed and civic minded deliberation.” On the other hand, commercial speech
has been defined as speech that does “no more than propose a commercial transaction.” The expression
resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is, however, definitely political speech.
FIFTH ISSUE: Content-based regulation.

pg. 23
Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions “based on the subject matter of the
utterance or speech.” In contrast, content-neutral regulation includes controls merely on the incidents of
the speech such as time, place, or manner of the speech.
The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The tarpaulin content is not
easily divorced from the size of its medium.
Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this court has used the
clear and present danger rule as measure.
Under this rule, “the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive, ‘extremely
serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.’” “Only when the challenged act has overcome the
clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the government having the burden
of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.”
Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the regulation. There is
no compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify
curtailment of the right of freedom of expression. There is no reason for the state to minimize the right of
non-candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their private property. The size of the tarpaulin does not
affect anyone else’s constitutional rights.
SIXTH ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the tarpaulin remains
the private property of petitioners. Their right to use their property is likewise protected by the
Constitution.
Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private property or

constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property rights is void, because it is repugnant
to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection of the laws.
The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that regulates where decals and stickers should
be posted is “so broad that it encompasses even the citizen’s private property.” Consequently, it violates
Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution which provides that no person shall be deprived of his property
without due process of law.
SEVENTH ISSUE: No.
The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not binding upon this
court. The position of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to
qualify the posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis. The
enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to its nature as speech with
political consequences and not religious speech.
Doctrine of benevolent neutrality
With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent neutrality allows
accommodation of religion under certain circumstances. Accommodations are government policies that
take religion specifically into account not to promote the government’s favored form of religion, but to
allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore
is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person’s or institution’s religion.
As Justice Brennan explained, the “government may take religion into account . . . to exempt,
when possible, from generally applicable governmental regulation individuals whose religious beliefs and
practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create without state involvement an atmosphere in
which voluntary religious exercise may flourish.”
pg. 24

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MICU MC October 30, 2018 Cases

Admin and Election Laws

KABATAAN PARTY-LIST G.R. No. 189868

Petitioners further contend that COMELEC Resolution No. 8585 is an unconstitutional

Section 8. System of Continuing Registration of Voters. The personal filing of application of

The petition is impressed with merit.

Section 8. System of Continuing Registration of Voters. The personal filing of application

G.R. No. 204828 December 3, 2013

JAIME C. REGIO, Petitioner,

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Candidate Clustered Precinct Number Total

Candidate Clustered Precinct Number Total

1302A 1304A 1306A 1307A

The trial court said:

As previously mentioned, protestant-appellant’s assertion is specious x x x. The records of the case is

The fallo of the COMELEC First Division Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (First Division) RESOLVED, as it hereby

The fallo of the COMELEC En Banc’s Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED as it hereby RESOLVES to

II. WHETHER THE RESPONDENT COMMISSION COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

The Court’s Ruling

SEC. 6. Disputable presumptions. - The following presumptions are considered as

(a) On the election procedure:

(3) Political parties and candidates were duly represented by pollwatchers;

(4) Pollwatchers were able to perform their functions; and

(b) On election paraphernalia:

(c) On appreciation of ballots:

(2) The ballot reflects the intent of the voter;

(3) The ballot is properly accomplished;

[G.R. No. 128877. December 10, 1999]

ROLANDO ABAD, JR., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; HON. OCTAVIO

The factual antecedents are as follows:

The election protest was filed before the Second

we ruled that the COMELEC,

MINERVA GOMEZ-CASTILLO G.R. No. 187231

The petition has no merit.

Section 8 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC provides that:

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

 No, it is not valid,

Section 8 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC provides that:

THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD VS

TEAM BUHAY TEAM PATAY

THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY.

G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015

TOPIC: Right to expression, right to political speech, right to property

FIRST ISSUE: No.

SECOND ISSUE: No.

THIRD ISSUE: No.

FOURTH ISSUE: Yes.

The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech

FIFTH ISSUE: Content-based regulation.

SIXTH ISSUE: Yes.

Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private property or

SEVENTH ISSUE: No.

Doctrine of benevolent neutrality

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