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American Geographical Society

Frontiers, Security, and International Organization


Author(s): Nicholas John Spykman
Source: Geographical Review, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Jul., 1942), pp. 436-447
Published by: American Geographical Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/210386 .
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FRONTIERS, SECURITY, AND INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION*
Nicholas John Spykman
Yale Uniiversity

TI lHERE will be peace after the war in which we are now engaged,
and in the organization of that peace the victors will remake the map
of the world. We can be certain that, if the German-Japanese alliance
is successful, our advice will not be sought; but, if the Allies win the final
battle, we as a nation will certainly have something to say about the "New
World Order." Notwithstanding the fervent hopes of many idealists, that
new order will probably not consist of a single superstate, and the peace-
makers will, therefore, be confronted with the same problems that faced
their predecessors at Paris and earlier conferences. Boundaries, territorial
security, and international organization will again be discussed, and, be-
cause of the fact that twenty-four political units have already disappeared
in the present conflict, it is likely that territorial security will receive special
consi'deration.
The problem of security is both geographic and political. It arises from
the existence of great inequalities in military strength between states that
live in an international community without international government. The
so-called "sovereign independence" of states, the absence of higher authority,
and the freedom from external restraint that characterize interstate relations
condition the problem. The international community does not guarantee
the member states either life, liberty, property, or the pursuit of happiness.
Whatever the paper provisions of international conventions may have
stipulated, each individual unit has continued to depend for its very exist-
ence, as well as for the enjoyment of its rights and the protection of its
interests, on its own strength or that of its protectors.
Because of this absence of a supreme government, international society
remains a dynamic system in which states engage in a struggle for power
unrestrained by higher authority. The state, however, differs from other
social structures not only in its claim to sovereignty but also in the fact
that its organization is territorial. Survival for such a unit means preserving
* Address delivered before the joint session of the Association of American Geographers and the
American Political Science Association, New York, December 31, 1941.
Professor Spykman's book "America's Strategy in World Politics" was reviewed by Dr. Isaiah
Bowman in the Geographical Review for April, 1942.-EDIT. NOTE.
FRONTIERS AND SECURITY 437

political independence and retaining control over a specific territory whose


limits are defined by an imaginary line called a "boundary." This geo-
graphic area is the territorial base from which the state operates in time of
war and the strategic position which- it occupies during the temporary
armistice called peace. The boundary is thus not only a line of demarcation
between legal systems but also a point of contact of territorial power struc-
tures. From the long-term point of view, the position of that line may
become an index to the power relations of the contending forces. Stability
then suggests an approximation to balanced power, and shifts indicate
changes in the relative strength of the neighbors, either through the accre-
tion of power by one or through a decline in the resistance of the other.
Viewed in this light, the problem of territorial security becomes a prob-
lem of neutralizing power differentials. Balancing the power of potential
aggressors has been attempted by three different methods. The individual
approach has been the most nearly universal. It involves the effort of states
to build, singlehanded, a system of national defense that will discourage
attack and parry the thrust if it comes. There have also been numerous
examples of bilateral cooperation between states for the purpose of achiev-
ing security. Alliances between equals are an old institution in international
relations, and there have always been cases of outright aid by strong states
to weaker ones. The third approach, usually called "collective security," is
of more recent origin. It consists of attempts to make the whole interna-
tional community responsible for the safety of the individual state. Although
advocated in earlier centuries, this method was not given institutional form
until the creation of the League of Nations at the end of the First World
War.
TERRITORIAL DEFENSE Is FRONTIER DEFENSE

Territorial defense remains the immediate responsibility of the govern-


ment of the individual state, even though it expects to receive aid from
allies or from the international community. The state must therefore create
out of all the elements at its disposal a military organization that will de-
fend it against invasion. In this task, frontiers assume a vital importance.
Topography, climate, and vegetation can be both aids and obstacles to troop
movement, and the search for the so-called "strategic frontier" has, there-
fore, long been the preoccupation of statesmen. In that search, the military
geographer has always been an indispensable adviser and guide.
Deserts, swamps, forests, and high mountain ranges have contributed
their barrier character to national defense, and maritime frontiers are even
43 8 THE GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW

