438 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
464, JULY 28, 2005 439
Calacala vs. Republic
G.R. No. 154415. July 28, 2005.*
GASPAR CALACALA, BALTAZAR CALACALA, MELCHOR
CALACALA, SOLOMON CALACALA, FELICIDAD
CALACALA, PETRONILA CALACALA and SALOME
CALACALA, petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by the Solicitor General, and
SHERIFF JUAN C. MARQUEZ, respondents.
Civil Law; Indispensable Requisites for an Action to
Quiet Title to Prosper.—For an action to quiet title to
prosper, two (2) indispensable requisites must concur,
namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an
equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of
the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be
shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima
facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.
Same; Same; Redemption; The expiration of the 1-year
redemption period forecloses the obligor’s right to redeem and
that the sale thereby becomes absolute, the issuance
thereafter of a final deed of sale is at its best a mere formality
and mere confirmation of the title that is already vested in
the purchaser.—With the rule that the expiration of the 1-
year redemption period forecloses the obligor’s right to
redeem and that the sale thereby becomes absolute, the
issuance thereafter of a final deed of sale is at best a mere
formality and mere confirmation of the title that is already
vested in the purchaser. As this Court has said in Manuel
vs. Philippine National Bank, et al.: Note must be taken of
the fact that under the Rules of Court the expiration of that
one-year period forecloses the owner’s right to redeem, thus
making the sheriff’s sale absolute. The issuance
thereafter of a final deed of sale becomes a mere
formality, an act merely confirmatory of the title that
is already in the purchaser and constituting official
evidence of that fact.
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
439
SUPREME VOL.
COURT Calacala vs. Republic
REPORTS
ANNOTAT PETITION for review on certiorari of the resolution and
order of the Regional Trial Court of Rosales, Pangasinan, Br.
ED
53.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Simplicio M. Sevilleja for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for the People.
GARCIA, J.:
In this appeal by way of a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioners urge us to
annul and set aside the resolution dated 31 October 2001
and the order dated 2 July 2002 of the Regional Trial Court
at Rosales, Pangasinan which respectively dismissed
petitioners’ complaint in Civil Case No. 1239-R and denied
their motion for reconsideration.
The material facts are not at all disputed:
The spouses Camilo Calacala and Conchita Calacala,
predecessors-in-interest of the herein petitioners, are the
registered owners of a parcel of land situated at Barangay
Balincanaway, Rosales, Pangasinan and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-21204 of the Registry of Deeds of
Pangasinan.
To secure the provisional release of an accused in a
criminal case then pending before the then Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Pangasinan, the spouses offered their
aforementioned parcel of land as a property bond in said
case. For failure of the accused to appear at his scheduled
arraignment on 4 November 1981, the CFI ordered the bond
forfeited in favor of the government, and, following the
bondman’s failure to produce in court the body of the
accused, rendered judgment against the bond in the amount
of P3,500.00. Thereafter, the court issued a Writ of
Execution1 directing the provincial
_______________
1 Rollo, p. 46.
440
440 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
 Calacala vs. Republic
sheriff to effect a levy on the subject parcel of land and to
sell the same at a public auction to satisfy the amount of the
bond. In compliance with the writ, the deputy provincial
sheriff issued on 26 July 1982 a Notice of Levy2 addressed to
the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan who, on 19 August
1982, caused the annotation thereof on TCT No. T-21204 as
Entry No. 83188.
Not long thereafter, a public auction of the subject parcel
of land was held on 24 September 1982, at which respondent
Republic submitted its bid for P3,500, which is the amount
of the judgment on the bond. Hence, on that same day, a
Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale3 was issued in favor of the
Republic as the winning bidder.
On 5 October 1982, the same Certificate of Sale was
registered and annotated on TCT No. T-21204 as Entry No.
83793, thereby giving the spouses Calacala a period of one
(1) year therefrom within which to redeem their property.
Unfortunately, they never did up to the time of their
respective deaths on 13 January 1988 and 8 January 1994.
Claiming ownership of the same land as legal heirs of the
deceased spouses, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial
Court at Rosales, Pangasinan a complaint4 for Quieting of
Title and Cancellation of Encumbrance on TCT No. T-
21204 against respondents Republic and Sheriff Juan C.
Marquez. In their complaint, docketed as Civil Case No.
1239-R and raffled to Branch 53 of the court, petitioners
prayed, inter alia, for the cancellation of Entries No. 83188
and 83793 on TCT No. T-21204 or the declaration of said
entries as null and void.
To the complaint, respondent Republic interposed
a Motion to Dismiss5 grounded on the (1) complaint’s failure
to state a
VOL. 464, JULY 28, 2005
Calacala vs. Republic
cause of action and (2) prescription of petitioners’ right to
redeem.
In their Opposition,6 petitioners contend that when
respondent Republic moved to dismiss the complaint for
failure to state a cause of action, it thereby hypothetically
admitted all the allegations therein, specifically the
averment that despite the lapse of nineteen (19) years,
respondent did not secure the necessary Certificate of Final
Sale and Writ of Possession and failed to execute an
Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership. Petitioners thus
submit that the Republic’s rights over the land in question
had either prescribed, been abandoned or waived. They add
that by filing a motion to dismiss, respondent Republic
likewise admitted the allegation in the same complaint that
petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest have been in
continuous possession of the subject land and paying the
realty taxes thereon.
In the herein assailed resolution7 dated 31 October 2001,
the trial court granted the Republic’s motion to dismiss and
accordingly dismissed petitioners’ complaint. Petitioners
moved for a reconsideration but their motion was denied by
the same court in its equally challenged order 8 of 2 July
2002.
Hence, petitioners’ present recourse, it being their
contentions that—
I.
THE INSTANT COMPLAINT FOR QUIETING OF TITLE
AND CANCELLATION OF ENCUMBRANCE ON TCT NO.
T-21204, FILED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT, RGIONAL
[sic] TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 53, ROSALES,
PANGASINAN WAS THE PROPER REMEDY.
II.
THE COMPLAINT STATES SUFFICIENT CAUSE OF
ACTION.
442 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Calacala vs. Republic
III.
441
THE CASE FOR QUIETING OF TITLE HAS NOT
PRESCRIBED.
IV.
AND THE RESPONDENT REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES HAS NOT PERFECTED ITS TITLE TO THE
LAND IN QUESTION.
In the main, it is petitioners’ submission that their
complaint a quo sufficiently states a cause of action because
they are still the owners of the subject parcel of land despite
their failure to redeem it within the 1-year redemption
period. They premise their argument on the Republic’s
failure to secure the Certificate of Final Sale, execute an
Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and obtain a writ of
possession over the same property within ten (10) years from
the registration of the Certificate of Sale on 5 October 1982.
Prescinding therefrom, they thus argue that the Republic’s
right over the property in question has already prescribed or
has been abandoned and waived, citing, in support thereof,
Article 1142 of the Civil Code. In short, it is petitioners’
thesis that respondent Republic failed to perfect its title.
On the other hand, it is respondent’s posture that its
rights and title as owner of the same property are already
perfected by the mere failure of petitioners and/or their
predecessors-in-interest to redeem the same within one (1)
year from the registration/annotation of the Sheriff’s
Certificate of Sale on TCT No. T-21204, in accordance with
Section 33, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
As we see it, the only question which commends itself for
our resolution is whether the trial court’s dismissal of
petitioners’ complaint for Quieting of Title was proper. It
thus behooves us to determine if, in the first place,
petitioners have a cause of action in their complaint.
We rule for respondent Republic.
443
VOL. 464, JULY 28, 2005
Calacala vs. Republic
To begin with, it bears emphasis that an action for quieting
of title is essentially a common law remedy grounded on
equity. As we held in Baricuatro, Jr. vs. CA:9
Regarding the nature of the action filed before the trial
court, quieting of title is a common law remedy for the
removal of any cloud upon or doubt or uncertainty with
respect to title to real property. Originating in equity
jurisprudence, its purpose is to secure ‘x x x an adjudication
that a claim of title to or an interest in property, adverse to
that of the complainant, is invalid, so that the complainant
and those claiming under him may be forever afterward free
from any danger of hostile claim.’ In an action for quieting of
title, the competent court is tasked to determine the
respective rights of the complainant and other claimants, ‘x
x x not only to place things in their proper place, to make the
one who has no rights to said immovable respect and not
disturb the other, but also for the benefit of both, so that he
who has the right would see every cloud of doubt over the
property dissipated, and he could afterwards without
fear introduce the improvements he may desire, to use, and
even to abuse the property as he deems best x x x (Italics
supplied).
Under Article 476 of the New Civil Code, the remedy may be
availed of only when, by reason of any instrument, record,
claim, encumbrance or proceeding, which appears valid but
is, in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable or unenforceable, a
cloud is thereby cast on the complainant’s title to real
property or any interest therein. The codal provision reads:
Article 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real
property or any interest therein, by reason of any
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which
is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact
invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be
prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove
such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from
being cast upon title to real property or any interest therein.
444 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Calacala vs. Republic
443 In turn, Article 477 of the same Code identifies the party
who may bring an action to quiet title, thus:
Article 477. The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title
to, or interest in the real property which is the subject-
matter of the action. He need not be in possession of said
property.
It can thus be seen that for an action for quieting of title to
prosper, the plaintiff must first have a legal, or, at least, an
equitable title on the real property subject of the action and
that the alleged cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact
invalid. So it is that in Robles, et al. vs. CA,10 we ruled:
It is essential for the plaintiff or complainant to have a legal
title or an equitable title to or interest in the real property
which is the subject matter of the action. Also, the deed,
claim, encumbrance or proceeding that is being alleged as a
cloud on plaintiff’s title must be shown to be in fact invalid
or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity
or legal efficacy.
Verily, for an action to quiet title to prosper, two (2)
indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the
plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or
interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the
deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be
casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid
or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity
or legal efficacy.
Unfortunately, the foregoing requisites are wanting in
this case.
To start with, petitioners base their claim of legal title
not on the strength of any independent writing in their favor
but simply and solely on respondent Republic’s failure to
secure the Certificate of Final Sale, execute an Affidavit of
Consolidation of Ownership and obtain a writ of possession
over the property in dispute within ten (10) years from the
registration of the Certificate of Sale.
_______________
10 384 Phil. 635, 647; 328 SCRA 97, 108 (2000).
445
VOL. 464, JULY 28, 2005
Calacala vs. Republic
Petitioners’ reliance on the foregoing shortcomings or
inactions of respondent Republic cannot stand.
For one, it bears stressing that petitioners’ predecessors-
in-interest lost whatever right they had over land in
question from the very moment they failed to redeem it
during the 1-year period of redemption. Certainly, the
Republic’s failure to execute the acts referred to by the
petitioners within ten (10) years from the registration of the
Certificate of Sale cannot, in any way, operate to restore
whatever rights petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest had
over the same. For sure, petitioners have yet to cite any
provision of law or rule of jurisprudence, and we are not
aware of any, to the effect that the failure of a buyer in a
foreclosure sale to secure a Certificate of Final Sale, execute
an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and obtain a writ
of possession over the property thus acquired, within ten
(10) years from the registration of the Certificate of Sale will
operate to bring ownership back to him whose property has
been previously foreclosed and sold. As correctly observed by
the trial court, the Republic’s failure to do anything within
ten (10) years or more following the registration of the
Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale cannot give rise to a presumption
that it has thereby waived or abandoned its right of
ownership or that it has prescribed, “for prescription does
not lie against the government”, nor could it “be bound or
estopped by the negligence or mistakes of its officials and
employees.”
Quite the contrary, Section 33,11 Rule 39 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly provides that “[u]pon the
expira-
_______________
11“SECTION 33. Deed and possession to be given at
expiration of redemption period; by whom executed or
given.—If no redemption be made within one (1) year from
the date of the registration of the certificate of sale, the
purchaser is entitled to a conveyance and possession of the
property; or, if so redeemed whenever sixty (60) days have
elapsed and no other redemption has been made, and notice
thereof given, and the time for redemption has expired, the
last redemptioner is entitled to the conveyance and
possession; but
445
446
446 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Calacala vs. Republic
tion of the right of redemption, the purchaser or redemptioner
shall be substituted to and acquire all the rights, title,
interest and claim of the judgment obligor to the property as
of the time of the levy.”
Concededly, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was yet in-
existent when the facts of this case transpired. Even then,
the application thereof to this case is justified by our
pronouncement in Lascano vs. Universal Steel Smelting Co.,
Inc., et al.,12 to wit:
Procedural laws are construed to be applicable to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, and
are deemed retroactive in that sense and to that extent. As a
general rule, the retroactive application of procedural laws
cannot be considered violative of any personal rights because
no vested right may attach to nor arise therefrom.
Moreover, with the rule that the expiration of the 1-year
redemption period forecloses the obligor’s right to redeem
and that the sale thereby becomes absolute, the issuance
thereafter of a final deed of sale is at best a mere formality
and mere confirmation of the title that is already vested in
the pur-
_______________
in all cases the judgment obligor shall have the entire
period of one (1) year from the date of the registration of sale
to redeem the property. The deed shall be executed by the
officer making the sale or by his successor in office, and in
the latter case shall have the same validity as though the
officer making the sale had continued in office and executed
it.
Upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the
purchaser or redemptioner shall be substituted to
and acquire all the rights, title, interest and claim of
the judgment obligor to the property as of the time of
the levy. The possession of the property shall be given to
the purchaser or last redemptioner by the same officer
unless a third party is actually holding the property
adversely to the judgment obligor.” (Emphasis supplied).
12 431 SCRA 248, 253 (2004) citing San Luis vs. Court of
Appeals, 365 SCRA 279, 285 (2001).
447
VOL. 464, JULY 28, 2005
Calacala vs. Republic
chaser. As this Court has said in Manuel vs. Philippine
National Bank, et al.:13
Note must be taken of the fact that under the Rules of Court
the expiration of that one-year period forecloses the owner’s
right to redeem, thus making the sheriff’s sale absolute. The
issuance thereafter of a final deed of sale becomes a
mere formality, an act merely confirmatory of the
title that is already in the purchaser and constituting
official evidence of that fact. (Emphasis supplied)
With the reality that petitioners are not holders of any legal
title over the property subject of this case and are bereft of
any equitable claim thereon, the very first requisite of an
action to quiet title, i.e., that the plaintiff or complainant has
a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property
subject matter of the action, is miserably wanting in this
case.
For another, and worse, petitioners never put in issue, as
in fact they admit in their pleadings, the validity of the
Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale duly registered on 5 October
1982. On this score, the second requisite of an action to quiet
title, namely, that the deed, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding alleged to cast cloud on a plaintiff’s title is in fact
invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of
validity or legal efficacy, is likewise absent herein.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the
assailed resolution and order of the trial court AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban (Chairman), Sandoval-
Gutierrez, Corona and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
Petition denied, assailed resolution and order affirmed.
_______________
13 101 Phil. 968, 971 (1957).
448
448 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
White Gold Marine Services, Inc. vs. Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation
Note.—The right of redemption over property sold on
execution may be exercised within twelve (12) months from
447 the date of registration of the certificate of sale. (Villanueva
vs. Malaya, 330 SCRA 278 [2000])
——o0o——

540
Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 152766. June 20, 2003.*
LILIA SANCHEZ, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
VICTORINO S. ALVARO as Presiding Judge, RTC-Br. 120, Caloocan City,
and VIRGINIA TERIA, respondents.
Civil Procedure; Actions; Pleadings and
Practice; Certiorari; Grounds; Where the issuance of the extraordinary writ
is also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or the Regional Trial
Court, it is either of these courts that the specific action for the procurement
of the writ must be presented.—Where the issuance of the extraordinary
writ is also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or the Regional
Trial Court, it is either of these courts that the specific action for the
procurement of the writ must be presented. However, this Court must be
convinced thor-
VOL. 404, JUNE 20, 2003 541
Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals
oughly that two (2) grounds exist before it gives due course to
a certiorari petition under Rule 65: (a) The tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction; and (b) There is no appeal nor any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Rules of Procedure; Liberal
Construction; Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on their
merits and not on mere technicalities.—The rules of procedure should be
viewed as mere tools designed to aid the courts in the speedy, just and
inexpensive determination of the cases before them. Liberal construction
of the rules and the pleadings is the controlling principle to effect
substantial justice. Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on
their merits and not on mere technicalities.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Rules must not be applied
rigidly so as not to override substantial justice.—The emerging trend in
the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from
the constraints of technicalities. Time and again, this Court has
consistently held that rules must not be applied rigidly so as not to
override substantial justice.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Aside from matters of life,
liberty, honor or property which would warrant the suspension of the Rules
of the most mandatory character, other elements should be considered.—
Aside from matters of life, liberty, honor or property which would warrant
the suspension of the Rules of the most mandatory character and an
examination and review by the appellate court of the lower court’s findings
of fact, the other elements that should be considered are the following: (a)
the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (b) the merits of the
case, (c) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the
party favored by the suspension of the rules, (d) a lack of any showing that
the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (e) the other party
will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.
Attorneys; Duties; Negligence; There should be no dispute regarding
the doctrine that normally notice to counsel is notice to parties.— There
should be no dispute regarding the doctrine that normally notice to
counsel is notice to parties, and that such doctrine has beneficent effects
upon the prompt dispensation of justice. Its application to a given case,
however, should be looked into and adopted, according to the surrounding
circumstances; otherwise, in the court’s desire to make a short-cut of the
proceedings, it might foster, wittingly or unwittingly, dangerous collusions
to the detriment of justice. It would then be easy for one lawyer to sell
one’s rights down the river, by just alleging that he just forgot every pro-
542
5 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
42
Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals
cess of the court affecting his clients, because he was so busy. Under
this circumstance, one should not insist that a notice to such irresponsible
lawyer is also a notice to his clients.
Civil Law; Co-ownership; Definition.—Sanchez Roman defines co-
ownership as “the right of common dominion which two or more persons
have in a spiritual part of a thing, not materially or physically divided.”
Manresa defines it as the “manifestation of the private right of ownership,
which instead of being exercised by the owner in an exclusive manner over
the things subject to it, is exercised by two or more owners and the
undivided thing or right to which it refers is one and the same.”
Same; Same; Characteristics; Co-ownership has the following
characteristics.—The characteristics of co-ownership are: (a) plurality of
subjects, who are the co-owners, (b) unity of or material indivision, which
means that there is a single object which is not materially divided, and
which is the element which binds the subjects, and, (c) the recognition of
ideal shares, which determines the rights and obligations of the co-owners.
Same; Same; Nature; In co-ownership, the relationship of such co-
owner to the other co-owners is fiduciary in character and attribute.—In co-
ownership, the relationship of such co-owner to the other co-owners is
fiduciary in character and attribute. Whether established by law or by
agreement of the co-owners, the property or thing held pro-indiviso is
impressed with a fiducial nature so that each co-owner becomes a trustee
for the benefit of his co-owners and he may not do any act prejudicial to
the interest of his co-owners. Thus, the legal effect of an agreement to
preserve the properties in co-ownership is to create an express trust
among the heirs as co-owners of the properties. Co-ownership is a form of
trust and every co-owner is a trustee for the others.
Same; Same; Co-owners; Rights; He may validly lease his undivided
interest to a third party independently of the other co-owners.—Article 493
of the Civil Code gives the owner of an undivided interest in the property
the right to freely sell and dispose of it, i.e., his undivided interest. He may
validly lease his undivided interest to a third party independently of the
other co-owners. But he has no right to sell or alienate a concrete, specific
or determinate part of the thing owned in common because his right over
the thing is represented by a quota or ideal portion without any physical
adjudication.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Noel S. Sorreda for petitioner.
543
VOL. 404, JUNE 20, 2003 543
Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals
Felizardo M. Mercado for respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is a Special Civil Action for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court to annul and set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23
May 2001 as well as its Resolution dated 8 January 2002 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 59182.
Lilia Sanchez, petitioner, constructed a house on a 76-square meter lot
owned by her parents-in-law. The lot was registered under TCT No.
263624 with the following co-owners: Eliseo Sanchez married to Celia
Sanchez, Marilyn Sanchez married to Nicanor Montalban, Lilian Sanchez,
widow, Nenita Sanchez, single, Susana Sanchez married to Fernando
Ramos, and Felipe Sanchez.1 On 20 February 1995, the lot was registered
under TCT No. 289216 in the name of private respondent Virginia Teria
by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale supposed to have been executed on 23
June 19952 by all six (6) co-owners in her favor.3 Petitioner claimed that
she did not affix her signature on the document and subsequently refused
to vacate the lot, thus prompting private respondent Virginia Teria to file
an action for recovery of possession of the aforesaid lot with the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Caloocan City sometime in September
1995, subsequently raffled to Br. 49 of that court.
On 12 February 1998, the MeTC-Br. 49 of Caloocan City ruled in favor
of private respondent declaring that the sale was valid only to the extent
of 5/6 of the lot and the other 1/6 remaining as the property of petitioner,
on account of her signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale having been
established as a forgery.
Petitioner then elevated her appeal to the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City, subsequently assigned to Br. 120, which ordered the
parties to file their respective memoranda of appeal. Counsel for petitioner
did not comply with this order, nor even inform her of the developments in
her case. Petitioner not having filed any pleading with the RTC of
Caloocan City, the trial court affirmed the 27 July 1998 decision of the
MeTC.
544 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals
On 4 November 1998, the MeTC issued an order for the issuance of a writ
of execution in favor of private respondent Virginia Teria, buyer of the
property. On 4 November 1999 or a year later, a Notice to Vacate was
served by the sheriff upon petitioner who however refused to heed
the Notice.
On 28 April 1999 private respondent started demolishing petitioner’s
house without any special permit of demolition from the court.
Due to the demolition of her house which continued until 24 May 1999
petitioner was forced to inhabit the portion of the premises that used to
serve as the house’s toilet and laundry area.
On 29 October 1999 petitioner filed her Petition for Relief from
Judgment with the RTC on the ground that she was not bound by the
inaction of her counsel who failed to submit petitioner’s appeal
memorandum. However the RTC denied the Petition and the subsequent
Motion for Reconsideration.
On 14 June 2000 petitioner filed her Petition for Certiorari with the
Court of Appeals alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
court a quo.
On 23 May 2001 the appellate court dismissed the petition for lack of
merit. On 18 June 2001 petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but
the Court of Appeals denied the motion in its Resolution of 8 January
2002.
The only issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals committed
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the challenged case before it.
As a matter of policy, the original jurisdiction of this Court to issue the
so-called extraordinary writs should generally be exercised relative to
actions or proceedings before the Court of Appeals or before constitutional
or other tribunals or agencies the acts of which for some reason or other
are not controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the issuance of the
extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the Court of Appeals
or the Regional Trial Court, it is either of these courts that the specific
action for the procurement of the writ must be presented. However, this
Court must be convinced thoroughly that two (2) grounds exist before it
gives due course to a certiorari petition under Rule 65: (a) The tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction;
545
VOL. 404, JUNE 20, 2003 545
Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals
and (b) There is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.
Despite the procedural lapses present in this case, we are giving due
course to this petition as there are matters that require immediate
resolution on the merits to effect substantial justice.
The Rules of Court should be liberally construed in order to promote
their object of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every
action or proceeding.4
The rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to aid
the courts in the speedy, just and inexpensive determination of the cases
before them. Liberal construction of the rules and the pleadings is the
controlling principle to effect substantial justice. 5 Litigations should, as
much as possible, be decided on their merits and not on mere
technicalities.6
Verily, the negligence of petitioner’s counsel cannot be deemed as
negligence of petitioner herself in the case at bar. A notice to a lawyer who
appears to have been unconscionably irresponsible cannot be considered
as notice to his client.7 Under the peculiar circumstances of this case, it
appears from the records that counsel was negligent in not adequately
protecting his client’s interest, which necessarily calls for a liberal
construction of the Rules.
The rationale for this approach is explained in Ginete v. Court of
Appeals—8
This Court may suspend its own rules or exempt a particular case from its
operation where the appellate court failed to obtain jurisdiction over the
case owing to appellant’s failure to perfect an appeal. Hence, with more
reason would this Court suspend its own rules in cases where the
appellate court has already obtained jurisdiction over the appealed case.
This prerogative to relax procedural rules of the most mandatory charac-
_______________
546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals
ter in terms of compliance, such as the period to appeal has been invoked
and granted in a considerable number of cases x x x x
Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as
mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and
rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to
frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect this principle. The power to
suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to
alter even that which this Court itself has already declared to be final, as
we are now constrained to do in the instant case x x x x
The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party
litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of
his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. Time and again, this
Court has consistently held that rules must not be applied rigidly so as not
to override substantial justice.
Aside from matters of life, liberty, honor or property which would warrant
the suspension of the Rules of the most mandatory character and an
examination and review by the appellate court of the lower court’s findings
of fact, the other elements that should be considered are the following: (a)
the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (b) the merits of the
case, (c) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the
party favored by the suspension of the rules, (d) a lack of any showing that
the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (e) the other party
will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.9
The suspension of the Rules is warranted in this case since the
procedural infirmity was not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of petitioner. Besides, substantial justice requires that we go
into the merits of the case to resolve the present controversy that was
brought about by the absence of any partition agreement among the
parties who were co-owners of the subject lot in question. Hence, giving
due course to the instant petition shall put an end to the dispute on the
property held in common.
In People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation v. Tiongco 10 we held:
VOL. 404, JUNE 20, 2003 547
Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals
There should be no dispute regarding the doctrine that normally notice to
counsel is notice to parties, and that such doctrine has beneficent effects
upon the prompt dispensation of justice. Its application to a given case,
however, should be looked into and adopted, according to the surrounding
circumstances; otherwise, in the court’s desire to make a shortcut of the
proceedings, it might foster, wittingly or unwittingly, dangerous collusions
to the detriment of justice. It would then be easy for one lawyer to sell
one’s rights down the river, by just alleging that he just forgot every
process of the court affecting his clients, because he was so busy. Under
this circumstance, one should not insist that a notice to such irresponsible
lawyer is also a notice to his clients.
Thus, we now look into the merits of the petition.
This case overlooks a basic yet significant principle of civil law: co-
ownership. Throughout the proceedings from the MeTC to the Court of
Appeals, the notion of co-ownership11 was not sufficiently dealt with. We
attempt to address this controversy in the interest of substantial
justice. Certiorari should therefore be granted to cure this grave abuse of
discretion.
Sanchez Roman defines co-ownership as “the right of common
dominion which two or more persons have in a spiritual part of a thing,
not materially or physically divided.12 Manresa defines it as the
“manifestation of the private right of ownership, which instead of being
exercised by the owner in an exclusive manner over the things subject to
it, is exercised by two or more owners and the undivided thing or right to
which it refers is one and the same.”13
The characteristics of co-ownership are: (a) plurality of subjects, who
are the co-owners, (b) unity of or material indivision, which means that
there is a single object which is not materially divided, and which is the
element which binds the subjects, and, (c) the recognition of ideal shares,
which determines the rights and obligations of the co-owners.14
548 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals
In co-ownership, the relationship of such co-owner to the other co-owners
is fiduciary in character and attribute. Whether established by law or by
agreement of the co-owners, the property or thing held pro-indiviso is
impressed with a fiducial nature so that each co-owner becomes a trustee
for the benefit of his co-owners and he may not do any act prejudicial to
the interest of his co-owners.15
Thus, the legal effect of an agreement to preserve the properties in co-
ownership is to create an express trust among the heirs as co-owners of
the properties. Co-ownership is a form of trust and every co-owner is a
trustee for the others.16
Before the partition of a land or thing held in common, no individual or
co-owner can claim title to any definite portion thereof. All that the co-
owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the
entire land or thing.17
Article 493 of the Civil Code gives the owner of an undivided interest
in the property the right to freely sell and dispose of it, i.e., his undivided
interest. He may validly lease his undivided interest to a third party
independently of the other co-owners.18 But he has no right to sell or
alienate a concrete, specific or determinate part of the thing owned in
common because his right over the thing is represented by a quota or ideal
portion without any physical adjudication.19
Although assigned an aliquot but abstract part of the property, the
metes and bounds of petitioner’s lot has not been designated. As she was
not a party to the Deed of Absolute Sale voluntarily entered into by the
other co-owners, her right to 1/6 of the property must be respected.
Partition needs to be effected to protect her right to her definite share and
determine the boundaries of her property. Such partition must be done
without prejudice to the
VOL. 404, JUNE 20, 2003 549
Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals
rights of private respondent Virginia Teria as buyer of the 5/6 portion of
the lot under dispute.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 23 May 2001 as well as its Resolution dated 8 January 2002
in CA-G.R. SP No. 59182 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. A survey of the
questioned lot with TCT No. 289216 (formerly TCT No. 263624) by a duly
licensed geodetic engineer and the PARTITION of the aforesaid lot are
ORDERED.
Let the records of this case be REMANDED to MeTC-Br. 49, Caloocan
City to effect the aforementioned survey and partition, as well as
segregate the 1/6 portion appertaining to petitioner Lilia Sanchez.
The Deed of Absolute Sale by the other co-owners to Virginia Teria
shall be RESPECTED insofar as the other undivided 5/6 portion of the
property is concerned.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-
Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo,
Sr. and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Austria-Martinez, J., On official leave.
Petition granted, judgment annulled and set aside. Partition ordered.
Note.—A co-owner has full ownership of his pro indiviso share and has
the right to alienate, assign or mortgage it, and substitute another person
in its enjoyment. (Del Campo vs. Court of Appeals, 351 SCRA 1 [2001])
114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
De Guia vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 120864. October 8, 2003.*
MANUEL T. DE GUIA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Former
Sixth Division) and JOSE B. ABEJO, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact,
Hermenegilda Abejo-Rivera, respondents.
Civil Law; Property; Co-ownership; A co-owner of an undivided parcel
of land is an owner of the whole, and over the whole he exercises the right
of dominion but he is at the same time the owner of a portion which is truly
abstract; There is no co-ownership when the different portions owned by
different people are already concretely determined and separately
identifiable even if not yet technically described.—Under Article 484 of the
Civil Code, “there is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an
undivided thing or right belongs to different persons.” A co-owner of an
undivided parcel of land is an “owner of the whole, and over the whole he
exercises the right of dominion, but he is at the same time the owner of a
portion which is truly abstract.” On the other hand, there is no co-
ownership when
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*FIRST DIVISION.
115
VOL. 413, OCTOBER 8, 2003 115
De Guia vs. Court of Appeals
the different portions owned by different people are already
concretely determined and separately identifiable, even if not yet
technically described.
Same; Same; Same; Any co-owner may file an action under Article
487 not only against a third person but also against another co-owner who
takes exclusive possession and asserts exclusive ownership of the
property.—Any co-owner may file an action under Article 487 not only
against a third person, but also against another co-owner who takes
exclusive possession and asserts exclusive ownership of the property. In
the latter case, however, the only purpose of the action is to obtain
recognition of the co-ownership. The plaintiff cannot seek exclusion of the
defendant from the property because as co-owner he has a right of
possession. The plaintiff cannot recover any material or determinate part
of the property.
Same; Same; Same; Each co-owner may demand at any time the
partition of the common property unless a co-owner has repudiated the co-
ownership under certain conditions.—Since a co-ownership subsists
between ABEJO and DE GUIA, judicial or extrajudicial partition is the
proper recourse. An action to demand partition is imprescriptible and not
subject to laches. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of
the common property unless a co-owner has repudiated the co-ownership
under certain conditions. Neither ABEJO nor DE GUIA has repudiated
the co-ownership under the conditions set by law.
Remedial Law; Certiorari; As a rule, a party may raise only questions
of law in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.—This
issue involves calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the
credibility of witnesses. As a rule, a party may raise only questions of law
in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The
Supreme Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh again the evidence
considered in the proceedings below. More so in the instant case, where
the Court of Appeals affirmed the factual findings of the trial court.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Manuel T. De Guia for and in his own behalf.
Abejo & Partners Law Offices for private respondent.
116
116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
De Guia vs. Court of Appeals
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the 22 August 1994
Decision2 as well as the 27 June 1995 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 39875. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision 3 of
the Regional Trial Court (“trial court”) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 16,
in Civil Case No. 8796-M. The trial court’s Decision ordered petitioner
Manuel T. De Guia (“DE GUIA”) to turn over to private respondent Jose
B. Abejo (“ABEJO”) possession of the one half (1/2) undivided portion of a
fishpond and to pay actual damages and attorney’s fees.
The Antecedents
On 12 May 1986, ABEJO4 instituted an action for recovery of possession
with damages against DE GUIA. In his complaint, ABEJO alleged that he
is the owner of the 1/2 undivided portion of a property used as a fishpond
(“FISHPOND”) situated in Meycauayan, Bulacan and covered by TCT No.
T-6358 of the Bulacan Register of Deeds. He alleged ownership over
approximately 39,611 square meters out of the FISHPOND’S total area of
79,220 square meters. ABEJO further averred that DE GUIA continues to
possess and use the FISHPOND without any contract and without paying
rent to ABEJO’s damage and prejudice. ABEJO also complained that DE
GUIA refuses to surrender ownership and possession of the FISHPOND
despite repeated demands to do so after DE GUIA’s sublease contract over
the FISHPOND had expired. ABEJO asked the trial court to order DE
GUIA to vacate an approximate area of 39,611 square meters as well as
pay damages.
DE GUIA, a lawyer by profession, appeared on his own behalf. He filed
his Answer on 12 January 1990 after the Court of Appeals resolved
several issues concerning the validity of the service of summons on him. In
his Answer, DE GUIA alleged that the complaint does not state a cause of
action and has prescribed. He
VOL. 413, OCTOBER 8, 2003 117
De Guia vs. Court of Appeals
claimed that the FISHPOND was originally owned by Maxima Termulo
who died intestate with Primitiva Lejano as her only heir. According to
him, ABEJO is not the owner of the entire FISHPOND but the heirs of
Primitiva Lejano who authorized him to possess the entire FISHPOND.
He assailed ABEJO’s ownership of the 1/2 undivided portion of the
FISHPOND as void and claimed ownership over an undivided half portion
of the FISHPOND for himself. DE GUIA sought payment of damages and
reimbursement for the improvements he introduced as a builder in good
faith.
The trial court set the pre-trial and required the parties to file their
pre-trial briefs. ABEJO filed his pre-trial brief5 on 05 April 1990. DE
GUIA filed his pre-trial brief6 on 31 July 1990. DE GUIA’s pre-trial brief
raised as the only issue in the case the amount of damages in the form of
rent that DE GUIA should pay ABEJO. DE GUIA also submitted an Offer
to Compromise,7 offering to settle ABEJO’s claim for P300,000 and to lease
the entire FISHPOND to any party of ABEJO’s choice.
Hearing commenced on 30 July 1990. ABEJO rested his case on 4
December 1990. DE GUIA’s last witness completed her testimony on 22
November 1991. The trial court summarized the evidence presented by
ABEJO and DE GUIA as follows:
Evidence adduced from plaintiff shows that there are two parcels of land
covering a fishpond with a total area of 79,220 sq. m. more or less,
situated at Ubihan, Meycauayan, Bulacan and covered by TCT No. 6358
equally owned by Primitiva Lejano and Lorenza Araniego married to Juan
Abejo (Exh. “A”). The one half undivided portion owned by Lorenza
Araniego corresponding to 39,611 sq. m. was later purchased by plaintiff
from his father Teofilo Abejo (Exh. “B”), the only heir of the original owner
on November 22, 1983. Prior to this sale on July 30, 1974 the whole
fishpond (79,220) was the subject of a “Salin ng Pamumusisyong ng
Palaisdaan” executed by the heirs of Primitiva Lejano with the knowledge
and consent of Teofilo A. Abejo in favor of one Aniano Victa and defendant.
The contract provided that the period of lease shall be until November 30,
1979. When the contract expired and defendant failed to surrender the
fishpond, written demands the last of which was on November 27, 1983
were made for defendants to pay back rental and to vacate the premises in
question (Exh. “D” & “E”). Defendant refused to deliver possession and
also to pay
118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
De Guia vs. Court of Appeals
the rentals due. In anticipation, however, that defendant will vacate the
fishpond, plaintiff, on December 21, 1983 entered into a two year
“Kasunduan ng Buwisan ng Palaisdaan” with Ruperto C. Villarico for a
consideration of P50,000.00 (Exh. “G”). This contract, despite its execution
and even already notarized, had to be cancelled and the amount of
P50,000.00 returned by plaintiff to Villarico when the defendant did not
heed the demand to vacate the fishpond. For unpaid rental, actual as well
as moral and exemplary damages, plaintiff asks payment of P450,000.00
and P20,000.00 attorney’s fees.
On the other hand, defendant’s evidence tends to show that the entire
fishpond with an area of 79,200 sq. m. was leased to him by the heirs of
Primitiva Lejano. Subsequently, defendant became the absolute owner of
one half of the undivided area of the fishpond and he questioned plaintiffs
ownership of the other half as void and fraudulent. As to the area
pertaining to plaintiff, defendant claimed that he introduced
improvements worth P500,000 and being in good faith, he asked that he
should be reimbursed by plaintiff. In his pre-trial brief, however,
defendant raised the only issue which is the amount of damages plaintiff
is entitled to in the form of rental. Hence, the thrust of the testimonies of
defendant’s witnesses particularly Ben Ruben Camargo and Marta
Fernando Pena was the amount of rental of fishponds in the same locality
as the fishpond in question at a given time. However, the documentary
evidence (Exhs. “1” and “2”) in support of their testimony were not offered
as evidence.8
The trial court rendered its decision on 8 June 1992, disposing as follows:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant and hereby orders that:
1. 1.Defendant shall turn over possession to plaintiff one half
undivided portion of the 79,200 sq. m. fishpond who shall enjoy
the benefits and fruits in equal share with the defendant effective
immediately until such time that partition of the property is
effected;
 2. 2.Defendant shall pay to plaintiff the amount of P262,500.00 by
way of actual or compensatory damages;
3. 3.Defendant shall pay plaintiff P20,000.00 as and for attorney’s
fees; and
4. 4.To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.”9
VOL. 413, OCTOBER 8, 2003 119
De Guia vs. Court of Appeals
Aggrieved, DE GUIA went to the Court of Appeals insisting the trial court
erred in ordering him to vacate and surrender possession of the 1/2
undivided portion of the FISHPOND and to pay actual damages and
attorney’s fees. The Court of Appeals found DE GUIA’s appeal without
merit and affirmed the trial court’s decision. Upon DE GUIA’s motion for
reconsideration, the appellate court reduced the compensatory damages
from P262,500 to P212,500.
Hence, the instant petition.
The undisputed facts as found by the trial court and adopted in toto by
the Court of Appeals are restated as follows:
1. 1.The subject of the dispute are two undivided parcels of land used
as a fishpond situated in Barrio Ubihan, Meycauayan, Bulacan,
originally co-owned by Primitiva Lejano and Lorenza Araniego
married to Juan Abejo.
2. 2.The FISHPOND is registered under the names of Primitiva
Lejano and Lorenza Araniego under TCT No. 6358 of the Bulacan
Register of Deeds as follows:
PRIMITIVA LEJANO, Filipina, of legal age, single—1/2 share; and
LORENZA ARANIEGO, Filipina, of legal age, married to Juan Abejo, 1/2
share,—
1. 3.The FISHPOND has a total land area of approximately 79,220
square meters. ABEJO is seeking to recover possession of the 1/2
undivided portion of the FISHPOND containing 39,611 square
meters.
2. 4.DE GUIA (along with a certain Aniano Victa) acquired
possession of the entire FISHPOND by virtue of a document
captioned Salin ng Pamumusisyong ng Palaisdaan (“Lease
Contract”) executed between him and the heirs of Primitiva
Lejano. The Lease Contract was effective from 30 July 1974 up to
30 November 1979 for a consideration of P100,000.
3. 5.The Lease Contract was executed with the knowledge and
consent of Teofilo Abejo, sole heir of Lorenza Araniego Abejo.
Teofilo Abejo acquired Lorenza Araniego Abejo’s 1/2 undivided
share in the FISHPOND by intestate succession.
4. 6.Teofilo Abejo (now deceased) sold his 1/2 undivided share in the
FISHPOND to his son, ABEJO, on 22 November 1983.
5. 7.DE GUIA continues to possess the entire FISHPOND and to
derive income from the property despite the expiration of the
Lease Contract and several demands to vacate made by Teofilo
Abejo and by his successor-in-interest, ABEJO, The last demand
letter was dated 27 November 1983.
120
120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
De Guia vs. Court of Appeals
1. 8.ABEJO filed his complaint for recovery of possession with
damages against DE GUIA on 12 May 1986.
2. 9.DE GUIA’s claim of ownership over the other 1/2 undivided
portion of the FISHPOND has not been finally adjudicated for or
against him.
DE GUIA offers the verified Complaint for Annulment of Real Estate
Mortgage and Contract of Lease with Preliminary Injunction signed by the
heirs of Primitiva Lejano as proof of his ownership of the other undivided
half portion of the FISHPOND. Records show that DE GUIA filed the
complaint for himself and as attorney-in fact of the heirs of Primitiva
Lejano (“Lejano Heirs”)10 against Spouses Teofilo Morte and Angelina
Villarico, Spouses Ruperto and Milagros Villarico, et al. (“Defendants”).
The case was raffled to Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan, and docketed as Civil Case. No. 86-27-M. The complaint alleged
that DE GUIA acquired his 1/2 undivided share in the FISHPOND from
the Lejano Heirs in February 1986. DE GUIA and the Lejano Heirs sought
to annul the Kasulatan ng Sanglaan and Kasulatan ng Pagbubuwis ng
Palaisdaan, executed on 10 November 1979 by Primitiva Lejano in favor
of the Defendants. DE GUIA and the Lejano Heirs claimed that Primitiva
Lejano signed these documents under duress and without consideration.
The trial court rendered judgment11 on 28 February 1992 against DE
GUIA and the Lejano Heirs as follows:
“WHEREFORE, the evidence having shown the plaintiffs, particularly
Manuel de Guia, their successor-in-interest, not entitled upon the facts
and the law to the relief prayed for in the amended complaint, the same is
hereby DISMISSED with costs against said plaintiff. Instead, as prayed
for by defendants, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. 1.Declaring the “Kasulatan ng Sanglaan” (Exhs. “A” & “1”) dated
November 10, 1979, and the “Kasulatan ng Pagbubuwis ng
Palaisdaan” (Exhs. “C” and “3”) also dated November 10, 1979, as
valid for all legal intents and purposes;
2. 2.Ordering the Ex-Officio Sheriff, RTC, Bulacan, to proceed with
the extrajudicial foreclosure of the subject real estate mortgage;
and
VOL. 413, OCTOBER 8, 2003 121
De Guia vs. Court of Appeals
1. 3.Ordering plaintiffs to pay defendants attorney’s fees in the
amount of P20,000.00.
SO ORDERED.”12
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court in a Decision dated 30
August 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 38031. The Court of Appeals found the
claim of force and intimidation in the execution of the documents as highly
improbable since Primitiva Lejano’s son, Renato Davis, witnessed the
signing of the documents and found nothing irregular at the time. The
appellate court also held that assuming Defendants threatened DE GUIA
and the Lejano Heirs with immediate foreclosure, Defendants were merely
exercising their legitimate right of foreclosing the mortgaged property for
non-payment of the loan. In addition, Primitiva Lejano’s lawyer and
notary public, Atty. Mamerto Abaño, testified that the parties appeared
before him to affirm the contents of the documents. He also stated that he
was present when Defendants paid Primitiva Lejano Davis and her son
Renato. As of this writing, DE GUIA has a pending motion for
reconsideration before the Court of Appeals. In the event the Court of
Appeals’ Decision attains finality, DE GUIA may lose whatever right he
claims over the FISHPOND.
The Trial Court’s Ruling
The trial court ruled that ABEJO has the right to demand that DE GUIA
vacate and surrender an area equivalent to ABEJO’s 1/2 undivided share
in the FISHPOND. The trial court explained that DE GUIA’s sublease
contract expired in 1979 and ABEJO acquired his father’s share in 1983.
However, the trial court pointed out that ABEJO failed to present
evidence of the judicial or extrajudicial partition of the FISHPOND. The
identification of the specific area pertaining to ABEJO and his co-owner is
vital in an action to recover possession of real property. Nevertheless, the
trial court declared that pending partition, it is only just that DE GUIA
pay ABEJO a reasonable amount as rental for the use of ABEJO’s share in
the FISHPOND. DE GUIA admitted this obligation when he raised as sole
issue in his pre-trial brief how much rent he should pay ABEJO. DE GUIA
even proposed P300,000 as the rea-
_______________
12 CA Rollo, pp. 72-73.
122
122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
De Guia vs. Court of Appeals
sonable amount but under certain conditions which ABEJO found
unacceptable.
In determining the reasonable rent due to ABEJO, the trial court
considered the Lease Contract between ABEJO and a certain Ruperto C.
Villarico which provided for a yearly rent of P25,000 for 1/2 undivided
portion of the FISHPOND. The trial court declared that the total amount
of rent due is P212,500, computed from November 1983 when ABEJO
became a co-owner of the FISHPOND up to 199113 or a period of eight and
one half years. The trial court further ordered DE GUIA to pay an
additional P50,000 which represents the amount ABEJO returned to
Ruperto C. Villarico when they cancelled the Lease Contract between
them due to DE GUIA’s refusal to vacate the FISHPOND.
Lastly, the trial court ruled that pending partition, ABEJO as co-owner
has the right to possess the FISHPOND and to receive an equal share in
the benefits from the FISHPOND effective immediately. Until there is a
partition, and while there is no contract of lease, the Civil Code provisions
on co-ownership shall govern the rights of the parties.
The Court of Appeals’ Ruling
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision. The Court of
Appeals debunked DE GUIA’s claim that partition and not recovery of
possession was the proper remedy under the circumstances. The Court of
Appeals pointed out that DE GUIA’s failure to respect ABEJO’s right over
his 1/2 undivided share in the FISHPOND justifies the action for recovery
of possession. The trial court’s decision effectively enforces ABEJO’s right
over the property which DE GUIA violated by possession and use without
paying compensation. According to the Court of Appeals, partition would
constitute a mechanical aspect of the decision just like accounting when
necessary.
The Court of Appeals likewise rejected DE GUIA’s claim that the
award of compensatory damages of P242,000, computed based on the rent
stipulated in the Lease Contract between ABE JO and Ruperto C.
Villarico, is grossly exorbitant. The Court of Appeals
_______________
13Should be 1992. The 8 1/2 period is counted from November 1983 up
to May 1992.
123
VOL. 413, OCTOBER 8, 2003 123
De Guia vs. Court of Appeals
clarified that the amount the trial court awarded was P262,500 and not
P242,000 as erroneously alleged by DE GUIA. The Court of Appeals
pointed out that the notarized Lease Contract between ABEJO and
Ruperto C. Villarico carries more evidentiary weight than the testimonies
of DE GUIA’s witnesses, Ben Ruben Camargo and Marta Fernando Peña.
The Court of Appeals also upheld the award of attorney’s fees since the
parties could have avoided litigation had DE GUIA heeded the justifiable
demands of ABEJO.
On motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals reduced the
compensatory damages from P262,500 to P212,500. The Court of Appeals
explained that the trial court correctly computed the total amount of rent
due at P212,500. The trial court erred, however, in adding the sum of
P50,000 representing the rent for 1983 and 1984 which ABEJO returned
to Ruperto C. Villarico. The appellate court clarified that the sum of
P212,500 was arrived at by multiplying the rent of P25,000 by 8 1/2 years.
The 8 1/2 year period already included the two months rent received from
and then subsequently reimbursed to Ruperto C. Villarico.
The Issues
DE GUIA raises the following issues in his Memorandum:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURT’S DECISION DENYING PETITIONER’S PLEA FOR
DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE
OF ACTION;
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURT’S ORDER DIRECTING PETITIONER TO TURN OVER THE
ONE-HALF UNDIVIDED PORTION OF THE FISHPOND WHICH IS
STILL UNDER A STATE OF CO-OWNERSHIP;
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING, IN PART, THE
AWARD OF ACTUAL OR COMPENSATORY DAMAGES DESPITE
LACK OF CREDIBLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE SAME;
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De Guia vs. Court of Appeals
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE AWARD OF
ATTORNEY’S FEES IN PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S FAVOR.14
In essence, this Court is asked to resolve: (1) whether an action for
recovery of possession and turn-over of the 1/2 undivided portion of a
common property is proper before partition; and (2) whether there is
sufficient basis for the award of compensatory damages and attorney’s
fees.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
First and Second Issues: Cause of Action and Turn-Over of
Possession
DE GUIA. contends that a co-owner cannot claim a definite portion from
the property owned in common until there is a partition. DE GUIA argues
that ABEJO should have filed an action for partition instead of recovery of
possession since the court cannot implement any decision in the latter
case without first a partition. DE GUIA contends that an action for
recovery of possession cannot prosper when the property subject of the
action is part of an undivided, co-owned property. The procedural mode
adopted by ABEJO, which is recovery of possession, makes enforcement
difficult if not impossible since there is still no partition of the subject
property.
Under Article 484 of the Civil Code, “there is co-ownership whenever
the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons.”
A co-owner of an undivided parcel of land is an “owner of the whole, and
over the whole he exercises the right of dominion, but he is at the same
time the owner of a portion which is truly abstract.” 15 On the other hand,
there is no co-ownership when the different portions owned by different
people are already
_______________
14 Rollo, pp. 172-173.
 15Si v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122047, 12 October 2000, 342 SCRA cannot be excluded from a specific portion of the property because as a co-
653. owner he has a right to possess and the plaintiff cannot recover any
125 material or determinate part of the property. Thus, the courts a quo erred
VOL. 413, OCTOBER 8, 2003 125 when they ordered the delivery of one-half (1/2) of the building in favor of
private respondent.
De Guia vs. Court of Appeals
Indisputably, DE GUIA has been in exclusive possession of the entire
concretely determined and separately identifiable, even if not yet
FISHPOND since July 1974. Initially, DE GUIA disputed ABEJO’s claim
technically described.16
of ownership over the 1/2 undivided portion of the FISHPOND.
Article 487 of the Civil Code provides, “[a]ny one of the co-owners may
Subsequently, he implicitly recognized ABEJO’s 1/2 undivided share by
bring an action in ejectment.” This article covers all kinds of actions for
offering to settle the case for P300,000 and to vacate the property. During
the recovery of possession. Article 487 includes forcible entry and unlawful
the trial proper, neither DE GUIA nor ABEJO asserted or manifested a
detainer (accion interdictal), recovery of possession (accion publiciana),
claim of absolute and exclusive ownership over the entire FISHPOND.
and recovery of ownership (accion de reivindicacion). The summary
Before this Court, DE GUIA limits the issues to the propriety of bringing
actions of forcible entry and unlawful detainer seek the recovery of
an action for recovery of possession and the recovery of compensatory
physical possession only. These actions are brought before municipal trial
damages.
courts within one year from dispossession. However, accion
Following the inherent and peculiar features of co-ownership, while
publiciana, which is a plenary action for recovery of the right to possess,
ABEJO and DE GUIA have equal shares in the FISHPOND quantitatively
falls under the jurisdiction of the proper regional trial court when the
speaking, they have the same right in a qualitative sense as co-owners.
dispossession has lasted for more than one year. Accion de
Simply stated, ABEJO and DE GUIA are owners of the whole and over the
reivindicacion, which seeks the recovery of ownership, also falls under the
whole, they exercise the right of dominion. However, they are at the same
jurisdiction of the proper regional trial court.17
time individual owners of a 1/2 portion, which is truly abstract because
Any co-owner may file an action under Article 487 not only against a
until there is partition, such portion remains indeterminate or
third person, but also against another co-owner who takes exclusive
unidentified.21 As co-owners, ABEJO and DE GUIA may jointly exercise
possession and asserts exclusive ownership of the property.18 In the latter
the right of dominion over the entire FISHPOND until they partition the
case, however, the only purpose of the action is to obtain recognition of the
FISHPOND by identifying or segregating their respective portions.
co-ownership. The plaintiff cannot seek exclusion of the defendant from
Since a co-ownership subsists between ABEJO and DE GUIA, judicial
the property because as co-owner he has a right of possession. The
or extra-judicial partition is the proper recourse. An action to demand
plaintiff cannot recover any material or determinate part of the property. 19
partition is imprescriptible and not subject to laches. 22 Each co-owner may
In Hermogena G. Engreso with Spouse Jose Engreso v. Nestoria De La
demand at any time the partition of the com-
Cruz and Herminio De La Cruz,20we reiterated the rule that a co-owner
cannot recover a material or determinate part of a common property prior
to partition as follows: VOL. 413, OCTOBER 8, 2003 127
It is a basic principle in civil law that before a property owned in common De Guia vs. Court of Appeals
is actually partitioned, all that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract mon property unless a co-owner has repudiated the co-ownership under
quota or proportionate share in the entire property. A co-owner has no certain conditions.23 Neither ABEJO nor DE GUIA has repudiated the co-
right to demand a concrete, specific or determinate part of the ownership under the conditions set by law.
20 G.R. No. 148727, 9 April 2003, 401 SCRA 217. To recapitulate, we rule that a co-owner may file an action for recovery
126 of possession against a co-owner who takes exclusive possession of the
126 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED entire co-owned property. However, the only effect of such action is a
recognition of the co-ownership. The courts cannot proceed with the actual
De Guia vs. Court of Appeals
partitioning of the co-owned property. Thus, judicial or extrajudicial
thing owned in common because until division is effected his right over the
partition is necessary to effect physical division of the FISHPOND
thing is represented only by an ideal portion.
between ABEJO and DE GUIA. An action for partition is also the proper
As such, the only effect of an action brought by a co-owner against a co-
forum for accounting the profits received by DE GUIA from the
owner will be to obtain recognition of the co-ownership; the defendant
FISHPOND. However, as a necessary consequence of such recognition,
ABEJO shall exercise an equal right to possess, use and enjoy the entire
FISHPOND.
DE GUIA further claims that the trial and appellate courts erred when
they ordered the recovery of rent when the exact identity of the portion in
question had not yet been clearly defined and delineated. According to DE
GUIA, an order to pay damages in the form of rent is premature before
partition.
We disagree.
The right of enjoyment by each co-owner is limited by a similar right of
the other co-owners. A co-owner cannot devote common property to his
exclusive use to the prejudice of the co-ownership.24 Hence, if the subject is
a residential house, all the co-owners may live there with their respective
families to the extent possible. However, if one co-owner alone occupies the
entire house without opposition from the other co-owners, and there is no
lease agreement, the other co-owners cannot demand the payment of
rent. Conversely, if there is an agreement to lease the house, the co-owners
can demand rent from the co-owner who dwells in the house.
128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
De Guia vs. Court of Appeals
The co-owners can either exercise an equal right to live in the house, or
agree to lease it. If they fail to exercise any of these options, they must
bear the consequences. It would be unjust to require the co-owner to pay
rent after the co-owners by their silence have allowed him to use the
property.25
In case the co-owners agree to lease a building owned in common, a co-
owner cannot retain it for his use without paying the proper
rent.26 Moreover, where part of the property is occupied exclusively by
some co-owners for the exploitation of an industry, the other co-owners
become co-participants in the accessions of the property and should share
in its net profits.27
The Lejano Heirs and Teofilo Abejo agreed to lease the entire
FISHPOND to DE GUIA. After DE GUIA’s lease expired in 1979, he could
no longer use the entire FISHPOND without paying rent. To allow DE
GUIA to continue using the entire FISHPOND without paying rent would
prejudice ABEJO’s right to receive rent, which would have accrued to his
1/2 share in the FISHPOND had it been leased to others. 28 Since ABEJO
acquired his 1/2 undivided share in the FISHPOND on 22 November 1983,
DE GUIA should pay ABEJO reasonable rent for his possession and use of
ABEJO’s portion beginning from that date. The compensatory damages of
P25,000 per year awarded to ABEJO is the fair rental value or the
reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the leased
property,29 considering the circumstances at that time. DE GUIA shall
continue to pay ABEJO a yearly rent of P25,000 corresponding to
ABEJO’s 1/2 undivided share in the FISHPOND. However, ABEJO has
the option either to exercise an equal right to occupy the FISHPOND, or to
file a new petition before the trial court to fix a new rental rate in view of
changed circumstances in the last 20 years.
ABEJO made an extrajudicial demand on DE GUIA by sending the 27
November 1983 demand letter. Thus, the rent in arrears should earn
interest at 6% per annum from 27 November 1983
129
VOL. 413, OCTOBER 8, 2003 129
De Guia vs. Court of Appeals
until finality of this decision pursuant to Article 220930 of the Civil Code.
Thereafter, the interest rate is 12% per annum from finality of this
decision until full payment.31
Third Issue: Lack of Credible Evidence to Support Award
of Compensatory Damages
DE GUIA contends the P212,500 in rent awarded to ABEJO is exorbitant.
He assails as doubtful and self-serving evidence the Lease Contract
between ABEJO and Ruperto C. Villarico that served as basis for the
yearly rent of P25,000 for ABEJO’s share in the FISHPOND.
DE GUIA says the trial and appellate courts should have given
credence to the testimonies of his witnesses, Ben Ruben Camargo
(“Camargo”) and Marta Fernando Peña (“Peña”) that rentals of fishponds
in the same vicinity are for much lesser considerations.
This issue involves calibration of the whole evidence considering
mainly the credibility of witnesses. As a rule, a party may raise only
questions of law in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. The Supreme Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh again
the evidence considered in the proceedings below. 32 More so in the instant
case, where the Court of Appeals affirmed the factual findings of the trial
court.33
It is not true that the trial court disregarded the testimonies of
Camargo and Peña because DE GUIA failed to present documentary
evidence to support their testimonies. Actually, the trial and appellate
courts found the testimonies of Camargo and Peña unconvincing. Judges
cannot be expected to rely on the testimonies of every witness. In
ascertaining the facts, they determine who are
130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
De Guia vs. Court of Appeals
credible and who are not. In doing so, they consider all the evidence before
them.34
We find no cogent reason to overturn the trial and appellate courts’
evaluation of the witnesses’ testimonies. We likewise find reasonable the
P25,000 yearly compensation for ABEJO’s 1/2 undivided share in the at 6% per annum from 27 November 1983 until finality of this
FISHPOND. Indeed, being a question of fact, it is for the trial and decision, and thereafter at 12% per annum until full payment;
appellate courts to decide and this Court will not disturb their findings 4. 4.Manuel T. de Guia shall pay Jose B. Abejo a yearly rent of
unless clearly baseless or irrational. The exception does not obtain in this P25,000 from June 1992 until finality of this decision, with
case. interest at 6% per annum during the same period, and thereafter
Fourth Issue: Attorney’s Fees at 12% interest per annum until full payment;
The trial court did not err in imposing attorney’s fees of P20,000. 5. 5.After finality of this decision and for as long as Manuel T. de
Attorney’s fees can be awarded in the cases enumerated in Article 2208 of Guia exclusively possesses the entire FISHPOND, he shall pay
the Civil Code specifically: Jose B. Abejo a yearly rental of P25,000 for the latter’s 1/2
xxx undivided share in the FISHPOND, unless Jose B. Abejo secures
(2) Where the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to from the proper court an order fixing a different rental rate in
litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest; view of possible changed circumstances.
xxx
DE GUIA is a lawyer and he should have known that a co-owner could not SO ORDERED.
take exclusive possession of a common property. Although DE GUIA
offered to settle the case out of court, such offer was made under
conditions not acceptable to ABEJO. Certainly, ABEJO was still put to
unnecessary expense and trouble to protect his interest under paragraph
(2), Article 2208 of the Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 22 August 1994 and Resolution
dated 27 June 1995 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 39875 is
AFFIRMED with respect to that portion ordering Manuel T. De Guia to
pay Jose B. Abejo compensatory damages of P212,500 and attorney’s fees
of P20,000, and MODIFIED as follows:

