VALERA vs OFILADA G.R. No. L-27526 Sep.

12, 1974

FACTS: Civil Case No. 64, R-1 of the Court of First Instance of Abra is a special proceeding for the
settlement of the intestate estate of Francisco Valera. Virgilio Valera was the administrator of the estate,
He died on March 21, 1961. He was survived by his widow, Angelita Garduque Vda. de Valera and their ten
(10) children, named Amanda, Oscar, Dionisio, Benito, Felixberto, Eva, Lita, Toniette, Vicenta and Teresita,
all petitioners herein, except Vicenta and Teresita, who were abroad.

Later, Adoracion Valera Bringas, who claims to be an acknowledged natural child of Francisco Valera, was
appointed administratrix. She filed in the intestate proceeding a petition to require "Celso Valera and
family and Angelita de Valera and family to pay P100.00" as monthly rental for the one-third pro-indiviso
portion of the Valera residence located in Bangued, Abra. Celso Valera interposed an opposition to it on
the ground that Francisco Valera had no interest in the Valera residence, that the property was never
leased and that the remedy of Mrs. Bringas was "in a appropriate remedy and/or procedure" and not in the
intestate proceeding. The lower court subsequently granted the petition.

The said heirs, through Atty. Angel V. Colet, a son-in-law of Mrs. Valera, filed a motion for the
reconsideration of that order. They contended that the Valera residence "should be excluded from the
inventory," because that was their "absolute property of which they have been in complete possession and
occupation". Mrs. Bringas replied that Francisco Valera's estate had "already consolidated" its ownership
over that one-third partition "through the submission of the inventory and its approval" by the probate
court.

Respondent Judge Macario M. Ofilada denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the heirs of Virgilio
Valera and granted the motion of Mrs. Bringas for execution and for the delivery of certain funds and
properties.

In this present case, petitioners assail the brief, three-sentence order on the following grounds: (a) that it
decided the issue of ownership as to the one-third pro-indiviso share of Francisco Valera in the Valera
residence, an issue, which according to them, is beyond the court's probate jurisdiction; (b) that it was
issued without the benefit of a trial on the merits and without hearing all the parties involved; (c) that it
does not contain findings of fact and law; (d) that it is a judgment for a money claim which should have
been filed in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased debtor, Virgilio Valera, and
(e) that the order has no basis in substantive law.

The petitioners attack Judge Ofilada's order on the following grounds: (a) that, as a probate judge, he had
no jurisdiction to require the heirs of Virgilio Valera to account for the fruits of the six parcels of land
administered by him and that a separate action should be filed or the proper claim should be made
against his estate; (b) that he had no jurisdiction to order the heirs of Virgilio Valera to deliver to Mrs.
Bringas the sum of P4,784.98 as "insurance and war damage monies collected by Virgilio Valera"; (c) that
Section 8, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court contemplates that "double the value of the fruits and monies"
should be recovered in an "action" and not in an intestate proceeding, and (d) that the order was issued
without any trial on the merits and it does not contain findings of fact and law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court, sitting as a probate court in the intestate proceeding for the estate of
Francisco Valera, could hold the heirs of Virgilio Valera answerable for certain supposed monetary
liabilities of the latter to the estate and enforce said liabilities against the properties of the deceased
Virgilio Valera.

RULING: NO. The decedent's heirs are not liable personally for the debts of his debts. Thus, it was held:

It happens, however, that the plaintiffs are not under obligation to pay the debts of their late father, such
as items (a), (f) and (h) of the counterclaim. It does not appear that they personally bound themselves to
pay them, and the mere fact that they are the deceased's heirs does not make them answerable for such
credits against their predecessor in interest, inasmuch as article 1003 of the Civil Code is no longer in
force, having been abrogated by certain provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (Pavia vs. De la Rosa, 8
Phil. 70, cited in Calma vs. Calma, 56 Phil. 102, 105).

The error becomes more glaring in the light of Section 7, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which allows
execution in case of the death of a party only "where a party dies after the entry of the judgment or order".
The implication is that if a person, before his death, or the legal representative of his estate was never a
party to a case, no execution can be issued against his properties after his death. In this case, the Sheriff
seems to have proceeded on the assumption that the properties levied upon belonged to the deceased
Virgilio Valera and that the said properties were in the possession of his heirs.

Furthermore, there is merit in the petitioners' contention that the probate court generally cannot issue a
writ of execution. It is not supposed to issue a writ of execution because its orders usually refer to the
adjudication of claims against the estate which the executor or administrator may satisfy without the
necessity of resorting to a writ of execution. The probate court, as such, does not render any judgment
enforceable by execution.

The circumstance that the Rules of Court expressly specifies that the probate court may issue execution
(a) to satisfy the contributive shares of devisees, legatees and heirs in possession of the decedent's
assets (Sec. 6, Rule 88), (b) to enforce payment of the expenses of partition (Sec. 3, Rule 90), and (e) to
satisfy the costs when a person is cited for examination in probate proceedings (Sec. 13, Rule 142) may
mean, under the rule of inclusion unius est exclusion alterius, that those are the only instances when it can
issue a writ of execution.
 GUEVARA V. GUEVARA, GR NO. L-4884

FACTS: It appears that on August 26, 1931, Victorino L. Guevara executed a will,
apparently with all the formalities of the law. On September 27, 1933, he died. His last will and
testament, however, was never presented to the court for probate, nor has any administration
proceeding ever been instituted for the settlement of his estate. Ever since the death of
Victorino L. Guevara, his only legitimate son Ernesto M. Guevara appears to have possessed the
land adjudicated to him in the registration proceeding and to have disposed of various portions
thereof for the purpose of paying the debts left by his father.

In the meantime Rosario Guevara, who appears to have had her father's last will and
testament in her custody, did nothing judicially to invoke the testamentary dispositions made
therein in her favor, whereby the testator acknowledged her as his natural daughter and, aside
from certain legacies and bequests, devised to her a portion of 21.6171 hectares of the large
parcel of land described in the will. But a little over four years after the testator's demise, she
commenced the present action against Ernesto M. Guevara alone for the purpose hereinbefore
indicated; and it was only during the trial of this case that she presented the will to the court, not
for the purpose of having it probated but only to prove that the deceased had acknowledged her
as his natural daughter. Upon that proof of acknowledgment she claimed her share of the
inheritance from him, but on the theory or assumption that he died intestate, because the will
had not been probated, for which reason, she asserted, the betterment therein made by the
testator in favor of his legitimate son Ernesto M. Guevara should be disregarded. Both the trial
court and the Court of appeals sustained that theory.

ISSUE: Whether or not a claim for extrajudicial settlement of the estate can be had
without having the will probated.