today powerful obstaclesto invasion. Nevertheless,naturealone has almost


nowhere created impassable barriers.All the invasions into Egypt have
come through the hundred miles of desert on the Sinai Peninsula, and
all the land invasions into India have come over the Hindu Kush, one of
the highest and most difficult mountain chains in the world. Only when
the possibilitiesof the terrainare utilized in a system of artificialfortifica-
tion can any degree of securitybe achieved.Ideallysuch a system of frontier
defense should be strong enough to stop invasion and deny the enemy
penetration.But if it should prove impossible to keep the invading force
beyond the border,this does not mean that the frontierdefenseshave failed
in their purpose.Even if ground must be sacrificedand advancedpositions
surrendered,the frontier still performsits strategicfunction if it retardsthe
first onslaught and provides a barrierzone behind which the nation can
mobilize the full strengthof its economic and militaryresources.
The history of warfare is the history of the struggle for supremacy
between offensive and defensive weapons. This struggle has been reflected
vividly in the evolution of frontier fortifications.With every advance in
the destructive power of artillery and every lengthening of its effective
range, the frontier system has been forced to adjust itself to new threats
by digging deeper and deeper into the earth and building more and more
adequateprotection. In the long history of border fortificationsthat begins
with the stockadesand palisadesof primitivetribes,thereappearthe Chinese
and Persianwalls, the Roman Limes, feudal castles, the intricate defenses
of the seventeenth-centuryborder fortresses,the breastworksof Metz and
Verdun, and, finally, the Maginot and SiegfriedLines.Wood, earthenwalls,
brick, masonry, steel plates, and reinforced concrete have been successive
answersto the ever increasingdestructivepower of the offensive.
In the latest phase of this struggle the advantageseems to lie once again
with the offensive. The Germans have fashioned out of dive bombers,
tanks, shock troops, and motorized infantry a combination of great mo-
bility and striking power, with which they have pierced several frontiers
and conquered most of Europe. But much more important than the ex-
ploitation of the inherent possibilitiesof the tank and the substitutionof
dive bombing for artillery barrage is the introduction of large-scale air
operationsbehind the fighting lines. Tanks and short-rangedive bombers
used as thrustsagainstentrenchedpositionsdo not basicallychange the two-
dimensional characterof war. It is the operation of air power at points
far distant from the actual battle line that has made warfare truly three-
FRONTIERS AND SECURITY 439

dimensional.The "front"in the technicalsenseof the term has now dis-


appeared,and with it the safetyof the lines of supply.The protectionof
theserouteshas, of course,alwaysbeenthe constantconcernof the com-
mander,but the solutionof the problemwas, at leastin theory,relatively
simple.It meantpreventingthe front from being piercedand the flanks
from being turned.Under the new form of warfare,land forcescan no
longergive securityto the routesbetweenthe basezoneandthe battlefield.
Only air supremacycan guardthoselinesand guaranteethe flow of men
andmaterielnecessaryfor the conductof the war.
Three-dimensional warfarehasnot merelyproducednew threatsto the
lines of communicationwith the front. It has openedup possibilitiesfor
directphysicalassaulton the industrialbasisof the war effortand on the
morale of the civilian population. Frontierfortificationsare no hindrance
to large-scale bombing on the industrial heart of a country, nor can they
guard the civilian population against the wholesale destruction of life and
property.
That air power alone can force large states into submission is now be-
lieved only by a small group of experts of whom Major de Seversky is the
most convincing representative. More widely accepted is the theory that
the airplane, although the most powerful weapon in modern warfare,
achieves its best results as a member of a team, operating in conjunction
with sea power and land power. But even if it is granted that land opera-
tions are still necessary to successful warfare, it remains true, nonetheless,
that the frontier has lost a good deal of its significance as a protective element.
This is not because blitzkrieg tactics are less hampered by terrain or vege-
tation; on the contrary, mechanized and motorized divisions are much
more limited in action by topography and climate than old-fashioned in-
fantry and cavalry. But air power has become the decisive factor, and it
is no longer on the land but in the skies that victory is achieved. Whether
the terrain lends itself to the use of mechanized forces or demands infantry
shock troops, the decision will be gained by him who can establish air
superiority over the field of battle. Not forests and deserts in the border
zone, but great size, dispersed airfields, and decentralized industries are now
the important elements of strength. The possibility of a defense organized
in depth and an effective reply to aerial bombardment will be a greater de-
terrent to attack than the retarding effect of a mountain border or the
assumed impregnability of concrete fortifications behind flooded marshland.
Only large states are able to resist three-dimensional envelopment.
440 THE GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW

In the history of western civilization, as in that of the classicalworld,


the long-term historicaltrend seems to have been toward larger and larger
political units. Small states have neverthelesssurvived, in spite of marked
differentialsin power potential between themselves and their neighbors.
The explanationlies in part in the fact that their continued existence is of
strategic significanceto some larger state and that they are therefore not
dependent for their territorialsecurity solely on their own strength.They
can count on supportfrom third parties.