1. 1.The co-ownership between Manuel T. De Guia and Jose B. Abejo

over the entire FISHPOND covered by TCT No. 6358 of the
Bulacan Register of Deeds is recognized without prejudice to the
outcome of CA-G.R. CV No. 38031 pending before

_______________

34 Baritua v. Mercader, G.R. No. 136048, 23 January 2001, 350 SCRA

86.
131
VOL. 413, OCTOBER 8, 2003 131
De Guia vs. Court of Appeals

1. the Court of Appeals and other cases involving the same property;
2. 2.Manuel T. De Guia and Jose B. Abejo shall equally enjoy
possession and use of the entire FISHPOND prior to partition;
3. 3.The compensatory damages of P25,000 per annum representing
rent from 27 November 1983 until May 1992 shall earn interest
 Timoteo R. Quimpo, Jr. for respondents.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED NARVASA, J.:

Sering vs. Plazo
The application of settled principles is all that is needed to resolve the
No. L-49731. September 29, 1988.*
instant appeal. Article 487 of the Civil Code provides that anyone of the
ALFREDO SERING, petitioner, vs. RESTITUTO PLAZO and
co-owners of an immovable may bring an action in ejectment. A co-owner
GERTRUDES SUAN, respondents.
may thus bring an ejectment action without joining the other co-owners,
Civil Law; Co-ownership; Anyone of the co-owners of an immovable
the suit being deemed instituted for the benefit of all. 1 And the term,
may bring an action in ejectment.—The application of settled principles is
“action in ejectment,” includes a suit of forcible entry (detentacion) or
all that is needed to resolve the instant appeal. Article 487 of the Civil
unlawful detainer (desahucio).2
Code provides that anyone of the co-owners of an immovable may bring an
The proceeding at bar had its inception in a forcible entry suit filed by
action in ejectment. A co-owner may thus bring an ejectment action
petitioner Sering against respondent Spouses Restituto Plazo and
without joining the other co-owners, the suit being deemed instituted for
Gertrudes Suan with the then Municipal Court of del Carmen, Surigao del
the benefit of all. And the term, “action in ejectment,” includes a suit of
Norte.3 The case resulted in a judgment against the Plazos who thereupon
forcible entry (detentacion) or unlawful detainer (desahucio).
appealed to the Court of First Instance of Surigao del Norte. In the latter
Same; Same; Same; Orders complained of are indeed tainted by
court the Plazos learned that the property subject of the suit was not
serious error and should therefore be reversed and set aside.—The orders
owned solely by Sering but was owned in common by him and others. This
complained of are indeed tainted by serious error and should therefore be
prompted the Plazos to move for the impleading of the other co-owners as
reversed and set aside, upon the considerations set out in the opening
parties plaintiff, on the theory that they were indispensable parties. 4 The
paragraph of this resolution. The same issues had been raised and
Court agreed and ordered
resolved as early as eight (8) years before promulgation of the contested
orders. In Vencilao v. Camarento, decided in 1969, this Court pertinently
_______________
ruled as follows: “Anent the question of whether an action of forcible
entry and detainer should be brought in the name of all co-owners, We 1 . . . as also, an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria: Sentencias
hold that under Article 487 of the new Civil Code, any of the co-owners
of the Supreme Court of Spain dated April 6, 1968 and June 5, 1918, cited
may bring the action. x x In forcible entry and detainer action(s), the
in Tolentino, Civil Code, 1983 ed., Vol. II, p. 157; and it is noteworthy that
matter to be determined is simply the question of prior physical
at common law the word “ejectment” also has a broad signification as “a
possession. It having been alleged in the complaint that the plaintiff was
form of action by which possessory titles to corporeal hereditaments may
in actual possession of the properties, certainly the plaintiff alone, who
be tried and possession obtained x x (or) which lies to regain the
was in actual possession, could file the complaint.”
possession of real property, with damages for the unlawful detention
(Bouvier’s Law Dictionary).
_______________ 2 Vencilao v. Camarenta, 29 SCRA 473, 481-482.
3 The action was commenced on October 14, 1974 and was docketed
*FIRST DIVISION.
as Civil Case No. 82.
85 4 Rollo, p. 26.
VOL. 166, SEPTEMBER 29, 1988 85 86
Sering vs. Plazo 86 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sering vs. Plazo
PETITION to review the orders of the Court of First Instance Surigao del
Sering to amend his complaint so as to include his co-owners as co-
Norte, Br. 3.
plaintiffs. Sering demurred claiming that under the law anyone of the co-
owners could bring suit for ejectment without joining the others. 5 The
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
Plazos contended, on the other hand, that the provision invoked by Sering
Manuel Tesiorna and Noel P. Catre for petitioner.
had no application to forcible entry actions, but only to suits of unlawful
detainer. Because Sering failed to comply with the Court’s order for
amendment of the complaint, the Trial Court dismissed his complaint. 6 It
also thereafter denied his motion for reconsideration.7 Sering has come to
this Court praying for the nullification and reversal of said order of
dismissal and that denying his plea for reconsideration.
The orders complained of are indeed tainted by serious error and
should therefore be reversed and set aside, upon the considerations set out
in the opening paragraph of this resolution. The same issues had been
raised and resolved as early as eight (8) years before promulgation of the
contested orders. In Vencilao v. Camarento, decided in 1969,8 this Court
pertinently ruled as follows:9
“2. Anent the question of whether an action of forcible entry and detainer
should be brought in the name of all co-owners, We hold that under Article
487 of the new Civil Code, any of the co-owners may bring the action x x.
In forcible entry and detainer action(s), the matter to be determined is
simply the question of prior physical possession. It having been alleged in
the complaint that the plaintiff was in actual possession of the properties,
certainly the plaintiff alone, who was in actual possession, could file the
complaint.”
The Court has been cited to no reason of substance for modifying or
overruling this doctrine.
WHEREFORE, the challenged Orders—dismissing the petitioner’s
complaint for ejectment and denying reconsideration of the dismissal
decree10—are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE,
87
VOL. 166, SEPTEMBER 29, 1988 87
Limpin vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
and the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court for resolution,
with all deliberate dispatch, of the respondents’ appeal from the judgment
of the inferior court. This Resolution is immediately executory.
Cruz, Gancayco, Giño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Orders reversed and set aside.
 G.R. No. 122249. January 29, 2004.*
REYNALDO, TELESFORO, REMEDIOS, ALFREDO and BELEN, all
surnamed AGUIRRE, VICENTA, HORACIO and FLORENCIO, all
surnamed MAGTIBAY and LEONILA, CECILIA, ANTONIO, and
VENANCIO, all surnamed MEDRANO, and ZOSIMA QUIAMBAO,
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ELIAS, JOSE, ARSENIA and
ROGELIO, all surnamed BALITAAN, and MARIA ROSALES,
respondents.
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Appeals; Exceptions; In the exercise
of the Supreme Court’s power of review, the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are conclusive and binding on the Supreme Court, with certain
exceptions.—It is settled that in the exercise of the Supreme Court’s power
of review, the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and
binding on the Supreme Court. The exceptions to this rule are: (1) when
the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures;
(2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based
on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the
issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the
appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial
court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the
petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on
the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion.
Civil Law; Ownership; Prescription; Acquisitive
Prescription; Kinds; Acquisitive prescription of real rights may be ordinary
or extraordinary.—Acquisitive prescription of real rights may be ordinary
or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of
things in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law; without
good faith and just title, acquisitive prescription can only be extraordinary
in character. Regarding real or immovable property, ordinary acquisitive
prescription requires a period of possession of ten years, while
extraordinary acquisitive prescription requires an uninterrupted adverse
possession of thirty years.
VOL. 421, JANUARY 29, 2004 31
1
Aguirre vs. Court of Appeals
Same; Same; Same; Same; Ordinary Acquisitive Prescription;
Ordinary acquisitive prescription demands that possession be in good faith
and with just title.—Ordinary acquisitive prescription demands that
possession be “in good faith,” which consists in the reasonable belief that
the person from whom the thing is received has been the owner thereof
and could thereby transmit that ownership. There is “just title” when the
adverse claimant comes into possession of the property through any of the
modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real
rights, but that the grantor is neither the owner nor in a position to
transmit the right.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Contracts; Sales; Purchaser in Good Faith;
Burden of Proof; The burden of proving the status of a purchaser in good
faith lies upon him who asserts that status.—It must be remembered that
the burden of proving the status of a purchaser in good faith lies upon him
who asserts that status. It is not sufficient to invoke the ordinary
presumption of good faith, that is, that everyone is presumed to have acted
in good faith, since the good faith that is here essential is integral with the
very status that must be established.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A purchaser cannot
close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man upon his
guard.—A purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a
reasonable man upon his guard, and then claim that he acted in good faith
under the belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor.
Same; Co-Ownership; Adverse Possession; Elements; In order that a
co-owner’s possession may be deemed adverse to the cestui que trust or the
other co-owners, the following elements must concur.—This Court has held
that the possession of a co-owner is like that of a trustee and shall not be
regarded as adverse to the other co-owners but in fact as beneficial to all of
them. Acts which may be considered adverse to strangers may not be
considered adverse insofar as co-owners are concerned. A mere silent
possession by a co-owner, his receipt of rents, fruits or profits from the
property, the erection of buildings and fences and the planting of trees
thereon, and the payment of land taxes, cannot serve as proof of exclusive
ownership, if it is not borne out by clear and convincing evidence that he
exercised acts of possession which unequivocably constituted an ouster or
deprivation of the rights of the other co-owners. Thus, in order that a co-
owner’s possession may be deemed adverse to the cestui que trust or the
other co-owners, the following elements must concur: (1) that he has
performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the
cestui que trust or the other co-owners; (2) that such positive acts of
repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust or the other co-
owners; and (3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing.
312
3 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
12
Aguirre vs. Court of Appeals
Same; Same; Laches; An action to demand partition cannot be barred
by prescription.—It does not involve mere lapse or passage of time, but is
principally an impediment to the assertion or enforcement of a right,
which has become under the circumstances inequitable or unfair to
permit. The rule that each co-owner may demand at any time the partition
of the common property implies that an action to demand partition is
imprescriptible or cannot be barred by laches.
Same; Same; Partition; The appropriate recourse of co-owners in cases
where their consent were not secured in a sale of the entire property as well
as in a sale merely of the undivided shares of some of the co-owners is an
action for PARTITION under Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court.—From
the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is “entitled to sell
his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one-co-owner without
the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However, only the
rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a
co-owner of the property. The proper action in cases like this is not for the
nullification of the sale or for the recovery of possession of the thing owned
in common from the third person who substituted the co-owner or co-
owners who alienated their shares, but the DIVISION of the common
property as if it continued to remain in the possession of the co-owners who
possessed and administered it. Thus, it is now settled that the appropriate
recourse of co-owners in cases where their consent were not secured in a
sale of the entire property as well as in a sale merely of the undivided
shares of some of the co-owners is an action for PARTITION under Rule
69 of the Revised Rules of Court. Neither recovery of possession nor
restitution can be granted since the defendant buyers are legitimate
proprietors and possessors in joint ownership of the common property
claimed.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Juanito L. Garcia and Eugenio E. Mendoza for petitioners.
Lorenzo E. Leynes, Jr. and Jose P. Malabanan for respondents.
313
VOL. 421, JANUARY 29, 2004 313
Aguirre vs. Court of Appeals
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court seeking the reversal of the Decision 1 dated July 26, 1995 rendered
by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 42350 which set aside the
Decision2 dated April 28, 1992 of the Regional Trial Court of Batangas
City (Branch 2) in Civil Case No. 202,3 and declared private respondents
Heirs of Tiburcio Balitaan, as owners of the parcel of unregistered land
with an approximate area of 1,695 square meters, located at Aplaya,
Bauan, Batangas.
The facts of the case are as follows:
In his lifetime, Leopadio Medrano was the owner and possessor of a
parcel of residential land, situated in Aplaya, Bauan, Batan-gas,
containing an area of 2,611 square meters.4 The parcel of land was
conjugal property, having been acquired by Leocadio during his first
marriage with one Emiliana Narito. Their union begot four children,
namely: (a) Gertrudes Medrano, now deceased, represented in this case by
her children, herein petitioners Telesforo, Reynaldo, Remedios, Alfredo,
and Belen, all surnamed Aguirre; (b) Isabel Medrano, likewise deceased,
represented by her children, herein petitioners Vicenta, Horacio, and
Florencio, all surnamed Magtibay; (c) Placido Medrano, also deceased,
represented by his only child, herein petitioner Zosima Quiambao; and (d)
Sixto Medrano.
After the death of his first wife, Leocadio contracted a second marriage
with Miguela Cariño. Their union bore four children,
314 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Aguirre vs. Court of Appeals
herein co-petitioners, namely: Venancio, Leonila, Antonio and Cecilia, all
surnamed Medrano.
Upon the death of Leocadio on March 19, 1945, the surviving heirs
agreed that Sixto should manage and administer the subject property.
Sixto died on May 17, 1974. It was only after his death that petitioners
heard rumors that Sixto had, in fact, sold significant portions of the estate
of Leocadio. It appears that on September 7, 1953, Sixto, without the
knowledge and consent of the petitioners, executed an Affidavit of
Transfer of Real Property stating therein that he was the only heir of
Leocadio.5 Sixto declared that Leocadio died on September 16, 1949,
instead of the actual date of his death on March 19, 1945. With the use of
said affidavit and a survey plan,6 Tax Declaration No. 40105 in the name
of Leocadio was cancelled and Tax Declaration No. 44984 was issued in
the name of Sixto.7 On August 29, 1957, Sixto sold to Maria Bacong a 160-
square meter portion of the subject land.8 On September 28, 1959, Sixto
sold to Tiburcio Balitaan a 1,695 square meter portion of the same
land.9 Sometime in November 1967, Maria Bacong sold her property to
Rosendo Bacong.10
 Petitioners demanded the reconveyance of the portions sold by Sixto
but Tiburcio Balitaan, Maria Bacong and Rosendo Bacong refused to do so.
Hence, petitioners filed against them before the Regional Trial Court of
Batangas (Branch 2), a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Documents,
Partition, Malicious Prosecution and Damages, docketed as Civil Case No.
202.11
In their Answer, Maria Bacong and Rosendo Bacong contend that
petitioners have no cause of action because they acquired their property
thru a valid deed of sale dated August 29, 1957, executed
315
VOL. 421, JANUARY 29, 2004 315
Aguirre vs. Court of Appeals
by Sixto and, alternatively, petitioners’ cause of action, if any, was barred
by prescription and laches.12
In his Answer, Tiburcio Balitaan contends that petitioners have no
cause of action since petitioners were well-aware of the sale of the
property to him by Sixto; and that he was an innocent purchaser for value,
in possession and enjoyment of the land in the concept of absolute owner,
peacefully and publicly. He further echoed the contention of Maria and
Rosendo Bacong that any cause of action petitioners may have was barred
by prescription and laches.13
Maria Bacong died during the pendency of the suit in the trial court
and she was substituted by her surviving heirs, namely, Lorenza, Elena,
Felipa, Manuel, Marilou, Ricardo, Medel, Monchito and Milag, all
surnamed Medrano.14 Tiburcio Balitaan also died and was substituted by
his heirs, herein private respondents, namely: his wife, Maria Rosales and
their four children: Elias, Jose, Arsenia and Rogelio, all surnamed
Balitaan.15
On July 28, 1989, petitioners and Rosendo Bacong, for himself and as
attorney-in-fact of the heirs of Maria Bacong, entered into a compromise
agreement to settle the case between them. 16 The compromise agreement,
as approved by the trial court, provided that Rosendo Bacong and the
heirs of Maria Bacong agreed to pay P30,000.00 to petitioners in
recognition of petitioners’ ownership of a 269-square meter portion17 and
in consideration of which, petitioners recognized the full ownership, rights,
interest and participation of the former over said land. 18 The area of the
subject land is thus reduced to 2,342 square meters (2,611 square meters
minus 269 square meters).
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered judgment dated April
28, 1992, ruling that private respondents did not dispute, by any evidence,
the falsity of the Affidavit of Transfer, as well as the fact that Sixto had
co-owners to the property. It found
316
316 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Aguirre vs. Court of Appeals
that private respondents’ affirmative defense of laches and/or prescription
are unavailing against a property held in co-ownership as long as the state
of co-ownership is recognized. Consequently, the trial court upheld the
sale made by Sixto in favor of private respondents only to the extent that
Sixto is entitled to by virtue of his being a co-owner.19
In determining the area that Sixto could have validly sold to private
respondents, the trial court, in its decision, provided for the manner of
partition among the parties, based on the memorandum
submitted by petitioners, thus:
For the four (4) children of the first marriage, namely:
1. (1)Gertrudes, who is already dead represented by her children
Tefesforo, Reynaldo, Remedios, Alfredo and Belen, all surnamed
Aguirre—399.42 square meters;
2. (2)Isabel Medrano, who is already dead, represented by the
plaintiffs, her children Vicenta, Horacio and Florencio, all
surnamed Magtibay—399.42 square meters;
3. (3)Placido Medrano (dead), represented by his only child Zosima
Medrano 399.42 square meters; and
4. (4)Sixto Medrano—399.42 square meters only which he had the
right to dispose of in favor of Tiburcio Balitaan and Maria
Rosales.
The above consist of undivided interest, shares and participations from
the inheritance or succession to the conjugal estate of Leocadio Medrano
and Emiliana Narito.
For the children of the second marriage their shares in the inheritance
from the property of Leocadio Medrano are as follows:
(1) To Venancio Medrano —138.32 square meters
(2) To Leonila Medrano —138.32 square meters
(3) To Antonio Medrano —138.32 square meters
(4) To Cecilia Medrano —138.32 square meters
with all the above consisting of undivided shares, interest and
participation in the estate.
For the defendants Maria Rosales, surviving spouse of the deceased
Tiburcio Balitaan and their Children, an area of 399.42 square meters, the
only area and extent which Sixto Medrano could have legally dispensed of
in their favor.20
VOL. 421, JANUARY 29, 2004 317
Aguirre vs. Court of Appeals
Thus, the dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court renders judgment in
favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, to wit:
1. (a)Ordering the partition of the property in question among the
plaintiffs and the defendants; and
2. (b)Ordering the parties plaintiffs and defendants, to make a
partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance
and to submit before this Court a project of partition should the
parties be able to agree for the confirmation of the Court within
two (2) months upon receipt of this decision, otherwise this Court
will be constrained to appoint commissioners to make the
partition in accordance with law.
“All other claims not having been duly proved are ordered dismissed.
“SO ORDERED.”21
Aggrieved, private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals.22
On July 26, 1995, the appellate court rendered judgment recognizing
the validity of the sale only with respect to the undivided share of Sixto
Medrano as co-owner; but nonetheless, declaring respondents as absolute
owners of 1,695 square meters of the subject property, reasoning that:
. . . Defendants-appellees have been in possession, in the concept of owner,
of the entire parcel of land sold to Tiburcio Balitaan by Sixto Medrano for
more than ten years, seventeen years to be exact (1958-1975). Relying on
the affidavit of transfer (Exhibit “B”) the tax declaration (Exhibit “C”) and
the survey plan (Exhibit “D”) shown to him by Sixto Medrano which
indicate the latter as owner of the property in dispute, Tiburcio Balitaan
believed transfer to him was effected. (TSN, April 17, 1991, pp. 14-47) and
thus, entered the property as owner (Ibid., at p. 13) Tiburcio Balitaan,
believing himself as the lawful transferee, in addition, caused Tax
Declaration No. 51038 to be issued in his name (Exhibits “6,” “6-A,” “6-B,”
and
318 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Aguirre vs. Court of Appeals
“6-C”). Thus, although the sale of the co-owned property is only valid as to
the undivided share of Sixto Medrano, defendants, by virtue of their open,
adverse and uninterrupted possession from 1958 (Exhibit “G”) to 1975,
obtained title to the entire property and not just Sixto’s undivided share.
This is pursuant to Article 1134 (1957a) of the New Civil Code which
provides that:
Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by
ordinary prescription through possession often years.
...
Plaintiffs did not at all inquire as to the status of their property all this
time and thus have been remiss of their duties as owners of the property.
Plaintiffs waited until Sixto’s death to learn more about their property.
Even though the co-ownership is to be preserved in accordance with the
wishes of the deceased, the plaintiffs should have taken it upon
themselves to look into the status of the property once in a while, to assure
themselves that it is managed well and that they are receiving what is due
them as co-owners of the parcel of land or to at least manifest their
continued interest in the property as normal owners would do. But the
plaintiffs did not show any interest in the way Sixto Medrano was
managing the property which in effect gave the latter carte blanche
powers over the same. Such passivity is aggravated by the fact that one of
the plaintiffs resides a mere 600 meters away from the disputed property
(TSN, April 17, 1991, p. 13). By not showing any interest, the plaintiffs
have, in fact, slept on their rights and thus, cannot now exercise a stale
right.23
Petitioners sought reconsideration24 but the appellate court de nied it in a
Resolution dated October 5, 1995.25
In their present recourse, petitioners take exception from the appellate
court’s findings that respondents have been in possession, in the concept of
owner of the entire parcel of land sold to Tiburcio Balitaan by Sixto
Medrano for seventeen years (1958-1975), relying on the Affidavit of
Transfer and Tax Declaration No. 51038 in the name of Sixto; and that
Tiburcio acquired ownership of the whole property from Sixto through
ordinary prescription for ten years.
Petitioners submit that Tiburcio Balitaan was not a purchaser in good
faith and for value since there are enough circumstances which should
have put him on guard and prompted him to be more
VOL. 421, JANUARY 29, 2004 319
Aguirre vs. Court of Appeals
circumspect and inquire further about the true status of Sixto Medrano’s
ownership; that during his lifetime, Tiburcio was a neighbor of petitioners
and was well-aware that Sixto had other siblings but Tiburcio chose to
rely on the Affidavit of Transfer executed by Sixto Medrano declaring that
he was the only heir of Leocadio; that the Court of Appeals should not
have faulted them for failing to inquire about the status of the disputed
property until after the death of Sixto Medrano; that they are not guilty of
laches.
It is settled that in the exercise of the Supreme Court’s power of
review, the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and
binding on the Supreme Court.26 The exceptions to this rule are: (1) when
the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures;
(2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based
on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the
issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the
appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial
court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the
petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on
the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion.27 Exceptions (4), (7), (10) and (11) are
present in the instant case.
320 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Aguirre vs. Court of Appeals
We find the petition meritorious.28 We agree with the petitioners that the
Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in upholding the claim of
petitioners that they acquired ownership of the subject property through
prescription.
Acquisitive prescription of real rights may be ordinary or
extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of
things in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law; 29 without
good faith and just title, acquisitive prescription can only be extraordinary
in character. Regarding real or immovable property, ordinary acquisitive
prescription requires a period of possession of ten years, 30 while
extraordinary acquisitive prescription requires an uninterrupted adverse
possession of thirty years.31 Ordinary acquisitive prescription demands
that possession be “in good faith,” which consists in the reasonable belief
that the person from whom the thing is received has been the owner
thereof and could thereby transmit that ownership. 32 There is “just title”
when the adverse claimant comes into possession of the property through
any of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or
other real rights, but that the grantor is neither the owner nor in a
position to transmit the right.33
Article 1130 of the Civil Code states that the “title for prescription
must be true and valid.” In Doliendo vs. Biamesa,34 we elucidated on this
provision, thus:
We think that this contention is based on a misconception of the scope and
effect of the provisions of this article of the Code in its application to
“ordinary prescription.” It is evident that by a “titulo verdadero y valido”
in this connection we are not to understand a “titulo que por si solo tiene
fuerza de transferir el dominio sin necesidad de la prescricion” (a title
which of itself is sufficient to transfer the ownership without the necessity
of the lapse of the prescription period); and we accept the opinion of a
learned Spanish law writer who holds that the “titulo verdadero y
valido” as used in this article of the code prescribes a “titulo Colorado” and
not
VOL. 421, JANUARY 29, 2004 321
Aguirre vs. Court of Appeals
merely “putativo”; a “titulo Colorado” being one ‘which a person has when
he buys a thing, in good faith, from one whom he believes to be the owner,’
and a “titulo putative” “being one which is supposed to have preceded the
acquisition of a thing, although in fact it did not, as might happen when
one is in possession of a thing in the belief that it had been bequeathed to
him.” (Viso Derecho Civil, Parte Segunda, p. 541)35
The requirements for ordinary acquisitive prescription as hereinabove
described have not been met in this case.
It must be remembered that the burden of proving the status of a
purchaser in good faith lies upon him who asserts that status. It is not
sufficient to invoke the ordinary presumption of good faith, that is, that
everyone is presumed to have acted in good faith, since the good faith that
is here essential is integral with the very status that must be
established.36
After a careful examination of the records, we find that private
respondents failed to discharge the burden of proof that Tiburcio Balitaan
was a purchaser in good faith. It is undisputed that Tiburcio practically
lived his entire lifetime in the area where the property in dispute is
located and had been a neighbor of petitioners. He knew that Sixto
Medrano had other siblings because his son, Dr. Elias Balitaan, is the
godson by baptism of spouses Jose Aguirre and Gertrudes Medrano, the
latter being a deceased sister of Sixto. Thus, Tiburcio was not a complete
stranger to the Medrano clan. Yet, he deliberately chose to close his eyes
to said facts and despite his personal knowledge to the contrary, he
purchased the disputed property from Sixto on the basis of the
misrepresentation of the latter in his Affidavit of Transfer that he is the
sole surviving heir of Leocadio. A purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts
which should put a reasonable man upon his guard, and then claim that
he acted in good faith under the belief that there was no defect in the title
of the vendor.37
Since the disputed property is an unregistered land, Tiburcio as buyer
thereof did so at his peril. Private respondents’ claim that Tiburcio bought
the land in good faith, that is, without notice that
37 Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 331 SCRA
267, 290 (2000); Lucena vs. Court of Appeals, 313 SCRA 47, 57 (1999).
322
322 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Aguirre vs. Court of Appeals
some other person has a right to or interest in the property, would not
protect them if it turns out, as it actually did in this case, that the seller,
Sixto Medrano, did not own the entire property at the time of the sale, but
only an undivided portion of the land as a co-owner. Private respondents
failed to show that the petitioners were notified of the subject sale or that
respondents gave their consent to the sale. Not being in “good faith,” the
ten-year period required for ordinary acquisitive prescription does not
apply.
Even the thirty-year period under extraordinary acquisitive
prescription has not been met in this case. Private respondents claim to
have been in possession, in the concept of owner, of the entire parcel of
land sold to Tiburcio Balitaan by Sixto Medrano for only seventeen years
(1958-1975).
In addition, as we have enunciated in Salvador vs. Court of
Appeals,38 to wit:
This Court has held that the possession of a co-owner is like that of a
trustee and shall not be regarded as adverse to the other co-owners but in
fact as beneficial to all of them. Acts which may be considered adverse to
strangers may not be considered adverse insofar as co-owners are
concerned. A mere silent possession by a co-owner, his receipt of rents,
fruits or profits from the property, the erection of buildings and fences and
the planting of trees thereon, and the payment of land taxes, cannot serve
as proof of exclusive ownership, if it is not borne out by clear and
convincing evidence that he exercised acts of possession which
unequivocably constituted an ouster or deprivation of the rights of the
other co-owners.
Thus, in order that a co-owner’s possession may be deemed adverse to
the cestui que trust or the other co-owners, the following elements must
concur: (1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation
amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust or the other co-owners; (2)
that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui
que trust or the other co-owners; and (3) that the evidence thereon must be
clear and convincing.39 (Emphasis supplied)
Tested against these guidelines, respondents failed to present competent
evidence that the acts of Sixto adversely and clearly repudiated the
existing co-ownership among the heirs of Leocadio Medrano.
VOL. 421, JANUARY 29, 2004 323
Aguirre vs. Court of Appeals
Private respondents’ reliance on the tax declaration in the name of Sixto
Medrano is unworthy of credit since we have held on several occasions
that tax declarations by themselves do not conclusively prove title to
land.40 Further, private respondents failed to show that the Affidavit
executed by Sixto to the effect that he is the sole owner of the subject
property was known or made known to the other co-heirs of Leocadio
Medrano.
Neither can we subscribe to the appellate court’s view that petitioners
are guilty of laches. Laches is the negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 41 It does not
involve mere lapse or passage of time, but is principally an impediment to
the assertion or enforcement of a right, which has become under the
circumstances inequitable or unfair to permit.42 The rule that each co-
owner may demand at any time the partition of the common property
implies that an action to demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot be
barred by laches.43
We have consistently held that if a co-owner sells the whole property
as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-
owners who did not consent to the sale. 44 Article 493 of the Civil Code
provides:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and the
fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate,
assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the
alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited
to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership.
324
324 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Aguirre vs. Court of Appeals
It clearly provides that the sale or other disposition affects only the seller’s
share pro indiviso, and the transferee gets only what corresponds to his
grantor’s share in the partition of the property owned in common. Since a
co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire
property by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not
null and void; only the rights of the co-owner/seller are transferred,
thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.45 Accordingly, we
held in Bailon-Casilao vs. Court of Appeals:
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is “entitled to
sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one-co-owner
without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However,
only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the
buyer a co-owner of the property.
The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale
or for the recovery of possession of the thing owned in common from the
third person who substituted the co-owner or co-owners who alienated their
shares, but the DIVISION of the common property as if it continued to
remain in the possession of the co-owners who possessed and administered
it. [Mainit v. Bandoy, supra].
Thus, it is now settled that the appropriate recourse of co-owners in
cases where their consent were not secured in a sale of the entire property
as well as in a sale merely of the undivided shares of some of the co-
owners is an action for PARTITION under Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Neither recovery of possession nor restitution can be granted since
the defendant buyers are legitimate proprietors and possessors in joint
ownership of the common property claimed [Ramirez v. Bautista, supra].46
It is clear therefore that the deed of sale executed by Sixto Medrano in
favor of Tiburcio Balitaan is a valid conveyance only insofar as the share
of Sixto Medrano in the co-ownership is concerned. Thus, the respondent
court erred in declaring the ownership of the entire 1,695-square meter
property sold by Sixto, in favor of the private respondents.
The next question is what is the area of the pro indiviso share
pertaining to Sixto Medrano that was sold to private respondents? The
trial court endeavored to determine the same by ascertaining the
inheritance of each of the heirs of Leocadio. However, the man-
VOL. 421, JANUARY 29, 2004 325
Aguirre vs. Court of Appeals
ner of partition as set out by the trial court in the text of its decision needs
to be amended so as to conform to the laws on intestate succession under
the Old Civil Code absent any allegation or showing that Leocadio left any
last will and testament.
It is not disputed that the 2,342-square meter property was a conjugal
property of Leocadio and Emiliana. Upon the death of Emiliana, which
occurred many years before the death of Leocadio in 1945, both deaths
occurring before the enactment of the New Civil Code in 1950, all the four
children of the first marriage and the four children of the second marriage
shall share equally. The subject property should have been divided into
eight equal parts, pursuant to Articles 921 and 931 of the old Civil
Code,47 or 292.75 square meters each. The respective heirs of the now
deceased children of Leocadio inherit by way of representation the
respective shares of their respective parents, pursuant to Articles 933 and
934 of the Old Civil Code.48
At the time of death of Leocadio in 1945, Miguela was entitled only to
the usufruct of the land pursuant to Article 834 of the Old Civil
Code,49 which provides that “[i]f only one legitimate child or descendant
survives, the widower or widow shall have the usufruct of the third
available for betterment, such child or descendant to
_______________
47 Art. 921. In every inheritance the relative nearest in degree excludes
the one more remote, except in cases in which the right of representation
exists.
Relatives in the same degree shall inherit in equal portions, subject to
the provisions of Article 949 with respect to relationship by the whole
blood.
Art. 931. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the
parents and other ascendants, without distinction of sex or age, even
though they spring from different marriages.
48 Art. 933. The grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by
right or representation, and if any one of them should have died, leaving
several heirs, the portion pertaining to him shall be divided among the
latter in equal portions. Art. 934. Should children and descendants of
other deceased children survive, the former shall inherit in their own
right, and the latter by right of representation.
49 NOW ART. 996 of the New Civil Code, [a widow or widower and
legitimate children or descendants are left, the surviving spouse has in the
succession the same share as that of each of the children].
326
326 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Aguirre vs. Court of Appeals
have the naked ownership until, on the death of the surviving spouse, the
whole title is merged in him.”
Thus, to recapitulate, each of the heirs of Leocadio should inherit
292.75 square meters, pro-indiviso (2,342 square meters ÷ 8 = 292.75
square meters) after deducting from the original 2,611 square meters of
the subject property the 269 square meters ceded to the heirs of Maria
Bacong in a compromise agreement among the petitioners and the heirs of
Maria Bacong. The deceased children of Leocadio are represented by their
respective heirs by right of representation under Articles 933 and 934 of
the Old Civil Code.
Accordingly, the undivided shares of Leocadio’s eight children or their
heirs by right of representation, upon the death of Leocadio in 1945 are as
follows:
(1) Venancio Medrano —292.75
square meters
(2) Leonila Medrano —292.75
square meters
(3) Antonio Medrano —292.75
square meters
(4) Cecilia Medrano —292.75
square meters
(5) Heirs of Gertrudes M. Aguirre, Telesforo, Reynaldo, —292.75 (5) Venancio Medrano —227.04
Remedios, Alfredo and Belen, all surnamed Aguirre square meters square
(6) Heirs of Isabel M. Magtibay, Vicenta, Horacio and —292.75 meters
Florencio, all surnamed Magtibay square meters (6) Leonila Medrano —227.04
(7) Heirs of Placido Medrano, plaintiff Zosima Medrano —292.75 square
Quimbao square meters meters
(8) Sixto Medrano —292.75 (7) Antonio Medrano —227.04
square meters square
meters
During the pendency of the case in the trial court but after the death of (8) Cecilia Medrano —227.04
Sixto, petitioners sold 460 square meters to one Mateo Castillo. square
Consequently, the 460 square meters should be charged against the
meters
shares of petitioners only and should not affect the 292.75 square meters
undivided share of Sixto Medrano which he had sold in (9) Rosendo Bacong —269
1959.50 Accordingly, 460 square meters divided by 7 equals 65.71 square square
meters. Deducting said area from 292.75 square meters, the final meters
undivided share of each of the seven heirs (10) Mateo Castillo —460
square
_______________
meters
50Rollo, pp. 523, 524.
327 WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The assailed decision of the Court
VOL. 421, JANUARY 29, 2004 327 of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 42350, dated July 26, 1995, is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The decision of the Regional Trial Court is
Aguirre vs. Court of Appeals
REINSTATED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
of Leocadio should be 227.04 square meters (292.75 - 65.71 = 227.04) and
The sale in favor of private respondents is declared VALID but only
that pertaining to Sixto in 292.75 square meters.
insofar as the 292.75 square meters undivided share of Sixto Medrano in
Thus, the manner of partition set forth by the trial court in its decision
the subject property is concerned.
should be amended, as follows:
328
(1) Gertrudes M. Aguirre, deceased, represented by her children, —227.04
328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
herein petitioners Telesforo, Reynaldo, Remedios, Alfredo square
Lapulapu Foundation, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
and Belen, all surnamed Aguirre meters
Let the parcel of land, located at Aplaya, Bauan, Batangas, consisting of
(2) Isabel M. Magtibay, deceased,represented by her children, —227.04 2,611 square meters, be partitioned and distributed as determined by the
herein petitioners Vicenta, Horacio and Florencio, all square Court in the text of herein decision. Accordingly, let the records of the case
surnamed Magtibay meters be remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Batangas City (Branch 2) in
(3) Placido Medrano, deceased, represented by his only child, —227.04 Civil Case No. 202 for further appropriate proceedings under Rule 69 of
the Rules of Court.
Placido Medrano square
No pronouncement as to costs.
meters SO ORDERED.
(4) Private respondents Maria Rosales and heirs of Tiburcio —292.75
Balitaan, namely: Elias, Jose, Arsenia and Rogelio all square
surnamed Balitaan (in lieu of Sixto Medrano) meters
 G.R. No. 108228. February 1, 2001.*
SPOUSES MANUEL and SALVACION DEL CAMPO,
petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF JOSE
REGALADO, SR., respondents.
Civil Law; Property; Co-ownership; Mere fact that Salome purportedly
transferred a definite portion of the co-owned lot by metes and bounds to
Soledad does not per se render the sale a nullity.—On the first issue, it
seems plain to us that the trial court concluded that petitioners could not
have acquired ownership of the subject land which originally formed part
