commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful, is authorized to do so only within
VOL. 259, JULY 19, 1996 129 the area of the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this
Navarro vs. Domagtoy
* a marriage outside his court’s jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid
A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088. July 19, 1996.   down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating
(Formerly A.M. No. OCA I.P.I. 95-61-MTJ)
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant,  vs.  JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY,
respondent.
Civil Law;  Family Code;  Marriages;  Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is
necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage.—There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to
comprehend in this provision. In fact, the law is clear and simple. Even if the spouse present has a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement
which has been precisely incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent marriages where it
is not proven that the previous marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or
presumptively dead, in accordance with pertinent provisions of law.
Same; Same; Same; Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent
judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom.—In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan
did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his first wife’s presumptive death. Absent
this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida Peñaranda. Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was
manifest error on the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the
groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage.
Under Article 35 of the Family Code, “The following marriage shall be void from the beginning; (4) Those
bigamous x x x marriages not falling under Article 41.”
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
130
130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Navarro vs. Domagtoy
Same;  Same;  Same;  Instances where a marriage can be held outside of the judge’s chambers or
courtroom.—As the aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be held outside of the judge’s chambers
or courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in remote places in accordance
with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect.
Same; Same; Same; Article 8 which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage
ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer.—Under Article 3, one of
the formal requisites of marriage is the “authority of the solemnizing officer.” Under Article 7, marriage
may be solemnized by, among others, “any incumbent member of the judiciary  within the court’s
jurisdiction.” Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony
and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding
provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s jurisdiction, there is a
resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3 which while it may not affect the
validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.—A priest who is
Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as
long as the requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific
jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes
official to administrative liability.
Same; Same;  Same;  Administrative Law;  Judges;  By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as
grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of
understanding of the basic principles of civil law.—Inasmuch as respondent judge’s jurisdiction covers
the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage
in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing
131
VOL. 259, JULY 19, 1996 131
Navarro vs. Domagtoy
Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority,
respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic principles of civil law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the
law.—Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law. The legal
principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention are elementary and uncomplicated, prompting
us to conclude that respondent’s failure to apply them is due to a lack of comprehension of the law.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Gross Misconduct and Inefficiency.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
ROMERO, J.:
The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del
Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts
committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he
contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law.
First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A.
Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from
his first wife.
Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador
Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court’s jurisdiction on October 27, 1994.
Respondent judge holds office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta.
Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the respondent judge’s
residence in the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the
municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the
municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.
132
132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Navarro vs. Domagtoy
In his letter-comment to the Office of the Court Administrator, respondent judge avers that
the office and name of the Municipal Mayor of Dapa have been used by someone else, who, as
the mayor’s “lackey,” is overly concerned with his actuations both as judge and as a private
person. The same person had earlier filed Administrative Matter No. 94-980-MTC, which was
dismissed for lack of merit on September 15, 1994, and Administrative Matter No. OCA-IPI-
95-16, “Antonio Adapon v. Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy,” which is still pending.
In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of
having solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his
wife, and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the
Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the 1
fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first
wife have not seen each other for almost seven years.  With respect to the second charge, he
maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not
violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code which states that: “Marriage may be
solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction”; and
that Article 8 thereof applies to the case in question.
The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the pleadings submitted
2 clear and simple. Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
were considered sufficient for a resolution of the case.
Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of complainant have not
been sufficiently proven, they will not be dwelt upon. The acts complained of and respondent
judge’s answer thereto will suffice and can be objectively assessed by themselves to prove the
latter’s malfeasance.
________________
1 Rollo,
pp. 7-8.
2 Uy v. Dizon-Capulong,  A.M. No. RTJ-91-766, April 7, 1993;  Montemayor v. Collado,  A.M. No. 2519-MTJ,
September 10, 1981; Ubongon v. Mayo, A.M. No. 1255-CTJ, August 6, 1980, 99 SCRA 30.
133
VOL. 259, JULY 19, 1996 133
Navarro vs. Domagtoy
The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga
states that Tagadan’s civil status is “separated.” Despite this declaration, the wedding
ceremony was solemnized by respondent judge. He presented in evidence a joint affidavit by
Maurecio A. Labado, Sr. and Eugenio Bullecer, subscribed and sworn to before Judge
3
Demosthenes C. Duquilla, Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar.   The affidavit was not
issued by the latter judge, as claimed by respondent judge, but merely acknowledged before
him. In their affidavit, the affiants stated that they knew Gaspar Tagadan to have been civilly
married to Ida D. Peñaranda in September 1983; that after thirteen years of cohabitation and
having borne five children, Ida Peñaranda left the conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon
and that she has not returned nor been heard of for almost seven years, thereby giving rise to
the presumption that she is already dead.
In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit is sufficient
proof of Ida Peñaranda’s presumptive death, and ample reason for him to proceed with the
marriage ceremony. We do not agree.
Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:
“A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and
void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.” (Emphasis
added.)
_________________
3 Rollo, p. 12.
134
134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Navarro vs. Domagtoy
There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact, the law is
was already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary
in order to contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement which has been
precisely incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent marriages where it is
not proven that the previous marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or
presumptively dead, in accordance with pertinent provisions of law.
In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the
declaration of his first wife’s presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains
married to Ida Peñaranda. Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part
of respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect
or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. Under
Article 35 of the Family Code, “The following marriage shall be void from the beginning; (4)
Those bigamous x x x marriages not falling under Article 41.”
The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside the court’s
jurisdiction, covered by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code, thus:
“Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction;
x x x      x x x      x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court, in the
church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be,
and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places in
accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in
which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement
to that effect.”
135
VOL. 259, JULY 19, 1996 135
Navarro vs. Domagtoy
Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justification for his having
solemnized the marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his
court’s jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be held outside of the
judge’s chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in
remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a
sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at
the point of death or in a remote place. Moreover, the written request 4presented addressed to
the respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario.
 More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the
solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the “authority of
the solemnizing officer.” Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, “any
incumbent member of the judiciary  within the court’s jurisdiction.” Article 8, which is a
directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or
qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-
compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage.
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful, is
authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An
appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to
solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied
with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings
only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his
court’s jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article
3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating
________________
4 Rollo, pp. 10-11.
136
136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
VOL. 259, JULY 19, 1996 137
Navarro vs. Domagtoy
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to the Court, a six-
month suspension and a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be
dealt with more severely. Considering that one of the marriages in question resulted in a
bigamous union and therefore void, and the other lacked the necessary authority of
respondent judge, the Court adopts said recommendation. Respondent is advised to be more
circumspect in applying the law and to cultivate a deeper understanding of the law.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is hereby
SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months and given a STERN WARNING that a repetition
of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
     Regalado (Chairman), Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy suspended for six (6) months with stern warning
against repetition of similar acts.
Note.—While an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the
marriage the party or parties responsible for the same shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable. (Cosca vs. Palaypayon, Jr., 237 SCRA 249 [1994])

Navarro vs. Domagtoy

5
official to administrative liability.
Inasmuch as respondent judge’s jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and
Burgos, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of
Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for the
exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of
understanding of the basic principles of civil law.
Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law. The
legal principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention are elementary and
uncomplicated, prompting us to conclude that respondent’s failure to apply them is due to a
lack of comprehension of the law.
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in
the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and
competent in understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that 6
they be conversant
with basic legal principles like the ones involved in
7
the instant case. It is not too much to
expect them to know and apply the law intelligently.  Otherwise, the system of justice rests on
a shaky foundation indeed, compounded by the errors committed by those not learned in the
law. While magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not
penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an
area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons.
The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and void,
there being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Peñaranda.

_______________
5 Article 4, Family Code.
6 Lim v. Domogas, A.M. No. RTJ-92-899, October 15, 1993, 227 SCRA 258, 263 citing Ubongan v. Mayo, 99 SCRA
30 and Ajeno v. Inserto, 71 SCRA 166.
7 Galan Realty Co. v. Arranz, A.M. No. MTJ-93-978, October 27, 1994, 237 SCRA 771.

137

402 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Arañes vs. Occiano
* ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Gross Ignorance of the Law.
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390. April 11, 2002.  
(Formerly IPI No. 01-1049-MTJ)
MERCEDITA MATA ARAÑES, petitioner,  vs.  JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO,
respondent.
Administrative Law; Judges; The authority of the regional trial court judges and judges of inferior
courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court.—Under
the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P. 129, the authority of the regional trial court judges and
judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by
the Supreme Court.
Same; Same; Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside the court’s jurisdiction, there is a resultant
irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the
marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.—“A priest who is commissioned
and allowed by his local ordinance to marry the faithful is authorized to do so only within the area or
diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has
jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the
requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may
______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
403
VOL. 380, APRIL 11, 2002 403
Arañes vs. Occiano
officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage
outside his court’s jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in
Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to
administrative liability.”
Same; Same; Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing
officer the authority to solemnize a marriage.—In  People vs. Lara, we held that a marriage which
preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license
cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is
the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage.
Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this
respect, respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.
Same; Same; The withdrawal of the complaint does not necessarily have the legal effect of exonerating
respondent from disciplinary action.—Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of
Desistance filed by petitioner. This Court has consistently held in a catena of cases that the withdrawal
of the complaint does not necessarily have the legal effect of exonerating respondent from disciplinary
action. Otherwise, the prompt and fair administration of justice, as well as the discipline of court
personnel, would be undermined. Disciplinary actions of this nature do not involve purely private or
personal matters. They can not be made to depend upon the will of every complainant who may, for one
reason or another, condone a detestable act. We cannot be bound by the unilateral act of a complainant
in a matter which involves the Court’s constitutional power to discipline judges. Otherwise, that power
may be put to naught, undermine the trust character of a public office and impair the integrity and
dignity of this Court as a disciplining authority.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
PUNO, J.:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Arañes charges respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the
Law via a sworn Letter-Complaint dated 23 May 2001. Respondent is the Presiding Judge of
the Mu-
404
404 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Arañes vs. Occiano
nicipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. Petitioner alleges that on 17 February 2000,
respondent judge solemnized her marriage to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia without the
requisite marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial
jurisdiction.
They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her husband
passed away. However, since the marriage was a nullity, petitioner’s right to inherit the “vast
properties” left by Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving the
pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy.
Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge for his illegal acts and
unethical misrepresentations which allegedly caused her so much hardships, embarrassment
and sufferings.
On 28 May 2001, the case was referred by the Office of the Chief Justice to then Acting
Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño for appropriate action. On 8 June 2001, the Office of
the Court Administrator required respondent judge to comment.
In his Comment dated 5 July 2001, respondent judge averred that he was requested by a
certain Juan Arroyo on 15 February 2000 to solemnize the marriage of the parties on 17
February 2000. Having been assured that all the documents to the marriage were complete, he
agreed to solemnize the marriage in his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan,
Camarines Sur. However, on 17 February 2000, Arroyo informed him that Orobia had a
difficulty walking and could not stand the rigors of travelling to Balatan which is located
almost 25 kilometers from his residence in Nabua. Arroyo then requested if respondent judge
could solemnize the marriage in Nabua, to which request he acceded.
Respondent judge further avers that before he started the ceremony, he carefully examined
the documents submitted to him by petitioner. When he discovered that the parties did not
possess the requisite marriage license, he refused to solemnize the marriage and suggested its
resetting to another date. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of
visitors, and the delivery of provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the mar-
405
VOL. 380, APRIL 11, 2002 405
Arañes vs. Occiano
riage out of human compassion. He also feared that if he reset the wedding, it might aggravate
the physical condition of Orobia who just suffered from a stroke. After the solemnization, he
reiterated the necessity for the marriage license and admonished the parties that their failure
to give it would render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured respondent judge
that they would give the license to him in the afternoon of that same day. When they failed to
comply, respondent judge followed it up with Arroyo but the latter only gave him the same
reassurance that the marriage license would be delivered to his sala at the Municipal Trial
Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.
Respondent judge vigorously denies that he told the contracting parties that their marriage
is valid despite the absence of a marriage license. He attributes the hardships and
embarrassment suffered by the petitioner as due to her own fault and negligence.
On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance dated 28 August 2001
with the Office of the Court Administrator. She attested that respondent judge initially
refused to solemnize her marriage due to the want of a duly issued marriage license and that
it was because of her prodding and reassurances that he eventually solemnized the same. She
confessed that she filed this administrative case out of rage. However, after reading the
Comment filed by respondent judge, she realized her own shortcomings and is now bothered
by her conscience.
Reviewing the records of the case, it appears that petitioner and Orobia filed their
Application for Marriage License on 5 January 2000. It was stamped in this Application that
the marriage license shall be issued on 17 January 2000. However, neither petitioner nor
Orobia claimed it.
It also appears that the Office of the Civil Registrar General issued a Certification that it
has no record of such marriage that allegedly took place on 17 February 2000. Likewise, the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur issued another Certification dated
7 May 2001 that it cannot issue a true copy of the Marriage Contract of the parties since it has
no record of their marriage.
406
406 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Arañes vs. Occiano
On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought the assistance of respondent judge so the latter could
communicate with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur for the
issuance of her marriage license. Respondent judge wrote the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua,
Camarines Sur. In a letter dated 9 May 2001, a Clerk of said office, Grace T. Escobal, informed
respondent judge that their office cannot issue the marriage license due to the failure of
Orobia to submit the Death Certificate of his previous spouse.
The Office of the Court Administrator, in its Report and Recommendation dated 15
November 2000, found the respondent judge guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly
issued marriage license and for doing so outside his territorial jurisdiction. A fine of P5,000.00
was recommended to be imposed on respondent judge.
We agree.
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P. 129, the authority of the regional
trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their
territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court. 1
The case at bar is not without precedent. In Navarro vs. Domagtoy,  respondent judge held
office and had jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao
del Norte. However, he solemnized a wedding at his residence in the municipality of Dapa,
Surigao del Norte which did not fall within the jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta.
Monica and Burgbs. We held that:
“A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinance to marry the faithful is authorized to
do so only within the area or diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a
Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the
venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied with.  However, judges who are appointed to
specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge
solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal
requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it
______________
1 259 SCRA 129 (1996).
407
VOL. 380, APRIL 11, 2002 407
Arañes vs. Occiano
may not 2 affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative
liability.”  (Emphasis supplied.)
In said case, we suspended respondent judge for six (6) months on the ground that his act of
solemnizing a marriage outside his jurisdiction constitutes gross ignorance of the law. We
further held that:
“The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the law they
are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent in
understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles
like the ones involved in the instant case, x x x While magistrates may at times make mistakes in
judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary
3
provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons.”
In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality
of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in
Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative
liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the
marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the
law on marriage.
Respondent judge should also be 4faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite
marriage license. In People vs. Lara,  we held that a marriage which preceded the issuance of
the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot render
valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the
marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage.
Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of
petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.
______________
2 Id., pp. 135-136.
3 Id., p. 136.
4 C.A. O.G. 4079.
408
408 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Arañes vs. Occiano
Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance filed by petitioner.
This Court has consistently held in a catena of cases that the withdrawal of the complaint does
not necessarily have the legal effect of exonerating respondent from disciplinary action.
Otherwise, the prompt and fair administration
5
of justice, as well as the discipline of court
personnel, would be undermined.   Disciplinary actions of this nature do not involve purely
private or personal matters. They can not be made to depend upon the will of every
complainant who may, for one reason or another, condone a detestable act. We cannot be
bound by the unilateral act of a complainant in a matter which involves the Court’s
constitutional power to discipline judges. Otherwise, that power may be put to naught,
undermine the trust character of6 a public office and impair the integrity and dignity of this
Court as a disciplining authority.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal
Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING
that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

     Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Kapunan and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Respondent Judge meted a P5,000 fine with stern warning against repetition of similar
offense.

Note.—A void marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all. (Suntay vs. Cojuangco-
Suntay, 300 SCRA 760[1998])
 of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it
122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity—meaning no third party was involved at
any time within the 5 years and continuity—that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year
Niñal vs. Bayadog cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry
each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging
* parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived
G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000. faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and its
requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves
ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIÑAL, as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should
INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., petitioners,  vs.NORMA not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing
BAYADOG, respondent. element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nul-

