1 instituted a criminal complaint against him for “adultery” which was, however,

447 Phil. 76 dismissed after preliminary investigation.

THIRD DIVISION Finally, respondent claimed that complainant himself had been cohabiting with
another woman.
[ A M. No. P-94-1054, March 11, 2003 ]
By Resolution of February 6, 1995, this Court referred the case to then Executive
Judge Filomeno A. Vergara of the Regional Trial Court of Puerto Princesa,
EDWIN A. ACEBEDO, PETITIONER, VS. EDDIE P. ARQUERO, RESPONDENT.
Palawan for investigation, report and recommendation.[9] Judge Vergara having
retired during the pendency of the investigation, the case was referred to
DECISION
Executive Judge Nelia Y. Fernandez who was, by Resolution of August 16, 2000,
directed by this Court to (1) verify the authenticity of the marriage certificate and
baptismal certificate submitted by complainant; (2) conduct an investigation as
CARPIO MORALES, J.: to the information contained in the said baptismal certificate and the
circumstances under which it was issued, and such other verifiable matters
By letter-complaint[1] dated June 1, 1994, Edwin A. Acebedo charged Eddie P.
relevant to the charge; and (3) submit her report and recommendation
Arquero, Process Server of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Brooke’s Point,
thereon.[10]
Palawan for immorality.
In her Investigation Report of February 12, 2001, Judge Fernandez recommends
Complainant alleged that his wife, Dedje Irader Acebedo, a former stenographer
that the complaint be dismissed for failure to adduce adequate evidence to show
of the MTC Brooke’s Point, and respondent unlawfully and scandalously cohabited
that respondent is guilty of the charge.[11] The report focuses on the non-
as husband and wife at Bancudo Pulot, Brooke’s Point, Palawan as a result of
appearance of complainant and Dedje Irader Acebedo, thusly:
which a girl, Desiree May Irader Arquero, was born to the two on May 21, 1989.
xxx
Attached to the letter-complaint was the girl’s Baptismal Certificate[2] reflecting
the names of respondent and Dedje Irader as her parents. Also attached to the
Having appeared that the complainant Edwin Acebedo and Dedjie Irader who per
letter-complainant was a copy of a marriage contract[3] showing that complainant
reliable information cannot be notified for reason that subject persons
and Dedje Irader contracted marriage on July 10, 1979.
are no longer residing in their given address and their whereabouts is unknown
as shown by the return of the subpoena dated November 7, 2000, and the
By Resolution of September 7, 1994, this Court required respondent to file an
inadmissibility of the baptismal certificate alleging therein that the father of
answer to the complaint.[4]
Desiree Arquero is the respondent herein, and for the reason that the same had
not been testified to by Dedje Irader who is the informant of the entries
By his Answer[5] of October 6, 1994, respondent vehemently denied the charge of
contained therein, this Court had not received adequate proof or relevant
immorality, claiming that it is “just a (sic) mere harassment and a product of
evidence to support a conclusion that respondent herein could be held liable of
complainant’s hatred and extreme jealousy to (sic) his wife.”[6] Attached to the
the charge imputed against him, hence, he should be absolved from any liability.
answer were the September 27, 1987 affidavit of desistance[7] executed by
complainant in favor of his wife with respect to an administrative complaint he
x x x[12] (Quoted verbatim).
had much earlier filed against her, and complainant’s sworn statement[8] dated
By Resolution of April 25, 2001, this Court referred the case to the Office of the
September 13, 1994 acknowledging paternity of a child born out of wedlock,
Court Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report and recommendation.
which documents, respondent claims, support his contention that the complaint
filed against him is but a malicious scheme concocted by complainant to harass
By Memorandum of December 12, 2001, the OCA, disagreeing with the
him.
recommendation of the Investigating Judge that the case should be dismissed,
recommends that respondent be held guilty of immorality and that he be
Additionally, respondent claimed that sometime in 1991, complainant likewise

1
suspended from office for a period of one (1) year without pay.[13] Thus the OCA
ratiocinates:
. . . [R]espondent admitted the fact that for eight (8) to nine (9) months,
he a single man maintained relations with Dedje Irader Acebedo, wife of
herein complainant, attended with “sexual union” (TSN dated 23 November
2000, pp. 14-15). Based on his testimony, we observed that respondent
justified his having a relationship with Dedje I. Acebedo solely on the
written document purportedly a “Kasunduan” or agreement entered into
by complainant and his wife, consenting to and giving freedom to either
of them to seek any partner and to live with him or her. Being a court
employee respondent should have known that said agreement was void despite it
having been notarized. Even granting that Dedjie I. Acebedo was separated from
her husband during their short lived relation, to hold on to said scandalous
agreement and enter an immoral relationship with a very much married woman
and a co-court-employee at that is highly improper. It is contrary to the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officials and Employees which provides
that public employees of which respondent is one, xxx “ shall at times (sic)
respect the rights of others, and shall refrain from doing acts contrary to law,
good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public
interest. Moreover, respondent cannot seek refuge and “sling mud” at
complainant for having executed an Affidavit dated September 13, 1994,
acknowledging that he bore a woman other than his wife, a child. It would seem
that respondent would want to apply the principle of in pari delicto in the instant
case. Respondent would have it appear that a married man with an extra-marital
relation and an illegitimate child is precluded from complaining if his wife enters
into a relationship with another man.
Second, the records show that an Affidavit of Desistance was executed by herein
complainant. However, a cursory reading of said document reveals that it favors
only Dedje Irader Acebedo and not herein respondent. Interestingly, the date of
said affidavit is 2 September 1987. Respondent had the temerity to claim it as
evidence in his favor when the instant complaint was only filed sometime in
1994.
Third, when respondent was asked by the investigating judge if he attended the
baptism of the daughter of Dedje Irader Acebedo, his former co-employee and
ex-intimate friend, he answered, “I did not. I’m not sure the child is mine”. From
his answer, we could infer that respondent did not categorically rule out the
possibility that said child might be her (sic) daughter, only that he is doubtful of
her paternity.
x x x[14] (Emphasis supplied; underscoring in the original).
While complainant appears to have lost interest in the prosecution of the present
case, the same does not ipso facto warrant its dismissal. Once administrative
charges have been filed, this Court may not be divested of its jurisdiction to
investigate and ascertain the truth thereof.[15] For it has an interest in the
conduct of those in the service of the Judiciary and in improving the delivery of
justice to the people, and its efforts in that direction may not be derailed by the
complainant’s desistance from prosecuting the case he initiated.[16]
On the merits of the case, the entry of respondent’s name as father in the
baptismal certificate of Desiree May I. Arquero cannot be used to prove her
filiation and, therefore, cannot be availed of to imply that respondent maintained
illicit relations with Dedje Irader Acebedo. A canonical certificate is conclusive
proof only of the baptism administered, in conformity with the rites of the
Catholic Church by the priest who baptized the child, but it does not prove the
veracity of the declarations and statements contained therein which concern the
relationship of the person baptized.[17] It merely attests to the fact which gave
rise to its issue, and the date thereof, to wit, the fact of the administration of the
sacrament on the date stated, but not the truth of the statements therein as to
the parentage of the child baptized.[18]
By respondent’s own admission, however, he had an illicit relationship with
complainant’s wife:
Q: During the formal offer of the possible nature of your testimony before the Court by your
counsel, did the Court get it correct that there has been a short lived relation between you and
Dedgie Irader, am I correct in my impression?
A: During that time that I have heard she and her husband have parted ways already, I jokingly
informed her that she is now being separated, she is now single and is free to have some
commitment. So, I courted her and she accepted me, so we have a short lived relation and after
that we parted ways.
Q: For how long was this short lived relation you made mention a while ago?
A: May be (sic) about eight (8) to nine (9) months.
Q: When you said you have (sic) a short lived relationship from 8 to 9 months, you mean to tell the
Court that you have (sic) a sexual union with this woman?
A: Yes ma’am.[19] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Respondent justified his pursuing a relationship with complainant’s wife with the
spouses having priorly entered into a settlement with respect to their marriage
which was embodied in a “Kasunduan”, the pertinent portions of which are
reproduced hereunder:
2
Kami, EDWIN AGUINALDO ACEBEDO at DEDJE IRADER ACEBEDO, may sapat na
taong gulang, mag-asawa, Pilipino, at kasalukuyang nakatira sa Poblacion,
Broke’s (sic) Point, Palawan, ay malayang nagkasundo ng mga sumusunod:
1. Na, yayamang hindi kami magkasundo bilang mag-asawa, at
magiging miserable lamang ang aming mga buhay kung aming
ipagpapatuloy pa ang aming pagsasama bilang mag-asawa, kami
ay malayang nagkasundo ngayon na maghiwalay na bilang mag-
asawa, at ang bawat isa sa amin ay may kalayaan na humanap na
ng kaniyang makakasama sa buhay bilang asawa at hindi kami
maghahabol sa isat isa sa alin pa mang hukuman;
x x x[20] (Italics supplied).
Respondent’s justification fails. Being an employee of the judiciary, respondent
ought to have known that the Kasunduan had absolutely no force and effect on
the validity of the marriage between complainant and his wife. Article 1 of the
Family Code provides that marriage is “an inviolable social institution whose
nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation.” It is an institution of public order or policy, governed by rules
established by law which cannot be made inoperative by the stipulation of the
parties.[21]
immoral conduct.
Under Rule IV, Section 52A (15) of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service, an immoral conduct is classified as a grave offense
which calls for a penalty of suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one
(1) year for the first offense, and dismissal is imposed for the second offense.
Since the present charge of immorality against respondent constitutes his first
offense, his suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day is in order.
WHEREFORE, this Court finds respondent Eddie P. Arquero, Process Server of the
Municipal Trial Court of Brooke’s Point, Palawan, GUILTY of immorality, for which
he is hereby SUSPENDED for six (6) months and one (1) day without pay with a
STERN WARNING that commission of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with
severely.
Let a copy of this decision be filed in the personal record of respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez and Corona, JJ., concur.

Republic Act 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees, enunciates the State’s policy of
promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public
[1]
Rollo at 1.
service.[22] [2]
Id. at 3
Although every office in the government service is a public trust, no position
exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness from an
[3]
Id. at 2.
individual than in the judiciary.[23] That is why this Court has firmly laid down
exacting standards of morality and decency expected of those in the service of
[4]
Id. at 4.
the judiciary.[24] Their conduct, not to mention behavior, is circumscribed with the
heavy burden of responsibility,[25] characterized by, among other things,
[5]
Id. at 5.
propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep the public’s respect and confidence
in the judicial service.[26] It must be free from any whiff of impropriety, not only
[6]
Id.
with respect to their duties in the judicial branch but also to their behavior
outside the court as private individuals.[27] There is no dichotomy of morality;
[7]
Id. at 9.
court employees are also judged by their private morals.[28] [8]
Id. at 10.
Respondent’s act of having illicit relations with complainant’s wife is, within the
purview of Section 46 (5) of Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of Executive Order No.
[9]
Id. at 15.
292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, a disgraceful and [10]
Id. at 69.
3
 SECOND DIVISION
[11]
Report and Recommendation at 3.
[ G.R. No. 145370, March 04, 2004 ]
[12]
Id.
MARIETTA B. ANCHETA, PETITIONER, VS. RODOLFO S. ANCHETA,
[13]
Memorandum at 6. RESPONDENT.
[14]
Id. at 4-5. DECISION
[15]
Imbing v. Tiongson, 229 SCRA 690, 702 (1994).
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
[16]
Id.
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Resolution [1] of the Court of
[17]
Macadangdang v. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 73, 84-85 (1980). Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59550 which dismissed the petitioner’s petition under
Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure to annul the Order[2] of the Regional
[18]
Fortus v.Novero, 23 SCRA 1330, 1340 (1968). Trial Court of Naic, Cavite, Branch 15 in Special Proceedings No. NC-662
nullifying the marriage of the petitioner and the respondent Rodolfo S. Ancheta,
[19]
TSN, November 23, 2000 at 14-15. and of the resolution of the appellate court denying the motion for
reconsideration of the said resolution.
[20]
Rollo at 106.
This case arose from the following facts:
[21]
Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the
Philippines, Vol. 1, 1990 ed., at 222-223. After their marriage on March 5, 1959, the petitioner and the respondent resided
in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. They had eight children during their coverture,
[22]
Civil Service Commission v. Sta. Ana, A.M. No. OCA-01-5, August 1, 2002 whose names and dates of births are as follows:
(citation omitted).
a. ANA MARIE B . ANCHETA – born October 6, 1959
[23]
Legaspi v. Garrete, 242 SCRA 679, 701 (1995).
b. RODOLFO B. ANCHETA, JR. – born March 7, 1961
c. VENANCIO MARIANO B. ANCHETA – born May 18, 1962
[24]
Merilo-Bedural, 342 SCRA 593, 599 (2000).
d. GERARDO B. ANCHETA – born April 8, 1963
e. KATHRINA B. ANCHETA – born October 29, 1965
[25]
Merilo-Bedural v. Edroso, 342 SCRA 598.
f. ANTONIO B. ANCHETA – born March 6, 1967
g. NATASHA MARTINA B. ANCHETA – born August 2, 1968
[26]
Policarpio v. Fortus, 248 SCRA 272, 276 (1995) (citation omitted).
h. FRITZIE YOLANDA B. ANCHETA – born November 19, 1970[3]
[27]
Burgos v. Aquino, 249 SCRA 504, 509 (1995) (citation omitted).
On December 6, 1992, the respondent left the conjugal home and abandoned the
[28]
Id. petitioner and their children. On January 25, 1994, petitioner Marietta Ancheta
filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 40, against the
respondent for the dissolution of their conjugal partnership and judicial
separation of property with a plea for support and support pendente lite. The
2
case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. M-3735. At that time, the petitioner was
468 Phil. 900
renting a house at No. 72 CRM Avenue cor. CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza,

4
Las Piñas, Metro Manila.[4]
On April 20, 1994, the parties executed a Compromise Agreement[5] where some
of the conjugal properties were adjudicated to the petitioner and her eight
children, including the following:
b. A parcel of land (adjoining the two lots covered by TCT Nos. 120082 and
TCT No. 120083-Cavite) located at Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, registered in the
name of the family Ancheta. Biofood Corporation under TCT No. 310882,
together with the resort Munting Paraiso, Training Center, four-storey building,
pavilion, swimming pool and all improvements. All of the shares of stocks of
Ancheta Biofoods Corporation were distributed one-third (1/3) to the petitioner
and the eight children one-twelfth (1/12) each.[6]
The court rendered judgment based on the said compromise
agreement. Conformably thereto, the respondent vacated, on June 1, 1994, the
resort Munting Paraiso and all the buildings and improvements thereon. The
petitioner, with the knowledge of the respondent, thenceforth resided in the said
property.
In the meantime, the respondent intended to marry again. On June 5, 1995, he
filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Naic, Cavite, Branch 15, for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage with the petitioner on the ground of
psychological incapacity. The case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. NC-
662. Although the respondent knew that the petitioner was already residing at
the resort Munting Paraiso in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, he, nevertheless, alleged
in his petition that the petitioner was residing at No. 72 CRM Avenue corner CRM
Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Piñas, Metro Manila, “where she may be
served with summons.”[7] The clerk of court issued summons to the petitioner at
the address stated in the petition.[8] The sheriff served the summons and a copy
of the petition by substituted service on June 6, 1995 on the petitioner’s son,
Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III, at his residence in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite.[9]
On June 21, 1995, Sheriff Jose R. Salvadora, Jr. submitted a Return of Service to
the court stating that the summons and a copy of the petition were served on the
petitioner through her son Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III on June 6, 1995:
RETURN OF SERVICE
This is to certify that the summons together with the copy of the complaint and
its annexes was received by the herein defendant thru his son Venancio M.B.
Ancheta [III] as evidenced by the signature appearing on the summons. Service
was made on June 6, 1995.
June 21, 1995, Naic, Cavite.
(Sgd.) JOSE R. SALVADORA, JR.
Sheriff[10]
The petitioner failed to file an answer to the petition. On June 22, 1995, the
respondent filed an “Ex-Parte Motion to Declare Defendant as in Default” setting
it for hearing on June 27, 1995 at 8:30 a.m. During the hearing on the said
date, there was no appearance for the petitioner. The public prosecutor appeared
for the State and offered no objection to the motion of the respondent who
appeared with counsel. The trial court granted the motion and declared the
petitioner in default, and allowed the respondent to adduce evidence ex-
parte. The respondent testified in his behalf and adduced documentary
evidence. On July 7, 1995, the trial court issued an Order granting the petition
and declaring the marriage of the parties void ab initio.[11] The clerk of court
issued a Certificate of Finality of the Order of the court on July 16, 1996. [12]
On February 14, 1998, Valentine’s Day, the respondent and Teresita H. Rodil
were married in civil rights before the municipal mayor of Indang, Cavite.[13]
On July 7, 2000, the petitioner filed a verified petition against the respondent
with the Court of Appeals under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, as amended, for
the annulment of the order of the RTC of Cavite in Special Proceedings No. NC-
662. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 59550. The petitioner
alleged, inter alia, that the respondent committed gross misrepresentations by
making it appear in his petition in Sp. Proc. No. NC-662 that she was a resident
of No. 72 CRM Avenue cor. CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Piñas, Metro
Manila, when in truth and in fact, the respondent knew very well that she was
residing at Munting Paraiso, Bancal, Carmona, Cavite. According to the petitioner,
the respondent did so to deprive her of her right to be heard in the said case, and
ultimately secure a favorable judgment without any opposition thereto. The
petitioner also alleged that the respondent caused the service of the petition and
summons on her by substituted service through her married son, Venancio
Mariano B. Ancheta III, a resident of Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, where the
respondent was a resident. Furthermore, Venancio M.B. Ancheta III failed to
deliver to her the copy of the petition and summons. Thus, according to the
petitioner, the order of the trial court in favor of the respondent was null and void
(1) for lack of jurisdiction over her person; and (2) due to the extrinsic fraud
perpetrated by the respondent. She further contended that there was no factual
basis for the trial court’s finding that she was suffering from psychological
incapacity. Finally, the petitioner averred that she learned of the Order of the
RTC only on January 11, 2000. Appended to the petition, inter alia, were the
affidavits of the petitioner and of Venancio M.B. Ancheta III.
The petitioner prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in her
favor, thus:
5
WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays this Honorable Court to render
Judgment granting the Petition.
1. Declaring null and void the Order dated June 7, 1995 (of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 14, Naic, Cavite).
2. Ordering respondent to pay petitioner
a. P1,000,000.00 as moral damages;
b. P500,000.00 as exemplary damages;
c. P200,000.00 as attorney’s fees plus P7,500.00 per diem for every
hearing;
d. P100,000.00 as litigation expenses;
e. Costs of suit.[14]
On July 13, 2000, the CA issued a Resolution dismissing the petition on the
following ground:
We cannot give due course to the present petition in default or in the absence of
any clear and specific averment by petitioner that the ordinary remedies of new
trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer
available through no fault of petitioner. Neither is there any averment or
allegation that the present petition is based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud
and lack of jurisdiction. Nor yet that, on the assumption that extrinsic fraud can
be a valid ground therefor, that it was not availed of, or could not have been
availed of, in a motion for new trial, or petition for relief.[15]
The petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the said resolution,
appending thereto an amended petition in which she alleged, inter alia, that:
4. This petition is based purely on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction.
5. This petition has not prescribed; it was filed within the four-year period
after discovery of the extrinsic fraud.
6. The ground of extrinsic fraud has not been availed of, or could not have
been availed of in a motion for new trial or petition for relief.
7. The ground of lack of jurisdiction is not barred by laches and/or estoppel.
8. The ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies were no longer available through no fault of
petitioner; neither has she ever availed of the said remedies. This petition
is the only available remedy to her.[16]
The petitioner also alleged therein that the order of the trial court nullifying her
and the respondent’s marriage was null and void for the court a quo’s failure to
order the public prosecutor to conduct an investigation on whether there was
collusion between the parties, and to order the Solicitor General to appear for the
State.
On September 27, 2000, the CA issued a Resolution denying the said motion.
The petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court alleging that
the CA erred as follows:
1. In failing to take into consideration the kind of Order which was sought to
be annulled.
2. In finding that the Petition was procedurally flawed.
3. In not finding that the Petition substantially complied with the
requirements of the Rules of Court.
4. In failing to comply with Section 5, Rule 47, Rules of Court.
5. In not even considering/resolving Petitioner’s Motion to Admit the
Amended Petition; and in not admitting the Amended Petition.
6. In failing to apply the Rules of Procedure with liberality.[17]
The petition is meritorious.
An original action in the Court of Appeals under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, to annul a judgment or final order or resolution in civil actions of the
RTC may be based on two grounds: (a) extrinsic fraud; or (b) lack of jurisdiction.
If based on extrinsic fraud, the remedy is subject to a condition precedent,
namely, the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner.[18] The petitioner must allege in the petition that the ordinary remedies
of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, under Rule 38 of the Rules
of Court are no longer available through no fault of hers; otherwise, the petition
will be dismissed. If the petitioner fails to avail of the remedies of new trial,
appeal or relief from judgment through her own fault or negligence before filing
6
her petition with the Court of Appeals, she cannot resort to the remedy under
Rule 47 of the Rules; otherwise, she would benefit from her inaction or
negligence.[19]
It is not enough to allege in the petition that the said remedies were no longer
available through no fault of her own. The petitioner must also explain and justify
her failure to avail of such remedies. The safeguard was incorporated in the rule
precisely to avoid abuse of the remedy.[20] Access to the courts is guaranteed.
But there must be limits thereto. Once a litigant’s rights have been adjudicated
in a valid final judgment of a competent court, he should not be granted an
unbridled license to sue anew. The prevailing party should not be vexed by
subsequent suits.[21]
In this case, the petitioner failed to allege in her petition in the CA that the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, and petition for relief, were no longer
available through no fault of her own. She merely alleged therein that she
received the assailed order of the trial court on January 11, 2000. The
petitioner’s amended petition did not cure the fatal defect in her original petition,
because although she admitted therein that she did not avail of the remedies of
new trial, appeal or petition for relief from judgment, she did not explain why she
failed to do so.
We, however, rule that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the original
petition and denying admission of the amended petition. This is so because
apparently, the Court of Appeals failed to take note from the material allegations
of the petition, that the petition was based not only on extrinsic fraud but also on
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner, on her claim that the
summons and the copy of the complaint in Sp. Proc. No. NC-662 were not served
on her. While the original petition and amended petition did not state a cause of
action for the nullification of the assailed order on the ground of extrinsic fraud,
we rule, however, that it states a sufficient cause of action for the nullification of
the assailed order on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the person
of the petitioner, notwithstanding the absence of any allegation therein that the
ordinary remedy of new trial or reconsideration, or appeal are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner.
In a case where a petition for the annulment of a judgment or final order of the
RTC filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is grounded on lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant/respondent or over the nature or subject of the
action, the petitioner need not allege in the petition that the ordinary remedy of
new trial or reconsideration of the final order or judgment or appeal therefrom
are no longer available through no fault of her own. This is so because a
judgment rendered or final order issued by the RTC without jurisdiction is null
and void and may be assailed any time either collaterally or in a direct action or
by resisting such judgment or final order in any action or proceeding whenever it
is invoked,[22]unless barred by laches.[23]
In this case, the original petition and the amended petition in the Court of
Appeals, in light of the material averments therein, were based not only on
extrinsic fraud, but also on lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over the person of
the petitioner because of the failure of the sheriff to serve on her the summons
and a copy of the complaint. She claimed that the summons and complaint were
served on her son, Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III, who, however, failed to give
her the said summons and complaint.
Even a cursory reading of the material averments of the original petition and its
annexes will show that it is, prima facie meritorious; hence, it should have been
given due course by the Court of Appeals.
In Paramount Insurance Corporation v. Japzon,[24] we held that jurisdiction is
acquired by a trial court over the person of the defendant either by his voluntary
appearance in court and his submission to its authority or by service of
summons. The service of summons and the complaint on the defendant is to
inform him that a case has been filed against him and, thus, enable him to
defend himself. He is, thus, put on guard as to the demands of the plaintiff or
the petitioner. Without such service in the absence of a valid waiver renders the
judgment of the court null and void.[25] Jurisdiction cannot be acquired by the
court on the person of the defendant even if he knows of the case against him
unless he is validly served with summons.[26]
Summons and complaint may be served on the defendant either by handing a
copy thereof to him in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by
tendering it to her.[27]However, if there is impossibility of prompt service of the
summons personally on the defendant despite diligent efforts to find him, service
of the summons may be effected by substituted service as provided in Section 7,
Rule 14 of the said Rules:
SEC. 7. Substituted service.— If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be
served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service
may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s
residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein,
or (b) by leaving the copies of defendant’s office or regular place of business with
some competent person in charge thereof.[28]
In Miranda v. Court of Appeals,[29] we held that the modes of service should be
strictly followed in order that the court may acquire jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant. Thus, it is only when a defendant cannot be served personally
within a reasonable time that substituted service may be made by stating the
7
efforts made to find him and personally serve on him the summons and
complaint and the fact that such effort failed.[30] This statement should be made
in the proof of service to be accomplished and filed in court by the sheriff. This is
necessary because substituted service is a derogation of the usual method of
service. It has been held that substituted service of summons is a method
extraordinary in character; hence, may be used only as prescribed and in the
circumstances categorized by statutes.[31]
As gleaned from the petition and the amended petition in the CA and the annexes
thereof, the summons in Sp. Proc. No. NC-662 was issued on June 6,
1995.[32] On the same day, the summons was served on and received by
Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III,[33] the petitioner’s son. When the return of
summons was submitted to the court by the sheriff on June 21,
1995, no statement was made on the impossibility of locating the defendant
therein within a reasonable time, or that any effort was made by the sheriff to
locate the defendant. There was no mention therein that Venancio Mariano
Ancheta III was residing at No. 72 CRM Avenue cor. CRM Corazon, BF Homes,
Almanza, Las Piñas, where the petitioner (defendant therein) was allegedly
residing. It turned out that Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III had been residing at
Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, and that his father merely showed him the summons
and the complaint and was made to affix his signature on the face of the
summons; he was not furnished with a copy of the said summons and complaint.
4. From the time my father started staying at Munting Paraiso, Bancal,
Carmona, Cavite, I have been residing on the adjoining land consisting of
two (2) lots later apportioned to my father as his share of the conjugal
partnership. Since then, I have been residing therein up to the present.
5. On June 6, 1995, at Bancal, Carmona, Cavite (at my residence situated on
my father’s lot), my father came to see me and then asked me to sign and
I did sign papers which he (my father) and the Sheriff did not allow me to
read. Apparently, these papers are for the Summons to my mother in the
case for annulment of marriage filed by my father against her. I was not
given any copy of the Summons and/or copy of the complaint/petition.[34]
We, thus, rule that the Court of Appeals acted arbitrarily in dismissing the
original petition of the petitioner and the amended petition for annulment of the
assailed order grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.
The action in Rule 47 of the Rules of Court does not involve the merits of the final
order of the trial court. However, we cannot but express alarm at what transpired
in the court a quoas shown by the records. The records show that for the
petitioner’s failure to file an answer to the complaint, the trial court granted the
motion of the respondent herein to declare her in default. The public prosecutor
condoned the acts of the trial court when he interposed no objection to the
motion of the respondent. The trial court forthwith received the evidence of the
respondent ex-parte and rendered judgment against the petitioner without a
whimper of protest from the public prosecutor. The actuations of the trial court
and the public prosecutor are in defiance of Article 48 of the Family Code, which
reads:
Article 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage,
the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on
behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to
take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based
upon a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment.[35]
The trial court and the public prosecutor also ignored Rule 18, Section 6 of the
1985 Rules of Court (now Rule 9, Section 3[e] of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure) which provides:
Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation.—
If the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation
fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate
whether or not a collusion between the parties exits, and if there is no collusion,
to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not
fabricated.[36]
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals,[37] this Court laid down the guidelines
in the interpretation and application of Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of which
concerns the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the State:
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down
unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen
(15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the
court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.[38]
This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin[39] reiterated its pronouncement
in Republic v. Court of Appeals,[40] regarding the role of the prosecuting attorney
or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State.[41] The trial
court, abetted by the ineptitude, if not sheer negligence of the public prosecutor,
waylaid the Rules of Court and the Family Code, as well as the rulings of this
Court.
8
The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social institution requires vigilant [1]
Penned by Associate Justice Renato C. Dacudao, with Associate Justices Cancio
and zealous participation and not mere pro-forma compliance. The protection of C. Garcia (Chairman) and B.A. Adefuin-de la Cruz, concurring.
marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and
genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well.[42] [2]
Penned by Judge Enrique M. Almario.

A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with [3]

CA Rollo, pp. 26-27.
the danger of collusion. Hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of
marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to [4]
Id. at 26.
appear on behalf of the State for the purpose of preventing any collusion
between the parties and to take care that their evidence is not fabricated or [5]
Rollo, pp. 95-102.
suppressed. If the defendant-spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court
cannot declare him or her in default but instead, should order the prosecuting [6]
CA Rollo, pp. 4-5.
attorney to determine if collusion exists between the parties. The prosecuting
attorney or fiscal may oppose the application for legal separation or annulment [7]
Id. at 49.
through the presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced
is dubious and fabricated. [8]
Id. at 53.

Our constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic [9]
Id.
social institution. Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a
mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The [10]
Id. at 54.
State can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The
break-up of families weakens our social and moral fabric; hence, their [11]
Id. at 57-59.
preservation is not the concern of the family members alone.[43] Whether or not a
marriage should continue to exist or a family should stay together must not [12]
Id. at 212.
depend on the whims and caprices of only one party, who claims that the other
suffers psychological imbalance, incapacitating such party to fulfill his or her [13]
Id. at 213.
marital duties and obligations.
[14]
Id. at 21.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated July 13, 2000 and September 27, 2000 [15]
Id. at 101.
in CA-G.R. SP No. 59550 are hereby SET ASIDE and REVERSED. Let the
records of CA-G.R. SP No. 59550 be remanded to the Court of Appeals for further [16]
Id. at 109.
proceedings conformably with the Decision of this Court and Rule 47 of the Rules
of Court, as amended. [17]
Rollo, p. 36.

SO ORDERED. [18]
Rule 47, Section 1.

Quisumbing, (Acting Chairman), Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur. [19]

Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 352 SCRA 235 (2001).
Puno, J., (Chairman), on leave.
[20]
Herrera, Remedial Law, Vol. III, 1997 ed., p. 549.

[21]
Pacquing v. Court of Appeals, 115 SCRA 117 (1982).

9
[22]
Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 635 (1989). Sec. 8. Answer.—(1) The respondent shall file his answer within fifteen days from
service of summons, or within thirty days from the last issue of publication in
[23]
SEC. 3. Period for filing action.—If based on extrinsic fraud, the action must case of service of summons by publication. The answer must be verified by the
be filed within four (4) years from its discovery; and if based on lack of respondent himself and not by counsel or attorney-in-fact.
jurisdiction, before it is barred by laches or estoppel.
(2) If the respondent fails to file an answer, the court shall not declare him or her
[24]
211 SCRA 879 (1992). in default.

[25]
Umandap v. Sabio, Jr., 339 SCRA 243 (2000). (3) Where no answer is filed or if the answer does not tender an issue, the court
shall order the public prosecutor to investigate whether collusion exists between
[26]
United Coconut Planters Bank v. Ongpin, 368 SCRA 464 (2001). the parties.

[27]
Rule 14, Section 6, Rules of Court. Sec. 9. Investigation report of public prosecutor.—(1) Within one month after
receipt of the court order mentioned in paragraph (3) of Section 8 above, the
[28]
Supra. public prosecutor shall submit a report to the court stating whether the parties
are in collusion and serve copies thereof on the parties and their respective
[29]
326 SCRA 278 (2000). counsels, if any.

[30]
Keister v. Navarro, 77 SCRA 209 (1977). (2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state the basis
thereof in his report. The parties shall file their respective comments on the
[31]
Ibid. finding of collusion within ten days from receipt of a copy of the report. The court
shall set the report for hearing and, if convinced that the parties are in collusion,
[32]
CA Rollo, p. 53. it shall dismiss the petition.

[33]
Ibid. (3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the court shall set the
case for pre-trial. It shall be the duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the
[34]
Id. at 55-56. State at the pre-trial.

[35]
Supra. [42]
See note 39.

[36]
Supra. [43]
Tuason v. Court of Appeals, 256 SCRA 158 (1996).

[37]
268 SCRA 198 (1997). 3
558 Phil. 192
[38]
Id. at 213.
THIRD DIVISION
[39]
355 SCRA 285 (2001).
[ G.R. NO. 167746, August 28, 2007 ]
[40]
Supra.

The procedure has been modified by the Supreme Court in Administrative

[41] RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA, PETITIONER, VS. ROSITA A. ALCANTARA
Matter No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003. AND HON. COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENTS.

10

DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Restituto
Alcantara assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September
2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 66724 denying petitioner's appeal and affirming the
decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 143, in Civil
Case No. 97-1325 dated 14 February 2000, dismissing his petition for annulment
of marriage.
The antecedent facts are:
A petition for annulment of marriage [3] was filed by petitioner against respondent
Rosita A. Alcantara alleging that on 8 December 1982 he and respondent, without
securing the required marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the
purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a marriage for them. They met
a person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding before a certain Rev. Aquilino
Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC BR Chapel.[4] They got married on
the same day, 8 December 1982. Petitioner and respondent went through
another marriage ceremony at the San Jose de Manuguit Church in Tondo,
Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was likewise celebrated without the
parties securing a marriage license. The alleged marriage license, procured in
Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party
was a resident of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a
license with the local civil registrar of the said place. On 14 October 1985,
respondent gave birth to their child Rose Ann Alcantara. In 1988, they parted
ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed that after due hearing, judgment
be issued declaring their marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel
the corresponding marriage contract[5] and its entry on file.[6]
Answering petitioner's petition for annulment of marriage, respondent asserts the
validity of their marriage and maintains that there was a marriage license issued
as evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona,
Cavite. Contrary to petitioner's representation, respondent gave birth to their
first child named Rose Ann Alcantara on 14 October 1985 and to another
daughter named Rachel Ann Alcantara on 27 October 1992.[7] Petitioner has a
mistress with whom he has three children.[8] Petitioner only filed the annulment
of their marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage.[9] Respondent, in fact,
has filed a case for concubinage against petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 60.[10] Respondent prays that the petition for
annulment of marriage be denied for lack of merit.
On 14 February 2000, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143, rendered its Decision
disposing as follows:
The foregoing considered, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. The Petition is dismissed for lack of merit;
2. Petitioner is ordered to pay respondent the sum of twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) per month as support for their two (2) children on the first
five (5) days of each month; and
3. To pay the costs.[11]
As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the
petitioner's appeal. His Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied in a
resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 6 April 2005.[12]
The Court of Appeals held that the marriage license of the parties is presumed to
be regularly issued and petitioner had not presented any evidence to overcome
the presumption. Moreover, the parties' marriage contract being a public
document is a prima facie proof of the questioned marriage under Section 44,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.[13]
In his Petition before this Court, petitioner raises the following issues for
resolution:
a. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it ruled
that the Petition for Annulment has no legal and factual basis despite the
evidence on record that there was no marriage license at the precise
moment of the solemnization of the marriage.
b. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it gave
weight to the Marriage License No. 7054133 despite the fact that the
same was not identified and offered as evidence during the trial, and was
not the Marriage license number appearing on the face of the marriage
contract.
c. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it
failed to apply the ruling laid down by this Honorable Court in the case of
Sy vs. Court of Appeals. (G.R. No. 127263, 12 April 2000 [330 SCRA
550]).
11
 d. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it
failed to relax the observance of procedural rules to protect and promote
the substantial rights of the party litigants.[14]
We deny the petition.
Petitioner submits that at the precise time that his marriage with the respondent
was celebrated, there was no marriage license because he and respondent just
went to the Manila City Hall and dealt with a "fixer" who arranged everything for
them.[15] The wedding took place at the stairs in Manila City Hall and not in CDCC
BR Chapel where Rev. Aquilino Navarro who solemnized the marriage
belongs.[16] He and respondent did not go to Carmona, Cavite, to apply for a
marriage license. Assuming a marriage license from Carmona, Cavite, was issued
to them, neither he nor the respondent was a resident of the place. The
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, cannot be given
weight because the certification states that "Marriage License number 7054133
was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario"[17] but
their marriage contract bears the number 7054033 for their marriage license
number.
The marriage involved herein having been solemnized on 8 December 1982, or
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law to determine its
validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration.
A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil
Code, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article
80(3)[18] in relation to Article 58 of the same Code.[19]
Article 53 of the Civil Code[20] which was the law applicable at the time of the
marriage of the parties states:
Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied
with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.
The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the State's demonstration
of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of
which the general public is interested. [21]
Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the
validity of his marriage. The cases where the court considered the absence of a
marriage license as a ground for considering the marriage void are clear-cut.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[22] the Local Civil Registrar
issued a certification of due search and inability to find a record or entry to the
effect that Marriage License No. 3196182 was issued to the parties. The Court
held that the certification of "due search and inability to find" a record or entry as
to the purported marriage license, issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, enjoys
probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all
data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Based on said certification,
the Court held that there is absence of a marriage license that would render the
marriage void ab initio.
In Cariño v. Cariño,[23] the Court considered the marriage of therein petitioner
Susan Nicdao and the deceased Santiago S. Carino as void ab initio. The records
reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased
bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of
San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license. The
court held that the certification issued by the local civil registrar is adequate to
prove the non- issuance of the marriage license. Their marriage having been
solemnized without the necessary marriage license and not being one of the
marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, the marriage of the
petitioner and the deceased is undoubtedly void ab initio.
In Sy v. Court of Appeals,[24] the marriage license was issued on 17 September
1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place on 15 November 1973. The
Court held that the ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed
contracted without a marriage license.
In all these cases, there was clearly an absence of a marriage license which
rendered the marriage void.
Clearly, from these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void on the
ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the absence of
such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very
least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such
marriage license was issued to the parties. In this case, the marriage contract
between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number. A
certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona,
Cavite.[25] The certification moreover is precise in that it specifically identified the
parties to whom the marriage license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and
12
Rosita Almario, further validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the
parties herein.
The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L. Diaz of Carmona, Cavite,
reads:
This is to certify that as per the registry Records of Marriage filed in this office,
Marriage License No. 7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and
Miss Rosita Almario on December 8, 1982.
This Certification is being issued upon the request of Mrs. Rosita A. Alcantara for
whatever legal purpose or intents it may serve.[26]
This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed and the issuance of the marriage license was done in the regular
conduct of official business.[27] The presumption of regularity of official acts may
be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty.
However, the presumption prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it
becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of the
presumption and, in case of doubt as to an officer's act being lawful or unlawful,
construction should be in favor of its lawfulness.[28] Significantly, apart from
these, petitioner, by counsel, admitted that a marriage license was, indeed,
issued in Carmona, Cavite.[29]
Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage
license, claims that neither he nor respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite.
Even then, we still hold that there is no sufficient basis to annul petitioner and
respondent's marriage. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality,
not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage
license despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-
day period for publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the
validity of the marriage.[30] An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of
marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively liable. [31]
Again, petitioner harps on the discrepancy between the marriage license number
in the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar, which states that the marriage
license issued to the parties is No. 7054133, while the marriage contract states
that the marriage license number of the parties is number 7054033. Once more,
this argument fails to sway us. It is not impossible to assume that the same is a
mere a typographical error, as a closer scrutiny of the marriage contract reveals
the overlapping of the numbers 0 and 1, such that the marriage license may read
either as 7054133 or 7054033. It therefore does not detract from our conclusion
regarding the existence and issuance of said marriage license to the parties.
Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean
hands,[32] petitioner cannot pretend that he was not responsible or a party to the
marriage celebration which he now insists took place without the requisite
marriage license. Petitioner admitted that the civil marriage took place because
he "initiated it."[33] Petitioner is an educated person. He is a mechanical engineer
by profession. He knowingly and voluntarily went to the Manila City Hall and
likewise, knowingly and voluntarily, went through a marriage ceremony. He
cannot benefit from his action and be allowed to extricate himself from the
marriage bond at his mere say-so when the situation is no longer palatable to his
taste or suited to his lifestyle. We cannot countenance such effrontery. His
attempt to make a mockery of the institution of marriage betrays his bad faith.[34]
Petitioner and respondent went through a marriage ceremony twice in a span of
less than one year utilizing the same marriage license. There is no claim that he
went through the second wedding ceremony in church under duress or with a gun
to his head. Everything was executed without nary a whimper on the part of the
petitioner.
In fact, for the second wedding of petitioner and respondent, they presented to
the San Jose de Manuguit Church the marriage contract executed during the
previous wedding ceremony before the Manila City Hall. This is confirmed in
petitioner's testimony as follows"
WITNESS
As I remember your honor, they asked us to get the necessary document prior to
the wedding.
COURT
What particular document did the church asked you to produce? I am referring to
the San Jose de Manuguit church.
WITNESS
I don't remember your honor.
COURT
Were you asked by the church to present a Marriage License?
WITNESS
13
I think they asked us for documents and I said we have already a Marriage
Contract and I don't know if it is good enough for the marriage and they accepted WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED for lack of
it your honor. merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 affirming
the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 143 of Makati City, dated 14
COURT February 2000, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

In other words, you represented to the San Jose de Manuguit church that you SO ORDERED.
have with you already a Marriage Contract?
Ynares-Santiago, (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, Nachura, and Reyes,
WITNESS JJ., concur.

Yes your honor.

COURT Penned by Associate Justice Vicente S. E. Veloso with Associate Justices

[1]

Roberto A. Barrios and Amelita G. Tolentino, concurring; rollo, p. 25-32.

That is why the San Jose de Manuguit church copied the same marriage License
in the Marriage Contract issued which Marriage License is Number 7054033. [2]
Penned by Judge Salvador S. Abad Santos; CA rollo, pp. 257-258.

WITNESS [3]
Docketed as Civil Case No. 97-1325.

Yes your honor.[35] [4]

Crusade of the Divine Church of Christ.
The logical conclusion is that petitioner was amenable and a willing participant to
all that took place at that time. Obviously, the church ceremony was confirmatory [5]
Annex A, Records, p. 5; Annexes B to C, Records, pp. 6-7.
of their civil marriage, thereby cleansing whatever irregularity or defect attended
the civil wedding.[36] [6]
Rollo, pp. 33-36.

Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner -- that they appeared before a "fixer" who [7]
Id. at 185.
arranged everything for them and who facilitated the ceremony before a certain
Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC Br Chapel -- will not [8]
TSN, 14 October 1999, p. 34.
strengthen his posture. The authority of the officer or clergyman shown to have
performed a marriage ceremony will be presumed in the absence of any showing [9]
Rollo, p. 39.
to the contrary.[37] Moreover, the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to
investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and regularly issued [10]
Id. at 46.
by the local civil registrar. All the solemnizing officer needs to know is that the
license has been issued by the competent official, and it may be presumed from [11]
Id. at 68-69.
the issuance of the license that said official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain
whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of law. [38] [12]
Id. at 21.

Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the Sec. 44. Entries in official records. - Entries in official records made in the
[13]

validity of the marriage.[39] Every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the
validity of the marriage bonds. The Courts look upon this presumption with great
favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great
weight.
performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in
the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of
the facts therein stated.
14
[14]
Rollo, p. 206.
The local civil registrar concerned shall enter all applications for marriage licenses
[15]
Id. at 209. filed with him in a register book strictly in the order in which the same shall be
received. He shall enter in said register the names of the applicants, the dates on
[16]
Records p. 1. which the marriage license was issued, and such other data as may be necessary.