B UFFER STATES
A unique type of dependence in that it combines protection with a
relatively high degree of independenceis that of the buffer state. Buffer
states are small political units located between large nations. They survive
because they separatestates that would otherwise be powerful neighbors
and becausethe attempt to conquer them would be met, not by the rela-
tively weak resistanceof the buffer, but by the much stronger opposition
of the other neighbor. From the point of view of the neighbor, the buffer,
as long as it remainsneutraland independent,performsa protectivefunction
similar to that of a fortified border zone, but on a larger scale and at con-
siderablyless expense.
The buffer state as a protective device is the result of a long historical
evolution. Its prototypes are the wastelandfrontier, the demilitarizedzone,
and the semi-independentborder state called the march that appearedin
the Middle Ages. In the long run, the small buffer state cannot, of course,
defend itself against the more powerful neighbors, but it can hold up an
invasion, gain time for the mobilization of the other neighbor, and offer
him an opportunityto fight a war without bringing devastationto his own
territory.
The intermediate state is particularlyvaluable as a protective border
zone if, because of topography, climate, or technologic backwardnessin
communication, it functions as a genuine barrier to troop movement.
Persia, Afghanistan,and Tibet are more effective obstaclesthan Mongolia
and Manchuria,and Switzerlandis topographicallya greater barrierthan
Belgium and Poland.
As time goes on, however, systems of communication will develop
even in the most backwardand the most mountainousregions, regardless
of attempts to delay progress and preserve the barrier characterof the
buffer state. When transportationdevelops, both neighbors will immedi-
FRONTIERS AND SECURITY 44I

ately attempt to control the system of communication and guide its con-
structionto their own strategicadvantage.The railroadhistory of Afghan-
istan, Persia, and Manchuria bears this out. The railroad history -of the
European buffer states seems at first sight to have been guided exclusively
by the demands of commerce, but strategic considerationshave by no
means been absent. When the buffer state, instead of being a barrier,be-
comes a military highway held by a weak power, temptation to control
this highway becomes almost irresistible.It may then seem safer to the
neighbors to incorporatethe intermediatestate into their own frontier de-
fense systems. When the opportunity presentsitself and one neighbor be-
comes strong enough to disregardthe objections of the other, the buffer
will disappear.The buffer state is, like the frontier, a line of demarcation
between territorialpower structures.In an area of contending forces, the
continued existence of a buffer, as well as the stability of a frontier, is an
indicationof a system of approximatelybalancedforces.
The same factors that have reduced the defensive value of the frontier
zone and border fortificationshave reduced the protective function of the
buffer state. In this respect, the new forms of warfarehave continued the
trend that began with the building of road systems and railroadnets. The
small state is becoming an easy passage instead of being an obstacle. In
I939 the German army moved through Belgium considerablyfaster than
in I9I4, and it looks as if small states were no longer in a position to resist
modern forms of warfare. Mechanized assaults can be stopped only by a
system of defense in depth, and the small state is by definition prevented
from creating such a system, even if it could financially afford the cost.
Still more significant is the lack of protection against aerial warfare. Bomb-
ing range is constantly expanding, and enemy squadrons can fly over small
buffer states almost as easily as over their own territory.
As has already been observed in connection with the development of
transportation in primitive regions, neighbors are apt to weaken in their
determination to respect and preserve the territorial integrity of buffers if
the latter lose their protective function. If this service were the only reason
for their survival, the future of small states would seem dark indeed. Ad-
miration for their glorious past and appreciation of the great contributions
they have made to culture and the life of the spirit would not be enough to
assure their survival. Fortunately, buffer states have endured not merely
because of the recognition of their positive protective value but also because
it has always seemed better to a nation to have the territory beyond its
442 THE GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW

borderin the handsof a smallstatethanto haveit becomean integralpart


of a largemilitaryunit.Even if Belgiumcannotstemthe flood of German
mechanizeddivisionson theirway to Paris,it is stillbetterthatthey should
haveto starttheirjourneyat Aix-la-Chapelle thanat Mons.Germanbomb-
ing squadrons canfly over the Netherlandswith the greatestof ease,but it
is still betterfor GreatBritainthat theirairportsshouldbe nearMiinster
than nearRotterdam.This meansthat therecontinueto be good reasons
for defendingbufferstates.But if, in the war resultingfrom the defense,
the opponentis thoroughlydefeated,the reasonsfor restoringthe buffer
statemay not be as cogentas were thosefor defendingit. The advantages
of being able to basebombersnearerthe industrialcenterof the former
enemy and of obtainingextradepth for defensemay well outweighthe
advantages to be gainedfromthe restorationof an independentbuffer.But
even if, for other than strategicreasons,the formerbuffershouldbe re-
established, it is well to rememberthatit mustbe given adequatesizeand
strengthif, undermodernconditions,it is to performanyprotectivefunction
at all.
COLLECTIVE SECURITY

The peacemakers in Pariswho drewthe new mapof Europeat the end


of the FirstWorldWarproceededwith lavishhandto reversethe historical
trendtowardlargerpoliticalunits.Ethnicdemandswere permittedto set
asideall otherconsiderations,with the resultthatthereemergedin eastern
Europea whole seriesof smallstatesthatwere viablein neithera strategic,
an economic,or a politicalsense.Thatthe powerstructureof Europeafter
the Treatyof Versaillesrestedon a most precariousbalancewhich pre-
supposedthe continueddisarmament of Germanywas recognizedby only
a few people.But eventhey felt thatthiswouldcauseno difficultybecause
the newlycreatedsystemof collectivesecurityasincorporated in theLeague
of Nationswould compensatefor the inequalities in militarystrengthand
neutralizethe powerdifferentials.
Accordingto ArticleX of the Covenantof theLeague,everyindividual
state was entitledto protectionby the internationalcommunityagainst
aggressionor the threatof aggressionfrom otherstates.In practice,how-
ever, this right proved illusoryand the doctrineof collectivesecuritya
piousfraud.It hastakenthe failuresof the lastten yearsto demonstrate that
the Leaguesystemas envisagedby its founderscould not functionin the
existingpowerrelations.One weaknesslay in the discrepancy betweenthe
legalfictionof universalityandthe fact
political of regionalism.The League
FRONTIERS AND SECURITY 443
was supposedto compriseall the statesof the earth,andall memberswere
expectedto participatein the systemof collectivesecurity.This was an
expectationthat could not possiblybe fulfilled.Nationshad little interest
in the territorialsecurityof stateson far-awaycontinents,and distancere-
strictedthe possibilityof exertingeffectiverestraintson aggressors.The
nationsof Europefound it much easierto becomeconcernedaboutag-
gressionon theirown continentthanaboutattacksagainstthe sovereignty
of China,and, as the presentwar is demonstrating, the defenseof China
by Europeanpowersis a difficultundertaking.
In termsof the actualgeographicdistributionof power in the world,
the type of organizationthat the Leaguerepresented could not neutralize
the existingpower differentials.Sanctions,both economicand military,
were envisaged,but no organizedforce of the international community
was provided.Collectiveactiondepended,not on an international police
force, but on the ad hoccodperationof the individualstates.On the basis
of an inadequateunderstanding of the role of blockadein the war, much
was expectedof economicsanctionsthat were supposedto go into effect
moreor lessautomatically. It shouldhavebeenclearthat,if appliedalone,
they could be a deterrentonly when aggressorand defenderwere so well
matchedthat economic pressurewould determinethe outcome of the
struggle.Where thereis greatinequalityin militarystrengthand victory
will be easy and quick, the only conditionsunderwhich aggressionis
likely, they are useless.They did not saveEthiopia,and they would not
havesavedthe Netherlandsor Belgium.
Accordingto the Covenantof the League,militarysanctionswere to
takethe formof a collectiveundertaking in whichthe memberstateswere
to usetheirarmedforceson behalfof the international community.In case
of an outbreakof hostilities,the Leaguememberswere to meetin Geneva
and, after due deliberation,decide on the aggressor,createthe military
forceof the community,and work out a commonplanof action.Sucha
systemis obviouslyslow andcumbersome. Technicallythe problemof de-
a
fending stateagainstaggressionis not alteredby callingwar a "sanction"
anda war of coalitiona "systemof collectivesecurity."Whateverthe dif-
ferencesmay be from the legalandmoralpointsof view, the strategicand
logisticproblemsremainthe same.As a guaranteeof territorialsecurity,
the Leaguesystemis boundto be inefficientandmuchlesseffectivethanan
old-fashionedmilitaryalliance.In thesedays of blitzkriegand aerialwar-
fare,it cannotneutralizethe powerdifferentials betweenthe weakandthe
444 THE GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW

strong states with sufficientspeed to be a successfuldeterrent against ag-


gression. And what is more, collective security is least likely to go into
operation when it is most needed. When the aggressoris very strong and
the victim very weak, other small states will be hesitant to expose them-
selves to revenge by participatingin common action. Compensating for
power differentialsby meansof collective action is likeliestto succeedwhere
the differentialsare small and aggressionis therefore unlikely. This means
that a true system of collective securitydemandsfor its successan approxi-
mate equality of strengthamong member states.

GEOGRAPHY AND POWER POTENTIAL

The declining importance of topography as a protective barrier, the


limited usefulnessof buffer states under conditions of aerial warfare, and
the prerequisitesof a successfulsystem of collective securityall suggest that
the map makers of the postwar world should try to avoid as much as
possible great inequality in power potential and should try also to achieve
an international society composed of members of approximately equal
strength. The location of boundariesstill remains a task in which the aid
of the geographer is indispensable,but interest in the frontier is now no
longer in terms of the strategicvalue of the border zone but in terms of
the power potential of the territory it surrounds.The basic question thus
presentsitself: To what extent do geographicfactors determine the power
potential of a state, and what formula for power can be devised for the
guidanceof statesmenin their work on the map for the New World Order?
It needs only a moment's reflection on the history of the First World
War and on the courseof the presentconflictto realizethat militarystrength
depends on many factors not immediately related to soil and climate. It
took almost a whole world to defeat Germany in I9I8, and our so-called
"Have-Not" opponents seem once again to be winning the early rounds.
The great military strength of Germany is due in large measure to the
application of the best available intelligence, the most thoroughgoing re-
search, and the most complete and systematicplanning to the conduct of
war. The tank is a British product, the airplaneis a Yankee invention, and
fleets of station wagons are the normal motorized transportationof Ameri-
can suburbia.But it was the Germanswho developed out of such elements
the tools of mechanized warfare and devised the tactics to make them
formidable.There are other intangiblesequallyhardto measurethat greatly
influence the military effectivenessof states. Without -obedienceand disci-
FRONTIERS AND SECURITY 445

pline, national fervor, and willingness to sacrifice and suffer, no nation can
survive in the struggle for power, even if it owns all the iron ore in the
world.
After due consideration has been paid to the intangibles in military
strength, there remain, nonetheless, a great many factors directly observ-
able in geographic terms, such as size, location, topography, climate, popu-
lation, arable land, and minerals. Geographers have attempted to set up
yardsticks for measuring actual and potential power relations, but none
have received wide acceptance. Wagner, for instance, developed an equation
for frontier pressure that divided the total population of the surrounding
countries by the length of the frontier. From the political point of view,
this equation produced rather meaningless results. It gave Great Britain no
frontier pressure at all and showed buffer states in a position of extreme
exposure, merely because Great Britain was an island and the buffers had
large neighbors. Griffith Taylor, in one of his early essays on "The Distri-
bution of Future White Settlement,"' devised a most ingenious yardstick
for measuring the ability of a given area to sustain a white population.
Methodologically, the problem of estimating this economic potential is not
different from that of estimating war potentials, and the formula is there-
fore of interest. It includes temperature, rainfall, altitude, and the coal re-
serves to a square mile of territory.
Finding an equation for measuring the power of states has not been
merely an academic pursuit of geographers. The Preparatory Disarmament
Conference in Geneva found itself enmeshed in the problem for several
years when it became necessary to decide what factors, other than the
direct military establishment, contributed to the war strength of nations.
That conference also was in search of security through balanced power,
and it realized that identical military establishments and equality in arma-
ment and number of divisions did not mean identical war strength and that
geographic location, vulnerability of frontiers, population, resources, length
and nature of maritime communications, and density and character of rail-
roads would all have to be taken into consideration to arrive at a true
equation of power. The problem the peacemakers will face is the reverse
of that which occupied the attention of the Preparatory Conference. The
latter was trying to express the power potential of a given piece of territory.
The future Peace Conference will have to delimit frontiers in order to
arrive at territories of a given power potential.