124
Civil Law; Family Code; Marriages; A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article
53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80 (3) in
relation to Article 58.—A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil
Code, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to 124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Article 58. The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the State’s demonstration of its
ANNOTATED
involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is
interested. This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity
of family life and of affording protection to the family as a basic “autonomous social institution.” Niñal vs. Bayadog
Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as an “inviolable social institution,” and is the
foundation of family life which shall be protected by the State. This is why the Family Code considers
marriage as “a special contract of permanent union” and case law considers it “not just an adventure but lify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the
a lifetime commitment.” circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required
in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who
Same;  Same;  Same;  There are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local
license is dispensed with.—There are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a mar- civil registrar.
Same; Same; Same; Any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall
________________ be illegal and void.—This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited
* FIRST
the concurrence of multiple marriages by the same person during the same period. Thus, any marriage
DIVISION.
subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void, subject only to
the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled. The Revised
Penal Code complements the civil law in that the contracting of two or more marriages and the having of
123
extramarital affairs are considered felonies,  i.e., bigamy and concubinage and adultery. The law
sanctions monogamy.
Same;  Same;  Same;  The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the
filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third
VOL. 328, MARCH 14, 2000 123 party as being one as “husband and wife.”—Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated
in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already
Niñal vs. Bayadog lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but
rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the
riage license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76, referring to the marriage time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other,
of a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even
a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The rationale why no license where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any
is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as “husband and wife.”
concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication
Same;  Same;  Same;  Void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but
of every applicant’s name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the marriage license may
voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in
discourage such persons from legitimizing their status. To preserve peace in the family, avoid the
peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from the
125
publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt them from that
requirement.
Same; Same; Same; The five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the
date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the
marriage.—Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife
VOL. 328, MARCH 14, 2000 125
for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of a
cohabitation as “husband and wife” where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to Niñal vs. Bayadog
validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back
from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence
 which case the parties and their offspring will be left: as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.—
The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void
marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court;
whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken place and cannot be
the source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription
while the other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a
direct proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can
be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the
lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be
left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That is why the action or defense for nullity is
imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable
marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.
Same; Same; Same; No judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage.—
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the
nullity of a marriage. “A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their
original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely
necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is
expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of
competent jurisdiction.”
Same; Same; Same; Other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity.—Other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of
heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a
criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly
instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without
prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of decla-
126
126 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Niñal vs. Bayadog
ration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause “on the basis of
a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void” in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that
such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Roldan R. Mangubat for petitioners.
     Daryll A. Amante for private respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage
after his death?
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their
marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on
April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and
respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito
and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a
marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their father’s
death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma
alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed
under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect
petitioner’s successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners
have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for
“annulment of marriage” under Article 47 of the Family Code.
127
VOL. 328, MARCH 14, 2000 127
Niñal vs. Bayadog
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59,
dismissed the petition after finding that the Family Code is “rather silent, obscure,
insufficient” to resolve the following issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the
declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with
her specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G.
Niñal is already dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs’ deceased father with defendant is
null and void ab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing 1 the validity of the second
marriage after it was dissolved due to their father’s death.
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and
void their father’s marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of
the Family Code which 2enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate an action for
annulment of marriage.   Hence, this petition for review with this Court grounded on a pure
question of law.
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and because “the verification failed to state the basis of
petitioner’s averment that the allegations in the petition are ‘true and correct.’ ” It was thus
treated as an
3
unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the
1997 Rules.  However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court
________________
1 The dispositive portion of the Order dated March 27, 1998 issued by Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of Regional Trial
Court (RTC)-Branch 59, Toledo City, reads: “WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendant’s motion to dismiss is
hereby granted and this instant case is hereby ordered dismissed without costs.” (p. 6; Rollo, p. 21).
2 Order, p. 4; Rollo, p. 19.
3 Minute Resolution dated July 13, 1998; Rollo, p. 39.
128
128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Niñal vs. Bayadog
4
reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the petition for review.
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was
5
 5
the law in effect at the time of their celebration.
6
  A valid marriage license is a requisite of
marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code,   the absence of which8 renders the marriage
7
void  ab initio  pursuant to Article 80(3)   in relation to Article 58.   The requirement and
issuance of marriage license is the State’s demonstration of its involvement and9 participation
in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested.  This interest
proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life
and of affording protection to the family as a basic
__________________
4 MinuteResolution dated October 7, 1998; Rollo, p. 50.
5 Tamano
v. Ortiz, 291 SCRA 584 (1998).
6 Now Article 3, Family Code. Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all the requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties; their consent, freely given;
(2) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(3) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.
7 Now Article 4, Family Code. Art. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
x x x      x x x      x x x
(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character.
x x x      x x x      x x x
8 Art. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of this Title, but not those under
article 76, no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the
municipality where either contracting party habitually resides.
9 Perido v. Perido, 63 SCRA 97 (1975).
129
VOL. 328, MARCH 14, 2000 129
Niñal vs. Bayadog
10
“autonomous social institution.”   Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as an
“inviolable11social institution,” and is the foundation of family life which shall be protected by
the State.   This is 12
why the Family Code considers marriage as “a special contract of
permanent union”13
  and case law considers it “not just an adventure but a lifetime
commitment.”
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein 14
a marriage
license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76,   referring to the
marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as
husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the
marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties
to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of
persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant’s name for a
marriage license. The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such
________________
10 Section 12, Article II, 1987 Constitution; Hernandez v. CA, G.R. No. 126010, December 8, 1999, 320 SCRA 76;
See also Tuason v. CA, 256 SCRA 158 (1996).
11 Section 2, Article XV (The Family), 1987 Constitution.
12 Article 1, Family Code provides: “Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman
entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal or family life. x x x.
13 Santos v. CA, 240 SCRA 20 at 35 (1995); 58 SCAD 17 (1995); 310 Phil. 21, 41 (1995).
14 Now Article 34, Family Code. Art. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who
have attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any
person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also
state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and
that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.
130
130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Niñal vs. Bayadog
15
persons from legitimizing their status.  To preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping and
suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from the publication
of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt them from that
requirement.
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners’ father to respondent Norma was
celebrated without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating
that “they have attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived together 16
as
husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire to marry each other.”   The
only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated
under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year period in order to
exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation
wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each other during the entire five-year
continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife during the entire five-year continuous period
regardless of whether there is a legal impediment to their being lawfully married, which
impediment may have either disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation
period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and
wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on
the basis of a cohabitation as “husband and wife” where the only missing factor is the special
contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law
cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be
a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period
should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of
cohabitation characterized
_______________
15 Report of the Code Commission, p. 80.
16 Rollo, p. 29.
131
VOL. 328, MARCH 14, 2000 131
Niñal vs. Bayadog
by exclusivity—meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and
continuity—that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed
without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during
the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to
have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived
faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such
and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements
of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single
requirement and later use the same missing element as a preconceived escape ground to
nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless
the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a
license is required in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be united in
matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge 17
of any impediment to the union of
the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.  The Civil Code provides:
Article 63: “x x x. This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the
marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof. x x x.”
Article 64: “Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the local civil registrar
shall forthwith make an investigation, examining persons under oath. x x x”
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Article 17  provides in part: “x x x. This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any
impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof. x x x.”
_______________
17 Articles 63 and 64, Civil Code; Articles 17 and 18, Family Code.
132
132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Niñal vs. Bayadog
Article 18 reads in part: “x x x.In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or brought to
his attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the application for a
marriage license. x x x.”
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the
concurrence of multiple marriages by the same person during the same period.Thus, any
marriage
18
subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and
void, subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was
dissolved or annulled.  The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that the
contracting of two or more marriages and the having of extramarital affairs are considered
19
felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and adultery.  The law sanctions monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent’s marriage, it cannot be said that they
have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding
day. From the time Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with
respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first
wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with
each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-
_______________
18 Article 83, Civil Code provides “Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the
first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance,
unless:
(1) the first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) the first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years . . .”
Article 41 of the Family Code reads: “A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years . . .”
19 Arts. 333 and 334, Revised Penal Code.
133
VOL. 328, MARCH 14, 2000 133
Niñal vs. Bayadog
year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the
nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the
absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he
started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other,
Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the
marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the
spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as
“husband and wife.”
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the
exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of
such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to
declare their father’s marriage void after his death? 20
Contrary to respondent judge’s ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code   cannot be applied
even by analogy to petitions
_________________
20 Art. 47. The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by the following persons and within the periods
indicated herein:
(1) For causes mentioned in number 1 of Article 45 by the party whose parent or guardian did not give his or her
consent, within five years after attaining the age of twenty-one; or by the parent or guardian or person having
legal charge of the minor, at any time before such party has reached the age of twenty-one;
(2) For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 45, by the sane spouse, who had no knowledge of the other’s
insanity; or by any relative or guardian or person having legal charge of the insane, at any time before the
death of either party, or by the insane spouse during a lucid interval or after regaining sanity;
(3) For causes mentioned in number 3 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years after the discovery of
the fraud;
134
134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Niñal vs. Bayadog
for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment of marriage relied
upon by the trial court, which allows “the sane spouse” to file an annulment suit “at any time
before the death of either party” is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods
and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage.
The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable
and void marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise
declared by the court;
21
whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never
to have taken place  and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or
confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A voidable
marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage
can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the
death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the
parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left
22
 22
as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.  That is why the action or defense for nullity is
imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a
voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.
Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the properties of
the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership (4) For causes mentioned in number 4 of Article
45, by the injured party, within five years from the time the force, intimidation or undue
influence disappeared or ceased; For causes mentioned in numbers 5 and 6 of Article 45, by
the injured party, within five years after the marriage.
___________________
21  Suntay v. Cojuanco-Suntay,  300 SCRA 760  (1998);  People v. Retirement Board, 272 111. App. 59 cited in I
Tolentino, Civil Code, 1990 ed., p. 271.
22 In re Conza’s Estate, 176 111. 192; Miller v. Miller, 175 Cal. 797, 167 Pac. 394 cited in I Tolentino, Civil Code,
1990 ed., p. 271.
135
VOL. 328, MARCH 14, 2000 135
Niñal vs. Bayadog
23
or ownership through actual joint contribution,   and its effect on the children born to such
void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Articles 43 and 44 as well as Articles 51,
53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing voidable
marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its annulment
are legitimate.
Contrary to the trial court’s ruling, the death of petitioner’s father extinguished the alleged
marital bond between him and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a
wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was dissolved between the two. It should
be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all and the
death of either extinguished nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code 24
states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to
establish the nullity of a marriage.   “A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to
restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no
sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society
as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should
25
be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction.”   “Under
ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal
rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being
good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact
of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties
at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and
upon mere proof
______________
23 Articles148-149, Family Code; Article 144, Civil Code.
24 Odayat v. Amante, 77 SCRA 338 (1977); Weigel v. Sempio-Dy, 143 SCRA 499 (1986); People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil.
845 (1954); 50 O.G. (10) 4767 cited in People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033 (1957); 53 O.G. 3749.
25 35 Am. Jur. 219-220.
136
136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Niñal vs. Bayadog
of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by
the courts.” It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in
direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either,
26
the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio.  But Article 40 of the Family
Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the 27 nullity of a previous
marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second 28
marriage   and such absolute
nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect.   For the same reason, the law
makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
29
imprescriptible.  Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action
or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of
heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property
regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage
even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case.
When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the
purpose is other than to remarry. The clause “on the basis of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void” in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment
need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
__________________
26 18 RCL 446-7; 35 Am Jur. 221.
27  Apiag v. Cantero,  335 Phil. 511  (1997);  268 SCRA 47  (1997);  Atienza v. Judge Brillantes,  Jr.,  243 SCRA
32 (1995); 60 SCAD 119; 312 Phil. 939(1995).
28 Domingo v. CA, 226 SCRA 572 (1993).
29 Article 39, Family Code as amended by E.O. 209 and 227, s. 1987 and further amended by R.A. No. 8533 dated
February 23, 1998.
137
VOL. 328, MARCH 14, 2000 137
Heirs of Alberto Suguitan vs. City of Mandaluyong
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court,
Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
     Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Puno and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
     Pardo, J., On official business abroad.
Petition granted, order reversed and set aside. Case ordered reinstated.
Note.—Per current jurisprudence, “a marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration
of such fact” before any party thereto can marry again; otherwise, the second marriage will
also be void. (Apiag vs. Cantero, 268 SCRA 47 [1997])

 
*
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329. March 8, 2001.  
(Formerly A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 99-706-MTJ.)
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner, vs. JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta,
Pangasinan, respondent.
Marriage;  Marriage Licenses;  Husband and Wife;  Legal Ratification of Marital
Cohabitation;  Requisites.—For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the
following requisites must concur: 1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and
wife for at least five years before the marriage; 2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry
each other, 3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of
marriage; 4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five
years [and are without legal impediment to marry
______________
* FIRST
DIVISION.
2
2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Borja-Manzano vs. Sanchez
each other]; and 5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained
the qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.
Same; Same;  Same;  Judges;  Gross Ignorance of the Law;  A judge ought to know that a subsisting
previous marriage is a diriment impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void.
—Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment
impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void. In fact, in his Comment, he
stated that had he known that the late Manzano was married he would have discouraged him from
contracting another marriage. And respondent Judge cannot deny knowledge of Manzano’s and Payao’s
subsisting previous marriage, as the same was clearly stated in their separate affidavits which were
subscribed and sworn to before him.
Same; Same; Same; Legal Separation; Legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less
authorize the parties to remarry, and this holds true all the more when the separation is merely de facto.—
The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long time
already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of
legal separation to live separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are not
severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the
parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is merely de facto, as in the case at
bar.
Same; Same; Same; Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at
least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage—marital cohabitation for a long
period of time between two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground
for exemption from marriage license.—Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of
David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for
seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five
years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period of
time between two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for
exemption from marriage license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a
subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.
3
VOL. 354, MARCH 8, 2001 3
Borja-Manzano vs. Sanchez
Same; Same; Same; Judges; Gross Ignorance of the Law; A judge demonstrates gross ignorance of the
law when her solemnizes a void and bigamous marriage.—Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross
ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage. The maxim “ignorance of the
law excuses no one” has special application to judges, who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence. It is highly imperative
that judges be conversant with the law and basic legal principles. And when the law transgressed is
simple and elementary, the failure to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Gross Ignorance of the Law.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The solemnization of a marriage between two. contracting parties who were both bound by a
prior existing marriage is the bone of contention of the instant complaint against respondent
Judge Roque R. Sanchez, Municipal Trial Court, Infanta, Pangasinan. For this act,
complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano charges respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the
law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on 12 May
1999.
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been
married
1
to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel
2
Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan
City.  Four children were born out of that marriage.  On 22 March 1993, however, her husband
3
contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge.   When
respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same
________________
1 Annex “A” of Complaint.
2 Annexes “B” to “E” of Complaint.
3 Annex “F” of Complaint.
4
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Borja-Manzano vs. Sanchez
was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties
were “separated.”
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated the
marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married.

What he knew was that the two had been living together as husband and wife for 4
seven years
already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit.   According to
him, had he known that the late Manzano was married, he would have advised the latter not
to marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with bigamy. He then prayed that
the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for being designed merely to harass him.
After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator
recommended that respondent Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be
ordered to pay a fine of P2,000, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act
would be dealt with more severely.
On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to manifest whether they were willing
to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings thus filed. Complainant
answered in the affirmative.
For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the dismissal of
the complaint and setting aside his5
earlier Comment. He therein invites the attention of the
Court to two separate affidavits   of the late Manzano and of Payao, which were allegedly
unearthed by a member of his staff upon his instruction. In those affidavits, both David
Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that they were married to Herminia Borja
and Domingo Relos, respectively; and that since their respective marriages had been marked
by constant quarrels, they had both left their families and had never cohabited or
communicated with their spouses anymore. Respondent Judge alleges that on the basis of
those affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in question in accordance with Article 34
of the Family Code.
_______________
4 Attached to the Marriage Contract (Annex “F” of Complaint).
5 Annexes “B” and “C” of Respondent Judge’s Manifestation.
5 obtained a decree of legal separation to live separately from each other, but in such a case the
VOL. 354, MARCH 8, 2001 5 the separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar.
Borja-Manzano vs. Sanchez
We find merit in the complaint.
Article 34 of the Family Code provides:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The
contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to
administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the
qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage.
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites
must concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least
five years before the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the
time of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least
five years [and are without legal impediment to marry each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the
qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their
6
6
marriage.
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in
their separate affidavits executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge
himself, David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior
existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were
“separated.”
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage 7
is a diriment
impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void. In fact, in his
Comment, he stated that had he known that the late Manzano was married he
_______________
6 DISIDERIO P. JURADO, CIVIL LAW REVIEWER 63 (1989).
7 Article 41, Family Code.
6
6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Borja-Manzano vs. Sanchez
would have discouraged him from contracting another marriage. And respondent Judge cannot
deny knowledge of Manzano’s and Payao’s subsisting previous marriage, as the same was
clearly stated in their separate affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to before him.
The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a
long time already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have
marriage bonds are not severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve the
marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when
Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and
Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years.
Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five
years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long
period of time between two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each other is
merely a ground for exemption from marriage license. It could not serve as a justification for
respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior
existing marriage.
Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a
void and bigamous marriage.
8
The maxim “ignorance of the law excuses no one” has special
application to judges,   who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the
embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence.
9
It is highly imperative that judges be
conversant with the law and basic legal principles.  And when the law transgressed
________________
8 Espiritu v. Jovellanos, 280 SCRA 579, 589 [1997]; Vercide v. Hernandez, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1265, 6 April 2000, 330
SCRA 49.
9 Macasasa v. Imbing, 312 SCRA 385, 395 [1999].
7
VOL. 354, MARCH 8, 2001 7
Borja-Manzano vs. Sanchez
 10
is simple and elementary, the failure to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby ADOPTED,
with the MODIFICATION that the amount of fine to be imposed upon respondent Judge
Roque Sanchez is increased to P20,000.
SO ORDERED.

     Puno, Kapunan, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Recommendation adopted with modification.

Notes.—A judge who solemnizes a marriage without the required marriage license
dismally fails to live up to his commitment to be the embodiment of competence, integrity and
independence. (Moreno vs. Bernabe, 246 SCRA 120[1995])
A husband is not merely a man who has contracted marriage—he is a partner who has
solemnly sworn to love and respect his wife and remain faithful to her until death. (Narag vs.
Narag, 291 SCRA 451 [1998])
That a marriage license was used legally in the celebration of the civil ceremony does not
detract from the ceremonial use thereof in the church wedding of the same parties to the
marriage, for the latter rites served not only to ratify but also to fortify the first. (Ty vs. Court
of Appeals, 346 SCRA 86 [2000])

