VOL. 250, NOVEMBER 29, 1995 389 of the crime.
389 of the crime. With either of these elements wanting, the crime of rebellion legally
People vs. Lovedioro
G.R. No. 112235. November 29, 1995. *
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.ELIAS
LOVEDIORO y CASTRO, defendant-appellant.
Criminal Law; Rebellion; By its very nature, rebellion is essentially a crime of
masses or multitudes involving crowd action which cannot be confined a priori
within predetermined bounds.—The gravamen of the crime of rebellion is an
armed public uprising against the government. By its very nature, rebellion is
essentially a crime of masses or multitudes involving crowd action, which cannot
be confined a priori within predetermined bounds. One aspect noteworthy in the
commission of rebellion is that other acts committed in its pursuance
______________
*FIRST DIVISION.
390
390 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Lovedioro
are, by law, absorbed in the crime itself because they require a political
character.
Same; Same; In deciding if the crime committed is rebellion, not murder, it
becomes imperative for our courts to ascertain whether or not the act was done in
furtherance of a political end.—Divested of its common complexion therefore, any
ordinary act, however grave, assumes a different color by being absorbed in the
crime of rebellion, which carries a lighter penalty than the crime of murder. In
deciding if the crime committed is rebellion, not murder, it becomes imperative for
our courts to ascertain whether or not the act was done in furtherance of a political
end. The political motive of the act should be conclusively demonstrated.
Same; Same; The burden of demonstrating political motive falls on the
defense.—In such cases, the burden of demonstrating political motive falls on the
defense, motive, being a state of mind which the accused, better than any
individual, knows. Thus, in People v. Gempes, this court stressed that: Since this
is a matter that lies peculiarly with (the accused’s) knowledge and since moreover
this is an affirmative defense, the burden is on them to prove, or at least to state,
which they could easily do personally or through witnesses, that they killed the
deceased in furtherance of the resistance movement.
Same; Same; It is not enough that the overt acts of rebellion are duly proven.—
From the foregoing, it is plainly obvious that it is not enough that the overt acts of
rebellion are duly proven. Both purpose and overt acts are essential components
does not exist. In fact, even in cases where the act complained of were committed
simultaneously with or in the course of the rebellion, if the killing, robbing, or etc.,
were accomplished for private purposes or profit, without any political motivation,
it has been held that the crime would be separately punishable as a common crime
and would not be absorbed by the crime rebellion.
Same; Same; If no political motive is established and proved, the accused
should be convicted of the common crime and not of rebellion.—It follows,
therefore, that if no political motive is established and proved, the accused should
be convicted of the common crime and not of rebellion. In cases of rebellion, motive
relates to the act, and mere membership in an organization dedicated to the
furtherance of rebellion would not, by and of itself, suffice.
391
VOL. 250, NOVEMBER 29, 1995 391
People vs. Lovedioro
Same; Same; The burden of proof that the act committed was impelled by a
political motive lies on the accused.—As stated hereinabove, the burden of proof
that the act committed was impelled by a political motive lies on the Accused.
Political motive must be alleged in the information. It must be established by clear
and satisfactory evidence.
Same; Evidence; Lack or absence of motive for committing a crime does not
preclude conviction there being a reliable eyewitness who fully and satisfactorily
identified appellant as the perpetrator of the felony.—Against appellant’s claims
that he acted merely as a look-out, the testimony of one witness, his blood relative,
free from any signs of impropriety or falsehood, was sufficient to convict the
accused. Moreover, neither may lack of motive be availing to exculpate the
appellant. Lack or absence of motive for committing a crime does not preclude
conviction, there being a reliable eyewitness who fully and satisfactorily identified
appellant as the perpetrator of the felony.
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, Br.
1.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Ricafort Law Office for accused-appellant.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Off-duty policeman SPO3 Jesus Lucilo was walking along Burgos St., away
from the Daraga, Albay Public Market when a man suddenly walked beside
him, pulled a .45 caliber gun from his waist, aimed the gun at the
policeman’s right ear and fired. The man who shot Lucilo had three other
companions with him, one of whom shot the fallen policeman four times as
he lay on the ground. After taking the latter’s gun, the man and his
companions boarded a tricycle and fled. 1
The incident was witnessed from a distance of about nine meters by
Nestor Armenta, a 25 year old welder from Pilar, Sorsogon, who claimed
that he knew both the victim and the man
_______________
1TSN, May 18, 1993, p. 7.
392
392 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Lovedioro
who fired the fatal shot. Armenta identified the man who fired at the
deceased as Elias Lovedioro y Castro, his nephew (appellant’s father was
his first cousin) and alleged that he knew the victim from the fact that the
latter was a resident of Bagumbayan.
Lucilo died on the same day of massive blood loss from multiple gunshot
wounds on the face, the chest, and other parts of the body. On autopsy, the
2
municipal health officer established the cause of death as hypovolemic
shock. 3
As a result of the killing, the office of the provincial prosecutor of Albay,
on November 6, 1992 filed an Information charging accused-appellant Elias
Lovedioro y Castro of the crime of Murder under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code. The Information reads:
That on or about the 27th day of July, 1992, at more or less 5:30 o’clock in the
afternoon, at Burgos Street, Municipality of Daraga, Province of Albay,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed
accused, together with Gilberto Longasa, who is already charged in Crim. Case
No. 5931 before RTC, Branch 1, and three (3) others whose true identities are at
present unknown and remain at large, conniving, conspiring, confederating and
helping one another for a common purpose, armed with firearms, with intent to
kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously fire and shoot one SPO3 JESUS LUCILO, a member of
the Daraga Police Station, inflicting upon the latter multiple gunshot wounds
causing his death, to the damage and prejudice of his legal heirs.
After trial, the court a quo found accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder. The dispositive portion of said
decision, dated September 24, 1993 states:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, this Court finds the
accused ELIAS LOVEDIORO guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal, acting
in conspiracy with his co-accused who are still at large, of the crime of murder,
defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby
sentences him to
______________
2 Exhibit “A,” p. 73, Records.
3 Id.,at 74.
393
VOL. 250, NOVEMBER 29, 1995 393
People vs. Lovedioro
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with all the accessories provided by law;
to pay the heirs of the deceased SPO3 Jesus Lucilo through the widow, Mrs.
Remeline Lucilo, the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos representing
the civil indemnity for death; to pay the said widow the sum of Thirty Thousand
(P30,000.00) Pesos representing reasonable moral damages; and to pay the said
widow the sum of Eighteen Thousand Five Hundred Eighty-Eight (P18,588.00)
Pesos, representing actual damages, without subsidiary imprisonment however,
in case of insolvency on the part of the said accused.
With costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the instant appeal, in which the sole issue interposed is that portion
of trial court decision finding him guilty of the crime of murder and not
rebellion.
Appellant cites the testimony of the prosecution’s principal witness,
Nestor Armenta, as supporting his claim that he should have been charged
with the crime of rebellion, not murder. In his Brief, he asseverates that
Armenta, a police informer, identified him as a member of the New People’s
Army. Additionally, he contends that because the killing of Lucilo was “a
means to or in furtherance of subversive ends,” (said killing) should-have
4
been deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion under Arts. 134 and 135 of
the Revised Penal Code. Finally, claiming that he did not fire the fatal shot
but merely acted as a look-out in the liquidation of Lucilo, he avers that he
should have been charged merely as a participant in the commission of the
crime of rebellion under paragraph 2 of Article 135 of the Revised Penal
Code and should therefore have been meted only the penalty of prision
mayor by the lower court.
Asserting that the trial court correctly convicted appellant of the crime
of murder, the Solicitor General avers that the crime committed by
appellant may be considered as rebellion only if the defense itself had
conclusively proven that the motive or intent for the killing of the policeman
was for “political and subversive ends.” Moreover, the Solicitor General
5
contends that even if
_____________
4Rollo, p. 53.
5Rollo, p. 95.
394
394 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Lovedioro
appellant were to be convicted of rebellion, and even if the trial court had
found appellant guilty merely of being a participant in a rebellion, the
proper imposable penalty is not prision mayor as appellant contends,
but reclusion temporal, because Executive Order No. 187 as amended by
Republic Act No. 6968, the Coup D’etat Law, prescribes reclusion
temporal as the penalty imposable for individuals found guilty as
participants in a rebellion.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the crime committed was
murder and not rebellion.
Under Art. 134 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 6968, rebellion is committed in the following manner:
[B]y rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of
removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the
Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other
armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or
partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.6
The gravamen of the crime of rebellion is an armed public uprising against
the government. By its very nature, rebellion is essentially a crime of
7 From the foregoing, it is plainly obvious that it is not enough that the overt
masses or multitudes involving crowd action, which cannot be confined
a prioriwithin predetermined bounds. One aspect noteworthy in the
8
commission of rebellion is that other acts committed in its pursuance are,
by law, absorbed in the crime itself because they require a political
character. This peculiarity was underscored in the case of People v.
Hernandez, thus:9
In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as
well as such common crimes as may be committed to achieve a political purpose.
The decisive factor is the intent or motive. If a crime usually regarded as common,
like homicide, is perpetrated for the purpose of removing from the allegiance ‘to
the Government the
_____________
6 86 O.G. 9865.
7 AQUINO, II REVISED PENAL CODE, 91 (1987).
8 People v. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90, 96 (1956).
9 99 Phil. 515, 535-536 (1956).
395
VOL. 250, NOVEMBER 29, 1995 395
People vs. Lovedioro
territory of the Philippine Islands or any part thereof,’ then it becomes stripped of
its “common” complexion, inasmuch as, being part and parcel of the crime of
rebellion, the former acquires the political character of the latter.
Divested of its common complexion therefore, any ordinary act, however
grave, assumes a different color by being absorbed in the crime of rebellion,
which carries a lighter penalty than the crime of murder. In deciding if the
crime committed is rebellion, not murder, it becomes imperative for our
courts to ascertain whether or not the act was done in furtherance of a
political end. The political motive of the act should be conclusively
demonstrated.
In such cases, the burden of demonstrating political motive falls on the
defense, motive, being a state of mind which the accused, better than any
individual, knows. Thus, in People v. Gempes, this Court stressed that:
10
Since this is a matter that lies peculiarly with (the accused’s) knowledge and since
moreover this is an affirmative defense, the burden is on them to prove, or at least
to state, which they could easily do personally or through witnesses, that they
killed the deceased in furtherance of the resistance movement.
acts of rebellion are duly proven. Both purpose and overt acts are essential
components of the crime. With either of these elements wanting, the crime
of rebellion legally does not exist. In fact, even in cases where the act
complained of were committed simultaneously with or in the course of the
rebellion, if the killing, robbing, or etc., were accomplished for private
purposes or profit, without any political motivation, it has been held that
the crime would be separately punishable as a common crime and would
not be absorbed by the crime rebellion. 11
Clearly, political motive should be established before a person charged
with a common crime—alleging rebellion in order to
_____________
83 Phil. 267, 274 (1949).
10
People v. Geronimo, supra note 8, at pp. 95 & 99.
11
396
396 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Lovedioro
lessen the possible imposable penalty—could benefit from the law’s
relatively benign attitude towards political crimes. Instructive in this
regard is the case of Enrile v. Amin, where the prosecution sought to
12
charge Senator Juan Ponce Enrile with violation of P.D. No. 1829, for 13
allegedly harboring or concealing in his home Col. Gregorio Honasan in
spite of the senator’s knowledge that Honasan might have committed a
crime. This Court held, against the prosecution’s contention, that rebellion
and violation of P.D. 1829 could be tried separately (on the principle that
14
rebellion is based on the Revised Penal Code while P.D. 1829 is a special
law), that the act for which the senator was being charged, though
punishable under a special law, was absorbed in the crime of rebellion being
motivated by, and related to the acts for which he was charged in Enrile vs.
Salazar (G.R. Nos. 92163 and 92164) a case decided on June 5, 1990. Ruling
in favor of Senator Enrile and holding that the prosecution for violation of
P.D. No. 1829 cannot prosper because a separate prosecution for rebellion
had already been filed and in fact decided, the Court said:
The attendant circumstances in the instant case, however constrain us to rule that
the theory of absorption in rebellion cases must not confine itself to common crimes
but also to offenses under special laws which are perpetrated in furtherance of the
political offense.15
Noting the importance of purpose in cases of rebellion the court in Enrile
vs. Amin further underscored that:
[I]ntent or motive is a decisive factor. If Senator Ponce Enrile is not charged with
rebellion and he harbored or concealed Colonel Honasan simply because the latter
is a friend and former associate, the motive for the act is completely different. But
if the act is committed with political or social motives, that is in furtherance of
rebellion, then
______________
12 189 SCRA 573 (1990).
13 This decree penalizes persons who willfully obstructs or impedes the apprehension of suspects
and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases “by harboring and concealing” such suspects.
14 Supra, note 12, at 580.
15 Id., at 581.
397
VOL. 250, NOVEMBER 29, 1995 397
People vs. Lovedioro
being punished separately.
It follows, therefore, that if no political motive is established and proved,
the accused should be convicted of the common crime and not of rebellion.
In cases of rebellion, motive relates to the act, and mere membership in an
organization dedicated to the furtherance of rebellion would not, by and of
itself, suffice.
The similarity of some of the factual circumstances of People v. Ompad,
Jr., to the instant case is striking. Two witnesses, both former NPA
16
recruits identified the accused Ompad, alias “Commander Brando,” a
known hitman of the NPA, as having led three other members of the NPA
in the liquidation of Dionilo Barlaan, a military informer, also in a rebel
infested area. In spite of his notoriety as an NPA hitman, Ompad was
merely charged with and convicted of murder, not rebellion because
political motive was neither alleged nor proved.
As stated hereinabove, the burden of proof that the act committed was
impelled by a political motive lies on the accused. Political motive must be
alleged in the information. It must be established by clear and satisfactory
17
evidence. In People v. Paz and Tica we held:
That the killing was in pursuance of the Huk rebellion is a matter of mitigation or
defense that the accused has the burden of proving clearly and satisfactorily. The
lone uncorroborated assertion of appellant that his superiors told him of Dayrit
being an informer, and his suspicion that he, was one such, is neither sufficient or
adequate to establish that the motivation for the killing was political, considering
appellant’s obvious interest in testifying to that effect. 18
Similarly, in People v. Buco, the Court stressed that accused in that case
19
failed to establish that the reason for the killing of their victim was to
further or carry out rebellion. The evidence
______________
16 233 SCRA 62 (1994).
17 People v. Hernandez, supra at pp. 536 and 551.
18 121 Phil. 918, 931 (1965).
19 21 SCRA 5 (1967).
398
398 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Lovedioro
adduced by the defense therein simply showed that appellant Francisco
Buco was ordered by Tomas Calma, alias “Commander Sol” to kill
municipal mayor Conrado G. Dizon. However, the evidence likewise showed
that Calma was induced by an acquaintance, a civilian, to order the killing
on account of private differences over a ninety (90) hectare piece of land.
The court attributed no political motive for the killing, though committed
by known members of the Hukbalahap movement. 20
People v. Dasig has a factual milieu almost similar to the instant case.
21
There, the Court held that “the act of killing a police officer, knowing too
well that the victim is a person in authority is a mere component or
ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of a rebellion.”
In Dasig the Court however noted that the accused, who was charged with
murder, not only admitted his membership with the NPA but also executed
an extrajudicial confession to the effect that he was a member of an NPA
“sparrow unit,” a fact to which even the Solicitor General, in his brief
therein was in agreement. The Solicitor General’s brief in Dasig which this
Court favorably quoted, noted that:
[T]he sparrow unit is the liquidation squad of the New People’s Army with the
objective of overthrowing the duly constituted government. It is therefore not hard
to comprehend that the killing of Pfc. Manatad was committed as a means to or in
furtherance of the subversive ends of the NPA. 22
By contrast, the Solicitor General vigorously argues for a different result in
the case at bench. He states that accusedappellant’s belated claims to
membership in the NPA were not only insubstantial but also self
serving, an averment to which, given a thorough review of the
23
circumstances of the case, we fully agree. He states:
[In the case cited] the appellants, admittedly members of the NPA, clearly
overcame the burden of proving motive or intent. It was
_____________
20 Id.
21 221 SCRA 549 (1993).
22 Id., at 558.
23 Rollo, p. 101.
399
VOL. 250, NOVEMBER 29, 1995 399
People vs. Lovedioro
shown that the political motivation for the killing of the victim was the fact that
Ragaul was suspected as an informer for the PC. The perpetrators even left a letter
card, a drawing on the body of Ragaul as a warning to others not to follow his
example. It is entirely different in the case at bar where the evidence for the
appellant merely contains self-serving assertions and denials not substantial
enough as an indicia of political motivation in the killing of victim SPO3 Jesus
Lucilo. 24
In the case at bench, the appellant, assisted by counsel, admitted in his
extrajudicial confession to having participated in the killing of Lucilo as
follows:
Q What was that incident if any, please narrate?
A July 27, 1992 at more or less 12:00 noon. I am at home,
three male person a certain alias ALWIN, ALIAS
SAMUEL and the other one unknown to me, fetched me
and told me to go with them, so I asked them where, Alwin
handed me a hand gun and same he stopped/call a
passenger jeepney and told me board on said jeepney. (sic)
Q Please continue.
A Upon reaching Daraga, Albay fronting Petron Gasoline
Station, we alighted on said jeep, so we walk towards
Daraga Bakery we stopped walking due to it is raining,
when the rain stopped we continue walking by using the
road near the bakery. (sic)
Q When you reached Daraga bakery, as you have said in Q. 7
you used the road near the bakery where did you proceed?
A I am not familiar with that place, but I and my companion
continue walking, at more or less 4:30 P.M. July 27, 1992
 one of my companion told us as to quote in Bicol dialect,
to wit: ‘AMO NA YADI AN TINAMPO PALUWAS’
(This is the place towards the poblacion), so, I placed
myself just ahead of a small store, my three (3)
companions continue walking towards poblacion, later on a
policeman sporting white T-shirt and a Khaki pant was
walking towards me, while the said policeman is nearly
approaching me, ALWIN shot the said policeman infront
of the small store, when the said policeman fell on the
asphalted road, ALWIN took the
_____________
Id.
24
400
400 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Lovedioro
service firearm of the said policeman, then we ran
towards the subdivision, then my two (2) companions
commanded a tricycle then we fled until we reached a
hill wherein there is a small bridge, thereafter Ka Samuel
took the handgun that was handed to me by them at Pilar,
Sorsogon. (sic)
Q Do you know the policeman that was killed by your
companion?
A I just came to know his name when I reached home and
heard it radio, that he is JESUS LUCILO. (sic)
Q What is your participation in the group?
A Look-out sir.
Q I have nothing more to asked you what else, if there is
any? (sic)
A No more sir.25
It bears emphasis that nowhere in his entire extrajudicial confession did
appellant ever mention that he was a member of the New People’s Army. A
thorough reading of the same reveals nothing which would suggest that the
killing in which he was a participant was motivated by a political purpose.
Moreover, the information filed against appellant, based on sworn
statements, did not contain any mention or allusion as to the involvement
of the NPA in the death of SPO3 Lucilo. Even prosecution eyewitness
26
Nestor Armenta did not mention that NPA in his sworn statement of
October 19, 1992. 27
As the record would show, allegations relating to appellant’s
membership in the NPA surfaced almost merely as an afterthought,
something which the defense merely picked up and followed through upon
prosecution eyewitness Armenta’s testimony on cross-examination that he
knew appellant to be a member of the NPA. Interestingly, however, in the
same testimony, Armenta admitted that he was “forced” to pinpoint
appellant as an NPA member. The logical result, of course, was that
28
______________
25 Record, pp. 2-3; Exh. “C” or “1.”
26 Record, pp. 6-10.
27 Id., at pp. 6-7.
28 TSN, May 3, 1993, pp. 15-16.
401
VOL. 250, NOVEMBER 29, 1995 401
People vs. Lovedioro
the trial court did not give any weight and credence to said testimony. The
trial court, after all, had the prerogative of rejecting only a part of a witness’
testimony while upholding the rest of it. While disbelieving the portion of
29
Armenta’s testimony on appellant’s alleged membership in the NPA, the
trial court correctly gave credence to his unflawed narration about how the
crime was committed. Such narration is even corroborated in its pertinent
30
portions, except as to the identity of the gunwielder, by the testimony of the
appellant himself.
In any case, appellant’s claim regarding the political color attending the
commission of the crime being a matter of defense, its viability depends on
his sole and unsupported testimony. He testified that, upon the prodding of
alias Alwin and alias Samuel, he joined the NPA because of the
organization’s goals. He claimed that his two companions shot Lucilo
31
because he “had offended our organization,” without, however, specifying
32
what the “offense” was. Appellant claimed that he had been a member of
the NPA for five months before the shooting incident. 33
 As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, appellant’s contentions
are couched in terms so general and non-specific that they offer no
34
explanation as to what contribution the killing would have made towards
the achievement of the NPA’s subversive aims. SPO3 Jesus Lucilo, a mere
policeman, was never alleged to be an informer. No acts of his were
specifically shown to have offended the NPA. Against appellant’s attempts
to shade his participation in the killing with a political color, the evidence
on record leaves the impression that appellant’s bare allegations of
membership in the NPA was conveniently infused to mitigate the penalty
imposable upon him. It is of judicial notice that in many NPA infested
areas, crimes have been all-too-quickly attributed to the furtherance of an
ideology or under the cloak of political color for the purpose of mitigating
the imposable penalty
______________
29 People v. Flores, 239 SCRA 83 (1994).
30 People v. Nitcha, 240 SCRA 283, 288-289 (1995).
31 TSN, May 18, 1993, pp. 4-5.
32 Id., p. 7.
33 Id., pp. 12-14.
34 Rollo, p. 99.
402
402 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Lovedioro
when in fact they are no more than ordinary crimes perpetrated by common
criminals. In Baylosis v. Chavez, Jr., Chief Justice Narvasa aptly observed:
The existence of rebellious groups in our society today, and of numerous bandits,
or irresponsible or deranged individuals, is a reality that cannot be ignored or
belittled. Their activities, the killings and acts of destruction and terrorism that
they perpetrate, unfortunately continue unabated despite the best efforts that the
Government authorities are exerting, although it may be true that the
insurrectionist groups of the right or the left no longer pose a genuine threat to
the security of the state. The need for more stringent laws and more rigorous law-
enforcement, cannot be gainsaid. 35
In the absence of clear and satisfactory evidence pointing to a political
motive for the killing of SPO3 Jesus Lucilo, we are satisfied that the trial
court correctly convicted appellant of the crime of murder. It is of no
36
moment that a single eyewitness, Nestor Armenta, sealed his fate, for it is
settled that the testimony of one witness, if credible and positive, is
sufficient to convict. Against appellant’s claims that he acted merely as a
37
look-out, the testimony of one witness, his blood relative, free from any
signs of impropriety or falsehood, was sufficient to convict the
accused. Moreover, neither may lack of motive be availing to exculpate the
38
appellant. Lack or absence of motive for committing a crime does not
preclude conviction, there being a reliable eyewitness who fully and
satisfactorily identified appellant as the perpetrator of the felony. In the 39
case at bench, the
_____________
35 202 SCRA 405, 419 (1991).
36 Although appellant stated in his extrajudicial confession that his companion also asported
Lucilo’s service firearm, a fact which Armenta corroborated in court, robbery was not alleged
in the information.
37 People v. Ompad, supra, note 16, at 67; People v. Mendoza, 233 SCRA 108 (1994); People
v. Quetua, 222 SCRA 357 (1993).
38 People v. Abapo, G.R. Nos. 93632-33, December 28, 1994, 239 SCRA 469, 479.
39 People v. Gamiao, G.R. No. 91492, January 19, 1995, 240 SCRA 254, 264; People v.
Layam, G.R. No. 102308, July 25, 1994, 234, 424, 432.
403
VOL. 250, NOVEMBER 29, 1995 403
People vs. Lovedioro
strength of the prosecution’s case was furthermore bolstered by accused-
appellant’s admission in open court that he and the eyewitness, his own
uncle, bore no grudges against each other. 40
Finally, treachery was adequately proved in the court below. The attack
delivered by appellant was sudden, and without warning of any kind. The 41
killing having been qualified by treachery, the crime committed is murder
under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code. In the absence of any mitigating
and aggravating circumstances, the trial court was correct in imposing the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, together with all the accessories provided by
law.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the trial court’s decision
dated September 14, 1993, sentencing the accused of Murder is hereby
AFFIRMED, in toto.
SO ORDERED.
 Padilla (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Hermosisima, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed in toto.
Note.—The qualified offense of illegal possession of firearms in
furtherance of rebellion under Presidential Decree No. 1866 is distinct from
the crime of rebellion provided under Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised
Penal Code. (People vs. De Gracia, 233 SCRA 716 [1994])

——o0o——

______________

40TSN, May 18, 1993, p. 20.

41TSN, May 3, 1993, p. 29, People v. Adonis, G.R. No. 98196, January 31, 1995, 240 SCRA
773, 774.
404
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716 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. De Gracia
People vs. De Gracia intent to commit the crime is not necessary. It is sufficient that the offender
G.R. Nos. 102009-10. July 6, 1994. * has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law. Intent to commit
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.ROLANDO DE the crime and intent to perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A person may
not have consciously intended to commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an
GRACIA, CHITO HENSON and JOHN DOES, accused. ROLANDO DE
act, and that act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself. In the first (intent
GRACIA, accused-appellant.
to commit the crime), there must be criminal intent; in the second (intent to
Criminal Law; Illegal possession of firearms; P.D.
perpetrate the act) it is enough that the prohibited act is done freely and
1866; Statutes; Background for the passage of Presidential Decree No. 1866.—
consciously.
Presidential Decree No. 1866 was passed because of an upsurge of crimes vitally
Same; Same; Same; In order that one may be found guilty of a violation of P.D.
affecting public order and safety due to the proliferation of illegally possessed and
1866, it is sufficient that the accused had no authority or license to possess a
manufactured firearms, ammunition and explosives, and which criminal acts have
firearm, and that he intended to possess the same, even if such possession was made
resulted in loss of human lives, damage to property and destruction of valuable
in good faith and without criminal intent.—In the present case, a distinction
resources of the country. The series of coup d’etats unleashed in the country during
should be made between criminal intent and intent to possess. While mere
the first few years of the transitional government under then President Corazon
possession, without criminal intent, is sufficient to convict a person for illegal
C. Aquino attest to the ever-growing importance of laws such as Presidential
possession of a firearm, it must still be shown that there was animus possidendi or
Decree No. 1866 which seek to nip in the bud and preempt the commission of any
an intent to possess on the part of the accused. Such intent to possess is, however,
act or acts which tend to disturb public peace and order.
without regard to any other criminal or felonious intent which the accused may
Same; Same; Same; Evidence; Ownership is not an essential element of illegal
have harbored in possessing the firearm. Criminal intent here refers to the
possession of firearms and ammunition since what the law requires is merely
intention of the accused to commit an offense with the use of an unlicensed
possession which includes not only actual physical possession but also constructive
firearm. This is not important in convicting a person under Presidential Decree
possession or subjection of the thing to one’s control and management.—The rule is
No. 1866. Hence, in order that one may be found guilty of a violation of the decree,
that ownership is not an essential element of illegal possession of firearms and
it is sufficient that the accused had no authority or license to possess a firearm,
ammunition. What the law requires is merely possession which includes not only
and that he intended to possess the same, even if such possession was made in
actual physical possession but also constructive possession or the subjection of the
good faith and without criminal intent.
thing to one’s control and management. This has to be so if the manifest intent of
Same; Same; Same; A temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless possession
the law is to be effective. The same evils, the same perils to public security, which
or control of a firearm cannot be considered a violation of a statute prohibiting the
the law penalizes exist whether the unlicensed holder of a prohibited weapon be
possession of this kind of weapon.—Concomitantly, a temporary, incidental,
its owner or a borrower. To accomplish the object of this law the proprietary
casual, or harmless possession or control of a firearm cannot be considered a
concept of the possession can have no bearing whatsoever.
violation of a statute prohibiting the possession of this kind of weapon, such as
Same; Same; Same; When the crime is punished by a special law, intent to
Presidential Decree No. 1866. Thus, although there is physical or constructive
commit the crime is not necessary as it is sufficient that the offender has the intent
possession, for as long as the animus possidendi is absent, there is no offense
to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law; Intent to commit the crime and
committed.
intent to perpetrate the act, distinguished.—When the crime is punished by a
Same; Same; Same; Animus possidendi; What exists in the realm of thought
special law, as a rule,
is often disclosed in the range of action.—Animus possidendi is a state of mind
_______________ which may be determined on a case to case basis, taking into consideration the
prior and coetaneous acts of the accused and the surrounding circumstances. What
*SECOND DIVISION. exists in the realm of thought is often disclosed in the range of action. It is not
717 controverted that
VOL. 233, JULY 6, 1994 717 718
 718 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. De Gracia
appellant De Gracia is a former soldier, having served with the Philippine
Constabulary prior to his separation from the service for going on absence without
leave (AWOL). We do not hesitate, therefore, to believe and conclude that he is
familiar with and knowledgeable about the dynamites, “molotov” bombs, and
various kinds of ammunition which were confiscated by the military from his
possession. As a former soldier, it would be absurd for him not to know anything
about the dangerous uses and power of these weapons. A fortiori, he cannot feign
ignorance on the import of having in his possession such a large quantity of
explosives and ammunition. Furthermore, the place where the explosives were
found is not a military camp or office, nor one where such items can ordinarily but
lawfully be stored, as in a gun store, an arsenal or armory. Even an ordinarily
prudent man would be put on guard and be suspicious if he finds articles of this
nature in a place intended to carry out the business of selling cars and which has
nothing to do at all, directly or indirectly, with the trade of firearms and
ammunition.
Same; Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Bill of Rights; Searches and
Seizures; Where the raiding military operatives, at the height of the December 1989
coup d’etat attempt, had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being
committed, and had no opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from
the courts, the same constituted an exception to the prohibition against warrantless
searches.—It is admitted that the military operatives who raided the Eurocar
Sales Office were not armed with a search warrant at that time. The raid was
actually precipitated by intelligence reports that said office was being used as
headquarters by the RAM. Prior to the raid, there was a surveillance conducted
on the premises wherein the surveillance team was fired at by a group of men
coming from the Eurocar building. When the military operatives raided the place,
the occupants thereof refused to open the door despite requests for them to do so,
thereby compelling the former to break into the office. The Eurocar Sales Office is
obviously not a gun store and it is definitely not an armory or arsenal which are
the usual depositories for explosives and ammunition. It is primarily and solely
engaged in the sale of automobiles. The presence of an unusual quantity of high-
powered firearms and explosives could not be justifiably or even colorably
explained. In addition, there was general chaos and disorder at that time because
of simultaneous and intense firing within the vicinity of the office and in the
nearby Camp Aguinaldo which was under attack by rebel forces. The courts in the
surrounding areas were obviously closed and, for that matter, the building and
houses therein were deserted. Under the foregoing circumstances, it is our
considered opinion that the instant case falls under one of the exceptions to the
719
VOL. 233, JULY 6, 1994 719
People vs. De Gracia
prohibition against a warrantless search. In the first place, the military
operatives, taking into account the facts obtaining in this case, had reasonable
ground to believe that a crime was being committed. There was consequently more
than sufficient probable cause to warrant their action. Furthermore, under the
situation then prevailing, the raiding team had no opportunity to apply for and
secure a search warrant from the courts. The trial judge himself manifested that
on December 5, 1989 when the raid was conducted, his court was closed. Under
such urgency and exigency of the moment, a search warrant could lawfully be
dispensed with.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Double Jeopardy; The qualified offense of
illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion under P.D. 1866 is distinct
from the crime of rebellion punished under Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised
Penal Code.—It must be made clear that appellant is charged with the qualified
offense of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion under
Presidential Decree No. 1866 which, in law, is distinct from the crime of rebellion
punished under Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code. These are two
separate statutes penalizing different offenses with discrete penalties. The
Revised Penal Code treats rebellion as a crime apart from murder, homicide,
arson, or other offenses, such as illegal possession of firearms, that might
conceivably be committed in the course of a rebellion. Presidential Decree No. 1866
defines and punishes, as a specific offense, the crime of illegal possession of
firearms committed in the course or as part of a rebellion.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Unlawful possession of unlicensed
firearm in furtherance of rebellion may give rise to separate prosecutions for a
violation of P.D. No. 1866 and also a violation of Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised
Penal Code.—It follows that, subject to the presence of the requisite elements in
each case, unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm in furtherance of rebellion
may give rise to separate prosecutions for a violation of Section 1 of Presidential
Decree No. 1866, and also a violation of Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal
Code on rebellion. Double jeopardy in this case cannot be invoked because the first
is an offense punished by a special law while the second is a felony punished by
the Revised Penal Code, with variant elements.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Pardon; Executive clemency is a matter within the
exclusive prerogative of the President whose decision thereon should be unduly
insulated against any tenuous importunity.—It was a legal malaproprism for the
lower court to interject paragraph 2 of
720
 720 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. De Gracia
Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code in this prosecution for a crime under a
special law. Consequently, there is no basis for its recommendation for executive
clemency in favor of appellant De Gracia after he shall have served a jail term of
five years with good behavior. In any event, this is a matter within the exclusive
prerogative of the President whose decision thereon should be insulated against
any tenuous importunity.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Br.
103. Salazar, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Nicolas R. Ruiz, II for accused-appellant.
REGALADO, J.:
The incidents involved in this case took place at the height of the coup
d’etat staged in December, 1989 by ultra-rightist elements headed by the
Reform the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of the Filipino People (RAM-
SFP) against the Government. At that time, various government
establishments and military camps in Metro Manila were being bombarded
by the rightist group with their “tora-tora” planes. At around midnight of
November 30, 1989, the 4th Marine Battalion of the Philippine Marines
occupied Villamor Air Base, while the Scout Rangers took over the
Headquarters of the Philippine Army, the Army Operations Center, and
Channel 4, the government television station. Also, some elements of the
Philippine Army coming from Fort Magsaysay occupied the Greenhills
Shopping Center in San Juan, Metro Manila. 1
Accused-appellant Rolando de Gracia was charged in two separate
informations for illegal possession of ammunition and explosives in
furtherance of rebellion, and for attempted homicide, docketed as Criminal
Cases Nos. Q-90-11755 and Q-90-11756, respectively, which were tried
jointly by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 103.
_______________
1 TSN, August 28, 1990, 40-42.
721
VOL. 233, JULY 6, 1994 721
People vs. De Gracia
In Criminal Case No. Q-90-11755, Rolando de Gracia, Chito Henson and
several John Does whose true names and identities have not as yet been
ascertained, were charged with the crime of illegal possession of
ammunition and explosives in furtherance of rebellion, penalized under
Section 1, paragraph 3, of Presidential Decree No. 1866, allegedly
committed as follows:
“That on or about the 5th day of DECEMBER, 1989, in QUEZON CITY, METRO
MANILA, PHILIPPINES, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping one another, and without authority of law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly have in their possession, custody and
control, the following to wit:
Five (5) bundles of C-4 or dynamites Six (6) cartoons of M-16 ammunition at 20 each
One hundred (100) bottles of MOLOTOV bombs
without first securing the necessary license and/or permit to possess the same
from the proper authorities, and armed with said dynamites, ammunition and
explosives and pursuant to their conspiracy heretofore agreed upon by them and
prompted by common designs, come to an agreement and decision to commit the
crime of rebellion, by then and there participating therein and publicly taking
arms against the duly constituted authorities, for the purpose of overthrowing the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, disrupting and jeopardizing its
activities and removing from its allegiance the territory of the Philippines or parts
thereof.”2
In Criminal Case No. Q-90-11756, Rolando de Gracia, Chito Henson,
Lamberto Bicus, Rodolfo Tor and several John Does were charged with
attempted homicide allegedly committed on December 1, 1989 in Quezon
City upon the person of Crispin Sagario who was shot and hit on the right
thigh.
Appellant was convicted for illegal possession of firearms in furtherance
of rebellion, but was acquitted of attempted homicide.
During the arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges.
However, he admitted that he is not authorized to possess any firearms,
ammunition and/or explosive. The parties
3
_______________
 2Original Record, 1.
Ibid., 52.
3
722
722 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. De Gracia
likewise stipulated that there was a rebellion during the period from
November 30 up to December 9, 1989. 4
The records show that in the early morning of December 1, 1989, Maj.
Efren Soria of the Intelligence Division, National Capital Region Defense
Command, was on board a brown Toyota car conducting a surveillance of
the Eurocar Sales Office located at Epifanio de los Santos Avenue in Quezon
City, together with his team composed of Sgt. Crispin Sagario, M/Sgt.
Ramon Briones, S/Sgt. Henry Aquino, one S/Sgt. Simon and a Sgt. Ramos.
The surveillance, which actually started on the night of November 30, 1989
at around 10:00 P.M., was conducted pursuant to an intelligence report
received by the division that said establishment was being occupied by
elements of the RAM-SFP as a communication command post.
Sgt. Crispin Sagario, the driver of the car, parked the vehicle around ten
to fifteen meters away from the Eurocar building near P. Tuazon Street,
S/Sgt. Henry Aquino had earlier alighted from the car to conduct his
surveillance on foot. A crowd was then gathered near the Eurocar office
watching the on-going bombardment near Camp Aguinaldo. After a while,
a group of five men disengaged themselves from the crowd and walked
towards the car of the surveillance team. At that moment, Maj. Soria, who
was then seated in front, saw the approaching group and immediately
ordered Sgt. Sagario to start the car and leave the area. As they passed by
the group, then only six meters away, the latter pointed to them, drew their
guns and fired at the team, which attack resulted in the wounding of Sgt.
Sagario on the right thigh. Nobody in the surveillance team was able to
retaliate because they sought cover inside the car and they were afraid that
civilians or bystanders might be caught in the cross-fire.
As a consequence, at around 6:30 A.M. of December 5, 1989, a searching
team composed of F/Lt. Virgilio Babao as team leader, M/Sgt. Lacdao, Sgt.
Magallion, Sgt. Patricio Pacatang, and elements of the 16th Infantry
Battalion under one Col. delos Santos raided the Eurocar Sales Office. They
were able to find and confiscate six cartons of M-16 ammunition, five
bundles of C-4 dynamites, M-shells of different calibers,
and “molotov” bombs
_______________
4Ibid., 97.
723
VOL. 233, JULY 6, 1994 723
People vs. De Gracia
inside one of the rooms belonging to a certain Col. Matillano which is
located at the right portion of the building. Sgt. Oscar Obenia, the first one
to enter the Eurocar building, saw appellant De Gracia inside the office of
Col. Matillano, holding a C-4 and suspiciously peeping through a door. De
Gracia was the only person then present inside the room. A uniform with
the nametag of Col. Matillano was also found. As a result of the raid, the
team arrested appellant, as well as Soprieso Verbo and Roberto Jimena who
were janitors at the Eurocar building. They were then made to sign an
inventory, written in Tagalog, of the explosives and ammunition confiscated
by the raiding team. No search warrant was secured by the raiding team
because, according to them, at that time there was so much disorder
considering that the nearby Camp Aguinaldo was being mopped up by the
rebel forces and there was simultaneous firing within the vicinity of the
Eurocar office, aside from the fact that the courts were consequently closed.
The group was able to confirm later that the owner of Eurocar office is a
certain Mr. Gutierrez and that appellant is supposedly a “boy” therein.
Appellant Rolando de Gracia gave another version of the incident. First,
he claims that on November 30, 1989, he was in Antipolo to help in the
birthday party of Col. Matillano. He denies that he was at the Eurocar Sales
Office on December 1, 1989. Second, he contends that when the raiding
team arrived at the Eurocar Sales Office on December 5, 1989, he was inside
his house, a small nipa hut which is adjacent to the building. According to
him, he was tasked to guard the office of Col. Matillano which is located at
the right side of the building. He denies, however, that he was inside the
room of Col. Matillano when the raiding team barged in and that he had
explosives in his possession. He testified that when the military raided the
office, he was ordered to get out of his house and made to lie on the ground
face down, together with “Obet” and “Dong” who were janitors of the
building. He avers that he does not know anything about the explosives and
insists that when they were asked to stand up, the explosives were already
there.
Appellant stated that he visited Col. Matillano in 1987 at the stockade
of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police (PC-INP), and
that he knew Matillano was detained because of the latter’s involvement in
the 1987 coup d’etat. In
724
724 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. De Gracia
July, 1989, appellant again went to see Matillano because he had no job.
Col. Matillano then told him that he could stay in the PC-INP stockade and
do the marketing for them. From that time until his arrest at the Eurocar
office, appellant worked for Matillano.
De Gracia believes that the prosecution witnesses were moved to testify
against him because “bata raw ako ni Col. Matillano eh may atraso daw sa
kanila si Col. Matillano kaya sabi nila ito na lang bata niya ang ipitin
natin.”
On February 22, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment acquitting
5
appellant Rolando de Gracia of attempted homicide, but found him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of illegal possession of firearms in
furtherance of rebellion and sentenced him to serve the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Moreover, it made a recommendation that “(i)nasmuch as
Rolando de Gracia appears to be merely executing or obeying orders and
pursuant to the spirit contained in the 2nd paragraph of Art. 135, R.P.C.,
the court recommends that Rolando de Gracia be extended executive
clemency after serving a jail term of five (5) years of good behavior.”
That judgment of conviction is now challenged before us in this appeal.
Appellant principally contends that he cannot be held guilty of illegal
possession of firearms for the reason that he did not have either physical or
constructive possession thereof considering that he had no intent to possess
the same; he is neither the owner nor a tenant of the building where the
ammunition and explosives were found; he was merely employed by Col.
Matillano as an errand boy; he was guarding the explosives for and in
behalf of Col. Matillano; and he did not have actual possession of the
explosives. He claims that intent to possess, which is necessary before one
can be convicted under Presidential Decree No. 1866, was not present in
the case at bar.
Presidential Decree No. 1866 provides as follows:
“SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession
of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or intended to be Used in the
Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition.—The
_______________
5 Penned by Judge Jaime N. Salazar; Original Record, 146.
725
VOL. 233, JULY 6, 1994 725
People vs. De Gracia
penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire,
dispose, or possess any firearms, part of firearms, ammunition or machinery, tool
or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or
ammunition.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the
penalty of death shall be imposed.
If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in
connection with the crimes of rebellion, insurrection or subversion, the penalty of
death shall be imposed.”
Presidential Decree No. 1866 was passed because of an upsurge of crimes
vitally affecting public order and safety due to the proliferation of illegally
possessed and manufactured firearms, ammunition and explosives, and
which criminal acts have resulted in loss of human lives, damage to
property and destruction of valuable resources of the country. The series
of coup d’etats unleashed in the country during the first few years of the
transitional government under then President Corazon C. Aquino attest to
the ever-growing importance of laws such as Presidential Decree No. 1866
which seek to nip in the bud and preempt the commission of any act or acts
which tend to disturb public peace and order.
I. The first issue to be resolved is whether or not intent to possess is an
essential element of the offense punishable under Presidential Decree No.
1866 and, if so, whether appellant De Gracia did intend to illegally possess
firearms and ammunition.
The rule is that ownership is not an essential element of illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition. What the law requires is merely
possession which includes not only actual physical possession but also
constructive possession or the subjection of the thing to one’s control and
management.6 This has to be so if the manifest intent of the law is to be
effective. The same evils, the same perils to public security, which the law
penalizes exist whether the unlicensed holder of a prohibited weapon be its
owner or a borrower. To accomplish the object of this law the proprietary
concept of the possession can have no bearing
_______________
6 People vs. Cruz, G.R. No. 76728, August 30, 1988, 165 SCRA 135; People vs. Fajardo, et
al., 123 Phil. 1348 (1966).
726
726 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. De Gracia
whatsoever. 7
But is the mere fact of physical or constructive possession sufficient to
convict a person for unlawful possession of firearms or must there be an
intent to possess to constitute a violation of the law? This query assumes
significance since the offense of illegal possession of firearms is a malum
prohibitum punished by a special law, in which case good faith and absence
8
of criminal intent are not valid defenses. 9
When the crime is punished by a special law, as a rule, intent to commit
the crime is not necessary. It is sufficient that the offender has the intent
to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law. Intent to commit the
crime and intent to perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A person may
not have consciously intended to commit a crime; but he did intend to
commit an act, and that act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself.
In the first (intent to commit the crime), there must be criminal intent; in
the second (intent to perpetrate the act) it is enough that the prohibited act
is done freely and consciously. 10
In the present case, a distinction should be made between criminal
intent and intent to possess. While mere possession, without criminal
intent, is sufficient to convict a person for illegal possession of a firearm, it
must still be shown that there was animus possidendi or an intent to
possess on the part of the accused. Such intent to possess is, however,
11
without regard to any other criminal or felonious intent which the accused
may have harbored in possessing the firearm. Criminal intent here refers
to the intention of the accused to commit an offense with the use of an
unlicensed firearm. This is not important in convicting a person under
Presidential Decree No. 1866. Hence, in order that one may be found guilty
of a violation of the decree, it is sufficient that the accused had no authority
or license to
_______________
7 People vs. Estoista, 93 Phil. 647 (1953).
8 Veroy, et al. vs. Layague, etc., et al., G.R. No. 95630, June 18, 1992, 210 SCRA 97.
9 People vs. Neri, G.R. No. L-37762, December 19, 1985, 140 SCRA 406.
10 Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book One, 1981, 12th ed., 53.
11 People vs. Soyang, et al., 110 Phil. 565 (1960); People vs. Lubo, et al., 101 Phil.
179 (1957); U.S. vs. Samson, 16 Phil. 323 (1910).
727
VOL. 233, JULY 6, 1994 727
People vs. De Gracia
possess a firearm, and that he intended to possess the same, even if such
possession was made in good faith and without criminal intent.
Concomitantly, a temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless possession
or control of a firearm cannot be considered a violation of a statute
prohibiting the possession of this kind of weapon, such as Presidential
12
Decree No. 1866. Thus, although there is physical or constructive
possession, for as long as the animus possidendi is absent, there is no
offense committed.
Coming now to the case before us, there is no doubt in our minds that
appellant De Gracia is indeed guilty of having intentionally possessed
several firearms, explosives and ammunition without the requisite license
or authority therefor. Prosecution witness Sgt. Oscar Abenia categorically
testified that he was the first one to enter the Eurocar Sales Office when
the military operatives raided the same, and he saw De Gracia standing in
the room and holding the several explosives marked in evidence as Exhibits
D to D-4. At first, appellant denied any knowledge about the explosives.
13
Then, he alternatively contended that his act of guarding the explosives for
and in behalf of Col. Matillano does not constitute illegal possession thereof
because there was no intent on his part to possess the same, since he was
merely employed as an errand boy of Col. Matillano. His pretension of
impersonal or indifferent material possession does not and cannot inspire
credence.
Animus possidendi is a state of mind which may be determined on a case
to case basis, taking into consideration the prior and coetaneous acts of the
accused and the surrounding circumstances. What exists in the realm of
thought is often disclosed in the range of action. It is not controverted that
appellant De Gracia is a former soldier, having served with the Philippine
Constabulary prior to his separation from the service for going on absence
without leave (AWOL). We do not hesitate, therefore, to believe and
14
conclude that he is familiar with and knowledgeable about the
dynamites, “molotov” bombs, and various kinds of ammunition
_______________
12 People vs. Estoista, supra, Fn. 7.
13 TSN, November 22, 1990, 12.
14 Ibid., December 6, 1990, 36.
728
728 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. De Gracia
which were confiscated by the military from his possession. As a former
soldier, it would be absurd for him not to know anything about the
dangerous uses and power of these weapons. A fortiori, he cannot feign
ignorance on the import of having in his possession such a large quantity of
explosives and ammunition. Furthermore, the place where the explosives
were found is not a military camp or office, nor one where such items can
ordinarily but lawfully be stored, as in a gun store, an arsenal or armory.
Even an ordinarily prudent man would be put on guard and be suspicious
if he finds articles of this nature in a place intended to carry out the
business of selling cars and which has nothing to do at all, directly or
indirectly, with the trade of firearms and ammunition.
On the basis of the foregoing disquisition, it is apparent, and we so hold,
that appellant De Gracia actually intended to possess the articles
confiscated from his person.
II. The next question that may be asked is whether or not there was a
valid search and seizure in this case. While the matter has not been
squarely put in issue, we deem it our bounden duty, in light of advertence
thereto by the parties, to delve into the legality of the warrantless search
conducted by the raiding team, considering the gravity of the offense for
which herein appellant stands to be convicted and the penalty sought to be
imposed.
It is admitted that the military operatives who raided the Eurocar Sales
Office were not armed with a search warrant at that time. The raid was
15
actually precipitated by intelligence reports that said office was being used
as headquarters by the RAM. Prior to the raid, there was a surveillance
16
conducted on the premises wherein the surveillance team was fired at by a
group of men coming from the Eurocar building. When the military
operatives raided the place, the occupants thereof refused to open the door
despite requests for them to do so, thereby compelling the former to break
into the office. The Eurocar Sales Office is obviously not a gun store and it
17
is definitely not an armory or arsenal which are the usual depositories for
explosives
_______________
15 Ibid., November 22, 1990, 33.
16 Ibid., October 2, 1990, 21-22.
17 Ibid., id., November 22, 1990, 8.
729
VOL. 233, JULY 6, 1994 729
People vs. De Gracia
and ammunition. It is primarily and solely engaged in the sale of
automobiles. The presence of an unusual quantity of high-powered firearms
and explosives could not be justifiably or even colorably explained. In
addition, there was general chaos and disorder at that time because of
simultaneous and intense firing within the vicinity of the office and in the
nearby Camp Aguinaldo which was under attack by rebel forces. The 18
courts in the surrounding areas were obviously closed and, for that matter,
the building and houses therein were deserted.
Under the foregoing circumstances, it is our considered opinion that the
instant case falls under one of the exceptions to the prohibition against a
warrantless search. In the first place, the military operatives, taking into
account the facts obtaining in this case, had reasonable ground to believe
that a crime was being committed. There was consequently more than
sufficient probable cause to warrant their action. Furthermore, under the
situation then prevailing, the raiding team had no opportunity to apply for
and secure a search warrant from the courts. The trial judge himself
manifested that on December 5, 1989 when the raid was conducted, his
court was closed. Under such urgency and exigency of the moment, a
19
search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with.
The view that we here take is in consonance with our doctrinal ruling
which was amply explained in People vs. Malmstedt and bears reiteration:
20
“While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant
when the search was made over the personal effects of accused, however, under
the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said officers
to believe that accused was then and there committing a crime.
“Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed, and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched. The required probable cause that will justify a
warrantless search and
_______________
18 Ibid., id., October 2, 1990, 16-17.
19 Ibid., November 29, 1990, 58.
20 G.R. No. 91107, June 19, 1991, 198 SCRA 401.
730
730 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. De Gracia
seizure is not determined by any fixed formula but is resolved according to the
facts of each case.
“Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by
this Court as valid, because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of
marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused, or where the
accused was acting suspiciously, and attempted to flee.
“Aside from the persistent reports received by the NARCOM that vehicles
coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs,
their Commanding Officer also received information that a Caucasian coming from
Sagada on that particular day had prohibited drugs in his possession. Said
information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM the very same
morning that accused came down by bus from Sagada on his way to Baguio City.
“When NARCOM received the information, a few hours before the
apprehension of herein accused, that a Caucasian travelling from Sagada to
Baguio City was carrying with him prohibited drugs, there was no time to obtain
a search warrant. In the Tangliben case, the police authorities conducted a
surveillance at the Victory Liner Terminal located at Bgy. San Nicolas, San
Fernando, Pampanga, against persons engaged in the traffic of dangerous drugs,
based on information supplied by some informers. Accused Tangliben who was
acting suspiciously and pointed out by an informer was apprehended and searched
by the police authorities. It was held that when faced with on-the-spot information,
the police officers had to act quickly and there was no time to secure a search
warrant.
“It must be observed that, at first, the NARCOM officers merely conducted a
routine check of the bus (where accused was riding) and the passengers therein,
and no extensive search was initially made. It was only when one of the officers
noticed a bulge on the waist of accused, during the course of the inspection, that
accused was required to present his passport. The failure of accused to present his
identification papers, when ordered to do so, only managed to arouse the suspicion
of the officer that accused was trying to hide his identity. For is it not a regular
norm for an innocent man, who has nothing to hide from the authorities, to readily
present his identification papers when required to do so?
“The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada
had prohibited drugs in his possession, plus the suspicious failure of the accused
to produce his passport, taken together as a whole, led the NARCOM officers to
reasonably believe that the accused was trying to hide something illegal from the
authorities. From these circumstances arose a probable cause which justified the
warrantless search that was made on the personal effects of the accused. In other
731
VOL. 233, JULY 6, 1994 731
People vs. De Gracia
words, the acts of the NARCOM officers in requiring the accused to open his pouch
bag and in opening one of the wrapped objects found inside said bag (which was
discovered to contain hashish) as well as the two (2) teddy bears with hashish
stuffed inside them, were prompted by accused’s own attempt to hide his identity
by refusing to present his passport, and by the information received by the
NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his
possession. To deprive the NARCOM agents of the ability and facility to act
accordingly, including, to search even without warrant, in the light of such
circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law
enforcement, to the detriment of society.”
In addition, we find the principle enunciated in Umil, et al. vs. Ramos, et
al., applicable, by analogy, to the present case:
21
“The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed
elements, or for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is
more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the
rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for a
statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the
prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by a judge of the
existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and
the granting of bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously the absence of a judicial
warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt
acts of violence against government forces, or any other milder acts but really in
pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or capture is thus impelled by
the exigencies of the situation that involves the very survival of society and its
government and duly constituted authorities. If killing and other acts of violence
against the rebels find justification in the exigencies of armed hostilities which
(are) of the essence of waging a rebellion or insurrection, most assuredly so in case
of invasion, merely seizing their persons and detaining them while any of these
contingencies continues cannot be less justified.”
III. As earlier stated, it was stipulated and admitted by both parties that
from November 30, 1989 up to and until December 9, 1989, there was a
rebellion. Ergo, our next inquiry is whether or not appellant’s possession of
the firearms, explosives and ammunition seized and recovered from him
was for the purpose
_______________
G.R. No. 81567, July 9, 1990, 187 SCRA 311.
21
732
732 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. De Gracia
and in furtherance of rebellion.
The trial court found accused guilty of illegal possession of firearms in
furtherance of rebellion pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 135 of the
Revised Penal Code which states that “any person merely participating or
executing the command of others in a rebellion shall suffer the penalty
of prision mayor in its minimum period.” The court below held that
appellant De Gracia, who had been servicing the personal needs of Col.
Matillano (whose active armed opposition against the Government,
particularly at the Camelot Hotel, was well known), is guilty of the act of
guarding the explosives and “molotov” bombs for and in behalf of the latter.
We accept this finding of the lower court.
The above provision of the law was, however, erroneously and
improperly used by the court below as a basis in determining the degree of
liability of appellant and the penalty to be imposed on him. It must be made
clear that appellant is charged with the qualified offense of illegal
possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion under Presidential Decree
No. 1866 which, in law, is distinct from the crime of rebellion punished
under Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code. These are two
separate statutes penalizing different offenses with discrete penalties. The
Revised Penal Code treats rebellion as a crime apart from murder,
homicide, arson, or other offenses, such as illegal possession of firearms,
that might conceivably be committed in the course of a rebellion.
Presidential Decree No. 1866 defines and punishes, as a specific offense, the
crime of illegal possession of firearms committed in the course or as part of
a rebellion. 22
As a matter of fact, in one case involving the constitutionality of Section
1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, the Court has explained that said
provision of the law will not be invalidated by the mere fact that the same
act is penalized under two different statutes with different penalties, even
if considered highly advantageous to the prosecution and onerous to the
accused. It follows that, subject to the presence of the requisite elements
23
in each case, unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm in
_______________
Baylosis, et al. vs. Chavez, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 95136, October 3, 1991, 202 SCRA 405.
22
Misolas vs. Panga, etc. et al., G.R. No. 83341, January 30, 1990, 181 SCRA 648.
23
733
VOL. 233, JULY 6, 1994 733
People vs. De Gracia
furtherance of rebellion may give rise to separate prosecutions for a
violation of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, and also a violation
of Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code on rebellion. Double
jeopardy in this case cannot be invoked because the first is an offense
punished by a special law while the second is a felony punished by the
Revised Penal Code, with variant elements.
24
It was a legal malapropism for the lower court to interject the aforestated
provision of the Revised Penal Code in this prosecution for a crime under a
special law. Consequently, there is no basis for its recommendation for
executive clemency in favor of appellant De Gracia after he shall have
served a jail term of five years with good behavior. In any event, this is a
matter within the exclusive prerogative of the President whose decision
thereon should be insulated against any tenuous importunity.
 Withal, we are duly convinced that the firearms, explosives and the supposed basis thereof are hereby DELETED, with costs against
ammunition confiscated from appellant De Gracia were illegally possessed accused-appellant.
by him in furtherance of the rebellion then admittedly existing at that time. SO ORDERED.
In the words of the court a quo: Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Padilla, Puno and Mendoza,
“2. the nature and quantity of the items—5 bundles of C-4 dynamites, 6 cartons of JJ., concur.
M-16 ammo and 100 bottles of molotov bombs indicate that the reports received Impugned judgment affirmed.
by the military that the Eurocar Sales Building was being used by the rebels was Notes.—Mere suspicion of subversion is never a legal reason for
not without basis. Those items are clearly not for one’s personal defense. They are summary execution (People vs. De la Cruz, 227 SCRA 278 [1993]).
for offensive operations. De Gracia admitted that per instruction of Col. Matillano
Every judge should strictly follow the procedure for the issuance of
he went down to Eurocar Sales Building from Antipolo to stay guard there.
warrants of arrest (Ancog vs. Tan, 227 SCRA 137 [1993]).
“His manifestation of innocence of those items and what he has been guarding
in that office is not credible for: (a) he was a former military personnel; (b) at the
——o0o——
birthday party of Col. Matillano on November 30, 1989 many soldiers and ex-
soldiers were present which self-evidently discloses that De Gracia, in the _______________
company of his boss, was still very much at home and constantly in touch with
soldiers and the armed rebellion of November 30, 1989 to December 8 or 9, 1989 Original Record, 149-150.
25

was a military coup d’etat; (c) it appears that he is the only person tasked with 735
caretaking (sic) there in the Matillano office, which shows that he is a highly © Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
trusted right-hand man of Col. Matillano; and (d) as

_______________

24 Cf. People vs. Tiozon, G.R. No. 89823, June 19, 1991, 198 SCRA 368.
734
734 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. De Gracia
heretofore discussed, de Gracia was earlier seen with some men who fired upon a
car of the AFP intelligence agents.” 25

