PRE-TRIAL

Bayas v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 143689-91, 12 November 2002

Doctrine:
Once the stipulations are reduced into writing and signed by the parties and their counsels, they
become binding on the parties who made them. They become judicial admissions of the fact or facts
stipulated. Even if placed at a disadvantageous position, a party may not be allowed to rescind them
unilaterally; it must assume the consequences of the disadvantage.[30] If the accused are allowed to
plead guilty under appropriate circumstances, by parity of reasoning, they should likewise be allowed
to enter into a fair and true pretrial agreement under appropriate circumstances.

Three Informations[ were filed before the SBN, charging Petitioners Ernesto T. Matuday and Sixto M.
Bayas with violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019, as amended; and two counts of malversation
through falsification penalized under Article 217, in relation to Article 171, of the Revised Penal Code.
They were charged in their capacities as municipal mayor and municipal treasurer, respectively, of the
Municipality of Kabayan, Province of Benguet.

During their arraignment petitioners pled "not guilty." Pre-trial conference was thrice cancelled and
reset due to the counsel for the accused (Atty. Molintas) being unprepared and or sick. Nonetheless, the
Sandiganbayan urged the accused to discuss with their counsel the stipulation of facts drafted by
Ombudsman Prosecutor II Evelyn T. Lucero. They were asked to do so, so that at the resumption of the
pretrial on December 10, 1999, they could expeditiously pass upon all other matters that still remained
to be resolved.

Subsequently, a the parties submitted a Joint Stipulation of Facts and Documents," which had been duly
signed by the two accused and their counsel and Prosecutor Lucero. They agreed among others that
Accused Ernesto Matuday was then the Municipal Mayor and accused Sixto Bayas was and still the
Municipal Treasurer and designated Municipal Accountant both of Kabayan, Benguet during the period
relevant to this case and Both of the accused admit the disbursement of the amount of P510,000.00
and P55,000.00. They also submitted several documents as evidence.

However, the pretrial conference was again scuttled due to the absence of Atty. Molintas. The hearing
was rescheduled however, he later moved to withdraw as counsel for the accused. His motion was
granted by the anti-graft court and the pretrial was rescheduled to give the accused ample time to
employ a new counsel.

Hence, the accused, represented by their new counsel, Atty. Cecilia M. Cinco, moved to withdraw the
Joint Stipulation of Facts and Documents. Specifically, they sought to withdraw, first, Stipulation 1(b)
which states that "Both the accused admit the disbursement of the amount of P510,000.00 and
P55,000.00"; invoking their constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.
Sandiganbayan: Denied the motion to withdraw since there was express statement from Atty. Cortes
that neither fraud nor any other mistake of a serious character vitiated the consent of the parties when
they affixed their conformity to the stipulations of facts. MR also denied. Elevated to SC.
Issue:
1. W/N petitioners may be allowed to withdraw unilaterally from the Joint Stipulation of Facts and
Documents. - NO
2. W/N there is a law or rule which would bar petitioners from withdrawing their Joint Stipulation of
Facts and Documents from the respondent Sandiganbayan. - YES
3. W/N Sandiganbayan acted with GRADALEJ – NO.

Held:
1. NO. Once validly entered into, stipulations will not be set aside unless for good cause.[14] They
should be enforced especially when they are not false, unreasonable or against good morals and
sound public policy. When made before the court, they are conclusive. And the party who
validly made them can be relieved therefrom only upon a showing of collusion, duress, fraud,
misrepresentation as to facts, and undue influence; or upon a showing of sufficient cause on
such terms as will serve justice in a particular case. Moreover, the power to relieve a party from
a stipulation validly made lies in the court's sound discretion which, unless exercised with grave
abuse, will not be disturbed on appeal

While petitioners wish to be relieved from the stipulations, they, however, do not allege that
these were false or misleading or were obtained through force or fraud. On the contrary, they
do not dispute the finding of the anti-graft court that no fraud or serious mistake vitiated their
and their counsel's consent to the signing of these stipulations. They even admitted, in answer
to its query, that they had freely given their consent.

Petitioners fail to appreciate the indispensable role of stipulations in the speedy disposition of
cases. The new Rules on Criminal Procedure mandate parties to agree on matters of facts, issues
and evidence. Such stipulations are greatly favored because they simplify, shorten or settle
litigations in a faster and more convenient manner. They save costs, time and resources of the
parties and, at the same time, help unclog court dockets.

Argument on incompetence of the accused former counsel - To be a ground for relief against a
stipulation, a mistake must be one of fact -- not, as in this case, a mere lack of full knowledge of
fact because of failure to exercise due diligence in ascertaining it. It is hornbook doctrine that
parties are bound by the action or the inaction of their counsel. To all intents and purposes, the
acts of a lawyer in the defense or the prosecution of a case are the acts of the client. The rule
extends even to the mistakes and the simple negligence committed by the counsel.

Ruling on alleged violation of consti right to be presumed innocent - There is nothing irregular
or unlawful in stipulating facts in criminal cases. The policy encouraging it is consistent with the
doctrine of waiver, which recognizes that "x x x everyone has a right to waive and agree to waive
the advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and protection of the individual in his
private capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished without infringing on any public
right and without detriment to the community at large." In the present case, the Joint
Stipulation made by the prosecution and petitioners was a waiver of the right to present
evidence on the facts and the documents freely admitted by them. There could have been no
impairment of petitioners' right to be presumed innocent, right to due process or right against
 self-incrimination because the waiver was voluntary, made with the assistance of counsel and
is sanctioned by the Rules on Criminal Procedure.

2. YES, Sec 2, Rule 118. A pretrial agreement to be binding on the accused, it must satisfy the
following conditions: (1) the agreement or admission must be in writing, and (2) it must be
signed by both the accused and their counsel. The court's approval, mentioned in the last
sentence of the above-quoted Section, is not needed to make the stipulations binding on the
parties. Such approval is necessary merely to emphasize the supervision by the court over the
case and to enable it to control the flow of the proceedings.
Another cogent reason why the Joint Stipulation should be binding. It must be noted that the
SBN could not fully act on the matter, not through its fault, but because of the continued
absence of petitioners' counsel. Verily, the records reveal that at the intended completion of
the pretrial on January 14, 2000, it could not pass upon the Joint Stipulation because he was
absent. Also, the pretrial conference had to be re-scheduled six times, just to ensure the
attendance of the parties and their counsels and to prepare them for the conference.

3. NO GRADALEJ. Petitioners in this case failed to prove that the Sandiganbayan committed grave
abuse of discretion in disallowing them to withdraw the stipulations that they had freely and
voluntarily entered into. Also, no bad faith or malice was or can be imputed to the anti-graft
court for failing to immediately act upon the Joint Stipulation. The delay was due, not to its
deliberate evasion of its duty, but to the continued absence of petitioners' counsel.
Estipona v. Lobrigo, G.R. No. 226679, 15 August 2017

National Power Corporation v. Adiong, AM RTJ-07-2060

People v. Likiran, G.R. No. 201858, 4 June 2014

FACTS: During the town’s fiesta and a barrio dance in Bukidnon, Jerome Likiran (the accused
appellant’s brother, punched Mercado on the mouth. Goloceno was about to assist Mercado
when he saw that Jerome was armed with a short firearm while the accused-appellant was
holding a hunting knife, so he backed off. Afterwards, Jerome approached Sareno and shot him
several times. With Sareno fallen, the accused-appellant stabbed him on the back. One of the
witness, Dagangon, saw the incident firsthand as he was only three meters from where Sareno
was.