G.R. No. 175581. March 28, 2008.*
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. JOSE A. DAYOT, respondent.
G.R. No. 179474. March 28, 2008.*
FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, petitioner, vs. JOSE A. DAYOT, respondent.
Marriages; Marriage License; A marriage performed without the corresponding marriage license is
void, this being nothing more than the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the
essence of the marriage contract, in stark contrast to the old Marriage Law, whereby the absence of a
marriage license did not make the marriage void; The rationale for the compulsory character of a
marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting
parties, after the proper government official has inquired into their capacity to contract marriage.—Article
58 makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the local
civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, save marriages of an
exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under Article 75. Article 80(3) of the
Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage performed without the corresponding marriage license is void,
this being nothing more than the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the
essence of the marriage contract. This is in stark contrast to the old Marriage Law, whereby the absence
of a marriage license did not make the marriage void. The rationale for the compulsory character of a
marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting
parties, after the proper government official has inquired into their capacity to contract marriage.
Same; Same; Ratification of Marital Cohabitation; The reason for the law on ratification of marital
cohabitation, whereby no marriage license is required, is that the publicity attending a marriage
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
436
436 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Dayot
license may discourage such persons who have lived in a state of cohabitation from legalizing their
status.—The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under Article 76 of the Civil
Code, which provides: ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who
have attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for
at least five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in
an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who
solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other
qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage. The
reason for the law, as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the publicity attending a marriage
license may discourage such persons who have lived in a state of cohabitation from legalizing their
status.
Same; Same; Same; The falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth
fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the marriage void ab initio for lack
of a marriage license.—It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed
without a marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit declaring that “they have attained
the age of maturity; that being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years; and that because of this union, they desire to marry each other.” One of the central issues in the
Petition at bar is thus: whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have
in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the marriage void  ab
initio for lack of a marriage license. We answer in the affirmative.
Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the
exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license, and under the
rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed.—
Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of
the formal requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a
general rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed. They extend only
437
VOL. 550, MARCH 28, 2008 437
Republic vs. Dayot
so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general
provisions rather than the exception. Where a general rule is established by statute with exceptions, the
court will not curtail the former or add to the latter by implication. For the exception in Article 76 to
apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman must have attained the age of majority,
and that, being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 of the Civil Code leaves
the Court with no other expediency but to read the law as it is plainly written—the exception of a marriage
license under Article 76 applies only to those who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years and desire to marry each other.—A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no
other expediency but to read the law as it is plainly written. The exception of a marriage license under
Article 76 applies only to those who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and
desire to marry each other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period
requirement of five years of cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since the language of
Article 76 is precise. The minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in
the language of the law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact cannot
be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a
mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the contracting parties
shall state the requisite facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths;
and that the official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that
he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found
no legal impediment to the marriage.
Same; Same; Same; The question as to whether they satisfied the minimum five-year requisite is
factual in nature.—It is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the minimum five-year
requisite is factual in nature. A question of fact arises when there is a need to decide on the truth or
falsehood of the alleged facts. Under Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not subject to this Court’s
review. It is already well-settled that: The general rule
438
438 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Dayot
is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding on this Court. A recognized exception
to this rule is when the Court of Appeals and the trial court, or in this case the administrative body,
make contradictory findings. However, the exception does not apply in every instance that the Court of
Appeals and the trial court or administrative body disagree. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals
remain conclusive on this Court if such findings are supported by the record or based on substantial
evidence.
Same; Same; Same; The rule that persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in
the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married does not apply
to a case which does not involve an apparent marriage.—Anent petitioners’ reliance on the presumption
of marriage, this Court holds that the same finds no applicability to the case at bar. Essentially, when we
speak of a presumption of marriage, it is with reference to the prima facie presumption that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.
Restated more explicitly, persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence
of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The present case does
not involve an apparent marriage to which the presumption still needs to be applied. There is no
question that Jose and Felisa actually entered into a contract of marriage on 24 November 1986, hence,
compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, which
spawned the instant consolidated Petitions.
Same; Same; Same; The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the
law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary
parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by making a prior license a prerequisite
for a valid marriage.—The declaration of the Civil Code that every intendment of law or fact leans
towards the validity of marriage will not salvage the parties’ marriage, and extricate them from the
effect of a violation of the law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa was entered into without the requisite
marriage license or compliance with the stringent requirements of a marriage under exceptional
circumstance. The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and
would lead or could be used, at least, for the
439
VOL. 550, MARCH 28, 2008 439
Republic vs. Dayot
perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the law
sought to prevent by making a prior license a prerequisite for a valid marriage.  The protection of
marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the
exposure of an invalid one as well. To permit a false affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to
allow an abject circumvention of the law. If this Court is to protect the fabric of the institution of
marriage, we must be wary of deceptive schemes that violate the legal measures set forth in our laws.
Same; Same; Same; The falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of the
parties’ cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a
marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely
required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath—if the essential matter in the sworn
affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect.—We are not impressed by
the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the
license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that
the parties have cohabited for at least five years as required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former
is with reference to an irregularity of the marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here, there is
no marriage license at all. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the
period of Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the
requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact
that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. If the essential
matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence,
it is as if there was no affidavit at all.
Same; Same; Same; Equity; Equity finds no room for application where there is a law.—In its second
assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that based on equity, Jose should be denied
relief because he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby profit from his wrongdoing. This is a
misplaced invocation. It must be stated that equity finds no room for application where there is a law.
There is a law on the ratification of marital cohabitation,
440
440 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Dayot
which is set in precise terms under Article 76 of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the authorities are
consistent that the declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage is without prejudice to their criminal
liability.
Same; Declaration of Nullity; Prescription; An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible.—The
Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is deemed estopped from assailing the
legality of his marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and Felisa had lived
together from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Jose’s subsequent marriage to Rufina Pascual on 31 August
1990, and that it took Jose seven years before he sought the declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel had
set in. This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. Jose and Felisa’s marriage
was celebrated sans a marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached except that it is void  ab
initio. In this case, the right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe, and may be raised any time.
Same; Same; Common-Law Cohabitation Period; To settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down
the rule that the five-year common-law cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period
computed back from the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not
been for the absence of a marriage.—To settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the
five-year common-law cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period computed back from
the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of
a marriage. It covers the years immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by
exclusivity—meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years—and continuity that
is unbroken.
PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the amended decision of the Court of Appeals.
    The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Public Attorney’s Office for Felisa Tecson-Dayot.
  Urbano C. Victorio, Sr. for Jose A. Dayot.
441
VOL. 550, MARCH 28, 2008 441
Republic vs. Dayot
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and G.R. No. 179474 are Petitions
for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the Republic of the Philippines and
Felisa Tecson-Dayot (Felisa), respectively, both challenging the Amended Decision1  of the
Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, which declared the
marriage between Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void ab initio.
The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were married at the Pasay
City Hall. The marriage was solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza.2  In lieu of a marriage
license, Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit,3 also dated 24 November 1986, attesting
that both of them had attained the age of maturity, and that being unmarried, they had lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years.
On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint4  for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Biñan, Laguna, Branch 25. He contended that
his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between the
parties; that he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as
husband and wife for at least five years; and that his consent to the marriage was secured
through fraud.
In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his filing of the same.
According to Jose, he was introduced to Felisa in 1986. Immediately thereafter, he came to live
as a boarder in Felisa’s house, the latter being his landlady. Some three weeks later, Felisa
requested him to accom-
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon with Associate Justices Mario L. Guariña III and Santiago Javier
Ranada, concurring; Rollo (G.R. No. 175581), pp. 65-70; Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), pp. 156-161.
2 Records, p. 170.
3 Id.
4 Id., at pp. 1-8.
442
442 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Dayot
pany her to the Pasay City Hall, ostensibly so she could claim a package sent to her by her
brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City Hall, upon a pre-arranged signal from Felisa, a
man bearing three folded pieces of paper approached them. They were told that Jose needed to
sign the papers so that the package could be released to Felisa. He initially refused to do so.
However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him that his refusal could get both of them killed by her
brother who had learned about their relationship. Reluctantly, he signed the pieces of paper,
and gave them to the man who immediately left. It was in February 1987 when he discovered
that he had contracted marriage with Felisa. He alleged that he saw a piece of paper lying on
top of the table at the sala of Felisa’s house. When he perused the same, he discovered that it
was a copy of his marriage contract with Felisa. When he confronted Felisa, the latter feigned
ignorance.
In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Jose’s allegations and defended the validity of
their marriage. She declared that they had maintained their relationship as man and wife
absent the legality of marriage in the early part of 1980, but that she had deferred contracting
marriage with him on account of their age difference.5 In her pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded
that while her marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with a certain
Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on 31 August 1990. On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy
against Jose. Subsequently, she filed an administrative complaint against Jose with the Office
of the Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were both employees of the National Statistics and
Coordinating Board.6 The Ombudsman found Jose administratively liable for disgraceful
_______________
5 The marriage contract shows that at the time of the celebration of the parties’ marriage, Jose was 27 years old,
while Felisa was 37.
6 The Administrative complaint before the Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman
was docketed as OMB-ADM-0-93-0466; Records, pp. 252-258.
443
VOL. 550, MARCH 28, 2008 443
Republic vs. Dayot
and immoral conduct, and meted out to him the penalty of suspension from service for one
year without emolument.7
On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision8dismissing the Complaint. It disposed:
“WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the evidence presented by both parties, this
Court finds and so holds that the [C]omplaint does not deserve a favorable consideration. Accordingly,
the above-entitled case is hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs against [Jose].”9
The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage celebrated
between Jose and Felisa on 24 November 1986 was valid. It dismissed Jose’s version of the
story as implausible, and rationalized that:
“Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any attempt to make him or her sign a
blank sheet of paper. [Jose] could have already detected that something was amiss, unusual, as they
were at Pasay City Hall to get a package for [Felisa] but it [was] he who was made to sign the pieces of
paper for the release of the said package. Another indirect suggestion that could have put him on guard
was the fact that, by his own admission, [Felisa] told him that her brother would kill them if he will not
sign the papers. And yet it took him, more or less, three months to “discover” that the pieces of paper
that he signed was [sic] purportedly the marriage contract. [Jose] does not seem to be that ignorant, as
perceived by this Court, to be “taken in for a ride” by [Felisa.]
[Jose’s] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied by the fact that he acknowledged
Felisa Tecson as his wife when he wrote [Felisa’s] name in the duly notarized statement of assets and
liabilities he filled up on May 12, 1988, one year after he discovered the marriage contract he is now
claiming to be sham and false. [Jose], again, in his company I.D., wrote the name of [Felisa] as the
person to be contacted in case of emergency. This Court does not believe that the only reason why her
name was written in his com-
_______________
7 Id., at p. 257.
8 Id., at pp. 313-323.
9 Id., at p. 323.
444
444 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Dayot
pany I.D. was because he was residing there then. This is just but a lame excuse because if he really
considers her not his lawfully wedded wife, he would have written instead the name of his sister.
When [Jose’s] sister was put into the witness stand, under oath, she testified that she signed her
name voluntarily as a witness to the marriage in the marriage certificate (T.S.N., page 25, November 29,
1996) and she further testified that the signature appearing over the name of Jose Dayot was the
signature of his [sic] brother that he voluntarily affixed in the marriage contract (page 26 of T.S.N. taken
on November 29, 1996), and when she was asked by the Honorable Court if indeed she believed that
Felisa Tecson was really chosen by her brother she answered yes. The testimony of his sister all the more
belied his claim that his consent was procured through fraud.”10
Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Jose’s action had prescribed. It cited
Article 8711 of the New Civil
_______________
10 Id., at pp. 321-322.
11 ART. 87. The action for annulment of marriage must be commenced by the parties and within the periods as
follows:
(1) For causes mentioned in Number 1 of Article 85, by the party whose parent or guardian did not give his or her
consent, within four years after attaining the age of twenty or eighteen years, as the case may be; or by the parent or
guardian or person having legal charge, at any time before such party has arrived at the age of twenty or eighteen
years;
 (2) For causes mentioned in Number 2 of Article 85, by the spouse who has been absent, during his or her lifetime;
or by either spouse of the subsequent marriage during the lifetime of the other;
(3) For causes mentioned in Number 3 of Article 85, by the sane spouse, who had no knowledge of the other’s
insanity; or by any relative or guardian of the party of unsound mind, at any time before the death of either party;
(4) For causes mentioned in Number 4, by the injured party, within four years after the discovery of the fraud;
(5) For causes mentioned in Number 5, by the injured party, within four years from the time the force or
intimidation ceased;
(6) For causes mentioned in Number 6, by the injured party, within eight years after the marriage.
445
VOL. 550, MARCH 28, 2008 445
Republic vs. Dayot
Code which requires that the action for annulment of marriage must be commenced by the
injured party within four years after the discovery of the fraud. Thus:
“That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent was obtained by [Felisa] through fraud,
trickery and machinations, he could have filed an annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage at the
earliest possible opportunity, the time when he discovered the alleged sham and false marriage contract.
[Jose] did not take any action to void the marriage at the earliest instance. x x x.”12
Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals.
In a Decision dated 11 August 2005, the Court of Appeals found the appeal to be without
merit. The dispositive portion of the appellate court’s Decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.”13
The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage between Jose and Felisa as it
was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The appellate court observed that
the circumstances constituting fraud as a ground for annulment of marriage under Article
8614 of the Civil Code
_______________
12 Records, p. 322.
13 Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 125.
14  ART. 86. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in number 4 of the preceding
article:
(1) Misrepresentation as to the identity of one of the contracting parties;
(2) Nondisclosure of the previous conviction of the other party of a crime involving moral turpitude, and the
penalty imposed was imprisonment for two years or more;
(3) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than
her husband;
446
446 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Dayot
did not exist in the marriage between the parties. Further, it ruled that the action for
annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud was filed beyond the prescriptive period
provided by law. The Court of Appeals struck down Jose’s appeal in the following manner:
“Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was employed on Jose in giving his consent
to the marriage, the action for the annulment thereof had already prescribed. Article 87 (4) and (5) of the
Civil Code provides that the action for annulment of marriage on the ground that the consent of a party
was obtained by fraud, force or intimidation must be commenced by said party within four (4) years after
the discovery of the fraud and within four (4) years from the time the force or intimidation ceased.
Inasmuch as the fraud was allegedly discovered by Jose in February, 1987 then he had only until
February, 1991 within which to file an action for annulment of marriage. However, it was only on July 7,
1993 that Jose filed the complaint for annulment of his marriage to Felisa.”15
Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Jose’s assertion that his marriage to Felisa
was void  ab initio  for lack of a marriage license. It ruled that the marriage was solemnized
under Article 7616 of the Civil Code as one of exceptional character, with the parties executing
an affidavit of marriage
_______________
No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give
grounds for action for the annulment of marriage.
15 Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 122.
16  ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the age of
majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry
each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law
to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that
he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal
impediment to the marriage.
447
VOL. 550, MARCH 28, 2008 447
Republic vs. Dayot
between man and woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.
The Court of Appeals concluded that the falsity in the affidavit to the effect that Jose and
Felisa had lived together as husband and wife for the period required by Article 76 did not
affect the validity of the marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled by the
statements contained therein. In this manner, the Court of Appeals gave credence to the good-
faith reliance of the solemnizing officer over the falsity of the affidavit. The appellate court
further noted that on the dorsal side of said affidavit of marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the
solemnizing officer, stated that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of
the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to their marriage. Finally, the Court of
Appeals dismissed Jose’s argument that neither he nor Felisa was a member of the sect to
which Rev. Tomas V. Atienza belonged. According to the Court of Appeals, Article 5617 of the
Civil Code did not require that either one of the contracting parties to the marriage must
belong to the solemnizing officer’s church or religious sect. The prescription was established
only
_______________
17 ART. 56. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court;
(2) The Presiding Justice and the Justices of the Court of Appeals;
(3) Judges of the Courts of First Instance;
(4) Mayors of cities and municipalities;
(5) Municipal judges and justices of the peace;
(6) Priests, rabbis, ministers of the gospel of any denomination, church, religion or sect, duly registered, as
provided in Article 92; and
(7) Ship captains, airplane chiefs, military commanders, and consuls and vice-consuls in special cases provided in
Articles 74 and 75.
448
448 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of
the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.
Republic vs. Dayot
_______________

in Article 718 of the Family Code which does not govern the parties’ marriage.
Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration
thereof. His central opposition was that the requisites for the proper application of the
exemption from a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code were not fully attendant
in the case at bar. In particular, Jose cited the legal condition that the man and the woman
must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage.
Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by him and
Felisa was false.
The Court of Appeals granted Jose’s Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself.
Accordingly, it rendered an Amended Decision, dated 7 November 2006, the  fallo  of which
reads:
“WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is RECALLED and SET ASIDE and another one
entered declaring the marriage between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson void ab initio.
_______________
18 ART. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction;
(2) Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church or religious sect duly authorized by his church or religious sect and
registered with the civil registrar general, acting within the limits of the written authority granted him by his church or religious
sect and provided that at least one of the contracting parties belongs to the solemnizing officer’s church or religious sect;
(3) Any ship captain or airplane chief only in the cases mentioned in Article 31;
(4) Any military commander of a unit to which a chaplain is assigned, in the absence of the latter, during a military operation,
likewise only in the cases mentioned in Article 32; or
(5) Any consul-general, consul or vice-consul in the case provided in Article 10.
449
VOL. 550, MARCH 28, 2008 449
Republic vs. Dayot
Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City.”19
In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling of this Court in Niñal v.
Bayadog,20 and reasoned that:  _______________
19 CA Rollo, p. 279.
20 384 Phil. 661; 328 SCRA 122 (2000).
450
450 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Dayot
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage solemnized without a marriage license, save
marriages of exceptional character, shall be void from the beginning. Inasmuch as the marriage between
Jose and Felisa is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is, therefore,
void ab initio because of the absence of a marriage license.”21
Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no avail. The appellate court
rendered a Resolution22dated 10 May 2007, denying Felisa’s motion.
Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed a Petition for Review before this Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying that the Court
of Appeals’ Amended Decision dated 7 November 2006 be reversed and set aside for lack of
merit, and that the marriage between Jose and Felisa be declared valid and subsisting. Felisa
filed a separate Petition for Review, docketed as G.R. No. 179474, similarly assailing the
appellate court’s Amended Decision. On 1 August 2007, this Court resolved to consolidate the
two Petitions in the interest of uniformity of the Court rulings in similar cases brought before
it for resolution.23
The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following arguments for the allowance of its
Petition, to wit:
I
RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION OF THE VALIDITY OF HIS
MARRIAGE TO FELISA.
II
RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS AND SHOULD NOT BE
ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM HIS OWN FRAUDULENT CONDUCT.

“In  Niñal v. Bayadog,  where the contracting parties to a marriage solemnized without a marriage 21 CA Rollo, pp. 278-279.
22 Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), pp. 173-174.
license on the basis of their affidavit that they had attained the age of majority, that being unmarried, 23 Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 180.
they had lived together for at least five (5) years and that they desired to marry each other, the Supreme
Court ruled as follows: 451
“x x x In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the
date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the VOL. 550, MARCH 28, 2008 451
marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it
should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity—meaning no third party was involved at Republic vs. Dayot
any time within the 5 years and continuity—that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year
cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry
each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging III
parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF HIS MARRIAGE FOR LACK
faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and its OF MARRIAGE LICEN[S]E.24
requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves
as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals misapplied Niñal.25 She
not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing differentiates the case at bar from Niñal by reasoning that one of the parties therein had an
element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from existing prior marriage, a circumstance which does not obtain in her cohabitation with Jose.
securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It Finally, Felisa adduces that Jose only sought the annulment of their marriage after a criminal
should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be case for bigamy and an administrative case had been filed against him in order to avoid
liability. Felisa surmises that the declaration of nullity of their marriage would exonerate Jose
from any liability.
For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and Felisa. To reach a
considered ruling on the issue, we shall jointly tackle the related arguments vented by
petitioners Republic of the Philippines and Felisa.
The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances give rise to the
presumption that a valid marriage exists between Jose and Felisa. For her part, Felisa echoes
the claim that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage by citing
this Court’s ruling in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals.26 To buttress its assertion, the Republic
points to the affidavit executed by Jose and Felisa, dated 24 November 1986, attesting that
they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, which they used in lieu of
a marriage license. It is the Republic’s position that the falsity of the statements in the
affidavit does not affect the validity of the marriage, as the essential and formal requisites
were complied with; and the solemnizing officer was not required to investigate as to whether
the said affida-
_______________
24 Rollo (G.R. No. 175581), pp. 44-45.
25 Erroneously cited as Niño v. Bayadog; Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 18.
26 377 Phil. 919; 320 SCRA 76 (1999).
452
452 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Dayot
vit was legally obtained. The Republic opines that as a marriage under a license is not
invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be
invalidated by the fact that the parties incorporated a fabricated statement in their affidavit
that they cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years. In addition, the Republic posits
that the parties’ marriage contract states that their marriage was solemnized under Article 76
of the Civil Code. It also bears the signature of the parties and their witnesses, and must be
considered a primary evidence of marriage. To further fortify its Petition, the Republic
adduces the following documents: (1) Jose’s notarized Statement of Assets and Liabilities,
dated 12 May 1988 wherein he wrote Felisa’s name as his wife; (2) Certification dated 25 July
1993 issued by the Barangay Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, District 24 of Pasay City, attesting that
Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife in said barangay; and (3) Jose’s
company ID card, dated 2 May 1988, indicating Felisa’s name as his wife.
The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue of the effect of a false
affidavit under Article 76 of the Civil Code. A survey of the prevailing rules is in order.
It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated on 24 November
1986, prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code governs their
union. Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of marriage as a contract:
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.” (Emphasis ours.)
453
VOL. 550, MARCH 28, 2008 453
Republic vs. Dayot
Article 5827  makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first
being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party
habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code,
but not those under Article 75.28  Article 80(3)29  of the Civil Code makes it clear that a
marriage performed without the corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing
more than the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of
the marriage contract.30  This is in stark contrast to the old Marriage Law,31  whereby the
absence of a marriage license did not make the marriage void. The rationale for the
compulsory character of a marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the authority
granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the proper government official has
inquired into their capacity to contract marriage.32
_______________
27 ART. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of this Title, but not those under
Article 75, no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the
municipality where either contracting party habitually resides.
28  ART. 75. Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may be solemnized by consuls and vice-consuls of the
Republic of the Philippines. The duties of the local civil registrar and of a judge or justice of the peace or mayor with
regard to the celebration of marriage shall be performed by such consuls and vice-consuls.
29 ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxxx
(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character. 
30 People v. De Lara, No. 12583-R, 14 February 1955, 51 O.G. 4079, 4082.
31  The Marriage Law, otherwise known as Act No. 3613, requires the following essential requisites: (1) legal
capacity of the contracting parties; and (2) their mutual consent.
32 Report of the Code Commission, pp. 79-80; see also Ambrosio Padilla, Civil Code Annotated, 1956 Edition, Vol. I,
p. 195. 
454
454 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Dayot
Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title
III, comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages  in  articulo
mortis  or at the point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote places, (2)
consular marriages,33 (3) ratification of marital cohabitation, (4) religious ratification of a civil
marriage, (5) Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (6) mixed marriages.34
The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under Article 76 of the
Civil Code, which provides:
“ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the
age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit
before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized
the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other
qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.
The reason for the law,35  as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the publicity
attending a marriage license may
_______________
33 Must be read with Article 58 of the Civil Code which provides:
 ART. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of this Title, but not those
under Article 75, no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar
of the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides.
34 Edgardo L. Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated (1984 Eleventh Ed.), pp. 302-310.
35 In Niñal v. Bayadog (supra note 20 at pp. 668-669; pp. 129-130), this Court articulated the spirit behind Article
76 of the Civil Code, thus:
“However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed
with, one of
455
VOL. 550, MARCH 28, 2008 455
Republic vs. Dayot
discourage such persons who have lived in a state of cohabitation from legalizing their
status.36
It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed without a
marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit declaring that “they have attained
the age of maturity; that being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years; and that because of this union, they desire to marry each other.”37 One of the
central issues in the Petition at bar is thus: whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital
cohabitation, where the parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum
_______________
which is that provided in Article 76, referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together
and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years
before the marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to
humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a
valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant’s name for a marriage license. The publicity attending
the marriage license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their status. To preserve peace in the
family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from
the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt them from that
requirement.”
36  The Report of the Code Commission states that “No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a
woman who have attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for
at least five years desire to marry each other. In such case, the publicity attending a marriage license may discourage
such persons from legalizing their status,” Report of the Code Commission, p. 80.
37 Records, p. 49. The affidavit was denominated by the parties as an “Affidavit on (sic) Marriage Between Man
and Woman Who Haved (sic) Lived Together as Husband and Wife for at Least Five Years.”
456
456 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Dayot
five-year requirement, effectively renders the marriage void  ab initio  for lack of a marriage
license.
We answer in the affirmative.
Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the
indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory
construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly38  but reasonably
construed.39 They extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should
be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception.40 Where a general rule
is established by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former or add to the
latter by implication.41  For the exception in Article 76 to apply, it is a  sine qua non  thereto
that the man and the woman must have attained the age of majority, and that,  being
unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.
A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other expediency but to
read the law as it is plainly written. The exception of a marriage license under Article 76
applies only to those who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and
desire to marry each other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period
requirement of five years of cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since the
language of Article 76 is precise. The minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an
indispensability carved in the language of the law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76
to be valid, this material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not as
_______________
38 Benedicto v. Court of Appeals, 416 Phil. 722, 744; 364 SCRA 334, 357 (2001).
39 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 363 Phil. 130, 137; 303 SCRA 508, 515 (1999).
40 Id.
41 Id. citing Samson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-43182, 25 November 1986, 145 SCRA 654, 659.
457
VOL. 550, MARCH 28, 2008 457
Republic vs. Dayot
a directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a mandatory character. It is worthy to
mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the contracting parties shall state the requisite
facts42 in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths; and that the
official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he
took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he
found no legal impediment to the marriage.
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at
the time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted
that Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the
celebration of their marriage.43 The Court of Appeals also noted Felisa’s testimony that Jose
was introduced to her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986
after the EDSA Revolution.44 The appellate court also cited Felisa’s own testimony that it was
only in June 1986 when Jose commenced to live in her house.45
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the minimum five-
year requisite is factual in nature. A question of fact arises when there is a need to decide on
the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts.46 Under
_______________
42 The first part of Article 76 states, “No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have
attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years,
desire to marry each other x x x.”
43 Rollo (G.R. No. 175581), p. 38.
44 Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 158, citing TSN (Civil Case No. B-4143), 15 April 1999.
45 Id., at p. 159.
46 First Dominion Resources Corporation v. Peñaranda, G.R. No. 166616, 27 January 2006, 480 SCRA 504, 508.
458
458 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Dayot
Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not subject to this Court’s review.47 It is already well-
settled that:
“The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding on this Court. A
recognized exception to this rule is when the Court of Appeals and the trial court, or in this case the
administrative body, make contradictory findings. However, the exception does not apply in every
instance that the Court of Appeals and the trial court or administrative body disagree. The factual
findings of the Court of Appeals remain conclusive on this Court if such findings are supported by the
record or based on substantial evidence.”48
Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by Jose and Felisa
to exempt them from the requirement of a marriage license, is beyond question.
We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the
parties’ affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal
requisites were complied with. The argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be
denied that the marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal requisite
of a marriage license. Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in
Article 76, that they should have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, so
as to be excepted from the requirement of a marriage license.
Anent petitioners’ reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court holds that the same
finds no applicability to the case at bar. Essentially, when we speak of a presumption of
marriage, it is with reference to the  prima facie  presumption that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband
_______________
47 Civil Service Commission v. Ledesma, G.R. No. 154521, 30 September 2005, 471 SCRA 589, 605.
48 Id.
459
VOL. 550, MARCH 28, 2008 459
Republic vs. Dayot
and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.49Restated more explicitly, persons
dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married.50 The present case does not
involve an apparent marriage to which the presumption still needs to be applied. There is no
question that Jose and Felisa actually entered into a contract of marriage on 24 November
1986, hence, compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage, which spawned the instant consolidated Petitions.
In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code51 that every intendment of law or fact
leans towards the validity of marriage will not salvage the parties’ marriage, and extricate
them from the effect of a violation of the law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa was entered into
without the requisite marriage license or compliance with the stringent requirements of a
marriage under exceptional circumstance. The solemnization of a marriage without prior
license is a clear violation of the law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the
perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the
law sought to prevent by making a prior license a prerequisite for a valid marriage.52  The
protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and
genuine union but the expo-
_______________
49 Vda. de Jacob v. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil. 693, 708; 312 SCRA 772, 787 (1999).
50 Id.
51 ART. 220. In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of law
or fact leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the
community of property during marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and the validity of defense for
any member of the family in case of unlawful aggression.
52 People v. De Lara, supra note 30 at p. 4083.
460
460 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Dayot
sure of an invalid one as well.53  To permit a false affidavit to take the place of a marriage
license is to allow an abject circumvention of the law. If this Court is to protect the fabric of
the institution of marriage, we must be wary of deceptive schemes that violate the legal
measures set forth in our laws.
Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage
under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must
a marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited for at
least five years as required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to an
irregularity of the marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here, there is no marriage
license at all. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the
period of Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an
exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers
to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the
parties under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere
scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.
In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that based on
equity, Jose should be denied relief because he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby
profit from his wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It must be stated that equity finds
no room for application where there is a law.54  There is a law on the ratification of marital
cohabitation, which is set in precise terms under Article 76 of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the
authorities are
_______________
53 Malcampo-Sin v. Sin, 407 Phil. 583, 588; 355 SCRA 285, 288 (2001).
54 Salavarria v. Letran College, 357 Phil. 189, 196; 296 SCRA 184, 191 (1998); Aparente, Sr. v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 387 Phil. 96, 108; 331 SCRA 82, 93 (2000).
461
VOL. 550, MARCH 28, 2008 461
Republic vs. Dayot
consistent that the declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage is without prejudice to their
criminal liability.55
The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is deemed estopped
from assailing the legality of his marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose
and Felisa had lived together from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Jose’s subsequent marriage
to Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose seven years before he sought the
declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.
This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible.56  Jose and Felisa’s
marriage was celebrated sans a marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached except
that it is void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe,
and may be raised any time.
Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year common-
law cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period computed back from the
date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the
absence of a marriage.57 It covers

_______________

55 Supra note 33 at p. 306. Alicia V. Sempio-Diy in A Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines (1995 Ed., p.
38) wrote that “If the parties falsify their affidavit in order to have an instant marriage, although the truth is that
they have not been cohabiting for five years, their marriage will be void for lack of a marriage license, and they will
also be criminally liable.” Article 76 of the Civil Code is now Article 34 of the Family Code, which reads:
ART. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting
parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The
solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and
found no legal impediment to the marriage.
56 Niñal v. Bayadog, supra note 20 at p. 134.
57 Id., at pp. 130-131.