RULING: No. In the instant case there is no showing that the various legatees other than
the present litigants had received their respective legacies or that they had knowledge of the
existence and of the provisions of the will. Their right under the will cannot be disregarded, nor
may those rights be obliterated on account of the failure or refusal of the custodian of the will to
present it to the court for probate. Section 1 of Rule 74 merely authorizes the extrajudicial or
judicial partition of the estate of a decedent "without securing letter of administration." It does
not say that in case the decedent left a will the heirs and legatees may divide the estate among
themselves without the necessity of presenting the will to the court for probate. The petition to
probate a will and the petition to issue letters of administration are two different things,
although both may be made in the same case. The allowance of a will precedes the issuance of
letters testamentary or of administration. One can have a will probated without necessarily
securing letters testamentary or of administration. We hold that under Section 1 of Rule 74, in
relation to Rule 76, if the decedent left a will and no debts and the heirs and legatees desire to
make an extrajudicial partition of the estate, they must first present that will to the court for
probate and divide the estate in accordance with the will. They may not disregard the provisions
of the will unless those provisions are contrary to law. Neither may they so away with the
presentation of the will to the court for probate, because such suppression of the will is contrary
to law and public policy.
CUA v. VARGAS G.R. No. 156536 October 31, 2006

FACTS: Paulina Vargas died leaving a parcel of residential land with an area of 99 square
meters located in San Juan, Virac, Catanduanes. A notarized Extra Judicial Settlement Among
Heirs was executed by and among her heirs, partitioning and adjudicating unto themselves the
lot in question, each one of them getting a share of 11 square meters. Florentino, Andres,
Antonina and Gloria, however, did not sign the document. Only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida
and Rosario signed it. The Extra Judicial Settlement among Heirs was published in the
Catanduanes Tribune for three consecutive weeks. An Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs
with Sale was again executed by and among the same heirs over the same property and also
with the same sharings. Once more, only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and Rosario signed the
document and their respective shares totaling 55 square meters were sold to petitioner Joseph
Cua. 7 months after, Gloria, widow of Santiago Vargas knew of the sale of the 55 square meters
to petitioner. She tried to redeem the property by way of legal redemption. It was refused. She,
together with her children, filed a case for annulment of Extra Judicial Settlement and Legal
Redemption of the lot with the MTC of Virac, Catanduanes against petitioner and consigned the
amount of P100,000 which is the amount of the purchase with the Clerk of Court claiming that
as co-owners of the property, they may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by
reimbursing him the price of the sale. They likewise alleged that the 30-day period following a
written notice by the vendors to their co-owners for them to exercise the right of redemption of
the property had not yet set in as no written notice was sent to them. In effect, they claimed that
the Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs and the Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with
Sale were null and void and had no legal and binding effect on them. The MTC rendered a
decision in favor of petitioner and declaring the Deed of Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs
with Sale valid and binding. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the MTC decision. This was, however,
reversed by the CA declaring that the Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs and the Extra
Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale were void and without any legal effect.

ISSUE:

1. Whether a publication of an extrajudicial settlement and partition of estate binds those heirs
who did not participate therein.

2. Whether the right to redeem was lost after the lapse of the 30-day period within which a co-
heir can exercise the right to be subrogated to the rights of a purchaser.

RULING:

1. NO. The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The rule plainly
states that persons who do not participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will
not be bound thereby and such partition is invalid insofar as they are concerned. The publication
of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the heirs who had no knowledge or
did not take part in it because the same was notice after the fact of execution. The requirement
of publication is geared for the protection of creditors and was never intended to deprive heirs
of their lawful participation in the decedent's estate. The respondents never signed either of the
settlement documents, having discovered their existence only shortly before the filing of the
present complaint. However, the heirs who actually participated in the execution of the
extrajudicial settlements, which included the sale to petitioner of their pro indiviso shares in the
subject property, are bound by the same.

2. NO. The right to redeem was never lost because respondents were never notified in writing of
the actual sale by their co-heirs. Based on the provision, there is a need for written notice to
start the period of redemption. It bears emphasis that the period of one month shall be
reckoned from the time that a co-heir is notified in writing by the vendor of the actual sale.
Written notice is indispensable and mandatory, actual knowledge of the sale acquired in some
other manner by the redemptioner notwithstanding.
PORTUGAL vs. PORTUGAL-BELTRAN G.R. No. 155555. August 16, 2005

FACTS:

On November 25, 1942, Jose Q. Portugal (Portugal) married Paz Lazo. On May 22, 1948, Portugal married
petitioner Isabel de la Puerta.

On September 13, 1949, petitioner Isabel gave birth to a boy whom she named Jose Douglas Portugal Jr.,
her herein co-petitioner. On April 11, 1950, Paz gave birth to a girl, Aleli, later baptized as Leonila Perpetua
Aleli Portugal, herein respondent.

On May 16, 1968, Portugal and his four (4) siblings executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and Waiver
of Rights over the estate of their father, Mariano Portugal, who died intestate on November 2, 1964. In the
deed, Portugal’s siblings waived their rights, interests, and participation over a parcel of land located in
Caloocan in his favor.

On January 2, 1970, the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City issued Transfer Certificate of Title covering
the Caloocan parcel of land in the name of "Jose Q. Portugal married to Paz C. Lazo.”

On February 18, 1984, Paz died. On April 21, 1985, Portugal died intestate.

On February 15, 1988, respondent executed an "Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole Heir of Estate of
Deceased Person" adjudicating to herself the Caloocan parcel of land.

Later getting wind of the death in 1985 of Portugal and still later of the 1988 transfer by respondent of the
title to the Caloocan property in her name, petitioners filed before the RTC of Caloocan City on a
complaint against respondent for annulment of the Affidavit of Adjudication executed by her and the
transfer certificate of title issued in her name. In their complaint, petitioners alleged that respondent is not
related whatsoever to the deceased Portugal, hence, not entitled to inherit the Caloocan parcel of land
and that she perjured herself when she made false representations in her Affidavit of Adjudication.

Petitioners accordingly prayed that respondent’s Affidavit of Adjudication and the TCT in her name be
declared void and that the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan be ordered to cancel the TCT in respondent’s
name and to issue in its stead a new one in their (petitioners’) name, and that actual, moral and exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees and litigation expenses be awarded to them.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners have to institute a special proceeding to determine their status as heirs before
they can pursue the case for annulment of respondent’s Affidavit of Adjudication and of the TCT issued in
her name.

RULING:

YES. The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse parties are putative heirs to the
estate of a decedent or parties to the special proceedings for its settlement is that if the special
proceedings are pending, or if there are no special proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstances
of the case, a need to file one, then the determination of, among other issues, heirship should be raised and
settled in said special proceedings. Where special proceedings had been instituted but had been finally
closed and terminated, however, or if a putative heir has lost the right to have himself declared in the
special proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask for its re-opening, then an ordinary civil action can
be filed for his declaration as heir in order to bring about the annulment of the partition or distribution or
adjudication of a property or properties belonging to the estate of the deceased.

In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was the sole heir to Portugal’s estate,
executed the questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the second sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of the
Revised Rules of Court. Said rule is an exception to the general rule that when a person dies leaving a
property, it should be judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified
administrator, in the order established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased left no will, or in case he
did, he failed to name an executor therein.

Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of Portugal. A probate or intestate court, no doubt,
has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of a deceased.

It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the
Caloocan parcel of land, to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding
which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not
only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an administration
proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the civil case – subject of the
present case, could and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court which assumed
jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.