[17]
Id. at 15-a. [26]
Records, p. 15-a.

(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of

[18] [27]
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. - x x x
exceptional character.
xxxx
[19]
Art. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2
of this Title, but not those under article 75, no marriage shall be solemnized (m) That official duty has been regularly performed. (Rule 131, Rules of Court.)
without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality
where either contracting party habitually resides. [28]
Magsucang v. Balgos, 446 Phil. 217, 224-225 (2003).

[20]
Now Article 3 of the Family Code. [29]
TSN. 23 November 1999, p. 4.

Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are: [30]

Sta. Maria Jr., Persons and Family Relations Law, p. 125.
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
[31]
Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code, p. 8; Moreno v. Bernabe, 316
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Phil. 161, 168 (1995).
Title; and
Abacus Securities Corporation v. Ampil, G.R. No. 160016, 27 February 2006,
[32]

(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the 483 SCRA 315, 337.
contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration
that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than [33]
TSN, 1 October 1998, p. 96.
two witnesses of legal age.
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the [34]
Atienza v. Judge Brilliantes, Jr., 312 Phil. 939, 944 (1995).
marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35.
[35]
TSN, 1 October 1998, pp. 33-35.
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as
provided in Article 45. [36]
Ty v. Court of Appeals, 399 Phil. 647, 662 2003).

[21]
Niñal v. Bayadog, 384 Phil. 661, 667-668 (2000). [37]
Goshen v. New Orleans, 18 US 950.

[22]
G.R. No.103047, 2 September 1994, 236 SCRA 257, 262. [38]
People v. Janssen, 54 Phil. 176, 180 (1929).

[23]
G.R. No.132529, 2 February 2001, 351 SCRA 127, 133. Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco, G.R. No. 158896, 27 October 2004, 441 SCRA
[39]

422, 436; Sevilla v. Cardenas, G.R. No. 167684, 31 July 2006, 497 SCRA 428,
[24]
386 Phil. 760, 769 (2000). 443.

[25]
Article 70 of the Civil Code, now Article 25 Family Code, provides: 4
15
384 Phil. 661 (2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father with
defendant is null and void ab initio;
FIRST DIVISION
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the
[ G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000 ] second marriage after it was dissolved due to their father's death.[1]
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare
null and void their father's marriage to respondent before his death, applying by
ENGRACE NIÑAL FOR HERSELF AND AS GUARDIAN AD LITEM OF THE
analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates the time and the
MINORS BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO
persons who could initiate an action for annulment of marriage.[2] Hence, this
NIÑAL, JR., PETITIONERS, VS. NORMA BAYADOG, RESPONDENT.
petition for review with this Court grounded on a pure question of law.
DECISION
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule
13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and because "the verification failed to
state the basis of petitioner's averment that the allegations in the petition are
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: `true and correct'." It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading which
produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules.[3] However,
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of
upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated
his marriage after his death?
the petition for review.[4]
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity
their marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting
of the Family Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil
in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on
Code which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration.[5] A valid
December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without
marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil
any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit
Code,[6] the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to
dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and
Article 80(3)[7] in relation to Article 58.[8] The requirement and issuance of
wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage
marriage license is the State's demonstration of its involvement and participation
license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their father's
in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is
death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of
interested.[9] This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the
Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage
State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the
license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of
family as a basic "autonomous social institution."[10] Specifically, the Constitution
the second marriage would affect petitioner's successional rights. Norma filed a
considers marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of
motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since
family life which shall be protected by the State.[11] This is why the Family Code
they are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of
considers marriage as "a special contract of permanent union"[12] and case law
marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.
considers it "not just an adventure but a lifetime commitment."[13]
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu,
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a
Branch 59, dismissed the petition after finding that the Family Code is "rather
marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article
silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the following issues:
76,[14] referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking
and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and
for the declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G.
unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The rationale
Niñal, with her specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their
why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to
father Pepito G. Niñal is already dead;
humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous
cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every
16
applicant's name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the marriage
license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their status.[15] To
preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public
exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from the publication of their
names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt them from
that requirement.
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to respondent Norma
was celebrated without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an
affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of majority, and, being
unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, and
that we now desire to marry each other."[16] The only issue that needs to be
resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76
of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year period in order to
exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage license. Should it be a
cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each other during the
entire five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both
parties have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife
during the entire five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a
legal impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may have
either disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as
husband and wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year
period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife"
where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the
union. In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is
counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal
union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should
be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a
period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity - meaning no third party was
involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity - that is unbroken.
Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any
distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during
the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and
encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the
same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a
special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be
strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the
requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not
comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing element as
a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should
be noexemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances
clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is
required in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be united in
matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to
the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.[17] The Civil
Code provides:
Article 63: "x x x. This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any
impediment to the marriage to advice the local civil registrar thereof. x x x."
Article 64: "Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the
local civil registrar shall forthwith make an investigation, examining persons
under oath. x x x"
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Article 17 provides in part: "x x x. This notice shall request all persons having
knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil registrar
thereof. x x x."
Article 18 reads in part: "x x x. In case of any impediment known to the local civil
registrar or brought to his attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof
and his findings thereon in the application for a marriage license. x x x."
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited
the concurrence of multiple marriages by the same person during the same
period. Thus, any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the
first spouse shall be illegal and void,[18] subject only to the exception in cases of
absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled. The Revised
Penal Code complements the civil law in that the contracting of two or more
marriages and the having of extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e.,
bigamy and concubinage and adultery.[19] The law sanctions monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said
that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years
prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to
the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed.
Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter
both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already
lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was
not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect
union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of
the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he
started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with
each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The
subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial
companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either
17
spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife".
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered
by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab
initio because of the absence of such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a
petition to declare their father's marriage void after his death?
Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code[20] cannot be
applied even by analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The
second ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which
allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at any time before the death
of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods and
persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of
marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of
a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage that is
annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that
is void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken place[21] and cannot
be the source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free
cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A voidable
marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void
marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be
questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be
assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in
which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been
perfectly valid.[22] That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible,
unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a
voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void
marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law
concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or
ownership through actual joint contribution,[23] and its effect on the children born
to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as
well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property
regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the
children conceived before its annulment are legitimate.
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's father extinguished
the alleged marital bond between him and respondent. The conclusion is
erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise that there was a marriage bond
that was dissolved between the two. It should be noted that their marriage was
void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all and the death of either
extinguished nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in
order to establish the nullity of a marriage.[24] "A void marriage does not require
a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the
marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet
as well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all
concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained
and declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction."[25]"Under
ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the
conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever
taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be
maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material,
either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time,
whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and
upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded
or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which
cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the
lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be
impeached, and is made good ab initio.[26] But Article 40 of the Family Code
expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a
previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second
marriage[27] and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to
that effect.[28] For the same reason, the law makes either the action or defense
for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible.[29] Corollarily, if
the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for
defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not
limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that
matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in
the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is
necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis
of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the
Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for
purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial
Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED.
18
 Section 12, Article II, 1987 Constitution; Hernandez v. CA, G. R. No. 126010,
[10]

SO ORDERED. December 8, 1999; See also Tuason v. CA, 256 SCRA 158 (1996).

Davide, Jr., (Chairman), Puno, and Kapunan, JJ., concur. [11]

Section 2, Article XV (The Family), 1987 Constitution.
Pardo, J., on official business abroad.
Article 1, Family Code provides: "Marriage is a special contract of permanent
[12]

union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the
[1]
The dispositive portion of the Order dated March 27, 1998 issued by Judge establishment of conjugal or family life. x x x.
Ferdinand J. Marcos of Regional Trial Court (RTC) - Branch 59, Toledo City,
reads: "WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendant's motion to dismiss is [13]
Santos v. CA, 58 SCAD 17 (1995); 310 Phil. 21, 41 (1995).
hereby granted and this instant case is hereby ordered dismissed without costs."
(p. 6; Rollo, p. 21). [14]
Now Article 34, Family Code. Art. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary
when a man and a woman who have attained the age of majority and who, being
[2]
Order, p. 4; Rollo, p. 19. unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire
to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an
[3]
Minute Resolution dated July 13, 1998; Rollo, p. 39. affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official,
priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that
[4]
Minute Resolution dated October 7, 1998; Rollo, p. 50. he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting
parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.
[5]
Tamano v. Ortiz, 291 SCRA 584 (1998).
[15]
Report of the Code Commission, p. 80.
[6]
Now Article 3, Family Code. Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all
the requisites are complied with: [16]
Rollo, p. 29.
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties; their consent, freely given;
[17]
Articles 63 and 64, Civil Code; Article 17 and 18, Family Code.
(2) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
Article 83, Civil Code provides "Any marriage subsequently contracted by any
[18]

(3) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character. person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person
[7]
Now Article 4, Family Code. Art. 80. The following marriages shall be void from other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance,
the beginning: unless:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) the first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional
character. (2) the first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years...."

xxx xxx xxx Article 41 of the Family Code reads: "A marriage contracted by any person during
[8]
Art. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the
this Title, but not those under article 75, no marriage shall be solemnized without celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for
a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where four consecutive years..."
either contracting party habitually resides.
[19]
Arts. 333 and 334, Revised Penal Code.
[9]
Perido v. Perido, 63 SCRA 97 (1975).
[20]
Art. 47. The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by the following
19
persons and within the periods indicated herein:
Article 39, Family Code as amended by E.O. 209 and 227 s. 1987 and further
[29]

(1) For causes mentioned in number 1 of Article 45 by the party whose parent or amended by R.A. No. 8533 dated February 23, 1998.
guardian did not give his or her consent, within five years after attaining the age
of twenty-one; or by the parent or guardian or person having legal charge of the 5
minor, at any time before such party has reached the age of twenty-one; 618 Phil. 545

(2) For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 45, by the sane spouse, who THIRD DIVISION
had no knowledge of the other's insanity; or by any relative or guardian or
person having legal charge of the insane, at any time before the death of either
[ G.R. No. 114217, October 13, 2009 ]
party, or by the insane spouse during a lucid interval or after regaining sanity;

(3) For causes mentioned in number 3 of Article 45, by the injured party, within HEIRS OF JOSE SY BANG, HEIRS OF JULIAN SY AND OSCAR
five years after the discovery of the fraud; SY,[1] PETITIONERS, VS. ROLANDO SY, ROSALINO SY, LUCIO SY,
ENRIQUE SY, ROSAURO SY, BARTOLOME SY, FLORECITA SY, LOURDES
(4) For causes mentioned in number 4 of Article 45, by the injured party, within SY, JULIETA SY, AND ROSITA FERRERA-SY, RESPONDENTS.
five years from the time the force, intimidation or undue influence disappeared or
ceased; [ G.R. NO. 150797]

For causes mentioned in numbers 5 and 6 of Article 45, by the injured party, ILUMINADA TAN, SPOUSES JULIAN SY AND ROSA TAN, ZENAIDA TAN,
within five years after the marriage. AND MA. EMMA SY, PETITIONERS, VS. BARTOLOME SY, ROSALINO SY,
FLORECITA SY, ROLANDO SY, LOURDES SY, ROSAURO SY, JULIETA SY,
[21]
Suntay v. Cojuanco-Suntay, 300 SCRA 760 (1998); AND ROSITA FERRERA-SY, RESPONDENTS.
People v. Retirement Board, 272 Ill. App. 59 cited in I Tolentino, Civil Code, 1990
ed. p. 271. DECISION

[22]
In re Conza's Estate, 176 Ill. 192; Miller v. Miller, 175 Cal. 797, 167 Pac. 394
cited in I Tolentino, Civil Code, 1990 ed., p. 271. NACHURA, J.:

[23]
Article 148-149, Family Code; Article 144, Civil Code. Before this Court are two Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. The first Petition, G.R. No. 114217, assails the Decision[2] dated
Odayat v. Amante, 77 SCRA 338 (1977); Weigel v. Sempio-Dy, 143 SCRA
[24] May 6, 1993 and the Resolution[3] dated February 28, 1994 of the Court of
499 (1986); People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845 (1954); 50 O.G. (10) 4767 cited in Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 17686. On the other hand, the second
People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033 (1957); 53 O.G. 3749. Petition, G.R. No. 150797, questions the Decision dated February 28, 2001 and
the Resolution dated November 5, 2001 of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 46244.
[25]
35 Am. Jur. 219-220.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
[26]
18 RCL 446-7; 35 Am Jur. 221.
G.R. No. 114217
Apiag v. Cantero, 335 Phil. 511 (1997); 268 SCRA 47 (1997); Atienza v.
[27]

Judge Brillantes, Jr., 60 SCAD 119; 312 Phil. 939 (1995). On May 28, 1980, respondent Rolando Sy filed a Complaint for Partition against
spouses Jose Sy Bang and Iluminada Tan, spouses Julian Sy and Rosa Tan,
[28]
Domingo v. CA, 226 SCRA 572 (1993). Zenaida Sy, Ma. Emma Sy, Oscar Sy, Rosalino Sy, Lucio Sy, Enrique Sy, Rosauro

20
Sy, Bartolome Sy, Florecita Sy, Lourdes Sy, Julieta Sy, Rosita Ferrera-Sy, and
Renato Sy before the then Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch 2, docketed
as Civil Case No. 8578.[4]
Respondents Rolando Sy, Rosalino Sy, Lucio Sy, Enrique Sy, Rosauro Sy,
Bartolome Sy, Julieta Sy, Lourdes Sy, and Florecita Sy are the children of Sy
Bang by his second marriage to respondent Rosita Ferrera-Sy, while petitioners
Jose Sy Bang, Julian Sy and Oscar Sy are the children of Sy Bang from his first
marriage to Ba Nga, and petitioners Zenaida Tan and Ma. Emma Sy are the
children of petitioner spouses Jose Sy Bang and Iluminada Tan.[5]
Sy Bang died intestate in 1971, leaving behind real and personal properties,
including several businesses.[6]
During an out-of-court conference between petitioners and respondents, it was
agreed that the management, supervision or administration of the common
properties and/or the entire estate of the deceased Sy Bang shall be placed
temporarily in the hands of petitioner Jose Sy Bang, as trustee, with authority to
delegate some of his functions to any of petitioners or private respondents. Thus,
the function or duty of bookkeeper was delegated by Jose Sy Bang to his co-
petitioner Julian Sy, and the duty or function of management and operation of
the business of cinema of the common ownership was delegated by petitioner
Jose Sy Bang to respondent Rosauro Sy.[7]
Herein petitioners and respondents also agreed that the income of the three
cinema houses, namely, Long Life, SBS and Sy-Co Theaters, shall exclusively
pertain to respondents for their support and sustenance, pending the termination
of Civil Case No. 8578, for Judicial Partition, and the income from the vast parts
of the entire estate and other businesses of their common father, to pertain
exclusively to petitioners. Hence, since the year 1980, private respondents,
through respondent Rosauro Sy, had taken charge of the operation and
management of the three cinema houses, with the income derived therefrom
evenly divided among themselves for their support and maintenance.[8]
On March 30, 1981, the Judge rendered a First Partial Decision based on the
Compromise Agreement dated November 10, 1980, submitted in Civil Case No.
8578 by plaintiff Rolando Sy and defendants Jose Sy Bang and Julian Sy. On April
2, 1981, the Judge rendered a Second Partial Decision based on the pretrial order
of the court, dated March 25, 1981, entered into by and between respondent
Renato Sy and petitioner spouses. Said First Partial Decision and Second Partial
Decision had long become final, without an appeal having been interposed by any
of the parties.[9]
On June 8, 1982, the Judge rendered a Third Partial Decision,[10] the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders this Third Partial Decision:
(a) Declaring that all the properties, businesses or assets, their income, produce
and improvements, as well as all the rights, interests or participations (sic) in the
names of defendants Jose Sy Bang and his wife Iluminada Tan and their children,
defendants Zenaida and Ma. Emma; both surnamed Sy, and defendants Julian Sy
and his wife Rosa Tan, as belonging to the estate of Sy Bang, including the
properties in the names of said defendants which are enumerated in the
Complaints in this case and all those properties, rights and interests which said
defendants may have concealed or fraudulently transferred in the names of other
persons, their agents or representatives;
(b) Declaring the following as the heirs of Sy Bang, namely: his surviving widow,
Maria Rosita Ferrera-Sy and her children, Enrique, Bartolome, Rosalino, Rolando,
Rosauro, Maria Lourdes, Florecita and Julieta, all surnamed Sy, and his children
by his first wife, namely: Jose Sy Bang, Julian Sy, Lucio Sy, Oscar Sy and Renato
Sy;
(c) Ordering the partition of the Estate of Sy Bang among his heirs entitled
thereto after the extent thereof shall have been determined at the conclusion of
the proper accounting which the parties in this case, their agents and
representatives, shall render and after segregating and delivering to Maria Rosita
Ferrera-Sy her one-half (1/2) share in the conjugal partnership between her and
her deceased husband Sy Bang;
(d) Deferring resolution on the question concerning the inclusion for partition of
properties in the names of Rosalino, Bartolome, Rolando and Enrique, all
surnamed Sy.
SO ORDERED.
On June 16, 1982, petitioners filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings and for
Inhibition, alleging, among others, that the Judge had patently shown partiality in
favor of their co-defendants in the case. This motion was denied on August 16,
1982.[11]
On July 4, 1982, petitioners filed a Petition for Prohibition and for Inhibition
(Disqualification) and Mandamus with Restraining Order with the Supreme Court
docketed as G.R. No. 60957. The Petition for Prohibition and for Inhibition was
denied, and the Petition for Mandamus with Restraining Order was Noted.[12]
21
On August 17, 1982, the Judge issued two Orders: (1) in the first Order,[13] Mrs.
Lucita L. Sarmiento was appointed as Receiver, and petitioners' Motion for New
Trial and/or Reconsideration, dated July 9, 1982 and their Supplemental Motion,
dated July 12, 1982, were denied for lack of merit; and (2) in the second
Order,[14] the Judge ordered the immediate cancellation of the lis
pendens annotated at the back of the certificates of title in the names of
Bartolome Sy, Rosalino Sy and Rolando Sy.
On August 18, 1982, the trial court approved the bond posted by the receiver,
Mrs. Lucita L. Sarmiento, Bartolome Sy, Rolando Sy and Rosalino Sy.[15]
While the Petition for Mandamus with Restraining Order was pending before the
First Division of the Supreme Court, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition before the Supreme Court, docketed as G.R. No. 61519. A Temporary
Restraining Order was issued on August 31, 1982, to enjoin the Judge from
taking any action in Civil Case No. 8578 and, likewise, restraining the effectivity
of and compliance with the Resolution dated August 16, 1982, the two Orders
dated August 17, 1982, and the Order dated August 18, 1982.
On September 2, 1982, petitioners withdrew their Petition for Mandamus with
Restraining Order, docketed as G.R. No. 60957.
On September 11, 1982, an Urgent Manifestation and Motion was filed by Mrs.
Lucita L. Sarmiento, the appointed receiver, which was opposed by petitioners on
September 24, 1982. [16]
After several incidents in the case, the Court, on May 8, 1989, referred the
petition to the CA for proper determination and disposition.
The CA rendered the assailed Decision[17] on May 6, 1993, denying due course to
and dismissing the petition for lack of merit. It held that Judge Puno acted
correctly in issuing the assailed Third Partial Decision. The CA said that the act of
Judge Puno in rendering a partial decision was in accord with then Rule 36,
Section 4, of the Rules of Court, which stated that in an action against several
defendants, the court may, when a judgment is proper, render judgment against
one or more of them, leaving the action to proceed against the others. It found
that the judge's decision to defer resolution on the properties in the name of
Rosalino, Bartolome, Rolando, and Enrique would not affect the resolution on the
properties in the names of Jose Sy Bang, Iluminada, Julian, Rosa, Zenaida, and
Ma. Emma, since the properties were separable and distinct from one another
such that the claim that the same formed part of the Sy Bang estate could be the
subject of separate suits.
The CA also upheld the judge's appointment of a receiver, saying that the judge
did so after both parties had presented their evidence and upon verified petition
filed by respondents, and in order to preserve the properties under litigation.
Further, the CA found proper the order to cancel the notice of lis
pendens annotated in the certificates of title in the names of Rosalino, Rolando
and Bartolome.
The Motion for Reconsideration was denied on February 28, 1994.[18]
On April 22, 1994, petitioners filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
The Court denied the Petition for non-compliance with Circulars 1-88 and 19-91
for failure of petitioners to attach the registry receipt. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration, and the Petition was reinstated on July 13, 1994.
In this Petition for Review, petitioners seek the reversal of the CA Decision and
Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 17686 and, consequently, the nullification of the
Third Partial Decision and orders of the trial court in Civil Case No. 8578. They
also pray for the Court to direct the trial court to proceed with the reception of
further evidence in Civil Case No. 8578.[19] In particular, petitioners allege that
the CA decided questions of substance not in accord with law when it upheld the
trial court's Third Partial Decision which, they alleged, was rendered in violation
of their rights to due process.
Petitioners narrate that the trial court initially gave them two trial days - May 26
and 27, 1982 - to present their evidence. However, at the hearing on May 26, the
judge forced them to terminate the presentation of their evidence. On June 2,
1982, following petitioners' submission of additional documentary evidence, the
trial court scheduled the case for hearing on June 8 and 9, 1982, at 2 o'clock in
the afternoon "in view of the importance of the issue concerning whether all the
properties in the names of Enrique Sy, Bartolome Sy, Rosalino Sy, and Rolando
Sy and/or their respective wives (as well as those in the names of other party-
litigants in this case) shall be declared or included as part of the Estate of Sy
Bang, and in view of the numerous documentary evidences (sic) presented by
Attys. Raya and Camaligan." At the June 8 hearing, petitioners presented
additional evidence. Unknown to them, however, the trial court had already
rendered its Third Partial Decision at 11 o'clock that morning. Thus, petitioners
argue that said Third Partial Decision is void.[20]
They also question the trial court's First Order dated August 17, 1982 and Order
dated August 18, 1982 granting the prayer for receivership and appointing a
22
receiver, respectively, both allegedly issued without a hearing and without
showing the necessity to appoint a receiver. Lastly, they question the Second
Order dated August 17, 1982 canceling the notice of lis pendens ex parte and
without any showing that the notice was for the purpose of molesting the adverse
parties, or that it was not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused
it to be recorded.[21]
On May 9, 1996, Rosita Ferrera-Sy filed a Motion for Payment of Widow's
Allowance. She alleged that her deceased husband, Sy Bang, left an extensive
estate. The properties of the estate were found by the trial court to be their
conjugal properties. From the time of Sy Bang's death in 1971 until the filing of
the motion, Rosita was not given any widow's allowance as provided in Section 3,
Rule 83 of the Rules of Court by the parties in possession and control of her
husband's estate, or her share in the conjugal partnership.[22]
In their Comment on the Motion for Payment of Widow's Allowance, petitioners
argued that Section 3, Rule 83 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that the
same is granted only "during the settlement of the estate" of the decedent, and
this allowance, under Article 188 of the Civil Code (now Article 133 of the Family
Code), shall be taken from the "common mass of property" during the liquidation
of the inventoried properties.[23] Considering that the case before the trial court is
a special civil action for partition under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court, Rosita is
not entitled to widow's allowance.
On September 23, 1996, the Court granted the Motion for Payment of Widow's
Allowance and ordered petitioners jointly and severally to pay Rosita P25,000.00
as the widow's allowance to be taken from the estate of Sy Bang, effective
September 1, 1996 and every month thereafter until the estate is finally settled
or until further orders from the Court.[24]
In a Manifestation dated October 1, 1996, petitioners informed the Court that
Rosita and co-petitioner Enrique Sy had executed a waiver of past, present and
future claims against petitioners and, thus, should be dropped as parties to the
case.[25] Attached thereto was a Sinumpaang Salaysay wherein Rosita and
Enrique stated that they were given P1 million and a 229-square meter parcel of
land, for which reason they were withdrawing as plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
8578.[26]
Respondents, except Enrique Sy, filed a Counter-Manifestation and Opposition to
Drop Rosita Sy as a Party.[27] They said that it would be ridiculous for Rosita to
give up her share in Sy Bang's estate, amounting to hundreds of millions of
pesos, which had already been ordered partitioned by the trial court, to the
prejudice of her seven full-blooded children. They alleged that Rosita was not in
possession of her full faculties when she affixed her thumbmark on
the Sinumpaang Salaysay considering her age, her frequent illness, and her lack
of ability to read or write. Hence, they filed a petition before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Lucena City for guardianship over her person and properties. They
also alleged that Enrique and some of Jose Sy Bang's children would stealthily
visit Rosita in Rosauro's house while the latter was away. On one of those
occasions, she was asked to affix her thumbmark on some documents she could
not read and knew nothing about. They claim that Rosita has never received a
single centavo of the P1 million allegedly given her.
In their Reply to Counter-Manifestation,[28] petitioners countered that
respondents failed to present any concrete evidence to challenge the Sinumpaang
Salaysay. Since the same was duly notarized, it was a public document and
presumed valid. They, likewise, alleged that the Counter-Manifestation was filed
without Rosita's authorization as, in fact, she had written her counsel with
instructions to withdraw said pleading.[29] Further, they averred that Rosita
executed the Sinumpaang Salaysay while in full possession of her faculties. They
alleged that Rosita intended to oppose the petition for guardianship and they
presented a copy of a sworn certification from Rosita's physician that "she
(Rosita) is physically fit and mentally competent to attend to her personal or
business transactions."[30]
On the other hand, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's
September 23, 1996 Resolution. It alleged that Rosita and Enrique executed
their Sinumpaang Salaysayon August 29, 1996. However, this development was
made known to the Court only on October 1, 1996; hence, the Court was not
aware of this when it issued its Resolution. Petitioners prayed for the
reconsideration of the September 23, 1996 Resolution and dropping Rosita and
Enrique as parties to the case.[31]
In their Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration, respondents maintained
that the Court should not consider the Motion for Reconsideration. Respondents
alleged that Rosita thumbmarked the Sinumpaang Salaysay without
understanding the contents of the document or the implications of her acts.
Respondents also tried to demonstrate that their mother would thumbmark any
document that their children asked her to by exhibiting four documents each
denominated as Sinumpaang Salaysay and thumbmarked by Rosita. One
purported to disown the earlier Sinumpaang Salaysay. The second was a
reproduction of the earlier Sinumpaang Salaysay with the amount changed to
P100.00, the Transfer Certificate of Title number changed to 12343567, and the
size of the property to "as big as the entire Lucena City." The third purported to
bequeath her shares in the conjugal partnership of gains to Rosauro, Bartolome,
Rolando, and Rosalino, while refusing to give any inheritance to Florecita,
23
Lourdes, Julieta, and Enrique. Lastly, the fourth contradicted the third in that it
was in favor of Florecita, Lourdes, Julieta, and Enrique, while disinheriting
Rosauro, Bartolome, Rolando, and Rosalino. These, respondents assert, clearly
show that their mother would sign any document, no matter the contents, upon
the request of any of her children.[32]
The Court denied the Motion for Reconsideration on November 18, 1996.[33]
Petitioners filed a Supplement to their Memorandum, additionally arguing that
the Third Partial Decision did not only unduly bind the properties without due
process, but also ignored the fundamental rule on the indefeasibility of Torrens
titles.[34]
G.R. No. 150797
Meanwhile, on September 30, 1996, respondents filed a Joint Petition for the
Guardianship of the Incompetent Rosita Ferrera-Sy before the RTC of Lucena
City, Branch 58 (Guardianship court), docketed as Special Proceedings No. 96-
34. On May 19, 1997, Rosauro Sy, who sought to be named as the special
guardian, filed before the Guardianship court a Motion to Order Court Deposit of
Widow's Allowance Ordered by the Supreme Court.[35] Then, he filed a Motion
before this Court seeking an Order for petitioners to pay Rosita P2,150,000.00 in
widow's allowance and P25,000.00 every month thereafter, as ordered by this
Court in its September 23, 1996 Resolution. He also prayed for petitioners'
imprisonment should they fail to comply therewith.[36]
On July 8, 1997, the Guardianship court issued an Order, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, Mr. Jose Sy Bang and his wife Iluminada Tan; and their children,
Zenaida Sy and Ma. Emma Sy; and Julian Sy and his wife Rosa Tan, are hereby
ordered to deposit to this Court, jointly and severally, the amount of P250,000.00
representing the widow's allowance of the incompetent Rosita Ferrera Sy
corresponding the (sic) periods from September 1, 1996 to June 30, 1997, and
additional amount of P25,000.00 per month and every month thereafter, within
the first ten (10) days of each month.[37]
Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was denied. Rosauro, the appointed
guardian, then asked the Guardianship court to issue a writ of execution.
Meanwhile, on December 10, 1997, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with
the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 46244 to annul the July 8, 1997 Order and
October 9, 1997 Resolution of the Guardianship court.[38]
In a Decision[39] dated February 28, 2001, the CA ruled in respondents' favor,
finding "nothing legally objectionable in private respondent Rosauro Sy's filing of
the motion to order the deposit of the widow's allowance ordered by the Supreme
Court in G.R. No. 114217 or, for that matter, in the public respondent's grant
thereof in the order herein assailed. More so, when the public respondent's
actions are viewed in the light of the Supreme Court's denial of petitioners'
motion for reconsideration of its resolution dated September 23, 1996."[40]Thus it
held:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the assailed
resolution dated September 23, 1996 (sic) is AFFIRMED in
toto. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Their Motion for Reconsideration having been denied on November 5,
2001,[41] petitioners filed this Petition for Review[42] under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court praying for this Court to reverse the CA's February 28, 2001 Decision and
its Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration, and to declare the
Guardianship court to have exceeded its jurisdiction in directing the deposit of
the widow's allowance in Special Proceedings No. 96-34.[43] They argued that the
Guardianship court's jurisdiction is limited to determining whether Rosita was
incompetent and, upon finding in the affirmative, appointing a guardian.
Moreover, under Rule 83, Section 3, of the Rules of Court, a widow's allowance
can only be paid in an estate proceeding. Even if the complaint for partition were
to be considered as estate proceedings, only the trial court hearing the partition
case had the exclusive jurisdiction to execute the payment of the widow's
allowance.[44]
They raised the following issues:
The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Guardianship Court's Order dated 8
July 1997, and Resolution dated 9 October 1997, in that:
I
The trial court, acting as a Guardianship Court, and limited jurisdiction,
had no authority to enforce payment of widow's allowance.
II
The payment of widow's allowance cannot be implemented at [the] present
24
because the estate of Sy Bang - the source from which payment is to be taken -
has not been determined with finality.
III
The Order of the trial court purporting to enforce payment of widow's allowance
unduly modified the express terms of this Honorable Court's Resolution granting
it.[45]
Petitioners, likewise, question the Guardianship court's omission of the phrase "to
be taken from the estate of Sy Bang" from the July 8, 1997 Order. They
interpreted this to mean that the Guardianship court was ordering that the
widow's allowance be taken from their own properties and not from the estate of
Sy Bang - an "undue modification" of this Court's September 23, 1996
Resolution.[46]
On January 21, 2002, the Court resolved to
consolidate G.R. No. 114217 and G.R. No. 150797. The parties submitted their
respective Memoranda on May 21, 2003 and June 19, 2003, both of which were
noted by this Court in its August 11, 2003 Resolution.
Pending the issuance of this Court's Decision in the two cases, respondent
Rosauro Sy filed, on November 11, 2003, a Motion to Order Deposit in Court of
Supreme Court's Ordered Widow's Allowance Effective September 23, 1996 and
Upon Failure of Petitioners Julian Sy, et al. to Comply Therewith to Order Their
Imprisonment Until Compliance. He alleged that his mother had been ill and
had no means to support herself except through his financial assistance, and that
respondents had not complied with this Court's September 23, 1996 Resolution,
promulgated seven years earlier.[47] He argued that respondents' defiance
constituted indirect contempt of court. That the Guardianship court had found
them guilty of indirect contempt did not help his mother because she was still
unable to collect her widow's allowance.[48]
Petitioners opposed said Motion arguing that the estate from which the widow's
allowance is to be taken has not been settled. They also reiterated that Rosita,
together with son Enrique, had executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay waiving all
claims against petitioners. Hence, there was no legal ground to cite them in
contempt.[49]
On April 4, 2005, this Court granted Rosauro's Motion, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds and so holds petitioner Iluminada Tan (widow of
deceased petitioner Jose Sy Bang), their children and co-petitioners Zenaida
Sy, Ma.Emma Sy, Julian Sy and the latter's wife Rosa Tan, GUILTY of
contempt of this Court and are collectively sentenced to pay a FINE equivalent to
ten (10%) percent of the total amount due and unpaid to Rosita Ferrera-Sy by
way of a widow's allowance pursuant to this Court's Resolution of September 13,
1996, and accordingly ORDERStheir immediate imprisonment until they shall
have complied with said Resolution by paying Rosita Ferrera-Sy the amount of
TWO MILLION SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED PESOS
(P2,600,100.00), representing her total accumulated unpaid widow's allowance
from September, 1996 to April, 2005 at the rate of TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND
PESOS (P25,000.00) a month, plus six (6%) percent interest thereon. The Court
further DIRECTS petitioners to faithfully pay Rosita Ferrera-Sy her monthly
widow's allowance for the succeeding months as they fall due, under pain of
imprisonment.
This Resolution is immediately EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED.[50]
Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma paid the court fine of P260,010.00 on April 5,
2005.[51]
Respondents, except Rosauro Sy (who had died), filed a Motion for
Execution[52] before this Court on April 25, 2005. On the other hand, petitioner
Rosa Tan filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer for Clarification.[53] She
alleged that, in accordance with Chinese culture, she had no participation in the
management of the family business or Sy Bang's estate. After her husband's
death, she allegedly inherited nothing but debts and liabilities, and,
having no income of her own, was now in a quandary on how these can be paid.
She asked the Court to consider that she had not disobeyed its Resolution and to
consider her motion.
Other petitioners, Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma, also filed a Motion for
Reconsideration with Prayer for Clarification.[54] They stressed that the P1 million
and the piece of land Rosita had already received from Jose Sy Bang in 1996
should form part of the widow's allowance. They also argued that whatever
allowance Rosita may be entitled to should come from the estate of Sy Bang.
They further argued the unfairness of being made to pay the allowance when
none of them participated in the management of Sy Bang's estate; Zenaida and
Ma. Emma being minors at the time of his death, while Iluminada and Rosa
had no significant role in the family business.
Respondents then filed a Motion for Issuance of Order Requiring Respondents to
Deposit with the Supreme Court's Cashier its Ordered Widow's Allowance[55] and
25
a Motion for Execution of Resolution dated April 4, 2005.[56] Petitioners opposed
the same.[57]
On July 25, 2005, the Court issued a Resolution granting both of respondents'
motions and denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.[58]
Petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma filed, on August 15, 2005, a
Manifestation of Compliance and Motion for Clarification.[59] They maintained that
the issues they had raised in the motion for reconsideration had not been duly
resolved. They argued that when this Court issued its September 23, 1996
Resolution, it was not yet aware that Rosita had executed a Sinumpaang
Salaysay, wherein she waived her claims and causes of action against petitioners.
They also informed this Court that, on April 17, 1998, the Guardianship court had
issued an Order which recognized a "temporary agreement" based on the
voluntary offer of Jose Sy Bang of a financial assistance of P5,000.00 per month
to Rosita while the case was pending. Moreover, as a manifestation of good faith,
petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma paid the P430,000.00 out of their
own funds in partial compliance with the Court's Resolution. However, the same
did not in any way constitute a waiver of their rights or defenses in the present
case. They underscored the fact that the allowance must come from the estate of
Sy Bang, and not from Jose Sy Bang or any of the latter's heirs, the extent of
which remained undetermined. They further asked the Court to adjudicate the
liability for the widow's allowance to be equally divided between them and the
other set of petitioners, the heirs of Julian Sy.
On August 30, 2005, respondents filed a motion asking this Court to issue an
Order for the immediate incarceration of petitioners for refusing to comply with
the Court's resolution.[60]They aver that the period within which petitioners were
to comply with the Court's Resolution had now lapsed, and thus, petitioners must
now be incarcerated for failure to abide by said Resolution. They likewise asked
the Court to refer petitioners' counsel, Atty. Vicente M. Joyas, to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for violations of the Canons of Professional
Responsibility or to declare him in contempt of court. They alleged that despite
the finality of the Court's denial of petitioners' motion for reconsideration, Atty.
Joyas still filed a Manifestation with compliance arguing the same points. Further,
Atty. Joyas is not petitioners' counsel of record in this case since he never
formally entered his appearance before the Court.[61]
In a Resolution dated September 14, 2005, the Court denied the motion to refer
Atty. Joyas to the IBP for being a wrong remedy.[62]
Petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma then filed an Omnibus
Motion,[63] seeking an extension of time to comply with the Court's Resolution
and Motion to delete the penalty of "fine" as a consequence of voluntary
compliance. They insist that their compliance with the order to pay the widow's
allowance should "obliterate, expunge, and blot out" the penalty of fine and
imprisonment. They alleged that for their failure to comply with this Court's
Resolution, the RTC, Lucena City, found them guilty of indirect contempt and
imposed on them a fine of P30,000.00. They had appealed said order to the CA.
They also tried to make a case out of the use of the terms "joint and several" in
the September 23 Resolution, and "collectively" in the April 5, 2005 Resolution.
They argued that "joint and several" creates individual liability for each of the
parties for the full amount of the obligation, while "collectively" means that all
members of the group are responsible together for the action of the group.
Hence, "collectively" would mean that the liability belongs equally to the two
groups of petitioners. They requested for an additional 60 days to raise the
necessary amount. They also asked the Court to hold their imprisonment in
abeyance until their "just and reasonable compliance" with the Court's orders.
Barely a month later, petitioners, through their new counsel, filed another
Manifestation stressing that Sy Bang's marriage to Rosita Ferrera is void. They
claimed that respondents have falsified documents to lead the courts into
believing that Rosita's marriage to Sy Bang is valid.
The Omnibus Motion was denied in a Resolution dated October 17, 2005.
Thereafter, respondents filed a Motion to Immediately Order Incarceration of
Petitioners,[64] which petitioners opposed.[65]
In a Resolution dated December 12, 2005,[66] the Court issued a Warrant of
Arrest[67] against petitioners and directed the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) to detain them until they complied with this Court's April 4, 2005 and July
25, 2005 Resolutions.
Petitioner Rosa Tan filed a Manifestation with Motion.[68] She informed the Court
that, to show that she was not obstinate and contumacious of the Court and its
orders, she had begged and pleaded with her relatives to raise money to comply,
but concedes that she was only able to raise a minimal amount since she
has no source of income herself and needs financial support to buy her food and
medicines. She obtained her brother's help and the latter issued six checks in the
total amount of P650,000.00. She also alleged that she was not informed by her
husband's counsel of the developments in the case, and remained unconsulted on
any of the matters or incidents of the case. She reiterated that she
had noparticipation in the management of the Sy Bang estate and received
nothing of value upon her husband's death. She prayed that the Court would not
consider her failure to raise any further amount as contempt or defiance of it's
26
orders.
The motion was denied in a Resolution dated January 16, 2006.
In an Urgent Manifestation of Compliance with the Contempt Resolutions with
Payment of Widow's Allowance with Prayer Reiterating the Lifting of Warrant of
Arrest on Humanitarian Grounds,[69] petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma.
Emma asked the Court to delete the penalty of indefinite imprisonment
considering their partial compliance and the partial compliance of Rosa Tan. They
expressed willingness to deposit the widow's allowance with the Supreme Court's
Cashier pending the determination of Sy Bang's estate. They reasoned that the
money to be deposited is their own and does not belong to Sy Bang's estate. The
deposit is made for the sole purpose of deleting the penalty of indefinite
imprisonment. They claim that they are not willfully disobeying the Court's order
but are merely hesitating to comply because of pending incidents such as the
falsification charges against Rosita, the resolution of the partition case, the
Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by Rosita, and the pendency of Rosita's
guardianship proceedings, as well as humanitarian considerations. Thus, they
prayed for the Court to reconsider the order of contempt and to recall the
warrant of arrest.
On February 15, 2006, this Court issued a Resolution[70] lifting the warrant of
arrest on petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida, Ma. Emma, and Rosa Tan on the
condition that they issue the corresponding checks to settle the accrued widow's
allowance of Rosita Ferrera-Sy. They were also directed to submit proof of their
compliance to the Court within ten (10) days from notice.
In a Manifestation[71] dated February 28, 2006, petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida
and Ma. Emma informed the Court that they had deposited the checks in favor of
Rosita with the RTC, Lucena City, Branch 58, during the proceedings on February
28, 2006.[72]
Respondents filed a Comment to the Manifestation arguing that the deposit of
said checks, amounting to P1,073,053.00, does not amount to full compliance
with the Court's order considering that the accrued widow's allowance now
amounted to P4,528,125.00.
Then, petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma filed a Motion to include
Rosalino Sy, Bartolome Sy, Rolando Sy, and Heirs of Enrique Sy as Likewise
Liable for the Payment of Widow's Allowance as Heirs of Sy Bang as they may
also hold Assets-Properties of the Estate of Sy Bang.[73] They argued that it is
denial of the equal protection clause for the Court to single out only the two
children of the first marriage - Jose Sy Bang and Julian Sy - and their heirs, as
the ones responsible for the widow's allowance. This ruling, they aver, does not
take into consideration the numerous and valuable properties from the estate of
Sy Bang being held in the names of Rosalino, Bartolome, Rolando, and Enrique.
They alleged that two compromise agreements, both approved by the trial court,
transferred properties to Rolando and Renato. They further alleged that
respondents Rolando, Maria Lourdes, Florecita, Rosalino, Enrique, and Rosita
Ferrera-Sy have executed separate waivers and quitclaims over their shares in
the estate of Sy Bang for certain considerations. However, out of respect for the
Court and their fear of incarceration, they complied with the Court's orders using
their personal funds which they claim is unfair because they have never
participated in the management of the properties of Sy Bang. They prayed that
the Court pronounce that the liability for the widow's allowance be divided
proportionately among the following groups: Iluminada, Zenaida, and Ma. Emma;
Rosa Tan; Rosalino Sy and wife Helen Loo; Bartolome Sy and wife Virginia Lim;
Rolando Sy and wife Anacorita Rioflorido; and the heirs of Enrique Sy, namely,
Elaine Destura and Edwin Maceda.
On March 23, 2006, petitioners filed an Urgent Reply to respondents' Comment
on the manifestation of compliance with Opposition[74] to the motion filed by
respondents for the Court to reiterate its order for the NBI to arrest petitioners
for failure to comply with the February 15, 2006 Resolution. They argued that
they had fully complied with the Court's orders. They alleged that on three
occasions within the period, they had tried to submit 12 postdated checks to the
Court's cashiers, but the same were refused due to the policy of the Court not to
issue receipts on postdated checks. They then filed a motion before the RTC of
Lucena City praying for authority to deposit the checks with the trial court. The
motion was denied but, on reconsideration, was later granted. The checks are
now in the custody of the RTC. The only issue respondents raise, they claim, is
the amount of the checks. Hence, there is no basis for the Court to direct the NBI
to effect their arrest.
The Court, in a Resolution dated March 29, 2006, required respondents to
comment on the motion to include some of them in the payment of widow's
allowance. Petitioners, on the other hand, were required to comment on a motion
filed by respondents for the Court to reiterate its order to the NBI to arrest
petitioners for failure to comply with the February 15, 2006 Resolution.[75]
Petitioners filed their Comment with Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the
March 29, 2006 Resolution.[76] They reiterated their arguments in their Urgent
Reply to respondents' Comment on the manifestation of compliance with
Opposition. They further alleged that there is now a Resolution by the Regional
State Prosecutor, Region IV, San Pablo City, finding probable cause to charge
respondents with falsification of three marriage contracts between Sy Bang and
27
Rosita Ferrera. According to them, this development now constitutes a "highly
prejudicial question" on whether they should comply with the order to pay
widow's allowance. They claim that, while the filing of the information is merely
the first step in the criminal prosecution of respondents, it already casts doubt on
whether Rosita is legally entitled to the widow's allowance. They now seek partial
reconsideration of the Resolution inasmuch as it requires them to deposit with
the Clerk of Court, RTC of Lucena City, Branch 58, new checks payable to Rosita
Ferrera.
Respondents, on the other hand, filed a Comment and Manifestation [77] on why
they should not be made to pay the widow's allowance. They argued that the RTC
had already decided that the estate of Sy Bang was comprised of properties in
the names of Jose Sy Bang, Iluminada Tan, Zenaida, Ma. Emma, Julian Sy, and
Rosa Tan, and the same was affirmed by the CA. Pending the resolution of the
appeal before this Court, this Decision stands. Thus, petitioners' claim that the
estate of Sy Bang is yet undetermined is false. They also claim that, contrary to
petitioners' claims of being poor, they still hold enormous properties of the Sy
Bang estate, which had been transferred in their names through falsification of
public documents, now subject of several cases which respondents filed against
them before the Department of Justice (DOJ). Respondents further claim that the
validity of their mother's marriage to Sy Bang has been recognized by the courts
in several cases where the issue had been raised, including the case for
recognition of Rosita's Filipino citizenship, the guardianship proceedings, and the
partition proceedings.
On June 23, 2006, respondents filed a Motion for Substitution of Parties.[78] They
averred that Jose Sy Bang died on September 11, 2001, leaving behind his widow
Iluminada and 14 children, while Julian Sy died on August 28, 2004, leaving
behind his widow Rosa and eight children. The claims against Jose and Julian
were not extinguished by their deaths. It was the duty of petitioners' counsel,
under Rule 3, Section 16 of the Rules of Court, to inform the Court of these
deaths within 30 days thereof. Petitioners' counsel failed to so inform this Court,
which should be a ground for disciplinary action. Hence, respondents prayed that
the Court order the heirs of the two deceased to appear and be substituted in
these cases within 30 days from notice.
In a Resolution[79] dated July 5, 2006, the Court granted the motion for
substitution and noted the Comment and Manifestation on the Motion to include
Rosalino Sy, Bartolome Sy, Rolando Sy, and Heirs of Enrique Sy as Likewise
Liable for the Payment of Widow's Allowance as Heirs of Sy Bang.
Respondents then filed a Manifestation and Motion to Implement the Supreme
Court's Resolutions of September 23, 1996, April 4, 2005, July 25, 2005,
December 12, 2005, and February 15, 2006.[80] They prayed that petitioners be
given a last period of five days within which to deposit with the Supreme Court
Cashier all the accrued widow's allowances as of June 2006.
Petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma opposed respondents'
manifestation and motion.[81] They argued that the resolutions sought to be
implemented were all issued prior to the DOJ Resolution finding probable cause
to file the falsification charges against respondents. They contended that the
criminal cases for falsification expose Rosita as a mere common-law wife and not
a "widow"; hence, there is no legal justification to give her the widow's
allowance. They also reiterated their earlier arguments against the grant of
widow's allowance.
Meanwhile, Rosa Tan filed a Comment on the Substitution of Parties with Motion
for Reconsideration.[82] She argued that since the trial court had already
appointed a judicial administrator for the estate of Sy Bang, which includes Julian
Sy's estate, the proper party to be substituted should be the administrator and
not Julian's heirs who never exercised ownership rights over the properties
thereof.
The Court denied the motion for reconsideration to the Resolution granting
substitution of parties for lack of merit on November 20, 2006.
The Court's Ruling
G.R. No. 114217
Finding no reversible error therein, we affirm the CA Decision.
The Third Partial Decision of the RTC
To review, the CA held, to wit:
The respondent Judge acted correctly inasmuch as his decision to defer the
resolution on the question concerning the properties in the name of Rosalino,
Bartolome, Rolando and Enrique, all surnamed Sy, will not necessarily affect the
decision he rendered concerning the properties in the names of Jose Sy Bang and
wife, Julian Sy and wife, Zenaida Sy and Maria Sy, considering that the properties
mentioned were separable and distinct from each other, such that the claim that
said properties were not their own, but properties of the late Sy Bang, could have
been the subject of separate suits.[83]
We agree with the CA.
28
Section 4, Rule 36 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure states:
SEC. 4. Several judgments. - In an action against several defendants, the court
may, when a several judgment is proper, render judgment against one or more
of them, leaving the action to proceed against the others.
The trial court's Third Partial Decision is in the nature of a several judgment as
contemplated by the rule quoted above. The trial court ruled on the status of the
properties in the names of petitioners (defendants below) while deferring the
ruling on the properties in the names of respondents pending the presentation of
evidence.
A several judgment is proper when the liability of each party is clearly separable
and distinct from that of his co-parties, such that the claims against each of them
could have been the subject of separate suits, and judgment for or against one of
them will not necessarily affect the other.[84]
Petitioners, although sued collectively, each held a separate and separable
interest in the properties of the Sy Bang estate.
The pronouncement as to the obligation of one or some petitioners did not affect
the determination of the obligations of the others. That the properties in the
names of petitioners were found to be part of the Sy Bang estate did not preclude
any further findings or judgment on the status or nature of the properties in the
names of the other heirs.
The trial court's June 2, 1982 Order reads:
IN view of the importance of the issue concerning whether all the properties in
the name (sic) of Enrique Sy, Bartolome Sy, Rosalino Sy and Rolando Sy and/or
their respective wives (as well as those in the names of the other parties litigants
in this case), (sic) shall be declared or included as part of the Estate of Sy Bang,
and in view of the numerous documentary evidences (sic) presented by Attys.
Raya and Camaligan after the said question was agreed to be submitted for
resolution on May 26, 1982, the Court hereby sets for the reception or for the
resolution of said issue in this case on June 8 and 9, 1982, both at 2:00 o'clock in
the afternoon; notify all parties litigants in this case of these settings. [85]
It is obvious from the trial court's order[86] that the June 8, 1982 hearing is for
the purpose of determining whether properties in the names of Enrique Sy,
Bartolome Sy, Rosalino Sy, and Rolando Sy and/or their respective wives are also
part of the Sy Bang estate.
Hence, in the assailed Decision, the trial court said:
[I]n fact, the Court will require further evidence for or against any of the parties
in this case in the matter of whatever sums of money, property or asset
belonging to the estate of Sy Bang that came into their possession in order that
the Court may be properly guided in the partition and adjudication of the rightful
share and interest of the heirs of Sy Bang over the latter's estate; this becomes
imperative in view of new matters shown in the Submission and Formal Offer of
Reserve Exhibits and the Offer of Additional Documentary Evidence filed
respectively by Oscar Sy and Jose Sy Bang, et al., thru their respective counsels
after the question of whether or not the properties in the names of Enrique,
Bartolome, Rosalino, and Rolando, all surnamed Sy, should form part or be
included as part of the estate of Sy Bang, had been submitted for resolution as of
May 26, 1982; the Court deems it proper to receive additional evidence on the
part of any of the parties litigants in this case if only to determine the true extent
of the estate belonging to Sy Bang.[87]
The trial court painstakingly examined the evidence on record and narrated the
details, then carefully laid out the particulars in the assailed Decision. The
evidence that formed the basis for the trial court's conclusion is embodied in the
Decision itself - evidence presented by the parties themselves, including
petitioners.
However, notwithstanding the trial court's pronouncement, the Sy Bang estate
cannot be partitioned or distributed until the final determination of the extent of
the estate and only until it is shown that the obligations under Rule 90, Section
1,[88] have been settled.[89]
In the settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties
can only be made: (1) after all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of
administration, allowance to the widow, and estate tax have been paid; or (2)
before payment of said obligations only if the distributees or any of them gives a
bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of said
obligations within such time as the court directs, or when provision is made to
meet those obligations.[90]
Settling the issue of ownership is the first stage in an action for partition. [91] As
this Court has ruled:
The issue of ownership or co-ownership, to be more precise, must first be
resolved in order to effect a partition of properties. This should be done in the
action for partition itself. As held in the case of Catapusan v. Court of Appeals:
29
"In actions for partition, the court cannot properly issue an order to divide the
property, unless it first makes a determination as to the existence of co-
ownership. The court must initially settle the issue of ownership, the first stage in
an action for partition. Needless to state, an action for partition will not lie if the
claimant has no rightful interest over the subject property. In fact, Section 1 of
Rule 69 requires the party filing the action to state in his complaint the "nature
and extent of his title" to the real estate. Until and unless the issue of ownership
is definitely resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the properties
x x x."[92]
Moreover, the Third Partial Decision does not have the effect of terminating the
proceedings for partition. By its very nature, the Third Partial Decision is but a
determination based on the evidence presented thus far. There remained issues
to be resolved by the court. There would be no final determination of the extent
of the Sy Bang estate until the court's examination of the properties in the names
of Rosalino, Bartolome, Rolando, and Enrique. Based on the evidence presented,
the trial court will have to make a pronouncement whether the properties in the
names of Rosalino, Bartolome, Rolando, and Enrique indeed belong to the Sy
Bang estate. Only after the full extent of the Sy Bang estate has been determined
can the trial court finally order the partition of each of the heirs' share.
Appointment of Receiver
As to the issue of the judge's appointment of a receiver, suffice it to say that the
CA conclusively found thus:
The records show that the petitioners were never deprived of their day in court.
Upon Order of the respondent Judge, counsel for the petitioners submitted their
opposition to [the] petition for appointment of a receiver filed by private
respondents. x x x.
Moreover, evidence on record shows that respondent Judge appointed the
receiver after both parties have presented their evidence and after the Third
Partial Decision has been promulgated. Such appointment was made upon
verified petition of herein private respondents, alleging that petitioners are
mismanaging the properties in litigation by either mortgaging or disposing the
same, hence, the said properties are in danger of being lost, wasted, dissipated,
misused, or disposed of. The respondent Judge acted correctly in granting the
appointment of a receiver in Civil Case No. 8578, in order to preserve the
properties in litis pendentia and neither did he abuse his discretion nor acted
arbitrarily in doing s. On the contrary, We find that it was the petitioners who
violated the status quo sought to be maintained by the Supreme Court,
in G.R. No. 61519, by their intrusion and unwarranted seizures of the 3 theaters,
subject matter of the litigation, and which are admittedly under the exclusive
management and operation of private respondent, Rosauro Sy.[93]
Cancellation of Notice of Lis Pendens
Next, petitioners question the trial court's Order canceling the notice of lis
pendens.[94]
Section 77 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, or the Property Registration Decree,
provides:
SEC. 77. Cancellation of lis pendens. Before final judgment, a notice
of lis pendens may be cancelled upon order of the court, after proper showing
that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not
necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be registered. It
may also be cancelled by the Register of Deeds upon verified petition of the party
who caused the registration thereof.
At any time after final judgment in favor of the defendant, or other disposition of
the action such as to terminate finally all rights of the plaintiff in and to the land
and/or buildings involved, in any case in which a memorandum or notice of lis
pendens has been registered as provided in the preceding section, the notice of
lis pendens shall be deemed cancelled upon the registration of certificate of the
clerk of court in which the action or proceeding was pending stating the manner
of disposal thereof.
The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a two-fold effect: (1) to keep the subject
matter of the litigation within the power of the court until the entry of the final
judgment in order to prevent the final judgment from being defeated by
successive alienations; and (2) to bind a purchaser, bona fide or not, of the land
subject of the litigation to the judgment or decree that the court will promulgate
subsequently.[95]
While the trial court has an inherent power to cancel a notice of lis pendens, such
power is to be exercised within the express confines of the law. As provided in
Section 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a notice of lis
pendens may be cancelled on two grounds: (1) when the annotation was for the
purpose of molesting the title of the adverse party, or (2) when the annotation is
not necessary to protect the title of the party who caused it to be recorded.[96]
This Court has interpreted the notice as:
30
The notice is but an incident in an action, an extrajudicial one, to be sure. It does
not affect the merits thereof. It is intended merely to constructively advise, or
warn, all people who deal with the property that they so deal with it at their own
risk, and whatever rights they may acquire in the property in any voluntary
transaction are subject to the results of the action, and may well be inferior and
subordinate to those which may be finally determined and laid down therein. The
cancellation of such a precautionary notice is therefore also a mere incident in
the action, and may be ordered by the Court having jurisdiction of it at any given
time. And its continuance or removal-like the continuance or removal of a
preliminary attachment of injunction-is not contingent on the existence of a final
judgment in the action, and ordinarily has noeffect on the merits thereof.[97]
The CA found, and we affirm, that Rosalino, Bartolome and Rolando were able to
prove that the notice was intended merely to molest and harass the owners of
the property, some of whom were not parties to the case. It was also proven that
the interest of Oscar Sy, who caused the notice to be annotated, was only 1/14
of the assessed value of the property. Moreover, Rosalino, Bartolome and
Rolando were ordered to post a P50,000.00 bond to protect whatever rights or
interest Oscar Sy may have in the properties under litis pendentia.[98]
G.R. No. 150797
In G.R. No. 150797, petitioners are asking this Court to reverse the CA's
February 28, 2001 Decision and its Resolution denying the Motion for
Reconsideration, and to declare the Guardianship court to have exceeded its
jurisdiction in directing the deposit of the widow's allowance in Special
Proceedings No. 96-34.
We find merit in petitioners' contention.
The court hearing the petition for guardianship had limited jurisdiction. It
had no jurisdiction to enforce payment of the widow's allowance ordered by this
Court.
Reviewing the antecedents, we note that the claim for widow's allowance was
made before the Supreme Court in a case that did not arise from the
guardianship proceedings. The case subject of the Supreme Court petition (Civil
Case No. 8578) is still pending before the RTC of Lucena City.
Rule 83, Sec. 3, of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 3. Allowance to widow and family. - The widow and minor or incapacitated
children of a deceased person, during the settlement of the estate, shall receive
therefrom, under the direction of the court, such allowance as are provided by
law.
Correlatively, Article 188 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 188. From the common mass of property support shall be given to the
surviving spouse and to the children during the liquidation of the inventoried
property and until what belongs to them is delivered; but from this shall be
deducted that amount received for support which exceeds the fruits or rents
pertaining to them.
Obviously, "the court" referred to in Rule 83, Sec. 3, of the Rules of Court is the
court hearing the settlement of the estate. Also crystal clear is the provision of
the law that the widow's allowance is to be taken from the common mass of
property forming part of the estate of the decedent.
Thus, as evident from the foregoing provisions, it is the court hearing the
settlement of the estate that should effect the payment of widow's allowance
considering that the properties of the estate are within its jurisdiction, to the
exclusion of all other courts.[99]
In emphasizing the limited jurisdiction of the guardianship court, this Court has
pronounced that:
Generally, the guardianship court exercising special and limited jurisdiction
cannot actually order the delivery of the property of the ward found to be
embezzled, concealed, or conveyed. In a categorical language of this Court, only
in extreme cases, where property clearly belongs to the ward or where his title
thereto has been already judicially decided, may the court direct its delivery to
the guardian. In effect, there can only be delivery or return of the embezzled,
concealed or conveyed property of the ward, where the right or title of said ward
is clear and undisputable. However, where title to any property said to be
embezzled, concealed or conveyed is in dispute, x x x the determination of said
title or right whether in favor of the persons said to have embezzled, concealed
or conveyed the property must be determined in a separate ordinary action and
not in a guardianship proceedings.[100]
Further, this Court has held that the distribution of the residue of the estate of
the deceased incompetent is a function pertaining properly, not to the
guardianship proceedings, but to another proceeding in which the heirs are at
liberty to initiate.[101]
Other Unresolved Incidents
31