462

462 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Republic vs. Dayot

the years immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by exclusivity—
meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years—and continuity that is
unbroken.58
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated 7 November 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot to
Felisa Tecson-Dayot void ab initio, is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to their criminal liability,
if any. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Austria-Martinez (Acting Chairperson), Tinga,**Velasco, Jr.*** and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Petitions denied, amended decision affirmed.

Notes.—“Secret marriage” is a legally non-existent phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a

civil marriage celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of either or
both of the contracting parties. (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 257 [1994])
A marriage license is a formal requirement, and its absence renders the marriage void ab
initio. (Sy vs. Court of Appeals, 330 SCRA 550 [2000])
——o0o——

_______________

58 Id.
** Per Special Order No. 497, dated 14 March 2008, signed by Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno designating Associate
Justice Dante O. Tinga to replace Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, who is on official leave under the
Court’s Wellness Program and assigning Associate Justice Alicia Austria-Martinez as Acting Chairperson.
*** Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. was designated to sit as additional member replacing Justice Antonio Eduardo
B. Nachura per Raffle dated 12 September 2007.

162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
De Castro vs. Assidao-De Castro
* affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they could push through with the marriage has no
G.R. No. 160172. February 13, 2008.
REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, petitioner,  vs.  ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO,
respondent.
Civil Law; Marriages; Filiation; The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked; Other
than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.
—The Court holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage between
petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked. Thus, in Niñal v.
Bayadog, 328 SCRA 122 (2000), we held: However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial
action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited
to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of
property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage
even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of
the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final
judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause
“on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void” in Article 40 of the Family Code
connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
Same;  Same;  Same;  Court may pass upon the validity of a marriage even in a suit not directly
instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the
case.—In  Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño, 351 SCRA 127 (2001), the Court ruled that it is clothed with
sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of two marriages despite the main case being a claim for
death benefits. Reiterating Niñal, we held that the Court may pass upon the validity of a marriage even
in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. However, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the
existence of grounds rendering such a marriage an absolute nullity.
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
163
VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 13, 2008 163
De Castro vs. Assidao-De Castro
Same; Same; Same; Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites
shall render the marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the
marriage voidable.—Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites
shall render the marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render
the marriage voidable. In the instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner and
respondent did not have a marriage license when they contracted their marriage. Instead, they presented
an affidavit stating that they had been living together for more than five years. However, respondent
herself in effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during crossexamination, thus—
ATTY. CARPIO: QBut despite of (sic)the fact that you have not been living together as husband and wife
for the last five years on or before March 13, 1995, you signed the Affidavit, is that correct? AYes, sir.
Same; Same; Same; Failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders the marriage void ab
initio.—The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of
marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who have
lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period
of at least five years before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to
humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside
a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant’s name for a marriage license. In the instant
case, there was no “scandalous cohabitation” to protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all. The false
value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license
requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio.
Same; Same; Same; Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way
and on the same evidence as legitimate children.—Anent the second issue, we find that the child is
petitioner’s illegitimate daughter, and therefore entitled to support. Illegitimate children may establish
their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
164
164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
De Castro vs. Assidao-De Castro
Thus, one can prove illegitimate filiation through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or
a final judgment, an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Macario D. Carpio & Christine P. Carpio for petitioner.
     Richard Lee for respondent.
TINGA, J.:
1
This is2 a petition for review of the Decision   of the Court of Appeals in  CA-GR CV. No.
69166,  declaring that (1) Reianna Tricia A. De Castro is the legitimate child of the petitioner;
and (2) that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is valid until properly nullified
by a competent court in a proceeding instituted for that purpose.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow.
Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get
married, thus they applied for a marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig
City in September 1994. They had their first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and
had regularly engaged in sex thereafter. When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil
Registrar, the marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to push through with the
plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that
they had been living together as husband
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 31-41.
2 Captioned Annabelle Assidao—De Castro v. Reinel Anthony B. De Castro.
165
VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 13, 2008 165
 De Castro vs. Assidao-De Castro declaration of nullity, and not in the instant proceedings. The proceedings before the trial
court should have been limited to the obligation of petitioner to support the child and his wife
on the basis of the marriage apparently and
and wife for at least five years. The couple got married on the same date, with Judge Jose C.
Bernabe, presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, administering the civil
rites. Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to their _______________
respective homes and did not live together as husband and wife. 6 Id., at p. 37.
On 13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a child named Reinna Tricia A. De Castro.
Since the child’s birth, respondent has been the one supporting her out of her income as a 167
government dentist and from her private practice.
On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint 3
for support against petitioner before the VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 13, 2008 167
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (trial court).  In her complaint, respondent alleged that she
is married to petitioner and that the latter has “reneged on his4 responsibility/obligation to De Castro vs. Assidao-De Castro
financially support her “as his wife and Reinna Tricia as his child.”
Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming that their marriage is void ab 7
voluntarily entered into by petitioner and respondent.  The dispositive portion of the decision
initio since the marriage was facilitated by a fake affidavit; and that he was merely prevailed reads:
upon by respondent to sign the marriage contract to save her from embarrassment and
possible administrative prosecution due to her pregnant state; and that he was not able to get “WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 16 October 2000, of the Regional Trial Court of
parental advice from his parents before he got married. He also averred that they never lived Pasig City, National Capital Judicial Region, Brach 70, in JDRC No. 4626, is  AFFIRMED  with
together as husband and wife and that he has never seen nor acknowledged the child. the  MODIFICATIONS  (1) declaring Reianna Tricia A. De Castro, as the legitimate child of the
5
In its Decision dated 16 October 2000,   the trial court ruled that the marriage between appellant and the appellee and (2) declaring the marriage on 13 March 1995 between the appellant and
petitioner and respondent is not valid because it was solemnized without a marriage license. the appellee valid until properly annulled
8
by a competent court in a proceeding instituted for that
purpose. Costs against the appellant.”
However, it declared petitioner as the natural father of the child, and thus obliged to give her
support. Petitioner ele- Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion was denied by the Court of
9
Appeals.  Hence this petition.
_______________ Before us, petitioner contends that the trial court properly annulled his marriage with
3 The case was eventually raffled to Branch 70 of the Pasig RTC, presided by Judge Pablito M. Rojas.
respondent because as shown by the evidence and admissions of the parties, the marriage was
4 Records, p. 3, Complaint. celebrated without a marriage license. He stresses that the affidavit they executed, in lieu of a
5 Rollo, pp. 92-94. marriage license, contained a false narration of facts, the truth being that he and respondent
never lived together as husband and wife. The false affidavit should never be allowed or
166 10
admitted as a substitute to fill the absence of a marriage license.   Petitioner additionally
argues that there was no need for the appearance of a prosecuting attorney in this case
166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED because it is only an ordinary action for support and not an action for annulment or
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage. In any case, petitioner argues that the trial court
De Castro vs. Assidao-De Castro had jurisdiction to determine the invalidity of their marriage since it was validly invoked as
an affirmative defense in the instant action for
vated the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the lower court committed grave abuse of
discretion when, on the basis of mere belief and conjecture, it ordered him to provide support _______________
to the child when the latter is not, and could not have been, his own child. 7 Id., at p. 40.
The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the rule that a marriage is presumed 8 Rollo, p. 41.
to be subsisting until a judicial declaration of nullity has been made, the appellate court 9 Id., at pp. 43-44; Resolution dated 1 October 2003.
declared that the child was born during the subsistence and validity of the parties’ marriage. 10 Id., at pp. 15-20.

In addition, the Court of Appeals frowned upon petitioner’s refusal to undergo DNA testing to
168
prove the paternity and filiation, as well as his refusal to state with certainty the last time he
had carnal knowledge with respondent, saying that petitioner’s “forgetfulness should not be
used as a vehicle
6
to relieve him of his obligation and reward him of his being 168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
irresponsible.”  Moreover, the Court of Appeals noted the affidavit dated 7 April 1998 executed
by petitioner, wherein he voluntarily admitted that he is the legitimate father of the child. De Castro vs. Assidao-De Castro
The appellate court also ruled that since this case is an action for support, it was improper
11
for the trial court to declare the marriage of petitioner and respondent as null and void in the support. Citing several authorities,  petitioner claims that a void marriage can be the subject
very same case. There was no participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney or of a collateral attack. Thus, there is no necessity to institute another independent proceeding
fiscal, to see to it that there is no collusion between the parties, as required by the Family for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between the parties. The refiling of another case
Code in actions for declaration of nullity of a marriage. The burden of proof to show that the for declaration of nullity where the same evidence and parties would be presented would entail
marriage is void rests upon petitioner, but it is a matter that can be raised in an action for enormous expenses and anxieties, would be time-consuming for the parties, and would
12
 12
increase the burden of the courts. Finally, petitioner claims that in view of the nullity of his
marriage with respondent and his vigorous denial of the child’s paternity and filiation, the
Court of Appeals gravely erred in declaring the child as his legitimate child.
In a resolution dated 16 February 2004, the Court required respondent 13
and the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG)
14
to file their respective comments on the petition.
In her Comment,  respondent claims that the instant petition is a mere dilatory tactic to
thwart the finality of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Echoing the findings and rulings of
the appellate court, she argues that the legitimacy of their marriage cannot be attacked
collaterally, but can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for
that purpose. With regard to the filiation of her child, she pointed out that compared to her
candid and straightforward testimony, petitioner was uncertain, if not evasive in answering
questions about their sexual encounters. Moreover, she adds that despite the challenge from
her and from the trial court, 15petitioner strongly objected to being subjected to DNA testing to
prove paternity and filiation.
_______________
11 Niñal v. Bayadog, 384 Phil. 661; 328 SCRA 122 (2000). TOLENTINO,  CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Vol. I, 1990 Ed. and SEMPIO-DIY,HANDBOOK ON THE FAMILY CODE, 1991 Ed.
12 Rollo, pp. 25-26.
13 Id., at p. 135.
14 Id., at pp. 119-126.
15 Id., at pp. 139-144.
169
VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 13, 2008 169
De Castro vs. Assidao-De Castro
For its part, the OSG avers that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that it was improper for
the trial court to declare null and void the marriage 16
of petitioner and respondent in the action
for support. Citing the case of  Niñal v. Bayadog,   it states that courts may pass upon the
validity of a marriage in an action for support, since the right to support from petitioner
hinges on the existence of a valid marriage. Moreover, the evidence presented during the
19 Vda. de Jacob v. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil. 693, 704; 312 SCRA 772, 781 (1999), citing TOLENTINO,  CIVIL
CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES:COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE, Vol. I, 1987 ed., p. 265.
170
170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
De Castro vs. Assidao-De Castro
other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may
pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it
is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the
case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is
other than to remarry. The clause “on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void” in Article 40 of the
20
Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for
purpose of remarriage.”
21
Likewise, in Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño,   the Court ruled that it is clothed with sufficient
authority to pass upon the validity of two marriages despite the main case being a claim for
death benefits. Reiterating  Niñal, we held that the Court may pass upon the validity of a
marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long
as it is essential to the determination of the case. However, evidence must be adduced,
testimonial or documentary,
22
to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a marriage an
absolute nullity.
Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render
the marriage void ab23
initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the
marriage voidable.  In the instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner
and respondent did not have a marriage license when they contracted their marriage. Instead,
they presented an affidavit stating that
_______________
20 Niñal v. Bayadog, 384 Phil. 661, 675; 328 SCRA 122, 136 (2000).
21 Cariño v. Cariño, 403 Phil. 861; 351 SCRA 127 (2001).
22 Id., at p. 132.

proceedings in the trial court showed that the marriage between petitioner and respondent 23 FAMILY CODE, Art. 4.

was solemnized without a marriage license, and that their affidavit (of a man and woman who
171
have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for at least five years)
was false. Thus, it concludes the trial 17
court correctly held that the marriage between
petitioner and respondent is not valid. In addition, the OSG agrees with the findings of 18
the VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 13, 2008 171
trial court that the child is an illegitimate child of petitioner and thus entitled to support.
Two key issues are presented before us. First, whether the trial court had the jurisdiction to De Castro vs. Assidao-De Castro
determine the validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent in an action for
24
support and second, whether the child is the daughter of petitioner. they had been living together for more than five years. However, respondent herself in effect
Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during cross-examination, thus—
validity of the marriage between
19
petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void marriage
may be collaterally attacked.  Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog, we held: ATTY. CARPIO:
“However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an Q But despite of (sic) the fact that you have not been
absolute nullity. For living together as husband and wife for the last
five years on or before March 13, 1995, you signed
_______________ the Affidavit, is that correct?
25
16 384 Phil. 661, 673; 328 SCRA 122, 136 (2000).
17 Rollo,
A Yes, sir.
pp. 174-182.
18 Id., at pp. 183-185.
The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites
of marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman
who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous
and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to
avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the
scandalous cohabitation of persons outside26 a valid marriage due to the publication of every
applicant’s name for a marriage license.   In the instant case, there was no “scandalous
cohabitation” to protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all.
_______________
24 Purportedly
complying with Art. 34 of the Family Code, which provides:
Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an
affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he
ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage.
25 TSN,
18 February 2000, p. 20.
26 
Niñal v. Bayadog,  384 Phil. 661, 669;  328 SCRA 122, 129 (2000), citing THEREPORT OF THE CODE
COMMISSION, p. 80.
172
172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
De Castro vs. Assidao-De Castro
The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they could push through with
the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from
the marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license
renders their marriage void ab initio.
Anent the second issue, we find that the child is petitioner’s illegitimate daughter, and
therefore entitled to support. Illegitimate children may establish their27 illegitimate filiation in
the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.   Thus, one can prove
illegitimate filiation through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment, an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the open and continuous possession of the
status28 of a legitimate child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws. 29
The Certificate of Live Birth   of the child lists petitioner as the father. In addition,
petitioner, in an affidavit waiving additional tax exemption in favor of respondent, admitted
that he is the father of the child, thus stating:
“1. I am the legitimate father of REIANNA TRICIA A. DE CASTRO who was born on November 3, 1995
30
at Better Living, Parañaque, Metro Manila;”
VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 13, 2008 173
De Castro vs. Assidao-De Castro
We are likewise inclined to agree with the following findings of the trial court:
“That Reinna Tricia is the child of the respondent with the petitioner is supported not only by the
testimony of the latter, but also by respondent’s own admission in the course of his testimony wherein he
conceded that petitioner was his former girlfriend. While they were sweethearts, he used to visit
petitioner at the latter’s house or clinic. At times, they would go to a motel to have sex. As a result of
their sexual dalliances, petitioner became pregnant which ultimately led to their marriage, though
invalid, as earlier ruled. While respondent claims that he was merely forced to undergo the marriage
ceremony, the pictures taken of the occasion reveal otherwise (Exhs. “B,” “B-1,” to “B-3,” “C,” “C-1” and
“C-2,” “D,” “D-1” and “D-2,” “E,” “E-1” and “E-2,” “F,” “F-1” and “F-2,” “G,” “G-1” and “G-2” and “H,” “H-1”
to “H-3”). In one of the pictures (Exhs. “D,” “D-1” and “D-2”), defendant is seen putting the wedding ring
on petitioner’s finger and
31
in another picture (Exhs. “E,” “E-1” and “E-2”) respondent is seen in the act of
kissing the petitioner.”
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in part. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 69166 are SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional
Trial Court Branch 70 of Pasig City in JDRC No. 4626 dated 16 October 2000 is hereby
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
     Quisumbing (Chairperson), Carpio, Velasco, Jr. and Nachura,** JJ., concur.
Petition granted in part, assailed decision and resolution set aside. That of Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, Br. 70 reinstated.
_______________
31 Rollo, pp. 93-94.
** As replacement of Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales who inhibited herself per Administrative Circular No. 84-
2007.
174
174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Quimpo, Sr. vs. Abad Vda. de Beltran
Note.—An illegitimate child born after the effectivity of the Family Code has no right to
use her father’s surname. Rule applies even if petitioner’s father admits paternity. (Leonardo
vs. Court of Appeals, 410 SCRA 446 [20003])

_______________
27 FAMILY CODE, Art. 175.
28 FAMILY CODE, Art. 172.
In the book Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines by Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, p. 246 (1988), the following were given as
examples of “other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws:” (a) the baptismal certificate of the child; (b) a judicial
admission; (c) the family bible wherein the name of the child is entered; (d) common reputation respecting pedigree; (e) admission
by silence; (f) testimonies of witnesses; and (g) other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130.
29 Records, p. 6.
30 Id., at p. 160.