Presidential Decree No. 1866 imposes the death penalty where the illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition is committed in furtherance of
rebellion. At the time the offense charged in this case was committed under
the governance of that law, the imposition of the death penalty was
proscribed by the Constitution. Consequently, appellant De Gracia could
only be sentenced to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua which was
correctly meted out by the trial court, albeit with an erroneous recom-
mendation in connection therewith.
WHEREFORE, the impugned judgment of the trial court is hereby
AFFIRMED, but its recommendation therein for executive clemency and
 VOL. 221, APRIL 28, 1993 549
People vs. Dasig
G.R. No. 100231. April 28, 1993. *
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RODRIGO
DASIG @ KA RUBIN DAKU @ ARMAND; EDWIN NUNEZ Y TABANAS @
MABI; ALVIN DOE @ AL @ KA ALVIN; ROGER DOE @ KA JAMES @ KA
PEPE; TUDING ANDRINO @ KA ERMI @ KA ROEL @ KA GRINGO
MONTAYRE; RUBEN DOE @ KA RUBEN @ KA JOJI @ INO ECHAVEZ;
ANASTACIO BANGKAL @ KA JUNIOR; AND CARLITO MAGASIN @
BOBBY, accused. RODRIGO DASIG, accused-appellant.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Extra-judicial confession; A confession is
admissible until the accused successfully proves that it was given as a result of
violence, intimidation, threat or promise of reward or leniency.—We do not find
any reason to doubt the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court that the
extra-judicial confession of the appellant was voluntarily made. Said the trial
court: ‘The prosecution’s evidence clearly shows that herein accused during his
investigation was properly informed and appraised of his constitutional right to
remain silent and to have a competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice but since at that time he did not signify his intention to retain a lawyer
of his own choice, so he was provided with a lawyer in the person of Atty. Fortunato
Parawan of the Creer Law Office who was available at that time, to assist him
during the custodial investigation conducted by T/Sgt. Ariston L. Ira at his
hospital bed at Camp Lapulapu Army Station Hospital, Cebu City where he was
confined after being hit on his upper left arm and in fact, Atty. Parawan only
consented to assist herein accused after the latter has answered in the affirmative
to his question as to whether he would be amenable to be assisted by him as his
counsel of his own choice. “The prosecution’s evidence further show that Atty.
Fortunato Parawan after consenting to be his counsel was with him when his
extra-judicial confession or sworn statement was subscribed and sworn to by him
before Assistant City Fiscal Salvador O. Solima of the Cebu City Fiscal’s Office
who, before accused has actually affixed his signature on each and every pages of
his extra-judicial confession, has informed him (accused) of his constitutional
rights and has explained the contents of his extrajudicial confession. “Moreover,
per certification made by Assistant City Fiscal Salvador O. Solima of the Cebu
City Fiscal’s Office, clearly shows that accused in executing the same has done so
voluntarily and after
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
550
550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Dasig
having understood the contents thereof which is in the Visayan language, a
language known to him, found on the last page thereof now marked as Exhibit “J-
7”B.” “Furthermore, this sworn statement of accused Dasig is collaborated by the
sworn statement of his co-accused Edwin Nunez dated August 18, 1987 which is
sworn and subscribed to before City Fiscal Jopelinito Pareja of the City Fiscal’s
Office of Cebu City.” The settled jurisprudence on the matter is that a confession
is admissible until the accused successfully proves that it was given as a result of
violence, intimidation, threat or promise of reward or leniency.
Criminal Law; Rebellion; Appellant is liable for the crime of rebellion, not
murder with direct assault upon a person in authority.—The Solicitor General
agrees with the accused-appellant on this point as manifested in the People’s brief,
which We quote: however, as correctly pointed by appellant, the lower court
erroneously convicted him of Murder with Assault Upon a Person in Authority,
instead of Rebellion. “Rebellion is committed by taking up arms against the
government, among other means. (Article 135, Revised Penal Code). In this case,
appellant not only confessed voluntarily his membership with the sparrow unit
but also his participation and that of his group in the killing of Pfc. Manatad while
manning the traffic in Mandaue City in the afternoon of August 4, 1987. It is of
judicial notice that the sparrow unit is the liquidation squad of the New People’s
Army with the objective of overthrowing the duly constituted government. It is
therefore not hard to comprehend that the killing of Pfc. Manatad was committed
as a means to or in furtherance of the subversive ends of the NPA. Consequently,
appellant is liable for the crime of rebellion, not murder with direct assault upon
a person in authority.”
Same; Same; Indeterminate Sentence Law; Case at Bar; The Indeterminate
Sentence Law is not applicable to persons convicted of rebellion.—As to the proper
imposable penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is rot applicable to persons
convicted of rebellion (Sec. 2, R.A. 4203), contrary to the insinuation of the Solicitor
General. Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision
mayor and a fine not exceeding P20,000.00 to any person who promotes,
maintains, or heads a rebellion. However, in the case at bar, there is no evidence
to prove that appellant Dasig headed the crime committed. As a matter of fact he
was not specifically pinpointed by Pfc. Catamora as the person giving instructions
to the group which attacked Pfc. Manatad.
Same; Same; Same; Penalty Imposable; Appellant has to suffer the penalty of
eight (8) years of prision mayor and pay P50,000.00 to the heirs of Pfc. Manatad as
civil indemnity.—Appellant merely partici-
 551
VOL. 221, APRIL 28, 1993 551
People vs. Dasig
pated in committing the act, or just executed the command of an unknown
leader. Hence, he should be made to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of eight
(8) years of prision mayor. For the resulting death, appellant is likewise ordered
to pay the heirs of Pfc. Manatad FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as civil
indemnity.
APPEAL from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City,
Br. 28.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Kinaadman and Archival for accused-appellant.
NOCON, J.:
Appellant, Rodrigo Dasig is now before Us to plead the reversal of his
conviction by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Mandaue City finding
him guilty of Murder with Direct Assault.
He was charged together with Edwin Nuñez and 6 others who are still
at large, in an Information which reads:
“That on or about the 4th day of August, 1987, in the City of Mandaue, of this
Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused, conspiring and confederating together
and helping one another, with intent to kill, treachery, evident premeditation,
abuse of superior strength and use of motor vehicle, all armed with unlicensed
firearms, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and shoot one Redempto Manatad, a police officer on traffic duty, at his vital
portion which caused his death soon thereafter, knowing beforehand that the
victim was a policeman who was then in the performance of his official duties.”1
Upon arraignment, appellant and Edwin Nuñez entered a plea of “not
guilty.” However, after the prosecution had presented its first witness,
accused Nuñez changed his plea of “not guilty” to “guilty.” Hence, the lower
court held in abeyance the promulgation of a judgment against said accused
until the prosecution had finished presenting its evidence. While trial was
still
_______________
1Rollo, p. 5.
552
552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Dasig
ongoing, Nuñez died on March 10, 1989, thereby extinguishing his criminal
liability.
The facts surrounding this case show that in the afternoon of August 4,
1987, Pfc. Redempto Manatad, Pfc. Ninah Tizon and Pfc. Rene Catamora
were tasked by their commanding officer to assist in manning the traffic at
M.N. Briones and Bonifacio Streets in Mandaue City. Pfc. Tizon controlled
the traffic lighting facility; Pfc, Manatad manned the traffic; while Pfc.
Catamora acted as back-up and posted himself at Norkis Trading building.
At about 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon, Pfc. Catamora noticed eight (8)
persons, one of whom he identified as Edwin Nuñez, acting suspiciously. He
noticed one of them giving instructions to two of the men to approach Pfc.
Manatad. He followed the two, but sensing that they were being followed,
they immediately proceeded to the middle of the road and engaged Pfc.
Catamora to a gun battle. At that instant, Pfc. Catamora heard a series of
shots from the other group and thereafter saw Pfc. Manatad sprawled on
the ground. Being out-numbered and to save his own life, Pat. Catamora
sought refuge at the nearby BIR Office from where he saw two (2) persons
take Pfc. Manatad’s gun and again fired at him to make sure that he is dead
while the rest of the group including Nuñez acted as back up. Thereafter,
the Nuñez group commandeered a vehicle and fled from the scene of the
shooting. Pfc. Rene Catamora testified that he can identify accused-
appellant Nuñez because of a mole at the bridge of his nose near the left
eye which he noticed when the accused passed 2 or 3 meters in front of him
together with his companions.
On August 16, 1987, two teams of police officers were tasked to conduct
surveillance on a suspected safehouse of members of the sparrow unit
located in Peace Valley, Cebu City. Upon reaching the place, the group saw
Rodrigo Dasig and Edwin Nuñez trying to escape. The team of Capt.
Antonio Gorre captured Nuñez and confiscated a .45 caliber revolver with
3 magazines and ammunitions, while the group of Sgt. Ronald Arnejo
pursued Dasig, who threw a grenade at his pursuers, but was shot on his
left upper arm and subsequently apprehended. A .38 caliber revolver with
17 live ammunitions were confiscated from him.
 Thereafter, Dasig was brought to the hospital for treatment, while
Nuñez was turned over to the Metrodiscom for investigation. Meanwhile,
Dasig was interrogated by M/Sgt. Ariston Ira of
553
VOL. 221, APRIL 28, 1993 553
People vs. Dasig
the PC Criminal Investigation Service on August 19, 1987 at his hospital
bed at the Lapulapu Army Hospital in Cebu City. Assisting Dasig during
the interrogation was Atty. Fortunato Parawan of the Creer Law Office,
who was requested by the military to represent appellant who did not have
a lawyer. Before the start of the interrogation, Atty. Parawan asked
appellant whether he was willing to avail of his services, to which appellant
agreed. M/Sgt. Ira then appraised Dasig of his constitutional rights. The
interrogation was conducted in Cebuano upon appellant’s request.
Dasig confessed that he and the group of Edwin Nuñez killed Pfc.
Manatad. He likewise admitted that he and Nuñez were members of the
sparrow unit and that their aliases were “Armand” and “Mabi,”
respectively. The extra-judicial confession of appellant marked as Exhibit
“J” was signed by him on every page thereof with the first page containing
2
a certification likewise signed by him, which states: “I hereby certify that
the herein statement is free and voluntary, and that I am assisted by my
counsel in the course of this investigation” followed by the signed
conformity of Atty. Parawan. The extra-judicial confession was subscribed
and sworn to before Cebu City Asst. Fiscal Salvador Solima.
In the present appeal, Dasig contends that the procedure by which his
extra-judicial confession was taken was legally defective, and contrary to
his Constitutional rights. He further contends that assuming he conspired
in the killing of Pfc. Manatad, he should be convicted at most of simple
rebellion and not murder with direct assault.
Appellant also claims that the custodial interrogation was done while he
was still very sick and consequently, he could not have fully appreciated the
wisdom of admitting such a serious offense. That even with the presence of
counsel, his extra-judicial confession is inadmissible in evidence as said
counsel did not actively assist him and advise him of his rights. In effect,
his presence was merely to give a semblance of legality to the proceedings
and not to protect appellant against possible abuses of the investigator.
Dasig, likewise questions the sincerity of
_______________
2Pp. 11-18, Records.
554
554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Dasig
Atty. Parawan in protecting his rights considering that the latter is a
known anti-Communist advocate and that the law firm to which he belongs
has represented high ranking officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines.
We find the argument specious. Fiscal Salvador Solima in his
certification, Exhibit “J-7-B,” stated that he had personally examined the
affiant and that he is convinced that the latter’s statement was free and
voluntary and that the affiant signed the same in his presence and swore
under oath as to the veracity of everything therein. Atty. Fortunato L.
Parawan also testified that he assisted the affiant from the start of the
investigation up to its termination. Atty. Parawan testified thus:
“Q Who introduced Rodrigo Dasig to you?
A I inquired from the personnel of the hospital the
whereabout of Rodrigo Dasig and I introduced myself as
a lawyer. So they informed me the room of Rodrigo
Dasig. At that time I introduced myself as a lawyer who
came to assist the person of Rodrigo Dasig. Once we had
a confrontation with Rodrigo Dasig, I asked him whether
he was willing to get me as his lawyer in that
investigation. Then he told me yes.
Q Did he tell you whether he has a counsel of his own
choice?
A No.
xxx
Q In other words he accepted your services as counsel in
connection with that investigation which was about to be
made?
A Yes.
Q Who are the persons present at that time?
A There were guards outside and inside. There was a man
from the CIS in the person of Sgt. Ira, myself and Dasig.
Q What happened after that?
A The CIS started the investigation.
Q You mean this Ariston Ira?
A Yes.
Q Before Ariston Ira conducted the investigation was Dasig
informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent,
tocounsel and if he chooses to testify or say something,
that statement of his will be used against or in his favor in
A After the investigation, I think that was already
past 3:00 or 4:00, we proceeded to the office of the
City Fiscal at F. Ramos St., Cebu City and then we
proceeded to the Office of Fiscal Solema (sic) and
then it was subscribed there before Fiscal Solema
(sic).
Q Were you present during the proceeding?
A I was also present.”3

the court of justice? We do not find any reason to doubt the factual findings and conclusions of
A Yes. He was willing to get me as counsel in that the trial court that the extra-judicial confession of the appellant was
investigation. voluntarily made. Said the trial court:
Q After he was informed of his constitutional rights what “The prosecution’s evidence clearly shows that herein accused during his
555 investigation was properly informed and appraised of his constitutional right to
VOL. 555 remain silent and to have a competent and independent counsel preferably of his
221, own choice but since at that time he did not signify his intention to retain a lawyer
of his own choice, so he was provided with a lawyer in the person of Atty. Fortunato
APRIL
Parawan of the Creer Law Office who was available at that time, to assist him
28, 1993 during the custodial investigation conducted by T/Sgt. Ariston L. Ira at his
People vs. Dasig hospital bed at Camp Lapulapu Army Station Hospital, Cebu City where he was
transpired next? confined after being hit on his upper left arm and in fact, Atty. Parawan only
A The investigation started. consented to assist herein accused after the latter has answered in the affirmative
Q Were you present at the very start of that to his question as to whether he would be amenable to be assisted by him as his
investigation? counsel of his own choice.
“The prosecution’s evidence further show that Atty. Fortunato Parawan after
A Yes, I was present from the start until it was
consenting to be his counsel was with him when his extra-judicial confession or
finished. sworn statement was subscribed and sworn
Q Was that reduced to writing?
A Yes. _______________
x x x. 3 TSN, p. 5-8, March 8, 1990.
Q You said you were present during the entire 556
investigation. 556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Were the answers of the accused, Rodrigo Dasig, People vs. Dasig
to the questions propounded by the Investigator to by him before Assistant City Fiscal Salvador O. Solima of the Cebu City Fiscal’s
voluntary? Office who, before accused has actually affixed his signature on each and every
A Yes, they are voluntary. pages of his extra-judicial confession, has informed him (accused) of his
Q After the investigation was finished what constitutional rights and has explained the contents of his extra-judicial
transpired next? confession.
 “Moreover, per certification made by Assistant City Fiscal Salvador O. Solima
of the Cebu City Fiscal’s Office, clearly shows that accused in executing the same
has done so voluntarily and after having understood the contents thereof which is
in the Visayan language, a language known to him, found on the last page thereof
now marked as Exhibit “J-7”B.”
“Furthermore, this sworn statement of accused Dasig is collaborated by the
sworn statement of his co-accused Edwin Nuñez dated August 18, 1987 which is
sworn and subscribed to before City Fiscal Jopelinito Pareja of the City Fiscal’s
Office of Cebu City.” 4
The settled jurisprudence on the matter is that a confession is admissible
until the accused successfully proves that it was given as a result of
violence, intimidation, threat or promise of reward or leniency. The case 5
of People of the Philippines v. Parojinog is four square to the case at bar.
In Parojinog this court had this to say:
“Anent his claim that Atty. Fuentes was not his choice, Section 12 (1) of Article III
of the 1987 Constitution provides:
‘Sec. 12(1).—Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services
of counsel he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel.’
“It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that a person under
investigation for the commission of an offense may choose his own counsel but if
he cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. While the
initial choice of the lawyer in the latter case is naturally lodged in the police
investigators, the accused really has the final choice as he may reject the counsel
chosen for him and ask
_______________
4 Decision, p. 12-13.
5 People v. Parojinog, G.R. No. 95860, 203 SCRA 673.
557
VOL. 221, APRIL 28, 1993 557
People vs. Dasig
for another one. In the instant case, the records show that no objection was voiced
by the accused throughout the entire proceedings of the investigation and
afterwards when he subscribed to its veracity before City Prosecutor Luzminda V.
Uy. Thus, he apparently acquiesced to the choice of the investigators. He
complained for the first time that Atty. Fuentes was not his choice only during
trial. Thus it was too late.” 6 therefore not hard to comprehend that the killing of Pfc. Manatad was committed
Appellant relies on the much abused claim that his extrajudicial confession
was legally defective and hence, should not have been admitted and
considered by the trial judge. This accusation is whimsical and obviously a
mere refuge for appellant’s turnabout. In an attempt to avoid criminal
liability, he now questions the integrity of the police authorities and the
reputation of the lawyer who stood by him during the investigation.
Indubitably established and now a matter of record is the fact that
appellant was assisted by Atty. Parawan who even signed the former’s
sworn declarations. It is likewise a matter of record that before appellant
made his extra-judicial confession, he was first asked if he was amenable to
the services of Atty. Parawan to which query he answered affirmatively.
Finally, the alleged use of force and intimidation has not been
substantiated by evidence other than his self-serving testimony. As has
been pointed out, such allegation is another naive effort of appellant to back
track from his prior voluntary admission of guilt. Evidently, the taking of
his extra-judicial confession was done with regularity and legality. 7
Nevertheless, there is merit in appellant’s argument that granting he is
guilty, what he committed was a political crime of simple rebellion, and
hence he should not be convicted of murder with direct assault.
The Solicitor General agrees with the accused-appellant on this point as
manifested in the People’s brief, which We quote:
“However, as correctly pointed by appellant, the lower court erroneously convicted
him of Murder with Assault Upon a Person in Authority, instead of Rebellion.
“Rebellion is committed by taking up arms against the govern-
_______________
6 Id. at p. 680.
7 People v. Quijano, G.R. No. 84361, 197 SCRA 761.
558
558 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Dasig
ment, among other means. (Article 135, Revised Penal Code). In this case,
appellant not only confessed voluntarily his membership with the sparrow unit
but also his participation and that of his group in the killing of Pfc. Manatad while
manning the traffic in Mandaue City in the afternoon of August 4, 1987. It is of
judicial notice that the sparrow unit is the liquidation squad of the New People’s
Army with the objective of overthrowing the duly constituted government. It is
as a means to or in furtherance of the subversive ends of the NPA. Consequently,
appellant is liable for the crime of rebellion, not murder with direct assault upon
a person in authority.” 8
The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is a vast movement of men
and a complex net of intrigues and plots. Acts committed in furtherance of
rebellion though crimes in themselves are deemed absorbed in one single
crime of rebellion. The act of killing a police officer, knowing too well that
9
the victim is a person in authority is a mere component or ingredient of
rebellion or an act done in furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot be made a
basis of a separate charge.
Moreover, in the case of People v. Mangallan We held that where the
10
accused who was charged with murder admitted his membership with the
NPA and the killing of a suspected PC informer, the crime committed is not
murder but rebellion punishable under Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised
Penal Code.
As to the proper imposable penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is
not applicable to persons convicted of rebellion (Sec. 2, R.A. 4203), contrary
to the insinuation of the Solicitor General. Article 135 of the Revised Penal
Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding
P20,000.00 to any person who promotes, maintains, or heads a rebellion.
However, in the case at bar, there is no evidence to prove that appellant
Dasig headed the crime committed. As a matter of fact he was not
specifically pinpointed by Pfc. Catamora as the person giving instructions
to the group which attacked Pfc. Manatad.
Appellant merely participated in committing the act, or just
Premises considered, We uphold the findings of the trial court that the
extra-judicial confession was legally obtained. However, appellant being a
confessed member of the sparrow unit, the liquidation squad of the New
People’s Army whose objective is to overthrow the duly constituted
government, the crime committed is simple rebellion and not murder with
direct assault.
WHEREFORE, accused Rogelio Dasig is found guilty of participating in
an act of rebellion beyond reasonable doubt and is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) years of prision mayor, and
to pay the heirs of Pfc. Redempto Manatad, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Accused-appellant found guilty of rebellion.
Note.—Confessions extracted by force are not admissible. Judges should
look deeper into the validity of challenged confessions (People
vs. Opida, 142 SCRA 295).
——o0o——
560
© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

_______________

8 Plaintiff-Appellee’s Brief, p. 13; Rollo, p. 99.

9 Enrile v. Amin, G.R. No. 93335, 189 SCRA 573.
10 160 SCRA 116.

559
VOL. 221, APRIL 28, 1993 559
People vs. Dasig
executed the command of an unknown leader. Hence, he should be made to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) years of prision mayor. For
the resulting death, appellant is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of Pfc.
Manatad FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity.
 VOL. 187, JULY 9, 1990 311 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF
Umil vs. Ramos NARCISO B. NAZARENO. ALFREDO NAZARENO, petitioner, vs. THE
G.R. No. 81567. July 9, 1990.
* STATION COMMANDER OF THE MUNTINGLUPA POLICE STATION,
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF Muntinglupa, Metro Manila, P/SGT. JACINTO MEDINA, P/SGT. ELADIO
ROBERTO UMIL, ROLANDO DURAL and RENATO VILLANUEVA. TAGLE, P/SGT. LEVI SOLEDAD, and P/SGT. MAURO AROJADO,
MANOLITA O. UMIL, and NICANOR P. DURAL, FELICITAS V. SESE, respondents.
petitioners, vs. FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Arrests; Arrest of a person without a
BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, warrant of arrest or previous complaint is recognized in law.—The arrest of a
person without a warrant of arrest or previous complaint is recognized in law. The
respondents.
occasions or instances when such an arrest may be effected are clearly spelled out
G.R. Nos. 84581-82. July 9, 1990. *
in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
AMELIA ROQUE and WILFREDO BUENAOBRA, petitioners, vs. GEN. Same; Same; Same; Arrest without a warrant is justified when the person
RENATO DE VILLA and GEN. RAMON MONTANO, respondents. arrested is caught in flagranti delicto.—An arrest without a warrant of arrest,
G.R. Nos. 84583-84. July 9, 1990. *
under Section 5 paragraphs (a) and (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ATTY. amended, is justified when the person arrested is caught in flagranti delicto, viz.,
DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE. DOMINGO T. in the act of committing an offense; or when an offense has just been committed
ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE, petitioners, vs. HON. and the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of the facts indicating
FIDEL V. RAMOS, GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, COL. EVARISTO that the person arrested has committed it.
CARINO, LT. COL. REX D. PIAD, T/SGT. CONRADO DE TORRES, Same; Same; Same; Same; Rationale behind lawful arrests without warrant
S/SGT. ARNOLD DURIAN, and Commanding Officer, PC-INP Detention stated in the case of People vs. Kagui Malasugui.—The rationale behind lawful
arrests, without warrant, was stated by this Court in the case of People vs. Kagui
Center, Camp Crame, Quezon City, respondents.
Malasugui thus: “To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and
G.R. No. 83162. July 9, 1990.
*
searched for the evidence and tokens of his crime without a warrant, would be to
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert, and
VICKY A. OCAYA AND DANNY RIVERA. VIRGILIO A. OCAYA, the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many instances.”
petitioner, vs. BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, COL. HERCULES Same; Same; Same; Same; Petitioners had freshly committed or were actually
CATALUNA, COL. NESTOR MARIANO, respondents. committing an offense when apprehended so that their arrests without a warrant
G.R. No. 85727. July 9, 1990.
* were clearly justified.—The record of the instant cases would show that the
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS persons in whose behalf these
313
_______________ VOL. 187, JULY 9, 1990 313
Umil vs. Ramos
*EN BANC.
312 petitions for habeas corpus have been filed, had freshly committed or were
312 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED actually committing an offense, when apprehended, so that their arrests without
a warrant were clearly justified, and that they are, further, detained by virtue of
Umil vs. Ramos valid informations filed against them in court.
OF: DEOGRACIAS ESPIRITU, petitioner, vs. BRIG. GEN. ALFREDO S. Criminal Law; Habeas Corpus; Subversion; The crimes of rebellion,
LIM, COL. RICARDO REYES, respondents. subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses
G.R. No. 86332. July 9, 1990.* committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct
assaults against the State are in the nature of continuing crimes.—However,
Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the New Peoples Army (NPA),
an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the
arrest of Rolando Dural without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was
committing an offense when arrested. The crimes of rebellion, subversion,
conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed
in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against
the State and are in the nature of continuing crimes.
Same; Same; If a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody
of an officer under process issued by a court or judge and that the court or judge
had jurisdiction to issue the process or make the order or if such person is charged
before any court, the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed.—It is to be noted
that, in all the petitions here considered, criminal charges have been filed in the
proper courts against the petitioners. The rule is, that if a person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a
court or judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or
make the order, or if such person is charged before any court, the writ of habeas
corpus will not be allowed.
Same; Same; No compelling reason to abandon the doctrine laid down in the
case of Ilagan vs. Enrile; As the court stated in Morales Jr. vs. Enrile, in all
petitions for habeas corpus the court must inquire into every phase and aspect of
petitioner’s detention.—We find, however, no compelling reason to abandon the
said doctrine. It is based upon express provision of the Rules of Court and the
exigencies served by the law. The fears expressed by the petitioners are not really
unremediable. As the Court sees it, re-examination or reappraisal, with a view to
its abandonment, of the Ilagan case doctrine is not the answer. The answer and
the better practice would be, not to limit the function of habeas corpus to a mere
inquiry as to whether or not the court which issued the process, judgment or order
or of commitment or
314
314 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Umil vs. Ramos
before whom the detained person is charged, had jurisdiction or not to issue
the process, judgment or order or to take cognizance of the case, but rather, as the
Court itself states in Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile, “in all petitions for habeas corpus the
court must inquire into every phase and aspect of petitioner’s detention—from the
moment petitioner was taken into custody up to the moment the court passes upon
the merits of the petition:” and “only after such a scrutiny can the court satisfy itself
that the due process clause of our Constitution has in fact been satisfied.” This is
exactly what the Court has done in the petitions at bar. This is what should
henceforth be done in all future cases of habeas corpus. In short, all cases involving
deprivation of individual liberty should be promptly brought to the courts for their
immediate scrutiny and disposition.
CRUZ, J., Dissenting:
Fact that subversion is a continuing offense to justify the arrest without
warrant of any person at any time as long as the authorities say he has
been placed under surveillance on suspicion of the offense is a dangerous
doctrine.
FELICIANO, J., Concurring:
There is no obstacle to a careful examination of the doctrine of continuing
crimes as applied to such offenses as subversion and inciting to sedition and
possibly other offenses in some future case where that issue is raised
squarely and is unavoidable.
SARMIENTO, J., Dissenting:
Warrantless arrest may be exercised only in the most urgent cases and
when the guilt of an offender is plain and evident.
CORTÉS, J., Concurring:
I join Mr. Justice Feliciano in his separate concurring statement.
PETITIONS for Habeas Corpus.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Efren H. Mercado for petitioners in G.R. No. 81567.
Ricardo C. Valmonte for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84581-82.
Ramon S. Esguerra, Barbara Anne C. Migallos and Agripino G.
Morga for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84583-84.
315
VOL. 187, JULY 9, 1990 315
Umil vs. Ramos
Efren H. Mercado for petitioner in G.R. No. 83162.
Banzuela, Flores, Miralles, Raneses, Sy, Taquio & Associates for
petitioner in G.R. No. 85727.
 Josefina G. Campbell-Castillo for petitioners in G.R. No. 86332.
The Solicitor General for the respondents.
PER CURIAM:
These are eight (8) petitions for habeas corpus filed before the Court, which
have been consolidated because of the similarity of issues raised, praying
for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, ordering the respective
respondents to produce the bodies of the persons named therein and to
explain why they should not be set at liberty without further delay.
In their respective Returns, the respondents uniformly assert that the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not available to the petitioners as
they have been legally arrested and are detained by virtue of valid
informationsfiled in court against them.
The petitioners counter that their detention is unlawful as their arrests
were made without warrant and, that no preliminary investigation was
first conducted, so that the informations filed against them are null and
void.
The Court has carefully reviewed the contentions of the parties in their
respective pleadings, and it finds that the persons detained have not been
illegally arrested nor arbitrarily deprived of their constitutional right to
liberty, and that the circumstances attending these cases do not warrant
their release on habeas corpus.
The arrest of a person without a warrant of arrest or previous complaint
is recognized in law. The occasions or instances when such an arrest may
be effected are clearly spelled out in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, which provides:
“Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
1. (a)When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
2. (b)When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
316
316 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Umil vs. Ramos
1. personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
2. (c)When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail,
and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.”
An arrest without a warrant of arrest, under Section 5 paragraphs (a) and
(b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as amended, is justified when the
person arrested is caught in flagranti delicto, viz., in the act of committing
an offense; or when an offense has just been committed and the person
making the arrest has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the
person arrested has committed it. The rationale behind lawful arrests,
without warrant, was stated by this Court in the case of People vs. Kagui
Malasugui thus:
1
“To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the
evidence and tokens of his crime without a warrant, would be to leave society, to
a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert, and the most
depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many instances.”
The record of the instant cases would show that the persons in whose behalf
these petitions for habeas corpus have been filed, had freshly committed or
were actually committing an offense, when apprehended, so that their
arrests without a warrant were clearly justified, and that they are, further,
detained by virtue of valid informations filed against them in court.
A brief narration of the facts and events surrounding each of the eight
(8) petitions is in order.
_______________
163 Phil. 221.
317
VOL. 187, JULY 9, 1990 317
Umil vs. Ramos
I
In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil vs. Ramos), the record shows that, on 1 February
1988, the Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the Capital Command
(RIOU-CAPCOM) received confidential information about a member of the
NPA Sparrow Unit (liquidation squad) being treated for a gunshot wound
at the St. Agnes Hospital in Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City. Upon
verification, it was found that the wounded person, who was listed in the
hospital records as Ronnie Javelon, is actually Rolando Dural, a member of
the NPA liquidation squad, responsible for the killing of two (2) CAPCOM
soldiers the day before, or on 31 January 1988, in Macanining Street,
Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. In view of this verification, Rolando Dural
was transferred to the Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for
security reasons. While confined thereat, or on 4 February 1988, Rolando
Dural was positively identified by eyewitnesses as the gunman who went
on top of the hood of the CAPCOM mobile patrol car, and fired at the two
(2) CAPCOM soldiers seated inside the car identified as T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon
and CIC Renato Manligot.
As a consequence of this positive identification, Rolando Dural was
referred to the Caloocan City Fiscal who conducted an inquest and
thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an
information charging Rolando Dural alias Ronnie Javelon with the crime of
“Double Murder with Assault Upon Agents of Persons in Authority.” The
case was docketed therein as Criminal Case No. C-30112 and no bail was
recommended. On 15 February 1988, the information was amended to
include, as defendant, Bernardo Itucal, Jr. who, at the filing of the original
information, was still unidentified.
Meanwhile, on 6 February 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed
with this Court on behalf of Roberto Umil, Rolando Dural, and Renato
Villanueva. The Court issued the writ of habeas corpus on 9 February 1988
and the respondents filed a Return of the Writ on 12 February 1988.
Thereafter, the parties were heard on 15 February 1988.
On 26 February 1988, however, Roberto Umil and Renato
Villanueva posted bail before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City where
charges for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act had
318
318 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Umil vs. Ramos
been filed against them, and they were accordingly released. The petition
for habeas corpus, insofar as Umiland Villanueva are concerned, is now
moot and academic and is accordingly dismissed, since the writ of habeas
corpus does not lie in favor of an accused in a criminal case who has been
released on bail. 2
As to Rolando Dural, it clearly appears that he was not arrested while
in the act of shooting the two (2) CAPCOM soldiers aforementioned. Nor
was he arrested just after the commission of the said offense for his arrest
came a day after the said shooting incident. Seemingly, his arrest without
warrant is unjustified.
However, Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the New
Peoples Army (NPA), an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion
being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural without warrant is
justified as it can be said that he was committing an offense when arrested.
The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such
crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in
connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State and are in
the nature of continuing crimes. As stated by the Court in an earlier case:
“From the facts as above-narrated, the claim of the petitioners that they were
initially arrested illegally is, therefore, without basis in law and in fact. The crimes
of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such
crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance, on the
occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith under Presidential
Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of continuing offenses which set them
apart from the common offenses, aside from their essentially involving a massive
conspiracy of nationwide magnitude. Clearly then, the arrest of the herein
detainees was well within the bounds of the law and existing jurisprudence in our
jurisdiction.
2. The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed
elements, or for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is
more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the
rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for a
statutory offense. The
_______________
2 Zacarias vs. Cruz, G.R. No. L-25899, November 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 728.
319
VOL. 187, JULY 9, 1990 319
 Umil vs. Ramos
arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses
which requires the determination by a judge of the existence of probable cause
before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if the
offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal
impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence
against government forces, or any other milder acts but equally in pursuance of
the rebellious movement. The arrest or capture is thus impelled by the exigencies
of the situation that involves the very survival of society and its government and
duly constituted authorities. If killing and other acts of violence against the rebels
find justification in the exigencies of armed hostilities which is of the essence of
waging a rebellion or insurrection, most assuredly so in case of invasion, merely
seizing their persons and detaining them while any of these contingencies
continues cannot be ess justified. x x x” 3 The record of these two (2) cases shows that on 27 June 1988, one
The record, moreover, shows that the criminal case filed against Rolando
Dural and Bernardo Itucal, Jr. for “Double Murder, etc.” was tried in the
court below and at the conclusion thereof, or on 17 August 1988, Rolando
Dural and Bernardo Itucal, Jr. were found guilty of the charge and
sentenced accordingly. Rolando Dural is now serving the sentence imposed
upon him by the trial court. Thus, the writ of habeas corpus is no longer
available to him. For, as held in the early case of U.S. vs. Wilson: 4 from Sorsogon and Lopez, Quezon; “Ka Ted”, and “Ka Totoy”. He also
“In this case, whatever may be said about the manner of his arrest, the fact
remains that the defendant was actually in court in the custody of the law on
March 29, when a complaint sufficient in form and substance was read to him. To
this he pleaded not guilty. The trial followed, in which, and in the judgment of
guilty pronounced by the court, we find no error. Whether, if there were
irregularities in bringing him personally before the court, he could have been
released on a writ of habeas corpus or now has a civil action for damages against
the person who arrested him we need not inquire. It is enough to say that such
irregularities are not sufficient to set aside a valid judgment rendered upon a
sufficient complaint and after a trial free from error.”
_______________
3Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile, G.R. No. 61388, April 20, 1983, 121 SCRA 472, 488-489.
44 Phil. 317, 325.
320
320 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Umil vs. Ramos
II
In G.R. Nos. 84581-82 (Roque vs. De Villa), the arrest of Amelia
Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra, without warrant, is also justified. When
apprehended at the house of Renato Constantino in Marikina Heights,
Marikina, Metro Manila, Wilfredo Buenaobra admitted that he was an
NPA courier and he had with him letters to Renato Constantino and other
members of the rebel group. Amelia Roque, upon the other hand, was a
member of the National United Front Commission, in charge of finance,
and admitted ownership of subversive documents found in the house of her
sister in Caloocan City. She was also in possession of ammunition and a
fragmentation grenade for which she had no permit or authority to possess.
Rogelio Ramos y Ibanes, a member of the NPA, who had surrendered to
the military authorities, told military agents about the operations of the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the New Peoples Army
(NPA) in Metro Manila. He identified some of his former comrades as “Ka
Mong”, a staff member of the Communications and Transportation Bureau;
“Ka Nelia”, a staff member in charge of finance; “Ka Miller”, an NPA courier
pointed to a certain house occupied by Renato Constantino located in the
Villaluz Compound, Molave St., Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro
Manila, which is used as a safehouse of the National United Front
Commission (NUFC) of the CPP-NPA.
In view of these revelations, the Constantino house was placed under
military surveillance and on 12 August 1988, pursuant to a search warrant
issued by Judge Eutropio Migrino of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, a
search of the house was conducted at about 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon, by
a combined team of the Criminal Investigation Service, National Capital
District (CIS-NCD) and the Constabulary Security Group (CSG). In the
course of the search, the following articles were found and taken under
proper receipt:
1. a)One (1) Colt M16A1 long rifle with defaced serial number;
2. b)One (1) Cal. .380 ACT/9mm Model PPK/8 SN: 260577 & 2605778;
321
 VOL. 187, JULY 9, 1990 321
Umil vs. Ramos
1. c)Two (2) fragmentation hand grenades;
2. d)Fifty-six (56) live ammunition for Cal. 5.56mm;
3. e)Five (5) live ammunition for Cal. .380;
4. f)One (1) ICOM VHF FM Radio Transciever SN: 14903
5. g)One (1) Regulated power supply 220V AC;
6. h)One (1) Antennae (adjustable);
7. i)One (1) Speaker with cord ALEXAR;
8. j)Voluminous Subversive documents.
When confronted, Renato Constantino could not produce any permit or
authority to possess the firearms, ammunition, radio and other
communications equipment. Hence, he was brought to the CIS
Headquarters for investigation. When questioned, he refused to give a
written statement, although he admitted that he was a staff member of the
executive committee of the NUFC and a ranking member of the
International Department of the Communist Party of the Philippines
(CPP).
At about 8:00 o’clock in the evening of the same day (12 August 1988),
Wilfredo Buenaobra arrived at the house of Renato Constantino in the
Villaluz Compound. When accosted, he readily admitted to the military
agents that he is a regular member of the CPP/NPA and that he went to
the place to deliver letters to “Ka Mong”, referring to Renato Constantino,
and other members of the rebel group. On further questioning, he also
admitted that he is known as “Ka Miller” and that he was from Barangay
San Pedro, Lopez, Quezon. Among the items taken from him were the
following:
1. (1)Handwritten letter addressed to “Ka Bing & Co. from A & Co.” dated
August 11, 1988;
2. (2)Handwritten letter addressed to “ROD from VIC (Schell datre)” dated
August 11, 1988;
3. (3)Handwritten letter addressed to “Suzie” from “Vic”, dated August 11,
1988.
Also found in Buenaobra’s possession was a piece of paper containing a
written but jumbled telephone number of Florida M. Roque, sister of Amelia
Roque alias “Ka Nelia”, at 69 Geronimo St., Caloocan City. Acting on the
lead provided as to the whereabouts of Amelia Roque, the military agents
went to the given address the next day (13 August 1988). They arrived at
322
322 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Umil vs. Ramos
the place at about 11:00 o’clock in the morning. After identifying themselves
as military agents and after seeking permission to search the place, which
was granted, the military agents conducted a search in the presence of the
occupants of the house and the barangay captain of the place, one Jesus D.
Olba.
The military agents found the place to be another safehouse of the
NUFC/CPP. They found ledgers, journals, vouchers, bank deposit books,
folders, computer diskettes, and subversive documents as well as live
ammunition for a .38 SPL Winchester, 11 rounds of live ammunition for a
cal. .45, 19 rounds of live ammunition for an M16 Rifle, and a fragmentation
grenade. As a result, Amelia Roque and the other occupants of the house
were brought to the PC-CIS Headquarters at Camp Crame, Quezon City,
for investigation. Amelia Roque admitted to the investigators that the
voluminous documents belonged to her and that the other occupants of the
house had no knowledge of them. As a result, the said other occupants of
the house were released from custody.
On 15 August 1988, Amelia Roque was brought to the Caloocan City
Fiscal for inquest after which an information charging her with violation of
PD 1866 was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City. The case
is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. C-1196. Another information for
violation of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against Amelia Roque before
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City, which is docketed therein as
Criminal Case No. C-150458.
An information for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed
against Wilfredo Buenaobra before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Marikina, Metro Manila. The case is docketed therein as Criminal Case No.
23715. Bail was set at P4,000.00.
On 24 August 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed before this
Court on behalf of Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra. At the hearing
of the case, however, Wilfredo Buenaobra manifested his desire to stay in
the PC-INP Stockade at Camp Crame, Quezon City. Accordingly, the
petition for habeas corpus filed on his behalf is now moot and academic.
Only the petition of Amelia Roque remains for resolution.
The contention of respondents that petitioners Roque and Buenaobra are
officers and/or members of the National United Front Commission (NUFC)
of the CPP was not controverted or
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VOL. 187, JULY 9, 1990 323
Umil vs. Ramos
traversed by said petitioners. The contention must be deemed admitted.5 As
officers and/or members of the NUFC-CPP, their arrest, without warrant,
was justified for the same reasons earlier stated vis-a-vis Rolando Dural.
The arrest without warrant of Roque was additionally justified as she was,
at the time of apprehension, in possession of ammunitions without license
to possess them.
III
In G.R. Nos. 84583-84 (Anonuevo vs. Ramos), the arrest of Domingo
Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, without warrant, is also justified under the
rules. Both are admittedly members of the standing committee of the NUFC
and, when apprehended in the house of Renato Constantino, they had a bag
containing subversive materials, and both carried firearms and
ammunition for which they had no license to possess or carry.
The record of these two (2) cases shows that at about 7:30 o’clock in the
evening of 13 August 1988, Domingo T. Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple
arrived at the house of Renato Constantino at Marikina Heights, Marikina,
which was still under surveillance by military agents. The military agents
noticed bulging objects on their waist lines. When frisked, the agents found
them to be loaded guns. Anonuevo and Casiple were asked to show their
permit or license to possess or carry firearms and ammunition, but they
could not produce any. Hence, they were brought to PC Headquarters for
investigation. Found in their possession were the following articles:
1. a)Voluminous subversive documents
2. b)One (1) Cal. 7.65 MOD 83 2C Pistol SN: 001412 with one (1) magazine
for Cal. 7.65 containing ten (10) live ammunition of same caliber;
3. c)One (1) Cal. 7.65 Pietro Barreta SN; A18868 last digit tampered with one
(1) magazine containing five (5) live ammunition of same caliber.
At the PC Stockade, Domingo Anonuevo was identified as “Ka
_______________
5Lorenzo vs. Mc Coy, 15 Phil. 559.
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324 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Umil vs. Ramos
Ted”, and Ramon Casiple as “Ka Totoy” of the CPP, by their comrades who
had previously surrendered to the military.
On 15 August 1988, the record of the investigation and other
documentary evidence were forwarded to the Provincial Fiscal at Pasig,
Metro Manila, who conducted an inquest, after which Domingo Anonuevo
and Ramon Casiple were charged with violation of Presidential Decree No.
1866 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila. The cases are
docketed therein as Criminal Cases Nos. 74386 and 74387, respectively. No
bail was recommended.
On 24 August 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court
on behalf of Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, alleging that the said
Anonuevo and Casiple were unlawfully arrested without a warrant and
that the informations filed against them are null and void for having been
filed without prior hearing and preliminary investigation. On 30 August
1988, the Court issued the writ of habeas corpus, and after the respondents
had filed a Return of the Writ, the parties were heard.
The petitioners’ (Anonuevo and Casiple) claim that they were unlawfully
arrested because there was no previous warrant of arrest, is without merit.
The record shows that Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple were
carrying unlicensed firearms and ammunition in their person when they
were apprehended.
There is also no merit in the contention that the informations filed
against them are null and void for want of a preliminary investigation. The
filing of an information, without a preliminary investigation having been
first conducted, is sanctioned by the Rules. Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, reads:
“Sec. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without a warrant.—When a person is
lawfully arrested without a warrant for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial
Court the complaint or information may be filed by the offended party, peace
officer or fiscal without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted,
on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or person.
However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the person arrested
may ask for a preliminary investigation by a proper officer in accordance with this
Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, with
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VOL. 187, JULY 9, 1990 325
Umil vs. Ramos
the assistance of a lawyer and in case of non-availability of a lawyer, a responsible
person of his choice. Notwithstanding such waiver, he may apply for bail as
provided in the corresponding rule and the investigation must be terminated
within fifteen (15) days from its inception.
If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary investigation having
been first conducted, the accused may within five (5) days from the time he learns
of the filing of the information, ask for a preliminary investigation with the same
right to adduce evidence in his favor in the manner prescribed in this Rule.”
The petitioners Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, however, refused
to sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended. In the informations filed against them, the prosecutor made
identical certifications, as follows:
“This is to certify that the accused has been charged in accordance with Sec. 7,
Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, that no preliminary
investigation was conducted because the accused has not made and signed a
waiver of the provisions of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; that
based on the evidence presented, there is reasonable ground to believe that the
crime has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.”
Nor did petitioners ask for a preliminary investigation after the
informations had been filed against them in court. Petitioners cannot now
claim that they have been deprived of their constitutional right to due
process.
IV
In G.R. No. 83162 (Ocaya vs. Aguirre), the arrest without warrant, of Vicky
Ocaya is justified under the Rules, since she had with her unlicensed
ammunition when she was arrested. The record of this case shows that on
12 May 1988, agents of the PC Intelligence and Investigation of the Rizal
PC-INP Command, armed with a search warrant issued by Judge Eutropio
Migrino of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, conducted a
search of a house located at Block 19, Phase II, Marikina Green Heights,
Marikina, Metro Manila, believed to be occupied by Benito Tiamson, head
of the CPP-NPA. In the
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326 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Umil vs. Ramos
course of the search, Vicky Ocaya arrived in a car driven by Danny Rivera.
Subversive documents and several rounds of ammunition for a .45 cal.
pistol were found in the car of Vicky Ocaya. As a result, Vicky Ocaya and
Danny Rivera were brought to the PC Headquarters for investigation.
When Vicky Ocaya could not produce any permit or authorization to possess
the ammunition, an information charging her with violation of PD 1866 was
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila. The case is
docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 73447. Danny Rivera, on the other
hand, was released from custody.
On 17 May 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed, with this Court
on behalf of Vicky Ocaya and Danny Rivera. It was alleged therein that
Vicky Ocaya was illegally arrested and detained, and denied the right to a
preliminary investigation.
It would appear, however, that Vicky Ocaya was arrested in flagranti
delicto so that her arrest without a warrant is justified. No preliminary
investigation was conducted because she was arrested without a warrant
and she refused to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code, pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
V
The petitioners Vicky Ocaya, Domingo Anonuevo, Ramon Casiple, and
Amelia Roque claim that the firearms, ammunition and subversive
documents alleged to have been found in their possession when they were
arrested, did not belong to them, but were “planted” by the military agents
to justify their illegal arrest.
 The petitioners, however, have not introduced any evidence to support
their aforesaid claim. On the other hand, no evil motive or ill-will on the
part of the arresting officers that would cause the said arresting officers in
these cases to accuse the petitioners falsely, has been shown. Besides, the
arresting officers in these cases do not appear to be seekers of glory and
bounty hunters for, as counsel for the petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple
say, “there is absolutely nothing in the evidence submitted during the
inquest that petitioners are on the ‘AFP Order of
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VOL. 187, JULY 9, 1990 327
Umil vs. Ramos
Battle with a reward of P150,000.00 each on their heads.’ ” On the other
6
hand, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, the arrest of the petitioners
is not a product of a witch hunt or a fishing expedition, but the result of an
in-depth surveillance of NPA safehouses pointed to by no less than former
comrades of the petitioners in the rebel movement.
The Solicitor General, in his Consolidated Memorandum, aptly observes:
“x x x. To reiterate, the focal point in the case of petitioners Roque, Buenaobra,
Anonuevo and Casiple, was the lawful search and seizure conducted by the
military at the residence of Renato Constantino at Villaluz Compound, Molave St.,
Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila. The raid at Constantino’s residence,
was not a witch hunting or fishing expedition on the part of the military. It was a
result of an in-depth military surveillance coupled with the leads provided by
former members of the underground subversive organizations. That raid produced
positive results. To date, nobody has disputed the fact that the residence of
Constantino when raided yielded communication equipment, firearms and
ammunitions, as well as subversive documents.
The military agents working on the information provided by Constantino that
other members of his group were coming to his place, reasonably conducted a
‘stake-out’ operation whereby some members of the raiding team were left behind
the place. True enough, barely two hours after the raid and Constantino’s arrest,
petitioner Buenaobra arrived at Constantino’s residence. He acted suspiciously
and when frisked and searched by the military authorities, found in his person
were letters. They are no ordinary letters, as even a cursory reading would show.
Not only that, Buenaobra admitted that he is a NPA courier and was there to
deliver the letters to Constantino.
Subsequently, less than twenty four hours after the arrest of Constantino and
Buenaobra, petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple arrived at Constantino’s place.
Would it be unreasonable for the military agents to believe that petitioners
Anonuevo and Casiple are among those expected to visit Constantino’s residence
considering that Constantino’s information was true, in that Buenaobra did come
to that place? Was it unreasonable under the circumstances, on the part of the
military agents, not to frisk and search anyone who should visit the residence of
Constantino, such as petitioners Anonuevo and Ca-
_______________
6 Rollo of G.R. Nos. 84583-84, p. 105.
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328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Umil vs. Ramos
siple? Must this Honorable Court yield to Anonuevo and Casiple’s flimsy and bare
assertion that they went to visit Constantino, who was to leave for Saudi Arabia
on the day they were arrested thereat?
As to petitioner Roque, was it unreasonable for the military authorities to effect
her arrest without warrant considering that it was Buenaobra who provided the
leads on her identity? It cannot be denied that Buenaobra had connection with
Roque. Because the former has the phone number of the latter. Why the necessity
of jumbling Roque’s telephone number as written on a piece of paper taken from
Buenaobra’s possession? Petitioners Roque and Buenaobra have not offered any
plausible reason so far.
In all the above incidents, respondents maintain that they acted reasonably,
under the time, place and circumstances of the events in question, especially
considering that at the time of petitioners’ arrest, incriminatory evidence, i.e,
firearms, ammunitions and/or subversive documents were found in their
possession.
Petitioners, when arrested, were neither taking their snacks nor innocently
visiting a camp, but were arrested in such time, place and circumstances, from
which one can reasonably conclude that they were up to a sinister plot, involving
utmost secrecy and comprehensive conspiracy.”
VI
In G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the release on habeas corpus of the
petitioner Deogracias Espiritu, who is detained by virtue of an Information
for Violation of Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code (Inciting to Sedition)
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, is similarly not warranted.
The record of the case shows that the said petitioner is the General
Secretary of the Pinagkaisahang Samahan ng Tsuper at Operators
Nationwide (PISTON), an association of drivers and operators of public
service vehicles in the Philippines, organized for their mutual aid and
protection.
Petitioner claims that at about 5:00 o’clock in the morning of 23
November 1988, while he was sleeping in his home located at 363 Valencia
St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, he was awakened by his sister Maria Paz Lalic who
told him that a group of persons wanted to hire his jeepney. When he went
down to talk to them, he was immediately put under arrest. When he asked
for the warrant of arrest, the men, headed by Col. Ricardo Reyes, bodily
lifted him and placed him in their owner-type jeepney.
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VOL. 187, JULY 9, 1990 329
Umil vs. Ramos
He demanded that his sister, Maria Paz Lalic, be allowed to accompany
him, but the men did not accede to his request and hurriedly sped away.
He was brought to Police Station No. 8 of the Western Police District at
Blumentritt, Manila where he was interrogated and detained. Then, at
about 9:00 o’clock of the same morning, he was brought before the
respondent Lim and, there and then, the said respondent ordered his arrest
and detention. He was thereafter brought to the General Assignment
Section, Investigation Division of the Western Police District under Police
Capt. Cresenciano A. Cabasal where he was detained, restrained and
deprived of his liberty.7
The respondents claim however, that the detention of the petitioner is
justified in view of the Information filed against him before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 88-683-85,
charging him with violation of Art. 142 of the Revised Penal Code (Inciting
to Sedition).
The respondents also claim that the petitioner was lawfully arrested
without a judicial warrant of arrest since petitioner when arrested had in
fact just committed an offense in that in the afternoon of 22 November 1988,
during a press conference at the National Press Club.
“Deogracias Espiritu through tri-media was heard urging all drivers and operators
to go on nationwide strike on November 23, 1988, to force the government to give
in to their demands to lower the prices of spare parts, commodities, water and the
immediate release from detention of the president of the PISTON (Pinag-isang
Samahan ng Tsuper Operators Nationwide). Further, we heard Deogracias
Espiritu taking the place of PISTON president Medardo Roda and also announced
the formation of the Alliance Drivers Association to go on nationwide strike on
November 23, 1988.” 8
Policemen waited for petitioner outside the National Press Club in order to
investigate him, but he gave the lawmen the slip. He was next seen at
9
about 5:00 o’clock that afternoon at a
_______________
7 Petition, Nos. 4 to 8, inclusive.
8 Return of Writ.
9 Exhibit 2.
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330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Umil vs. Ramos
gathering of drivers and symphatizers at the corner of Magsaysay Blvd. and
Valencia Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila where he was heard to say:
“Bukas tuloy ang welga natin, sumagot na ang Cebu at Bicol na kasali sila, at
hindi tayo titigil hanggang hindi binibigay ng gobyerno ni Cory ang gusto nating
pagbaba ng halaga ng spare parts, bilihin at ang pagpapalaya sa ating pinuno na
si Ka Roda hanggang sa magkagulo na. ” (emphasis supplied)
10
The police finally caught up with the petitioner on 23 November 1988. He
was invited for questioning and brought to police headquarters after which
an Information for violation of Art. 142 of the Revised Penal Code was filed
against him before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. 11
Since the arrest of the petitioner without a warrant was in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 113, Sec. 5(b) of the Rules of Court and that the
petitioner is detained by virtue of a valid information filed with the
competent court, he may not be released on habeas corpus. He may,
however be released upon posting bail as recommended. However, we find
the amount of the recommended bail (P60,000.00) excessive and we reduce
it to P10,000.00 only.
VII
In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno vs. Station Commander), we also find no merit
in the submission of Narciso Nazarenothat he was illegally arrested and is
unlawfully detained. The record of this case shows that at about 8:30 o’clock
in the morning of 14 December 1988, one Romulo Bunye II was killed by a
group of men near the corner of T. Molina and Mendiola Streets in Alabang,
Muntinglupa, Metro Manila. One of the suspects in the killing was Ramil
Regala who was arrested by the police on 28 December 1988. Upon
questioning, Regala pointed to Narciso Nazareno as one of his companions
in the killing of the said Romulo Bunye II. In view thereof, the police
officers, without
_______________
Exhibit 1.
10
Exhibit 4.
11
331
VOL. 187, JULY 9, 1990 331
Umil vs. Ramos
warrant, picked up Narciso Nazareno and brought him to the police
headquarters for questioning. Obviously, the evidence of petitioner’s guilt
is strong because on 3 January 1989, an information charging Narciso
Nazareno, Ramil Regala, and two (2) others, with the killing of Romulo
Bunye II was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila.
The case is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 731.
On 7 January 1989, Narciso Nazareno filed a motion to post bail, but the
motion was denied by the trial court in an order dated 10 January 1989,
even as the motion to post bail, earlier filed by his co-accused, Manuel
Laureaga, was granted by the same trial court.
On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this
Court on behalf of Narciso Nazareno and on 13 January 1989, the Court
issued the writ of habeas corpus, returnable to the Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna, Branch 24, ordering said court to
hear the case on 30 January 1989 and thereafter resolve the petition.
At the conclusion of the hearing, or on 1 February 1989, the Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna issued a resolution
denying the petition for habeas corpus, it appearing that the said Narciso
Nazareno is in the custody of the respondents by reason of an information
filed against him with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila
which had taken cognizance of said case and had, in fact, denied the motion
for bail filed by said Narciso Nazareno (presumably because of the strength
of the evidence against him).
The findings of the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan,
Laguna are based upon the facts and the law. Consequently, we will not
disturb the same. Evidently, the arrest of Nazareno was effected by the
police without warrant pursuant to Sec. 5 (b), Rule 113, Rules of Court after
he was positively implicated by his co-accused Ramil Regala in the killing
of Romulo Bunye II; and after investigation by the police authorities. As
held in People vs. Ancheta: 12
“The obligation of an agent of authority to make an arrest by reason of a crime,
does not presuppose as a necessary requisite for the
_______________
12 68 Phil. 415.
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332 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Umil vs. Ramos
fulfillment thereof, the indubitable existence of a crime. For the detention to be
perfectly legal, it is sufficient that the agent or person in authority making the
arrest has reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the existence of an act having
the characteristics of a crime and that the same grounds exist to believe that the
person sought to be detained participated therein.”
VIII
It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here considered, criminal charges
have been filed in the proper courts against the petitioners. The rule is, that
if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an
officer under process issued by a court or judge, and that the court or judge
had jurisdiction to issue the process or make the order, or if such person is
charged before any court, the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed.
Section 4, Rule 102, Rules of Court, as amended is quite explicit in
providing that:
“Sec. 4. When writ is not allowed or discharge authorized.—If it appears that the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of
record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the
judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction
appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of
any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in
this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of
an offense in the Philippines or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful
judgment.” (emphasis supplied)
At this point, we refer to petitioners’ plea for the Court to reexamine and,
thereafter, abandon its pronouncement in Ilagan vs. Enrile, that a writ of
13
habeas corpus is no longer available after an information is filed against
the person detained and a warrant of arrest or an order of commitment is
issued by the court where said information has been filed. The petitioners
14
_______________
G.R. No. 70748, Oct. 21, 1985, 139 SCRA 349.
13
Actually, the requirement in the Ilagan case doctrine that a
14
333
VOL. 187, JULY 9, 1990 333
Umil vs. Ramos
claim that the said ruling, which was handed down during the past
dictatorial regime to enforce and strengthen said regime, has no place
under the present democratic dispensation and collides with the basic,
fundamental, and constitutional rights of the people. Petitioners point out
that the said doctrine makes possible the arrest and detention of innocent
persons despite lack of evidence against them, and, most often, it is only
after a petition for habeas corpus is filed before the court that the military
authorities file the criminal information in the courts of law to be able to
hide behind the protective mantle of the said doctrine. This, petitioners
assert, stands as an obstacle to the freedom and liberty of the people and
permits lawless and arbitrary State action.
We find, however, no compelling reason to abandon the said doctrine. It
is based upon express provision of the Rules of Court and the exigencies
served by the law. The fears expressed by the petitioners are not really
unremediable. As the Court sees it, re-examination or reappraisal, with a
view to its abandonment, of the Ilagan case doctrine is not the answer. The
answer and the better practice would be, not to limit the function of habeas
corpus to a mere inquiry as to whether or not the court which issued the
process, judgment or order of commitment or before whom the detained
person is charged, had jurisdiction or not to issue the process, judgment or
order or to take cognizance of the case, but rather, as the Court itself states
in Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile, “in all petitions for habeas corpus the court
15
must inquire into every phase and aspect of petitioner’s detention—from
the moment petitioner was taken into custody up to the moment the court
passes upon the merits of the petition;” and “only after such a scrutiny can
the court satisfy itself that the due process clause of our Constitution has in
fact
_______________
warrant of arrest or order of commitment should be issued even after the information has
been filed against the detained person, would seem superfluous. As aptly stated in the early
case of U.S. vs. Wilson, 4 Phil. 381, “where a person who has been legally arrested without a
warrant was actually before a court, that court had a right to proceed against him without in
the first place issuing a warrant for his detention.”
15 G.R. Nos. 61016 and 61107, April 26, 1983, 121 SCRA 538, 563.
334
334 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Umil vs. Ramos
been satisfied.” This is exactly what the Court has done in the petitions at
bar. This is what should henceforth be done in all future cases of habeas
corpus. In short, all cases involving deprivation of individual liberty should
be promptly brought to the courts for their immediate scrutiny and
disposition.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED, except that in
G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the bail bond for petitioner’s provisional
liberty is hereby ordered reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez,
Jr., Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-
Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., See separate opinion.
Feliciano, J., See separate concurring statement.
Sarmiento, J., I dissent. See dissenting opinion.
Cortés, J., I join Mr. Justice Feliciano in his separate concurring
statement.
CRUZ, J., Dissenting and Concurring:
I dissent insofar as the ponencia affirms the ruling in Garcia-Padilla v.
Enrile that subversion is a continuing offense, to justify the arrest without
warrant of any person at any time as long as the authorities say he has been
placed under surveillance on suspicion of the offense. That is a dangerous
doctrine. A person may be arrested when he is doing the most innocent acts,
as when he is only washing his hands, or taking his supper, or even when
he is sleeping, on the ground that he is committing the “continuing” offense
of subversion. Libertarians were appalled when that doctrine was imposed
during the Marcos regime. I am alarmed that even now this new Court is
willing to sustain it. I strongly urge my colleagues to discard it altogether
as one of the disgraceful vestiges of the past dictatorship and uphold the
rule guaranteeing the right of the people against unreasonable searches
and seizures. We can do no less if we are really to reject the past oppression
and commit ourselves to the true freedom. Even if it be argued that the
military
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VOL. 187, JULY 9, 1990 335
Umil vs. Ramos
should be given every support in our fight against subversion, I maintain
that that fight must be waged honorably, in accordance with the Bill of
Rights. I do not believe that in fighting the enemy we must adopt the ways
of the enemy, which are precisely what we are fighting against. I submit
that our more important motivation should be what are we fighting for.
Except for this reservation and appeal, I concur with the decision.
FELICIANO, J., Concurring
I concur in the result reached in each of the eight (8) consolidated Petitions
for Habeas Corpus. At the same time, I have some reservations concerning
certain statements made by the Court in G.R. No. 81567 (Umil, et
al. v. Ramos) (Part I of the Decision) and in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu v.
Lim) (Part VI of the Decision).
In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil, et al. v. Ramos), the per curiam opinion states
categorically that: “the crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or
proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in
furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults
against the State and are in the nature of continuing crimes.” The majority
here relies upon Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile (121 SCRA 472 [1983]). The
majority there made the same equally broad statement but without any
visible effort to examine the basis, scope and meaning of such a sweeping
statement. Garcia-Padilla did not even identify the specific offenses which
it regarded as “in the nature of continuing offenses which set them apart
from the common offenses” (121 SCRA at 489). It appears to me that in G.R.
No. 85727 (Espiritu v. Lim) (Part VI of the Decision), the per
curiam opinion has in effect included the offense of “inciting to sedition”
penalized under Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code as a “continuing
offense” under the capacious blanket of the majority opinion in Garcia-
Padilla, at least for purposes of determining the legality of the arrest
without a warrant of petitioner Deogracias Espiritu.
I would respectfully recall to my learned colleagues in the Court that
“inciting to sedition” is defined in Article 142 of the
336
336 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Umil vs. Ramos
Revised Penal Code in terms of speech and that consequently it is
1
important constantly to distinguish between speech which is protected by
the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech and of the press and speech
which may constitutionally be regarded as violative of Article 142 of the
Revised Penal Code. Precisely because speech which the police authorities
might regard as seditious or as criminal inciting to sedition may well turn
out to be only an exercise of a constitutionally guaranteed freedom, I would
submit that we must apply the concept of “continuing offense” narrowly for
purposes of application of Section 5 (b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Court. In my view, the very broad statement made about “continuing
crimes” in G.R. No. 81567 (Umil, et al. v. Ramos) constitutes dictum,
considering that Rolando Dural and Bernardo Itucal, Jr. had already been
tried in the court below for “double murder, etc.” and found guilty of the
offense charged, sentenced accordingly, and at least in the case of Rolando
Dural, service of the sentence imposed upon him by the trial court had
already begun.
Similarly, in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu v. Lim) the statement that the
arrest of petitioner Espiritu without a warrant was in accordance with the
provisions of Section 5 (b), Rule 113 of the
_______________
 1 Article 142. Inciting to sedition.—The penalty of prision correccionalin its maximum period
and a fine not exceeding 2,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, without taking any
direct part in the crime of sedition, should incite others to the accomplishment of any of the acts
which constitute sedition, by means of speeches, proclamations, writings, emblems cartoons,
banners, or other representa tions tending to the same end, or upon any person or persons who
shall utter seditious words or speeches, write, publish, or circulate scurrilous libels against the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, or any of the duly constituted authorities
thereof, or which tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing the functions of his
office, or which tend to instigate others to cabal and meet together for unlawful purposes, or
which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots, or which lead or tend to stir up the
people against the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the community, the safety and
order of the Government, or who shall knowingly conceal such evil practices. (As amended by
Com. Act No. 202).
337
VOL. 187, JULY 9, 1990 337
Umil vs. Ramos
Revised Rules of Court does not appear strictly necessary, considering that
the petitioner had already been charged in a valid information filed with
the competent court, which court had presumably issued an order for his
commitment, and considering further that he is entitled to bail.
There is thus no obstacle, to my mind, to a careful examination of the
doctrine of “continuing crimes” as applied to such offenses as subversion
and inciting to sedition and possibly other offenses, in some future case
where that issue is raised squarely and is unavoidable.
SARMIENTO, J., Dissenting Opinion
I beg to differ from my brethren. I submit that habeas corpus lies in all eight
cases.
G.R. No. 81567
The majority says that Rolando Dural’s arrest without a warrant is lawful
under the Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
1. (a)When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
2. (b)When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and
3. (c)When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail,
and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. 1
“Rolando Dural,” so states the majority, “was arrested for being a member
of the New People’s Army (NPA), an outlawed
_______________
1RULES OF COURT, Rule 113, sec. 5.
338
338 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Umil vs. Ramos
subversive organization,” and that “[s]ubversion being a continuing
2
offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural without a warrant is justified as it can
be said that he was committing an offense when arrested.” 3
As I said, I beg to differ.
First, Rolando Dural was charged with “Double Murder with Assault
upon Agents of Authority.” If he had been guilty of subversion—the offense
4
for which he was supposedly arrested via a warrantless arrest—subversion
was the logical crime with which he should have been charged.
The authorities could not have rightly arrested him for subversion on
account of the slay of the two CAPCOM soldiers, a possible basis for
violation of the Anti-Subversion Act, because as the majority points out, “he
was not arrested while in the act of shooting [them]. . .[n]or was he arrested
just after the commission of the said offense for his arrest came a day
after the said shooting incident.” 5
Second, I do not believe that a warrantless (or citizen’s) arrest is possible
in case of subversion—in the absence of any overt act that would justify the
authorities to act. “Subversion,” as the term is known in law, means
“knowingly, wilfully and by overt acts affiliat[ing] [oneself] with, becom[ing]
or remain[ing] a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines and/or
its successor or of any subversive association as defined in sections two and
three hereof. . .” Logically, the military could not have known that Dural,
6 subversion is supposed to be a continuing offense.
at the time he was taken, was a member of the New People’s Army because
he was not performing any overt act that he was truly, a rebel. Indeed, it
had to take a “verification” before he could be identified as allegedly a
6 that Dural is indeed a member of the Communist Party’s military arm. And
member of the underground army. Under these circumstances, I am hard
put to say that he was committing subversion when he was arrested,
assuming that he was guilty of subversion, for purposes of a warrantless
arrest.
_______________
2 Decision, 7.
3 Supra; emphasis in the original.
4 Supra, 6.
5 Supra, 6; emphasis in the original.
6 Exec. Order No. 276, sec. 3; emphasis ours.
339
VOL. 187, JULY 9, 1990 339
Umil vs. Ramos
“Overt act” is made up of “[e]very act, movement, deed and word of the
[accused],” indicating intent to accomplish a criminal objective. Dural, at
7 tence. I likewise take exception. It has been held that: “The writ may be
the time he was arrested, was lying in a hospital bed. This is not the overt
act contemplated by law.
Under the Rule above-quoted, the person must have either been
apprehended in flagranti (first paragraph) or after the act, provided that
the peace officer has “personal knowledge” that he, the suspect, is guilty.
(second paragraph.) As I stated, Dural was not caught in the act. Moreover,
what the Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the Capital Command
(RIOU-CAPCOM) had in its hands was a mere “confidential information.”
I do not think that this is the personal knowledge referred to by the second
paragraph. Plainly and simply, it is hearsay.
8
The rule, furthermore, on warrantless arrest is an exceptional one. By
its language, it may be exercised only in the most urgent cases and when
the guilt of an offender is plain and evident. What I think we have here is
purely and simply, the military taking the law in its hands.
By stamping validity to Rolando Dural’s warrantless arrest, I am afraid
that the majority has set a very dangerous precedent. With all due respect,
my brethren has accorded the military a blanket authority to pick up any
Juan, Pedro, and Maria without a warrant for the simple reason that
That Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the New People’s
Army” is furthermore to me, a hasty statement. It has yet to be established
9
unless proven guilty, he is presumed, and must be presumed most of all by
this Court, to be innocent.
The majority also says that habeas corpus is moot and academic because
Dural has been convicted and is serving sen-
_______________
7 Cramer v. U.S., 325 U.S. 1, 34 (1944), a treason case.
8 Prior to its amendment, paragraph (b) required merely “reasonable ground” to justify a
warrantless arrest. See RULES OF COURT (1964), Rule 113, sec. 6, par. (b). The amendment
was made to stop warrantless arrests based on suspicion and hearsay. See FERIA, 1985 RULES
ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 20 (1987).
9 Decision, supra, 7.
340
340 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Umil vs. Ramos
granted upon a judgment already final.” 10
The writ of liberty is a high prerogative writ. Vindication of due process
11
is its historic office.12
G.R. Nos. 84581-82
In the case of Wilfredo Buenaobra, the majority avers that he had
“manifested his desire to stay in the PC-INP stockade,” for which habeas
13
corpus has supposedly become moot and academic. I am not convinced that
that is reason enough to dismiss habeas corpus as moot and academic. It is
the duty of this Court, in my opinion, to make sure that Buenaobra has
made his choice freely and voluntarily. Personally, I find it indeed strange
why he should prefer to stay in jail than go scotfree.
There is further no doubt that Buenaobra’s petition is one impressed
with a public interest. In one case we denied a motion to withdraw a
14
petition for habeas corpus in view of its far-reaching importance to the
nation, I do not see how we should act differently, perhaps even
insouciantly, here, especially since it involves persons who think and
believe differently from the rest of us.
Both Buenaobra and Amelia Roque supposedly admitted that they were
ranking officers of the Communist Party of the Philippines. According to
the majority, Buenaobra and Roque are bound by their admissions.
_______________
Chavez v. Court of Appeals, No. L-29169, August 19, 1968, 24 SCRA 663, 684; see Castro,
10
J., Concurring, citing Fay v. Noia, 372 US 391(1963).
11 Supra, 683.
12 Supra, 690.
13 Decision, supra. 14.
14 Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile, Nos. L-35546, 35538, 35539, 35540, 35547, 35556, 35567, 35571, and
35573, September 17, 1974, 59 SCRA 183, 247-248, citing among other cases, Gonzales v.
Commission on Elections, No. L-27833, April 18, 1969, 27 SCRA 835 and Krivenko v. Register
of Deeds, 79 Phil. 461 (1947).
15 Decision, supra.
341
VOL. 187, JULY 9, 1990 341
Umil vs. Ramos
That both parties had admitted to be members of the Communist Party of
the Philippines (the National United Front Commission) is a naked
contention of the military. The fact that it has not been controverted, in my
view, does not justify the couple’s arrest without a warrant. Worse, by
relying on the bare word of the military, this very Court has, to all intents
and purposes, condemned the duo for a crime (subversion and/or illegal
possession of firearms) the bone of contention, precisely, below.
G.R. Nos. 84583-84
I also find the warrantless arrests of Domingo Añonuevo and Ramon
Casiple to be contrary to law. That they are “admittedly members of the
standing committee of the NUFC” and that “subversive materials” and
16
unlicensed firearms were found in their possession, are, like Buenaobra’s
and Roque’s cases, barren claims of the military. I also fear that by the
majority’s strong language (that Añonuevo and Casiple are admitted NUCF
officers) the majority has pronounced the petitioners guilty, when the lower
courts have yet to sit in judgment. I think we should be the last to preempt
the decision of the trial courts. We would have set to naught the
presumption of innocence accused persons enjoy.
G.R. No. 83162
15
With respect to the case of Vicky Ocaya, I am afraid that I am inclined
towards the same conclusion. There was no basis—at the outset—to say
that Ocaya was probably guilty of illegal possession of firearms. As I have
observed, a warrantless arrest must be predicated upon the existence of a
crime being actually committed or having been committed. What I find
here, rather, is nothing less than a successful fishing expedition conducted
by the military upon an unwary citizen. I am quite distressed to note that
this is still possible under a supposed democracy.
_______________
Supra.
16
Supra.
17
342
342 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Umil vs. Ramos
G.R. No. 85727
Deogracias Espiritu was fast asleep in his house when he was placed under
arrest. For the life of me, I can not figure out how one can be picked upon
in one’s own home and held moments later without a warrant of arrest.
Espiritu was allegedly guilty of inciting to sedition as a result of a speech
delivered in a press conference at the National Press Club on November 21,
1988. He was, however, arrested the day after, November 22, 1988. Under
these circumstances, it eludes me how an arrest without a warrant could
be justified, either under paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) of the Rule on
17
warrantless arrests.
The majority avers that since an information had been filed with the
court, Espiritu’s detention, is allegedly justifiable. The question is whether
or not an information is an authority to hold a person in custody. Under the
Rules, an information means “an accusation in writing charging a person
with an offense subscribed by the fiscal and filed with the court.” It is not,
18
however, an order to keep one under detention.
G.R. No. 86332
The offense for which Narciso Nazareno is being held—the fatal shooting of
Romulo Bunye II—was committed on December 14, 1988. It was, however,
only on December 28, 1988 that the police collared a suspect, Ramil Regala,
who subsequently pointed to Nazareno as his accomplice. It also escapes me
how Nazareno, under these circumstances, could have been validly put
under arrest without a warrant or the existence of the circumstance
described under either paragraph (a) or (b) of the Rule above-quoted: The
crime had long been committed prior to the arrest.
G.R. Nos. 81567; 84581-82; 84583-84; 83162;
85727 & 86332; Postscripts
The majority has disposed of these cases on the bedrock of
_______________
RULES OF COURT, Rule 110, sec. 4.
18
343
VOL. 187, JULY 9, 1990 343
Umil vs. Ramos
what I view as doctrines that have lost their luster:
1. 1.The teaching of Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile, which held that subversion is
19
a continuing offense;
2. 2.The ruling in Ilagan v. Enrile;
20
I also find, for reasons to be set forth hereinafter, a glossing over of the
fundamental rights of the petitioners under the Constitution in the
authorities’ handling of the petitioners’ cases.
I hold that Garcia-Padilla is no longer good law under the present
Constitution. Two reasons persuade me. First, it is repugnant to due
process of law. (“The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure
in the prosecution of offenses which require the determination by a judge of
the existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of
arrest and the granting of bail if the offense is bailable.” Under the 1987
21
Constitution, not even “[a] state of martial law suspend[s] the operation of
[the Charter]. . .” Second, it leaves the liberty of citizens to the whim of one
22
man (“On these occasions [the existence of a state of emergency], the
President takes absolute command, for the very life of the Nation and its
government, which, incidentally, includes the courts, is in grave peril. In so
doing, the President is answerable only to his conscience, the people and to
God. For their part, in giving him the supreme mandate as their President,
the people can only trust and pray that, giving him their own loyalty and
without patriotism, the President will not fail them.” ) Under the Charter
23
now prevailing, the Chief Executive shares, to a certain extent, the exercise
of emergency powers, with Congress. 24
As a law advocate under the regime of Marcos, I had challenged the
soundness of Garcia-Padilla. I doubted whether it could stand up under the
aegis of the 1973 Constitution. I still doubt whether it can withstand
scrutiny under the 1987
_______________
19 No. 61388, April 20, 1983, 121 SCRA 472.
20 No. 70748, October 21, 1985, 139 SCRA 349.
21 Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile, supra, 489.
22 CONST., art. VII, sec. 18.
23 Garcia-Padilla, supra, 501.
24 CONST., supra.
344
344 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Umil vs. Ramos
Constitution.
The majority also fails to point out that six days after Garcia-Padilla was
handed down, the Court promulgated Morales, Jr. v. Enrile, a case that in25
my view has significantly whittled down Garcia-Padilla’s very esse. In that
case, Mr. Justice Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr. wrote for the majority:
xxx xxx xxx
1. 16.After a person is arrested . . . without a warrant . . . the proper complaint
or information against him must be filed with the courts of justice within
the time prescribed by law . . .
2. 17.Failure of the public officer to do so without any valid reason would
constitute a violation of Art. 125, Revised Penal Code, as amended. And
the person detained would be entitled to be released on a writ of habeas
corpus, unless he is detained under subsisting process issued by a
competent court. 26
I also gather from the records that none of the petitioners had been: (1)
informed of their right to remain silent; and (2) to have competent and
independent counsel. 27
As I said, the majority is denying habeas corpus on self-serving claims of
the military that the petitioners (Dural, Buenaobra, Roque, Añonuevo, and
Casiple) are members of the Communist Party of the Philippines—and that
they have supposedly confessed to be in fact members of the outlawed
organization. The question that has not been answered is whether or not
these supposed confessions are admissible, for purposes of a warrantless
arrest, as evidence of guilt, in the absence of any showing that they were
apprised of their constitutional rights. I am perturbed by the silence of the
majority. I am distressed because as we held in one case, violation of the
Constitution divests the court of jurisdiction and entitles the accused
to habeas corpus. 28
According to the majority, a “re-examination or re-appraisal . . . of the
Ilagan doctrine is not the answer.” In my consid-
29
_______________
25 Nos. 61016-7, April 16, 1983, 121 SCRA 538.
26 Supra, 560, 562.
27 CONST., art. III, sec. 12.
28 Abriol v. Homeres, 84 Phil. 525 (1949).
29 Decision, supra, 28.
345
VOL. 187, JULY 9, 1990 345
Umil vs. Ramos
ered opinion, Ilagan v. Enrile does not rightfully belong in the volumes of
30
Philippine jurisprudence. In that case, the petitioners, three Davao-based
lawyers, were held by virtue of a simple information (“the petition herein
has been rendered moot and academic by virtue of the filing of an
Information against them for Rebellion . . . and the issuance of a Warrant
of Arrest against them” ) without any preliminary investigation
31
(examination) having been previously conducted (to justify the issuance of
a warrant). As I have stated, an information is not a warrant of arrest. The
fact that an information exists does not mean that a warrant will be issued.
Accused persons have the right of preliminary investigation
(examination). It forms part and parcel of due process of law. I find the
32 33
majority’s reliance on U.S. v. Wilson, an ancient (1905) decision, inapt
34
and untenable. In that case, the accused had been served with a warrant
and thereafter taken into custody. The question that faced the Court was
whether or not the warrant was valid, amid the accused’s charges that the
judge who issued it did not examine the complainant under oath. We held
that the query was academic, because the accused had already pleaded, and
the case had entered the trial stage.
The cases at bar are not on all fours. Here, no warrant has been issued.
I submit that in that event, the petitioners are entitled to freedom by way
of the writ of liberty.
xxx
The apprehensions in question chronicle in my mind the increasing
pattern of arrests and detention in the country without the sanction of a
judicial decree. Four years ago at “EDSA”, and many years before it,
although with much fewer of us, we valiantly challenged a dictator and all
the evils his regime had
_______________
30 Supra.
31 Supra, 364-365.
32 Ilagan v. Enrile, supra, 384, Teehankee, J., Dissenting.
33 Supra.
34 4 Phil. 316 (March 24, 1905).
346
346 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Maritime Agencies & Services, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
stood for: repression of civil liberties and trampling on of human rights. We
set up a popular government, restored its honored institutions, and crafted
a democratic constitution that rests on the guideposts of peace and freedom.
I feel that with this Court’s ruling, we have frittered away, by a stroke of
the pen, what we had so painstakingly built in four years of democracy, and
almost twenty years of struggle against tyranny.
It also occurs to me that I am interposing what looms as a quixotic
outlook of Philippine law on warrantless arrests and its implications on
liberty. It is an impression that does not surprise me. Quixotic as they may
seem, and modesty aside, my views reflect a strong bias on my part—forged
by years of experience and sharpened by a painful and lonely struggle for
freedom and justice—toward men and women who challenge settled beliefs.
If this dissent can not gain any adherent for now, let it nevertheless go on
record as a plea to posterity and an appeal for tolerance of opinions with
which we not only disagree, but opinions we loathe.
I feel it is my duty to articulate this dissent.
Petitions dismissed except G.R. No. 85727.