of Lot 162, on the ground that their alleged right springs from a void sale
transaction between Salome and Soledad. The mere fact that Salome
purportedly transferred a definite portion of the co-owned lot by metes
________________
* SECOND DIVISION.
2 VOL. 351, FEBRUARY 1, 2001
2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Del Campo vs. Court of Appeals
and bounds to Soledad, however, does not per se render the sale a
nullity. This much is evident under Article 493 of the Civil Code and
pertinent jurisprudence on the matter.
Same; Same; Same; A co-owner has full ownership of his pro-indiviso
share and has the right to alienate, assign or mortgage it, and substitute
another person in its enjoyment.—Salome’s right to sell part of her
undivided interest in the co-owned property is absolute in accordance with
the well-settled doctrine that a co-owner has full ownership of his pro-
indiviso share and has the right to alienate, assign or mortgage it, and
substitute another person in its enjoyment. Since Salome’s clear intention
was to sell merely part of her aliquot share in Lot 162, in our view no valid
objection can be made against it and the sale can be given effect to the full
extent.
Same; Same; Same; Since the co-owner/vendor’s undivided interest
could properly be the object of the contract of sale between the parties, what
the vendee obtains by virtue of such a sale are the same rights as the vendor
had as co-owner.—We are not unaware of the principle that a co-owner
cannot rightfully dispose of a particular portion of a co-owned property
prior to partition among all the co-owners. However, this should not
signify that the vendee does not acquire anything at all in case a
physically segregated area of the co-owned lot is in fact sold to him. Since
the co-owner/vendor’s undivided interest could properly be the object of
the contract of sale between the parties, what the vendee obtains by virtue
of such a sale are the same rights as the vendor had as co-owner, in an
ideal share equivalent to the consideration given under their transaction.
In other words, the vendee steps into the shoes of the vendor as co-owner
and acquires a proportionate abstract share in the property held in
common.
Same; Same; Same; Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided
share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner will only transfer the
rights of said co-owner to the buyer, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of
the property.—Based on the principle that “no one can give what he does
not have,” Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo could not legally sell the shares
pertaining to Soledad since a co-owner cannot alienate more than his
share in the co-ownership. We have ruled many times that even if a co-
owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own
share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale.
Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire
property by one co-owner will only transfer the rights of said co-owner to
the buyer, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.
3
3
Del Campo vs. Court of Appeals
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
De Jesus, Paguio & Associates for petitioners.
Alberto L. Deslate Law Office for private respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas
City, Branch 15 in Civil Case No. V-5369, ordering the dismissal of the
action for repartition, resurvey and reconveyance filed by petitioners.
Pure questions of law are raised in this appeal as the following factual
antecedents are undisputed:
Salome, Consorcia, Alfredo, Maria, Rosalia, Jose, Quirico and Julita,
all surnamed Bornales, were the original co-owners of Lot 162 of the
Cadastral Survey of Ponteverda, Capiz under Original Certificate of Title
No. 18047. As appearing therein, the lot, which consisted of a total area of
27,170 square meters was divided in aliquot shares among the eight (8) co-
owners as follows:
Salome Bornales 4/16
Consorcia Bornales 4/16
Alfredo Bornales 2/16
Maria Bornales 2/16
Jose Bornales 1/16
Quirico Bornales 1/16
Rosalia Bornales 1/16
Julita Bornales 1/16
On July 14, 1940, Salome sold part of her 4/16 share in Lot 162 for
P200.00 to Soledad Daynolo. In the Deed of Absolute Sale signed by
Salome and two other co-owners, Consorcia and Alfredo, the portion of Lot
162 sold to Soledad was described as having more or less the following
measurements:
4 Buenvenida, and two of her children, Rosemarie and Antonio. Josefina
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Del Campo vs. Court of Appeals
63-1/2 meters from point “9” to “10,” 35 meters from point “10” to point
“11”, 30 meters from point “11” to a certain point parallel to a line drawn
from points “9” to “10”; and then from this “Certain Point” to point “9” and
as shown in the accompanying sketch, and made an integral part of this
deed, to SOLEDAD DAYNOLO, her heirs and assigns.1
Thereafter, Soledad Daynolo immediately took possession of the land
described above and built a house thereon. A few years later, Soledad and
her husband, Simplicio Distajo, mortgaged the subject portion of Lot 162
as security for a P400.00 debt to Jose Regalado, Sr. This transaction was
evidenced by a Deed of Mortgage2 dated May 1, 1947.
On April 14, 1948, three of the eight co-owners of Lot 162, specifically,
Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo, sold 24,993 square meters of said lot to
Jose Regalado, Sr.
On May 4, 1951, Simplicio Distajo, heir of Soledad Daynolo who had
since died, paid the mortgage debt and redeemed the mortgaged portion of
Lot 162 from Jose Regalado, Sr. The latter, in turn, executed a Deed of
Discharge of Mortgage3 in favor of Soledad’s heirs, namely: Simplicio
Distajo, Rafael Distajo and Teresita Distajo-Regalado. On same date, the
said heirs sold the redeemed portion of Lot 162 for P1,500.00 to herein
petitioners, the spouses Manuel Del Campo and Salvacion Quiachon.
Meanwhile, Jose Regalado, Sr. caused the reconstitution of Original
Certificate of Title No. 18047. The reconstituted OCT No. RO-4541
initially reflected the shares of the original co-owners in Lot 162. However,
title was transferred later to Jose Regalado, Sr. who subdivided the entire
property into smaller lots, each covered by a respective title in his name.
One of these small lots is Lot No. 162-C-6 with an area of 11,732 square
meters which was registered on February 24, 1977 under TCT No. 14566.
In 1987, petitioners Manuel and Salvacion del Campo brought this
complaint for “repartition, resurvey and reconveyance” against the heirs of
the now deceased Jose Regalado, Sr. Petitioners
VOL. 351, FEBRUARY 1, 2001 5
Del Campo vs. Court of Appeals
claimed that they owned an area of 1,544 square meters located within Lot
162-C-6 which was erroneously included in TCT No. 14566 in the name of
Regalado. Petitioners alleged that they occupied the disputed area as
residential dwelling ever since they purchased the property from the
Distajos way back in 1951. They also declared the land for taxation
purposes and paid the corresponding taxes.
On April 1, 1987, summons were served on Regalado’s widow, Josefina
and Rosemarie were declared in default on May 10, 1989 because only
Antonio filed an answer to the complaint.
During trial, petitioners presented the Deed of Absolute Sale 4 executed
between Soledad Daynolo and Salome Bornales as well as the Deed of
Mortgage5 and Deed of Discharge6 signed by Jose Regalado, Sr. The Deed
of Absolute Sale7 showing the purchase by the Del Campos of the property
from the Distajos was likewise given in evidence.
Despite the filing of an answer, Antonio failed to present any evidence
to refute the claim of petitioners. Thus, after considering Antonio to have
waived his opportunity to present evidence, the trial court deemed the
case submitted for decision.
On November 20, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing
the complaint. It held that while Salome could alienate her pro-
indiviso share in Lot 162, she could not validly sell an undivided part
thereof by metes and bounds to Soledad, from whom petitioners derived
their title. The trial court also reasoned that petitioners could not have a
better right to the property even if they were in physical possession of the
same and declared the property for taxation purposes, because mere
possession cannot defeat the right of the Regalados who had
a Torrens title over the land.
6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Del Campo vs. Court of Appeals
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment, with
no pronouncement as to costs.8
Petitioners now seek relief from this Court and maintain that:
I.
THE FACT THAT THE SALE OF THE SUBJECT PORTION
CONSTITUTES A SALE OF A CONCRETE OR DEFINITE PORTION OF
LAND OWNED IN COMMON DOES NOT ABSOLUTELY DEPRIVE
HEREIN PETITIONERS OF ANY RIGHT OR TITLE THERETO;
 II.
IN ANY EVENT, HEREIN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE ALL
ESTOPPED FROM DENYING THE RIGHT AND TITLE OF HEREIN
PETITIONERS.9
In resolving petitioners’ appeal, we must answer the following questions:
Would the sale by a co-owner of a physical portion of an undivided
property held in common be valid? Is respondent estopped from denying
petitioners’ right and title over the disputed area? Under the facts and
circumstances duly established by the evidence, are petitioners entitled to
‘repartition, resurvey and reconveyance’ of the property in question?
On the first issue, it seems plain to us that the trial court concluded
that petitioners could not have acquired ownership of the subject land
which originally formed part of Lot 162, on the ground that their alleged
right springs from a void sale transaction between Salome and Soledad.
The mere fact that Salome purportedly transferred a definite portion of
the co-owned lot by metes and bounds to Soledad, however, does not per
se render the sale a nullity. This much is evident under Article 493 10 of the
Civil Code and
10 Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and
of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore
alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the
alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited
7
VOL. 351, FEBRUARY 1, 2001 7 and Alfredo could not have sold the entire Lot 162 to Jose Regalado, Sr. on
Del Campo vs. Court of Appeals
pertinent jurisprudence on the matter. More particularly in Lopez vs. Vda.
De Cuaycong, et al.11 which we find relevant, the Court, speaking through
Mr. Justice Bocobo, held that:
. . . The fact that the agreement in question purported to sell a concrete
portion of the hacienda does not render the sale void, for it is a well-
established principle that the binding force of a contract must be
recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so. “Quando res non valet ut
ago, valeat quantum valere potest.” (When a thing is of no force as I do it,
it shall have as much force as it can have.)12
Applying this principle to the instant case, there can be no doubt that the
transaction entered into by Salome and Soledad could be legally
recognized in its entirety since the object of the sale did not even exceed
the ideal shares held by the former in the co-ownership. As a matter of
fact, the deed of sale executed between the parties expressly stipulated
that the portion of Lot 162 sold to Soledad would be taken from Salome’s
4/16 undivided interest in said lot, which the latter could validly transfer
in whole or in part even without the consent of the other co-owners.
Salome’s right to sell part of her undivided interest in the co-owned
properly is absolute in accordance with the well-settled doctrine that a co-
owner has full ownership of his pro-indiviso share and has the right to
alienate, assign or mortgage it, and substitute another person in its
enjoyment.13 Since Salome’s clear intention was to sell merely part of her
aliquot share in Lot 162, in our view no valid objection can be made
against it and the sale can be given effect to the foil extent.
We are not unaware of the principle that a co-owner cannot rightfully
dispose of a particular portion of a co-owned property prior to partition
among all the co-owners. However, this should not signify that the vendee
does not acquire anything at all in case a physically segregated area of the
co-owned lot is in fact sold to him. Since the co-owner/vendor’s undivided
interest could properly to the portion which may be allotted to him in the
division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
8 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Del Campo vs. Court of Appeals
be the object of the contract of sale between the parties, what the vendee
obtains by virtue of such a sale are the same rights as the vendor had as
co-owner, in an ideal share equivalent to the consideration given under
their transaction. In other words, the vendee steps into the shoes of the
vendor as co-owner and acquires a proportionate abstract share in the
property held in common.
Resultantly, Soledad became a co-owner of Lot 162 as of the year 1940
when the sale was made in her favor. It follows that Salome, Consorcia
April 14, 1948 because at that time, the ideal shares held by the three co-
owners/vendors were equivalent to only 10/16 of the undivided
property less the aliquot share previously sold by Salome to Soledad. Based
on the principle that “no one can give what he does not have,” 14 Salome,
Consorcia and Alfredo could not legally sell the shares pertaining to
Soledad since a co-owner cannot alienate more than his share in the co-
ownership. We have ruled many times that even if a co-owner sells the
whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those
of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. Since a co-owner is
entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-
owner will only transfer the rights of said co-owner to the buyer, thereby
making the buyer a co-owner of the property.15
In this case, Regalado merely became a new co-owner of Lot 162 to the
extent of the shares which Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo could validly
convey. Soledad retained her rights as co-owner and could validly transfer
her share to petitioners in 1951. The logical effect of the second disposition
is to substitute petitioners in the rights of Soledad as co-owner of the land.
Needless to say, these rights are preserved notwithstanding the issuance
of TCT No. 14566 in Regalado’s name in 1977.
Be that as it may, we find that the area subject matter of this petition
had already been effectively segregated from the ’mother lot’ even before
title was issued in favor of Regalado. It must be noted that 26 years had
lapsed from the time petitioners bought
9 subject portion from Salome since he could not have reasonably accepted
VOL. 351, FEBRUARY 1, 2001 9 the lot as security for the mortgage debt if such were not the case. By
Del Campo vs. Court of Appeals
and took possession of the property in 1951 until Regalado procured the
issuance of TCT No. 14566. Additionally, the intervening years between
the date of petitioners’ purchase of the property and 1987 when petitioners
filed the instant complaint, comprise all of 36 years. However, at no
instance during this time did respondents or Regalado, for that matter,
question petitioners’ right over the land in dispute. In the case of Vda. de
Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals,16 we had occasion to hold that where the
transferees of an undivided portion of the land allowed a co-owner of the
property to occupy a definite portion thereof and had not disturbed the
same for a period too long to be ignored, the possessor is in a better
condition or right than said transferees. (Potior est condition
possidentis). Such undisturbed possession had the effect of a partial
partition of the co-owned property which entitles the possessor to the
definite portion which he occupies. Conformably, petitioners are entitled to
the disputed land, having enjoyed uninterrupted possession thereof for a
total of 49 years up to the present.
The lower court’s reliance on the doctrine that mere possession cannot
defeat the right of a holder of a registered Torrens title over property is
misplaced, considering that petitioners were deprived of their dominical
rights over the said lot through fraud and with evident bad faith on the
part of Regalado. Failure and intentional omission to disclose the fact of
actual physical possession by another person during registration
proceedings constitutes actual fraud. Likewise, it is fraud to knowingly
omit or conceal a fact, upon which benefit is obtained to the prejudice of a
third person.17 In this case, we are convinced that Regalado knew of the
fact that he did not have a title to the entire lot and could not, therefore,
have validly registered the same in his name alone because he was aware
of petitioners’ possession of the subject portion as well as the sale between
Salome and Soledad.
That Regalado had notice of the fact that the disputed portion of Lot
162 was under claim of ownership by petitioners and the latter’s
predecessor is beyond question. Records show that the par-
10
10 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Del Campo vs. Court of Appeals
ticular area subject of this case was mortgaged by Soledad and her
husband to Jose Regalado, Sr. as early as May 1, 1947 or one year prior to
the alienation of the whole lot in favor of the latter. Regalado never
questioned the ownership of the lot given by Soledad as security for the
P400.00 debt and he must have at least known that Soledad bought the
accepting the said portion of Lot 162 as security for the mortgage
obligation, Regalado had in fact recognized Soledad’s ownership of this
definite portion of Lot 162. Regalado could not have been ignorant of the
fact that the disputed portion is being claimed by Soledad and
subsequently, by petitioners, since Regalado even executed a Release of
Mortgage on May 4, 1951, three years after the entire property was
supposedly sold to him. It would certainly be illogical for any mortgagee to
accept property as security, purchase the mortgaged property and,
thereafter, claim the very same property as his own while the mortgage
was still subsisting.
Consequently, respondents are estopped from asserting that they own
the subject land in view of the Deed of Mortgage and Discharge of
Mortgage executed between Regalado and petitioners’ predecessor-in-
interest. As petitioners correctly contend, respondents are barred from
making this assertion under the equitable principle of estoppel by
deed, whereby a party to a deed and his privies are precluded from
asserting as against the other and his privies any right or title in
derogation of the deed, or from denying the truth of any material fact
asserted in it.18 A perusal of the documents evidencing the mortgage
would readily reveal that Soledad, as mortgagor, had declared herself
absolute owner of the piece of land now being litigated. This declaration of
fact was accepted by Regalado as mortgagee and accordingly, his heirs
cannot now be permitted to deny it.
Although Regalado’s certificate of title became indefeasible after the
lapse of one year from the date of the decree of registration, the
attendance of fraud in its issuance created an implied trust in favor
_______________
18Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated, 1989 Edition, Edgardo L.
Paras, p. 776 citing 31 CJS 195.
11
VOL. 351, FEBRUARY 1, 2001 11
Del Campo vs. Court of Appeals
of petitioners and gave them the right to seek reconveyance of the parcel
wrongfully obtained by the former. An action for reconveyance based on an
implied trust ordinarily prescribes in ten years. But when the right of the
true and real owner is recognized, expressly or implicitly such as when he
remains undisturbed in his possession, the said action is imprescriptible,
it being in the nature of a suit for quieting of title. 19 Having established by
clear and convincing evidence that they are the legal owners of the
litigated portion included in TCT No. 14566, it is only proper that
reconveyance of the property be ordered in favor of petitioners. The alleged
incontrovertibility of Regalado’s title cannot be successfully invoked by
respondents because certificates of title merely confirm or record title
already existing and cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true
owner or be used as a shield for the commission of fraud. 20
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 30438 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The parties are directed to cause a SURVEY for exact
determination of their respective portions in Lot 162-C-6. Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 14566 is declared CANCELLED and the Register of
Deeds of Capiz is ordered to ISSUE a new title in accordance with said
survey, upon finality of this decision.
Costs against respondents.
SO ORDERED.
 VOL. 391, NOVEMBER 14, 2002 653
Fernandez vs. Tarun
G.R. No. 143868. November 14, 2002.*
OSCAR C. FERNANDEZ, GIL C. FERNANDEZ and ARMANDO C.
FERNANDEZ, petitioners, vs. Spouses CARLOS and NARCISA TARUN,
respondents.
Civil Law; Property; Sales; Redemption; The right of redemption may
be availed of by a co-owner, only when the shares of the other owners are
sold to a third person; There is no legal redemption, either in case of a mere
lease and if the purchaser is also a tenant.—In Basa v. Aguilar, this Court
has unequivocally ruled that the right of redemption may be availed of by
a co-owner, only when the shares of the other owners are sold to a third
person. “Legal redemption is in the nature of a privilege created by law
partly for reasons of public policy and partly for the benefit and
convenience of the redemptioner, to afford him a way out of what might be
a disagreeable or [an] inconvenient association into which he has been
thrust. (10 Manresa, 4th. Ed., 317.) It is intended to minimize
coownership. The law grants a co-owner the exercise of the said right of
redemption when the shares of the other owners are sold to a ‘third
person.’ ” There is no legal redemption, either in case of a mere lease and
if the purchaser is also a tenant.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Code merely provides that a deed of
sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied
by an affidavit that a written notice has been given to all possible
redemptioners; It does not state that, by reason of such lack of notice, the
sale shall become void.—Equally unavailing is petitioners’ contention that
the sale was void, because the vendor had not sent any notice in writing to
the other co-owners as required under Article 1625 of the Code. Indeed,
the Code merely provides that a deed of sale shall not be recorded in the
Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit that a written
notice has been given to all possible redemptioners. However, it does not
state that, by reason of such lack of notice, the sale shall become void.
Same; Same; Same; Jurisprudence affirms the need for notice, but its
form has been the subject of varying interpretations.—Jurisprudence
affirms the need for notice, but its form has been the subject of varying
interpretations. Conejero v. Court of Appeals held that a written notice
was still required, even if the redemptioner had actual prior knowledge of
the sale. However, in Distrito v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that
_______________
*THIRD DIVISION.
654
6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
54
Fernandez vs. Tarun
written notice was not necessary, if the co-owner was actually aware
of the sale. While the law requires that the notice must be in writing, it
does not prescribe any particular form, so long as the reasons for a written
notice are satisfied otherwise. Thus, in a civil case for collection of a share
in the rentals by an alleged buyer of a co-owned property, the receipt of a
summons by a co-owner has been held to constitute actual knowledge of
the sale. On that basis, the co-owner may exercise the right of redemption
within 30 days from the finality of the decision.
Same; Same; Same; Mortgage; Circumstances where a document is
considered a contract of equitable mortgage; For the presumption of an
equitable mortgage to arise, one must first satisfy the requirement that the
parties entered into a contract denominated as a contract of sale, and that
their intention was to secure an existing debt by way of mortgage.—On its
face, a document is considered a contract of equitable mortgage when the
circumstances enumerated in Article 1602 of the Civil Code are manifest,
as follows: (a) when the price of the sale with the right to repurchase is
unusually inadequate, and (b) when the vendor remains in possession as
lessee or otherwise. Although it is undisputed that Angel Fernandez was
in actual possession of the property, it is important to note that he did not
sell it to respondents. The sellers were his co-owners—Antonio and
Demetria Fernandez—who, however, are not claiming that the sale
between them was an equitable mortgage. For the presumption of an
equitable mortgage to arise, one must first satisfy the requirement that
the parties entered into a contract denominated as a contract of sale, and
that their intention was to secure an existing debt by way of mortgage.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Unless the price is grossly inadequate or
shocking to the conscience, a sale is not set aside.—Furthermore, mere
alleged inadequacy of the price does not necessarily void a contract of sale,
although the inadequacy may indicate that there was a defect in the
consent, or that the parties really intended a donation, mortgage, or some
other act or contract. Finally, unless the price is grossly inadequate or
shocking to the conscience, a sale is not set aside.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the Opinion of the Court.
Oscar C. Fernandez for petitioners.
Fernando P. Cabrera for private respondents.
655
VOL. 391, NOVEMBER 14, 2002 655
 Fernandez vs. Tarun
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The right of redemption may be exercised by a co-owner, only when part of
the community property is sold to a stranger. When the portion is sold to a
co-owner, the right does not arise because a new participant is not added
to the co-ownership.
The Case
The Petition for Review on Certiorari before us challenges the July 7, 2000
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) 1 in CA-GR CV No. 55264, which
reversed the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City (Branch 44)
in Civil Case No. D-3815.2 The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
“WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and a NEW ONE is
entered:
“1. Ordering the partition of Lot 2991 in the proportion stated in
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 24440, that is: Angel Fernandez, married
to Corazon Cabal—7,114.46 sqm; spouses Carlos Tarun and Narcisa
Zareno—1094.54 sqm.
“The costs of the subdivision shall be equitably shared by plaintiffs-
appellants and defendants-appellees.
“2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Dagupan City to issue a separate
transfer certificate of title each to plaintiffs-appellants and defendants-
appellees corresponding to their respective shares upon completion of the
partition.3
The Facts
The antecedent facts of the case are narrated in the assailed CA Decision
as follows:
“An 8,209-square meter fishpond situated at Arellano-Bani, Dagupan City
is disputed by [Respondents] Carlos Tarun and Narcisa Zareno,
_______________
1 Fifteenth Division. Penned by Justice Ruben T. Reyes (Division
chairman) and concurred in by Justices Candido V. Rivera and Jose L.
Sabio, Jr. (members).
2 Written by Judge Crispin C. Laron; Records, pp. 298-305.
3 Rollo, pp. 32-33.
656
656 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Fernandez vs. Tarun
and [Petitioners] Corazon Cabal vda. de Fernandez and her children
Oscar, Gil and Armando, all surnamed Fernandez.
“The property is known as Lot No. 2991 of the Cadastral Survey of
Dagupan. It was originally covered by OCT No. 43099, subsequently
cancelled by TCT No. 24440. The brothers Antonio, Santiago, Demetria
and Angel Fernandez, together with their uncle Armando, co-owned this
property to the extent of 1/6 thereof.4 It was subsequently increased to 1/5
on account of the 1/6 share of Armando, who died single and without issue,
which accrued in favor of the five remaining co-owners.
“On June 4, 1967, Antonio Fernandez sold his share of about 547.27
square meters to [the Spouses] Tarun (Exh. “I”). 5 On June 18, 1967,
Demetria Fernandez, also sold her share on the same fishpond consisting
of 547.27 square meters to [respondents].6 Thus, the total area sold to
[respondents] is 1094.54 square meters, more or less. The two sales were
registered and annotated on OCT No. 43099.
“On November 14, 1969, the co-owners of the subject fishpond and
another fishpond covered by TCT No. 10944 executed a Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition of two parcels of registered land with exchange of
shares. Among the parties to the deed are Antonio, Santiago, Demetria
and Angel, all surnamed Fernandez.
“It was stipulated in the deed that the parties recognize and respect
the sale of a portion of Lot 2991 consisting of 1094.54 square meters
previously sold by Antonio and Demetria Fernandez in favor of
[respondents]. This portion was excluded in the partition.
“Likewise, by virtue of the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, Angel B.
Fernandez exchanged his share on the other fishpond covered by TCT No.
10944 to the shares of his co-owners on the remaining portion of [L]ot No.
2991 covered by TCT No. 10945, making Angel B. Fernandez and
[respondents] as co-owners of Lot No. 2991.
“By virtue of the terms and conditions set forth in the Deed, TCT No.
24440 of the Registry of Deed[s] of Dagupan City, (Exh. ‘A’) was issued in
favor of Angel B. Fernandez and [respondents]. From the time the latter
bought the 1094.54 square meter portion of the fishpond, they had been
paying the realty taxes thereon. However, it was Angel B. Fernandez and
_______________
4 Actually, the property was co-owned by Jose, Amando (not Armando),
Miguel, Paz, Angel and Aurelio Fernandez (Records, pp. 13-14). Antonio,
Demetria and Santiago are the children of Aurelio Fernandez, while
petitioners are the children of Angel Fernandez.
5 Records, p. 132.
6 Id., p. 131.
657
VOL. 391, NOVEMBER 14, 2002 657
Fernandez vs. Tarun
later on his heirs, [petitioners], who remained in possession of the entire
fishpond.
“When Angel B. Fernandez was still alive, [respondents] sought the
partition of the property and their share of its income. Angel Fernandez
refused to heed their demand. After the death of Angel Fernandez,
[respondents] wrote [petitioners] of their desire for partition but this was
rejected by [petitioners]. Hence, this suit for partition and damages.” 7
Ruling of the RTC
On August 1, 1996, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of petitioners,
ruling that, under Articles 1620 and 1621 of the Civil Code, they were
entitled to redeem the property that they had sold to respondents. It
further held that the sale was highly iniquitous and void for respondent’s
failure to comply with Article 1623 of the same code.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Reversing the RTC, the CA held that petitioners were not entitled to
redeem the controversial property for several reasons. First, it was Angel
Fernandez who was its co-owner at the time of the sale; hence, he was the
one entitled to receive notice and to redeem the property, but he did not
choose to exercise that right. Second, the execution of the Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition was a substantial compliance with the notice
requirement under the law. Finally, it was too late in the day to declare
the exchange highly iniquitous, when Angel Fernandez had not
complained about it. As his successors-in-interest, petitioners were bound
by the terms of the agreement.
Hence, this Petition.8
Issues
In their Memorandum,9 petitioners raise the following issues.
658 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Fernandez vs. Tarun
1. “1.Whether or not petitioners are entitled to exercise their right of
legal redemption.
2. “2.Whether or not the transaction is one of equitable mortgage.
3. “3.Whether or not the deed of extra-judicial partition is void and
inefficacious.
4. “4.Whether or not petitioners are entitled to damages, attorney’s
fees and costs.
5. “5.Whether or not the lower court committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it substituted
its surmises, conjectures and guesswork in place of the trial
court’s findings of fact borne by the evidence on record.”10
This Court’s Ruling
The Petition is not meritorious.
First Issue:
Entitlement to Legal Redemption
Petitioners aver that the sale to respondents is void, because it did not
comply with the requirements of the Civil Code. According to them, they
were not notified of the sale, but learned about it only when they received
the summons for the partition case. They claim their right to redeem the
property under the following provisions of the Civil Code:
“Article 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption
in case the shares of all the other co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a
third person. If the price of the alienation is grossly excessive, the
redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one.
“Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of
redemption, they may only do so in proportion to the share they may
respectively have in the thing owned in common.”
“Article 1621. The owners of adjoining lands shall also have the right of
redemption when a piece of rural land, the area of which does not exceed
one hectare, is alienated, unless the grantee does not own any rural land.
_______________
10Petitioners’ Memorandum, pp. 4-5; Rollo, pp. 85-86.
659
VOL. 391, NOVEMBER 14, 2002 659
Fernandez vs. Tarun
“The right is not applicable to adjacent lands which are separated by
brooks, drains, ravines, roads and other apparent servitudes for the
benefit of other estates.
“If two or more adjoining owners desire to exercise the right of
redemption at the same time, the owner of the adjoining land of smaller
area shall be preferred; and should both lands have the same area, the one
who first requested the redemption.
xxx xxx xxx
“Article 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be
exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the
prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale
shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by
an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all
possible redemptioners.
“The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining
owners.”
We disagree with petitioners. True, the right to redeem is granted not only
to the original co-owners, but also to all those who subsequently acquire
their respective shares while the community subsists. 11 However, it must
be stressed that this right of redemption is available only when part of the
co-owned property is sold to a third person. Otherwise put, the right to
redeem referred to in Article 1620 applies only when a portion is sold to a
non-co-owner.
In this case, it is quite clear that respondents are petitioners’ coowners.
The sale of the contested property to Spouses Tarun had long been
consummated before petitioners succeeded their predecessor, Angel
Fernandez. By the time petitioners entered into the co-ownership,
respondents were no longer “third persons,” but had already become co-
owners of the whole property. A third person, within the meaning of
Article 1620, is anyone who is not a coowner.12
In Basa v. Aguilar,13 this Court has unequivocally ruled that the right
of redemption may be availed of by a co-owner, only when the
_______________
660
660 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Fernandez vs. Tarun
shares of the other owners are sold to a third person. “Legal redemption is
in the nature of a privilege created by law partly for reasons of public
policy and partly for the benefit and convenience of the redemptioner, to
afford him a way out of what might be a disagreeable or [an] inconvenient
association into which he has been thrust. (10 Manresa, 4th. Ed., 317.) It
is intended to minimize co-ownership. The law grants a co-owner the
exercise of the said right of redemption when the shares of the other
owners are sold to a ‘third person.’”14 There is no legal redemption, either
in case of a mere lease15 and if the purchaser is also a tenant.16
Equally unavailing is petitioners’ contention that the sale was void,
because the vendor had not sent any notice in writing to the other co-
owners as required under Article 1625 of the Code. Indeed, the Code
merely provides that a deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of
Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit that a written notice has
been given to all possible redemptioners. However, it does not state that,
by reason of such lack of notice, the sale shall become void.
Jurisprudence affirms the need for notice, but its form has been the
subject of varying interpretations. Conejero v. Court of Appeals17 held that
a written notice was still required, even if the redemptioner had actual
prior knowledge of the sale. However, in Distrito v. Court of Appeals,18 the
Court ruled that written notice was not necessary, if the co-owner was
actually aware of the sale. While the law requires that the notice must be
in writing, it does not prescribe any particular form, so long as
the reasons for a written notice are satisfied otherwise.19 Thus, in a civil
case for collection of a share in the rentals by an alleged buyer of a co-
owned property, the receipt of a summons by a co-owner has been held to
constitute actual knowledge of the sale. On that basis, the co-owner
VOL. 391, NOVEMBER 14, 2002 661
Fernandez vs. Tarun
may exercise the right of redemption within 30 days from the finality of
the decision.20
Applying the presently prevailing principles discussed above,
petitioners’ predecessor—Angel Fernandez—is deemed to have been given
notice of the sale to respondents by the execution and signing of the Deed
of Extrajudicial Partition and Exchange of Shares. As correctly held by the
CA, the law does not require any specific form of written notice to the
redemptioner.21 From such time, he had 30 days within which to redeem
the property sold under Article 1623. The Deed was executed November 4,
1969; hence, the period to redeem expired on December 4, 1969.
Consequently, the right to redeem was deemed waived, and petitioners are
bound by such inaction of their predecessor. The former cannot now be
allowed to exercise the right and adopt a stance contrary to that taken by
the latter. Otherwise stated, the right to redeem had long expired during
the lifetime of the predecessor and may no longer be exercised by
petitioners who are his successors-in-interest.
Second Issue:
Sale or Equitable Mortgage?
Petitioners contend that the sale was only an equitable mortgage because
(1) the price was grossly inadequate, and (2) the vendors remained in
possession of the land and enjoyed its fruits. Since the property is situated
primely within the city proper, the price of P7,662 for 1,094.54 square
meters is supposedly unconscionable. Moreover, since June 4, 1967 up to
the present, the vendees (or herein respondents) have allegedly never been
in actual possession of the land.
The contention is untenable. On its face, a document is considered a
contract of equitable mortgage when the circumstances enumerated in
Article 1602 of the Civil Code are manifest, as follows: (a) when the price
of the sale with the right to repurchase is
662
662 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Fernandez vs. Tarun
unusually inadequate,22 and (b) when the vendor remains in possession as
lessee or otherwise.23 Although it is undisputed that Angel Fernandez was
in actual possession of the property, it is important to note that he did not
sell it to respondents. The sellers were his co-owners—Antonio and
Demetria Fernandez—who, however, are not claiming that the sale
between them was an equitable mortgage. For the presumption of an
equitable mortgage to arise, one must first satisfy the requirement that
the parties entered into a contract denominated as a contract of sale, and
that their intention was to secure an existing debt by way of mortgage. 24
Furthermore, mere alleged inadequacy of the price does not necessarily
void a contract of sale, although the inadequacy may indicate that there
was a defect in the consent, or that the parties really intended a donation,
mortgage, or some other act or contract.25 Finally, unless the price is
grossly inadequate or shocking to the conscience, 26 a sale is not set aside.
In this case, petitioners failed to establish the fair market value of the
property when it was sold in 1967. Hence, there is no basis to conclude
that the price was grossly inadequate or shocking to the conscience.
Third Issue:
Validity of the Extrajudicial Partition
Petitioners also assail the partition as lopsided and iniquitous. They argue
that their predecessor stood to lose 5,498.14 square meters under the
extrajudicial partition.
We are not convinced. It is a long-established doctrine that the law will
not relieve parties from the effects of an unwise, foolish or disastrous
agreement they entered into with all the required formalities and with full
awareness of what they were doing. Courts have no power to relieve them
from obligations they voluntarily assumed, simply because their contracts
turn out to be disastrous
663
VOL. 391, NOVEMBER 14, 2002 663
Fernandez vs. Tarun
deals or unwise investments.27 Neither the law nor the courts will
extricate them from an unwise or undesirable contract which they entered
into with all the required formalities and with full knowledge of its
consequences.28 On the other hand, petitioners herein are bound by the
extrajudicial partition, because contracts not only take effect between the
parties, but also extend to their assigns and heirs.29
Moreover, if petitioners intended to annul the extrajudicial partition
for being “lopsided and iniquitous,” then they should have argued this in a
proper action and forum. They should have filed an action to annul the
extrajudicial partition and claimed their rightful share in the estate,
impleading therein the other signatories to the Deed and not just herein
respondents.
In any event, a perusal of the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with
Exchange of Shares reveals that the partition of Lot Nos. 2991 and 2924
was done equally and fairly. Indeed, 1,641.80 square meters of Lot No.
299130 and 10,971.80 square meters of Lot No. 2924-B31 were originally
given to all the co-owners—except Antonio, Demetria and Santiago
Fernandez, who had already sold parts of their share to third persons.
However, Angel Fernandez agreed and stipulated in the same Deed that
he had traded his share in Lot No. 2924-B for the entire Lot No. 2991,
except the portion already sold to respondents.32
Taking these stipulations into consideration, we are inclined to believe
that the swapping of shares by the heirs was more favorable to the late
Angel Fernandez, because his ownership became
664
664 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Fernandez vs. Tarun
contiguous and compact in only one fishpond, instead of being merely
shared with the other co-heirs in two different fishponds.33
Fourth Issue:
Damages and Attorney’s Fees
Petitioners’ claim that they are entitled to P50,000 as attorney’s fees and
damages deserves scant consideration. It has been clearly established that
respondents are co-owners of the subject property. Under Article 494 of
the Civil Code, each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the
thing owned in common. Hence, respondents’ action for partition was not
an unfounded suit. Verily, it was founded on a right given by law.
Fifth Issue:
Factual Findings of the CA
Petitioners insist that the CA made some factual findings that were
neither in conformity with those of the RTC nor borne by the evidence on
record. They assert that the appellate court erred in ruling that the
extrajudicial partition had been freely and willfully entered into when, in
fact, Angel B. Fernandez had been shortchanged by 5,498.14 square
meters. They also contend that the registration of the two Deeds of Sale in
favor of respondents was not valid, because it was not accompanied by an
affidavit that written notice had been served to all possible redemptioners.
We are not persuaded. We do not find any factual or legal basis to
conclude that the extrajudicial partition was iniquitous, and that the sale
of Antonio and Demetria’s share in Lot No. 2991 is void. Factual findings
of the CA supported by substantial evidence are conclusive and
binding,34 unless they fall under the exceptions in Fuentes v. Court of
Appeals35 and similar cases.
_______________
33 Respondents’ Memorandum, Rollo, p. 108.
 34 Bañas v. Court of Appeals, 325 SCRA 259, 271, February 10,
2000; Maxi v. Court of Appeals, 332 SCRA 475, 480-481, May 31,
2000; Heirs of Tan Eng Kee v. Court of Appeals, 341 SCRA 740, 748,
October 3, 2000.
35 268 SCRA 703, 708-709, February 26, 1997.