Dagangon was able to bring Sareno to the hospital only after Jerome and the accused-appellant
left, but Sareno was already dead at that point.
The accused-appellant, however, denied any involvement in the crime. While he admitted that
he was at the dance, he did not go outside when the commotion happened. The RTC found that
the prosecution was able to establish the accused-appellant’s culpability. Jenny Likiran (accused-
appellant) was convicted of the crime of Murder by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malaybalay
City.

Upon appeal, CA also affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA, nevertheless, deviated from the
RTC’s conclusion that there was conspiracy between Jerome and the accused-appellant, and that
abuse of superior strength attended the commission of the crime.
The accused-appellant asserted that the information charged him of murder committed by
attacking, assaulting, stabbing and shooting Sareno, thereby causing his instantaneous death. He
argued that the evidence on record established that Sareno was in fact shot by some other
person (Ang argument nya, sya lang sumaksak after barilin ilang beses, pero sya lang yung
convicted ng murder). At this juncture, the Court notes that the testimony of Dagangon, indeed,
identified two assailants (who shot Sereno) — the accused-appellant and his brother, Jerome;
however, it was only the accused-appellant who was charged with the death of Sareno.

ISSUE: WON the accused-appellant’s contention is correct and shall be considered by the court
to relieve him of the charges of murder.

HELD: NO. The SC affirmed the CA in disregarding the accused-appellant’s contention and ruled
that “the cause of death was not made an issue in the court a quo” and the Certificate of Death
was admitted during the pre-trial conference as proof of the fact and cause of death. And even
assuming that the cause of death was an issue, the CA still held the accused-appellant liable for
the death of Sareno on the basis of the Court’s ruling in People v. Pilola.
The pre-trial agreement issued by the RTC states that one of the matters stipulated upon and
admitted by the prosecution and the defense was that the Certificate of Death issued by Dr.
Cidric Dael (Dr. Dael) of the Bukidnon Provincial Hospital and reviewed by the Rural Health
Physician of Malaybalay City “is admitted as proof of fact and cause of death due to multiple stab
wound. Stipulation of facts during pre-trial is allowed by Rule 118 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Section 2 of Rule 118, meanwhile, prescribes that all agreements or
admissions made or entered during the pretrial conference shall be reduced in writing and
signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise, they cannot be used against the accused. In this
case, while it appears that the pre-trial agreement was signed only by the prosecution and
defense counsel, the same may nevertheless be admitted given that the defense failed to object
to its admission. Moreover, a death certificate issued by a municipal health officer in the regular
performance of his duty is prima facie evidence of the cause of death of the victim. The accused-
appellant, therefore, is bound by his admission of Sareno’s cause of death. More importantly,
the accused-appellant is criminally liable for the natural and logical consequence resulting from
his act of stabbing Sareno. It may be that he was not the shooter, it is nevertheless true that the
stab wound he inflicted on Sareno contributed to the latter’s death.

Garayalbas v. Ong, G.R. No. 174507-30, 3 August 2011

Doctrine: Criminal Procedure; Pursuant to Section 3, Rule 118 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
court may sanction or penalize counsel for the accused if the following concur: (1) counsel does not appear at
the pretrial conference and (2) counsel does not offer an acceptable excuse.

FACTS: Petitioner Atty. Garayblas is the principal legal counsel, with petitioner Atty. De la Cruz as collaborating
counsel, for Gen. Jose S. Ramiscal who’s facing charges for falsification of public documents and violation of
Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019.

Accused Gen. Ramiscal was arraigned and the SB 4th Div. set the pre-trial. Notice of Hearing were sent to parties,
informing them of the cancellation pre-trial hearing and its resetting (April 27). Petitioner Atty. Garayblas, opposed
resetting, filed a Motion to Reset, which the SB denied stating that "Atty. Garayblas and Associates must adjust
their schedule to suit all the other accused and their counsels, who are available for the pre-trial hearing"

Petitioners failed to appear for pre-trial; hence, public respondents ordered petitioners to explain why they should
not be held in contempt. Atty. Garayblas filed a Compliance/Manifestation, explaining that on the day of the pre-
trial she suffered recurrent headaches, sluggishness and body weakness. Her condition did not disappear. Due to
this continuous discomforts and pains, and apprehensive that she might lose her consciousness, she was unable to
attend the scheduled hearing. Atty. De la Cruz also filed his Explanation stating that he did not attend the pre-trial
of the cases because he had to appear before another division of SB for another crime involving the same accused,
attaching a certificate of appearance from the Second Division as proof of his explanation.

The SB 4th Division issued the assailed Order, ruling that they are constrained to hold Attys. De la Cruz and
Garayblas liable for their absence or non-appearance which caused the cancellation of the scheduled pre-trial
conference and thus wasted the time of the Court. Hence, pursuant to Sec. 3 of Rule 118 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the Court hereby orders them to pay the amount of ten thousand pesos (₱10,000) each as
sanction or penalty and to partially answer the traveling and other expenses of the Court in holding the subject pre-
trial conference in Davao City, within ten (10) days from receipt of this order. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration.
Atty. Garayblas reasoned that: (1) she had no intention whatsoever of disregarding the scheduled pre-trial but her
health and physical condition prevented her from attending the same, and records would show that except for
her non-appearance at the pre-trial, she had never been absent in all the proceedings for subject criminal cases
before the SB 4th Division; Atty. De la Cruz, for his part, reiterated Atty. Garayblas' explanation that he did not
appear before the SB 4th Division because they agreed that it was the latter who would appear for their client at
the pre-trial in Davao City.

The SB 4th Div. denied petitioners' MR, stating that even if the Court is inclined to believe Atty. Garayblas' illness,
the Court still expected her to make the necessary arrangement for co-counsel or any other colleague to attend
the pre-trial. It was also reiterated in said Resolution that Atty. De la Cruz should have given priority to the pre-trial
hearing in Davao City. Aggrieved, petitioners filed the present petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not SB 4th Div. acted with GADLEJ in not finding their explanation satisfactory and ordering
them to pay a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (₱10,000.00) each and pay part of the travel expenses of court
personnel in holding the hearing in Davao City.- Partially

2. Did petitioners present an acceptable or valid excuse for said non-appearance- Yes

RULING: The payment of travel expenses of court personnel is unwarranted. Section 3, Rule 118 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure provides as follows:

Sec. 3. Non-appearance at Pre-Trial Conference. - If the counsel for the accused or the prosecutor does not appear
at the pre-trial conference and does not offer an acceptable excuse for his lack of cooperation, the court may
impose proper sanctions or penalties.

Pursuant to the foregoing provision, the court may sanction or penalize counsel for the accused if the following
concur: (1) counsel does not appear at the pre-trial conference AND (2) counsel does not offer an acceptable
excuse.

The SB 4th Division already said it believed Atty. Garayblas' claim that a day before the scheculed pre-trial
conference in Davao City, she started suffering from hyperglycemia (high blood sugar) and hypertension, the
Court can understand that a person suffering from such would be hard put to attend a hearing, much less have the
clarity of mind to think or worry about finding another lawyer to substitute for her. Indeed, it would not be
reasonable to expect her to have been able to make the necessary arrangements for another lawyer to attend in
her stead.