I Geogr. Rev., Vol. I2, I922, pp. 375 -402.


446 THE GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW

That no specificequation found generalacceptanceat the Disarmament


Conferenceand no geographer'sformula widespreadadherencein academic
circles does not minimize the fact that there is pretty wide agreement on
the factors that influence military strength. It is, however, only after one
has attemptedto draw boundariesfor statesof approximatelyequal strength
according to any one of half a dozen formulas that the basic difficulty of
the problem becomes manifest. It would almost seem as if the geographic
distribution of power factors did not favor that kind of equality. High
agrarianpotentials in terms of temperate climatic zones with more than
20 inches of rainfall are found only in limited regions in eastern North
America, western Europe, and the Far East. High industrialpotentials in
terms of iron ore, coal, and other energy resourcesare even more concen-
trated. Energy in terms of man power is closely related to the agrarian
potential;in terms of water power, it is a function of rainfall,evaporation,
and topography; and in terms of coal, it is localized in areas that are ex-
ceedingly small compared with the total earth surface.The distributionof
energy factorsin terms of oil resourcescreateseven more difficultproblems.
The workable oil depositsof the world seem to be concentratedin regions
marginalto the three middle seas, the European,the Australasian,and the
AmericanMediterraneans.Significantas these regions are for the industrial
life of the twentieth century, they are themselveswithout other industrial
resources,and they can, therefore, serve only as tributaryeconomic zones
to the industrialregions in Europe, North America, and the FarEast.
It is doubtful whether a shift in the metallic base of our civilization, a
change from an iron age to an age of light metal, would considerably
rearrangethe centers of power in the world. Aluminum is made from
bauxite not at the geographicsourcesof the raw materialbut at the centers
of cheap energy in terms of coal and water power. New processeswill un-
doubtedly be developed eventuallyfor making this metal out of clays more
widely distributedthan bauxite. But unlessthe new pr( cessesdispensewith
the need for large energy resources, they will not lead to a geographic
redistributionof industrialcenters.
To constructout of the presentgeographicdistributionof power factors
an internationalsociety consisting of a great many statesof approximately
equal power seems thereforea practicalimpossibility. This does not mean
that the future peacemakersshould not devote a great deal more attention
to the geography of power than their predecessorsin Parisdid, but it does
suggest that a simple geographic solution of the problem of world peace
FRONTIERS AND SECURITY 447

is no more likely than a simple legal solution. We can probably do better


than last time, but even our best will leave power differentialsbetween
individual units, and the problem of territorial security will, therefore,
remain.The geographerhas a greaterknowledge of boundariesand a better
understandingof bufferstates,and the political scientisthas a bettercompre-
hension of the working of internationalorganization.Together they should
be able to formulatelegal provisionsfor sanctionsthat harmonizewith the
distribution of power. The contributions of frontiers, buffer states, and
internationalorganization to territorialsecurity can be better integrated,
but no treaty, even though perfect, can assurea permanentpeace. It is no
more possible to draw a lasting map of an internationalorder than it is to
draw an immutableconstitutionfor the conduct of nationallife.
In a dynamic world in which forces shift and ideas change, no legal
structurecan remain acceptablefor any length of time. Preserving order
within the state is not a question of designing once and for all the final and
permanentsolution of all problemsbut a questionof making daily decisions
that will adjust human frictions, balance social forces, and compromise
political conflicts. It involves deciding ever anew in the light of changing
circumstanceswhat should be preservedand what should be changed. Pre-
serving order in the internationalsociety is a problem of the same nature.
It demandsall the skill and artistryof the political expert. The scholarcan
elucidate the lessons of history, but only the statesmanin his day-to-day
conduct of the affairsof nations can make treatieswork and international
institutions function.

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