665
VOL. 391, NOVEMBER 15, 2002 665
Re: Habitual Tardiness First Semester 2002
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Fangonil-Herrera vs. Fangonil
G.R. No. 169356. August 28, 2007.*
CARMEN FANGONIL-HERRERA, petitioner, vs. TOMAS FANGONIL,
PURA FANGONIL TINO, MARINA FANGONIL, MARIANO FANGONIL,
MILAGROS FANGONILLAYUG and VICTORIA FANGONIL
ESTOQUE,1 respondents.
Remedial Law; Appeals; The appeal from a final disposition of the
Court of Appeals is a petition for review under Rule 45 and not a special
civil action under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.— Although
petitioner erroneously impleaded the Court of Appeals as one of the
respondents, petitioner clearly and rightly invoked Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court as the remedy availed of. As we held in National Irrigation
Administration v. Court of Appeals, 318 SCRA 255 (1999), the appeal from
a final disposition of the Court of Appeals is a petition for review under
Rule 45 and not a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, decisions, final orders
or resolutions of the Court of Appeals, regardless of the nature of the
action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to us by filing a petition
for review, which would be but a continuation of the appellate process over
the original case. The correct procedure is not to implead the Court of
Appeals.
Same; Certiorari; In appeals by certiorari before the Supreme Court,
questions of fact may not be raised unless the case falls under any of the
exceptions.—Under Section 1, Rule 45, providing for appeals
by certiorari before the Supreme Court, it is clearly enunciated that only
questions of law may be set forth.Questions of fact may not be raised
unless the case falls under any of the following exceptions: (1) when the
findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2)
when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;
(3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based
on a misapprehension of
_______________
THIRD DIVISION.
*
The Court of Appeals was removed from the original title of the case
1
in compliance with the requirements under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules
of Court.
487
VOL. 531, AUGUST 28, 2007 487
Fangonil-Herrera vs. Fangonil
facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making
its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its
findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the
appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8)
when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as
in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.
Same; Same; Factual findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive
on the parties and carry even more weight when the said court affirms the
factual findings of the trial court.—In the exercise of the Supreme Court’s
power of review, this Court is not a trier of facts, and unless there are
excepting circumstances, it does not routinely undertake the re-
examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during
the trial of the case. Factual matters are beyond the jurisdiction of this
Court. In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court, this Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of
fact, unless the factual findings complained of are devoid of support by the
evidence on record or the assailed judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts. As held in Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 275 SCRA 261 (1997), factual findings of the Court of Appeals are
conclusive on the parties and carry even more weight when the said court
affirms the factual findings of the trial court. Absent any palpable error or
arbitrariness, the findings of fact of the lower court are conclusive. On this
ground alone, the appeal warrants a dismissal.
Civil Law; Property; Ownership; The fact that it was petitioner’s
money that was used for the repurchase of the properties does not make her
the owner thereof, in the absence of convincing proof that would indicate
such; Although the Court recognizes that real tax receipts indicating
payment of realty tax and possession of the parcels are indicia of
ownership, such are not conclusive proof of ownership in the absence of
other circumstances and evidence showing otherwise.—After a thorough
examination of the cases cited by petitioner and a painstaking review of
the case records, this Court cannot give credence to petitioner’s stance.
The scales of justice overwhelmingly
488
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
88
Fangonil-Herrera vs. Fangonil
tilt in favor of respondents and against petitioner’s assertion that
exclusive ownership of parcels 6 and 7 has vested in her. The fact that it
was petitioner’s money that was used for the repurchase of the properties
does not make her the owner thereof, in the absence of convincing proof
that would indicate such. This is more so if other evidence was adduced to
show such is not the case. Neither will petitioner’s exercise of acts of
ownership over the properties bring us to that conclusion. It is evident
that petitioner was allowed to maintain possession and enjoy the fruits of
the property only by the mere tolerance of the other co-owners. Moreover,
although we recognize that real estate tax receipts indicating payment of
realty tax and possession of the parcels are indicia of ownership, such are
not conclusive proof of ownership, in the presence of other circumstances
and evidence showing otherwise. As a matter of fact, although the receipts
indicate that the real estate tax payments for parcels 6 and 7 for the years
following their repurchase and release were made by petitioner, the
receipts also state that the declared owner of the properties is still the
decedent Fabian Fangonil.
Same; Same; Co-Ownership; Prescription; Prescription applies to
adverse, open, continuous and exclusive possession; Elements In Order that
a Co-owner’s Possession may be Deemed Adverse to the other Co-owners;
Prescription does not run in favor of a co-heir or coowner as long as he
expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership and he cannot acquire
by prescription the share of the other coowners absent a clear repudiation of
the co-ownership.—As to the issue of prescription, petitioner’s possession
of parcels 6 and 7 did not ripen into sole and exclusive ownership
thereof. First, prescription applies to adverse, open, continuous, and
exclusive possession. In order that a co-owner’s possession may be deemed
adverse to the other co-owners, the following elements must concur: (1)
that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an
ouster of the other co-owners; (2) that such positive acts of repudiation
have been made known to the other co-owners; and (3) that the evidence
thereon must be clear and convincing. Clearly, petitioner cannot claim
adverse possession in the concept of an owner where she voluntarily
executed documents stating that she was a mere creditor and/or co-owner.
Mere silent possession by a co-owner; his receipt of rents, fruits or profits
from the property; his erection of buildings and fences and the planting of
trees thereon; and the payment of land taxes cannot serve as proofs of
exclusive ownership, if it is not
489
VOL. 531, AUGUST 28, 2007 489
Fangonil-Herrera vs. Fangonil
borne out by clear and convincing evidence that he exercised acts of
possession which unequivocably constituted an ouster or deprivation of
the rights of the other co-owners. In this case, we find that petitioner
effected no clear and evident repudiation of the co-ownership. Petitioner’s
only act of repudiation of the co-ownership was when she refused to honor
the extrajudicial settlement in 1994. Alternatively, possession by a co-
owner is like that of a trustee and shall not be regarded as adverse to the
other co-owners, but in fact as beneficial to all of them. A co-ownership is a
form of trust, with each owner being a trustee for each other. Mere actual
possession by one will not give rise to the inference that the possession
was adverse because a co-owner is, after all, entitled to possession of the
property. Thus, as a rule, prescription does not run in favor of a co-heir or
co-owner as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership;
and he cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners,
absent a clear repudiation of the co-ownership. An action to demand
partition among co-owners is imprescriptible, and each co-owner may
demand at any time the partition of the common property.
Laches; Requisites in Order for Laches to Apply; There is no absolute
rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand, each case is to be
determined according to its particular circumstances with the question of
laches addressed to the sound discretion of the court.—On the matter of
laches, we find no sufficient cause to apply the principle of laches, it being
a principle grounded on equity. Laches is the failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned or declined to assert it. Several circumstances must be
present. First, there should exist conduct on the part of the defendant or
one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint
is made and for which the complainant seeks a remedy. Second, there is
delay in asserting the complainant’s right, the complainant having had
knowledge or notice of defendant’s conduct and having been afforded an
opportunity to institute a suit. Third, defendant had no knowledge or
notice that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his
claim. Fourth, the defendant will suffer injury or prejudice in the event
relief is accorded the complainant, or the suit is not held barred. Petitioner
failed to prove the presence of all four established
490
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
90
Fangonil-Herrera vs. Fangonil
requisites of laches. Moreover, there is no absolute rule as to what
constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be determined
according to its particular circumstances, with the question of laches
addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Because laches is an
equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations
and should not be used to defeat justice or to perpetuate fraud or injustice.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
 Gacayan, Paredes, Agmata & Associates Law Offices for petitioner.
Napoleon B. Arenas, Jr. for respondents.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this instant Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court, petitioner assails the (a) Decision issued by the Court of Appeals
dated 30 January 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 61990, and (b) the Resolution of
the same Court dated 15 July 2005 denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration. Petitioner urges this Court to modify the assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Decision dated 9
October 1998 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Agoo, La Union, Branch
31 in Special Proceedings Case No. A-806 for Judicial Partition. The
petition prays that the two parcels of land, one located in Magsaysay,
Tubao, La Union, more particularly described as:
“A parcel of rice land which the middle portion (15,364 sq. m.) has been
included and situated in Barrio Lloren, Tubao, La Union, declared under
Tax Dec. Number 2889. Bounded on the North, by the property of Manuel
Ordoña; on the East, by the property of Severino Padilla, Nicolas Caniero,
and Heirs of V. Selga; on the South, by the properties of Manuel Ordoña
and Francisco Padilla;
491
VOL. 531, AUGUST 28, 2007 491
Fangonil-Herrera vs. Fangonil
and on the West, by a river; containing an area of more than two hectares;
x x x.”2
and the other in San Nicholas East, Agoo, La Union, designated as:
A parcel of unirrigated rice land without permanent improvements,
situated in Barrio San Nicolas, Agoo, La Union with an area of 10,777 sq.
m. (1 Ha. 1,777 sq. m.) more or less, visible by signs of pilapiles around its
perimeter, assessed at P400.00, declared for tax purposes in my name
under Tax Declaration Number 6373, and bounded-on the North, by
Donato Eslao; on the East, by the Heirs of Flaviano Fangonil, and others;
on the South, by Eulalio Fangonil; and on the West, by the heirs of Remgio
Boado; x x x.”3
be adjudged solely to petitioner to the exclusion of respondents. In
addition, petitioner requests that another parcel of land located in
Poblacion, Tubao, La Union, be divided in accordance with the manner she
proposes.
The following are the antecedent facts:
Petitioner and respondents4 are children of the late Fabian Fangonil
and Maria Lloren Fangonil5 of Tubao, La Union. The Fangonil spouses
had 7 children: Tomas, Pura, Marina, Mariano, Milagros, Sinforoso, and
Carmen. Fabian died on 1 June 1953, while Maria Lloren died on
February 1976. The spouses died intestate, leaving an estate consisting of
7 parcels of land herein specified:
Parcel 1—a 1,800 square meter residential land located at Poblacion,
Tubao, La Union, which is facing the Town Plaza;
_______________
2 Hereinafter referred to as parcel 6. Rollo, p. 213.
3 Hereinafter referred to as parcel 7. Id., at p. 212.
4 Respondent Victoria Estoque is the daughter of a brother of the other
respondents, the late Baguio Regional Trial Court Executive Judge
Sinforoso Fangonil.
5 Hereinafter referred to as the Fangonil spouses.
492
492 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Fangonil-Herrera vs. Fangonil
Parcel 2—a 922 square meter residential lot located at Barangay Sta.
Barbara, Agoo, La Union;
Parcel 3—a 54,759 square meter agricultural land located at Francia
West, Tubao, La Union;
Parcel 4—an 84,737 square meter agricultural land located at Francia
West, Tubao, La Union;
Parcel 5—a 5,821 square meter parcel of agricultural land located at
Francia Sur, Tubao, La Union;
Parcel 6—a 17,958 square meter parcel of agricultural land located at
Magsaysay, Tubao, La Union;
Parcel 7—9,127 square meter parcel of agricultural land located at San
Nicolas East, Agoo, La Union.
The only remaining heirs are the 7 children. Prior to an extrajudicial
settlement executed by the heirs in 1983, there was never any settlement
of the estate. The parties do not dispute that the succeeding transactions
involving parcels 6 and 7 took place. Fabian Fangonil, with the consent of
Maria Lloren Fangonil, obtained a loan secured by a mortgage over a
15,364 square meter middle portion of the sixth parcel of land for
P1,450.00, executed under a Deed of Mortgage 6 in favor of Francisca
Saguitan on 20 April 1949. A portion of the sixth parcel, with an area of
4,375 square meters, was sold with a right to repurchase to a certain
Constantino Oribello for P1,450.00 on 15 December 1953. The transaction
was under an agreement designated as a Deed of Pacto de Retro
_______________
6Under this Deed of Mortgage dated 20 April 1949, it is stated, among
others:
“That I reserve to myself, my heirs, and assigns the right and to redeem
the above mentioned middle portion for the same amount of One
Thousand Four Hundred Fifty (P1,450.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency,
without interest thereon except enjoying the fruits and products of said
portion of land raised therefrom by the mortgagee until said property is
redeemed, and failure of mortgagor to redeem said property shall remain
in full force and effect and be inforceable (sic) in accordance with
law.” Rollo, p. 213.
493
VOL. 531, AUGUST 28, 2007 493
Fangonil-Herrera vs. Fangonil
Sale7 between Maria Lloren Fangonil, who was a widow by then, and
Constantino Oribello. On the other hand, the seventh parcel of land was
sold, with a right to repurchase, by Fabian Fangonil to Quirino Estacio
under an agreement denominated as Deed of Sale with Pacto de Retro8 on
12 December 1949 for P2,600.00. The total amount received by the
Fangonil spouses for the properties was P5,500.00.
The parcels above-mentioned were never repurchased or redeemed by
the Fangonil spouses. Prior to foreclosure, the portion of the sixth parcel
covered by a Deed of Mortgage was released from the mortgage on 20
April 1956 upon petitioner’s payment of P1,950.00 to Francisca Suguitan.
The portion of the sixth parcel covered by the Deed of Pacto de Retro Sale
was repurchased on 16 October 1956 upon petitioner’s pay-
_______________
7 Under the pertinent provisions of the Deed of Pacto de Retro Sale
dated 15 December 1953, it is stated, among others:
“That we have agreed with the purchaser that I shall have the right to
repurchase the land above described for the same amount of One
Thousand Four Hundred Fifty (P1,450.00) PESOS, Philippine currency in
any time during the month of May of each year within the period of TEN
(10) years effective from this date of execution of this instrument and that
failure on my part to exercise my right as above stipulated will render this
instrument the character of absolute and irrevocable sale without the
necessity of executing my further deed to consolidate the ownership of the
same unto the vendee.” Id., at p. 214.
8 Deed of Sale with Pacto de Retro dated 12 December 1949. Pertinent
provisions of the contract state:
“That I HEREBY RESERVE THE RIGHT to repurchase the said property
within the period of TEN (10) years from and after the execution of this
instrument by paying back to the vendee, his heirs or assigns, the same
price of TWO THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED (P2,600.00) PESOS,
Philippine Currency; and on my, or my heirs’ or assigns’ failure to exercise
the right of redemption within the period stipulated, this instrument shall
automatically become an absolute deed of sale and absolute title to the
property shall become irrevocably vested in the vendee, his heirs and
assigns.” Id., at p. 212.
494
494 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Fangonil-Herrera vs. Fangonil
ment of P1,550.00 to Constantino Oribello. On the other hand, the seventh
parcel subject of the Deed of Sale with Pacto de Retro was repurchased by
petitioner on 13 November 1959 upon the payment of P2,600.00 to Quirino
Estacio. Petitioner paid the total amount of P6,100.00 for the redemption
of parcels 6 and 7.
On 14 November 1983, the parties executed an Extrajudicial
Settlement and Partial Partition of the estate of the Fangonil spouses
covering the seven parcels of land. Although petitioner signed the
extrajudicial settlement, she refused to accede to the proposed manner of
partition of parcel 1. Thereafter, all the heirs concerned, except petitioner,
executed a joint affidavit dated 19 December 1994, stipulating on the
partition of parcel 1. On 2 February 1995 or 11 years after the execution of
the extrajudicial settlement, petitioner executed an affidavit 9 refuting the
portions pertaining to parcels 6 and
_______________
9 Paragraph 9 reads:
That, in all these years, such forbearance of my brothers and sisters on my
acts of ownership and possession of the properties is in abiding with an
oral agreement of partition with our parents who, having caused these
properties to be the subject of sale with pacto de retro or mortgage (salda
in the locality), enjoined their children that whoever redeems or
repurchases any or all of these properties shall take possession of and own
the property so redeemed or repurchased. Paragraph 12 reads:
That x x x (b) because my signature on the Extrajudicial Settlement of
Estate and Partial Partition have been procured against my better
judgment; and (c) considering that the said properties cannot be the
subject of agreement(s) other than the oral agreement which my brothers
and sisters abided to in all these years, I hereby repudiate my agreement
on the portion of the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate and Partial
Partition which states on page 5 thereof: “The properties described above
as Sixth and Seventh Parcels shall be partitioned and settled in a separate
agreement for the reason that they have not yet
495
VOL. 531, AUGUST 28, 2007 495
 Fangonil-Herrera vs. Fangonil 3. 5.So that the amount of indebtedness of P6,100.00 on November
7, on the ground that her late brother Sinforoso Fangonil who was a 13, 1959 has now the equivalent of P65,790.00 as of 31 August
Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge then, committed misrepresentation and 1998;
convinced her to sign the said settlement.
On 1 March 1995, six of the seven children of the Fangonil spouses, 1. 5.1The equivalent amount of P65,790.00 shall be proportionately
excluding herein petitioner, filed with the RTC a petition for judicial paid by all the heirs with each and every heir having a share in
partition of the seven parcels of land, with prayer for appointment of said indebtedness in the amount of P9,398.57;11
Marina Fangonil as administratrix. The case was docketed as Special
Proceedings Case No. A-806. Petitioner intervened before the trial court to On 7 October 1998, the RTC issued an Order generally approving the
oppose the petition. She likewise prayed that she be appointed manifestation/motion except for the computation, modifying the amount to
administratrix, claiming exclusive ownership over parcels 6 and 7. P138,100.00 as the present equivalent of the amount of P6,100.00
The parties agreed to submit the case for decision based on the previously paid by petitioner to redeem parcels 6 and 7. In its
pleadings, considering there was no disagreement as to the manner of Decision12 dated 9 October 1998, the RTC ruled in favor of respondents
sharing Parcels 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the estate. In addition, on 16 September herein and declared parcels 6 and 7 as part of the estate of the spouses
1996, the respondent heirs deposited in court P7,453.00 10 as payment to Fangonil to be partitioned and ordered the partition of parcel 1 based on
petitioner and her brother Tomas Fangonil as the only outstanding the manner proposed by respondents. It ordered the payment of the estate
debtors of the estate as specified in the 14 November 1983 extrajudicial debt to petitioner and her brother in the amount of P138,100.00, the
settlement. On 2 September 1998, respondents, through counsel, money equivalent of the P6,100.00 paid by her at the time of redemption of
submitted a Manifestation/Motion dated 31 August 1998, proposing a parcels 6 and 7. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
manner of computation for repayment to petitioner, the pertinent portions “WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing premises, this court hereby
of which read: adjudicates and partitions the inherited properties, including the
controversial parcels 6 and 7, in accordance with the following:
_______________
FIRST PARCEL
agreed on the manner of the disposal of the same. Records, p. 12.
10 Records, pp. 95-96. Computed as:
xxxx
A. Estate Debt to Petitioner P 8,700.00
Add: Estate Debt to Tomas P 1,500.00 This is divided into two (2) segments, the Eastern Portion and Western
Portion.
Total Estate Debt P10,200.00
The Eastern Portion shall belong to three (3) heirs, namely Tomas
Divide among seven heirs /7 Fangonil, Sinforoso Fangonil represented by Victoria Estoque and Marina
P1,457.00 per heir Fangonil. The Western Portion shall belong to two (2)
B. Estate Debt to Petitioner P 8,700.00
Less: Share in Estate Debt P 1,457.00 VOL. 531, AUGUST 28, 2007 497
Amount to be reimbursed Petitioner P 7,243.00 Fangonil-Herrera vs. Fangonil
496 heirs, the Southwestern part belongs to Pura F. Tino and the
496 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Northwestern part belongs to Carmen Fangonil Herrera x x x.
Fangonil-Herrera vs. Fangonil SECOND PARCEL

1. “3.That the currency rate of the Philippine Peso to the U.S. Dollar xxxx
on November 13, 1959 is P3.90 to U.S. $1.00;
2. 4.That the currency rate of the Philippine Peso to the U.S. Dollar This parcel goes to Mariano Fangonil and Milagros Fangonil Layug.
as of this date August 31, 1998 is P42.00 to U.S. $1.00;
 THIRD PARCEL Lot 2—Marina Fangonil
Lot 3—Milagros F. Layug
xxxx Lot 4—Sinforoso Fangonil
Lot 5—Carmen F. Herrera
A drawing of lots was conducted on April 25, 1997 with respect to Lot 6—Mariano Fangonil
parcel 3. Parcel 3 was divided into seven by Geodetic Engineer Gerardo Lot 7—Tomas Fangonil
Dacayanan. The result was the following (see also, Order dated April 25,
1997, page 166, Record of the case): SIXTH PARCEL
Lot 1 (A)—Milagros F. Layug
Lot 2 (B)—Tomas Fangonil xxxx
Lot 3 (C)—Mariano Fangonil
Lot 4 (D)—Pura F. Tino On August 27, 1998, the drawing of lots was conducted with respect to
Lot 5 (E)—Sinforoso Fangonil the controversial parcels, the SIXTH PARCEL and the SEVENTH
Lot 6 (F)—Carmen F. Herrera PARCEL. The result on the sixth parcel was as follows:
Lot 7 (G)—Marina Fangonil Lot 1—Pura F. Tino
Lot 2—Sinforoso Fangonil
xxxx Lot 3—Tomas Fangonil
Lot 4—Marina Fangonil
FOURTH PARCEL Lot 5—Carmen F. Herrera (boycotted the draw)
Lot 6—Mariano Fangonil
xxxx Lot 7—Milagros F. Layug