In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still subject
Portugal’s estate to administration proceedings since a determination of petitioners’ status as heirs
could be achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners, the trial court should proceed to evaluate the
evidence presented by the parties during the trial and render a decision thereon upon the issues it
defined during pre-trial.
 ABARRO V. DE GUIA GR NO. L-47317

FACTS: In the summary settlement of the estate of the deceased, Januaria Gonzales, the
court below ordered the heirs to pay the creditor of the estate, Sisenando Abarro, the amount of
P800, with legal interest. No payment having been made, lot No. 1157, the only property left by
the deceased, was ordered sold at public auction and awarded to the creditor himself as the
highest bidder thereat. The sheriff's deed of sale contained a proviso to the effect that the
property was subject to redemption, as provided by law, within one year. Upon the expiration of
such period with no redemption having been made by the heirs, the purchaser filed a motion in
court praying that the sheriff be ordered to execute a final deed of sale in his behalf. Tomasa de
Guia, heir of the deceased, opposed the motion, alleging that she had delivered to the sheriff the
amount of P1,056.40 for the redemption of the property. This allegation was found by the court
to be true and, accordingly, the motion filed by the purchaser was overruled. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the sales ordered by the probate court for payment of debts are final and
are not subject to legal redemption.

RULING: Yes. The validity of the sheriff's sale is not questioned, and brushing aside
considerations on other questions not duly raised, we hold that Tomasa de Guia has no right to
redeem and that the sale made in favor of Sisenando Abarro is final. In the administration and
liquidation of the estate of a deceased person, sales ordered by the probate court for payment
of debts are final and are not subject to legal redemption. Unlike in ordinary execution sales,
there is no legal provision allowing redemption in the sale of property for payment of debts of a
deceased person.
PEREIRA vs. CA G.R. No. L-81147 June 20, 1989

FACTS: Andres de Guzman Pereira, an employee of the Philippine Air Lines, died without a will.
He was survived by his legitimate spouse, the petitioner, Victoria Bringas Pereira, and his sister
Rita Pereira Nagac, the private respondent.Private respondent instituted a special proceeding
before the RTC of Bacoor, Cavite for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor
pertaining to the estate of the deceased, alleging the following: that she and Victoria Bringas
Pereira are the only surviving heirs of the deceased; that the deceased left no will; that there are
no creditors of the deceased; that the deceased left several properties namely: employment
benefits, savings deposits, death benefits and a 300 square meter lot located at Barangay
Pamplona, Las Pinas, Rizal and finally, that the spouse of the deceased had been working in
London as an auxiliary nurse and as such one-half of her salary forms part of the estate of the
deceased. Petitioner filed her opposition and motion to dismiss the petition of private
respondent alleging that there exists no estate of the deceased for purposes of administration
and praying in the alternative, that if an estate does exist, the letters of administration relating to
the said estate be issued in her favor as the surviving spouse. RTC appointed private respondent
as administratrix of the intestate estate upon a bond posted by her in the amount of Pl,000.00.
The trial court ordered her to take custody of all the real and personal properties of the
deceased and to file an inventory thereof within three months after receipt of the order. On
appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not a judicial administration proceeding is necessary where there are no
debts left by the decedent.

RULING: NO. The general rule is that when a person dies leaving property, the same should be
judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the
order established in Section 6, Rule 78, in case the deceased left no will, or in case he had left
one, should he fail to name an executor therein. An exception to this rule is established in
Section 1 of Rule 74, when all the heirs are of lawful age and there are no debts due from the
estate, they may agree in writing to partition the property without instituting the judicial
administration or applying for the appointment of an administrator. It should be noted that
recourse to an administration proceeding even if the estate has no debts is sanctioned only if
the heirs have good reasons for not resorting to an action for partition. Where partition is
possible, either in or out of court, the estate should not be burdened with an administration
proceeding without good and compelling reasons.

In the case at bar, the claims of both parties as to the properties left by the deceased may be
properly ventilated in simple partition proceedings where the creditors, should there be any, are
protected in any event.
PEZA vs. Fernandez G.R. No. 138971 June 6, 2001

FACTS: The subject of the present controversy is Lot No. 4673 of the Opon Cadastre situated in Lapu-
Lapu City and registered in the names of Florentina Rapaya, Victorino Cuizon, Isidro Cuizon, Ursula
Cuizon, Benito Lozano, Isabel Lozano, Pelagia Lozano, Augusto Lozano, Valeriano Ybañez, Jesus Ybañez,
Numeriano Ybañez, Martino Ybañez, Eutiquio Patalinghug, Celedonio Patalinghug, Santiago Patalinghug
and Silvino Patalinghug. The lot has an area of 11,345 square meters, more or less.

Jorgea Igot-Soroño, Frisca Booc and Felix Cuizon executed an Extrajudicial Partition, in which they
declared themselves as the only surviving heirs of the registered owners of the aforesaid lot.
Consequently, they were issued TCT No. 12467.

Considering that the said lot was among the objects of expropriation proceedings docketed as Civil Case
No 510-L and pending before it, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lapu-Lapu City rendered a partial
Decision on August 11, 1982. In that Decision, the RTC approved the Compromise Agreement entered into
between the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) and the new registered owners of Lot No. 4673;
namely, Jorgea Igot-Soroño, Frisca Booc and Felix Cuizon. In accordance with the approved Compromise
Agreement, PEZA would pay P68,070 as just compensation for the expropriation of the subject property,
which was to be used for an export processing zone to be established in Lapu-Lapu City.

As a consequence of the RTC Decision, petitioner acquired title over Lot No. 4673 and the corresponding
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 12788 issued by the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City.

Private respondents filed with the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City a Complaint for Nullity of Documents,
Redemption and Damages against petitioner and Jorgea-Igot Soroño et al. Docketed as Civil Case No.
4534-L, alleging that herein private respondents had been excluded from the extrajudicial settlement of
the estate. It likewise sought the nullification of several documents, including TCT No. 12788, issued in
the name of herein petitioner.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint on the ground of prescription. This Motion was denied
by respondent judge. A Motion for Reconsideration thereof was likewise denied. Petitioner elevated the
matter to the Court of Appeals through a Petition for Certiorari. The CA dismissed the Petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the private respondents’ claim against expropriated property had prescribed.

RULING:

The pertinent provisions of Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, are reproduced for easy reference, as
follows:

"Section 4. Liability of distributees and estate. - If it shall appear at any time within two (2) years
after the settlement and distribution of an estate in accordance with the provisions of either of the
first two sections of this rule, that an heir or other person has been unduly deprived of his lawful
participation in the estate, such heir or such other person may compel the settlement of the estate
 in the courts in the manner hereinafter provided for the purpose of satisfying such lawful
participation. And if within the same time of two (2) years, it shall appear that there are debts
outstanding against the estate which have not been paid, or that an heir or other person has been
unduly deprived of his lawful participation payable in money, the court having jurisdiction of the
estate may, by order for that purpose, after hearing, settle the amount of such debts or lawful
participation and order how much and in what manner each distributee shall contribute in the
payment thereof, and may issue execution, if circumstances require, against the bond provided in
the preceding section or against the real estate belonging to the deceased, or both. Such bond and
such real estate shall remain charged with a liability to creditors, heirs, or other persons for the full
period of two (2) years after such distribution, notwithstanding any transfers of real estate that
may have been made."

A perusal of the foregoing provision will show that persons unduly deprived of their lawful participation in
a settlement may assert their claim only within the two-year period after the settlement and distribution of
the estate. This prescription period does not apply, however, to those who had no part in or had no notice
of the settlement. Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, is not meant to be a statute of limitations.
Moreover, by no reason or logic can one contend that an extrajudicial partition, being merely an ex parte
proceeding, would affect third persons who had no knowledge thereof. 6 Be that as it may, it cannot be
denied, either, that by its registration in the manner provided by law, a transaction may be known actually or
constructively.