In Bayas v. Sandiganbayan,14 the Court expounded on the role of lawyers in pre-trials, to wit:

Pre-trial is meant to simplify, if not fully dispose of, the case at its early stage. x x x

x x x during pre-trial, attorneys must make a full disclosure of their positions as to what the real issues of the trial
would be. They should not be allowed to embarrass or inconvenience the court or injure the opposing litigant by
their careless preparation for a case; or by their failure to raise relevant issues at the outset of a trial x x x15

This being so, it is not quite prudent to send in a new lawyer, who has not had ample time to fully familiarize
himself or herself with the facts and issues involved in the case, to attend a pre-trial conference. Sending to the
pre-trial conference a new lawyer who is not very knowledgeable about the case would most probably lead to such
careless preparation which the Court abhors.
However, Atty. Garayblas should have at least sent word to the SB 4th Division and to her co-counsel, Atty. De la
Cruz, when she began feeling the symptoms of hypertension and hyperglycemia, that she would be unable to
attend said pre-trial conference. This would have been the courteous thing to do.

With regard to Atty. De la Cruz, his non-appearance at the pre-trial conference was also excusable. There were
hearings for their client's case in two separate divisions of the Sandiganbayan on the very same date in two distant
locations. It appears that Atty. De la Cruz was not fully apprised of the fact that his co-counsel would not be able to
attend the pre-trial conference. It was already too late for Atty. De la Cruz to change plans and to notify the 2nd Div
that he would be absent so he could attend the pre-trial.

The Court finds respondents' directive for petitioners to pay part of the travel expenses of court personnel in
holding the hearing in Davao City to be unwarranted. There is nothing on record to show that the proceedings
were being held in Davao City mainly because of the cases being handled by petitioners. The Court deems
imposing a fine on petitioners and ordering them to answer part of the court personnels' travel expenses to be too
harsh. In Inonog v. Ibay,17 the Court reiterated that:

The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts so as to preserve order in judicial proceedings as well as
to uphold the administration of justice. The courts must exercise the power of contempt for purposes that are
impersonal because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges but for the functions they exercise.
Thus, judges have, time and again, been enjoined to exercise their contempt power judiciously, sparingly, with
utmost restraint and with the end in view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of
the court, not for retaliation or vindication. x x x18

Petitioner Atty. De la Cruz has presented a valid and acceptable excuse, for which he should not be found liable
under Section 3, Rule 118 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. On the other hand, petitioner Atty.
Garayblas showed some lapse in judgment, not to mention discourteous behavior, in not informing the SB 4th
Division at the earliest possible time of her illness and inability to attend said pre-trial conference.

FALLO: WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Sandiganbayan 4th Division's Order are
hereby MODIFIED by DELETING the fine and the order for both petitioners to pay part of the traveling expenses of
the court. Instead, petitioner Atty. Garayblas is hereby given a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
Sec. 8(f), AM No. 15-06-10-SC
AM No. 11-1-6-SC

RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED

Perez v. People, G.R. No. 164763, 12 February 2008

Facts: An audit team conducted a cash examination on the account of Zenon Perez, petitioner, who was
then the acting municipal treasurer of Tubigon, Bohol. In a recent audit made on his office, it was found
that the public funds that he was entrusted to is short of P72,784.57. When asked by the auditing team as
to the location of the missing funds, petitioner verbally explained that part of the money was used to pay
for the loan of his late brother, another portion was spent for the food of his family, and the rest for his
medicine.

As a result of the audit, Arlene R. Mandin (prosecution witness) prepared a memorandum addressed to
the Provincial Auditor of Bohol recommending the filing of the appropriate criminal case against
petitioner.
An administrative case was filed against petitioner.

Later, petitioner was charged before the Sandiganbayan with malversation of public funds, defined and
penalized by Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.

The Sandiganbayan dispensed with pre-trial and allowed the prosecution to present its witness, Arlene
Mandin.

Petitioner denied the contents of his first Answer to the administrative case filed against him by the audit
team. He claimed it was prepared without the assistance of counsel and that at the time of its preparation
and submission, he was not in peak mental and physical condition, having been stricken with diabetes
mellitus. He was found guilty of Malversation of Funds by the Sandiganbayan.

Upon appeal at the SC, petitioner claims that his right to a speedy trial and due process was violated for
unduly and unreasonably delaying the decision of the case for over 13 years.

Issue: 1. WON his right to speedy trial and due process was violated. No.
2. WON he has right to counsel in his administrative case. No.

Ruling:
1. The Court went on to adopt a middle ground: the "balancing test," in which "the conduct of both the
prosecution and defendant are weighed." A balancing test necessarily compels courts to approach speedy
trial cases on an ad hoc basis. We can do little more than identify some of the factors which courts should
assess in determining whether a particular defendant has been deprived of his right. Though some might
express them in different ways, we identify four such factors: Length of delay, the reason for the delay, the
defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.

The length of the delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism. Until there is some delay which is
presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance.
Nevertheless, because of the imprecision of the right to speedy trial, the length of delay that will provoke
such an inquiry is necessarily dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of the case. To take but one
example, the delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a
serious, complex conspiracy charge.

In the present case, We rule that petitioner was not deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of his
case.

More important than the absence of serious prejudice, petitioner himself did not want a speedy
disposition of his case. Petitioner was duly represented by counsel de parte in all stages of the
proceedings before the Sandiganbayan. From the moment his case was deemed submitted for decision
up to the time he was found guilty by the Sandiganbayan, however, petitioner has not filed a single
motion or manifestation which could be construed even remotely as an indication that he wanted his case
to be dispatched without delay.

Petitioner has clearly slept on his right. The matter could have taken a different dimension if during all
those twelve years, petitioner had shown signs of asserting his right to a speedy disposition of his case or
at least made some overt acts, like filing a motion for early resolution, to show that he was not waiving
that right.

Currit tempus contra decides et sui juris contempores: Time runs against the slothful and those who
neglect their rights. Ang panahon ay hindi panig sa mga tamad at pabaya sa kanilang karapatan. Vigilantis
sed non dormientibus jura in re subveniunt. The law aids the vigilant and not those who slumber in their
rights. Ang batas ay tumutulong sa mga mapagbantay at hindi sa mga humihimbing sa kanilang
karapatan.

Pending his conviction by the Sandiganbayan, petitioner may have truly lived in suspicion and anxiety for
over twelve years. However, any prejudice that may have been caused to him in all those years was only
minimal. The supposed gravity of agony experienced by petitioner is more imagined than real.

2. There is no law, jurisprudence or rule which mandates that an employee should be assisted by counsel
in an administrative case. On the contrary, jurisprudence is in unison in saying that assistance of counsel is
not indispensable in administrative proceedings.

While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding,
the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted
by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of respondent's capacity to represent himself,
and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel. Thus, the right to
counsel is not imperative in administrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to
determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against erring public officers and
employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service.

Benares v. Lim, G.R. No. 173421, 14 December 2006

People v. Baloloy,G.R. No. 140740, 12 April 2002

Doctrine: It has been held that the constitutional provision on custodial investigation does not apply
to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities but given in an
ordinary manner whereby the suspect orally admits having committed the crime. Neither can it apply
to admissions or confessions made by a suspect in the commission of a crime before he is placed
under investigation. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or
confessions. The rights under Section 12 of the Constitution are guaranteed to preclude the slightest
use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him
from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.