The same thing happened. There was a drawing of lots. The result was xxxx
the following:
Lot 1 (A)—Marina Fangonil SEVENTH PARCEL
Lot 2 (B)—Carmen F. Herrera
Lot 3 (C)—Tomas Fangonil xxxx
Lot 4 (D)—Sinforoso Fangonil
Lot 5 (E)—Milagros F. Layug The draw was made on the same day, August 27, 1998. Just like in the
Lot 6 (F)—Pura F. Tino drawing of lots for the Sixth Parcel, Carmen F. Herrera boycotted the
Lot 7 (G)—Mariano Fangonil draw. Hence, the Court ruled that since there are seven rolled papers for
the seven heirs to draw, the last undrawn rolled-paper containing the lot
xxxx number shall be for Carmen Herrera. The result for the draw for the
SEVENTH PARCEL was as follows:
FIFTH PARCEL Lot 1—Carmen Herrera
Lot 2—Tomas Fangonil
xxxx Lot 3—Milagros F. Layug
Lot 4—Marina Fangonil
498 499
498 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOL. 531, AUGUST 28, 2007 499
Fangonil-Herrera vs. Fangonil Fangonil-Herrera vs. Fangonil
On May 2, 1997, the drawing of lots on Parcel 5 was conducted. The result Lot 5—Sinforoso Fangonil
was as follows: Lot 6—Mariano Fangonil
Lot 1—Pura F. Tino Lot 7—Pura F. Tino
 It should be noted that after the draws on August 27, 1998, Atty.
Baltazar, counsel for [respondents], manifested that he will file a motion
as regards the accounting of the produce of the sixth and seventh parcels.
However, what he filed was the Manifestation/Motion dated August 31,
1998.
The six heirs (excluding Carmen F. Herrera) shall reimburse the
amount of P138,100.00, each one contributing the amount of P19,728.57,
to Carmen F. Herrera. Since the other six heirs did not insist on the
accounting of the produce with respect to parcels 6 and 7, Carmen F.
Herrera does not have to render an accounting. As a matter of fact, this
Court, in its Order dated October 7, 1998, considered the produce of the
said two (2) parcels, which she appropriated from the ‘50s to the present
as interest on her money.”13
Petitioner appealed the above RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals,
alleging the unfair and prejudicial manner of partition of parcel 1 and
claiming exclusive ownership over parcels 6 and 7. The Court of Appeals
denied the appeal in its Decision promulgated 30 January 2004, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, the October 9, 1998 Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Agoo, La Union, Branch 31, in Special Proceeding Case No. A-806, is
AFFIRMED in toto.”14
Under said decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the findings of
the trial court, pronouncing that petitioner failed to adduce any evidence
that would support her claim that the distribution was not equal and
prejudicial to her interest. It concurred with the trial court in concluding
that,
_______________
13 Records, pp. 361-368.
14 Penned by Former Associate Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion with
Associate Justices Lucas P. Bersamin and Godardo A. Jacinto,
concurring; Rollo, p. 39.
500
500 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Fangonil-Herrera vs. Fangonil
at the most, she is only entitled to the reimbursement of the amount she
spent for redemption of the questioned lots in an amount equivalent to
what her money commanded then, stating that petitioner is simply
holding the said property in trust for the other co-heirs. At the same time,
it upheld the trial court’s finding on the equivalent of the money which
petitioner paid to redeem and repurchase parcels 6 and 7, but the
dispositive portion merely indicated the amount of P130,100.00.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the 30 January 2004
Decision which the Court of Appeals denied in a Resolution dated 15 July
2005. Dissatisfied with the final resolution of the Court of Appeals on the
matter, petitioner now comes before this Court via a Petition for Review
under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. Petitioner insists she is the
exclusive owner of parcels 6 and 7 and rejects the partition of parcel 1 as
being unequal and prejudicial, raising the following issues:
I.
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE
MANNER IN WHICH PARCEL 1 IS TO BE PARTITIONED BASED ON
THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS’ POSITION WHICH IS CLEARLY
UNEVEN AND UNFAIR TO THE PETITIONER WHOSE SHARE WILL
THEN BE FOUND AT THE REAR PORTION OF THE SAID LOT.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
NOT HOLDING THAT PARCELS 6 AND 7 SHALL BE OWNED SOLELY
AND EXCLUSIVELY BY THE PETITIONER BEING THE ONLY ONE
WHO REDEEMED AND REPURCHASED SAID PARCELS IN THE
1950’S EVEN WHILE THE PARENTS OF THE PARTIES WERE STILL
ALIVE.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
NOT HOLDING THAT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS’ RIGHT TO
CLAIM A SHARE IN PARCELS 6 AND 7 HAD LONG PRE-
501
VOL. 531, AUGUST 28, 2007 501
Fangonil-Herrera vs. Fangonil
SCRIBED AS A RESULT OF THEIR INACTION FOR MORE THAN
FORTY (40) YEARS WHERE THEY ALLOWED THE PETITIONER TO
EXERCISE FULL OWNERSHIP OVER SAID PARCELS, EVEN
ASSUMING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT AT FIRST, THEY HAVE
THE RIGHT TO REDEEM THE SAID PARCELS.
IV.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
NOT HOLDING THAT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS’ RIGHT TO
CLAIM A SHARE IN PARCELS 6 AND 7 HAD LONG BEEN BARRED
BY LACHES AS A RESULT OF THEIR INACTION FOR MORE THAN
FORTY (40) YEARS WHERE THEY ALLOWED THE PETITIONER [TO]
EXERCISE FULL OWNERSHIP OVER SAID PARCELS, EVEN
ASSUMING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT AT FIRST, THEY HAVE
THE RIGHT TO REDEEM THE SAID PARCELS.
V.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
MONEY EQUIVALENT OF THE MONEY OF THE
OPPOSITORAPPELLANT WHICH SHE USED TO REPURCHASE AND
REDEEM PARCELS 6 AND 7 IN THE 1950’S WOULD ONLY BE
P138,100.00 IN TODAY’S MONEY, EVEN ASSUMING WITHOUT
ADMITTING THAT THE SAID PARCELS COULD BE REDEEMED BY
THE ESTATE OF FABIAN AND MARIA LLOREN. 15
Petitioner’s arguments are fallacious.
With respect to procedural matters, respondents argue that the
petition is a combination of an appeal via a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 and an independent civil action
of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. This is based on
the observation that petitioner impleaded the Court of Appeals as one of
the respondents while at the same time raising issues of fact alone.
Respondents posit that these are indicative of an “intention to categorize
the petition to be under both Rules 65 and 45 of the Rules of
_______________
15 Rollo, pp. 17-19.
502
502 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Fangonil-Herrera vs. Fangonil
Court” and should be dismissed outright. Although petitioner erroneously
impleaded the Court of Appeals as one of the respondents, petitioner
clearly and rightly invoked Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court as the
remedy availed of. As we held in National Irrigation Administration v.
Court of Appeals,16 the appeal from a final disposition of the Court of
Appeals is a petition for review under Rule 45 and not a special civil action
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. Under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court, decisions, final orders or resolutions of the Court of
Appeals, regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings involved,
may be appealed to us by filing a petition for review, which would be but a
continuation of the appellate process over the original case. 17 The correct
procedure is not to implead the Court of Appeals. This Court has ruled in
several instances that where the Court of Appeals is impleaded as
respondent in the Petition for Review, and the petition clearly invokes
Rule 45, the Court of Appeals is merely omitted from the title of the case
pursuant to Sec. 4(a) of Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. 18 The Court
of Appeals is herein omitted from the title of the case, as a liberal
interpretation of the rules on technicality, in pursuit of the ends of justice
and equity.19
_______________
16 376 Phil. 362, 372-373; 318 SCRA 255, 264 (1999), as cited
in Macasasa v. Sicad, G.R. No. 146547, 20 June 2006, 491 SCRA 368, 376.
17 Mercado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150241, 4 November 2004, 441
SCRA 463, 469.
18 Selegna Management and Development Corporation v. United
Coconut Planters Bank, G.R. No. 165662, 3 May 2006, 489 SCRA 125.
19 Anent the procedural defects raised by respondent, the Court agrees
that the correct procedure, as mandated by Section 4, Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, is not to implead the lower court which rendered
the assailed decision. However, impleading the lower court as respondent
in the petition for review on certiorari does not automatically mean the
dismissal of the appeal but merely authorizes the dismissal of the petition.
Besides, formal defects in
503
VOL. 531, AUGUST 28, 2007 503
Fangonil-Herrera vs. Fangonil
We now discuss respondents’ contention that only factual issues have been
brought to this Court.
Under Section 1, Rule 45, providing for appeals by certiorari before the
Supreme Court, it is clearly enunciated that only questions of law may be
set forth.20Questions of fact may not be raised unless the case falls under
any of the following exceptions:21
_______________
petitions are not uncommon. The Court has encountered previous
petitions for review on certiorari that erroneously impleaded [the Court of
Appeals.] In those cases, the Court merely called the petitioners’ attention
to the defects and proceeded to resolve the case on their merits.
The Court finds no reason why it should not afford the same liberal
treatment in this case. While unquestionably, the Court has the discretion
to dismiss the appeal for being defective, sound policy dictates that it is far
better to dispose of cases on the merits, rather than on technicality as the
latter approach may result in injustice. This is in accordance with Section
6, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which encourages a reading
of the procedural requirements in a manner that will help secure and not trial court; and (b) whether or not the respondent court gravely erred in
defeat justice. not finding that exclusive ownership of the properties in question has been
Simon v. Canlas, G.R. No. 148273, 19 April 2006, 487 SCRA 433, 444- vested in petitioner.
446. In the exercise of the Supreme Court’s power of review, this Court is
20 Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court.—A party desiring not a trier of facts, and unless there are excepting
to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the
Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other VOL. 531, AUGUST 28, 2007 505
courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a
Fangonil-Herrera vs. Fangonil
verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only
circumstances, it does not routinely undertake the reexamination of the
questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.
21 It should be stressed that under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the
case.23 Factual matters are beyond the jurisdiction of this Court.24 In
as amended, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
before this Court. However, this Rule is not absolute, it admits of the
Court, this Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact,
exceptions, as provided in the text.
unless the factual findings complained of are devoid of support by the
Pamplona Plantation Company, Inc. v. Tinghil, G.R. No. 159121, 3
evidence on record or the assailed judgment is based on a
February 2005, 450 SCRA 421, 427-428; Maglucot-aw v. Maglucot, 385
misapprehension of facts. As held in Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of
Phil. 720, 729-730; 329 SCRA 78, 88-89 (2000); Philippine Rabbit Bus
Appeals,25 factual findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive 26 on the
Lines, Inc. v. Macalinao, G.R. No. 141856, 11 February 2005, 451 SCRA
parties and carry even more weight when the said court affirms the
63, 68-69; Halili v. Court of Appeals, 350
factual findings of the trial court.27 Absent any palpable error or
504
arbitrariness, the findings of fact of the lower court are conclusive. On this
504 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED ground alone, the appeal warrants a dismissal.
Fangonil-Herrera vs. Fangonil Setting aside the procedural defects, the appeal must fail based on the
“(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or merits. Upon perusal of the records of the case,
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd,
or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the 506 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of
Fangonil-Herrera vs. Fangonil
fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals
it is evident to this Court that no cogent reason exists to disturb the
went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the
decision of the Court of Appeals.
admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings
Petitioner contends that the manner of partition of parcel 1 by the
are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are
RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, is unfair and prejudicial to her
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
interest. However, she was not able to adduce substantial
(9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s
evidence aliunde to support her allegations. Respondents stress that the
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when
Fangonil spouses appropriated portions of Parcel 1 to Carmen, Pura,
the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
Tomas, Marina, and Sinforoso, by pointing out specific areas pertaining to
contradicted by the evidence on record.”
each. Carmen, Tomas, and Marina built their houses on parcel 1. Prior to
In this particular instance, we are clearly faced with issues of fact. A
the order of partition, an ocular inspection of parcel 1 was conducted by
question of fact is involved when the doubt or difference arises as to the
the RTC to determine which manner of partition it would approve. During
truth or falsehood of alleged facts or when the query necessarily invites
said ocular inspection, however, the RTC saw existing structures upon
calibration of the whole evidence, considering mainly the credibility of
which the homes of Carmen, Tomas, Marina, and a store of Carmen were
witnesses, existence and relevance of specific surrounding circumstances,
situated. The arrangement was allegedly based on their oral agreement.
their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probabilities of the
This same arrangement allotting an equal area of 362 square meters to
situation.22 We find that the only questions to be resolved are the
each of the heirs was made the basis of the manner of partition proposed
following: (a) whether or not the respondent court gravely erred in
affirming the partition of parcel 1 in accordance with the findings of the
by respondents and later on approved by both the RTC and Court of Petitioner and respondents executed an extrajudicial settlement dated
Appeals. 14 November 1983, wherein it was stipulated that the Fangonil spouses
Anent the rights of the parties pertaining to parcels 6 and 7, petitioner died intestate, leaving 7 parcels of
insists that her act of paying for the repurchase and release from
mortgage of parcels 6 and 7 was on the understanding with her parents 508 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
that she would thereafter be the owner thereof. She asserts that her
Fangonil-Herrera vs. Fangonil
exercise of acts of ownership over parcels 6 and 7, to the exclusion of her
land in their names. Parcels 6 and 7 were included. It further stipulated
parents and siblings, reveals she is the exclusive owner of these lots. She
that petitioner and her brother Tomas (now deceased) are the only
cites several circumstances in support of her contention that respondents
creditors of the estate, categorically stating petitioner is a creditor of the
never considered parcels 6 and 7 part of the estate of their parents and are
estate in the amount of P8,700.00. This amount represents what was paid
not co-owners thereof. First, petitioner presented real estate tax receipts
for by her for the repurchase and release from the mortgage lien of parcels
indicating that she had been the one paying for the realty taxes of the
6 and 7 in the 1950s. Pertinent records of the case reveal that the amount
property. Secondly, petitioner asserts she has been the only one hiring
actually advanced for the repurchase was P6,100.00. The aforementioned
tenants for and benefiting from the produce of parcels 6 and 7. Lastly, the
extrajudicial settlement, which was later on submitted to the RTC for
non-attempt of respondents to partition parcels 6 and 7 within 10 years
consideration in the judicial partition, taken together with petitioner’s
from the death of the Fangonil spouses, as well as to reimburse her if
comment30 in the same proceedings, are clear and categorical evidences
indeed such was the
that the transaction between petitioner and her parents was a mere loan.
507
Under this extrajudicial settlement, respondents and petitioner included
VOL. 531, AUGUST 28, 2007 507 parcels 6 and 7 as part of the estate of their deceased parents. It is
Fangonil-Herrera vs. Fangonil particularly stated therein that petitioner and her brother Tomas are the
agreement, demonstrates that they never considered the said parcels part only creditors of the estate. Although petitioner’s comment allegedly
of the estate of their parents. maintained her claims on parcels 6 and 7, she categorically admitted
After a thorough examination of the cases cited by petitioner and a therein that the amount totaling P8,700.00 referred to in the extrajudicial
painstaking review of the case records, this Court cannot give credence to settlement represents the
petitioner’s stance. The scales of justice overwhelmingly tilt in favor of
respondents and against petitioner’s assertion that exclusive ownership of VOL. 531, AUGUST 28, 2007 509
parcels 6 and 7 has vested in her. The fact that it was petitioner’s money
Fangonil-Herrera vs. Fangonil
that was used for the repurchase of the properties does not make her the
personal money she used for the redemption of parcels 6 and 7.
owner thereof, in the absence of convincing proof that would indicate such.
Thus, petitioner is a mere creditor of the estate and not an owner of
This is more so if other evidence was adduced to show such is not the case.
parcels 6 and 7. An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the
Neither will petitioner’s exercise of acts of ownership over the properties
course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The
bring us to that conclusion. It is evident that petitioner was allowed to
admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through
maintain possession and enjoy the fruits of the property only by the mere
palpable mistake, or that no such admission was made. 31 We find that
tolerance of the other co-owners.28 Moreover, although we recognize that
petitioner’s affidavit retracting her acquiescence to the stipulation on
real estate tax receipts indicating payment of realty tax and possession of
parcels 6 and 7 in the extrajudicial settlement deserves scant
the parcels are indicia of ownership, such are not conclusive proof of
consideration for being self-serving. Absent positive proof that the earlier
ownership, in the presence of other circumstances and evidence showing
statements made by petitioner resulted from palpable mistake, retractions
otherwise.29 As a matter of fact, although the receipts indicate that the
thereof, especially if unsupported by evidence, lack credence. 32
real estate tax payments for parcels 6 and 7 for the years following their
As to the issue of prescription, petitioner’s possession of parcels 6 and 7
repurchase and release were made by petitioner, the receipts also state
did not ripen into sole and exclusive ownership thereof. First, prescription
that the declared owner of the properties is still the decedent Fabian
applies to adverse, open, continuous, and exclusive possession. In order
Fangonil.
that a co-owner’s possession may be deemed adverse to the other co-
owners, the following elements33 must concur: (1) that he has performed
unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other co-
owners; (2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known
to the other co-owners; and (3) that the evidence thereon must be clear
and convincing. Clearly, petitioner cannot claim adverse possession in the
concept of an owner where she voluntarily executed documents stating
510
510 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Fangonil-Herrera vs. Fangonil
that she was a mere creditor and/or co-owner. Mere silent possession by a
co-owner; his receipt of rents, fruits or profits from the property; his
erection of buildings and fences and the planting of trees thereon; and the
payment of land taxes cannot serve as proofs of exclusive ownership, if it
is not borne out by clear and convincing evidence that he exercised acts of
possession which unequivocably constituted an ouster or deprivation of
the rights of the other co-owners.34 In this case, we find that petitioner
effected no clear and evident repudiation of the co-ownership. Petitioner’s
only act of repudiation of the co-ownership was when she refused to honor
the extrajudicial settlement in 1994. Alternatively, possession by a
coowner is like that of a trustee and shall not be regarded as adverse to
the other co-owners, but in fact as beneficial to all of them. 35 A co-
ownership is a form of trust, with each owner being a trustee for each
other.36 Mere actual possession by one will not give rise to the inference
that the possession was adverse because a co-owner is, after all, entitled to
possession of the property.37 Thus, as a rule, prescription does not run in
favor of a co-heir or co-owner as long as he expressly or impliedly
recognizes the co-ownership; and he cannot acquire by prescription the
share of the other co-owners, absent a clear repudiation of the co-
ownership.38 An action to demand partition among co-owners is
imprescriptible, and each co-owner may demand at any time the partition
of the common property.39
VOL. 531, AUGUST 28, 2007 511
Fangonil-Herrera vs. Fangonil
On the matter of laches, we find no sufficient cause to apply the principle
of laches, it being a principle grounded on equity. Laches is the failure or
neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier;
it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned or declined to assert it.40 Several circumstances must be
present. First, there should exist conduct on the part of the defendant or
one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint
is made and for which the complainant seeks a remedy. Second, there is
delay in asserting the complainant’s right, the complainant having had
knowledge or notice of defendant’s conduct and having been afforded an
opportunity to institute a suit. Third, defendant had no knowledge or
notice that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his
claim. Fourth, the defendant will suffer injury or prejudice in the event
relief is accorded the complainant, or the suit is not held barred. Petitioner
failed to prove the presence of all four established requisites of laches.
Moreover, there is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or
staleness of demand; each case is to be determined according to its
particular circumstances, with the question of laches addressed to the
sound discretion of the court.41 Because laches is an equitable doctrine, its
application is controlled by equitable considerations and should not be
used to defeat justice or to perpetuate fraud or injustice. 42
512 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Fangonil-Herrera vs. Fangonil
Regarding the issue on the computation of the money to be paid to
petitioner as reimbursement for the amount she advanced to repurchase
and release parcels 6 and 7 from the mortgage debt, the Court of Appeals
adopted the amount as computed by the RTC based on the present peso
money equivalent.43 There is a discrepancy between the amount of
indebtedness as quoted by the Court of Appeals from the RTC decision and
the amount cited by the Court of Appeals in the latter part of its decision.
However, the amount stated in the paragraph before the dispositive
portion was P130,100.00, without any other indication that it intended to
modify the amount determined by the RTC while the body of the Court of
Appeals decision quoting the RTC decision indicated the amount of
indebtedness as P138,100.00. There was obviously a typographical error,
with the body of the decision stating that the Court of Appeals was
affirming the RTC’s manner of computation totaling P138,100.00.
Moreover, in the body and dispositive portion, the Court of Appeals upheld
the RTC’s decision in toto. Even then, the amount found by the RTC on the
basis of the formula it used in the Order dated 7 October 1998 was
erroneous.44
Still applying the present peso-dollar exchange rate, a slight
modification in the computation is hereby ordered. The present peso
equivalent of the P6,100.00 indebtedness in-
_______________
The RTC applied the present peso money equivalent based on the
43
proposal of respondents in their Manifestation/Motion dated 31 August
1998, wherein it clearly stipulated that the amount of indebtedness to be
judicially determined is to be based on its present equivalent. The RTC
modified the stipulated 1950s currency exchange rate between the
Philippine Peso and United States Dollar.
44 Relevant provisions of the aforementioned order read:

“The Philippine Peso should have a rate of exchange with the United
States dollar computed at 2:1 because the transactions were in the 1950s.
Hence, if the present exchange rate is P42.00:$1.00, then the amount of
P6,100.00 in the 1950s has its equivalence at present in the amount of
P138,100.00.” Records, p. 347.
513
VOL. 531, AUGUST 28, 2007 513
Fangonil-Herrera vs. Fangonil
curred on 13 November 1959 by the Fangonil spouses and payable to
petitioner should be computed based on the following figures:
The currency exchange rate of the Philippine Peso to the United States
Dollar in the 1950s, which is P2.00:$1.00;
Currency exchange rate of the Philippine Peso to the United States
Dollar as of the date of finality of this judgment.
Therefore, the present peso money equivalent of the P6,100.00 should be
derived from the succeeding formula:
[(Current exchange rate of the Philippine Peso to the United States Dollar
as of the date of finality of this judgment divided by the exchange rate in
the 1950s)] multiplied by P6,100.00
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is
DENIED. The (a) Decision issued by the Court of Appeals dated 30
January 2004 and (b) its Resolution dated 15 July 2005 denying
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration dated 23 February 2004 are hereby
AFFIRMED, with MODIFICATION as to the amount to be reimbursed to
petitioner. The present peso equivalent of the P6,100.00 indebtedness is
hereby ordered reimbursed to petitioner which amount shall be computed
based on current peso-dollar exchange rates at the time of finality of
judgment, applying the formula below:
[(Current exchange rate of the Philippine Peso to the United States Dollar
as of the date of finality of this judgment divided by the exchange rate in
the 1950s)] multiplied by P6,100.00.
The equivalent amount shall be proportionately paid by all the heirs with
each and every heir having a share in the said indebtedness. No Costs.
SO ORDERED.
 VOL. 157, JANUARY 29, 1988 455
Adille vs. Court of Appeals
No. L-44546. January 29, 1988.*
RUSTICO ADILLE, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, EMETERIA ASEJO, TEODORICA ASEJO, DOMINGO
ASEJO, JOSEFA ASEJO, and SANTIAGO ASEJO, respondents.
Civil Law; Property; Co-ownership; Redemption; Redemption of the
whole property by a co-owner will not make him of all of it.—The right of
repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner with respect to his share alone.
While the records show that the petitioner redeemed the property in its
entirety, shouldering the expenses therefor, that did not make him the
owner of all of it. In other words, it did not put to end the existing state of
co-ownership.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Failure of all co-owners to redeem
the property entitles the vendee a retro to retain it and consolidate title
thereto in his name; Redemption not a mode of terminating a co-
ownership.—The result is that the property remains to be in a condition of
co-ownership. While a vendee a retro, under Article 1613 of the Code,
“may not be compelled to consent to a partial redemption,” the redemption
by one co-heir or co-owner of the property in its totality does not vest in
him ownership over it. Failure on the part of all the co-owners to redeem it
entitles the vendee a retro to retain the property and consolidate title
thereto in his name. But the provision does not give to the redeeming co-
owner the right to the entire property. It does not provide for a mode of
terminating a co-ownership.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Registration of property not a
means of acquiring ownership.—Neither does the fact that the petitioner
had succeeded in securing title over the parcel in his name terminate the
existing co-ownership. While his half-brothers and sisters are, as we said,
liable to him for reimbursement as and for their shares in redemption
expenses, he cannot claim exclusive right to the property owned in
common. Registration of property is not a means of acquiring ownership.
It operates as a mere notice of existing title, that is, if there is one.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Petitioner is a trustee of the property on
behalf of private respondents.—The petitioner must then be said to be a
trustee of the property on behalf of the private respondents. We agree with
the respondent Court of Appeals that fraud attended the registra-
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
456
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
56
Adille vs. Court of Appeals
tion of the property. The petitioner’s pretension that he was the sole
heir to the land in the affidavit of extrajudicial settlement he executed
preliminary to the registration thereof betrays a clear effort on his part to
defraud his brothers and sisters and to exercise sole dominion over the
property. It is the view of the respondent Court that the petitioner, in
taking over the property, did so either on behalf of his co-heirs, in which
event, he had constituted himself a negotiorum gestor under Article 2144
of the Civil Code, or for his exclusive benefit, in which case, he is guilty of
fraud, and must act as trustee, the private respondents being the
beneficiaries, under the Article 1456. The evidence, of course, points to the
second alternative, the petitioner having asserted claims of exclusive
ownership over the property and having acted in fraud of his co-heirs. He
cannot therefore be said to have assumed the mere management of the
property abandoned by his co-heirs, the situation Article 2144 of the Code
contemplates. In any case, as the respondent Court itself affirms, the
result would be the same whether it is one or the other. The petitioner
would remain liable to the private respondents, his co-heirs.
Same; Same; Same; Prescription; Prescription must be preceded by
repudiation to terminate co-ownership; Requisites.—Prescription, as a
mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership, must have been preceded
by repudiation (of the co-ownership). The act of repudiation, in turn, is
subject to certain conditions: (1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership;
(2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made known to the other co-
owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive; and (4) he has
been in possession through open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession of the property for the period required by law.
Same; Same; Land registration; Torrens Title cannot cover up fraud;
Registration not equivalent to notice of repudiation.—It is true that
registration under the Torrens system is constructive notice of title, but it
has likewise been our holding that the Torrens title does not furnish a
shield for fraud. It is therefore no argument to say that the act of
registration is equivalent to notice of repudiation, assuming there was
one, notwithstanding the long-standing rule that registration operates as
a universal notice of title.
Civil Procedure; Prescription; While actions to enforce a constructive
trust prescribe in ten years from registration of the property, private
respondents’ right commenced from actual discovery of petitioner’s act of
defraudation.—For the same reason, we cannot dismiss the private
respondents’ claims commenced in 1974 over the estate registered in 1955.
While actions to enforce a constructive trust prescribes in ten years,
reckoned from the date of the registration of the property, we, as
457
 VOL. 157, JANUARY 29, 1988 45
7 458
Adille vs. Court of Appeals
we said, are not prepared to count the period from such a date in this
case. We note the petitioner’s sub rosa efforts to get hold of the property
exclusively for himself beginning with his fraudulent misrepresentation in
his unilateral affidavit of extrajudicial settlement that he is ‘‘the only heir
and child of his mother Feliza with the consequence that he was able to
secure title in his name also.” Accordingly, we hold that the right of the
private respondents commenced from the time they actually discovered
the petitioner’s act of defraudation. According to the respondent Court of
Appeals, they “came to know [of it] apparently only during the progress of
the litigation.” Hence, prescription is not a bar.
Same; Same; Prescriptive as an affirmative defense must be pleaded
either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer otherwise it is deemed
waived.—Moreover, and as a rule, prescription is an affirmative defense
that must be pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer
otherwise it is deemed waived, and here, the petitioner never raised that
defense. There are recognized exceptions to this rule, but the petitioner
has not shown why they apply.
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
SARMIENTO, J.:
In issue herein are property and property rights, a familiar subject of
controversy and a wellspring of enormous conflict that has led not only to
protracted legal entanglements but to even more bitter consequences, like
strained relationships and even the forfeiture of lives. It is a question that
likewise reflects a tragic commentary on prevailing social and cultural
values and institutions, where, as one observer notes, wealth and its
accumulation are the basis of self-fulfillment and where property is held
as sacred as life itself. “It is in the defense of his property,” says this
modern thinker, that one “will mobilize his deepest protective devices, and
anybody that threatens his possessions will arouse his most passionate
enmity.”1
The task of this Court, however, is not to judge the wisdom of values;
the burden of reconstructing the social order is shouldered by the political
leadership—and the people themselves.
_______________
1 GREENE, FELK, THE ENEMY 234 (1971).
458 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Adille vs. Court of Appeals
The parties have come to this Court for relief and accordingly, our
responsibility is to give them that relief pursuant to the decree of law.
The antecedent facts are quoted from the decision2 appealed from:
xxx xxx xxx
x x x [Th]e land in question Lot 14694 of Cadastral Survey of Albay
located in Legaspi City with an area of some 11,325 sq. m. originally
belonged to one Felisa Alzul as her own private property; she married
twice in her lifetime; the first, with one Bernabe Adille, with whom she
had as an only child, herein defendant Rustico Adille; in her second
marriage with one Procopio Asejo, her children were herein plaintiffs,—
now, sometime in 1939, said Felisa sold the property in pacto de retro to
certain 3rd persons, period of repurchase being 3 years, but she died in
1942 without being able to redeem and after her death, but during the
period of redemption, herein defendant repurchased, by himself alone, and
after that, he executed a deed of extra-judicial partition representing
himself to be the only heir and child of his mother Felisa with the
consequence that he was able to secure title in his name alone also, so that
OCT. No. 21137 in the name of his mother was transferred to his name,
that was in 1955; that was why after some efforts of compromise had
failed, his half-brothers and sisters, herein plaintiffs, filed present case for
partition with accounting on the position that he was only a trustee on an
implied trust when he redeemed,—and this is the evidence, but as it also
turned out that one of plaintiffs, Emeteria Asejo was occupying a portion,
defendant counterclaimed for her to vacate that,—
Well then, after hearing the evidence, trial Judge sustained defendant
in his position that he was and became absolute owner, he was not a
trustee, and therefore, dismissed case and also condemned plaintiff
occupant, Emeteria to vacate; it is because of this that plaintiffs have
come here and contend that trial court erred in:
1. “I.... declaring the defendant absolute owner of the property;
2. II.... not ordering the partition of the property; and
3. III.... ordering one of the plaintiffs who is in possession of the
portion of the property to vacate the land, p. 1 Appellant’s brief.
which can be reduced to simple question of whether or not on the basis
________________
 Gatmaitan, Magno, Acting Pres. J.; Domondon, Sixto and Reyes,
2 The result is that the property remains to be in a condition of co-
Samuel, JJ., Concurring. ownership. While a vendee a retro, under Article 1613 of the Code, “may
459 not be compelled to consent to a partial redemption,” the redemption by
VOL. 157, JANUARY 29, 1988 459 one co-heir or co-owner of the property in its totality does not vest in him
ownership over it. Failure on the part of all the co-owners to redeem it
Adille vs. Court of Appeals
entitles the vendee a retro to retain the property and consolidate title
of evidence and law, judgment appealed from should be maintained. 3 x x
thereto in his name.7 But the provision does not give to the redeeming co-
x xxx xxx
owner the right to the entire property. It does not provide for a mode of
The respondent Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, 4 and ruled for
terminating a co-ownership.
the plaintiffs-appellants, the private respondents herein. The petitioner
Neither does the fact that the petitioner had succeeded in securing title
now appeals, by way of certiorari, from the Appellate Court’s decision.
over the parcel in his name terminate the existing co-ownership. While his
We required the private respondents to file a comment and thereafter,
half-brothers and sisters are, as we said, liable to him for reimbursement
having given due course to the petition, directed the parties to file their
as and for their shares in redemption expenses, he cannot claim exclusive
briefs. Only the petitioner, however, filed a brief, and the private
right to the property owned in common. Registration of property is not a
respondents having failed to file one, we declared the case submitted for
means of acquiring ownership. It operates as a mere notice of existing
decision.
title, that is, if there is one.
The petition raises a purely legal issue: May a co-owner acquire
The petitioner must then be said to be a trustee of the property on
exclusive ownership over the property held in common?
behalf of the private respondents. The Civil Code states:
Essentially, it is the petitioner’s contention that the property subject of
ART. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person
dispute devolved upon him upon the failure of his co-heirs to join him in
obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for
its redemption within the period required by law. He relies on the
the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.
provisions of Article 1515 of the old Civil Code, Article 1613 of the present
We agree with the respondent Court of Appeals that fraud attended the
Code, giving the vendee a retro the right to demand redemption of the
registration of the property. The petitioner’s pretension that he was the
entire property.
sole heir to the land in the affidavit of extrajudicial settlement he executed
There is no merit in this petition.
preliminary to the registration thereof betrays a clear effort on his part to
The right of repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner with respect to
defraud his brothers and sisters and to exercise sole dominion over the
his share alone.5 While the records show that the petitioner redeemed the
property. The aforequoted provision therefore applies.
property in its entirety, shouldering the expenses therefor, that did not
It is the view of the respondent Court that the petitioner, in taking
make him the owner of all of it. In other words, it did not put to end the
over the property, did so either on behalf of his co-heirs, in which event, he
existing state of co-ownership.
had constituted himself a negotiorum gestor
Necessary expenses may be incurred by one co-owner, subject to his
right to collect reimbursement from the remaining co-owners.6 There is no
_______________
doubt that redemption of property entails a necessary expense. Under the
Civil Code: 7Supra, art. 1607.
ART. 488. Each co-owner shall have a right to compel the other co-owners
461
to contribute to the expenses of preservation of the thing or right owned in
common and to the taxes. Any one of the latter may exempt himself from VOL. 157, JANUARY 29, 1988 461
this obligation by renouncing so much of his Adille vs. Court of Appeals
under Article 2144 of the Civil Code, or for his exclusive benefit, in which
460 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED case, he is guilty of fraud, and must act as trustee, the private respondents
being the beneficiaries, under the Article 1456. The evidence, of course,
Adille vs. Court of Appeals
points to the second alternative the petitioner having asserted claims of
undivided interest as may be equivalent to his share of the expenses and
exclusive ownership over the property and having acted in fraud of his co-
taxes. No such waiver shall be made if it is prejudicial to the co-ownership.
heirs. He cannot therefore be said to have assume the mere management
of the property abandoned by his co-heirs, the situation Article 2144 of the
Code contemplates. In any case, as the respondent Court itself affirms, the there was one, notwithstanding the long-standing rule that registration
result would be the same whether it is one or the other. The petitioner operates as a universal notice of title.
would remain liable to the private respondents, his co-heirs. For the same reason, we cannot dismiss the private respondents’
This Court is not unaware of the well-established principle that claims commenced in 1974 over the estate registered in 1955. While
prescription bars any demand on property (owned in common) held by actions to enforce a constructive trust prescribes in ten years,12 reckoned
another (co-owner) following the required number of years. In that event, from the date of the registration of the property, 13 we, as we said, are not
the party in possession acquires title to the property and the state of co- prepared to count the period from such a date in this case. We note the
ownership is ended.8 In the case at bar, the property was registered in petitioner’s sub rosa efforts to get hold of the property exclusively for
1955 by the petitioner, solely in his name, while the claim of the private himself beginning with his fraudulent misrepresentation in his unilateral
respondents was presented in 1974. Has prescription then, set in? affidavit of extrajudicial settlement that he is “the only heir and child of
We hold in the negative. Prescription, as a mode of terminating a his mother Feliza with the consequence that he was able to secure title in
relation of co-ownership, must have been preceded by repudiation (of the his name also.”14 Accordingly, we hold that the right of the private
co-ownership). The act of repudiation, in turn, is subject to certain respondents commenced from the time they actually discovered the
conditions: (1) a co-owner repudiates the co-owner-ship; (2) such an act of petitioner’s act of defraudation.15 According to the respondent Court of
repudiation is clearly made known to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence Appeals, they “came to know [of it] apparently only during the progress of
thereon is clear and conclusive; and (4) he has been in possession through the litigation.”16 Hence, prescription is not a bar.
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property for Moreover, and as a rule, prescription is an affirmative defense
the period required by law.9
The instant case shows that the petitioner had not complied with these VOL. 157, JANUARY 29, 1988 463
requisites. We are not convinced that he had repudiated the co-ownership;
Adille vs. Court of Apppeals
on the contrary, he had deliberately kept the private respondents in the
that must be pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer
dark by feigning sole heirship over the estate under dispute. He cannot
otherwise it is deemed waived,17 and here, the petitioner never raised that
therefore be said to have
defense.18 There are recognized exceptions to this rule, but the petitioner
has not shown why they apply.
________________
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error committed by the
respondent Court of Appeals, the petition is DENIED. The Decision
8 The modes of terminating a co-ownership other than by prescription
sought to be reviewed is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No pronouncement as
are partition (CIVIL CODE, arts. 494; 1079,1082), merger or
to costs.
consolidation, and loss of the thing (3 Manresa 486).
9 Santos v. Heirs of Crisostomo, 41 Phil. 3342 (1921); Bargayo v.
SO ORDERED.
Camumot, 40 Phil. 857 (1920).
462
462 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Adille vs. Court of Appeals
“made known” his efforts to deny the co-ownership. Moreover, one of the
private respondents, Emeteria Asejo, is occupying a portion of the land up
to the present, yet, the petitioner has not taken pains to eject her
therefrom. As a matter of fact, he sought to recover possession of that
portion Emeteria is occupying only as a counterclaim, and only after the
private respondents had first sought judicial relief.
It is true that registration under the Torrens system is constructive
notice of title,10 but it has likewise been our holding that the Torrens title
does not furnish a shield for fraud.11 It is therefore no argument to say
that the act of registration is equivalent to notice of repudiation, assuming
 OL. 201, SEPTEMBER 24, 1991 641
Delima vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 46296. September 24, 1991.*
EPITACIO DELIMA, PACIANO DELIMA, FIDEL DELIMA, VIRGILIO
DELIMA, GALILEO DELIMA, JR., BIBIANO BACUS, OLIMPIO BACUS
and PURIFICACION BACUS, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, GALILEO DELIMA (deceased), substituted by his legal heirs,
namely: FLAVIANA VDA. DE DELIMA, LILY D. ARIAS, HELEN
NIADAS, ANTONIO DELIMA, DIONISIO DELIMA, IRENEA DELIMA,
ESTER DELIMA AND FELY DELIMA, respondents.
Civil Law; Co-ownership; Partition; Prescription; An action to compel
partition may be filed at anytime by any of the co-owners against the actual
possessor; No prescription shall run in favor of a coowner against his co-
owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-
ownership.—As a rule, possession by a coowner will not be presumed to be
adverse to the others, but will be held to benefit all. It is understood that
the co-owner or co-heir who is in possession of an inheritance pro-
indiviso for himself and in representation of his co-owners or co-heirs, if,
as such owner, he administers or takes care of the rest thereof with the
obligation of delivering it to his co-owners or co-heirs, is under the same
situation as a depository, a lessee or a trustee (Bargayo v. Camumot, 40
Phil. 857; Segura v. Segura, No. L-29320, September 19, 1988, 165 SCRA
368). Thus, an action to compel partition may be filed at any time by any
of the co-owners against the actual possessor. In other words, no
prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner against his co-owners or
coheirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; From the moment one of the
coowners claims that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of the
properties and denies the others any share therein, the question involved is
no longer one of partition but of ownership.—However, from the moment
one of the co-owners claims that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of
the properties and denies the others any share therein, the question
involved is no longer one of partition but of ownership (De Castro v.
Echarri, 20 Phil. 23; Bargayo v. Camumot, supra; De los Santos v. Santa
Teresa, 44 Phil. 811). In such case, the imprescriptibility of the action for
partition can no longer be invoked or applied when one of the co-owners
has adversely possessed the
________________
* FIRST DIVISION.
642
6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
42
Delima vs. Court of Appeals
property as exclusive owner for a period sufficient to vest ownership
by prescription.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Possession by a co-owner or co-heir is that
of a trustee; Requisites before possession is considered adverse to the cestui
que trust amounting to a repudiation of the co-ownership.—It is settled
that possession by a co-owner or co-heir is that of a trustee. In order that
such possession is considered adverse to the cestui que trust amounting to
arepudiation of the co-ownership, the following elements must concur: 1)
that the trustee has performed unequivocal acts amounting to an ouster of
the cestui que trust; 2) that such positive acts of repudiation had been
made known to the cestui que trust; and 3) that the evidence thereon
should be clear and conclusive.
Same; Same; Same; Same; When a co-owner of the property in
question executed a deed of partition and on the strength thereof obtained
the cancellation of the title in the name of their predecessor and the
issuance of a new one wherein he appears as the new owner of the property,
the statute of limitations started to run for the purposes of the action
instituted by the latter seeking a declaration of the existence of the co-
ownership and of their rights thereunder.—We have held that when a co-
owner of the property in question executed a deed of partition and on the
strength thereof obtained the cancellation of the title in the name of their
predecessor and the issuance of a new one wherein he appears as the new
owner of the property, thereby in effect denying or repudiating the
ownership of the other co-owners over their shares, the statute of
limitations started to run for the purposes of the action instituted by the
latter seeking a declaration of the existence of the co-ownership and of
their rights thereunder (Castillo v. Court of Appeals, No. L-18046, March
31, 1964, 10 SCRA 549). Since an action for reconveyance of land based on
implied or constructive trust prescribes after ten (10) years, it is from the
date of the issuance of such title that the effective assertion of adverse
title for purposes of the statute of limitations is counted.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The issuance of new title constituted an
open and clear repudiation of the trust or co-ownership and the lapse of ten
(10) years of adverse possession by Galileo Delima from February 4, 1954
was sufficient to vest title in him by prescription.—Evidence shows that
TCT No. 2744 in the name of the legal heirs of Lino Delima, represented
by Galileo Delima, was cancelled by virtue of an affidavit executed by
Galileo Delima and that on February 4, 1954, Galileo Delima obtained the
issuance of a new title in his name numbered TCT No. 3009 to the
exclusion of his co-heirs. The issuance
643
VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 24, 1991 64
 3 Galileo Delima declared the lot in his name for taxation purposes and paid
Delima vs. Court of Appeals
of this new title constituted an open and clear repudiation of the
trust or co-ownership, and the lapse of ten (10) years of adverse possession
by Galileo Delima from February 4, 1954 was sufficient to vest title in him
by prescription. As the certificate of title was notice to the whole world of
his exclusive title to the land, such rejection was binding on the other
heirs and started as against them the period of prescription. Hence, when
petitioners filed their action for reconveyance and/or to compel partition
on February 29, 1968, such action was already barred by prescription.
Whatever claims the other co-heirs could have validly asserted before can
no longer be invoked by them at this time.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Gabriel J. Canete for petitioners.
Emilio Lumontad, Jr. for private respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of
Appeals reversing the trial court’s judgment which declared as null and
void the certificate of title in the name of respondents ’ predecessor and
which ordered the partition of the disputed lot among the parties as co-
owners.
The antecedent facts of the case as found both by the respondent
appellate court and by the trial court are as follows:
During his lifetime, Lino Delima acquired Lot No. 7758 of the Talisay-
Minglanilla Friar Lands Estate in Cebu by sale on installments from the
government. Lino Delima later died in 1921 leaving as his only heirs three
brothers and a sister namely: Eulalio Delima, Juanita Delima, Galileo
Delima and Vicente Delima. After his death, TCT No. 2744 of the property
in question was issued on August 3, 1953 in the name of “The Legal Heirs
of Lino Delima, deceased, represented by Galileo Delima.”
On September 22, 1953, Galileo Delima, now substituted by
respondents, executed an affidavit of “Extra-judicial Declaration of Heirs.”
Based on this affidavit, TCT No. 2744 was cancelled and TCT No. 3009
was issued on February 4, 1954 in the name of Galileo Delima alone to the
exclusion of the other heirs.
644
644 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Delima vs. Court of Appeals
the taxes thereon from 1954 to 1965.
On February 29, 1968, petitioners, who are the surviving heirs of
Eulalio and Juanita Delima, filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu
(now Regional Trial Court) an action for reconveyance and/or partition of
property and for the annulment of TCT No. 3009 with damages against
their uncles Galileo Delima and Vicente Delima,. Vicente Delima was
joined as party defendant by the petitioners for his refusal to join the
latter in their action.
On January 16, 1970, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of
petitioners, the dispositive portion of which states:
“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the following are
the declared owners of Lot No. 7758 of the TalisayMinglanilla Friar Lands
Estate presently covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3009, each
sharing a pro-indiviso share of one-fourth;
1. 1)Vicente Delima (one-fourth)
2. 2)Heirs of Juanita Delima, namely: Bibiano Bacus, Olimpio Bacus
and Purificacion Bacus (on-fourth);
3. 3)Heirs of Eulalio Delima, namely Epitacio, Paciano, Fidel, Virgilio
and Galileo Jr., all surnamed Delima (one-fourth); and
4. 4)The Heirs of Galileo Delima, namely Flaviana Vda. de Delima,
LIly D. Arias, Helen Niadas, and Dionisio, Antonio, Eotu, Irenea,
and Fely, all surnamed Delima (one-fourth).
“Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3009 is declared null and void and the
Register of Deeds of Cebu is ordered to cancel the same and issue in lieu
thereof another title with the above heirs as pro-indiviso owners.
“After the payment of taxes paid by Galileo Delima since 1958, the
heirs of Galileo Delima are ordered to turn over to the other heirs their
respective shares of the fruits of the lot in question computed at P1 70.00
per year up to the present time with legal (interest).
“Within sixty (60) days from receipt of this decision the parties are
ordered to petition the lot in question and the defendants are directed to
immediately turn over possession of the shares here awarded to the
respective heirs.
“Defendants are condemned to pay the costs of the suit.
“The counterclaims dismissed.
“SO ORDERED." (pp. 54–55, Rollo)
645
VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 24, 1991 645
Delima vs. Court of Appeals
Not satisfied with the decision, respondents appealed to the Court of
Appeals. On May 19, 1977, respondent appellate court reversed the trial
court’s decision and upheld the claim of Galileo Delima that all the other
brothers and sister of Lino Delima, namely Eulalio, Juanita and Vicente,
had already relinquished and waived their rights to the property in his
favor, considering that he (Galileo Delima) alone paid the remaining
balance of the purchase price of the lot and the realty taxes thereon (p.
26, Rollo).
Hence, this petition was filed with the petitioners alleging that the
Court of Appeals erred:
1. “1)In not holding that the right of a co-heir to demand partition of
inheritance is imprescriptible. If it does, the defenses of
prescription and laches have already been waived.
2. “2)In disregarding the evidence of the petitioners.” (p. 13, Rollo)
The issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or not petitioners’
action for partition is already barred by the statutory period provided by
law which shall enable Galileo Delima to perfect his claim of ownership by
acquisitive prescription to the exclusion of petitioners from their .shares in
the disputed property.
Article 494 of the Civil Code expressly provides:
“Art. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership.
Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned
in common, insofar as his share is concerned.
“Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain
period of time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This term may be
extended by a new agreement.
“A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not
exceed twenty years.
“Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by law.
“No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his
co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the
co-ownership.”
As a rule, rule, possession by a co-owner will not be presumed to be
adverse to the others, but will be held to benefit all. It is understood that
the co-owner or co-heir who is in possession of
646
646 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Delima vs. Court of Appeals
an inheritance pro-indiviso for himself and in representation of his co-
owners or co-heirs, if, as such owner, he administers or takes care of the
rest thereof with the obligation of delivering it to his co-owners or co-heirs,
is under the same situation as a depository, a lessee or a trustee (Bargayo
v. Camumot, 40 Phil. 857; Segura v. Segura, No. L-29320, September 19,
1988, 165 SCRA 368). Thus, an action to compel partition may be filed at
any time by any of the co-owners against the actual possessor. In other
words, no prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner against his co-
owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-
ownership (Del Blanco v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. 72694,
December 1, 1987, 156 SCRA 55).
However, from the moment one of the co-owners claims that he is the
absolute and exclusive owner of the properties and denies the others any
share therein, the question involved is no longer one of partition but of
ownership (De Castro v. Echarri, 20 Phil. 23; Bargayo v.
Camumot, supra; De los Santos v. Santa Teresa, 44 Phil. 811), In such
case, the imprescriptibility of the action for partition can no longer be
invoked or applied when one of the co-owners has adversely possessed the
property as exclusive owner for a period sufficient to vest ownership by
prescription.
It is settled that possession by a co-owner or co-heir is that of a trustee.
In order that such possession is considered adverse to the cestui que
trust amounting to a repudiation of the coownership, the following
elements must concur: 1) that the trustee has performed unequivocal acts
amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust; 2) that such positive acts of
repudiation had been made known to the cestui que trust; and 3) that the
evidence thereon should be clear and conclusive (Valdez v. Olorga, No. L-
22571, May 25, 1973, 51 SCRA 71; Pangan v. Court of Appeals, No. L-
39299, October 18, 1988, 166 SCRA 375).
We have held that when a co-owner of the property in question
executed a deed of partition and on the strength thereof obtained the
cancellation of the title in the name of their predecessor and the issuance
of a new one wherein he appears as the new owner of the property,
thereby in effect denying or repudiating the ownership of the other co-
owners over their shares,
647
VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 24, 1991 647
Delima vs. Court of Appeals
the statute of limitations started to run for the purposes of the action
instituted by the latter seeking a declaration of the existence of the co-
ownership and of their rights thereunder (Castillo v. Court of Appeals, No.
L-18046, March 31, 1964, 10 SCRA 549). Since an action for reconveyance
of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes after ten (10)
years, it is from the date of the issuance of such title that the effective
assertion of adverse title for purposes of the statute of limitations is
counted (Jaramil v. Court of Appeals, No. L-31858, August 31, 1977, 78
SCRA 420).
Evidence shows that TCT No. 2744 in the name of the legal heirs of
Lino Delima, represented by Galileo Delima, was cancelled by virtue of an
affidavit executed by Galileo Delima and that on February 4, 1954, Galileo
Delima obtained the issuance of a new title in his name numbered TCT
No. 3009 to the exclusion of his co-heirs. The issuance of this new title
constituted an open and clear repudiation of the trust or coownership, and
the lapse of ten (10) years of adverse possession by Galileo Delima from
February 4, 1954 was sufficient to vest title in him by prescription. As the
certificate of title was notice to the whole world of his exclusive title to the
land, such rejection was binding on the other heirs and started as against
them the period of prescription. Hence, when petitioners filed their action
for reconveyance and/or to compel partition on February 29,1968, such
action was already barred by prescription. Whatever claims the other co-
heirs could have validly asserted before can no longer be invoked by them
at this time.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 19, 1977 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
 Mariategui vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 57062. January 24, 1992.*
MARIA DEL ROSARIO MARIATEGUI, ET AL., petitioners, vs. HON.
COURT OF APPEALS, JACINTO MARIATEGUI, JULIAN
MARIATEGUI and PAULINA MARIATEGUI, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Complaint; The Court of Appeals
correctly adopted the settled rule that the nature of an action filed in court
is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint constituting the cause of
action.—A perusal of the entire allegations of the complaint, however,
shows that the action is principally one of partition. The allegation with
respect to the status of the private respondents was raised only
collaterally to assert their rights in the estate of the deceased. Hence, the
Court of Appeals correctly adopted the settled rule that the nature of an
action filed in court is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint
constituting the cause of action (Republic vs. Estenzo, 158 SCRA 282
[1988]). It has been held that, if the relief demanded is not the proper one
which may be granted under the law, it does not characterize or determine
the nature of plaintiffs' action, and the relief to which plaintiff is entitled
based on the facts alleged by him in his complaint, although it is not the
relief demanded, is what determines the nature of the action (1 Moran, p.
127, 1979 ed., citing Baguioro vs. Barrios, et al., 77 Phil. 120).
Same; Evidence; Disputable presumption; Once a man and woman
have lived as husband and wife and such relationship is not denied nor
contradicted, the presumption of their being married must be admitted as a
fact.—Courts look upon the presumption of marriage with great favor as it
is founded on the following rationale: "The basis of human society
throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this
jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an
institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.
Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing
matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are
presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special
to that case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common
order of society and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves
out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and
of law x x x." (Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 56 [1922] quoted in
Alavado vs. City Government of Taclo-
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
338
3 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
38
Mariategui vs. Court of Appeals
ban, 139 SCRA 230 [1985]). So much so that once a man and a
woman have lived as husband and wife and such relationship is not denied
nor contradicted, the presumption of their being married must be
admitted as a fact (Alavado v. City Gov't. of Tacloban, supra).
Civil Law; Family Code; Filiation; Art. 172 of the Family Code
provides that filiation of legitimate children may be established by the
record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment or by the
open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child.—
Article 172 of the said Code provides that the filiation of legitimate
children may be established by the record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment or by the open and continuous possession of
the status of a legitimate child. Evidence on record proves the legitimate
filiation of the private respondents. Jacinto's birth certificate is a record of
birth referred to in the said article. Again, no evidence which tends to
disprove facts contained therein was adduced before the lower court. In
the case of the two other private respondents, Julian and Paulina, they
may not have presented in evidence any of the documents required by
Article 172 but they continuously enjoyed the status of children of Lupo
Mariategui in the same manner as their brother Jacinto.
Same; Same; Prescription; Prescription of an action for partition does
not lie except when the co-ownership is properly repudiated by the co-
owner.—In view of the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than
that private respondents are legitimate children and heirs of Lupo
Mariategui and therefore, the time limitation prescribed in Article 285 for
filing an action for recognition is inapplicable to this case. Corollarily,
prescription does not run against private respondents with respect to the
filing of the action for partition so long as the heirs for whose benefit
prescription is invoked, have not expressly or impliedly repudiated the co-
ownership. In other words, prescription of an action for partition does not
lie except when the co-ownership is properly repudiated by the co-owner
(Del Banco vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 156 SCRA 55 [1987] citing
Jardin vs. Hollasco, 117 SCRA 532 [1982]). Otherwise stated, a co-owner
cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners absent a
clear repudiation of co-ownership duly communicated to the other co-
owners (Mariano vs. De Vega, 148 SCRA 342 [1987]). Furthermore, an
action to demand partition is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by
laches (Del Banco vs. IAC, 156 SCRA 55 [1987]). On the other hand, an
action for partition may be seen to be at once an action for declaration of
coownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion
of the property involved (Roque vs. IAC, 165 SCRA 118 [1988]).
339
VOL. 205, JANUARY 24, 1992 33
 9 **Penned by Associate Justice Elias B. Asuncion, concurred by Sison,
Mariategui vs. Court of Appeals
Same; Same; Wills and Succession; Repudiation; Petitioners'
registration of the properties in their names in 1971 did not operate as a
valid repudiation of the co-ownership.—Petitioners' registration of the
properties in their names in 1971 did not operate as a valid repudiation of
the co-ownership. In Adille vs. Court of Appeals (157 SCRA 455, 461-462
[1988]), the Court held: "Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation
of co-ownership, must have been preceded by repudiation (of the co-
ownership). The act of repudiation, in turn, is subject to certain conditions:
(1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such an act of repudiation
is clearly made known to the other coowners; (3) the evidence thereon is
clear and conclusive; and (4) he has been in possession through open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property for the
period required by law." x x x "It is true that registration under the
Torrens system is constructive notice of title, but it has likewise been our
holding that the Torrens title does not furnish shield for fraud. It is
therefore no argument to say that the act of registration is equivalent to
notice of repudiation, assuming there was one, notwithstanding the long-
standing rule that registration operates as a universal notice of title."
Inasmuch as petitioners registered the properties in their names in fraud
of their co-heirs prescription can only be deemed to have commenced from
the time private respondents discovered the petitioners' act of
defraudation (Adille vs. Court of Appeals, supra). Hence, prescription
definitely may not be invoked by petitioners because private respondents
commenced the instant action barely two months after learning that
petitioners had registered in their names the lots involved.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Asuncion, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Montesa, Albon & Associates for petitioners.
Parmenio B. Patacsil, Patacsil Twins Law Office for the heirs of the
late Maria del Rosario Mariategui.
Tinga, Fuentes & Tagle Law Firm for private respondents.
BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision ** of the Court of
Appeals dated December 24,1980 in CA-G.R. No.
_______________
P.V. and Censon, JJ.
340
340 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mariategui vs. Court of Appeals
61841, entitled "Jacinto Mariategui, et al. vs. Maria del Rosario
Mariategui, et al.," reversing the judgment of the then Court of First
Instancce of Rizal, Branch VIII*** at Pasig, Metro Manila. The undisputed
facts are as follows:
Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 (Brief for
respondents, Rollo, pp. 116; 8). During his lifetime, Lupo Mariategui
contracted three (3) marriages. With his first wife, Eusebia Montellano,
who died on November 8,1904, he begot four (4) children, namely:
Baldomera, Maria del Rosario, Urbana and Ireneo. Baldomera died and
was survived by her children named Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria,
Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed Espina. Ireneo also died and
left a son named Ruperto. With his second wife, Flaviana Montellano, he
begot a daughter named Cresenciana who was born on May 8,1910 (Rollo,
Annex "A", p. 36).
Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco (Lupo's third wife) got married
sometime in 1930. They had three children, namely: Jacinto, born on July
3, 1929, Julian, born on February 16, 1931 and Paulina, born on April 19,
1938. Felipa Velasco Mariategui died in 1941 (Rollo, Ibid).
At the time of his death, Lupo Mariategui left certain properties which
he acquired when he was still unmarried (Brief for respondents, Rollo, pp.
116; 4). These properties are described in the complaint as Lots Nos. 163,
66, 1346 and 156 of the Muntinglupa Estate (Rollo, Annex "A", p. 39).
On December 2, 1967, Lupo's descendants by his first and second
marriages, namely, Maria del Rosario, Urbana, Ruperto, Cresencia, all
surnamed Mariategui and Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo,
Virginia and Federico, all surnamed Espina, executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated unto themselves Lot No.
163 of the Muntinglupa Estate. Thereafter, Lot No. 163 was the subject of
a voluntary registration proceedings filed by the adjudicatees under Act
No. 496, and the land registration court issued a decree ordering the
registration of the lot. Thus, on April 1, 1971, OCT No. 8828 was issued in
the name of the above-mentioned heirs. Subsequently, the registered
owners caused the subdivision of the
VOL. 205, JANUARY 24, 1992 341
Mariategui vs. Court of Appeals
said lot into Lots Nos. 163-A to 163-H, for which separate transfer
certificates of title were issued to the respective parties (Rollo, ibid).
 On April 23, 1973, Lupo's children by his third marriage with Felipa
Velasco (Jacinto, Julian and Paulina) filed with the lower court an
amended complaint claiming that Lot No. 163 together with Lots Nos. 669,
1346 and 154 were owned by their common father, Lupo Mariategui, and
that, with the adjudication of Lot No. 163 to their co-heirs, they (children
of the third marriage) were deprived of their respective shares in the lots.
Plaintiffs pray for partition of the estate of their deceased father and
annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition dated December 2, 1967
(Petition, Rollo, p. 10). Cresencia Mariategui Abas, Flaviana Mariategui
Cabrera and Isabel Santos were impleaded in the complaint as unwilling
defendants as they would not like to join the suit as plaintiffs although
they acknowledged the status and rights of the plaintiffs and agreed to the
partition of the parcels of land as well as the accounting of their fruits
(Ibid., Rollo, p. 8; Record on Appeal, p. 4).
The defendants (now petitioners) filed an answer with counterclaim
(Amended Record on Appeal, p. 13). Thereafter, they filed a motion to
dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action and prescription. They
specifically contended that the complaint was one for recognition of
natural children. On August 14, 1974, the motion to dismiss was denied by
the trial court, in an order the dispositive portion of which reads:
"It is therefore the opinion of the Court that Articles 278 and 285 of the
Civil Code cited by counsel for the defendants are of erroneous application
to this case. The motion to dismiss is therefore denied for lack of merit.
"SO ORDERED." (Ibid, p. 37).
However, on February 16, 1977, the complaint as well as petitioners'
counterclaim were dismissed by the trial court, in its decision stating thus:
"The plaintiffs' right to inherit depends upon the acknowledgment or
recognition of their continuous enjoyment and possession of status of
children of their supposed father. The evidence fails to sustain either
premise, and it is clear that this action cannot be
342
342 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mariategui vs. Court of Appeals
sustained. (Ibid, Rollo, pp. 67-68)
The plaintiffs elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on the ground that
the trial court committed an error "x x x in not finding that the parents of
the appellants, Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco (were) lawfully
married, and in holding (that) they (appellants) are not legitimate children
of their said parents, thereby divesting them of their inheritance x x x."
(Rollo, pp. 14-15).
On December 24,1980, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision
declaring all the children and descendants of Lupo Mariategui, including
appellants Jacinto, Julian and Paulina (children of the third marriage) as
entitled to equal shares in the estate of Lupo Mariategui; directing the
adjudicatees in the extrajudicial partition of real properties who
eventually acquired transfer certificates of title thereto, to execute deeds
of reconveyance in favor, and for the shares, of Jacinto, Julian and Paulina
provided rights of innocent third persons are not prejudiced otherwise the
said adjudicatees shall reimburse the said heirs the fair market value of
their shares; and directing all the parties to submit to the lower court a
project of partition in the net estate of Lupo Mariategui after payment of
taxes, other government charges and outstanding legal obligations.
The defendants-appellees filed a motion for reconsideration of said
decision but it was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition which was
given due course by the court on December 7, 1981.
The petitioners submit to the Court the following issues: (a) whether or
not prescription barred private respondents' right to demand the partition
of the estate of Lupo Mariategui, and (b) whether or not the private
respondents, who belatedly filed the action for recognition, were able to
prove their successional rights over said estate. The resolution of these
issues hinges, however, on the resolution of the preliminary matter, i.e.,
the nature of the complaint filed by the private respondents.
The complaint alleged, among other things, that "plaintiffs are the
children of the deceased spouses Lupo Mariategui x x x and Felipa
Velasco"; that "during his lifetime, Lupo Mariategui had repeatedly
acknowledged and confirmed plaintiffs as his children and the latter, in
turn, have continuously enjoyed such
343
VOL. 205, JANUARY 24, 1992 343
Mariategui vs. Court of Appeals
status since their birth"; and "on the basis of their relationship to the
deceased Lupo Mariategui and in accordance with the law on intestate
succession, plaintiffs are entitled to inherit shares in the foregoing estate
(Record on Appeal, pp. 5 & 6). It prayed, among others, that plaintiffs be
declared as children and heirs of Lupo Mariategui and adjudication in
favor of plaintiffs their lawful shares in the estate of the decedent (Ibid, p.
10).
A perusal of the entire allegations of the complaint, however, shows
that the action is principally one of partition. The allegation with respect
to the status of the private respondents was raised only collaterally to
assert their rights in the estate of the deceased. Hence, the Court of
Appeals correctly adopted the settled rule that the nature of an action
filed in court is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint
constituting the cause of action (Republic vs. Estenzo, 158 SCRA
282 [1988]).
It has been held that, if the relief demanded is not the proper one
which may be granted under the law, it does not characterize or determine
the nature of plaintiffs' action, and the relief to which plaintiff is entitled
based on the facts alleged by him in his complaint, although it is not the
relief demanded, is what determines the nature of the action (1 Moran, p.
127,1979 ed., citing Baguioro vs. Barrios, et al., 77 Phil. 120).
With respect to the legal basis of private respondents' demand for
partition of the estate of Lupo Mariategui, the Court of Appeals aptly held
that the private respondents are legitimate children of the deceased.
Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco were alleged to have been lawfully
married in or about 1930. This fact is based on the declaration
communicated by Lupo Mariategui to Jacinto who testified that "when
(his) father was still living, he was able to mention to (him) that he and
(his) mother were able to get married before a Justice of the Peace of