——o0o——

© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

 [Nos. L-6025-26. July 18, 1956]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee, vs. AMADO
V. HERNANDEZ. ET AL., defendants and appellants.
1. 1.CMMINAL LAW; REBELLION; ELEMENTS OF: PENALTY.—
According to Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, one of the means by
which rebellion may be committed is by "engaging in war against the
forces of the government" and "committing serious violence" in the
prosecution of said war". These expressions imply everything that war
connotes, namely: resort to arms, requisition of property and services,
collection of taxes and contributions, restraint of liberty, damages to
property, physical injuries and loss of life, and the hunger, illness and
unhappiness that war leaves in its wake. Being within the purview of
"engaging in war" and "committing serious violence", said act of resorting
_to arms, with the resulting impairment or destruction of life and
property—when, as alleged in the information, performed "as a necessary
means to commit rebellion, in connection therewith and in futherance
thereof" and "so as to facilitate the accomplishment of the * * * purpose" of
the rebellion—constitutes neither two or more offenses, nor a complex
crime, but one crime—that of rebellion. plain and simple, punishable with
one single penalty, namely, that prescribed in said Article 135.
1. 2.ID.; ID.; COMMON CRIMES PERPETRATED IN FURTHERANCE OF
A POLITICAL OFFENSE, NOT SUBJECT TO EXTRADITION.—
National as well as international, laws and jurisprudence overwhelmingly
favor the proposition that common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of
a political offense, are divested of their character as "common" offenses
and assumes the political complexion of the main crime of which they are
mere ingredients, and, consequently, could not be punished, under Article
244 of the old Penal Code of the Philippines, separately f rom the principal
oifense, or complexed with the^ same, to justify the imposition of a graver
penalty.
1. 3.ID.; ID.; COMPLEX CRIMES; ARTICLE 48 APPLIES ONLY WHEN
Two CRIMES ARE COMMITTED.—The language of Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code presupposes the commission of two or more crimes,
and hence, does not apply when the culprit is guilty of only onecrime.
1. 4.ID.; ID.; ID.; "PRO REO" PRINCIPLE; LESS CRIMINAL PERVERSITY
IN COMPLEX CRIMES.—If one act constitutes two or more offenses,
516
516 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Hemandez, et al.
1. there can be no reason to inflict a punishment graver than that prescribed
for each one of said offenses put together. In directing that the penalty for
the graver offense be, in such case, imposed in its maximum period, Article
48 of the Revised Penal Code could have had no other purpose than to
prescribe a. penalty lower than the aggregate of the penalties for each
oifense, if imposed separately. The reason for this benevolent spirit of
Article 48 is readily discernible. When two or more crimes/ are the result
of a single act, the offender is deemed less perverse than when he commits
said crimes through separate and distinct acts. Instead of sentencing him
for each crime independently from the other, he must suffer the maximuin
of the penalty f or the more serious one, on the assumption that it is less
grave than the sum total of the separate penalties for each offense.
1. 5.ID.; ID.; CBIMINAL PROCEDURE; BAIL; WHEN ACCUSED
ENTITLED TO BAIL.—Individual freedom is too basic, too
transcendental and vital in a republican state, to be denied mere general
principles and abstract considerations of public policy. Considering that
the information filed against defendant is simply rebellion, the penalty for
which cannot exceed twelve years of prision mayor and a fine of P20,000;
that defendant was sentenced by the lower court, not to the extreme
penalty, but to life imprisonment; and that the decision appealed from and
the opposition to the petition for bail do not reveal satisfectorily any
concrete, positive act of the defendant showing, sufficiently, that his
provisional release, during the pendency of the appeal, would jeopardize
the security of the State, said defendant may be allowed bail.
MOTION for bail pending appeal of the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Manila. Montesa, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Jose P. Laurel, Claudio Techankee, Enrique Fernando,Vicente A.
Rafael, Manuel Q. Chan and Juan T. David for appellant A. V. Hernandez.
Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla for appellee.
RESOLUTION
CONCEPCION, J.:
This refers to the petition for bail filed by defendantappellant Amado
Hernandez on June 26, 1954, and renewed
517
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 517
People vs. Hernandez, et al.
on December 22, 1955. A similar petition, filed on December'28, 1953, had
been denied by a resolution of this court dated February 2, 1954. Although
not stated in said resolution, the same was due mainly to these
circumstances: The prosecution maintains that Hernandez is charged with,
and has been convicted of, rebellion complexed with murders, arsons and
robberies, for which the capital punishment, it is claimed, may be imposed,
although the lower court sentenced him merely to life imprisonment. Upon
the other hand, the defense contends, among other things, that rebellion
can not be complexed with murder, arson, or robbery. Inasmuch as the issue
thus raised had not been previously settled squarely, and this court was
then unable, as yet, to reach a definite conclusion thereon, it was deemed
best not to disturb, for the time being, the course of action taken by the
lower court, which denied bail to the movant. After mature deliberation,
our considered opinion on said issue is as follows:
The first two paragraphs of the amended information in this case read:
"The tmdersigned accuses (1) Amado V.
Hernandez alias Victor alias Soliman alias Amado alias AVH alias Victor
Soliman, (2) Guillermo Capadocia alias Huan Bantiling alias Cap alias G.
Capadocia, (3) Mariano P. Balgos alias Bakal alias Tony
Collantes alias Bonifacio, (4) Alfredo
Saulo alias Elias alias Fred alias A.B.S. alias A.B., (5) Andres Baisa, Jr. alia-
s Ben alias Andy (6) Genaro de la Cruz alias Gonzalo alias Gorio alias Arong, (7)
Aquilino Bunsol alias Anong, (8) Adriano Samson alias Danoy, (9) Juan J.
Cruz alias Johnny 2, alias Jessie Wilson alias William, (10) Jacobo Espino, (11)
Amado Racanday, (12) Fermin Rodillas, and (13) Julian Lumanog alias Manue, of
the crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies committed as
follows:
"That on or about March 15, 1945, and for some time before the said date and
contimiously thereafter tmtil the present time, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
and the place which they had chosen as the nerve center of all their rebellious
activities in the different parts of the Philippines, the said accused, conspiring,
confederating, and cooperating with each other, as well as with the thirty-one (31)
defendants charged in criminal cases Nos. 14071,
518
518 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Hernandez, et al.
14082, 14270, 14315, and 14344 of the Court of First Instance of Manila (decided
May 11, 1951) and also with others whose whereabouts and identities are still
unknown, the said accused and their co-conspirators, being then officers and/or
members of, or otherwise associated with the Congress of Labor Organizations
(CLO) formerly known as the Committee on Labor. Organization (CLO), an active
agency, organ, and instrumentality of the Communist Party of the Philippines
(P.K.P.), with central offices in Manila and chapters and affiliated or associated
labor unions and other 'mass organizations' in different places in the Philippines,
and as such agency, organ, and instrumentality, fully cooperates in, and
synchronizes its activities with the rebellious activities of the 'Hukbong
Magpalayang Bayan, (H.M.B.) and other organs, agencies, and instrumentalities
of the Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.) to thereby assure, facilitate,
and effect the complete and permanent success of the armed rebellion against the
Repubflic of the Philippines, as the herein defendants and their co-conspirators
have in fact synchronized the activities of the CLO with the rebellious activities of
the HMB and other agencies, organs and instrumentalities of the Communist
Party of the Philippines and have otherwise master-minded or promoted the
cooperative efforts between the CLO and HMB and other agencies, organs, and
instrumentalitifcs of the P.K.P. in the prosecution of the rebellion against the
Republic of the Philippines, and being theri also high ranking officers and/or
members of, or otherwise affiliated with, the Communist Party of the Philippines
(P.K.P.), which is now actively engaged in an armed rebellion against the
Government of the Philippines through acts therefor committed and planned to be
further committed in Manila and other places in the Philippines, and of which
party the 'Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan' (HMB), otherwise or formerly known
as the 'Hukbalahaps' (Huks), is the armed force, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously help, support, promote, maintain, cause, direct and/or
command the *Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan' (HMB) or the 'Hukbalahaps'
(Huks) to rise publicly and take arms against the Republic of the Philippines, or
otherwise participate in such armed public uprising, for the purpose of removing
the territory of the Philippines from the allegiance to the government and laws
thereof as in fact the said 'Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan' or 'Hukbalahaps'
have risen publicly and taken arms to attain the said purpose by then and there
making armed raids, sorties and ambushes, attacks against police, constabulary
and army detachments as well as innocent civilians, and as a necessary means to
commit the crime af rebellion, in connection therewith and in furtherance
thereof, have then and there committed acts of murder, pillage, looting, plnnder^
a^son, and plan-
 519
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 519
People vs. Hernandez, et al.
ned destruction of private and public property to create and spread chaos, disorder,
terror, and fear so as to facilitate the accomplishment of the aforesaid purpose, as
follows, to wit:"
Then follows a description of the murders, arsons and robberies allegedly
perperated by the accused "as a necessary means to commit the crime of rebellion,
in connection therewith and in furtherance thereof."
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that:
"When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when
an oifense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period."
It is obvious, from the language of this article, that the same presupposes
the commission of two (2) or more crimes, and, hence, does not apply when
the culprit is guilty of only one crime.
Article 134 of said code reads:
"The crime of rebellion or insurrection is committed by rising publicly and taking
arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to
said Government or its laws, the territory of the Philippine Islands or any part
thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or of depriving the Chief
Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or
prerogatives."
Pursuant to Article 135 of the same code "any person, merely participating
or executing the commands of others in a rebellion shall suffer the penalty
of prision mayor in its minimum period."
The penalty is increased to priswn mayor and a fine not to exceed
P20,000 for "any person who promotes, maintains or heads a rebellion or
insurrection or who, while holding any public office or employment, takes
part therein":
1. 1."engaging in war against the forces of the government",
2. 2."destroying property", or
3. 3."committing serious violence",
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520 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Hernandez, et al.
1. 4."exacting contributions or"
2. 5."diverting public funds from the lawful purpose for which they have been
appropriated".
Whether performed singly or collectively, these five (5) classes of acts
constitute only one offiense, and no more, and are, altogether, subject to
only one penalty—prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P20,000. Thus for
instance, a public officer who assists the rebels by turning over to them, for
use in financing the uprising, the public funds entrusted to his custody,
could neither be prosecuted for malversation of such funds, apart from
rebellion, nor accused and convicted of the complex crime of rebellion with
malversation of public funds. The reason is that such malversation is
inherent in the crime of rebeliion committed by him. In fact, he would not
be guilty of rebellion had he not so misappropriated said funds. In the
imposition, upon said public officer, of the penalty for rebellion it wvuld
even be improper to consider the aggravating circumstance of advantage
taken by the offender of his public position, this being an essential element
of the crime he had perpetrated. Now, then, if the office held by said
offender and the nature of the f unds malversed by him cannot aggravate
the penalty for his offense, it is clear that neither may it worsen the
very crime committed by the culprit by giving rise, either to an
independent crime, or to a complex crime. Needless to say, a mere
participant in the rebellion, who is not a public officer, should not be placed
at a more disadvantageous position than the promoters, maintainers or
leaders of the movement, or the public officers who join the same, insofar
as the application of Article 48 is concerned.
One of the means by which rebellion may be committed, in the words of
said Article 135, is by "engaging in war against the forces of the
government" and "committing serious violence" in the prosecution of said
"war". These expressions imply everything that war connotes, namely;
521
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 521
People vs. Hernandez, et al.
resort to arms, requisition of property and services, collec
tion of taxes and contributions, restraint of Hberty, damage to property,
physical injuries and loss of life, and the hunger, illness and unhappiness
that war leaves in its wake—except that, very often, it is worse than war in
the international sense, f or it involves internal struggle, a fight between
brothers, with a bitterness and passion or ruthlessness seldom found in a
contest between strangers. Being within the purview of "engaging in war"
and "committing serious violence", said resort to arms, with the resulting
impairment or destruction of life and property, constitutes not two or more
offense, but only one crime—that of rebellion plain and simple. Thus, f or
instance, it has been held that "the crime of treason may be committed 'by
executing either a single or similar intentional overt acts, diff erent or
similar but distinct, and for that reason, it may be considered one single
continuous offense. (Guinto vs.Veluz, 77 Phil., 801, 44 Off. Gaz., 909.)"
(People vs.Pacheco, 93 Phil., 521.)
Inasmuch as the acts specified in said Article 135 constitute, we
repeat, one single crime, it follows necessarily that said acts offer no
occasion for the application of Article 48, which requires therefor the
commission of, at least, two crimes. Hence, this court has never in the past,
convicted any person of the "complex crime of rebellion with murder". What
is more, it appears that in every one of the cases of rebellion published in
the Philippine Reports, the defendants were convicted
of simplerebellion, although they had killed several persons,sometimes
peace officers (U. S. vs. Lagnason, 3 PhiL, 472; U. S. vs. Baldello, 3 Phil.,
509, U. S. vs. Ayala, 6 Phil., 151; League vs. People, 73 PhiL, 155).
Following a parallel line are our decisions in the more recent cases of
treason, resulting from eollaboration with the Japanese during the war in
the Pacific. In fact, said cases went further than the aforementioned cases
of rebellion, in that the theory of the prosecution to the
522
522 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Hernandez, et al.
effect that the accused in said treason cases were guilty of the complex
crime of treason with murder and other crimes was expressly and
repeatedty rejected therein. Thus, commenting on the decision of the
People's Court flnding the accused in People w. Prieto (80 Phil., 138, 45 Off.
Gaz., 3329) "guilty of * * * the crime of treason complexed by murder and
physical injuries" and sentencing him to death,and on the contention of the
Solicitor General that Prieto had coimnitted the "complex crime of treason
with homicide", this court, speaking through Mr. Justice Tuason, said:
"The execution of some of the guerrilla suspects mentioned in these counts and the
infliction of physical injuries on others are not offenses separate from treason.
Under the Philippine treason law and under the United States constitution
defming treason, after which the former was patterned, there must concur both
adherence to the enemy and giving him aid and comfort. One without the other
does not make treason.
"In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be accomplished
by some kind of action. Its very nature part&kes, of a deed or physical activity as
opposed to a mental operation. (Cramer vs. U.S., ante.) This deed or physical
activity may be, and often is, in itself a criminal offense under another penal
statute or provision. Even so, when the deed is charged as an element of treason it
becomes identified with the latter crime and can not b.e the subject of a separate
punishment, or used in combination with treason to increase the penalty as Article
48 of the Revised Penal Code provides. Just as one can not be punished for
possessing opium in a prosecution for smoking the identical drug, and a robber
cannot be held guilty of coercion or trespass to a dwelling in a prosecution for
robbery, because possession of opium and force and trespass are inherent in
smoking and in robbery respectively, so may not a defendant be made liable for
murder as a separate crime or in conjunction with another offense where, as in
this case, it is averfed as a constitutive ingredient of treason. * * * Where imirder
or physical injuries are charged as overt acts of treason * * * they can not be
regarded separately under their general denomination." (Italics supplied.)
Accordingly, we convicted the accused of simple treason and sentenced him
to Hfe imprisonment.
523
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 523
People vs. Hernandez, et al.
In People vs. Labra, 81 Phil., 377, 46 Off. Gaz., Supp. No. 1, p. 159, we used
the following language:
"The lower eourt found appellant guilty not only of treason, but of nrnrder, for the
killing of Tomas Abella, and, following the provisions of Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code sentenced him to death, the maximum penalty provided by article 114.
"The lower court erred in finding appellant guilty of the murder of Tomas
Abella. The arrest and killing of Tomas Abella for being a guerilla, is alleged in
count 3 of the information, as one of the elements of the crime of treason for which
appellant is prosecuted. Such element constitute a part of the legal basis upon
which appellant stands convicted of the crime of treason. The killing of Tomas
Abella cannot be considered as legal ground for convicfing appellant of any crime
other than treason. The essential elements of a given crime cannot be
disintegrated in different parts, each one stand as a separate grotmd to convict the
accused of a different crime or criminal offense. The elements constituting a given
crime are integral and inseparable parts of a whole. In the contemplation of the
law, they cannot be used for double or multiple purposes. Tliey can only be used for
the sole purpose of showing the commission of the crime of which they form part.
The factual complexity of the crime of treason does not endow it with the functional
ability of worm multiplication or amoeba reproduction. Otherwise, the accused will
have to face as many prosecution^ and convictions as there are elements in the
crime of treason, in open violation of the constitutional prohibition against double
jeopardy," (Italics supplied.)
The same conclusion was reached in People vs. Alibotod 82 Phil., 164, 46
Off. Gaz., 1005, despite the direct partidpation of the def endant therein in
the maltreatment and killing of several persons.
In People vs. Vilo 82 Phil., 524, 46 Off. Gaz., 2517, we held:
"The People's Court, however, erred in classifying the crime as treason with
murder. The killing of Amado Satorre and one Segundo is charged as an element
of treason, and it therefore becomes identified with the latter crime, and cannot be
the subject of a separate punishment or used in combination with treason to
mcrease the penalty as Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
provides." (People vs. Prieto, L-399, 45 Off. Gaz. 3329. See also People vs. Labra,
1^886, 46 Oif. Gaz., [Supp. to No. 1], 159.) (Italics supplied.)
524
524 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Hernandez, et al.
To the same effect was our decision in People vs. Roble 83 Phil., 1, 46 Off.
Gaz., 4207. We stated therein:
"The court held that the facts alleged in the information is a complev crime of
treason with murders, with the result that the penalty provided for the most
serious offense was to be imposed on its maximum degree. Viewing the case from
the standpoint of modifying circumstances, the court believed that the same result
obtained. It opined that the killings were murders qualified by treachery and
aggravated by the circumstances of evident premeditation, superior strength,
cruelty, and an armed band.
"We think this is error. The tortures and murders set forth fn the information
are merged in and formed part of the treason. They were in this case the overt acts
which, besides^ traitorous intention supplied a vital ingredient in the crime."
(Italics supplied.)
The accused in People vs. Delgado 83 PhiL, 9, 46 Off. Gaz., 4213, had been
convicted by the People's Court of "the crime of treason complexed with the
criine of murder" and sentenced to the extreme penalty. In our decision,
penned by Mr. Justice Montemayor, we expressed ourselves as follows:
The appellant herein was and is a Filipino citizen. His adherence to the Japanese
forces of occupation and giving them aid and comfort by acting as their spy,
undercover man, investigator, and even killer when necessary to cow and compel
the inhabitants to surrender their firearms and disclose information about the
guerrillas has been fully established. His manner of investigation and
maltreatment of some of his victims like Tereso Sanchez and Patricio Suico, was
so cruel, brutal and inhuman that it is almost unbelievable that a Filipino can
commit and practice such atrocities especially on his own countrymen. But,
evidently, war, confusion and opportunism can and do produce characters and
monster unknown during peace and normal times.
"The People's Court found the appellant guilty of treason complexed with
murder. The Solicitor General, however, maintains that the offense committed
is simple treason, citing the doctrine laid down by this court in the case
of People vs. Prieto, (L—399, 45 Oif. Gaz., 3329) but accompanied by the
aggravating circumstance under Article 14, paragraph 21, of the Revised Penal
Code, and not compensated by any mitigating circumstance, and he recommends
the imposition of the penalty of death. We agree with the Solicitor General that on
the basis of the ruling of this court
525
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 525
People vs. Hernandez, et al.
in the case of People vs. Prieto, supra, the appellant may be convicted only of
treason, and that the killing and infliction of physical injuries committed by him
may not be separated from the crime of treason but should be regarded as acts
performed in the commission of treason, although, as stated in said case, the
brutality with which the killing or physical injuries were carried out may be taken
as an aggravating circumstance." (Italics supplied.)
and reduced the penalty from death to life imprisonmentand a fine of
F20,000.
Identical were the pertinent features of the case
of People vs. Adlawan, 83 Phil., 194, 46 Off. Gaz., 4299, in which, through
Mr. Justice Reyes (A), we declared:
"* * * we find merit in the contention that appellant should have not been convicted
of the so-called 'Complex crime of treason with murder, robbery, and rape.' The
killings, robbery, and raping mentioned in the information are therein alleged not
as specific offenses but as mere elements of \the crime of treason for which the
accused is being prosecuted. Being merged in and identified with the general
charged, they can not be used in combination with the treason to increase the
penalty under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. (People vs. Prieto, L-399,
January 29, 1948, 45 Off. Gaz., 3329.) Appellant should, therefore, be held guilty
of treason only" (Italics supplied.)
In People vs. Suralta, 85 Phil., 714, 47 Off. Gaz., 4595, the language used
was:
"* * * But the People's Court erred in finding the appellant guilty of the complex
crime of treason with murder, because murder was an ingredient of the crime of
treason, as we have heretofore held in several cases. (Italics supplied.)
This was reiterated in People vs. Navea, 87 PhiL, 1, 47 Off. Gaz., Supp. No.
12, p. 252:
"The Solicitor General recommends that the appellant be sentenced for the
complex crime of treason with murder. We have already ruled, however, that
where, as in the present case, the killing is charged as an element of treason, it
'becomes identified with the latter crime and cannot be thz subject of a separate
punishment, or used in combination with treason to increase the penalty as Article
48 of the Revised Penal Code provides" (Italics supplied.)
526
526 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Hernandez, et al.
The question at bar was, also, taken up in the case of Crisologo vs. People
and Villalobos (94 PhiL, 477), decided on February 26,1954. The facts and
the rule therein laid down are set forth in our unanimous decision in said
case, from which we quote:
"The petitioner Juan D. Crisologo, a captain in the USAPFE during the last world
war and at the time of the filing of the present petition a lieutenant colonel in the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, was on March 12, 1946, accused of treason under
Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code in an information filed in the People's Court.
But before the accused could be brought under the jurisdiction of the court, he was
on January 13, 1947, indicted for violations of Commonwealth Act No. 408,
otherwise known as the Articles of War, before a military court created by
authority of the Army Chief of Staff, the indictment containing three charges, two
of which, the first and third, were those of treason consisting in giving information
and aid to the enemy leading to the capture of USAFFE officers and men and other
persons with anti-Japanese reputation and in urging members of the USAFFE to
surrender and cooperate with the enemy, while the second was that of having
certain civilians killed in time of war. Found innocent of the first and third charges
but guilty of the second, he was on May, 8, 1947, sentenced by the military court
to life imprisonment.
"With. the approval on June 17, 1948, of Republic Act No. 311 abolishing the
People's Court, the criminal case in that court against the petitioner was, pursuant
to the provisions of said Act, transferred to the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga and there the charges of treason were amplified. Arraigned in that
tourt upon the amended information, petitioner presented a motion to quash,
challenging the jurisdiction of the court and pleading double jeopardy because of
his previous sentence in the military court. But the court denied the motion and,
after petitioner had pleaded not guilty, proceeded to trial, whereupon, the present
petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed in this court to have the trial judge
desist from proceeding with the trial and dismiss the case.
"It is, however, claimed that the offense charged in the military court different
from that charged in the civil court and that even granting that the offense was
identical the military court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same
because the People's Court had previously acquired jurisdiction over the case with
th.e
527
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 527
People vs. Hernandez, et al.
result that the conviction in the court martial was void. In support of the first
point, it is urged that the amended information filed in the Court of First Instance
of Zamboanga contains overt acts distinct from those charged in the military court.
But we note that while certain overt acts specified in the amended information in
the Zamboanga court were not specified in the indictment in the court martial,
they all are embraced in the general charge of treason, which is a continuous
offense and one who commits it is not criminally liable for as many crimes as there
are overt acts, because all overt act 'he has done or might Jiave done for that
purpose constitute but a single offense.' (Guinto vs. Veluz, 44 Off. Gaz.,
909; People vs. Pacheco, L-4750, promulgated July 31, 1953.) In other words, since
the offense charged in the amended information in the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga is treason, the fact that the said information contains an enumeration
of additional overt acts not specifically mentioned in the indictment before the
military court is immaterial since the new alleged overt acts do not in themselves
constitute a new and distinct offense from that of treasont and this court has
repeatedly held that a person cannot be found guilty of treason and at the same
time also guilty of overt acts specified in the information for treason even if those
overt acts,, considered separately, are punishable by law, for the simple reason that
those overt acts are not separate offenses distinct from that of treason but constitute
ingredients thereof." (Italics suplied.)
Thus, insofar as treason is concerned, the opinion of this court, on the
question whether said crime may be complexed with murder, when the
former was committed through the latter, and it is so alleged in the
information, had positively and clearly crystalized itself in the negative as
early as January 29, 1948.
We have not overlooked the decision in People vs. Labra(L-1240, decided
on May 12, 1949), the dispositive paft of which partly reads:
"Wherefore, the verdict of guilty must be affirmed. Articles 48, 114 and 248 of the
Revised Penal Code are applicable to the offense of treason with murder. However
for lack of sufficient votes to impose the extreme penalty, the appellant will be
sentenced to life imprisonment. * * *."
Although it mentions Articles 48 and 248 of the Revised Penal Code and
"the offense of treason with murder," it should be noted that
we affirmed therein the action of the
528
528 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Hernandez, et al.
People's Court, which, according to the opening statement of our decision,
convicted Labra of "treason aggravated with murder". Besides, the
applicability of said articles was not disciissed in said decision. It is obvious,
from a mere perusal thereof, thaj; this court had no intention of passing
upon such question. Otherwise, it would have explained why it did not
follow the rule laid down in the previous cases of Prieto, Labra (August 10,
1948), Alibotod, Vilo, Roble, Delgado and Adlawan (supra), in which the
issue was explidtly examined and decided in the negative. Our continued
adherence to this view in the subsequent cases of Suralta, Navea, Pacheco
and Crisologo, without even a passing reference to the second Labra case,
shows that we did not consider the same as reflecting the opinion of the
court on said question. At any rate, insofar as it suggests otherwise, the
position taken in the second Labra case must be deemed reversed by our
decisions in said cases of Suralta, Navea, Pacheco and Crisologo.
It is true that treason and rebellion are distinct and different from each
other. This does not detract, however, from the rule that the ingredients of
a crime form part and parcel thereof, and, hence, are absorbed by the same
and cannot be punished either separately therefrom or by the application
of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. Besides there is more reason to
apply said rule in the crime of rebellion than in that of treason, for the law
punishing rebellion (Article 135, Revised Penal Code) specificallymentions
the act of engaging in war and committing serious violence among its
essential elements—thus clearly indicating that everything done in the
proseeution of said war, as a means necessary therefor, is embraced
therein—unlike the provision on treason (Article 114, Revised Penal Code)
which is less explicit thereon.
It is urged that, if the crime of assault upon a person in authority or an
agent of a person in authority may
529
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 529
People vs. Hernandez, et aL
be committed with physical injuries (U. S. vs. Montiel, 9 Phil, 162),
homicide (People vs. Lojo, 52 Phil., 390) and murder (U.
S. vs. Ginosolongo, 23 Phil., 171; U. S. vs.Baluyot, 40 Phil., 385), and rape
may be perpetrated with physical injuries (U. S. vs. Andaya, 34 Phil., 690),
then rebellion may, similarly, be complexed with murder, arson, or robbery.
The conclusion does not follow, for engaging in war, serious violence,
physical injuries and destruction of life and property are inherent in
rebellion, but not in assault upon persons in authority or agents of persons
in authority or in rape. The word "rebellion" evokes, not merely a challenge
to the constituted authorities, but, also, civil war, on a bigger or lesser scale,
with all the evils that go with it, whereas, neither rape nor assault upon
persons in authority connotes necessarily, or even generally, either physical
injuries, or murder. 1
In support of the theory that a rebel who kills in furtherance of the
insurrection is guilty of the complex crime of rebellion with murder, our
attention has been called to Article 244 of the old Penal Code of the
Philippines, reading:
"Los delitos particulares cometidos en tma rebelion o sedicion, o con motivo de
ellas, seran castigados respectivamente segun las disposiciones de este Codigo.
"Cuando no puedan descubrirse sus autores seran penados como tales los jefes
principales de la rebelion o sedicion."
and to the foHowing observations of Cuello Calon (Derecho Penal, Vol. II,
p. 110), in relation thereto:
"Se establece aqui que el en una rebelion o sedicion, o con motivo de ellas, comete
otros delitos (v.g., roba, mata o lesiona), sera responsable de estos ademas de los
delitos de rebelion o sedicion. La dificultad consiste en estds casos en separar los
accidentes de la rebelion o s^dicion de los delitos independientes de estas, y como
las leyes no contienen en este punto precepto alguno aplicable, su solucion ha
quedado encomendada a los tribunales. La
_______________
1 ln the Andaya case the victim was a girl twelve years of age.
530
530 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Hernandez, et al.
jurisprudencia que estos han sentado considera como accidentes de la rebelion o
sedicion—cuya criminalidad queda embedida en la de estos delitos, y, por tanto,
no son punibles especialmente—los hechos de escasa gravedad (v.g., atentados,
desacatos, lesiones menos graves); por el contrario, las inf racciofces graves, como
el asesinato o las lesiones graves, se consideran como delitos independientes de la
rebelion o de la sedicion."
It should be noted, however, that said Article 244 of the old Penal Code of
the Philippines has not been included in our Revised Penal Code. If the
applicability of Article 48 to rebellion was determined by the existence of
said Article 244, then the elimination of the latter would be indicative of
the contrary.
Besides, the crime of rebellion, referred to by Cuello Calon, was that
punished in the Spanish Penal Code, Article 243 of which provides:
"Son reos de rebelion los que se alzaren publicamente y ei? abierta hostilidad
contra el Gobierno para cualquiera de los objetos siguientes:
1. 1."Destronar al Rey, deponer al Regente o Regencia del Reino, o privarles
de su libertad personal u obligarles a ejecutar un acto contrario a su
voluntad.
2. 2."Impedir la celebracion de las elecciones para Diputados a Cortes o
Senadores en todo el Keino, o la reunion legitima de las mismas.
3. 3."Disolver las Cortes o impedir la deliberacion de alguno de los Cuerpos
Colegisladores o arrancarles alguna resolucion.
4. 4."Ejecutar cuailquiera de los delitos previstos en el articulo 165.
5. 5."Sustraer el Reino o parte de el o algun cuerpo de trop'i de tierra o de mar,
o cualquiera otra clase de fuerza armada, de la obediencia del Supremo
Gobierno.
6. 6."Usar y ejercer por si o despojar a los Ministros de la Corona de sus
facultades constitucionales, o impedirles o coartarles su libre ejercicio.
(Articulo 167, Codigo Penal de 1850.—Veanse las demas concordancias del
articulo 181.)"
Thus, the Spanish Penal Code did not specifically declare that rebellion
includes the act of engaging in war against the forces of the Government
and of using serious violence for the purposes stated in Article 134 of the
Revised Penal
531
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 531
People vs. Hernandez, et al.
Code. In view of this express statutory inclusion of the acts of war
and serious violence among the ingredients of rebellion in the Philippines,
it is clear that the distinction made by Cuello Calon between grave and less
grave offenses committed in the course of an insurrection cannot be
accepted in this jurisdiction. Again, if both classes of offenses are part and
parcel of a rebellion, or means necessary therefor, neither law nor logic
justifies the exclusion of the one and the inclusion of the other. In fact,
Cuello Calon admits that "the difficulty lies in separating the accidents of
rebellion or sedition from the offenses independent therefrom." Ergo,
offenses that are not independent therefrom, but. constituting an integral
part thereof—committed, precisely, to carry out the uprising to its
successful conclusion—are beyond the purview of Article 244. Indeed, the
above quoted statement of CueUo Calon—to the effect that grave f elonies
committed in the course of an insurrection are independent therefrom—was
based upon a decision of t;he Supreme Court of Spain of February 5, 1872,
which we find reported in the Codigo Penal de Filipinas, by Jose Perez
Rubio, as follows:
"El Tribunal Supremo de Justicia en sentencia de 5 de Febrero de 1872, tiene
declarado: Que segun los articulos 184 del Codigo Penal de 1830, y 259 del
reformado (1870), los delitos particulares cometidos en una rebelion o sedicion o
con motivo de ellas se castigan respectivamente segun las disposiciones de los
mismos Codigos; y con arreglo al decreto de amnistia de 9 de Agosto de 1876 estan
solo comprendidos en aquella gracia las personas sentenciadas, procesadas 6
sujetas a responsabilidad por delitos politicos de cualquiera especie cometidos
desde el 29 de Septiembre de 1868; Que el asesinato del Gobernador Civil de
Burgos na fu6 resultado de movimiento alguno politico, sino de un mero tumulto
que imprimio el fanatismo, y cuya unica aparente tendencia era impedir que aquel
funcionario inventariase ciertos objetos artisticos que se decian existentes en la
Catedral: Que esto lo demuestran las salvajes voces de muerte proferidas por los
asesinos contra la persona del Gobernador; sin que al ejecutar en 6l mismo recinto
del templo los horrorosos hechos que aparecen en la causa, alzasen bandera
politica alguna ni dieran otro grito que el, en aquel momento sacrilego e impio, de
'Viva la religion:' Que la apreciar la Sala sentenciadora los hechos refe-
 532
532 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Hernandez, et al.
rentes al {jobernador Civil de delito de asesinato, penarlo con arreglo al Codigo y
declarar inaplicable el citado Decreto de Amnistia, no ha cometido el error de
derecho senalado en los casos 1.° 3.° del articulo 4.° de la ley sobre establecimiento
de la cajsacion criminal, ni infringido los articulos 250 y 259 del Codigo Penal de
1870." (Page 239; Italics supplied.) (See, also, "El Codigo Penal", by Hidalgo
Garcia, Vol. I, p. 623.)'
It is apparent that said case is not in point. There was no issue therein on
whether murder may be complexed with rebellion or sedition. The question
for determination was whether the killers of the victim were guilty of the
common crime of murder, or should have been convicted only of rebellion or
sedition. The court adopted the first alternative, not because of
the gravity of the acts performed by the accused, but because they had no
political motivation. Moreover, the footnote to said quotation from Cuello
Calon reads:
"Los atentados desacatos y lesiones a la autoridad u otros delitos contra el orden
publico cometidos en la sedicion o con motivo de ella, no son delitos distintos de la
sedicion, 3 octubre 1903, 19 noviembre 1906; la resistencia o acometimiento a la
fuerza publica por los sediciosos es accidente de la rebelion, 23 mayo 1890.
"El asesinato de un gobernador cometido en el curso de un tumulto debe
penarse como un delito comun de asesinato, 5 febrero 1872. Sin embargo, la
jurisprudencia, tratandose de ciertos delitos, es vacilante; asi, v. g., el
acometimiento al teniente de alcalde se ha declarado en un fallo independiente de
la perturbacion tumultuaria promovida para impedir al alcalde el cumplimiento
de sus providencias, 16 marzo 1885, mientras que un hecho analogo se ha
considerado en otra sentencia ya citada como accidente de la rebelion, 3 Octubre
1903. El acometimiento de los sediciosos a la fuerza piiblica es accidente de la
sedicion y no uno de los delitos particulares a que se refiere este articulo, 23 de
mayo 1890. Entre estos delitos a que alude el precepto se hallan las lesiones que
puedan causar los sediciosos, 19 noviembre 1906." (Footnote 21, II Cuelo Calon,
Derecho Penal, pp. 110-111.) (Italics supplied.)
Thus in a decision, dated May 2, 1934, the Supreme Court of Spain held:
"Considerando que la nota deferencial entre los delitos de rebelion y sedicion, de
una parte, y el de atentado, esta constituida por
533
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 533
People vs. Hemandez, et al.
la circunstancia de alzamiento publico que caracteriza a los primeros, los cuales,
por su indole generica, absorben a los de atentado y demas infracciones que durante
su comision y con su motivo se cometan, y afirmandose como hecho en la sentencia
recurrida que el procesado Mariano Esteban Martinez realizo, en union de otros,
el atendado que se le imputa sin alzarse publicamente, cae por su base el recurso
fundado en supuesto distinto." (Jurisprudencia Criminal, Tomo 130, p. 551.)
(Italics supplied.)
To the same effect are, likewise, the following:
"La provocacion y el ataque a la Guardia Civil por paisanos alzados
tumultuariamente para impejdir al Delegado de un Gobernador civil el
cumplimiento de sus providencias, no pueden estimarse constitutivos de un delito
distinto del de sedicion, ni ser, por tanto, perseguidos y penados separadamente.
"La resistencia o el acometimiento de los sublevados a la fuerza publica
constituye, en su caso, una circuns.tancia o accidente de la sedicion y no es delito
de los que el Codigo Penal en este articulo (formerly Article 244, now Article 227)
supone que pueden cometerse en ella o con su motivo, los cuales denomina delitos
particulares, y manda que se penen conf orme a las disposiciones del propio Codigo.
(S. 23-5-890; G. 23-6-890; t. 44; pagina 671)" (II Doctrina Penal del Tribunal
Supremo, p. 2411.) (Italics supplied.)
"La Audiencia condeno como autores de atentado a dos de los amotinados que
agredieron al alcalde, e interpuesto recurso de casacion contra la sentencia, el
Tribunal Supremo la casa. y anula, teniendo en cuenta lo dispuesto en el articulo
250 (numero 3.°) del Codigo Penal;
'Considerando que el acto llevado a cabo por el grupo constituye una verdadera
sedicion, sin que sea licito el dividir este hecho y calificarlo de atentado respecto a
las personas que agredieron a dicho alcalde, porque el acometimiento fue un
accidente de la sedicion, de la cual' eran todos responsables, ya se efectuara por los
agrupados en conjunto o por uno solo, por ser comun el objeto que se proponian y
no individual; y al calificar y penar este hecho la Audencia de Gerona, de atentado
* * *, ha incurrido en error de derecho e infringido los articulos 250 y siguientes
del Codigo Penal, por no haberlos aplicado, y el 263, numero 2.°, en relacion con el
264, numeros 1.° y 3.°, por su aplicacion * * *" (Sent, 3 octubre 1903.—Gac. 12
Diciembre) (Enciclopedia Juridica Espanola, Tomo xxviii, p. 250).
These cases are in accord with the text of said Article 244, which refers, not
to all offenses committed in the
534
534 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Hernandez, et al.
course of a rebellion or on the occasion thereof, but only to "delitos
particulares" or common crimes. Now, what are "delitos particulares" as the
phrase is used in said article 244? We quote from Viada:
"Las disposicion defl primer parrafo de este artfculo no puede ser mas justa; con
arreglo a ella, los delitos particulares o coizmnes cometidos en una rebelion or
sedicion no deberan reputarse como accidentes inherentes a estas, sino como
delitos especiales, a dicha rebelion y sedicion ajenos, los que deberan ser
respectivamente castigados con las penas que en este C6digo se las senalan. Pero,
que delitos deberan considerarse como comunes, y cuales como constitutivos de la
propia rebelion o sedicion? En cuanto a la rebelion, no ofrece esta cuestion
dificultad alguna, pues todo hecho que no este comprendido en uno y otro de los
objetos especificados en los seis numeros del articulo 243 sera extraiio a la
rebelion, y si se hallare definido en algun otro articulo del C6digo, con arreglo a
este debera ser castigado como delito particular. Pero tratandose de la sedicion,
comprendiendose como objetos de la misma, en los numeros 3.°, 4.° y 5.° del
articulo 250, hechos que constituyen otros tantos ataques a las personas o a la
propiedad, cuales se consideran como accidentes inherentes a la propria sedicion,
y cuales deberari reputarse como delitos particulares o comunes? En cuanto a los
casos de los numeros 4.° y 5. , estimanos que el objeto politico y social que se
requiera para la realizacion de los actos en aquellos comprendidos es el que debe
servirnos de norma y guia, para distinguir lo inherente a la sedicion de lo que es
ajeno o extrano a ella. Cuando no exista ese objeto politico y social, el acto de odio
o venganza ejercido contra los particulares o cualquiera clase del Estado, y el
atentado contra las propiedades de los ciudadanos o corporaciones mentados en el
numero 5.° del articulo 250, no seran constitutivos del delito de sedicion, sino que
deberan ser apreciados y castigados como delitos comunes, segun las disposiciones
respectivas de este Codigo—y por lo que toca a los actos de odio o venganza
ejercidos en la persona o bienes de alguna Autoridad o sus agentes, estimamos
que deberan reputarse como delitos convunes todos aquellos
hechos innecesarios para la consecucion del fin particular que se propusieran los
2 tambien las que, apreciadas subjetivamente,maiiifiestan una motivacion de
sediciosos—y como esenciales, constitutivos de la propia sedicion todos aquellos
actos de odio o venganza que sean medio racionalmente necesario para el logro del
objeto especial a que se encaminaran los esfuerzos de los sublevados. Asi, en el caso
de la Cuestion 1
________________
2 The information in the case at bar alleges that the acts therein set f orth were comnaitted "as
a necessary means to commit tlie crime of rebellion."
535
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 535
People vs. Hernandez, et al.
expuesta en el comentario del articulo 258, es evidente que el fin que se
propusieron los sediciosos fue no pagar el impuesto a cuya cobranza iba a pyoceder
el comisionado; pero para lograr este objeto, como lo lograron, fue preciso hacer
salir del pueblo al ejecutor, y a este efecto, lo amenazaron, lo persiguieron y
llegaron hasta lesionarle. Esas amenazas y lesiones no pudieron apreciarse, ni las
aprecio tampoco la Sala sentenciadora, como delito comun, sino como accidente
inherente a la misma sedicion,por cuanto fueron im medio racionalmente
necesario para la consecucion del fin determinado que se propusieron los
culpables.
"Pero cuando tal necesidad desaparece, cuando se hiere por herir, cuando se
mata por matar, el hecho ya, no puede ser considerado como un accidente propio
de la sedicion, sino como tm delito especial, al que debe aplicarse la pena al mismo
correspondiente." (III Viada, pp. 311-312.) (Italks supplied.)
Cuello Calon is even more illuminating. He says:
"La doctrina cientifica considera los delitos llamados politicos como infracciones de
un caracter especial distintas de los denominados delitos comunes. De esta
apreciacion ha nacido la division de los delitos, desde el punto de vista de su
naturaleza intrinse'ca, en delitos politicos y delitos comunes o de derechocomun.
"Se reputan delitos comunes aquellos que lesionan bienes juridicos individuales
(v. gr., los delitos contra la vida, contra la honestidad, contra la propiedad, etc.).
"La nocion del delito poflitico no parece tan cl^ra. Desde luego revisten este
caracter los que atentan contra el orden politico del Estado, contra su orden extenjo
(independencia de la nacion, integridad del territorio, etc.) o contra el interno
(delitos contra el Jefe del Estado, contra la forma de Gobierno, etc.)- Pero tambien
pueden ser considerados como politicos todos los delitos, cualesquiera, que sean
incluso los de derecho comtin, cuando fueron cometidos por moviles
politicos. Deben, por tanto, estimarse como infracciones de esta clase, no solo las
que objetivamente tengan tal caracter por el interes politico que lesionan, sino
caracter politico.
"Asi podria formulares esta definicion: es delito politico el cometido contra el
orden politico del Estado, asi como todo delito de cualquiera otra clase determinado
por moviles poKttcos." (Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, Tomo I, pp. 247-249.)
In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order,
as well as such common crimes as may
536
536 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Hernandez, et al.
be committed to achieve a political purpose. The decisive factor is the intent
or motive. If a crime usually regarded as common, like homicide, is
perpetrated for the purpose of removing from the allegiance "to the
Government the territory of the Philippines Islands or any part thereof."
then said offense becomes stripped of its "common" complexion, inasmuch
as, being part and parcel of the crime of rebellion, the former acquires the
political character of tlie latter.
Conformably with the foregoing, the case of murder against the
defendant in U. S. vs. Lardizabal (1 Phil., 729)—an insurgent who killed a
prisoner of war because he was too weak to march with the retreating rebel
forces, and could not be left behind without endangering the safety of the
latter—was dismissed upon the ground that the execution of said prisoner
of wwr formed part of, and, was included in, the crime of sedition, which, in
turn, was covered by an amnesty, to the benefits of which said defendant
was entitled.
True, in U. S. vs. Alfont (1 Phil., 115), the commander of an unorganized
group of insurgents was, pursuant to Article 244 of our old Penal Code,
convicted of homicide for having shot and killed a woman who was driving
a vehicle. But the complex crime of rebellion with homicide
was notconsidered in that case. Apart from this, the accused failed to
established the relation between her deaih and the insurrection. What is
more, it was neither proved nor alleged that he had been prompted by
political reasons. In other words, his offense was independent from the
rebellion. The latter was merely the occasion for the commission of the
former.
It is noteworthy that the aforementioned decisions of this court and the
Supreme Court of Spain in cases of treason, rebellion and sedition, are in
line with the trend in other countries, as well as in the field of international
relations. Referring to the question as to what offenses are
537
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 537
People vs. Hernandez, et al.
political in nature, it was said in In re Ezeta (62 Fed. Rep., 972):
"What constitutes an offense of a political character has not yet been determined
by judicial authority. Sir James Stephens, in his work, History of the Criminal
Law of England (Volume 2, p. 71), thinks that it should be 'interpreted to mean
that fugitive criminals are not to be surrendered for extraditidn crimes if those
crimes were incidental to and formed a part of political disturbances.' Mr. John
Stuart Mill, in the house of commons, in 1866, while discussing an amendment to
the act of 'extradition, on which the treaty between England and France was
founded, gave this defmition: Any offense committed in the course of or furthering
of civil war, insurrection, or political commotion.'Hansard's Debates Vol. 184, p.
2115. In the Castioni Case, supra,decided in 1891, the question was discussed by
the most eminent counsel at the English bar, and considered by distinguished
judges, without a definition being framed that would draw a fixed and certain line
between a municipal or common crime and one of political character. 'I do not
think/ said Denman, J., 'it is necessary or desirable that we should attempt to put
into language, in the shape of an exhaustive definition, exactly the whole state of
things, or every state of things, which might bring a particular case within the
description of an offense of a political character/ In that case, Castioni was charged
with the murder of one Rossi, by shooting him with a revolver, in the town of
Bellinzona, in the canton of Ticino, in Switzerland. The deceased, Rossi, was
a member of the state council of the canton of Ticino. Castioni was a citizen of the
same canton. For some time previous to the nrurder, much dissatisfaction had
been felt and expressed by a large number of inhabitants of Ticino at the mode in
which the political party then in power were conducting the government of the
canton. A request was presented to the government for a revision of the
constitution of the canton and, the government having declined to take a popular
vote on that question, a number of the citizens of Bellinzona, among whom was
Castioni, seized the arsenal of the town, from which they took rifles and
ammunition, disarmed the gendarmes, arrested and bound or handcuffed several
persons connected with the government, and forced them to march in front of the
armed crowd to the municipal palace. Admission to the palace was demanded in
the name of the people, and was refused by Rossi and another member of the
government, who were in the palace. The crowd then broke open the outer gate of
the palace, and rushed in, pushing before them the government officials whom
they had arrested and bound. Castioni, who was armed with a revolver, was among
the first to enter. A second door, which
538
538 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Hernandez, et al.
was locked, was broken open, and at this time, or immediately after, Rossi, who
was in the passage, was shot through the body with a revolver, and died very soon
afterwards. Some other shots were fired, but no one else was injured. Castioni fled
to England. His extradition was requested by the federal council of Switzerland.
He was arrested and taken before a police magistrate, as provided by the statute,
who held him for extradition. Application was made by the accused to the high
court of justice of England for a writ of habeas corpus. He was represented by Sir
Charles Russell, now lord chief justice. The attorney general, Sir Richard Webster,
appeared for the crown, and the solicitor general, Sir Edward Clarke, and Robert
Woodfal, for the federal council of Switzerland. This array of distinguished
counsel, and the high character of the court, commends the case as one of the
highest authority. It appeared from an admission by one of the parties engaged in
the disturbances 'that the death of Rossi was a misfortune, and not necessary for
the rising.' The opinions of the judges as to the political character of the crime
charged against Castioni, upon the facts stated, is exceedingly interesting, but I
need only refer to the following passages. Judge Denman says:
"The question really is whether, upon the facts, it is clear that the man was
acting as one of a number of persons engaged in acts of violence of a political
character with a political object, and as part of thc political movement and risiug
in which he was taking part.'
"Judge Hawkins, in commenting upon the character of political offenses, said:
'I cannot help thinking that everybody knows there are many acts of a political
character done without reason, done against all reason; but at the same time one
cannot look too hardly, and weigh in golden scales the acts of men hot in their
political excitement. We know that in heat, and in heated blood, men often do
things which are against and contrary to reason; but none the less an act of this
description may be done for the purpose of furthering and in fwrtherance of a
political rising, even though it is an act which may be deplored and lamented, as
even cruel and against all reason, by those who can calmly reflect upon it after the
battle is over.'
"Sir James Stephens, whose definition as an author has already been cited, was
one of the judges, and joined in the views taken as to the political character of the
crime charged against Castioni. The prisoner was discharged. Applying, by
analogy, the action of the English court in that case to the four cases now before
me, under consideration, the conclusion. follows that the crimes charged here,
associated as they are wlth the actual conflict of armed forces, are of a political
character.
539
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 539
People vs. Hernandez, et al.
"The draft of a treaty on International Penal Law, adopted by the congress of
Montevidecr in 1888, and recommended by the International American
Conference to the governments of the Latin-American natiojis in 1890, contains
the following provisions (Article 23):
"Political offenses, offenses subversive of the internal and external safety of a
state or common offenses connected ivith these, shall not warrant extradition. The
detettnination of the character of the offense is incumbent upon the nations upon
which the demand for extradition is made; and its decision shall be made under
and according to the provisions of the law which shall prove to be most favorable
to the accused:'
"I am not aware that any part of this Code has been made the basis of treaty
stipulations between any of the American nations, but the article cited may be at
least accepted as expressing the wisdom of leading jurists and diplomats. The
article is important with respect to two of its features: (1) provides that a fugitive
shall not be extradited for an offense connected with a political offense, or with an
offense subversive of the internal or external safety of the state; and (2) the
decision as to the character of the offense shall be made under and according to
the provisions of the law which shall prove most favorable to the accused. The first
provision is sanctioned by Calvo, who, speaking of the exemption from extradition
of persons charged with political offenses, says:
'The exemption even extends to acts connected with political crimes or offenses,
and it is enough, as says Mr. Fuastin Helio; that a common crime be connected with
a political act, that it be the outcome of or be in the outcome of or be in the execution
of such, to be covered by the privilege which protects the latter' Calvo,Droit Int.
(3me ed.) p. 413, section 1262.
"The second provision of the article is founded on the broad principles of
humanity found everywhere in the criminal law, distinguishing its administration
with respect to even the worst features of our civilization from the cruelties of
barbarism. When this article was under discussion in the international American
conference in Washington, Mr. Silva, of Colombia, submitted some observations
upon the difficulty of drawing a line between an offense of a political character and
a coromon crime, and incidentally ref erred to the crime of robbery, in terms
worthy of some consideration here. He said:
"In, the revolutions, as we conduct them in our countries, the common offenses
are necessarily mixed up with the political in
540
540 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Hemandez, et al.
many cases. A colleague General Caamano (of Ecuador) knows how we carry on
wars. A revolutionist needs horses for moving-, beef to feed his troops, etc.; and
since he does not go into the public markets to purchase these horses and that
beef, nor the arms and saddfles to mount and equip his forces, lie takes them from
the first pasture or shop he find at hand. This is called robbery everywhere, and is
a common offense in time of peace, but in time of war it is a circumstance closely
allied to the manner of waging it.' International American Conference, Vol. 2, p.
615." (Italics supplied.)
We quote the following from footnote (23) on pages 249-250, Vol. I, of Cuello
Calon's aforesaid work on "Derecho Penal."
"En algunos €6digo y leyes de fecha proxima ya se halla una defhucion de estos
delitos. El Codigo penal ruso, en el articulo 58, define como 'delitos contra
revolucionarios' los hechos encaminados a derrocar o debilitar el poder de los
Consejos de trabajadores y campesinos y de los gobiernos de la Union de
Republicas socialistas sovieticas, a destruir o debilitar la seguridad exterior de la
Union de Republicas Sovieticas y las conquistas economicas, politicas y nacionales
fundamentales de la revolucion proletaria.' El Codigo Penal italiano de 1930
considera en su articulo 8.° como delito politico 'todo delito que ofenda un interes
politico del Estado o un derecho politico del ciudadano.' Tambien se reputa politico
el delito comun determinado, en todo o en parte por motivos politicos. En la ley
alemana de extradicion de 25 diciembre 1929 se definen asi: 'Son delitos politicos
los atentados punibles directamente ejecutados contra la existencia o la seguridad
del Estado, contra el jefe o contra un miembro del gobierno del Estado como tal,
contra ima corporacion constitucional, contra los derechos politicos las buenas
relaciones con el extranjero.' parrafo 3.°, 2.
"La 6a. Conferencia para la Unificacion del Derecho penal (Copenhague, 31
agosto—3 septiembre 1935) adopto la siguiente nocion del delito politico:
1. "1.Por delitos politicos se entienden los dirigidos contra la organizaeion y
funcionamiento del Estado o contra los derechoa que de esta organizacion
y funcionamiento provienen para el culpable.
2. "2.Tambien se consideran como delitos politicos los delitos de derecho
comun que constituyen hechos conexos con la ejecucion de los delitos
previstos en seccion 1.°: como los hechos dirigidos a
541
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 541
People vs. Hernandez, et al.
1. favorecer la ejecucion de un delito politico o a perniitir al autor de este delito
sustraerse a la aplicacion de la ley penal.
2. "3.No s6 consideraran delitos politicos aquellos a los que ?u autor sea
inducido por un motivo egoista y vil
3. "4.No se consideraran delitos los que creen un peligro para la comimidad o
un estado de terror." (Italics supplied.)
Thus, national, as well as international, laws and jurisprudence
overwhelmingly f avor the proposition that common crimes, perpetrated in
f urtherance of a political offense, are divested of their character as
"common" offenses and assume the political complexion of the main crime of
wkich they are mere ingredients, and,consequently, cannot be punished
separately from the principal offense, or complexed with the same, to justify
the imposition of a graver penalty.
There is one other reason—and a fundamental one at that—why Article
48 of our Penal Code cannot be applied in the case at bar. If murder were
not complexed with rebellion, and the two crimes were punished separately
(assuming that this could be done), the following penalties would be
imposable upon the movant, namely: (1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine not
exceeding P20,000 and prisidn mayor, in the corresponding period,
depending upon the modifying circumstances present, but never exceeding
12 years of prision mayor; and (2) for the crime of murder, reclmion
temporal in its maximum period to death, depending upon the modifying
circumstances present. In other words, in the absence of aggravating
circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him.
However, under Article 48, said pznalty would have to be meted out to
him, even in tke absence of a single aggravating circumstance. Thus, said
provision, if construed in conformity with the theory of the prosecution,
wouW be unfavorable to the movant.
Upon the other hand, said Article 48 was enacted for tfoe purpose
of favoring the culprit, not of sentencing him t® a penalty more severe than
that which would be proper
542
542 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Hernandez, et al.
if the several acts performed by him were punished separately. In the word
of Rodriguez Navarro:
"La unificacion de penas en los casos de concurso de delitos a que hace referencia
esjte articulo (75 del Codigo de 1932), esta basado francamente en el principio pro
reo." (II Doctrina Pejial del Tribunal Supremo de Espana, p. 2168. )3
We are aware of the fact that this observation refers to Article 71 (later 75)
of the Spanish Penal Code (the counterpart of our Article 48), as amended
in 1908 and then in 1932, reading:
"Las disposiciones. del articulo anterior no son aplicables en el caso de que un solo
hecho constituya dos o mas delitos, o cuando el uno de ellos sea medio necesario
para cometer el otro.
"En estos casos solo se impondra la pena correspondiente al delito mas grave
en su grado maximo, hasta el limite que represente la suma de las que pudieran
imponerse, penando separadamente los delitos.
"Cuando la pena asi computada exceda de este limite, se sancionaran los delitos
por separado." (Rodriguez Navarro, Doctrino Penal del Tribunal Supremo, Vol. II,
p. 2163.)
and that our Article 48 does not contain the qualification inserted in said
amendment, restricting the imposition of the penajty for the graver offense
in its maximum period to the case when it does not exceed the sum total of
the penalties imposable if the acts charged w6re dealt with separately. The
absenee of said limitation in our Penal Code does not, to our mind, affect
substantially the spirit of said Article 48. Indeed, if oiie act constitutes two
or more offenses, there can be no reason to inflict a punishment graver than
that prescribed for each one of said offenses put together. In directing that
the penalty for the graver off ense be, in such case, imposed in its maximum
period, Article 48 could have had no other purpose than to prescribe a
penalty lower than the aggregate of the
________________
3Sve, also the comentarios el C6digo Penal, by A. Quintano Ripolles (Vol. I, pp. 396-397)
and Derecho Penal, by Federico Puig Pena (Vol. I, p. 289).
543
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 543
People vs. Hernandez, et al.
penalties for each offense, if imposed separately. The reason for this
benevolent spirit of Article 48 is readily discernible. When two or more
crimes are the result of a single act, the oflfender is deemed ,less perverse
than when he commits said crimes thru separate and distinct acts. Instead
of sentencing him for each crime independently from the other, he must
suffer the maximum of the penalty for the more serious one, on the
assumption that it is less grave than the sum total of the separate penalties
for each offense.
Did the framers of Article 48 have a different purpose in dealing therein
with an offense which is a means necessary for the commission of another?
To begin with, the culprit can not, then, be considered as displaying a
greater degree of malice than when the two off enses are independent of
each other. On the contrary, since one offense is a necessary means for the
commission of the other, ilie evil intent is one, which, at least,
quantitatively, is lesser than when the two offenses are ufirelated to each
other, because, in such event, he is twice guilty of having harbored criminal
designs and of carrying the same into execution. Furthermore, it must be
presumed that the object of Article 48, in its entirvty, is only one. We cannot
assume that the purpose of the lawmaker, at the beginning of the single
sentence of which said article consists, was to favor the accused, and
that, before the sentence ended, the former had a change of heart and turned
about face against the latter. If the second part of Article 48 had been
meant to be unfavorable to the accused—and, hence, the exact opposite of
the first part—each would have been placed in separateprovisions, instead
of in one single article. If the first part sought to impose, upon the culprit,
a penalty less grave than that which he would deserve if the two or more
offenses resulting from his single act were punished separately, then this,
also, must be the purpose of the second part, in dealiiig with an offense
which is a necessary means f or the commission of another.
544
544 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Hernandez, et al
The accuracy of this conclusion is borne out by the fact that, since 1850, when
the counterpart of our Article 48 was inserted in the Penal Code of Spain, or
for over a century, it does not appear to have been applied by the Supreme
Court thereof to crimes of murder committed in furtherance of an
insurrection.
Tncidentally, we cannot accept the explanation that crimes committed
as a means necessary for the success of a rebellion had to be prosecuted
separately under the provisions of Article 259 of the Penal Code of Spain,
which is the counterpart of Article 244 of our old Penal Code. To begin with,
these articles are part of a substantive law. They do not govern the manner
or method of prosecution of the culprits. Then again, said precepts ordain
that common crimes committed during a rebellion or sedition, or on the
occasion thereof, "shall be respectively punished according to the provisions
of this Code." Among such provisions was Article 90 (later Article 71, then
Article 75) of the Spanish Penal Code, and Article 89 of our old Penal Code,
of which Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines is a
substantial reproduction. Hence, had the Supreme Court of Spain or the
Philippines believed that murders committed as a means necessary to
attain the aims of an uprising were "common" crimes, the same would have
been complexed with the rebellion or sedition, as the case may be.
The cases of People vs. Cabrera (43 Phil., 64) and Peopte vs. Cabrera (43
Phil., 82) have not escaped our attention. Those cases involved members of
the constabulary who rose publicly, for the purpose of performing acts of
hate and vengeance upon the police force of Manila, and in an encounter
with the latter, killed some members thereof. Charged with and convicted
of sedition in the first case, they were accused of murder in the second case.
They pleaded double jeopardy in the second case, upon the ground that the
facts alleged in the information were those set forth in the charge in the
first case, in which they had
545
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 545
People vs. Hernandez, et al.
been convicted. This plea was rejected upon the ground that the organic law
prohibited double jeopardy for the same offense, and that the offense of
sedition is distinct and different f rom that of murder, although both were
the result of the same act.
The question whether one offense was inherent in, or identified with, the
other was not discussed or even considered in said cases. Besides, the lower
court applied,in the murder case Article 89 of the old Penal Code—which is
the counterpart of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code—but this
Court refused to do so. Again, simply because one act may constitute two or
more offenses, it does not follow necessarily that a person may be
prosecuted for one after conviction for the other, without violating the
injunction against double jeopardy. For instance, if a man fires a shotgun
at another, who suffers thereby several injuries, one of which produced his
death, may he, after conviction for murder or homicide, based upon said
fatal injury, be accused or convicted, in a separate case, for the non-fatal
injuries sustained by the victim? Or may the former be convicted of the
complex crime of murder or homicide with serious and/or less serious
physical injuries? The mere formulation of these questions suffices to show
that the limitation of the rule on double jeopardy to a subsequent
prosecution for the same offense does not constitute a license for the
separate prosecution of two offenses resulting from the same act, if one
offense is an essential element of the other. At any rate, as regards this phase
of the issue, which was not touched in the Cabrera cases, the rule therein
laid down must necessarily be considered modified by our decision in the
cases of People vs. Labra(46 Off. Gaz., Supp. No. 1, p. 159)
and Crisologo vs. People and Villalobos (supra,), insofar as inconsistent
therewith.
The main argument in support of the theory seeking to complex rebellion
with murder and other offenses is that "war"—within the purview of the
laws on rebellion and sedition—may be "waged" or "levied" without killing.
546
546 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Hernandez, et al.
This premise does not warrant, however, the conclusion—drawn
therefrom—that any killing done in furtherance of a rebellion or sedition is
independent therefrom, and may be complexed therewith, upon the ground
that destruction of human life is not indispensable to the waging or levying
of war. A person may kill anothsr without inflicting physical injuries upon
the latter, such, for instance, as by poisoining, drowning, suffocation or
shock. Yet it is admitted that he who f atally stabs another cannot be
convieted of homicide with physical injuries. So too, it is undeniable that
treason may be committed without torturing or murdering anybody. Yet, it
is well-settled that a citizen who gives aid and comfort to the enemy by
taking direct part in the maltreatment and assassination of his (citizen's)
countrymen, in furtherance of the wishes of said enemy, is guilty of plain
treason, not complexed with murder or physical injuries, the later being—
as charged and proven—mere ingredients of the former. Now then, if
homicide may be an ingredient of treason, why can it not be an ingredient
of rebellion? The proponents of the idea of rebellion complexed with
homicide, etc., have not even tried to answer this question. Neither have
they assailed the wisdom of our aforementioned decisions in treason cases.
The Court is conscious of the keen interest displayed, and the
considerable efforts exerted, by the Executive Department in the
apprehension and prosecution of those believed to be guilty of crimes
against public order, of the lives lost, and the time and money spent in
connection therewith, as well as of the possible implicatlons or
repercussions in the security of the State. The careful consideration given
to said policy of a coordinate and coequal branch of the Government is
reflected in the time consumed, the extensive and intensive research work
undertaken, and the many meetings held by the members of the court for
the purpose of elucidating on the question under discussion and of settling
the same.
547
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 547
People vs. Hernandez, et al.
The role of the judicial department under the Constitution is, however,
clear—to settle justiceable controversies by the application of the law. And
the latter must be enf orced as it is—with all its flaws and def ects, not
affecting its validity—not as the judges would have it. In other words, the
courts must apply the policy of the State as set forth m its laws, regardless
of the wisdom thereof.
It is evident to us that the policy of our statutes on rebellion is to consider
all acts committed in furtherance thereof—as specified in Articles 134 and
135 of the Revised Penal Code—as constituting only one crime, punishable
with one single penalty—namely, that prescribed in said Article 135. It is
interesting to note, in this connection, that the penalties provided in our old
Penal Code (Articles 230 to 232) were much stiffer, namely:
1. 1.Life imprisonment to death—for the promoters, maintainers and leaders
ol the rebellion, and, also, for subordinate officers who held positions of
authority, either civil or ecclesiastical, if the pufpose of the movement was
to proclaim the independence of any portion of the Philippine territory;
2. 2.Reclusion temporal in its maximum period—for said promoters,
maintainers and leaders of the insurrection, and for its subordinate
officers, if the purpose of the rebellion was any of those enumerated in
Article 229, except that mentioned in the preceding paragraph;
3. 3.Rechtswn temporal: (a) for subordinate officers other than those already
adverted to; and (&) for mere participants in the rebellion f alling under
the first paragraph of No. 2 of Article 174; and
4. 4.Prision mayor in its medium period to reclusion temporal in its minimum
period—for participants not falling under No. 3.
After the cession of the Philippines to the United States, the rigors of the
old Penal Code were tempered. Its aforementioned provisions were
superseded by section 3 of Act No. 292, which reduced the penalty to
imprisonment f or not
548
548 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Hernandez, et al.
more than ten (10) years and a fine not exceeding $10,000, or F20,000, for
"every person who incites, sets on foot, assists or engages in any rebellion
or insurrection * * * or who gives aid and comfort to any one so engaging in
such rebellion or insurrection." Such liberal attitude was adhered to by the
authors of the Revised Penal Code. The penalties therein are substantially
identical to those prescribed in Act 292. Although the Revised Penal Code
increased slightly the penalty of imprisonment for the promoters,
maintainers and leaders of the uprising, as well as for public officers joining
the same, to a maximum not exceeding twelve (12) years of prision mayor, it
reduced the penalty of imprisonment for mere participants to not more than
eight (8) years of prision mayor, and eliminated the fine.
This benign mood of the Revised Penal Code becomes more significant
when we bear in mind it was approved on December 8, 1930 and became
effective on January 1, 1932. At that time the communists in the
Philippines had already given ample proof of their widespread activities
and of their designs and potentialities. Prior thereto, they had been under
surveillance by the agents of the law, who gathered evidence of their
subversive movements, culminating in the prosecution of Evangelista,
Manahan (57 Phil., 354; 57 Phil., 372), Capadocia (57 Phil., 364), Feleo (57
PhiL, 451), Nabong (57 Phil., 455), and others. In fact, the first information
against the first two alleged that they committed the crime of inciting to
sedition "on and during the month of November, 1930, and for sometime
prior and subsequent thereto."
As if this were not enough, the very Constitution adopted in 1935,
incorporated a formal and solemn declaration (Article II, section 5)
committing the Commonwealth, and, then the Republic of the Philippines,
to the "promotion of social justice". Soon later, Commonwealth Act No. 103,
creating the Court of Industrial Relations, was passed.
549
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 549
People vs. Hernandez, et al.
Then followed a number of other statutes implementing said constitutional
mandate. It is not necessary to go into the details of said legislative
enactments. Suffice it to say that the same are predicated upon a
recognition of the f act that a good many of the problems confronting the
State are due to social and economic evils, and that, unless the latter are
removed or, least minimized, the former will keep on harrassing the
community and affecting the wellbeing of its members.
Thus, the settled policy of our laws on rebellion, since the begining of the
century, has been one of decided leniency, in comparison with the laws
enforce during the Spanish regime. Such policy has not suffered the
slightest alteration. Although the Government has, for the past five or six
years, adopted a more vigorous course of action in the apprehension of
violators of said law and in their pwsecution, the established policy of the
State, as regards the punishment of the culprits has remained unchanged
since 1932. It is not for us to consider the merits and demerits of such policy.
This falls within the province of the policy-making branch of the
government—the Congress of the Philippines. However, the following
quotation from Cuello Calon indicates the schools of thought on this subject
and the reason that may have influenced our lawmakers in making their
choice:
"Durante muchos siglos, hasta tiempos relativamente cercanos, se reputaban los
hechos que hoy llamaxnos delitos politicos como mas graves y peligrosos que los
crimenes comunes. Se consideraba que mientras estos solo causan un dafio
individual, aquellos producen profundas perturbaciones en fla vida collectiva
llegando a poner en peligro la mis/ma vida del Estado. En consonancia con estas
ideas fueron reprimidos con extraordinaria severidad y designados con la
denominacion romana de delitos de lesa majestad se catalogaron en las leyes
penales como los crimenes mas temibles.
"Pero desde hace poco mds de un siglo se ha realizado en este punto una transf
ormacion profunda merced a la cual la delincuencia politica dejo de apreciarse con
los severos criterios de antano quedando sometida a un regimen penal, por regla
general suave y benevolo.
550
550 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Hernandez, et al.
"El origen de este cambio se remonta, segun opinion muy difundida, a la revolucion
que tuvo lugar en Francia en el ano 1830. El gobierno de Luis Felipe establecio
una honda separacion entre los delitos comunes y los politicos, siendo estos
sometidos a una penalidad mas suave y sus autores exceptuados de la extradicion.
Irradiando a otros paises tuvieron estas tan gran difusion que en casi todos los de
regimen liberal-individualista se ha llegado a crear un tratamiento desprovisto de
severidad para la represion de estos hechos. No solo las penas con que se
conminaron perdieron gran parte de su antigua dureza, sino que en algunos paises
se creo un regimen penal mas suave para estos delicuentes, en otros se abolio para
ellos la pena de muerte. Tan profundo contraste eiitre el antiguo y el actual
tratamiento de la criminalidad politica en la mayoria de los paises solo puede ser
explicado por las ideas nacidas y difundidas bajo los regimenes politicos liberales
acerca de estos delitos y delincuentes. Por una parte se ha afirmado que la
criminalidad de estos heqhos no contiene la misma inmoralidad que la
delincuencia comuri, que es tan solo relativa, que depende del tiempo, del lugar,
de las circumstandias, de las instituciones del pais. Otros invocan la elevacion de
los moviles y sentimientos determinantes de estos hechos, el amor a la patria, la
adhesion ferviente a determinadas ideas o principios, el espiritu de sacrificio por
el triunfo de tm ideal.
"Contra su trato benevolo, del que no pocas veces se han beneficiado peligrosos
malhechores, se ha iniciado hace algun tiempo una fuerte reaccion (vease Cap. XV,
3.°, b), que llego a alcanzar considerable severidad en las legislaciones de tipo
.autoritario, y que tambien ha hallado eco, en forma mas suave, en las de otros
paises de constitucion democratica en los que, especialmente en los ultimos aiios,
la frecuencia de agitaciones politicas y sociales ha originado la publicacion de
numerosas leyes encaminadas a la proteccion penal del Estado." (Cuello Calon,
Derecho Penal, Tomo 1, pp. 250-252.)
Such evils as may result from the failure of the policy of the
law punishing the offense to dovetail with the policy of the law enforcing
agencies in the apprehension and prosecutionof the off'enders are matters
which may be brought to the attention of the departments concerned. The
judicial branch can not amend the former in order to suit the latter. The
Court cannot indulge in judicial legislation without violating the principle
of separation of powers, and, hence, undermining the foundation of our
republican system. In short, we cannot accept the theory of the prosecution
without causing much bigger harm than
551
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 551
Peopte vs. Hernandez, et al.
that which would allegedly result f rom the adoption of the opposite view.
In conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations of the amended
information against defendant-appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the
murders, arsons and robberies described therein are mere ingredients of the
crime of rebellion allegedly committed by said defendants, as means
"necessary" (4) for the perpetration of said offense of rebellion; that the
crime charged in the aforementioned amended information is, therefore,
simple rebellion, not the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder,
arsons and robberies; that the maximum penalty imposable under such
charge cannot exceed twelve (12) years of prisidn mayor and a fine of
F20,000; and that, in conformity with the policy of this court in dealing with
accused persons amenable to a similar punishment, said defendant may
may be allowed bail.
It is urged that, in the exercise of its discretion, the Court should deny
the motion under consideration, because the security of the State so
requires, and because the judgment of conviction appealed from indicates
that the evidence of guilt of Amado V. Hernandez is strong. However, as
held in a resolution of this court, dated January 29, 1953, in the case
of Montano vs. Ocampo (G. R. L-6352):
"* * * to deny bail it is not enough that the evidence of guilt is strong; it must also
appear that in case of conviction the defendant's criminal liability would probably
call for a capital punishment. No clear or conclusive showing before this Court has
been made."
In fact, in the case at bar, defendant Amado V. Hernandez was sentenced
by the lower court, not to the extreme penalty, but to life
imprisonment. Furthermore, individual f reedom is too basic, too
transcendental and vital in a republican state, like ours, to be denied upon
mere general principles and abstract consideration of public safety. Indeed,
the preservation of liberty is such a major preoccupation of our political
system that, not satisfied
________________
4In the language of the information.
552
552 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Hernandez, et al.
with guaranteeing its enjoyment in the very first paragraph of section (1)
of the Bill of Rights, the framers of our Constitution devoted paragraphs
(3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18), and (21) of
said section (1) to^ the protection of several aspects of freedom. Thus,, in
line with the letter and spirit of the fundamental law, we said in the
aforementioned case of Montano vs.Ocampo:
"Exclusion from bail in capital offenses being an exception to the otherwise
absolute right guaranteed by the constitution, the natural tendency of the courts
has been toward a fair and liberal appreciation, rather than otherwise, of the
evidence in the determination of the degree of proof and presumption of guilt
necessary to warrant a deprivation of that right."
* * *
"In the evaluation of the evidence the probability of flight is one other important
factor to be taken into account. The sole purpose of confining accused in jail before
conviction, it has been obseryed, is to assure his presence at the trial. In other
words, if denial of bail is authorized in capital cases, it is only on the theory that
the prOof being strong, the defendant would flee, if he has the opportunity, rather
than face the verdict of the jury. Hence, the exception to the fundamental right to
be bailed should be applied in direct ratio to the extent of the probability of evasion
of prosecution.
"The possibility of escape in this case, bearing in mind the defendant's official
and social standing and his other personal circumstances, seems remote if not nil."
This view applies f ully to Amado V. Hernandez, with the particularity that
there is an additional circumstance in his favor—he has been detained since
January 1951, or for more than five (5) years, and it may still take some
time to dispose of the case, for the same has not been, and is not in a position
to be, included, as yet, in our calendar, inasmuch as the briefs for some
appellants—other than Hernandez—as well as the brief for the
Government, are pending submission. It should be noted, also, that the
decision appealed from the opposition to the motion in question do not
reveal satisfactorily and concrete, positive
553
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 553
People vs. Hernandez, et al.
act of the accused showing, sufficiently, that his provincial release, during
the pendency of the appeal, would jeopardize the security of the State.
Wherefore, the aforementioned motion for bail of defendant-appellant
Amado V. Hernandez is hereby granted and, upon the filing of a bond, with
sufficient sureties, in the sum of P30,000, and its approval by the court, let
said defendant-appellant be provisionally released. Is is so ordered.
Parás, C. J., Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo and Reyes. J. B. L., JJ., concur.
Bengzon, J., concurs in the result.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
Amado V. Hernandez and others were charged in the Court of First
Instance of Manila with the crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons
and robberies. The body of the information charged that he and his co-
defendants conspired and that "as a necessary means to commit the crime
of rebellion, in connection therewith and in furtherance thereof," "have then
and there committed acts of murder, pillage, looting, plunder, arson, and
planned destruction of private and public property to create and spread
chaos, disorder, terror, and fear so as to facilitate the accomplishment of
the aforesaid purpose," and recited the different crimes committed by the
defendants. After trial Amado V. Hernandez was found guilty and
sentenced to suffer life imprisonment from which judgment and sentence
he appealed. The appeal is pending in this Court.
Upon the ground that there is no complex crime of rebellion with murder,
the penalty provided for to be imposed upon persons found guilty of
rebellion being prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P20,000 only, the
SEC. 7. Capital offenses—burden of proof.—On the hearing of an applieation
for admission to bail made by any person who is in custody for the eommission of
a capital offense, the burd'en of showing that evidence of guilt is strong is on the
prosecution.
SEC. 13. Bail on appeal.—Bail upon appeal must conform in all respects as
provided for in other cases of bail.
According to this Rule, a defendant in a criminal case after a judgment of
conviction by the Justice of the Peace Court and before conviction by the
Court of First Instance is entitled to bail. After conviction by the Court of
First Instance he, upon application, may still be bailed in non-capital
offenses but at the discretion of the court. When the information charges a
capital offense the defendant is not entitled to bail if the evidence of his
guilt is strong. Of course this means before conviQtion. After conviction for
a capital offense, the defendant has absolutely no right to bail, because even
before conviction a defendant charged with capital offense is not entitled to
1