An information for the crim of rape with homicide was charged against Baloloy for the rape and death of
one Genelyn Camacho, a minor. Baloloy entered a plea of not guilty. Trial on the merits ensued
thereafter. Barangay Captain Ceniza testified that during Genelyn’s wake Ceniza asked those who were
present whether anyone of them owned the rope. Baloloy answered that he owned it. Thereafter Ceniza
talked to Baloloy. Baloloy then voluntarily told her the circumstances surrounding the incident and how
he raped Genelyn which led to the latter’s death. Ceniza then turned over Juanito to a policeman who
brought him to the police station, and took the affidavits of the witnesses. The following day, a
complaint was filed against Juanito.

On August 4, 1996, several people came to the courtroom of Presiding Judge Celestino V. Dicon to swear
to their affidavits before him. Judge Dicon asked Juanito several questions where the latter
spontaneously narrated how he killed Genelyn and dropped her body into the precipice and claimed he
was “demonized”. During his investigation by the police officers and by Judge Dicon, Juanito was never
assisted by a lawyer.
Trial court convicted Juanito of rape with homicide and imposed on him the penalty of death.
Baloloy contends: that the trial court violated Section 12(1) of Article III of the Constitution when it
admitted in evidence his alleged extrajudicial confession to Barangay Captain Ceniza and Judge Dicon.
According to him, the two failed to inform him of his constitutional rights before they took it upon
themselves to elicit from him the incriminatory information and asserts that the prosecution miserably
failed to establish with moral certainty his guilt. He points to the contradicting testimonies of the
witnesses for the prosecution concerning the retrieved rope owned by him. Consequently, with the
inadmissibility of his alleged extrajudicial confession and the apparent contradiction surrounding the
prosecution's evidence against him, the trial court should have acquitted him.

OSG: Supports the trial court's finding that JUANITO is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime as
charged. His bare denial and alibi cannot overcome the positive assertions of the witnesses for the
prosecution. Moreover, he was unable to establish by sufficient evidence that Barangay Captain Ceniza
and Judge Dicon had an ulterior motive to implicate him in the commission of the crime.

Issue: W/N the admission of the confessions made by Baloloy is violative of his constitutional rights

Sub issue: whether the confession made to Ceniza and Judge Dicon is admissible evidence

Held:

Yes. (see doctrine) [insofar as the confession to Ceniza is concerned]

In the instant case, after he admitted ownership of the black rope and was asked by Ceniza to tell her
everything, JUANITO voluntarily narrated to Ceniza that he raped GENELYN and thereafter threw her
body into the ravine. This narration was a spontaneous answer, freely and voluntarily given in an
ordinary manner. It was given before he was arrested or placed under custody for investigation in
connection with the commission of the offense.

Of no moment that Ceniza and Dicon are not police investigators, for as public officials it was incumbent
upon them to observe the express mandate of the Constitution. While these rights may be waived, the
prosecution failed to show that he effectively waived his rights through a written waiver executed in the
presence of counsel. He concludes that his extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence

As to the confession made to Judge Dicon:

There is merit in JUANITO's claim that his constitutional rights during custodial investigation were
violated by Judge Dicon when the latter propounded to him incriminating questions without
informing him of his constitutional rights. It is settled that at the moment the accused voluntarily
surrenders to, or is arrested by, the police officers, the custodial investigation is deemed to have started.
So, he could not thenceforth be asked about his complicity in the offense without the assistance of
counsel.[28] Judge Dicon's claim that no complaint has yet been filed and that neither was he
conducting a preliminary investigation deserves scant consideration. The fact remains that at that time
JUANITO was already under the custody of the police authorities, who had already taken the statement
of the witnesses who were then before Judge Dicon for the administration of their oaths on their
statements

Records reveal that JUANITO was in fact arrested. If indeed JUANITO's safety was the primordial concern
of the police authorities, the need to detain and deprive him of his freedom of action would not have
been necessary. Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer
for the commission of an offense, and it is made by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested, or
by his submission to the person making the arrest.

While it is true that JUANITO's extrajudicial confession before Judge Dicon was made without the advice
and assistance of counsel and hence inadmissible in evidence, IT COULD however be treated as a
verbal admission of the accused, which could be established through the testimonies of the persons
who heard it or who conducted the investigation of the accused.

KNB: Here are the circumstantial evidence that led to the conviction of Baloloy:

1. At about 5:00 p.m. of 3 August 1996, Jose Camacho bid his daughter GENELYN to borrow some rice
from their neighbor Wilfredo Balogbog. GENELYN did so as told, but failed to return home.

2. About 7:30 p.m. of the same day, JUANITO arrived at Ernesto's house bringing a sack and kerosene
lamp, trembling and apparently weak.

3. Thirty minutes thereafter, JUANITO returned to Ernesto's house and told Ernesto that he saw a foot of
a dead child at the waterfalls, without disclosing the identity of the deceased.

4. When JUANITO and Ernesto were at Jose's house, the former told Jose that it was GENELYN's foot he
saw at the waterfalls.

5. GENELYN was found dead at the waterfalls with fresh lacerations on her vaginal wall at 9 and 3 o'clock
positions.

6. At about 8:00 a.m. of 4 August 1996, Antonio Camacho, Andres Dolero and Edgar Sumalpong
recovered at the crime site a black rope, which they turned over to Ceniza, who was then at GENELYN's
wake.

7. When Ceniza asked the people around as to who owned the black rope, JUANITO claimed it as his.

8. When Ceniza examined JUANITO's body, she saw a wound on his right shoulder and scratches on
different parts of his body.

9. Dr. Lumancad's physical examination of JUANITO revealed abrasions, which could have been caused
by scratches.

Guilt may be established through circumstantial evidence provided that the following requisites concur:
(1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the inferences are based on proven facts; and (3) the
combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the
accused.[34] All these requisites are present in the case at bar.

Fallo: WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 30, Aurora, Zamboanga Del Sur, in
Criminal Case No. AZ-CC-96-156, finding accused-appellant Juanito Baloloy guilty of the crime of rape
with homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death is AFFIRMED with the modification that
he is ordered to pay the heirs of Genelyn Camacho P100,000 as indemnity and P50,000 as moral
damages.

People v. Teves, G.R No. 141767, 2 April 2001

People v. Musa, G.R. No. 170472, 3 July 2009

Aquino v. Paiste, G.R. No. 147782, 25 June 2008

FACTS: Petitioner Juanita Aquino, Elizabeth Garganta, and another woman identified only as “Adeling,”
went to the house of respondent in Tondo, Manila. Petitioner tried to convince respondent to buy a gold
bar owned by a certain Arnold, an Igorot. After respondent was shown a sample of the gold bar, she
agreed to go with them to a pawnshop in Tondo to have it tested. She was told that it was genuine.

The two convinced her to go with them to Angeles City, Pampanga to meet Arnold and see the gold bar.
When they met Arnold, he showed them the gold bar. Arnold informed her that it was worth PhP
60,000. After respondent informed them again she had no money, petitioner continued to press her
that buying the gold bar would be good investment.

Few days after, the three returned, this time they told respondent that the price was reduced to PhP
10,000. She agreed to go with them to Angeles City to meet Arnold once more. Arnold pretended to
refuse the PhP 10,000 offer and insisted on PhP 50,000. On petitioner’s insistence, on March 18, 1991,
the two went to Angeles City and bought the gold bar for PhP 50,000.