In the present case, private respondents are deemed to have been constructively notified of the
extrajudicial settlement by reason of its registration and annotation in the certificate of title over the
subject lot. From the time of registration, private respondents had two (2) years or until July 8, 1984,
within which to file their objections or to demand the appropriate settlement of the estate.

On the matter of constructive notice vis-à-vis prescription of an action to contest an extrajudicial partition, a
leading authority on land registration elucidates as follows:

"While it may be true that an extrajudicial partition is an ex parte proceeding, yet after its
registration under the Torrens system and the annotation on the new certificate of title of the
contingent liability of the estate for a period of two years as prescribed in Rule 74, Section 4, of the
Rules of Court, by operation of law a constructive notice is deemed made to all the world, so that
upon the expiration of said period all third persons should be barred [from going] after the
particular property, except where title thereto still remains in the names of the alleged heirs who
executed the partition tainted with fraud, or their transferees who may not qualify as ‘innocent
purchasers for value’. If the liability of the registered property should extend indefinitely beyond that
period, then such constructive notice which binds the whole world by virtue of registration would be
meaningless and illusory. x x x."7

The only exception to the above-mentioned prescription is when the title remains in the hands of the heirs
who have fraudulently caused the partition of the subject property or in those of their transferees who
cannot be considered innocent purchasers for value.
In this regard, title to the property in the present case was no longer in the name of the allegedly
fraudulent heirs, but already in that of an innocent purchaser for value – the government. Moreover, the
government is presumed to have acted in good faith in the acquisition of the lot, considering that title
thereto was obtained through a Compromise Agreement judicially approved in proper expropriation
proceedings.
 MUNICIPALITY OF SAN PEDRO, LAGUNA V. COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE, GR NO. L-45460

FACTS: The Municipality of San Pedro, Laguna filed in the CFI a petition claiming the
Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan by the right of Escheat. Colegio de San Jose, claiming to be the
exclusive owner of the said hacienda, assailed the petition upon the grounds that the petition
does not allege sufficient facts to entitle the applicants to the remedy prayed for. Carlos Young,
claiming to be a lessee of the hacienda under a contract legally entered with Colegio de San
Jose, also intervened in the case. Municipal Council of San Pedro, Laguna objected to the
appearance and intervention of Colegio de San Jose and Carlos Young but such objection was
overruled. Furthermore the lower court dismissed the petition filed for by Municipal Council of
San Pedro.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for escheats should be dismissed?

RULING: YES. According to Sec. 750 of the Code of Civil Procedure (now Sec 1 of Rule
91), the essential facts which should be alleged in the petition, which are jurisdictional because
they confer jurisdiction upon the CFI are:

1. That a person died intestate or without leaving any will,

2. That he has left real or personal property and he was the owner thereof,

3. That he has not left any heir or person by law entitled to the property, and

4. That the one who applies for the escheat is the municipality where deceased has his last
residence or in case he should have no residence in the country, the municipality where the
property is situated.

Sec. 751 (now Sec 3 of Rule 91) provides that after the publications and trial, if the court
finds that the deceased is in fact the owner of real and personal property situated in the country
and has not left any heir or other person entitled there to, it may order, after payment of debts
and other legal expenses, the escheat and in such case, it shall adjudicate the personal property
to the municipality where the deceased had his last residence and the real property to the
municipality/ies where they are situated.

Escheat is a proceeding whereby the real and personal property of a deceased person
become the property of the State upon his death without leaving any will or legal heirs. It is not
an ordinary action but a special proceeding. The proceeding should be commenced by a petition
and not by a complaint. The Municipal base its right to escheat on the fact that the Hacienda de
San Pedro Tunasan, temporal property of the Father of the Society of Jesus, were confiscated
by the order of the King of Spain. From the moment it was confiscated, it became the property
of the commonwealth of the Philippines. Given this fact, it is evident that the Municipality
cannot claim that the same be escheated to them, because it is no longer the case of real
property owned by a deceased person who has not left any person which may legally claim it
(2nd requirement lacking).
RCBC vs. Hi-Tri Development Corp. G.R. No. 192413 June 13, 2012

FACTS: Spouses Bakunawa are registered owners of six (6) parcels of land sequestered by the
Presidential Commission on Good Government [(PCGG)]. Sometime in 1990, a certain Teresita
Millan, offered to buy said lots for around 6.7 million with the promise that she will take care of
clearing whatever preliminary obstacles there may be to effect a "completion of the sale". The
Spouses Bakunawa gave to Millan the Owner’s Copies of said TCTs and in turn, Millan made a
down payment for the intended purchase. Failing to clear the obstacles, the Spouses Bakunawa
rescinded the sale and offered to return to Millan her downpayment. However, Millan refused to
accept. Consequently, the Spouses Bakunawa, through their company, the Hi-Tri Development
Corporation took out on a Manager’s Check from RCBC-Ermita in the amount of 1 million,
payable to Millan’s company Rosmil Realty and Development Corporation and used this as one
of their basis for a complaint which they filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
praying among others that the titles of the properties be returned. Millan was informed that the
Manager’s Check was available for her withdrawal, she being the payee. During the pendency of
the case and without the knowledge of the parties, RCBC reported the 1 million peso -credit
existing in favor of Rosmil to the Bureau of Treasury as among its "unclaimed balances".
Republic, filed with the RTC the action below for Escheat. When the parties settled amicably,
they were informed that the amount was already subject of the escheat proceedings before the
RTC. RTC rendered a decision allowing the escheat proceedings to proceed and the forfeiture of
the amount held by RCBC. It ordered the deposit of the escheated balances with the Treasurer
and credited in favor of the Republic. Respondents claim that they were not able to participate in
the trial, as they were not informed of the ongoing escheat proceedings. However, the CA
reversed the decision.

ISSUE:

1. Whether the Decision and Order of the RTC were void for failure to send separate notices to
respondents by personal service

2. Whether petitioner had the obligation to notify respondents immediately before it filed its
Sworn Statement with the Treasurer

RULING:

1. NO. Escheat proceedings are actions in rem, whereby an action is brought against the thing
itself instead of the person. Thus, an action may be instituted and carried to judgment without
personal service upon the depositors or other claimants. Jurisdiction is secured by the power of
the court over the res. Consequently, a judgment of escheat is conclusive upon persons notified
by advertisement, as publication is considered a general and constructive notice to all persons
interested.
2. YES. Insofar as banks are concerned, service of processes is made by delivery of a copy of
the complaint and summons upon the president, cashier, or managing officer of the defendant
bank. On the other hand, as to depositors or other claimants of the unclaimed balances, service
is made by publication of a copy of the summons in a newspaper of general circulation in the
locality where the institution is situated. A notice about the forthcoming escheat proceedings
must also be issued and published, directing and requiring all persons who may claim any
interest in the unclaimed balances to appear before the court and show cause why the dormant
accounts should not be deposited with the Treasurer.
CITY OF MANILA vs. ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA

G.R. No. L-10033 August 30, 1917

FACTS:

Ana Sarmiento resided, with her husband, in the city of Manila sometime prior to the 17th day of
November, 1668; that on said date she made a will; that on the 23d day of November, 1668, she added a
codicil to said will, that on the 19th day of May, 1669, she made another will making a part thereof the
said codicil of November 23d, 1668; that said will contained provisions for the establishment of a
"Capellania de Misas;" that the first chaplain of said capellania should be her nephew Pedro del Castillo;
that said will contained a provision for the administration of said property in relation with the said
"Capellania de Misas" succeeding administration should continue perpetually; that said Ana Sarmiento
died about the year 1672; that for more than two hundred years the intervener, the Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila, through his various agencies, has administered said property; that the Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Manila has rightfully and legally succeeded in accordance with the terms and
provisions of the will of Ana Sarmiento.