173

G.R. No. 183896. January 30, 2013.*
SYED AZHAR ABBAS, petitioner, vs. GLORIA GOO ABBAS, respondent.
Civil Law; Family Law; Marriages; Formal Requisites of Marriage.―As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was
solemnized on Janu-
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
647
VOL. 689, JANUARY 30, 2013 647
Abbas vs. Abbas
ary 9, 1993, Executive Order No. 209, or the Family Code of the Philippines, is the applicable law. The pertinent
provisions that would apply to this particular case are Articles 3, 4 and 35(3), which read as follows: Art. 3. The formal
requisites of marriage are: (1) Authority of the solemnizing officer; (2) A valid marriage license except in the cases
provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and (3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the
contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and
wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age. Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2). A defect in any of the essential
requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45. An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not
affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable. Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: x x x x (3) Those solemnized
without a license, except those covered by the preceding Chapter.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Disputable Presumptions; Presumption of Regularity; Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the
Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an official duty has been regularly performed, absent contradiction or
other evidence to the contrary; The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty.―Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable
presumption that an official duty has been regularly performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We
held, “The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to
perform a duty.” No such affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing her
duty of checking the records of their office, thus the presumption must stand. In fact, proof does exist of a diligent search
having been conducted, as Marriage License No. 996967 was indeed located and submitted to the court. The fact that the
names in said license do not correspond to those of Gloria and Syed does not overturn the presumption that the registrar
conducted a diligent search of the records of her office.
648
648 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Abbas vs. Abbas
Civil Law; Family Law; Marriages; Marriage License; Evidence; The certification of the Local Civil Registrar that
their office had no record of a marriage license was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license.―In the case
of Cariño v. Cariño, following the case of Republic, it was held that the certification of the Local Civil Registrar that
their office had no record of a marriage license was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license. The case
of Cariño further held that the presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had been overcome, and that it became the
burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the marriage was valid, and that the required marriage license
had been secured. Gloria has failed to discharge that burden, and the only conclusion that can be reached is that no valid
marriage license was issued. It cannot be said that there was a simple irregularity in the marriage license that would not
affect the validity of the marriage, as no license was presented by the respondent. No marriage license was proven to
have been issued to Gloria and Syed, based on the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and
Gloria’s failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized without a
license is void from the beginning, except those exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2,
Title I of the same Code.―All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a
marriage contract was signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license. Article 4 of the Family
Code is clear when it says, “The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio, except as stated in Article 35(2).” Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized
without a license is void from the beginning, except those exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27 to 34,
Chapter 2, Title I of the same Code.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
649
VOL. 689, JANUARY 30, 2013 649
Abbas vs. Abbas
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
questioning the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 11, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760,
which reversed the Decision2 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM dated October 5, 2005 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 109, Pasay City, and the CA Resolution dated July 24, 2008, denying petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision.
The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) for the declaration of
nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas (Gloria) with the RTC of Pasay City, docketed as Civil Case No.
03-0382-CFM, and raffled to RTC Branch 109. Syed alleged the absence of a marriage license, as provided
for in Article 4, Chapter I, Title 1 of Executive Order No. 269, otherwise known as the Family Code of the
Philippines, as a ground for the annulment of his marriage to Gloria.
In the Marriage Contract3 of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that Marriage License No. 9969967, issued at
Carmona, Cavite on January 8, 1993, was presented to the solemnizing officer. It is this information that is
crucial to the resolution of this case.
At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in
1991, and they were married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan.4 He arrived in the
Philippines in December of 1992. On January 9, 1993, at around 5 o’clock in the afternoon, he was
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo and concurred in by Associate Justices Regalado E. Maambong and Myrna
Dimaranan Vidal.
2 Penned by Judge Tingaraan U. Guiling.
3 Rollo, p. 13.
4 Id., at p. 47.
650
650 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Abbas vs. Abbas
at his mother-in-law’s residence, located at 2676 F. Muñoz St., Malate, Manila, when his mother-in-law
arrived with two men. He testified that he was told that he was going to undergo some ceremony, one of the
requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the nature of said ceremony. During the
ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he did not know that the ceremony was a
marriage until Gloria told him later. He further testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a
marriage license, and that he had never resided in that area. In July of 2003, he went to the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check on their marriage license, and was asked to show a copy of their
marriage contract wherein the marriage license number could be found.5 The Municipal Civil Registrar,
Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage license
number appearing in the marriage contract he submitted, Marriage License No. 9969967, was the number of
another marriage license issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.6 Said certification reads
as follows:
11 July 2003
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage License filed in this office, Marriage License No. 9969967 was
issued in favor of MR. ARLINDO GETALADO and MISS MYRA MABILANGAN on January 19, 1993.
No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to MR. SYED AZHAR ABBAS and MISS GLORIA F. GOO on
January 8, 1993.
This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar Abbas for whatever legal purpose or intents it may serve.7
_______________
5 Id.
6 Id., at p. 12.
7 Id., at p. 10.
651
VOL. 689, JANUARY 30, 2013 651
Abbas vs. Abbas
On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy cases against him in 2001 and 2002,
and that he had gone to the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite to get certification on whether or
not there was a marriage license on advice of his counsel.8
Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee of the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite. Bagsic appeared under a letter of authority from the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona,
Cavite, and brought documents pertaining to Marriage License No. 9969967, which was issued to Arlindo
Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 20, 1993.9 Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers
for marriage licenses and that the numbers are issued chronologically.10 He testified that the certification
dated July 11, 2003, was issued and signed by Leodivina Encarnacion, Registrar of the Municipality of
Carmona, Cavite, certifying that Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued for Arlindo Getalado and Myra
Mabilangan on January 19, 1993, and that their office had not issued any other license of the same serial
number, namely 9969967, to any other person.11
For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented Reverend Mario Dauz, Atty. Lorenzo
Sanchez, Felicitas Goo and May Ann Ceriola.
Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a minister of the Gospel and a barangay captain,
and that he is authorized to solemnize marriages within the Philippines.12 He testified that he solemnized the
marriage of Syed Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo at the residence of the bride on Janu-
_______________
8 Id., at p. 48.
9 Id., at p. 49, “January 19, 1993” in some parts of the records.
10 Id.
11 Id., at pp. 49-50.
12 Id., at p. 50.
652
652 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Abbas vs. Abbas
ary 9, 1993.13 He stated that the witnesses were Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez (Atty. Sanchez) and Mary Ann
Ceriola.14He testified that he had been solemnizing marriages since 1982, and that he is familiar with the
requirements.15 Rev. Dauz further testified that Atty. Sanchez gave him the marriage license the day before
the actual wedding, and that the marriage contract was prepared by his secretary.16After the solemnization of
the marriage, it was registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and Rev. Dauz submitted the
marriage contract and copy of the marriage license with that office.17
Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the wedding of Syed Abbas and Gloria Goo
by the mother of the bride, Felicitas Goo.18 He testified that he requested a certain Qualin to secure the
marriage license for the couple, and that this Qualin secured the license and gave the same to him on January
8, 1993.19 He further testified that he did not know where the marriage license was obtained.20 He attended
the wedding ceremony on January 9, 1993, signed the marriage contract as sponsor, and witnessed the
signing of the marriage contract by the couple, the solemnizing officer and the other witness, Mary Ann
Ceriola.21
Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and Syed Azhar Abbas is her son-in-law, and that
she was present at the wedding ceremony held on January 9, 1993 at her house.22 She testified that she
sought the help of Atty. Sanchez at the Manila City Hall in securing the marriage license,
_______________
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id., at p. 51.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id., at p. 52.
21 Id.
22 Id., at p. 53.
653
VOL. 689, JANUARY 30, 2013 653
Abbas vs. Abbas
and that a week before the marriage was to take place, a male person went to their house with the application
for marriage license.23 Three days later, the same person went back to their house, showed her the marriage
license before returning it to Atty. Sanchez who then gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer.24 She
further testified that she did not read all of the contents of the marriage license, and that she was told that the
marriage license was obtained from Carmona.25 She also testified that a bigamy case had been filed by Gloria
against Syed at the Regional Trial Court of Manila, evidenced by an information for Bigamy dated January
10, 2003, pending before Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.26
As to Mary Ann Ceriola’s testimony, the counsels for both parties stipulated that: (a) she is one of the
sponsors at the wedding of Gloria Goo and Syed Abbas on January 9, 1993; (b) she was seen in the wedding
photos and she could identify all the persons depicted in said photos; and (c) her testimony corroborates that
of Felicitas Goo and Atty. Sanchez.
The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and presented the marriage contract bearing
their signatures as proof.27 She and her mother sought the help of Atty. Sanchez in securing a marriage
license, and asked him to be one of the sponsors. A certain Qualin went to their house and said that he will
get the marriage license for them, and after several days returned with an application for marriage license for
them to sign, which she and Syed did. After Qualin returned with the marriage license, they gave the license
to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer. Gloria testified that she and Syed were
married on January 9, 1993 at their residence.28
_______________
23 Id., at p. 54.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
 27 Id., at p. 55. In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the following assignment of errors:
28 Id.
I
654 THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND
RESPONDENT AS NULL AND VOID DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF A MARRIAGE
654 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
_______________
34 Rollo, pp. 58-59.
Abbas vs. Abbas
656
29
Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on June 15, 1993.
Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who had married a certain Maria Corazon 656 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Buenaventura during the existence of the previous marriage, and that the case was docketed as Criminal Case
No. 02A-03408, with the RTC of Manila.30 Abbas vs. Abbas
Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on August 9, 1992 in Taiwan, but that she did
not know if said marriage had been celebrated under Muslim rites, because the one who celebrated their LICENSE DESPITE EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWING THAT THERE WAS ONE.
marriage was Chinese, and those around them at the time were Chinese.31 II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING, AS A REQUISITE OF A VALID MARRIAGE, THE
The Ruling of the RTC OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT A MARRIAGE CEREMONY TOOK PLACE WITH THE
APPEARANCE OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES BEFORE THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER AND THEIR
In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid marriage license was issued by the PERSONAL DECLARATION THAT THEY TOOK EACH OTHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE IN THE PRESENCE
Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed, as Marriage License No. 9969967 OF NOT LESS THAN TWO WITNESSES OF LEGAL AGE.
had been issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan, and the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, III
Cavite had certified that no marriage license had been issued for Gloria and Syed.32 It also took into account THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE ISSUE OF ESTOPPEL BY LACHES ON THE PART
the fact that neither party was a resident of Carmona, Cavite, the place where Marriage License No. 9969967 OF THE PETITIONER, AN ISSUE TIMELY RAISED IN THE COURT BELOW.35
was issued, in violation of Article 9 of the Family Code.33 As the marriage was not one of those exempt from
the license requirement, and that the lack of a valid marriage The CA gave credence to Gloria’s arguments, and granted her appeal. It held that the certification of the
Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent search for the marriage license of Gloria
and Syed was conducted, and thus held that said certification could not be accorded probative value.36 The
_______________
29 Id., at p. 56.
CA ruled that there was sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed had been
30 Id., at p. 57. validly married and that there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law.37It gave weight to the
31 Id. fact that Syed had admitted to having signed the marriage contract. The CA also considered that the parties
32 Id., at p. 58. had comported themselves as husband and wife, and that Syed only instituted his petition after Gloria had
33 Article  9. A Marriage License shall be issued by the Local Civil Registrar of the city or municipality where either contracting filed a case against him for bigamy.38
party habitually resides, except in marriages where no license is required in accordance with Chapter 2 of this Title.

655 _______________
35 Id., at p. 122.
36 Id., at p. 128.
VOL. 689, JANUARY 30, 2013 655 37 Id., at p. 129.
38 Id., at p. 130.
Abbas vs. Abbas
657

license is an absence of a formal requisite, the marriage of Gloria and Syed on January 9, 1993 was void ab
initio. VOL. 689, JANUARY 30, 2013 657
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:
Abbas vs. Abbas
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner, and against the respondent declaring as follows:
1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas is hereby annulled; The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:
2. Terminating the community of property relations between the petitioner and the respondent even if no property was acquired
during their cohabitation by reason of the nullity of the marriage of the parties. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 05 October 2005 and Order dated
3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Civil Registrar General, National Statistics Office, are hereby ordered to cancel 27 January 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109, in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM are
from their respective civil registries the marriage contracted by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo- REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is DISMISSED. The marriage
Abbas on January 9, 1993 in Manila.
between Shed [sic] Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo Abbas contracted on 09 January 1993 remains valid and subsisting. No
SO ORDERED.34
costs.
SO ORDERED.39
Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 7, 2005, but the RTC denied the same,
prompting her to appeal the questioned decision to the Court of Appeals. Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 200840 but the same was denied by the CA in
a Resolution dated July 24, 2008.41
The Ruling of the CA
Hence, this petition.
 Grounds in Support of Petition Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and relied on the
marriage contract as well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said license. To prove
I that no such license was issued, Syed turned to the office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona,
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN CITING REPUBLIC VS. Cavite which had allegedly issued said license. It was there that he requested certification that no such
COURT OF APPEALS AS THE SAME IS DIAMETRICALLY INCONSISTENT AND CONTRARY TO THE license was issued. In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals43 such certification was allowed, as permitted
COURT’S OWN FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN THIS CASE. by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE, WITHOUT SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record.―A written statement signed by an officer having the custody of an official record
ANY FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS, THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRANTING THE or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his
PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.42 office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no
such record or entry.
_______________
39 Id., at p. 131. In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil Registrar of Pasig to prove the non-
40 Id., at pp. 135-146. issuance of a marriage license, the Court held:
41 Id., at pp. 173-174.
42 Id., at p. 31. The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular
document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As
658 custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a
register book where they are required to enter all

658 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED _______________

43 G.R. No. 103047, September 2, 1994, 236 SCRA 257.
Abbas vs. Abbas
660

The Ruling of this Court

The petition is meritorious.
As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9, 1993, Executive Order No. 209, or the
Family Code of the Philippines, is the applicable law. The pertinent provisions that would apply to this
particular case are Articles 3, 4 and 35(3), which read as follows:
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and
their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal
age.
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in
Article 35(2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxxx
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding Chapter.
There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art. 2 of the Family Code, nor with the formal
requisites of the authority of the solemnizing officer and the conduct of the marriage ceremony. Nor is the
marriage one that is exempt from
659
660 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Abbas vs. Abbas
applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and
such other relevant data.44
The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil registrar enjoyed probative value, as
his duty was to maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was
allegedly issued, issued a certification to the effect that no such marriage license for Gloria and Syed was
issued, and that the serial number of the marriage license pertained to another couple, Arlindo Getalado and
Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine copy of Marriage License No. 9969967 was presented, which was
issued in Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of Gloria and Syed do not appear in the document.
In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the certification, stating that it did not comply
with Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
The CA deduced that from the absence of the words “despite diligent search” in the certification, and
since the certification used stated that no marriage license appears to have been issued, no diligent search had
been conducted and thus the certification could not be given probative value.
To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals.45 It is worth noting that in
that particular case, the Court, in sustaining the finding of the lower court that a marriage license was
lacking, relied on the Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, which merely stated that the alleged
marriage license could not be located as the same did not appear in their records. Nowhere in the
Certification was it categorically stated that the officer in-

_______________
VOL. 689, JANUARY 30, 2013 659 44 Id., at p. 262.
45 Supra note 43.
Abbas vs. Abbas
661

the requirement of a valid marriage license under Chapter 2, Title I of the Family Code. The resolution of this
case, thus, hinges on whether or not a valid marriage license had been issued for the couple. The RTC held VOL. 689, JANUARY 30, 2013 661
that no valid marriage license had been issued. The CA held that there was a valid marriage license.
We find the RTC to be correct in this instance. Abbas vs. Abbas
volved conducted a diligent search, nor is a categorical declaration absolutely necessary for Sec. 28, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court to apply.
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an official duty has
been regularly performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held, “The presumption
of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a
duty.”46 No such affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing
her duty of checking the records of their office, thus the presumption must stand. In fact, proof does exist of a
diligent search having been conducted, as Marriage License No. 996967 was indeed located and submitted to
the court. The fact that the names in said license do not correspond to those of Gloria and Syed does not
overturn the presumption that the registrar conducted a diligent search of the records of her office.
It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy thereof to the court. She failed to
explain why the marriage license was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location where, admittedly, neither party
resided. She took no pains to apply for the license, so she is not the best witness to testify to the validity and
existence of said license. Neither could the other witnesses she presented prove the existence of the marriage
license, as none of them applied for the license in Carmona, Cavite. Her mother, Felicitas Goo, could not
even testify as to the contents of the license, having admitted to not reading all of its contents. Atty. Sanchez,
one of the sponsors, whom Gloria and Felicitas Goo approached for assistance in securing the license,
admitted not knowing where the license came from. The task of applying for the license was delegated to a
certain Qualin, who could have testified as to how the
_______________
46 Alcantara v. Alcantara, G.R. No. 167746, August 28, 2007, 531 SCRA 446, 456.
662
662 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Abbas vs. Abbas
license was secured and thus impeached the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar as well as the
testimony of her representative. As Gloria failed to present this Qualin, the certification of the Municipal
Civil Registrar still enjoys probative value.
It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage contract and a copy of the marriage
license were submitted to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy of the marriage license could
have simply been secured from that office and submitted to the court. However, Gloria inexplicably failed to
do so, further weakening her claim that there was a valid marriage license issued for her and Syed.
In the case of Cariño v. Cariño,47 following the case of Republic,48 it was held that the certification of the
Local Civil Registrar that their office had no record of a marriage license was adequate to prove the non-
issuance of said license. The case of Cariño further held that the presumed validity of the marriage of the
parties had been overcome, and that it became the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to prove that
the marriage was valid, and that the required marriage license had been secured.49 Gloria has failed to
discharge that burden, and the only conclusion that can be reached is that no valid marriage license was
issued. It cannot be said that there was a simple irregularity in the marriage license that would not affect the
validity of the marriage, as no license was presented by the respondent. No marriage license was proven to
have been issued to Gloria and Syed, based on the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona,
Cavite and Gloria’s failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license.
_______________
47 403 Phil. 861, 869; 351 SCRA 127, 133 (2001).
48 Supra note 43.
49 Supra note 47, at p. 870; p. 133.
663
VOL. 689, JANUARY 30, 2013 663
Abbas vs. Abbas
To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to support its conclusion that Gloria and Syed were
validly married. To quote the CA:
Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial and documentary, that appellant and appellee have been
validly married and there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law. Both parties are legally capacitated to
marry. A certificate of legal capacity was even issued by the Embassy of Pakistan in favor of appellee. The parties herein
gave their consent freely. Appellee admitted that the signature above his name in the marriage contract was his. Several
pictures were presented showing appellant and appellee, before the solemnizing officer, the witnesses and other members
of appellant’s family, taken during the marriage ceremony, as well as in the restaurant where the lunch was held after the
marriage ceremony. Most telling of all is Exhibit “5-C” which shows appellee signing the Marriage Contract.
xxxx
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and has [sic] one offspring, Aliea Fatima Goo Abbas,
who was born on 15 June 1993. It took appellee more than ten (10) years before he filed on 01 August 2003 his Petition
for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 4 of the Family Code. We take serious note that said Petition appears
to have been instituted by him only after an Information for Bigamy (Exhibit “1”) dated 10 January 2003 was filed
against him for contracting a second or subsequent marriage with one Ma. Corazon (Maryam) T. Buenaventura. We are
not ready to reward (appellee) by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom and in the process allow
him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy.50
All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage
contract was signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license. Article 4 of the Family
Code is clear when it says, “The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage
void ab initio, except as stated in Article
_______________
50 Rollo, pp. 129-130.
664
664 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Abbas vs. Abbas
35(2).” Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void
from the beginning, except those exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2,
Title I of the same Code.51 Again,
_______________
51 Art.  27. In case either or both of the contracting parties are at the point of death, the marriage may be solemnized without
necessity of a marriage license and shall remain valid even if the ailing party subsequently survives.
Art. 28. If the residence of either party is so located that there is no means of transportation to enable such party to appear
personally before the local civil registrar, the marriage may be solemnized without necessity of a marriage license.
Art. 29. In the cases provided for in the two preceding articles, the solemnizing officer shall state in an affidavit executed before
the local civil registrar or any other person legally authorized to administer oaths that the marriage was performed in articulo mortis or
that the residence of either party, specifying the barrio or barangay, is so located that there is no means of transportation to enable such
party to appear personally before the local civil registrar and that the officer took the necessary steps to ascertain the ages and
relationship of the contracting parties and the absence of legal impediment to the marriage.
Art. 30. The original of the affidavit required in the last preceding article, together with a legible copy of the marriage contract,
shall be sent by the person solemnizing the marriage to the local civil registrar of the municipality where it was performed within the
period of thirty days after the performance of the marriage.
Art. 31. A marriage in articulo mortis between passengers or crew members may also be solemnized by a ship captain or by an
airplane pilot not only while the ship is at sea or the plane is in flight, but also during stopovers at ports of call.
Art.  32. A military commander of a unit, who is a commissioned officer, shall likewise have authority to solemnize marriages
in articulo mortis between persons within the zone of military operation, whether members of the armed forces or civilians.
Art. 33. Marriage among Muslims or among members of the ethnic cultural communities may be performed validly without the
665
VOL. 689, JANUARY 30, 2013 665
 Abbas vs. Abbas

this marriage cannot be characterized as among the exemptions, and thus, having been solemnized without a
marriage license, is void ab initio.
As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well be that his motives are
less than pure, that he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same does not make up for the
failure of the respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage license, given the weight of evidence
presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage license cannot be attributed to him, as it was Gloria who
took steps to procure the same. The law must be applied. As the marriage license, a formal requisite, is
clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated
March 11, 2008 and Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City
dated October 5, 2005 in Civil Case No. 03- 0382-CFM annulling the marriage of petitioner with respondent
on January 9, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Peralta, Abad, Mendoza and Leonen, JJ., concur.

_______________
necessity of marriage licenses, provided they are solemnized in accordance with their customs, rites or practices.
Art.  34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an
affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained
the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage.

666

666 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Abbas vs. Abbas

Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and set aside.