bail if the evidence of guilt is strong. So that

majority grants the petition for bail filed by the appellant.
_______________
1Article 135, Revised Penal Code.
554
554 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Hernandez, et al.
Section 1, paragraph 16, Article III, of the Constitution provides:
All persons shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, except those
charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong. Excessive bail shall
not be required. (Italics supplied.)
The pertinent sections of Rule 110 provide:
SEC. 3. Offenses less than capital before conviction by the Court of First Instance.—
After judgment by a justice of the peace and before conviction by the Court of First
Instance, the defendant shafll be admitted to bail as of right.
SEC. 4. Noncapital offenses after conviction by the Court of First Instance.—
After convictioh by the Court of First Instance defendant may, upon application,
be bailed at the discretion of the court.
SEC. 5. Capital offenses defined. A capital offense, as the term is used in this
rule, is an offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission, and
at the time of the application to be admitted to bail, may be punished by death.
SEC. 6. Capital offenses not bailable.—No person in custody for the commission
of a capital offense shall be admitted to bail if the evidence of his guilt is strong.
555
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 555
People vs. Hernandez, et al.
should a defendant charged with a capital offense apply for bail before
conviction, the prosecution must establish and show that the evidence of
the defendant's guilt is strong if the applieation for bail be objected to. After
conviction of a defendant charged with a capital offense there is no stronger
evidence of his guilt than the judgment rendered by the trial court. The
judgment is entitled to full faith and credit. Until after the evidence shall
have been reviewed and the reviewing court shall have found that the trial
court committed error in convicting the defendant of the crime charged, the
judgment and sentence of the trial court in such criminal case must be
taken at its face value and be given full faith and credit by this Court.
Without a review of the evidence presented in the case, the majority has
taken up and discussed the question whether, under and pursuant to the
provisions of article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, the complex crime of
rebellion with murder may arise or exist or be committed and has reached
the conclusion that murder as an incident to rebellion is integrated,
imbibed, incorporated, or absorbed in, or part and parcel of, the last
mentioned crime. For that reason it is of the opinion that, as the
information filed against Amado V. Hernandez does not charge a capital
offense, he may be admitted to bail at the discretion of the Court.
Even if the majority opinion that the crime charged in the inf ormation
is rebellion only—a non-capital offense—be correct, still the granting of bail
after conviction is discretionary, and I see no plausible reason for the
reversal of this Court's previous stand, because the security of the State is
at stake.
For these reasons I dissent.
MONTEMAYOR, J., dissenting:
Unable to agree to the resolution of the majority, I am constrained to
dissent therefrom, not so much from
556
556 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Hernandez, et al.
the part thereof granting the motion for bail, as where it holds not only that
there can be no complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, robbery,
arson, etc., but that these crimes when committed during and on the
oceasion of a rebellion, are absorbed by the latter. The new doctrine now
being laid down besides being, to my mind, quite radical and in open and
clear contravention of public policy, is fundamental and of far-reaching
consequences, and I feel it myMuty not only to voice my dissent but also to
state the reasons in support thereof.
The resolution cites and quotes Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code to
support its theory that the five acts enumerated therein particularly those
of engaging in war against the forces of the government, destroying
property and committing serious violence, cover all the murders, robberies,
arsons, etc., committed on the occasion of or during a rebellion; and it
procefeds to assert that the expressions used in said article, such as
engaging in war against the forces of the government and committing
serious violence imply everything that war connotes such as physical
injuries and loss of life. In this connection, it is of profit and even necessary
to refer to Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code defining and describing
how the crime of rebellion is committed.
"ART. 134. Rebellion or insurrection—How committed.—The crime of rebellion or
insurrection is committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the
Government for the purpose of iremoving from the allegiance to said Government
or its laws, the territory of the Pihlippine Islands or any part thereof, of any body
of land, naval or other armed forces, or of depriving the Chief Executive or the
Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives."
According to the above article, rebellion is committed by rising publicly and
taking arms against the government for the purpose or purposes
enumerated in said article. In other words, the commission of rebellion is
complete and consummated if a group of persons for the
557
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 557
People vs. Hernandez, et al.
purposes enumerated in the article, rise publiely, take up arms and
assemble. It is not necessary for its consummation that anybody be injured
or killed, be it a, government soldier or civilian, or that innocent persons be
forcibly deprived of their properties by means of robbery or that their stores
and houses be looted and then burned to the ground. Stated differently,
murders, robberies, arsons, etc., are not necessary or indispensable in the
commission of rebellion and, consequently, are not ingredients or elements
of the latter.
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code providing for "Penalty for complex
crimes" reads thus:
"ART. 48. Penalty for complex crimes.—When a single act constitutes two or more
grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for
committmg: the other, the penalty for the inost serious crlme shall be imposed, the
same to be applied in its maxinram periocL" (As amended by Act No. 4000.)
For better understanding, I deem it advisable to ascertain and explain the
meaning of the phrase "necessary means" used in Article 48. "Necessary
means" as interpreted by criminologists, jurists and legal commentators,
does not rnean indispensable means, because if it did, then the offense as a
"necessary means" to commit another would be an indispensable element
of the latter and would be an ingredient thereof. That would be true in the
offense of trespass to dwelling to commit robbery in an inhabited house, or
the infliction of physical injuries to commit homicide or murder. The phrase
"necessary means" used in Article 48, merely signifies that for instanse, a
crime such as simple estafa can be and ordinarily is committed in the
manner defined and described in the Penal Code; but, if the "estafador"
resorts to or employs falsification, merely to facilitate and insure his
committing the estafa, then he is guilty of the complex crime of estafa thru
falsification. So, if one desiring to rape a certain woman, instead of waiting
for an opportunity where she could be alone or helpless, in
558
558 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Hernandez, et al.
the fields or some isolated place, abducts her by force and takes her to a
forest to ravish her; or he enters her home through a window at night and
rapes her in her room, then he is guilty of the complex crime of abduction
with rape or rape with tresspass to dwelling. The reason is that the
commission of abduction of tresspass to dwelling are not indispensable
means or ingredients of the crime of rape. They are but means selected by
the culprit to facilitate and carry out perhaps more quickly his evil designs
on his victim. Says the eminent Spanish commentator, Groizard, on this
point:
"Una cosa anologa acontece respecto de los delitos conexionados con una relacion
de medio a fin. Tanibien en ellos la unidad dc acto moral, que da vida al delito,
hace logica la imposicion de una sola pena. Preciso es, sin embargo, distinguir el
caso en que el delito medio sea medio necesario de realizar el delito fin, del caso en
que sea puramente medio, pero no medio indispensable. En aquel, el delito medio
no es, en realidad, sino una condicion precisa, una circumstancia sine qua non, un
elemento integral de la accion punible concebida como fin. Sin pasar por uno, seria
imposible llegar al otro. La voluntad, libre e inteligente, tiene entonces por unico
objeto llegar al delito fin. Si al recorrer su camino ha de pasar,
indispensablemente, por la comision de otro hecho punible, no dos, sino un delito
habra que castigar, toda vez que uno fue el mal libremente querido, no siendolo el
otro por si, sino en tanto que era necesario para obtener la realizacion del mal
proposito concebido."
* * * rebellion.
"Asi, hay que reconocer que es plausible que, cuando un delito es medio de
realizar otro, se imponga al culpable la pena correspondiente al mayor en su grado
maximo; pero que no los es si resulta que ha sido medio necesario. Por lo contrario,
para que sea justo el aumento de pena, con arreglo a la doctrina general acerca del
delito y las circunstancia agravantes, es preciso que existan y no se aprovechen
otros procedimientos, otros recursos, mas o menos faciles para consumar el delito.
Entonces la responsibilidad se hace mayor eligiendo un medio que sea un delito en
si. El que puede, haciendo uso de su libertad y de su inteligencia, escoger entre
varios procedimientos para llegar a un fin, y se decide por uno que por si solo
constituye delito, de este delito no necessario para la realizacion del proyectado
como fin, debe responder tambien."
* * *
559
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 559
People vs. Hernandez, et al.
"Ejemplo: el allanamiento de domicilio como medio de llegar al delito de violaci6n.
No es condicion necesaria, para que la violacion pueda realizarse, el entrar en la
morada ajena contra la voluntad de su dueiio. Sin esa circunstancia, el delito puede
existir. Ahora bien; si el criminal acepta como medio de llegar a la violacion el
allanamiento de domicilio, este delito y el de violacion deben ser castigados
observandose en la aplicacion del castigo una unidad de penalidad que guarde
cierta analogia con la unidad de pensamiento que llevo en ctilpable a la realizacion
de ambos delitos. Para estos y analogos casos, la razon aprueba la imposicion de
la mas grave de las penas en su grado maximo." (Groizard, El Codigo Penal de
1870, Tomo II, pp. 495-496.)
Applying the above observations to the crime of rebellion as definied in
Article 134, the same may be committed by merely rising publicly and
taking arms against the government, such as was done on several
occassions as alleged in the information for rebellion in the present case
where a group of Hukbalahaps, entered towns, overpowered the guards at
the Presidencia confiscated fireams and the contents of the municipal
treasurer's safe, exacted eontributions in the form of money, foodstuffs and
clothing from the residents and maintained virtual control of the town for
a few hours. That is simple but consummated rebellion. Murder, robbery,
arson, etc., are not necessary or indispensable to consummate the crime of
But in other cases, this group or other groups of dissidents in order to
facilitate achieving their objective to overthrow the government, according
to the findings of the trial courts in several cases of rebellion, resorted to
looting and robberies to raise funds to finance their movement, sometimes
killing civilians who refused to contribute or to be recruited to augment the
forces of the rebels or who were suspected of giving information to the
government forces of the movements of the dissidents. Sometimes, homes
of town and barrio residents are set on fire and burned to the ground in
reprisal or in order to strike terror into the hearts of the inhabi-
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People vs. Hernandez, et aL
tants, so that they would be more amenable to the rule and the demands of
the rebels. At other times, civilians were kidnapped for purposes of ransom,
and some hostages killed when the ransom was not paid or was not
forthcoming. In the raid on Camp Macabulos in Tarlac, besides shooting
down soldiers and officers, buildings were set on fire, including the hospital,
as a result of which, patients including a Red Cross nurse were killed. In
another case, a passenger bus containing about forty civilian passengers in
Sta. Cruz, Zambales, was held up by these armed dissidents; the passengers
were robbed of their money and jewelry and fourteen of them were shot to
death. The party of Mrs. Aurora Quezon while on its way to the town of
Baler, was ambushed in Bongabong, Nueva Ecija by the dissidents and
several members of the party, including herself, her daughter, her son-in-
law, Mayor Bernardo of Quezon City, and others were killed, and their
persons despoiled of jewelries and belongings. It is clear that all these acts
of murder, vandalism, banditry and pillage cannot be regarded as
ingredients and indispensable elements of the crime of rebellion. The
aforecited acts and cases, the enumeration of which is far from complete,
are not based on mere suspicion or hearsay. They are alleged as facts in the
numerous counts contained in complaints or informations for rebellion with
multiple murder, robbery, arson, kidnapping, etc. in several separate cases
in the Courts of First Instance, some still pending trial but quite a number
already decided and now pending appeal before us. There must be much
truth to these charges and counts because in the case against Huk Supremo
Luis Taruc, William Pomeroy et al., (criminal case No. 19166 C.F.I., Manila)
Pomeroy pleaded guilty to all the thirty counts against him; so did Taruc
after seven counts had been eliminated from the thirty contained in the
information. Among the twenty three counts remaining to which Taruc
pleaded guilty were the holding
561
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 561
People vs. Hernandez, et al.
up of forty civilians in a passenger bus in Sta. Cruz, Zambales, and the
night raid on Camp Macabulos where hospital patients and a Red Cross
nurse were killed.
Since the above mentioned crimes of multiple murder, robbery,
kidnapping, ete., are not ingredients of rebellion nor indispensable to its
commission but only means selected and employed by the offenders to
commit rebellion and achieve their goal, a complex crime is committed
under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
Going back to the theory of the majority in the resolution that the phrase
engaging in war and committing serious violence used in Article 134, covers
the crimes of murder, robbery, arson, etc., committed during a rebellion, I
emphatically disagree. Engaging in war and levying war, against the
government, are general terms employed in the United States statutes to
define rebellion and treason. They are used interchangeably and have the
same meaning in our law on rebellion and treason, (Articles 114, 134, 135,
Revised Penal Code) which are based on Act 292 of American origin. They
do not necessarily mean actual killing of government troops, much less of
innocent civilians.
"Levying War.—The assembling of a body of men for the purpose of effecting by
force a treasonable object; and all who perform any part, however, minute, or
however remote from the scene of action, and who are leagued in the general
conspiracy, are considered as engaged in levying war, within the meaning of the
constitution." (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Vol. 2, p. 1938.)
This Tribunal defines "levying war" in the case of U. S. vs.Lagnason, 3
PhiL, 478-9, thus:
"Whatever differences there may have been among the early judges as to whether
an armed resistance to the enforcement of a public law (see Act No. 292, section 5,
1) constituted a levying of war or not, and was or was not treason, yet they were
all unanimous in holding that acts of violence committed by an armed body of men
with the purpose of overthrowing the Govern-
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562 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Hernandez, et al.
ment was "levying war against the United States," and was therefore treason,
whether it was done by ten men or ten thousand. (See United States vs. Hanway,
2 WalL, jr., 139; 26 Fed. Cases, 105.)
* * *
"As the act of engaging in a rebellion is levying war, and therefore treason, the
same act seems to be punished by both sections and in different ways." (U.
S. vs. Lagnason, 3 Phil., 48-9.)
Just as a citizen can commit treason by adhering to the enemy and
committing treasonable overt acts such as pointing out and helping arrest
guerrillas, accompanying enemy soldiers on patrol and giving valuable
information to the enemy, without himself killing anyone of his
countrymen, this although Article 114 uses the phrase levying war to define
treason, so, although Article 135 uses the phrase "engaging in war", a group
of individuals may also commit rebellion by merely rising publicly and
taking arms against the government without firing a single shot or
inflicting a single woimd.
But the majority says that serious violence mentioned in Article 134 may
include murder. To me, this view is untenable. From serious violence to the
capital offense of murder, certainly, is a far cry. Besides, serious violence
can also be on things. In my opinion, the different acts mentioned in Article
135, among them, destroying property, committing serious violence,
exacting contributions or diverting public funds, instead of giving license
and unlimited leave to rebels and dissidents to engage in mass murder,
looting and wholesale destruction of property, on the contrary, serve to limit
and restrict the violations of law that may be included in and absorbed by
rebellion. Article 135 mentions those acts which generally accompany a
public armed uprising. When rebels raid a town or barrio, manhandling of
civilians who obstruct their movements or fail to carry out their orders such
as to lend their carabaos and carts for transportation
563
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 563
People vs. Hemandez, et al.
purposes, or to contribute food, clothes, medicines, money etc., may be
expected. The rebels may employ force to disarm the policeman guarding
the Presidencia and if he offers resistance beat him up or, once inside, break
down the door of the treasurer's office, blow up his safe and carry away the
money contents thereof. All these acts involve violence, even serious
violence on persons and things, including diversion of public funds. But
knowing that these law violations, relatively not serious, are generally
unavoidable in public armed uprisings involving hastily assembled persons
and groups with little discipline' the law tolerates them, considering them
as part of the rebellion. But when rebels rob innocent civilians, kidnap them
for purposes of ransom, even kill them merely because they fail to pay the
ransom, and civilian houses are put to the torch, endangering the lives of
the inmates; when civilians are killed for refusing to contribute, or on mere
suspicion of their giving information to the government, I cannot believe
that these brutal act are condoned by the law and are to be included in the
crime of rebellipn.
The majority leans heavily on our decisions in several treason cases
wherein we refused or failed to convict of the complex crime of treason with
multiple murder. To me, those cases are neither controlling nor applicable
for several reasons. Almost invariably, indictment in those treason cases
alleged the killings committed by the indictees as ingrediente and elements
of treason. They are mentioned as the overt acts to establish and prove
treason. Naturally, the court held that being ingred'ients of the crime of
treason they cannot be considered as distinct and separate offenses for the
purpose of applying Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. Another reason
is that, treason being a capital offense, this court did not see any immediate
necessity for considering and applying the theory of complex crime because
the result would in many cases be practically the same. In other words,
treason might yet be said to absorb the crime of homicide, even
564
564 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Hernandez, et al.
of murder, because as regards the penalty, they are of the same category.
Still another reason, not an unimportant one is that at that time, opinion
among the members of this Tribunal on the question of complex crime of
treason with homicide, sedition with murder and rebellion with murder,
arson, robbery, etc., had not yet crystalized, one way or the other. So, we
preferred to avoid ruling on the issue, specially since by considering the
commission of murder, robbery, etc., in treason as aggravating the crime,
we would achieve the same result as regards the penalty to be imposed.
But in the case of People vs. Perfecto Labra, G. R. No. 1240, May 12,
1949, this court through Mr. Justice Bengzon, accepted the view of the
Solicitor General that under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, Labra
was guilty of the complex crime of treason with murder, as shown by the
dispositive part of otir decision in that case, which is quoted below:
"Wherefore, the verdict of guilt must be affirmed. Artiele 48, 114 and 248 of the
Revfsed Penal Code are applicable to the offense of treason with murder. However,
for lack of sufficient votes to impose the extreme penalty, the appellant will be
sentenced to life imprisonment."
The only reason why the death penalty was not imposed in said case was
because of lack of sufficient votes but evidently, the Justices were agreed as
to the application of Article 48 of the Penal Code regarding complex crimes.
Then In the treason case of People vs. Barrameda, 85 PhiL, 789, 47 Off.
Gaz., 5082, on the strength of our deeision in the case of Labra, the Solicitor
General recommended that Barrameda be also convicted of the eomplex
crime of treason with multiple murder and sentenced to death. This
Tribunal accepted the Solicitor GeneraPs recommendation and imposed the
death penalty in the following language:
"We entertain not the least doubt as to the guilt of the appellant. His very counsel
de oficio who made an analysis of the testimonies of the witnesses for the
prosecution and painstakingly stated them in detail in his brief, agrees that his
client is guilty
565
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 195 565
People vs. Hernandez, et al.
although he prays that the sentence of life imprisonment be affirmed. The Solicitor
General, however, recommends that the penalty of death be imposed upon the
appellant. Considering that the treason committed by the appellant was
accompanied not only by the apprehension of Americans (U. S. citizens) and their
delivery to the Japanese forces which evidently later executed them, but also by
killing with his own hands not only one but several Filipinos, his own countrymen,
and that in addition to this, he took part in the mass killing and slaughter of many
other Filipinos, we are constrained to agree to said recommendation. However,
unpleasant, even painful is the compliance with our duty, we hereby impose upon
the appellant Teodoro Barrameda the penalty of death which will be carried out
on a day to be fixed by the trial court within thirty (30) days after the return of the
record of the case to said court."
With the two aforecited cases, it may not be said that the Supreme Court
has always held that there can be no complex crime of treason with murder.
The theory of the majority is that the crime of rebellion with the
maximum penalty of twelve years and fine, absorbs the other crimes of
murder, robbery, arson, kidnapping, etc., as long as the latter are
committed in the course and in furtherance of the former. The idea of one
crime absorbing a more serious one with a more severe penalty does not
readily appeal to the reasonable and logical mind which can only
eomprehend a thing absorbing another smaller or less than itself in volume,
in importance, in value or in category. That is why Judge Montesa in the
three cases, People vs. Hernandez, People vs. Espiritu,
and People vs. Medina, criminal cases Nos. 15481, 15479 and 1411
respectively, of the Court of First Instance, Manila, in his decision
convicting the accused therein, in disposing of the theory of absorption,
urged upon him by counsel for the defense to the effect that the crime of
rebellion absorbs the crime of murder, robbery, arson, etc., made the
following observations:
"The theory of absorption tenaciously adhered to by the defense to the effect that
rebellion absorbs all these more serious offenses is preposterous to ,say the least,
considering that it is both physically
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566 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Hernandez, et al.
and metaphysically imposible for a smaller unit or entity to absorb a bigger one."
(Montesa, J., People vs. Hernandez G. R. No. 15481, p. 78.)
We need not go into an academic discussion of this question because as a
matter of law, my opinion, criminal jurisprudence, expounding the criminal
law namely the Penal Code and the Penal Code of Spain, on which it is
based, expressly and clearly declare that the common crimes of murder,
robbery, arson, etc., committed in the course or by reason of rebellion, are
separate crimes, not to be merged in or absorbed by rebellion and should be
prosecuted separately. Article 259 of the Penal Code of Spain, of 1870 on
which our Penal Code promulgated in 1887, was based, provides as follow:
"Los delitos particulares cometidos en una rebellion o sedicion 6 con motivo de
ellas, seran castigados respectivamente, segun las disposiciones de este Codigo.
"Cuando no puedan descubrirse sus autores, seran penados como tales los jefes
principales de la rebelion 6 sedicion." (Groizard, El Codigo Penal de 1870, Tomo
III, Articulo 259, p. 649.)
In commenting on Article 259 of the Spanish Penal Code, Viada says:
" 'La disposicion del primer parrafo de este articulo no puede ser mas justa; con
arreglo a ella, los delitos particulares o comunes cometidos en una rebellion o
sedicion no deberan reputarse como accidentes inherentes a estas, sino como
delitos especiales a dicha rebellion y sedicion ajenos, los que deberan ser
respectivamente castigados con las penas que en este Codigo se les senalan. Pero
que delitos deberan considerarse como comunes, y cuafles como constitutivos de la
propia rebelion o sedicion? En cuanto a la rebelion, no ofrece este cuesti6n
dificultad alguna, pues todo hecho que no este comprendido en uno u otro de los
objetos especificados en los seis niimeros del Articulo 243 sera extrano a la
rebelion, y si se hallere definido en algun otro articulo del Codigo, con arreglo a
este debera ser castigado como delito particular.'" (Viada, Codigo Penal, Tomo II,
198-199.)
Pefia, another commentator, referring to Article 259 of the Spanish Penal
Code, has the following to say:
"La disposicion de este articulo es sobradamente justa, pero cuando se entendera
que el hecho es independiente de la insurgencia?
567
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 567
People vs. Hernandez, et al.
Tratandose de la rebelion no hay problema, pues toclos los fines que se indkan en
el Articulo 214 se distinguen facilmente de un asesinato, un robo, una violacion,
etc. El problema puede surgir con la sedicion, en cuyos tres ultimos ntimeros, dice
un autor, se tipifican conductas que muy bien pueden ser subsimidas en otros
lugares del Codigo. El T.S. parece que sigue est,e principio general: las
infracciones graves se considerdn como delitos independientes, en cambio los
heehos de menor gravedad puedan ser considerados como accidentes de la
rebelion. En este sentido, el T. S. ha declarado que son accidentes de la rebelion,
los desacatos y lesiones a la autoridad y otros delitos contra el orden piiblico, asi
como la resistencia o acometiendo a la fuerza publica (23 Mayo 1890). El abuso de
superioridad tambien es inherente el alzamiento tumultuario (19 noviembre
1906.)" (Pena Deredes Penal, Tomo II pp. 89-90.)
Another commentator, A. Quintano Ripolles, says of Article 259 of the
Spanish Penal Code, counterpart of Article 244 of our old Penal Code:
"La concurrencia de delitos consignada en este articulo no piiede ser mds
justa, bien que la dificultad persista siempre para determinar cuales han de ser
los particulares accidentales y cuales los integrantes de la propia subversion. Una
doctrina demasiado simplista, que ha sido a menudo seguida por la
Jurisprudencia, es la de estimar que, absorbiendo el delito mds grave al que lo es
menos, todo el que por debajo del de rebelion o sedicion sera anulado por este. Para
los de la misma naturaleza, la cosa es incuestionable, pero no para los que la
tengan diversa, entendiendo por la estrana e iraprecisa expresion de (particulares)
a las infracciones comunes o no politicas." (A. Quintano Eipolles, Comentarios al
Codigo Penal Vol. II, pp. 101-102; cursivas con nuestras.)
Another distinguished legal commentator gives his view on the same Article
259:
"Se establece aqui que en una rebelion 6 sedicion, o con motivo de ellas, comente
otros delitos (v. g., roba, mata o lesiona), seBd responsable de estos ademas de los
delitos de rebelion o sedicion. La dificultad consiste en estos casos en separar los
accidentes de la rebelion o sedicion de los delitos independientes de estas, y como
las leyes no contienen en este punto precepto alguno aplicable, su solucion ha
quedado encomendada a los tribunales. La jurisprudencia que estos han sentado
considera como accidentes de la rebelion o sedicion—cuya criminalidad queda
embebida en la de estos delitos, y, por tanto, no son punibles especialmente—los
hechos de escasa gravedad (v:g., atentados, desacatos, lesiones menos
568
568 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Hernandez, et al.
graves); por e'l contrario, las infracciones graves, como el asesinato o las lesiones
graves, se eonsideran como delitos independientes de la rebelion o de la sedieion,"
(Cfmello Gakm, Vol. .2 Dereeho Penal p. 110.)
Finally, 'Groizard, another eminent commentator of the Penal code of
Spain, in commenting on the same Article 259 of the Spanish Penal Code of
1870, says the following:
"No necesita ninguno el parrafo primero de este articulo. Aunque no se hubiera
escrito en el Codigo, harian los Tribunales lo que dice. Seria necesario para que asi
no sucediera el que fuera la rebelion un motivo de exencion de responsabilidad
criminal para las demas clases de delitos." (Groizard Tomo 3, 650.)
It will be seen that Spanish jurists and legal commentators are, with
reference to Article 259 of the Spanish Penal Code of 1870, unanimous in
the opinion that this provision of the Criminal Law is just and fair because
one should not take advantage of his committing the crime of rebellion by
committing other more serious crime such as murder, robbery, arson, etc.,
with impunity. The above much commented Article 259 of the Spanish
Penal Code has its counterpart in Article 244 of our old Penal Code in
practically the same wording and phraseology:
"ART. 24. All other crimes committed in the course of a rebellion of seditious
movement, or on occasion thereof, shall be punished in accordance with the rules
of this Code.
"If the perpetrators of such crimes can not be discovered, the principal leaders
of the rebellion or sedition shall be punished therefore as prineipals."
In this jurisdiction, we have faithfully observed and applied this penal
provision. In the cases of U. S. vs. Cabrera, et al., 43 PhiL, page 64 and page
82 for sedition and multiple murder respectively, wherein members of the
Philippine constabulary attacked and killed several policemen in the City
of Manila, this Court convicted said soldiers, first, of sedition and later, of
multiple murder, clear proof that the murders committed in the course of
and by reason of the sedition were not included in and, absorbed by sedition,
this despite the fact that our law
 569
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 569
People vs. Hernandez, et aL
on sedition then, section 5 of Act No. 292 uses the Words—rise publicly and
tinnHltuousIy, in order to attain by f orce or outside of legal methods any
of the following objects are guilty of seditioiu IB the imdtiple murder ease,
the sergeants and corporals of the constabulary, who took part in the killing
of the city policemen, were sentenced to death. This court in that case said:
"It is merely stating the obvicms to say that sedition is not the same offense as
murder. Sedition is a ctime against public order; murder is a crime against
persons. Sedition is a crime directed against the existence of the State, the
authority of the government, and the general public tranquility; murder is a crime
directed against the lives of individuals. (U. S. vs. Abad (1902) 1 Phil. 437.)
Sedition in its more general sense is the raising of commotions or disturbances in
the state; murder at common law is where a person of sound min(J and discretion
unlawfully kills any human being, in the peace of the sovereign, with malice
aforethought, express or implied.
"The oflfenses eharged in the two informations for sedition and murder are
perfectly distinct in point of law, howevery nearly they may be connected in point
of faet. Not alone are the offieiises "eo nomine" different, but the allegations in the
body of the informations are different. The gist of the infornaation for sedition is
the public and tumultuous uprising of the constabulary in order to attain by force
and outside of legal methods the object of inflicting an act of hate and revenge
upon the persons of the police force of the city of Manila by firing at them in several
placea in the city of Manila; the gist of the information in the murder case is that
the constabulary, conspiring together, illegally and criminally killed eight persons
aad gravely wcmnded three others. The crimes of murder and' serious physical
inj.uries were not necessarily included in the infoipnsDation for sedition; and the
defendants could not have been convictedi of these crimes under the first
information." (Phil. Vol. 43, pages 99-100.)
There is an insinuation made in the majority resolution, that the American
Law on sedition and rebellion, the origin of our present law on the subject,
is more benign and- liberal than its counterpart in the Spanish Penal Code,
defining and penalizing sedition and rebellion, and that under American
jurisprudence, rebellion and sedition include crimes like murder, robbery,
arson, etc., committed
570
570 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Hernandez, et al.
in the course thereof. But it will be noticed that of the nine Justices who
signed the decision in the case of People vs.Cabrera for multiple murder,
five, including Mr. Justice Malcolm, who penned the decision, were
Americans, supposed to be steeped in American Law and the common law,
and yet they all held that sedition where force is expected to be used, did
not include murder. It is evident that the insinuation made in the majority
resolution is not exactly borne out by the Cabrera case.
The majority asks why in the past, especially up to 1932, when our
Revised Penal Code was promulgated no one had ever been prosecuted,
much less convicted of rebellion or sedition complexed with murder,
robbery, etc., if it is true that there is such a complex crime of rebellion with
murder. For that matter, one may even ask why the constabulary soldiers
in the Cabrera case were not charged with the complex crime of sedition
with murder. The reason and the answer are obvious. Until 1932, the year
of the promulgation of our Revised Penal Code, our old Penal Code included
Article 244, the counter-part of Article 259 of the Spanish Penal Code, to
the effect that common crimes like murder, robbery, arson, committed on
the occasion or by reason of a rebellion or seditibn, are to be prosecuted
separately. That was why insurgents who committed rebellion or
insurrection with homicide or murder during the first days of the American
regime in the Philippines, could not be charged with the complex crime of
rebellion with murder; and that explains why Cabrera and his co-accused
could not be charged with the complex crime of sedition with multiple
murder, but were prosecuted separately for multiple murder.
The majority also asks why the insurgents in the year 1901 and 1902
were charged only with rebellion but never with murder despite the fact
that there was proof that they also had committed murder in the course of
the rebellion or insurrection. The reason to my mind was that, shortly
thereafter, came the proclamation of amnesty
571
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 571
People vs. Hernandez, et al.
issued by President McKinley of the United States, which amnesty covered
not only the crime of rebellion but also other violatioiis of the law committed
in the course of the rebellion.
Then came our Revised Penal Code promulgated in 1932. It is a revision
of our old Penal Code of 1887. One of the purposes of the revision was
simplification, and elimination of unnecessary provisions. In proof of this,
while our Penal Code of 1887 contained 611 articles, our Revised Penal
Code contains only 367 articles. Among the articles of the old Penal Code
not included in the Revised Penal Code, is Article 244. Does the omission or
elimination of Article 244 mean that now, common crimes like murder,
robbery, arson, etc., committed in the course of a rebellion or sedition are
absorbed by rebellion or sedition? Hardly. It cannot be that the committee
on revision and our legislators abandoned the idea and the theory contained
in said Article 244, because as I have already explained, all the Spanish
commentators and jurists commenting on this particular provision of the
Spanish Penal Code are agreed that it is a just and reasonable provision, so
that sedition and rebellion may not be utilized as a cloak of immunity in
the commission of other serious crimes, To me, the reason for the omission
is that it was really unnecessary. As Groizard said in his commentary
already reproduced, even if that provision were not embodied in the penal
code, the court would still apply said provision:
"No necesita ninguno el parrafo primero de este articulo. Aunque no se hubiera
escrito en el Codigo, harian los Tribunales lo que dice. Seria necesario para que asi
no sucediera el que fuera la rebelion un motivo de exencion de responsabilidad
criminal para las demas clases de delitos." (Groizard Tomo 3, p. 650.)
The members of the committee on revision of our old Penal Code who must
have been familiar with the opinion and comments of eminent Spanish
jurists, particularly the above comment of Groizard undoubtedly, deemed
the provision of Article 244 superfluous and unnecessary, and so
572
572 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Hernandez, et al.
omitted it in the revision. However, this omission of Article 244 of our Penal
Code in the new, has an important effect. No longer shall we be obliged to
prosecute murder, robbery, arson, kidnapping, etc., committed in the course
of and by reason of a sedition or a rebellion, separately. The prosecution is
now free to combine these common crimes with the crimes of sedition or
rebellion and charge a complex crime. And that is what has been done in
the prosecution of the numerous cases of rebellion.
This idea, this theory of complex crime of rebellion with mutiple murder,
etc., is not such a strange, extravagant or fantastic proposition or idea. We
are not the 'ohly ones holding this view. Out of seven separate cases, all
involving the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder and etc.,
decided in the Court of First Instance, not long ago, cases No. 14070—
People vs. Lava; No. 15841—People vs.Hernandez; No. 2878—
People vs. Capadocia; No. 10400—People vs. Salvador No. 2704—
People vs. Nava; No. 19166—People vs. Pomeroy and the same case
19166—People vs.Taruc, only one judge, Hon. Gregorio Narvasa, of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, held that there is no complex crime of
rebellion with murder, and his holding was based mainly if not entirely on
the decisions of this Tribunal in the treason cases which as I have already
explained, are not controlling or applicable. In the other cases, five judges
of Courts of First Instance, Judges Ocampo, Castelo, Barcelona, Gatmaitan,
and Montesa, held that there is such a complex crime of rebellion with
murder and actually convicted the accused of said complex crime. Again, in
the case of People vs. Umali, et al., criminal case No. 11087 of the Court of
Pirst Instance of Quezon Province, Judge Gustavo Victoriano, convicted the
accused of the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, etc.
Recently, in several criminal cases pending in Pangasinan, involving the
complex crimes of rebellion with multiple murder, etc., Judge Morfe of the
Court of First Instance of that province acting upon
573
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 573
People vs. Hernandez, et al.
motions to quash the informations on the ground that there was no such
complex crime of rebellion with murder and consequently, the informations
were not in accordance with law, for charging more than one offense, in a
well reasoned and considered order, denied the same and held that there is
a complex crime of rebellion with murder. Of course, these opinions of
judges of the lower courts are not binding on this tribunal but surely, they
are persuasive ard can not be ignored. At least, they show that there are
others, learned in the law, who subscribe to the theory of complex crime of
rebellion with murder, arson, etc.
Our decision in the case of People vs. Umali, (96 Phil., 185), promulgated
on November 29, 1954, is another proof that murders committed in the
course of sedition or rebellion are not absorbed by the latter. In said case,
this court in a unanimous decision found the defendants therein guilty of
sedition, multiple murder, arson, frustrated murder and physical injuries
and sentenced them accordingly. The question may again be asked, if there
is such a complex crime of sedition with murder, arson, etc., why were
Umali and his co-accused not convicted of this complex crime? The answer
is found in a portion of our decision in that ca&e which we quote:
"The last point to be determined is the nature of the offense or offenses committed.
Appellants were charged with and convicted of the complex crime of rebellion with
multiple murder, frustrated murder, arson and robbery. Is there such a complex
crime of rebellion with multiple murder, etc? While the Solicitor General in his
brief claims that appellants are guilty of said complex crime and in support of his
stand 'asks for leave to incorporate by reference' his previous alrguments in
opposing Umali's petition for bail, counsel for appellants considered it unnecessary
to discuss the existence or non-existence of such complex crime, saying that the
nature of the crime committed 'is of no moment to herein appellants because they
had absolutely no part in it whatsoever'. For the present, and with respect to this
particular case, we deem it unnecessary to decide this important and controversial
question, deferring its consideration and determination to another case or occasion
more opportune, when it is more directly and squarely raised and both
574
574 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Hernandez, et al.
parties given an opportunity to discuss and argue the question more adequately
and exhaustively. Considering that, assuming for the moment that there is no such
complex crime of rebellion with murder, etc., and that consequently appellants
could not have been legally charged with it, much less convicted of said complex
crime, and the information should therefore, be regarded as having charged more
than one offense, contrary to Rule 106, section 12 and Rule 113, section 2(e), of the
Rules of Court, but that appellants having interposed no objection thereto, they
were properly tried for and lawfully convicted if guilty of the several and separate
crimes charged therein, we have decided and we rule that the appellants may
properly be convicted of said several and separate crimes, as hereinafter specified.
We feel particularly supported and justified in this stand that we take, by the
result of the case, namely, that the prison sentence we impose does not exceed,
except perhaps in actual duration, that meted out by the court below, which is life
imprisonment."
The majority resolution invokes and applies the principle of the so
called pro reo in connection with Article 48 of our Revised Penal Code on
complex crimes, to the effect that said article should not be applied when
the resulting penalty exceeds the sum total of the several crimes committed
constituting the complex crime. According to the majority, the theory of pro
reo is that the principle of complex crime was adopted for the benefit of the
accused and not to his prejudice; so, it is to be applied when the maximum
of the penalty for the more serious crime is less in severity or duration of
imprisonment than the sum total of the several crimes committed, but not
otherwise. This is a novel theory in this jurisdiction. To my knowledge it
has never been advanced before. All along and during all these years, the
courts of this country not excluding this august tribunal had been applying
the provisions of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and its source, Article
89 of our Penal Code of 1887, regardless of whether or not the resulting
penalty was prejudicial to the accused. As a matter of fact, in most cases
the resulting penalty imposed by this tribunal in complex crimes was much
more severe and of longer duration (imprison-
575
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 575
People vs. Hernandez, et al.
ment) than the sum total of the two or more crimes committed. In the
numerous cases decided by this court involving the complex crime of estafa
through falsification, the maximum of the penalty for the more serious
crime of falsification was imposed although it exceeded the total of the
penalties for estafa and for falsification. In cases of rape with physical
injuries the maximum of the penalty for the crime of rape was imposed
although it exceeded in duration and severity the total of the penalty for
rape and that for the relatively light penalty for physical injuries. In the
case of People vs. Parulan (88 Phil., 615), involving the complex crime of
kidnapping with murder, this tribunal applied the provision of Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code and would have sentenced the accused to death,
were it not for one dissenting vote based not on the applicability of Article
48, but on the question of jurisdiction. Said this court:
"La pena que debe imponerse al acusado Parulan es la del delito mas grave de
secuestro en su grado maximo, o sea, pena capital. Pero el Magistrado Sr. Tuason,
consecuente con su opinion disidente en Parulan contra Rodas, supra, no puede
confirmar la pena capital impuesta por el Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Manila
que segun el no tenia jurisdiccion sobre la presente causa. En vista de este voto
disidente, el presidente del tribunal Sr. Paras y tres magistrados aunque creen
que el acusado Parulan, por las pruebas presentadas, merece pena capital, con
todo no pueden votar por la confirmacion porque el delito se cometio antes de la
aprobacion de la Ley de la Eepublica No. 296, que solo exige ocho votos para la
imposicion de la pena capital. Automaticamente, por ministerio de la ley debe
imponerse a Parulan la pena inmediatamente inferior a la de muerte, que es la de
reclusion perpetua con las accesorias." (88 Phil., p. 624.)
Then in the case of People vs. Guillen 47 Off. Gaz., 3433, involving the
* hecho constituya dos o mas delitos, o cuando el uno de ellos sea medio necesario
complex crime of murder and multiple attempted murder committed by the
accused with a single act of hurling a hand grenade at President Roxas, this
tribunal in a per curiam decision, ignoring the aggravating circumstances
that attended the commission of 4he crime, applied the maximum of the
penalty for the more serious
_______________
*85 Phil,, 307.
576
576 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Hernandez, et al.
crime of murder in accordance with Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
and sentenced the accused to death. Other instances and cases may be
cited ad libitum to show that in this jurisdiction and in this tribunal, the
principle of pro reo was never entertained, much less accepted.
Origin of pro reo principle
Up to the year 1908, the Spanish Penal Code had the following provisions
for complex crimes:
"Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no son aplicables en el caso de que un solo
hecho constituya dos o mas deflitos, o cuando el uno de ellos sea medio necesario
para cometer el otro.
"En estos casos solo se impondra la pena correspondiente al delito mas grave,
aplicandola en su grado maximo."
The above provisions were copied in our Penal Code of 1887 under Article
89 which reads thus:
"The provisions of the next preceding article are not applicable to cases in which a
single act constitutes two or more crimes, or when one offense is a necessary means
for committing the other.
"In these cases, only the penalty of the more serious crime shall be imposed,
the same to be applied in its maximum degree."
On January 3, 1908, the Spanish Penal Code was amended, particularly
paragraph 2 of Article 90 thereof so as to add to said paragraph the
following clause:
"Hasta el limite que represente la suma de las dos que pudieran imponerse,
penando separadamente ambos delitos."
so that since January 1908, Article 90 of the Spanish Penal Code reads:
"Las aisposiciones del articulo anterior no son aplicables en el caso de que un solo
para cometer el otro.
"En estos casos solo se impondra la pena correspondiente al delito mas grave,
aplicandola en su grado maximo hasta el limite que represente la suma de las dos
que pudieran imponerse, penando separadamente ambos delitos."
The amendment is the provision for the so called pro reorule. But we never
accepted much less followed said innovation in the Philippines. We did
not amend Article 89
577
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 577
People vs. Hernandez, et al.
of our old Penal Code particularly paragraph 2 thereof so as to add the
clause:
"Hasta el limite que represente la suma de las dos que pudieran imponerse,
penando separadamente ambos delitos."
inserted by the amending Spanish Law of January 3, 1908 to the second
paragraph of Article 90 of the Spanish Pen&3 Code. Furthermore, when we
draf ted and promulgated our Revised Penal Code in 1932 (Article No. 3815)
we ignored and did not accept the amendment to the Spanish Penal Code
that favored one accused of a complex crime as regards the penalty, so that
now our law on the subject is contained in Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code which as amended by Act No. 4000, reads as follows:
"AnT. 48. Penalty for complex erimes.—When a single act constitutes two or more
grave or less felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the
other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be
applied in its maximum period. (As amended by Act No. 4000.)
The majority resolution makes a more or less extensive dissertation and
citation of authorities on the law of extradition, intended to show that
common crimes such as murder, etc., committed on the occasion of or in the
course of the commission of political crimes like sedition and rebellion, are
not subject to extradition. We believe that these citations and these
arguments are neither relevant nor applicable. All we can say is that a
murder committed in the course of a rebellion or sedition may be considered
a political crime in contemplation of the extradition law and that a persoii
accused of said murder is not subject to extradition. But a crime may be
considered political from the standpoint of the extradition law and yet may
be regarded by the country where committed as a common crime separate
and distinct from the rebellion or sedition in the course of which it was
committed, and, consequently, subject to prosecution. Moreover, the fact
that a murder committed in the course of a sedition or rebellion is excluded
from the scope of the extradition agreement between
578
578 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Hernandez, et al.
nations, is proof and argument that were it not for its exclusion, the
member nations of the extradition agreement, where murders are
committed in the course of a rebellion or sedition may and would extradite
the offenders, on the theory that said murders are separate from and are
not absorbed by the rebellion or sedition; otherwise, there would be no need
for excluding such crimes of murder, arson, etc., committed during a
rebellion or sedition, from the scope of the extradition law. And among such
nations which consider these common crimes of murder, etc., as separate
from rebellion or sedition during which they were committed, are Spain, as
shown by Article 259 of its Penal Code, and the Philippines as illustrated
in the cases of U.S. vs. Cabrera and People vs.Umali, supra. Groizard lists
down several countries that consider common crimes committed during a
rebellion or sedition as subject to prosecution:
"Codigo del Canton de Zuxich.
S. 75. Si con motivo de la sedicion o como consecuencia fueren cottietidos otros delitos,
estos seran castigados conforme a las disposiciones penales para los mismos fijadas.
"Codigo de Peru.
ART. 145. Los reos de rebelion, sedicion motin 6 asonada son responsables de los delitos
especiales que cometen, observandose lo dispuesto en el Articulo 45.
AKT. 146. Si no pudiese averiguarse quien de los sublevados cometio el delito especial,
se hara responsable a los autores del tumulto.
"Codigo de Chile.
ART. 131. Los delitos particulares cometidos en un sublevacion 6 con motivo de ella, seran
castigados respectivamente con las penas designadas para ellos, no obstante le dispuesto
en el articulo 129.—Si no pueden descubrirse los autores, seran considerados y penados
como complices de tales delitos los jefes principales 6 subalternos de ttos sublevados que
hallandose en la posibilidad de impedirlos no lo hubieren hecho.
"Codigo del Paraguay.
ART. 380. Los delitos particulares cometidos en la sedicion 6 con motivo de ella, seran
castigados con la pena que les corresponda por las leyes respectivas.
579
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 579
People vs. Hernandez, et al.
"Codigo de la Republica Argentina.
ART. 231. Los que cometen delitos comunes con motivo de la rebelion motin 6 asonada 6
con ocasion de ella, seran castigados con la pena que corresponde a esos delitos.
"Codigo de Honduras.
ART. 224. (Como el xraestro.)
(Groizard, El Codigo Penal de 1870, Vol. 3, Artfculo 259, p. 650.)
In justice to the defendants-appellants in the present case, I wish to explain
and make clear that in mentioning and describing the serious crimes of
murder, robbery, arson, kidnapping, etc., alleged to have been committed
in the course of the rebellion or by reason thereof, I am not referring
particularly to the charge or charges and counts alleged against them. Their
case is now pending appeal in this tribunal and their guilt or innocence of
said charges or counts will be decided in due time. And so, I am not
imputing or attributing to them the serious violations of law I haVe
mentioned in this opinion. Rather, I am making general reference to the
informations filed in other cases, especially in the informations against Luis
Taruc and William Pomeroy which case is not only decided but also is
closed.
In conclusion, I hold that under the law and under general principles
rebellion punished with a maximum penalty of twelve (12) years and fme
cannot possibly absorb a much more serious crimes like murder or
kidnapping which are capital offenses and carry the maximum penalty of
death. It is hard for the mind to grasp the idea that a person committing
one lone murder may be headed for the electric chair; but if perpetrates
several murders, kidnappings, arsons, and robberies and during their
perpetration, was still committing another crime, that of trying to
ovorthrow his own government by force, then all he gets is twelve years and
fine. Since, the serious crimes like multiple murder, robbery, arson,
kidnapping, etc., committed during the rebellion are not ingredients of, nor
are they indispensable to the commission of rebellion, and were but means
freely selected by the rebels to facilitate
580
580 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Hernandez, et al.
their commission of rebellion or to achieve and specd up their realization of
their object, which was to overthrow the government and implant their own
system said to be of communistic ideology, then under Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code, the complex crime of rebellion with murder, etc., was
committed.
Judging by the numerous acts of atrocity contained in the several
informations filed against the rebels in different cases, not only government
soldiers and officers, but innocent civilians by the hundreds were murdered.
Stores and homes were looted; not only public buildings,
like presidencias and government hospitals, but also private buildings and
homes were burned to the ground. And as a result of these acts of terrorism,
entire barrios were abandoned and landowners, especially owners of landed
estates, evacuated to the provincial capitals or to the cities for personal
security. And it seems that these acts of banditry and pillage still continue
though on a smaller scale.
Settled public policy or the policy of the Government as regards rebellion
and the crimes against persons and property committed by the rebels is
clear. With their taxes, the citizens are maintaining a large army to put
down the rebellion. Substantial rewards ranging from P500 to FIOO',000
are offered for the apprehension of the rebels, specially the leaders. A rebel
leader with a P100,000 price on his head, after a campaign of several years
by the army, and after the loss of lives of many soldiers and civilian guides,
is finally captured. The government pays down the P100,000 to those
responsible for the capture and charges him with the complex crime of
rebellion with multiple murder, kidnapping, etc.,—a capital offense.
Pending trial, he asks to be released on bail and under the doctrine being
laid down by us, he is set at liberty, free to go back to the hills to resume
his dissident activities where he left off, by merely posting a bond
corresponding to a maximum imprisonment of twelve years (P12,000)
581
VOL. 99, JULY 18, 1956 581
People vs. Hernandez, et al.
and a fine the amount of which is left to the discretion of the trial court. If
he jumps his bail and assuming that the full amount of the bond is
confiscated, still, the Government which paid P100,000 for his capture is
the loser. It will have to wage another campaign to recapture him and
perhaps offer another reward for his apprehension. This would illustrate
the wide divergence between the policy of the Government and the present
ruling of the Court. That is not as it should be. The three departments of
the Government, the Executive, the Legi&lative and the Judicial
pepartment, though independent of each other, should f unction as a team,
harmoniously, and in cooperation, all f or the public welfare. They cannot
work at cross purposes. All three should be guided by the settled public
policy of the state and this applies to the courts. In the case
of Rubi vs.provincial board of Mindoro, 39 PhiL, pp. 718-19, this court
speaking about the relation between interpretation of the law by the courts
and public policy, said:
"As a point which has been left for the end of this decision and which, in case of
doubt, would lead to the determination that section 2145 is valid, is the attitude
which the courts should assume towards the settled policy of the Government. In
a late decision with which we are in full accord, Gamble vs. Vanderbilt University
(200 Southwegtern Reporter 510) the Chief of Justice of the Supreme Court of
Tennessee writes:
'We can see no objection to the application of public policy as a ratio
decidendi. Every really new question that comes before the courts is, in the last
analysis, determined on the theory, when not determined by differentiation of the
principle of a prior case or line of cases, or by the aid of analogies furnished by
such prior cases. Jn balancing conflicting solutions, that one is perceived to tip the
scales which the court believes will best promote the public welfare in its probable
operation as a general rule or principle.'
"Justice Holmes, in one of the aphorisms for which he is justly famous, said
that "constitutional law, like other mortal contrivances, has to take some chances.
(Blinn vs. Nelson [1911] 222 U.S., 1.) If in the final decision of the many grave
questions which this case presents, the court must take "a chance," it should be,
with a view to upholding the law, with a view to the effectuation of the general
582
582 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Hernandez, et al.
governmental policy, and with a view to the court's performing its duty in no
narrow and bigotted sense, but with that broad conception which will make the
courts as progressive and effective a force as are the other departments of the
Government."
Now, by the majority resolution, this Court would spread the mantle of
immunity over all these serious crimes against persons and property on the
theory that they are all covered by, included in, and absorbed by the crime
of rebellion. Under this protective mantle extended by us, instead of curbing
and discouraging the commission of these common serious crimes in
accordance with public policy, the commission of said crimes would be
encouraged. No longer would evil-minded men, outlaws, bandits, Jhesitate
to kill and rob and kidnap, because by pretending to be rebels or to be security the discretion should not be exercised in favor of the granting of
engaged in rebellion, their acts of atrocity would be covered by rebellion, for bail.
which they would get, at most, twelve (12) years and fine. No longer would Petition granted.
the spectre of the death penalty and the electric chair hang sword of
Damocles-like over the heads of would be kidnappers, murderers and _____________
arsonists because by merely claiming to have committed another additional
© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
crime, rebellion, under the doctrine laid down by the majority resolution,
capital punishment for all capital crimes they have committed or may
commit, is automatically reduced to twelve (12) years and fine. It is evident
that the effect of the interpretation by this Court of the law on complex
crimes, in relation to rebellion and the common serious crimes committed
during and in the course thereof, runs counter to the settled public policy
on the subject.
Sad, indeed, is the role being played by this Tribunal in laying down a
doctrine of such far reaching consequences and in my opinion of such
baneful not to say disastrous effects on peace and order and personal
security, diametrically and utterly opposed to settled public policy, when af
ter all, we have now the opportunity and the choice of accepting and
adopting another view, another interpretation of the law on complex crimes,
to me more reasonable,
583
VOL. 99, JULY 20, 1956 583
People vs. Arinso
more logical and certainly, more in accordance with public policy, and more
in keeping with peace and order, personal security and the public welfare.
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.
Endencia, JJ., concurs.