ISSUE:

Whether or not said property be declared escheated.

RULING:

NO. Section 750 of Act No. 190 provides when property may be declared escheated. It provides, "when a
person dies intestate, seized of real or personal property . . . leaving no heir or person by law entitled to
the same," that then and in that case such property under the procedure provided for by sections 751 and
752, may de declared escheated.

The proof shows that Ana Sarmiento did not die intestate. She left a will. The will provides for the
administration of said property by her nephew as well as for the subsequent administration of the same.
She did not die without an heir nor without persons entitled to administer her estate. It further shows that
she did not die without leaving a person by law entitled to inherit her property. In view of the facts,
therefore, the property in question cannot be declared escheated as of the property of Ana Sarmiento. If
by any chance the property may be declared escheated, it must be based upon the fact that persons
subsequent to Ana Sarmiento died intestate without leaving heir or person by law entitled to the same.

The will clearly, definitely and unequivocally defines and designates what disposition shall be made of the
property in question. The heir mentioned in said will evidently accepted its terms and permitted the
property to be administered in accordance therewith. And, so far as the record shows, it is still being
administered in accordance with the terms of said will for the benefit of the real beneficiary as was
intended by the original owner.
 BALAIS-MABANAG V. ROD OF QUEZON CITY, GR NO. 153142

FACTS: Romulo, Annett, Annabell, Floraida, and Cielito (Coronels) executed a document entitled
receipt of down payment, stipulating that they received from respondent Ramona Patricia Alcaraz,
through Ramona’s mother, respondent Concepcion D. Alcaraz, the sum of ₱50,000.00 as down payment
on the total purchase price of ₱1,240,000.00 for their "inherited house and lot, covered by TCT No.
119627 of the ROD of Quezon City." The Coronels bind themselves to effect the transfer in their names
from their deceased father, Constancio P. Coronel, the transfer certificate of title immediately upon their
receipt of the down payment above-stated. On their presentation of the TCT already in their name, they
will immediately execute the deed of absolute sale of said property and Miss Ramona Patricia Alcaraz
shall immediately pay the balance. Subsequently the title was transferred in the name of the Coronels
under TCT No. 327043, however, the Coronels sold the property covered by TCT No. 327043 to the
petitioner (Mabanag) for the higher price of ₱1,580,000.00 after the latter delivered an initial sum of
₱300,000.00. For this reason, the Coronels rescinded their contract with Ramona by depositing her down
payment of ₱50,000.00 in the bank in trust for Ramona. Aggrieved, Conception filed a complaint for
specific performance and damages in her own name in the RTC in Quezon City against the Coronels and
subsequently caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on TCT No. 327403. The Coronels
executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of the petitioner. RTC Quezon City rendered a judgement in
favor of Conception ordering defendant to execute in favor of plaintiffs a deed of absolute sale covering
that parcel of land embraced in and covered by TCT No. 327403 (now TCT No. 331582) of the ROD for
Quezon City, the petitioner and the Coronels appealed to the CA but the CA affirmed the RTC decision
which subsequently became final and executory. A writ of execution was issued the Court however the
Coronels failed to comply with the order hence, this appeal challenging the capacity of Ramona Alcaraz to
acquire the property, alleging that she is not a Filipino citizen.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not a final judgment rendered by a trial court can still be disturbed.

2. Whether or not the petitioner was the proper party to question Ramona’s capacity to acquire lands.

RULING:

1 No. Obviously, the lower court’s judgment has become final and executory as per Entry of Judgment
issued by the Supreme Court. It is axiomatic that final and executory judgment can no longer be attacked
by any of the parties or be modified, directly or indirectly, even by the highest court of the land. All the
aforestated recourses have had the uniform result of sustaining the right of Ramona to acquire the
property. Such result fully affirms that the petitioner’s objection is now barred by res judicata. Under the
doctrine of res judicata, therefore, a final judgment or decree on the merits rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits and on all
points and matters determined in the previous suit. The foundation principle upon which the doctrine rests
is that the parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once; that when a right or
fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains
unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate.
2. No. Under Section 7, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185, the Solicitor General or his representative shall institute
escheat proceedings against its violators. Although the law does not categorically state that only the
Government, through the Solicitor General, may attack the title of an alien transferee of land, it is
nonetheless correct to hold that only the Government, through the Solicitor General, has the personality to
file a case challenging the capacity of a person to acquire or to own land based on non-citizenship. This
limitation is based on the fact that the violation is committed against the State, not against any individual;
and that in the event that the transferee is adjudged to be not a Filipino citizen, the affected property
reverts to the State, not to the previous owner or any other individual. Herein, even assuming that Ramona
was legally disqualified from owning the subject property, the decision that voids or annuls their right of
ownership over the subject land will not inure to the benefit of the petitioner. Instead, the subject property
will be escheated in favor of the State in accordance with Batas Pambansa Blg. 185.
FRANCISCO v. CA G.R. No. L-57438 January 3, 1984

FACTS: Petitioner is the duly appointed guardian of the incompetent Estefania San Pedro .
Respondent Pelagio Francisco, claiming to be a first cousin of Estefania San Pedro, together
with two others, said to be nieces of the incompetent, petitioned the court for the removal of
petitioner and for the appointment in his stead of respondent Pelagio Francisco. Among other
grounds, the petition was based on the failure of the guardian to submit an inventory of the
estate of his ward and to render an accounting. It would seem that petitioner subsequently
rendered an accounting but failed to submit an inventory, for which reason the court on gave
petitioner ten (10) days within which to do so, otherwise he would be removed from
guardianship. Petitioner thereafter submitted an inventory to which respondent Pelagio
Francisco filed an objection on the ground that petitioner actually received P14,000.00 for the
sale of a residential land and not P12,000.00 only as stated in the deed of sale and reported by
him in his inventory. The respondent Judge found the claim to be true, and, in his order relieved
the petitioner as guardian. On motion of petitioner, however, the respondent Judge reconsidered
his finding, but nevertheless, ordered the retirement of petitioner on the ground of old age.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was however, denied. The court a quo
appointed respondent Pelagio Francisco as the new guardian of the person and property of the
incompetent Estefania San Pedro. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the CA
challenging the validity of the order of the trial court granting the execution pending appeal of its
decision and appointing respondent Pelagio Francisco as the new guardian despite the fact that
respondent is five (5) years older than petitioner. The CA dismissed the petition.

ISSUE: Whether the removal of petitioner as guardian on the ground of old age is a good ground
for the execution of the decision pending appeal.