Payment of Widow's Allowance
It has been 13 years since this Court ordered petitioners to pay Rosita Ferrera-Sy
her monthly widow's allowance. Petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma
have since fought tooth and nail against paying the said allowance, grudgingly
complying only upon threat of incarceration. Then, they again argued against the
grant of widow's allowance after the DOJ issued its Resolution finding probable
cause in the falsification charges against respondents. They contended that the
criminal cases for falsification proved that Rosita is a mere common-law wife and
not a "widow" and, therefore, not entitled to widow's allowance.
This argument deserves scant consideration.
A finding of probable cause does not conclusively prove the charge of falsification
against respondents.
In a preliminary investigation, probable cause has been defined as "the existence
of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind,
acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person
charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted." It is well-settled
that a finding of probable cause needs to rest only on evidence showing
that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by
the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing
evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of
guilt.[102]
Hence, until the marriage is finally declared void by the court, the same is
presumed valid and Rosita is entitled to receive her widow's allowance to be
taken from the estate of Sy Bang.
We remind petitioners again that they are duty-bound to comply with whatever
the courts, in relation to the properties under litigation, may order.
Motion to Include Rosalino Sy, Bartolome Sy, Rolando Sy, and Heirs of
Enrique Sy as Likewise Liable for the Payment of Widow's Allowance as
Heirs of Sy Bang
On March 14, 2006, petitioners filed a Motion to include Rosalino Sy, Bartolome
Sy, Rolando Sy, and Heirs of Enrique Sy as Likewise Liable for the Payment of
Widow's Allowance as Heirs of Sy Bang.
The Motion is denied.
The widow's allowance, as discussed above, is chargeable to Sy Bang's estate. It
must be stressed that the issue of whether the properties in the names of
Rosalino, Bartolome, Rolando, and Enrique Sy form part of Sy Bang's estate
remains unsettled since this Petition questioning the trial court's Third Partial
Decision has been pending. On the other hand, there has been a categorical
pronouncement that petitioners are holding properties belonging to Sy Bang's
estate.
That the full extent of Sy Bang's estate has not yet been determined is no excuse
from complying with this Court's order. Properties of the estate have been
identified - i.e., those in the names of petitioners - thus, these properties should
be made to answer for the widow's allowance of Rosita. In any case, the amount
Rosita receives for support, which exceeds the fruits or rents pertaining to her,
will be deducted from her share of the estate.[103]
A Final Note
We are appalled by the delay in the disposition of this case brought about by
petitioners' propensity to challenge the Court's every directive. That the
petitioners would go to extreme lengths to evade complying with their duties
under the law and the orders of this Court is truly deplorable. Not even a citation
for contempt and the threat of imprisonment seemed to deter them. Their
contumacious attitude and actions have dragged this case for far too long with
practically no end in sight. Their abuse of legal and court processes is shameful,
and they must not be allowed to continue with their atrocious behavior.
Petitioners deserve to be sanctioned, and ordered to pay the Court treble costs.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition in G.R. No.
150797 is GRANTED, while the Petition in G.R. No. 114217 is DENIED. The
Regional Trial Court of Lucena City is directed to hear and decide Civil Case No.
8578 with dispatch. The Motion to include Rosalino Sy, Bartolome Sy, Rolando
Sy, and Heirs of Enrique Sy as Likewise Liable for the Payment of Widow's
Allowance as Heirs of Sy Bang is DENIED. Treble costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., and Peralta, JJ., concur.
32
[1]
The Petition was originally filed by Spouse Jose Sy Bang and Iluminada Tan, [18]
Supra note 3.
Spouses Julian Sy and Rosa Tan, Zenaida Sy, Ma. Emma Sy, and Oscar Sy.
Respondents filed a Motion for Substitution of Parties on June 23, 2006, [19]
Rollo (G.R. No. 114217), p. 39.
informing this Court of the deaths of Jose Sy Bang and Julian Sy. The Court
granted the Motion in a Resolution dated July 5, 2006. [20]
Id. at 29-32.

[2]
Penned by Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago (a retired member of [21]
Id. at 16-17.
this Court), with Associate Justices Luis A. Javellana (ret.) and Minerva P.
Gonzaga-Reyes (a retired member of this Court), [22]
Id. at 576.
concurring; rollo (G.R. No. 114217), pp. 154-164.
[23]
Id. at 644-645.
[3]
Penned by Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago (a retired member of
[24]
this Court), with Associate Justices Alfredo L. Benipayo (ret.) and Minerva P. Id. at 658.
Gonzaga-Reyes (a retired member of this Court), concurring; rollo, pp. 186-187.
[25]
Id. at 659.
[4]
Other respondents became complainants; rollo (G.R. No. 114217), p. 155.
[26]
Sinumpaang Salaysay, id. at 661.
[5]
Rollo, p. 155.
[27]
Rollo (G.R. No. 114217), pp. 664-668.
[6]
Id.
[28]
Id. at 689-691.
[7]
Id.
[29]
Id. at 689-690.
[8]
Id.
[30]
Id. at 685-686.
[9]
Id. at 155-156.
[31]
Id. at 679-670.
[10]
Penned by Judge Benigno M. Puno, id. at 77-101.
[32]
Id. at 697-702.
[11]
Id. at 157.
[33]
Id. at 684-685 (unnumbered pages).
[12]
Id.
[34]
Id. at 617.
[13]
Id. at 110-113.
[35]
Rollo (G.R. No. 150797), pp. 43-44.
[14]
Id. at 118-119.
[36]
Rollo (G.R. No. 114217), p. 719.
[15]
Id. at 114.
[37]
Rollo (G.R. No. 150797), p. 271.
[16]
Id. at 155-159.
[38]
Id. at 45.
[17]
Supra note 2.
[39]
Penned by Associate Justice Fermin A. Martin, Jr. (ret.), with Associate
33
Justices Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos and Mercedes Gozo-Dadole (ret.), concurring; [59]
Id. at 657-690.
id. at 11-20.
[60]
Id. at 709-715.
[40]
Rollo (G.R. No. 150797), p. 69. (Citations omitted.)
[61]
Id. at 712.
CA Resolution penned by Associate Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos, with
[41]

Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Mercedes Gozo-Dadole (ret.), [62]
Id. at (between 715-716).
concurring; id. at 73.
[63]
Id. at 787-802.
[42]
Rollo (G.R. No. 150797), pp. 33-59.
[64]
Id. at 900-905.
[43]
Id. at 55.
[65]
Id. at 908-922.
[44]
Id. at 49-50.
[66]
Id. at 924-925.
[45]
Id. at 46-47.
[67]
Id. at 926-928.
[46]
Id. at 53.
[68]
Id. at 933-946.
[47]
Id. at 451.
[69]
Id. at 992-1001.
[48]
Id. at 488-494.
[70]
Id. at 1073-1074.
[49]
Id. at 467-474.
[71]
Id. at 1023-1024.
[50]
Rollo (G.R. No. 114217), pp. 762-763.
[72]
Id. at 1025.
[51]
Rollo (G.R. No. 150797), p. 511.
[73]
Id. at 1032-1043.
[52]
Id. at 512-516.
[74]
Id. at 1076-1084.
[53]
Id. at 517-526.
[75]
Id. at 1067-1069.
[54]
Id. at 527-538.
[76]
Id. at 1100-1114.
[55]
Id. at 565-568.
[77]
Id. at 1141-1159.
[56]
Id. at 573-577.
[78]
Id. at 1162-1167.
[57]
Id. at 578-590, 617-622.
[79]
Id. at 1168-1169.
[58]
Id. at 611-616.
[80]
Id. at 1170-1178.
34

[81]
Id. at 1173-1207
[82]
Id. at 1258-1263.
[83]
Rollo (G.R. No. 114217), p. 161.
[84]
Fernando v. Santamaria, 487 Phil. 351, 357 (2004).
[85]
Rollo (G.R. No. 114217), p. 161.
[86]
Id. at 76.
[87]
Id. at 100.
[88]
SECTION 1. When order for distribution of residue made.--When the debts,
funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance to the widow, and
inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with law, have
been paid, the court, on the application of the executor or administrator, or of a
person interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the
residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the same, naming them and the
proportions, or parts, to which each is entitled, and such persons may demand
and recover their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any
other person having the same in his possession. If there is a controversy before
the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the
controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above
mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of
them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment
of said obligations within such time as the court directs.
[89]
See Estate of Ruiz v. Court of Appeals, 322 Phil. 590, (1996).
[90]
Estate of Ruiz v. Court of Appeals, id., citing Castillo v. Castillo, 124 Phil. 485
(1966); Edmands v. Philippine Trust Co., 87 Phil. 405 (1952).
[91]
Heirs of Velasquez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126996, February 15, 2000,
325 SCRA 552, 566, citing de Mesa v. CA, 231 SCRA 773.
[92]
Reyes-de Leon v. del Rosario, 479 Phil. 98, 107 (2004).
[93]
Rollo (G.R. No. 114217), p. 162.
[94]
Id. at 118-119.
[95]
Romero v. Court of Appeals, 497 Phil. 775, 784-785 (2005), citing Heirs of
Eugenio Lopez, Sr. v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 146262, January 21, 2005, 449 SCRA
173.
[96]
Romero v. Court of Appeals, id. (Citations omitted.)
Magdalena Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-
[97]
60323, April 17, 1990, 184 SCRA 325, 330; Yared v. Ilarde, G.R. No. 114732,
August 1, 2000, 337 SCRA 53.
[98]
Rollo (G.R. No. 114217), p. 163.
[99]
Rule 73, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court states:
SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled.--If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an
alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate
settled, in the Regional Trial Court in the province in which he resides at the time
of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Regional Trial
Court of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by
a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the
location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an
appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction
appears on the record. (Emphasis supplied.)
[100]
Paciente v. Dacuycuy, etc., et al., 200 Phil. 403, 408-409 (1982), citing Cui,
et al. v. Piccio, et al., 91 Phil. 712 (1952); Parco and Bautista v. Court of
Appeals, 197 Phil. 240 (1982).
[101]
Gomez v. Imperial, 134 Phil. 858, 864 (1968); Garcia v. Court of Appeals,
350 Phil. 465 (1998), where the Court upheld the ruling of the Court of Appeals
affirming the trial court's jurisdiction over a case for guardianship holding that
the reliance on Gomez was misplaced, since in that case, the petition was only
for guardianship; while in Garcia, the action was for both guardianship and
settlement of the estate.
[102]
Lastrilla v. Granada, G.R. No. 160257, January 31, 2006, 481 SCRA 324,
35
340. (Citations omitted.)
[103]
See Article 188 of the Civil Code.
6
527 Phil. 722
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. NO. 162368, July 17, 2006 ]
MA. ARMIDA PEREZ-FERRARIS, PETITIONER, VS. BRIX FERRARIS,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This resolves the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Ma. Armida Perez-
Ferraris of the Resolution dated June 9, 2004 denying the petition for review on
certiorari of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated April 30,
2003 and February 24, 2004, respectively, for failure of the petitioner to
sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error.
On February 20, 2001, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 151
rendered a Decision[1] denying the petition for declaration of nullity of petitioner's
marriage with Brix Ferraris. The trial court noted that suffering from epilepsy
does not amount to psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Civil Code
and the evidence on record were insufficient to prove infidelity. Petitioner's
motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order[2] dated April 20, 2001 where
the trial court reiterated that there was no evidence that respondent is mentally
or physically ill to such an extent that he could not have known the obligations he
was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed[3] in toto the judgment
of the trial court. It held that the evidence on record did not convincingly
establish that respondent was suffering from psychological incapacity or that his
"defects" were incurable and already presen t at the inception of the
marriage.[4] The Court of Appeals also found that Dr. Dayan's testimony failed to
establish the substance of respondent's psychological incapacity; that she failed
to explain how she arrived at the conclusion that the respondent has a mixed
personality disorder; that she failed to clearly demonstrate that there was a natal
or supervening disabling factor or an adverse integral element in respondent's
character that effectively incapacitated him from accepting and complying with
the essential marital obligations.[5]
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied[6] for lack of merit; thus, she
filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court. As already stated, the
petition for review was denied for failure of petitioner to show that the appellate
tribunal committed any reversible error.
Petitioner filed the instant motion for reconsideration.[7] The Court required
respondent Brix Ferraris to file comment[8] but failed to comply; thus, he is
deemed to have waived the opportunity to file comment. Further, the Court
directed the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on petitioner's
motion for reconsideration which it complied on March 2, 2006.
After considering the arguments of both the petitioner and the OSG, the Court
resolves to deny petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The issue of whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling
for annulment of marriage depends crucially, more than in any field of the law,
on the facts of the case.[9] Such factual issue, however, is beyond the province of
this Court to review. It is not the function of the Court to analyze or weigh all
over again the evidence or premises supportive of such factual
determination.[10] It is a well-established principle that factual findings of the trial
court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court,[11] save
for the most compelling and cogent reasons, like when the findings of the
appellate court go beyond the issues of the case, run contrary to the admissions
of the parties to the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, will justify a different conclusion; or when there is a misappreciation
of facts,[12] which are unavailing in the instant case.
The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness
afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so
grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.[13] As all people
may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated
with certain personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the intendment
of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. [14] It is
for this reason that the Court relies heavily on psychological experts for its
36
understanding of the human personality. However, the root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must be fully
explained,[15] which petitioner failed to convincingly demonstrate.
As aptly held by the Court of Appeals:
Simply put, the chief and basic consideration in the resolution of marital
annulment cases is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish
respondent's psychological condition. Here, appellant contends that there is such
evidence. We do not agree. Indeed, the evidence on record did not convincingly
establish that respondent was suffering from psychological incapacity. There is
absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at the inception of
the marriage, or that those are incurable.
Quite apart from being plainly self-serving, petitioner's evidence showed that
respondent's alleged failure to perform his so-called marital obligations was not
at all a manifestation of some deep-seated, grave, permanent and incurable
psychological malady. To be sure, the couple's relationship before the marriage
and even during their brief union (for well about a year or so) was not all bad.
During that relatively short period of time, petitioner was happy and contented
with her life in the company of respondent. In fact, by petitioner's own reckoning,
respondent was a responsible and loving husband. x x x. Their problems began
when petitioner started doubting respondent's fidelity. It was only when they
started fighting about the calls from women that respondent began to withdraw
into his shell and corner, and failed to perform his so-called marital obligations.
Respondent could not understand petitioner's lack of trust in him and her
constant naggings. He thought her suspicions irrational. Respondent could not
relate to her anger, temper and jealousy. x x x.
xxxx
At any rate, Dr. Dayan did not explain how she arrived at her diagnosis that
respondent has a mixed personality disorder called "schizoid," and why he is the
"dependent and avoidant type." In fact, Dr. Dayan's statement that one suffering
from such mixed personality disorder is dependent on others for decision x x x
lacks specificity; it seems to belong to the realm of theoretical speculation. Also,
Dr. Dayan's information that respondent had extramarital affairs was supplied by
the petitioner herself. Notably, when asked as to the root cause of respondent's
alleged psychological incapacity, Dr. Dayan's answer was vague, evasive and
inconclusive. She replied that such disorder "can be part of his family upbringing"
x x x. She stated that there was a history of respondent's parents having
difficulties in their relationship. But this input on the supposed problematic
history of respondent's parents also came from petitioner. Nor did Dr. Dayan
clearly demonstrate that there was really "a natal or supervening disabling
factor" on the part of respondent, or an "adverse integral element" in
respondent's character that effectively incapacitated him from accepting, and,
thereby complying with, the essential marital obligations. Of course, petitioner
likewise failed to prove that respondent's supposed psychological or mental
malady existed even before the marriage. All these omissions must be held up
against petitioner, for the reason that upon her devolved the onus of establishing
nullity of the marriage. Indeed, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
validity of the marriage and the indissolubility of the marital vinculum. [16]
We find respondent's alleged mixed personality disorder, the "leaving-the-house"
attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks,
the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to
spend more time with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on some
debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume
the essential obligations of marriage.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,[17] where therein respondent preferred to spend
more time with his friends than his family on whom he squandered his money,
depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was dishonest to his wife
regarding his finances, the Court held that the psychological defects spoken of
were more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations and that a mere showing of
irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitute
psychological incapacity; it is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet
their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must
be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological, not physical,
illness.
Also, we held in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals[18] that habitual alcoholism,
sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do not by themselves constitute
grounds for declaring a marriage void based on psychological incapacity.
While petitioner's marriage with the respondent failed and appears to be without
hope of reconciliation, the remedy however is not always to have it declared
void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. An unsatisfactory
marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage.[19] No less than the
Constitution recognizes the sanctity of marriage and the unity of the family; it
decrees marriage as legally "inviolable" and protects it from dissolution at the
whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the
state.[20]
Thus, in determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, it
must be read in conjunction with, although to be taken as distinct from Articles
35,[21] 37,[22] 38,[23]and 41[24] that would likewise, but for different reasons,
37
render the marriage void ab initio, or Article 45[25] that would make the marriage
merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal separation.
Care must be observed so that these various circumstances are not applied so
indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter.[26]Article 36 should
not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the
Corporation, G.R. No. 162270, April 6, 2005, 455 SCRA 97, 106.
[11]
Domingo v. Robles, G.R. No. 153743, March 18, 2005, 453 SCRA 812, 817.
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Macalinao, G.R. No. 141856, February 11,
[12]

causes therefor manifest themselves.[27] Neither it is to be equated with legal 2005, 451 SCRA 63, 69.
separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity
but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug [13]
Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840, 851 (2000).
addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. [28]
[14]
Santos v. Court of Appeals, 310 Phil. 21, 40 (1995).
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration of the
Resolution dated June 9, 2004 denying the petition for review on certiorari for [15]
Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra note 9 at 677.
failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed
any reversible error, is DENIED WITH FINALITY. [16]
Rollo, pp. 111-113.

SO ORDERED. [17]
Supra note 9 at 669 & 674.

Panganiban, C.J., (Chairman), Austria-Martinez,, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, [18]

377 Phil. 919, 931 (1999).
JJ., concur
Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco, G.R. No. 158896, October 27, 2004, 441
[19]

SCRA 422, 439.

[1]
Rollo, pp. 96-99. Penned by Judge Franchito N. Diamante. [20]
Republic v. Iyoy, G.R. No. 152577, September 21, 2005, 470 SCRA 508, 522.

[2]
Id. at 101. [21]
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

Id. at 9-19. Penned by Associate Justice Renato C. Dacudao and concurred in

[3]
(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the
by Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and Danilo B. Pine. consent of parents or guardians;
(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages
[4]
Id. at 17. unless such marriages were contracted with either or both parties believing in
good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do so;
[5]
Id. at 18. (3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding
Chapter;
[6]
Id. at 7. (4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 41;
(5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity
[7]
Id. at 208-227. of the other; and
(6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.
[8]
Id. at 228.
[22]
Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the
Concurring Opinion of Justice Teodoro R. Padilla in Republic v. Court of
[9]
beginning, whether the relationship between the parties be legitimate or
Appeals, 335 Phil. 664, 680 (1997). illegitimate:

[10]
Abacus Real Estate Development Center, Inc. v. Manila Banking (1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and
38
(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.
[23]
Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons
of public policy:
(1) Between collateral blood relatives, whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to
the fourth civil degree;
(2) Between step-parents and step-children;
(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;
(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;
(8) Between the adopted children of the same adopter; and
(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that
other person's spouse or his or her own spouse.
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a
[24]
previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive
years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under
the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an
absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided
in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
[25]
Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing
at the time of the marriage:
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was
eighteen years of age or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was
solemnized without the consent of the parents, guardian or person having
substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining
the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived
together as husband and wife;
(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to
reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party
afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely
cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue
influence, unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter
freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage
with the other, and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or
(6) That either party was inflicted with a sexually-transmitted disease found to be
serious and appears to be incurable.
Concurring Opinion of Justice Jose C. Vitug in Republic v. Court of
[26]
Appeals, supra note 9 at 690.
[27]
Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco, supra note 19 at 439.
[28]
Marcos v. Marcos, supra note 13.
7
579 Phil. 187
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 171042, June 30, 2008 ]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. LYNNETTE CABANTUG-
BAGUIO, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
From the Decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed that of the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 24 nullifying the marriage of respondent, Lynnette
Cabantug-Baguio (Lynnette), to Martini Dico Baguio (Martini), the Republic
through the Office of the Solicitor General filed the present petition for review.
Lynnette and Martini contracted marriage on August 12, 1997. Less than three
years later or on October 12, 2000, Lynnette filed before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Cebu City a complaint[1] for declaration of nullity of marriage, docketed
as Civil Case No. CEB 25700, on the ground of Martini's psychological incapacity
to comply with the essential marital duties and obligations under Articles 68-
70[2] of the Family Code.
39
Despite service of summons upon Martini, he never filed any responsive pleading
to the complaint.[3] No collusion was established between the parties.[4] Upon
the authority of the Solicitor General, the provincial prosecutor of Cebu City
appeared in the case under the former's supervision and control.[5]
From the deposition of Lynnette taken before Branch Clerk of Court Atty. Monalila
S. Tecson on January 10, 2001,[6] the following are gathered:
Lynnette and Martini, a seaman working overseas, became pen pals in 1995.
In 1996, the two met in person during Martini's vacation after the expiration of
his contract on board an ocean-going vessel.
On August 12, 1997, Martini, then 32, and Lynnette, then 34, contracted
marriage,[7] following which they moved to the house of Lynnette's parents at 33-
B La Guardia Extension, Lahug, Cebu City. Martini, however, stayed there only on
weekends, and during weekdays he stayed with his parents in Looc, Lapu-lapu
City. While Lynnette suggested that the two of them stay in the house of Martini's
parents, Martini disagreed, claiming that there were many already living with his
parents.
Lynnette noticed that every time she conversed with Martini, he always
mentioned his mother and his family, and she soon realized that he was a
"mama's boy." And she noticed too that when she would call up Martini at his
parent's house and his mother was the one who answered the call, she would
deny that he was around.
In 1998, after Martini again returned following an almost 10-month contract
overseas,[8] he stayed with Lynnette. When in 1999 Martini again disembarked,
he stayed with his parents.
On the insistence of his mother, Martini's monetary allotment was shared equally
between her and Lynnette.
Lynnette had since January 1999 not heard from Martini. And since April 1999,
Lynnette stopped receiving her share of the allotment, drawing her to inquire
from Martini's employer who informed her that he had already disembarked on
even month. She soon found out that Martini was in Alabang, Muntinlupa.
When Lynnette and Martini finally met in Cebu City, he told her that they are not
compatible and should just part ways.
The last time the couple talked was on October 14, 1999 when Martini was at the
Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) about to depart for abroad. Since
then, Martini never communicated with Lynnette. On investigation, Lynnette
learned that Martini declared in his employment records that he was "single" and
named his mother as principal allottee.[9]
Hence, Lynnette's filing of the complaint for declaration of nullification of
marriage.
Aside from her deposition,[10] Lynnette presented her Certificate of
Marriage,[11] Martini's undated Seafarer Information Sheet,[12] the letter of
clinical psychologist Dr. Andres S. Gerong (Dr. Gerong) to Martini requesting for
a personal interview,[13] Dr. Gerong's testimony,[14] and the Psychological
Evaluation Report[15] prepared by Dr. Gerong after his interview of Lynnette and
her sister Dr. Rosemarie Sistoza.[16]
In the Psychological Evaluation Report, Dr. Gerong noted as follows:
1. The couples [sic] were married on August 12, 1997 in Danao City, Cebu[;]
2. After the wedding the couple stayed at the petitioner's residence, but the
defendant would always go home to his parents in Looc, Lapu-lapu City;
3. Defendant did not show any directions to establish their home, [is] happy-
go-lucky, and would just see the plaintiff for his physical and sexual
needs;
4. Plaintiff felt being used, exploited, uncared for, taken for granted,
abandoned;
5. Defendant's parents appeared to control the son to the extent of meddling
[with] the finances coming from the income as a seaman;
6. Defendant never showed respect for his parents-in-law;
7. Parents of the defendant insisted [on] a co-allot[ment without] any
protestations from the plaintiff who has been generous all the time;
8. Defendant remained immature, could not stand by his wife and would
still depend upon the decisions of his parents and without any personal
directions as to what to do with his family;
9. Strictly speaking, the couple never really live[d] together as husband and
wife like any ordinary couple[17] (underscoring supplied),
40
and concluded that
Defendant shows immature personality disorder, dependency patterns, and self-
centered motives. Th[ese are] the core personality dysfunctions noted and have
been exaggeratedly expressed which are detrimental to the familial well-being;
The situation is serious, grave, existing already during the adolescent period, and
incurable because personality and character are stable whether or not it is normal
and adaptive.
xxxx
The defendant is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations in marriage and family.[18] (Underscoring supplied)
Expounding on his findings, Dr. Gerong testified, thus:
ATTY. SINGCO: (To witness)
Q: In gist, what were your findings as to the psychological capacity or incapacity of defendant
Martini Dico Baguio?
A: x x x [T]o sum it up, the synopsis of the findings, the defendant husband appeared to be
[a] dependent person to his family and unable to [sever . . .] the connection being a married
man and to establish a domicile for his family and to support his family.
xxxx
ATTY. SINGCO: (To witness)
Q: Dr. Gerong, how grave or serious is the psychological incapacity of the defendant?
A: Being, I would say in our popular parlance, "mama's boy" as alleged, that will endanger the
integrity of the marriage because instead of establishing a permanent conjugal relationship
with the wife the husband-defendant would remain dependent on his family.
xxxx
ATTY. SINGCO: (To witness)
Q: Okay, in terms of the chances that this incapacity will be cured, what are the chances, if any?
A: As to curability, since I am using a clinical term ["]personality or character disorder or
dysfunction["] and as I have said many times that the personality is stable and pervasive
over time. And if it is established as early as adolescent period and up to the present it has
remained persistent thru the years and therefore it's a permanent trait of the defendant-
husband, therefore it's incurable.[19] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
By Decision[20] of January 2, 2002, Branch 24 of the Cebu City RTC found Martini
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, and that the same incapacity existed "at the time the couple
exchanged their marriage vows."
The Solicitor General, via appeal,[21] challenged before the Court of Appeals the
trial court's decision
. . . DECLARING THE PARTIES' MARRIAGE NULL AND VOID, DEFENDANTS
MARTINI DICO BAGUIO'S PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY NOT HAVING BEEN
PROVEN TO EXIST.[22]
By Decision[23] of January 13, 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
decision. Addressing the Solicitor General's argument that Dr. Gerong's
testimony failed to establish the cause of Martini's psychological incapacity and to
show that it existed at the inception of the marriage,[24] the Court of Appeals
held:
x x x [I]n contradiction of the Republic's contention and its supporting above-
cited doctrine, this Court cites the more recent jurisprudence laid down in the
case of Marcos v. Marcos,[25] in which the High Tribunal has foregone with the
requirement that the defendant should be examined by a physician or
psychologist as a conditio sine qua nonfor declaration of nullity of marriage. It
held thus:
"The x x x guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated x x x - [w]hat is important is the
presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological
condition, [f]or indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination for the
person concerned need not be resorted to."[26]
Therefore, the oral deposition [of Lynette] and the Psychological
Evaluation Report by Dr. Andres S. Gerong, Ph.D. as Clinical Psychologist
declaring the defendant psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations in marriage and family life was sufficient for US to believe
that undeniably the defendant suffers psychological incapacity.[27] (Italics
in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On the Solicitor General's contention that Martini's abandonment of Lynnette is a
ground for legal separation and not for declaration of nullity of marriage,[28] and
that Martini's alleged personality traits are not of the nature contemplated by
Article 36 of the Family Code,[29] the Court of Appeals declared:
x x x WE note that it was not the abandonment which was the ground relied upon
by the plaintiff-appellee but the defendant's being a mama's boy.[30]
xxxx
Being a Mama's Boy, his uncaring attitude towards his wife, declaring
himself single and naming his mother as the beneficiary, spending more
time with his family and less with his wife and ultimately, abandoning her
manifested defendant's psychological incapacity. These, to sum it all, to US are
41
manifestations of severe psychological disorder rather than a mere obstinate
refusal to comply with his marital obligations.[31] (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
The Solicitor General's Motion for Reconsideration[32] having been denied by the
Court of Appeals,[33] the present petition[34] was filed, faulting the appellate court
to have gravely erred:
I found defendant's incapacity to be incurable. This Honorable Court has held that
. . . IN RULING THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION AND TESTIMONY OF
DR. ANDRES GERONG THAT DEFENDANT IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED
HAVE LEGAL BASIS.
II
. . . IN FAILING TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THAT ABANDONMENT BY ONE'S
SPOUSE IS ONLY A GROUND FOR LEGAL SEPARATION AND NOT FOR THE
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.
III
. . . IN RULING THAT DEFENDANT'S BEING A MAMA'S BOY IS A MANIFESTATION
OF A PSYCHOLOGICAL DISORDER.[35] (Italics in the original)
The Solicitor General's arguments persuade.
The Solicitor General argued as follows:
Dr. Gerong merely testified that defendant's alleged psychological incapacity
(being a mama's boy) began in his adolescent stage and has remained persistent
through the years (p. 20, Brief). Dr. Gerong did not detail this finding. He
made no effort to look into and testify on defendant's past life, attitudes, habits
and character to explain defendant's alleged psychological incapacity as
required by this Honorable Court in the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals
and Molina, 268 SCRA 198 (1998).
Again, while it is true that Dr. Gerong testified that defendant's alleged defect is
incurable, he failed to explain why it is clinically or medically permanent. His
only basis for saying that it is incurable is his finding that defendant has been a
mama's boy since his adolescence (p. 7, TSN, June 19, 2001). During the trial,
Dr. Gerong also failed to explain in detail why the defendant's alleged
psychological incapacity is grave and to discuss what kind of disorder defendant
is suffering from.[36] (Emphasis in the original; italics and underscoring supplied)
On the doctor's findings in his Report, the Solicitor General argued:
The said findings reveal nothing in defendant's past life and acts that shows a
behavior pattern that would prove his alleged psychological incapacity. Dr.
Gerong's finding that defendant's parents are too controlling because they were
made co-allottees of the remittances sent by their son does not prove the alleged
psychological incapacity of defendant. The report likewise failed to explain the
gravity of the alleged psychological incapacity of defendant and state whether or
not it incapacitates defendant from carrying out the normal and ordinary duties of
marriage and family. There is likewise no explanation by Dr. Gerong why he
such illness must be shown to be grave enough to bring about the disability of
the party to assume the essential obligation of the marriage. Such incapacity
must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable and
grave [Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, supra]. These Dr. Gerong
failed to do.
Even when the rules have been relaxed and the personal examination of
the defendant by a psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer
mandatory for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code, the totality of evidence presented during trial by private respondent
must still prove the gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability of the
alleged psychological incapacity (Marcos v. Marcos, 343 SCRA 755
[2000]; Santos v. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 20 [1995]). (Emphasis in the
original; italics and underscoring supplied)
In fine, the Solicitor General concluded that there was no showing that Martini's
alleged personality traits are of the nature contemplated by Article 36 of the
Family Code and the rulings of this Court in the cited cases,[37] and that Martini's
abandonment of Lynnette constitutes only a ground for legal separation but not
for declaration of nullity of marriage.[38]
Article 36 of the Family Code on which Lynnette anchors her complaint provides
that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations
of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization."
Article 36 must be read in conjunction with the other articles in the Family Code,
specifically Articles 35, 37, 38, and 41 which provide different grounds to render
a marriage void ab initio, as well as Article 45 which dwell on voidable marriages,
and Article 55 on legal separation.[39] Care must be observed so that these
various circumstances are not to be applied indiscriminately as if the law were
indifferent on the matter.[40]
And Article 36 should not be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital
bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves, nor with legal
separation in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity
42
but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment, and the like.[41]
"Psychological incapacity" has been elucidated on as follows:
The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness
afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so
grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. As all people
may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated
with certain personality disorders, there is hardly a doubt that the intendment of
the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. x x x [T]he root cause must be identified as a psychological illness,
and its incapacitating nature must be fully explained x x x.[42] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The mere showing of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities"
does not constitute psychological incapacity.[43] Nor does failure of the parties to
meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons.
It is essential that the parties to a marriage must be shown to be insensitive
to or incapable of meeting their duties and responsibilities due to some
psychological (not physical) illness,[44] which insensitivity or incapacity should
have been existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage even if it
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.[45]
In fine, for psychological incapacity to render a marriage void ab initio, it must be
characterized by
(a) Gravity - It must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in a marriage;
(b) Juridical Antecedence - It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and
(c) Incurability - It must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved.[46]
Dr. Gerong found that Martini's "personality disorders" including his being a
"mama's boy" are "serious, grave, existing already during the adolescent period
and incurable" and concluded that Martini "appeared" to be dependent upon his
family and unable "to establish a domicile for his family and to support his
family."
The doctor's findings and conclusion were derived from his interview of Lynnette
and her sister and Lynnette's deposition. From Lynnette's deposition, however, it
is gathered that Martini's failure to establish a common life with her stems from
his refusal, not incapacity, to do so. It is downright incapacity, not refusal or
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will,[47]which renders a marriage void on the
ground of psychological incapacity. In another vein, how the doctor arrived at
the conclusion, after interviewing Lynnette and considering her deposition, that
any such personality disorders of Martini have been existing since Martini's
adolescent years has not been explained. It bears recalling that Martini and
Lynnette became pen pals in 1995 and contracted marriage in 1997 when Martini
was already 32 years old, far removed from adolescent years.
Dr. Gerong's citing of Martini's appointment of his mother as a beneficiary and his
representing himself as single in his Seafarer Information Sheet, without more,
as indications of Martini's dependence on his family amounting to his incapacity
to fulfill his duties as a married man does not logically follow, especially given
that the Seafarer's Information Sheet is not even dated[48] and, therefore, there
is no certainty that it was prepared after Martini contracted marriage.
While the examination by a physician of a person in order to declare him/her
psychological incapacitated is not required, the root cause thereof must be
"medically or clinically identified." There must thus be evidence to adequately
establish the same. There is none such in the case at bar, however.
The Constitution sets out a policy of protecting and strengthening the family as
the basic social institution and marriage as the foundation of the
family.[49] Marriage, an inviolable institution protected by the State,[50] cannot be
dissolved at the whim of the parties.[51] In petitions for the declaration of nullity
of marriage, the burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies on the
plaintiff.[52] Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.[53]
As reflected above, Lynnette failed to discharge the onus probandi. While the
Court sympathizes with her predicament, its first and foremost duty is to apply
the law.[54] Dura lex sed lex.
Lynnette's marriage with Martini may have failed then, but it cannot be declared
void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity in light of the insufficient
evidence presented.[55]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
dated January 13, 2005 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. CEB
25700 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 24, is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
43
Quisumbing, (Chairperson), Tinga, Velasco, Jr., and Brion, JJ., concur. [7]
Exhibit "A," records, p. 43.