LABRADOR, J., dissenting:

I fully agree with the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Montemayor in so

far as he holds that the complex crime of rebellion with murder exists under
our law. I also concur with the opinion of Mr. Justice Padilla in so far as ,he
holds that the petition f or bail should be denied because of the danger that
the release of the petitionerappellant may cause to the security of the State.
As the appellant has been convicted by the Court of First Instance, he may
be admitted to bail in the sound discretion of the court. In the interest of
 VOL.189, SEPTEMBER13, 1990 573
Ponce Enrile vs. Amin
G.R. No. 93335. September 13, 1990. *
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner, vs. HON. OMAR U. AMIN, Presiding
Judge of Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 135, HON. IGNACIO M.
CAPULONG, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch
134, Pairing Judge, SPECIAL COMPOSITE TEAM of: Senior State
Prosecutor AURELIO TRAMPE, State Prosecutor FERDINAND
ABESAMIS and Asst. City Prosecutor EULOGIO MANANQUIL; and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Criminal Law; Rebellion; Pres. Decree 1829; Rebellion cannot be complexed
with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof either as a means
necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes
rebellion.—The resolution of the above issue brings us anew to the case of People
v. Hernandez (99 Phil. 515 [1956]) the rulings of which were recently repeated in
the petition for habeas corpus of Juan Ponce Enrile v. Judge Salazar, (G.R. Nos.
92163 and 92164, June 5, 1990). The Enrile case gave this Court the occasion to
reiterate the long standing proscription against splitting the component offenses
of rebellion and subjecting them to separate prosecutions, a procedure reprobated
in the Hernandez case. This Court recently declared: “The rejection of both options
shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court, which is
that Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of
rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a
means necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that
constitutes rebellion.”(Emphasis supplied) This doctrine is applicable in the case
at bar. If a person can not be charged with the complex crime of rebellion for the
greater penalty to be applied, neither can he be charged separately for two (2)
different offenses where one is a constitutive or component element or committed
in furtherance of rebellion.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Political Crimes; Political crimes are those directly
aimed against the political order, as well as such com-
_______________
*EN BANC.
574
574 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ponce Enrile vs. Amin
mon crimes as may be committed to achieve a political purpose.—The
petitioner is now facing charges of rebellion in conspiracy with the fugitive Col.
Gringo Honasan. Necessarily, being in conspiracy with Honasan, petitioner’s
alleged act of harboring or concealing was for no other purpose but in furtherance
of the crime of rebellion thus constituting a component thereof. It was motivated
by the single intent or resolution to commit the crime of rebellion. As held in People
v. Hernandez,supra: “In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the
political order, as well as such common crimes as may be committed to achieve
a political purpose. The decisive factor is the intent or motive.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; The act of harboring or concealing Col. Honasan is
a mere component of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of the rebellion, it
cannot therefore be made the basis of a separate charge.—The crime of rebellion
consists of many acts. It is described as a vast movement of men and a complex
net of intrigues and plots. (People v. Almasan [CA] O.G. 1932). Jurisprudence tells
us that acts committed in furtherance of the rebellion though crimes in themselves
are deemed absorbed in the one single crime of rebellion. (People v. Geronimo, 100
Phil. 90 [1956]; People v. Santos, 104 Phil. 551 [1958]; People v. Rodriguez, 107
Phil. 659 [1960]; People v. Lava, 28 SCRA 72 [1969]). In this case, the act of
harboring or concealing Col. Honasan is clearly a mere component or ingredient of
rebellion or an act done in furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot therefore be made
the basis of a separate charge. The case of People v. Prieto(80 Phil., 138 [1948]) is
instructive: “In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be
accomplished by some kind of action. Its very nature partakes of a deed or physical
activity as opposed to a mental operation. (Cramer v. U.S., ante) This deed or
physical activity may be, and often is, in itself a criminal offense under another
penal statute or provision. Even so, when the deed is charged as an element of
treason it becomes identified with the latter crime and can not be the subject of a
separate punishment, or used in combination with treason to increase the penalty
as article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides. Just as one can not be punished
for possessing opium in a prosecution for smoking the identical drug, and a robber
cannot be held guilty of coercion or trespass to a dwelling in a prosecution for
robbery, because possession of opium and force and trespass are inherent in
smoking and in robbery respectively, so may not a defendant be made liable for
murder as a separate crime or in conjunction with another offense where, as in
this case, it is averred as a constitutive ingredient of treason.”
575
VOL.189, SEPTEMBER13, 1990 575
Ponce Enrile vs. Amin
Same; Same; Same; Same; All crimes, whether punishable under a special
law or general law, which are mere components or ingredients, or committed in
furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the crime of rebellion and cannot be
isolated and charged as separate crimes in themselves.—The prosecution tries to
distinguish by contending that harboring or concealing a fugitive is punishable
under a special law while the rebellion case is based on the Revised Penal Code;
hence, prosecution under one law will not bar a prosecution under the other. This
argument is specious in rebellion cases. In the light of the Hernandez doctrine the
prosecution’s theory must fail. The rationale remains the same. All crimes,
whether punishable under a special law or general law, which are mere
components or ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed
in the crime of rebellion and can not be isolated and charged as separate crimes in
themselves. Thus: “This does not detract, however, from the rule that the
ingredients of a crime form part and parcel thereof, and hence, are absorbed by
the same and cannot be punished either separately therefrom or by the application
of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. xxx (People v. Hernandez, supra, at p. 528)
The Hernandez and other related cases mention common crimes as absorbed in
the crime of rebellion. These common crimes refer to all acts of violence such as
murder, arson, robbery, kidnapping etc. as provided in the Revised Penal Code.
The attendant circumstances in the instant case, however, constrain us to rule
that the theory of absorption in rebellion cases must not confine itself to common
crimes but also to offenses under special laws which are perpetrated in furtherance
of the political offense.
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Makati, Metro Manila, Br. 135 and 134.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Reyes & Manalastas Law Offices for
petitioner.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Together with the filing of an information charging Senator Juan Ponce
Enrile as having committed rebellion complexed with murder with the Regional Trial
1
Court of Quezon City,
576
576 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ponce Enrile vs. Amin
government prosecutors filed another information charging him for
violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829 with the Regional Trial Court of
Makati. The second information reads:
“That on or about the lst day of December 1989, at Dasmariñas Village, Makati,
Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, having reasonable ground to believe or suspect that Ex-Col.
Gregorio “Gringo” Honasan has committed a crime, did then and there unlawfully,
feloniously, willfully and knowingly obstruct, impede, frustrate or delay the
apprehension of said Ex. Lt. Col. Gregorio “Gringo” Honasan by harboring or
concealing him in his house.”
On March 2, 1990, the petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (a) to hold in
abeyance the issuance of a warrant of arrest pending personal
determination by the court of probable cause, and (b) to dismiss the case
and expunge the information from the record.
On March 16, 1990, respondent Judge Ignacio Capulong, as pairing
judge of respondent Judge Omar Amin, denied Senator Enrile’s Omnibus
motion on the basis of a finding that “there (was) probable cause to hold the
accused Juan Ponce Enrile liable for violation of PD No. 1829.”
On March 21, 1990, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and
to Quash/Dismiss the Information on the grounds that:
1. (a)The facts charged do not constitute an offense;
2. (b)The respondent court’s finding of probable cause was devoid of factual
and legal basis; and
3. (c)The pending charge of rebellion complexed with murder and frustrated
murder against Senator Enrile as alleged co-conspirator of Col. Honasan,
on the basis of their alleged meeting on December 1, 1989 preclude the
prosecution of the Senator for harboring or concealing the Colonel on the
same occasion under PD 1829.
On May 10, 1990, the respondent court issued an order denying the motion
for reconsideration for alleged lack of merit and setting Senator Enrile’s
arraignment to May 30, 1990.
The petitioner comes to this Court on Certiorari imputing grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of juris-
577
VOL. 189, SEPTEMBER 13, 1990 577
Ponce Enrile vs. Amin
diction committed by the respondent court in refusing to quash/ dismiss the
information on the following grounds, to wit:
1. I.The facts charged do not constitute an offense;
 2. II.The alleged harboring or concealing by Sen. Enrile of Col. Honasan in a
supposed meeting on 1 December 1989 is absorbed in, or is a component
element of, the “complexed” rebellion presently charged against Sen.
Enrile as alleged co-conspirator of Col. Honasan on the basis of the same
meeting on 1 December 1989;
3. III.The orderly administration of Justice requires that there be only one
prosecution for all the component acts of rebellion;
4. IV.There is no probable cause to hold Sen. Enrile for trial for alleged
violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829;
5. V.No preliminary investigation was conducted for alleged violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1829. The preliminary investigation, held only for
rebellion, was marred by patent irregularities resulting in denial of due
process.
On May 20, 1990 we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
respondents from conducting further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90-
777 until otherwise directed by this Court.
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner could be
separately charged for violation of PD No. 1829 notwithstanding the
rebellion case earlier filed against him.
Respondent Judge Amin sustained the charge of violation of PD No. 1829
notwithstanding the rebellion case filed against the petitioner on the theory
that the former involves a special law while the latter is based on the
Revised Penal Code or a general law.
The resolution of the above issue brings us anew to the case of People v.
Hernandez (99 Phil. 515 [1956]) the rulings of which were recently repeated
in the petition for habeas corpus of Juan Ponce Enrile v. Judge
Salazar, (G.R. Nos. 92163 and 92164, June 5, 1990). The Enrile case gave
this Court the occasion to reiterate the long standing proscription against
splitting the componentoffenses of rebellion and subjecting them to
separate prosecutions, a procedure reprobated in the Hernandez case. This
Court recently declared:
578
578 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ponce Enrile vs. Amin
“The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the
Court, which is that Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the
complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof,
either as a means necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect of an
activity that constitutes rebellion.” (Emphasis supplied)
This doctrine is applicable in the case at bar. If a person can not be charged
with the complex crime of rebellion for the greater penalty to be applied,
neither can he be charged separately for two (2) different offenses where
one is a constitutive or component element or committed in furtherance of
rebellion.
The petitioner is presently charged with having violated PD No. 1829
particularly Section 1 (c) which states:
“SECTION 1. The penalty of prison correccional in its maximum period, or a fine
ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who
knowingly or wilfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of
suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing
any of the following acts:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he knows,
or has reasonable ground to believe or suspect, has committed any offense under
existing penal laws in order to prevent his arrest, prosecution and conviction.”
xxx xxx xxx
The prosecution in this Makati case alleges that the petitioner entertained
and accommodated Col. Honasan by giving him food and comfort on
December 1, 1989 in his house. Knowing that Colonel Honasan is a fugitive
from justice, Sen. Enrile allegedly did not do anything to have Honasan
arrested or apprehended. And because of such failure the petitioner
prevented Col. Honasan’s arrest and conviction in violation of Section 1 (c)
of PD No. 1829.
The rebellion charges filed against the petitioner in Quezon City were
based on the affidavits executed by three (3) employees of the Silahis
International Hotel who stated that the fugitive Col. Gregorio “Gringo”
Honasan and some 100 rebel soldiers attended the mass and birthday party
held at the residence of the petitioner in the evening of December 1, 1989.
579
VOL. 189, SEPTEMBER 13, 1990 579
Ponce Enrile vs. Amin
The information (Annex “C”, p. 3) particularly reads that on “or about 6:30
p.m., 1 December, 1989, Col. Gregorio “Gringo” Honasan conferred with
accused Senator Juan Ponce Enrile accompanied by about 100 fully armed
rebel soldiers wearing white armed patches”. The prosecution thereby
concluded that:
“In such a situation, Sen. Enrile’s talking with rebel leader Col. Gregorio “Gringo”
Honasan in his house in the presence of about 100 uniformed soldiers who were
fully armed, can be inferred that they were co-conspirators in the failed December
coup.” (Annex A, Rollo, p. 65; Emphasis supplied)
As can be readily seen, the factual allegations supporting the rebellion
charge constitute or include the very incident which gave rise to the charge
of the violation under Presidential Decree No. 1829. Under the Department
of Justice resolution (Annex A, Rollo, p. 49) there is only one crime of
rebellion complexed with murder and multiple frustrated murder but there
could be 101 separate and independent prosecutions for “harboring and
concealing” Honasan and 100 other armed rebels under PD No. 1829. The
splitting of component elements is readily apparent.
The petitioner is now facing charges of rebellion in conspiracy with the
fugitive Col. Gringo Honasan. Necessarily, being in conspiracy with
Honasan, petitioner’s alleged act of harboring or concealing was for no other
purpose but in furtherance of the crime of rebellion thus constituting a
component thereof. It was motivated by the single intent or resolution to
commit the crime of rebellion. As held in People v. Hernandez, supra:
“In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as
well as such common crimes as may be committed to achieve a political
purpose. The decisive factor is the intent or motive.” (p. 535)
The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is described as a vast
movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots. (People v.
Almasan [CA] O.G. 1932). Jurisprudence tells us that acts committed in
furtherance of the rebellion though crimes in themselves are deemed
absorbed in the one single crime of rebellion. (People v. Geronimo, 100 Phil.
90 [1956];
580
580 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ponce Enrile vs. Amin
People v. Santos, 104 Phil. 551 [1958]; People v. Rodriguez, 107 Phil.
659 [1960]; People v. Lava, 28 SCRA 72 [1969]). In this case, the act of
harboring or concealing Col. Honasan is clearly a mere component or
ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of the rebellion. It
cannot therefore be made the basis of a separate charge. The case of People
v. Prieto (80 Phil., 138 [1948]) is instructive:
2 absorbed in the crime of rebellion. These common crimes refer to all acts of
“In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be accomplished by
some kind of action. Its very nature partakes of a deed or physical activity as
opposed to a mental operation. (Cramer v. U.S., ante) This deed or physical activity
may be, and often is, in itself a criminal offense under another penal statute or
provision. Even so, when the deed is charged as an element of treason it becomes
identified with the latter crime and can not be the subject of a separate
punishment, or used in combination with treason to increase the penalty as article
48 of the Revised Penal Code provides. Just as one can not be punished for
possessing opium in a prosecution for smoking the identical drug, and a robber
cannot be held guilty of coercion or trespass to a dwelling in a prosecution for
robbery, because possession of opium and force and trespass are inherent in
smoking and in robbery respectively, so may not a defendant be made liable for
murder as a separate crime or in conjunction with another offense where, as in
this case, it is averred as a constitutive ingredient of treason.”
The prosecution tries to distinguish by contending that harboring or
concealing a fugitive is punishable under a special law while the rebellion
case is based on the Revised Penal Code; hence, prosecution under one law
will not bar a prosecution under the other. This argument is specious in
rebellion cases.
In the light of the Hernandez doctrine the prosecution’s theory must fail.
The rationale remains the same. All crimes, whether punishable under a
special law or general law, which are mere components or ingredients, or
committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the crime of rebellion
and can not be
_______________
2 The doctrine relied upon was set down in treason cases but is applicable to rebellion cases.
As Justice McDonough opined, rebellion is treason of less magnitude (U.S. v. Lagnoasan, 3 Phil.
472, 484, 1904).
581
VOL. 189, SEPTEMBER 13, 1990 581
Ponce Enrile vs. Amin
isolated and charged as separate crimes in themselves. Thus:
“This does not detract, however, from the rule that the ingredients of a crime form
part and parcel thereof, and hence, are absorbed by the same and cannot be
punished either separately therefrom or by the application of Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code. xxx (People v. Hernandez, supra, at p. 528)
The Hernandez and other related cases mention common crimes as
violence such as murder, arson, robbery, kidnapping etc. as provided in the
Revised Penal Code. The attendant circumstances in the instant case,
however, constrain us to rule that the theory of absorption in rebellion cases
must not confine itself to common crimes but also to offenses under special
laws which are perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense.
The conversation and, therefore, alleged conspiring of Senator Ponce
Enrile with Colonel Honasan is too intimately tied up with his allegedly
harboring and concealing Honasan for practically the same act to form two
separate crimes of rebellion and violation of PD No. 1829.
Clearly, the petitioner’s alleged act of harboring or concealing which was
based on his acts of conspiring with Honasan was committed in connection
with or in furtherance of rebellion and must now be deemed as absorbed by,
merged in, and identified with the crime of rebellion punished in Articles
134 and 135 of the RPC.
“Thus, national, as well as international, laws and jurisprudence overwhelmingly
favor the proposition that common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political
offense, are divested of their character as “common” offenses, and assume the
political complexion of the main crime of which they are mere ingredients, and
consequently, cannot be punished separately from the principal offense, or
complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty.” (People v.
Hernandez, supra, p. 541)
In People v. Elias Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960], the accused, after having
pleaded guilty and convicted of the crime of rebellion, faced an independent
prosecution for illegal posses-
582
582 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ponce Enrile vs. Amin
sion of firearms. The Court ruled:
“An examination of the record, however, discloses that the crime with which the
accused is charged in the present case which is that of illegal possession of firearm
and ammunition is already absorbed as a necessary element or ingredient in the
crime of rebellion with which the same accused is charged with other persons in a
separate case and wherein he pleaded guilty and was convicted.” (at page 662)
xxx xxx xxx
“xxx [T]he conclusion is inescapable that the crime with which the accused is
charged in the present case is already absorbed in the rebellion case and so to
press it further now would be to place him in double jeopardy.” (at page 663)
Noteworthy is the recent case of Misolas v. Panga, (G.R. No. 83341,
January 30, 1990) where the Court had the occasion to pass upon a nearly
similar issue. In this case, the petitioner Misolas, an alleged member of the
New Peoples Army (NPA), was charged with illegal possession of firearms
and ammunitions in furtherance of subversion under Section 1 of PD 1866.
In his motion to quash the information, the petitioner based his arguments
on the Hernandez and Geronimo rulings on the doctrine of absorption of
common crimes in rebellion. The Court, however, clarified, to wit:
“x x x in the present case, petitioner is being charged specifically for the qualified
offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under PD 1866. HE IS
NOT BEING CHARGED WITH THE COMPLEX CRIME OF SUBVERSION
WITH ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. NEITHER IS HE BEING
SEPARATELY CHARGED FOR SUBVERSION AND FOR ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. Thus, the rulings of the Court in Hernandez,
Geronimo and Rodriguez find no application in this case.”
The Court in the above case upheld the prosecution for illegal possession of
firearms under PD 1866 because no separate prosecution for subversion or
rebellion had been filed.3 The prosecution must make up its mind whether
to charge Senator
_______________
3 Justices Isagani A. Cruz and Abraham F. Sarmiento believe that PD 1866 is
unconstitutional and should be struck down as illegal
583
VOL.189, SEPTEMBER13, 1990 583
Ponce Enrile vs. Amin
Ponce Enrile with rebellion alone or to drop the rebellion case and charge
him with murder and multiple frustrated murder and also violation of P.D.
1829. It cannot complex the rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder. Neither can it prosecute him for rebellion in Quezon City and
violation of P.D 1829 in Makati. It should be noted that there is in fact a
separate prosecution for rebellion already filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City. In such a case, the independent prosecution under
PD 1829 can not prosper.
As we have earlier mentioned, the intent or motive is a decisive factor.
If Senator Ponce Enrile is not charged with rebellion and he harbored or
concealed Colonel Honasan simply because the latter is a friend and former
associate, the motive for the act is completely different. But if the act is
committed with political or social motives, that is in furtherance of
rebellion, then it should be deemed to form part of the crime of rebellion
instead of being punished separately.
In view of the foregoing, the petitioner can not be tried separately under
PD 1829 in addition to his being prosecuted in the rebellion case. With this
ruling, there is no need for the Court to pass upon the other issues raised
by the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Information in Criminal
Case No. 90-777 is QUASHED. The writ of preliminary injunction,
enjoining respondent Judges and their successors in Criminal Case No. 90-
777, Regional Trial Court of Makati, from holding the arraignment of Sen.
Juan Ponce Enrile and from conducting further proceedings therein is made
permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Melencio-
Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortés, Gri
ño-Aquinoand Regalado, JJ., concur.
Fernan (C.J.), On official leave.
Paras, J., On leave.

_______________

per se. Justice Sarmiento stated in his separate dissent that PD 1866 is a bill of attainder,
vague and violative of the double jeopardy clause, and an instrument of repression.
584
584 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Arizala vs. Court of Appeals
Medialdea, J., No part.
Petition granted.
Note.—The criminal liability of an accessory under Art. 19, Par. 3 is
directly linked to and inseparable from that of the principal. (Vino vs.
People: dissenting opinion, 178 SCRA 626.)