Notes.―In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify
marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation. (Braza vs. The City Civil Registrar of
Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, 607 SCRA 638 [2009])
Under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a
spouse of foreign nationality provided it is valid according to his/her national law. (Vda. de
Catalan vs. Catalan-Lee, 665 SCRA 487 [2012])

VOL. 15, NOVEMBER 29, 1965 355
Tenchavez vs. Escaño
No. L-19671. November 29, 1965.
PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant, vs.VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET AL., defendants-
appellees.
Husband and wife; Foreign divorce between Filipino citizens decreed after the effectivity of the new
Civil Code; Remarriage of divorced consort.—A  foreign divorce between Filipino citizens,,  sought  and
decreed after the effectivity of the new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386), is not entitled to
recognition as valid inthe Philippines; and neither is the marriage contracted with another party by the
divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity in this country.
Same; Same; Same; Innocent consort entitled to legal separation.—The marriage of the divorced wife
and her cohabitation with a person other than the lawful husband entitles the latter to a decree of legal
separation conformably to Philippine law.
Same; Same; Same; Invalid divorce entitles innocent consort to recover damages.—The desertion and
securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort entitles the other to recover damages.
356
356 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Tenchavez vs. Escaño
Same; Action for alienation of affections against parents of one consort; Absence of proof of malice.—
An  action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not lie in the absence of
proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part
DIRECT APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     J. V. Binamira & F. B. Barria for plaintiff-appellant.
     Jalandoni & Jamir for defendants-appellees.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from the judgment of the Court of First Instance
of Cebu, in its Civil Case No. R-4177, denying the claim of the plaintiffappellant, Pastor B.
Tenchavez, for legal separation and one million pesos in 1
damages his wife and parentsin-law,
2 Her letter of 22 March 1948 (Exh. "M"), while still solicitous of her husband's welfare, was not
the defendants-appellees, Vicente, Mamerto and Mena,  all surnamed "Escaño," respectively.
The facts, supported by the evidence of record, are the following:
Missing her late afternoon classes on 24 February 1948 in the University of San Carlos, Cebu City,
where she was then enrolled as a second year student of commerce, Vicenta Escaño, 27 years of age
(scion of a well-to-do and socially prominent Filipino family of Spanish ancestry and and a "sheltered
colegiala"), exchanged marriage vows with. Pastor Tenchavez, 82 years of age, an engineer, exarmy
officer and of undistinguished stock, without the knowledge of her parents, before a Catholic chaplain,
Lt. Moises Lavares, in the house of one Juan Alburo in the said city. The marriage was the culmination
of a pre-
_______________
1 The latter was substituted by her heirs when she died during the pendency of the case in the trial court,
2 The original complaint included the Roman Catholic Church as a defendant, sought to be enjoined from acting on
a petition for the ecclesiastical annulment of the marriage be tween Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escaño; the case
against the defendant Church was dismissed on a joint motion.
357
VOL. 15, NOVEMBER 29, 1965 357
Tenchavez vs. Escaño
vious love affair and was duly registered with the local civil register.
Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her, bef ore the marriage, indicate that the couple were deeply in
love. Together with a friend, Pacita Noel, their matchmaker and go-between, they had planned out their
marital f uture whereby Pacita would be the governess of their first-born; they started saving money in a
piggy bank. A few weeks before their secret marriage, their engagement was broken; Vicenta returned
the engagement ring and accepted another suitor, Joseling Lao. Her love for Pastor beckoned; she
pleaded for his return, and they reconciled, This time they planned to get married and then elope. To
facilitate the elopement, Vicenta had brought some of her clothes to the room of Pacita Noel in St. Mary's
Hall, which was their usual trysting place.
Although planned for the midnight following their marriage, the elopement did not, however,
materialize because when Vicenta went back to her classes af ter the marriage, her mothers
who got wind of the intended nuptials, was already waiting for her at the college, Vicenta was
taken home where she admitted that she had already married Pastor. Mamerto and Mena
Escaño were surprised, because Pastor never asked for the hand of Vicenta, and were
disgusted because of the great scandal that the clandestine marriage would provoke (t.s.n., vol.
III, pp. 1105-6). The following morning, the Escaño spouses sought priestly advice. Father
Reynes suggested a recelebration to validate what he believed to be an invalid marriage, from
the standpoint of the Church, due to the lack of authority from the Archbishop or the parish
priest for the officiating chaplain to celebrate the marriage. The recelebration did not take
place, because on 26 February 1948 Mamerto Escaño was handed by a maid, whose name he
claims he does not remember, a letter purportedly coming from San Carlos college students
and disclosing an amorous relationship between Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita Noel; Vicenta
translated the letter to her father, and thereafter would not agree to a new marriage. Vicenta
and Pastor met that day in the house of Mrs. Pilar Mendezona. There-
358
358 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tenchavez vs. Escaño
after, Vicenta continued living with her parents while Pastor returned to his job in Manila.
as endearing as her previous letters when their love was aflame.
Vicenta was bred in Catholic ways but is of a changeable disposition, and Pastor knew it
She fondly accepted her being called a "jellyfish." She was not prevented by her parents from
communicating with Pastor (Exh. "1-Escaño"), but her letters became less frequent as the days
passed. As of June, 1948 the newlyweds were already estranged (Exh. "2-Escaño"), Vicenta
had gone to Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, to escape f rom the scandal that her marriage
stirred in Cebu society. There, a lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted by then Senator
Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul her marriage. She did not sign the petition (Exh. "B-5"). The was
dismissed without prejudice because of her non-appearance at the hearing (Exh.
On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she applied for a passport, indicating in
her application that she was single, that her purpose was to study, and she was domiciled in
Cebu City, and that she intended to return after two years. The application' was approved,
and she left for the United States,  On 22  August 1950, she filed a verified complaint for
divorce against the herein plaintiff in the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada
in and f or the County of Washoe, on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in
character." On 21 October 1950, a decree of divorce, "final and absolute", was issued in open
court by the said tribunal.
In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escaño f iled a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul
their daughter's marriage to Pastor (Exh. "D"). On 10 September 1954, Vicenta sought papal
dispensation of her marriage (Exh. "D"-2).
On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She
now lives with him in California, and, by him, has begotten children. She acquired American
citizenship on 8 August 1958.
359
VOL. 15, NOVEMBER 29, 1966 359
Tenchavez vs. Escaño
But on 80 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint in the
Court of First Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escaño, her
parents, Mamerto and Mena Escaño, whom he charged with having dissuaded and
discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating her affections, and against the
Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of
the marriage, and asked for legal separation and one million pesos in damages. Vicenta
claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff and an equally valid marriage to her present husband,
Russell Leo Moran; while her parents denied that they had in any way influenced their
daughter's acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.
The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, but freed the plaintiff from
supporting his wife and to acquire property to the exclusion of his wife. It allowed the
counterclaim of Mamerto Escaño and Mena Escaño f or moral and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees against the plaintiff-appellant, to the extent of P45,000.00, and plaintiff
resorted directly to this Court.
The appellant ascribes, as errors of the trial court, the following:
1. In not declaring legal separation; in not holding defendant Vicenta F. Escaño liable for
damages and in dismissing the complaint;
2. In not holding the defendant parents Mamerto Escaño and the heirs of Doña Mena
Escaño liable for damages;
3. 10 holding the plaintiff liable for and requiring him to pay the damages to the
defendant parents on their counterclaims; and
4. In dismissing the complaint and in denying the relief sought by the plaintiff.
That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor Tenchavez, and the defendant-
appellee, Vicenta Escaño, were validly married to each other, from the standpoint of our civil
law, is clearly established by the record before us. Both parties were then above the age of
majority, and otherwise qualified; and both consented to the marriage, which was performed
by a Catholic priest (army
360
360 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tenchavez vs. Escaño
chaplain Lavares) in the presence of competent witnesses. It is nowhere shown that said priest
was not duly authorized under civil law to solemnize marriages.
The chaplain's alleged lack of ecclesiastical authorization from the parish priest and the
Ordinary, as required by Canon law, is irrelevant in our civil law, not only because of the
separation of Church and State but also because Act 3613 of the Philippine Legislature (which
was the marriage law in force at the time) expressly provided that—
"SEC. 1. Essential requisites, Essential requisites for marriage are the legal capacity of the contracting
parties consent/' (Italics supplied)
The actual authority of the solemnizing officer was thus3 only a formal requirement, and,
therefore, not essential to give the marriage civil effects,   and this is by section 27 of said
marriage act, which provided the following:
"SEC. 27, Failure to comply with formal requirements. No marriage shall be declared invalid because of
the absence of one or several of the formal requirements of this Act if, when it was performed, the
spouses or one of them believed in good faith that the person who solemnized the marriage was actually
empowered to do so, and that the marriage was perfectly legal."
The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and hence the validity of their marriage) will
be presumed  until the contrary is positively proved (Lao vs. Dee Tim, 45 Phil. 739, 745;
Francisco vs. Jason, 60 Phil. 442, 448). It is well to note here that in the case at bar, doubts as
to the authority of the solemnizing priest arose only af ter the marriage, when Vicenta's
parents consulted Father Reynes and the archbishop of Cebu. Moreover, the very act of
Vicenta in abandoning her original action for annulment and subsequently suing for divorce
implies an admission that her marriage to plaintiff was valid and binding.
_______________
3 In the present Civil Code the contrary rule obtains (Art 53).
361
VOL. 15, NOVEMBER 29, 1966 361
Tenchavez vs. Escaño
Defendant Vicenta Escaño argues that when she contracted the marriage she was under the
undue influence of Pacita Noel, whom she charges to have been in conspiracy with appellant
Tenchavez. Even granting, for argument's sake, the truth of that contention, and assuming
that Vicenta's consent was vitiated by fraud and undue influence, such vices did not render
her marriage  ab initio  void, but merely voidable, and the marriage remained valid until
annulled by a competent civil court. This was never done, and admittedly, Vicenta's suit for
annulment in the Court of First Instance of Misamis was dismissed for non-prosecution.
It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and
Vicenta Escaño remained subsisting and undissolved under Philippine law, notwithstanding
the decree of absolute divorce that the wife sought and obtained on 21 October 1950 from the
Second Judicial District Court of Washoe County, State of Nevada, on grounds of "extreme
cruelty, entirely mental in character." At the time 4 the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta
Escaño, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen.  She was then subject to Philippine Iaw,
and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already in force at the
time, expressly provided:
"Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad."
The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute divorce,  quo ad
vinculo  matrimonii; and in fact does not even use that term, to further emphasize its
restrictive policy on the matter, in contrast to the preceding legislation that admitted absolute
divorce on grounds of adultery of the wife or concubinage of the husband (Act 2710). Instead of
divorce, the present Civil Code only provides for legal separation (Title IV, Book I, Arts. 97 to
108), and, even in that case, it expressly
_______________
4 She was naturalized as an American citizen only on 8 August 1958.
362
362 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tenchavez vs. Escaño
prescribes that "the marriage bonds shall not be severed" (Art 106, subpar. 1).
For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign decree of
absolute divorce between Filipino citizens would be a patent violation of the declared public
policy of the state, specially in view of the third paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code that
prescribes the following:
"Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public
order, policy and good customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country."
Even the of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign divorce would, in effect, give rise to
an irritating scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens, to the detriment of those
members of our polity whose means do not permit them to sojourn and obtain absolute
divorces the Philippines.
From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant Pastor Tenchavez should have
appeared in the Nevada divorce court. Primarily because the policy of our law cannot be
nullified by acts of private parties (Civil Code, Art. 17, jam quot.); and additionally, because
the mere appearance of a non-resident consort cannot confer jurisdiction where the court
originally had none (Arca vs, Javier, 95 Phil. 579).
From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a necessary consequence that in
this jurisdiction Vicenta Escaño's divorce and second marriage are not entitled to recognition
as valid; for her previous  union  to plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and
undissolved. It follows, likewise, that her refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her denial
of consortium and her desertion of her husband constitute in law a wrong caused through her
fault, for which the husband is entitled to the corresponding indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176).
Neither an unsubstantiated charge of deceit nor an anonymous letter
363
VOL. 15, NOVEMBER 29, 1965 363
Tenchavez vs. Escaño
charging immorality against the husband constitute, contrary to her claim, adequate excuse.
Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran is technically "intercourse
with a person not her husband" from the standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles
plaintiffappellant Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation under our law, on the basis of
adultery" (Revised Penal Code, Art. 333).
The foregoing conclusions as to the untoward effect of a marriage after an invalid divorce
are in accord with the previous doctrines and rulings of this court on the subject, particularly
those that were rendered under our laws prior to the approval of the absolute divorce act (Act
2710 of the Philippine Legislature) As a matter of legal history, our statutes did not recognize
divorces a vinculo before 1917, when Act 2710 became effective; and the present Civil Code of
the Philippines, in disregarding absolute divorces, in effect merely reverted to the policies on
the subject prevailing before Act 2710. The rulings, therefore, under the Civil Code of 1889,
prior to the Act above-mentioned, are now fully applicable. Of these, the decision in Ramirez
vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855, is of particular interest. Said this Court in that case:
"As the divorce granted by the French Court must be ignored, it results that the marriage of Dr. Mory
and Leona Castro, celebrated in London in 1905, could not legalize their relations; and the circumstance
that they afterwards passed for husband and wife in Switzerland until her death is wholly without legal
significance. The claims of the very children to participate in the estate of Samuel Bishop must therefore
be rejected. The right to inherit is limited to legitimate, legitimated and acknowledged natural children.
The children of adulterous relations are wholly excluded. The word 'descendants' as used in Article 941 of
the Civil Code cannot be interpreted to includillegitimates born of adulterous relations." (Italics supplied)
Except for the fact that the successional rights of the children, begotten from Vicenta's
marriage to Leo Moran after the invalid divorce, are not involved in the case at bar, the Gmur
case is authority for the proposition that such union is adulterous in this jurisdiction, and,
therefore, justifies an action for legal separation on the part
364
364 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tenchavez vs. Escaño
of the innocent consort of the f irst marriage, that stands undissolved in Philippine law. In not
so declaring, the trial court committed error.
True it is that our ruling gives rise to anomalous situations where the status of a person
(whether divorced or not) would depend on the territory where the question arises. Anomalies
of this kind are not new in the PhiIippines, and the answer to them was given in Barretto vs.
Gonzales, 58 Phil. 667:
"The hardship of the existing divorce laws in the Philippine Islands are well known to the members of
the Legislature. It is the duty of the Courts to enforce the laws of divorce as written by Legislature if
they are constitutional. Courts have no right to say that such laws are too strict or too liberal." (p. 72)
The appellant's first assignment of error is, therefore, sustained.
However, the plaintiff-appellant's charge that his wife's parents, Dr. Mamerto Escaño and
his wife, the late Doña Mena Escaño, alienated the affections of their daughter and influenced
her conduct towards. her husband are not supported by credible evidence. The testimony of
Pastor Tenchavez about the Escaño's animosity toward him strikes us to be merely conjecture
and exaggeration, and. are belied by Pastor's own letters written before this suit was begun
(Exh. "2-Escaño" and "Vicenta," Ree, on App., pp. 270-274). In these letters he expressly
apologized to the defendants for "misjudging them" and for the "great unhappiness" caused by
his "impulsive blunders" and "sinful pride/' "effrontery and audacity" [sic]. Plaintiff was
admitted to the Escaño house to visit and court Vicenta, and the record shows nothing to prove
that he would not have been accepted to marry Vicenta had he openly asked for her hand, as
good manners and breeding demanded, Even after learning of the clandestine marriage, and
despite their shock at such unexpected event, the parents of Vicenta proposed and arranged
that the marriage be recelebrated in strict conformity with the canons of their religion upon
advice that the previous one was canonically defective. If no recelebration of the mar-
365
 VOL. 15, NOVEMBER 29, 1965 365
Tenchavez vs. Escaño—
riage ceremony was had it was not due to defendants Mamerto Escaño and his wife, but to the
refusal of Vicenta to proceed with it. That the spouses Escaño did not seek to compel or induce
their daughter to assent to the recelebration but respected her decision, or that they abided by
her resolve, does not constitute in law an alienation of affections. Neither does the fact that
Vicenta's parents sent her money while she was in the United States; for it was natural that
they should not wish their daughter to live in penury even if they did not concur in her
decision to divorce Tenchavez (27 Am. Jur. 130-132),
There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided and abetted
her original suit for annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she appears to have acted
independently, and being of age, she was entitled to judge what was best for her and ask that
her decisions be respected. Her parents, in so doing, certainly .cannot be charged with
alienation of affections in the absence of malice or unworthy motives, which have not been
shown, good faith being always presumed until the contrary isproved.
"SEC. 629. Liability of Parents, Guardians or Kin.—The law distinguishes between the right of a parent
to interest himself in the marital affairs of his child and the absence of rights in a stranger to
intermeddle in such affairs. However, such distinction between the liability of parents and that of
strangers is only in regard to what will justify interference. A parent is liable for alienation of affections
resulting from his own malicious conduct, as where he wrongfuIly entices his son or daughter to leave his
or her spouse, but he is not liable unless he acts maliciously, without justification and from unworthy
motives. He is not liable where he acts and advises his child in good faith with respect to his child's
marital relations in the interest of his child as he sees it, the marriage of his child not terminating his
right and liberty to interest himself in, and be extremely solicitous for, his child's welfare and happiness,
even where his conduct and advice suggest or result in the separation of the spouses or the obtaining of a
divorce or annulment, or where he acts under mistake or misinformation, or where his advice or
interference are indiscreet or unfortunate, although it has been held that the parent is liable for
consequences resulting from recklessness. He may in good faith take his child into his home and afford
him or her protection and support, so long as he has not maliciously enticed
366
366 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tenchavez vs. Escaño
his child away, or does not maliciously entice or cause him or her to stay away, from his or her spouse,
This rule has more frequently been applied in the case of advice given ,to a married daughter, but it is
equally applicable in the case of advice given to a son."
Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social
discrimination and with having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and
divorce, unquestionably caused them unrest and anxiety, entitling them to recover damages,
While this suit may not have been impelled by actual malice, the charges were certainly
reckless in the face of the proven facts and circumstances Court actions are not established for
parties to give vent to their prejudices or spleen.
In the assessment of the moral damages recoverable by appellant Pastor Tenchavez from
defendant Vicenta Escaño, it is proper to take into account, against his patently unreasonable
claim for a million pesos in damages, that (a) the marriage was celebrated in secret, and its
failure was not characterized by publicity or undue humiliation on appellant's part; (b) that
the parties never lived together; and (c) that there is evidence that appellant had originally
agreed to the annulment of the marriage, although such a promise was legally invalid, being
against public policy (cf. Art 88, Civ. Code), While appellant is unable to remarry under our
law, this fact is a consequence of the indissoluble character of the union that appellant entered
into voluntarily and with open eyes rather than of her divorce and her second marriage. All
told, we are of the opinion that appellant should recover P25,000 only by way of moral
damages and attorney's fees.
With regard to the P45,000 damages awarded to the defendants, Dr. Mamerto Escaño and
Mena Escaño, by the court below, we opine that the same are excessives While the filing of
this unfounded suit must have wounded said defendants' feelings and caused them anxiety,
the same could in no way have seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced
them, lawsuits-having become a common occurrence in present society, What is important,
and has been correctly established in the decision of the
367
VOL. 15, NOVEMBER 29, 1965 367
Tenchavez vs. Escaño
court below, is that said defendants were not guilty of any improper conduct in the whole
deplorable affair. This Court, therefore, reduces the damages awarded to P5,000 only.
Summing up, the Court rules:
(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the
effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 886), is not entitled to recognition as
valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage contracted with another party by
the divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity
in the country;
(2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her cohabitation with a person other than the
lawful husband entitle the latter to a decree of legal separation conformably to
Philippine law;
(3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort entitles the
other to recover damages;
(4) That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not
lie in the absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part.
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;
(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation
from defendant Vicenta F. Escaño;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez
the amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys" fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escaño and the
estate of his wife, the deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys'
fees.
Neither party to recover costs.
          Bengzon, C.J.,  Bautista Angelo,  Concepcion,  Dizon,Regala,  Makalintal,  Bengzon,
J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ.,concur.
Decision modified.

VOL. 139, OCTOBER 8, 1985 139
Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr.
*
No. L-68470, October 8, 1985.
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner, vs. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding
Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region Pasay City, and
RICHARD UPTON, respondents.
Certiorari; Denial of motion to dismiss may be the subject of a certiorari proceeding in certain cases.—
Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is not subject to appeal.
Certiorari and Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the propriety of an interlocutory order of
the trial Court. However, when a grave abuse of discretion was patently committed, or the lower Court
acted capriciously and whimsically, then it devolves upon this Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise
its supervisory authority and to correct the error committed which, in such a case, is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. Prohibition would then lie since it would be useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the
proceedings. We consider the petition filed in this case within the exception, and we have given it due
course.
Husband and Wife;  Judgments;  Marriages;  Divorce;  A divorce decree granted by a U.S. Court
between a Filipina and her American husband is binding on the American husband.—Therecan be no
question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree is
binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue
petitioner,  as her husband,  in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the
divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public
policy.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Absolute divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in
the Philippines if valid under the national law of such an alien.—lt is true that owing to the nationality
principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they
are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada
________________
* FIRST DIVISION.
140
140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr.
released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under
which divorce dissolves the marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Estoppel;  Actions;  An American granted absolute divorce in his country
with his Filipina wife is estopped from asserting his rights over property allegedly held in the Philippines
as conjugal property by him and his former wife.—Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent
is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own
country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate,
he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged
conjugal property.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Succession;  An American granted absolute divorce with Filipina wife is
cut off from marital and successional rights with the latter.—To maintain, as private respondent does,
that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject
to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be
obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The
latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not
be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
PETITION for certiorari and prohibition to review the orders of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City, Br. CX Romillo, Jr. J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set
aside the Orders, dated September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075-P,
issued by respondent Judge, which denied her Motion to Dismiss said case, and her Motion for
Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, respectively.
141
VOL. 139, OCTOBER 8, 1985 141
Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr.
The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private
respondent is a citizen of the United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972;
that, after the marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines; that they begot
two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties were
divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada,
this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-
P of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in
Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking
that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private
respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to
dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the
divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he
and petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11,1982. The Court below denied the
Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is located in
the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case, The denial is now the
subject of this Certiorari proceeding.
Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is not subject
to appeal. Certiorari and Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the propriety of an
interlocutory order of the trial Court. However, when a grave abuse of discretion was patently
committed, or the lower Court acted capriciously and whimsically, then it devolves upon this
Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise its supervisory authority 1and to correct the error
committed which, in such a case, is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.  Prohibition would 2then
lie since it would be useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the proceedings.   We
consider the petition filed
________________
1 Sanchez vs. Zosa, 68 SCRA 171 (1975); Malit vs. People, 114 SCRA 348 (1982).
2 U.S.T. vs. Hon. Villanueva, et al., 106 Phil. 439 (1959).
142
142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr.
in this case within the exception, and we have given it due course.
For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal
property in the Philippines.
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal
property because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the
American Court that they had no community of property; that the Galleon Shop was not
established through conjugal funds; and that respondent's claim is barred by prior judgment.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot
prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the
acts and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public
policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property
relations between petitioner and private respondent, after their marriage, were upon absolute
or relative community property, upon complete separation of property, or upon any other
regime. The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over
petitioner who appeared in person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also
obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who, giving his address as No. 381 Bush Street,
San Francisco, California, authorized his attorneys in the divorce case, Karp & Gradt, Ltd., to
agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in3 the understanding that there were
neither community property nor community obligations. As explicitly stated in the Power of
Attorney he executed in favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno,
Nevada, to represent him in the divorce proceedings:
x x x                                              x x x
"You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to
________________
3 Annex "Y", Petition for Certiorari.
143
VOL. 139, OCTOBER 8, 1985 143
Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr.
file an Answer, appear on my behalf and do all things necessary and proper to represent me, without
farther contesting, subject to the following:
"1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.
"2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.
"3. That there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.
x x x                                              x x x"
4
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the
United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For
instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union.
What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this
jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.
It 5is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code,  only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same
being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, which may6 be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law.   In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private
respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which  divorce
dissolves the marriage.  As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in
Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of competent
jurisdiction are to change the ex-
____________
4 p. 98, Rollo.
5 "Art, 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad."
6 cf. Recto vs. Harden, 100 Phil. 427 [1956]; Paras, Civil Code, 1971 ed., Vol. I, p. 52; Salonga, Private International Law, 1979
ed., p. 231.
144
144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr.
isting status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The
marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a
wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty, that
the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the
bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner.
He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which
validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is
estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged
conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under
Article 109,  et. seq.  of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live
together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The
latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She
should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss
the Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.
Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
          Teehankee  (Chairman),  Plana,  Relova,  Gutierrez, Jr.,  De la Fuente  and  Patajo,
JJ., concur.
Petition granted.