[8]
Vide TSN, January 8, 2001, pp. 6-7.

[1]
Records, pp. 1-4. [9]
Records, p. 44.

[2]
Article 68: [10]
Supra note 8 at 1-12.

The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect [11]
Exhibit "A," records, p. 43.
and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
[12]
Exhibit "B," id. at 44.
Article 69:
[13]
Exhibit "E," id. at 45.
The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the
court shall decide. [14]
TSN, June 19, 2001, pp. 4-9.

The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should [15]
Exhibit "F," records, pp. 46-47.
live abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the
exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not [16]
TSN, June 19, 2001, pp. 5-6.
compatible with the solidarity of the family.
[17]
Records, p. 46.
Article 70:
[18]
Id. at 47.
The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. The expenses
for such support and other conjugal obligations shall be paid from the [19]
TSN, June 19, 2001, pp. 6-7.
community property and, in the absence thereof, from the income and fruits of
their separate properties. [20]
Records, pp. 71-76.

[3]
Records, pp. 9-10. [21]
Id. at 78.

[4]
January 23, 2001 Investigation Report of Prosecutor II Enriqueta L. Belarmino [22]
CA rollo, p. 38.
of the Cebu City Prosecutor's Office bearing the approval of the Officer-in-Charge,
id. at 17-18. Penned by Court of Appeals Associate Justice Arsenio J. Magpale, with the
[23]

concurrences of Associate Justices Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo and Ramon M.

[5]
Id. at 21-23. Bato, Jr. CA rollo, pp. 152-163.

[6]
Exhibit "C," id. at 25-37. The motion to take deposition by oral examination, [24]
Id. at 57-58.
filed on December 21, 2000, on the ground that Lynnette was about to leave the
Philippines on the second week of January 2001 in order to comply with the [25]
397 Phil. 840 (2000).
deadline set by her prospective employer in the United States to report for work
on said date, was granted by the trial court by Order of January 2, 2001 (Exhibit [26]
Id. at 850; italics added in CA rollo, p. 160.
"D," records, p. 14).
44
[27]
Id. at 160-161.
[47]
Vide Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra note 43 at 678.
[28]
Id. at 56.
[48]
Exhibit "B," records, p. 44.
[29]
Id. at 46-56.
Vide 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article XV, Sections 1 and 2; Republic v.
[49]
[30]
Id. at 158. Iyoy, G.R. No. 152577, September 21, 2005, 470 SCRA 508, 526-527.

[31]
Id. at 159. [50]
Vide 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article XV, Section 2; FAMILY CODE, Article 1.

[32]
Id. at 165-178. Vide FAMILY CODE, Article 1; Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris, G.R. No. 162368, July
[51]

17, 2006, 495 SCRA 396, 403.

[33]
Id. at 191-192.
[52]
Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra note 40 at 676.
[34]
Rollo, pp. 25-55.
[53]
Ibid.
[35]
Id. at 28-29.
[54]
Dedel v. Court of Appeals, 466 Phil. 226, 235 (2004).
[36]
Rollo, pp. 38-39.
Vide Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris, G.R. No. 162368, July 17, 2006, 495 SCRA
[55]
[37]
Id. at 46-56. 396, 403.

[38]
Id. at 56. 8
513 Phil. 391
Vide Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris, G.R. No. 162368, 495 SCRA 396, July 17,
[39]

2006, 403-405. SECOND DIVISION

[40]
Id. at 405 (citation omitted).
[ G.R. NO. 159614, December 09, 2005 ]
[41]
Vide id. at 405-406 (citations omitted).
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE
Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris, G.R. No. 162368, July 17, 2006, 495 SCRA 396,
[42] COURT OF APPEALS (TENTH DIVISION) AND ALAN B. ALEGRO,
400-401. RESPONDENTS.

[43]
Vide Republic v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 664, 674 (1997). DECISION

[44]
Ibid.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Vide FAMILY CODE, Article 36; Republic v. Court of Appeals, id. at
[45]

677; Santos v. Court of Appeals, 310 Phil. 21, 39 (1995). On March 29, 2001, Alan B. Alegro filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 27, for the declaration of presumptive death
[46]
Republic v. Iyoy, G.R. No. 152577, September 21, 2005, 470 SCRA 508, 521 of his wife, Rosalia (Lea) A. Julaton.
(citation omitted).
45
In an Order[1] dated April 16, 2001, the court set the petition for hearing on May
30, 2001 at 8:30 a.m. and directed that a copy of the said order be published
once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in the Samar Reporter, a newspaper
of general circulation in the Province of Samar, and that a copy be posted in the
court's bulletin board for at least three weeks before the next scheduled hearing.
The court also directed that copies of the order be served on the Solicitor
General, the Provincial Prosecutor of Samar, and Alan, through counsel, and that
copies be sent to Lea by registered mail. Alan complied with all the foregoing
jurisdictional requirements.[2]
On May 28, 2001, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Motion to Dismiss[3] the petition, which was,
however, denied by the court for failure to comply with Rule 15 of the Rules of
Court.[4]
At the hearing, Alan adduced evidence that he and Lea were married on January
20, 1995 in Catbalogan, Samar.[5] He testified that, on February 6, 1995, Lea
arrived home late in the evening and he berated her for being always out of their
house. He told her that if she enjoyed the life of a single person, it would be
better for her to go back to her parents.[6] Lea did not reply. Alan narrated that,
when he reported for work the following day, Lea was still in the house, but when
he arrived home later in the day, Lea was nowhere to be found.[7] Alan thought
that Lea merely went to her parents' house in Bliss, Sto. Niño, Catbalogan,
Samar.[8] However, Lea did not return to their house anymore.
Alan further testified that, on February 14, 1995, after his work, he went to the
house of Lea's parents to see if she was there, but he was told that she was not
there. He also went to the house of Lea's friend, Janeth Bautista,
at Barangay Canlapwas, but he was informed by Janette's brother-in-law, Nelson
Abaenza, that Janeth had left for Manila.[9] When Alan went back to the house of
his parents-in-law, he learned from his father-in-law that Lea had been to their
house but that she left without notice.[10] Alan sought the help
of BarangayCaptain Juan Magat, who promised to help him locate his wife. He
also inquired from his friends of Lea's whereabouts but to no avail.[11]
Sometime in June 1995, he decided to go to Manila to look for Lea, but his
mother asked him to leave after the town fiesta of Catbalogan, hoping that Lea
may come home for the fiesta. Alan agreed.[12] However, Lea did not show up.
Alan then left for Manila on August 27, 1995. He went to a house in Navotas
where Janeth, Lea's friend, was staying. When asked where Lea was, Janeth told
him that she had not seen her.[13] He failed to find out Lea's whereabouts despite
his repeated talks with Janeth. Alan decided to work as a part-time taxi driver.
On his free time, he would look for Lea in the malls but still to no avail. He
returned to Catbalogan in 1997 and again looked for his wife but failed.[14]
On June 20, 2001, Alan reported Lea's disappearance to the local police
station.[15] The police authorities issued an Alarm Notice on July 4, 2001.[16] Alan
also reported Lea's disappearance to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
on July 9, 2001.[17]
Barangay Captain Juan Magat corroborated the testimony of Alan. He declared
that on February 14, 1995, at 2:00 p.m., Alan inquired from him if Lea passed by
his house and he told Alan that she did not. Alan also told him that Lea had
disappeared. He had not seen Lea in the barangay ever since.[18] Lea's father,
who was his compadre and the owner of Radio DYMS, told him that he did not
know where Lea was.[19]
After Alan rested his case, neither the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor nor the
Solicitor General adduced evidence in opposition to the petition.
On January 8, 2002, the court rendered judgment granting the petition.
The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, petitioner's absent spouse
ROSALIA JULATON is hereby declared PRESUMPTIVELY DEAD for the purpose of
the petitioner's subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code of the
Philippines, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the said absent
spouse.
SO ORDERED.[20]
The OSG appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA) which rendered
judgment on August 4, 2003, affirming the decision of the RTC.[21] The CA cited
the ruling of this Court in Republic v. Nolasco.[22]
The OSG filed a petition for review on certiorari of the CA's decision alleging that
respondent Alan B. Alegro failed to prove that he had a well-founded belief that
Lea was already dead.[23] It averred that the respondent failed to exercise
reasonable and diligent efforts to locate his wife. The respondent even admitted
that Lea's father told him on February 14, 1995 that Lea had been to their house
but left without notice. The OSG pointed out that the respondent reported his
wife's disappearance to the local police and also to the NBI only after the
petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the petition. The petitioner avers that, as
gleaned from the evidence, the respondent did not really want to find and locate
Lea. Finally, the petitioner averred:
In view of the summary nature of proceedings under Article 41 of the Family
Code for the declaration of presumptive death of one's spouse, the degree of due
diligence set by this Honorable Court in the above-mentioned cases in locating
46
the whereabouts of a missing spouse must be strictly complied with. There have
been times when Article 41 of the Family Code had been resorted to by parties
wishing to remarry knowing fully well that their alleged missing spouses are alive
and well. It is even possible that those who cannot have their marriages x x x
declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code resort to Article 41 of
the Family Code for relief because of the x x x summary nature of its
proceedings.
It is the policy of the State to protect and strengthen the family as a basic social
institution. Marriage is the foundation of the family. Since marriage is an
inviolable social institution that the 1987 Constitution seeks to protect from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. For respondent's failure to prove that he
had a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead and that he exerted the
required amount of diligence in searching for his missing wife, the petition for
declaration of presumptive death should have been denied by the trial court and
the Honorable Court of Appeals.[24]
The petition is meritorious.
Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines reads:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a
previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive
years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an
absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided
in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. [25]
The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent
and that he has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead
before the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not
define what is meant by a well-grounded belief. Cuello Callon writes that "es
menester que su creencia sea firme se funde en motivos racionales."[26]
Belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an overt act. It
may be proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence which may tend,
even in a slight degree, to elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determination
probably founded in truth. Any fact or circumstance relating to the character,
habits, conditions, attachments, prosperity and objects of life which usually
control the conduct of men, and are the motives of their actions, was, so far as it
tends to explain or characterize their disappearance or throw light on their
intentions,[27] competence evidence on the ultimate question of his death.
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to
goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse
and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not
the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse
depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances
occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature
and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse.[28]
Although testimonial evidence may suffice to prove the well-founded belief of the
present spouse that the absent spouse is already dead, in Republic v.
Nolasco,[29] the Court warned against collusion between the parties when they
find it impossible to dissolve the marital bonds through existing legal means. It is
also the maxim that "men readily believe what they wish to be true."
In this case, the respondent failed to present a witness other
than Barangay Captain Juan Magat. The respondent even failed to present Janeth
Bautista or Nelson Abaenza or any other person from whom he allegedly made
inquiries about Lea to corroborate his testimony. On the other hand, the
respondent admitted that when he returned to the house of his parents-in-law on
February 14, 1995, his father-in-law told him that Lea had just been there but
that she left without notice.
The respondent declared that Lea left their abode on February 7, 1995 after he
chided her for coming home late and for being always out of their house, and told
her that it would be better for her to go home to her parents if she enjoyed the
life of a single person. Lea, thus, left their conjugal abode and never returned.
Neither did she communicate with the respondent after leaving the conjugal
abode because of her resentment to the chastisement she received from him
barely a month after their marriage. What is so worrisome is that, the respondent
failed to make inquiries from his parents-in-law regarding Lea's whereabouts
before filing his petition in the RTC. It could have enhanced the credibility of the
respondent had he made inquiries from his parents-in-law about Lea's
whereabouts considering that Lea's father was the owner of Radio DYMS.
The respondent did report and seek the help of the local police authorities and
the NBI to locate Lea, but it was only an afterthought. He did so only after the
OSG filed its notice to dismiss his petition in the RTC.
In sum, the Court finds and so holds that the respondent failed to prove that he
had a well-founded belief, before he filed his petition in the RTC, that his spouse
47
Rosalia (Lea) Julaton was already dead. [16]
Exhibit "J," Id. at 23.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of [17]
Exhibit "K," Id. at 24.
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73749 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Consequently, the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 27, [18]
TSN, November 5, 2001, pp. 4-6.
is ORDERED to DISMISS the respondent's petition.
[19]
Id. at 8.
SO ORDERED.
[20]
Records, pp. 23-24.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Penned by Associate Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos, with Associate
[21]

Justices Edgardo P. Cruz and Noel G. Tijam, concurring; rollo, pp. 33-40.

[1]
Records, p. 1. [22]
G.R. No. 94053, March 17, 1993, 220 SCRA 20.

[2]
Exhibits "C" to "H" and "H-1," folder of exhibits, pp. 10-21. [23]
Rollo, p. 17.

[3]
Records, pp. 3-6. [24]
Id. at 26-28.

[4]
Id. at 9. [25]
Emphases supplied.

[5]
Exhibit "A," folder of exhibits, p. 5. [26]
Derecho Penal, Vol. II, p. 633.

[6]
TSN, 20 September 2001, p. 6. [27]
Tyrrell v. Prudential Insurance Company of America, 115 A.L.R., 392 (1937),
citing In re: Hurlburt's Estate,35 L.R.A. 794 68 Vt.366, 35 A.77.
[7]
Id. at 9.
[28]
Gall v. Gall, 69 Sickels 109, 21 NE 106 (1889).
[8]
Id. at 7.
[29]
Supra, note 19.
[9]
TSN, 20 September 2001, p. 12.
9
[10]
Id. at 16. 673 Phil. 460
[11]
Id. at 13-15. FIRST DIVISION
[12]
Id. at 16.
[ G.R. No. 166357, September 19, 2011 ]
[13]
Id. at 17-19.
VALERIO E. KALAW, PETITIONER, VS. MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ,
[14]
Id. at 20-21. RESPONDENT.

[15]
Exhibits "I" and "I-1," folder of exhibits, p. 22. DECISION

48

DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A finding of psychological incapacity must be supported by well-established
facts. It is the plaintiff's burden to convince the court of the existence of these
facts.
Before the Court is a Petition for Review[1] of the Court of Appeals' (CA) May 27,
2004 Decision[2] and December 15, 2004 Resolution[3] in CA-G.R. CV No. 64240,
which reversed the trial court's declaration of nullity of the herein parties'
marriage. The fallo of the assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE¸the appeal is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision
is SET ASIDE and VACATED while the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Factual Antecedents
Petitioner Valerio E. Kalaw (Tyrone) and respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez (Malyn)
met in 1973. They maintained a relationship and eventually married in Hong
Kong on November 4, 1976. They had four children, Valerio (Rio), Maria Eva
(Ria), Ramon Miguel (Miggy or Mickey), and Jaime Teodoro (Jay).
Shortly after the birth of their youngest son, Tyrone had an extramarital affair
with Jocelyn Quejano (Jocelyn), who gave birth to a son in March 1983.[5]
In May 1985, Malyn left the conjugal home (the house of her Kalaw in-laws) and
her four children with Tyrone.[6] Meanwhile, Tyrone started living with Jocelyn,
who bore him three more children.[7]
In 1990, Tyrone went to the United States (US) with Jocelyn and their children.
He left his four children from his marriage with Malyn in a rented house in Valle
Verde with only a househelp and a driver.[8] The househelp would just call Malyn
to take care of the children whenever any of them got sick. Also, in accordance
with their custody agreement, the children stayed with Malyn on weekends.[9]
In 1994, the two elder children, Rio and Ria, asked for Malyn's permission to go
to Japan for a one-week vacation. Malyn acceded only to learn later that Tyrone
brought the children to the US.[10] After just one year, Ria returned to the
Philippines and chose to live with Malyn.
Meanwhile, Tyrone and Jocelyn's family returned to the Philippines and resumed
physical custody of the two younger children, Miggy and Jay. According to Malyn,
from that time on, the children refused to go to her house on weekends because
of alleged weekend plans with their father.[11]
Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage
On July 6, 1994, nine years since the de facto separation from his wife, Tyrone
filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the
Family Code.[12] He alleged that Malyn was psychologically incapacitated to
perform and comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the
celebration of their marriage. He further claimed that her psychological incapacity
was manifested by her immaturity and irresponsibility towards Tyrone and their
children during their co-habitation, as shown by Malyn's following acts:
1. she left the children without proper care and attention as she played mahjong
all day and all night;
2. she left the house to party with male friends and returned in the early hours of
the following day; and
3. she committed adultery on June 9, 1985, which act Tyrone discovered in
flagrante delicto.[13]
During trial,[14] Tyrone narrated the circumstances of Malyn's alleged
infidelity. According to him, on June 9, 1985, he and his brother-in-law, Ronald
Fernandez (Malyn's brother), proceeded to Hyatt Hotel and learned that Malyn
was occupying a room with a certain Benjie Guevarra (Benjie). When he
proceeded to the said room, he saw Benjie and Malyn inside.[15] At rebuttal,
Tyrone elaborated that Benjie was wearing only a towel around his waist, while
Malyn was lying in bed in her underwear. After an exchange of words, he agreed
not to charge Malyn with adultery when the latter agreed to relinquish all her
marital and parental rights.[16] They put their agreement in writing before Atty.
Jose Palarca.
Tyrone presented a psychologist, Dr. Cristina Gates (Dr. Gates), and a Catholic
canon law expert, Fr. Gerard Healy, S.J. (Fr. Healy), to testify on Malyn's
psychological incapacity.
Dr. Gates explained on the stand that the factual allegations regarding Malyn's
behavior - her sexual infidelity, habitual mahjong playing, and her frequent
nights-out with friends - may reflect a narcissistic personality disorder
(NPD).[17] NPD is present when a person is obsessed to meet her wants and
49
needs in utter disregard of her significant others.[18] Malyn's NPD is manifest in
her utter neglect of her duties as a mother.[19]
Dr. Gates reported that Malyn's personality disorder "may have been evident
even prior to her marriage" because it is rooted in her family background and
upbringing, which the psychologist gathered to be materially deprived and
without a proper maternal role model.[20]
Dr. Gates based her diagnosis on the facts revealed by her interviews with
Tyrone, Trinidad Kalaw (Tyrone's sister-in-law), and the son Miggy. She also
read the transcript of Tyrone's court testimony.[21]
Fr. Healy corroborated Dr. Gates' assessment. He concluded that Malyn was
psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital duties.[22] He explained that
her psychological incapacity is rooted in her role as the breadwinner of her
family. This role allegedly inflated Malyn's ego to the point that her needs
became priority, while her kids' and husband's needs became secondary. Malyn
is so self-absorbed that she is incapable of prioritizing her family's needs.
Fr. Healy clarified that playing mahjong and spending time with friends are not
disorders by themselves. They only constitute psychological incapacity whenever
inordinate amounts of time are spent on these activities to the detriment of one's
familial duties.[23] Fr. Healy characterized Malyn's psychological incapacity as
grave and incurable.[24]
He based his opinion on his interview with Tyrone, the trial transcripts, as well as
the report of Dr. Natividad Dayan (Dr. Dayan), Malyn's expert witness.[25] He
clarified that he did not verify the truthfulness of the factual allegations regarding
Malyn's "habits" because he believed it is the court's duty to do so.[26] Instead,
he formed his opinion on the assumption that the factual allegations are indeed
true.
Malyn's version
Malyn denied being psychologically incapacitated.[27] While she admitted playing
mahjong, she denied playing as frequently as Tyrone alleged. She maintained
that she did so only two to three times a week and always between 1 p.m. to 6
p.m. only.[28] And in those instances, she always had Tyrone's permission and
would often bring the children and their respective yayas with her.[29] She
maintained that she did not neglect her duties as mother and wife.
Malyn admitted leaving the conjugal home in May 1985. She, however, explained
that she did so only to escape her physically abusive husband.[30] On the day she
left, Tyrone, who preferred to keep Malyn a housewife, was upset that Malyn was
preparing to go to work. He called up the security guards and instructed them not
to let Malyn out of the house. Tyrone then placed cigarette ashes on Malyn's
head and proceeded to lock the bedroom doors. Fearing another beating, Malyn
rushed out of their bedroom and into her mother-in-law's room. She blurted
that Tyrone would beat her up again so her mother-in-law gave her P300 to leave
the house.[31] She never returned to their conjugal home.
Malyn explained that she applied for work, against Tyrone's wishes, because she
wanted to be self-sufficient. Her resolve came from her discovery that Tyrone
had a son by Jocelyn and had secretly gone to the US with Jocelyn.[32]
Malyn denied the allegation of adultery. She maintained that Benjie only booked
a room at the Hyatt Hotel for her because she was so drunk after partying with
friends. She admitted finding her brother Ronald and Tyrone at the door of the
Hyatt Hotel room, but maintained being fully clothed at that time.[33] Malyn
insisted that she wrote the letter relinquishing all her spousal and parental rights
under duress.[34]
After the Hyatt Hotel incident, Malyn only saw her children by surreptitiously
visiting them in school. She later obtained partial custody of the children as an
incident to the legal separation action filed by Tyrone against her (which action
was subsequently dismissed for lack of interest).
As an affirmative defense, Malyn maintained that it was Tyrone who was
suffering from psychological incapacity, as manifested by his drug dependence,
habitual drinking, womanizing, and physical violence.[35] Malyn presented Dr.
Dayan a clinical psychologist, as her expert witness.
Dr. Dayan interviewed Tyrone, Malyn, Miggy/Mickey, Jay, and Ria for her
psychological evaluation of the spouses. The factual narrations culled from these
interviews reveal that Tyrone found Malyn a "lousy" mother because of her
mahjong habit,[36] while Malyn was fed up with Tyrone's sexual infidelity, drug
habit, and physical abuse.[37] Dr. Dayan determined that both Tyrone and Malyn
were behaviorally immature. They encountered problems because of their
personality differences, which ultimately led to the demise of their marriage. Her
diagnostic impressions are summarized below:
The marriage of Tyrone and Malyn was a mistake from the very beginning. Both
of them were not truly ready for marriage even after two years of living together
and having a child. When Malyn first met Tyrone who showered her with gifts,
flowers, and affection she resisted his overtures. She made it clear that she
could `take him or leave him.' But the minute she started to care, she became a
50
different person - clingy and immature, doubting his love, constantly demanding
reassurance that she was the most important person in his life. She became
relationship-dependent. It appears that her style then was when she begins to
care for a man, she puts all her energy into him and loses focus on herself. This
imbalance between thinking and feeling was overwhelming to Tyrone who
admitted that the thought of commitment scared him. Tyrone admitted that
when he was in his younger years, he was often out seeking other women. His
interest in them was not necessarily for sex, just for fun - dancing, drinking, or
simply flirting.
Both of them seem behaviorally immature. For some time, Malyn adapted to her
husband who was a moody man with short temper and unresolved issues with
parents and siblings. He was a distancer, concerned more about his work and
friends tha[n] he was about spending time with his family. Because of Malyn's
and Tyrone's backgrounds (both came from families with high conflicts) they
experienced turmoil and chaos in their marriage. The conflicts they had
struggled to avoid suddenly galloped out of control Their individual personalities
broke through, precipitating the demise of their marriage.[38]
Dr. Dayan likewise wrote in her psychological evaluation report that Malyn
exhibited significant, but not severe, dependency, narcissism, and
compulsiveness.[39]
On the stand, the psychologist elaborated that while Malyn had relationship
problems with Tyrone, she appeared to have a good relationship with her
kids.[40] As for Tyrone, he has commitment issues which prevent him from
committing himself to his duties as a husband. He is unable to remain faithful to
Malyn and is psychologically incapacitated to perform this duty.[41]
Children's version
The children all stated that both their parents took care of them, provided for
their needs, and loved them. Rio testified that they would accompany their
mother to White Plains on days that she played mahjong with her friends. None
of them reported being neglected or feeling abandoned.
The two elder kids remembered the fights between their parents but it was only
Ria who admitted actually witnessing physical abuse inflicted on her
mother.[42] The two elder kids also recalled that, after the separation, their
mother would visit them only in school.[43]
The children recalled living in Valle Verde with only the househelp and driver
during the time that their dad was abroad.[44] While they did not live with their
mother while they were housed in Valle Verde, the kids were in agreement that
their mother took care of them on weekends and would see to their needs. They
had a common recollection that the househelp would call their mother to come
and take care of them in Valle Verde whenever any of them was sick.[45]
Other witnesses
Dr. Cornelio Banaag, Tyrone's attending psychiatrist at the Manila Sanitarium,
testified that, for the duration of Tyrone's confinement, the couple appeared
happy and the wife was commendable for the support she gave to her
spouse.[46] He likewise testified that Tyrone tested negative for drugs and was
not a drug dependent.[47]
Malyn's brother, Ronald Fernandez, confirmed Tyrone's allegation that they found
Malyn with Benjie in the Hyatt hotel room. Contrary to Tyrone's version, he
testified that neither he nor Tyrone entered the room, but stayed in the hallway.
He likewise did not recall seeing Benjie or Malyn half-naked.[48]
Tyrone then presented Mario Calma (Mario), who was allegedly part of Malyn's
group of friends. He stated on the stand that they would go on nights-out as a
group and Malyn would meet with a male musician-friend afterwards.[49]
Social worker
The trial court ordered the court social worker, Jocelyn V. Arre (Arre), to conduct
a social case study on the parties as well as the minor children. Arre interviewed
the parties Tyrone and Malyn; the minor children Miggy/Mickey and Jay;
Tyrone's live-in partner, Jocelyn;[50] and Tyrone and Malyn's only daughter, Ria.
While both parents are financially stable and have positive relationships with their
children, she recommended that the custody of the minor children be awarded to
Malyn. Based on the interviews of family members themselves, Malyn was shown
to be more available to the children and to exercise better supervision and
care. The social worker commended the fact that even after Malyn left the
conjugal home in 1985, she made efforts to visit her children clandestinely in
their respective schools. And while she was only granted weekend custody of the
children, it appeared that she made efforts to personally attend to their needs
and to devote time with them.[51]
On the contrary, Tyrone, who had custody of the children since the couple's de
facto separation, simply left the children for several years with only a maid and a
driver to care for them while he lived with his second family abroad.[52] The
social worker found that Tyrone tended to prioritize his second family to the
detriment of his children with Malyn. Given this history during the formative
51
years of the children, the social worker did not find Tyrone a reliable parent to
whom custody of adolescents may be awarded.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court[53]
After summarizing the evidence presented by both parties, the trial court
concluded that both parties are psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential marital obligations under the Family Code. The court's Decision is
encapsulated in this paragraph:
From the evidence, it appears that parties are both suffering from psychological
incapacity to perform their essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the
Family Code. The parties entered into a marriage without as much as
understanding what it entails. They failed to commit themselves to its essential
obligations: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of
mutual help, the procreation and education of their children to become
responsible individuals. Parties' psychological incapacity is grave, and serious
such that both are incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in
marriage. The incapacity has been clinically established and was found to be
pervasive, grave and incurable.[54]
The trial court then declared the parties' marriage void ab initio pursuant to
Article 36 of the Family Code.[55]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals[56]
Malyn appealed the trial court's Decision to the CA. The CA reversed the trial
court's ruling because it is not supported by the facts on record. Both parties'
allegations and incriminations against each other do not support a finding of
psychological incapacity. The parties' faults tend only to picture their immaturity
and irresponsibility in performing their marital and familial obligations. At most,
there may be sufficient grounds for a legal separation.[57] Moreover, the
psychological report submitted by petitioner's expert witness, Dr. Gates, does not
explain how the diagnosis of NPD came to be drawn from the sources. It failed to
satisfy the legal and jurisprudential requirements for the declaration of nullity of
marriage.[58]
Tyrone filed a motion for reconsideration[59] but the same was denied
on December 15, 2004.[60]
Petitioner's arguments
Petitioner Tyrone argues that the CA erred in disregarding the factual findings of
the trial court, which is the court that is in the best position to appreciate the
evidence. He opines that he has presented preponderant evidence to prove that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital
obligations, to wit:
a) the expert witnesses, Dr. Gates and Fr. Healy, proved on the stand that
respondent's egocentric attitude, immaturity, self-obsession and self-
centeredness were manifestations of respondent's NPD;[61]
b) these expert witnesses proved that respondent's NPD is grave and incurable
and prevents her from performing her essential martial obligations; [62] and
c) that respondent's NPD existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage
because it is rooted in her upbringing, family background, and socialite lifestyle
prior to her marriage.[63]
Petitioner stresses that even respondent insisted that their marriage is void
because of psychological incapacity, albeit on petitioner's part.[64]
Respondent's arguments
Respondent maintains that Tyrone failed to discharge his burden of proving her
alleged psychological incapacity.[65] She argues that the testimonies of her
children and the findings of the court social worker to the effect that she was a
good, loving, and attentive mother are sufficient to rebut Tyrone's allegation that
she was negligent and irresponsible.[66]
She assails Dr. Gates's report as one-sided and lacking in depth. Dr. Gates did
not interview her, their common children, or even Jocelyn. Moreover, her report
failed to state that Malyn's alleged psychological incapacity was grave and
incurable.[67] Fr. Healy's testimony, on the other hand, was based only on
Tyrone's version of the facts.[68]
Malyn reiterates the appellate court's ruling that the trial court Decision is
intrinsically defective for failing to support its conclusion of psychological
incapacity with factual findings.
Almost four years after filing her memorandum, respondent apparently had a
change of heart and filed a Manifestation with Motion for Leave to Withdraw
Comment and Memorandum.[69] She manifested that she was no longer disputing
the possibility that their marriage may really be void on the basis of Tyrone's
psychological incapacity. She then asked the Court to dispose of the case with
52
justice.[70] Her manifestation and motion were noted by the Court in its January
20, 2010 Resolution.[71]
Issue
Whether petitioner has sufficiently proved that respondent suffers from
psychological incapacity
Our Ruling
The petition has no merit. The CA committed no reversible error in setting aside
the trial court's Decision for lack of legal and factual basis.
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is governed by Article 36 of the
Family Code which provides:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations
of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization.
Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance
of and to assume the basic marital obligations.[72] The burden of proving
psychological incapacity is on the plaintiff.[73] The plaintiff must prove that the
incapacitated party, based on his or her actions or behavior, suffers a serious
psychological disorder that completely disables him or her from understanding
and discharging the essential obligations of the marital state. The psychological
problem must be grave, must have existed at the time of marriage, and must be
incurable.[74]
In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers
from psychological incapacity. He presented the testimonies of two supposed
expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is psychologically incapacitated,
but the conclusions of these witnesses were premised on the alleged acts or
behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven. Petitioner's
experts heavily relied on petitioner's allegations of respondent's constant
mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery,
and neglect of their children. Petitioner's experts opined that respondent's alleged
habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of
time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological
incapacity in the form of NPD.
But petitioner's allegations, which served as the bases or underlying premises of
the conclusions of his experts, were not actually proven. In fact, respondent
presented contrary evidence refuting these allegations of the petitioner.
For instance, petitioner alleged that respondent constantly played mahjong and
neglected their children as a result. Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but
it was not proven that she engaged in mahjong so frequently that
she neglected her duties as a mother and a wife. Respondent refuted
petitioner's allegations that she played four to five times a week. She maintained
it was only two to three times a week and always with the permission of her
husband and without abandoning her children at home. The children
corroborated this, saying that they were with their mother when she played
mahjong in their relative's home. Petitioner did not present any proof, other than
his own testimony, that the mahjong sessions were so frequent that respondent
neglected her family. While he intimated that two of his sons repeated the second
grade, he was not able to link this episode to respondent's mahjong-playing. The
least that could have been done was to prove the frequency of respondent's
mahjong-playing during the years when these two children were in second
grade. This was not done. Thus, while there is no dispute that respondent
played mahjong, its alleged debilitating frequency and adverse effect on the
children were not proven.
Also unproven was petitioner's claim about respondent's alleged constant visits to
the beauty parlor, going out with friends, and obsessive need for attention from
other men. No proof whatsoever was presented to prove her visits to beauty
salons or her frequent partying with friends. Petitioner presented Mario (an
alleged companion of respondent during these nights-out) in order to prove that
respondent had affairs with other men, but Mario only testified that
respondent appeared to be dating other men. Even assuming arguendo that
petitioner was able to prove that respondent had an extramarital affair with
another man, that one instance of sexual infidelity cannot, by itself, be equated
with obsessive need for attention from other men. Sexual infidelity per se is a
ground for legal separation, but it does not necessarily constitute psychological
incapacity.
Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually engaged in the
behaviors described as constitutive of NPD, there is no basis for concluding that
she was indeed psychologically incapacitated. Indeed, the totality of the evidence
points to the opposite conclusion. A fair assessment of the facts would show that
respondent was not totally remiss and incapable of appreciating and performing
her marital and parental duties. Not once did the children state that they were
neglected by their mother. On the contrary, they narrated that she took care of
them, was around when they were sick, and cooked the food they like. It
53
appears that respondent made real efforts to see and take care of her children
despite her estrangement from their father. There was no testimony whatsoever [5]
Social Case Study Report, p. 14; Records, Vol. I, p. 216.
that shows abandonment and neglect of familial duties. While petitioner cites the
fact that his two sons, Rio and Miggy, both failed the second elementary level [6]
TSN dated March 15, 1995, pp. 11-12.
despite having tutors, there is nothing to link their academic shortcomings to
Malyn's actions. [7]
Social Case Study Report, p. 14; Records, Vol. I, p. 216.

After poring over the records of the case, the Court finds no factual basis for the [8]
Social Case Study Report, pp. 11 and 13; id. at 213 and 215.
conclusion of psychological incapacity. There is no error in the CA's reversal of
the trial court's ruling that there was psychological incapacity. The trial court's [9]
Dr. Dayan's Psychological Evaluation Report, p. 7; id. at 259.
Decision merely summarized the allegations, testimonies, and evidence of the
respective parties, but it did not actually assess the veracity of these allegations, [10]
Id. at 10-11; id. at 259.
the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight of the evidence. The trial court
did not make factual findings which can serve as bases for its legal conclusion of TSN dated March 15, 1995, pp. 23-24; Dr. Dayan's Psychological Evaluation
[11]

psychological incapacity. Report, pp. 7-8; Records, Vol. I, p. 259.

What transpired between the parties is acrimony and, perhaps, infidelity, which [12]
Id. at 1-4.
may have constrained them from dedicating the best of themselves to each other
and to their children. There may be grounds for legal separation, but certainly Id. at 2; Petitioner's Memorandum in JDRC Case No. 3100, records, Vol. II,
[13]

not psychological incapacity that voids a marriage. pp. 306-307.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of The case proceeded to trial after the fiscal manifested to the court that there
[14]

Appeals' May 27, 2004 Decision and its December 15, 2004 Resolution in CA-G.R. was no collusion between the parties (Records, Vol. I, p. 45).
CV No. 64240 are AFFIRMED.
[15]
TSN dated January 5, 1995, pp. 16-17.
SO ORDERED.
[16]
Id. at 17-18.
Corona, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro,
Bersamin, and Perez,* JJ., concur. [17]
Psychological Report, Records, Vol. I, pp. 173-175.

[18]
TSN dated February 15, 1995, pp. 6-7.

*
In lieu of Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr., per Special Order No. 1080 [19]
Id. at 7.
dated September 13, 2011.
[20]
Psychological Report, Records, Vol. I, pp. 174-175.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 26-56.
[21]
TSN dated February 15, 1995, p. 4.
Id. at 9-20; penned by Associate Justice Roberto A. Barrios and concurred in
[2]

by Associate Justices Regalado E. Maambong and Vicente Q. Roxas. [22]

TSN dated June 17, 1998, p. 24.

[3]
Id. at 22-23. [23]
Id. at 30-31.

[4]
CA Decision, p. 11; rollo, p. 19. [24]
Id. at 26-27.
54
 [45]
TSN dated June 8, 1995, p. 9; Social Case Study Report, pp. 11 and 19 (Id.
[25]
Id. at 22-23. at 213 and 221).

[26]
Id. at 23. [46]
TSN dated November 20, 1995, pp. 15 and 21.

[27]
Records, Vol. I, pp. 20-21. [47]
Id. at 8-10.

[28]
TSN dated July 8, 1998, pp. 5-7. [48]
TSN dated January 4, 1996, pp. 4-6.

[29]
Id. at 6-7. [49]
TSN dated April 2, 1998, pp. 18-20.

[30]
TSN dated March 15, 1995, pp. 12-13. [50]
Tyrone alleges that he married Jocelyn Quejano in 1990 in California, United
States of America after divorcing with Malyn also in California sometime in 1987.
[31]
Id. at 11-12. There is, however, nodocumentary evidence of the divorce and remarriage. There
is no allegation that Tyrone had obtained American citizenship and is indicated in
[32]
Id. at 9-11. the Social Case Study Report as a Filipino citizen (Records, Vol. I, p. 219).