———o0o———

© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

 VOL. 186, JUNE 5, 1990 217
Enrile vs. Salazar
G.R. No. 92163. June 5, 1990. *
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS. JUAN
PONCE ENRILE, petitioner, vs. JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR (Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City [Br. 103], SENIOR STATE
PROSECUTOR AURELIO TRAMPE, PROSECUTOR FERDINAND R.
ABESAMIS, AND CITY ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR EULOGIO
MANANQUIL, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION DIRECTOR
ALFREDO LIM, BRIG. GEN. EDGAR DULA TORRES (Superintendent of
the Northern Police District) AND/ OR ANY AND ALL PERSONS WHO
MAY HAVE ACTUAL CUSTODY OVER THE PERSON OF JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, respondents.
G.R. No. 92164. June 5, 1990. *
SPS. REBECCO E. PANLILIO ANDERLINDA E. PANLILIO,
petitioners, vs. PROSECUTORS FERNANDO DE LEON, AURELIO C.
TRAMPE, FERDINAND R. ABESAMIS, AND EU-
_______________
*EN BANC.
218
218 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Salazar
LOGIO C. MANANQUIL, and HON. JAIME N. SALAZAR, JR., in his
capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch
103, respondents.
Rebellion; Complex Crime; Hernandez doctrine prohibits complexing of
rebellion with any other offense.—The rejection of both options shapes and
determines the primary ruling of the Court, which is that Hernandez remains
binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other
offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its
commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.
Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Personal evaluation of report and
supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor, sufficient to determine probable
cause.—It is also contended that the respondent Judge issued the warrant for
petitioner’s arrest without first personally determining the existence of probable
cause by examining under oath or affirmation the complainant and his witnesses,
in violation of Art. III, sec. 2, of the Constitution. This Court has already ruled,
however, that it is not the unavoidable duty of the judge to make such a personal
examination, it being sufficient that he follows established procedure
by personally evaluating the report and the supporting documents submitted by
the prosecutor. Petitioner claims that the warrant of arrest issued barely one hour
and twenty minutes after the case was raffled off to the respondent Judge, which
hardly gave the latter sufficient time to personally go over the voluminous records
of the preliminary investigation. Merely because said respondent had what some
might consider only a relatively brief period within which to comply with that duty,
gives no reason to assume that he had not, or could not have, so complied; nor does
that single circumstance suffice to overcome the legal presumption that official
duty has been regularly performed.
Same; Same; Same; Bail; Courts; Respondent Court has jurisdiction to deny
or grant bail to petitioner.—The criminal case before the respondent Judge was
the normal venue for invoking the petitioner’s right to have provisional liberty
pending trial and judgment. The original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested
with said respondent. The correct course was for petitioner to invoke that
jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per
se or by reason of the weakness of the evidence against him. Only after that
remedy was denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court
have been invoked, and even then, not without first apply-
219
VOL. 186, JUNE 5, 1990 219
Enrile vs. Salazar
ing to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also available there.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Incumbent on the accused, to whom no bail is
recommended, to claim the right to bail hearing to prove the reason or weakness of
evidence against him.—There was and is no reason to assume that the resolution
of any of these questions was beyond the ability or competence of the respondent
Judge—indeed such an assumption would be demeaning and less than fair to our
trial courts; none whatever to hold them to be of such complexity or transcendental
importance as to disqualify every court, except this Court, from deciding them;
none, in short that would justify bypassing established judicial processes designed
to orderly move litigation through the hierarchy of our courts. Parenthetically, this
is the reason behind the vote of four Members of the Court against the grant of
bail to petitioner: the view that the trial court should not thus be precipitately
ousted of its original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail and, if it erred in that
matter, denied an opportunity to correct its error. It makes no difference that the
respondent Judge here issued a warrant of arrest fixing no bail. Immemorial
practice sanctions simply following the prosecutor’s recommendation regarding
bail, though it may be perceived as the better course for the judge motu propioto
set a bail hearing where a capital offense is charged. It is, in any event, incumbent
on the accused as to whom no bail has been recommended or fixed to claim the
right to a bail hearing and thereby put to proof the strength or weakness of the
evidence against him.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Court has no power to change, but only to
interpret the law as it stands at any given time.—It is enough to give anyone
pause—and the Court is no exception—that not even the crowded streets of our
capital City seem safe from such unsettling violence that is disruptive of the public
peace and stymies every effort at national economic recovery. There is an apparent
need to restructure the law on rebellion, either to raise the penalty therefor or to
clearly define and delimit the other offenses to be considered as absorbed thereby,
so that it cannot be conveniently utilized as the umbrella for every sort of illegal
activity undertaken in its name. The Court has no power to effect such change, for
it can only interpret the law as it stands at any given time, and what is needed
lies beyond interpretation. Hopefully, Congress will perceive the need for promptly
the initiative in this matter, which is properly within its province.
220
220 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Salazar
FERNAN, C.J., Dissenting and Concurring:
Rebellion; Complex Crime; Hernandez doctrine should not be interpreted as
an all embracing authority; Reasons.—To my mind, the Hernandez doctrine
should not be interpreted as an all-embracing authority for the rule that all
common crimes committed on the occasion, or in furtherance of, or in connection
with, rebellion are absorbed by the latter. To that extent, I cannot go along with
the view of the majority in the instant case that “Hernandez remains binding
doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense
committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission
or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.”
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., Separate Opinion:
Rebellion; Complex Crime; Habeas Corpus; Statutes; The rules on habeas
corpus are to be liberally construed.—While litigants, should, as a rule, ascend the
steps of the judicial ladder, nothing should stop this Court from taking cognizance
of petitions brought before it raising urgent constitutional issues, any procedural
flaw notwithstanding. The rules on habeas corpus are to be liberally construed
(Ganaway v. Quilen, 42 Phil. 805), the writ of habeas corpus being the
fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary
and lawless state action. The scope and flexibility of the writ—its capacity to reach
all manner of illegal detention—its ability to cut through barriers of form and
procedural mazes—have always been emphasized and jealously guarded by courts
and lawmakers (Gumabon v. Director of Bureau of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420) [italics
ours].
FELICIANO, J., Concurring Opinion:
Rebellion; Complex Crime; Statutes; Non-retroactivity rule applies to statutes
principally; Expost facto law.—The non-retroactivity rule applies to statutes
principally. But, statutes do not exist in the abstract but rather bear upon the lives
of people with the specific form given them by judicial decisions interpreting their
norms. Judicial decisions construing statutory norms give specific shape and
content to such norms. In time, the statutory norms become encrusted with the
glosses placed upon them by the courts and the glosses become integral with the
norms (Cf. Caltex v. Palomar, 18 SCRA 247 [1966]). Thus, while in legal theory,
judicial interpretation of a statute becomes part of the law as of the date that the
law was originally
221
VOL. 186, JUNE 5, 1990 221
Enrile vs. Salazar
enacted, I believe this theory is not to be applied rigorously where a new
judicial doctrine is announced, in particular one overruling a previous existing
doctrine of long standing (here, 36 years) and most specially not where the statute
construed is criminal in nature and the new doctrine is more onerous for the
accused than the pre-existing one (People v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607 [19741; People
v. Licera, 65 SCRA 270 [1975]; Gumabon v. Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420
[1971]). Moreover, the non-retroactivity rule whether in respect of legislative acts
or judicial decisions has constitutional implications. The prevailing rule in the
United States is that a judicial decision that retroactively renders an act criminal
or enhances the severity of the penalty prescribed for an offense, is vulnerable to
constitutional challenge based upon the rule against ex post facto laws and the due
process clause (Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 US 347, 12 L. Ed. 2d 894 [1964];
Marks v. U.S., 43 US 188, 51 L. Ed. 2d 260 [1977]; Devine v. New Mexico
Department of Corrections, 866 F. 2d 339 [1989]).
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., Concurring Opinion:
 Rebellion; Complex Crime; Rebellion consists of many acts; Case at bar.—The
crime of rebellion consists of many acts. The dropping of one bomb cannot be
isolated as a separate crime of rebellion. Neither should the dropping of one
hundred bombs or the firing of thousands of machine gun bullets be broken up into
a hundred or thousands of separate offenses, if each bomb or each bullet happens
to result in the destruction of life and property. The same act cannot be punishable
by separate penalties depending on what strikes the fancy of prosecutors—
punishment for the killing of soldiers or retribution for the deaths of civilians. The
prosecution also loses sight of the regrettable fact that in total war and in rebellion
the killing of civilians, the laying waste of civilian economies, the massacre of
innocent people, the blowing up of passenger airplanes, and other acts of terrorism
are all used by those engaged in rebellion. We cannot and should not try to
ascertain the intent of rebels for each single act unless the act is plainly not
connected to the rebellion. We cannot use Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code in
lieu of still-to-be-enacted legislation. The killing of civilians during a rebel attack
on military facilities furthers the rebellion and is part of the rebellion.
PADILLA, J., Separate Opinion:
Rebellion; Complex yCrime; Crime of Rebellion complexed with murder, and
multiple frustrated murder does not exist.—Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in
the Hernandez case, was “ground- breaking” on
222
222 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Salazar
the issue of whether rebellion can be complexed with murder, arson, robbery,
etc. In the present cases, on the other hand, the prosecution and the lower court,
not only had the Hernandezdoctrine (as case law), but Executive Order No. 187 of
President Corazon C. Aquino dated 5 June 1987 (as statutory law) to bind them to
the legal proposition that the crime of rebellion complexed with murder, and
multiple frustrated murder does not exist.
Same; Same; Same; Case at bar; The reformation is clearly a nullity and
plainly void ab initio.—And yet, notwithstanding
these unmistakable and controlling beacon lights—absent when this Court laid
down the Hernandez doctrine—the prosecution has insisted in filing, and the
lower court has persisted in hearing, an information charging the petitioners with
rebellion complexed with murder and multiple frustrated murder. That
information is clearly a nullity and plainly void ab initio. Its head should not be
allowed to surface. As a nullity in substantive law, it charges nothing; it has given
rise to nothing. The warrants of arrest issued pursuant thereto are as null and
void as the information on which they are anchored. And, since the entire question
of the information’s validity is before the Court in these habeas corpus cases, I
venture to say that the information is fatally defective,even under procedural law,
because it charges more than one (1) offense (Sec. 13, Rule 110, Rules of Court).
BIDIN, J., Concurring and Dissenting:
Rebellion; Complex Crime; Bail; Habeas Corpus is the proper remedy to
petitioner as an accused; Case at bar.—I submit that the proceedings need not be
remanded to the respondent judge for the purpose of fixing bail since we have
construed the indictment herein as charging simple rebellion, an offense which is
bailable. Consequently, habeas corpus is the proper remedy available to petitioner
as an accused who had been charged with simple rebellion, a bailable offense but
who had been denied his right to bail by the respondent judge in violation of the
petitioner’s constitutional right to bail. In view thereof, the responsibility of fixing
the amount of bail and approval thereof when filed, devolves upon us, if complete
relief is to be accorded to petitioner in the instant proceedings.
SARMIENTO, J., Concurring in part and dissenting in part:
Rebellion; Complex Crime; Habeas Corpus; Bail; No useful purpose to have
the trial court hear the incident again when the Supreme Court has been satisfied
that petitioner is entitled to temporary
223
VOL. 186, JUNE 5, 1990 223
Enrile vs. Salazar
freedom.—I dissent, however, insofar as the majority orders the remand of
the matter of bail to the lower court. I take it that when we, in our Resolution of
March 6, 1990, granted the petitioner “provisional liberty” upon the filing of a bond
of P100,000.00, we granted him bail. The fact that we gave him “provisional
liberty” is in my view, of no moment, because bail means provisional liberty. It will
serve no useful purpose to have the trial court hear the incident again when we
ourselves have been satisfied that the petitioner is entitled to temporary freedom.
PETITION for Habeas Corpus.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
NARVASA, J.:
Thirty-four years after it wrote history into our criminal
jurisprudence, People vs. Hernandez once more takes center stage as the
1 filed the petition for habeas corpus herein (which was followed by a
focus of a confrontation at law that would reexamine, if not the validity of
its doctrine, the limits of its applicability. To be sure, the intervening period
saw a number of similar cases that took issue with the ruling—all with a
2
marked lack of success—but none, it would seem, where season and
circumstance had more effectively conspired to attract wide public attention
and excite impassioned debate, even among laymen; none, certainly, which
has seen quite the kind and range of arguments that are now brought to
bear on the same question.
The facts are not in dispute. In the afternoon of February 27, 1990,
Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law
enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the National Bureau of
Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal Case No.
90-10941. The warrant had issued on an information signed and earlier
that day filed by a panel of prosecutors composed of
_______________
199 Phil. 515 (1956).
2 People vs. Lava, 28 SCRA 72 (1956); People vs. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90 (1956); People vs.
Romagosa, 103 Phil. 20 (1958); and People vs. Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 (1960).
224
224 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Salazar
Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor Ferdinand R.
Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging
Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio
Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup attempt
from November 29 to December 10, 1990. Senator Enrile was taken to and
held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila, without
bail, none having been recommended in the information and none fixed in
the arrest warrant. The following morning, February 28, 1990, he was
brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City where he was given over
to the custody of the Superintendent of the Northern Police District, Brig.
Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres. 3
On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel,
supplemental petition filed on March 2, 1990), alleging that he was
deprived of his constitutional rights in being, or having been:
1. (a)held to answer for criminal offense which does not exist in the statute
books;
2. (b)charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no complaint
was initially filed or preliminary investigation was conducted, hence was
denied due process;
3. (c)denied his right to bail; and
4. (d)arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued without the
judge who issued it first having personally determined the existence of
probable cause. 4
The Court issued the writ prayed for, returnable March 5, 1990 and set the
plea for hearing on March 6, 1990. On March 5, 1990, the Solicitor General
5
filed a consolidated return for the respondents in this case and in G.R. No.
6
92164, which had been
7
_______________
3 Rollo, G.R. No. 92163, pp. 32-34.
4 Rollo, G.R. No. 92163, pp. 34 et seq.
5 Rollo, G.R. No. 92163, p. 26.
6 Rollo, G.R. No. 92163, pp. 305-359.
7 Originally a petition for certiorari and prohibition which the Court, upon motion of the
petitioners, resolved to treat as a petition
225
VOL. 186, JUNE 5, 1990 225
Enrile vs. Salazar
contemporaneously but separately filed by two of Senator Enrile’s co-
accused, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and raised similar
questions. Said return urged that the petitioners’ case does not fall within
the Hernandez ruling because—and this is putting it very simply—the
information in Hernandez charged murders and other common crimes
committed as a necessary means for the commission of rebellion, whereas
the information against Sen. Enrile et al. charged murder and frustrated
murder committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance, of rebellion.
Stated otherwise, the Solicitor General would distinguish between the
complex crime (“delito complejo”) arising from an offense being a necessary
means for committing another, which is referred to in the second clause of
Article 48, Revised Penal Code, and is the subject of the Hernandez ruling,
and the compound crime (“delito compuesto”) arising from a single act
constituting two or more grave or less grave offenses referred to in the first
clause of the same paragraph, with which Hernandez was not concerned
and to which, therefore, it should not apply.
The parties were heard in oral argument, as scheduled, on March 6,
1990, after which the Court issued its Resolution of the same date granting
8
Senator Enrile and the Panlilio spouses provisional liberty conditioned
upon their filing, within 24 hours from notice, cash or surety bonds of
P100,000.00 (for Senator Enrile) and P200,000.00 (for the Panlilios),
respectively. The Resolution stated that it was issued without prejudice to
a more extended resolution on the matter of the provisional liberty of the
petitioners and stressed that it was not passing upon the legal issues raised
in both cases. Four Members of the Court voted against granting bail to
9
Senator Enrile, and two against granting bail to the Panlilios.
10
The Court now addresses those issues insofar as they are raised and
litigated in Senator Enrile’s petition, G.R. No. 92163.
The parties’ oral and written pleas presented the Court with the
following options:
_______________
for habeas corpus; Rollo, G.R. No. 92164, pp. 128-129.
8 Rollo, G.R. No. 92163, pp. 407-411.
9 Fernan, C.J., and Narvasa, Cortés and Griño-Aquino, JJ.
10 Fernan, C.J. and Narvasa, J.
226
226 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Salazar
1. (a)abandon Hernandez and adopt the minority view expressed in the main
dissent of Justice Montemayor in said case that rebellion cannot absorb
more serious crimes, and that under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
rebellion may properly be complexed with common offenses, so-called; this
option was suggested by the Solicitor General in oral argument although
it is not offered in Ms written pleadings;
2. (b)hold Hernandez applicable only to offenses committed in furtherance, or
as a necessary means for the commission, of rebellion, but not to acts
committed in the course of a rebellion which also constitute “common”
crimes of grave or less grave character;
3. (c)maintain Hernandez as applying to make rebellion absorb all other
offenses committed in its course, whether or not necessary to its
commission or in furtherance thereof.
On the first option, eleven (11) Members of the Court voted against
abandoning Hernandez. Two (2) Members felt that the doctrine should be
re-exainined. In the view of the majority, the ruling remains good law, its
10-a
substantive and logical bases have withstood all subsequent challenges and
no new ones are presented here persuasive enough to warrant a complete
reversal. This view is reinforced by the fact that not too long ago, the
incumbent President, exercising her powers under the 1986 Freedom
Constitution, saw fit to repeal, among others, Presidential Decree No. 942
of the former regime which precisely sought to nullify or
neutralize Hernandez by enacting a new provision (Art. 142-A) into the
Revised Penal Code to the effect that “(w)hen by reason, or on the occasion,
of any of the crimes penalized in this Chapter (Chapter I of Title 3, which
includes rebellion), acts which constitute offenses upon which graver
penalties are imposed by law are committed, the penalty for the most
serious offense in its maximum period shall be imposed upon the
offender.” In thus acting, the President in effect by legislative fiat
11
reinstated Hernandez as binding doctrine with the effect of law. The Court
can do no less than accord it the same recognition, absent any sufficiently
powerful reason against so doing.
On the second option, the Court unanimously voted to reject
________________
Two Members are on leave.
10-a
Executive Order No. 187 issued June 5, 1987.
11
227
VOL. 186, JUNE 5, 1990 227
Enrile vs. Salazar
the theory that Hernandez is, or should be, limited in its application to
offenses committed as a necessary means for the commission of rebellion
and that the ruling should not be interpreted as prohibiting the complexing
of rebellion with other common crimes committed on the occasion, but not
in furtherance, thereof While four Members of the Court felt that the
proponents’ arguments were not entirely devoid of merit, the consensus was
that they were not sufficient to overcome what appears to be the real thrust
of Hernandez to rule out the complexing of rebellion with any other offense
committed in its course under either of the aforecited clauses of Article 48,
as is made clear by the following excerpt from the majority opinion in that
case:
“There is one other reason—and a fundamental one at that—why Article 48 of our
Penal Code cannot be applied in the case at bar. If murder were not complexed
with rebellion, and the two crimes were punished separately (assuming that this
could be done), the following penalties would be imposable upon the movant,
namely: (1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision
mayor, in the corresponding period, depending upon the modifying circumstances
present, but never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor; and (2) for the crime of
murder, reclusion temporalin its maximum period to death, depending upon the
modifying circumstances present. In other words, in the absence of aggravating
circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him. However,
under Article 48 said penalty would have to be meted out to him, even in the
absence of a single aggravating circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in
conformity with the theory of the prosecution, would be unfavorable to the movant.
“Upon the other hand, said Article 48 was enacted for the purpose
of favoring the culprit, not of sentencing him to a penalty more severe than that
which would be proper if the several acts performed toy Mm were punished
separately. In the words of Rodriguez Navarro:
‘La unificacion de penas en los casos de eoncmrso de delitos a que hace referenda este
articulo (75 del Codigo de 1932), esta basado franeamente en el principio pro reo.’ (II
Doctrina Penal del Tribunal Supremo de Espana, p. 2168.)
“We are aware of the fact that this observation refers to Article 71 (later 75) of
the Spanish Penal Code (the counterpart of our Article 48), as amended in 1908
and then in 1932, reading:
228
228 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Salazar
‘Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no son aplicables en el caso de que un solo hecho
constituya dos o mas delitos, o cuando el uno de ellos sea medio necesario para cometer el
otro.
‘En estos casos solo se impondra la pena correspondiente al delito mas grave en su
grado maximo, hasta el limite que represente la suma de las que pudieran imponerse,
penando separadamente los delitos.
‘Cuando la pena asi computada exceda de este limite, se sancionaran los delitos por
séparado.’ (Rodriguez Navarro, Doctrina Penal del Tribunal Supremo, Vol. II, p. 2163)
and that our Article 48 does not contain the qualification inserted in said
amendment, restricting the imposition of the penalty for the graver offense in its
maximum period to the case when it does not exceed the sum total of the penalties
imposable if the acts charged were dealt with separately. The absence of said
limitation in our Penal Code does not, to our mind, affect substantially the spirit
of said Article 48. Indeed, if one act constitutes two or more offenses, there can be
no reason to inflict a punishment graver than that prescribed for each one of said
offenses put together. In directing that the penalty for the graver offense be, in
such case, imposed in its maximum period, Article 48 could have had no other
purpose than to prescribe a penalty lower than the aggregate of the penalties for
each offense, if imposed separately. The reason for this benevolent spirit of Article
48 is readily discernible. When two or more crimes are the result of a single act,
the offender is deemed less perverse than when he commits said crimes thru
separate and distinct acts. Instead of sentencing him for each crime independently
from the other, he must suffer the maximum of the penalty for the more serious
one, on the assumption that it is less grave than the sum total of the separate
penalties for each offense.” 12
The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of
the Court, which is that Hernandezremains binding doctrine operating to
prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on
the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as an
unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.
This, however, does not write finis to the case. Petitioner’s guilt or
innocence is not here inquired into, much less adjudged. That is for the trial
court to do at the proper time. The Court’s ruling merely provides a take-
off point for the disposition of
________________
People vs. Hernandez, supra at 541-543.
12
229
VOL. 186, JUNE 5, 1990 229
Enrile vs. Salazar
other questions relevant to the petitioner’s complaints about the denial of
his rights and to the propriety of the recourse he has taken.
The Court rules further (by a vote of 11 to 3) that the information filed
against the petitioner does in fact charge an offense. Disregarding the
objectionable phrasing that would complex rebellion with murder and
multiple frustrated murder, that indictment is to be read as
charging simple rebellion. Thus, in Hernandez, the Court said:
“In conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations of the amended
information against defendant-appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the murders,
arsons and robberies described therein are mere ingredients of the crime of
rebellion allegedly committed by said defendants, as means “necessary” (4) for the
perpetration of said offense of rebellion; that the crime charged in the
aforementioned amended information is, therefore, simple rebellion, not the
complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies; that the
maximum penalty imposable under such charge cannot exceed twelve (12) years
of prision mayor and a fine of P20,000; and that, in conformity with the policy of
this court in dealing with accused persons amenable to a similar punishment, said
defendant may be allowed bail.” 13
The plaint of petitioner’s counsel that he is charged with a crime that does
not exist in the statute books, while technically correct so far as the Court
has ruled that rebellion may not be complexed with other offenses
committed on the occasion thereof, must therefore be dismissed as a mere
flight of rhetoric. Read in the context of Hernandez, the information does
indeed charge the petitioner with a crime defined and punished by the
Revised Penal Code: simple rebellion.
Was the petitioner charged without a complaint having been initially
filed and/or preliminary investigation conducted? The record shows
otherwise, that a complaint against petitioner for simple rebellion was filed
by the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, and that on the
strength of said complaint a preliminary investigation was conducted by
the respondent prosecutors, culminating in the filing of the ques-
_______________
Id., at 551.
13
230
230 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Salazar
tioned information. There is nothing inherently irregular or contrary to
14
law in filing against a respondent an indictment for an offense different
from what is charged in the initiatory complaint, if warranted by the
evidence developed during the preliminary investigation.
It is also contended that the respondent Judge issued the warrant for
petitioner’s arrest without first personallydetermining the existence of
probable cause by examining under oath or affirmation the complainant
and his witnesses, in violation of Art. III, sec. 2, of the Constitution. This
15
Court has already ruled, however, that it is not the unavoidable duty of the
judge to make such a personal examination, it being sufficient that he
follows established procedure by personally evaluating the report and the
supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor. Petitioner claims that
16
the warrant of arrest issued barely one hour and twenty minutes after the
case was raffled off to the respondent Judge, which hardly gave the latter
sufficient time to personally go over the voluminous records of the
preliminary investigation. Merely because said respondent had what some
17
might consider only a relatively brief period within which to comply with
that duty, gives no reason to assume that he had not, or could not have, so
complied; nor does that single circumstance suffice to overcome the legal
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.
Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light
of the Court’s reaffirmation of Hernandezas applicable to petitioner’s case,
and of the logical an.d necessary corollary that the information against him
should be considered as charging only the crime of simple rebellion, which
is bailable before conviction, that must now be accepted as a correct
proposition. But the question remains: Given the facts from which this case
arose, was a petition for habeas corpus in this Court the appropriate vehicle
for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial?
_______________
14 Rollo, G.R. No. 92163, pp, 78-79 and 73-76.
15 Supra, footnote 4.
16 Soliven vs. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 394.
17 Rollo, G.R. No. 92163, pp. 46-47.
231
VOL. 186, JUNE 5, 1990 231
Enrile vs. Salazar
The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue for
invoking the petitioner’s right to have provisional liberty pending trial and
judgment. The original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said
respondent. The correct course was for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction
by filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per se by
reason of the weakness of the evidence against him. Only after that remedy
was denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court
have been invoked, and even then, not without first applying to the Court
of Appeals if appropriate relief was also available there.
Even acceptance of petitioner’s premise that going by
the Hernandez ruling, the information charges a non-existent crime or,
contrarily, theorizing on the same basis that it charges more than one
offense, would not excuse or justify his improper choice of remedies. Under
either hypothesis, the obvious recourse would have been a motion to quash
brought in the criminal action before the respondent Judge. 18
There thus seems to be no question that all the grounds upon which
petitioner has founded the present petition, whether these went into the
substance of what is charged in the information or imputed error or
omission on the part of the prosecuting panel or of the respondent Judge in
dealing with the charges against him, were originally justiciable in the
criminal case before said Judge and should have been brought up there
instead of directly to this Court.
There was and is no reason to assume that the resolution of any of these
questions was beyond the ability or competence of the respondent Judge—
indeed such an assumption would be demeaning and less than fair to our
trial courts; none whatever to hold them to be of such complexity or
transcendental importance as to disqualify every court, except this Court,
irom deciding them; none, in short that would justify by-passing established
judicial processes designed to orderly move litigation through the hierarchy
of our courts. Parenthetically, this is the reason behind the vote of four
Members of the Court against the grant of bail to petitioner: the view that
the trial
_______________
Sec. 2, Rule 117, Rules of Court.
18
232
232 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Salazar
court should not thus be precipitately ousted of its original jurisdiction to
grant or deny bail, and if it erred in that matter, denied an opportunity to
correct its error. It makes no differ* ence that the respondent Judge here
issued a warrant of arrest fixing no bail. Immemorial practice sanctions
simply following the prosecutor’s recommendation regarding bail, though it
may be perceived as the better course for the judge motu proprio to set a
bail hearing where a capital offense is charged. It is, in any event,
19
incumbent on the accused as to whom no bail has been recommended or
fixed to claim the right to a bail hearing and thereby put to proof the
strength or weakness of the evidence against him.
It is apropos to point out that the present petition has triggered a rush
to this Court of other parties in a similar situation, all apparently taking
their cue from it, distrustful or contemptuous of the efficacy of seeking
recourse in the regular manner just outlined. The proliferation of such pleas
has only contributed to the delay that the petitioner may have hoped to
avoid by coming directly to this Court.
Not only because popular interest seems focused on the outcome of the
present petition, but also because to wash the Court’s hand off it on
jurisdictional grounds would only compound the delay that it has already
gone through, the Court now decides the same on the merits. But in so
doing, the Court cannot express too strongly the view that said petition
interdicted the ordered and orderly progression of proceedings that should
have started with the trial court and reached this Court only if the relief
applied for was denied by the former and, in a proper case, by the Court of
Appeals on review.
Let it be made very clear that hereafter the Court will no longer
countenance, but will give short shrift to, pleas like the present, that clearly
short-circuit the judicial process and burden it with the resolution of issues
properly within the original competence of the lower courts.
What has thus far been stated is equally applicable to and decisive of the
petition of the Panlilio spouses (G.R. No. 92164) which is virtually identical
to that of petitioner Enrile in factual
_______________
Ocampo vs. Bernabe, 77 Phil. 55.
19
233
VOL. 186, JUNE 5, 1990 233
Enrile vs. Salazar
milieu and is therefore determinable on the same principles already set
forth. Said spouses have uncontestedly pleaded that warrants of arrest
20
issued against them as co-accused of petitioner Enrile in Criminal Case No.
90-10941, that when they appeared before NBI Director Alfredo Lim in the
afternoon of March 1, 1990, they were taken into custody and detained
without bail on the strength of said warrants in violation—they claim—of
their constitutional rights.
It may be that in the light of contemporary events, the act of rebellion
has lost that quitessentially quixotic quality that justifies the relative
leniency with which it is regarded and punished by law, that present-day
rebels are less impelled by love of country than by lust for power and have
become no better than mere terrorists to whom nothing, not even the
sanctity of human life, is allowed to stand in the way of their ambitions.
Nothing so underscores this aberration as the rash of seemingly senseless
killings, bombings, kidnappings and assorted mayhem so much in the news
these days, as often perpetrated against innocent civilians as against the
military, but by and large attributable to, or even claimed by so-called
rebels to be part of, an ongoing rebellion.
It is enough to give anyone pause—and the Court is no exception—that
not even the crowded streets of our capital City seem safe from such
unsettling violence that is disruptive of the public peace and stymies every
effort at national economic recovery. There is an apparent need to
restructure the law on rebellion, either to raise the penalty therefor or to
clearly define and delimit the other offenses to be considered as absorbed
thereby, so that it cannot be conveniently utilized as the umbrella for every
sort of illegal activity undertaken in its name. The Court has no power to
effect such change, for it can only interpret the law as it stands at any given
time, and what is needed lies beyond interpretation. Hopefully, Congress
will perceive the need for promptly seizing the initiative in this matter,
which is properly within its province.
WHEREFORE, the Court reiterates that based on the doctrine
enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the questioned information filed
against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the
_______________
Rollo, G.R. No. 92164, pp. 124-125.
20
234
234 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Salazar
spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple
rebellion only, hence said petitioners are entitled to bail, before final
conviction, as a matter of right. The Court’s earlier grant of bail to
petitioners being merely provisional in character, the proceedings in both
cases are ordered REMANDED to the respondent Judge to fix the amount
of bail to be posted by the petitioners. Once bail is fixed by said respondent
for any of the petitioners, the corresponding bail bond filed with this Court
shall become functus oficio. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED,
Cruz, Gancayco and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J., See separate dissenting and concurring opinion.
Melencio-Herrera and Feliciano, JJ., See separate opinion.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., See concurring opinion.
Paras, J., I concur with the separate opinion of Justice Padilla.
Padilla, J., See dissent.
Bidin, J., See concurring and dissenting opinion.
Sarmiento, J., See concurring and dissenting in part.
Cortés and Griño-Aquino, JJ., On leave.
Medialdea, J., Concurring in G.R. No. 92164; No part in G.R. No.
92163.
FERNAN, C.J., Dissenting and Concurring:
I am constrained to write this separate opinion on what seems to be a rigid
adherence to the 1956 ruling of the Court. The numerous challenges to the
doctrine enunciated in the case of People vs. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 (1956)
should at once demonstrate the need to redefine the applicability of said
doctrine so as to make it conformable with accepted and well-settled
principles of criminal law and jurisprudence.
To my mind, the Hernandez doctrine should not be interpreted as an all-
embracing authority for the rule that all common crimes committed on the
occasion, or in furtherance of, or in connection with, rebellion are absorbed
by the latter. To that extent, I cannot go along with the view of the majority
in the
235
VOL. 186 JUNE 5, 1990 235
Enrile vs. Salazar
instant case that “Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to
prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on
the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as an
unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion” (p. 9, Decision).
The Hernandez doctrine has served the purpose for which it was applied
by the Court in 1956 during the communist-inspired rebellion of the Huks.
The changes in our society in the span of 34 years since then have far-
reaching effects on the all-embracing applicability of the doctrine
considering the emergence of alternative modes of seizing the powers of the
duly-constituted Government not contemplated in Articles 134 and 135 of
the Revised Penal Code and their consequent effects on the lives of our
people. The doctrine was good law then, but I believe that there is a certain
aspect of the Hernandez doctrine that needs clarification.
With all due respect to the views of my brethren in the Court, I believe
that the Court, in the instant case, should have further considered that
distinction between acts or offenses which are indispensable in the
commission of rebellion, on the one hand, and those acts or offenses that
are merely necessary but not indispensable in the commission of rebellion,
on the other. The majority of the Court is correct in adopting, albeit
impliedly, the view in Hernandez case that when an offense perpetrated as
a necessary means of committing another, which is an element of the latter,
the resulting interlocking crimes should be considered as only one simple
offense and must be deemed outside the operation of the complex crime
provision (Article 48) of the Revised Penal Code. As in the case of
Hernandez, the Court, however, failed in the instant case to distinguish
what is indispensable from what is merely necessary in the commission of
an offense, resulting thus in the rule that common crimes like murder,
arson, robbery, etc. committed in the course or on the occasion of rebellion
are absorbed or included in the latter as elements thereof.
The relevance of the distinction is significant, more particularly, if
applied to contemporaneous events happening in our country today.
Theoretically, a crime which is indispensable in the commission of another
must necessarily be an element of the latter; but a crime that is merely
necessary but not indis-
236
236 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Salazar
pensable in the commission of another is not an element of the latter, and
if and when actually committed, brings the interlocking crime within the
operation of the complex crime provision (Art. 48) of the Revised Penal
Code. With that distinction, common crimes committed against
Government forces and property in the course of rebellion are properly
considered indispensable overt acts of rebellion and are logically absorbed
in it as virtual ingredients or elements thereof, but common crimes
committed against the civilian population in the course or on the occasion
of rebellion and in furtherance thereof, may be necessary but not
indispensable in committing the latter, and may, therefore, not be
considered as elements of the said crime of rebellion. To illustrate, the
deaths occurring during armed confrontation or clashes between
government forces and the rebels are absorbed in the rebellion, and would
be those resulting from the bombing of military camps and installations, as
these acts are indispensable in carrying out the rebellion. But deliberately
shooting down an unarmed innocent civilian to instill fear or create chaos
among the people, although done in the furtherance of the rebellion, should
not be absorbed in the crime of rebellion as the felonious act is merely
necessary, but not indispensable, In the latter case, Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code should apply.
The occurrence of a coup d’etat in our country as a mode of seizing the
powers of the duly-constituted government by staging surprise attacks or
occupying centers of powers, of which this Court should take judicial notice,
has introduced a new dimension to the interpretation of the provisions on
rebellion and insurrection in the Revised Penal Code. Generally, as a mode
of seizing the powers of the duly-constituted government, it falls within the
contemplation of rebellion under the Revised Penal Code, but, strictly
construed, a coup d’etat per se is a class by itself. The manner of its
execution and the extent and magnitude of its effects on the lives of the
people distinguish a coup d’etat from the traditional definition and modes
of commission attached by the Revised Penal Code to the crime of rebellion
as applied by the Court to the communist-inspired rebellion of the 1950’s.
A coup d’etat may be executed successfully without its perpetrators
resorting to the commission of other serious crimes such as murder, arson,
kidnapping, robbery, etc. because of the
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 Enrile vs. Salazar
element of surprise and the precise timing of its execution. In extreme cases
where murder, arson, robbery, and other common crimes are committed on
the occasion of a coup d’etat, the distinction referred to above on what is
necessary and what is indispensable in the commission of the coup d’etat
should be painstakingly considered as the Court should have done in the
case of herein petitioners.
I concur in the result insofar as the other issues are resolved by the Court
but I take exception to the vote of the majority on the broad application of
the Hernandez doctrine.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., Separate Opinion:
I join my colleagues in holding that the Hernandezdoctrine, which has been
with us for the past three decades, remains good law and, thus, should
remain undisturbed, despite periodic challenges to it that, ironically, have
only served to strengthen its pronouncements.
I take exception to the view, however, that habeas corpus was not the
proper remedy.
Had the Information filed below charged merely the simple crime of
Rebellion, that proposition could have been plausible. But that Information
charged Rebellion complexed with Murder and Multiple Frustrated
Murder, a crime which does not exist in our statute books. The charge was
obviously intended to make the penalty for the most serious offense in its
maximum period imposable upon the offender pursuant to Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code. Thus, no bail was recommended in the Information nor
was any prescribed in the Warrant of Arrest issued by the Trial Court.
Under the attendant circumstances, therefore, to have filed a Motion to
Quash before the lower Court would not have brought about the speedy
relief from unlawful restraint that petitioner was seeking. During the
pendency of said Motion before the lower Court, petitioner could have
continued to languish in detention. Besides, the Writ of Habeas Corpus may
still issue even if another remedy, which is less effective, may be availed of
(Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663).
It is true that habeas corpus would ordinarily not lie when a person is
under custody by virtue of a process issued by a Court.
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238 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Salazar
The Court, however, must have jurisdiction to issue the process. In this
case, the Court below must be deemed to have been ousted of jurisdiction
when it illegally curtailed petitioner’s liberty. Habeas corpus is thus
available.
The writ of habeas corpus is available to relieve persons from unlawful restraint.
But where the detention or confinement is the result of a process issued by the
court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or sentence, the writ ordinarily cannot be
availed of. It may still be invoked though if the process, judgment or sentence
proceeded from a court or tribunal the jurisdiction of which may be assailed. Even
if it had authority to act at the outset, it is now the prevailing doctrine that a
deprivation of constitutional right, if shown to exist, would oust it of jurisdiction.
In such a case, habeas corpus could be relied upon to regain one’s liberty (Celeste
vs. People, 31 SCRA 391) [Italics ours].
The Petition for habeas corpus was precisely premised on the violation of
petitioner’s constitutional right to bail inasmuch as rebellion, under the
present state of the law, is a bailable offense and the crime for which
petitioner stands accused of and for which he was denied bail is non-
existent in law. While litigants should, as a rule, ascend the steps of the
judicial ladder, nothing should stop this Court from taking cognizance of
petitions brought before it raising urgent constitutional issues, any
procedural flaw notwithstanding.
The rules on habeas corpus are to be liberally construed (Ganaway v. Quilen, 42
Phil. 805), the writ of habeas corpus being the fundamental instrument for
safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action. The
scope and flexibility of the writ—its capacity to reach all manner of illegal
detention—its ability to cut through barriers of form and procedural mazes—have
always been emphasized and jealously guarded by courts and lawmakers
(Gumabon v. Director of Bureau of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420) [italics ours].
The proliferation of cases in this Court, which followed in the wake of this
Petition, was brought about by the insistence of the prosecution to charge
the crime of Rebellion complexed with other common offenses
notwithstanding the fact that this Court had not yet ruled on the validity
of that charge and had granted provisional liberty to petitioner,
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VOL. 186, JUNE 5, 1990 239
Enrile vs. Salazar
If, indeed, it is desired to make the crime of Rebellion a capital offense (now
punishable by reclusion perpetua), the remedy lies in legislation. But
Article 142-A of the Revised Penal Code, along with P.D« No. 942, were
1
repealed, for being “repressive,” fey EO No. 187 on 5 June 1987. EO 187
further explicitly provided that Article 134 (and others enumerated) of the
Revised Penal Code was “restored to its full force and effect as it existed
before said amendatory decrees.” Having been so repealed, this Court is
bereft of power to legislate into existence, under the guise of re-examining
a settled doctrine, a “creature unknown in law”—the complex crime of
Rebellion with Murder.
The remand of the case to the lower Court for further proceedings is in
order. The Writ of Habeas Corpus has served its purpose.
FELICIANO, J., Concurring
I concur in the result reached by the majority of the Court.
I believe that there are certain aspects of the Hernandezdoctrine that, as
an abstract question of law, could stand reexamination or clarification. I
have in mind in particular matters such as the correct or appropriate
relationship between Article 134 and Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code.
This is a matter which relates to the legal concept of rebellion in our legal
system. If one examines the actual terms of Article 134 (entitled: “Rebellion
or Insurrection—How Committed”), it would appear that this Article
specifies both the overt acts and the criminal purposewhich, when put
together, would constitute the offense of rebellion. Thus, Article 134 states
that “the crime of rebellion is committed by rising publicly and taking arms
against the Government—”(i.e., the overt acts comprising rebellion), “for
the purpose of (i.e., the specific criminal intent or political objective)
removing from the allegiance to said government or its laws the territory of
the Republic of the Philippines
_______________
1 “ART. 142-A. Cases where other offenses are committed.—When by reason or on the
occasion of any of the crimes penalized in this Chapter, acts which constitute offenses upon
which graver penalties are imposed by law are committed, the penalty for the most serious
offense in its maximum period shall be imposed upon the offender.”
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240 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Salazar
or any part thereof, or any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or
depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of
their powers or prerogatives.” At the same time, Article 135 (entitled:
“Penalty for Rebellion or Insurrection.”) sets out a listing of acts or
particular measures which appear to fall under the rubric of rebellion or
insurrection: “engaging in war against the forces of the Government,
destroying property or committing serious violence, exacting contributions
or diverting public funds from the lawful purpose for which they have been
appropriated.” Are these modalities of rebellion generally? Or are they
particular modes by which those “who promote [ ], maintain [ ] or head [ ] a
rebellion or insurrection” commit rebellion, or particular modes of
participation in a rebellion by public officers or employees?Clearly, the scope
of the legal concept of rebellion relates to the distinction between, on the
one hand, the indispensable acts or ingredients of the crime of rebellion
under the Revised Penal Code and, on the other hand, differing optional
modes of seeking to carry out the political or social objective of the rebellion
or insurrection.
The difficulty that is at once raised by any effort to examine once more
even the above threshold questions is that the results of such re-
examination may well be that acts which under the Hernandez doctrine are
absorbed into rebellion, may be characterized as separate or discrete
offenses which, as a matter of law, can either be prosecuted separately from
rebellion or prosecuted under the provisions of Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code, which (both Clause 1 and Clause 2 thereof) clearly envisage
the existence of at least two (2) distinct offenses. To reach such a conclusion
in the case at bar, would, as far as I can see, result in colliding with the
fundamental non-retroactivity principle (Article 4, Civil Code; Article 22,
Revised Penal Code; both in relation to Article 8, Civil Code).
The non-retroactivity rule applies to statutes principally. But, statutes
do not exist in the abstract but rather bear upon the lives of people with the
specific form given them by judicial decisions interpreting their norms.
Judicial decisions construing statutory norms give specific shape and
content to such norms. In time, the statutory norms become encrusted with
the glosses placed upon them by the courts and the glosses become integral
with the norms (Cf. Caltex v. Palomar, 18 SCRA 247
241
 VOL. 186, JUNE 5, 1990 241
Enrile vs. Salazar
[1966]). Thus, while in legal theory, judicial interpretation of a statute
becomes part of the law as of the date that the law was originally enacted,
I believe this theory is not to be applied rigorously where a new judicial
doctrine is announced, in particular one overruling a previous existing
doctrine of long standing (here, 36 years) and most specially not where the
statute construed is criminal in nature and the new doctrine is more
onerous for the accused than the pre-existing one (People v. Jabinal, 55
SCRA 607 [1974]; People v. Licera, 65 SCRA 270 [1975]; Gumabon v.
Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420 [1971]). Moreover, the non-retroactivity
rule whether in respect of legislative acts or judicial decisions has
constitutional implications. The prevailing rule in the United States is that
a judicial decision that retroactively renders an act criminal or enhances
the severity of the penalty prescribed for an offense, is vulnerable to
constitutional challenge based upon the rule against ex post facto laws and
the due process clause (Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 US 347,12 L. Ed. 2d
894 [1964]; Marks v. U.S., 43 US 188, 51 L. Ed. 2d 260 [1977]; Devine v.
New Mexico Department of Corrections, 866 F. 2d 339 [1989]).
It is urged by the Solicitor General that the non-retroactivity principle
does not present any real problem for the reason that
the Hernandez doctrine was based upon Article 48, second clause, of the
Revised Penal Code and not upon the first clause thereof, while it is
precisely the first clause of Article 48 that the Government here invokes. It
is, however, open to serious doubt whether Hernandezcan reasonably be so
simply and sharply characterized. And assuming the Hernandez could be
so characterized, subsequent cases refer to the Hernandez doctrine in terms
which do not distinguish clearly between the first clause and the second
clause of Article 48 (e.g., People v. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90 [1956]; People v.
Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960]). Thus, it appears to me that the critical
question would be whether a man of ordinary intelligence would have
necessarily read or understood the Hernandezdoctrine as referring
exclusively to Article 48, second clause. Put in slightly different terms, the
important question would be whether the new doctrine here proposed by
the Government could fairly have been derived by a man of average
intelligence (or counsel of average competence in the law) from an
examination of Articles 134 and
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242 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Salazar
135 of the Revised Penal Code as interpreted by the Court in
the Hernandez and subsequent cases. To formulate the question in these
terms would almost be to compel a negative answer, especially in view of
the conclusions reached by the Court and its several Members today.
Finally, there appears to be no question that the new doctrine that the
Government would have us discover for the first time since the
promulgation of the Revised Penal Code in 1932, would be more onerous for
the respondent accused than the simple application of
the Hernandezdoctrine that murders which have been committed on the
occasion of and in furtherance of the crime of rebellion must be deemed
absorbed in the offense of simple rebellion
I agree therefore that the information in this case must be viewed as
charging only the crime of simple rebellion.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., Concurring Opinion
I join the Court’s decision to grant the petition. In reiterating the rule that
under existing law rebellion may not be complexed with murder, the Court
emphasizes that it cannot legislate a new crime into existence nor prescribe
a penalty for its commission. That function is exclusively for Congress.
I write this separate opinion to make clear how I view certain issues
arising from these cases, especially on how the defective informations filed
by the prosecutors should have been treated.
I agree with the ponente that a petition for habeas corpus is ordinarily
not the proper procedure to assert the right to bail Under the special
circumstances of this case, however, the petitioners had no other recourse.
They had to come to us.
First, the trial court was certainly aware of the decision in People v.
Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 (1956) that there is net such crime in our statute
books as rebellion complexed with murder, that murder committed in
connection with a rebellion is absorbed by the crime of rebellion, and that a
resort to arms resulting in the destruction of life or property constitutes
neither two or more offenses nor a complex crime but one crime—rebellion
pure and simple.
 Second, Hernandez has been the law for 34 years. It has been reiterated
in equally sensational cases. All lawyers and even
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VOL. 186, JUNE 5, 1990 243
Enrile vs. Salazar
law students are aware of the doctrine. Attempts to have the doctrine re-
examined have been consistently rejected by this Court
Third, President Marcos through the use of his then legislative powers,
issued Pres. Decree 942, thereby installing the new crime of rebellion
complexed with offenses like murder where graver penalties are imposed
by law. However, President Aquino using her then legislative powers
expressly repealed PD 942 by issuing Exec. Order 187. She thereby erased
the crime of rebellion complexed with murder and made it clear that
the Hernandez doctrine remains the controlling rule. The prosecution has
not explained why it insists on resurrecting an offense expressly wiped out
by the President. The prosecution, in effect, questions the action of the
President in repealing a repressive decree, a decree which, according to the
repeal order, is violative of human rights.
Fourth, any re-examination of the Hernandez doctrine brings the ex post
facto principle into the picture. Decisions of this Court form part of our legal
system. Even if we declare that rebellion may be complexed with murder,
our declaration can not be made retroactive where the effect is to imprison
a person for a crime which did not exist until the Supreme Court reversed
itself.
And fifth, the attempts to distinguish this case from the Hernandez case
by stressing that the killings charged in the information were committed
“on the occasion of, but not a necessary means for, the commission of
rebellion” result in outlandish consequences and ignore the basic nature of
rebellion. Thus, under the prosecution theory a bomb dropped on PTV-4
which kills government troopers results in simple rebellion because the act
is a necessary means to make the rebellion succeed. However, if the same
bomb also kills some civilians in the neighborhood, the dropping of the bomb
becomes rebellion complexed with murder because the killing of civilians is
not necessary for the success of a rebellion and, therefore, the killings are
only “on the occasion of but not a “necessary means for” the commission of
rebellion.
This argument is puerile.
The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. The dropping of one bomb
cannot be isolated as a separate crime of rebellion.
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244 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Salazar
Neither should the dropping of one hundred bombs or the firing of
thousands of machine gun bullets be broken up into a hundred or thousands
of separate offenses, if each bomb or each bullet happens to result in the
destruction of life and property. The same act cannot be punishable by
separate penalties depending on what strikes the fancy of prosecutors—
punishment for the killing of soldiers or retribution for the deaths of
civilians. The prosecution also loses sight of the regrettable fact that in total
war and in rebellion the killing of civilians, the laying waste of civilian
economies, the massacre of innocent people, the blowing up of passenger
airplanes, and other acts of terrorism are all used by those engaged in
rebellion. We cannot and should not try to ascertain the intent of rebels for
each single act unless the act is plainly not connected to the rebellion. We
cannot use Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code in lieu of still-to-beenacted
legislation. The killing of civilians during a rebel attack on military
facilities furthers the rebellion and is part of the rebellion.
The trial court was certainly aware of all the above considerations. I
cannot understand why the trial Judge issued the warrant of arrest which
categorically states therein that the accused was not entitled to bail. The
petitioner was compelled to come to us so he would not be arrested without
bail for a nonexistent crime. The trial court forgot to apply an established
doctrine of the Supreme Court. Worse, it issued a warrant which reversed
34 years of established procedure based on a well-known Supreme Court
ruling.
All courts should remember that they form part of an independent
judicial system; they do not belong to the prosecution service. A court should
never play into the hands of the prosecution and blindly comply with its
erroneous manifestations. Faced with an information charging a manifestly
non-existent crime, the duty of a trial court is to throw it out. Or, at the very
least and where possible, make it conform to the law.
A lower court cannot re-examine and reverse a decision of the Supreme
Court especially a decision consistently followed for 34 years. Where a
Judge disagrees with a Supreme Court ruling, he is free to express his
reservations in the body of his decision, order, or resolution. However, any
judgment he renders, any order he prescribes, and any processes he issues
must
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VOL. 186, JUNE 5, 1990 245
Enrile vs. Salazar
follow the Supreme Court precedent. A trial court has no jurisdiction to
reverse or ignore precedents of the Supreme Court. In this particular case,
it should have been the Solicitor General coming to this Court to question
the lower court’s rejection of the application for a warrant of arrest without
bail. It should have been the Solicitor-General provoking the issue of re-
examination instead of the petitioners asking to be freed from their arrest
for a non-existent crime.
The principle bears repeating:
“Respondent Court of Appeals really was devoid of any choice at all. It could not
have ruled in any other way on the legal question raised. This Tribunal having
spoken, its duty was to obey. It is as simple as that. There is relevance to this
excerpt from Barrera v. Barrera. (L-31589, July 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 98) The
delicate task of ascertaining the significance that attaches to a constitutional or
statutory provision, an executive order, a procedural norm or a municipal
ordinance is committed to the judiciary. It thus discharges a role no less crucial
than that appertaining to the other two departments in the maintenance of the
rule of law. To assure stability in legal relations and avoid confusion, it has to
speak with one voice. It does so with finality, logically and rightly, through the
highest judicial organ, this Court. What it says then should be definitive and
authoritative, binding on those occupying the lower ranks in the judicial
hierarchy. They have to defer and to submit.’ (Ibid, 107. The opinion of Justice
Laurel in People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937] was cited). The ensuing paragraph of
the opinion in Barrera further emphasizes the point: Such a thought was
reiterated in an opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes and further emphasized in these
words: ‘Judge Gaudencio Cloribel need not be reminded that the Supreme Court,
by tradition and in our system of judicial administration, has the last word on
what the law is; it is the final arbiter of any justifiable controversy. There is only
one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts should take their
bearings.’ ” (Ibid. Justice J.B.L. Reyes spoke thus in Albert v. Court of First
Instance of Manila (Br. VI), L-26364, May 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 948, 961. (Tugade v.
Court of Appeals, 85 SCRA 226 [1978]. See also Albert v. Court of First
Instance, 23 SCRA 948 [1968] and Vir-Jen Shipping and Marine Services, Inc. v.
NLRC, 125 SCRA 577 [1983])
I find the situation in Spouses Panlilio v. Prosecutors Fernando de Leon, et
al. even more inexplicable. In the case of the Panlilios, any probable cause
to commit the non-existent crime of rebellion complexed with murder exists
only in the minds of
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246 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Salazar
the prosecutors, not in the records of the case.
I have gone over the records and pleadings furnished to the members of
the Supreme Court. I listened intently to the oral arguments during the
hearing and it was quite apparent that the constitutional requirement of
probable cause was not satisfied. In fact, in answer to my query for any
other proofs to support the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the answer was
that the evidence would be submitted in due time to the trial court.
The spouses Panlilio and one parent have been in the restaurant
business for decades. Under the records of these petitions, any restaurant
owner or hotel manager who serves food to rebels is a co-conspirator in the
rebellion. The absurdity of this proposition is apparent if we bear in mind
that rebels ride in buses and jeepneys, eat meals in rural houses when
mealtime finds them in the vicinity, join weddings, fiestas, and other
parties, play basketball with barrio youths, attend masses and church
services and otherwise mix with people in various gatherings. Even if the
hosts recognize them to be rebels and fail to shoo them away, it does not
necessarily follow that the former are co-conspirators in a rebellion.
The only basis for probable cause shown by the records of the Panlilio
case is the alleged fact that the petitioners served food to rebels at the
Enrile household and a hotel supervisor asked two or three of their waiters,
without reason, to go on a vacation. Clearly, a much, much stronger
showing of probable cause must be shown.
In Salonga v. Cruz Paño, 134 SCRA 438 (1985), then Senator Salonga
was charged as a conspirator in the heinous bombing of innocent civilians
because the man who planted the bomb had, sometime earlier, appeared in
a group photograph taken during a birthday party in the United States with
the Senator and other guests. It was a case of conspiracy proved through a
group picture. Here, it is a case of conspiracy sought to proved through the
catering of food.
The Court in Salonga stressed:
‘The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against hasty,
malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an open and public
accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial, and
also to protect the state from useless and expensive trials. (Trocio v. Manta, 118
SCRA
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VOL. 186, JUNE 5, 1990 247
Enrile vs. Salazar
241; citing Hashimn v. Boncan, 71 Phil. 216). The right to a preliminary
investigation is a statutory grant, and to withhold it would be to transgress
constitutional due process. (See People v. Oandasa, 2S SCRA 277) However, in
order to satisfy the due process clause it is not enough that the preliminary
investigation is conducted in the sense of making sure that a transgressor shall
not escape with impunity. A preliminary investigation serves not only the
purposes of the State. More important, it is a part of the guarantees of freedom
and fair play which are birthrights of all who live in our country. It is, therefore,
imperative upon the fiscal or the judge as the case may be, to relieve the accused
from the pain of going through a trial once it is ascertained that the evidence is
insufficient to sustain a prima facie case or that no probable cause exists to form
a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused. Although there is no general
formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable cause since the same must
be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining in given situations and its
existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge
conducting the examination, such a finding should not disregard the facts before
the judge nor run counter to the clear dictates of reason (See La Chemise Lacoste,
S.A. v. Fernandez, 129 SCRA 391). The judge or fiscal, therefore, should not go on
with the prosecution in the hope that some credible evidence might later turn up
during trial for this would be a flagrant violation of a basic right which the courts
are created to uphold. It bears repeating that the judiciary lives up to its mission
by vitalizing and not denigrating constitutional rights. So it has been before. It
should continue to be so.” (id., pp. 461-462)
Because of the foregoing, I take exception to that part of the ponencia which
will read the informations as charging simple rebellion. This case did not
arise from innocent error. If an information charges murder but its contents
show only the ingredients of homicide, the Judge may rightly read it as
charging homicide. In these cases, however, there is a deliberate attempt to
charge the petitioners for an offense which this Court has ruled as non-
existent. The prosecution wanted Hernandez to be reversed. Since the
prosecution has filed informations for a crime which, under our rulings,
does not exist, those informations should be treated as null and void. New
informations charging the correct offense should be filed. And in G.R, No,
92164 an extra effort should be made to see whether or not the principle
in Salonga v. Cruz Paño, et al. (supra) has been violated.
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248 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Salazar
The Court is not, in any way, preventing the Government from using more
effective weapons to suppress rebellion. If the Government feels that the
current situation calls for the imposition of more severe penalties like death
or the creation of new crimes like rebellion complexed with murder, the
remedy is with Congress, not the courts.
I, therefore, vote to GRANT the petitions and to ORDER the respondent
court to DISMISS the void informations for a nonexistent crime.
PADILLA, J., Separate Opinion
I concur in the majority opinion insofar as it holds that the ruling in People
vs. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 “remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit
the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the
occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as an
unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.”
I dissent, however, from the majority opinion insofar as it holds that the
information in question, while charging the complex crime of rebellion with
murder and multiple frustrated murder, “is to be read as charging simple
rebellion.”
The present cases are to be distinguished from the Hernandez case in at
least one (1) material respect. In the Hernandez case, this Court was
confronted with an appealed case, i.e., Hernandez had been convicted by the
trial court of the complex crime of rebellion with murder, arson and robbery,
and his plea to be released on bail before the Supreme Court, pending
appeal, gave birth to the now celebrated Hernandez doctrine that the crime
of rebellion complexed with murder, arson and robbery does not exist. In
the present cases, on the other hand, the Court is confronted with
an original case, i.e., where an information has been recently filed in the
trial court and the petitioners have not even pleaded thereto.
 Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in the Hernandezcase, was “ground-
breaking” on the issue of whether rebellion can be complexed with murder,
arson, robbery, etc. In the present cases, on the other hand, the prosecution
and the lower court, not only had the Hernandez doctrine (as case law), but
Executive Order No. 187 of President Corazon C. Aquino dated 5 June
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VOL. 186, JUNE 5, 1990 249
Enrile vs. Salazar
1987 (as statutory law) to bind them to the legal proposition that the crime
of rebellion complexed with murder, and multiple frustrated murder does
not exist
And yet, notwithstanding these unmistakable and controlling beacon
lights—absent when this Court laid down the Hernandez doctrine—the
prosecution has insisted in filing, and the lower court has persisted in
hearing, an information charging the petitioners with rebellion complexed
with murder an multiple frustrated murder. That information is clearly a
nullity and plainly void ab initio. Its head should not be allowed to surface.
As a nullity in substantive law, it charges nothing; it has given rise to
nothing. The warrants of arrest issued pursuant thereto are as null and
void as the information on which they are anchored. And, since the entire
question of the information’s validity is before the Court in these habeas
corpus cases, I venture to say that the information is fatally defective, even
under procedural law, because it charges more than one (1) offense (Sec. 13,
Rule 110, Rules of Court}.
I submit then that it is not for this Court to energize a dead and, at best,
fatally decrepit information by labelling or “baptizing” it differently from
what it announces itself to be. The prosecution must file an entirely new
and properinformation, for this entire exercise to merit the serious
consideration of the courts.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the petitions, QUASH the warrants
of arrest, and ORDER the information for rebellion complexed with murder
and multiple frustrated murder in Criminal Case Nos. 90-10941, RTC of
Quezon City, DISMISSED.
Consequently, the petitioners should be ordered
permanently released and their bails cancelled.
BIDIN, J., Concurring and Dissenting:
I concur with the majority opinion except as regards the dispositive portion
thereof which orders the remand of the case to the respondent judge for
further proceedings to fix the amount of bail to be posted by the petitioner.
I submit that the proceedings need not be remanded to the respondent
judge for the purpose of fixing bail since we have construed the indictment
herein as charging simple rebellion, an offense which is bailable.
Consequently, habeas corpus is the
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250 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Salazar
proper remedy available to petitioner as an accused who had feeen charged
with simple rebellion, a bailable offense but who had been denied his right
to bail by the respondent judge in violation of petitioner’s constitutional
right to bail. In view thereof, the responsibility of fixing the amount of bail
and approval thereof when filed, devolves upon us, if complete relief is to be
accorded to petitioner in the instant proceedings.
It is indubitable that before conviction, admission to bail is a matter of
right to the defendant, accused before the Regional Trial Court of an offense
less than capital (Section 13 Article III, Constitution and Section 3, Rule
114). Petitioner is, before Us, on a petition for habeas corpuspraying, among
others, for his provisional release on bail. Since the offense charged
(construed as simple rebellion) admits of bail, it is incumbent upon us in
the exercise of our jurisdiction over the petition for habeas corpus (Section
5 (1), Article VIII, Constitution; Section 2, Rule 102), to grant petitioner his
right to bail and having admitted him to bail, to fix the amount thereof in
such sums as the court deems reasonable. Thereafter, the rules require that
“the proceedings together with the bond” shall forthwith be certified to the
respondent trial court (Section 14, Rule 102).
Accordingly, the cash bond in the amount of P100,000.00 posted by
petitioner for his provisional release pursuant to our resolution dated
March 6, 1990 should now be deemed and admitted as his bail bond for his
provisional release in the case (simple rebellion) pending before the
respondent judge, without necessity of a remand for further proceedings,
conditioned for his (petitioner’s) appearance before the trial court to abide
its order or judgment in the said case.
SARMIENTO, J., Concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree that People v. Hernandez should abide. More than three decades
1 Note.—Amnesty granted by former President Marcos covers crimes for
after which it was penned, it has firmly settled in the tomes of our violation of subversion laws or those defined under crimes against public
jurisprudence as correct doctrine. order. (Macaga-an vs. People, 152 SCRA 480.)
As Hernandez put it, rebellion means “engaging in war against the forces
of the government,” which implies “resort to arms,
2 ——o0o——

_______________ _______________

199 Phil. 515 (1956). 3Supra, 521.

2Supra, 520. 4US v. Santiago, 41 Phil. 793 (1917).
251 252
VOL. 186, JUNE 5, 1990 251 © Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
Enrile vs. Salazar
requisition of property and services, collection of taxes and contributions,
restraint of liberty, damage to property, physical injuries and loss of life,
and the hunger, illness and unhappiness that war leaves in its
wake....” whether committed in furtherance, of as a necessary means for
3

the commission, or in the course, of rebellion. To say that rebellion may be

completed with any other offense, in this case murder, is to play into a
contradiction in terms because exactly, rebellion includes murder, among
other possible crimes.
I also agree that the information may stand as an accusation for simple
rebellion. Since the acts complained of as constituting rebellion have been
embodied in the information, mention therein of murder as a complexing
offense is a surplusage, because in any case, the crime of rebellion is left
fully described. 4