VOL. 174, JUNE 30, 1989 653
Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera
*
G.R. No. 80116. June 30, 1989.
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner, vs.  HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS
C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING,
respondents.
Criminal Law; Actions; Rule that the crime of adultery as well as four other crimes against chastity
cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse, a jurisdictional
requirement.—Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery, as well as four other
crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by
the offended spouse.  It has long since been established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance
with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement. While in point of strict law the
jurisdiction of the court over the offense is vested in it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement for a sworn
written complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that complaint which starts the
prosecutory proceeding and without which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.
Same; Same; Same; In prosecutions for adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally file the
complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else.—Now, the law specifically provides that in
prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can legally file the complaint should be the
offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lascivi-
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
654
654 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera
ousness, no provision is made for the prosecution of the crimes of adultery and concubinage by the
parents, grandparents or guardian of the offended party. The so-called exclusive and successive rule in
the prosecution of the first four offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery and concubinage.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Complainant must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do
so at the time of the filing of the criminal action.—Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the
offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status,
capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar
and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss
in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code presupposes that the marital
relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery.—This
policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in
silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. Hence, as cogently argued by petitioner,
Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at
the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery. This is a logical consequence since
the raison d'etre of said provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased
to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The status and capacity of the complainant to commence the
action be definitely established and indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action.—In these cases,
therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to commence the action be
definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status or capacity must indubitably exist as of
the time he initiates the action. It would be absurd if his capacity to bring the action would be
determined by his status  before  or  subsequent  to the commencement thereof, where such capacity or
status existed prior to but ceased before, or was acquired subsequent to but did not exist at the time of,
the institution of the case. We would thereby have the anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit at the
very time when he is without the legal capacity to do so.
655
VOL. 174, JUNE 30, 1989 655
Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera
Same;  Same;  Divorce;  Fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country is
admitted and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines.—In the present case, the fact that
private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted.
Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is
concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons.
Same;  Same;  Same;  Rule under American jurisprudence that after a divorce has been decreed, the
innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings against the offender is in pari materia
with ours.—American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are  in pari
materia with ours, yields the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has
the right to institute proceedings against the offenders  where the statute provides that the innocent
spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery. Where, however, proceedings
have been properly commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can have no legal effect on the
prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a conclusion.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Court sees no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this
case and in our jurisdiction.—We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case
and in our jurisdiction, considering our statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are convinced
that in cases of such nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as of
the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the adultery case must be an offended
spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the
complaint.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Private respondent being no longer the husband of petitioner has no
legal standing to commence the adultery case.—Under the same considerations and rationale, private
respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery
case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Allegation that private respondent could not have brought
this case before the decree of divorce
656
656 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera
 for lack of knowledge even if true is of no legal significance or consequence.—The allegation of private Fiscal Jacinto A. de los Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding investigation,
5
recommended the
respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decree of divorce for lack of knowledge, dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.  However, upon review, the
even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this case. When said respondent initiated the respondent city fiscal approved a resolution, dated
6
January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two
divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to complaints for adultery against the petitioner. The complaints were accordingly filed and were
protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a danger of introducing eventually raffled to two branches of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The case entitled
spurious heirs into the family, which is said to be one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our “People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and William Chia,” docketed as Criminal Case
law on adultery, since there would thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak of The severance of No. 87-
the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations
of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.
_______________
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION for certiorari and prohibition to review the order of the Regional 2 Ibid., 6, 29.
Trial Court of Manila, Br. XXVI. Ibay-Somera, J. 3 Ibid., 7.
4 Ibid., 7, 29-30; Annexes A and A-1, Petition.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. 5 Ibid., 7, 178.
6 Ibid., 8; Annexes B, B-1 and B-2, id.

REGALADO, J.:
658
An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign absolute divorce,
only to be followed by a criminal infidelity suit of the latter against the former, provides Us 658 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
the opportunity to lay down a decisional rule on what hitherto appears to be an unresolved
jurisdictional question. Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private
respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar of
52435, was assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the respondent judge; while the other case,
Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. The
“People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua”, docketed as Criminal Case No.
marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in Malate, 7
1 87-52434 went to the sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of the same court.
Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980.
On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that the
Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, 8
aforesaid resolution of respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be dismissed.  A
followed by a separation de facto between them.
similar petition was filed by James Chua, her co-accused in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The
Secretary of Justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave due course to both petitions and
_______________ directed the respondent city fiscal to inform the Department of Justice “if the accused have
1 Rollo, 5, 29. already been arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer 9
further proceedings” and to
elevate the entire records of both cases to his office for review.
657 Petitioner thereafter filed a motion 10in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to
suspend further proceedings thereon.   As a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended
VOL. 174, JUNE 30, 1989 657 proceedings in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. On the other hand, respondent judge merely reset
the date of the arraignment in  Criminal Case No. 87-52435to April 6, 1987. Before such
Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera scheduled date, petitioner moved for the cancellation of the arraignment and for the
suspension of proceedings in said Criminal Case No. 87-52435 until 11
after the resolution of the
petition for review then pending before the Secretary of Justice.  A motion to quash was also
After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in 12
filed in the same case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction,  which motion was denied by the
private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the
respondent judge in an order dated September 8, 1987. The same order also directed the
Schoneberg Local Court in January, 1983. He claimed2 that there was failure of their marriage
arraignment of both accused therein, that is, petitioner and William Chia. The latter entered
and that they had been living apart since April, 1982.
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of
property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where _______________
3
the same is still pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866. 7 Ibid., 8-9, 178.
On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of 8 Ibid., 9, 178; Annex C, id.
Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. 9 Ibid., 9-10, 178; Annex D, id.
10 Ibid., 9; Annexes E and E-1, id.
The custody of the child was granted to petitioner. The records show that under German law 11 Ibid., 10; Annex F, id.
said court was locally and internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and that the 12 Ibid., 9, 179; Annex G, id.
dissolution of said marriage
4
was legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law of
that foreign jurisdiction. 659
On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private
respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that,
while still married to said respondent, petitioner “had an affair with a certain William Chia as VOL. 174, JUNE 30, 1989 659
early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983”. Assistant Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera

a plea of not guilty while the petitioner refused to be arraigned. Such refusal of the petitioner
being considered by respondent judge as direct contempt, she and her counsel13were fined and
the former was ordered detained until 14she submitted herself for arraignment.  Later, private
respondent entered a plea of not guilty.
On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition,
with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the
lower court denying her motion to quash. The petition is anchored on the main ground that the
court is without jurisdiction “to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a private
offense that cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a foreigner,
does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his
15
national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint.”
On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
respondents from implementing the aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from further
proceeding with Criminal Case No. 87-52435. Subsequently, on March 23, 1988 Secretary of
Justice Sedfrey A. Ordonez acted on the aforesaid petitions for review and, upholding
petitioner’s ratiocinations, issued a resolution directing
16
the respondent city fiscal to move for
the dismissal of the complaints against the petitioner.
We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed
17
for shall accordingly issue.
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code,  the crime of adultery, as well as four other
crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by
the  offended spouse.  It has long since been established, with unwavering consistency, that
compliance with this rule is a
_______________
13 Ibid., 10;
Annex H, id.
14 Ibid., 105.
15 Ibid., 11.
16 Ibid., 311-313.
17 Cf. Sec. 5, Rule 110, Rules of Court.
660
660 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera
18
jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement. While in point of strict law the
jurisdiction of the court over the offense is vested in it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement
for a sworn written complaint is just as 19jurisdictional a mandate since it is that complaint
which starts the prosecutory proceeding   and without which the court cannot exercise its
jurisdiction to try the ease.
Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the
person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else.
Unlike the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is
made for the prosecution of the crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents,
grandparents or guardian of the offended party. The so-called exclusive and successive rule in
the prosecution of the first four offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery and
concubinage. It is significant that while the State, as parens patriae, was added and vested by
the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the power to initiate the criminal action for a
deceased or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and
acts of lasciviousness, in default of her parents, grandparents or guardian, such amendment
did not include the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other words, only the offended
spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to initiate the action therefor.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it
necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to
do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil
actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases,
is determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition.
_______________
18  People vs. Mandia,  60 Phil. 372, 375 (1934);  People vs. Zurbano,  37 SCRA 565, 569 (1971);  People vs.
Lingayen, G.R. No. 64556, June 10, 1988.
19 Valdepeñas vs. People, 16 SCRA 871 (1966); People vs. Babasa, 97 SCRA 672 (1980).
661
VOL. 174, JUNE 30, 1989 661
Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera
The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not mean
that the same requirement and rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may not have
been found necessary since criminal actions are generally and fundamentally commenced by
the State, through the People of the Philippines, the offended party being merely the
complaining witness therein. However, in the so-called “private crimes”, or those which cannot
be prosecuted de oficio, and the present prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the offended
spouse assumes a more predominant role since the right to commence the action, or to refrain
therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his power and option.
This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to
20
suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial.  Hence, as
cogently argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the
marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for
adultery. This is a logical consequence since the raison d'etre of said provision of law would be
absent where the supposed offended party had 21
ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender
at the time of the filing of the criminal case.
In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant
to commence the action be definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status or
capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action. It would be absurd if his
capacity to bring the action would be determined by his status  before  or  subsequent  to the
commencement thereof, where such capacity or status existed prior to but ceased before, or
was acquired subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case. We
would thereby have the anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time when he
is without the legal capacity to do so. To repeat, there does not appear to be any local
precedential
_______________
20 Samilin vs. Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, 57 Phil. 298(1932); Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, et al., 133
SCRA 616 (1984).
21 Rollo, 289.
662
662 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera
jurisprudence on the specific issue as to when precisely the status of a complainant as an
offended spouse must exist where a criminal prosecution can be commenced only by one who
in law can be categorized as possessed of such status. Stated differently and with reference to
the present case, the inquiry would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a
criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused
be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the action by the former against the
latter.
American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari
materia with ours, yields the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no
longer has the right to institute proceedings against the offenders where the statute provides
that the innocent spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery.
Where, however, proceedings have been properly commenced, a divorce subsequently 22granted
can have no legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a conclusion.  In the
cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that—
“ ‘No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of the husband or wife’ Section
4932, Code. Though Loftus was husband of defendant when the offense is said to have been committed, he
had ceased to be such when the prosecution was begun; and appellant insists that his status was not such
as to entitle him to make the complaint. We have repeatedly said that the offense is against the
unoffending spouse, as well as the state, in explaining the reason for this provision in the statute; and we
are of the opinion that the unoffending spouse must be such when the prosecution is commenced.” (Italics
supplied.)
We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our
jurisdiction, considering our
_______________
22 2 Am. Jur. 2d., 973 citing State vs. Loftus, 104 NW 906, 907; Re Smith, 2 Okla. 153, 37 p. 1099; State vs. Russell,
90 Iowa 569, 58 NW 915.
663
VOL. 174, JUNE 30, 1989 663
Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera
statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are convinced that in cases of such nature,
the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as of the time the
complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the adultery case must be an offended
spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the time of the
filing of the complaint.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country,
the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal 23
effects may be
recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned   in view of the
nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of 24
persons.
Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al.,  after a divorce was granted by
a United States court between Alice Van Dorn, a Filipina, and her American husband, the
latter filed a civil case in a trial court here alleging that her business concern was conjugal
property and praying that she be ordered to render an accounting and that the plaintiff be
granted the right to manage the business. Rejecting his pretensions, this Court perspicuously
demonstrated the error of such stance, thus:
“There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United
States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private
respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union, xxx.
“It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. xxx
“Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in
_______________
23 Recto vs. Harden, 100 Phil. 427 (1956).
24 139 SCRA 139 140 (1985).
664
664 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera
25
the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets, x x x”
Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband
of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that
he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the
decree of divorce for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence
in this case. When said respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that
there would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of the
marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a danger of introducing spurious heirs into the
family, which
26
is said to be one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law on
adultery,  since there would thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak of. The severance
of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence
the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.
The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by private
respondent. In applying Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the same as Article
333 of the Revised Penal Code, which punished adultery “although the marriage be afterwards
declared void”, the Court merely stated that “the lawmakers intended to declare adulterous
the infidelity of a married woman to her marital vows, even though it should be made to
appear that she is entitled to have her marriage contract declared null and void, until and
unless she
_______________
25 The said pronouncements foreshadowed and are adopted in the Family Code of the Philippines (Executive Order
No. 209, as amended by Executive Order No. 227, effective on August 3, 1988), Article 26 whereof provides that
“(w)here marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.”
26 U.S. vs. Mata, 18 Phil. 490 (1911).
665
VOL. 174, JUNE 30, 1989 665
Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera
actually secures a formal judicial declaration to that effect”. Definitely, it cannot be logically
inferred therefrom that the complaint can still be filed after the declaration of nullity because
such declaration that the marriage is void  ab initiois equivalent to stating that it never
existed. There being no marriage from the beginning, any complaint for adultery filed after
said declaration of nullity would no longer have a leg to stand on. Moreover, what was
consequently contemplated and within the purview of the decision in said case is the situation
where the criminal action for adultery was filed before the termination of the marriage by a
judicial declaration of its nullity ab initio. The same rule and requisite would necessarily apply
where the termination of the marriage was effected, as in this case, by a valid foreign divorce.
Private
27
respondent’s invocation of  Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Va-menta,  hereinbefore
cited,  must suffer the same fate of inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case reveals that
the offended spouse therein had duly and seasonably filed a complaint for adultery, although
an issue was raised as to its sufficiency but which was resolved in favor of the complainant.
Said case did not involve a factual situation akin to the one at bar or any issue determinative
of the controversy herein.
WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner’s motion to quash is  SET
ASIDE and another one entered DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435
for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order issued in this case on October 21,
1987 is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
     Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ.,concur.
     Paras, J., I concur in a separate opinion.
PARAS, J.: Concurring Opinion
It is my considered opinion that regardless of whether We consider the German absolute
divorce as valid also in the
husband the absolute divorce will be valid, still one of the exceptions to the application of the
proper foreign law (one of the exceptions to comity) is when the foreign law will work an
injustice or injury to the people or residents of the forum. Consequently since to recognize the
absolute divorce as valid on the part of the husband would be injurious or prejudicial to the
Filipino wife whose marriage would be still valid under her national law, it would seem that
under our law existing before the new Family Code (which took effect on August 3, 1988) the
divorce should be considered void both with respect to the American husband and the Filipino
wife.
The recent case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. (139 SCRA [1985]) cannot apply despite the fact
that the husband was an Ameri-
667
VOL. 174, JUNE 30, 1989 667
Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. NLRC
can with a Filipino wife because in said case the validity of the divorce insofar as the Filipino
wife is concerned was NEVER put in issue.
Note.—Adultery being a private offense, it cannot be prosecuted except upon a complaint
by the offended spouse who cannot institute the criminal prosecution without including both
the guilty parties if they are both alive, nor in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned
the offenders. (DonioTeves vs. Vamenta, Jr., 133 SCRA 616.)

_______________
27 Footnote 20, ante.

666

666 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera

Philippines, the fact is that the husband in the instant case, by the very act of his obtaining an
absolute divorce in Germany can no longer be considered as the offended party in case his
former wife actually has carnal knowledge with another, because in divorcing her, he already
implicitly authorized the woman to have sexual relations with others. A contrary ruling would
be less than fair for a man, who is free to have sex will be allowed to deprive the woman of the
same privilege.
In the case of  Recto v. Harden  (100 Phil. 427  [1956]), the Supreme Court considered the
absolute divorce between the American husband and his American wife as valid and binding
in the Philippines on the theory that their status and capacity are governed by their National
law,  namely, American law. There is no decision yet of the Supreme Court regarding the
validity of such a divorce if one of the parties, say an American, is married to a Filipino wife,
for then two (2) different nationalities would be involved.
In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private International Law and
precisely because of the  National law  doctrine, he considers the absolute divorce as valid
insofar as the American husband is concerned but void insofar as the Filipino wife is involved.
This results in what he calls a “socially grotesque situation,” where a Filipino woman is still
married to a man who is no longer her husband. It is the opinion however, of the undersigned
that very likely the opposite expresses the correct view. While under the national law  of the
 alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an
114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As
fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to
Republic vs. Orbecido III remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in
this case. Thus Cipriano, the “divorced” Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
*
G.R. No. 154380. October 5, 2005. Civil Procedure; Declaratory Relief; Requisites of a Petition for Declaratory Relief.—The requisites of
a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must
be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, respondent. in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Regional Trial Court of
Family Code; Marriages; Divorce; The Supreme Court holds that paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be
interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Br. 23.
Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce
decree.—This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried      The Solicitor General for respondent.
while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner representing the State      Public Attorney’s Office for respondent.
asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a
116
declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the
controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent
remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of his second marriage. x x x We hold that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a Republic vs. Orbecido III
foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as
if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise
would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact QUISUMBING, J.:
and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it
should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a
law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the
they come within its spirit or intent. Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court is unanimous in holding that paragraph 2 of Article 26 of Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite ruling on
the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino this apparently novel question, presented as a pure question of law. 1
citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision  dated May 15, 2002, of
2
the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and its Resolution  dated
_______________ July 4, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The court a quo had declared that herein
respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry. The  fallo  of the impugned
* FIRST DIVISION.
Decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code and by
115 reason of the divorce decree obtained against him by his American wife, the petitioner is given the
capacity to remarry under
3
the Philippine Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.”

VOL. 472, OCTOBER 5, 2005 115 The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United
Republic vs. Orbecido III Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with
a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few
foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry.—We are unanimous in our holding that years later, Cipriano discov-
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be
interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign
_______________
citizenship and remarried, also to remarry.
1 Rollo, pp. 20-22.
Same;  Same;  Same;  The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
2 Id., at pp. 27-29.
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the 3 Id.,
alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.—We state the twin elements for the application of at pp. 21-22.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows: 1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a 117
Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and 2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the VOL. 472, OCTOBER 5, 2005 117

Republic vs. Orbecido III
ered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce
decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him
currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the
petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
4
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the
instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper
5
remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a
petition for annulment or for legal separation.  Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law
that governs respondent’s6 situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not
of judicial determination.
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but
insists that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated
_______________
4 Id., at p. 105.
5 Id., at pp. 106-110.
6 Id., at p. 110.
118
118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Orbecido III
her to remarry, he is7
likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II
of the Constitution.
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court
actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of
the Rules of Court provides:
RULE 63 DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Section 1.  Who may file petition—Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or other
governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate
Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration
of his rights or duties, thereunder.
...
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable
controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that
the party seeking the relief has 8
a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is
ripe for judicial determination.
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two
Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree,
_______________
7 Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.
The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development
of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
8 Office of the Ombudsman v. Ibay, G.R. No. 137538, 3 September 2001,  364 SCRA 281, 286, citing  Galarosa v.
Valencia, G.R. No. 109455, 11 November 1993, 227 SCRA 729, 737.
119
VOL. 472, OCTOBER 5, 2005 119
Republic vs. Orbecido III
and remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner
representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage while respondent,
a private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for
relief, has legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial
determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into
question the validity of his second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code
apply to the case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had come
about in the first place, and what was the intent of the legislators in its enactment?
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209,
otherwise known as the “Family Code,” which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof
states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No.
227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A
second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
120
120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Orbecido III
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented by the
case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at
the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the
wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her
capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the
U.S.A. 9 _______________
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings   on the Family Code, the Catholic
Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to
Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are Filipinos
who divorce them abroad. These spouses who are divorced will not be able to re-marry,
while the spouses of foreigners who validly divorce them abroad can.
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for Filipino
citizens. For those whose foreign spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be
considered to be validly divorced here and can re-marry. We propose that this be
deleted and made into law only after more widespread consultation. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil
_______________
9 Held on January 27 and 28, 1988 and February 3, 1988.
121
VOL. 472, OCTOBER 5, 2005 121
Republic vs. Orbecido III
Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse.
Interestingly,
10
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of  Van Dorn v.
Romillo,  Jr.   The  Van Dorncase involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is
valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under
Philippine law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign
citizenship by naturalization?
The 11jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of  Quita v. Court of
Appeals.  In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married.
The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same
year. The Court therein hinted, by way of  obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his
naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we
hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties
who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of
them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino
spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time
of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and
injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according
10 No. L-68470, 8 October 1985, 139 SCRA 139.
11 G.R. No. 124862, 22 December 1998, 300 SCRA 406.
122
122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Orbecido III
to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear
purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason,
disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to
cases not
12
within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or
intent.
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the
contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship  at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad  by the alien
spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a
valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the
naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry.
Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in
this case. Thus Cipriano, the “divorced” Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
_______________
12 Lopez & Sons, Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, No. L-9274, 1 February 1957, 100 Phil. 850, 855.
123
VOL. 472, OCTOBER 5, 2005 123
Republic vs. Orbecido III
We are also unable to sustain the OSG’s theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino spouse
is to file either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment would be
a long and tedious process, and in this particular case, not even feasible, considering that the
marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal
separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the
legally separated Filipino spouse would still remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by
respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondent’s wife. It is
settled rule
13
that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not
evidence.
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his
wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must 14prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Such foreign law must also be
proved as our courts cannot 15take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws
must be alleged and proved.  Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree
allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would
be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code (E.O. No. 209, as

_______________
13 Cortes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121772, 13 January 2003, 395 SCRA 33, 38.
14 Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, 2 October 2001, 366 SCRA 437, 447.
15 Id., at p. 451.