[33]
Id. at 15-17. [51]
Social Case Study Report, pp. 19-20; id. at 221-222.

[34]
Id. at 17-18. [52]
Id.; id.

[35]
Records, Vol. I, p. 21. Records, Vol. II, pp. 382-389; penned by Judge Jose R. Hernandez of Branch
[53]

158 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City.

[36]
Dr. Dayan's Psychological Evaluation Report, p. 13; id. at 259.
[54]
RTC Decision, pp. 7-8; id. at 388-389.
[37]
Id. at 4-6; id.
[55]
The fallo reads:
[38]
Id. at 17-18; id.; TSN dated March 14, 1996, p. 10.
WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Valerio Kalaw and respondent Ma.
[39]
TSN dated January 30, 1996, p. 13. Elena Fernandez celebrated on November 4, 1976 is declared void ab initio
pursuant to the provisions of Article 36 of the Family Code, and of no further
[40]
Id. at 15. effect.

[41]
TSN dated March 14, 1996, p. 12. The provisions of Article[s] 50, 51, and 52 of the Family Code of the Philippines
relative to the delivery of their children's presumptive legitime shall not apply
Social Case Study Report, p. 13 (Records, Vol. I, p. 215); Dr. Dayan's
[42]
because parties were not able to prove the existence of any conjugal partnership
Psychological Evaluation Report, p. 9 (Records, Vol. I, p. 259). of gains.

[43]
TSN dated June 8, 1995, p. 6; Dr. Dayan's Psychological Evaluation Report, p.
9 (Id.); Rio's deposition, p. 3 (Id. at 356).
[44]
Social Case Study Report, pp. 11 and 13; Records, Vol. I, pp. 213 and 215.
Upon finality of this Decision, furnish a copy each to the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Pasig City and the National Statistics Office, Quezon City for their
appropriate action consistent with this Decision.
SO ORDERED. (Id.; id.)
55
 SECOND DIVISION
[56]
CA rollo, pp. 262-273.
[ G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013 ]
[57]
CA Decision, p. 7; CA rollo, p. 268.
MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER, VS. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY,
[58]
Id. at 11; id. at 272. SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND
THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE
[59]
CA rollo, pp. 281-298. NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, RESPONDENTS.
[60]
Id. at 310-311. DECISION
[61]
Petitioner's Memorandum, pp. 23-26; rollo, pp. 606-609.
CARPIO, J.:
[62]
Id. at 13-20; id. at 596-603.
The Case
[63]
Id. at 20-22; id. at 603-605.
This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
[64]
Id. at 26-27; id. at 609-610. 107, Quezon City, through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court on a pure question of law. The petition assails the Order[1] dated
[65]
Respondent's Memorandum, p. 2; id. at 551. 31 January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and its Resolution
dated 2 March 2011 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC
[66]
Id. at 17-18; id. at 566-567. dismissed the petition for “Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage)” based on improper venue and the lack of
[67]
Id. at 19; id. at 568. personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.
[68]
Id. at 20; id. at 569. The Facts
[69]
Rollo, pp. 650-654. Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent
Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines[2] on 23 January 2004. The
[70]
Respondent's Manifestation, p. 2; id. at 651. marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his
wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
[71]
Rollo, p. 662.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without
Republic v. Iyoy, 507 Phil. 485, 502 (2005), citing Republic v. Court of
[72]
the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May
Appeals, 335 Phil. 664, 678 (1997). 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However,
Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and
[73]
Republic v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 664, 676 (1997). started to contact Fujiki.[3]
[74]
Santos v. Court of Appeals, 310 Phil. 21, 39 (1995). Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their
relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family
10 court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void
712 Phil. 524 on the ground of bigamy.[4] On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC

56
entitled: “Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity
of Marriage).” Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be
recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be
declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the
Philippines;[5] and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon
City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of
Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the
Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics
Office (NSO).[6]
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order
dismissing the petition and withdrawing the case from its active civil
docket.[7] The RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC):
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. –
(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Venue. – The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or
city where the petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six
months prior to the date of filing, or in the case of a non-resident respondent,
where he may be found in the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner. x x x
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in “gross
violation” of the above provisions. The trial court based its dismissal on Section
5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which provides that “[f]ailure to comply with any
of the preceding requirements may be a ground for immediate dismissal of the
petition.”[8] Apparently, the RTC took the view that only “the husband or the
wife,” in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their
marriage void, and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC contemplated ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of
marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A petition for recognition
of foreign judgment is a special proceeding, which “seeks to establish a status, a
right or a particular fact,”[9] and not a civil action which is “for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.”[10] In other words,
the petition in the RTC sought to establish (1) the status and concomitant rights
of Fujiki and Marinay as husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of the
Japanese Family Court judgment declaring the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner contended that the
Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the
Philippines[11] on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine
courts.[12]
In any case, it was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to
void marriages under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of
psychological incapacity.[13] Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides
that “a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife.” To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would be
absurd because only the guilty parties would be permitted to sue. In the words of
Fujiki, “[i]t is not, of course, difficult to realize that the party interested in having
a bigamous marriage declared a nullity would be the husband in the prior, pre-
existing marriage.”[14] Fujiki had material interest and therefore the personality to
nullify a bigamous marriage.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil
Registry) of the Rules of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the “procedural
implementation” of the Civil Register Law (Act No. 3753)[15] in relation to Article
413 of the Civil Code.[16] The Civil Register Law imposes a duty on the “successful
petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy of the final decree
of the court to the local registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or
annulled marriage was solemnized.”[17] Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that
entries in the civil registry relating to “marriages,” “judgments of annulments of
marriage” and “judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning” are
subject to cancellation or correction.[18] The petition in the RTC sought (among
others) to annotate the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the certificate
of marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court
“gravely erred” when, on its own, it dismissed the petition based on improper
venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may be confusing the concept of venue with the
concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of jurisdiction which allows a court to
dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate
Court[19] which held that the “trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant’s
prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue by motu proprio
dismissing the case.”[20] Moreover, petitioner alleged that the trial court should
not have “immediately dismissed” the petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC because he substantially complied with the provision.
57

On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. In its Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage.[21] The trial court reiterated its two grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack of
personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as a “third person”[22] in the proceeding
because he “is not the husband in the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese
Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially recognized, x x x.” [23] On the
other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground of impropriety of venue. It only
said that “[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a ground for
dismissal of this case[,] it should be taken together with the other ground cited
by the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x.”[24]
The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on Braza
v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental.[25] The Court in
Braza ruled that “[i]n a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108
(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court
has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x x.”[26] Braza emphasized that the
“validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in
a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through a collateral
attack such as [a] petition [for correction of entry] x x x.”[27]
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage
between Marinay and Maekara. The trial court held that this is a “jurisdictional
ground” to dismiss the petition.[28] Moreover, the verification and certification
against forum shopping of the petition was not authenticated as required under
Section 5[29] of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also warranted the “immediate
dismissal” of the petition under the same provision.
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and
the Letters of Marinay and Maekara
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the
petition for review.[30] The public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon
City and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the NSO, participated
through the Office of the Solicitor General. Instead of a comment, the Solicitor
General filed a Manifestation and Motion.[31]
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTC’s
“pronouncement that the petitioner failed to comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC x x x be set aside” and that the case be reinstated in the trial court for
further proceedings.[32] The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as the spouse of
the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous
marriage between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General cited Juliano-
Llave v. Republic[33] which held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does
not apply in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this Court explained:
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had
only discovered during the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and
especially if the conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a
subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it would not be
expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus, in
such circumstance, the “injured spouse” who should be given a legal remedy is
the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved
party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property
ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional
burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder
of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which
sanctity is protected by the Constitution.[34]
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese
Family Court judgment may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding.[35] In Corpuz v.
Santo Tomas,[36] this Court held that “[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce
decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special
proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to
establish the status or right of a party or a particular
fact.”[37] While Corpuz concerned a foreign divorce decree, in the present case
the Japanese Family Court judgment also affected the civil status of the parties,
especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the
procedure to record “[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil
status of persons” in the civil registry as required by Article 407 of the Civil Code.
In other words, “[t]he law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial
decrees that produce legal consequences upon a person’s legal capacity and
status x x x.”[38] The Japanese Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil
status of a Filipino citizen and should therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108
proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in
assailing a void marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De
Castro[39] and Niñal v. Bayadog[40]which declared that “[t]he validity of a void
marriage may be collaterally attacked.”[41]
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the
58
directive for them to comment on the petition.[42] Maekara wrote that Marinay
concealed from him the fact that she was previously married to
Fujiki.[43] Maekara also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on
Marinay.[44] On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to oppose
the petition.[45] She would like to maintain her silence for fear that anything she
say might cause misunderstanding between her and Fujiki.[46]
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize
a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse
and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of
the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v.
Republic,[47] this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the
husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage “does
not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.”[48]
I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner
only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To
be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence
and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39,
Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.[49] Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family
Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy
attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has
custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by
the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan
and authenticated by the seal of office.[50]
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign
judgment would mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its
provisions, including the form and contents of the petition,[51] the service of
summons,[52] the investigation of the public prosecutor,[53] the setting of pre-
trial,[54] the trial[55] and the judgment of the trial court.[56] This is absurd because
it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign
judgments, which is “to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues.”[57] The
interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits.
In Mijares v. Rañada,[58] this Court explained that “[i]f every judgment of a
foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on
his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously concluded
litigation.”[59]
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status,
condition and legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign
judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent
with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws.[60] Article 15 of the Civil
Code provides that “[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad.” This is the rule of lex nationalii in private
international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the
Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its
citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status,
condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not
require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know
the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot
substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the
foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine
courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules
of evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or
final order against a person creates a “presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.”
59
Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that “the judgment or final
order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.” Thus, Philippine courts
exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve
into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted and
proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to its
merits, i.e. , “want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact.” The rule on limited review embodies the policy of
efficiency and the protection of party expectations,[61] as well as respecting the
jurisdiction of other states.[62]
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,[63] Philippine courts have recognized
foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are
successfully proven under the rules of evidence. [64] Divorce involves the
dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce decree does not
involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of
ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts
may, however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his
or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.[65]
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the
Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the
Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy,
as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4)
of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court
judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule
39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
II.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the
judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3
of the Rules of Court provides that “[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a
party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.” Rule 108 creates a
remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life which are recorded by the State
pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public
consequence such as birth, death or marriage,[66] which the State has an interest
in recording. As noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this
Court declared that “[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made
in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that
in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a
party or a particular fact.”[67]
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event,
order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been
recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or
correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the
province where the corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of
bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For
the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel
the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the
basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in
maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations
arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of
an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the
public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of
the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances[68]) his most
intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by
operation of law the moment he contracts marriage.[69] These property interests
in marriage include the right to be supported “in keeping with the financial
capacity of the family”[70] and preserving the property regime of the marriage.[71]
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the
Constitution,[72] but a spouse’s right in a marriage extends further to relational
rights recognized under Title III (“Rights and Obligations between Husband and
Wife”) of the Family Code.[73] A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot “diminish, increase,
or modify” the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the integrity of his
marriage.[74] In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this
substantive right by limiting the personality to sue to the husband or the wife of
the union recognized by law.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting
marriage to question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of
bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that “[a] petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
60
husband or the wife”[75]—it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting
marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void
from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the
husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the prior
subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from
the beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code,[76] which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can
initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the
prosecution and prevention of crimes.[77] If anyone can file a criminal action
which leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage,[78] there is more
reason to confer personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting
marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public interest of
prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in the purely
civil aspect of protecting his marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is
clearly an injured party and is therefore interested in the judgment of the
suit.[79] Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse “is clearly the aggrieved party as
the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property
ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional
burden to the prior spouse.”[80] Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is
entitled to sue in order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he
can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous
marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the
Philippines. Once established, there should be no more impediment to cancel the
entry of the bigamous marriage in the civil registry.
III.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this
Court held that a “trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages” in a special
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.[81] Thus, the “validity of marriage[] x x x can be questioned only in a
direct action” to nullify the marriage.[82]The RTC relied on Braza in dismissing the
petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara.
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of
the foreign country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry
cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is
necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards
of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related
laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited
grounds for the dissolution of marriage,[83] support pendente lite of the spouses
and children,[84] the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the
spouses,[85] and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine
collusion.[86] A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is
also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts
under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the
Regional Trial Court “where the corresponding civil registry is located.”[87] In
other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient
of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil
registry entry based on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. There is
neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage
under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369.
A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an
action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign
judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided
under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a
petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where
one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369
define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend
the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial
to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that “[w]here a marriage
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.”
In Republic v. Orbecido,[88] this Court recognized the legislative intent of the
second paragraph of Article 26 which is “to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse”[89] under the laws of his or
her country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only
61
authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree
precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot
try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the
anomaly that results from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow
divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in
the Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to
marry under the laws of his or her country. The correction is made by extending
in the Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree, which is already
effective in the country where it was rendered. The second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code is based on this Court’s decision in Van Dorn v.
Romillo[90] which declared that the Filipino spouse “should not be discriminated
against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.”[91]
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a
Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the
marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad
to declare the marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The principle in the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because the foreign spouse,
after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry
under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in
the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be discriminated—the foreign spouse can
remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts
are empowered to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the
marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding
Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to
extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the
foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A critical difference
between the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully
consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family
Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the
option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or
her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying
a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to
substitute their judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They
cannot decide on the “family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and
legal capacity” of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus,
Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of a
foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status
of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only
decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex
nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign
judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and
(2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the
foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public
policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by
default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section
48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is already
“presumptive evidence of a right between the parties.” Upon recognition of the
foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the
basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The
recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a
subsequent event that establishes a new status, right and fact[92] that needs to
be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency
between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public
records in the Philippines.
However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is
without prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code.[93] The recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal liability under Articles 89 and
94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal
Code, “[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when the
offender is absent from the Philippine archipelago.”
Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to
address the questions on venue and the contents and form of the petition under
Sections 4 and 5, respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and
the Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107,
Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for further
proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
62

Brion, Del Castillo, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
[1]
Penned by Judge Jose L. Bautista Jr.
[2]
In Pasay City, Metro Manila.
[3]
See rollo, p. 88; Trial Family Court Decree No. 15 of 2009, Decree of Absolute
Nullity of Marriage between Maria Paz Galela Marinay and Shinichi Maekara dated
18 August 2010. Translated by Yoshiaki Kurisu, Kurisu Gyoseishoshi Lawyer’s
Office (see rollo, p. 89).
[4]
Id.
[5]
FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES (E.O. No. 209 as amended):
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxxx
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 41;
xxxx
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an
absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
[6]
Rollo, pp. 79-80.
[7]
The dispositive portion stated:
WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby ordered DISMISSED and WITHDRAWN
from the active civil docket of this Court. The RTC-OCC, Quezon City is directed
to refund to the petitioner the amount of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000) to be
taken from the Sheriff’s Trust Fund.
[8]
Rollo, pp. 44-45. Section 5 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC)
provides:
Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition. – (1) The petition shall allege the complete
facts constituting the cause of action.
(2) It shall state the names and ages of the common children of the parties and
specify the regime governing their property relations, as well as the properties
involved.
If there is no adequate provision in a written agreement between the parties, the
petitioner may apply for a provisional order for spousal support, custody and
support of common children, visitation rights, administration of community or
conjugal property, and other matters similarly requiring urgent action.
(3) It must be verified and accompanied by a certification against forum
shopping. The verification and certification must be signed personally by the
petitioner. No petition may be filed solely by counsel or through an attorney-in-
fact.
If the petitioner is in a foreign country, the verification and certification against
forum shopping shall be authenticated by the duly authorized officer of the
Philippine embassy or legation, consul general, consul or vice-consul or consular
agent in said country.
(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition
on the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the City or Provincial
Prosecutor, within five days from the date of its filing and submit to the court
proof of such service within the same period.
Failure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for
immediate dismissal of the petition.
[9]
RULES OF COURT, Rule 1, Sec. 3(c). See rollo, pp. 55-56 (Petitioner’s Motion
for Reconsideration).
[10]
RULES OF COURT, Rule 1, Sec. 3(a).
FAMILY CODE (E.O. No. 209 as amended), Art. 35. The following marriages
[11]
shall be void from the beginning:
xxxx
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 41;
63
 adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k)
xxxx election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (1) civil interdiction; (m) judicial
determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o)
[12]
Rollo, p. 56. changes of name.

[13]
FAMILY CODE, Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time [19]
273 Phil. 1 (1991).
of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity [20]
Id. at 7. See rollo, pp. 65 and 67.
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
[21]
Rollo, p. 47.
[14]
Rollo, p. 68.
[22]
Id. at 46.
[15]
Enacted 26 November 1930.
[23]
Id. at 48.
[16]
CIVIL CODE, Art. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil
status shall be governed by special laws. [24]
Id.

[17]
Act No. 3753, Sec. 7. Registration of marriage. - All civil officers and priests [25]
G.R. No. 181174, 4 December 2009, 607 SCRA 638.
or ministers authorized to solemnize marriages shall send a copy of each
marriage contract solemnized by them to the local civil registrar within the time [26]
Id. at 641.
limit specified in the existing Marriage Law.
[27]
Id. at 643.
In cases of divorce and annulment of marriage, it shall be the duty of the
successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy of the [28]
See rollo, p. 49.
final decree of the court to the local civil registrar of the municipality where the
dissolved or annulled marriage was solemnized. [29]
Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC states in part:

In the marriage register there shall be entered the full name and address of each
of the contracting parties, their ages, the place and date of the solemnization of
the marriage, the names and addresses of the witnesses, the full name, address,
and relationship of the minor contracting party or parties or the person or
persons who gave their consent to the marriage, and the full name, title, and
address of the person who solemnized the marriage.
In cases of divorce or annulment of marriages, there shall be recorded the names
of the parties divorced or whose marriage was annulled, the date of the decree of
the court, and such other details as the regulations to be issued may require.
[18]
RULES OF COURT, Rule 108, Sec. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or
correction. — Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil
register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths;
(d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h)
Contents and form of petition. – x x x
xxxx
(3) It must be verified and accompanied by a certification against forum
shopping. The verification and certification must be signed personally by the
petitioner. No petition may be filed solely by counsel or through an attorney-in-
fact.
If the petitioner is in a foreign country, the verification and certification against
forum shopping shall be authenticated by the duly authorized officer of the
Philippine embassy or legation, consul general, consul or vice-consul or consular
agent in said country.
xxxx
64
Failure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for
immediate dismissal of the petition. [46]
Id.

[30]
Resolution dated 30 May 2011. Rollo, p. 105. [47]
Supra note 33.

[31]
Under Solicitor General Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz. [48]
Supra note 33 at 655.

[32]
Rollo, p. 137. The “Conclusion and Prayer” of the “Manifestation and Motion [49]
RULES OF COURT, Rule 132, Sec. 24. Proof of official record. — The record of
(In Lieu of Comment)” of the Solicitor General stated: public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for
any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy
In fine, the court a quo’s pronouncement that the petitioner failed to comply with attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy,
the requirements provided in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC should accordingly be set and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate
aside. It is, thus, respectfully prayed that Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 be that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a
reinstated for further proceedings. foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer
Other reliefs, just and equitable under the premises are likewise prayed for. in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which
the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
[33]
G.R. No. 169766, 30 March 2011, 646 SCRA 637.
Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a copy of a document
Id. at 656. Quoted in the Manifestation and Motion of the Solicitor General,
[34]
or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in
pp. 8-9. See rollo, pp. 132-133. substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part
thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the
[35]
Rollo, p. 133. attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal,
under the seal of such court.
[36]
G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010, 628 SCRA 266.
Rule 39, Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. — The effect of a
[37]
Id. at 287. judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to
render the judgment or final order, is as follows:
[38]
Rollo, p. 133.
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or
[39]
G.R. No. 160172, 13 February 2008, 545 SCRA 162. final order is conclusive upon the title of the thing; and

[40]
384 Phil. 661 (2000). (b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final
order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
[41]
De Castro v. De Castro, supra note 39 at 169. successors in interest by a subsequent title.

[42]
Supra note 30. In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want
of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
[43]
See rollo, p. 120. law or fact.

[44]
Id. See RULES OF COURT, Rule 132, Sec. 24-25. See also Corpuz v. Santo
[50]

Tomas, supra note 36 at 282.

[45]
See rollo, p. 146.
65
[51]
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Sec. 5. Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010, 628 SCRA 266,
[64]

280; Garcia v. Recio, 418 Phil. 723 (2001); Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, supra.
[52]
Id., Sec. 6.
[65]
FAMILY CODE, Art. 26. x x x
[53]
Id., Sec. 9.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated
[54]
Id., Sec. 11-15. and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
[55]
Id., Sec. 17-18. remarry under Philippine law.

[56]
Id., Sec. 19 and 22-23. [66]
Act No. 3753, Sec. 1. Civil Register. — A civil register is established for
recording the civil status of persons, in which shall be entered: (a) births; (b)
[57]
Mijares v. Rañada, 495 Phil. 372, 386 (2005) citing Eugene Scoles & Peter deaths; (c) marriages; (d) annulments of marriages; (e) divorces; (f)
Hay, Conflict of Laws 916 (2nd ed., 1982). legitimations; (g) adoptions; (h) acknowledgment of natural children; (i)
naturalization; and (j) changes of name.
[58]
Id.
Cf. RULES OF COURT, Rule 108, Sec. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or
[59]
Id. at 386. correction. — Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil
register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d)
[60]
Civil Code, Art. 17. x x x legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h)
xxxx adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k)
election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (1) civil interdiction; (m) judicial
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o)
for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered changes of name.
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. [67]
Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, supra note 36 at 287.

[61]
Mijares v. Rañada, supra note 57 at 386. “Otherwise known as the policy of [68]
FAMILY CODE, Art. 35-67.
preclusion, it seeks to protect party expectations resulting from previous
litigation, to safeguard against the harassment of defendants, to insure that the [69]
FAMILY CODE, Art. 74-148.
task of courts not be increased by never-ending litigation of the same disputes,
and – in a larger sense – to promote what Lord Coke in the Ferrer’s Case of 1599 [70]
FAMILY CODE, Art. 195 in relation to Art. 194.
stated to be the goal of all law: ‘rest and quietness.’” (Citations omitted)
[71]
See supra note 69.
[62]
Mijares v. Rañada, supra note 57 at 382. “The rules of comity, utility and
convenience of nations have established a usage among civilized states by which [72]
CONSTITUTION, Art. III, Sec. 1: “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty,
final judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally or property without due process of law x x x.”
respected and rendered efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in
different countries.” (Citations omitted) [73]
FAMILY CODE, Art. 68-73.

[63]
43 Phil. 43 (1922). [74]
CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5). The Supreme Court shall have the
following powers:
66

xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the
practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged.
Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall
not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. x x x
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
[75]
Emphasis supplied.
[76]
Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815, as amended), Art. 349. Bigamy. - The
penalty of prisión mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a
second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
[77]
See III RAMON AQUINO, THE REVISED PENAL CODE (1997), 518.
[78]
RULES OF COURT, Rule 111, Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. —
(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the
criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the
right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action.
xxxx
[79]
Cf. RULES OF COURT, Rule 3, Sec. 2. Parties in interest. — A real party in
interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by
law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of
the real party in interest.
[80]
Juliano-Llave v. Republic, supra note 33.
[81]
Supra note 25.
[82]
Supra note 25.
[83]
See supra note 68.
[84]
FAMILY CODE, Art. 49. During the pendency of the action and in the absence
of adequate provisions in a written agreement between the spouses, the Court
shall provide for the support of the spouses and the custody and support of their
common children. The Court shall give paramount consideration to the moral and
material welfare of said children and their choice of the parent with whom they
wish to remain as provided to in Title IX. It shall also provide for appropriate
visitation rights of the other parent.
Cf. RULES OF COURT, Rule 61.
[85]
FAMILY CODE, Art. 50. The effects provided for by paragraphs (2), (3), (4)
and (5) of Article 43 and by Article 44 shall also apply in the proper cases to
marriages which are declared ab initio or annulled by final judgment under
Articles 40 and 45.
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the
common children, and the delivery of third presumptive legitimes, unless such
matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation.
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be
adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Sec. 19. Decision.— (1) If the court renders a decision
granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or
decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after compliance with
Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule on
Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.
xxxx
[86]
FAMILY CODE, Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion
between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based
67
upon a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Sec. 9. Investigation report of public prosecutor. — (1)
Within one month after receipt of the court order mentioned in paragraph (3) of
Section 8 above, the public prosecutor shall submit a report to the court stating
whether the parties are in collusion and serve copies thereof on the parties and
their respective counsels, if any.
(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state the basis
thereof in his report. The parties shall file their respective comments on the
finding of collusion within ten days from receipt of a copy of the report The court
shall set the report for hearing and if convinced that the parties are in collusion,
it shall dismiss the petition.
(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the court shall set the
case for pre-trial. It shall be the duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the
State at the pre-trial.
[87]
RULES OF COURT, Rule 108, Sec. 1.
[88]
509 Phil. 108 (2005).
[89]
Id. at 114.
[90]
223 Phil. 357 (1985).
[91]
Id. at 363.
[92]
See RULES OF COURT, Rule 1, Sec. 3(c).
[93]
See RULES OF COURT, Rule 72, Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of civil actions. —
In the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions
shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings.
Rule 111, Sec. 2. When separate civil action is suspended. — x x x
If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been instituted,
the latter shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found before judgment
on the merits. The suspension shall last until final judgment is rendered in the
criminal action. Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits is rendered in the
civil action, the same may, upon motion of the offended party, be consolidated
with the criminal action in the court trying the criminal action. In case of
consolidation, the evidence already adduced in the civil action shall be deemed
automatically reproduced in the criminal action without prejudice to the right of
the prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses presented by the offended party
in the criminal case and of the parties to present additional evidence. The
consolidated criminal and civil actions shall be tried and decided jointly.
During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the period of
prescription of the civil action which cannot be instituted separately or whose
proceeding has been suspended shall be tolled.
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil
action. However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if
there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.
11
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018 ]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, V. MARELYN TANEDO
MANALO, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules)
seeks to reverse and set aside the September 18, 2014 Decision[1] and October
12, 2015 Resolution[2]of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076.
The dispositive portion of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 15 October
2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, First Judicial Region, Branch
43, in SPEC. PROC. NO. 2012-0005 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Let a copy of this Decision be served on the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan,
Metro Manila.
SO ORDERED.[3]
68
The facts are undisputed.
On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a
petition for cancellation of entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan,
Metro Manila, by virtue of a judgment of divorce rendered by a Japanese court.
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and in substance, Branch 43 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City set the case for initial hearing on April
25, 2012. The petition and the notice of initial hearing were published once a
week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation. During
the initial hearing, counsel for Manalo marked the documentary evidence
(consisting of the trial court's Order dated January 25, 2012, affidavit of
publication, and issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012,
February 28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012) for purposes of compliance
with the jurisdictional requirements.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for petitioner
Republic of the Philippines authorizing the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Dagupan to appear on its behalf. Likewise, a Manifestation and Motion was filed
questioning the title and/or caption of the petition considering that, based on the
allegations therein, the proper action should be a petition for recognition and
enforcement of a foreign judgment.
As a result, Manalo moved to admit an Amended Petition, which the court
granted. The Amended Petition, which captioned that it is also a petition for
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgment, alleged:
2. That petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national
named YOSHINO MINORO as shown by their Marriage Contract x x x;
3. That recently, a case for divorce was filed by herein [petitioner] in Japan and
after due proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6, 2011 was rendered
by the Japanese Court x x x;
4. That at present, by virtue of the said divorce decree, petitioner and her
divorced Japanese husband are no longer living together and in fact, petitioner
and her daughter are living separately from said Japanese former husband;
5. That there is an imperative need to have the entry of marriage in the Civil
Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila cancelled, where the petitioner and the former
Japanese husband's marriage was previously registered, in order that it would
not appear anymore that petitioner is still married to the said Japanese national
who is no longer her husband or is no longer married to her; furthermore, in the
event that petitioner decides to be remarried, she shall not be bothered and
disturbed by said entry of marriage;
6. That this petition is filed principally for the purpose of causing the cancellation
of entry of the marriage between the petitioner and the said Japanese national,
pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, which marriage was already
dissolved by virtue of the aforesaid divorce decree; [and]
7. That petitioner prays, among others, that together with the cancellation of the
said entry of her marriage, that she be allowed to return and use. her maiden
surname, MANALO.[4]
Manalo was allowed to testify in advance as she was scheduled to leave for Japan
for her employment. Among the documents that were offered and admitted
were:
1. Court Order dated January 25, 2012, finding the petition and its attachments
to be sufficient in form and in substance;
2. Affidavit of Publication;
3. Issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 -
March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012;
4. Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her former Japanese husband;
5. Divorce Decree of the Japanese court;
6. Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate General in Osaka,
Japan of the Notification of Divorce; and
7. Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce.[5]
The OSG did not present any controverting evidence to rebut the allegations of
Manalo.
On October 15, 2012, the trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. In
ruling that the divorce obtained by Manalo in Japan should not be recognized, it
opined that, based on Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine law "does
not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce, whether they are in the country
69
or living abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they
celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in another country" and that unless
Filipinos "are naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine laws shall have
control over issues related to Filipinos' family rights and duties, together with the
determination of their condition and legal capacity to enter into contracts and
civil relations, including marriages."[6]
On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the
Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo
who filed for divorce against her Japanese husband because the decree they
obtained makes the latter no longer married to the former, capacitating him to
remarry. Conformably with Navarro, et al. v. Exec. Secretary Ermita, et
al.[7] ruling that the meaning of the law should be based on the intent of the
lawmakers and in view of the legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be the
height of injustice to consider Manalo as still married to the Japanese national,
who, in turn, is no longer married to her. For the appellate court, the fact that it
was Manalo who filed the divorce case is inconsequential. Cited as similar to this
case was Van Dorn v. Judge Romillo, Jr.[8] where the marriage between a
foreigner and a Filipino was dissolved through a divorce filed abroad by the latter.
The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied; hence, this
petition.
We deny the petition and partially affirm the CA decision.
Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage,
are of two types: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates
the marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and
leaves the bond in full force.[9] In this jurisdiction, the following rules exist:
1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot
grant it.[10]
2. Consistent with Articles 15[11] and 17[12] of the New Civil Code, the marital
bond between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by an absolute divorce
obtained abroad.[13]
3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective
national laws.[14]
4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is allowed
to contract a subsequent marriage in case the absolute divorce is validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.[15]
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Executive
Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known as The Family Code of the Philippines,
which took effect on August 3, 1988.[16] Shortly thereafter, E.O. No. 227 was
issued on July 17, 1987.[17] Aside from amending Articles 36 and 39 of the Family
Code, a second paragraph was added to Article 26.[18] This provision was
originally deleted by the Civil Code Revision Committee (Committee), but it was
presented and approved at a Cabinet meeting after Pres. Aquino signed E.O. No.
209.[19] As modified, Article 26 now states:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1),
(4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated
and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the
effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to
determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.[20] It authorizes our
courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the
Philippines does not allow divorce.[21] Philippine courts cannot try the case on the
merits because it is tantamount to trying a divorce case.[22] Under the principles
of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of
foreign nationality, but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care and
support of the children or property relations of the spouses, must still be
determined by our courts.[23]
According to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Committee, the idea of
the amendment is to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as still being married
to his or her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married to the former
because he or she had obtained a divorce abroad that is recognized by his or her
national law.[24] The aim was that it would solve the problem of many Filipino
women who, under the New Civil Code, are still considered married to their alien
husbands even after the latter have already validly divorced them under their
(the husbands') national laws and perhaps have already married again.[25]
70
In 2005, this Court concluded that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 applies to a case
where, at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them acquired foreign citizenship by naturalization,
initiated a divorce proceeding, and obtained a favorable decree. We held
in Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido III:[26]
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of
Appeals. In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they
got married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and
obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter
dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer
married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of
reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include
cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were
Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign
citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be
allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity
and injustice. x x x
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant
case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.[27]
Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision, a Filipino
citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce
proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien
spouse who is capacitated to remarry. Specifically, Manalo pleads for the
recognition and enforcement of the divorce decree rendered by the Japanese
court and for the cancellation of the entry of marriage in the local civil registry "in
order that it would not appear anymore that [she] is still married to the said
Japanese national who is no longer her husband or is no longer married to her;
[and], in the event that [she] decides to be remarried, she shall not be bothered
and disturbed by said entry of marriage," and to return and to use her maiden
surname.
We rule in the affirmative.
Both Dacasin v. Dacasin[28] and Van Dorn[29] already recognized a foreign divorce
decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its
legal effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, respectively.
In Dacasin, post-divorce, the former spouses executed an Agreement for the joint
custody of their minor daughter. Later on, the husband, who is a US citizen, sued
his Filipino wife to enforce the Agreement, alleging that it was only, the latter
who exercised sole custody of their child. The trial court dismissed the action for
lack of jurisdiction, on the ground, among others, that the divorce decree is
binding following the "nationality rule" prevailing in this jurisdiction. The husband
moved to reconsider, arguing that the divorce decree obtained by his former wife
is void, but it was denied. In ruling that the trial court has jurisdiction to
entertain the suit but not to enforce the Agreement, which is void, this Court
said:
Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree's alleged invalidity - not because the
Illinois court lacked jurisdiction or that the divorce decree violated Illinois law,
but because the divorce was obtained by his Filipino spouse - to support the
Agreement's enforceability. The argument that foreigners in this jurisdiction are
not bound by foreign divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van Dorn v. Romillo settled
the matter by holding that an alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce
decree obtained abroad. There, we dismissed the alien divorcee's Philippine suit
for accounting of alleged post-divorce conjugal property and rejected his
submission that the foreign divorce (obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not valid
in this jurisdiction x x x.[30]
Van Dorn was decided before the Family Code took into effect. There, a complaint
was filed by the ex-husband, who is a US citizen, against his Filipino wife to
71
render an accounting of a business that was alleged to be a conjugal property
and to be declared with right to manage the same. Van Dorn moved to dismiss
the case on the ground that the cause of action was barred by previous judgment
in the divorce proceedings that she initiated, but the trial court denied the
motion. On his part, her ex-husband averred that the divorce decree issued by
the Nevada court could not prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and
its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign court
cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine courts
of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction. In dismissing the case
filed by the alien spouse, the Court discussed the effect of the foreign divorce on
the parties and their conjugal property in the Philippines. Thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the
States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an
American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her
husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that
the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to
local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute
divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized
in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this
case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from
the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs.
Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a
court of competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic
relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage
tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without
a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law
provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again,
that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the
former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband
of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him,
and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged
conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to
be considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's
obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner
should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and
render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of
her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served.[31]
In addition, the fact that a validly obtained foreign divorce initiated by the Filipino
spouse can be recognized and given legal effects in the Philippines is implied from
Our rulings in Fujikiv. Marinay, et al.[32] and Medina v. Koike.[33]
In Fujiki, the Filipino wife, with the help of her first husband, who is a Japanese
national, was able to obtain a judgment from Japan's family court, which declared
the marriage between her and her second husband, who is a Japanese national,
void on the ground of bigamy. In resolving the issue of whether a husband or
wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign
citizen on the ground of bigamy, We ruled:
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of
bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For
the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel
the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the
basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in
maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations
arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of
an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the
public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of
the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) his most
intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by
operation of law the moment he contracts marriage. These property interests in
marriage include the right to be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity
of the family" and preserving the property regime of the marriage.
72
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, but a
spouse's right in a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under
Title III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family
Code. x x x[34]
On the other hand, in Medina, the Filipino wife and her Japanese husband jointly
filed for divorce, which was granted. Subsequently, she filed a petition before the
RTC for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to
remarry pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Article 26. The RTC denied the petition on
the ground that the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien
spouse recognizing his capacity to obtain a divorce decree must be proven in
accordance with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence. This Court agreed and ruled that, consistent with Corpuz v. Sto.
Tomas, et al.[35] and Garcia v. Recio,[36] the divorce decree and the national law
of the alien spouse must be proven. Instead of dismissing the case, We referred
it to the CA for appropriate action including the reception of evidence to
determine and resolve the pertinent factual issues.
There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-mentioned rulings.
When this Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and
obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of
child custody and property relation, it should not stop short in likewise
acknowledging that one of the usual and necessary consequences of absolute
divorce is the right to remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to
live together and observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and ceased
to exist, the civil status and the domestic relation of the former spouses change
as both of them are freed from the marital bond.
The dissent is of the view that, under the nationality principle, Manalo's personal
status is subject to Philippine law, which prohibits absolute divorce. Hence, the
divorce decree which she obtained under Japanese law cannot be given effect, as
she is, without dispute, a national not of Japan, but of the Philippines. It is said
that a contrary ruling will subvert not only the intention of the framers of the law,
but also that of the Filipino people, as expressed in the Constitution. The Court is,
therefore, bound to respect the prohibition until the legislature deems it fit to lift
the same.
We beg to differ.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. " Based on a clear and plain
reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained
abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be
the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It
does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the
respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of
the statute; neither can We put words in the mouths of the lawmakers.[37] "The
legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used words
advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found
in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute
there should be no departure."[38]
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be
interpreted to mean that the divorce proceeding must be actually initiated by the
alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter of the statute when to do so
would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield
conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act.[39] Laws have ends
to achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out
such ends and purposes.[40] As held in League of Cities of the Phils., et al. v.
COMELEC, et al.:[41]
The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in
which the resulting law is couched. Thus, applying a verba legis or strictly literal
interpretation of a statute may render it meaningless and lead to inconvenience,
an absurd situation or injustice. To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind
the principle that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should
be to the rule that the spirit of the law controls its letter.
To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who,
after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was
rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective
measure to address an anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage
while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her
country.[42] Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding
or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or
her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will
effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce
proceeding is in the same place and in "like circumstance as a Filipino who is at
the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject
provision should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a
means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on Filipinos
whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operation of the latter's
national law.
73
Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such principle, found
under Article 15 of the Civil Code, is not an absolute and unbending rule. In fact,
the mere existence of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is a testament that the State may
provide for an exception thereto. Moreover, blind adherence to the nationality
principle must be disallowed if it would cause unjust discrimination and
oppression to certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected by
law. The courts have the duty to enforce the laws of divorce as written by the
Legislature only if they are constitutional.[43]
While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification
and that its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice,
such classification may be subjected to judicial review.[44] The deference stops
where the classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons
accorded special protection by the Constitution.[45] When these violations arise,
this Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional
guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional
limitations.[46] If a legislative classification impermissibly interferes with the
exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a
suspect class strict judicial scrutiny is required since it is presumed
unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to prove that the
classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the
least restrictive means to protect such interest.[47]
"Fundamental rights" whose infringement leads to strict scrutiny under the equal
protection clause are those basic liberties explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the
Constitution.[48] It includes the right of procreation, the right to marry, the right
to exercise free speech, political expression, press, assembly, and so forth, the
right to travel, and the right to vote.[49]On the other hand, what constitutes
compelling state interest is measured by the scale of rights and powers arrayed
in the Constitution and calibrated by history.[50] It is akin to the paramount
interest of the state for which some individual liberties must give way, such as
the promotion of public interest, public safety or the general welfare.[51] It
essentially involves a public right or interest that, because of its primacy,
overrides individual rights, and allows the former to take precedence over the
latter.[52]
Although the Family Code was not enacted by the Congress, the same principle
applies with respect to the acts of the President, which have the force and effect
of law unless declared otherwise by the court. In this case, We find that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 violates one of the essential requisites[53] of the equal
protection clause.[54] Particularly, the limitation of the provision only to a foreign
divorce decree initiated by the alien spouse is unreasonable as it is based on
superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification.
A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated with a Filipino
who is married to a foreign citizen. There are real, material and substantial
differences between them. Ergo, they should not be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and liabilities imposed. Without a doubt, there are political,
economic, cultural, and religious dissimilarities as well as varying legal systems
and procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a Filipino national who is married to an
alien spouse has to contend with. More importantly, while a divorce decree
obtained abroad by a Filipino against another Filipino is null and void, a divorce
decree obtained by an alien against his or her Filipino spouse is recognized if
made in accordance with the national law of the foreigner.[55]
On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino
who initiated a foreign divorce proceedings and a Filipino who obtained a divorce
decree upon the instance of his or her alien spouse. In the eyes of the Philippine
and foreign laws, both are considered as Filipinos who have the same rights and
obligations in a alien land. The circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it
not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner spouses
who are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between
them based merely on the superficial difference of whether they initiated the
divorce proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue
favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the other.
Further, the differentiation in Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is arbitrary. There is
inequality in treatment because a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and
obtained by a Filipino citizen against his or her alien spouse would not be
recognized even if based on grounds similar to Articles 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the
Family Code.[56] In filing for divorce based on these grounds, the Filipino spouse
cannot be accused of invoking foreign law at whim, tantamount to insisting that
he or she should be governed with whatever law he or she chooses. The dissent's
comment that Manalo should be "reminded that all is not lost, for she may still
pray for the severance of her marital ties before the RTC in accordance with the
mechanisms now existing under the Family Code" is anything but comforting. For
the guidance of the bench and the bar, it would have been better if the dissent
discussed in detail what these "mechanisms" are and how they specifically apply
in Manalo's case as well as those who are similarly situated. If the dissent refers
to a petition for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage, the reality is that
there is no assurance that our courts will automatically grant the same. Besides,
such proceeding is duplicitous, costly, and protracted. All to the prejudice of
our kababayan.
74
It is argued that the Court's liberal interpretation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26
encourages Filipinos to marry foreigners, opening the floodgate to the
indiscriminate practice of Filipinos marrying foreign nationals or initiating divorce
proceedings against their alien spouses.
The supposition is speculative and unfounded.
First, the dissent falls into a hasty generalization as no data whatsoever was
shown to support what he intends to prove. Second, We adhere to the
presumption of good faith in this jurisdiction. Under the rules on evidence, it is
disputably presumed (i.e., satisfactory if uncontradicted and overcome by other
evidence) that a person is innocent of crime or wrong,[57]that a person intends
the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts,[58] that a person takes ordinary
care of his concerns,[59] that acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing
acquiesced in was conformable to the law and fact,[60] that a man and woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage,[61] and that the law has been obeyed.[62] It is whimsical to easily
attribute any illegal, irregular or immoral conduct on the part of a Filipino just
because he or she opted to marry a foreigner instead of a fellow Filipino. It is
presumed that interracial unions are entered into out of genuine love and
affection, rather than prompted by pure lust or profit. Third, We take judicial
notice of the fact that Filipinos are relatively more forbearing and conservative in
nature and that they are more often the victims or at the losing end of mixed
marriages. And Fourth, it is not for Us to prejudge the motive behind a Filipino's
decision to marry an alien national. In one case, it was said:
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not
and cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt
to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to privacy and
would raise serious constitutional questions. The right to marital privacy allows
married couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they see fit, to
live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or
not, and so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or
otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and title,
provided that they comply with all the legal requisites, are equally valid. Love,
though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause
for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a
marriage.[63]
The 1987 Constitution expresses that marriage, as an inviolable social institution,
is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State.[64] Nevertheless, it was not meant to be a general prohibition on divorce
because Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon, in response to a question by
Father Joaquin G. Bernas during the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, was categorical about this point.[65] Their exchange reveal as
follows:
MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I ask that Commissioner Bernas be
recognized.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco). Commissioner Bernas is recognized.
FR. BERNAS. Just one question, and I am not sure if it has been categorically
answered. I refer specifically to the proposal of Commissioner Gascon. Is this to
be understood as a prohibition of a general law on divorce? His intention is to
make this a prohibition so that the legislature cannot pass a divorce law.
MR. GASCON. Mr. Presiding Officer, that was not primarily my intention. My
intention was primarily to encourage the social institution of marriage, but not
necessarily discourage divorce. But now that he mentioned the issue of divorce,
my personal opinion is to discourage it, Mr. Presiding Officer.
FR. BERNAS. No. my question is more categorical. Does this carry the meaning of
prohibiting a divorce law?
MR. GASCON. No. Mr. Presiding Officer.
FR. BERNAS. Thank you.[66]
Notably, a law on absolute divorce is not new in our country. Effective March 11,
1917, Philippine courts could grant an absolute divorce on the grounds of
adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband by
virtue of Act No. 2710 of the Philippine Legislature.[67] On March 25, 1943,
pursuant to the authority conferred upon him by the Commander-in-Chief of the
Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines and with the approval of the latter,
the Chairman of the Philippine Executive Commission promulgated an E.O. No.
141 ("New Divorce Law"), which repealed Act No. 2710 and provided eleven
grounds for absolute divorce, such as intentional or unjustified desertion
continuously for at least one year prior to the filing of the action, slander by deed
or gross insult by one spouse against the other to such an extent as to make
further living together impracticable, and a spouse's incurable insanity.[68] When
the Philippines was liberated and the Commonwealth Government was restored,
it ceased to have force and effect and Act No. 2710 again prevailed.[69]From
August 30, 1950, upon the effectivity of Republic Act No. 386 or the New Civil
75
Code, an absolute divorce obtained by Filipino citizens, whether here or abroad,
is no longer recognized.[70]
Through the years, there has been constant clamor from various sectors of the
Philippine society to re-institute absolute divorce. As a matter of fact, in the
current 17th Congress, House Bill (H.B.) Nos. 116,[71] 1062,[72] 2380[73] and
6027[74] were filed in the House of Representatives. In substitution of these bills,
H.B. No. 7303 entitled "An Act Instituting Absolute Divorce and Dissolution of
Marriage in the Philippines" or the Absolute Divorce Act of 2018 was submitted by
the House Committee on Population and Family Relations on February 28, 2018.
It was approved on March 19, 2018 on Third Reading - with 134 in favor, 57
against, and 2 abstentions. Under the bill, the grounds for a judicial decree of
absolute divorce are as follows:
1. The grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code,
modified or amended, as follows:
a. Physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a
common child, or a child of the petitioner;
b. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change
religious or political affiliation;
c. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or
a child of the petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such
corruption or inducement;
d. Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six
(6) years, even if pardoned;
e. Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism or chronic gambling of the respondent;
f. Homosexuality of the respondent;
g. Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in
the Philippines or abroad;
h. Marital infidelity or perversion or having a child with another person other than
one's spouse during the marriage, except when upon the mutual agreement of
the spouses, a child is born to them by in vitro or a similar procedure or when the
wife bears a child after being a victim of rape;
i. Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner, a common child or
a child of the petitioner; and
j. Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more
than one (1) year.
When the spouses are legally separated by judicial decree for more than two (2)
years, either or both spouses can petition the proper court for an absolute
divorce based on said judicial decree of legal separation.
1. Grounds for annulment of marriage under Article 45 of the Family Code,
restated as follows:
a. The party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage
annulled was eighteen (18) years of age or over but below twenty-
one (21), and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of
the parents, guardian or person having substitute parental
authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the
age of twenty-one (21), such party freely cohabited with the other
and both lived together as husband or wife;
b. either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming
to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
c. The consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such
party afterwards with full knowledge of the facts constituting the
fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
d. The consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or
undue influence, unless the same having disappeared or ceased,
such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband
and wife;
e. Either party was physically incapable of consummating the
marriage with the other and such incapacity continues or appears
to be incurable; and
f. Either party was afflicted with a sexually transmissible infection
found to be serious or appears to be incurable.
Provided, That the grounds mentioned in b, e and f existed either at the time of
the marriage or supervening after the marriage.
1. When the spouses have been separated in fact for at least five (5)
years at the time the petition for absolute divorce is filed, and
reconciliation is highly improbable;
2. Psychological incapacity of either spouse as provided for in Article
36 of the Family Code, whether or not the incapacity was present
at the time of the celebration of the marriage or later;
3. When one of the spouses undergoes a gender reassignment
surgery or transitions from one sex to another, the other spouse is
entitled to petition for absolute divorce with the transgender or
transsexual as respondent, or vice-versa;
4. Irreconcilable marital differences and conflicts which have resulted
in the total breakdown of the marriage beyond repair, despite
earnest and repeated efforts at reconciliation.
76
To be sure, a good number of the Filipinos led by the Roman Catholic Church
react adversely to any attempt to enact a law on absolute divorce, viewing it as
contrary to our customs, morals, and traditions that has looked upon marriage
and family as an institution and their nature of permanence, inviolability, and
solidarity. However, none of our laws should be based on any religious law,
doctrine, or teaching; otherwise, the separation of Church and State will be
violated.[75]
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government
can do with religion, it also limits what religious sects can or cannot do. They can
neither cause the government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for
everyone, nor can they cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so,
in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and,
thus, establish a state religion.[76]
The Roman Catholic Church can neither impose its beliefs and convictions on the
State and the rest of the citizenry nor can it demand that the nation follow its
beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they are good for the country. [77] While
marriage is considered a sacrament, it has civil and legal consequences which are
governed by the Family Code.[78] It is in this aspect, bereft of any ecclesiastical
overtone, that the State has a legitimate right and interest to regulate.
The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State, should not be read
in total isolation but must be harmonized with other constitutional provisions.
Aside from strengthening the solidarity of the Filipino family, the State is equally
mandated to actively promote its total development.[79] It is also obligated to
defend, among others, the right of children to special protection from all forms of
neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their
development.[80] To Our mind, the State cannot effectively enforce these
obligations if We limit the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 only to those
foreign divorce initiated by the alien spouse. It is not amiss to point that the
women and children are almost always the helpless victims of all forms of
domestic abuse and violence. In fact, among the notable legislation passed in
order to minimize, if not eradicate, the menace are R.A. No. 6955 (prohibiting
mail order bride and similar practices), R.A. No. 9262 ("Anti-Violence Against
Women and Their Children Act of 2004"), R.A. No. 9710 ("The Magna Carta of
Women"), R.A. No. 10354 ("The Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health
Act of 2012"), and R.A. No. 9208 ("Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003"), as
amended by R.A. No. 10364 ("Expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of
2012"). Moreover, in protecting and strengthening the Filipino family as a basic
autonomous social institution, the Court must not lose sight of the constitutional
mandate to value the dignity of every human person, guarantee full respect for
human rights, and ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and
men.[81]
A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than good. If
We disallow a Filipino citizen who initiated and obtained a foreign divorce from
the coverage of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 and still require him or her to first avail
of the existing "mechanisms" under the Family Code, any subsequent relationship
that he or she would enter in the meantime shall be considered as illicit in the
eyes of the Philippine law. Worse, any child born out of such "extra-marital" affair
has to suffer the stigma of being branded as illegitimate. Surely, these are just
but a few of the adverse consequences, not only to the parent but also to the
child, if We are to hold a restrictive interpretation of the subject provision. The
irony is that the principle of inviolability of marriage under Section 2, Article XV of
the Constitution is meant to be tilted in favor of marriage and against unions not
formalized by marriage, but without denying State protection and assistance to
live-in arrangements or to families formed according to indigenous customs. [82]
This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present time. With
the advancement of communication and information technology, as well as the
improvement of the transportation system that almost instantly connect people
from all over the world, mixed marriages have become not too uncommon.
Likewise, it is recognized that not all marriages are made in heaven and that
imperfect humans more often than not create imperfect unions.[83] Living in a
flawed world, the unfortunate reality for some is that the attainment of the
individual's full human potential and self-fulfillment is not found and achieved in
the context of a marriage. Thus, it is hypocritical to safeguard the quantity of
existing marriages and, at the same time, brush aside the truth that some of
them are of rotten quality.
Going back, We hold that marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment
between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society
where one is considered released from the marital bond while the other remains
bound to it.[84] In reiterating that the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated
against in his or her own country if the ends of justice are to be served, San Luis
v. San Luis[85] quoted:
x x x In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise,
we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of
the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the
77
intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in
such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An
indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the
legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with
justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure,
there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied
in a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we
are not bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the
same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a
balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law
is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the
law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to
its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the
words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words
import a policy that goes beyond them."
xxxx
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and
perpetual wish to render every one his due." That wish continues to motivate this
Court when it assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to it for
decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the
facts warrant, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming
that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be
dispensed with justice.[86]
Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal
import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the
legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding
as far as necessary the letter of the law.[87] A statute may, therefore, be
extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they
come within its spirit or intent.[88]
The foregoing notwithstanding, We cannot yet write finis to this controversy by
granting Manalo's petition to recognize and enforce the divorce decree rendered
by the Japanese court and to cancel the entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of
San Juan, Metro Manila.
Jurisprudence has set guidelines before Philippine courts recognize a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen
of a foreign country. Presentation solely of the divorce decree will not
suffice.[89] The fact of divorce must still first be proven.[90] Before a foreign
divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove
the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing
it.[91]
x x x Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the
document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained
abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a
judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record
of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document
may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an
official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy
must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. [92]
In granting Manalo's petition, the CA noted:
In this case, Petitioner was able to submit before the court a quo the
1) Decision of the Japanese Court allowing the divorce; 2)
the Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate General in
Osaka, Japan of the Decree of Divorce; and 3) Acceptance of Certificate of
Divorce by Petitioner and the Japanese national. Under Rule 132, Sections 24 and
25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the Rules of Court, these documents
sufficiently prove the subject Divorce Decree as a fact. Thus, We are constrained
to recognize the Japanese Court's judgment decreeing the divorce.[93]
If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case, the divorce decree is
rendered admissible as a written act of the foreign court.[94] As it appears, the
existence of the divorce decree was not denied by the OSG; neither was the
jurisdiction of the divorce court impeached nor the validity of its proceedings
challenged on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law,
albeit an opportunity to do so.[95]
Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.
78
x x x The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a fact [3]
Id. at 30. (Emphasis in the original)
or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases,
plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint [4]
Id. at 42-43.
when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of
proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new [5]
Id. at 25, 37-38.
matters. x x x
[6]
Id. at 40-41.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. x x x The [7]
663 Phil. 546 (2011).
power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable
doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.[96] [8]
223 Phil. 357 (1985).
Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the pertinent
Japanese law validating it, as well as her former husband's capacity to remarry, Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals, 543 Phil. 568, 575 (2007), citing Garcia v.
[9]