At any rate, the government need only amend the information by a

clerical correction, since an amendment will not alter its substance.
I dissent, however, insofar as the majority orders the remand of the
matter of bail to the lower court. I take it that when we, in our Resolution
of March 6, 1990, granted the petitioner “provisional liberty” upon the filing
of a bond of P100,000.00, we granted him bail. The fact that we gave him
“provisional liberty” is in my view, of no moment, because bail means
provisional liberty. It will serve no useful purpose to have the trial court
hear the incident again when we ourselves have been satisfied that the
petitioner is entitled to temporary freedom.
Proceedings in both cases remanded to respondent judge to fix the amount
of bail.
542 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Pimentel
G.R. No. 100210. April 1, 1998. *
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.HON. OSCAR B.
PIMENTEL, as Judge, RTC of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 148 and
ANTONIO A. TUJAN, respondents.
Criminal Law; Illegal Possession of Firearms; Presidential Decree
1866; Under the first paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. 1866, the mere possession of
an unlicensed firearm or ammunition is the crime itself which carries the penalty
of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua, and the third
paragraph of the same Section makes the use of said firearm and ammunition “in
furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crimes of rebellion,
insurrection or subversion” a circumstance to increase the penalty to death.—The
above-quoted provisions of P.D. No. 1866 are plain and simple. Under the first
paragraph of Section 1, the mere possession of an unlicensed firearm or
ammunition is the crime itself which carries the penalty of reclusion temporal in
its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. The third paragraph of the same
Section makes the use of said firearm and ammunition “in furtherance of, or
incident to, or in connection with the crimes of rebellion, insurrection or
subversion” a circumstance to increasethe penalty to death. Thus, the allegation in
the Information in Criminal Case No. 1789 that the unlicensed firearm found in
the possession of Antonio Tujan, “a member of the communist party of the
Philippines and its front organization,” was used “in furtherance of or incident to,
or in connection with the crime of subversion” does not charge him with the
separate and distinct crime of Subversion in the same Information, but simply
describes the mode or manner by which the violation of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866
was committed so as to qualify the penalty to death.
Same; Same; Same; There is nothing in P.D. No. 1866, specifically Section 1
thereof, which decrees categorically or by implication that the crimes of rebellion,
insurrection or subversion are the very acts that are being penalized.—There is,
therefore, only one offense charged in the questioned information, that is, the
illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, qualified by its being used in
furtherance of subversion. There is nothing in P.D. No. 1866, specifically
____________________________
*EN BANC.
543
VOL. 288, APRIL 1, 1998 543
People vs. Pimentel
Section 1 thereof, which decrees categorically or by implication that the
crimes of rebellion, insurrection or subversion are the very acts that are being
penalized. This is clear from the title of the law itself which boldly indicates the
specific acts penalized under it: “CODIFYING THE LAWS
ON ILLEGAL/UNLAWFUL POSSESSION, MANUFACTURE, DEALING IN,
ACQUISITIONOR DISPOSITION, OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR
EXPLOSIVES OR INSTRUMENTS USED IN THE MANUFACTURE OF
FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES, AND IMPOSING STIFFER
PENALTIES FOR CERTAIN VIOLATIONS THEREOF AND FOR RELEVANT
PURPOSES.”
Constitutional Law; Double Jeopardy; Requisites.—In order that the
protection against double jeopardy may inure to the benefit of an accused, the
following requisites must have obtained in the first criminal action: (a) a valid
complaint or information; (b) a competent court; (c) the defendant had pleaded to
the charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against
him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
Same; Criminal Law; Anti-Subversion Law; Ex Post Facto Laws; R.A. No.
7636 totally repealing R.A. No. 1700, being favorable to the accused, should be
given retroactive effect.—While we hold that both the subversion charge under R.A.
No. 1700, as amended, and the one for illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition in furtherance of subversion under P.D. No. 1866, as amended, can
co-exist, the subsequent enactment of Republic Act No. 7636 on September 22,
1992, totally repealing R.A. No. 1700, as amended, has substantially changed the
complexion of the present case, inasmuch as the said repealing law being favorable
to the accused-private respondent, who is not a habitual delinquent, should be
given retroactive effect.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The legislative intent of totally abrogating the old
anti-subversion law is clear, thus, it would be illogical for courts to try and sentence
an accused for an offense that no longer exists.—That R.A. No. 7636 should apply
retroactively to accused-private respondent is beyond question. The repeal by said
law of R.A. No. 1700, as amended, was categorical, definite and absolute. There
was no saving clause in the repeal. The legislative intent of totally abrogating the
old anti-subversion law is clear.
544
544 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Pimentel
Thus, it would be illogical for the trial courts to try and sentence the accused-
private respondent for an offense that no longer exists.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Where the repeal of a
penal law is total and absolute and the act which was penalized by a prior law
ceases to be criminal under the new law, the previous offense is obliterated.—
Where, as here, the repeal of a penal law is total and absolute and the act which
was penalized by a prior law ceases to be criminal under the new law, the previous
offense is obliterated. It is a recognized rule in this jurisdiction that a total repeal
deprives the courts of jurisdiction to try, convict and sentence persons charged
with violation of the old law prior to the repeal.
Same; Same; Same; Same; With the enactment of R.A. No. 7636, the charge of
illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, qualified by subversion should be
amended to simple illegal possession of firearm and ammunition since subversion
is no longer a crime.—With the enactment of R.A. No. 7636, the charge of
subversion against the accused-private respondent has no more legal basis and
should be dismissed. As regards the other charge of illegal possession of firearm
and ammunition, qualified by subversion, this charge should be amended to simple
illegal possession of firearm and ammunition since, as earlier discussed,
subversion is no longer a crime.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Augusto S. Sanchez & Associates Law Firm for private respondent.
MARTINEZ, J.:
Is the Court of Appeals, in affirming the order of the Regional Trial Court,
correct in ruling that Subversion is the “main offense” in a charge of Illegal
Possession of Firearm and Ammunition in Furtherance of Subversionunder
P.D. No. 1866, as amended, and that, therefore, the said charge should
545
VOL. 288, APRIL 1, 1998 545
People vs. Pimentel
be quashed in view of a previous charge of Subversionunder R.A. No. 1700,
as amended by P.D. No. 885, against the same accused pending in another
court?
Stated differently, is the accused charged with the sameoffense in both
cases, which would justify the dismissal of the second charge on the ground
of double jeopardy?
This is the pith issue presented before us in this appeal by certiorari
interposed by the People under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court,
seeking a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals (Sixteenth Division)
1
dated May 27, 1991, in CA-G.R. SP No. 24273, entitled “THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, versus HON. OSCAR B. PIMENTEL, as
Judge, RTC of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 148 and ANTONIO A.
TUJAN, Respondents.”
The record discloses the following antecedent facts:
As early as 1983, private respondent Antonio Tujan was charged with
Subversion under Republic Act No. 1700 (the Anti-Subversion Law), as
amended, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 45), National
Capital Region, docketed as Criminal Case No. 64079. As a consequence2
thereof, a warrant for his arrest was issued on July 29, 1983, but it 3
remained unserved as he could not be found.
Almost seven (7) years thereafter, or on June 5, 1990, Antonio Tujan was
arrested on the basis of the warrant of arrest in the subversion case. When 4
arrested, an unlicensed .38 caliber special revolver and six (6) rounds of live
ammunition were found in his possession. 5
____________________________
1 Penned by then Associate Justice Justo P. Torres, Jr. and concurred in by then Associate
Justice Ricardo J. Francisco and Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago; Annex “N,”
Petition; Rollo, pp. 95-106.
2 Annexes “E” & “E-1,” Petition; Rollo, pp. 32, 38.
3 Rollo, p. 39.
4 Annexes “E” & “E-1,” supra.
5 Ibid.
546
546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Pimentel
Consequently, on June 14, 1990, Antonio Tujan was charged with Illegal
Possession of Firearm and Ammunition in Furtherance of Subversion
under Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati (Branch 148), docketed as Criminal Case No. 1789. The
Information reads:
“That on or about the 5th day of June, 1990, in the Municipality of Parañaque,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, being a member of a communist party of the Philippines,
and its front organization, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have in his possession, control and custody, in furtherance of or incident to, or in
connection with the crime of subversion, a special edition ARMSCOR PHILS.
caliber .38 special revolver with Serial No. 1026387 and with six (6) live
ammunitions, without first securing the necessary license or permit thereof from
competent government authority.” 6
The above Information recommended no bail for Antonio Tujan, which
recommendation was approved by the trial court in an Order dated June
19, 1990. The same order also directed the continued detention of Antonio
7
Tujan at MIG 15 of the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (ISAFP), Bago Bantay, Quezon City, while his case is pending.
On June 26, 1990, Antonio Tujan, through counsel, filed a
motion invoking his right to a preliminary investigation pursuant to
8
Section 7, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court and praying that his
arraignment be held in abeyance until the preliminary investigation is
terminated.
However, on June 27, 1990, during the hearing of Antonio Tujan’s
motion for preliminary investigation, his counsel withdrew the motion since
he would file a motion to quash the Information, for which reason counsel
requested a period of
____________________________
6 Annex “N,” Petition; Rollo, pp. 98-99.
7 Annex “B,” Petition; Rollo, p. 27.
8 Annex “C,” Petition; Rollo, p. 28.
547
VOL. 288, APRIL 1, 1998 547
People vs. Pimentel
twenty (20) days to do so. This was granted by the trial court on that same
day. 9
On July 16, 1990, Antonio Tujan did file the motion to quash the 10
Information in Criminal Case No. 1789 on the ground that he “has been
previously in jeopardy of being convicted of the offense charged” in Criminal
Case No. 64079 (for subversion) of the Regional Trial Court of Manila
(Branch 45). The said ground is based on Sections 3(h) and 7, Rule 117 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. In support of the motion, Antonio
Tujan contends that “common crimes such as illegal possession of firearms
and ammunition should actually be deemed absorbed in subversion,” citing11
the cases of Misolas vs. Panga, et al. (G.R. No. 83341, January 30, 1990, 181
SCRA 648) and Enrile vs. Salazar, et al. (G.R. No. 92163, June 5, 1990, 186
SCRA 217). Antonio Tujan then avers that “the present case is the twin
prosecution” of “the earlier subversion case” and, therefore, he “is entitled
to invoke the constitutional protection against double jeopardy.” 12
The petitioner opposed the motion to quash, arguing that Antonio Tujan
13
does not stand in jeopardy of being convicted a second time because: (a) he
has not even been arraigned in the subversion case, and (b) the offense
charged against him in Criminal Case No. 64079 is for Subversion,
punishable under Republic Act No. 1700; while the present case is for
Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition in Furtherance of
Subversion, punishable under a different law (Presidential Decree No.
1866). Moreover, petitioner contends that Antonio Tujan’s reliance on
the Misolas and Enrile cases “is misplaced.” Tujan merely relies on the
14
dissenting opinions in the Misolas case. Also, the Enrile case which
involved a complex crime of rebellion with murder is inapplicable to the
____________________________
9 Annex “D,” Petition; Rollo, p. 31.
10 Annex “E,” Petition; Rollo, p. 32.
11 Rollo, p. 33.
12 Ibid., p. 34.
13 Annex “G,” Petition; Rollo, p. 41.
14 Rollo, p. 43.
548
548 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Pimentel
instant case which is not a complex offense. Thus, the “absorption rule” as
held applicable in the Enrile ruling “has no room for application in the
present case because (illegal) possession of firearm and ammunition is not
a necessary means of committing the offense of subversion, nor is
subversion a necessary means of committing the crime of illegal possession
of firearm and ammunition.” 15
The trial court, in an order dated October 12, 1990, granted the motion
to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 1789, the dispositive portion
of the order reading:
“WHEREFORE, the motion to quash the information is hereby GRANTED, but
only in so far as the accused may be placed in jeopardy or in danger of being
convicted or acquitted of the crime of Subversion and as a consequence the
Information is hereby quashed and the case dismissed without prejudice to the
filing of Illegal Possession of Firearm.
“SO ORDERED.” 16
It is best to quote the disquisition of the respondent court in quashing the
information and dismissing the case:
“x x x xxx xxx
“In other words, the main offense the accused is being charged in this case is
also Subversion considering that the alleged Illegal Possession of the Firearm and
Ammunition is only in furtherance thereof.
“Now, subversion being a continuing offense as has been previously held by the
Supreme Court, the fact that the accused has been previously charged of
Subversion before another court before the institution of this instant case is just a
continuing offense of his former charge or that his acts constituting subversion is
a continuation of the acts he committed before.
“The court therefore cannot subscribe to the position taken by the prosecution
that this case is very different from the other case and that double jeopardy will
attach in this particular case.
____________________________
Rollo, p. 43.
15
Annex “H,” Petition; Rollo, p. 45.
16
549
VOL. 288, APRIL 1, 1998 549
People vs. Pimentel
“This court agrees with the position taken by the defense that double jeopardy will
attach to the accusation of subversion, punishable now under Republic Act 1700,
as Rule 117 of the Rules of Court particularly Section 1 thereof, provides:
‘Time to move to quash—At any time before entering his plea, the accused may move to
quash the complaint or information. (1a)’
“In other words, there is no necessity that the accused should be arraigned first
before he can move to quash the information. It is before he pleads which the
accused did in this case.
“On the other submissions by the prosecution, that the possession of firearms
and ammunitions is not a necessary means of committing the offense of subversion
or vice versa, then if the court follows such argument, there could be no offense of
Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition in furtherance of Subversion, for
even the prosecution admits also that in subversion which is an offense involving
propaganda, counter propaganda, a battle of the hearts and mind of the people
does not need the possession or use of firearms and ammunitions.
“The prosecution even admits and to quote:
‘The defense of double jeopardy, while unquestionably available to the accused, had not
been clearly shown to be invokable (sic) at this point in time.’
“But the rule says otherwise as previously stated as provided for under Section
1 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.
“Thus, if ever the accused is caught in possession of a firearm and ammunition
which is separate and distinct from the crime of subversion and is not a necessary
ingredient thereof and the court believed so, the prosecution will have to file another
information as they may wish. The court therefore has to grant the motion to quash
on the aforestated grounds, subject to Section 5 of Rule 117, considering that the
only offense to which the accused in this case may be placed in jeopardy is
Subversion and not Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions.
“The prosecution may file any information as warranted within ten (10) days
from receipt of this order otherwise the court will
550
550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Pimentel
order the release of the accused, unless he is in custody for some other
offense.” (Emphasis ours)
17
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was also denied in an order dated
18
December 28, 1990. 19
The petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals through a
petition for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 24273. However, the
appellate court found that the trial court did not commit any grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in quashing the
questioned Information. In dismissing the petition, the appellate court, in
its decision dated May 27, 1991, basically reiterated the aforequoted ruling
of the trial court.
Petitioner now comes to this Court, claiming that: (1) the decision of the
Court of Appeals is not in accord with the law and applicable jurisprudence;
and (2) it was deprived of due process to prosecute and prove its case against
private respondent Antonio Tujan in Criminal Case No. 1789.
We agree with the petitioner.
The Court of Appeals considered as duplicitous the Information for
violation of P.D. No. 1866 filed against private respondent Antonio Tujan.
It ruled:
“The foregoing information (for Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition in
Furtherance of Subversion) filed before the Makati court shows that the main case
is subversion considering that there is an allegation that the alleged illegal
possession of firearms was made ‘in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection
with the crime of subversion.’ Also, the information alleged likewise that the
accused is a member of a communist party of the Philippines and its front
organization. Basically, the information refers to the crime of Subversion qualified
by Illegal Possession of Firearms. x x x.” 20
____________________________
17 Annex “H,” Petition; Rollo, pp. 48-50.
18 Annex “J,” Petition; Rollo, p. 51.
19 Annex “J,” Petition; Rollo, p. 55.
20 Rollo, p. 99.
551
VOL. 288, APRIL 1, 1998 551
People vs. Pimentel
The ruling of the Court of Appeals is erroneous.
Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, under which Antonio Tujan is
charged in Criminal Case No. 1789 before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati (Branch 148), provides as follows:
“Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sales, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of
Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the
Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition.—The penalty of reclusion temporal in
its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who
shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any firearms,
part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to
be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.
“If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearms, the
penalty of death shall be imposed.
“If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in
connection with the crimes of rebellion, insurrection or subversion, the penalty of
death shall be imposed.
“The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, director or other
responsible officer of any public or private firm, company, corporation or entity,
who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by such firm,
company, corporation or entity to be used by any person or persons found guilty of
violating the provisions of the preceding paragraphs.
“The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
carry any licensed firearm outside his residence without legal authority therefor.”
(Emphasis ours)
The above-quoted provisions of P.D. No. 1866 are plain and simple. Under
the first paragraph of Section 1, the mere possession of an unlicensed
firearm or ammunition is the crime itself which carries the penalty
of reclusion temporalin its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. The third
paragraph of the same Section makes the use of said firearm and
ammunition “in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the
crimes of rebellion, insurrection or subversion” a circumstance
to increase the penalty to death. Thus, the allegation in
552
552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Pimentel
the Information in Criminal Case No. 1789 that the unlicensed firearm
found in the possession of Antonio Tujan, “a member of the communist
party of the Philippines and its front organization,” was used “in
furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the crime of
subversion” does not charge him with the separate and distinct crime of
Subversion in the same Information, but simply describes the mode or
manner by which the violation of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 was
committed so as to qualify the penalty to death.
21
There is, therefore, only one offense charged in the questioned
information, that is, the illegal possession of firearm and ammunition,
qualified by its being used in furtherance of subversion. There is nothing
22
in P.D. No. 1866, specifically Section 1 thereof, which decrees categorically
or by implication that the crimes of rebellion, insurrection or subversion are
the very acts that are being penalized. This is clear from the title of the law
itself which boldly indicates the specific acts penalized under it:
“CODIFYING THE LAWS ON ILLEGAL/UNLAWFUL POSSESSION,
MANUFACTURE, DEALING IN, ACQUISITIONOR DISPOSITION, OF
FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES OR INSTRUMENTS USED IN
THE MANUFACTURE OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES,
AND IMPOSING STIFFER PENALTIES FOR CERTAIN VIOLATIONS
THEREOF AND FOR RELEVANT PURPOSES.” (Emphasis ours)
On the other hand, the previous subversion charge against Antonio Tujan
in Criminal Case No. 64079, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila
(Branch 45), is based on a different law, that is, Republic Act No. 1700, as
amended. Section 3 thereof penalizes any person who “knowingly, wilfully
and by overt act affiliates with, becomes or remains a member of a
____________________________
See Tangan vs. People, et al., No. L-73963, November 5, 1987, 155 SCRA 435, 444.
21
See Misolas vs. Panga, et al., G.R. No. 83341 [En Banc], January 30, 1990, 181 SCRA 648.
22
553
VOL. 288, APRIL 1, 1998 553
People vs. Pimentel
subversive association or organization x x x.” Section 4 of said law further
penalizes “such member [of the Communist Party of the Philippines and/or
its successor or of any subversive association] (who) takes up arms against
the Government.” Thus, in the present case, private respondent Antonio
Tujan could be charged either under P.D. No. 1866 or R.A. No. 1700, or
both.
This leads us to the issue of whether or not private respondent Antonio
Tujan was placed in double jeopardy with the filing of the second
Information for Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition in
Furtherance of Subversion.
We rule in the negative.
Article III of the Constitution provides:
“Sec. 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal
under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.”
(Emphasis ours)
Complementing the above constitutional provision, Rule 117 of the Revised
Rules of Court states:
“SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy.—When an accused has
been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon
a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge,
the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar
to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the
same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
xxx xxx x x x.”
____________________________
Ibid., p. 655.
23
554
554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Pimentel
The right of an accused against double jeopardy is a matter which he may
raise in a motion to quash to defeat a subsequent prosecution for
the same offense. The pertinent provision of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules
of Court provides:
“SEC. 3. Grounds.—The accused may move to quash the complaint or information
on any of the following grounds:
xxx xxx xxx
(h) That the accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of being
convicted, or acquitted of the offense charged. (2a)” (Emphasis ours)
23
In order that the protection against double jeopardy may inure to the
benefit of an accused, the following requisites must have obtained in
the first criminal action: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a
competent court; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (d) the
24
defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
25
Suffice it to say that in the present case, private respondent’s motion to
quash filed in the trial court did not actually raise the issue of double
jeopardy simply because it had not arisen yet. It is noteworthy that the
private respondent has not even been arraigned in the first criminal action
for subversion. Besides, as earlier discussed, the two criminal charges
against private respondent are not of the same offense as required by
Section 21, Article III of the Constitution.
It is clear from the foregoing, that the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals is not in accordance with the law and jurisprudence and thus
should be reversed.
While we hold that both the subversion charge under R.A. No. 1700, as
amended, and the one for illegal possession of
____________________________
24Gaspar vs. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 416.
25People v. Obsania, 132 Phil. 782, 788; People vs. Santiago, 174 SCRA 143; Ada vs.
Virola, 172 SCRA 336; People vs. Pineda, 219 SCRA 1; People vs. Vergara, 221 SCRA
560; Paulin vs. Gimenez, 217 SCRA 386.
555
VOL. 288, APRIL 1, 1998 555
People vs. Pimentel
firearm and ammunition in furtherance of subversion under P.D. No. 1866,
as amended, can co-exist, the subsequent enactment of Republic Act No.
7636 on September 22, 1992, totally repealing R.A. No. 1700, as amended,
has substantially changed the complexion of the present case, inasmuch as
the said repealing law being favorable to the accused-private respondent,
who is not a habitual delinquent, should be given retroactive effect. 26
Although this legal effect of R.A. No. 7636 on privaterespondent’s case
has never been raised as an issue by the parties—obviously because the
said law came out only several months after the questioned decision of the
Court of Appeals was promulgated and while the present petition is
pending with this Court—we should nonetheless fulfill our duty as a court
of justice by applying the law to whomsoever is benefited by it regardless of
whether or not the accused or any party has sought the application of the
beneficent provisions of the repealing law. 27
That R.A. No. 7636 should apply retroactively to accusedprivate
respondent is beyond question. The repeal by said law of R.A. No. 1700, as
amended, was categorical, definite and absolute. There was no saving
clause in the repeal. The legislative intent of totally abrogating the old anti-
subversion law is clear. Thus, it would be illogical for the trial courts to try
and sentence the accused-private respondent for an offense that no longer
exists. 28
As early as 1935, we ruled in People vs. Tamayo: 29
“There is no question that at common law and in America a much more favorable
attitude towards the accused exists relative to statutes that have been repealed
than has been adopted here. Our
____________________________
26 Article 22, Revised Penal Code.
27 See People vs. Simon, G.R. No. 93028, July 29, 1994 (En Banc), 234 SCRA 555, 570-571,
citing People vs. Moran, et al., 44 Phil. 387 [1923].
28 People vs. Tamayo, 61 Phil. 225, 227 [1935].
29 Ibid.
556
556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Pimentel
rule is more in conformity with the Spanish doctrine, but even in Spain, where the
offense ceases to be criminal, prosecution cannot be had. (1 Pacheco Commentaries,
296)” (Emphasis ours)
Where, as here, the repeal of a penal law is total and absolute and the act
which was penalized by a prior law ceases to be criminal under the new law,
the previous offense is obliterated. It is a recognized rule in this
30
jurisdiction that a total repeal deprives the courts of jurisdiction to try,
convict and sentence persons charged with violation of the old law prior to
the repeal. 31
With the enactment of R.A. No. 7636, the charge of subversion against
the accused-private respondent has no more legal basis and should be
dismissed.
As regards the other charge of illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition, qualified by subversion, this charge should be amended to
simple illegal possession of firearm and ammunition since, as earlier
discussed, subversion is no longer a crime.
Moreover, the offense of simple illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition is now bailable under Republic Act No. 8294 which was
enacted on June 6, 1997. R.A. No. 8294 has amended Presidential Decree
No. 1866, as amended, by eliminating the provision in said P.D. that if the
unlicensed firearm is used in furtherance of subversion, the penalty of
death shall be imposed. Under the new law (R.A. No. 8294), the penalty
32
prescribed for simple illegal possession of firearm (.38 caliber) is now
reduced to prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less
than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00). The reduced penalty of
33
imprisonment—which is four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day to
six (6) years—entitles the accused-private respondent to bail.
____________________________
30 Ibid.
31 People vs. Sindiong, et al., 77 Phil. 1000; People vs. Jacinto, O.G., November 17, 1958, pp.
7585, 7587.
32 Section 1, par. 3, P.D. No. 1866, as amended.
33 Section 1, par. 1, R.A. No. 8294.
557
VOL. 288, APRIL 1, 1998 557
People vs. Pimentel
Considering, however, that the accused-private respondent has been
detained since his arrest on June 5, 1990 up to the present (as far as our
record has shown), or more than seven (7) years now, his immediate release
is in order. This is so because even if he were convicted for illegal possession
of firearm and ammunition, the length of his detention while his case is possession of this kind of weapon. (People vs. De Gracia, 233 SCRA
pending has already exceeded the penalty prescribed by the new law. 716 [1994])
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated May To be liable for the aggravated form of illegal possession of a firearm
27, 1991, in CA-G.R. SP No. 24273, including the orders dated October 12, which entails the capital punishment, such illegal possession must be the
1990 and December 28, 1990 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati (Branch specific and principal offense charged, with the fact of killing being included
148), National Capital Region, in Criminal Case No. 1789, are hereby in the particulars of the indictment. (People vs. Macagaling, 237 SCRA
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. 299 [1994])
The subversion charge against accused-private respondent Antonio A.
Tujan in Criminal Case No. 64079 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, ——o0o——
Branch 45, is hereby DISMISSED. The other Information for illegal
© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
possession of firearm and ammunition in furtherance of subversion against
the same accused in Criminal Case No. 1789 of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 148, is DEEMED AMENDED to Simple Illegal Possession
of Firearm and Ammunition. The accusedappellant is hereby ordered
RELEASED IMMEDIATELY from detention for the reason stated above,
unless he is being detained for any other offense.
This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J.), Regalado, Davide,
Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiba
n, Quisumbing and Purisima, JJ., concur.
Decision of Court of Appeals and orders of the Regional Trial Court
reversed and set aside. Judgment immediately executory.
558
558 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Espano vs. Court of Appeals
Notes.—The offense defined in second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No.
1866 does not absorb the crime of homicide or murder under the Revised
Penal Code and therefore does not bar the simultaneous or subsequent
prosecution of the latter crime. (People vs. Deunida, 231 SCRA 520 [1994])
The possession of a firearm becomes unlawful when there is no permit
or license for its holding, and the law does not prescribe a minimum period
of time for holding of the firearm before its possession can be illegal. (People
vs. Verchez, 233 SCRA 174 [1994])
A temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless possession or control of a
firearm cannot be considered a violation of a statute prohibiting the
 G.R. No. 176830. February 11, 2014.*
SATURNINO C. OCAMPO, petitioner, vs. HON. EPHREM S. ABANDO, in
his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Hilongos,
Leyte, Branch 18, CESAR M. MERIN, in his capacity as Approving
Prosecutor and Officer-in-Charge, ROSULO U. VIVERO, in his capacity as
Investigating Prosecutor, RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Justice, respondents.
G.R. No. 185587. February 11, 2014.*
RANDALL B. ECHANIS, petitioner, vs. HON. THELMA BUNYI-
MEDINA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 32, HON. EPHREM S. ABANDO, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Hilongos, Leyte, Branch 18,
CESAR M.
_______________
* EN BANC.
674
MERIN, in his capacity as Approving Prosecutor and Officer-in-Charge,
ROSULO U. VIVERO, in his capacity as Investigating Prosecutor, RAUL
M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Justice,
respondents.
G.R. No. 185636. February 11, 2014.*
RAFAEL G. BAYLOSIS, petitioner, vs. HON. THELMA BUNYI-MEDINA,
in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 32, HON. EPHREM S. ABANDO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court of Hilongos, Leyte, Branch 18, CESAR M.
MERIN, in his capacity as Approving Prosecutor and Officer-in-Charge,
ROSULO U. VIVERO, in his capacity as Investigating Prosecutor, RAUL
M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Justice,
respondents.
G.R. No. 190005. February 11, 2014.*
VICENTE P. LADLAD, petitioner, vs. HON. THELMA BUNYI-MEDINA,
in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 32, and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigations; Due Process;
While the right to have a preliminary investigation before trial is statutory rather
than constitutional, it is a substantive right and a component of due process in the
administration of criminal justice.—A preliminary investigation is “not a casual
affair.” It is conducted to protect the innocent from the embarrassment, expense
and anxiety of a public trial. While the right to have a preliminary investigation
before trial is statutory rather than constitutional, it is a substantive right and a
component of due process in the administration of criminal justice. In the context
of a preliminary investigation, the right to due process of law entails the
opportunity to be heard. It serves to accord an opportunity for the presentation of
the respondent’s side with regard to the accusation. Afterwards, the investigating
officer shall decide whether the allegations and defenses lead to a reasonable belief
that a crime has been com-
675mitted, and that it was the respondent who committed it. Otherwise, the
investigating officer is bound to dismiss the complaint.
Due Process; The essence of due process is reasonable opportunity to be heard
and submit evidence in support of one’s defense.—“The essence of due process is
reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit evidence in support of one’s
defense.” What is proscribed is lack of opportunity to be heard. Thus, one who has
been afforded a chance to present one’s own side of the story cannot claim denial
of due process.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigations; As long as
efforts to reach a respondent were made, and he was given an opportunity to present
countervailing evidence, the preliminary investigation remains valid.—Section
3(d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, allows Prosecutor Vivero to resolve the
complaint based on the evidence before him if a respondent could not be
subpoenaed. As long as efforts to reach a respondent were made, and he was given
an opportunity to present countervailing evidence, the preliminary investigation
remains valid. The rule was put in place in order to foil underhanded attempts of
a respondent to delay the prosecution of offenses.
Same; Same; Prosecution of Offenses; The Supreme Court has previously
cautioned that “litigants represented by counsel should not expect that all they need
to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of their case.”—We have previously
cautioned that “litigants represented by counsel should not expect that all they
need to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of their case.” Having opted to
remain passive during the preliminary investigation, petitioner Ladlad and his
counsel cannot now claim a denial of due process, since their failure to file a
counter-affidavit was of their own doing.
Same; Same; Motion for Reconsideration; It must be pointed out that the
period for filing a motion for reconsideration or an appeal to the Secretary of Justice
is reckoned from the date of receipt of the resolution of the prosecutor, not from the
date of the resolution.—As to his claim that he was denied the right to file a motion
for reconsideration or to appeal the Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero due to the 19-
day delay in the service of the Resolution, it must be pointed out that the period
for filing a motion for reconsideration or an appeal to the Secretary of Justice is
reckoned from the date of receipt of the
676resolution of the prosecutor, not from the date of the resolution. This is
clear from Section 3 of the 2000 National Prosecution Service Rule on Appeal: Sec.
3. Period to appeal.—The appealshall be taken within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of the resolution, or of the denial of the motion for
reconsideration/reinvestigation if one has been filed within fifteen (15) days
from receipt of the assailed resolution. Only one motion for reconsideration
shall be allowed.
Same; Same; Warrants of Arrest; Search Warrants; No search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce.—Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution provides that “no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce.”
Same; Same; Same; Probable Cause; Although the Constitution provides that
probable cause shall be determined by the judge after an examination under oath
or an affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses, the Supreme Court has
ruled that a hearing is not necessary for the determination thereof.—Probable cause
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest has been defined as “such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.” Although
the Constitution provides that probable cause shall be determined by the judge
after an examination under oath or an affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses, we have ruled that a hearing is not necessary for the determination
thereof. In fact, the judge’s personal examination of the complainant and the
witnesses is not mandatory and indispensable for determining the aptness of
issuing a warrant of arrest.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is enough that the judge personally evaluates the
prosecutor’s report and supporting documents showing the existence of probable
cause for the indictment and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or if,
on the basis of his evaluation, he finds no probable cause, to disregard the
prosecutor’s resolution and require the submission of additional affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in determining its existence.—It is enough that the judge
personally evaluates the prosecutor’s report and support-
677ing documents showing the existence of probable cause for the indictment
and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or if, on the basis of his
evaluation, he finds no probable cause, to disregard the prosecutor’s resolution and
require the submission of additional affidavits of witnesses to aid him in
determining its existence. Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis claim that, had Judge
Abando painstakingly examined the records submitted by Prosecutor Vivero, the
judge would have inevitably dismissed the charge against them. Additionally,
petitioner Ocampo alleges that Judge Abando did not point out facts and evidence
in the record that were used as bases for his finding of probable cause to issue a
warrant of arrest. The determination of probable cause for the issuance of
warrants of arrest against petitioners is addressed to the sound discretion of Judge
Abando as the trial judge. Further elucidating on the wide latitude given to trial
judges in the issuance of warrants of arrest, this Court stated in Sarigumba v.
Sandiganbayan, 451 SCRA 533 (2005).
Same; Same; Prosecution of Offenses; Political Offense Doctrine; Under the
political offense doctrine, common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political
offense, are divested of their character as “common” offenses and assume the
political complexion of the main crime of which they are mere ingredients, and,
consequently, cannot be punished separately from the principal offense, or
complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty.—Under the
political offense doctrine, “common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political
offense, are divested of their character as “common” offenses and assume the
political complexion of the main crime of which they are mere ingredients, and,
consequently, cannot be punished separately from the principal offense, or
complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty.” Any
ordinary act assumes a different nature by being absorbed in the crime of rebellion.
Thus, when a killing is committed in furtherance of rebellion, the killing is not
homicide or murder. Rather, the killing assumes the political complexion of
rebellion as its mere ingredient and must be prosecuted and punished as rebellion
alone.
Same; Same; Same; Same; When the political offense doctrine is asserted as a
defense in the trial court, it becomes crucial for the court to determine whether the
act of killing was done in furtherance of a political end, and for the political motive
of the act to be conclusively demonstrated; The burden of demonstrating political
motivation must be discharged by the defense, since motive is a state of mind
678which only the accused knows.—When the political offense doctrine is
asserted as a defense in the trial court, it becomes crucial for the court to
determine whether the act of killing was done in furtherance of a political end, and
for the political motive of the act to be conclusively demonstrated. Petitioners aver
that the records show that the alleged murders were committed in furtherance of
the CPP/NPA/NDFP rebellion, and that the political motivation behind the alleged
murders can be clearly seen from the charge against the alleged top leaders of the
CPP/NPA/NDFP as co-conspirators. We had already ruled that the burden of
demonstrating political motivation must be discharged by the defense, since
motive is a state of mind which only the accused knows. The proof showing political
motivation is adduced during trial where the accused is assured an opportunity to
present evidence supporting his defense. It is not for this Court to determine this
factual matter in the instant petitions.
Same; Same; Same; Same; As held in the case of Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Zamboanga Del Norte v. Court of Appeals, 348 SCRA 714 (2000), if
during trial, petitioners are able to show that the alleged murders were indeed
committed in furtherance of rebellion, Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court
provides the remedy.—As held in the case of Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Zamboanga Del Norte v. Court of Appeals, 348 SCRA 714 (2000), if during trial,
petitioners are able to show that the alleged murders were indeed committed in
furtherance of rebellion, Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides the
remedy, to wit: SECTION 14. Amendment or substitution.—A complaint or
information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at
any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a
formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done
without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused. However, any amendment
before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or excludes any
accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the
prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court
shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be
furnished all parties, especially the offended party. (n) If it appears at any time
before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper
offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information
upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance
with
679Section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall not be placed in
double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their
appearance at the trial.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Double Jeopardy; If it is shown that the proper
charge against petitioners should have been simple rebellion, the trial court shall
dismiss the murder charges upon the filing of the Information for simple rebellion,
as long as petitioners would not be placed in double jeopardy.—If it is shown that
the proper charge against petitioners should have been simple rebellion, the trial
court shall dismiss the murder charges upon the filing of the Information for
simple rebellion, as long as petitioners would not be placed in double jeopardy.
Section 7, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, states: SEC. 7. Former conviction or
acquittal; double jeopardy.—When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or
the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information
or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and
after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the
accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the
offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or
for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or information. Based on the above provision,
double jeopardy only applies when: (1) a first jeopardy attached; (2) it has been
validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first.
A first jeopardy attaches only after the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or
the case has been dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent,
by a competent court in a valid indictment for which the accused has entered a
valid plea during arraignment.
Leonen, J., Concurring Opinion:
Criminal Law; International Law; Rebellion; Crimes Against International
Humanitarian Law, Genocide and Other Crimes Against Humanity (R.A. No.
9851); View that acts committed in violation of Republic Act No. 9851, even in the
context of armed conflicts of a non-international character and in view of the
declarations of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democ-
680ratic Front, cannot be deemed to be acts in connection with or in
furtherance of rebellion.—The Informations and Warrants were issued for the
crime of multiple murder. Petitioners assert that they have a pending criminal
charge of rebellion and that the acts raised in their petitions should be dismissed
because they are deemed to be affected by the political offense doctrine. The
political offense doctrine states that certain crimes, such as murder, are already
absorbed by the charge of rebellion when committed as a necessary means and in
connection with or in furtherance of rebellion. I agree that this case should be
remanded because there has been no evidence yet to prove that the acts imputed
to the petitioners actually happened or are attributable to them. Judicial economy,
however, requires that we state that there are certain acts which have been
committed on the occasion of a rebellion which should no longer be absorbed in
that crime. Acts committed in violation of Republic Act No. 9851, even in the
context of armed conflicts of a non-international character and in view of the
declarations of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the National
Democratic Front, cannot be deemed to be acts in connection with or in furtherance
of rebellion.
 Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the most serious crimes of concern to the
international community as a whole must not go unpunished and their effective
prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the national level, in order to
put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus contribute to
the prevention of such crimes, it being the duty of every State to exercise its criminal
jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes.—International
humanitarian law (IHL) is the body of international law that regulates the conduct
of armed conflicts, whether of an international or non-international character.
This body of law seeks to limit the effects of the conflict on individuals. The 1949
Geneva Conventions and its Additional Protocols are the main instruments that
govern IHL. Nevertheless, IHL and the rules and principles contained in the
Geneva Conventions are largely regarded in the international sphere as having
the character of general or customary international law given the fundamental
nature of the rules and “because they constitute intransgressible principles of
international customary law.” In the Philippines, Republic Act No. 9851 was
enacted in view of its policy to “[renounce] war x x x, [adopt] the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the
681land and [adhere] to a policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation and amity with all nations.” Accordingly, “[t]he most serious crimes of
concern to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished and
their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the national
level, in order to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and
thus contribute to the prevention of such crimes, it being the duty of every State
to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international
crimes.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Jus Cogens; View that jus cogens norms under the
Vienna Convention of Law of the Treaties are “norm[s] accepted and recognized by
the international community of States as a whole as [norms] from which no
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of
general international law having the same character.”—Jus cogens norms under
the Vienna Convention of Law of the Treaties are “norm[s] accepted and
recognized by the international community of States as a whole as [norms] from
which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.” The
principles embedded in Common Article 3 have been held to apply even to
international armed conflict, thus, depicting a universal character. It lays down
fundamental standards which are applicable at all times, in all circumstances and
to all States and from which no derogation at any time is permitted. As was stated,
it “sets forth a minimum core of mandatory rules [and], reflects the fundamental
humanitarian principles which underlie international humanitarian law as a
whole, and upon which the Geneva Conventions in their entirety are based. These
principles, the object of which is the respect for the dignity of the human
person, developed as a result of centuries of warfare and had already
become customary law at the time of the adoption of the Geneva
Conventions because they reflect the most universally recognized
humanitarian principles.” (Emphasis provided) Hence, nonobservance of the
minimum standard provided for in Common Article 3 triggers a violation of well-
accepted principles of international law.
International Law; International Humanitarian Law; International Human
Rights Law; View that international humanitarian law and international human
rights law are two sets of regimes in
682international law.—International humanitarian law and international
human rights law are two sets of regimes in international law. The two regimes
have been compared and contrasted with each other, to wit: The two sets of rules
certainly have a different history and often a different field of application,
both ratione personae and ratione temporis. Human rights thus apply to all people
and humanitarian law applies to certain groups of persons (for example, to the
wounded, to prisoners o[f] war, to civilians) and, furthermore, humanitarian law
applies only in times of armed conflict. On the other hand, ‘human rights’ and
‘humanitarian law’ regulate, ratione materiae, similar rights at least insofar that
they all intend to increase the protection of individuals, alleviate pain and
suffering and secure the minimum standard of persons in various situations.
(Emphasis in the original) Thus, all persons are protected in both times of war and
peace. The protection accorded by human rights laws does not cease to apply when
armed conflict ensues. Still, some “human rights” are allowed to be derogated in
times of “emergency which threatens the life of the nation.” Nevertheless,
provisions on the right to life, prohibition from torture, inhuman and degrading
treatment, and slavery remain free from any derogation whatsoever, having
acquired a jus cogens character.
Same; Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide and Other
Crimes Against Humanity (R.A. No. 9851); Criminal Law; Rebellion; View that
Republic Act No. 9851 defines and provides for the penalties of crimes against
humanity, serious violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), genocide,
and other crimes against humanity; These crimes are separate from or independent
from the crime of rebellion even if they occur on the occasion of or argued to be
connected with the armed uprisings.—Rep. Act No. 9851 defines and provides for
the penalties of crimes against humanity, serious violations of IHL, genocide, and
other crimes against humanity. This law provides for the non-prescription of the
prosecution of and execution of sentences imposed with regard to the crimes
defined in the Act. It also provides for the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court
over the crimes defined in the Act. These crimes are, therefore, separate from or
independent from the crime of rebellion even if they occur on the occasion of or
argued to be connected with the armed uprisings.683
Same; Same; View that spies and civilians suspected of being spies are also
accorded protection under Republic Act No. 9851.—Even spies are accorded
protection under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Common Article 3
and Additional Protocol II are broad enough to secure fundamental guarantees to
persons not granted prisoner of war or civilian status, such as protection from
summary execution and right to fair trial. These fundamental guarantees are also
found in Article 75, in relation to Articles 45 and 46 of Additional Protocol I. Spies
and civilians suspected of being spies are also accorded protection under Rep. Act
No. 9851.
Same; Same; View that persons committing crimes against humanity or
serious violations of international humanitarian law, international human rights
laws, and Republic Act No. 9851 must not be allowed to hide behind a doctrine
crafted to recognize the different nature of armed uprisings as a result of political
dissent.—Concomitantly, persons committing crimes against humanity or serious
violations of international humanitarian law, international human rights laws,
and Rep. Act No. 9851 must not be allowed to hide behind a doctrine crafted to
recognize the different nature of armed uprisings as a result of political dissent.
The contemporary view is that these can never be considered as acts in furtherance
of armed conflict no matter what the motive. Incidentally, this is the view also
apparently shared by the CPP/NPA/NDF and major insurgent groups that are part
of the present government’s peace process.
Same; Same; View that torture and summary execution — in any context —
are shameful, naked brutal acts of those who may have simply been transformed
into desperate cowards. Those who may have suffered or may have died because of
these acts deserve better than to be told that they did so in the hands of a rebel.—
The rebel, in his or her effort to assert a better view of humanity, cannot negate
himself or herself. Torture and summary execution of enemies or allies are never
acts of courage. They demean those who sacrificed and those who gave their lives
so that others may live justly and enjoy the blessings of more meaningful freedoms.
Torture and summary execution — in any context — are shameful, naked brutal
acts of those who may have simply been transformed into desperate cowards.
Those who may have suffered or may have died because of these acts deserve
better than to be told that they did so in the hands of a rebel.
684
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and
Prohibition.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. and Gerald DL. Vasquez for petitioner V.P.
Ladlad.
Romeo T. Capulong, Rachel F. Pastores and Amylyn B. Sato for
petitioners in G.R. Nos. 176830, 185636 and 185587.
SERENO, CJ.:
On 26 August 2006, a mass grave was discovered by elements of the 43rd
Infantry Brigade of the Philippine Army at Sitio Sapang
Daco, Barangay Kaulisihan, Inopacan, Leyte.1 The mass grave contained
skeletal remains of individuals believed to be victims of “Operation
Venereal Disease” (Operation VD) launched by members of the Communist
Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army/National Democratic Front of
the Philippines (CPP/NPA/NDFP) to purge their ranks of suspected
military informers.
While the doctrine of hierarchy of courts normally precludes a direct
invocation of this Court’s jurisdiction, we take cognizance of these petitions
considering that petitioners have chosen to take recourse directly before us
and that the cases are of significant national interest.
Petitioners have raised several issues, but most are too insubstantial to
require consideration. Accordingly, in the exer-
_______________
1 Also allegedly found from 2009 to 2012 were more mass grave sites in Gubat, Sorsogon;
Camalig, Albay; and Labo, Camarines Norte — all in the Bicol Region
[http://www.interaksyon.com/article/38278/
photos--bones-in-npa-mass-grave-dont-easily-surrender-names-of-victims (Last accessed on 13
January 2014)].
On 21 July 2012, a mass grave was found in San Francisco, Quezon
[http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/233887/remains-found-in-quezon-mass-grave-include-a-
pregnant-rebel-army-exec (Last accessed on 13 January 2014)].
685cise of sound judicial discretion and economy, this Court will pass
primarily upon the following:
1. Whether petitioners were denied due process during preliminary
investigation and in the issuance of the warrants of arrest.
2. Whether the murder charges against petitioners should be dismissed
under the political offense doctrine.
Antecedent Facts
These are petitions for certiorari and prohibition2seeking the annulment
of the orders and resolutions of public respondents with regard to the
indictment and issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners for the (IALAG) came up with the names of ten (10) possible victims after
crime of multiple murder. comparison and examination based on testimonies of relatives and
Police Chief Inspector George L. Almaden (PC/Insp. Almaden) of the witnesses.11
Philippine National Police (PNP) Regional Office 8 and Staff Judge The 12 complaint-affidavits were from relatives of the alleged victims of
Advocate Captain Allan Tiu (Army Captain Tiu) of the 8th Infantry Operation VD. All of them swore that their relatives had been abducted or
Division of the Philippine Army sent 12 undated letters to the Provincial last seen with members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP and were never seen again.
Prosecutor of Leyte through Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rosulo U. They also expressed belief that their relatives’ remains were among those
Vivero (Prosecutor Vivero).3 The letters requested appropriate legal action discovered at the mass grave site.
on 12 complaint-affidavits attached therewith accusing 71 named members _______________
of the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army/National 6 Id.
Democratic Front of the Philippines (CPP/NPA/NDFP) of murder, including 7 Id., at p. 337.
petitioners herein along with several other unnamed members. 8 Id., at pp. 424-427.
9 Id., at p. 427.
The letters narrated that on 26 August 2006, elements of the 43rd 10 Id., at pp. 336-338.
Infantry Brigade of the Philippine Army discovered a mass grave site of the 11 Id., at pp. 337-338.
CPP/NPA/NDFP at Sitio Sapang Daco, Barangay Kaulisihan, Inopacan, 687
Leyte.4Recovered from the grave site were 67 severely deteriorated skeletal Also attached to the letters were the affidavits of Zacarias
remains believed to be victims of Operation VD.5 Piedad,12 Leonardo C. Tanaid, Floro M. Tanaid, Numeriano Beringuel,
_______________ Glecerio Roluna and Veronica P. Tabara. They narrated that they were
2 Except G.R. No. 190005, which is only a petition for certiorari. former members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP.13 According to them, Operation VD
3 Rollo (G.R. No. 176830), pp. 135-269. was ordered in 1985 by the CPP/NPA/NDFP Central
4 Id., at p. 139. Committee.14 Allegedly, petitioners Saturnino C. Ocampo
5 Id., at p. 336.
(Ocampo),15 Randall B. Echanis (Echanis),16 Rafael G. Baylosis
686
(Baylosis),17 and Vicente P. Ladlad (Ladlad)18were then members of the
The PNP Scene of the Crime Operation (SOCO) Team based in Regional
Central Committee.
Office 8 was immediately dispatched to the mass grave site to conduct crime
According to these former members, four sub-groups were formed to
investigation, and to collect, preserve and analyze the skeletal
implement Operation VD, namely, (1) the Intel Group responsible for
remains.6 Also, from 11-17 September 2006, an investigation team
gathering information on suspected military spies and civilians who would
composed of intelligence officers, and medico-legal and DNA experts,
not support the movement; (2) the Arresting Group charged with their
conducted forensic crime analysis and collected from alleged relatives of the
arrests; (3) the Investigation Group which would subject those arrested to
victims DNA samples for matching.7
questioning; and (4) the Execution Group or the “cleaners” of those
The Initial Specialist Report8 dated 18 September 2006 issued by the
confirmed to be military spies and civilians who would not support the
PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City, was inconclusive
movement.19
with regard to the identities of the skeletal remains and even the length of
time that they had been buried. The report recommended the conduct of From 1985 to 1992, at least 100 people had been abducted, hog-tied,
tortured and executed by members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP20 pursuant to
further tests to confirm the identities of the remains and the time window
Operation VD.21
of death.9
However, in a Special Report10 dated 2 October 2006, the Case
Secretariat of the Regional and National Inter-Agency Legal Action Group
 On the basis of the 12 letters and their attachments, Prosecutor Vivero
issued a subpoena requiring, among others, petitioners to submit their
counter-affidavits and those of their
_______________
12 With Supplemental Affidavit dated 12 January 2007; id., at pp. 276-278.
13 Id., at pp. 273, 287, 296, 309, 318 and 329.
14 Id., at p. 289.
15 Id., at pp. 288, 310, 319 and 329.
16 Id., at p. 319.
17 Id., at pp. 310, 319 and 329.
18 Id., at pp. 310 and 319.
19 Id., at pp. 289-290.
20 Id., at p. 89.
21 Id., at p. 291.
688witnesses.22 Petitioner Ocampo submitted his
counter-
affidavit. Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis did not file counter-
23 24 25
affidavits because they were allegedly not served the copy of the complaint
and the attached documents or evidence. Counsel of petitioner Ladlad made
a formal entry of appearance on 8 December 2006 during the preliminary
investigation.26 However, petitioner Ladlad did not file a counter-affidavit
because he was allegedly not served a subpoena.27
In a Resolution28 dated 16 February 2007, Prosecutor Vivero
recommended the filing of an Information for 15 counts of multiple murder
against 54 named members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP, including petitioners
herein, for the death of the following: 1) Juanita Aviola, 2) Concepcion
Aragon, 3) Gregorio Eras, 4) Teodoro Recones, Jr., 5) Restituto Ejoc, 6)
Rolando Vasquez, 7) Junior Milyapis, 8) Crispin Dalmacio, 9) Zacarias
Casil, 10) Pablo Daniel, 11) Romeo Tayabas, 12) Domingo Napoles, 13)
Ciriaco Daniel, 14) Crispin Prado, and 15) Ereberto Prado.29
Prosecutor Vivero also recommended that Zacarias Piedad, Leonardo
Tanaid, Numeriano Beringuel and Glecerio Roluna be dropped as
respondents and utilized as state witnesses, as their testimonies were vital
to the success of the prosecution.30 The Resolution was silent with regard to
Veronica Tabara.
The Information was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
Hilongos, Leyte, Branch 18 (RTC Hilongos, Leyte) presided by Judge
Ephrem S. Abando (Judge Abando) on 28
_______________
22 Id., at p. 91.
23 Id.
24 Rollo (G.R. No. 185587), p. 10.
25 Rollo (G.R. No. 185636), p. 14.
26 Rollo (G.R. No. 190005), p. 51.
27 Id., at p. 52.
28 Rollo (G.R. No. 176830), pp. 88-94.
29 Id., at p. 93.
30 Id.
689February 2007, and docketed as Criminal Case No. H-1581.31 Petitioner
Ocampo filed an Ex Parte Motion to Set Case for Clarificatory Hearing
dated 5 March 2007 prior to receiving a copy of the Resolution
recommending the filing of the Information.32
On 6 March 2007, Judge Abando issued an Order finding probable cause
“in the commission by all mentioned accused of the crime charged.”33 He
ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest against them with no
recommended bail for their temporary liberty.34
On 16 March 2007, petitioner Ocampo filed before us this special civil
action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and
docketed as G.R. No. 176830 seeking the annulment of the 6 March 2007
Order of Judge Abando and the 16 February 2007 Resolution of Prosecutor
Vivero.35 The petition prayed for the unconditional release of petitioner
Ocampo from PNP custody, as well as the issuance of a temporary
restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the conduct of
further proceedings during the pendency of the petition.36
Petitioner Ocampo argued that a case for rebellion against him and 44
others (including petitioners Echanis and Baylosis37 and Ladlad38) docketed
as Criminal Case No. 06-944 was then pending before the RTC Makati,
Branch 150 (RTC Makati).39 Putting forward the political offense doctrine,
peti-
_______________
31 Id., at pp. 84-87.
32 Id., at pp. 96-99. Petitioner Ocampo received a copy of the Resolution on 12 March 2007.
33 Id., at p. 82.
34 Id.
35 Id., at pp. 3-81.
36 Id., at p. 77.
37 Rollo (G.R. No. 185587), p. 451.
38 Rollo (G.R. No. 190005), p. 75.
 39 Rollo (G.R. No. 176830), p. 59. On 1 June 2007, the Supreme Court granted the petitions
in Ladlad v. Velasco — G.R. Nos.
690tioner Ocampo argues that common crimes, such as murder in this case,
are already absorbed by the crime of rebellion when committed as a
necessary means, in connection with and in furtherance of rebellion.40
We required41 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on
the petition and the prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order/writ of preliminary injunction, and set42 the case for oral arguments
on 30 March 2007. The OSG filed its Comment on 27 March 2007.43
The following were the legal issues discussed by the parties during the
oral arguments:
1. Whether the present petition for certiorari and prohibition is the
proper remedy of petitioner Ocampo;
2. Assuming it is the proper remedy, whether he was denied due process
during preliminary investigation and in the issuance of the warrant
of arrest;
3. Whether the murder charges against him are already included in the
rebellion charge against him in the RTC.44
Afterwards, the parties were ordered to submit their memoranda within
10 days.45 On 3 April 2007, the Court ordered the provisional release of
petitioner Ocampo under a P100,000 cash bond.46
_______________
172070-72, 172074-76 and 175013 — in which the RTC of Makati, Branch 150, was ordered to
dismiss Criminal Case Nos. 06-452 and 06-944.
40 Id., at p. 62.
41 Id., at pp. 515-A – 515-B.
42 Id., at pp. 541-542.
43 Id., at p. 554-A.
44 Id., at pp. 554-C – 554-D.
45 Id., at p. 554-D.
46 Id., at pp. 557-558.
691
Acting on the observation of the Court during the oral arguments that
the single Information filed before the RTC Hilongos, Leyte was defective
for charging 15 counts of murder, the prosecution filed a Motion to Admit
Amended Information and New Informations on 11 April 2007.47 In an
Order dated 27 July 2007, Judge Abando held in abeyance the resolution
thereof and effectively suspended the proceedings during the pendency of
G.R. No. 176830 before this Court.48
While the proceedings were suspended, petitioner Echanis was arrested
on 28 January 2008 by virtue of the warrant of arrest issued by Judge
Abando on 6 March 2007.49 On 1 February 2008, petitioners Echanis and
Baylosis filed a Motion for Judicial Reinvestigation/Determination of
Probable Cause with Prayer to Dismiss the Case Outright and Alternative
Prayer to Recall/Suspend Service of Warrant.50
On 30 April 2008, Judge Abando issued an Order denying the
motion.51 Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis filed a Motion for
Reconsideration52 dated 30 May 2008, but before being able to rule thereon,
Judge Abando issued an Order dated 12 June 2008 transmitting the records
of Criminal Case No. H-1581 to the Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC
Manila.53 The Order was issued in compliance with the Resolution dated 23
April 2008 of this Court granting the request of then Secretary of Justice
Raul Gonzales to transfer the venue of the case.
The case was re-raffled to RTC Manila, Branch 32 (RTC Manila)
presided by Judge Thelma Bunyi-Medina (Judge Medina) and re-docketed
as Criminal Case No. 08-262163.54
_______________
47 Rollo (G.R. No. 185587), pp. 426-427.
48 Id., at pp. 428-429.
49 Id., at p. 18.
50 Id., at pp. 430-460.
51 Id., at pp. 69-73.
52 Id., at pp. 461-485.
53 Id., at p. 486.
54 Id., at p. 19.
692Petitioner Echanis was transferred to the PNP Custodial Center in
Camp Crame, Quezon City. On 12 August 2008, petitioners Echanis and
Baylosis filed their Supplemental Arguments to Motion for
Reconsideration.55
In an Order56 dated 27 October 2008, Judge Medina suspended the
proceedings of the case pending the resolution of G.R. No. 176830 by this
Court.
On 18 December 2008, petitioner Ladlad filed with the RTC Manila a
Motion to Quash and/or Dismiss.57
On 23 December 2008, petitioner Echanis filed before us a special civil
action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
seeking the annulment of the 30 April 2008 Order of Judge Abando and the
27 October 2008 Order of Judge Medina.58 The petition, docketed as G.R.
No. 185587, prayed for the unconditional and immediate release of
petitioner Echanis, as well as the issuance of a temporary restraining
order/writ of preliminary injunction to restrain his further incarceration.59
On 5 January 2009, petitioner Baylosis filed before us a special civil
action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court also
seeking the annulment of the 30 April 2008 Order of Judge Abando and the
27 October 2008 Order of Judge Medina.60 The petition, docketed as G.R.
No. 185636, prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order/writ
of preliminary injunction to restrain the implementation of the warrant of
arrest against petitioner Baylosis.61
_______________
55 Id., at pp. 487-519.
56 Id., at pp. 64-68.
57 Rollo (G.R. No. 190005), pp. 162-218.
58 Rollo (G.R. No. 185587), pp. 3-63.
59 Id., at p. 56.
60 Rollo (G.R. No. 185636), pp. 7-71.
61 Id., at p. 64.
693
The Court consolidated G.R. Nos. 185587 and 185636 on 12 January
2009.62
On 3 March 2009, the Court ordered the further consolidation of these
two cases with G.R. No. 176830.63 We required64 the OSG to comment on the
prayer for petitioner Echanis’ immediate release, to which the OSG did not
interpose any objection on these conditions: that the temporary release
shall only be for the purpose of his attendance and participation in the
formal peace negotiations between the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines (GRP) and the CPP/NPA/NDFP, set to begin in August 2009;
and that his temporary release shall not exceed six (6) months.65 The latter
condition was later modified, such that his temporary liberty shall continue
for the duration of his actual participation in the peace negotiations.66
On 11 August 2009, the Court ordered the provisional release of
petitioner Echanis under a P100,000 cash bond, for the purpose of his
participation in the formal peace negotiations.67
Meanwhile, the Department of Justice (DOJ) filed its Opposition68 to
petitioner Ladlad’s motion to quash before the RTC Manila. The trial court
conducted a hearing on the motion on 13 February 2009.69
On 6 May 2009, Judge Medina issued an Order70denying the motion to
quash. The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Ladlad was also
denied on 27 August 2009.71
_______________
62 Id., at p. 564.
63 Rollo (G.R. No. 185587), p. 587.
64 Id., at pp. 606-607.
65 Rollo (G.R. No. 176830), pp. 736-740.
66 Id., at pp. 1029-1032.
67 Id., at pp. 742-743.
68 Rollo (G.R. No. 190005), pp. 331-340.
69 Id., at pp. 347-348.
70 Id., at pp. 108-111.
694
On 9 November 2009, petitioner Ladlad filed before us a special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking the
annulment of the 6 May 2009 and 27 August 2009 Orders of Judge
Medina.72 The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 190005.
On 11 January 2010, we ordered the consolidation of G.R. No. 190005
with G.R. Nos. 176830, 185587 and 185636.73 We also required the OSG to
file its comment thereon. The OSG submitted its Comment74 on 7 May 2010.
On 27 July 2010, we likewise required the OSG to file its Comment in
G.R. Nos. 185636 and 185587.75 These Comments were filed by the OSG on
13 December 201076and on 21 January 2011,77 respectively. Petitioners
Echanis and Baylosis filed their Consolidated Reply78 on 7 June 2011.
On 2 May 2011, petitioner Ladlad filed an Urgent Motion to Fix
Bail.79 On 21 July 2011, petitioner Baylosis filed A Motion to Allow
Petitioner to Post Bail.80 The OSG interposed no objection to the grant of a
P100,000 cash bail to them considering that they were consultants of the
NDFP negotiating team, which was then holding negotiations with the GRP
peace panel for the signing of a peace accord.81
On 17 January 2012, we granted the motions of petitioners Ladlad and
Baylosis and fixed their bail in the amount of P100,000, subject to the
condition that their temporary re-
_______________
71 Id., at p. 112.
72 Id., at pp. 3-107.
73 Id., at pp. 860-861.
74 Id., at pp. 879-922.
 75 Id., at pp. 932-933. opportunity to be heard.89 Thus, one who has been afforded a chance to
76 Id., at pp. 940-1003.
present one’s own side of the story cannot claim denial of due process.90
77 Rollo (G.R. No. 185587), pp. 807-851.
78 Rollo (G.R. No. 185636), pp. 1363-1391. Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis allege that they did not receive a copy
79 Rollo (G.R. No. 190005), pp. 1006-1024. of the complaint and the attached documents or evidence.91 Petitioner
80 Rollo (G.R. No. 185636), pp. 1399-1402. Ladlad claims that he was not served a subpoena due to the false address
81 Rollo (G.R. No. 190005), p. 1046; Rollo (G.R. No. 185636), p. 1419.
indicated in the 12 undated letters of P C/Insp. Almaden and Army Captain
695lease shall be limited to the period of their actual participation in the
Tiu to Prosecutor Vivero.92 Furthermore, even though his counsels filed
peace negotiations.82
their formal entry of appearance before the Office of the Prosecutor,
Petitioner Ladlad filed his Reply83 to the OSG Comment on 18 January
petitioner Ladlad was still not sent a subpoena through his counsels’
2013.
addresses.93 Thus, they were deprived of the right to file counter-affidavits.
Petitioner Ocampo claims that Prosecutor Vivero, in collusion with P
Our Ruling
C/Insp. Almaden and Army Captain Tiu, surreptitiously inserted the
Petitioners were accorded due
Supplemental Affidavit of Zacarias Piedad in the records of the case without
process during preliminary inves-
furnishing petitioner Ocampo a copy.94 The original affidavit of Zacarias
tigation and in the issuance of the
Piedad dated 14 September 2006 stated that a meeting presided by
warrants of arrest.
petitioner Ocampo was held in 1984, when the launching of Operation VD
A. Preliminary Investigation
was agreed upon.95 Petitioner Ocampo refuted this claim in his Counter-
A preliminary investigation is “not a casual affair.”84 It is conducted to
affidavit dated 22 December 2006
protect the innocent from the embarrassment, expense and anxiety of a _______________
public trial.85While the right to have a preliminary investigation before trial
is statutory rather than constitutional, it is a substantive right and a 88 Kuizon v. Desierto, 406 Phil. 611, 630; 354 SCRA 158, 176 (2001).
89 Id.
component of due process in the administration of criminal justice.86 90 Pascual v. People, 547 Phil. 620, 627; 518 SCRA 730, 736 (2007).
In the context of a preliminary investigation, the right to due process of 91 Rollo (G.R. No. 185587), p. 31; Rollo (G.R. No. 185636), p. 41.
law entails the opportunity to be heard.87 It serves to accord an opportunity 92 Rollo (G.R. No. 190005), pp. 49-50.
93 Id., at pp. 51-52.
for the presentation of the respondent’s side with regard to the accusation.
94 Rollo (G.R. No. 176830), pp. 75-76.
Afterwards, the investigating officer shall decide whether the allegations 95 Id., at pp. 288-289.
and defenses lead to a reasonable belief that a crime has been committed, 697stating that he was in military custody from October 1976 until his
and that it was the respondent who committed it. escape in May 1985. Thereafter, the Supplemental Affidavit of Zacarias
96
_______________
Piedad dated 12 January 2007 admitted that he made a mistake in his
82 Rollo (G.R. No. 190005), pp. 1050-1053. original affidavit, and that the meeting actually took place in June
83 Id., at pp. 1073-1116. 1985.97 Petitioner Ocampo argues that he was denied the opportunity to
84 Ang-Abaya v. Ang, G.R. No. 178511, 4 December 2008, 573 SCRA 129, 146.
reply to the Supplemental Affidavit by not being furnished a copy thereof.
85 Uy v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 156399-400, 27 June 2008, 556 SCRA 73, 93.
86 Id. Petitioner Ocampo also claims that he was denied the right to file a
87 Santos v. People, G.R. No. 173176, 26 August 2008, 563 SCRA 341, 369. motion for reconsideration or to appeal the Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero,
696Otherwise, the investigating officer is bound to dismiss the complaint. because the latter deliberately delayed the service of the Resolution by 19
“The essence of due process is reasonable opportunity to be heard and days, effectively denying petitioner Ocampo his right to due process.98
submit evidence in support of one’s defense.”88 What is proscribed is lack of
 As to the claim of petitioners Echanis and Baylosis, we quote the
pertinent portion of Prosecutor Vivero’s Resolution, which states:
In connection with the foregoing and pursuant to the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure[,] the respondents were issued and served with Subpoena at their last
known address for them to submit their counter-affidavits and that of their
witnesses.
Majority of the respondents did not submit their counter-affidavits because
they could no longer be found in their last known address, per return of the
subpoenas. On the other hand, Saturnino Ocampo @ Satur, Fides Lim, Maureen
Palejaro and Ruben Manatad submitted their Counter-Affidavits. However,
Vicente Ladlad and Jasmin Jerusalem failed to submit the required Counter
Affidavits in spite entry of appearance by their respective counsels.99
Section 3(d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, allows Prosecutor Vivero to
resolve the complaint based on the evidence
_______________
96 Id., at pp. 45-46.
97 Id., at p. 277.
98 Id., at pp. 74-75.
99 Id., at p. 91.
698before him if a respondent could not be subpoenaed. As long as efforts to
reach a respondent were made, and he was given an opportunity to present
countervailing evidence, the preliminary investigation remains valid.100The
rule was put in place in order to foil underhanded attempts of a respondent
to delay the prosecution of offenses.101
In this case, the Resolution stated that efforts were undertaken to serve
subpoenas on the named respondents at their last known addresses. This
is sufficient for due process. It was only because a majority of them could
no longer be found at their last known addresses that they were not served
copies of the complaint and the attached documents or evidence.
Petitioner Ladlad claims that his subpoena was sent to the nonexistent
address “53 Sct. Rallos St., QC,”102 which had never been his address at any
time.103 In connection with this claim, we take note of the fact that the
subpoena to Fides Lim, petitioner Ladlad’s wife,104 was sent to the same
address, and that she was among those mentioned in the Resolution as
having timely submitted their counter-affidavits.
Despite supposedly never receiving a subpoena, petitioner Ladlad’s
counsel filed a formal entry of appearance on 8 December
2006.105 Prosecutor Vivero had a reason to believe that petitioner Ladlad
had received the subpoena and accordingly instructed his counsel to
prepare his defense.
Petitioner Ladlad, through his counsel, had every opportunity to secure
copies of the complaint after his counsel’s formal entry of appearance and,
thereafter, to participate fully
_______________
100 Rodis, Sr. v. Sandiganbayan, 248 Phil. 854, 859; 166 SCRA 618, 623 (1988).
101 Id.
102 Rollo (G.R. No. 176830), p. 136.
103 Rollo (G.R. No. 190005), p. 51.
104 Id., at p. 11.
105 Id., at p. 51.
699in the preliminary investigation. Instead, he refused to participate.
We have previously cautioned that “litigants represented by counsel
should not expect that all they need to do is sit back, relax and await the
outcome of their case.”106 Having opted to remain passive during the
preliminary investigation, petitioner Ladlad and his counsel cannot now
claim a denial of due process, since their failure to file a counter-affidavit
was of their own doing.
Neither do we find any merit in petitioner Ocampo’s allegation of
collusion to surreptitiously insert the Supplemental Affidavit of Zacarias
Piedad in the records. There was nothing surreptitious about the
Supplemental Affidavit since it clearly alludes to an earlier affidavit and
admits the mistake committed regarding the date of the alleged meeting.
The date of the execution of the Supplemental Affidavit was also clearly
stated. Thus, it was clear that it was executed after petitioner Ocampo had
submitted his counter-affidavit. Should the case go to trial, that will provide
petitioner Ocampo with the opportunity to question the execution of
Zacarias Piedad’s Supplemental Affidavit.
Neither can we uphold petitioner Ocampo’s contention that he was
denied the right to be heard. For him to claim that he was denied due
process by not being furnished a copy of the Supplemental Affidavit of
Zacarias Piedad would imply that the entire case of the prosecution rested
on the Supplemental Affidavit. The OSG has asserted that the indictment
of petitioner Ocampo was based on the collective affidavits of several other
witnesses107 attesting to the allegation that he was a member of the
CPP/NPA/NDFP Central Committee, which had ordered the launch of
Operation VD.
_______________
106 Balgami v. Court of Appeals, 487 Phil. 102, 115; 445 SCRA 591, 601-602 (2004),
citing Salonga v. Court of Appeals, 336 Phil. 514; 269 SCRA 534 (1997).
107 Rollo (G.R. No. 176830), p. 587.
700
As to his claim that he was denied the right to file a motion for
reconsideration or to appeal the Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero due to the
19-day delay in the service of the Resolution, it must be pointed out that
the period for filing a motion for reconsideration or an appeal to the
Secretary of Justice is reckoned from the date of receipt of the resolution of
the prosecutor, not from the date of the resolution. This is clear from Section
3 of the 2000 National Prosecution Service Rule on Appeal:
Sec. 3. Period to appeal.—The appeal shall be taken withinfifteen (15) days
from receipt of the resolution, or of the denial of the motion for
reconsideration/reinvestigation if one has been filed within fifteen (15) days
from receipt of the assailed resolution. Only one motion for reconsideration
shall be allowed. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, when petitioner Ocampo received the Resolution of Prosecutor
Vivero on 12 March 2007,108 the former had until 27 March 2007 within
which to file either a motion for reconsideration before the latter or an
appeal before the Secretary of Justice. Instead, petitioner Ocampo chose to
file the instant petition for certiorari directly before this Court on 16 March
2007.
B. Issuance of the Warrants of Arrest
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that “no search warrant
or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.”
Petitioner Ocampo alleges that Judge Abando did not comply with the
requirements of the Constitution in finding the
_______________
108 Id., at p. 74.
701existence of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against
petitioners.109
Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest has been defined
as “such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the
person sought to be arrested.”110 Although the Constitution provides that
probable cause shall be determined by the judge after an examination under
oath or an affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses, we have ruled
that a hearing is not necessary for the determination thereof.111In fact, the
judge’s personal examination of the complainant and the witnesses is not
mandatory and indispensable for determining the aptness of issuing a
warrant of arrest.112
It is enough that the judge personally evaluates the prosecutor’s report
and supporting documents showing the existence of probable cause for the
indictment and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or if, on the
basis of his evaluation, he finds no probable cause, to disregard the
prosecutor’s resolution and require the submission of additional affidavits
of witnesses to aid him in determining its existence.113
Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis claim that, had Judge Abando
painstakingly examined the records submitted by Prosecutor Vivero, the
judge would have inevitably dismissed the charge against
them.114 Additionally, petitioner Ocampo alleges that Judge Abando did not
point out facts and evi-
_______________
109 Id., at p. 21.
110 Allado v. Diokno, G.R. No. 113630, 5 May 1994, 232 SCRA 192, 199-200.
111 De los Santos-Reyes v. Montesa, Jr., 317 Phil. 101, 111; 247 SCRA 85, 94 (1995).
112 People v. Grey, G.R. No. 180109, 26 July 2010, 625 SCRA 523, 536.
113 Supra note 111.
114 Rollo (G.R. No. 185587), p. 27; Rollo (G.R. No. 185636), p. 34.
702dence in the record that were used as bases for his finding of probable
cause to issue a warrant of arrest.115
The determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of
arrest against petitioners is addressed to the sound discretion of Judge
Abando as the trial judge.116Further elucidating on the wide latitude given
to trial judges in the issuance of warrants of arrest, this Court stated
in Sarigumba v. Sandiganbayan117 as follows:
x x x. The trial court’s exercise of its judicial discretion should not, as a general
rule, be interfered with in the absence of grave abuse of discretion.
Indeed, certiorari will not lie to cure errors in the trial court’s appreciation of the
evidence of the parties, the conclusion of facts it reached based on the said findings,
as well as the conclusions of law. x x x
 Whether or not there is probable cause for the issuance of warrants for the
arrest of the accused is a question of fact based on the allegations in the
Informations, the Resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor, including other
documents and/or evidence appended to the Information.
Here, the allegations of petitioners point to factual matters indicated in
the affidavits of the complainants and witnesses as bases for the contention
that there was no probable cause for petitioners’ indictment for multiple
murder or for the issuance of warrants for their arrest. As stated above, the
trial judge’s appreciation of the evidence and conclusion of facts based
thereon are not interfered with in the absence of grave abuse of discretion.
Again, “he sufficiently complies with the requirement of personal
determination if he reviews the [I]nformation and the documents attached
thereto, and on the
_______________
115 Rollo (G.R. No. 176830), p. 64.
116 Sarigumba v. Sandiganbayan, 491 Phil. 704, 720; 451 SCRA 533, 551 (2005).
117 Id., at pp. 720-721; p. 551.
703basis thereof forms a belief that the accused is probably guilty
crime with which he is being charged.” 118
Judge Abando’s review of the Information and the supporting documents
is shown by the following portion of the judge’s 6 March 2007 Order:
On the evaluation of the Resolution and its Information as submitted and filed
by the Provincial Prosecution of Leyte Province supported by the following
documents: Affidavits of Complainants, Sworn Statements of Witnesses and other
pertinent documents issued by the Regional Crime Laboratory Office, PNP, Region
VIII and Camp Crame, Quezon City, pictures of the grave site and skeletal
remains, this court has the findings [sic] of probable cause in the commission by
all mentioned accused of the crime charged.119
At bottom, issues involving the finding of probable cause for an
indictment and issuance of a warrant of arrest, as petitioners are doubtless
aware, are primarily questions of fact that are normally not within the
purview of a petition for certiorari,120 such as the petitions filed in the
instant consolidated cases.
The political offense doctrine is
not a ground to dismiss the charge
against petitioners prior to a de-
termination by the trial court that
the murders were committed in
furtherance of rebellion.
_______________
118 Cuevas v. Muñoz, 401 Phil. 752, 773-774; 348 SCRA 542, 562 (2000).
119 Rollo (G.R. No. 176830), p. 82.
120 Heirs of Marasigan v. Marasigan, G.R. No. 156078, 14 March 2008, 548 SCRA 409,
443; Serapio v. Sandiganbayan (Third Division), 444 Phil. 499, 529; 396 SCRA 443, 466
(2003); Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 378 Phil. 984, 990; 321 SCRA 368, 373-374 (1999).
704
Under the political offense doctrine, “common crimes, perpetrated in
furtherance of a political offense, are divested of their character as
“common” offenses and assume the political complexion of the main crime
of which they are mere ingredients, and, consequently, cannot be punished
separately from the principal offense, or complexed with the same, to justify
the imposition of a graver penalty.”121
Any ordinary act assumes a different nature by being absorbed in the
crime of rebellion.122 Thus, when a killing is committed in furtherance of
of the rebellion, the killing is not homicide or murder. Rather, the killing assumes
the political complexion of rebellion as its mere ingredient and must be
prosecuted and punished as rebellion alone.
However, this is not to say that public prosecutors are obliged to
consistently charge respondents with simple rebellion instead of common
crimes. No one disputes the well-entrenched principle in criminal procedure
that the institution of criminal charges, including whom and what to
charge, is addressed to the sound discretion of the public prosecutor.123
But when the political offense doctrine is asserted as a defense in the
trial court, it becomes crucial for the court to determine whether the act of
killing was done in furtherance of a political end, and for the political
motive of the act to be conclusively demonstrated.124
Petitioners aver that the records show that the alleged murders were
committed in furtherance of the CPP/NPA/NDFP rebellion, and that the
political motivation behind the alleged murders can be clearly seen from
the
_______________
121 People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515, 541 (1956).
122 People v. Lovedioro, 320 Phil. 481, 489; 250 SCRA 389, 395 (1995).
 123 Glaxosmithkline Philippines, Inc. v. Malik, 530 Phil. 662; 499 SCRA 268
(2006); Punzalan v. Dela Peña, 478 Phil. 771; 434 SCRA 601 (2004); Potot v. People, 432 Phil.
1028; 383 SCRA 449 (2002).
124 Supra note 122.
705charge against the alleged top leaders of the CPP/NPA/NDFP as co--
conspirators.
We had already ruled that the burden of demonstrating political
motivation must be discharged by the defense, since motive is a state of
mind which only the accused knows.125 The proof showing political
motivation is adduced during trial where the accused is assured an
opportunity to present evidence supporting his defense. It is not for this
Court to determine this factual matter in the instant petitions.