Taguig, Rizal." The spouses deported themselves as husband and wife, and
were known in the community to be such. Although no marriage certificate
was introduced to this effect, no evidence was likewise offered to
controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the
marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites
for its validity are present (People vs. Borromeo, 133 SCRA 106 [1984]).
344
344 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mariategui vs. Court of Appeals
Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken
place between Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a
woman, deporting themselves as husband and wife, have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there
being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that
things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the
ordinary habits of life (Section 5 (z), (bb), (cc), Rule 131, Rules of
Court; Corpus v. Corpus, 85 SCRA 567 [1978]; Saurnaba v. Workmen's
Compensation, 85 SCRA 502 [1978]; Alavado v. City Gov't. of
Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230 [1985]; Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA
439 [1985]).
Courts look upon the presumption of marriage with great favor as it is
founded on the following rationale:
"The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of
marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is
a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is
deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans
toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or
evidence special to that case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such
is the common order of society and if the parties were not what they thus
hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant
violation of decency and of law x x x." (Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee, 43
Phil. 43, 56 [1922] quoted in Alavado vs. City Government of
Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230 [1985]).
So much so that once a man and a woman have lived as husband and wife
and such relationship is not denied nor contradicted, the presumption of
their being married must be admitted as a fact (Alavado v. City Gov't. of
Tacloban, supra).
The Civil Code provides for the manner under which legitimate
filiation may be proven. However, considering the effectivity of the Family
Code of the Philippines, the case at bar must be decided under a new if not
entirely dissimilar set of rules because the parties have been overtaken by
events, to use the popular phrase (Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R
No 76873, October 26, 1989). Thus, under Title VI of the Family Code,
there are only two classes of children—legitimate and illegitimate. The
fine distinctions among various types of ille-
345
VOL. 205, JANUARY 24, 1992 345
Mariategui vs. Court of Appeals
gitimate children have been eliminated (Castro vs. Court of Appeals, 173
SCRA 656 [1989]).
Article 172 of the said Code provides that the filiation of legitimate
children may be established by the record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment or by the open and continuous possession of
the status of a legitimate child. Evidence on record proves the legitimate
filiation of the private respondents. Jacinto's birth certificate is a record of
birth referred to in the said article. Again, no evidence which tends to
disprove facts contained therein was adduced before the lower court. In
the case of the two other private respondents, Julian and Paulina, they
may not have presented in evidence any of the documents required by
Article 172 but they continuously enjoyed the status of children of Lupo
Mariategui in the same manner as their brother Jacinto.
While the trial court found Jacinto's testimonies to be inconsequential
and lacking in substance as to certain dates and names of relatives with
whom their family resided, these are but minor details. The nagging fact
is that for a considerable length of time and despite the death of Felipa in
1941, the private respondents and Lupo lived together until Lupo's death
in 1953. It should be noted that even the trial court mentioned in its
decision the admission made in the affidavit of Cresenciana Mariategui
Abas, one of the petitioners herein, that "x x x Jacinto, Julian and Paulina
Mariategui ay pawang mga kapatid ko sa ama x x x" (Exh. M, Record on
Appeal, pp. 65-66).
In view of the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that
private respondents are legitimate children and heirs of Lupo Mariategui
and therefore, the time limitation prescribed in Article 285 for filing an
action for recognition is inapplicable to this case. Corollarily, prescription
does not run against private respondents with respect to the filing of the
action for partition so long as the heirs for whose benefit prescription is
invoked, have not expressly or impliedly repudiated the coownership. In
other words, prescription of an action for partition does not lie except
when the co-ownership is properly repudiated by the co-owner (Del Banco
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 156 SCRA 55 [1987] citing Jardin vs.
Hollasco, 117 SCRA 532 [1982]).
Otherwise stated, a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription
346
346 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mariategui vs. Court of Appeals
the share of the other co-owners absent a clear repudiation of co-
ownership duly communicated to the other co-owners (Mariano vs. De
Vega, 148 SCRA 342 [1987]). Furthermore, an action to demand partition
is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches (Del Banco vs. IAC, 156
SCRA 55 [1987]). On the other hand, an action for partition may be seen
to be at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation
and conveyance of a determinate portion of the property involved (Roque
vs. IAC, 165 SCRA 118 [1988]).
Petitioners contend that they have repudiated the co-ownership when
they executed the extrajudicial partition excluding the private
respondents and registered the properties in their own names (Petition, p.
16; Rollo, p. 20). However, no valid repudiation was made by petitioners to
the prejudice of private respondents. Assuming petitioners' registration of
the subject lot in 1971 was an act of repudiation of the co-ownership,
prescription had not yet set in when private respondents filed in 1973 the
present action for partition (Ceniza vs. C.A., 181 SCRA 552 [1990]).
In their complaint, private respondents averred that in spite of their
demands, petitioners, except the unwilling defendants in the lower court,
failed and refused to acknowledge and convey their lawful shares in the
estate of their father (Record on Appeal, p. 6). This allegation, though
denied by the petitioners in their answer (Ibid, p. 14), was never
successfully refuted by them. Put differently, in spite of petitioners'
undisputed knowledge of their relationship to private respondents who are
therefore their co-heirs, petitioners fraudulently withheld private
respondent's share in the estate of Lupo Mariategui. According to
respondent Jacinto, since 1962, he had been inquiring from petitioner
Maria del Rosario about their (respondents) share in the property left by
their deceased father and had been assured by the latter (Maria del
Rosario) not to worry because they will get some shares. As a matter of
fact, sometime in 1969, Jacinto constructed a house where he now resides
on Lot No. 163 without any complaint from petitioners.
Petitioners' registration of the properties in their names in 1971 did
not operate as a valid repudiation of the co-ownership. In Adille vs. Court
of Appeals (157 SCRA 455, 461-462 [1988]), the Court held:
347
VOL. 205, JANUARY 24, 1992 347
Mariategui vs. Court of Appeals
"Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership, must
have been preceded by repudiation (of the co-ownership). The act of
repudiation, in turn, is subject to certain conditions: (1) a coowner
repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made
known to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear and
conclusive; and (4) he has been in possession through open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of the property for the period required
by law."
xxx xxx xxx
"It is true that registration under the Torrens system is constructive
notice of title, but it has likewise been our holding that the Torrens title
does not furnish shield for fraud. It is therefore no argument to say that
the act of registration is equivalent to notice of repudiation, assuming
there was one, notwithstanding the long-standing rule that registration
operates as a universal notice of title."
Inasmuch as petitioners registered the properties in their names in fraud
of their co-heirs prescription can only be deemed to have commenced from
the time private respondents discovered the petitioners' act of
defraudation (Adille vs. Court of Appeals, supra). Hence, prescription
definitely may not be invoked by petitioners because private respondents
commenced the instant action barely two months after learning that
petitioners had registered in their names the lots involved.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of
the Court of Appeals dated December 24, 1980 is Affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
 Vda. de Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years, the point of reference
being the date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the
G.R. No. 108547. February 3, 1997.*
certificate of title over the property, but this rule applies only when the
FELICIDAD VDA. DE CABRERA, MARYJANE CABRERA and
plaintiff or the person enforcing the trust is not in possession of the
FELICIDAD TEOKEMIAN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
property, since if a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual
VIRGILIA ORAIS DE FELICIO, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact,
possession of the property, as the defendants are in the instant case, the
ERNESTO M. ORAIS, respondents.
right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the
Land Registration; Land Titles; Ownership: Registration does not vest
property, does not prescribe. The reason for this is that one who is in
title—it is merely evidence of such title over a particular property.—As can
actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be the owner thereof may
be discerned from the established facts, the Certificates of Title of the
wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking
vendees Orais are, to say the least, irregular, and were issued in a
steps to vindicate his right, the reason for the rule being, that his
calculated move to deprive Felicidad Teokemian of her dominical rights
undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a
over the property reserved to her by descent. Plaintiff could not have
court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim
registered the part reserved to Felicidad Teokemian, as this was not
of a third party and its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed
among those ceded in the Deed of Sale between Daniel/Albertana
only by one who is in possession.
Teokemian and Andres Orais. It must be remembered that registration
Same; Same; Same; Same; Requisites before the period of prescription
does not vest title, it is merely evidence of such title over a particular
may start in regard to an action based on implied trust.—As it is, before
property. (Embrado vs. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 335)
the period of prescription may start, it must be shown that: (a) the trustee
Same; Same; The defense of indefeasibility of the Torrens Title does
has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of
not extend to a transferee who takes the certificate of title with notice of a
the cestui que trust, (b) such positive acts
flaw in his title.—The defense of indefeasibility of the Torrens Title does
341
not extend to a transferee who takes the certificate of title with notice of a
flaw in his title. (Añonuevo vs. Court of VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 3, 1997 34
1
3 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Vda. de Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals
40 of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust, and, (c)
Vda. de Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals the evidence thereon is clear and positive.
Same; Same; Laches; Ownership; Possession; Where the action for
Appeals, 244 SCRA 28) The principle of indefeasibility of title is
reconveyance (quieting of title) was instituted only after thirty years from
unavailing where there was fraud that attended the issuance of the free
the time a party was able to acquire a Certificate of Title covering a
patents and titles. (Meneses vs. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 162)
particular property, while the occupant has been in active possession of the
Same; Same; Trusts; Prescription; Actions; An action for reconveyance
same, this surely constitutes such tardiness on the part of the former
of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten
constituting the basis for laches.—On the other hand, the action for
years, the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed or the
reconveyance (quieting of title) of the plaintiff was instituted only in 1988,
date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the property, but this rule
that is, thirty years from the time the plaintiffs husband was able to
applies only when the plaintiff or the person enforcing the trust is not in
acquire Certificate of Title covering the properties inherited by the
possession of the property, since if a person claiming to be the owner thereof
Teokemians, and apparently including that portion belonging to Felicidad
is in actual possession of the property, the right to seek reconveyance, which
Teokemian. In the meantime, defendant Felicidad vda. De Cabrera and
in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not prescribe.—Be that as it
her late husband have been actively in possession of the same, tilling it,
may, that the right of the defendants for reconveyance of the subject
and constructing an irrigation system thereon. This must surely constitute
property arising from an implied trust under Article 1456 of the Civil Code
such tardiness on the part of the plaintiff constituting the basis for laches.
is material to the instant case, such remedy has not yet lapsed, as
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Laches,
erroneously submitted by the plaintiff, and, is thus, a bar to the plaintiff’s
Defined; Prescription; Laches is not concerned merely with lapse of time,
action. In the case of Heirs of Jose Olviga vs. Court of Appeals, we
unlike prescription—while the latter deals with the fact of delay, laches
observed that an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on
deals with the effect of unreasonable delay.—Laches has been defined as
the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time,
to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been
done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. The defense of
laches is an equitable one and does not concern itself with the character of
the defendant’s title, but only with whether or not by reason of plaintiffs
long inaction or inexcusable neglect, he should be barred from asserting
his claim at all, because to allow him to do so would be inequitable and
unjust to defendant. Laches is not concerned merely with lapse of time,
unlike prescription. While the latter deals with the fact of delay, laches
deals with the effect of unreasonable delay.
Same; Same; Same; It is an enshrined rule that even a registered
owner of property may be barred from recovering possession of property by
virtue of laches.—In our jurisdiction, it is an enshrined rule that even a
registered owner of property may be barred from recovering possession of
property by virtue of laches. Under the Land Registration Act (now the
Property Registration Decree), no
342
3 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
42
Vda. de Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals
title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner
shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. The same is not
true with regard to Laches. As we have stated earlier in Mejia de Lucas
vs. Gamponia, while the defendant may not be considered as having
acquired title by virtue of his and \\is predecessor’s long continued
possession (37 years) the original owner’s right to recover back the
possession of the property and the title thereto from the defendant has, by
the latter’s long period of possession and by patentee’s inaction and
neglect, been converted into a stale demand.
Same; Same; Co-Ownership; Possession; When there has been a
partial partition, as where the transferees of an undivided portion of the
land allowed a co-owner of the property to occupy a definite portion thereof
and had not disturbed the same, for a period too long to be ignored, the
possessor is in a better condition or right.—In Go Ong vs. Court of Appeals,
this Court ruled that the heirs, as co-owners, owners, shall each have the
full ownership of his part and the fruits and benefits pertaining to it. An
heir may, therefore, alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute
another person in its enjoyment, except when the personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation or mortgage, with respect to the
co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in
the division upon the termination of the co-ownership, Undisputed is the
fact that since the sale of the two-third portion of the subject property to
the plaintiff, the latter had allowed Felicidad Teokemian to occupy that
one-third portion allotted to her. There has, therefore, been a partial
partition, where the transferees of an undivided portion of the land
allowed a co-owner of the property to occupy a definite portion thereof and
has not disturbed the same, for a period too long to be ignored—the
possessor is in a better condition or right (Potior est conditio possidentis).
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals,
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Belo, Gozon & Elma for petitioners.
Ramirez, Corro & Associates for private respondent.
343
VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 3, 1997 343
Vda. de Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals
TORRES, JR., J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari is the Decision 1 of the
respondent Court of Appeals dated January 7, 1993 in CA-G.R. No. 22407-
CV, the dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court is hereby REVERSED and
judgment is hereby entered ordering defendants Felicidad Vda. de
Cabrera and Maryjane Cabrera to vacate the portion of Lot 2238 occupied
by them and surrender possession thereof to plaintiff.
SO ORDERED."
Reversed by the foregoing pronouncements was the decision 2 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Baganga, Davao Oriental in Civil Case
No. 379, an action for “Quieting of Title to Real Property, Damages with
Preliminary Injunction.” The trial court’s disposition reads:
“WHEREFORE, the plaintiff is hereby ordered:
1. (a)To execute a reconveyance within thirty (30) days after this
decision shall have become final and executory in favor of
defendant Felicidad Vda. De Cabrera corresponding only to that
portion of Lot No. 2239 actually and physically possessed and
occupied by the defendant as seen from the sketch plan of Engr.
Enecio Magno (Exh. ‘2') and pinpointed and identified during the
ocular investigation as to its extent and boundaries of the said
portion bought by defendants Felicidad Vda. De Cabrera from
Felicidad Teokemian;
2. (b)To reimburse defendants for litigation expenses and attorney’s
fees in the amount of P7,000; and
3. (c)To pay the cost.
 SO ORDERED."
We are restating the facts as determined by the appellate court, viz:
344 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Vda. de Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals
“On January 16, 1950, a Deed of Sale (Exh. B) was executed by Daniel
Teokemian and Albertana Teokemian in favor of Andres Orais over a
parcel of unregistered land situated at Abejod, Cateel, Davao Oriental
with an area described as 7.3720 hectares. The property was owned in
common by Daniel and Albertana and their sister Felicidad Teokemian,
having inherited the same from their late father, Domingo Teokemian.
However, the Deed of Sale was not signed by Felicidad, although her name
was printed therein as one of the vendors. On January 26, 1950, the parcel
of land was surveyed in the name of Virgilia Orais, daughter of the vendee
Andres Orais, and denominated as Lot No. 2239, PLS-287, Cateel
Cadastre. As surveyed, the property had an area of 11.1000 hectares.
On June 24, 1957, Virgilia Orais was issued Free Patent No. V-79089.
Original Certificate of Title No. P-10908 was issued in her name (Exh. A).
On July 27, 1972, Alberto (sic Albertana) Teokemian executed a Deed
of Absolute Sale conveying to Elano Cabrera, husband of Felicidad
Cabrera, ‘ONE HALF PORTION OF LOT NO. 2239, Cad287, eastern
portion, containing an area of FIFTY FIVE THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED TEN (55,510) SQUARE METERS, more or less’ (Exh. 3),
which portion supposedly corresponded to the onethird share in Lot 2239
of Felicidad Teokemian who was not a party to the Deed of Sale earlier
executed by her brother and sister in favor of Andres Orais, Virgilia Orais’
predecessor-in-interest. It was explained by Felicidad Cabrera that the
Deed of Sale was signed by Albertana Teokemian, not by Felicidad
Teokemian, because the whole of Lot 2239 was adjudicated to Albertana in
a decision of a cadastral court dated June 8, 1965 as evidenced by a
Certification of an officer-in-charge of the Office of the Clerk of Court,
RTC, Br. 7, Baganga, Davao Oriental (Exh. 4). Felicidad Cabrera and her
husband immediately took possession of the western portion of Lot 2239.
In 1974 and 1978, Virgilia Orais’ brothers, Rodolfo and Jimmy Orais
went to Cateel, Davao Oriental and confronted the Cabreras of the latter’s
alleged encroachment and illegal occupation of their sister’s land, but no
concrete action on the matter was pursued by Virgilia Orais until
February 11, 1988 when she filed Civil Case No. 379 against Felicidad
Cabrera, now a widow, and her daughter Maryjane Cabrera for ‘Quieting
of Title to Real Property, Damages with Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction/
The complaint, which was amended on June 22, 1988 by including
Felicidad Teokemian as party defendant (pp. 42–47, Rec-
345
VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 3, 1997 345
Vda. de Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals
ords), alleged that sometime in 1972 and 1973 the late Elano Cabrera and
defendant Felicidad Cabrera, knowing that Lot 2239 was already
registered in the name of the plaintiff, prepared a document of sale and
had Felicidad Teokemian sign it conveying a portion of said lot to them as
described in the Sketch Map (Annex D of the Complaint), after which they
entered and possessed said portion and enjoyed the fruits thereon.
Plaintiff further averred that by reason of the document of sale and the
declaration of the property involved in the name of defendant Felicidad
Vda. de Cabrera, there created a cloud of doubt on the former’s title on
said property.
Plaintiff prayed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, plaintiff through the undersigned
counsel respectfully prays this Honorable Court that:
1. a)After due notice and hearing, a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction be issued restraining the defendants from further
dispossessing the plaintiff of the land in question;
2. b)Ordering the defendants to pay jointly the plaintiff the amount
of not less than Sixteen Thousand Two Hundred (P16,200) as
total value of the rice produced from the riceland in question, and
the amount of Twenty One Thousand Six Hundred (P21,600.00)
Pesos as the total proceeds of the nuts of the coconut land in
question;
3. c)The Defendants be ordered to pay the plaintiff the amount of
Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos and Ten Thousand
(P10,000.00) Pesos as litigation expenses;
4. d)The defendants be ordered to pay Six Thousand (P6,000.00)
Pesos for attorney’s fees; Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos as
expenses for every-appearance in Court;
5. e)The document of sale executed by Felicidad Teokemian and the
Tax Declarations issued to the late Elano Cabrera and Felicidad
Vda. de Cabrera and the subsequent Tax Declaration creating a
cloud of doubt on the title, possession, rights and interest be
declared null and void for being fraudulent and without any legal
basis and inexistent; and
6. f)Such other reliefs and remedies which this Honorable Court may
deem just, proper, and equitable in the premises.’
In their answer with counterclaim (pp. 10–18, Records), defendants
alleged that they acquired a portion of Lot 2239 in good faith and for
value; that said portion was owned by Felicidad Teokemian
346
346 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Vda. de Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals
who was not a party to the Deed of Sale executed by Daniel and Albertana
Teokemian on January 16, 1950 in favor of Andres Orais over Lot 2239;
that not having signed the Deed of Sale, Felicidad Teokemian’s one-third
share in Lot 2239 could not have been legally conveyed to Andres Orais;
that Virgilia Orais (successor-in-interest of Andres Orais) committed fraud
in including the portion owned by Felicidad Teokemian in her applying for
free patent over Lot 2239 is concerned pursuant to Art. 1456 of the Civil
Code; and that plaintiff is guilty of laches for not initiating an action
against defendants to recover the western portion of Lot 2239 despite
plaintiffs knowledge of defendant’s acquisition thereof in 1972, as in fact it
was only in 1988 when the complaint for quieting of title was filed in
court.
Defendants prayed, thus:
“WHEREFORE, this Honorable Court, after due notice and hearing on the
merits of this case; to issue order or orders;
1. 1.Finding the defendants as the rightful, lawful, and legal owner
of that portion which was sold to them by Felicidad Teokemian
and which was included in the title of plaintiff;
2. 2.To find that the plaintiff did not own the said portion and that
they have personal knowledge of the same when the plaintiff filed
and secured the title under the Administrative Proceeding;
3. 3.Finding that the plaintiff is only holding the title to that portion
only in an implied trust in favor of the real owner;
4. 4.Finding the plaintiff legally obligated to cause the segregation of
the portion at their expense and deliver formally the said portion
to the real owners, the defendants;
5. 5.To order the plaintiff to execute, prepare and or make any
instrument or document to finally vest in the Defendants
absolute, clear and flawless title or ownership over the portion
which the plaintiff holds title in trust in defendant’s favor;
6. 6.To order the Plaintiff to pay actual damages in the sum of
P2,000.00 as litigation expense and Attorney’s fees in the sum of
P5,000.00 in favor of defendants;
7. 7.To direct the plaintiff to account for the share of the real owner
of the portion of land illegally cultivated and planted by plaintiff
to rice in favor of FELICIDAD TEOKEMIAN to be paid thru the
Defendants who are the owners, which consisted in ONE THIRD
OF THE RICE HARVEST
347
VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 3, 1997 347
Vda. de Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals
1. every year since the year 1950 to 1972 when the portion was sold
and cultivated by defendant based on the computation of income
by the plaintiff in Paragraph 16, a paragraph in the Second
Cause of Action of the complaint;
and to grant the defendants such other reliefs and remedies
proper and equitable in the premises.3
On April 27, 1989, the lower court rendered judgment in favor of
defendants and against the plaintiff, ruling that the latter can no longer
recover the western portion of Lot 2239 conveyed in 1972 by Felicidad
Teokemian in favor of the late Elano Cabrera and Felicidad Cabrera due
to laches. In support of its findings, the trial court referred to the Court’s
pronouncements in Lola vs. Court of Appeals, 4 where it was held that
although the defense of prescription is unavailing to the petitioners,
because, admittedly, the title to the subject lot was still registered in the
name of the respondent, still the petitioners have acquired title to it by
virtue of the equitable principle of laches due to the respondent’s failure to
assert her claim and ownership for thirty-two years; and in Republic vs.
Court of Appeals5 that, while it is true that by themselves tax receipts and
declaration of ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible
evidence of ownership, they become strong evidence of ownership acquired
by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the
property; and in Miguel vs. Catalino,6 that even granting appellant’s
proposition that no prescription lies against their fathers’ recorded title,
their passivity and inaction for more than thirty four years justifies the
defendant appellee in setting up the equitable defense of laches in his own
behalf.
The respondent Court of Appeals reversed such findings upon appeal.
348 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Vda. de Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals
Even as the appellate court observed that the registration made by the
plaintiff was fraudulent insofar as it involved the one-third interest of
Felicidad Teokemian, which was not included in the sale executed by
Albertana and Daniel Teokemian, it nevertheless upheld its effects, on the
justification that the defendants’ action for reconveyance based on an
implied trust had already been barred by prescription. Furthermore, the
action of the plaintiff is not barred by laches, as was held by the lower
court. Said the appellate court:
“We disagree with the lower court’s ruling that plaintiff is barred from
bringing an action for recovery of ownership. Parenthetically, while the
complaint filed by plaintiff is designated as one for quieting of title, the
allegations therein show that it is actually for recovery of
ownership/possession.
First. The Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 27, 1972 (Exh. 3) executed
by Albertana Teokemian in favor of Elcano Cabrera over the portion of
55,510 square meters of Lot 2238 which allegedly pertained to the one-
third interest of Felicidad Teokemian did not convey any title to Elcano
Cabrera, assuming that Felicidad Teokemian still owned a one-third
portion of Lot 2238 which was already registered in plaintiffs name,
considering that Albertana did not have any authority from Felicidad
Teokemian to effect such conveyance. Consequently, defendants Felicidad
vda. De Cabrera and Maryjane Cabrera had acquired no title upon which
to anchor their claim of ownership over the one-third portion. Such being
the case, plaintiffs cannot be barred by laches from instituting the action
to quiet title against defendants.
xxx
Second, There was no allegation, much less proof, that Lot 2239 had
been partitioned among the co-owners Daniel, Albertana, and Felicidad,
all surnamed Teokemian, before the land was sold to Andres Orais in 1950
when the same was still unregistered. This being the case, and assuming
that Felicidad Teokemian had retained ownership over an undivided one-
third portion of Lot 2239 despite its being titled in plaintiffs name in 1958,
Felicidad Teokemian could only dispose her undivided interest, not a
definite portion described in the Deed of Sale executed on July 27, 1972
(Exh. 3) as “eastern part.” Worse, the supposed vendee, Elcano Cabrera,
and her successors-in-interest, defendants Felicidad vda. de Cabrera and
Maryjane Cabrera, occupied the western portion of Lot 2239, not the
349
VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 3, 1997 349
Vda. de Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals
eastern portion which was the subject of the sale. Their occupation of a
definite portion of an undivided property, without any color of title, could
not have ripened into ownership on the principle of laches.
Third. As testified to by Jimmy Orais, plaintiffs brother, it was only in
1974 when plaintiff came to know that her property was occupied by
Elcano Cabrera. According to Jimmy, he and his elder brother Dr. Rodolfo
Orais went to the house of Elcano Cabrera three times in 1974 and in 1979
complaining of the latter’s occupancy of their sister’s property. Jimmy
further declared that after Elcano Cabrera was shown plaintiffs title to
the property, Elcano Cabrera proposed a relocation survey of the area to
determine whether the premises occupied by him were included in the
plaintiffs title (T.S.N. pp. 39–44, January 3, 1989). It appears, however,
that nothing came out of the proposal to conduct a relocation survey. From
the time plaintiff became aware of Cabrera’s possession of the western
portion of Lot 2239, which was in 1974, up to the time she instituted the
action for quieting of title in 1988, only fourteen (14) years had elapsed.
This case, therefore, has no congruency with those cases where the
Supreme Court ruled that the registered owner is barred by laches from
recovering his property. Thus, in Lola vs. Court of Appeals (145 SCRA
439), the petitioners acquired title to the land owned by respondent by
virtue of the equitable principles of laches due, according to the Supreme
Court, to respondent’s failure to assert her claims and ownership for
thirty-two (32) years/ In Miguel vs. Catalino (26 SCRA 234), the Supreme
Court said that appellant’s ‘passivity and inaction for more than 34 years
(1928–1962) justifies the defendant-appellee in setting up the equitable
defense of laches in his behalf.’ In Mejia vs. Gampomana (100 Phil. 277), it
was held that ‘the original owner’s right to recover back the possession of
the property and title thereto from the defendant has by the long period of
37 years and by the patentee’s inaction and neglect been converted into a
stale demand/
Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by the exercise of due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it (Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 32
SCRA 29). Since imprescriptibility is one of the basic features of a Torrens
title, it is not an ordinary delay in asserting one’s right that will give rise
to the application of the principle of laches, otherwise, registered title can
easily be defeated by
350
350 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Vda. de Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals
prescription. This is precisely the reason why, in the cases cited, the delay
or inaction by the registered owners in asserting their rights was
considered unreasonable and unexplained because it took them from 32 to
37 years to do so. In contrast, the delay in the case at bar was only
fourteen years.
While possession of defendants Felicidad vda. De Cabrera and
Maryjane Cabrera could not have ripened into ownership as already
discussed, they are possessors in good faith of the portion occupied by
them and, therefore, entitled to the benefits accorded by the Civil Code as
such."7
Sisters Felicidad Vda. de Cabrera and Maryjane Cabrera, together with
Felicidad Teokemian are now before the Court as Petitioners in this
Petition for Review on Certiorari, seeking relief from the respondent
court’s decision, assigning as errors the following:
 A their late father, Domingo, due to the long period of time which lapsed
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT
PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S COMPLAINT FILED IN 1988 FOR
QUIETING OF TITLE WHICH ACTUALLY IS ONE FOR RECOVERY
OF OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION AS FOUND BY RESPONDENT
COURT IS NOT BARRED BY LACHES BECAUSE:
1. 1.A PERIOD OF 30 YEARS HAD ELAPSED FROM 1958 WHEN
TORRENS TITLE WAS ISSUED TO PRIVATE RESPONDENT
TO 1988 WHEN HER COMPLAINT BELOW WAS FILED
DURING WHICH PERIOD OF TIME THE PROPERTY HAS
BEEN IN OPEN, CONTINUOUS AND ADVERSE POSSESSION
OF THE ORIGINAL OWNER, FELICIDAD TEOKEMIAN,
FROM 1958, OR EVEN EARLIER IN 1941 WHEN SHE
INHERITED THE PROPERTY, TO 1972 WHEN SHE SOLD IT
TO THE CABRERAS WHO CONTINUED THE PRIOR
POSSESSION UNTIL 1988 WHEN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
COMPLAINT WAS FILED.
2. 2.ASSUMING ARGUENDO RESPONDENT COURT’S HOLDING
THAT ONLY 14 YEARS HAD ELAPSED COUNTED FROM
1974 WHEN CABRERAS' POSSESSION
VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 3, 1997 351
Vda. de Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals
1. WAS QUESTIONED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S
BROTHERS, STILL THAT PERIOD CONSTITUTES LACHES.
B was typewritten together with her sister Albertana and brother Daniel all
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
LACHES DOES NOT APPLY BECAUSE WHAT WAS SOLD TO THE
CABRERAS WAS A DEFINITE PORTION OF THE COMMUNITY
PROPERTY BEFORE PARTITION, HENCE, VOID AND THAT
ALBERTANA TEOKEMIAN WHO SIGNED THE DOCUMENT OF SALE
IN FAVOR OF THE CABRERAS HAD NO AUTHORITY FROM HER
SISTER-CO-OWNER FELICIDAD TEOKEMIAN TO EXECUTE THE
DEED OF CONVEYANCE.8
The bone of the petitioners’ contention rests on the alleged waiver of the
plaintiff to recover any interest she had in the one-third portion of the
property inherited by Daniel, Albertana and Felicidad Teokemian from
from the time the plaintiff’s title was registered until the action for
quieting of title was instituted.
We find merit in the petition.
At the outset, it must be observed that the Certificate of Title of the
plaintiff, which was derived from Free Patent No. V79089, issued in the
name of Virgilia Orais, leaves much to be desired in propriety, considering
that the Deed of Sale executed by Daniel and Albertana Teokemian, on
one hand and Andres Orais on the other, did not bear the signature of
Felicidad Teokemian, and therefore, did not cover the latter’s share.
It was the respondent appellate court which observed that “the
registration of the plaintiff’s title over the subject property was fraudulent
insofar as it involved the one-third interest of Felicidad Teokemian who
did not sign the Deed of Sale in favor of plaintiff’s predecessor-in-interest
and, therefore, the latter held that portion as a trustee of an implied trust
for
352 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Vda. de Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals
the benefit of Felicidad, pursuant to Art. 1456 of the Civil Code."9 Needless
to state, these conclusions, being matters of fact, are entitled to our full
affirmation, since they are congruent with the findings of the trial court,
thus:
“It would seem from the facts of the case that the basis of the right of
plaintiff over the land in litigation specifically Lot No. 2239 now titled in
the name of the plaintiff; located at Buayahon, Abejod, Cateel, Davao
Oriental, proceeded from the Deed of Sale executed by Daniel Teokemian
and Albertana Teokemian on January 16, 1950 acknowledged before
Judge Proserador Danao as Notary Ex Oficio. Taking a hard look over the
aforesaid deed of sale (Exh “B") the said document apparently included the
third heir of Domingo Teokemian Felicidad Teokemian because her name
surnamed Teokemian in the said document. Again this fact will come to
mind that the vendee Andres Orais was anticipating at the time Felicidad
Teokemian will also sell her share in this portion of land (Lot No. 2239)
which at the time of the sale it was still unregistered land. The non-
signing of Felicidad Teokemian over her typewritten name in this deed of
sale (Exh. “B") will attest to the fact that she did not sell her share in the
lot in question. After this sale the vendee Andres Orais through his
encargado Melecio Capilitan and later Servillano Abarca immediately took
possession of the two-third portion of said parcel of land respecting the
third portion owned by Felicidad Teokemian."10
However, the appellate court stated further that nonetheless, the
plaintiff’s attempt to recover the property is justified because defendant
Felicidad Teokemian’s own action for reconveyance has already been
barred by prescription,11 which is the same as stating that the very
tardiness of the plaintiff in pursuing the present action for reconveyance
of the subject property has rendered the defendants’ defense nugatory, and
has made the fortress of the plaintiff’s case impregnable.
VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 3, 1997 353
Vda. de Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals
This conclusion is incorrect. As can be discerned from the established
facts, the Certificates of Title of the vendees Orais are, to say the least,
irregular, and were issued in a calculated move to deprive Felicidad
Teokemian of her dominical rights over the property reserved to her by
descent. Plaintiff could not have registered the part reserved to Felicidad
Teokemian, as this was not among those ceded in the Deed of Sale
between Daniel/Albertana Teokemian and Andres Orais. It must be
remembered that registration does not vest title, it is merely evidence of
such title over a particular property. (Embrado vs. Court of Appeals)12
The defense of indefeasibility of the Torrens Title does not extend to a
transferee who takes the certificate of title with notice of a flaw in his
title. (Añonuevo vs. Court of Appeals)13 The principle of indefeasibility of
title is unavailing where there was fraud that attended the issuance of the
free patents and titles. (Meneses vs. Court of Appeals) 14
Be that as it may, that the right of the defendants for reconveyance of
the subject property arising from an implied trust under Article 1456 of
the Civil Code is material to the instant case, such remedy has not yet
lapsed, as erroneously submitted by the plaintiff, and, is thus, a bar to the
plaintiff’s action. In the case of Heirs of Jose Olviga vs. Court of
Appeals,15 we observed that an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land
based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years, the point of
reference being the date of registration of the deed or the date of the
issuance of the certificate of title over the property, but this rule applies
only when the plaintiff or the person enforcing the trust is not in possession
of the property, since if a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in
actual possession of the property, as the defendants are in the instant
case, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to
the property, does not prescribe.
354 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Vda. de Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals
The reason for this is that one who is in actual possession of a piece of
land claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until his possession is
disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right,
the reason for the rule being, that his undisturbed possession gives him a
continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and
determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on
his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession.
As it is, before the period of prescription may start, it must be shown
that: (a) the trustee has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation
amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust, (b) such positive acts of
repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust, and, (c) the
evidence thereon is clear and positive.16
In the case at bar, the defendant Felicidad Teokemian, and thereafter,
the Cabreras, were in actual possession of the property since it was left to
Felicidad Teokemian by her father in 1941, which possession had not been
interrupted, despite the sale of the two-third portion thereof to the
plaintiff in 1950, and the latter’s procurement of a Certificate of Title over
the subject property in 1957. Until the institution of the present action in
1988, plaintiff, likewise, had not displayed any unequivocal act of
repudiation, which could be considered as an assertion of adverse interest
from the defendants, which satisfies the above-quoted requisites. Thus, it
cannot be argued that the right of reconveyance on the part of the
defendants, and its use as defense in the present suit, has been lost by
prescription.
On the other hand, the action for reconveyance (quieting of title) of the
plaintiff was instituted only in 1988, that is, thirty years from the time the
plaintiffs husband was able to acquire Certificate of Title covering the
properties inherited by the Teokemians, and apparently including that
portion belonging to Felicidad Teokemian. In the meantime, defendant
________________
16Huang vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108525, September 13,
1994, 236 SCRA 420.
355
VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 3, 1997 355
Vda. de Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals
Felicidad vda. de Cabrera and her late husband have been actively in
possession of the same, tilling it, and constructing an irrigation system
thereon. This must surely constitute such tardiness on the part of the
plaintiff constituting the basis for laches.
Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due
diligence could or should have been done earlier, it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it.17 The defense of laches is an equitable one and does
not concern itself with the character of the defendant’s title, but only with
whether or not by reason of plaintiff’s long inaction or inexcusable neglect,
he should be barred from asserting his claim at all, because to allow him
to do so would be inequitable and unjust to defendant. Laches is not
concerned merely with lapse of time, unlike prescription. While the latter
deals with the fact of delay, laches deals with the effect of unreasonable
delay.18
This Court emphasized in Mejia de Lucas vs. Gamponia,19 the reason
upon which the rule is based is not alone the lapse of time during which
the neglect to enforce the right has existed, but the changes of condition
which may have arisen during the period in which there has been neglect.
In other words, where a court finds that the position of the parties has to
change, that equitable relief cannot be afforded without doing injustice, or
that the intervening rights of third persons may be destroyed or seriously
impaired, it will not exert its equitable powers in order to save one from
the consequences of his own neglect.
356 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Vda. de Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals
In our jurisdiction, it is an enshrined rule that even a registered owner of
property may be barred from recovering possession of property by virtue of
laches. Under the Land Registration Act (now the Property Registration
Decree), no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered
owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. The same is
not true with regard to Laches.20 As we have stated earlier in Mejia de
Lucas vs. Gamponia, while the defendant may not be considered as having
acquired title by virtue of his and his predecessor’s long continued
possession (37 years) the original owner’s right to recover back the
possession of the property and the title thereto from the defendant has, by
the latter’s long period of possession and by patentee’s inaction and
neglect, been converted into a stale demand.
The argument that laches does not apply because what was sold to the
Cabreras was a definite portion of the community property, and, therefore,
void, is likewise untenable.
Under Article 493 of the Civil Code:
“Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits
and benefits pertaining thereto, and even he may therefore alienate,
assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the
alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited
to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership.”
In Go Ong vs. Court of Appeals,21 this Court ruled that the heirs, as co-
owners, shall each have the full ownership of his part and the fruits and
benefits pertaining to it. An heir may, therefore, alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except
when the personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the
VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 3, 1997 357
Vda. de Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals
portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination
of the co-ownership.
Undisputed is the fact that since the sale of the two-third portion of the
subject property to the plaintiff, the latter had allowed Felicidad
Teokemian to occupy that one-third portion allotted to her. There has,
therefore, been a partial partition, where the transferees of an undivided
portion of the land allowed a co-owner of the property to occupy a definite
portion thereof and has not disturbed the same, for a period too long to be
ignored—the possessor is in a better condition or right (Potior est conditio
possidentis).
Clearly, the plaintiff in this instance is barred from asserting her
alleged right over the portion subject matter in the instant case on the
ground that their right has been lost by laches. In Bailon-Casilao vs. Court
of Appeals, we ruled that:
“As early as 1923, this Court has ruled that even if a co-owner sells the
whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those
of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale (Punzalan vs. Boon
Liat, 44 Phil. 320 [1923]). This is because under the aforementioned codal
provision, the sale or other disposition affects only his undivided share
and the transferee gets only what would correspond to his grantor in the
partition of the things owned in common (Ramirez vs. Bautista, 14 Phil.
528 [1909]). x x x For Article 494 of the Civil Code explicitly declares: No
prescription shall lie in favor of a co-owner or co-heir so long as he
expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership."22
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is hereby GRANTED The decision of
the Court of Appeals dated January 7, 1993 is hereby SET ASIDE. The
decision of the trial court dated April 27, 1989 is hereby REINSTATED in
toto.
SO ORDERED.
 conveyance of real property, considering that it involves not a transfer of
Pada-Kilario vs. Court of Appeals property from one to the other but rather, a confirmation or ratification of
title or right of property that an heir is renouncing in favor of another heir
G.R. No. 134329. January 19, 2000.*
who accepts and receives the inheritance. The 1951 extrajudicial partition
VERONA PADA-KILARIO and RICARDO KILARIO,
of Jacinto Pada’s estate being legal and effective as among his heirs,
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SILVERIO PADA, respondents.
Juanita and Maria Pada validly transferred their ownership rights over
Civil Law; Property; Partition; No law requires partition among heirs
Cadastral Lot No. 5581 to Engr. Paderes and private respondent,
to be in writing and be registered in order to be valid; The partition of
respectively.
inherited property need not be embodied in a public document so as to be
Same; Same; Possession; Persons who occupy the land of another at
effective as regards the heirs that participated therein.—We hold that the
the latter’s tolerance or permission cannot be considered possessors nor
extrajudicial partition of the estate of Jacinto Pada among his heirs made
builders in good faith.—Considering that petitioners were in possession of
in 1951 is valid, albeit executed in an unregistered private document. No
the subject property by sheer tolerance of its owners, they knew that their
law requires partition among heirs to be in writing and be registered in
occupation of the premises may be terminated any time. Persons who
order to be valid. The requirement in Sec. 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules
occupy the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission, without
of Court that a partition be put in a public document and registered, has
any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise
for its purpose the protection of creditors and the heirs themselves against
that they will vacate the same upon demand, failing in which a summary
tardy claims. The object of registration is to serve as constructive notice to
action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them. Thus, they cannot
others. It follows then that the intrinsic validity of partition not executed
be considered possessors nor builders in good faith. It is well-settled that
with the prescribed formalities is not undermined when no creditors are
both Article 448 and Article 546 of the New Civil Code which allow full
involved. Without creditors to take into consideration, it is competent for
reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the premises until
the heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for distribution thereof in
reimbursement is made, apply only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one
a manner and upon a plan different from those provided by the rules from
who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof. Verily,
which, in the first place, nothing can be inferred that a writing or other
persons whose occupation of a realty is by sheer tolerance of its owners are
formality is essential for the partition to be valid. The partition of
not possessors in good faith.
inherited property need not be embodied in a public document so as to be
effective as regards the heirs that participated therein. The requirement of
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Article 1358 of the Civil Code that acts which have for their object the
creation, transmission, modification or extinguishment of real rights over
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
immovable property, must appear in a public instrument, is only for
Ernesto M. Andrade for petitioners.
convenience, non-compliance with which does not affect the validity or
Renato M. Rances for private respondents.
enforceability of the acts of the parties as among themselves.
483
Same; Same; Same; Neither does the Statute of Frauds under Article
1403 of the New Civil Code apply because partition among heirs is not VOL. 322, JANUARY 19, 2000 483
legally deemed a conveyance of real property.—And nei- Pada-Kilario vs. Court of Appeals