fall squarely upon her. Japanese laws on persons and family relations are not Recio, 418 Phil. 723, 735-736 (2001).
among those matters that Filipino judges are supposed to know by reason of
their judicial function. Garcia v. Redo, supra, at 730 and Medina v. Koike, G.R. No. 215723, July 27,
[10]

2016, 798 SCRA 733, 739.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The September
18, 2014 Decision and October 12, 2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition
[11]

CA-G.R. CV No. 100076, are AFFIRMED IN PART. The case is REMANDED to and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even
the court of origin for further proceedings and reception of evidence as to the though living abroad. (9a)
relevant Japanese law on divorce.
[12]
Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public
SO ORDERED. instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are
executed.
Carpio,[*] Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Martires, Tijam, Reyes, Jr.,
and Gesmundo, JJ., concur. When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials
Leonen, J., concur. See separate opinion. of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established
Del Castillo and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., join the dissent of J. Caguioa. by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution.
Caguioa, J., see dissenting opinion.
Sereno, C.J., on leave. Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have
Jardeleza, J., no part. for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.(11a)
[*]
Acting Chief Justice per Special Order No. 2539 dated February 28, 2018.
[13]
Tenchavez v. Escano, et al., 22 Phil. 752, 759-760 (1965), as cited in Cang v.
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Jane Aurora C. Lantion, with Associate Justices Court of Appeals, 357 Phil. 129, 162 (1998); Llorente v. Court of Appeals, 399
Vicente S.E. Veloso and Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela concurring; rollo, pp. 23-31. Phil. 342, 356 (2000); and Perez v. Court of Appeals, 516 Phil. 204, 211 (2006).
See also Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9, at 730; Republic v. Iyoy, 507 Phil. 485,
[2]
Rollo, pp. 32-33. 504 (2005); and Lavadia v. Heirs of Juan Luces Luna, 739 Phil. 331, 341-342
(2014).
79
[14]
Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9, at 730-731. [30]
Dacasin v. Dacasin, supra, at 507. (Citations omitted; underscoring ours)

[15]
FAMILY CODE, Article 26 Paragraph 2. See also Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9, [31]
Van Dorn v. Judge Romillo, Jr., supra note 8, at 361-363. (Citations omitted).
at 730 and Medina v. Koike, supra note 10.
[32]
Supra note 20.
[16]
Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido III, 509 Phil. 108, 112 (2005), as cited
in San Luis v. San Luis, 543 Phil. 275, 291 (2007). [33]
Supra note 10.

[17]
Id. at 112-113, as cited in San Luis v. San Luis, supra. [34]
Fujiki v. Marinay, et al., supra note 20, at 549-550. (Citations omitted).

[18]
Id. at 113, as cited in San Luis v. San Luis, supra. [35]
642 Phil. 420 (2010).

Sempio-Diy, Alicia V., HANDBOOK ON THE FAMILY CODE OF THE

[19] [36]
Supra note 9.
PHILIPPINES, 1988, pp. 26-27.
[37]
Commissioner of Customs v. Manila Star Ferry, Inc., 298 Phil. 79, 86 (1993).
Medina v. Koike, supra note 10 and Fujiki v. Marinay, 712 Phil. 524, 555
[20]

(2013). [38]
Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. v. NLRC, 283 Phil. 649, 660 (1992), as
cited in Victoria v. Commission on Elections, 299 Phil. 263, 268 (1994); Enjay
[21]
Fujiki v. Marinay, supra. Inc. v. NLRC, 315 Phil. 648, 656 (1995); and Pioneer Texturizing Corp. v. NLRC,
345 Phil. 1057, 1073 (1997). See also National Food Authority v. Masada
[22]
Id. Security Agency, Inc., 493 Phil. 241, 251 (2005); Rural Bank of San Miguel, Inc.
v. Monetary Board, 545 Phil. 62, 72 (2007); Rep. of the Phils. v. Lacap, 546 Phil.
See Vda. de Catalan v. Catalan-Lee, 681 Phil. 493, 498 (2012); Roehr v.
[23] 87, 100 (2007); and Phil. Amusement and Gaming Corp. (PAGCOR) v. Phil.
Rodriguez, 452 Phil. 608, 617-618 (2003); and Llorente v. Court of Appeals, Gaming Jurisdiction Inc. (PEJI), et al., 604 Phil. 547, 553 (2009).
supra note 13.
[39]
Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC, 312 Phil. 259, 268 (1995).
[24]
Supra note 19, at 27. See also Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido
III, supra note 16, at 114, as cited in Fujiki v. Marinay, supra note 20, at 555 [40]
Id.
and San Luis v. San Luis, supra note 16, at 292.
[41]
623 Phil. 531, 564-565 (2009).
[25]
Supra note 19, at 27.
[42]
Fujiki v. Marinay, supra note 20, at 555.
[26]
Supra note 16.
[43]
See Barretto Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 58 Phil. 67, 72 (1933), as cited
[27]
Id. at 114-115. (Citations omitted). in Tenchavez v. Escaño, et al., supra note 13, at 762.

[28]
625 Phil. 494 (2010). See Assn. of Small Landowners in the Phils., Inc. v. Hon. Secretary of
[44]

Agrarian Reform, 256 Phil. 777, 808 (1989) and Sameer Overseas Placement
[29]
Supra note 8. Agency, Inc. v. Cabiles, 740 Phil. 403, 436 (2014).

80
 Central Bank Employees Assn., Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 487 Phil.
[45]
531, 597 (2004) as cited in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., 601 Phil.
245, 436 (2009). See also Puno, C.J., Separate Concurring Opinion, Ang Ladlad
LGBT Party v. COMELEC, 632 Phil. 32, 100 (2010); Brion, J., Separate
Opinion, Biraogo v. Phil. Truth Commission of 2010, 651 Phil. 374, 550 (2010);
and Leonardo-De Castro, J., Concurring Opinion, Garcia v. Judge Drilon, et al.,
712 Phil. 44, 125 (2013).
[46]
Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas, supra.
[47]
Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., et al., 601 Phil. 245, 282 (2009)
and Mosqueda v. Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association, Inc., G.R.
Nos. 189185 & 189305, August 16, 2016, 800 SCRA 313, 360. See also Brion, J.,
Separate Opinion, Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, supra;
Velasco, Jr., J., Concurring Opinion, International Service for the Acquisition of
Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Phils.), et al., 774
Phil. 508, 706 (2015); and Jardeleza, J., Concurring Opinion, Poe-Llamanzares v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 221697 & 221698-700, March 8, 2016, 786
SCRA 1, 904.
Brion, J., Separate Opinion, Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010,
[48]
supra note 45, at 553.
See Morales, J., Dissenting Opinion, Central Bank Employees Assn., Inc. v.
[49]
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 487 Phil. 531, 697-698 (2004) as cited by Brion, J.,
Separate Opinion, Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, supra note
45, at 553, and Leonen, J., Separate Opinion, Samahan ng mga Progresibong
Kabataan v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017.
[50]
Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., et al., 601 Phil. 245, 298 (2009).
[51]
Id.
[52]
Brion, J., Separate Concurring Opinion, Sps. Imbong v. Hon. Ochoa, Jr., et
al., 732 Phil. 1, 326- 327 (2014).
[53]
To be valid, the classification must conform to the following requirements:
1.) It must rest on substantial distinctions.
2.) It must be germane to the purpose of the law.
3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only.
4) It must apply equally to all members of the same class. (See PAGCOR v.
Bureau of Internal Revenue, 660 Phil. 636, 648 [2011]; Maj. Gen. Garcia v. The
Executive Secretary, et al., 692 Phil. 114, 141-142 [2012]; Corpuz v. People, 734
Phil. 353, 405 [2014]; Ferrer, Jr. v. Mayor Bautista, 762 Phil. 233, 277
(2015); Drugstores Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. National Council on
Disability Affairs, G.R. No. 194561, September 14, 2016, 803 SCRA 25,
55; Ocampo v. Enriquez, G.R. Nos. 225973, 225984, 226097, 226116, 226117,
226120 & 226294, November 8, 2016; and Mindanao Shopping Destination Corp.
v. Duterte, G.R. No. 211093, June 6, 2017).
[54]
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution states:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
[55]
Tenchavez v. Escano, et al., supra note 13, as cited in Cang v. Court of
Appeals, supra note 13;; Llorente v. Court of Appeals, supra note 13; and Perez
v. Court of Appeals, supranote 13. See also Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9, at
730; Republic v. Iyoy supra note 13; and Lavadia v. Heirs of Juan Luces Luna,
supra note 13. FAMILY CODE, Article 26 Paragraph 2. See also Garcia v. Recio,
supra note 9, at 730 and Medina v. Koike, supra note 10.
[56]
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the
consent of parents or guardians;
(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages
unless such marriages were contracted with either or both parties believing in
good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do so;
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding
Chapter;
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 41;
(5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity
of the other; and
(6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations
of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization. (As amended by E.O. 227)
81
Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the Art. 53. Either of the former spouses may marry again after complying with the
beginning, whether the relationship between the parties be legitimate or requirements of the immediately preceding Article; otherwise, the subsequent
illegitimate: marriage shall be null and void.

(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and [57]

RULE 131, Section 3(a).
(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.
[58]
Id., Section 3(c).
Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of
public policy: [59]
Id., Section 3(d).

(1) Between collateral blood relatives, whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to [60]

Id., Section 3(x).
the fourth civil degree;
(2) Between step-parents and step-children; [61]
Id., Section 3(aa).
(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child; [62]
Id., Section 3(ff).
(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;
(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;
[63]
Rep. of the Phils. v. Albios, 719 Phil. 622, 636 (2013).
(8) Between the adopted children of the same adopter; and
(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article XV, Section 2. This echoed the Family Code
[64]

other person's spouse or his or her own spouse. (82) provision, which provides:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a
previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive
years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under
the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an
absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a
woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and
family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution
whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject
to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations
during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
Bernas, Joaquin G, S.J., THE INTENT OF THE 1986 CONSTITUTION WRITERS,
[65]

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding 1995 Edition, pp. 1132, citing V RECORD 41.
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided
in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without [66]
Record of the Constitutional Commission: Proceedings and Debates, Volume
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (83a) V, September 24, 1986, p. 41.

Art. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the See Garcia Valdez v. Soteraña Tuason, 40 Phil. 943, 944 (1920); Francisco v.
[67]

partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the
children's presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry
and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect third persons, (n)
Tayao, 50 Phil. 42 (1927); People v. Bitdu, 58 Phil. 817 (1933); Sikat v. Canson,
61 Phil. 207 (1939); and Arca, et al. v. Javier, 95 Phil. 579 (1954).
[68]
See Baptista v. Castañeda, 16 Phil. 461 (1946); Luz v. Court of First Instance
of Tacloban, 77 Phil. 679 (1946); and Antonio v. Reyes, 519 Phil. 337 (2006).

82
[69]
Baptista v. Castañeda, supra, at 463. [80]
Article XV, Section 3(2).

Tenchavezv. Escano, et al.,supra note 13, at 759-760, as cited in Cang v.

[70] [81]
Article II, Sections 11, 12 and 14. See also Republic Act Nos. 7192 ("Women
Court of Appeals, supra note 13; Llorente v. Court of Appeals, supra note 13; in Development and Nation Building Act") and 9710 ("The Magna Carta of
and Perez v. Court of Appeals, supra note 13. See also Garcia v. Recio, Women").
supra note 9, at 730; Republic v. Iyoy, supra note 13; and Lavadia v. Heirs of
Juan Luces Luna, 739 Phil. 331, 341-342 (2014). Bernas, Joaquin G, S.J., THE INTENT OF THE 1986 CONSTITUTION WRITERS,
[82]

1995 Edition, pp. 1132, citing V RECORD 40, 44.

Entitled "Instituting Absolute Divorce in the Philippines And For Other
[71]

Purposes," with Representative Edcel C. Lagman as Principal Author. [83]

See Paras v. Paras, 555 Phil. 786, 804 (2007)

Entitled "An Act Amending Title I, Chapter 3, of Executive Order No. 209,
[72] [84]
San Luis v. San Luis, supra note 16, at 292-293.
Otherwise Known as the Family Code of the Philippines, Prescribing Additional
Ground for Annulment," with Representative Robert Ace S. Barbers as Principal [85]
Supra note 16.
Author.
[86]
San Luis v. San Luis, supra note 16, at 293-294.
[73]
Entitled "An Act Introducing Divorce in the Philippines, Amending for the
Purpose Articles 26, 55 to 66 and Repealing Article 36 Under Title II of Executive [87]
Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido III, supra note 16, at 115.
Order No. 209, As Amended, Otherwise Known as the Family Code of the
Philippines, and For Other Purposes," with Gabriela Women's Party
Representatives Emmi A. De Jesus and Arlene D. Brosas as principal authors.
[88]
Id.

[74]
Entitled "An Act Providing for Grounds for the Dissolution of a Marriage," with Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9, at 731, as cited in Vda. de Catalan v. Catalan-
[89]

Representatives Teddy B. Baguilat, Jr., Rodel M. Batocabe, Arlene D. Brosas, Ariel Lee, supra note 23, at 501.
B. Casilao, France L. Castro, Nancy A. Catamco, Pia S. Cayetano, Emmi A. De
Jesus, Sarah Jane I. Elago, Gwendolyn F. Garcia, Ana Cristina Siquian Go, Edcel Fujiki v. Marinay, supra note 20, at 544 and Vda. de Catalan v. Catalan-Lee,
[90]

C. Lagman, Pantaleon D. Alvarez, Antonio L. Tinio, and Carlos Isagani T. Zarate supra note 23, at 499.
as Principal Authors.
[91]
Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9, at 731, as cited in Medina v. Koike, supra note
See Leonen, J., dissenting in Matudan v. Republic, G.R. No. 203284,
[75] 10 and Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido III, supra note 16, at 116. See
November 14, 2016. also Bayot v. The Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., 591 Phil. 452, 470 (2008).

Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano, A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC (Resolution), March 7,

[76] Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9, at 732-733. (Citations omitted). See also Vda.
[92]

2017. de Catalan v. Catalan-Lee, supra note 23, at 499 and 501-502 and San Luis v.
San Luis, supra note 16, at 294.
[77]
See Sps. Imbong, et al. v. Hon. Ochoa, Jr., et al., 732 Phil. 1, 167 (2014).
[93]
Rollo, pp. 29-30.
[78]
Tilar v. Tilar, G.R. No. 214529, July 12, 2017.
[94]
Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9, at 733-734.
[79]
Article XV, Section 1.
See Bayot v. The Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., supra note 75, at 470-471;
[95]

and Roehr v. Rodriguez, supra note, 23, at 617.

83
 Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9, at 735. (Citations omitted). See also Vda. de
[96]
Catalan v. Catalan- Lee, supra note 23, at 500-501; San Luis v. San Luis,
supra note 16, at 295; Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido III, supra note 16, at
116; and Llorente v. Court of Appeals, supra note 13, at 354.
NOTICE OF JUDGMENT
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that on April 24, 2018 a Decision/Resolution, copy attached
herewith, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the
original of which was received by this Office on May 17, 2018 at 3:15 p.m.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETA
Clerk of Court
CONCURRING OPINION
LEONEN, J.:
I concur with the ponencia of Justice Peralta, adding the following points.
I
The proposal of the Solicitor General is to give Article 26[1] of our Family Code an
interpretation which capacitates and empowers the Japanese husband the option
to divorce and how such choice has effects in our country while, at the same
time, disallowing the Filipina wife from being able to do the same simply because
she is a Filipina.
That interpretation may be unconstitutional. Article II, Section 14 of our
Constitution provides:
Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall
ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.
This constitutional fiat advances the notion of gender equality from its passive
formulation in Article III, Section 1[2] to its more active orientation.
Article III, Section 1 simply states that "nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws." Traditionally, this means that the State has no duty to
find ways and means to ensure equality. It is only a prescription that whatever
legal burdens and benefits are given to men should likewise be given to women.
It does not require the State, through any of its organs, to find affirmative ways
and means to battle the patriarchy—that complex of political, cultural, and
economic factors that ensure women's disempowerment.
By enacting our Constitution and signing on to our political obligations to the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, we
have legally committed to do better.
We likewise note that the Family Code was followed by Republic Act No. 7192 or
the Women in Development and Nation Building Act. Within this law are
provisions which ensure equal treatment between men and women, thus:
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes the role of women in
nation building and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of
women and men. The State shall provide women rights and opportunities equal
to that of men.
....
Section 5. Equality in Capacity to Act. - Women of legal age, regardless of civil
status, shall have the capacity to act and enter into contracts which shall in every
respect be equal to that of men under similar circumstances.
In all contractual obligations where married men have the capacity to act,
married women shall have equal rights.
To this end:
(1) Women shall have the capacity to borrow and obtain loans and execute security and credit
arrangements under the same conditions as men;
84
(2) Women shall have equal access to all government and private sector programs granting
agricultural credit, loans and non- material resources and shall enjoy equal treatment in agrarian
reform and land resettlement programs;
(3) Women shall have equal rights to act as incorporators and enter into insurance contracts; and
(4) Married women shall have the rights equal to those of married men in applying for passports,
secure visas and other travel documents, without need to secure the consent of their spouses.
In all other similar contractual relations, women shall enjoy equal rights and shall
have the capacity to act which shall in every respect be equal to those of men
under similar circumstances. (Underscoring supplied)
Republic Act No. 9710 or the Magna Carta of Women reflects the state policy to
"[abolish]. . . the unequal structures and practices that perpetuate discrimination
and inequality"[3]between the sexes, and Section 19 of the law is specific on the
equality of women and men as to rights relating to marriage and family
relations:
Section 19. Equal Rights in All Matters Relating to Marriage and Family Relations.
- The State shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination
against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations and shall
ensure:
(a) the same rights to enter into and leave marriages or common law relationships referred to under the
Family Code without prejudice to personal and religious beliefs;
(b) the same rights to choose freely a spouse and to enter into marriage only with their free and full
consent. The betrothal and the marriage of a child shall have no legal effect;
(c) the joint decision on the number and spacing of their children and to have access to the
information, education and means to enable them to exercise these rights;
(d) the same personal rights between spouses or common law spouses including the right to choose
freely a profession and an occupation;
(e) the same rights for both spouses or common law spouses in respect of the ownership, acquisition,
management, administration, enjoyment, and disposition of property;
(f) the same rights to properties and resources, whether titled or not, and inheritance, whether formal
or customary; and
(g) women shall have equal rights with men to acquire, change, or retain their nationality. The State
shall ensure in particular that neither marriage to an alien nor change of nationality by the husband
during marriage shall automatically change the nationality of the wife, render her stateless or force
upon her the nationality of the husband. Various statutes of other countries concerning dual
citizenship that may be enjoyed equally by women and men shall likewise be considered.
Customary laws shall be respected: Provided, however, That they do not
discriminate against women. (Underscoring supplied)
Section 19 is straightforward: the State shall ensure that men and women are to
have "the same rights to enter into and leave marriages."
Following section 19 of Republic Act No. 9710, Article 26 of the Family Code
should be read to mean that who initiates the divorce proceedings abroad is
immaterial. Once a divorce decree is issued, the foreign spouse is deemed to
have "obtained" a divorce which capacitates him or her to remarry. The same
status should therefore be afforded to the Filipino spouse.
Besides, in many jurisdictions, the foreign spouse is given the option to divorce
on the basis of a mutual recognition that irreconcilable differences have surfaced
in the context of their relationship. Some foreign laws, therefore, allow joint filing
for a divorce decree to ensure that there be less incrimination among the
spouses, a more civil and welcoming atmosphere for their children, and less
financial burden for the families affected. The interpretation proposed by the
Solicitor General does not accommodate this possibility. It is blind to the actual
complexities experienced by our citizens in mixed marriages.
II
Justice Caguioa provides the argument that interpreting Article 26 of the Family
Code in the manner provided in the ponencia violates the nationality principle
enshrined in Article 15 of the Civil Code.
I disagree.
Article 15 of the Civil Code provides:
Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad.
85
Clearly, it is not only Article 26 of the Family Code or the Civil Code that applies.
It should also include the Constitution, which is the bedrock of rights of any
citizen. Thus, the State's obligation to "ensure the fundamental equality before
the law of women and men"[4] applies with equal if not greater force. In my view,
this is the full extent of the nationality principle. It is borne of rational
interpretation, not judicial legislation.
III
Finally, my agreement with the ponencia is also impelled by my understanding
that divorce is more consistent with the constitutionally entrenched fundamental
freedoms inherent in individuals as human beings. It is also most consistent with
the constitutional command for the State to ensure human dignity.
The restrictive nature of our marriage laws tends to reify the concept of a family
which is already far from the living realities of many couples and children. For
instance, orthodox insistence on heteronormativity may not compare with the
various types of care that various other "non-traditional" arrangements present in
many loving households.
The worst thing we do in a human relationship is to regard the commitment of
the other formulaic. That is, that it is shaped alone by legal duty or what those
who are dominant in government regard as romantic. In truth, each commitment
is unique, borne of its own personal history, ennobled by the sacrifices it has
gone through, and defined by the intimacy which only the autonomy of the
parties creates.
In other words, words that describe when we love or are loved will always be
different for each couple. It is that which we should understand: intimacies that
form the core of our beings should be as free as possible, bound not by social
expectations but by the care and love each person can bring.
Yet, the present form and the present interpretation we have on the law on
marriage constrains. In love, there are no guarantees. In choosing our most
intimate partners, we can commit mistakes. It is but part of being human.
Our law cruelly defines the normal. The legal is coated in a false sense of morality
poorly reasoned. It condemns those who have made bad choices into a living
inferno.
In my view, this case is a step forward in the right direction.
IV
As I stated in a dissent[5] I wrote in 2016, we had absolute divorce laws in the
past. Act No. 2710,[6] enacted in 1917, allowed the filing of a petition for divorce
on the ground of adultery on the part of the wife, or concubinage on the part of
the husband.[7]
Eleven grounds for divorce were provided in Executive Order No. 141,[8] effective
during the Japanese occupation. These grounds included "intentional or
unjustified desertion continuously for at least one year prior to the filing of a
[petition] for divorce" and "slander by deed or gross insult by one spouse against
the other to such an extent as to make further living impracticable."[9]
After the Japanese left, the laws they enacted were declared void.[10] Act No.
2710 again took effect until the Civil Code's enactment in 1950. Since then,
absolute divorce has been prohibited in our jurisdiction.
A world whose borders are increasingly becoming permeable with the ease of
travel as well as with the technological advances will definitely foster more inter-
cultural relationships. These relationships can become more intimate.
I am of the belief that the law never intended for the Filipino to be at a
disadvantage. For so long as the Constitution itself guarantees fundamental
equality, the absurd result from a literal and almost frigid and unfeeling
interpretation of our laws should not hold. To say that one spouse may divorce
and the other may not contributes to the patriarchy. It fosters an unequal
relationship prone to abuse in such intimate relationships.
The law is far from frigid. It should passionately guarantee equality and I stand
with this Court in ensuring that it does.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to deny the Petition for Review on Certiorari and to
affirm, with modification, the Court of Appeals' Decision in CA-G.R. CV No.
100076. The case should be remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on
divorce.
[1]
FAMILY CODE, art. 26 provides:
Article 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with
the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as
86
such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35
(1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated
and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.
[2]
CONST, art. III, sec. 1 provides:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
[3]
Rep. Act No. 9710, sec. 2 provides:
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - Recognizing that the economic, political, and
sociocultural realities affect women's current condition, the State affirms the role
of women in nation building and ensures the substantive equality of women and
men. It shall promote empowerment of women and pursue equal opportunities
for women and men and ensure equal access to resources and to development
results and outcome. Further, the State realizes that equality of men and women
entails the abolition of the unequal structures and practices that perpetuate
discrimination and inequality. To realize this, the State shall endeavor to develop
plans, policies, programs, measures, and mechanisms to address discrimination
and inequality in the economic, political, social, and cultural life of women and
men. The State condemns discrimination against women in all its forms and
pursues by all appropriate means and without delay the policy of eliminating
discrimination against women in keeping with the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and other international
instruments consistent with Philippine law. The State shall accord women the
rights, protection, and opportunities available to every member of society.
The State affirms women's rights as human rights and shall intensify its efforts to
fulfill its duties under international and domestic law to recognize, respect,
protect, fulfill, and promote all human rights and fundamental freedoms of
women, especially marginalized women, in the economic, social, political,
cultural, and other fields without distinction or discrimination on account of class,
age, sex, gender, language, ethnicity, religion, ideology, disability, education,
and status. The State shall provide the necessary mechanisms to enforce
women's rights and adopt and undertake all legal measures necessary to foster
and promote the equal opportunity for women to participate in and contribute to
the development of the political, economic, social, and cultural realms.
The State, in ensuring the full integration of women's concerns in the mainstream
of development, shall provide ample opportunities to enhance and develop their
skills, acquire productive employment and contribute to their families and
communities to the fullest of their capabilities.
In pursuance of this policy, the State reaffirms the right of women in all sectors
to participate in policy formulation, planning, organization, implementation,
management, monitoring, and evaluation of all programs, projects, and services.
It shall support policies, researches, technology, and training programs and other
support services such as financing, production, and marketing to encourage
active participation of women in national development.
[4]
CONST., art. II, sec. 14.
[5]
See Dissenting Opinion in Matudan v. Republic, G.R. No. 203284, November
14, 2016, <
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2016/novem
ber2016/203284. pdf > [Per J. Del Castillo, Second Division].
[6]
An Act to Establish Divorce (1917).
[7]
Act. No. 2710, sec. 1 provides:
Section 1. A petition for divorce can only be filed for adultery on the part of the
wife or concubinage on the part of the husband, committed in any of the forms
described in article four hundred and thirty-seven of the Penal Code.
See Valdez v. Tuazon, 40 Phil. 943, 948 (1920) [Per J. Street, En Banc].
[8]
Otherwise known as "The New Divorce Law."
[9]
Baptista v. Castañeda, 76 Phil. 461, 462 (1946) [Per J. Ozaeta, En Banc].
[10]
Id. at 462-463.
DISSENTING OPINION
87
CAGUIOA, J.:
The Supreme Court x x x aims to adopt a liberal construction of statutes.
By liberal construction of statutes is meant that method by which courts
from the language used, the subject matter, and the purposes of those
framing laws, are able to find out their true meaning. There is a sharp
distinction, however, between construction of this nature and the act of
a court in engrafting upon a law something that has been omitted which
someone believes ought to have been embraced. The former is liberal
construction and is a legitimate exercise of judicial power. The latter is
judicial legislation forbidden by the tripartite division of powers among
the three departments of government, the executive, the legislative, and
the judicial.[1]
On the basis of the Court's rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[2] (Van Dorn),
Republic of the Philippines v. Orbecido III[3] (Orbecido), and Dacasin v.
Dacasin[4] (Dacasin), the ponenciaholds that Article 26(2) of the Family Code
permits the blanket recognition, under Philippine law, of a divorce decree
obtained abroad by a Filipino citizen against the latter's foreigner spouse.
I disagree.
At the outset, it bears to emphasize that the public policy against absolute
divorce remains in force. At present, there exists no legal mechanism under
Philippine law through which a Filipino may secure a divorce decree upon his own
initiative. Accordingly, it is the Court's duty to uphold such policy and apply the
law as it currently stands until the passage of an amendatory law on the subject.
As members of the Court, ours is the duty to interpret the law; this duty does not
carry with it the power to determine what the law should be in the face of
changing times, which power, in turn, lies solely within the province of Congress.
Article 26(2) of the Family Code is an exception to
the nationality principle under Article 15 of the
Civil Code.
Article 26(2) was introduced during the meetings of the Joint Civil Code and
Family Law Committee (the Committee) to address the effect of foreign divorce
decrees on mixed marriages between Filipinos and foreigners. The provision, as
originally worded, and the rationale for its introduction, appear in the
deliberations:
[Professor Esteban B. Bautista (Prof. Bautista)]'s position, even under the
present law, was that the Filipina wife should be allowed to remarry as long as
the divorce is valid under the national law of the husband, with which [Judge
Alicia Sempio-Diy (Judge Diy)] and [Justice Leonor Ines-Luciano (Justice
Luciano)] concurred.
After further deliberation, [Justice Ricardo C. Puno (Justice Puno)] suggested that
they formulate the base to cover the above situation. Judge Diy and [Justice
Eduardo P. Caguioa (Justice Caguioa)] formulated the base as follows:
In a mixed marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner, both capacitated
to marry under Philippine law, in case the foreigner should obtain a valid divorce
abroad, capacitating him to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.[5]
However, subsequent deliberations show that the Committee ultimately resolved
to delete the provision and defer action until absolute divorce is determined in
future legislation:
On Article [26(2)], [Justice Jose B.L. Reyes (Justice Reyes)] commented that it
seems to discriminate against Filipinos, who are married to Filipinos, since the
provision governs only Filipinos married to foreigners.
Justice Puno suggested that, in line with Justice Caguioa's view that xxx they
should make the Proposed Family Code as acceptable as possible and since they
are not touching on divorce which is one of the big issues and they are leaving it
to future legislation, they omit Article 126(2)] temporarily and take it up
when they take up the matter of absolute divorce.
Prof. Bautista remarked that it is a matter of equity, justice and fairness that
Article [26(2)] should be retained. On the point raised by Justice Reyes, Prof.
Bautista opined that there is no unfairness in the case of a Filipino, who is
married to a Filipino, because in the case of a Filipino who is married to a
foreigner, the foreigner is already free, and yet the Filipino is still married to
nobody. [Dean Bartolome S. Carale (Dean Carale)] added that if two Filipinos are
married anywhere, they are both covered by the Philippine prohibitory laws
because they are nationals of the Philippines. Justice Caguioa, however, pointed
out that, in effect, there is preferential treatment in the case of Filipinos married
to foreigners, since if the foreigner gets a divorce, the Filipino spouse also
automatically gets a divorce. Dean Carale remarked that Article [26(2)] will in
effect encourage Filipinos to marry foreigners. Prof. Bautista disagreed since it is
the foreigner and not the Filipino, who will seek divorce.
88
xxxx
Justice Reyes remarked that this article is an implicit recognition of
foreign divorce, with which Justice Caguioa concurred. Prof. Bautista and
[Professor Flerida Ruth P. Romero (Prof. Romero)] pointed out that the
article will only cover exceptional cases and special situations and that
there is a reasonable and substantial basis for making it an exception.
After further discussion, Justice Puno rephrased Article [26(2)] in accordance
with Dr. Cortes' suggestion as follows:
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated
abroad and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad capacitating such
foreigner to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law.
xxxx
Having sufficiently discussed the matter, the Committee decided to put the issue
to a vote.
The members voted as follows:
(1) Justice Puno, Justice Caguioa, Dr. Cortes, Dean Carale, Dean Gupit and Prof.
Baviera were for the deletion of Article [26(2)].
(2) Justice Diy, Prof. Bautista, Prof. Romero and [Director Flora C. Eufemio] were
for its retention.
Hence, the Committee agreed that x x x Article [26(2)] shall be deleted x
x x.[6] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Accordingly, Article 26(2) did not appear in the initial version of the Family Code
under Executive Order (EO) 209 which was signed into law by then President
Corazon Aquino on July 6, 1987. Days later, or on July 17, 1987, President
Aquino issued EO 227 which incorporated, among others, Article 26(2). Thus,
when the Family Code finally took effect on August 3, 1988, Article 26, in its
entirety, read as follows:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1),
(4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated
and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
While Article 26(2) was reinstated by executive fiat, it is nevertheless clear that
the true spirit behind the provision remains explicit in the Committee
deliberations — Article 26(2) had been crafted to serve as an exception to
the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, which
states:
ART. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad.
The deliberations show that Article 26(2) has the effect of (i) enforcing divorce
decrees which are binding on foreign nationals under their national law; and (ii)
recognizing the residual effect of such foreign divorce decrees on their Filipino
spouses who are bound by the prohibition against absolute divorce under the
Civil Code.[7]
To be sure, Article 26(2) had not been crafted to dilute the Philippines' policy
against absolute divorce. In fact, this perceived possible dilution is precisely what
prompted the majority of the Committee members to vote for the deletion of
Article 26(2) in the initial version of the Family Code found in EO 209. As the
deliberations indicate, the exception provided in Article 26(2) is narrow,
and intended only to address the unfair situation that results when a
foreign national obtains a divorce decree against a Filipino citizen,
leaving the latter stuck in a marriage without a spouse, thus:
Justice Caguioa explained that the intention of the provision is to legalize foreign
divorces for the Filipino so that in the case of a Filipina, who was married to an
American, who in turn later secured a divorce, said Filipina will be allowed to
remarry. Justice Puno and Judge Diy remarked that this is not clear in the
provision [Article 26(2)]. Justice Puno, however, commented that it will
open the gates to practically invalidating the Philippine laws by the
simple expedient of marrying a foreigner, and that it will be an additional
cause for the breakage of families, with which Justice Caguioa
89
concurred. Judge Diy stated that, on the other hand, it is an absurdity for
a Filipina to be married without a husband.[8] (Emphasis supplied)
I believe that this view is consistent with the Court's rulings in Van Dorn,
Orbecido, and Dacasin.
In Van Dorn, a case decided prior to the enactment of the Family Code, an
American citizen sought to compel his former Filipina wife to render an
accounting of their alleged conjugal business in Manila. The American citizen
argued that he retained the right to share in the proceeds of the disputed
business, as the divorce decree issued by the Nevada District Court cannot be
given effect in the Philippines. Ruling against the American citizen, the Court
held that the divorce decree issued by a United States court is binding
against him as an American citizen.[9] As a residual effect of such divorce,
the American citizen no longer had standing to sue as the husband of his
former Filipina wife.[10] Hence, in Van Dorn, the Court held:
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute
divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law. x x x[11] (Emphasis supplied)
In Orbecido, a Filipino citizen sought permission to remarry before the courts,
claiming that his former Filipina wife had obtained a divorce decree against him
from an American court after she had become a naturalized American
citizen. The Court held that the effects of the divorce decree should be
recognized in the Philippines since it was obtained by the former wife as
an American citizen in accordance with her national law, and that as a
consequence, the Filipino husband should be allowed to remarry
pursuant to Article 26(2). In so ruling, the Court laid down elements for the
application of Article 26(2), thus:
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when [the Filipino spouse's] wife was naturalized as an American
citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between [them].
As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid
divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus x x x
the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.[12] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Still, in Dacasin, a Filipino wife secured a divorce decree against her American
husband from an Illinois court. The decree awarded sole custody over the parties'
daughter in favor of the Filipino wife. While the parties subsequently executed a
Joint Custody Agreement, the Filipino wife refused to honor the agreement,
prompting the American husband to seek redress before the Philippine courts.
The Court held that the Illinois divorce decree is binding on the American citizen,
and that the latter cannot be permitted to evade the terms of the custodial
award. Citing the nationality principle, the Court stressed that "a foreign
divorce decree carries as much validity against the alien divorcee in this
jurisdictionas it does in the jurisdiction of the alien's nationality,
irrespective of who obtained the divorce."[13] It bears stressing that the issue
raised in Dacasin was the enforceability of the Joint Custody Agreement against
the American husband, and not the validity of the foreign divorce decree as
against the Filipino wife.
Thus, rather than serving as bases for the blanket recognition of foreign
divorce decrees in the Philippines, I believe that the Court's rulings
in Van Dorn, Orbecidoand Dacasin merely clarify the parameters for the
application of the nationality principle found in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, and the exception thereto found in Article 26(2) the Family
Code. These parameters may be summarized as follows:
1. Owing to the nationality principle, all Filipino citizens are covered by the
prohibition against absolute divorce. As a consequence of such prohibition,
a divorce decree obtained abroad by a Filipino citizen cannot be
enforced in the Philippines. To allow otherwise would be to permit a
Filipino citizen to invoke foreign law to evade an express
prohibition under Philippine law.
90
 2. Nevertheless, the effects of a divorce decree obtained by a foreign
national may be extended to the Filipino spouse, provided the latter is
able to prove (i) the issuance of the divorce decree, and (ii) the personal
law of the foreign spouse allowing such divorce. [14] This exception, found
under Article 26(2) of the Family Code, respects the binding effect of the
divorce decree on the foreign national, and merely recognizes the residual
effect of such decree on the Filipino spouse.
It should be emphasized, however, that the prohibition against absolute divorce
only applies to Filipino citizens. Accordingly, it cannot be invoked by a foreign
national to evade the effects of a divorce decree issued pursuant to his national
The corresponding effect of these determining factors are, in turn, illustrated by the relevant cases involving the issue at hand, decided after the issuance of EO 227:
Case Incidents of Divorce
Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera[15](Pilapil) Divorce obtained in Germany by German spouse
Republic v. Iyoy[16] (Iyoy) Divorce obtained in the United States by Filipino
wife prior to her naturalization as an American
citizen
Orbecido Divorce obtained in the United States by naturalized
American spouse
Dacasin Divorce obtained in the United States by Filipino
spouse
Bayot v. Court, of Appeals[17](Bayot) Divorce obtained in the Dominican Republic by
naturalized American spouse
law. To reiterate, a divorce decree issued by a foreign court remains
binding on the foreign spouse in the Philippines, regardless of the party
who obtained the same provided that such decree is valid and effective
under the foreign spouse's national law.
In essence, the applicable rule (whether Article 15 of the Civil Code on one hand,
or Article 26[2] of the Family Code on the other), is determined by (i) the law
upon which the divorce decree had been issued; (ii) the party who obtained the
divorce decree; (iii) the nature of the action brought before the Philippine courts;
and (iv) the law governing the personal status of the party seeking relief.
Incidents of Action in the Philippines Court's Resolution
German spouse filed two (2) complaints charging The divorce decree is binding on the German spouse
Filipino spouse with adultery pursuant to the nationality principle. Accordingly,
the German spouse lacks standing to file the
complaints as "offended spouse", having obtained
the divorce decree prior to the filing of said
complaints.
Filipino husband invokes the divorce decree secured The divorce decree cannot be recognized in the
by his Filipino wife as additional ground to grant his Philippines since the Filipino wife obtained the same
petition for declaration of nullity while still a Filipino citizen, and was, at such time,
bound by Philippine laws on family rights and
duties, pursuant to the nationality principle.
Filipino spouse sought enforcement of divorce in the The effects of the divorce decree must be recognized
Philippines in favor of the Filipino spouse pursuant to Article
26(2) of the Family Code. Accordingly, the Filipino
spouse should be allowed to re-marry.
American spouse sought enforcement of the Joint The divorce decree is binding on the American
Custody Agreement he had executed with his former spouse, pursuant to the nationality principle.
Filipino wife, which bore terms contrary to those in Accordingly, he cannot be allowed to evade the
the divorce decree same by invoking the terms of the Joint Custody
Agreement.
Naturalized American spouse sought annulment of The divorce decree is binding on the naturalized
her marriage with her Filipino spouse through a American spouse, pursuant to the nationality
petition for annulment filed before the Regional principle. Accordingly, she is left without any cause
Trial Court (RTC) of action before the RTC, as a petition for annulment
presupposes a subsisting marriage.
91
Fujiki v. Marinay[18] (Fujiki)
Medina v. Koike[19] (Medina)
Divorce obtained in Japan by Filipina wife against
her second husband, who is a Japanese national
Divorce jointly obtained in Japan by Filipina wife
and Japanese husband
First husband (also a Japanese national) sought
recognition of the divorce obtained by his Filipina
wife against her second husband through a Petition
for Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or
Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage) filed before
the RTC
Filipina wife sought to enforce the divorce in the
Philippines through a Petition for Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Divorce and Declaration of
Capacity to Remarry before the RTC
The effect of the divorce decree issued pursuant to
Japanese law may be recognized in the Philippines
in order to affect the status of the first husband, who,
pursuant to the nationality principle, is governed by
Japanese law. Such recognition is in line with the
Philippines' public policy, which characterizes
bigamous marriages as void ab initio.
The case was remanded to the CA to allow Filipina
wife to prove that the divorce obtained abroad by
her and her Japanese husband is valid according to
the latter's national law.