RULING: YES. A guardian is or becomes incompetent to serve the trust if he is so disqualified by

mental incapacity, conviction of crime, moral delinquency or physical disability as to be
prevented from properly discharging the duties of his office. A guardian, once appointed may be
removed in case he becomes insane or otherwise incapable of discharging his trust or
unsuitable therefor, or has wasted or mismanaged the estate, or failed for thirty (30) days after
it is due to render an account or make a return. There is need for petitioner Feliciano Francisco
to be retired from the guardianship over the person and property of incompetent Estefania San
Pedro. To sustain petitioner as guardian would, therefore, be detrimental to the ward. While age
alone is not a control criterion in determining a person's fitness or qualification to be appointed
or be retained as guardian, it may be a factor for consideration.
PEOPLE vs. FLORES G.R. No. 188315 August 25, 2010

FACTS: In February 1999 at around 9:30 p.m., AAA, then 11 years old, was sleeping inside the house
when she felt and saw appellant touch her thighs. The following day, at around the same time, and while
BBB was at work, appellant again touched AAA from her legs up to her breast. AAA tried to resist but
appellant threatened that he will kill her and BBB.

Two (2) weeks after the incident, AAA was already asleep when she suddenly woke up and saw appellant
holding a knife. While pointing the knife at AAA’s neck, appellant removed his shorts, as well as AAA’s
pajamas. He slowly parted AAA’s legs and inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina. Meanwhile, AAA struggled
and hit appellant’s shoulders. Appellant was able to penetrate her twice before he got out of the house.
Two (2) days after, appellant again raped her by inserting his organ into AAA’s vagina. AAA recounted that
appellant raped her at least three (3) times a week at around the same time until 15 October 2002, when
she was 14 years old.

On 27 August 2004, the RTC rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 181
counts of rape. The Court of Appeals affirmed the finding that AAA was raped by appellant, but it did so
only on two (2) counts. The Court of Appeals appreciated the qualifying circumstances of minority and
relationship in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua. It relied on the established fact that AAA was
still a minor when she was raped and on the stipulated fact that appellant is her guardian. One of the
instances wherein the crime of rape may be qualified is when the victim is a minor and the accused is her
guardian.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is considered a guardian of the victim.

RULING:

NO. The law requires a legal or judicial guardian since it is the consanguineous relation or the solemnity
of judicial appointment which impresses upon the guardian the lofty purpose of his office and normally
deters him from violating its objectives. Such considerations do not obtain in appellant's case or, for that
matter, any person similarly circumstanced as a mere custodian of a ward or another's property. The
fiduciary powers granted to a real guardian warrant the exacting sanctions should he betray the trust.

In results, therefore, that appellant cannot be considered as the guardian falling within the ambit of the
amendatory provision introduced by Republic Act No. 7659. He would not fall either in the category of the
"common-law spouse of the parent of the victim" in the same enumeration, since his liaison is with
respect to the aunt of [AAA]. Since both logic and fact conjointly demonstrate that he is actually only a
custodian, that is, a mere caretaker of the children over whom he exercises a limited degree of authority
for a temporary period, we cannot impose the death penalty contemplated for a real guardian under the
amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 7659, since he does not fit into that category.

Section 31(c) of R.A. No. 7610 contains a listing of the circumstances of relationship between the
perpetrator and the victim which will justify the imposition of the maximum penalty, namely when the
perpetrator is an "ascendant, parent, guardian, stepparent or collateral relative within the second degree
of consanguinity or affinity." It should be noted that the words with which "guardian" is associated in the
provision all denote a legal relationship. From this description we may safely deduce that the guardian
envisioned by law is a person who has a legal relationship with a ward. This relationship may be
established either by being the ward’s biological parent (natural guardian) or by adoption (legal guardian).
Appellant is neither AAA’s biological parent nor is he AAA’s adoptive father. Clearly, appellant is not the
"guardian" contemplated by law. Be that as it may, this qualifying circumstance of being a guardian was
not even mentioned in the Informations. What was clearly stated was that appellant was the "adopting
father" of AAA, which the prosecution nonetheless failed to establish.
 CABALES V. CA, GR NO. 162421

FACTS: Rufino Cabales died leaving a parcel of land located in Southern Leyte, to his surviving wife
Saturnina and children Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco, Leonora, Alberto and petitioner Rito. Subsequently,
the brothers and co-owners Bonifacio, Albino and Alberto sold the subject property to Dr. Cayetano
Corrompido for ₱2,000.00, with right to repurchase within eight (8) years. The three (3) siblings divided
the proceeds of the sale among themselves, each getting a share of P666.66. Alberto died leaving his
wife and son, petitioner Nelson. Within the eight-year redemption period, they redeemed the property from
Dr. Corrompido and later on sold the subject parcel of land to respondents-spouses Jesus and
Anunciacion Feliano for ₱8,000.00. It is hereby declared and understood that the amount of P2,286.00
corresponding and belonging to the Nelson Cabales heir of Alberto and to Rito Cabales who are still
minors upon the execution of this instrument are held in trust by the VENDEE and to be paid and delivered
only to them upon reaching the age of 21. Saturnina and her four (4) children executed an affidavit to the
effect that petitioner Nelson would only receive the amount of ₱176.34 from respondents-spouses when
he reaches the age of 21 considering that Saturnina paid Dr. Corrompido ₱966.66 for the obligation of
petitioner Nelson’s late father Alberto. Nelson learned from his uncle, petitioner Rito, of the sale of subject
property, he signified his intention to redeem the subject land during a barangay conciliation process
contending that they could not have sold their respective shares in subject property when they were
minors, petitioners filed before the RTC of Maasin, Southern Leyte, a complaint for redemption of the
subject land plus damages. In their answer, respondents-spouses maintained that petitioners were
estopped from claiming any right over subject property considering that (1) petitioner Rito had already
received the amount corresponding to his share of the proceeds of the sale of subject property, and (2)
that petitioner Nelson failed to consign to the court the total amount of the redemption price necessary
for legal redemption. They prayed for the dismissal of the case on the grounds of laches and prescription.

ISSUE: Whether or not the sale of the property will affect the share of Rito and Nelson who are both
minors when the sale took place.

RULING: No, Indeed, the legal guardian only has the plenary power of administration of the minor’s
property. It does not include the power of alienation which needs judicial authority. Thus, when Saturnina,
as legal guardian of petitioner Rito, sold the latter’s pro-indiviso share in subject land, she did not have the
legal authority to do so. Accordingly, the contract of sale as to the pro-indiviso share of petitioner Rito
was unenforceable. However, when he acknowledged receipt of the proceeds of the sale, petitioner Rito
effectively ratified it. This act of ratification rendered the sale valid and binding as to him, with respect to
petitioner Nelson, the contract of sale was void. He was a minor at the time of the sale. Saturnina or any
and all the other co-owners were not his legal guardians with judicial authority to alienate or encumber his
property. It was his mother who was his legal guardian and, if duly authorized by the courts, could validly
sell his undivided share to the property. She did not. Necessarily, when Saturnina and the others sold the
subject property in its entirety to respondents-spouses, they only sold and transferred title to their pro-
indiviso shares and not that part which pertained to petitioner Nelson and his mother. Consequently,
petitioner Nelson and his mother retained ownership over their undivided share of subject property.
However, as likewise established, the sale as to the undivided share of petitioner Nelson and his mother
was not valid such that they were not divested of their ownership thereto. Necessarily, they may redeem
the subject property from respondents-spouses. But they must do so within thirty days from notice in
writing of the sale by their co-owners vendors. However, the petitioners could no longer redeem the said
property, as required in Article 1088 that they should redeem the property within 30 days from notice of
the sale thereof. The thirty-day redemption period commenced in 1993, after petitioner Nelson sought the
barangay conciliation process to redeem his property. By January 12, 1995, when petitioner Nelson filed a
complaint for legal redemption and damages, it is clear that the thirty-day period had already expired.
HERNANDEZ v. SAN JUAN-SANTOS G.R. No. 166470 August 7, 2009