________________ DE LEON, JR., J.:

* SECOND DIVISION. The victory1 of petitioner spouses Ricardo and Verona Kilario in the
482 Municipal Circuit Trial Court2 in an ejectment suit3 filed against them by
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED private respondent Silverio Pada, was foiled by its reversal 4 by the
82 Regional Trial Court5 on appeal. They elevated their cause 6 to respondent
Court of Appeals7 which, however, promulgated a Decision 8 on May 20,
Pada-Kilario vs. Court of Appeals
1998, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court.
ther does the Statute of Frauds under Article 1403 of the New Civil The following facts are undisputed:
Code apply because partition among heirs is not legally deemed a
 One Jacinto Pada had six (6) children, namely, Marciano, Ananias,
Amador, Higino, Valentina and Ruperta. He died intestate. His estate
included a parcel of land of residential and coconut land located at
Poblacion, Matalom, Leyte, denominated as Cadastral Lot No. 5581 with
an area of 1,301.92 square meters. It is the northern portion of Cadastral
Lot No. 5581 which is the subject of the instant controversy.
During the lifetime of Jacinto Pada, his half-brother, Feliciano Pada,
obtained permission from him to build a house on the northern portion of
Cadastral Lot No. 5581. When Feliciano died, his son, Pastor, continued
living in the house together with his eight children. Petitioner Verona
Pada-
484 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Pada-Kilario vs. Court of Appeals
Kilario, one of Pastor’s children, has been living in that house since 1960.
Sometime in May, 1951, the heirs of Jacinto Pada entered into an
extra-judicial partition of his estate. For this purpose, they executed a
private document which they, however, never registered in the Office of
the Registrar of Deeds of Leyte.
At the execution of the extra-judicial partition, Ananias was himself
present while his other brothers were represented by their children. Their
sisters, Valentina and Ruperta, both died without any issue. Marciano was
represented by his daughter, Maria; Amador was represented by his
daughter, Concordia; and Higino was represented by his son, Silverio who
is the private respondent in this case. It was to both Ananias and
Marciano, represented by his daughter, Maria, that Cadastral Lot No.
5581 was allocated during the said partition. When Ananias died, his
daughter, Juanita, succeeded to his right as co-owner of said property.
On June 14, 1978, Juanita Pada sold to Engr. Ernesto Paderes, the
right of his father, Ananias, as co-owner of Cadastral Lot No. 5881.
On November 17, 1993, it was the turn of Maria Pada to sell the co-
ownership right of his father, Marciano. Private respondent, who is the
first cousin of Maria, was the buyer.
Thereafter, private respondent demanded that petitioner spouses
vacate the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581 so his family can
utilize the said area. They went through a series of meetings with the
barangay officials concerned for the purpose of amicable settlement, but
all earnest efforts toward that end, failed.
On June 26, 1995, private respondent filed in the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Matalom, Leyte, a complaint for ejectment with prayer for
damages against petitioner spouses.
On July 24, 1995, the heirs of Amador Pada, namely, Esperanza Pada-
Pavo, Concordia Pada-Bartolome, and Angelito
485
VOL. 322, JANUARY 19, 2000 485
Pada-Kilario vs. Court of Appeals
Pada, executed a Deed of Donation9 transferring to petitioner Verona
Pada-Kilario, their respective shares as co-owners of Cadastral Lot No.
5581.
On February 12, 1996, petitioner spouses filed their Answer averring
that the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581 had already been
donated to them by the heirs of Amador Pada. They contended that the
extra-judicial partition of the estate of Jacinto Pada executed in 1951 was
invalid and ineffectual since no special power of attorney was executed by
either Marciano, Amador or Higino in favor of their respective children
who represented them in the extra-judicial partition. Moreover, it was
effectuated only through a private document that was never registered in
the office of the Registrar of Deeds of Leyte.
The Municipal Circuit Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of
petitioner spouses. It made the following findings:
“After a careful study of the evidence submitted by both parties, the court
finds that the evidence adduced by plaintiff failed to establish his
ownership over x x x Cadastral Lot No. 5581 x x x while defendants has
[sic] successfully proved by preponderance of evidence that said property
is still under a community of ownership among the heirs of the late
Jacinto Pada who died intestate. If there was some truth that Marciano
Pada and Ananias Pada has [sic] been adjudicated jointly of [sic] the
above-described residential property x x x as their share of the inheritance
on the basis of the alleged extra judicial settlement, how come that since
1951, the date of partition, the share of the late Marciano Pada was not
transferred in the name of his heirs, one of them Maria Pada-Pavo and
still remain [sic] in the name of Jacinto Pada up to the present while the
part pertaining to the share of Ananias Pada was easily transferred in the
name of his heirs x x x.
“The alleged extra judicial settlement was made in private writing and
the genuineness and due execution of said document was assailed as
doubtful and it appears that most of the heirs were not participants and
signatories of said settlement, and there was
486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Pada-Kilario vs. Court of Appeals
lack of special power of attorney to [sic] those who claimed to have
represented their co-heirs in the participation [sic] and signing of the said
extra judicial statement.
“Defendants were already occupying the northern portion of the above-
described property long before the sale of said property on November 17,
1993 was executed between Maria Pada-Pavo, as vendor and the plaintiff,
as vendee. They are in possession of said portion of the above-described
property since the year 1960 with the consent of some of the heirs of
Jacinto Pada and up to the [sic] present some of the heirs of Jacinto Pada
has [sic] donated x x x their share of [sic] the above-described property to
them, virtually converting defendants’ standing as co-owners of the land
under controversy. Thus, defendants as co-owners became the undivided
owners of the whole estate x x x. As co-owners of x x x Cadastral Lot No.
5581 x x x their possession in the northern portion is being [sic] lawful.” 10
From the foregoing decision, private respondent appealed to the Regional
Trial Court. On November 6, 1997, it rendered a judgment of reversal. It
held:
“x x x [T]he said conveyances executed by Juanita Pada and Maria Pada
Pavo were never questioned or assailed by their co-heirs for more than 40
years, thereby lending credence on [sic] the fact that the two vendors were
indeed legal and lawful owners of properties ceded or sold. x x x At any
rate, granting that the co-heirs of Juanita Pada and Maria Pada Pavo
have some interests on the very lot assigned to Marciano and Ananias,
nevertheless, said interests had long been sadly lost by prescription, if not
laches or estoppel.
“It is true that an action for partition does not prescribe, as a general
rule, but this doctrine of imprescriptibility cannot be invoked when one of
the heirs possessed the property as an owner and for a period sufficient to
acquire it by prescription because from the moment one of the co-heirs
claim [sic] that he is the absolute owner and denies the rest their share of
the community property, the question then involved is no longer one for
partition but of ownership. x x x Since [sic] 1951 up to 1993 covers a period
of 42 long years.
VOL. 322, JANUARY 19, 2000 487
Pada-Kilario vs. Court of Appeals
Clearly, whatever right some of the co-heirs may have, was long
extinguished by laches, estoppel or prescription.
“x x x
“x x x [T]he deed of donation executed by the Heirs of Amador Pada, a
brother of Marciano Pada, took place only during the inception of the case
or after the lapse of more than 40 years reckoned from the time the
extrajudicial partition was made in 1951. Therefore, said donation is
illegal and invalid [sic] the donors, among others, were absolutely bereft of
any right in donating the very property in question.”11
The dispositive portion of the decision of the Regional Trial Court reads as
follows:
“WHEREFORE, a judgment is hereby rendered, reversing the judgment
earlier promulgated by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Matalom,
Leyte, [sic] consequently, defendants-appellees are hereby ordered:
1. “1.To vacate the premises in issue and return peaceful possession
to the appellant, being the lawful possessor in concept of owner;
2. “2.To remove their house at their expense unless appellant
exercises the option of acquiring the same, in which case the
pertinent provisions of the New Civil Code has to be applied;
3. “3.Ordering the defendants-appellees to pay monthly rental for
their occupancy and use of the portion of the land in question in
the sum of P100.00 commencing on June 26, 1995 when the case
was filed and until the termination of the present case;
4. “4.Ordering the defendants to pay to the appellant the sum of
P5,000.00 as moral damages and the further sum of P5,000.00 as
attorney’s fees;
5. “5.Taxing defendants to pay the costs of suit.”12
Petitioners filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for review of the
foregoing decision of the Regional Trial Court.
488 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Pada-Kilario vs. Court of Appeals
On May 20, 1998, respondent Court of Appeals rendered judgment
dismissing said petition. It explained:
“Well-settled is the rule that in an ejectment suit, the only issue is
possession de facto or physical or material possession and not de jure.
Hence, even if the question of ownership is raised in the pleadings, the
court may pass upon such issue but only to determine the question of
possession, specially if the former is inseparably linked with the latter. It
cannot dispose with finality the issue of ownership, such issue being
inutile in an ejectment suit except to throw light on the question of
possession x x x.
“Private respondent Silverio Pada anchors his claim to the portion of
the land possessed by petitioners on the Deed of Sale executed in his favor
by vendor Maria Pada-Pavo, a daughter of Marciano, son of Jacinto Pada
who was the registered owner of the subject lot. The right of vendee Maria
Pada to sell the property was derived from the extra-judicial partition
executed in May 1951 among the heirs of Jacinto Pada, which was written
in a Bisayan dialect signed by the heirs, wherein the subject land was
adjudicated to Marciano, Maria Pavo’s father, and Ananias Pada.
Although the authenticity and genuineness of the extra-judicial partition
is now being questioned by the heirs of Amador Pada, no action was ever
previously filed in court to question the validity of such partition.
“Notably, petitioners in their petition admitted among the antecedent
facts that Maria Pavo is one of the co-owners of the property originally
owned by Jacinto Pada x x x and that the disputed lot was adjudicated to
Marciano (father of Maria Pavo) and Ananias, and upon the death of
Marciano and Ananias, their heirs took possession of said lot, i.e. Maria
Pavo the vendor for Marciano’s share and Juanita for Ananias’ share x x x.
Moreover, petitioners do not dispute the findings of the respondent court
that during the cadastral survey of Matalom, Leyte, the share of Maria
Pada Pavo was denominated as Lot No. 5581, while the share of Juanita
Pada was denominated as Lot No. 6047, and that both Maria Pada Pavo
and Juanita were in possession of their respective hereditary shares.
Further, petitioners in their Answer admitted that they have been
occupying a portion of Lot No. 5581, now in dispute without paying any
rental owing to the liberality of the plaintiff x x x. Petitioners cannot now
impugn the aforestated extrajudicial partition executed by the heirs in
1951. As owner and possessor of the disputed property, Maria Pada, and
her vendee, private respondent, is entitled to possession. A voluntary
division of the estate of the deceased by the
489
VOL. 322, JANUARY 19, 2000 489
Pada-Kilario vs. Court of Appeals
heirs among themselves is conclusive and confers upon said heirs
exclusive ownership of the respective portions assigned to them x x x.
“The equally belated donation of a portion of the property in dispute
made by the heirs of Amador Pada, namely, Concordia, Esperanza and
Angelito, in favor of petitioner Verona Pada is a futile attempt to confer
upon the latter the status of co-owner, since the donors had no interest nor
right to transfer. x x x This gesture appears to be a mere afterthought to
help petitioners to prolong their stay in the premises. Furthermore, the
respondent court correctly pointed out that the equitable principle of
laches and estoppel come into play due to the donors’ failure to assert their
claims and alleged ownership for more than forty (40) years x x x.
Accordingly, private respondent was subrogated to the rights of the vendor
over Lot No. 5581 which include [sic] the portion occupied by
petitioners.”13
Petitioner spouses filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing
decision.
On June 16, 1998, respondent Court of Appeals issued a Resolution
denying said motion.
Hence this petition raising the following issues:
“I.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT
PETITIONERS, AS CO-OWNERS, CANNOT BE EJECTED FROM THE
PREMISES CONSIDERING THAT THE HEIRS OF JACINTO PADA
DONATED TO THEM THEIR UNDIVIDED INTEREST IN THE
PROPERTY IN DISPUTE.
“II.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING
THAT WHAT MARIA PADA SOLD WAS HER UNDIVIDED SHARE IN
THE PROPERTY IN DISPUTE.
________________
13 Decision of the Court of Appeals, pp. 6-8, Rollo, pp. 36-38. Emphasis
supplied by the Court of Appeals.
490
490 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Pada-Kilario vs. Court of Appeals
“III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS ARE BUILDERS IN GOOD
FAITH.”14
There is no merit to the instant petition.
First. We hold that the extrajudicial partition of the estate of Jacinto
Pada among his heirs made in 1951 is valid, albeit executed in an
unregistered private document. No law requires partition among heirs to
be in writing and be registered in order to be valid.15 The requirement in
Sec. 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court that a partition be put in a
public document and registered, has for its purpose the protection of
creditors and the heirs themselves against tardy claims. 16 The object of
registration is to serve as constructive notice to others. It follows then that
the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the prescribed
formalities is not undermined when no creditors are involved. 17 Without
creditors to take into consideration, it is competent for the heirs of an
estate to enter into an agreement for distribution thereof in a manner and
upon a plan different from those provided by the rules from which, in the
first place, nothing can be inferred that a writing or other formality is
essential for the partition to be valid.18 The partition of inherited property
need not be embodied in a public document so as to be effective as regards
the heirs that participated therein.19 The requirement of Article 1358 of
the Civil Code that acts which have for their object the creation,
transmission, modification or extinguishment of real rights over
immovable property, must appear in a public
VOL. 322, JANUARY 19, 2000 491
Pada-Kilario vs. Court of Appeals
instrument, is only for convenience, non-compliance with which does not
affect the validity or enforceability of the acts of the parties as among
themselves.20 And neither does the Statute of Frauds under Article 1403 of
the New Civil Code apply because partition among heirs is not legally
deemed a conveyance of real property, considering that it involves not a
transfer of property from one to the other but rather, a confirmation or
ratification of title or right of property that an heir is renouncing in favor
of another heir who accepts and receives the inheritance. 21 The 1951
extrajudicial partition of Jacinto Pada’s estate being legal and effective as
among his heirs, Juanita and Maria Pada validly transferred their
ownership rights over Cadastral Lot No. 5581 to Engr. Paderes and
private respondent, respectively.22
Second. The extrajudicial partition which the heirs of Jacinto Pada
executed voluntarily and spontaneously in 1951 has produced a legal
status.23 When they discussed and agreed on the division of the estate of
Jacinto Pada, it is presumed that they did so in furtherance of their
mutual interests. As such, their division is conclusive, unless and until it
is shown that there were debts existing against the estate which had not
been paid.24 No showing, however, has been made of any unpaid charges
against the estate of Jacinto Pada. Thus, there is no reason why the heirs
should not be bound by their voluntary acts.
The belated act of Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito, who are the
heirs of Amador Pada, of donating the subject property to petitioners after
forty four (44) years of never having disputed the validity of the 1951
extrajudicial partition that
492 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Pada-Kilario vs. Court of Appeals
allocated the subject property to Marciano and Ananias, produced no legal
effect. In the said partition, what was allocated to Amador Pada was not
the subject property which was a parcel of residential land in Sto. Nino,
Matalom, Leyte, but rather, one-half of a parcel of coconut land in the
interior of Sto. Nino St., Sabang, Matalom, Leyte and one-half of a parcel
of rice land in Itum, Sta. Fe, Matalom, Leyte. The donation made by his
heirs to petitioners of the subject property, thus, is void for they were not
the owners thereof. At any rate it is too late in the day for the heirs of
Amador Pada to repudiate the legal effects of the 1951 extrajudicial
partition as prescription and laches have equally set in.
Third. Petitioners are estopped from impugning the extrajudicial
partition executed by the heirs of Jacinto Pada after explicitly admitting
in their Answer that they had been occupying the subject property since
1960 without ever paying any rental as they only relied on the liberality
and tolerance of the Pada family.25 Their admissions are evidence of a high
order and bind them insofar as the character of their possession of the
subject property is concerned.
Considering that petitioners were in possession of the subject property
by sheer tolerance of its owners, they knew that their occupation of the
premises may be terminated any time. Persons who occupy the land of
another at the latter’s tolerance or permission, without any contract
between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that they will
vacate the same upon demand, failing in which a summary action for
ejectment is the proper remedy against them. 26 Thus, they cannot be
considered possessors nor builders in good faith. It is well-settled that
both Article 44827 and Article
493
VOL. 322, JANUARY 19, 2000 493
Pada-Kilario vs. Court of Appeals
54628 of the New Civil Code which allow full reimbursement of useful
improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is made,
apply only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with
the belief that he is the owner thereof. 29 Verily, persons whose occupation
of a realty is by sheer tolerance of its owners are not possessors in good
faith. Neither did the promise of Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito Pada
that they were going to donate the premises to petitioners convert them
into builders in good faith for at the time the improvements were built on
the premises, such promise was not yet fulfilled, i.e., it was a mere
expectancy of ownership that may or may not be realized.30 More
importantly, even as that promise was fulfilled, the donation is void for
Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito Pada were not the owners of Cadastral
Lot No. 5581. As such, petitioners cannot be said to be entitled to the
value of the improvements that they built on the said lot.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is HEREBY DENIED.
Maestrado vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 133345. March 9, 2000.*
JOSEFA CH. MAESTRADO, as substituted by her daughter LOURDES
MAESTRADO-LAVIÑA and CARMEN CH. ABAYA, petitioners, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Ninth Division and JESUS C.
ROA, JR., RAMON P. CHAVES and NATIVIDAD S. SANTOS,
respondents.
G.R. No. 133324. March 9, 2000.*
JOSEFA CHAVES MAESTRADO and CARMEN CHAVES ABAYA,
petitioners, vs. JESUS C. ROA, JR., RAMON P. CHAVES and
NATIVIDAD S. SANTOS, respondents.
Actions; Quieting of Title; Words and Phrases; Persons having legal
as well as equitable title to or interest in real property may bring an action
for quieting title and “title” here does not necessarily denote a certificate of
title issued in favor of the person filing the suit.—Petitioners are proper
parties to bring an action for quieting of title. Persons having legal as well
as equitable title to or interest in a real property may bring such action
and “title” here does not necessarily denote a certificate of title issued in
favor of the person filing the suit. Moreover, if the plaintiff in an action for
quieting of title is in possession of the property being litigated, such action
is imprescriptible. One who is in actual possession of a land, claiming to be
the owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is
attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right because his undisturbed
possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of the courts to
ascertain the nature of the adverse claim and its effects on his title.
Same; Same; Laches; Since laches is a creation of equity, acts or
conduct alleged to constitute the same must be intentional and unequivocal
so as to avoid injustice; Laches operates not really to penalize neglect or
sleeping on one’s rights, but rather to avoid recognizing a right when to do
so would result in a clearly inequitable situation.—Although prescription
and laches are distinct concepts, we have held, nonetheless, that in some
instances, the doctrine of laches is inapplicable where the action was filed
within the prescrip-
_________________
*SECOND DIVISION.
679
VOL. 327, MARCH 9, 2000 679
Maestrado vs. Court of Appeals
tive period provided by law. Thus, laches does not apply in this case
because petitioners’ possession of the subject lot has rendered their right
to bring an action for quieting of title imprescriptible and, hence, not
barred by laches. Moreover, since laches is a creation of equity, acts or
conduct alleged to constitute the same must be intentional and
unequivocal so as to avoid injustice. Laches operates not really to penalize
neglect or sleeping on one’s rights, but rather to avoid recognizing a right
when to do so would result in a clearly inequitable situation.
Land Titles; A possessor of real estate property is presumed to have
title thereto unless the adverse claimant establishes a better right.—A
possessor of real estate property is presumed to have title thereto unless
the adverse claimant establishes a better right. In the instant case it is the
petitioners, being the possessors of Lot No. 5872, who have established a
superior right thereto by virtue of the oral partition which was also
confirmed by the notarized quitclaims of the heirs.
Co-Ownership; Partition; Words and Phrases; Partition is the
separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among
those to whom it may belong; Since registration serves as constructive
notice to third persons, an oral partition by the heirs is valid if no creditors
are affected.—Partition is the separation, division and assignment of a
thing held in common among those to whom it may belong. It may be
effected extra-judicially by the heirs themselves through a public
instrument filed before the register of deeds. However, as between the
parties, a public instrument is neither constitutive nor an inherent
element of a contract of partition. Since registration serves as constructive
notice to third persons, an oral partition by the heirs is valid if no
creditors are affected.
Same; Same; Statute of Frauds.—Even the requirement of a written
memorandum under the statute of frauds does not apply to partitions
effected by the heirs where no creditors are involved considering that such
transaction is not a conveyance of property resulting in change of
ownership but merely a designation and segregation of that part which
belongs to each heir.
680
6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
80
Maestrado vs. Court of Appeals
Same; Same; Land Titles; Neither a Transfer Certificate of Title nor a
subdivision plan is essential to the validity of an oral partition.—
Respondent court was convinced that Lot No. 5872 is still common
property of the heirs of the deceased spouses Ramon and Rosario Chaves
because the TCT covering the said property is still registered in the name
of the said deceased spouses. Unfortunately, respondent court was
oblivious to the doctrine that the act of registration of a voluntary
instrument is the operative act which conveys or affects registered land
insofar as third persons are concerned. Hence, even without registration,
the contract is still valid as between the parties. In fact, it has been
recently held and reiterated by this Court that neither a Transfer
Certificate of Title nor a subdivision plan is essential to the validity of an
oral partition.
Quitclaims; The freedom to enter into contracts, such as the
quitclaims, is protected by law and the courts are not quick to interfere
with such freedom unless the contract is contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public policy or public order; Quitclaims, being contracts of
waiver, involve the relinquishment of rights, with knowledge of their
existence and intent to relinquish them.—Since the oral partition has been
duly established, the notarized quitclaims confirmed such prior oral
agreement as well as the petitioners’ title of ownership over the subject
Lot No. 5872. More importantly, independent of such oral partition, the
quitclaims in the instant case are valid contracts of waiver of property
rights. The freedom to enter into contracts, such as the quitclaims in the
instant case, is protected by law and the courts are not quick to interfere
with such freedom unless the contract is contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public policy or public order. Quitclaims, being contracts of
waiver, involve the relinquishment of rights, with knowledge of their
existence and intent to relinquish them. The intent to waive rights must
be clearly and convincingly shown. Moreover, when the only proof of intent
is the act of a party, such act should be manifestly consistent and
indicative of an intent to voluntarily relinquish a particular right such
that no other reasonable explanation of his conduct is possible.
Same; Notarial Law; Quitclaims being duly notarized and
acknowledged before a notary public, deserve full credence and are valid
and enforceable in the absence of overwhelming evidence to the contrary.—
In the instant case, the terms of the subject quitclaims dated August 16,
1977 and September 8, 1977 are clear; and the heirs’ signatures thereon
have no other significance but their con-
681
VOL. 327, MARCH 9, 2000 681
Maestrado vs. Court of Appeals
formity thereto resulting in a valid waiver of property rights. Herein
respondents quite belatedly and vainly attempted to invoke alleged fraud
in the execution of the said quitclaims but we are not convinced. In other
words, the said quitclaims being duly notarized and acknowledged before
a notary public, deserve full credence and are valid and enforceable in the
absence of overwhelming evidence to the contrary. In the case at bench, it
is our view and we hold that the execution of the said quitclaims was not
fraudulent.
Fraud; Words and Phrases; Fraud refers to all kinds of deception,
whether through insidious machination, manipulation, concealment or
misrepresentation to lead another party into error; Silence or concealment,
by itself, does not constitute fraud, unless there is a special duty to disclose
certain facts.—Fraud refers to all kinds of deception, whether through
insidious machination, manipulation, concealment or misrepresentation to
lead another party into error. The deceit employed must be serious. It
must be sufficient to impress or lead an ordinarily prudent person into
error, taking into account the circumstances of each case. Silence or
concealment, by itself, does not constitute fraud, unless there is a special
duty to disclose certain facts. Moreover, the bare existence of confidential
relation between the parties, standing alone, does not raise the
presumption of fraud.
Same; Evidence; Fraud must be established by clear and convincing
evidence—a mere preponderance of evidence is not even adequate to prove
fraud.—Dolo causante or fraud which attends the execution of a contract
is an essential cause that vitiates consent and hence, it is a ground for the
annulment of a contract. Fraud is never presumed, otherwise, courts
would be indulging in speculations and surmises. It must be established
by clear and convincing evidence but it was not so in the case at bench. A
mere preponderance of evidence is not even adequate to prove fraud.
Same; The Court has consistently denied relief to a party who seeks to
avoid the performance of an obligation voluntarily assumed because they
turned out to be disastrous or unwise contracts, even if there was a mistake
of law or fact.—The instances of fraud allegedly committed in the case at
bench are not the kind of fraud contemplated by law. On the contrary,
they constitute mere carelessness in the conduct of the affairs of the heirs
concerned. We have consistently denied relief to a party who seeks to
avoid the performance of
682
6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
82
Maestrado vs. Court of Appeals
an obligation voluntarily assumed because they turned out to be
disastrous or unwise contracts, even if there was a mistake of law or fact.
Moreover, we do not set aside contracts merely because solicitation,
importunity, argument, persuasion or appeal to affection were used to
obtain the consent of the other party.
PETITIONS for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Santiago, Cruz & Sarte for petitioner Carmen Chaves-Abaya.
Tan, Acut & Madrid for petitioner Lourdes Maestrado-Lavifia.
Quimpo, Borja, Neri, Calejesan & Oclarit Law Office for respondent
R. Chaves.
Constantino G. Jaraula and Francis Saturnino C. Juan for
respondents N. Santos and R.P. Chaves.
Teogenes Velez for respondents.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us are two (2) consolidated petitions for review on certiorari of the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals2 dated November 28, 1997 declaring Lot
No. 5872, located in Kauswagan, Cagayan de Oro City, as common
property of the heirs of the deceased spouses, Ramon and Rosario Chaves,
and ordering its equal division among all the co-owners. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23 of
Cagayan de Oro City, which dismissed petitioners’ action against the
private respondents for Quieting of Title over the said lot.
________________
 1 Penned by Associate Justice Salome A. Montoya and concurred in by
Associate Justices Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and Rodrigo V. Cosico, Rollo,
pp. 8-14.
2 Ninth Division.
683
VOL. 327, MARCH 9, 2000 683
Maestrado vs. Court of Appeals
The pertinent facts are the following:
These consolidated cases involve the status of Lot No. 5872 and the
rights of the contending parties thereto. The said lot which has an area of
57.601 square meters, however, is still registered in the name of the
deceased spouses Ramon and Rosario Chaves. The spouses Ramon and
Rosario died intestate in 1943 and 1944, respectively. They were survived
by the following heirs, namely: Carmen Chaves-Abaya, Josefa Chaves-
Maestrado, Angel Chaves, Amparo Chaves-Roa, Concepcion Chaves-
Sanvictores and Salvador Chaves.
To settle the estate of the said deceased spouses, Angel Chaves
initiated intestate proceedings3 in the Court of First Instance of Manila
and was appointed administrator of said estates in the process. An
inventory of the estates was made and thereafter, the heirs agreed on a
project of partition. Thus, they filed an action for partition 4 before the
Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental. The court appointed
Hernando Roa, husband of Amparo Chaves-Roa, as receiver. On June 6,
1956, the court rendered a decision approving the project of partition.
However, the records of said case are missing and although respondents
claimed otherwise, they failed to present a copy of said decision.
This notwithstanding, the estate was actually divided in this wise: (1)
Lot No. 3046 situated in Bulalong, Cagayan de Oro City, consisting of 44
hectares of coconut land was distributed equally among four (4) heirs,
namely: (a) Concepcion Chaves-Sanvictores; (b) Angel Chaves; (c) Amparo
Chaves-Roa; and (d) Ramon Chaves, while (2) Lot Nos. 5925, 5934, 1327
and 5872, all located in Kauswagan, Cagayan de Oro City and consisting
of an aggregate area of 14 hectares was distributed equally between
petitioners (a) Josefa Chaves-Maestrado; and (b) Carmen Chaves-Abaya.
At the time of the actual partition, Salvador Chaves had already died.
His share was given to his only son, Ramon, who
_________________
3 Docketed as Special Proceedings No. 73066.
4 Docketed as Civil Case No. 867.
684
684 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Maestrado vs. Court of Appeals
is the namesake of Salvador’s father. In 1956, the year the partition case
was decided and effected, receiver Hernando Roa delivered the respective
shares of said heirs in accordance with the above scheme. Subsequently,
Concepcion sold her share to Angel, while Ramon sold his share to
Amparo. Hence, one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 3046 went to Angel and the other
half to Amparo.
Significantly, Lot No. 5872 was not included in any of the following
documents: (1) the inventory of properties of the estate submitted to the
court in the proceedings for the settlement of said estate; (2) the project of
partition submitted to the court for approval; (3) the properties receiver
Hernando Roa had taken possession of, which he listed in the
“Constancia” submitted to the court; and (4) the court order approving the
partition. Decedent Ramon Chaves acquired Lot No. 5872 from Felomino
Bautista, Sr. but he subsequently delivered it to the spouses Hernando
Roa and Amparo Chaves-Roa.5 It was thereafter delivered to petitioners
during the actual partition in 1956, and petitioners have been in
possession of the same since then.
As to the omission of Lot No. 5872 in the inventory and project of
partition, the parties offer different explanations. Respondents claim that
due to the series of transactions involving the said lot, the heirs were
unsure if it belonged to the decedents’ estate at all. As a result, they
deferred its inclusion in the inventory of the properties of the estate as
well as its distribution pending the investigation of its status. In fact,
administrator Angel Chaves filed a motion in the proceedings for the
settlement of the estate to include the said lot in the inventory but the
court did not act on it. Petitioners, on the other hand, insist that the
omission was inadvertent and the inaction of the court on the motion was
due to the compromise agreement entered into by the heirs.6
Petitioners’ thesis consists of the existence of an oral partition
agreement entered into by all heirs soon after the death
________________
5Comment, p. 4, Rollo, p. 96.
6Abaya’s Petition, p. 6, Rollo, p. 24.
685
VOL. 327, MARCH 9, 2000 685
Maestrado vs. Court of Appeals
of their parents. The proposed project of partition was allegedly based on
it but the court’s order of partition failed to embody such oral agreement
due to the omission of Lot No. 5872. For some reason, however, the actual
partition of the estate conformed to the alleged oral agreement.
 Petitioners’ claim that they failed to notice the non-inclusion of Lot No.
5872 in the court’s order. They only realized such fact after the death in
1976 of Silvino Maestrado, the husband of petitioner Josefa. They
discovered among Silvino’s belongings, the partition order and found out
that Lot No. 5872 was not included therein.7
In an effort to set things right, petitioners prepared a quit-claim to
confirm the alleged oral agreement. On August 16, 1977, Angel,
Concepcion and Ramon signed a notarized quit-claim in favor of
petitioners. Amparo was unable to sign because she had an accident and
had passed away on the following day. It was her heirs who signed a
similarly worded and notarized quitclaim on September 8, 1977. 8
Respondents dispute the voluntariness of their consent or the consent
of their predecessors-in-interest to the quitclaims. Ramon claims to have
been betrayed by his lawyer, Francisco Velez, who is the son-in-law of
petitioner Josefa Maestrado. He allegedly signed the quitclaim without
reading it because his lawyer had already read it. He believed that since
his lawyer was protecting his interests, it was all right to sign it after
hearing no objections from said lawyer. On the other hand, Angel signed
the quitclaim “out of respect” for petitioners. On the other hand,
Concepcion signed because she was misled by alleged misrepresentations
in the “Whereas Clauses” of the quitclaim to the effect that the lot was
inadvertently omitted and not deliberately omitted due to doubts on its
status.9
686 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Maestrado vs. Court of Appeals
Six (6) years after the execution of the quitclaims, respondents discovered
that Lot No. 5872 is still in the name of the deceased spouses Ramon and
Rosario Chaves. Thus, on October 14, 1983, respondent Ramon Chaves,
the sole heir of Salvador Chaves, and respondent Jesus Roa, son of
Amparo Chaves-Roa, wrote a letter to their uncle Angel Chaves to inform
him that said property which they claim to belong to the estate of their
deceased grandparents, has not yet been distributed to the concerned
heirs. Hence, they requested Angel Chaves to distribute and deliver it to
the heirs.10 On October 24, 1983, respondent Natividad Santos, daughter
and attorney-in-fact of Concepcion Chaves-Sanvictores, also wrote a
similar letter to Angel Chaves. On December 1, 1983, Angel Chaves
transmitted the said letters to petitioner Carmen Abaya and requested
her to respond.
In response, petitioners filed, on December 22, 1983, an action for
Quieting of Title11 against respondents in the Regional Trial Court of
Cagayan de Oro. On April 10, 1995, the trial court rendered its Decision in
favor of respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
“In view of these facts, the court therefore considers the property, Lot 5872
still common property. Consequently, the property must be divided in six
(6) parts, there being six heirs. But since the group of Jesus Roa already
quitclaimed in favor of plaintiffs and the same is true with Angel Chaves,
the defendants Natividad Santos and Ramon Chaves shall receive one-
sixth (1/6) each out of Lot 5872 and the balance will be divided equally by
the plaintiffs Josefa Chaves-Maestrado represented by her daughters and
the other half to Carmen Chaves-Abaya.
With no other pronouncements.
SO ORDERED.”
The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which in a Decision,
promulgated on November 28, 1997, sustained the said Decision of the
trial court, in this wise:
VOL. 327, MARCH 9, 2000 687
Maestrado vs. Court of Appeals
“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Decision dated
April 10, 1995 subject of the appeal, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against the plaintiffs-appellants.
SO ORDERED.”
On May 29, 1998, petitioner Lourdes Maestrado-Laviña, in substitution of
her deceased mother, Josefa Chaves-Maestrado, filed a petition for review
on certiorari with this Court.12 Petitioner Carmen Chaves-Abaya also filed
her own petition for review on certiorari on June 1, 1998.13 Since the two
petitions involve the same facts and issues, we decided in a Resolution 14 to
consolidate the said cases.
Petitioner Maestrado-Laviña assigns the following errors:
1. I.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
TRIAL COURTS DECISION DECLARING LOT 5872 AS STILL
COMMON PROPERTY, THEREBY EFFECTIVELY
NULLIFYING THE VERBAL PARTITION AGREEMENT
REACHED AND IMPLEMENTED BY THE CHILDREN/HEIRS
OF DECEDENTS RAMON AND ROSARIO CHAVES WAY
BACK IN 1956;
2. II.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
TRIAL COURTS DECISION DECLARING LOT 5872 AS STILL
COMMON PROPERTY UPON ITS CONCLUSION THAT THE
SIGNATURES OF RESPONDENTS ON THE DULY
NOTARIZED QUITCLAIMS WERE OBTAINED THROUGH
FRAUD;
3. III.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS LEGAL
CONCLUSION THAT, ON THE BASIS ALONE OF THE
CLAIMS THAT (A) RAMON CHAVES SIGNED THE
 QUITCLAIM WITHOUT READING IT; AND THAT (B) ANGEL
CHAVES SIGNED THE QUITCLAIM OUT OF RESPECT,
THERE WAS FRAUD AS WOULD VITIATE RESPONDENTS
CONSENT TO THE QUIT-CLAIMS;
688 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Maestrado vs. Court of Appeals
1. IV.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
TRIAL COURTS CONCLUSION THAT PETITIONERS HAVE
NO CAPACITY TO SUE FOR QUIETING OF TITLE OR
REMOVAL OF CLOUD THEREON ON THE BASIS ALONE
THAT PETITIONERS ARE NOT THE REGISTERED OWNERS
OF LOT 5872;
2. V.IT BEING UNDISPUTED THAT THE FACTS GIVING RISE
TO CLOUD ON JOSEFA’S AND CARMEN’S OWNERSHIP
OVER LOT 5872 SURFACED ONLY IN 1983 AND
PETITIONERS FILED THE CORRESPONDING ACTION TO
QUIET TITLE OR REMOVE CLOUD THEREON ALSO IN 1983,
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
TRIAL COURT’S CONCLUSION THAT PETITIONERS ARE
GUILTY OF LACHES.15
Petitioner Carmen Chaves-Abaya, on the other hand, assigns the following
errors:
1. I.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
CLEAR ERROR IN THE INTERPRETATION OF LAW IN
HOLDING THAT THERE WAS FRAUD IN OBTAINING THE
CONSENT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT RAMON P. CHAVES
AND CONCEPCION CHAVES SANVICTORES, THE MOTHER
OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT NATIVIDAD SANTOS, TO THE
DEEDS OF QUIT-CLAIM;
2. II.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
RULING THAT THE ACTION FOR QUIETING OF TITLE WAS
NOT BROUGHT BY THE PERSON IN WHOSE NAME THE
TITLE IS ISSUED;
3. III.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
RULING THAT PETITIONERS WERE GUILTY OF LACHES
FOR HAVING SLEPT ON THEIR RIGHTS FOR MORE THAN
25 YEARS.16
We grant the consolidated petitions, the same being impressed with merit.
VOL. 327, MARCH 9, 2000 689
Maestrado vs. Court of Appeals
First. Petitioners are proper parties to bring an action for quieting of title.
Persons having legal as well as equitable title to or interest in a real
property may bring such action and “title” here does not necessarily
denote a certificate of title issued in favor of the person filing the
suit.17 Moreover, if the plaintiff in an action for quieting of title is in
possession of the property being litigated, such action is
imprescriptible.18 One who is in actual possession of a land, claiming to be
the owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is
attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right because his undisturbed
possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of the courts to
ascertain the nature of the adverse claim and its effects on his title.19
Although prescription and laches are distinct concepts, we have held,
nonetheless, that in some instances, the doctrine of laches is inapplicable
where the action was filed within the prescriptive period provided by
law.20 Thus, laches does not apply in this case because petitioners’
possession of the subject lot has rendered their right to bring an action for
quieting of title imprescriptible and, hence, not barred by laches.
Moreover, since laches is a creation of equity, acts or conduct alleged to
constitute the same must be intentional and unequivocal so as to avoid
injustice.21 Laches operates not really to penalize neglect or sleeping on
one’s rights, but rather to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would
result in a clearly inequitable situation.22
In the case at bench, the cloud on petitioners’ title to the subject
property came about only on December 1, 1983 when
________________
17Art. 477, New Civil Code; Mamadsual v. Moson, 190 SCRA 82, 89
(1990).
18 David v. Malay, G.R. No. 132644, November 19, 1999, p. 10, 318
SCRA 711; Faja v. Court of Appeals, 75 SCRA 441, 446 (1977).
19 Faja v. Court of Appeals, supra, p. 446.
20 Associated Bank v. Court of Appeals, 291 SCRA 511, 526, (1998).
21 Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, 280 SCRA 20, 54 (1997).
22 Catholic Bishop of Balanga v. Court of Appeals, 264 SCRA 181, 193
(1996).
690
690 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Maestrado vs. Court of Appeals
Angel Chaves transmitted respondents’ letters to petitioners, while
petitioners’ action was filed on December 22, 1983. Clearly, no laches
could set in under the circumstances since petitioners were prompt and
vigilant in protecting their rights.
Second. Lot No. 5872 is no longer common property of the heirs of the
deceased spouses Ramon and Rosario Chaves. Petitioners’ ownership over
said lot was acquired by reason of the oral partition agreed upon by the
deceased spouses’ heirs sometime before 1956. That oral agreement was
confirmed by the notarized quitclaims executed by the said heirs on August
16, 1977 and September 8, 1977, supra.
It appeared that the decision in Civil Case No. 867, which ordered the
partition of the decedents’ estate, was not presented by either party
thereto. The existence of the oral partition together with the said
quitclaims is the bone of contention in this case. It appeared, however,
that the actual partition of the estate conformed to the alleged oral
partition despite a contrary court order. Despite claims of private
respondents that Lot No. 5872 was mistakenly delivered to the
petitioners, nothing was done to rectify it for a period of twenty-seven (27)
years from 1983.
We are convinced, however, that there was indeed an oral agreement of
partition entered into by the heirs/parties. This is the only way we can
make sense out of the actual partition of the properties of the estate
despite claims that a court order provided otherwise. Prior to the actual
partition, petitioners were not in possession Of Lot No. 5872 but for some
reason or another, it was delivered to them. From 1956, the year of the
actual partition of the estate of the deceased Chaves spouses, until 1983,
no one among the heirs questioned peti-tioners’ possession of or ownership
over said Lot No. 5872. Hence, we are convinced that there was indeed an
oral agreement of partition among the said heirs and the distribution of
the properties was consistent with such oral agreement. In any event, the
parties had plenty of time to rectify the situation but no such move was
done until 1983.
691
VOL. 327, MARCH 9, 2000 691
Maestrado vs. Court of Appeals
A possessor of real estate property is presumed to have title thereto unless
the adverse claimant establishes a better right.23 In the instant case it is
the petitioners, being the possessors of Lot No. 5872, who have established
a superior right thereto by virtue of the oral partition which was also
confirmed by the notarized quitclaims of the heirs.
Partition is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in
common among those to whom it may belong.24 It may be effected extra-
judicially by the heirs themselves through a public instrument filed before
the register of deeds.25
However, as between the parties, a public instrument is neither
constitutive nor an inherent element of a contract of partition. 26 Since
registration serves as constructive notice to third persons, an oral
partition by the heirs is valid if no creditors are affected. 27 Moreover, even
the requirement of a written memorandum under the statute of frauds
does not apply to partitions effected by the heirs where no creditors are
involved considering that such transaction is not a conveyance of property
resulting in change of ownership but merely a designation and segregation
of that part which belongs to each heir.28
Nevertheless, respondent court was convinced that Lot No. 5872 is still
common property of the heirs of the deceased spouses Ramon and Rosario
Chaves because the TCT covering the said property is still registered in
the name of the said deceased spouses. Unfortunately, respondent court
was oblivious to the doctrine that the act of registration of a voluntary
instrument is the operative act which conveys or affects
692 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Maestrado vs. Court of Appeals
registered land insofar as third persons are concerned. Hence, even
without registration, the contract is still valid as between the parties. 29 In
fact, it has been recently held and reiterated by this Court that neither a
Transfer Certificate of Title nor a subdivision plan is essential to the
validity of an oral partition.30
In sum, the most persuasive circumstance pointing to the existence of
the oral partition is the fact that the terms of the actual partition and
distribution of the estate are identical to the sharing scheme in the oral
partition. No one among the heirs disturbed this status quo for a period of
twenty-seven (27) years.
Finally. The said notarized quitclaims signed by the heirs in favor of
petitioners are not vitiated by fraud. Hence, they are valid.
Since the oral partition has been duly established, the notarized
quitclaims confirmed such prior oral agreement as well as the petitioners’
title of ownership over the subject Lot No. 5872. More importantly,
independent of such oral partition, the quitclaims in the instant case are
valid contracts of waiver of property rights.
The freedom to enter into contracts, such as the quitclaims in the
instant case, is protected by law31 and the courts are not quick to interfere
with such freedom unless the contract is contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public policy or public order.32 Quitclaims, being contracts of
waiver, involve the relinquishment of rights, with knowledge of their
existence and intent to relinquish them.33 The intent to waive rights
693
VOL. 327, MARCH 9, 2000 693
 Maestrado vs. Court of Appeals established the title of ownership of the petitioners over the subject Lot
must be clearly and convincingly shown. Moreover, when the only proof of No. 5872.
intent is the act of a party, such act should be manifestly consistent and WHEREFORE, the instant consolidated petitions are GRANTED. The
indicative of an intent to voluntarily relinquish a particular right such Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated November 28, 1997, is hereby
that no other reasonable explanation of his conduct is possible. 34 REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioners’ action praying for the
In the instant case, the terms of the subject quitclaims dated August quieting of their title of ownership over Lot No. 5872, located in
16, 1977 and September 8, 1977 are clear; and the heirs’ signatures Kauswagan, Cagayan de Oro, is granted. Costs against respondents.
thereon have no other significance but their conformity thereto resulting
in a valid waiver of property rights.35 Herein respondents quite belatedly VOL. 327, MARCH 9, 2000 695
and vainly attempted to invoke alleged fraud in the execution of the said People vs. Mendoza
quitclaims but we are not convinced. In other words, the said quitclaims SO ORDERED.
being duly notarized and acknowledged before a notary public, deserve full
credence and are valid and enforceable in the absence of overwhelming
evidence to the contrary.36 In the case at bench, it is our view and we hold
that the execution of the said quitclaims was not fraudulent.
Fraud refers to all kinds of deception, whether through insidious
machination, manipulation, concealment or misrepresentation to lead
another party into error.37 The deceit employed must be serious. It must
be sufficient to impress or lead an ordinarily prudent person into error,
taking into account the circumstances of each case.38 Silence or
concealment, by itself, does not constitute fraud, unless there is a special
duty to disclose certain facts.39 Moreover, the bare existence of confidential
relation between the parties, standing alone, does not raise the
presumption of fraud.40

694 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Maestrado vs. Court of Appeals
Dolo causante or fraud which attends the execution of a contract is an
essential cause that vitiates consent and hence, it is a ground for the
annulment of a contract.41 Fraud is never presumed, otherwise, courts
would be indulging in speculations and surmises. 42 It must be established
by clear and convincing evidence but it was not so in the case at bench. A
mere preponderance of evidence is not even adequate to prove fraud. 43
The instances of fraud allegedly committed in the case at bench are not
the kind of fraud contemplated by law. On the contrary, they constitute
mere carelessness in the conduct of the affairs of the heirs concerned. We
have consistently denied relief to a party who seeks to avoid the
performance of an obligation voluntarily assumed because they turned out
to be disastrous or unwise contracts, even if there was a mistake of law or
fact.44 Moreover, we do not set aside contracts merely because solicitation,
importunity, argument, persuasion or appeal to affection were used to
obtain the consent of the other party.45
In a nutshell, the quitclaims dated August 16, 1977 and September 8,
1977 in the case at bench are valid, duly confirmed and undeniably
 Si vs. Court of Appeals and/or afterwards, a written notice of a fact already known to them, would
be superfluous. The statute does not demand what is unnecessary.
G.R. No. 122047. October 12, 2000.*
SPOUSES SERAFIN SI AND ANITA BONODE SI,
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES JOSE ARMADA and
REMEDIOS ALMANZOR (deceased, and substituted by heirs: Cynthia
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Armada, Danilo Armada and Vicente Armada), respondents.
Randolph Dacanay for petitioners.
Appeals; Evidence; When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals
Ricardo M. Dira Collaborating Counsel for petitioners.
are at variance with those of the trial court, or when the inference drawn by
Ceferino Padua Law Office for private respondents.
the Court of Appeals from the facts is manifestly mistaken, the Supreme
Court will not hesitate to review the evidence.—In instances when the
QUISUMBING, J.:
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are at variance with those of the
trial court, or when the inference drawn by the Court of Appeals froin the
This petition for certiorari under Rule 45 assails the Decision 1 dated
facts is manifestly mistaken, this Court will not hesitate to review the
March 25, 1994, of the Court of Appeals and its Resolutions2
evidence in order to arrive at the correct factual conclusion. This we have
done in this case.
Co-Ownership; Redemption; After the physical division of the lot VOL. 342, OCTOBER 12, 2000 655
among the co-owners, the community ownership terminated, and the right Si vs. Court of Appeals
of preemption or redemption for each other was no longer available; There dated March 24, 1995 and September 6, 1995 in CA-G.R. CV No. 30727.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Pasig City, Branch 113, and nullified the sale of the subject lot by the
54 spouses Crisostomo and Cresenciana Armada to spouses Serafin and
Anita Si. The dispositive portion of the respondent court’s decision reads:
Si vs. Court of Appeals
“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is
is no co-ownership when the different portions owned by different hereby REVERSED, and a new one is rendered:
people are already concretely determined and separately identifiable, even
if not yet technically described.—After the physical division of the lot
1. 1)Annulling and declaring as invalid the registration of the Deed
among the brothers, the community ownership terminated, and the right
of Absolute Sale dated March 27, 1979 executed by Cresenciana
of preemption or redemption for each brother was no longer available.
V. Alejo in favor of Anita Bonode Si.
Under Art. 484 of the Civil Code, there is co-ownership whenever the
2. 2)Ordering the Register of Deeds of Pasay City to annul and cancel
ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons.
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 24751, issued in the name of
There is no co-ownership when the different portions owned by different
Anita Bonode Si, married to Serafin D. Si., Jose R. Armada,
people are already concretely determined and separately identifiable, even
married to Remedios Almanzor and Dr. Severo R. Armada, Jr.,
if not yet technically described. This situation makes inapplicable the
single.
provision on the right of redemption of a co-owner in the Civil Code.
3. 3)Ordering the Register of Deeds of Pasay City to reconstitute and
Same; Same; Co-owners with actual notice of the sale are not entitled
revive Transfer Certificate of Title No. 16007 in the names of
to written notice.—Moreover, we note that private respondent Jose
Jose, Crisostomo and Severo, Jr.
Armada was well informed of the impending sale of Crisostomo’s share in
4. 4)That plaintiffs be allowed to repurchase or redeem the share
the land. In a letter dated February 22, 1979, Jose told his brother
corresponding to the share of Crisostomo Armada within thirty
Crisostomo: “Well you are the king of yourselves, and you can sell your
(30) days from notice in writing by Crisostomo Armada.
share of Leveriza.” Co-owners with actual notice of the sale are not
5. 5)The defendants-appellees are jointly and severally ordered to
entitled to written notice. A written notice is a formal requisite to make
pay the plaintiffs-appellants the sum of P10,000.00 as moral
certain that the co-owners have actual notice of the sale to enable them to
damages.
exercise their right of redemption within the limited period of thirty days.
But where the co-owners had actual notice of the sale at the time thereof
 6. 6)The defendants-appellees are jointly and severally ordered to
pay the plaintiff-appellants the sum of P10,000.00 as attorney’s
fees and litigation expenses and costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.”3
The factual background of the case is as follows:
The 340 square meters of land, situated in San Jose District, Pasay
City, the property in dispute, originally belonged to Escolastica, wife of
Severo Armada, Sr. This was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. (17345) 2460. During the lifetime of the spouses, the property
was transferred to their children and the Registry of Deeds, Pasay City,
issued TCT No. 16007 in the names
656 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Si vs. Court of Appeals
of the three sons, as follows: “DR. CRISOSTOMO R. ARMADA, married to
Cresenciana V. Alejo, 113.34 Square Meters; JOSE R. ARMADA, married
to Remedios Almanzor, 113.33 Square Meters; and DR. SEVERO R.
ARMADA, Jr., single, all of legal age, Filipinos.”4 Annotated also in the
title is the total cancellation of said title “. . . by virtue of the Deed of Sale,
(P.E. 77952/T-24751), dated March 28, 1979, executed by CRESENCIANA
V. ALEJO, as attorney-in-fact of CRISOSTOMO R. ARMADA, conveying
113.34 square meters of the property herein, in favor of ANITA BONODE
SI, married to Serafin D. Si, for the sum of P75,000.00, issuing in lieu
thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No. 24751, Reg. Book T-102. (Doc. No.
17, Page No. 5, Book No. 253 of Notary Public of Pasay City, Manila,
Julian Florentino).”5
On April 15, 1980, herein spouses Jose Armada and Remedios
Almanzor, filed a complaint for Annulment of Deed of Sale and
Reconveyance of Title with Damages, against herein petitioners Anita and
Serafin Si and Conrado Isada, brother-in-law of Cresenciana. Isada
brokered the sale.
The complaint alleged that Conrado Isada sold Crisostomo’s share by
making it appear that Cresenciana, the attorney-in-fact of her husband, is
a Filipino citizen, residing with Isada at No. 13-4th Camarilla Street,
Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City. By this time, Crisostomo and Cresenciana
had migrated and were already citizens of the United States of America. It
also stated that when petitioners registered the deed of absolute sale they
inserted the phrase “. . . and that the co-owners are not interested in
buying the same in spite of notice to them,” and that petitioners knew of
the misrepresentations of Conrado. Further, the complaint alleged that
the other owners, Jose and Severo, Jr., had no written notice of the sale;
and that all upon learning of the sale to the spouses Si, private
respondents filed a complaint for annulment of sale and re-conveyance of
title with damages, claiming they had a right of redemption.
Petitioners, on the other hand, alleged that on October 2, 1954,
Escolastica, with the consent of her husband executed three sepa-
VOL. 342, OCTOBER 12, 2000 657
Si vs. Court of Appeals
rate deeds of sale (Exhibits 1, 2, and 3)6 conveying 113.34 square meters of
the property to Severo, and 113.33 square meters each to Crisostomo and
Jose. The three deeds of sale particularly described the portion conveyed
to each son in metes and bounds. Petitioners contend that since the
property was already three distinct parcels of land, there was no longer co-
ownership among the brothers. Hence, Jose and Severo, Jr. had no right of
redemption when Crisostomo sold his share to the spouses Si. Petitioners
point out that it was only because the Armada brothers failed to submit
the necessary subdivision plan to the Office of the Register of Deeds in
Pasay City that separate titles were not issued and TCT No. 16007 was
issued and registered in the names of Jose, Crisostomo, and Severo, Jr.
After trial on the merits, the court ruled for petitioners:
“IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the complaint is hereby
DISMISSED. With costs against the plaintiffs.”7
Private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. On March 25, 1994,
the appellate court issued the decision now assailed by petitioners. In
reversing the decision of the trial court and ruling for private respondents,
the Court of Appeals found that:
“A careful examination of TCT No. 16007 (Exh. ‘A’) shows that the portion
sold by virtue of the Deeds of Sale (Exhs. 1, 2, & 3) to the Armada brothers
do not appear in the said title, neither does it indicate the particular area
sold. Moreover, no evidence was presented to show that the Register of
Deeds issued TCT No. 16007 (Exh. ‘A’) on the basis of the said deeds of
Sale. In fact, TCT No. 16007 (Exh. ‘A’) shows that the lot is co-owned by
Jose, Crisostomo and Severo, Jr. in the proportion of 113.33, 113.34 and
113.33 sq. m. respectively.
Furthermore, the evidence on record shows that the Deed of Absolute
Sale (Exh. ‘B’), executed by Cresencia Armada in favor of defendants Si,
stated that the portion sold was the ‘undivided one hundred thirteen &
34/100(113.34) square meters’ of the parcel of land covered by TCT NO.
16007 of the Registry of Deeds for Pasay City, which means that what was
658 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Si vs. Court of Appeals
sold to defendants are still undetermined and unidentifiable, as the area
sold remains a portion of the whole.
 Moreover, plaintiff Remedi[o]s Armada testified that on March 27,
1979, Crisostomo Armada, thru his attorney-in-fact and co-defendant,
Cresenciana Alejo, sold his undivided 113.34 share to defendants, Sps. Si
as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale (Exh. ‘B’), and presented for
registration with the Register of Deeds (Exh. ‘B-1’) without notifying
plaintiffs of the sale (TSN, pp. 6-8, December 20, 1988). Instead, it appears
that the phrase ‘and that the co-owners are not interested in buying the
same inspite of notice to them,’ was inserted in the Deed of Sale (Exh. ‘B’).
xxx
Otherwise stated, the sale by a (sic) co-owner of his share in the
undivided property is not invalid, but shall not be recorded in the Registry
Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the Vendor that he has
given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.”8
On August 29, 1994, petitioners’ counsel on record, Atty. Roberto B. Yam
received a copy of the CA decision. On October 14, 1994, he filed a motion
for reconsideration, but it was denied by the Court of Appeals on
November 21, 1994, for being filed out of time.
On December 5, 1994, petitioners filed their motion for new trial under
Section 1, Rule 53 of the Revised Rules of Court. 9 Petitioners presented
new evidence, TCT No. (17345) 2460, registered in the name of Escolastica
de la Rosa, married to Severo Armada, Sr., with annotation at the back
stating that the cancellation was by virtue of three deeds of sale in favor of
Escolastica’s sons. On March 24, 1995, respondent court denied the
motion, reasoning that when the motion was filed, the reglementary
period had lapsed and the decision had become final and executory.
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of said resolution was denied.
VOL. 342, OCTOBER 12, 2000 659
Si vs. Court of Appeals
Hence, the present petition, alleging that:
1. “1.Respondent Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in
ruling that a co-ownership still existed.
2. “2.Respondent Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in
denying the Motion for Reconsideration of its Decision of 25
March 1994 on purely technical grounds.
3. “3.Respondent Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in
denying the Motion for New Trial.
4. “4.Respondent Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in
ordering petitioners to pay moral damages, attorney’s fees,
litigation expenses and the costs of the suit.”10
In essence, this Court; is asked to resolve: (1) whether respondent court
erred in denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration and/or the Motion
for New Trial; (2) whether private respondents are co-owners who are
legally entitled to redeem the lot under Article 1623 of the Civil
Code;11 and (3) whether the award of moral damages, attorney’s fees and
costs of suit is correct.
The pivotal issue is whether private respondents may claim the right
of redemption under Art. 1623 of the Civil Code. The trial court found that
the disputed land was not part of an undivided estate. It held that the
three deeds of absolute sale12 technically described the portion sold to each
son. The portions belonging to the three sons were separately declared for
taxation purposes with the Assessor’s Office of Pasay City on September
21, 1970.13 Jose’s testimony that the land was undivided was contradicted
by his wife
______________
10 Id. at 16.
11 ART. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be
exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the
prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale
shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by
an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all
possible redemptioners. The right of redemption of co-owners excludes
that of adjoining owners.
12 CA Rollo, pp. 186-192.
13 Id. at 13.
660
660 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Si vs. Court of Appeals
when she said they had been receiving rent from the property specifically
allotted to Jose.14 More significantly, on January 9, 1995, the Registry of
Deeds of Pasay City cancelled TCT 24751 and issued three new titles as
follows: (1) TCT 13459415 in favor of Severo Armada, Jr.; (2) TCT
13459516 under the name of Anita Bonode Si, married to Serafin Si; and
(3) TCT 13459617 owned by Jose Armada, married to Remedios Almanzor.
All these are on record.
However, the Court of Appeals’ decision contradicted the trial court’s
findings.18
In instances when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are at
variance with those of the trial court, or when the inference drawn by the
Court of Appeals from the facts is manifestly mistaken, this Court will not
hesitate to review the evidence in order to arrive at the correct factual
conclusion.19 This we have done in this case. It is our considered view now,
that the trial court is correct when it found that:
“Rightfully, as early as October 2, 1954, the lot in question had already The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining
been partitioned when their parents executed three (3) deed of sales (sic) owners.”
in favor of Jose, Crisostomo and Severo, all surnamed Armada (Exhs. 1, 2,
& 3), which documents purports to have been registered with the Register 662 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
of Deeds of Pasay City, on September 18, 1970, and as a consequence TCT
Si vs. Court of Appeals
No. 16007 (Exh. A) was issued. Notably, every portion conveyed and
Moreover, we note that private respondent Jose Armada was well
transferred to the three sons was definitely described and segregated and
informed of the impending sale of Crisostomo’s share in the land. In a
with the corresponding technical description (sic). In short, this is what we
letter dated February 22, 1979, Jose told his brother Crisostomo: “Well
call extrajudicial partition. Moreover, every portion belonging to the three
you are the king of yourselves, and you can sell your share of
sons has been declared for taxation purposes with the Assessor’s Office of
Leveriza.”25 Co-owners with actual notice of the sale are not entitled to
Pasay City on September 21, 1970. These are the unblinkable facts that
written notice, A written notice is a formal requisite to make certain that
the portion sold to defendant spouses Si by defen-dants Crisostomo
the co-owners have actual notice of the sale to enable them to exercise
Armada and Cresenciana Armada was concretely determined and
their right of redemption within the limited period of thirty days. But
identifiable. The fact that the three portions are embraced in one
where the co-owners had actual notice of the sale at the time thereof
certificate of title does not make said portions less determinable or
and/or afterwards, a written notice of a fact already known to them, would
identifiable or distinguishable, one from the other, nor that dominion over
be superfluous. The statute does not demand what is unnecessary. 26
Considering that respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that
VOL. 342, OCTOBER 12, 2000 661 herein private respondent could redeem, the lot bought by petitioners, the
Si vs. Court of Appeals issue of whether the appellate court erred in denying petitioners’ motions
each portion less exclusive, in their respective owners. Hence, no right of for reconsideration and new trial need not be delved into. The same is true
redemption among co-owners exists.”20 (citation omitted) with respect to the questioned award of damages and attorney’s fees.
“. . . [T]he herein plaintiffs cannot deny the fact that they did not have Petitioners filed their complaint in good faith and as repeatedly held, we
knowledge about the impending sale of this portion. The truth of the cannot put a premium on the right to litigate.
matter is that they were properly notified. Reacting to such knowledge WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, the Decision of the Court of
and notification they wrote defendant Dr. Crisostomo Armada on Appeals dated March 25, 1994 and its Resolutions dated March 24, 1995
February 22, 1979, a portion of said letter is revealing: Well you are the and September 6, 1995 in CA-G.R. CV No. 30727 are ANNULLED and
king of yourselves, and you can sell your share of Leveriza.” 21 (emphasis SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 8023-P is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
omitted) decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 113,
After the physical division of the lot among the brothers, the community promulgated on August 29, 1989, is REINSTATED.
ownership terminated, and the right of preemption or redemption for each SO ORDERED.
brother was no longer available.22
Under Art. 484 of the Civil Code,23 there is co-ownership whenever the
ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons.
There is no co-ownership when the different portions owned by different
people are already concretely determined and separately identifiable, even
if not yet technically described.24 This situation makes inapplicable the
provision on the right of redemption of a co-owner in the Civil Code, as
follows:
“Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be
exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the
prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale
shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by
an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all
possible redemptioners.