The factual circumstances in the foregoing cases illustrate and confirm the
legislative intent behind Article 26(2), that is, primarily, to recognize foreign
divorce decrees secured by foreign nationals insofar as they affect Filipinos who
would otherwise be precluded from invoking such decrees in our jurisdiction, and,
as well, to recognize those foreign divorce decrees obtained by Filipinos insofar
as they affect their foreign spouses whose national laws allow divorce. For
emphasis, I quote the relevant portion of the deliberations:
Prof. Bautista remarked that it is a matter of equity, justice and fairness that
Article [26(2)] should be retained, x x x Dean Carale added that if two Filipinos
are married anywhere, they are both covered by the Philippine prohibitory laws
because they are nationals of the Philippines. Justice Caguioa, however, pointed
out that, in effect, there is preferential treatment in the case of Filipinos married
to foreigners, since if the foreigner gets a divorce, the Filipino spouse also
automatically gets a divorce. Dean Carale remarked that Article [26(2)] will in
effect encourage Filipinos to marry foreigners. Prof. Bautista disagreed since
it is the foreigner and not the Filipino, who will seek divorce.
xxxx
Consistent with the foregoing, the Court held in Iyoy:
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one
of the [parties in the marriage] is a foreigner who divorces his or her Filipino
spouse. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied
to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely
obtained her divorce, she was still, a Filipino citizen. x x x At the time she filed
for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the
nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and
duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already
living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and
recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have
validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.[21] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Article 26(2) of the Family Code merely
recognizes the classification previously made
pursuant to the nationality principle.

Justice Reyes remarked that this article is an implicit recognition of
foreign divorce, with which Justice Caguioa concurred. Prof. Bautista and
Prof. Romero pointed out that the article will only cover exceptional
cases and special situations and that there is a reasonable and
substantial basis for making it an exception.[20] (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
The ponencia characterizes Article 26(2) of the Family Code as unconstitutional,
as it proceeds from a "superficial [and] arbitrary" classification.[22] This position
appears to be based on the premise that Article 26(2) creates new distinctions in
itself. This premise, however, is simply erroneous.
The classification under Article 26(2), (that is, between Filipinos in mixed
marriages and Filipinos married to fellow Filipinos) was created as a matter of

92
necessity, in recognition of the classification between Filipinos and foreign
nationals which had been created by Article 15 of the Civil Code decades prior.
In his Separate Opinion in Pilapil, Justice Paras highlights the interplay between
these two provisions, thus:
In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme Court
considered the absolute divorce between the American husband and his American
wife as valid and binding in the Philippines on the theory that their status and
capacity are governed by their National law, namely, American law. There
is no decision yet of the Supreme Court regarding the validity of such a divorce if
one of the parties, say an American, is married to a Filipino wife, for then two (2)
different nationalities would be involved.
In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private International Law
and precisely because of the National law doctrine, he considers the absolute
divorce as valid insofar as the American husband is concerned but void insofar as
the Filipino wife is involved. This results in what he calls a "socially grotesque
situation," where a Filipino woman is still married to a man who is no longer her
husband. It is the opinion however, of the undersigned that very likely the
opposite expresses the correct view. While under the national law of the
husband the absolute divorce will be valid, still one of the exceptions to
the application of the proper foreign law (one of the exceptions to
comity) is when the foreign law will work an injustice or injury to the
people or residents of the forum. Consequently since to recognize the
absolute divorce as valid on the part of the husband would be injurious
or prejudicial to the Filipino wife whose marriage would be still valid
under her national law, it would seem that under our law existing before
the new Family Code (which took effect on August 3, 1988) the divorce
should be considered void both with respect to the American husband
and the Filipino wife.[23] (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, to characterize Article 26(2) as unconstitutional in such respect would be
to disregard the nationality principle and the reasons which render the adoption
thereof necessary; it would be tantamount to insisting that Filipinos should be
governed with whatever law they choose.
Article 26(2) of the Family Code rests on
substantial and reasonable distinctions.
It has been argued that the verba legis interpretation of Article 26(2) of the
Family Code violates the equal protection clause, and that the application of the
provision in this manner would not only be oppressive, but likewise
unconstitutional.
These reservations appear to proceed from three different classifications which,
in turn, have been called into question — first, that between Filipinos in mixed
marriages and Filipinos who are married to fellow Filipinos; second, that between
Filipinos and foreigners; and finally, that between men and women.
As earlier discussed, the ponencia finds the first classification "superficial [and]
arbitrary"[24] insofar as it limits the scope of recognition to cover only those
divorce decrees obtained by foreign nationals.
It bears to stress, however, that the guarantee of equal protection under the
Constitution does not require that all laws indiscriminately operate with equal
force with respect to all subjects at all times;[25] the guarantee does not preclude
classification provided they are reasonable and based on substantial
distinctions.[26]
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the
application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a
requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality,
that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality
of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on
persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances
surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The
Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be
treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause
does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not
prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is
directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification.
Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the
grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another
in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very
idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the
mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be
reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on
substantial distinctions which make for real differences, that it must be
germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the
93
class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the
classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or
rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.[27] (Emphasis supplied)
There should be no dispute on the existence of substantial distinctions between
Filipinos in mixed marriages and those who are married to fellow Filipinos. In
fact, several of these distinctions were highlighted in the ponencia, thus:
A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated with a Filipino
who is married to a foreign citizen. There are real, material and substantial
differences between them. Ergo, they should not be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and liabilities imposed. Without a doubt, there are political,
economic, cultural, and religious dissimilarities as well as varying legal systems
and procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a Filipino national who is married to an
alien spouse has to contend with. More importantly, while a divorce decree
obtained abroad by a Filipino against another Filipino is null and void, a
divorce decree obtained by an alien against his or her Filipino spouse is
recognized if made in accordance with the national law of the
foreigner.[28] (Emphasis supplied)
As observed by the ponencia, the most important distinction between Filipinos in
mixed marriages and those who are married to fellow Filipinos is their exposure
to the absurdity for which Article 26(2) had been precisely crafted, as only
Filipinos in mixed marriages may find themselves married without a spouse due
to the effects of a foreign divorce decree. This distinction is "substantial" as to
necessitate a difference in treatment before the law.
To disregard these substantial distinctions for the sake of liberality would
empower Filipinos in mixed marriages to obtain divorce decrees by invoking
foreign law at whim, and effectively sanction a legal preference in their favor at
the expense of those Filipinos who happen to be married to their fellow Filipinos.
A liberal interpretation of Article 26(2) would, in Dean Carale's words, "encourage
Filipinos to marry foreigners."[29]
To stress, all Filipinos are bound by the prohibition against absolute divorce. The
recognition afforded to foreign divorce under Article 26(2) is extended
only as a means to recognize its residual effect on Filipinos whose
marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operation of the latter's
national laws. The provision was not intended to grant any preferential
right in favor of Filipinos in mixed marriages, but intended merely to
recognize the operation of foreign divorce on foreigners whose national
laws permit divorce.
Equally apparent is the fundamental distinction between foreigners and Filipinos
under the second classification, the former being subject to their respective
national laws and the latter being bound by the laws of the Philippines regardless
of their place of residence. Clearly, foreigners and Filipinos are not similarly
situated. Hence, the determination of their legal status, among others, cannot be
made subject to the same parameters. In any case, I emphasize, at the sake of
being repetitious, that such classification had been created not by Article 26(2) of
the Family Code, but rather, the nationality principle under Article 15 of the Civil
Code:
ART. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad.
Finally, I find that Article 26(2) does not make any discernable distinction
between men and women, as the exception therein may be invoked by both men
and women with equal force to attain the same end, provided that the
requirements for its application obtain. While I am certainly aware that the
respondent in this case is one of the many Filipino women who find themselves in
unsuccessful marriages with foreign nationals, I am equally aware that this
unfortunate circumstance is similarly faced by Filipino men, who, like their female
counterparts, are precluded from obtaining an absolute divorce under Philippine
law.
Respondent's case falls outside of the scope of
Article 26(2) of the Family Code.
In this case, it has been established that (i) the respondent is a Filipino citizen
who married a Japanese national; (ii) it was the respondent who
subsequently obtained a divorce decree against her Japanese
husband from a Japanese court; and (iii) the respondent thereafter filed a
Petition for Recognition and Enforcement of a Foreign Judgment [30] before the
RTC.[31] It is clear that respondent is, and has always been, a Filipino citizen.
Pursuant to the nationality principle, respondent's personal status is subject to
Philippine law which, in turn, prohibits absolute divorce.
Hence, the divorce decree which respondent obtained under Japanese law cannot
be given effect, as she is, without dispute, a national not of Japan, but of the
Philippines. Nevertheless, the verba legis application of Article 26(2) does not
deprive the respondent of legal remedies, as she may pray for the severance of
her marital ties before the RTC in accordance with the mechanisms now existing
under the Family Code.
94
The Constitution mandates the protection of the family as a basic autonomous
social institution.[32] In this connection, the Family Code characterizes marriage
as a special contract of permanent union, and regards the family as "an
inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are
governed by law" and generally, not subject to stipulation.[33] Upon these
fundamental principles rests the prohibition against absolute divorce, which had
remained effective and unchanged since the enactment of the Civil Code in
1950.[34]
Adherence to this prohibition is met with much reservation, as it purportedly
forces Filipinos to play second-fiddle to their foreign spouses, and places said
Filipinos at a disadvantage. Moreover, it had been argued in the deliberations of
the Court that such adherence sanctions various forms of abuse that plague
mixed marriages, and deprives Filipinos in such marriages of a way out. I find
that these observations, pressing as they are, already delve into the wisdom of
statutes governing marriage and personal status with which the Court cannot
interfere.
To note, Article 26(2) of the Family Code has remained unchanged since the
issuance of EO 227. The blanket recognition of absolute divorce overturns the
Court's unequivocal interpretation of the provision as laid down in the cases
of Pilapil, Iyoy, Orbecido, Dacasin, Bayot, Fujiki and Medina, which span a period
of nearly three decades. Ascribing a contradictory interpretation to the provision,
under the guise of equal protection, essentially re-writes Article 26(2) and gives
it a meaning completely different from the framers' intention.
While I am not oblivious to the difficulty that results from the prohibition on
absolute divorce and commiserate totally with the respondent in this regard, I
find that the prohibition remains, and thus, must be faithfully applied. To my
mind, a contrary ruling will subvert not only the intention of the framers of the
law, but also that of the Filipino people, as expressed in the Constitution. The
Court is bound to respect the prohibition, until the legislature deems it lit
to lift the same through the passage of a statute permitting absolute
divorce.
As recognized by the ponencia, there are currently four bills on the subject of
divorce and severance of marriage pending before the 17th Congress: (i) House
Bill No. 116 (HB 116) and House Bill No. 2380 (HB 2380) which propose different
grounds for the issuance of a judicial decree of absolute divorce; (ii) House
Bill No. 1062 (HB 1062) which proposes the inclusion of separation in fact as an
additional ground for annulment of marriage; and (iii) House Bill No. 6027 (HB
6027) which proposes additional grounds for dissolution of marriage. These bills
have been consolidated and substituted by House Bill No. 7303[35] (HB 7303),
which, at present, is awaiting deliberations before the Senate.[36]
HB 7303 proposes the issuance of divorce decrees on the basis of the following
grounds:
1. The existing grounds for legal separation and annulment of marriage
under Articles 55 and 45 of the Family Code;
2. Separation in fact for at least five years;
3. Psychological incapacity, whether or not present at the time of the
celebration of the marriage;
4. Gender reassignment surgery or transition from one sex to another
undertaken by either spouse; and
5. Irreconcilable marital differences.[37]
These movements towards the passage of a divorce law illustrate that the
difficulty which results from the absolute prohibition against marriage is being
addressed by the 17th Congress through a statute specifically crafted for the
purpose. That the legislature has seen it necessary to initiate these
proposed laws is a clear delineation of the Court's role — that is, to
simply apply the current law and not for it to indulge in judicial
legislation.
Indeed, it is desirable, if not imperative, that statutes in a progressive democracy
remain responsive to the realities of the present time. However, responsiveness
is a matter of policy which requires a determination of what the law ought to be,
and not what the law actually is.[38] Widening the scope of the exception found in
Article 26(2) so as to indiscriminately recognize foreign divorce in this jurisdiction
is doing, in Justice Elias Finley Johnson's[39] words, "exactly what the Legislature
itself [has] refused to do."[40] It not only subverts the standing public policy
against absolute divorce; worse, it sanctions a violation of the fundamental
principle of separation of powers — a violation which cannot be undone by any
subsequent law. To wield judicial power in this manner is to arrogate unto the
Court a power which it does not possess; it is to forget that this State, is
foremost governed by the rule of law and not of men, however wise such men
are or purport to be.
Considering the foregoing, I submit that the Court of Appeals erred when it
reversed the RTC's order denying respondent's Petition for Enforcement. Hence, I
vote to GRANT the instant Petition for Review.
95
 See Tañada v. Yulo, 61 Phil. 515-516, 519 (1935) [Per J. Malcolm, En Banc];
[1] [19]
Supra note 14.
emphasis supplied.
[20]
Supra note 6.
[2]
223 Phil. 357 (1985) [Per J. Melencio-Herrera, First Division].
[21]
Supra note 16, at 503-504.
[3]
509 Phil. 108 (2005) [Per J. Quisumbing, First Division].
[22]
Ponencia, p. 14.
[4]
625 Phil. 494 (2010) [Per J. Carpio, Second Division].
[23]
Supra note 15, at 421.
Minutes of the 146th joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law
[5]

Committees dated July 12, 1986, p. 5. [24]

Ponencia, p. 14.

Minutes of the 149th Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law
[6] [25]
See generally Department of Education, Culture and Sports v. San Diego, 259
Committees dated August 2, 1986, pp. 14-15. Phil. 1016 (1989) [Per J. Cruz, En Banc].

[7]
See CIVIL CODE, Arts. 15 and 17. [26]
See Fariñas v. Executive Secretary, 463 Phil. 179, 206-208 (2003) [Per J.
Callejo, Sr., En Banc].
[8]
Supra note 5.
[27]
Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 487
[9]
Supra note 2, at 361. Phil. 531, 559-560 (2004) [Per J. Puno, En Banc].

[10]
Id. at 362. [28]
Ponencia, p. 14.

[11]
Id. [29]
Supra note 6, at 14.

[12]
Supra note 3, at 115-116. Formerly captioned as Petition for Cancellation of Entry of Marriage;
[30]

see ponencia, p. 2.
[13]
Supra note 4, at 508; emphasis and underscoring supplied.
[31]
Ponencia, p. 2.
[14]
See Medina v. Koike, 791 Phil. 645, 651-652 (2016) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe,
First Division]; Garcia v. Recio, 418 Phil. 723, 725 and 730-731 (2001) [Per J. [32]
CONSTITUTION, Art. II, Sec. 12.
Panganiban, Third Division].
[33]
FAMILY CODE, Title I, Art. 1.
[15]
256 Phil. 407 (1989) [Per J. Regalado, Second Division].
See generally Raymundo v. Peñas, 96 Phil. 311 (1954) [Per J. J.B.L. Reyes,
[34]
[16]
507 Phil. 485 (2005) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second Division]. En Banc].

[17]
591 Phil. 452 (2008) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Second Division]. AN ACT INSTITUTING ABSOLUTE DIVORCE AND DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE
[35]

IN THE PHILIPPINES.
[18]
712 Phil. 524 (2013) [Per J. Carpio, Second Division].

96
 HB 7303 passed its second reading on March 14, 2018, and was likewise
[36]
approved on its third and final reading before the lower house on March 19,
2018. See "House passes divorce bill on second reading,"
< http://www.sunstar.com.ph/article/423557 > (last accessed on March 19,
2018) and "House approves divorce bill on 3rd reading,"
< https://www.rappler.com/nation/198516-divorce-bill-philippines-passes-third-
reading-house-representatives > (last accessed on March 22, 2018).
[37]
See HB 7303, Sec. 5.
[38]
See generally People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937) [Per J. Laurel, En Banc].
[39]
Justice Elias Finley Johnson served as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
of the Philippines from 1903 to 1933.
See Nicolas v. Alberto, 51 Phil. 370, 380 (1928) [Dissenting Opinion, J.
[40]
Johnson]
12
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 209031, April 16, 2018 ]
ABIGAEL AN ESPINA-DAN, PETITIONER, VS. MARCO DAN, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] seeks to set aside the December 14, 2012
Decision[2] and August 29, 2013 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA)
denying the Petition in CA-G.R. CV No. 95112 and herein petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration,[4] respectively, thus affirming the January 4, 2010 Decision[5] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City, Branch 254, in Civil Case No. LP-
07-0155.
Factual Antecedents
Petitioner Abigael An Espina-Dan and respondent Marco Dan - an Italian national
- met "in a chatroom [o]n the internet"[6] sometime in May, 2005. They soon
became "chatmates" and "began exchanging letters which further drew them
emotionally closer to each other"[7] even though petitioner was in the Philippines
while respondent lived in Italy.
In November, 2005, respondent proposed marriage. The following year, he flew
in from Italy and tied the knot with petitioner on January 23, 2006.
Soon after the wedding, respondent returned to Italy. Petitioner followed
thereafter, or on February 23, 2006. The couple lived together in Italy.
On April 18, 2007, petitioner left respondent and flew back into the country.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On September 14, 2007, petitioner filed a Petition[8] for declaration of nullity of
her marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. LP-07-0155with the RTC of Las Piñas
City, Branch 254. The Office of the Solicitor General representing the Republic of
the Philippines opposed the petition.
On January 4, 2010, the RTC issued its Decision dismissing the petition on the
ground mat petitioner's evidence failed to adequately prove respondent's alleged
psychological incapacity. It held, thus:
Testifying thru her Judicial Affidavit x x x petitioner stated that sometime in May
2005, she chanced upon the respondent, an Italian, in the internet x x x and they
became regular chatmates. x x x In their exchanges of chat messages and
letters, she found respondent to be sweet, kind and jolly, He made her feel that
he really cared for her. He was romantic, x x x [A]lthough at times, respondent
was impatient and easily got irritated, x x x.
xxxx
On 9 January 2006, respondent flew in to the Philippines and x x x they got
married on 23 January 2006 x x x. During their honeymoon, petitioner noticed
that the respondent was not circumcised, x x x [Respondent [also] asked her
where to find marijuana since he had to sniff some. This made petitioner angry
and she quarrelled with him. Respondent apologized later.
On 29 January 2006, x x x respondent flew back to Italy and on 26 February
2006, x x x petitioner left to join respondent in Italy, x x x After a few days,
respondent started displaying traits, character and attitude different from that of
97
Marco whom she had known thru the internet. He was immature, childish,
irresponsible and dependent. He depended on his mother to do or to decide
things for him. It was even his mother who decided where they lived and how the
house should be arranged. When they transferred to a separate house, it was
respondent's mother who managed the household.
Respondent was also addicted to video games. During work days, playing video
games was always the first thing he does when he wakes up and the last thing he
does before retiring. During rest days, he would play video games the whole day.
There was never a quality times he spent with her, the kind of time that a
responsible husband would spend with his wife.
Respondent was extremely lazy that he never helped her in doing all the
household chores. He also has extremely poor hygiene. He seldom takes a bath
and brushes his teeth. For him to be able to take, a bath, petitioner would
literally push him to the bathroom or hand him his toothbrush with toothpaste to
brush his teeth. She had to put deodorant on his underarms for he would not do
it himself. He refused circumcision.
Sometime in May 2006, she caught him in their house while using marijuana.
When confronted, he got mad and pushed her [hard] and hit her in the arm, [and
told] her to go back to the Philippines. x x x
In October 2006, x x x they transferred to another house. Living in a separate
house from his mother did not improve their marital relationship. His addiction to
video games worsened. They seldom talk to each other as he did not want to be
disturbed while playing games. His addiction to drugs likewise worsened. He
would often invite his friends to their house for pot sessions, x x x to her extreme
fright and discomfort.
xxxx
On 18 April 2007, she flew back to the Philippines. x x x Since then, there
was no communication between them. x x x Petitioner took this as lack of
interest on his part to save their marriage, reason why she decided to file this
petition (TSR August 11, 2008, pp. 6-10).
xxxx
She further stated that respondent x x x only gave her money for food. He spent
most of his income for video games. If they ran out of food, it was her mother-in-
law who supported them.
xxxx
Next presented was NEDY TAYAG, a clinical psychologist, who testified x x x in
her direct-examination that petitioner x x x was subjected to a series of
psychological tests, written and oral form. She likewise subjected the mother of
the petitioner to clarificatory analysis x x x.
In her evaluation, she found no sign or symptom of major psychological
incapacity of the petitioner, while respondent is suffering from a x x x Dependent
Personality Disorder with Underlying Anti-Social Trait, by his parasitic attitude,
allowing other people to be the handler of his own personal sustenance, even
hygienic wise, which somehow distorted the notion on how to handle marital
obligations in terms of mutual understanding, communication and emotional
intent. She was able to arrive at these findings on respondent although he did
not submit himself for the same psychological tests, through the clinical
assessments and information supplied by the petitioner, and the description of
the petitioner's mother regarding how she perceived the respondent.
On cross-examination, x xx [s]he described respondent x x x as "Mama's Boy",
which attitude can be narcissistic because of his attachment to the mother. He
can do whatever he wants because the mother will always be at his back. She
likewise stated that the respondent is an unhygienic person and the reason why
he opted to lure herein petitioner to be his wife was because he wanted her to be
an extension of his maternal needs to sustain his own desire.
On clarificatory questions of the Court x x x Ms. Tayag testified that she was able
to describe the respondent x x x because of the description made by the
petitioner and her mother. She however, admitted that as disclosed to her by the
petitioner, she (petitioner) was not able to have a bonding or to know well the
respondent because more often than not the respondent was always in the
company of the mother that a pathological symbiotic relationship developed
between the mother and son.
Last witness presented was MS. VIOLETA G. ESPINA, the mother of herein
petitioner. Her Judicial Affidavit x x x was adopted as her direct-testimony, which
was entirely in corroboration of the testimony of petitioner Abigael An Espina-
Dan,
On cross-examination x x x. She testified that respondent had not assumed his
responsibilities as a married man, his dependency on drugs, his dependency on
his mother with regard to their finances were just told by her daughter, petitioner
herein, during their conversations in the internet and therefore she
has no personal knowledge to what happened to her daughter, petitioner herein.
98

xxxx
Article 36 of the Family Code x x x provides:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration of
marriage, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.
The Supreme Court in the case of Santos v. Court of Appeals, (240 SCRA 20, 24)
declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and. (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or
serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would
be beyond the means of the party involved.
In the instant case, the clinical psychologist found respondent to be suffering
from x x x Dependent Personality Disorder with underlying Anti-social
traits, x x x which x x x is 'grave, severe, long lasting and incurable by any
treatment'. x x x
xxxx
The clinical psychologist['s] findings and conclusion were derived from her
interviews of petitioner and her mother. However, from petitioner's Judicial
Affidavit x x x, it was gathered that respondent's failure to establish a common
life with her stems from his refusal, not incapacity to do so. It is downright
incapacity, not refusal or neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, which renders a
marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity. How she arrived at the
conclusion that respondent was totally dependent [on] his mother, his propensity
[with] illegal substance, his instability to maintain even his personal hygiene, and
his neglect to assume his responsibilities as a husband, Nedy Tayag failed to
explain. It bears recalling that petitioner and respondent were chatmates in 2005
and contracted marriage in 2006 when respondent was already 35 years old, far
removed from adolescent years.
Noteworthy is petitioner's admission that she and respondent met in a chat room
in the internet. Respondent was very sweet, kind and jolly. He was romantic. He
made her feel that he cared even if they were apart. He remembered important
occasions and he would always send her sweet messages and funny jokes x x x
which revealed the harmonious relationship of the couple before their marriage.
From this, it can be inferred how responsible respondent was to faithfully comply
with his obligations as a boyfriend. During marriage, respondent was working and
giving her money though not enough as she said (TSN, August, 11, 2008, p. 15).
With this premise, it is therefore safe to conclude that no matter how hard
respondent would try to show his best, to show his capability as husband to
petitioner, she would always find reason to say otherwise.
As to her allegation that respondent was unhygienic; x x x it was admitted
by no less than the psychologist, Nedy Tayag that in a country like Italy wherein
the weather is different from the Philippines, the people there do not bathe
regularly x x x. With respect to circumcision, we all know that circumcision is not
common in European countries. You cannot compel respondent to undergo
circumcision since it is against their culture. However, respondent expressed his
willingness to be circumcised, but later on, changed his mind.
As to her allegation that respondent was a drug dependent, petitioner never
showed, that she exerted effort to seek medical help for her husband.
Undeniably, drug addiction is curable and therefore it can hardly be considered as
a manifestation of the kind of psychological incapacity contemplated under Article
36 of the Family Code.
With regard to the dependency of respondent to his mother, it was not well
established by the petitioner, x x x What is clear was that respondent's mother
was all out in helping them since the salary of the respondent was not sufficient
to sustain their needs.
All told, the Court cannot see how the personality disorder of respondent would
render him unaware of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by him. At the most, the psychological evaluation of the
parties proved only incompatibility and irreconcilable differences, considering also
their culture differences, which cannot be equated with psychological incapacity.
Along this line, the aforesaid psychological evaluation made by Ms. Tayag is
unfortunately one sided [and] based only on the narrations made by petitioner
who had known respondent only for a short period of time and too general to
notice these specific facts thereby failing to serve its purpose in aiding the Court
in arriving at a just resolution of this case.
In sum, inasmuch as the evidence adduced by petitioner in support of her
petition is miserably wanting in force to convince this Court that her marriage
with respondent comes and qualifies under the provision of Article 36 of the
Family Code and hence unable to discharge completely her burden of overcoming
the legal presumption of validity and the continuance of her marriage with
respondent, declaration of nullity of same marriage is not in order.
99

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage is hereby DENIED, for lack of merit and accordingly, the same petition
is hereby DISMISSED.
Furnish the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the City Prosecutor,
Las Piñas City, for their information and guidance.[9]
Petitioner moved to reconsider,[10] but in an April 28, 2010 Order,[11] the RTC
held its ground.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Petitioner filed an appeal before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 95112. In
its assailed December 14, 2012 Decision, however, the CA denied the appeal and
affirmed the RTC Decision, declaring thus:
x x x There is no ground to declare the marriage x x x null and void on the
ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Thus, the
court a quo correctly denied the petition for annulment of marriage x x x.
xxxx
In Toring v. Toring, the Supreme Court held that psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability, to be sufficient basis to annul a marriage. The
psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage.
It further expounded on Article 36 x x x in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina and laid down definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of
this article. These guidelines incorporate the basic requirements of gravity,
juridical antecedence and incurability established in the Santos case, as follows:
xxxx
Subsequent jurisprudence on psychological incapacity applied these basic
guidelines to varying factual situations, thus confirming the continuing doctrinal
validity of Santos. [Insofar] as the present factual situation is concerned, what
should not be lost in reading and applying our established rulings is the intent of
the law to confine the application of Article 36 of the Family Code to the most
serious eases of personality disorders; these are the disorders that result in the
utter insensitivity or inability of the afflicted party to give meaning and
significance to the marriage he or she contracted. Furthermore, the psychological
illness and its root cause must have been there from the inception of the
marriage. From these requirements arise the concept that Article 36 x x x does
not really dissolve a marriage; it simply recognizes that there never was any
marriage in the first place because the affliction - already then existing was so
grave and permanent as to deprive the afflicted party of awareness of the duties
and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was to assume or had
assumed.
In the present case, We find the totality of the petitioner-appellant's evidence
insufficient to prove respondent-appellee was psychologically incapacitated to
perform his marital obligations. Petitioner-appellant's depiction of respondent-
appellee as irresponsible, childish, overly dependent on his mother, addicted to
video games, addicted to drugs, lazy, had poor hygiene, and his refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage, are not enough.
These traits do not equate to an inability to perform marital obligations due to a
psychological illness present at the time the marriage was solemnized.
Psychological incapacity must be more titan just a "difficulty," "refusal," or
"neglect" in the performance, of some marital obligations. It is not enough the
respondent-appellee, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in
complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these
obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor - an adverse integral
element in the respondent's personality structure that effectively incapacitated
him from complying with his essential marital obligations - must be shown. Mere
difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations, or ill will
on the part of the spouse, is different from incapacity rooted in some debilitating
psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or
perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not by
themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity x x x, as the same may
only be due to a person's refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. It is essential that the spouse must be shown to be
incapable of performing marital obligations, due to some psychological illness
existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Respondent-appellee's
condition or personality disorder has not been shown to be a malady rooted on
some incapacitating psychological condition.
It will be noted [that] Ms. Tayag did not administer psychological tests on
respondent-appellee. The conclusion in the psychological report of Ms. Tayag that
respondent-appellee was suffering from Dependent Personality Disorder, with
underlying Anti-Social traits, was based merely on information supplied by
petitioner-appellant and Violeta (mother of the petitioner-appellant).
100

Generally, expert opinions are regarded, not as conclusive, but as purely advisory
in character. The court must evaluate the evidentiary worth of the opinion with
due care and with the application of the more rigid and stringent set of standards
outlined above, i.e., that there must be a thorough and in-depth assessment of
the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a
psychological incapacity that is grave, severe, and incurable. Thus, We cannot
credit Ms. Tayag's findings as conclusive, as she did not conduct an actual
psychological examination on respondent-appellee. The information relied upon
by Ms. Tayag could not have secured a complete personality profile and could not
have conclusively formed an objective opinion or diagnosis of respondent-
appellee's psychological condition. The methodology employed (i.e., gathering
information regarding respondent-appellee from petitioner-appellant and Violeta,
without interviewing respondent-appellee himself), simply cannot satisfy the
required depth and comprehensiveness of examination required to evaluate a
party alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder.
Plaintiff-appellant failed to prove the root cause of the alleged psychological
incapacity, and to establish the requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence,
and incurability. The psychological report, was based entirely on petitioner-
appellant's assumed knowledge of respondent-appellee's family background and
upbringing, Ms. Tayag was not able to establish with certainty that respondent-
appellee's alleged psychological incapacity was grave enough to bring about the
inability of the respondent-appellee to assume the essential obligations of
marriage, so that the same was medically permanent or incurable. Also, it did not
fully explain the details of respondent-appellee's alleged disorder and its root
cause; how Ms. Tayag came to the conclusion that respondent-appellee's
condition was incurable; and how it related to the essential marital obligations
that respondent-appellee failed to assume.
In this case, the only proof which bears on the claim that respondent-appellee is
psychologically incapacitated, is his allegedly being irresponsible, childish, overly
dependent on his mother, addicted to video games, addicted to drugs, lazy, had
poor hygiene, and his refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations
of marriage. It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 x x x contemplates
downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic
marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on
the part of the errant spouse.
This Court finds the totality of evidence presented by petitioner-appellant failed
to establish the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband x x x. Therefore,
there is nobasis to declare their marriage null and void x x x.
The Constitution sets out a policy of protecting and strengthening the family as
the basic social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.
Marriage, as an inviolable institution protected by the State, cannot be dissolved
at the whim of the parties. In petitions for the declaration of nullity of marriage,
the burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies on the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity,
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 254, Las Piñas City dated 4 January 2010, in Civil Case No. LP-07-0155,
is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[12] (Citations omitted)
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but in its assailed August 29, 2013
Resolution, the CA stood its ground. Hence, the instant Petition.
Issue
Petitioner mainly contends that –
THE TOTALITY OF PETITIONER'S EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY OF RESPONDENT AND SATISFIED THE STANDARDS OF REPUBLIC
VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND MOLINA AND OTHER PREVAILING JURISPRUDENCE
IN POINT.[13]
Petitioner's Arguments
Petitioner argues that the root cause of respondent's psychological incapacity was
clinically identified, sufficiently alleged in the petition, and proved by adequate
evidence; that respondent's psychological incapacity was shown to be existing at
the time of the celebration of the marriage, and that the same is medically
permanent, incurable, and grave enough as to bring about the inability of
respondent to assume his obligations in marriage; and that as a consequence,
respondent is incapable of fulfilling his duties as a husband under the obligation
to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual
help and support to her.
Petitioner adds that her allegations in the petition for declaration of nullity are
specifically linked to medical and clinical causes as diagnosed by Dr. Tayag, which
diagnosis is contained in the latter's report which forms part of the evidence in
101
the case; that such diagnosis is backed by scientific tests and expert
determination, which sufficiently prove respondent's psychological incapacity;
that Dr. Tayag has adequately determined that respondent's condition is grave,
incurable, and existed prior to and at the time of his marriage to petitioner; that
respondent has been suffering from Dependent Personality Disorder with
Underlying Anti-Social Trait which deterred him from appropriately discharging
his duties and responsibilities as a married man; that despite considerable efforts
exerted by petitioner, respondent remained true to his propensities and even
defiant, to the point of exhibiting violence; that no amount of therapy - no matter
how intensive can possibly change respondent, but rather he would always be in
denial of his own condition and resist any form of treatment; and that
respondent's condition is deep-rooted and stems from his formative years - a
product of faulty child-rearing practices and unhealthy familial constellation that
altered his emotional and moral development.
Finally, petitioner argues that it is not necessary that personal examination of
respondent be conducted in order that he may be diagnosed or declared as
psychologically incapacitated. She cites the cases of Marcos v.
Marcos[14] and Antonio v. Reyes,[15] as well as the case of Suazo v. Suazo,[16] in
which latter case it was held that a personal examination of the party alleged to
be psychologically incapacitated is not necessarily mandatory, but merely
desirable, as it may not be practical in all instances given the oftentimes
estranged relations between the parties. She suggests instead that pursuant to
the ruling in Ngo Te v. Gutierrez Yu-Te,[17] "each case must be judged, not on the
basis of a priori presumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to
its own facts"[18] and that courts "should interpret the provision on a case-to-case
basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines x x x."[19]
The State's Arguments
In its Comment[20] praying for denial, the State calls for affirmance of the CA
dispositions, arguing that no new issues that merit reversal have been raised in
the Petition. It contends that petitioner failed to prove the elements of gravity,
juridical antecedence, and incurability; that quite the contrary, petitioner even
admitted that incipiently, respondent was romantic, funny, responsible, working,
and giving money to her; that petitioner's allegations of video game and drug
addiction are uncorroborated, and her failure to seek medical treatment therefor
in behalf of her husband must be considered against her; that such addictions are
curable and could not be the basis for a declaration of psychological incapacity;
that respondent's irresponsibility, immaturity, and over-dependence on his
mother do not automatically justify a conclusion of psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code; that the intent of the law is to confine the meaning
of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders –
existing at the time of the marriage – clearly demonstrating an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage, and depriving the
spouse of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the marital bond one is
about to assume; that the psychological evaluation of respondent was based on
one-sided information supplied by petitioner and her mother – which renders the
same of doubtful credibility; and that while personal examination of respondent is
indeed not mandatory, there are instances where it is required - such as in this
case, where the information supplied to the psychologist unilaterally comes from
the side of the petitioner, which renders such information biased and partial as
would materially affect the psychologist's assessment.
Our Ruling
The Court denies the Petition.
Both the trial and appellate courts dismissed the petition in Civil Case No. LP-07-
0155 on the ground that petitioner's evidence failed to sufficiently prove that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to enter marriage at the time. They
held that while petitioner alleged such condition, she was unable to establish its
existence, gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability based solely on her
testimony, which is insufficient, self-serving, unreliable, and uncorroborated, as
she did not know respondent very well enough - having been with, him only for a
short period of time; Dr. Tayag's psychological report - which is practically one-
sided for the latter's failure to include respondent in the study; and the account
of petitioner's mother, which is deemed biased and thus of doubtful credibility.
The Court agrees.
Petitioner's evidence consists mainly of her judicial affidavit and testimony; the
judicial affidavits and testimonies of her mother and Dr. Tayag; and Dr. Tayag's
psychological, evaluation report on the psychological condition of both petitioner
and respondent. The determination of respondent's alleged psychological
incapacity was based solely on petitioner's account and that of her mother, since
respondent was presumably in Italy and did not participate in the proceedings.
This is insufficient.
At some point in her accounts, petitioner admitted that before and during their
marriage, respondent was working and giving money to her; that respondent was
romantic, sweet, thoughtful, responsible, and caring; and that she and
respondent enjoyed a harmonious relationship. This belies her claim that
102
petitioner was psychologically unfit for marriage. As correctly observed by the
trial and appellate courts, the couple simply drifted apart as a result of
irreconcilable differences and basic incompatibility owing to differences in culture
and upbringing, and the very short period that they spent together prior to their
tying the knot. As for respondent's claimed addiction to video games and
cannabis, the trial and appellate courts are correct in their ruling that these are
not an incurable condition, and petitioner has not shown that she helped her
husband overcome them - as part of her marital obligation to render support and
aid to respondent.
"What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the
party's psychological condition."[21] "[T]he complete facts should allege the
physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the
time of the celebration of the marriage"[22] such that "[i]f the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual
medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to." [23]
'Psychological incapacity,' as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental – not merely physical –
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, among
others, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological
incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.[24]
With the declared insufficiency of the testimonies of petitioner and her witness,
the weight of proving psychological incapacity shifts to Dr. Tayag's expert
findings. However, her determinations were not based on actual tests or
interviews conducted on respondent himself - but on personal accounts of
petitioner alone. This will not do as well.
x x x Rumbaua provides some guidelines on how the courts should evaluate the
testimonies of psychologists or psychiatrists in petitions for the declaration of
nullity of marriage, viz:
We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag's conclusions about the respondent's
psychological incapacity were based on the information fed to her by only one
side — the petitioner — whose bias in favor of her cause cannot be doubted.
While this circumstance alone does not disqualify the psychologist for reasons of
bias, her report, testimony and conclusions deserve the application of a more
rigid and stringent set of standards in the manner we discussed above. For,
effectively, Dr. Tayag only diagnosed the respondent from the prism of a third
party account; she did not actually hear, see and evaluate the respondent and
how he would have reacted and responded to the doctor's probes.
Dr. Tayag, in her report, merely summarized the petitioner's narrations, and on
this basis characterized the respondent to be a self-centered, egocentric, and
unremorseful person who 'believes that the world revolves around him'; and who
'used love as a . . . deceptive tactic for exploiting the confidence [petitioner]
extended towards him.' . . . .
We find these observations and conclusions insufficiently in-depth and
comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that a psychological incapacity existed
that prevented the respondent from complying with the essential obligations of
marriage. It failed to identify the root cause of the respondent's narcissistic
personality disorder and to prove that it existed at the inception of the marriage.
Neither did it explain the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder, nor show
that the respondent was realty incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some
incapacity of a psychological, not physical, nature. Thus, we cannot avoid but
conclude that Dr. Tayag's conclusion in her Report — i.e., that the respondent
suffered "Narcissistic Personality Disorder with traces of Antisocial Personality
Disorder declared to be grave.and incurable' — is an unfounded statement, not a
necessary inference from her previous characterization and portrayal of the
respondent. While the various tests administered on the petitioner could have
been used as a fair gauge to assess her own psychological condition, this same
statement cannot be made with respect to the respondent's condition. To make
conclusions and generalizations on the respondent's psychological condition
based on the information fed by only one side is, to our mind, not different from
admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such
evidence.[25]
Concomitantly, the rulings of the trial and appellate courts - identical in most
respects -are entitled to respect and finality. The same being correct, this Court
finds no need to disturb them.
The issue of whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling
for annulment of marriage depends crucially, more than in any field of the law,
on the facts of the case. Such factual issue, however, is beyond the province of
this Court to review. It is not the function of the Court to analyze or weigh all
over again fee evidence or premises supportive of such factual determination. It
103
is a well-established principle that factual findings of the trial court, when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court, save for the most [3]
Id. at 94-95.
compelling and cogent reasons x x x.[26]
[4]
Id. at 82-92.