When the respondent had the gold bar tested, she was informed that it was fake. Respondent then
proceeded to petitioner’s house to inform the latter that the gold bar was fake. Petitioner replied that
they had to see Garganta, and that she had nothing to do with the transaction.

Respondent brought petitioner to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)-NCR in the presence of a
certain Atty. Tolentino where petitioner amicably promised respondent they would locate Garganta, and
the document (amicable settlement) they both signed would be disregarded should they locate
Garganta.

The document they signed say that Juanita Aquino will pay P25,000 as settlement for the case of Estafa
to which will be paid in installment. And that the undersigned accused waives her right to counsel
despite the recital of her constitutional rights made by NBI agent.

On April 6, 1991, petitioner brought Garganta to the house of respondent. Garganta was brought to the
police station where there was a demand against Garganta alone. Subsequently, respondent filed a
criminal complaint from which an Information against Garganta, petitioner, and three others for the
crime of estafa in Criminal Case was filed before the Manila RTC.
During arraignment, Accused Garganta and the others remained at large; only petitioner was arraigned
and entered a plea of not guilty. During trial, The prosecution presented as documentary evidence three
(3) documents, one of which is the amicable settlement signed in the NBI, while the defense relied solely
on its testimonial evidence.

RTC: The RTC found that petitioner conspired with Garganta, Adeling, and Arnold in committing the
crime of estafa. The trial court likewise gave credence to the amicable settlement as additional proof of
petitioner’s guilt as an amicable settlement in criminal cases is an implied admission of guilt.

CA: the CA found that from the tenor of the amicable settlement, the investigation before the NBI did
not push through as both parties came to settle the matter amicably. Nonetheless, the CA pointed out
that petitioner was assisted, although unnecessarily, by an independent counsel, a certain Atty. Gordon
S. Uy, during the proceedings. Nevertheless, the CA ruled that even if the amicable settlement was not
admissible or was totally disregarded, the RTC still did not err in convicting petitioner as it was
indubitably shown by the prosecution through convincing evidence replete in the records that
respondent conspired with the other accused through active participation in the commission of the
crime of estafa.

ISSUE: whether the amicable settlement executed in the NBI is admissible as evidence

HELD: YES. Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way. It is only after the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to
focus on a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the police carries out a process of
interrogations that lend itself to eliciting incriminating statements, that the rule begins to operate.10
Republic Act No. (RA) 743811 has extended this constitutional guarantee to situations in which an
individual has not been formally arrested but has merely been “invited” for questioning. Specifically,
Sec. 2 of RA 7438 provides that “custodial investigation shall include the practice of issuing an invitation
to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed x x x.”

It is evident that when petitioner was brought by respondent before the NBI-NCR to be investigated, she
was already under custodial investigation and the constitutional guarantee for her rights under the
Miranda Rule has set in. Since she did not have a lawyer then, she was provided with one in the person
of Atty. Uy, which fact is undisputed. However, it can be gleaned from the amicable agreement, as aptly
pointed out by the CA, that the custodial investigation on the inquiry or investigation for the crime was
either aborted or did not push through as the parties, petitioner, and respondent agreed to amicably
settle. Thus, the amicable settlement with a waiver of right to counsel appended was executed with
both parties affixing their signatures on it in the presence of Atty. Uy and NBI agent Atty. Ely Tolentino.
Petitioner’s contention that her constitutional rights were breached and she signed the document under
duress falls flat for the following reasons:

First, it is undisputed that she was provided with counsel, in the person of Atty. Uy. The presumption
that Atty. Uy is a competent and independent counsel whose interests are not adverse to petitioner has
not been overturned. Petitioner has merely posed before the CA and now this Court that Atty. Uy may
not be an independent and competent counsel. Without any shred of evidence to bolster such claim, it
cannot be entertained.

Second, petitioner made much of the fact that Atty. Uy was not presented as witness by the prosecution
and that what petitioner and Atty. Uy supposedly conferred about was likewise not presented. Basic is
the principle that consultation and information between counsel and client is privileged communication
and the counsel may not divulge these without the consent of the client. Besides, a party in a case has
full discretion to choose whoever it wants as testimonial witnesses to bolster its case. We cannot second
guess the reason of the prosecution in not presenting Atty. Uy’s testimony, more so on account of the
counsel-client privileged communication. Furthermore, petitioner could have asserted its right “to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses. for which she could have compelled Atty.
Uy to testify. She did not.

Third, petitioner never raised any objection against Atty. Gordon Uy’s appointment during the time she
was in the NBI and thereafter, when she signed the amicable settlement. As this Court aptly held in
People v. Jerez, when “the accused never raised any objection against the lawyer’s appointment during
the course of the investigation and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his statement
before the swearing officer” the accused is deemed to have engaged such lawyer. Verily, in the instant
case, petitioner is deemed to have engaged Atty. Uy when she conferred with him and thereafter signed
the amicable settlement with waiver of right to counsel in his presence. We do not see how the answer
of NBI agent Atty. Tolentino upon cross-examination about the petitioner’s counsel in the NBI, could be
evasive when the NBI agent merely stated the fact that an independent counsel, Atty. Uy, was provided
petitioner.

Fourth, when petitioner engaged Atty. Uy as her lawyer, she undoubtedly executed the amicable
settlement. Verily, she was provided with an independent counsel and such “right to counsel is intended
to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. The lawyer,
however, should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.” An amicable
settlement is not and does not partake of the nature of an extrajudicial confession or admission but is a
contract between the parties within the parameters of their mutually recognized and admitted rights
and obligations. Thus, the presence of Atty. Uy safeguarded petitioner’s rights even if the custodial
investigation did not push through and precluded any threat of violence, coercion, or intimidation.

Moreover, while we hold in this case that petitioner’s Miranda rights were not violated, still we will not
be remiss to reiterate what we held in People v. Malimit that the infractions of the so-called Miranda
rights render inadmissible “only the extrajudicial confession or admission made during custodial
investigation. The admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and is not
otherwise excluded by law or rules, is not affected even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial
investigation.”An admission is an act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact, while
confession is a declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any
offense necessarily included therein.
Fifth, even granting arguendo that the amicable settlement is in the nature of an admission, the
document petitioner signed would still be admissible since none of her constitutional rights were
violated. Petitioner’s allegations of threat, violence, and intimidation remain but bare allegations.

In fine, we agree with the courts a quo that even assuming arguendo that the amicable settlement is not
admissible, still the conviction of petitioner would be affirmed as conspiracy was duly proven by other
pieces of evidence.

People v. Serzo, G.R. No. 118435, 20 June 1997

DOCTRINE: While the right to be represented by counsel is immutable, the option to secure the services of counsel
de parte, however, is not absolute.—Accordingly, an accused may exercise his right to counsel by electing to be
represented either by a court-appointed lawyer or by one of his own choice. While his right to be represented by
counsel is immutable, his option to secure the services of counsel de parte, however, is not absolute. The court is
obliged to balance the privilege to retain a counsel of choice against the state’s and the offended party’s equally
important right to speedy and adequate justice. Thus, the court may restrict the accused’s option to retain a
counsel de parte if the accused insists on an attorney he cannot afford, or the chosen counsel is not a member of
the bar, or the attorney declines to represent the accused for a valid reason, e.g. conflict of interest and the like.