As held in the case of Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Zamboanga
Del Norte v. CA,126 if during trial, petitioners are able to show that the
alleged murders were indeed committed in furtherance of rebellion, Section
14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides the remedy, to wit:
SECTION 14. Amendment or substitution.—A complaint or information may
be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the
accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment
may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing
prejudice to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the
offense charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can
be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and
with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and
copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party. (n)
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made
in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original
complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the
proper offense in accordance with
_______________
125 Id.
126 401 Phil. 945, 961; 348 SCRA 714, 728 (2000).
706Section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall not be placed in
double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their
appearance at the trial. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, if it is shown that the proper charge against petitioners should
have been simple rebellion, the trial court shall dismiss the murder charges
upon the filing of the Information for simple rebellion, as long as petitioners
would not be placed in double jeopardy.
Section 7, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, states:
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy.—When an accused
has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon
a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge,
the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar
to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the
same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
Based on the above provision, double jeopardy only applies when: (1) a
first jeopardy attached; (2) it has been validly terminated; and (3) a second
jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first.127
A first jeopardy attaches only after the accused has been acquitted or
convicted, or the case has been dismissed or otherwise terminated without
his express consent, by a compe-
_______________
127 Pacoy v. Cajigal, G.R. No. 157472, 28 September 2007, 534 SCRA 338, 352.
707tent court in a valid indictment for which the accused has entered a valid
plea during arraignment.128
To recall, on 12 May 2006, an Information for the crime of rebellion, as
defined and penalized under Article 134 in relation to Article 135 of the
Revised Penal Code, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-944 was filed before
the RTC Makati against petitioners and several others.129
However, petitioners were never arraigned in Criminal Case No. 06-944.
Even before the indictment for rebellion was filed before the RTC Makati,
petitioners Ocampo, Echanis and Ladlad had already filed a petition before
this Court to seek the nullification of the Orders of the DOJ denying their
motion for the inhibition of the members of the prosecution panel due to
lack of impartiality and independence.130 When the indictment was filed,
petitioners Ocampo, Echanis and Ladlad filed supplemental petitions to
enjoin the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 06-944.131 We eventually
ordered the dismissal of the rebellion case. It is clear then that a first
jeopardy never had a chance to attach.
 Petitioner Ocampo shall remain on provisional liberty under the
P100,000 cash bond posted before the Office of the Clerk of Court. He shall
remain on provisional liberty until the termination of the proceedings
before the RTC Manila.
The OSG has given its conformity to the provisional liberty of petitioners
Echanis, Baylosis and Ladlad in view of the ongoing peace negotiations.
Their provisional release from detention under the cash bond of P100,000
each shall continue under the condition that their temporary release shall
be limited to the period of their actual participation as CPPNDF
consultants in the peace negotiations with the govern-
_______________
128 Id.
129 Rollo (G.R. No. 176830), pp. 117-128.
130 Ladlad v. Velasco, G.R. Nos. 172070-72, 172074-76, 175013, 1 June 2007, 523 SCRA
318, 340.
131 Id.
708ment or until the termination of the proceedings before the RTC Manila,
whichever is sooner. It shall be the duty of the government to inform this
Court the moment that peace negotiations are concluded.
WHEREFORE, the instant consolidated petitions are DISMISSED.
The RTC of Manila, Branch 32, is hereby ORDERED to proceed with
dispatch with the hearing of Criminal Case No. 08-262163. Petitioner
Saturnino C. Ocampo shall remain on temporary liberty under the same
bail granted by this Court until the termination of the proceedings before
the RTC Manila. Petitioners Randall B. Echanis, Rafael G. Baylosis and
Vicente P. Ladlad shall remain on temporary liberty under the same bail
granted by this Court until their actual participation as CPP-NDF
consultants in the peace negotiations with the government are concluded
or terminated, or until the termination of the proceedings before the RTC
Manila, whichever is sooner.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del
Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes and Perlas-Bernabe,
JJ., concurring.
Leonen, J., See separate concurring opinion.
CONCURRING OPINION
“Some say freedom is relative. One man’s freedom is another man’s bondage. We
may have been in chains, but we weren’t shackled by delusions. Our movements
were restrained, but we weren’t tied up by myth. Our tormentors thought they were
free, but they were blinded by falsehood; their senses were deadened by the mirage
of power they clutched and made god. And then they were stunned by their own
shadows; paralyzed by fear of the very monsters and demons they fashioned in their
heads that stood to devour them at the end of it all.
709
. . . Our eventual freedom was truly memorable. The process of unchaining was
both literal and symbolic, and not without drama and fanfare. We weren’t released
all at once, but one or two at a time. Ka Ranel and myself were freed at the same
time — around December of 1988. ‘Free at last!’ we declared, grinning from ear to
ear. We were guided through some underbrush, after it we came upon a clearing
where the rest of the former captives were waiting. We were greeted with applause.
Tearful hugs, handshakes, up-heres, singing, merry-making, even role-playing.
Rage and retribution will have to wait. The moment was a celebration.”
Robert Francis Garcia
“To Suffer Thy Comrades:
How the Revolution Decimated Its Own” 24 (2001)
LEONEN, J.:
Dissent affirms the dissenter’s belief in how human dignity should be
shaped. It assumes difference with the status quo. It is this assertion that
provides depth and dynamism in our democracy.
However, indignities masquerading as dissent or even brought about by
misguided assessments of what is pragmatic do not deserve any legal
protection. Such acts cease to become political. These are simply inhuman.
Acts which debase humanity even by the most organized and ardent
dissenters do not even deserve the label of rebellion.
I concur with the Chief Justice that this case should be remanded so that
the court can properly examine the evidence raised by the defense. I write
this separate opinion in the interest of judicial economy. Should it be shown
that there are acts committed in violation of Republic Act No. 9851,
otherwise known as the Philippine Act on Crimes Against International
Humanitarian Law, Genocide and Other Crimes Against Humanity, these
acts could not be absorbed in the crime of rebellion.
710
 I was inherent in the military operations for the preservation of the troops
For our decision are consolidated petitions for certiorariand prohibition
that pray for the declaration of several Informations and Warrants of
Arrests as void. The Informations and Warrants were issued for the crime
of multiple murder. Petitioners assert that they have a pending criminal
charge of rebellion1 and that the acts raised in their petitions should be
dismissed because they are deemed to be affected by the political offense
doctrine. The political offense doctrine states that certain crimes, such as
murder, are already absorbed by the charge of rebellion when committed as
a necessary means and in connection with or in furtherance of rebellion.
I agree that this case should be remanded because there has been no
evidence yet to prove that the acts imputed to the petitioners actually
happened or are attributable to them. Judicial economy, however, requires
that we state that there are certain acts which have been committed on the
occasion of a rebellion which should no longer be absorbed in that crime.
Acts committed in violation of Republic Act No. 9851, even in the context
of armed conflicts of a non-international character and in view of the
declarations of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the National
Democratic Front, cannot be deemed to be acts in connection with or in
furtherance of rebellion.
II
We survey the evolution of the political offense doctrine to provide better
context.
_______________
1 However, see Ladlad v. Velasco, G.R. Nos. 172070-72, 172074-76, and 175013, June 1,
2007, 523 SCRA 318, wherein this court granted the petitions and ordered the dismissal of
Criminal Case Nos. 06-452 and 06-944 for rebellion.
711
As early as 1903, this court distinguished common crimes from crimes
committed in furtherance of a political objective. In United States v.
Lardizabal,2 the accused, Commanding Officer of Filipino insurgents,
ordered the execution of an American prisoner before retreating from the
enemy. We said in this case that the accused’s act falls under the Amnesty
Proclamation of 1902, thus:
x x x [the execution] was not an isolated act such as a “political offense committed
during the insurrection pursuant to orders issued by the civil or military
insurrectionary authorities,” but was a measure which, whether necessary or not,
commanded by him and of which he was the supreme officer on that island. It was
an act which, while from the standpoint of military law might be regarded
as one of cruelty, was at the same time one depending absolutely upon the
discretion of an officer in charge of a command for securing the safety of
the troops under his control and constitutes no other offense than that of
sedition, within which term the war itself is included by the letter and
spirit of the proclamation.3 (Emphasis provided)
In United States v. Pacheco,4 two men selling English dictionaries within
the Dagupan area were abruptly abducted and killed by the accused and
his men. Witnesses testified that it was presumed by the accused that the
salesmen were American spies because the dictionaries being sold were
written in English. This court observed:
It does not appear from the record that the aggressors were impelled to kill the
deceased by any motive other than that the latter were suspected of being spies
_______________
2 1 Phil. 729 (1903).
3 Id., at p. 730.
4 2 Phil. 345 (1903).
712and, therefore, traitors to the revolutionary party to which the defendants
belonged. From the foregoing statement of facts, it may therefore be said that the
two murders prosecuted herein were of a political character and the result
of internal political hatreds between Filipinos, the defendants having been
insurgents opposed to the constituted government.
The case has to do with two crimes for which, under the penal law, the severest
punishment has always been inflicted. However, considering the circumstances
under which these crimes were committed and the fact that the sovereign power
in these Islands, in view of the extraordinary and radical disturbance which,
during the period following the year 1896, prevailed in and convulsed this country,
and prompted by the dictates of humanity and public policy, has deemed
it advisable to blot out even the shadow of a certain class of offenses,
decreeing full pardon and amnesty to their authors — an act of elevated
statesmanship and timely generosity, more political than judicial in its nature,
intended to mitigate the severity of the law — it is incumbent upon us, in deciding
this case, to conform our judgment to the requirements and conditions of the
decree so promulgated.5 (Emphasis provided)
Then in the landmark case of People v. Hernandez,6 this court defined
the term, political offense:
In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the political
order, as well as such common crimes as may be committed to achieve a
political purpose. The decisive factor is the intent or motive. If a crime
usually regarded as common, like homicide, is perpetrated for the purpose of
removing from the allegiance “to the Government the territory of the Philippines
Islands or any part thereof” then said offense becomes stripped of its
“common” complex-
_______________
5 Id., at pp. 346-347.
6 99 Phil. 515 (1956).
713ion, inasmuch as, being part and parcel of the crime of rebellion, the
former acquires the political character of the latter.7 (Emphasis provided)
This court in Hernandez first clarified whether common crimes such as
murder, arson, and other similar crimes are to be complexed with the main
crimes in the Revised Penal Code. Thus:
x x x national, as well as international, laws and jurisprudence overwhelmingly
favor the proposition that common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a
political offense, are divested of their character as “common” offenses and
assume the political complexion of the main crime of which they are mere
ingredients, and, consequently, cannot be punished separately from the
principal offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of
a graver penalty.8 (Emphasis provided)
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code covering complex crimes provides:
Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes.—When a single act constitutes two or more
grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the
same to be applied in its maximum period.
The Hernandez ruling was then affirmed by this court in subsequent
cases, such as Enrile v. Salazar.9 It is worthy to note, however, that in
“affirming” the doctrine in Hernandez, this court in Enrile said:
_______________
7 Id., at pp. 535-536.
8 Id., at p. 541.
9 264 Phil. 593; 186 SCRA 217 (1990) [Per J. Narvasa, En Banc].
714
It may be that in the light of contemporary events, the act of rebellion has lost
that quintessentially quixotic quality that justifies the relative leniency with
which it is regarded and punished by law, that present-day rebels are less impelled
by love of country than by lust for power and have become no better than mere
terrorists to whom nothing, not even the sanctity of human life, is allowed to stand
in the way of their ambitions. Nothing so underscores this aberration as the
rash of seemingly senseless killings, bombings, kidnappings and assorted
mayhem so much in the news these days, as often perpetrated against
innocent civilians as against the military, but by and large attributable
to, or even claimed by so-called rebels to be part of, an ongoing rebellion.
It is enough to give anyone pause — and the Court is no exception — that not
even the crowded streets of our capital City seem safe from such unsettling
violence that is disruptive of the public peace and stymies every effort at national
economic recovery. There is an apparent need to restructure the law on
rebellion, either to raise the penalty therefor or to clearly define and
delimit the other offenses to be considered as absorbed thereby, so that it
cannot be conveniently utilized as the umbrella for every sort of illegal
activity undertaken in its name. The Court has no power to effect such change,
for it can only interpret the law as it stands at any given time, and what is needed
lies beyond interpretation. Hopefully, Congress will perceive the need for promptly
seizing the initiative in this matter, which is properly within its
province.10 (Emphasis provided)
However, other cases declined to rule that all other crimes charged in
the Information are absorbed under alleged political offenses.11 In Misolas
v. Panga,12 this court ruled:
_______________
10 Id., at pp. 617-618; p. 233.
11 See Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Zamboanga del Norte v. Court of Appeals, 401
Phil. 945; 348 SCRA 714 (2000).
715
Neither would the doctrines enunciated by the Court
in Hernandez and Geronimo, [sic] and People v. Rodriguez [107 Phil. 659] save the
day for petitioner.
In Hernandez, the accused were charged with the complex crime of rebellion
with murder, arson and robbery while in Geronimo, the information was for the
complex crime of rebellion with murder, robbery and kidnapping. In those two
cases[,] the Court held that aforestated common crimes cannot be complexed with
rebellion as these crimes constituted the means of committing the crime of
rebellion. These common crimes constituted the acts of “engaging in war” and
“committing serious violence” which are essential elements of the crime of
rebellion [See Arts. 134-135, Revised Penal Code] and, hence, are deemed absorbed
in the crime of rebellion. Consequently, the accused can be held liable only for the
single crime of rebellion.
On the other hand, in Rodriguez, the Court ruled that since the accused had
already been charged with rebellion, he can no longer be charged for illegal
possession of firearms for the same act of unauthorized possession of firearm on
which the charge of rebellion was based, as said act constituted the very means for
the commission of rebellion. Thus, the illegal possession of the firearm was deemed
absorbed in the crime of rebellion.
However, in the present case, petitioner is being charged specifically for the
qualified offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under P.D. 1866.
HE IS NOT BEING CHARGED WITH THE COMPLEX CRIME OF
SUBVERSION WITH ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. NEITHER IS HE
BEING SEPARATELY CHARGED FOR SUBVERSION AND FOR ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. Thus, the rulings of the Court
in Hernandez, Geronimo and Rodriquez find no application in this
case.13 (Emphasis in the original)
_______________
12 260 Phil. 702; 181 SCRA 648 (1990) [Per J. Cortes, En Banc].
13 Id., at pp. 709-710; p. 656.
716
In Baylosis v. Chavez, Jr.,14 this court held that:
x x x The Code allows, for example, separate prosecutions for either murder or
rebellion, although not for both where the indictment alleges that the former has
been committed in furtherance of or in connection with the latter. Surely,
whether people are killed or injured in connection with a rebellion, or
not, the deaths or injuries of the victims are no less real, and the grief of
the victims’ families no less poignant.
Moreover, it certainly is within the power of the legislature to determine what
acts or omissions other than those set out in the Revised Penal Code or other
existing statutes are to be condemned as separate, individual crimes and what
penalties should be attached thereto. The power is not diluted or improperly
wielded simply because at some prior time the act or omission was but an element
or ingredient of another offense, or might usually have been connected with
another crime.
The interdict laid in Hernandez, Enrile and the other cases cited is against
attempts to complex rebellion with the so called “common” crimes committed in
furtherance, or in the course, thereof; this, on the authority alone of the first
sentence of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. Stated otherwise, the ratio of
said cases is that Article 48 cannot be invoked as the basis for charging and
prosecuting the complex crime of rebellion with murder, etc., for the purpose of
obtaining imposition of the penalty for the more serious offense in its maximum
period (in accordance with said Art. 48). Said cases did not — indeed they
could not and were never meant to — proscribe the legislative authority
from validly enacting statutes that would define and punish, as offenses
sui generis crimes which, in the context of Hernandez, et al. may be viewed
as a complex of rebellion with other offenses. There is no constitutional
prohibition against this, and the Court never
_______________
14 279 Phil. 448; 202 SCRA 405 (1991).
717said there was. What the Court stated in said cases about rebellion
“absorbing” common crimes committed in its course or furtherance must be viewed
in light of the fact that at the time they were decided, there were no penal
provisions defining and punishing, as specific offenses, crimes like murder, etc.
committed in the course or as part of a rebellion. This is no longer true, as far as
the present case is concerned, and there being no question that PD 1866 was a
valid exercise of the former President’s legislative powers.15 (Emphasis provided)
It is not our intention to wipe out the history of and the policy behind the
political offense doctrine. What this separate opinion seeks to accomplish is
to qualify the conditions for the application of the doctrine and remove any
blanket application whenever political objectives are alleged. The remnants
of armed conflict continue. Sooner or later, with a victor that emerges or
even with the success of peace negotiations with insurgent groups, some
form of transitional justice may need to reckon with different types of
crimes committed on the occasion of these armed uprisings. Certainly,
crimes that run afoul the basic human dignity of persons must not be
tolerated. This is in line with the recent developments in national and
international law.16
III
International humanitarian law17 (IHL) is the body of international law
that regulates the conduct of armed conflicts,
_______________
15 Id., at pp. 462-463; pp. 415-416.
16 In August 30, 2011, the Philippines ratified the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court.
17 See Vincent Chetail, ‘The contribution of the International Court of Justice to
international humanitarian law,’ 85 IRRC
(2003)<http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc_850_chetail.pdf> accessed on February 5,
2014. Contemporary IHL developed from the early laws of war (jus in bello), the Martens Clause
and the “elementary considerations of humanity,” and the Hague Conventions of 1907.
718whether of an international or non-international character. This body
of law seeks to limit the effects of the conflict on individuals.18 The 1949
Geneva Conventions and its Additional Protocols are the main instruments
that govern IHL.19 Nevertheless, IHL and the rules and principles
contained in the Geneva Conventions are largely regarded in the
international sphere as having the character of general or customary
international law given the fundamental nature of the rules and “because
they constitute intransgressible principles of international customary
law.”20
In the Philippines, Republic Act No. 9851 was enacted in view of its
policy to “[renounce] war x x x, [adopt] the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land and [adhere] to a policy of
peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all
nations.”21 Accordingly, “[t]he most serious crimes of concern to the
international community as a whole must not go unpunished and their
effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the national
level, in order to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes
and thus contribute to the prevention of such crimes, it being the duty of
every State to
_______________
18 See ‘The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols,’ International
Committee of the Red Cross <http://www.
icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-conventions/
overview-geneva-conventions.htm> accessed on February 5, 2014. See also C.
Greenwood, Historical Development and Basis in THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN
ARMED CONFLICTS 9-10 (1995).
19 The Philippines is a signatory of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. It ratified the
conventions on October 10, 1952. The Philippines acceded to Additional Protocol II on December
11, 1986.
20 M. M. MAGALLONA, FUNDAMENTALS OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 297 (2005)
citing Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, ICJ Reports, 1996, paras. 79 and 82.
21 Rep. Act No. 9851 (2009), “An Act Defining and Penalizing Crimes Against International
Humanitarian Law, Genocide and Other Crimes Against Humanity, Organizing Jurisdiction,
Designating Special Courts, and For Related Purposes,” sec. 2 (a).
719exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international
crimes.”22
Armed conflict in the law is defined as:
x x x any use of force or armed violence between States or a protracted armed
violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or
between such groups within a State: Provided, That such force or armed violence
gives rise, or may give rise, to a situation to which the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, including their common Article 3, apply. Armed conflict may
be international, that is, between two (2) or more States, including belligerent
occupation; or non-international, that is, between governmental
authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within
a State. It does not cover internal disturbances or tensions such as riots,
isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar
nature.23 (Emphasis provided)
Article 3 common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Additional
Protocol II24 are the foundation of the applicable rules in a non-international
or internal armed conflict. Common Article 3, which has attained a
customary law character,25 prescribes a minimum standard to be applied to
persons who are not actively taking part in an internal armed conflict.
Common Article 3 provides:
_______________
22 Rep. Act. No. 9851 (2009), sec. 2 (e).
23 Rep. Act. No. 9851 (2009), sec. 3 (c). See also The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (Jurisdiction
of the Tribunal), Case No. IT-94-1-AR72 (1995).
24 Protocol Additional To The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, And Relating To The
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) of 8 June 1977.
25 See J. M. Henckaerts & L. Doswald-Beck, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW 1-2 (vol. I [reprinted with corrections], 2009).
720
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be
bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed
forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by
sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all
circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction
founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other
similar criteria.
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in
any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds,
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
b) taking of hostages;
c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading
treatment;
d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without
previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court,
 affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as
indispensable by civilized peoples.
2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.
This portion of the provision is substantially reproduced in Section 4,
paragraph (b) of Republic Act No. 9851, which provides:
In case of a non-international armed conflict, serious violations of common Article
3 to the four (4) Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any of the
following acts committed against persons taking no active part in the hostilities,
including members of the armed forces
721who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness,
wounds, detention or any other cause:
(1) Violence to life and person, in particular, willful killings, mutilation,
cruel treatment and torture;
(2) Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating
and degrading treatment;
(3) Taking of hostages; and
(4) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without
previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all
judicial guarantees which are generally recognized as indispensable.
Additional Protocol II supplements Common Article 3 in terms of the
rules applicable to internal armed conflict.26Additional Protocol II specifies:
1) the guarantees afforded to persons involved in the internal armed
conflict; and 2) the
_______________
26 Article 1 — Material field of application
1. This Protocol, which develops and supplements Article 3 common to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949 without modifying its existing conditions of applications,
shall apply to all armed conflicts which are not covered by Article 1 of the Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) and which take place in the
territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed
forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise
such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and
concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol.
2. This Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions,
such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence, and other acts of a similar nature,
as not being armed conflicts.
722obligations of the parties to the internal armed conflict. These rights and
duties are seen in Articles 4 to 6, to wit:
Article 4 — Fundamental guarantees
1. All persons who do not take a direct part or who have ceased to take part in
hostilities, whether or not their liberty has been restricted, are entitled to
respect for their person, honour and convictions and religious practices. They
shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse
distinction. It is prohibited to order that there shall be no survivors.
2. Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, the following acts against
the persons referred to in paragraph 1 are and shall remain prohibited at any
time and in any place whatsoever:
a) violence to the life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in
particular murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or
any form of corporal punishment;
b) collective punishments;
c) taking of hostages;
d) acts of terrorism;
e) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading
treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault;
f) slavery and the slave trade in all their forms;
g) pillage;
h) threats to commit any of the foregoing acts.
xxxx
Article 5 — Persons whose liberty has been restricted
1. In addition to the provisions of Article 4, the following provisions shall be
respected as a
723minimum with regard to persons deprived of their liberty for reasons
related to the armed conflict, whether they are interned or detained:
a) the wounded and the sick shall be treated in accordance with Article 7;
b) the persons referred to in this paragraph shall, to the same extent as the
local civilian population, be provided with food and drinking water and be
afforded safeguards as regards health and hygiene and protection against
the rigours of the climate and the dangers of the armed conflict;
c) they shall be allowed to receive individual or collective relief;
d) they shall be allowed to practice their religion and, if requested and
appropriate, to receive spiritual assistance from persons, such as chaplains,
performing religious functions;
e) they shall, if made to work, have the benefit of working conditions and
safeguards similar to those enjoyed by the local civilian population.
2. Those who are responsible for the internment or detention of the
persons referred to in paragraph 1 shall also, within the limits of their
capabilities, respect the following provisions relating to such persons:
 a) except when men and women of a family are accommodated together, women
shall be held in quarters separated from those of men and shall be under the
immediate supervision of women;
b) they shall be allowed to send and receive letters and cards, the number of
which may be limited by competent authority if it deems necessary;
724
c) places of internment and detention shall not be located close to the combat
zone. The persons referred to in paragraph 1 shall be evacuated when the
places where they are interned or detained become particularly exposed to
danger arising out of the armed conflict, if their evacuation can be carried
out under adequate conditions of safety;
d) they shall have the benefit of medical examinations;
e) their physical or mental health and integrity shall not be endangered by any
unjustified act or omission. Accordingly, it is prohibited to subject the
persons described in this Article to any medical procedure which is not
indicated by the state of health of the person concerned, and which is not
consistent with the generally accepted medical standards applied to free
persons under similar medical circumstances.
3. Persons who are not covered by paragraph 1 but whose liberty has
been restricted in any way whatsoever for reasons related to the
armed conflict shall be treated humanely in accordance with Article 4
and with paragraphs 1 a), c) and d), and 2 b) of this Article.
4. If it is decided to release persons deprived of their liberty, necessary measures
to ensure their safety shall be taken by those so deciding.
Article 6 — Penal prosecutions
This Article applies to the prosecution and punishment of criminal offences related
to the armed conflict.
No sentence shall be passed and no penalty shall be executed on a person found
guilty of an offence except pursuant to a conviction pronounced by a court offering
the essential guarantees of independence and impartiality. In particular:
725
a) the procedure shall provide for an accused to be informed without delay of the
particulars of the offence alleged against him and shall afford the accused
before and during his trial all necessary rights and means of defence;
b) no one shall be convicted of an offence except on the basis of individual penal
responsibility;
c) no one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or
omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under the law, at the time
when it was committed; nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than that which
was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed; if, after
the commission of the offence, provision is made by law for the imposition of a
lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby;
d) anyone charged with an offence is presumed innocent until proved guilty
according to law;
e) anyone charged with an offence shall have the right to be tried in his presence;
f) no one shall be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt.
A convicted person shall be advised on conviction of his judicial and other remedies
and of the time-limits within which they may be exercised.
The death penalty shall not be pronounced on persons who were under the age of
eighteen years at the time of the offence and shall not be carried out on pregnant
women or mothers of young children.
At the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall endeavour to grant the
broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the armed conflict,
or those deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict, whether
they are interned or detained. (Emphasis provided)
726
Furthermore, protection for the civilian population is expressly provided
for in Additional Protocol II:
Article 13 — Protection of the civilian population
The civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection
against the dangers arising from military operations. To give effect to this
protection, the following rules shall be observed in all circumstances.
The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the
object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to
spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.
Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Part, unless and for such time
as they take a direct part in hostilities.
Some have asserted that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions
belongs to the body of jus cogens norms.27 Jus cogens norms under the
Vienna Convention of Law of the Treaties are “norm[s] accepted and
recognized by the international community of States as a whole as
[norms] from which no derogation is permitted and which can be
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the
same character.”28
_______________
27 See Rafael Nieto-Navia, ‘International Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) and
International Humanitarian Law’ (2001) <http://
www.iccnow.org/documents/WritingColombiaEng.pdf> pp. 24-26, accessed on February 6,
2014. See also Ulf Linderfalk, ‘The Effect of Jus CogensNorms: Whoever Opened Pandora’s Box,
Did You Ever Think About the Consequences?,’ vol. 18, no. 5 European Journal of International
Law (2007) <http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/18/5/248.pdf> pp. 853-871, accessed on February 6, 2014.
Consider Ulf’s discussion on the proposition that IHL, in relation to the right to self-defense
and the right to use of force, has jus cogens character, pp. 865-867.
28 Article 53. Treaties conflicting with a peremptory norm of general international law
(“jus cogens”).
727
The principles embedded in Common Article 3 have been held to apply
even to international armed conflict, thus, depicting a universal character.
It lays down fundamental standards which are applicable at all times, in all
circumstances and to all States and from which no derogation at any time is
permitted. As was stated, it “sets forth a minimum core of mandatory rules [and],
reflects the fundamental humanitarian principles which underlie international
humanitarian law as a whole, and upon which the Geneva Conventions in their
entirety are based. These principles, the object of which is the respect for
the dignity of the human person, developed as a result of centuries of
warfare and had already become customary law at the time of the
adoption of the Geneva Conventions because they reflect the most
universally recognized humanitarian principles.”29 (Emphasis provided)
Hence, nonobservance of the minimum standard provided for in
Common Article 3 triggers a violation of well-accepted principles of
international law.
In a similar vein, there exist international human rights laws or IHRL
(not necessarily belonging to international humanitarian law) that are
of jus cogens nature. Thus:
_______________
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general
international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general
international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States
as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by
a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.
29 See Rafael Nieto-Navia, ‘International Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) and
International Humanitarian
(2001)<http://www.iccnow.org/documents/WritingColombiaEng.pdf> p. 26, accessed
February 6, 2014.
728
There is a consensus x x x about the jus cogens nature of a number of prohibitions
formulated in international human rights law x x x. These include at a
minimum the prohibition of aggression, slavery and the slave trade,
genocide x x x, racial discrimination, apartheid and torture x x x, as well
as basic rules of international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict, and
the right to self-determination.30 (Emphasis provided)
International humanitarian law and international human rights law are
two sets of regimes in international law. The two regimes have been
compared and contrasted with each other, to wit:
The two sets of rules certainly have a different history and often a different field
of application, both ratione personae and ratione temporis. Human rights thus
apply to all people and humanitarian law applies to certain groups of persons (for
example, to the wounded, to prisoners o[f] war, to civilians) and, furthermore,
humanitarian law applies only in times of armed conflict. On the other hand,
‘human rights’ and ‘humanitarian law’ regulate, ratione materiae, similar rights
at least insofar that they all intend to increase the protection of individuals,
alleviate pain and suffering and secure the minimum standard of persons in
various situations.31 (Emphasis in the original)
Thus, all persons are protected in both times of war and peace. The
protection accorded by human rights laws does not cease to apply when
armed conflict ensues.32 Still, some “hu-
_______________
30 O. DE SCHUTTER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: CASES, MATERIALS,
COMMENTARY 65 (2010).
31 I. DETTER, THE LAW OF WAR 160-161 (2nd edition, 2000).
32 See M. M. MAGALLONA, FUNDAMENTALS OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 311-312
(2005) citing the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legal
Consequences of the Construc-
729man rights” are allowed to be derogated in times of “emergency which
threatens the life of the nation.”33Nevertheless, provisions on the right to
life, prohibition from torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, and
slavery remain free from any derogation whatsoever, having acquired a jus
cogens character.34
We do not need to go further to determine whether these norms form
Law’ part of “generally accepted principles of international law” to determine
on
whether they are “part of the law of the land.”35 At minimum, they have
been incorporated through statutory provisions.
Rep. Act No. 9851 defines and provides for the penalties of crimes
against humanity, serious violations of IHL, genocide, and other crimes
against humanity.36 This law provides for
_______________
tion of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, ICJ Reports, 2004, par. 106.
 33 See Art. 4, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or ICCPR.
34 I. DETTER, THE LAW OF WAR 162 (2nd edition, 2000) citing Articles 6, 7, and 8 of the
ICCPR.
35 Consti., Art. II, sec. 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national
policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the
land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with
all nations. (Emphasis provided)
36 Rep. Act No. 9851 (2009), sec. 4 (b). In case of a non-international armed conflict, serious
violations of common Article 3 to the four (4) Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely,
any of the following acts committed against persons taking no active part in the hostilities,
including members of the armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors
de combat by sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause:
(1) Violence to life and person, in particular, willful killings, mutilation, cruel treatment
and torture;
(2) Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading
treatment;
(3) Taking of hostages; and
730the non-prescription of the prosecution of and execution of sentences
imposed with regard to the crimes defined in the Act.37 It also provides for
the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over the crimes defined in the
Act.38
These crimes are, therefore, separate from or independent from the
crime of rebellion even if they occur on the occasion of or argued to be
connected with the armed uprisings.
Not only does the statute exist. Relevant to these cases are the
Declarations made by the Communist Party of the Philip-
_______________
(4) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment
pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all judicial guarantees which are
generally recognized as indispensable.
37 Rep. Act No. 9851 (2009), sec. 11. Non-prescription.—The crimes defined and
penalized under this Act, their prosecution, and the execution of sentences imposed on their
account, shall not be subject to any prescription.
38 Rep. Act No. 9851 (2009), sec. 18. Philippine Courts, Prosecutors and Investigators.—
The Regional Trial Courts of the Philippines shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over
the crimes punishable under this Act. Their judgments may be appealed or elevated to the
Court of Appeals and to the Supreme Court as provided by law.
The Supreme Court shall designate special courts to try cases involving crimes punishable
under this Act. For these cases, the Commission on Human Rights, the Department of Justice,
the Philippine National Police or other concerned law enforcement agencies shall designate
prosecutors or investigators as the case may be.
The State shall ensure that judges, prosecutors and investigators, especially those designated
for purposes of this Act, receive effective training in human rights, International Humanitarian
Law and International Criminal Law.
See also the Rome Statute which the Philippines ratified on August 30, 2011. See par. 10 of the
Preamble, Article 1, and Article 17 of the Rome Statute regarding the International Criminal
Court’s complementary jurisdiction over a case when a State party is unwilling or unable to
carry out an investigation or prosecution.
731pines/New People’s Army/National Democratic Front or CPP/NPA/NDF
invoking the Geneva Conventions and its 1977 Additional Protocols.
One of these documents is the Declaration of Adherence to International
Humanitarian Law dated August 15, 1991, whereby the National
Democratic Front “formally declare[d] its adherence to international
humanitarian law, especially Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions
as well as Protocol II additional to said conventions, in the conduct of armed
conflict in the Philippines.”39
We may take judicial notice that on July 5, 1996, the National
Democratic Front issued the Declaration of Undertaking to Apply the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Protocol I of 1977. The National
Democratic Front stated that:
Being a party to the armed conflict, civil war or war of national
liberation and authorized by the revolutionary people and forces to
represent them in diplomatic and other international relations in the
ongoing peace negotiations with the GRP, we the National Democratic
Front of the Philippines hereby solemnly declare in good faith to
undertake to apply the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I to the armed
conflict in accordance with Article 96, paragraph 3 in relation to Article
1, paragraph 4 of Protocol I.
The NDFP is rightfully and dutifully cognizant that this declaration
x x x shall have in relation to the armed conflict with the GRP, the
following effects:
_______________
39 Declaration of Undertaking to Apply the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Protocol I of 1977,
National Democratic Front of the Philippines Human Rights Monitoring Committee, Annex D, 98
(Booklet Number 6, 2005).
732
a. the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I are brought into force
for the NDFP as a Party to the conflict with immediate effect;
b. the NDFP assumes the same rights and obligations as those
which have been assumed by a High Contracting Party to the
Geneva Conventions and Protocol I; and
c. the Geneva Conventions and this Protocol are equally binding
upon all Parties to the conflict.40(Emphasis in the original)
 In addition, in the context of peace negotiations, it appears that there is
a Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and
International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL) executed by the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the
CPP/NPA/NDF. This agreement establishes the recognition of the
existence, protection, and application of human rights and principles of
international humanitarian law as well as provides the following rights and
protections to individuals by the CPP/NPA/NDF. The agreement partly
provides:
PART III
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Article 1. In the exercise of their inherent rights, the Parties shall adhere to and
be bound by the principles and standards embodied in international instruments
on human rights.
Article 2. This Agreement seeks to confront, remedy and prevent the most
serious human rights violations in terms of civil and political rights, as well as to
uphold, protect and promote the full scope of human rights and fundamental
freedoms, including:
_______________
40 Declaration of Undertaking to Apply the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Protocol I of 1977,
National Democratic Front of the Philippines Human Rights Monitoring Committee, Annex D, 12-
13 (Booklet Number 6, 2005).
733
1. The right to self-determination of the Filipino nation by virtue of which the
people should fully and freely determine their political status, pursue their
economic, social and cultural development, and dispose of their natural wealth
and resources for their own welfare and benefit towards genuine national
independence, democracy, social justice and development.
xxxx
3. The right of the victims and their families to seek justice for violations of human
rights, including adequate compensation or indemnification, restitution and
rehabilitation, and effective sanctions and guarantees against repetition and
impunity.
4. The right to life, especially against summary executions (salvagings),
involuntary disappearances, massacres and indiscriminate
bombardments of communities, and the right not to be subjected to
campaigns of incitement to violence against one’s person.
xxxx
7. The right not to be subjected to physical or mental torture, solitary
confinement, rape and sexual abuse, and other inhuman, cruel or
degrading treatment, detention and punishment.
xxxx
9. The right to substantive and procedural due process, to be presumed innocent
until proven guilty, and against self-incrimination.
xxxx
PART IV
RESPECT FOR INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW
Article 1. In the exercise of their inherent rights, the Parties to the armed
conflict shall adhere to and be
734bound by the generally accepted principles and standards of international
humanitarian law.
Article 2. These principles and standards apply to the following persons:
1. civilians or those taking no active part in the hostilities;
2. members of armed forces who have surrendered or laid down their arms;
3. those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds or any other cause;
4. persons deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the armed
conflict; and,
5. relatives and duly authorized representatives of above-named persons.
Article 3. The following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in
any place whatsoever with respect to the persons enumerated in the preceding
Article 2:
1. violence to life and person, particularly killing or causing injury,
being subjected to physical or mental torture, mutilation, corporal
punishment, cruel or degrading treatment and all acts of violence and
reprisals, including hostage-taking, and acts against the physical well-
being, dignity, political convictions and other human rights;
2. holding anyone responsible for an act that she/he has not committed and
punishing anyone without complying with all the requisites of due process;
3. requiring persons deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the
armed conflict to disclose information other than their identity;
4. desecration of the remains of those who have died in the course of the
armed conflict or while under detention, and breach of duty to
735tender immediately such remains to their families or to give them
decent burial;
5. failure to report the identity, personal condition and circumstances of
a person deprived of his/her liberty for reasons related to the armed
 conflict to the Parties to enable them to perform their duties and
responsibilities under this Agreement and under international
humanitarian law;
x x x x (Emphasis provided)
The CARHRIHL has provided a clear list of rights and duties that the
parties must observe in recognizing the application of human rights and
international humanitarian laws. The CPP/NPA/NDF, parties to an
ongoing armed conflict and to which petitioners allegedly belong, are
required to observe, at the minimum, the humane treatment of persons
involved in the conflict, whether hors de combat or a civilian.
In all these instruments, even spies are accorded protection under
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Common Article 3 and
Additional Protocol II are broad enough to secure fundamental guarantees
to persons not granted prisoner of war or civilian status, such as protection
from summary execution and right to fair trial.41 These fundamental
guarantees are also found in Article 75, in relation to Articles 45 and 46 of
Additional Protocol I.42 Spies and civilians suspected of
_______________
41 See J. M. Henckaerts & L. Doswald-Beck, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW 2363 (vol. II, 2005).
42 Additional Protocol I, however, pertains to the protection of victims of international
armed conflicts. Article 75 on Fundamental guarantees provides:
1. In so far as they are affected by a situation referred to in Article 1 of this Protocol,
persons who are in the power of a Party to the conflict and who do not benefit from more
favourable treatment under the Conventions or under this Protocol shall be treated humanely
in all circumstances and
736being spies are also accorded protection under Rep. Act No. 9851. A
_______________
shall enjoy, as a minimum, the protection provided by this Article without any adverse
distinction based upon race, colour, sex, language, religion or belief, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, wealth, birth or other status, or on any other similar
criteria. Each Party shall respect the person, honour, convictions and religious practices
of all such persons.
2. The following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place
whatsoever, whether committed by civilian or by military agents:
(a) violence to the life, health, or physical or mental well-being of persons, in
particular:
(i) murder;
(ii) torture of all kinds, whether physical or mental;
(iii) corporal punishment; and
(iv) mutilation;
(b) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading
treatment, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault;
(c) the taking of hostages;
(d) collective punishments; and
(e) threats to commit any of the foregoing acts.
3. Any person arrested, detained or interned for actions related to the armed conflict
shall be informed promptly, in a language he understands, of the reasons why these
measures have been taken. Except in cases of arrest or detention for penal offences, such
persons shall be released with the minimum delay possible and in any event as soon as the
circumstances justifying the arrest, detention or internment have ceased to exist.
A4. No sentence may be passed and no penalty may be executed on a person found guilty
of a penal offence related to the armed conflict except pursuant to a conviction pronounced
by an impartial and regularly constituted court respecting the generally recognized
principles of regular judicial procedure, which include the following:
737
IV
Concomitantly, persons committing crimes against humanity orC serious
violations of international humanitarian law,
_______________
(a) the procedure shall provide for an accused to be informed without delay of the
particulars of the offence alleged against him and shall afford the accused before and
during his trial all necessary rights and means of defence;
(b) no one shall be convicted of an offence except on the basis of individual penal
responsibility;
(c) no one shall be accused or convicted of a criminal offence on account of any act or
omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under the national or international
law to which he was subject at the time when it was committed; nor shall a heavier
penalty be imposed than that which was applicable at the time when the criminal offence
was committed; if, after the commission of the offence, provision is made by law for the
imposition of a lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby;
(d) anyone charged with an offence is presumed innocent until proved guilty
according to law;
(e) anyone charged with an offence shall have the right to be tried in his presence;
(f) no one shall be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt;
(g) anyone charged with an offence shall have the right to examine, or have
examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of
witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him;
C(h) no one shall be prosecuted or punished by the same Party for an offence in
respect of which a final judgement acquitting or convicting that person has been
previously pronounced under the same law and judicial procedure;
(i) anyone prosecuted for an offence shall have the right to have the judgement
pronounced publicly; and
738international human rights laws, and Rep. Act No. 9851 must not be ACCORDINGLY, I concur that these petitions be dismissed and the
allowed to hide behind a doctrine crafted to recognize the different nature Regional Trial Courts be directed to hear the cases with due and deliberate
of armed uprisings as a result of political dissent. The contemporary view dispatch taking these views into consideration should the evidence so
is that these can never be considered as acts in furtherance of armed conflict warrant.
no matter what the motive. Incidentally, this is the view also apparently Consolidated petitions dismissed.
shared by the CPP/NPA/NDF and major insurgent groups that are part of Notes.—Courts retain the power to review findings of prosecutors in
the present government’s peace process. preliminary investigations, although in a mere few exceptional cases
_______________ showing grave abuse of discretion. (Tan, Jr. vs. Matsuura, 688 SCRA 263
(j) a convicted person shall be advised on conviction of his judicial and other remedies [2013])
and of the time-limits within which they may be exercised. A judge is not bound by the resolution of the public prosecutor who
5. Women whose liberty has been restricted for reasons related to the armed conflict conducted the preliminary investigation and must himself ascertain from
shall be held in quarters separated from men’s quarters. They shall be under the immediate
the latter’s findings and supporting documents whether probable cause
supervision of women. Nevertheless, in cases where families are detained or interned, they
shall, whenever possible, be held in the same place and accommodated as family units. exists for the purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest. (De Los Santos-Dio vs.
6. Persons who are arrested, detained or interned for reasons related to the armed Court of Appeals, 699 SCRA 614 [2013])
conflict shall enjoy the protection provided by this Article until their final release, ——o0o——
repatriation or re-establishment, even after the end of the armed conflict.
7. In order to avoid any doubt concerning the prosecution and trial of persons accused of
war crimes or crimes against humanity, the following principles shall apply: © Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
(a) persons who are accused of such crimes should be submitted for the purpose of
prosecution and trial in accordance with the applicable rules of international law; and
(b) any such persons who do not benefit from more favourable treatment under the
Conventions or this Protocol shall be accorded the treatment provided by this Article,
whether or not the crimes of which they are accused constitute grave breaches of the
Conventions or of this Protocol.
8. No provision of this Article may be construed as limiting or infringing any other more
favourable provision granting greater protection, under any applicable rules of
international law, to persons covered by paragraph 1.
739
We, therefore, should nuance our interpretation of what will constitute
rebellion.
The rebel, in his or her effort to assert a better view of humanity, cannot
negate himself or herself. Torture and summary execution of enemies or
allies are never acts of courage. They demean those who sacrificed and those
who gave their lives so that others may live justly and enjoy the blessings
of more meaningful freedoms.
Torture and summary execution — in any context — are shameful,
naked brutal acts of those who may have simply been transformed into
desperate cowards. Those who may have suffered or may have died because
of these acts deserve better than to be told that they did so in the hands of
a rebel.
 [No. L-5803. November 29, 1954]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and
appellee, vs. NARCISO UMALI, ET AL., defendants. NARCISO UMALI,
EPIFANIO PASUMBAL and ISIDRO CAPINO, defendants and appellants.
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186 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Umali, et al.
1. 1.CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; INFORMATION CHARGING MORE THAN
ONE OFFENSE; ACCUSED MAY BE PROPERLY CONVICTED IF NO
OBJECTION HAS BEEN INTERPOSED.—Although an information
charges more than one offense, contrary to section 12, Rule 106 and
section 2(e), Rule 113, the defendants having interposed no objection
thereto, they were properly tried and may be convicted of said several and
separate crimes if found guilty.
1. 2.CRIMINAL LAW; SEDITION.—Where the purpose of the raid and acts
of the raiders in rising publicly and taking up arms, were not exactly
against the Government and for the purpose of doing the things defined
in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code under rebellion, but rather, by
means of force and intimidation, to inf lict an act of hate or revenge upon
the person or property of a public official, the crime committed is sedition.
1. 3.ID.; ID.; ROBBERIES COMMITTED AS AN AFTERTHOUGHT;
PERSONS RESPONSIBLE.—The purpose of the raiders was to kidnap or
kill the mayor and destroy his house. Robberies were committed by only
some of the raiders, presumably dissidents, as an afterthought, because
of the opportunity offered by the confusion and disorder resulting from the
shooting and the burning of the houses. Held: For these robberies only
those who actually took part therein are responsible.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Quezon.
Victoriano, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Jose P. Laurel, Cipriano Primicias, Alejo Mabanag,Manuel
Concordia, P. M. Stuart Del Rosario, Tomas R. Umali, Eufemio E. De
Mesa and Edmundo T. Zepeda for appellants.
Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Martiniano P. Vivo for
appellee.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Narciso Umali, Epifanio Pasumbal, and Isidro Capino are appealing
directly to this Tribunal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Quezon province finding them guilty of the complex crime of rebellion with
multiple murder, frustrated murder, arson and robbery, and sentencing
each of them to "life imprisonment, other acces-
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People vs. Umali, et al.
sories of the law, to indemnify jointly and severally Marcial Punsalan in the
amount of P24,023; Valentin Robles in the amount of P10,000; Yao Cabon
in the amount of P700; Claro Robles in the amount of P12,800; Pocho Guan
in the amount of P600; the heirs of Domingo Pisigan in the amount of
P6,000; the heirs of Vicente Soriano in the amount of P6,000; the heirs of
Leocadio Untalan in the amount of P6,000; Patrolman Pedro Lacorte in the
amount of P500; Lazaro Ortega in the amount of P300; Hilarion Aselo in
the amount of P300; Calixto Rivano in the amount of P50; Melecio Garcia
in the amount of P60; and Juanito Lector in the amount of P90, each to pay
one fifteenth of the costs, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency due to the nature of the principal penalty that is imposed upon
them."
The complex crime of which appellants were found guilty was said to
have been committed during the raid staged in the town of Tiaong, Quezon,
between 8:00 and 9:00 in the evening of November 14, 1951, by armed men.
It is not denied that such a raid took place resulting in the burning down
and complete destruction of the house of Mayor Marcial Punzalan including
its content valued at P24,023; the house of Valentin Robles valued at
P10,000, and the house of one Mortega, the death of Patrolman Domingo
Pisigan and civilians Vicente Soriano and Leocadio Untalan, and the
wounding of Patrolman Pedro Lacorte and five civilians; that during and
after the burning of the houses, some of the raiders engaged in looting,
robbing one house and two Chinese stores; and that the raiders were finally
dispersed and driven from the town by the Philippine Army soldiers
stationed in the town led by Captain Alzate.
To understand the reason for and object of the raid we have to go into
the political situation in Tiaong not only shortly before that raid but one or
two years before it. Narciso Umali and Marcial Punzalan were old time f
riends and belonged to the same political faction. In the general
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188 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Umali, et al.
elections of 1947 Umali campaigned for Punzalan who later was elected
Mayor of Tiaong. In the elections of 1949 Punzalan in his turn campaigned
and worked for Narciso Umali resulting in the latter's election as
Congressman. However, these friendly relations between the two did not
endure. In the words of Punzalan, Narciso Umali who as Congressman
regarded himself as the political head and leader in that region including
Tiaong, became jealous because of his (Punzalan's) fast growing popularity
among the people of Tiaong who looked to him instead of Umali for political
guidance, leadership, and f avors. In time the strain in their relations
became such that they ceased to have any dealings with each other and they
even filed mutual accusations. According to Punzalan, in May 1950, Umali
induced about twenty-six special policemen of his (Punzalan's) to flee to the
mountains with their arms and join the Huks, this in order to discredit
Punzalan's administration; that he was later able to contact two of his
tweny-six policemen and tried to persuade them to return to the town and
to the service, but they told him that they and their companions would not
surrender except with and through the intervention of Congressman Umali,
and so Punzalan had to seek Umali's intervention which resulted in the
surrender of the 26 men with their firearms; that thereafter Umali wanted
to have their firearms, claiming that they all belonged to him from his
guerrilla days when he was a colonel, and that after liberation he had
merely loaned them to the municipal authorities of Tiaong to help keep
peace and order; and that the ref usal of Punzalan to grant Umali's request
further strained their relations, and that thereafter Umali would not speak
to him even when they happened to meet at parties.
On September 19, 1951, the Chief of Police of Punzalan disarmed four of
Umali's men, including his bodyguard Isidro Capino who were then charged
with illegal possession of firearms. Umali interceded for his men and
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VOL. 96, NOVEMBER 29, 1954 189
People vs. Umali, et al.
Col. Gelveson, Provincial Commander, sent a telegram stating that the
firearms taken away from the men were licensed. As a result the complaint
was dismissed. This incident was naturally resented by Umali and spurred
him to have a showdown with Punzalan.
Then the elections of 1951 (November 13) approached and Punzalan ran
for reelection. To oppose him, and to clip his political wings and definitely
blast his ambition for continued power and influence in Tiaong, Umali
picked Epifanio Pasumbal, his trusted leader.
The pre-election campaign and fight waged by both factions—Punzalan
and Pasumbal, was intense and bitter, even ruthless. The election was to
be a test of political strength and would determine who was who in
Tiaong,—Umali or Punzalan. Umali spoke at political meetings, extolling
the virtues of Pasumbal and the benefits and advantages that would accrue
to the town if he was elected, at the same time bitterly attacking Punzalan,
accusing him of dishonesty, corruption in office, abuse of power, etc. At one
of those meetings he told the audience not to vote for Punzalan because he
would not be elected and that even if he won the election, he would not sit
for blood will flow, and that he (Umali) had already prepared a golden coffin
for him (Punzalan). After denying the charges, in retort, Punzalan would
say that Umali as a Congressman was useless, and that he did not even
attend the sessions and that his chair in Congress had gathered dust, even
cobwebs.
To help in the Umali-Pasumbal campaign, Amado Mendoza who later
was to play the role of star witness for the prosecution, was drafted. He was
a compadre of Pasumbal and had had some experience in political
campaigns, and although he was not exactly a model citizen, being
sometimes given to drunkenness, still, he had the gift of speech and
persuasion. In various political meetings he delivered speeches for
Pasumbal. He was ever at the back and call of Umali and Pasumbal, and
naturally
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190 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Umali, et al.
he frequented the latter's houses or headquarters. The result of the
elections plainly showed that Punzalan was the political master and leader
in Tiaong. He beat Pasumbal by an overwhelming majority of 2,221 votes.
Naturally, Umali and Pasumbal were keenly disappointed, and according
to the evidence, adopted measures calculated to frustrate Punzalan's
victory,. even as prophesied by Umali himself in one of his pre-election
speeches about blood flowing and gold coffin.
Going back to the raid staged in Tiaong on November 14, 1951, it is well
to make a short narration of the happenings shortly before it, established
by the evidence, so as to ascertain and be informed of the reason or purpose
of said raid, the persons behind it, and those who took part in it. According
to the testimony of Amado Mendoza, in the morning of November 12th, that
is, on the eve of the election, at the house of Pasumbal's father, then being
used as his electoral headquarters, he heard Umali instruct Pasumbal to
contact the Huks through Commander Abeng so that Punzalan will be
killed, Pasumbal complying with the order of his Chief (Umali) went to the
mountains which were quite near the town and held a conference with
Commander Abeng. It would seem that Umali and Pasumbal had a feeling
that Punzalan was going to win in the elections the next day, and that his
death was the surest way to eliminate him from the electoral fight.
The conference between Pasumbal and Commander Abeng on November
12th was witnessed and testified to by Nazario Añonuevo, a Huk who was
under Commander Abeng, and who later took an active part in the raid. In
the evening of the same day, Mendoza heard Pasumbal report to Umali
about his conference 'with Commander Abeng, saying that the latter was
agreeable to the proposition and had even outlined the manner of attack,
that the Huks would enter the town (Tiaong) under Commander Lucio and
Aladin, the latter to lead the sector towards the
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VOL. 96, NOVEMBER 29, 1954 191
People vs. Umali, et al.
East; but that Commander Abeng had suggested that the raid be postponed
because Pasumbal may yet win the election the following day, thereby
rendering unnecessary the raid and the killing of Punzalan,
Continuing with the testimony of Amado Mendoza, he told the court that
as per instructions of Umali he went to the house of the latter, in the
evening of November 14th, the day following the election, with the result of
the election already known, namely, the decisive victory of Punzalan over
Pasumbal. He was told by Umali to come with him, and Pasumbal and the
three boarded a jeep with Pasumbal at the wheel. They drove toward the
Tiaong Elementary School and once there he (Mendoza) was left at the
school premises with instructions by Umali to wait for Commander Abeng
and the Huks and point to them the house of Punzalan. After waiting for
sometime, Abeng and his troops numbering about fifty, armed with garands
and carbines, arrived and after explaining his identity and his mission to
Abeng, he led the dissidents or part of the contingent in the direction of
Punzalan's house and on arriving in front of the bodega of Robles, he
pointed out Punzalan's house and then walked toward his home, leaving
the Huks who proceeded to lie flat in a canal. Before reaching his house, he
already heard shots, so, he evacuated his family to their dugout in his yard.
While doing so he and his wife Catalina Tinapunan saw armed men in the
lanzones grove just across the street from their house, belonging to the
father of Umali, and among those men they saw Congressman Umali
holding a revolver, in the company of Huk Commander Torio and about 20
armed men. Afterwards they saw Umali and his companions leave in the
direction of Taguan, by way of the railroad tracks.
It would appear from the evidence that the raid was well-planned. As a
diversionary measure, part of the attacking force was deployed toward the
camp or station of the Army (part of 8th B.C.T.) in the suburbs and
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192 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Umali, et al.
the camp was fired upon, not exactly to destroy or drive out that Army unit
but to keep it from going to the rescue and aid of the main objective of the
raid. The rest of the raiding party went toward Punzalan's house and
attacked it with automatic weapons, hand grenades, and even with bottles
filled with gasoline (popularly known as Molotov's cocktail). It was evident
that the purpose of the attack on Punzalan's house was to kill him.
Fortunately, however, and apparently unknown to the attackers and those
who designed the raid, at six o'clock that morning of November 14th
Punzalan and his Chief of Police had left Tiaong to go to Lucena, the capital,
to report the results of the election to the Governor.
The attack on the house of Punzalan was witnessed and described by
several persons, including policemen who happened to be near the house.
Policeman Tomas Maguare who was in front of the house saw Epifanio
Pasumbal, Isidro Umali (brother of Congressman Umali) and Moises
Escueta enter the gate of Punzalan's house and take part in the firing.
Policeman Pedro Lacorte who was stationed as guard at the gate of Mayor
Punzalan's house recognized defendant Isidro Capino as one of those firing
at the house. Lacorte said that he was guarding the house of Punzalan when
he suddenly heard shots coming from the sides of the house and going over
to the place to investigate, he saw armed men in fatigue and shouting "burn
the house of Mayor Punzalan"; that he was hit on the left check and later
Isidro Capino threw at him a hand grenade and he was hit in the right
forearm and in the right eye and became permanently blind in said eye.
Mateo Galit, laundryman who was sitting inside a jeep parked in front of
the house of Punzalan recognized defendant Pasumbal as one of the
attackers who, once in the yard said in a loud voice as though addressing
somebody in the house "Pare, come down." Mrs. Punzalan who was then
inside the house related to the court that at about eight in the evening while
she was resting she heard shots and rapid
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VOL. 96, NOVEMBER 29, 1954 193
People vs. Umali, et al.
firing. As a precaution she took her children to the bathroom. Then she
noticed that her house was being fired at because the glass window panes
were being shattered and she heard the explosion of a hand grenade inside
the house, followed by flares in the sala and burning of blankets and
mosquito nets in the bedrooms and she noticed the smell of smoke of
gasoline. Realizing the great danger, she and the children ran out of the
house and went to hide in the house of a neighbor.
Nazario Añonuevo declared in court that he was a f armer and was
picked up and seized by Huk Commander Tommy sometime in August
1951, and was taken to Mt. Banahaw in Laguna and mustered in the ranks
of the Huks; that just before the elections of November 13, 1951, he saw
Pasumbal come to the mountains near Tiaong and talk to Commander
Abeng; that on November 14th by order of Commander Abeng he with other
Huks left Mt. Banahaw for Tiaong; that when they crossed the Osiw River
already near Tiaong, they were met by Pasumbal and Capino; that when
they were at the outskirts of the town, he and the party were told by
Commander Tommy to attack the 8th BCT camp in Tiaong to prevent the
sending of army help to the town proper; that he took part in firing on the
camp which returned the fire in the course of which he was wounded; and
that because of his wound he could not escape with his companions to the
mountains when the Army soldiers dispersed and drove them out of the
town and so he was finally captured by said soldiers.
As to defendants Pasumbal and Capino, their participation in and
responsibility for the raid was duly established not only by the going of
Pasumbal on November 12th to the mountains following instructions of
Umali, and conferring with Commander Abeng asking him to raid Tiaong
and kill Punzalan, but also by the fact that Pasumbal and Capino in the
afternoon or evening of November 14th met the Huks at the Osiw River as
the dissidents were on their way to Tiaong and later Pasumbal and Capino
were seen in the
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194 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Umali, et al.
yard of Punzalan firing at the house with automatic weapons and hand
grenades.
What about Umali? His criminal responsibility was also established, tho
indirectly. We have the testimony of Amado Mendoza who heard him
instructing Pasumbal to contact Commander Abeng and ask him to raid
Tiaong and kill Punzalan. The rest of the evidence is more or less
circumstantial, but nonetheless strong and convincing. No one saw him
take part in the firing and attack on the house of Punzalan; nor was he seen
near or around said house. Because of his important position as
Congressman, perchance he did not wish to figure too prominently in the
actual raid. Besides, he would seem to have already given out all the
instructions necessary and he could well stay in the background. However,
during the raid, not very far from Punzalan's house he was seen in the
lanzonesan of his father, holding a revolver and in the company of about 20
armed men with Huk Commander Torio, evidently observing and waiting
for developments. Then he and his companions left in the direction of
Taguan.
Umali and Pasumbal, however, claim that during the raid, they were in
the home of Pasumbal in Taguan, about seven kilometers away from Tiaong
where a consolation party was being held. There is ample evidence however
to the effect that they arrived in Pasumbal's home only around midnight.
An Army soldier named Cabalona who happened to be in Pasumbal's home
arriving there earlier in the evening and who was invited to take some
refreshments said that he did not see the two men until they arrived about
midnight when the Army reinforcements from Lucena passed by on their
way to Tiaong. Thus, we have this chain of circumstances that does not
speak in favor of Umali, or Pasumbal for that matter. But this is not all.
There is the rather strange and unexplained, at least not satisfactorily,
behaviour of Umali and Pasumbal that evening of November 14th.
Assuming for a moment as they claim, that the two were not in Tiaong at
the commencement of the raid between 8:00
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VOL. 96, NOVEMBER 29, 1954 195
People vs. Umali, et al.
and 9:00 p.m., and during the whole time the raid lasted, and that they
were all that time in the home of Pasumbal in Taguan, still, according to
their own evidence, they were informed by persons coming or fleeing from
Tiaong that there was a raid going on there, and that some houses were
burning. As a matter of fact, considering the proximity of Taguan to Tiaong,
a distance of about seven kilometers and the stillness and darkness of the
night, the fire and the glow produced by the burning of three houses and
the noise produced by the firing of automatic weapons and the explosion of
the hand grenades and bottles of gasoline, could and must have been seen
and heard f rom Taguan. The natural and logical reaction on the part of
Umali and Pasumbal would have been to rush to Tiaong, see what had
really happened and then render help and give succor to the stricken
residents, including their own relatives. It will be remembered that the
houses of the fathers of Umali and Pasumbal were in Tiaong and their
parents and relatives were residing there. And yet, instead of following a
natural impulse and urge to go to Tiaong, they fled in the opposite direction
towards Candelaria. And Umali instead of taking the road, purposely
avoided the same and preferred to hike through coconut groves so that upon
arriving in Candelaria, he was wet, and spattered and very tired. Had they
wanted to render any help to Tiaong they could have asked the police
authorities of Candelaria to send a rescue party to that town. Or better still,
when the army reinforcements from Lucena sent at the instance of
Punzalan, who at about eight or nine that evening was returning to Tiaong
from Lucena, found at the barrio or sitio of Lusakan near Tiaong that there
was fighting in the town, he immediately returned to Lucena to get army
reinforcements to relieve his town, was passing by Taguan, where they
were, Umali and Pasumbal could have joined said reinf forcements and
gone to Tiaong. Instead the two continued on their way to the capital
(Lucena) where before dawn, they went and contacted Provincial Fiscal
Mayo, a
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196 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Umali, et al.
first cousin of Umali, and Assistant Fiscal Reyes and later had these two
officials accompany them to the Army camp to see Col. Gelveson, not f or
the purpose of asking for the sending of aid or reinforcement to Tiaong but
presumably to show to the prosecution officials, specially the Army
Commander that they (Umali and Pasumbal) had nothing to do whatsoever
with the raid. Umali said he was trying to avoid and keep clear of Tiaong
because he might be suspected of having had some connection with the raid
and might be the object of reprisal. As a matter of fact, according to Umali
himself, while still in Taguan that evening and before he went to
Candelaria, somebody had informed him that Col. Legaspi of the Army was
looking for him. Instead of seeking Col. Legaspi and find out what was
wanted of him, he left in the opposite direction and fled to Candelaria and
later to Lucena, and the next day he took the train for Manila. This strange
act and behaviour of the two men, particularly Umali, all contrary to
impulse and natural reaction, and what other people would ordinarily have
done under the circumstances, prompted the trial court in its decision to
repeat the old saying "The guilty man flees even if no one pursues, but the
innocent stands bold as a lion." We might just as well reproduce that portion
of the decision of the trial court, to wit:
"* * *. Considering the fact that Taguan is very near Tiaong so that even taking it
for granted as true, for the sake of argument, that the said accused were really at
the party of Pasumbal on the night in question, that would not prevent them from
being in Tiaong between 8 and 9. Besides, why was it that night the hasaglamp
was replaced with candles when the reinforcements passed through Taguan about
the midnight of November 14, 1951. Why did Congressman Umali and company
instead of going to Tiaong which was the scene of the attack hurried towards
Candelaria, after the reinforcement has passed and went to the house of Felix Ona
walking through a muddy path under the coconut groves? Why was Umali afraid
to pass through the provincial road and preferred a muddy road instead? Was he
trying to conceal himself ? Why did Pasumbal and company also go to the house of
Ona? Why did they
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People vs. Umali, et al.
go to the house of Felix Ona instead of going to the house of Manalo who could
have given them better protection? And again why did Congressman Umali and
the other co-accused repaired and sought the company of Fiscal Reyes in going at
such an early hour to the Army authorities, did they fear any reprisal? From
whom? Why did Umali go to Manila from Lucena on November 16, 1951? 'The
guilty man flees even if no one pursues, but the innocent stands bold as a lion.'"
At first blush it would appear rather unbelievable that Umali and
Pasumbal, particularly the former should seek the aids of the Huks in order
to put down and eliminate their political enemy Punzalan. It would seem
rather strange and anomalous that a member of Congress should have
friendly relations with the dissidents whom the Government had been
fighting all these years. But if we study the evidence, it will be found that
the reason and the explanation are there. As already stated, during the
Japanese occupation, to further the resistance movement, guerrillas were
organized in different parts of the Philippines. One of these was the
guerrilla unit known as President Quezon's Own Guerrillas (PQOG)
operating in the provinces of Tayabas (now Quezon) and Laguna. Umali,
Pasumbal, Commander Abeng and even Punzalan himself were officers in
this guerrilla unit, Umali attaining the rank of colonel, and Pasumbal and
Punzalan that of Lieutenant-colonel, Pasumbal then being known as
"Panzer". After Liberation, Abeng joined the dissidents, and became a Huk
Commander. It was not unnatural that Umali and Pasumbal should
continue their friendship and association with Commander Abeng and seek
his aid when convenient and necessary. Umali admitted that he knew Huk
Commander Kasilag. Graciano Ramos, one of the witnesses of the
prosecution told the court that way back in May 1950, in a barrio of San
Pablo City he saw Umali confer with Commander Kasilag, which
Commander after the conference told his soldiers including Ramos that
Umali wanted the Huks to raid Tiaong, burn the presidencia and kidnap
Punzalan. Of course, the last part of
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198 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Umali, et al.
the testimony may be regarded as hearsay, but the f act is that Umali
conferred with a Huk Commander as early as 1950. Then we have the fact
that on November 18 of the same year Punzalan wrote to President Quirino
denouncing Congressman Umali for fraternizing with the Huks and
conducting a campaign among them in preparation for the elections the
following year. And we may also consider the fact that the town of Tiaong
stands at the foothills of Mt. Banahaw where the dissidents under
Commander Abeng, Tommy, Lucio, Aladin, and others had their hideout,
so that it was not difficult for residents of Tiaong like Umali and Pasumbal
to communicate and even associate with the dissidents in that region.
After carefully considering all the evidence in the case, we are
constrained to agree with the trial court that the three appellants are
guilty. Besides, the determination of this case, in great measure, hinges on
the credibility of witnesses. The learned trial court which had the
opportunity of observing the demeanor of witnesses on the stand and
gauging their sincerity and evaluating their testimony, decided the
Government witnesses, including Amado Mendoza, to be more credible and
reliable. And we find nothing in the record to warrant correction or reversal
of the stand and finding of the trial court on the matter. We have not
overlooked the rather belated retraction of Amado Mendoza made on
October 31, 1952, about a year and 9 months after he testified in court.
Considering the circumstances surrounding the making of this affidavit or
retraction, the late date at which it was made, the reasons given by him for
making it and the fact that when he testified in court under the observation
and scrutiny of the trial court bearing in mind that he was the star witness
for the prosecution and his testimony naturally extremely important, and
the trial court after the opportunity given to it of observing his demeanor
while on the witness stand had regarded him as a witness, sin-
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VOL. 96, NOVEMBER 29, 1954 199
People vs. Umali, et al.
cere, and his testimony truthful, and considering further the case with
which affidavits of retraction of this nature are obtained, we confess that
we are not impressed with such retraction of Mendoza.
The last point to be determined is the nature of the offense or offenses
committed. Appellants were charged with and convicted of the complex
crime of rebellion with multiple murder, frustrated murder, arson and
robbery. Is there such a complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder,
etc? While the Solicitor General in his brief claims that appellants are
guilty of said complex crime and in support of his stand "asks for leave to
incorporate by reference" his previous arguments in opposing Umali's
petition for bail, counsel for appellants considered it unnecessary to discuss
the existence or non-existence of such complex crime, saying that the nature
of the crime committed "is of no moment to herein appellants because they
had absolutely no part in it whatsoever". For the present, and with respect
to this particular case, we deem it unecessary to decide this important and
controversial question, defering its consideration and determination to
another case or occasion more opportune, when it is more directly and
squarely raised and both parties given an opportunity to discuss and argue
the question more adequately and exhaustively. Considering that,
assuming for the moment that there is no such complex crime of rebellion
with murder, etc., and that consequently appellants could not have been
legally charged with, much less convicted of said complex crime, and the
information should therefore, be regarded as having charged more than one
offense, contrary to Rule 106, section 12 and Rule 113, section 2 (e), of the
Rules of Court, but that appellants having interposed no objection thereto,
they were properly tried f or and lawfully ully convicted if guilty of the
several, separate crimes charged therein, we have decided and we rule that
the appellants may properly be convicted of said several and separate
crimes, as hereinafter specified. We feel particularly supported and just-
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200 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Umali, et al.
ified in this stand that we take, by the 'result of the case, namely, that the
prison sentence we impose does not exceed, except perhaps in actual
duration, that meted out by the Court below, which is life imprisonment.
We are convinced that the principal and main, tho not necessarily the
most serious, crime committed here was not rebellion but rather that of
sedition. The purpose of the raid and the act of the raiders in rising publicly
and taking up arms was not exactly against the Government and for the
purpose of doing the things defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code
under rebellion. The raiders did not even attack the Presidencia, the seat
of local Government. Rather, the object was to attain by means of force,
intimidation, etc. one object, to wit, to inflict an act of hate or revenge upon
the person or property of a public official, namely, Punzalan who was then
Mayor of Tiaong. Under Article 139 of the same Code this was sufficient to
constitute sedition. As regards the crime of robbery with which appellants
were charged and of which they were convicted, we are also of the opinion
that it was not one of the purposes of the raid, which was mainly to kidnap
or kill Punzalan and destroy his house. The robberies were actually
committed by only some of the raiders, presumably dissidents, as an
afterthought, because of the opportunity offered by the confusion and
disorder resulting from the shooting and the burning of the three houses,
the articles being intended presumably to replenish the supplies of the
dissidents in the mountains. For these robberies, only those who actually
took part therein are responsible, and not the three appellants herein. With
respect to the crime of multiple frustrated murder, while the assault upon
policeman Pedro Lacorte with a hand grenade causing him injuries
resulting in his blindness in one eye, may be regarded as frustrated murder;
the wounding of Ortega, Aselo, Rivano, Garcia and Lector should be
considered as mere physical injuries.
The crimes committed are, therefore, those of sedition, multiple murder,
arson, frustrated murder and physical
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VOL. 96, NOVEMBER 29, 1954 201
People vs. Umali, et al.
injuries. The murders may not be qualified by evident premeditation
because the premeditation was for the killing of Punzalan. The result was
the killing of three others not intended by the raiders (People vs. Guillen,
47 Off. Gaz., No. 7, p. 3433 and People vs. Mabug-at, 51 Phil., 967). The
killing may, however, be qualified by treachery, the raiders using firearms
against which the victims were defenseless, with the aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior strength. The three murders may be
punished with the penalty of death. However, because of lack of the
necessary votes, the penalty should be life imprisonment.
We deem it unnecessary to discuss the other points raised by the
appellants in their brief.
In conclusion, we find appellants guilty of sedition, multiple murder,
arson, frustrated murder and physical injuries. For the crime of sedition
each of the appellants is sentenced to 5 years of prisión correccional and to
pay a fine of P4,000; for each of the three murders, each of the appellants
is sentenced to life imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of each victim
in the sum of P6,000; and for the arson, for which we impose the maximum
penalty provided in Article 321, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code, for
the reason that the raiders in setting fire to the buildings, particularly the
house of Punzalan, they knew that it was then occupied by one or more
persons, because they even and actually saw an old lady, the mother of
Punzalan, at the window, and in view of the aggravating circumstances of
nighttime, each of the appellants is sentenced to reclusión perpetua and to
pay the indemnities mentioned in the decision of the lower court. It shall be
understood, however, that pursuant to the provisions of Article 70 of the
Revised Penal Code the duration of all penalties shall not exceed 40 years.
In view of the heavy penalties already imposed and their long duration, we
find it unnecessary to fix and impose the prison sentences corresponding to
frustrated murder and physical injuries; however, the sums awarded the
victims (Lacorte, Ortega,
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202 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Bernardo, et al. vs. Bernardo, et al.
Aselo, Rivano, Garcia and Lector), by the court below will stand. With these
modifications, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs.
Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista
Angelo, Concepción and Reyes, J. B. L., JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed with modifications.

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