FACTS: Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez (or Lulu) was born to the spouses Felix Hernandez
and Maria San Juan Hernandez. Unfortunately, the latter died due to complications during
childbirth. After Maria's death, Felix left Lulu in the care of her maternal uncle, Sotero C. San
Juan. Felix then married Natividad Cruz. The union produced three children, petitioners Cecilio
C. Hernandez, Ma. Victoria C. Hernandez-Sagun and Teresa C. Hernandez-Villa Abrille.
Meanwhile, as the only child of Maria and the sole testate heir of Sotero, Lulu inherited valuable
real properties worth 50 million from the San Juan family. Upon reaching the age of majority,
Lulu was given full control of her estate. Nevertheless, because Lulu did not even finish her
elementary education, Felix continued to exercise actual administration of Lulu’s properties
which he passed on to the petitioners after his death. Felix and petitioners undertook various
"projects" involving Lulu’s real properties. After learning that petitioners had been dissipating her
estate, Lulu then sought the assistance of her maternal first cousin, respondent Jovita San
Juan-Santos. She confided to Jovita that her paraphernal properties have been taken from her,
she was made to live in the basement of petitioners’ Montalban, Rizal home and was receiving a
measly daily allowance of ₱400 for her food and medication. Moreover, under the care of the
petitioners, Lulu was found to be afflicted with tuberculosis, rheumatism and diabetes from
which she was suffering several complications. Thereafter, the San Juan family demanded an
inventory and accounting of Lulu’s estate from petitioners. However, the demand was ignored.
Respondent filed a petition for guardianship in the RTC. She alleged that Lulu was incapable of
taking care of herself and managing her estate because she was of weak mind. Subsequently,
petitioners moved to intervene in the proceedings to oppose the same. RTC concluded that,
due to her weak physical and mental condition, there was a need to appoint a legal guardian
over the person and property of Lulu. Thus, it declared Lulu an incompetent and appointed
respondent as guardian over the person and property of Lulu on a ₱1 million bond. Petitioners
moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied.The CA affirmed such decision. Hence,
this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the person is an incompetent who requires the appointment of a judicial
guardian over her person and property.

RULING:

YES: Under Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court, persons who, though of sound mind but by
reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar causes are incapable of taking care of
themselves and their property without outside aid, are considered as incompetents who may
properly be placed under guardianship. The RTC and the CA both found that Lulu was incapable
of taking care of herself and her properties without outside aid due to her ailments and weak
mind. Thus, since determining whether or not Lulu is in fact an incompetent would require a
reexamination of the evidence presented in the courts a quo, it undoubtedly involves questions
of fact. Inasmuch as respondent’s appointment as the judicial guardian of Lulu was proper, the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in her favor was also in order.
DSWD vs. JUDGE ANTONIO M. BELEN A.M. No. RTJ-96-1362 July 18, 1997

FACTS:

As appears from the records, the spouses Desiderio Soriano and Aurora Bernardo-Soriano, both of whom
are naturalized American citizens, filed a verified petition for adoption of their niece, the minor Zhedell
Bernardo Ibea. In due time, respondent Judge Belen granted the petition in a decision after finding that
petitioner spouses were highly qualified to adopt the child as their own.

Among other evidence adduced before him, respondent Judge based his decree primarily on the "findings
and recommendation of the DSWD that the adopting parents on the one hand and the adoptee on the
other hand have already developed love and emotional attachment and parenting rules have been
demonstrated to the minor." On these considerations, respondent judge decided and proceeded to
dispense with trial custody.

However, when the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea sought to obtain the requisite travel clearance from the
DSWD in order to join her adoptive parents in the United States, the department uncovered what it
considered as an anomalous adoption decree regarding said minor. It turned out that the DSWD did not
have any record in its files regarding the adoption and that there was never any order from respondent
judge for the DSWD to conduct a "Home and Child Study Report" in the case. Furthermore, there was no
directive from respondent judge for the social welfare officer of the lower court to coordinate with the
DSWD on the matter of the required reports for said minor's adoption.

As the adoption never passed through the DSWD, it filed the present administrative complaint against
respondent judge charging him with violating Article 33 of Presidential Decree No. 603 which requires,
inter alia, that petitions for adoption shall be granted only after the DSWD has conducted and submitted a
case study of the adoptee, the natural parents and the adoptive parents. It was also alleged by the DSWD
that respondent Elma P. Vedaña had asked for an undisclosed amount of money from the adopting
parents in order to expedite the adoption case with the DSWD.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Belen violated Article 33 of PD 603 (The Child and Youth Welfare Code)

RULING:

YES. The error on the part of both respondent judge and social worker is thus all too evident. Pursuant to
Circular No. 12, the proper course that respondent judge should have taken was to notify the DSWD at the
outset about the commencement of Special Proceeding No. 5830 so that the corresponding case study
could have been accordingly conducted by said department which undoubtedly has the necessary
competence, more than that possessed by the court social welfare officer, to make the proper
recommendation. Moreover, respondent judge should never have merely presumed that it was routinary
for the social welfare officer to coordinate with the DSWD regarding the adoption proceedings. It was his
duty to exercise caution and to see to it that such coordination was observed in the adoption proceedings,
together with all the other requirements of the law.
By respondent's failure to do so, he may well have wittingly or unwittingly placed in jeopardy the welfare
and future of the child whose adoption was under consideration. Adoption, after all, is in a large
measure a legal device by which a better future may be accorded an unfortunate child like Zhedell
Bernardo Ibea in this case. Treading on equally sensitive legal terrain, the social welfare officer
concerned, respondent Elma P. Vedaña, arrogated unto herself a matter that pertained exclusively to the
DSWD, her task being to coordinate with the DSWD in the preparation and submission of the relevant
case study reports, and not to make the same and recommend by herself the facts on which the court
was to act.

Indeed, Article 33 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code provides in no uncertain terms that:

No petition for adoption shall be granted unless the Department of Social Welfare, or the Social
Work and Counselling Division, in case of Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, has made a
case study of the child to be adopted, his natural parents as well as the prospective adopting
parents, and has submitted its report and recommendations on the matter to the court hearing
such petition. The Department of Social Welfare shall intervene on behalf of the child if it finds,
after such case study, that the petition should be denied.

Circular No. 12, as a complementary measure, was issued by this Court precisely to obviate the
mishandling of adoption cases by judges, particularly in respect to the aforementioned case study to be
conducted in accordance with Article 33 of Presidential Decree No. 603 by the DSWD itself and involving
the child to be adopted, its natural parents, and the adopting parents. It definitively directs Regional Trial
Courts hearing adoption cases:

(1) to NOTIFY the Ministry of Social Services and Development, thru its local agency, of the filing of
adoption cases or the pendency thereof with respect to those cases already filed;

(2) to strictly COMPLY with the requirement in Article 33 of the aforesaid decree . . .

xxx xxx xxx

The Staff Assistant V. (Social Worker) of the Regional Trial Courts, if any, shall coordinate with the
Ministry of Social Services and Development representatives in the preparation and submittal of
such case study. . . .
 UY V. CA, GR NO. 109557

FACTS: Dr. Ernesto Jardelaza suffered stroke that rendered him comatose. Gilda, wife of
the latter, filed a petition in RTC Iloilo to be allowed as sole administrator of their conjugal
property and be authorized to sell the same as her husband is physically incapacitated to
discharge his functions. She further contest that such illness of the husband necessitated
expenses that would require her to sell their property in Lot 4291 and its improvement to meet
such necessities. RTC ruled in favor of Gilda contending that such decision is pursuant to
Article 124 of the Family Code and that the proceedings thereon are governed by the rules on
summary proceedings.