Right to counsel de parte is waivable.—Also, the right to counsel de parte is, like other personal rights, waivable so
long as (1) the waiver is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs; or prejudicial to a
third person with a right recognized by law and (2) the waiver is unequivocally, knowingly and intelligently made.

FACTS:

1. Appellant Mario Serzo was convicted of murder by the lower court for the stabbing/killing of Alfredo Casabal
after the latter rescued minors being held by the former.

2. Pre-trial was waived and the case proceeded to trial on the merits.

3. The accused alleged that he was denied the right to counsel. During the arraignment he appeared without
counsel,so the court appointed a counsel de officio. Thereafter, he moved that the arraignment be reset so he can
engage the services of his own counsel however, during the arraignment, he still appeared without one. The
arraignment proceeded with him being assisted by the counsel de officio.

4. During the trial, the same counsel appeared and cross-examined for the accused.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused was denied of his right to counsel.

RULING: NO. Herein, the accused was provided with a counsel de officio who assisted him in all stages of the
proceedings.The option to hire ones counsel cannot be used to sanction reprehensible dilatory tactics, trifle with
the Rules or prejudice the equally important right of the State and the offended party to speedy and adequate
justice.
The right to counsel is guaranteed by the Constitution to minimize the imbalance in the adversarial system where
an accused is pitted against the awesome prosecution machinery of the state. It is also a recognition of the
accused not having the skill to protect himself before a tribunal which has the power to take his life or liberty.

The right covers the period from custodial investigation until judgment is rendered, even on appeal. RA 7438
provides that any person arrested or detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by
counsel. The right is however not absolute and is waivable; a) the state must balance the private against the state's
and offended party's equally important rightto speedy and adequate justice, and b) the right is waivable as long as
the waiver is unequivocal, knowing, and intelligently made.

Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 200748, 23 July 2014

Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 206438, 31 July 2018

Magante v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 230950, 23 July 2018

ELPIDIO TAGAAN MAGANTE, PETITIONER, V. SANDIGANBAYAN, (THIRD DIVISION) AND PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
2018-07-23 | G.R. Nos. 230950-51

two separate informations for Falsification of Public Documents and for Splitting of Contracts were filed
against petitioner and his five (5) co-respondents therein on October 7, 2016 before the Sandiganbayan.

Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismissthe cases against him on the ground that inordinate
delay attended the conduct of the preliminary investigation of his alleged crimes, in violation of his
constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases.

Petitioner claimed that it took the Ombudsman about seven (7) years, reckoned from the
commencement of the fact-finding investigation in 2009 up to 2016, to issue its Resolution directing the
filing of two separate informations against him. Petitioner likewise asserted that even if the period
were to be counted from February 15, 2011, which is the date when the Ombudsman issued an Order
directing him and his co-respondents therein to submit their respective counter-affidavits, up to the
approval of its Resolution, still, there is a clear inordinate delay of five (5) years and two (2) months in
resolving his case.

Petitoner also cited several cases wherein this Court held that the delay of three, five, six, or eight years
in the termination of the preliminary investigation of the case amounts to a violation of the
constitutional rights of the accused to due process and to a speedy disposition of cases.

Ombudsman: The prosecution stressed the fact that there was neither hiatus, inaction, nor any
intentional delay on the part of the Ombudsman and that it had taken proper action in the ordinary
course of things and in accord with its mandate. However, the Resolution finding probable cause was
only promulgated on April 15, 2016 due to the fact that there were ten (10) respondents in the
complaint and each of them was afforded the right to explain themselves. The records of the case were
also voluminous that entailed considerable time to study and analyze.

Argues claimed that petitioner failed to assert his right to a speedy disposition of his cases all
throughout the proceedings, and, thus, like any other constitutional right, the same may be waived. The
prosecution likewise disputed the applicability of the cases cited by petitioner in his Motion to Dismiss
as their factual milieu differs with the present cases.

Sandiganbayan: Denied the dismissal. Ruled in favor of Ombudsman. Ruling that the case cited are
inapplicable to the cases at bar because of the material differences in their factual milieu [Note: Read
full text on how SB differentiated the case at bar to the cases cited by petitioner; medyo madami]. To
stress, the Supreme Court has consistently held that in the application of the constitutional guarantee of
the right to a speedy disposition of cases, particular regard must also be taken of the facts and
circumstance peculiar to each case. The prosecution appropriately explained the circumstances
surrounding the alleged delay.

Issue: W/N Sandiganbayan committed GRADALEJ when it held that constitutionally enshrined right of
the accused to speedy disposition of cases was not violated – YES.

Held:

The Court finds grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan in rendering its questioned
Resolutions denying the petitioner's Motion to Dismiss.

There is a violation of the said right. Under the Constitution, any party to a case may demand
expeditious action on all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice, including the
Ombudsman.

The Court imposed the same criteria as in Barker (See KNB notes) in determining whether or not there is
a violation of the constitutional right.

Factors to consider in determining inordinate delay: Length of delay, Reason for Delay Assertion of right
of the accused, prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay

Applying the test in the case at bar:

a. Length of delay - the reckoning point when delay starts to run is the date of the filing of a formal
complaint by a private complainant or the filing by the Field Investigation Office with the Ombudsman
of a formal complaint based on an anonymous complaint or as a result of its motu proprio
investigations. The period devoted to the fact-finding investigations prior to the date of the filing of the
formal complaint with the Ombudsman shall NOT be considered in determining inordinate delay. After
the filing of the formal complaint, the time devoted to fact finding investigations shall always be
factored in.

Thus, petitioner's preliminary investigation lasted from January 7, 2011 until April 15, 2016, or about five
(5) years and three (3) months from the date of the filing of the formal complaint, and five (5) years and
(2) months from February 15, 2011 when petitioner was ordered to file his counter-affidavit.

b. Reasons for the delay - The prosecution harps on the fact that there were ten (10) respondents in the
complaint file with the OMB and each of them was afforded the right to explain themselves. Also, the
records of the case were allegedly voluminous that entailed considerable time to study and analyze.
These reasons, to Our mind, do not sufficiently explain the more than five-year long preliminary
investigation.
No clarificatory hearing or further investigation was conducted that could have added a new dimension
to the case. the prosecution did not offer any acceptable explanation for this gap between February 15,
2011 and April 15, 2016. Contrary to the finding of the Sandiganbayan, there is a hiatus on the part of
the Ombudsman during this period. Left unsatisfactorily explained, this amounts to a violation of
petitioner's constitutional right to a speedy disposition of case, corollarily warranting the dismissal of
the criminal case against him.

c. Assertion of Right by the Accused - petitioner's alleged failure to assert his right is not a veritable
ground for the denial of the motion in the absence of any motion, pleading, or act on his part that
contributed to the delay. It is not for him to ensure that the wheels of justice continue to turn. Rather, it
is for the State to guarantee that the case is disposed within a reasonable period.

d. Prejudice to the respondent - there could have been no grave prejudice suffered by the State from
the delay since the criminal charges for falsification of public documents and splitting of contracts are
offenses that chiefly rely on the presentation of documentary evidence that, at this point, has already
formed part of the records of the case. The evidence of the prosecution is then sufficiently protected
and preserved. This weighs heavily against the State and in favor of petitioner who is at a tactical
disadvantage in going against the well-oiled machinery of the government and its infinite resources.