To reiterate, psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code must be [5]
Id. at 36-42; penned by Presiding Judge Gloria ButayAglugub.
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. "The
incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of [6]
Id. at 28.
carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations [7]
Id.
may emerge only after marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved."[27] Finally, [8]
Id. at 28-34.
the burden of proving psychological incapacity is on the petitioner.
[9]
Id. at 37-42.
x x x Indeed, the incapacity should be established by the totality of evidence
presented during trial, making it incumbent upon the petitioner to sufficiently [10]
Id. at 43-56.
prove the existence of the psychological incapacity.[28]
[11]
Id. at 57.

With petitioner's failure to prove her case, her petition for declaration of nullity of [12]
Id. at 69-80.
her marriage was correctly dismissed by the courts below.
[13]
Id. at 16.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The December 14, 2012 Decision and
August 29, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95112 [14]
397 Phil. 840 (2000).
are AFFIRMED.
[15]
519 Phil. 337 (2006).
SO ORDERED.
[16]
629 Phil. 157 (2010).
Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin,
** ***
and Tijam, JJ., concur.
Sereno, C.J., on leave. [17]
598 Phil. 666 (2009).

[18]
Id. at 699.

**
Designated as Acting Chairperson per Special Order No. 2540 dated February [19]
Id.
28, 2018.
[20]
Rollo, pp. 135-155.
Designated as additional member per October 24, 2017 raffle vice J. Jardeleza
***

who recused due to prior action as Solicitor General. [21]

Marcos v. Marcos, supra note 14at 850.

[1]
Rollo, pp. 9-26. [22]
Republic v. Galang, 665Phil. 658, 672 (2011).

Id. at 61-81; penned by Associate Justice Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela and

[2] [23]
Zamora v. Court of Appeals, 543 Phil. 701, 708 (2007).
concurred in by Associate Justices Isaias P. Dicdican and Michael P. Elbinias.
104
[24]
Republic v. De Gratia, 726 Phil. 502, 509 (2014). became steady in August of the same year. Nilo, whose job was then in Hong
Kong, prodded Marivi to marry him so she could join him there soonest. Marivi
Viñas v. Parel-Viñas, 751 Phil. 762, 775-776 (2015), citing Rumbaua v.
[25]
agreed. The couple married in a civil ceremony[5] on October 21, 1986 followed
Rumbaua, 612 Phil, 1061 (2009). by a church wedding[6] on February 8, 1987. The marriage produced two sons:
Antonio Manuel, born on April 25, 1988, and Jose Nilo, born on September 9,
[26]
Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris, 527 Phil. 722, 727 (2006). 1992.

[27]
Santos v. Court of Appeals, 310 Phil. 21, 39 (1995). On July 7, 2005, Marivi filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa City a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage[7] based on psychological incapacity. She
[28]
Republic v. Court of Appeals, 698 Phil. 257, 267 (2012). averred that it had been medically ascertained that Nilo was suffering from
"inadequate personality disorder related to masculine strivings associated with
13 unresolved oedipal complex,"[8] while she herself was found to be suffering from
a "personality disorder of the mixed type, [h]istrionic, [n]arcissistic with
FIRST DIVISION immaturity x x x."[9]

To show that Nilo failed to provide her with the necessary emotional,
[ G.R. No. 201988, October 11, 2017 ]
psychological, and physical support, Marivi cited the following:

MARIA VICTORIA SOCORRO LONTOC-CRUZ, PETITIONER, VS. NILO

1. His infidelity and his non-commitment to the marriage as he continued to
SANTOS CRUZ, RESPONDENT.
act like a bachelor;
DECISION
2. The lack of 'oneness' in the marriage as Nilo would make decisions (on
financial matters) without consulting or considering her suggestions;
treating her as a housemate or a "mayordoma;" keeping from her his
DEL CASTILLO, J.: whereabouts, when he would come home or how much his income was;
The most challenging part of being in a difficult marriage is to thrive in one. In 3. The lack of sexual contact for more than a decade as Nilo made excuses;
the case of petitioner Maria Victoria Socorro Lontoc-Cruz (Marivi) and respondent
Nilo Santos Cruz (Nilo), their marriage withered as this was beset with problems 4. Putting up a facade that he is a caring, concerned, and loving husband,
such as the lack of quality time, recriminations, disillusionment, loss of passion, especially to his bosses; and
and infidelity. The estranged spouses considered their union as non-functional,
attributing the failure of their marriage to their respective personality disorders 5. Preference towards the company of his peers/friends.[10]
that repelled each other.
In his Answer,[11] Nilo claimed that he was madly in love with Marivi; that at the
This Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] challenges the November 22, 2011
start of their relationship, both he and Marivi would exhibit negative personality
Decision[2] and May 29, 2012 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
traits which they overlooked; that he believed that both he and Marivi were
G.R. CV No. 93736 that affirmed the Decision[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
suffering from psychological incapacity; and that he was not singularly
Branch 207, Muntinlupa City in Civil Case No. 05-095 which refused to declare
responsible for the breakdown of their marriage. He stressed that Marivi also
the marriage void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code.
contributed to the deterioration of their union, to wit:
Factual Antecedents
1. Marivi would demand that he behave in ways he was not accustomed to or
Twenty-two-year-old Marivi met 28-year old Nilo sometime in March 1986. They inconsistent with his career position;

105
 2. Marivi was jealous of his friends; and would often make hasty conclusions
that he was having an affair with other women;
3. Marivi would exhibit volatile temperament if things did not go her way;
would not admit mistakes, and blame others instead;
4. Marivi would make decisions impulsively, such as changing an item she
gets tired of, or demanding that Nilo change a motor vehicle simply
because she did not like it; and
5. She lacked respect for Nilo, and would speak to him degradingly, and
even accuse him of being gay or a homosexual.[12]
On October 11, 2006, the trial court rendered a Partial Decision[13] approving the
parties' Compromise Agreement[14] pertaining to custody, support, and
dissolution of the properties. Trial on the issue of the nullity of marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity ensued.
Marivi's Version
Marivi narrated that when they were still going steady, Nilo would only spend
Saturdays and Sundays with her and devote the weekdays to partying with his
friends; that even after their engagement, Nilo would still meet other women and
accept invitations to beauty pageants and cocktails;[15] that Nilo was not the type
who would kiss passionately; that Nilo would not engage in foreplay during sex,
but wished only to satisfy himself; that Nilo would engage in anal sex and would
only stop when she complained that it was painful; that Nilo would thereafter
sleep, leaving her feeling "used," and that Nilo was impulsive, daring, and
adventurous.[16]
She also claimed that Nilo would habitually come home late; that Friday nights
were Nilo's boys' night out; that unless she would ask him to take her out on a
date, Nilo would not do so; and that Nilo would call her a "nagger" even if she
was merely asking him to come home early.[17]
Marivi further narrated that Nilo would engage in extramarital affairs; that a few
months into their marriage, Nilo had an affair with an unmarried female
officemate;[18] that Nilo ended the affair only after she (Marivi) threatened to tell
his employer/supervisor;[19] that Nilo had another affair a few weeks after the
birth of their second son; that when confronted with his womanizing and made to
choose between her and the children or the other women, Nilo replied that he
was "confused,"[20] which prompted her to leave and stay in Cebu with her
parents; and that she heard from her friends that while she was in Cebu, Nilo
was living a bachelor's life.[21]
Marivi added that she eventually reconciled with Nilo but despite the
reconciliation, Nilo never really changed, and that he remained indifferent,
insensitive, and unappreciative. According to Marivi, she would instead call up her
parents and sisters to talk about their family problems;[22] that while he (Nilo)
told people that he was proud of her, he never gave her the emotional,
psychological, and physical support she needed.[23] She felt like she was no more
than a mayordoma to him, and that they were just "housemates." Nilo would
come home late on weekdays and preferred to go out with his friends. Their
quarrels were frequent and their conversations were superficial; Nilo would rather
talk about himself, instead of asking Marivi about her day or about their children.
He was controlling and domineering,[24] and refused to consider her suggestions;
he would not want his money mingled with her (Marivi's) money.[25] Nilo would
shell out money when he wanted to buy things, but would make excuses when it
came to Marivi's suggestion for a family vacation.[26] Marivi also claimed that Nilo
had no sense of companionship with their children; and that Nilo even told their
son that their brand new house was everything to him.[27]
Marivi was moreover bothered by Nilo's effeminate ways; he was vain and would
have weekly "beauty" treatments.[28] Furthermore, they no longer had sex after
the birth of their second son. While they tried to have sex twice, Nilo failed to
have an erection. After that, Nilo would refuse to have sex with her which made
her (Marivi) question his sexual orientation, so much so that Nilo physically hurt
her when she questioned his virility.[29]
Marivi's father, Manuel, likewise stated that Marivi would call them up for help
because Nilo had hurt her during the couple's quarrel; that their marriage was
not harmonious due to Marivi's youth and her unfamiliarity with Nilo's personality
and family values. He considered Nilo only as a provider, not as a husband and a
good father to his sons.[30]
Marivi's younger sister, Margarita Ledesma (Margarita), who lived for four years
with Nilo and Marivi, claimed to have witnessed how lonely Marivi was. She
alleged that Nilo was absent when Marivi gave birth to their second son; that Nilo
was short-tempered when driving; and that the couple would often fight because
Nilo would always come home late or because Marivi suspected Nilo of infidelity.
Margarita believed that Nilo did not really want to save the marriage, although he
told her that he loves Marivi and the children.[31]
Nilo's Version
Nilo acknowledged his contribution to the breakdown of the marriage because his
106
job required him to come home late, his inability to sexually perform adequately,
his failure to be the "ideal husband,"[32] and because he had had extramarital
affairs in the years 1992, 2002, and 2006.[33] At the same time, Nilo insisted that
Marivi also contributed to the collapse of their union.
According to Nilo, Marivi would always want to know his companions and
whereabouts; would demand information about his female acquaintances; and
would even call up his workplace to ask where he was. Moreover, her conceit and
her "prima donna" attitude embarrassed him. Marivi would order him to act in
accordance with their stature in life, and would demand that he instruct his office
staff to accord her special treatment as Hewlett Packard's "first lady" during the
time that he was Hewlett Packard's President. Marivi would also instruct their
housemaids to call him "señorito;" and she would make a "big deal" out of her
being a "mestiza," and would think of herself a "trophy wife."[34]
Nilo claimed that Marivi was "unappreciative" of him, had a misdirected sense of
self-entitlement, and would complain if she did not get her own way, as she was
used to, she being her father's favorite daughter; Marivi did not even care about
discussing family finances with him as long as she got what she wanted. She also
had a violent temper and would hurl things at him during their fights; that she
would blame him for everything, and would keep on reciting his past mistakes.
Marivi did not understand the demands of his job, and unfairly compared his
work to her father's job, the operation of which was limited to a single area, a
compound in a mine site in Cebu. He explained that the multinational companies
he then worked for required him to work beyond the normal office hours because
he has to meet "sales quotas in millions of dollars," entertain people from
different headquarters, and meet with different clients from areas far from his
residence.[35]
Worse, Nilo was turned off by Marivi's act of broadcasting to her whole clan his
inadequacies during their intimate sexual relations, which began after he
witnessed Marivi giving birth to their first child. When he confided to Marivi about
this, she instead accused him of having another affair. Since then, he did not feel
any sexual excitement and attraction toward her when they were together.
Instead of discussing the problem with him candidly, she accused him of being
gay. Nilo stated that the last time they had sex was in 1997 or in 1998.[36]
The Clinical Findings
In support of her claim that she and Nilo were suffering from psychological
incapacity, Marivi presented Dr. Cecilia Villegas (Dr. Villegas), a psychiatrist, and
Dr. Ruben Encarnacion (Dr. Encarnacion), a clinical psychologist.
Dr. Villegas diagnosed Nilo to have "inadequate personality disorder related to
masculine strivings associated with unresolved oedipal complex,"[37] while she
diagnosed Marivi to have "personality disorder of the mixed type, [h]istrionic,
[n]arcissistic, with immaturity x x x."[38]
In the March 21, 2005 Psychiatric Report,[39] Dr. Villegas stated:
The root cause of the above clinical conditions on the part of Marivi Cruz, were
the overindulgence and over attention of her parents, in a prolonged manner,
carried over to adult adjustments. On the part of Nilo Cruz, his negative
identification and resentments towards his father and close attachments to his
mother, continued by his long-time maid, to the point of an oedipal situation led
to his inadequacy, along masculine strivings, with difficult assertions of his
authority and power.
The above clinical conditions existed prior [to] marriage but became manifest
only after the celebration due to marital stresses and demands. Both are
considered as permanent in nature, because they started early in their
developmental stage, and therefore became so deeply engrained into their
personality structures. Both are considered grave in degree, because they
hampered, interfered and disrupted their normal functioning related to
heterosexual adjustments.[40]
According to Dr. Villegas, both parties could not tolerate each others' weaknesses
and that the incapacities of the parties are grave because they preferred to
satisfy their own needs rather than to give in to the other's needs.[41]
She claimed that Nilo's lack of a father figure weakened his masculinity. He
cross-identified himself with his mother because his father, a disciplinarian and
the thrifty one, was often absent because of his military service. While he was
still a teenager, his mother migrated to Canada and their long-time maid acted as
his surrogate mother. Nilo sought from his wife his mother's nurturing qualities,
but he felt hostility when Marivi failed to meet his ego ideal. His aggression was
in the form of passivity, punishing his wife by not sexually performing.[42]
Dr. Villegas noted that Nilo would put on a facade, a compensatory mechanism
according to social norms. While he was not exactly a homosexual. he covered up
his weak masculine traits by being a "playboy." Nilo could only comply with the
financial obligation of marital life, but not the psychological and emotional parts
of it.[43] Nilo likewise was an inadequate father figure to his own two sons,
especially the younger, who has already manifested strong feminine traits.[44]
Marivi, on the other hand, expected that her interactions with the world would be
like that of her own close-knit family, a perception attributable to her parents'
prolonged gratification of her dependency needs. Her father was a dedicated,
107
devoted, and responsible family man who regularly came home to spend time
with them, while her mother was a good housewife, who always found time to
personally attend to their needs. Dr. Villegas described Marivi as one with strong
mood fluctuations, emotionally immature, with low self-esteem, has difficulty
neutralizing the outbreak of negativity in her behavior, is suggestible, egocentric,
and impelled by a desire to "extort" from others. To Dr. Villegas, the couple's
respective personality disorders were mutually repelling, their brain waves not
being in sync because what Marivi expected from Nilo happened to be Nilo's
weakest point.[45]
Dr. Encarnacion supported Dr. Villegas' diagnosis. On the basis of Nilo's five-to-
six sessions and Marivi's eight bi-weekly psychotherapy sessions with him, Dr.
Encarnacion concluded that there was no chance of a successful marriage in a
dysfunctional union when there is double psychological incapacity. He
categorically stated that Nilo was incapable of being a good husband and a good
father. Nilo lacked an individual coherent identity and instead went by the
standards of general society, which is driven by the desire to gain material
wealth, power, and control. Nilo did not like close relationships and was incapable
of forming some; his social anxiety, associated with paranoid fears, was
manifested by excessive vanity. Nilo projected an image of a wealthy, successful,
handsome man surrounded by women, in none of whom, however, he was
interested in a long-term sexual relationship; he saw himself as a performer-
provider and was disinterested in spending quality time with his family, in
carrying on conversations with members of his family, insensitive, intolerant, and
demanding.[46]
Dr. Encarnacion attributed respondent's psychological disorder to his childhood,
in which he did not have fond memories of tender moments and vacation times
with his family. Nilo grew up very close to his mother who always listened to his
complaints and with whom he sympathized, hence his unresolved oedipal issues;
even as he patterned his masculinity strivings after his stingy father, the family
provider, but whom he nonetheless described as "unappreciative,
undemonstrative, and quite materialistic." At the age of 18, when his parents
migrated to Canada and left him in the Philippines, he then lost his role models,
incapacitating him from creating his own identity. Thus, when he began working
at the age of 21, he imbibed the values of his workplace, where feelings and
emotional discussions were absent, factors that nonetheless somehow worked to
his advantage in his job.[47] Dr. Encarnacion opined that Nilo's incapacity was his
"rigidity," which drove him into imposing his family upbringing on his own family,
instead of adjusting to the modem family setup, i.e., that the modem father
should take on new roles and be part of family activities where his family needs
him to be, e.g. taking the children to the pediatrician or to the park, camping
with the family, or being with them in church, instead of strictly confining himself
to being a provider.[48]
As for Marivi, Dr. Encarnacion found that she exhibited "Histrionic Personality
Behaviors and Features" as manifested by her impressionistic speech, her
exaggerated expression of emotions, and her suggestibility. He stated that
Marivi's "inflexibility" consisted in her expecting a high standard of faithfulness
from all men as exemplified by her dad, who was also very devoted to her
mother. However, because dissatisfied and frustrated by her actual marital
situation, she sought attention, externalized blame, displayed anger, mistrust,
resentment, and self-indulgence.[49]
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its October 13, 2008 Decision,[50] the RTC denied the Petition.
The RTC took a dim view of the expert witnesses' attribution of a double
psychological incapacity to Marivi's nature of being a "father figure woman," and
to Nilo's "oedipal complex." The court noted that Marivi already disengaged
herself from her father as her standard of an ideal husband when she married
Nilo, despite the latter's limitations and his then being already very focused on
his job. Marivi's need for assurance that she is loved, vis-a-vis her looking up to
her father as her standard, was not by itself sufficient to declare her
psychologically incapacitated.
As for Nilo, the RTC found no concrete evidence of "oedipal complex;" the RTC
held that prioritizing his work over the emotional needs of his family was not
reflective of his psychological incapacity because what he did was still for his
family's benefit. Neither was Nilo's lack of sexual interest in Marivi a case of
psychological incapacity, for this was a result of his being turned off by Marivi's
unabated naggings and her revelations to her family of his sexual inadequacies.
From the RTC's verdict, petitioner appealed to the CA.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its November 22, 2011 Decision,[51] the CA united with the RTC in rejecting the
alleged. existence of psychological incapacity pointed out by Dr. Villegas and by
Dr. Encarnacion.
The CA found that Dr. Villegas and Dr. Encarnacion failed to paint a clear picture
of the supposed gravity or seriousness of Nilo's psychological incapacity, and that
it was unconvinced of the doctors' conclusion that Nilo had a deep propensity to
cover up for his serious inadequacies.
108

It ruled that Marivi failed to prove that Nilo's failure to comply with his sexual
obligation was due to some psychological condition or makeup, as this could very
well be explained by the stress brought about by Marivi's negative attitude
toward Nilo, who was turned off by her act of revealing to her clan their bedroom
secrets instead of privately resolving the problem with him. Moreover, the CA
said it is a non sequitur, that just because he could not sexually perform
according to Marivi's standard, he should thus be labelled a gay or homosexual.
It appears that Nilo has "selective" impotency, for while he could not have an
erection for Marivi, he nevertheless had had extramarital affairs. Neither did the
CA see anything wrong with Nilo's "put-on facade" of a happy marriage to protect
the family's privacy.
The CA did not even consider Marivi's alleged histrionic traits as ref1ected in her
behavior, e.g., her persistent demand as to Nilo's whereabouts, her constant
naggings, her attention-seeking acts, grave or serious enough to qualify as
psychological incapacity. The CA ruled that it was the couple's irreconcilable
differences that marred their marriage; that the negative acts or actions of one
spouse were neutralized or offset by the other's negative acts or actions, and that
these are "mere character flaws or bad habits that the spouses developed over
the years [which] can be modified or changed depending on the desire of either
spouse to do so."[52] The CA thereafter disposed of the appeal, thus:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court in
CV No. 05-095 denying the petition tor declaration of nullity of marriage between
appellant Maria Victoria Socorro Lontoc-Cruz and appellee Nilo Santos Cruz for
insufficiency of evidence is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.[53]
Marivi moved for a reconsideration but it was denied in the CA's May 29, 2012
Resolution.[54]
Issue
At issue before us is whether the psychological conditions of the parties fall under
Article 36 of the Family Code to warrant the declaration of nullity of marriage.
Our Ruling
We sustain the findings of both the RTC and the CA. Article 36 of the Family Code
states:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations
of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization.
We have laid down guidelines in interpreting and applying this provision.
In Republic v. De Gracia,[55] we reiterated the doctrine in Santos v. Court of
Appeals,[56] "that psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity
(i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage); (b) juridical antecedence
(i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage); and (c)
incurability (i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would
be beyond the means of the party involved)." Also, in Republic v. Court of
Appeals,[57] we reiterated the well-settled guidelines in resolving petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage, as embodied in Republic v. Court of
Appeals,[58] viz.:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation
of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. x x x.
xxxx
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts
and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires
that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. x x x.
xxxx
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the celebration'
of the marriage. x x x.
xxxx
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. x x x.
xxxx
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party
to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, 'mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts' cannot be accepted
as root causes. x x x.
109
xxxx
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to
71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220,
221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. x x x.
xxxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. x x x.
Notably, "mere showing of 'irreconcilable differences' and 'conflicting
personalities' [as in the present case,] in no wise constitutes psychological
incapacity."[59] "Nor does failure of the parties to meet their responsibilities and
duties as married persons" amount to psychological incapacity.[60] We further
elucidated in Yambao v. Republic[61] that the psychological condition should
render the subject totally unaware or incognitive of the basic marital obligations:
Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to
assume basic marital obligations and not merely difficulty, refusal, or neglect in
the performance of marital obligations or ill will. This incapacity consists of the
following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b)
this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of
marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of
mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability
must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. It is not enough to prove
that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is
essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some
psychological illness.[62]
In Marcos v. Marcos,[63] the actual medical examination of the one claimed to
have psychological incapacity is not a condition sine qua non, for what matters is
the totality of evidence to sustain a finding of such psychological incapacity.
While it behooves this Court to weigh the clinical findings of psychology experts
as part of the evidence, the court's hands are nonetheless free to make its own
independent factual findings. "It bears repeating that the trial courts, as in all the
other cases they try, must always base their judgments not solely on the expert
opinions presented by the parties but on the totality of evidence adduced in the
course of the proceedings."[64]
With specific reference to the case before us, even granting that both parties did
suffer from personality disorders as evaluated by the expert witnesses, we find
that the conclusions reached by these expert witnesses do not irresistibly point to
the fact that the personality disorders which plague the spouses antedated the
marriage; that these personality disorders are indeed grave or serious; or that
these personality disorders are incurable or permanent as to render the parties
psychologically incapacitated to carry out and carry on their marital duties. What
can be inferred from the totality of evidence, at most, is a case of incompatibility.
For a personality disorder to be declared clinically or medically incurable or
permanent is one thing; for a spouse to refuse or to be reluctant to perform
his/her marital duties is another.[65]
Indeed, we are loath to overturn the findings of the RTC and the CA. More than
that, too, the evidence on record do not square with the existence of
psychological incapacity as contemplated by law and jurisprudence. In the case of
Nilo, what brought about the breakdown of his relationship with Marivi was not
necessarily attributable to his so-called "psychological disorder" but can be
imputed to his work and marital stress, and his ordinary human failings.
With regard to his failure to sexually perform "adequately," the same appeared to
be a case of "selective impotency," as he was turned off by Marivi's disclosure of
their bed secrets to her family. Furthermore, Nilo testified that the sexual
problem with Marivi did not crop up until the birth of their second son, and that
he felt that the blame was invariably and unfairly laid on upon him, thus:
THE COURT:
The Court has just some questions with regard to the main issue. During your direct testimony;
Mr. Witness, you mentioned some of your faults which [may be] the reason why the instant case
was filed. x x x one of those faults is no sex. When did that happen? x x x
A. If I recall it right, Your Honor; I [had] some challenge[s] immediately after the first birth of my
eldest son which I x x x shared with the psychologist or psychiatrist who [had] examined me.
THE COURT:
But when you got married with your wife that was not a problem until the birth of your last son?
A. Yes, your Honor.
ATTY. STA MARIA, JR.:
Q. So it is attributable to the petitioner though you claim that it is your fault, is that correct?
A. Because, your Honor, that kind of situation, I always get blamed, so for the purpose of settling all
these questions, when you make that mistake, you'll always be the one to be blamed although as
per the psychologist and the psychiatrist, there's also a reason why I am not able to perform sex to
my wife because in those ten (10) years that we were together, after the first one, [didn't] have
any other affairs but I kept being blamed that I [had] just because I [was] not able to perform sex
110
 to her. The whole family, her family knows that in that premise because I got, one time, in one of
our quarrels x x x told me, "maybe you're not making love with my daughter because you are Q. Could you not refuse the invitations of going out and just go home and spend time with your
having an affair with another woman." So, I know I made a mistake in the past but if I'm x x x family?
kept [being] reminded of it, it's a punishment, your Honor. A. Sometimes I can refuse, sometimes I cannot. Because it becomes a condition of sale of the clients
x x x.
xxxx
xxxx
Q. What you initially said was your fault was...as you're now talking before this Honorable Court, is
really the fault of the petitioner; is that what you are saying? Q. So x x x what's the latest time of the night that you usually come home?
A. There [were] times, your Honor, I would say it was my fault. There [were] times it was caused by A. My objective as a husband and as a father is to really come as early as I can which I have
her faults as well. It's not one plus one it was hers and one plus one it was mine, it depends on the explained on and on, your Honor. But to meet my million dollar targets of the country, I have to
situation. We've been dealing with cases before so not all the time it's the fault of Mrs. Cruz. And do things beyond 5 o'clock. In several occasions when I tried to go home early, to my
not all the time it's the fault of Mr. Cruz. It's a relationship, there are times it's hers, there are disappointment, my kids are not at home because they were borrowed by my in-laws to have
times, it's mine but we're able to fix it until this annulment situation came. merienda. That's why I complained to my wife that time that "please tell me if they are going with
my in-laws because I don't want to deprive them also of the few times I'm able to go home early."
x x x x[67]
Nor can it be said that Nilo's failure to provide quality time for the family was Q. So, you are saying that you only have few times of coming home early?
caused by his "inadequate personality disorder" or "unresolved oedipal complex." A. Well, yes, but not very few.
Nilo explained that he has a taxing and demanding job, and that unfortunately,
with his working hours eating up his home life, while he was able to provide his Q. Okay. Have you tried to make an effort to remedy the situation?
family with an adequate standard of living, the lack of quality time for his wife A. Well, if I have my way to be able to direct my appointments in the South, my meetings in Amkor
became attenuated and resulted in severing his bond with Marivi, who failed to Anam, Mamplasan, in Sta. Rosa then that will allow me to be home at least 5-6 o'clock. But most
of my meetings in Makati, Quezon City, Manila especially with government clients [do] allow me
understand the nature of his job. They were a happy couple during the period of
to go home early, your Honor.
courtship, and even during the early years of their marriage. Nilo testified:
x x x x[68]
ATTY. REVILLA:
Q. x x x What was the reason why you had to stay up late?
THE COURT:
A. Ma'am, I'm...in those I.T. companies that I worked for whether manager or managing director, my
What about another fault you mentioned which is staying late, when did this thing happen?
companies are...the companies are involved in sales and marketing and support so it entails
entertainment of clients, entertainment of principals coming from headquarters and entertainment
A. When I came back from my assignment in Hong Kong in 1988 when I was given a new job in
of customers with my staff and other company.
sales and marketing.
Q. When you say I.T., what does it stand for?
xxxx
A. Information Technology.
THE COURT:
Q. You also referred to a headquarters. What do you mean by headquarters?
So before the birth of your children, that is after your marriage with the petitioner, this was not a
A. Headquarters, if you work in a multinational company like companies I worked for, they have
problem?
headquarters in Hong Kong, they have headquarters in Singapore, they have headquarters in the
U.S.
A. Because, your Honor, I was assigned in Hong Kong and I was only twelve (12) minutes [away]
by [foot] to our office x x x.
Q. So you had to entertain principals corning from [these] headquarters?
A. As a part of the job as required by the principals who [visit] us.
xxxx
Q. How often were you required to stay out late because of your job?
A. Ma'am, it is unpredictable. Sometimes, we were required to stay for dinner and entertainment
thereafter. Sometimes, we can go home early also.
111
 And I was not in [sales] and marketing, I was the Administrative Assistant of the President of
IBM in Southeast Asia so it's the...purely management administrative work as an administrative xxxx
assistant so there's [not] much of entertaining done in Hong Kong.
Your Honor, sometimes, I get all these complaints. But when they saw my picture in the
THE COURT: newspaper or in the TV having success stories and contract signing, they are proud of me.
Okay, so in other words, at that time, that was not a problem. It was only a problem when you
were appointed to your position in... THE COURT:
When you say "so proud of me," to whom are you referring x x x?
A. IBM.
A. My family. They call me, they congratulate me, we have dinners together to celebrate but to get to
THE COURT: that, is the working hard and staying away from the family.
That was so many years after you got married with your wife?
xxxx
A. We got married, your Honor, in 1987 then we went back to the Philippines in July 1988 [when] I
was given a new marketing and [sales] role as a manager of general marketing which is...which THE COURT:
encompasses all industries aside [from] the government. How long did you court your wife?

THE COURT: A. Six (6) months, your Honor.

So you mean to say that this problem of staying late only happened lately?
x x x x[69]
xxxx
THE COURT:
A. The definition, your Honor, of my family...late is when you don't make it at 7:00 o'clock Could you say that you were a perfect couple at that time?
or...[with] the family at 7:00 o'clock in the evening. So if I don't make it at seven, I considered
myself late. A. When we were starting, your Honor, we [were] happy, and during the time that we were in Hong
Kong. But when we went back to Manila, there are times (the witness is in tears)...adjusting to
THE COURT: work and family that is why it affected my relationship to her family and combination of mistakes
What is the reason why you have been late? happened which I admitted.

A. Your Honor, my job is not a 9 to 5 job because we...we call on customers, we entertain customers, THE COURT:
partners, principals, we also have fellowship with our teams. So, we either have dinner or we have How would you describe your wife during your first years of marriage?
happy hours. We also see friends after. So but, physically I cannot do that everyday, your Honor,
because I also wake up automatically at 6:00 everyday whether I have a drink, or have dinner, or I A. [She was] a very good wife.
worked out in the evening or play[ed] basketball during that time, I always wake up at six. So if I
stayed up late like previously...like 2, 3, it's gonna be a burden for me physically and [I would be] THE COURT:
unable to perform my job well. So, like I mentioned earlier in a hearing, your Honor, many times Did she perform her duties as a wife and as a mother?
I tried to be home by 10 to be able to watch. Before 10 to be able to watch the 10:00 o'clock news
and be able to enjoy my ice cream while watching it. A. Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: THE COURT:

Well, one of those faults you mentioned is also working hard, why did you say that it is your And was she that independent from her parents or she was too dependent [on] her parents?
fault?
A. On her performing her duties, with the...as a wife and as a friend, she's independent. When it
A. In our industry, your Honor, when you work out, you will definitely end up late several couple of comes to our problems, she would consult her family.
times, but not all the time.

112
THE COURT: It is significant to note that Marivi failed to substantiate Nilo's penchant for
So only those times when you have a problem. Like what problems, Mr. Witness? womanizing as a manifestation of his psychological incapacity. Aside from her
bare allegations, which were chiefly based on what other people told her, she
A. Our relationship, your Honor. never presented irrefutable proof to corroborate her claims of his sexual
proclivities, i.e., that these proclivities were already existing before the marriage
THE COURT: and during the first years of their marriage. Nilo, on the other hand, categorically
But most of the time, you were able to patch up your problems?
admitted to having extramarital affairs in 1992, 2002, and 2006, the period when
the marriage was already on the rocks. Neither is there evidence of Nilo's alleged
A. Yes, your Honor.
oedipal complex, the manifestations of which were not cited by the experts, that
x x x x[70] caused the couple to fall out of love.
Interestingly, when asked if there was no more functional marital life between
him and Marivi, Nilo candidly highlighted his different perception from his Anent Marivi's case, based on her family history as reflected in the experts'
clinical evaluation, she grew up in a well-functioning, supportive, and emotionally
estranged wife:
ATTY. STA. MARIA, JR.: healthy family environment. Even Nilo himself attested that she was a good wife
Q. So, Mr. Witness, well in reality today, Mr. Witness, even the petitioner believes that there and a good mother to their children. Her demand for attention, time, love, and
is no more functional marital life in this relationship, would you agree with that? fidelity is normal for a wife. The anger she felt within her is also a legitimate
A. If that's the way she thinks, I...I will have my own way of looking at things because... reaction.

xxxx Yet the psychologist Dr. Encarnacion himself acknowledged that Marivi's so-called
psychological incapacity is in fact, curable. Thus:
Q. Even...as I was saying since she was asking for nullity and you were asking for nullity, it's a fact ATTY. REVILLA:
of life as of today, as you speak today that there is no more functional marital life between the Q. So even without the respondent, Nilo Cruz, petitioner would still be psychologically
two (2) of you? incapacitated?
A. You see, your Honor, that's why we're different. Her style is conclude and conclude. I have a A. I beg to [differ] from that because the needs were not fulfilled in this particular marriage, it's like
different style because of my background. I will only stop till death. I cannot share her legal a tendency to have cancer, but if you take care of yourself with the right environment, you will
counsel's statement with my own thinking, your Honor. not catch cancer. Those were previous positions, that's why I called them Histrionic Personality
Traits Behaviors and Features not a full blown Histrionic Personality Disorder, the needs were
x x x x[71] badly unfulfilled in this marriage because she married a man who did not know the language of
Even the psychiatrist Dr. Villegas pinpointed the differences of the estranged feeling of showing some attention towards his spouse, meaning, if she is put in a relationship with
couple which led to squabbles - a man who is able to address these needs, she would be better, she would be better in a marriage.
ATTY. STA. MARIA, JR.:
Q. Doctor, from your examination of both respondent and petitioner the obligation of trust and Q. So this psychological incapacity of the petitioner is only dormant at the time that she was not yet
respect for each other, how did it not manifest in this relationship? married?
A. The respondent [sees] the petitioner as one who's very negativistic on him or who's very A. Well, it's grave...
demanding and who is also trying to put him down because according to him, the petitioner
would always see his weak points rather than his strong points. Q. Was it grave already at the time...
A. Yes, it is, it's grave but...
Q. Are you saying that this developed a non-trust just between them?
A. None trust. They do not trust each other anymore. On the part of the petitioner, because of his Q. Even before the marriage?
womanizing activities and on the part of the respondent, that the petitioner is always looking at A. ...but not incurable, that is the only adjective, grave, pre-existing...
his weak points rather than his strong points.
Q. Pre-existing?
x x x x[72] Grave and pre-existing, yes, incurable, no, in the sense that if she married properly if her needs
were addressed, it would not appear in that marriage.

113
 [1]
Rollo, pp. 44-133.
Q. But because of her marriage to the respondent, are you saying now that her psychological
incapacity now... CA rollo, pp. 166-190; penned by Associate Justice Socorro B. Inting and
[2]
A. Became an incapacity, yes. concurred in by Associate Justices Fernanda Lampas Peralta and Mariflor P.
Punzalan Castillo.
Q. ...became incurable?
A. No. [3]
Id. at 272-273.
xxxx [4]
Records, pp. 425-442; penned by Presiding Judge Philip A. Aguinaldo.
Q. Okay. I am quite curious about the curability of the personality disorder of the petitioner. Now, if
her needs are satisfied with...in case, assuming the petitioner enters into another relationship and
[5]
Id. at 206.
her needs are satisfied then her incapacity is cured, is that what you're saying?
[6]
A. In effect, yes, in effect, yes. Id. at 207.

Q. Would you say, what are these needs of the petitioner that [you're]...not satisfied of the [7]
Id. at 1-9.
respondent?
A. Need to be paid attention to, need to be valued, need to have an effect on someone, it is a [8]
Id. at 7.
universal need. She was made to feel that she did not have any effect on him and so are the
children, x x x well, the father made the children feel that they, wife and two sons did not have [9]
Id.
any effect on him, ma'am.
[10]
Id. at 4-5.
x x x[73]
[11]
Id. at 60-69.
Q. One last question. The needs of the petitioner, like you say, do you think she was able to convey,
clearly convey her needs to the respondent, properly convey? [12]
Id. at 62-63.
A. Very clearly, yes, and then when they were still not being heard, well, iyon na nga eh, yung
hostility niya and resentment would get the better of her as a ano...so it would become
dysfunctional reaction upon reaction. That's a good question. [74]
[13]
See CA rollo, p. 173.
Upon the view we take of this case, thus, this Court believes that the [14]
Records, pp. 125-128.
protagonists in this case are in reality simply unwilling to work out a solution for
each other's personality differences, and have thus become overwhelmed by [15]
Id. at 211-212.
feelings of disappointment or disillusionment toward one another. Sadly, a
marriage, even if unsatisfactory, is not a null and void marriage.[75] [16]
Id. at 212.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. [17]
Id. at 214.
SO ORDERED. [18]
Id.
Sereno, C. J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Jardeleza, and Tijam, JJ., [19]
Id. at 215.
concur.
[20]
Id.

[21]
Id.
114
 [43]
TSN-Dr. Cecilia Villegas, February 6, 2007, pp. 14, 16-18.
[22]
Id. at 217.
[44]
Id. at 23-24.
[23]
Id.
[45]
Records, pp. 244-245; TSN-Dr. Cecilia Villegas, February 6, 2007, pp. 28-30.
[24]
Id. at 215-216.
Records, pp. 259-261; TSN-Dr. Ruben Encarnacion, June 5, 2007, pp. 24, 26-
[46]
[25]
Id. at 216. 28, 34-35, 61-63.

[26]
Id. at 218. Records, pp. 259-261; TSN-Dr. Ruben Encarnacion, June 5, 2007, pp. 22-24,
[47]

44, 51-52.
[27]
Id. at 216-219, 220.
[48]
TSN-Dr. Ruben Encarnacion, June 5, 2007, pp. 55-56.
[28]
Id. at 216.
[49]
Records, pp. 259-260; TSN-Dr. Ruben Encarnacion, June 5, 2007, p. 59.
[29]
Id. at 216 and 219.
[50]
Records, pp. 443-460.
[30]
Id. at 247-251.
[51]
CA rollo, pp. 166-190.
[31]
Id. at 252-253.
[52]
Id. at 182-183.
[32]
TSN-Nilo Cruz, August 14, 2007, pp. 39-41.
[53]
Id. at 189.
[33]
TSN-Nilo Cruz, September 13, 2007, pp. 48-49.
[54]
Id. at 272-273.
[34]
Records, pp. 310-311.
[55]
726 Phil. 502, 510 (2014).
[35]
Records, pp. 311-312; TSN- Nilo Cruz, August 28, 2007, pp. 41-47.
[56]
310 Phil. 21, 39 (1995).
[36]
TSN-Nilo Cruz, September 13, 2007, p. 79.
[57]
698 Phil. 257, 266-267 (2012).
[37]
Records, p. 7.
[58]
335 Phil. 664, 676-679 (1997).
[38]
Id.
[59]
Id. at 674.
[39]
Id. at 236-246.
[60]
Republic v. Cabantug-Baguio, 579 Phil. 187, 199 (2008).
[40]
Id. at 246.
[61]
655 Phil. 346 (2011).
[41]
TSN-Dr. Cecilia Villegas, February 6, 2007, p. 60.
[62]
Id. at 358-359.
[42]
Records, pp. 245-246; TSN-Dr. Cecilia Villegas, February 6, 2007, pp. 19-20.
[63]
397 Phil. 840, 842 (2000).
115
[64]
Mendoza v. Republic, 698 Phil. 241, 254 (2012).

[65]
Republic v. De Gracia, supra note 55 at 513.

[66]
TSN-Nilo Cruz, September 13, 2007, pp. 35-36.

[67]
Id. at 62-63.

[68]
TSN-Nilo Cruz, August 28, 2007, pp. 42-43, 46-47.

[69]
TSN-Nilo Cruz, September 13, 2007, pp. 36-40.

[70]
Id. at 41-42.

[71]
Id. at 80-81.

[72]
TSN-Dr. Cecilia Villegas, February 6, 2007, pp. 25-26.

[73]
TSN-Dr. Ruben Encarnacion, June 5, 2007, pp. 41-43, 45.

[74]
Id. at 46.

[75]
Navales v. Navales, 578 Phil. 826, 846 (2008).

116