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Geographical Review.
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FRONTIERS, SECURITY, AND INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION*
Nicholas John Spykman
Yale Uniiversity
TI lHERE will be peace after the war in which we are now engaged,
and in the organization of that peace the victors will remake the map
of the world. We can be certain that, if the German-Japanese alliance
is successful, our advice will not be sought; but, if the Allies win the final
battle, we as a nation will certainly have something to say about the "New
World Order." Notwithstanding the fervent hopes of many idealists, that
new order will probably not consist of a single superstate, and the peace-
makers will, therefore, be confronted with the same problems that faced
their predecessors at Paris and earlier conferences. Boundaries, territorial
security, and international organization will again be discussed, and, be-
cause of the fact that twenty-four political units have already disappeared
in the present conflict, it is likely that territorial security will receive special
consi'deration.
The problem of security is both geographic and political. It arises from
the existence of great inequalities in military strength between states that
live in an international community without international government. The
so-called "sovereign independence" of states, the absence of higher authority,
and the freedom from external restraint that characterize interstate relations
condition the problem. The international community does not guarantee
the member states either life, liberty, property, or the pursuit of happiness.
Whatever the paper provisions of international conventions may have
stipulated, each individual unit has continued to depend for its very exist-
ence, as well as for the enjoyment of its rights and the protection of its
interests, on its own strength or that of its protectors.
Because of this absence of a supreme government, international society
remains a dynamic system in which states engage in a struggle for power
unrestrained by higher authority. The state, however, differs from other
social structures not only in its claim to sovereignty but also in the fact
that its organization is territorial. Survival for such a unit means preserving
* Address delivered before the joint session of the Association of American Geographers and the
American Political Science Association, New York, December 31, 1941.
Professor Spykman's book "America's Strategy in World Politics" was reviewed by Dr. Isaiah
Bowman in the Geographical Review for April, 1942.-EDIT. NOTE.
FRONTIERS AND SECURITY 437
B UFFER STATES
A unique type of dependence in that it combines protection with a
relatively high degree of independenceis that of the buffer state. Buffer
states are small political units located between large nations. They survive
because they separatestates that would otherwise be powerful neighbors
and becausethe attempt to conquer them would be met, not by the rela-
tively weak resistanceof the buffer, but by the much stronger opposition
of the other neighbor. From the point of view of the neighbor, the buffer,
as long as it remainsneutraland independent,performsa protectivefunction
similar to that of a fortified border zone, but on a larger scale and at con-
siderablyless expense.
The buffer state as a protective device is the result of a long historical
evolution. Its prototypes are the wastelandfrontier, the demilitarizedzone,
and the semi-independentborder state called the march that appearedin
the Middle Ages. In the long run, the small buffer state cannot, of course,
defend itself against the more powerful neighbors, but it can hold up an
invasion, gain time for the mobilization of the other neighbor, and offer
him an opportunityto fight a war without bringing devastationto his own
territory.
The intermediate state is particularlyvaluable as a protective border
zone if, because of topography, climate, or technologic backwardnessin
communication, it functions as a genuine barrier to troop movement.
Persia, Afghanistan,and Tibet are more effective obstaclesthan Mongolia
and Manchuria,and Switzerlandis topographicallya greater barrierthan
Belgium and Poland.
As time goes on, however, systems of communication will develop
even in the most backwardand the most mountainousregions, regardless
of attempts to delay progress and preserve the barrier characterof the
buffer state. When transportationdevelops, both neighbors will immedi-
FRONTIERS AND SECURITY 44I
ately attempt to control the system of communication and guide its con-
structionto their own strategicadvantage.The railroadhistory of Afghan-
istan, Persia, and Manchuria bears this out. The railroad history -of the
European buffer states seems at first sight to have been guided exclusively
by the demands of commerce, but strategic considerationshave by no
means been absent. When the buffer state, instead of being a barrier,be-
comes a military highway held by a weak power, temptation to control
this highway becomes almost irresistible.It may then seem safer to the
neighbors to incorporatethe intermediatestate into their own frontier de-
fense systems. When the opportunity presentsitself and one neighbor be-
comes strong enough to disregardthe objections of the other, the buffer
will disappear.The buffer state is, like the frontier, a line of demarcation
between territorialpower structures.In an area of contending forces, the
continued existence of a buffer, as well as the stability of a frontier, is an
indicationof a system of approximatelybalancedforces.
The same factors that have reduced the defensive value of the frontier
zone and border fortificationshave reduced the protective function of the
buffer state. In this respect, the new forms of warfarehave continued the
trend that began with the building of road systems and railroadnets. The
small state is becoming an easy passage instead of being an obstacle. In
I939 the German army moved through Belgium considerablyfaster than
in I9I4, and it looks as if small states were no longer in a position to resist
modern forms of warfare. Mechanized assaults can be stopped only by a
system of defense in depth, and the small state is by definition prevented
from creating such a system, even if it could financially afford the cost.
Still more significant is the lack of protection against aerial warfare. Bomb-
ing range is constantly expanding, and enemy squadrons can fly over small
buffer states almost as easily as over their own territory.
As has already been observed in connection with the development of
transportation in primitive regions, neighbors are apt to weaken in their
determination to respect and preserve the territorial integrity of buffers if
the latter lose their protective function. If this service were the only reason
for their survival, the future of small states would seem dark indeed. Ad-
miration for their glorious past and appreciation of the great contributions
they have made to culture and the life of the spirit would not be enough to
assure their survival. Fortunately, buffer states have endured not merely
because of the recognition of their positive protective value but also because
it has always seemed better to a nation to have the territory beyond its
442 THE GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW
pline, national fervor, and willingness to sacrifice and suffer, no nation can
survive in the struggle for power, even if it owns all the iron ore in the
world.
After due consideration has been paid to the intangibles in military
strength, there remain, nonetheless, a great many factors directly observ-
able in geographic terms, such as size, location, topography, climate, popu-
lation, arable land, and minerals. Geographers have attempted to set up
yardsticks for measuring actual and potential power relations, but none
have received wide acceptance. Wagner, for instance, developed an equation
for frontier pressure that divided the total population of the surrounding
countries by the length of the frontier. From the political point of view,
this equation produced rather meaningless results. It gave Great Britain no
frontier pressure at all and showed buffer states in a position of extreme
exposure, merely because Great Britain was an island and the buffers had
large neighbors. Griffith Taylor, in one of his early essays on "The Distri-
bution of Future White Settlement,"' devised a most ingenious yardstick
for measuring the ability of a given area to sustain a white population.
Methodologically, the problem of estimating this economic potential is not
different from that of estimating war potentials, and the formula is there-
fore of interest. It includes temperature, rainfall, altitude, and the coal re-
serves to a square mile of territory.
Finding an equation for measuring the power of states has not been
merely an academic pursuit of geographers. The Preparatory Disarmament
Conference in Geneva found itself enmeshed in the problem for several
years when it became necessary to decide what factors, other than the
direct military establishment, contributed to the war strength of nations.
That conference also was in search of security through balanced power,
and it realized that identical military establishments and equality in arma-
ment and number of divisions did not mean identical war strength and that
geographic location, vulnerability of frontiers, population, resources, length
and nature of maritime communications, and density and character of rail-
roads would all have to be taken into consideration to arrive at a true
equation of power. The problem the peacemakers will face is the reverse
of that which occupied the attention of the Preparatory Conference. The
latter was trying to express the power potential of a given piece of territory.
The future Peace Conference will have to delimit frontiers in order to
arrive at territories of a given power potential.