Important: Definition of inordinate delay Barker v. Wingo

Prevailing jurisprudence on the speedy disposition of cases is sourced from the landmark ruling of the
United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo[32] (Barker) wherein a delicate balancing test was
crafted to determine whether or not the right had been violated:

1. A balancing test necessarily compels courts to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc
basis. We can do little more than identify some of the factors which courts should assess
in determining whether a particular defendant has been deprived of his right. Though
some might express them in different ways, we identify four such factors: length of
delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to
the defendant.
2. The length of the delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism. Until there is some
delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other
factors that go into the balance. Nevertheless, because of the imprecision of the right to
speedy trial, the length of delay that will provoke such an inquiry is necessarily
dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of the case. To take but one example, the
delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a
serious, complex conspiracy charge.
3. reason the government assigns to justify the delay. Here, too, different weights should
be assigned to different reasons. A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to
hamper the defense should be weighted heavily against the government. A more
neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted less
 heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such
circumstances must rest with the government, rather than with the defendant.
4. the defendant's responsibility to assert his right. Whether and how a defendant asserts
his right is closely related to the other factors we have mentioned. The strength of his
efforts will be affected by the length of the delay, to some extent by the reason for the
delay, and most particularly by the personal prejudice, which is not always readily
identifiable, that he experiences. The more serious the deprivation, the more likely a
defendant is to complain. The defendant's assertion of his speedy trial right, then, is
entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether the defendant is being
deprived of the right. We emphasize that failure to assert the right will make it difficult
for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial. A fourth factor is prejudice
to the defendant. Prejudice, of course, should be assessed in the light of the interests of
defendants which the speedy trial right was designed to protect his Court has identified
three such interests: (i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize
anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will
be impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant
adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system. If witnesses die
or disappear during a delay, the prejudice is obvious. There is also prejudice if defense
witnesses are unable to recall accurately events of the distant past. Loss of memory,
however, is not always reflected in the record, because what has been forgotten can
rarely be shown. (emphasis added)

Macayan v. People, G.R. No. 175842, 18 March 2015

People v. Estibal, G.R. No. 208749, 26 November 2014

Atienza v. People, G.R. No. 188694, 12 February 2014

Patula v. People, G.R. No. 164457, 11 April 2012

Tanenggee v. People, G.R. No. 179448, 26 June 2013

People v. Lara, G.R. No. 199877, 13 August 2012

Belleza v. Macasa, A.C. No. 7815, 23 July 2009

Facts:

Chua, friend of Dolores referred Atty. Macasa, for legal servicesin connection with the arrest of her son
for Violation of RA 9165. Atty. Macasa agreed to handle the case for P30,000.00. Dolores made 3 partial
payments on different occasions and P18,000 purpose of posting a bond to secure the liberty of his son,
however no receipt was issued by Atty. Macasa. Dolores found out that Atty. Macasa did not remit the
amount to the court supposed to be intended for the provisional liberty of her son. She demanded the
return of P18,000 several times but respondent ignored her. Moreover, Atty. Macasa failed to act on the
case of complainants son and complainant was forced to avail the services of a PAO lawyer.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Macasa grossly neglected his duties for the cause of his client.
Ruling:
Yes. Respondent undertook to defend the criminal case against complainants son. A lawyer who accepts
the cause of a client commits to devote himself (particularly his time, knowledge, skills and effort) to
such cause. He must be ever mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him, constantly striving to
be worthy thereof. Accordingly, he owes full devotion to the interest of his client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his clients rights and the exertion of his utmost learning, skill and ability to
ensure that nothing shall be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law legally applied.

The accused is guaranteed the right to counsel under the Constitution. However, this right can only be
meaningful if the accused is accorded ample legal assistance by his lawyer: ... The right to counsel
proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process which basically means that a person must be
heard before being condemned. The due process requirement is a part of a person's basic rights; it is not
a mere formality that may be dispensed with or performed perfunctorily

The right of an accused to counsel is beyond question a fundamental right. Without counsel,
the right to a fair trial itself would be of little consequence, for it is through counsel that the
accused secures his other rights. In other words, the right to counsel is the right to effective
assistance of counsel.
The right of an accused to counsel finds substance in the performance by the lawyer of his
sworn duty of fidelity to his client. Tersely put, it means an effective, efficient and truly decisive
legal assistance, not a simply perfunctory representation.

In this case, after accepting the criminal case against complainant's son and receiving his
attorney's fees, respondent did nothing that could be considered as effective and efficient legal
assistance. For all intents and purposes, respondent abandoned the cause of his client. Indeed,
on account of respondent's continued inaction, complainant was compelled to seek the services
of the Public Attorney's Office. Respondent's lackadaisical attitude towards the case of
complainant's son was reprehensible. Not only did it prejudice complainant's son, it also
deprived him of his constitutional right to counsel. Furthermore, in failing to use the amount
entrusted to him for posting a bond to secure the provisional liberty of his client, respondent
unduly impeded the latter's constitutional right to bail.

Libuit v. People, G.R. No. 154363, 14 September 2005

Facts: Joel Libuit was charged with the crime of estafa. Sometime in May 1993, Domingo del Mundo
delivered and brought his car (Chevy 2dr. HT: Plate No. EDD-725) valued at P60,000.00, to the motor
shop owned and/or operated by Joel Libuit and Julius Libuit for repair, it was received by Jose Bautista,
mechanic, but accused Joel, once in possession of the said car, misappropriated, converted and/or
misapplied the said car to his own personal use and benefit and despite repeated demands to return the
said car to the owner, accused refused.

It appears from the prosecution evidence that sometime in May 1993, del Mundo, brought his car for
repair at the Paeng Motorworks operated by the Joel. The car was received by Jose Bautista, a
mechanic, in the presence of the Joel who assured the del Mundo that it would be safe in his motor
shop.

When del Mundo returned to the motor shop in January 1994, he saw his car by the roadside while the
engine was inside the shop. Bautista explained that the engine was pulled out because it also needed
repairs. Joel and Bautista assured him that they would finish the repair work and deliver the car to del
Mundo’s house after two weeks. However, Joel failed to deliver the car. Del Mundo gave him another
two weeks. Thereafter, del Mundo returned to the motor shop and found that his car was already
missing. He reported the matter to the police, who discovered that Joel had sold the car’s differential
and cylinder head, while the engine could no longer be found.

Joel testified on direct examination. However, his defense counsel, Atty. Glenn P. Mendoza withdrew
from the case after his initial cross-examination. The continuation of his cross-examination was reset to
give him time to engage the services of another counsel. Joel eventually secured the services of Atty.
Jose Dimayuga.

At the subsequent hearings, Atty. Dimayuga failed to appear despite notices. On motion of the
prosecution, court issued an order striking from the records Joel's direct testimony and declaring the
case submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence already on record.

Court found herein petitioner guilty of the crime of estafa.

On appeal, CA affirmed in toto the decision of trial court. CA held that the trial court never deprived Joel
of his right to counsel as he was represented by a counsel de parte, Atty. Glenn P. Mendoza. When said
counsel withdrew, the trial court allowed the resetting of Joel's cross-examination to give him time to
engage the services of another counsel. It ordered the striking of his testimony from the records only
after his new counsel failed to appear at the subsequent hearings.