The son of the spouses, Teodoro, filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the
petition made by her mother was essentially a petition for guardianship of the person and
properties of his father. As such it cannot be prosecuted in accordance with the provisions on
summary proceedings instead it should follow the rules governing special proceedings in the
Revised Rules of Court requiring procedural due process particularly the need for notice and a
hearing on the merits. He further reiterated that Chapter 2 of the Family Code comes under the
heading on “Separation in Fact Between Husband and Wife” contemplating a situation where
both spouses are of disposing mind. Hence, he argued that this should not be applied in their
case. During the pendency of the motion, Gilda sold the property to her daughter and son in law.
Upon the appeal by Teodoro, CA reversed the decision of the lower court.

ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for guardianship of persons and properties are governed by the
provisions on summary proceedings pursuant to Article 124 of the Family Code.

HELD: No, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Teodoro. The rule on summary proceedings does
not apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give
consent. In this case, trial court found that subject spouse was incompetent who was in a
comatose condition and with a diagnosis of brain stem infract. Hence, the proper remedy is a
judicial guardianship proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court. The law provides that wife
who assumes sole powers of administration has the same powers and duties as a guardian.
Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real property as administrator of the conjugal
property must observe the procedure for the sale of the ward’s estate required of judicial
guardians, and not the summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code. The Supreme
Court further held that such incapacity of the trial court to provide for an opportunity to be heard
is null and void on the ground of lack of due process.

ANONYMOUS v. CURAMEN A.M. No. P-08-2549 June 18, 2010

FACTS: The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received an anonymous complaint
charging respondent with falsification of a public document and simulation of birth. The
complaint alleged that respondent registered the birth of a child supposedly named Rica Mae
Baldonado Curamen in the local civil registry of Rizal, Nueva Ecija. Complainant submitted the
child’s purported birth certificate to show respondent misrepresented that she was the child’s
biological mother and her husband, Ricardo Curamen, was the biological father. Complainant
claimed respondent was, in fact, the child’s maternal grandmother. Complainant submitted the
child’s original birth certificate to show that the child’s real name was Rinea Mae Curamen
Aquino and that her parents were spouses Olga Mae Baldonado Curamen Aquino and Jun
Aquino. According to complainant, respondent included the child as additional dependent in her
income tax declaration. Respondent, on the other hand, admitted that the real parents of the
child were spouses Olga Mae Baldonado Curamen and Jun Aquino. Respondent claimed that
the child’s parents, being unemployed, were unable to support themselves let alone their child.
Executive Judge affirmed said facts. Respondent was found guilty of conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service.

ISSUE: Whether or not the " best interest of the child" can be considered to escape liability.

RULING:

NO. The making of a false statement therein constitutes dishonesty and falsification of a public
document. Respondent cannot escape liability by claiming that she did not have any intention to
conceal the identity of the child nor cause the loss of any trace as to the child’s true filiation to
the child’s prejudice. When public documents are falsified, the intent to injure a third person
need not be present because the principal thing punished is the violation of the public faith and
the destruction of the truth the document proclaims. Respondent’s justification for her act os
unreasonable. Respondent can very well continue supporting the child as her own, as is the
practice in Filipino families, without having to tamper with the child’s birth certificate.
Dishonesty, in order to warrant dismissal, need not be committed in the course of the
performance of official duties. She is subject to discipline the moment she commits a dishonest
act, whether in her private life or in her public life.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. EL MONTE DE PIEDAD Y CAJA DE AHORRAS DE
MANILA

G.R. No. L-9959 December 13, 1916

FACTS:

On June 3, 1863, a devastating earthquake in the Philippines took place. The Spanish dominions provided
$400,000 aid as received by the National Treasury as relief of the victims of the earthquake. The
government used the money as such but $80,000 was left untouched and was thus invested to Monte de
Piedad bank, which was in turn invested as jewelleries, equivalent to the same amount.

In June 1983, the Department of Finance called upon the same bank to return the $80,000 deposited from
before. The Monte de Piedad declined to comply with this order on the ground that the Governor-General
of the Philippine Islands and not the Department of Finance had the right to order the reimbursement
because the Philippine government is not the affected party. On account of various petitions of the
persons, the Philippine Islands brought a suit against Monte de Piedad for a recovery of the $80,000
together with interest, for the benefit of those persons and their heirs. Respondent refused to provide the
money.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Philippine government is authorized to file a reimbursement of the money of the
people deposited in respondent bank.

RULING:

YES. The Court held that the Philippine government is competent to file a complaint/reimbursement
against respondent bank in accordance to the Doctrine of Parens Patriae. The government is the sole
protector of the rights of the people thus, it holds an inherent supreme power to enforce laws which
promote public interest. The government has the right to "take back" the money intended for the people.
The government has the right to enforce all charities of public nature, by virtue of its general
superintending authority over the public interests, where no other person is entrusted with it.

The Supreme Court of the United States in Mormon Church vs. United States, supra, after approving also
the last quotations, said:

This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that
power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature, and has no affinity to those arbitrary
powers which are sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of the
people and the destruction of their liberties. On the contrary, it is a most beneficient functions,
and often necessary to be exercised in the interest of humanity, and for the prevention of injury to
those who cannot protect themselves.
 In Re Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim and Michael Jude Lim

GR No. 168992-93, May 21, 2009

FACTS: Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but
were childless. Minor children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents were unknown
as shown by a certification of DSWD. The spouses registered the children making it appears as
if they were the parents. Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died. She then married an American
Citizen, Angel Olario in December 2000. Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of
the amnesty given under RA 8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a child. In 2002, she
filed separate petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court. Michelle was
then 25 years old and already married and Michael was 18 years and seven months old.
Michelle and her husband including Michael and Olario gave their consent to the adoption
executed in an affidavit.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt.

RULING: No. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already remarried. Husband and
wife shall jointly adopt except in three instances: (1) if one spouse seeks to adopt the
legitimate son/daughter of the other; or (2) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own
illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, however, That the other spouse has signified his/her
consent thereto; or (3) if the spouses are legally separated from each other, which was not
present in the case at bar. In case spouses jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercise parental
authority. The use of the word “shall” signifies that joint adoption of husband and wife is
mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority since the child to
be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child; it is but natural to require spouses to
adopt jointly. The affidavit of consent given by Olario will not suffice since there are certain
requirements that he must comply as an American Citizen. He must meet the qualifications set
forth in Section 7 of RA 8552. The requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s
qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7. Parental authority is
merely just one of the effects of legal adoption others being the capacity to become a legitimate
child and the capacity to succeed. It includes caring and rearing the children for civic
consciousness and efficiency and development of their moral mental and physical character
and well-being.