Issue: Was petitioner deprived of his right to counsel?

Held: Joel contends that the trial court should have appointed a counsel de oficio when his counsel
consistently failed to appear for his cross-examination.

The duty of the court to appoint a counsel de oficio for the accused who has no counsel of choice and
desires to employ the services of one is mandatory only at the time of arraignment. No such duty exists
where the accused has proceeded to arraignment and then trial with a counsel of his own choice. When
the time for the presentation of evidence for the defense arrived, and Joel appeared by himself alone,
the absence of his counsel was inexcusable.

Since Joel was represented by counsel de parte at the arraignment and trial, the trial court could not be
deemed duty-bound to appoint a counsel de oficio for the continuation of his cross-
examination. Indeed, after his initial cross-examination, the trial court granted the motion to postpone,
giving him sufficient time to engage the services of another counsel.
The failure of Atty. Dimayuga, his newly hired lawyer, to appear at the subsequent hearings without
reason was sufficient legal basis for the trial court to order the striking from the records of his direct
testimony, and thereafter render judgment upon the evidence already presented. In fact, the repeated
failure to appear of Joel's counsel may even be taken as a deliberate attempt to delay the court’s
proceedings.

The appointment of a counsel de oficio in a situation like the present case would be discretionary with
the trial court, which discretion will not be interfered with in the absence of grave abuse. This Court is
convinced that the trial court had been liberal in granting postponements asked by the petitioner
himself. We think that such liberality removes any doubt that its order was tainted with grave abuse of
discretion.

Petition is denied.

Gutang v. People, G.R. No. 135406, 11 July 2000

Peole v. Fieldad, G.R. No. 196005, 1 October 2014

Estrada v. Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 212140-41, 21 January 2015

Go v. People, G.R. No. 185527, 18 July 2012

Victoriano v. People, G.R. Nos. 171322-24, 30 November 2006

De Castro v. People, G.R. No. 171672, 2 February 2015

Luspo v. People, G.R. No. 188487, 22 October 2014

Acting on a report of the Commission on Audit (COA) regarding disbursement irregularities for
combat, clothing, and individual equipment (CCIE) the Philippine National Police-General
Headquarters (PNP-GHQ), through the Office of the Inspector General (OIG), conducted an
investigation of several officers of the PNP and of a private individual.

On August 11, 1992, the Office of the Directorate for Comptrollership (ODC) of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) issued two (2) Advices of Sub-Allotment (ASA), amounting to five million
pesos each, for the purchase of combat, clothing, and individual equipment (CCIE items) for the
PNP’s North Capital Command (CAPCOM).
Upon receipt of the ASAs, P/Supt. Arturo Montano (Montano), Chief Comptroller, North
CAPCOM, directed Police Chief Inspector Salvador Duran, Sr. (Duran), Chief, Regional Finance
Service Unit, North CAPCOM, to prepare and draw 100 checks of P100,000.00 each, for a total of
P10,000,000.00. The checks were all dated August 12, 1992 and payable to four different
entities2 that are all owned and operated by Margarita Tugaoen (Tugaoen) who later collected
the proceeds of the checks from the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), Cubao Branch.
In her March 5, 1993 sworn statement, Tugaoen admitted that she received the P10 million
worth of checks as payment for the previously accumulated PNP debts and not for any CCIE
items that she delivered.3 P/CInsp. Isaias Braga, Chief Logistics Officer, North CAPCOM, and
Rolando Flores, Supply Accountable Officer, North CAPCOM confirmed the non-delivery of the
CCIE.

Issue: Whether or not Tuagoen’s statement before investigating committee is in violation of his
right to counsel and inadmissible as evidence?

Held:
No. Accordingly, contrary to the accused Tugaoen’s claim, the fact that she was “invited” by the
investigating committee does not by itself determine the nature of the investigation as custodial.
The nature of the proceeding must be adjudged on a case to case basis. The Sandiganbayan
correctly ruled that the investigation where Tugaoen made her statement was not a custodial
investigation that would bring to the fore the rights of the accused and the exclusionary rule
under paragraph 3, Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The investigator’s reminder to
Tugaoen of her Miranda rights during the investigation cannot be determinative of the nature of
the investigation. Otherwise, following the logic of this claim, the law enforcer’s own failure or
even disregard of his duty to inform an individual he investigates of his custodial investigation
rights would suffice to negate the character of an investigation as legally a custodial
investigation. Ultimately, the nature of the investigation must be determined by appreciating the
circumstances surrounding it as a whole.

People v. Chavez, G.R. NO. 207950, 22 September 2014

FACTS.

When Peñamante (witness) arrived home from work, around 2:45am, he saw a person wearing a black,
long-sleeved shirt and black pants and holding something while leaving the house/parlor of Elmer Duque
aka Barbie (victim). There was a light at the left side of the house/parlor of Barbie, his favorite
haircutter, so Peñamante was able to see the face of Chavez (accused). The following day, Barbie was
found dead, due to stab wounds, in the parlor and the place was in disarray. In a line-up to identify the
person he saw leaving Barbie’s house/parlor that early morning of October 28, 2006, Peñamante
immediately pointed to and identified Chavez and thereafter executed his written statement. Chavez
was charged with robbery with homicide.

Lower Court: Guilty as charged, based on circumstantial evidence. CA affirmed.

ISSUE

Whether or not Chavez is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide? – NO

RULING
There was no robbery. “What is imperative and essential for a conviction for the crime of robbery with
homicide is for the prosecution to establish the offender’s intent to take personal property before the
killing, regardless of the time when the homicide is actually carried out.” In cases when the prosecution
failed to conclusively prove that homicide was committed for the purpose of robbing the victim, no
accused can be convicted of robbery with homicide. The circumstantial evidence relied on by the lower
courts do not satisfactorily establish an original criminal design by Chavez to commit robbery.

At most, the intent to take personal property was mentioned by Chavez’s mother in her statement as
follows: “Na sinabi niya sa akin na wala siyang intensyon na patayin [sic] si Barbie kundi ay pagnakawan
lamang.” However, this statement is considered as hearsay, with no evidentiary value, since Chavez’s
mother was never presented as a witness during trial to testify on her statement.

An original criminal design to take personal property is also inconsistent with the infliction of no less
than 21 stab wounds in various parts of Barbie’s body. The sheer number of stab wounds inflicted on
Barbie makes it difficult to conclude an original criminal intent of merely taking Barbie’s personal
property.

Homicide – All these circumstances taken together establish Chavez’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt for
the crime of homicide:

1. The alibi of Chavez still places him at the scene of the crime that early morning of October 28,
2006. This court has considered motive as one of the factors in determining the presence of an
intent to kill, and a confrontation with the victim immediately prior to the victim’s death has
been considered as circumstantial evidence for homicide.
2. The number of stab wounds inflicted on Barbie strengthens an intention to kill and ensures his
death.
3. Peñamante’s positive identification of Chavez as the person leaving Barbie’s house that early
morning of October 28, 2006.
4. The medico-legal’s testimony establishing Barbie’s time of death as 12 hours prior to autopsy at
1:00 p.m., thus, narrowing the time of death to approximately 1:00 a.m. of the same day,
October 28, 2006.

DECISION. Judgment by lower court is MODIFIED. Chavez is GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
separate and distinct crime of HOMICIDE.

Relevant provisions in the Constitution

RA7438
Speedy Trial Act