124

124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Republic vs. Orbecido III

amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been
divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry.
However, considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and
on record, we are unable to declare, based on respondent’s bare allegations that his wife, who
was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an
American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be
made properly upon respondent’s submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of
Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

     Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Petition granted, assailed decision and resolution set aside.

Note.—The accused who secured a foreign divorce, and later remarried in the Philippines,
in the belief that the foreign divorce was valid, is liable for bigamy. (Diego vs. Castillo,  436
SCRA 67 [2004]).
 At the core of the present controversy are issues of (a) grave abuse of discretion allegedly
VOL. 404, JUNE 20, 2003 495 committed by public respondent and (b) lack of jurisdiction of the regional trial court, in
matters that spring from a divorce decree obtained abroad by petitioner.
Roehr vs. Rodriguez 1
In this special civil action for certiorari, petitioner assails (a) the order   dated September
*
30, 1999 of public respondent Judge Josefina Guevara-Salonga, Presiding Judge of Makati
G.R. No. 142820. June 20, 2003. Regional Trial

WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner,  vs.  MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ, HON. JUDGE _______________
JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA, Presiding Judge of Makati RTC, Branch 149, respondents. 1 Rollo, p. 15.

497
Civil Law; Family Code; Marriages; Nullity of Marriage;  Judgments;  Foreign Judgment;  The court
could modify or alter a judgment even after the same has become executory.—The court could modify or
alter a judgment even after the same has become executory whenever circumstances transpire rendering VOL. 404, JUNE 20, 2003 497
its decision unjust and inequitable, as where certain facts and circumstances justifying or requiring such
modification or altera- Roehr vs. Rodriguez
2
_______________
Court,  Branch
3
149, in  Civil Case No. 96-1389  for declaration of nullity of marriage, and (b)
* SECOND DIVISION. the order  dated March 31, 2000 denying his motion for reconsideration. The assailed orders
partially set aside the trial court’s order dismissing Civil Case No. 96-1389, for the purpose of
resolving issues relating to the property settlement of the spouses and the custody of their
496 children.
Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married private
respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Hamburg, Germany. 4
Their
marriage was subsequently ratified on February 14, 1981 in Tayasan, Negros Oriental.  Out of
496 SUPREME COURT REPORTS their union were born Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine on November 18, 1981 and October
ANNOTATED 25, 1987, respectively. 5
On August 28, 1996, private respondent filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
Roehr vs. Rodriguez marriage before the Regional Trial 6
Court (RTC) of Makati City. On February 7
6, 1997,
petitioner filed a motion to dismiss,  but it was denied by the trial court in its order  dated May
28, 1997.
tion transpired after the judgment has become final and executory and when it becomes imperative On8 June 5, 1997, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but was also denied in an
in the higher interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it. order  dated August 13, 1997. On September 5, 1997, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
Same;  Same;  Same;  Same;  Same;  Same;  Before the courts can give the effect of res judicata to a with the Court of Appeals. On November 27, 1998, the appellate court denied the petition and
foreign judgment, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment have been given ample remanded the case to the RTC.
opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court.—As a general Meanwhile, petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of
rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction, but Hamburg-Blankenese, promulgated on December 16, 1997. The decree provides in part:
the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children, must still be determined by our
courts. Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of [T]he Court of First Instance, Hamburg-Blankenese, Branch 513, has ruled through Judge van Buiren of
custody to petitioner by the German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment the Court of First Instance on the basis of the oral proceedings held on 4 Nov. 1997:
had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of The marriage of the Parties contracted on 11 December 1980 before the Civil Registrar of Hamburg-
Court. Altona is hereby dissolved.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence
of the justness of the claim of a party.—It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the _______________
foreign judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this
jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly provide that with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished 2 Judge Josefina Guevara-Salonga signed as Executive Judge.
3 Rollo, p. 16.
from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes  prima facie  evidence of the justness of the
4 Records, pp. 5-6.
claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.
5 Id., at pp. 1-4.
6 Id., at pp. 19-28.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari. 7 Id., at p. 147.
8 Id., at p. 165.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Manuel C. Moyco for petitioner. 498
     Fortun, Narvasa & Salazar for private respondent.

QUISUMBING, J.: 498 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

 Roehr vs. Rodriguez Petitioner filed a timely motion for reconsideration 12on October 19, 1999, which was denied by
respondent judge in an order dated March 31, 2000.
The parental custody for the children Petitioner ascribes lack of jurisdiction of the trial court and grave abuse of discretion on the
     Carolynne Roehr, born 18 November 1981 part of respondent judge. He cites as grounds for his petition the following:
     Alexandra Kristine Roehr, born on 25 October 1987
is granted to the father. 1. PARTIALLY SETTING ASIDE THE ORDER DATED JULY 14, 1999 DISMISSING
9
The litigation expenses shall be assumed by the Parties. THE INSTANT13
CASE IS NOT ALLOWED BY 1997 RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE.
In view of said decree, petitioner filed a Second Motion to Dismiss on May 20, 1999 on the 2. RESPONDENT MARIA CARMEN RODRIGUEZ BY HER MOTION FOR PARTIAL
ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action or suit as a RECONSIDERATION HAD RECOGNIZED AND ADMITTED THE DIVORCE
decree of divorce had already been promulgated dissolving the marriage of petitioner and DECISION OBTAINED BY HER EXHUSBAND IN HAMBURG, GERMANY.
14

private respondent.
3. THERE IS NOTHING LEFT TO BE TACKLED BY THE HONORABLE COURT AS
On July 14, 1999, Judge Guevara-Salonga issued an order granting petitioner’s motion to
THERE ARE NO CONJUGAL ASSETS ALLEGED
dismiss. Private respondent filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, with a prayer that the
case proceed for the purpose of determining the issues of custody of children and the
distribution of the properties between petitioner and private respondent. _______________
On August 18, 1999, an Opposition to the Motion for Partial Reconsideration was filed by 11 Supra, note 1.
the petitioner on the ground that there is nothing to be done anymore in the instant case as 12 Supra, note 3.
the marital tie between petitioner Wolfgang Roehr and respondent Ma. Carmen D. Rodriguez 13 Rollo, p. 6.
had already been severed by the decree of divorce promulgated by the Court of First Instance 14 Id., at p. 8.
of Hamburg, Germany on December 16, 1997 and in view of the fact that said decree of divorce
500
had already been recognized by the RTC in its order of July 10
14, 1999, through the
implementation of the mandate of Article 26 of the Family Code,   endowing the petitioner
with the capacity to remarry under the Philippine law. 500 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

_______________
Roehr vs. Rodriguez
9 Rollo, p. 33.
10 Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country IN THE PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE AND IN THE DIVORCE
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under PETITION, AND THE CUSTODY OF THE CHILDREN
15
HAD ALREADY BEEN
Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38. AWARDED TO PETITIONER WOLFGANG ROEHR.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have
Pertinent in this case before us are the following issues:
capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by E.O. No. 227, dated July 17, 1987.)

499 1. Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused her discretion in issuing her order
dated September 30, 1999, which partially modified her order dated July 14, 1999; and
2. Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused her discretion when she assumed and
VOL. 404, JUNE 20, 2003 499 retained jurisdiction over the present case despite the fact that petitioner has already
Roehr vs. Rodriguez obtained a divorce decree from a German court.

On September 30, 1999, respondent judge issued the assailed order partially setting aside her
order dated July 14, 1999 for the purpose of tackling the issues of property relations of the
spouses as well as support and custody of their children. The pertinent portion of said order
provides:
Acting on the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Order dated July 14, 1999 filed by petitioner thru
counsel which was opposed by respondent and considering that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code was included as an amendment thru Executive Order 227, to avoid the absurd situation of a
Filipino as being still married to his or her alien spouse though the latter is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse because he/she had obtained a divorce abroad which is recognized by his/her national
law, and considering further the effects of the termination of the marriage under Article 43 in relation to
Article 50 and 52 of the same Code, which include the dissolution of the property relations of the spouses,
and the support and custody of their children, the Order dismissing this case is partially set aside with
respect to these matters which may be ventilated in this Court.
11
SO ORDERED.  (Emphasis supplied.)
On the first issue, petitioner asserts that the assailed order of respondent judge is completely
inconsistent with her previous order and is contrary to Section 3, Rule 16, Rules of Civil
Procedure, which provides:
Sec. 3.  Resolution of motion.—After the hearing,  the court may dismiss the action or claim, deny the
motion, or order the amendment of the pleading.
The court shall not defer the resolution of the motion for the reason that the ground relied upon is not
indubitable.
In every case, the resolution shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Petitioner avers that a court’s action on a motion is limited to dismissing the action or claim,
denying the motion, or ordering the amendment of the pleading.
Private respondent, on her part, argues that the RTC can validly reconsider its order dated
July 14, 1999 because it had not yet attained finality, given the timely filing of respondent’s
motion for reconsideration.

Pertinent to this issue is Section 3 in relation to Section 7, Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, which provides:
Sec. 3. Action upon motion for new trial or reconsideration.—The trial court may set aside the judgment
or final order and grant a new trial, upon such terms as may be just, or may deny the motion. If the court
finds
_______________
15 Ibid.
501
VOL. 404, JUNE 20, 2003 501
Roehr vs. Rodriguez
that excessive damages have been awarded or that the judgment or final order is contrary to the evidence
or law, it may amend such judgment or final order accordingly.
Sec. 7. Partial new trial or reconsideration.—If the grounds for a motion under this Rule appear to the
court to affect the issues as to only a part, or less than all of the matters in controversy, or only one, or
less than all, of the parties to it, the court may order a new trial or grant reconsideration as to such issues
if severable without interfering with the judgment or final order upon the rest.(Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear from the foregoing rules that a judge can order a partial reconsideration of a case
that has not yet attained finality. Considering that private respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration within the reglementary period, the trial court’s
16
decision of July 14, 1999 can
still be modified. Moreover, in  Sañado v. Court of Appeals,   we held that the court could
modify or alter a judgment even after the same has become executory whenever circumstances
transpire rendering its decision unjust and inequitable, as where certain facts and
circumstances justifying or requiring such17 modification or alteration transpired after the
judgment has become final and executory   and when it 18becomes imperative in the higher
interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it.  In our view, there are even more
compelling reasons to do so when, as in this case, judgment has not yet attained finality.
Anent the second issue, petitioner claims that respondent judge committed grave abuse of
discretion when she partially set aside her order dated July 14, 1999, despite the fact that
petitioner has already obtained a divorce decree from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg,
Germany. 19 20 21
In  Garcia v. Recio,   Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.,   and  Llorente v. Court of Appeals,   we
consistently held that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our
jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner.
_______________
16 G.R. No. 108338, 17 April 2001, 356 SCRA 546, 561.
17 David
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115821, 13 October 1999, 316 SCRA 710, 719.
18 People v. Gallo, G.R. No. 124736, 29 September 1999, 315 SCRA 461, 463.
19 G.R. No. 138322, 2 October 2001, 366 SCRA 437, 447.
20 No. L-68470, 8 October 1985, 139 SCRA 139, 143.
21 G.R. No. 124371, 23 November 2000, 345 SCRA 592, 601.
502
502 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Roehr vs. Rodriguez
22
22
Relevant to the present case is  Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, where this Court specifically
recognized the validity of a divorce obtained by a German citizen in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany. We held in  Pilapil  that a foreign divorce and its legal effects may be
recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality
principle in our civil law on the status of persons.
In this case, the divorce decree issued by the German court dated December 16, 1997 has
not been challenged by either of the parties. In fact, save for the issue of parental custody,
even the trial court recognized said decree to be valid and binding, thereby endowing private
respondent the capacity to remarry. Thus, the present controversy mainly relates to the award
of the custody of their two children, Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine, to petitioner.
As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable
in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof,  23
e.g.  on custody, care and support of the
children, must still be determined by our courts. Before our courts can give the effect of  res
judicata  to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner by the German
court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample
opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now
Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:
SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments.—The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having
jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment may
be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact.
_______________
22 G.R. No. 80116, 30 June 1989, 174 SCRA 653, 663.
23 Llorente v. Court of Appeals, supra at 602.
503
VOL. 404, JUNE 20, 2003 503
Roehr vs. Rodriguez
It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order
for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our
Rules of Court clearly provide that with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from
actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie 24evidence of the justness of
the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.
In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the opportunity to
challenge the judgment of the German court so that there is basis for declaring that judgment
as  res judicata  with regard to the rights of petitioner to have parental custody of their two
children. The proceedings in the German court were summary. As to what was the extent of
private respondent’s participation in the proceedings in the German court, the records remain
unclear. The divorce decree itself states that neither has she commented on the
25 26
proceedings   nor has she given her opinion to the Social Services Office.   Unlike petitioner
who was represented
27
by two lawyers, private respondent had no counsel to assist her in said
proceedings.  More importantly, the divorce judgment was issued to petitioner by virtue of the
German Civil Code provision to the effect that when a couple lived separately for three years,
the marriage is deemed irrefutably dissolved. The decree did not touch on the issue as to who
the offending spouse was. Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain
custody of the children, the trial court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine
the issue of parental custody, care, support and education mindful of the best interests of the Services, Inc.
children. This is in consonance with the provision in the Child and Youth Welfare Code that
the child’s welfare is always the paramount consideration in all questions concerning his care
28      Austria-Martinez, J., On official leave.
and custody.
Judgment affirmed with modification.
_______________
24 Philsec
Note.—A divorce decree does not  ipso facto  clothe a divorcee with the legal capacity to
Investment Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103493, 19 June 1997, 274 SCRA 102, 110.
25 Rollo, p. 57.
remarry—he must still adduce sufficient evidence to show the foreign state’s personal law
26 Ibid. governing his status, or at the very least, he should still prove his legal capacity to contract
27 Id., at
pp. 55-56. the second marriage. (Garcia vs. Recio, 366 SCRA 437 [2001])
28 Sagala-Eslao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116773, 16 January 1997, 266 SCRA 317, 321, citing Art. 8, P.D. No.
603, The Child and Youth Welfare Code.

504

504 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Roehr vs. Rodriguez

On the matter of property relations, petitioner asserts that public respondent exceeded the
bounds of her jurisdiction when she claimed cognizance of the issue concerning property
relations between petitioner and private respondent. Private respondent herself has admitted
in Par. 14 of her petition for declaration of nullity of marriage dated August 26, 1996 filed with
the RTC of Makati, subject of this case, that: “[p]etitioner and respondent have not acquired
any conjugal
29
or community property nor have they incurred any debts during their
marriage.”   Herein petitioner did not contest this averment. 30
Basic is the rule that a court
shall grant relief warranted by the allegations and the proof.  Given the factual admission by
the parties in their pleadings that there is no property to be accounted for, respondent judge
has no basis to assert jurisdiction in this case to resolve a matter no longer deemed in
controversy.
In sum, we find that respondent judge may proceed to determine the issue regarding the
custody of the two children born of the union between petitioner and private respondent.
Private respondent erred, however, in claiming cognizance to settle the matter of property
relations of the parties, which is not at issue.
WHEREFORE, the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, issued on
September 30, 1999 and March 31, 2000 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. We hereby
declare that the trial court has jurisdiction over the issue between the parties as to who has
parental custody, including the care, support and education of the children, namely Carolynne
and Alexandra Kristine Roehr. Let the records of this case be remanded promptly to the trial
court for continuation of appropriate proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

     Bellosillo (Chairman) and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

_______________

Art. 8. Child’s Welfare Paramount.—In all questions regarding the care, custody, education and property of the
child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration.
29 Rollo, p. 19.
30 JG Summit Holdings, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124293, 20 November 2000, 345 SCRA 143, 154.

505

VOL. 404, JUNE 20, 2003 505

Lanzaderas vs. Amethyst Security and General

VOL. 366, OCTOBER 2, 2001 437
Garcia vs. Recio
*
G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001.
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, vs. REDERICK A. RECIO,
respondent.
Marriages; Husband and Wife; Divorce; Conflict of Laws; Philippine law does not provide for absolute
divorce, hence, our courts cannot grant it, and a marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even
by a divorce obtained abroad.—At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off
points for our discussion. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot
grant it. A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad,
because of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner,
Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is
“validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.” A divorce obtained
abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent
with their respective national laws.
Same;  Same;  Same;  Same;  Evidence;  Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
—A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned, can be
made.  Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.  decrees that “aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.” Therefore, before
a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a
fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Presentation solely of the divorce
decree is insufficient.
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
438
438 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Garcia vs. Recio
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value,
the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence.—Respondent, on the other hand, argues
that the Australian divorce decree is a public document—a written official act of an Australian family
court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its authenticity and due execution. Respondent is getting
ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must
first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree
itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written
act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.
Same;  Same;  Same;  Same;  Same;  Proof of Foreign Public or Official Records;  Requisites.—Under
Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or
official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication, or (2) a copy thereof attested by the
officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must
be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and (b) authenticated by the
seal of his office. The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic
one issued by an Australian family court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the
aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A party’s failure to object properly renders a foreign divorce decree
admissible as a written act of the court of another State.—Fortunately for respondent’s cause, when the
divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its
admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of
Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioner’s qualification.
Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner’s failure to
object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney,
Australia.
Same;  Same;  Same;  Same;  Same;  Citizenship;  A former Filipino is no longer bound by Philippine
personal laws after he acquires another State’s citizenship.—Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13
and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary, respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws
after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992. Natu-
439
VOL. 366, OCTOBER 2, 2001 439
Garcia vs. Recio
ralization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights
belonging to a citizen. Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former states, don the
attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the
Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the existence of
a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action; Where a divorce decree is a defense
raised by a party, the burden of proving the pertinent foreign law validating it falls squarely upon him.—
The burden of proof lies with “the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the
prosecution or defense of an action.” In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material
allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of
proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. Since the divorce was
a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls
squarely upon him.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same;  Judicial Notice;  Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign
laws—like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved.—It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our
courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved.
Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of
their judicial function. The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable
doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.
Same;  Same;  Same;  Same;  Words and Phrases;  In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal
dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage; A decree nisi or an interlocutory order—a
conditional or provisional judgment of divorce—is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board,
although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no
reconciliation is effected.—Respondent’s contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means
the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different
types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, and (2) limited divorce or a
mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond
in full force. There is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree—a conditional or provi-
440

440 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Garcia vs. Recio
sional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although an
absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no reconciliation is
effected. Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and
practices, still restrict remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute;
thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the ground of adultery may be prohibited from
marrying again. The court may allow a remarriage only after proof of good behavior.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Presumptions; A divorce decree does not raise a disputable presumption or
presumptive evidence as to the civil status of the person presenting it where no proof has been presented on
the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained under the foreign law.—We also reject the claim of
respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable presumption or presumptive evidence as to his
civil status based on Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, for the simple reason that no proof has
been presented on the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Certificate of Legal Capacity; The legal capacity to contract marriage is
determined by the national law of the party concerned; The certificate of legal capacity mentioned in
Article 21 of the Family Code is sufficient to establish the legal capacity of a foreign national—a duly
authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the
alien applicant for a marriage license.—Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by
Article 21 of the Family Code was not submitted together with the application for a marriage license.
According to her, its absence is proof that respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry. We clarify.
To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party
concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been sufficient to
establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and
admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant
for a marriage license.
Same;  Same;  Same;  Same;  Same;  The absence of a certificate of legal capacity is merely an
irregularity in complying with the formal requirements for procuring a marriage license, an irregularity
which will not affect the validity of a marriage celebrated on the basis of a marriage license issued without
that certificate.—In passing, we note that the absence of the said certificate is merely an irregularity in
complying with the for-
441
VOL. 366, OCTOBER 2, 2001 441
Garcia vs. Recio
mal requirement for procuring a marriage license. Under Article 4 of the Family Code, an
irregularity will not affect the validity of a marriage celebrated on the basis of a marriage license issued
without that certificate. (Vitug, Compendium, pp. 120-126; Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of
the Philippines,1997 reprint, p. 17; Rufus Rodriguez, The Family Code of the Philippines Annotated, 1990
ed., p. 42; Melencio Sta. Maria, Jr., Persons and Family Relations Law, 1999 ed., p. 146.).
Same;  Same;  Same;  Same;  A divorce decree does not ipso facto clothed a divorcee with the legal
capacity to remarry—he must still adduce sufficient evidence to show the foreign State’s personal law
governing his status, or at the very least, he should still prove his legal capacity to contract the second
marriage.—Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized
Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with
petitioner’s contention that the court  a quo  erred in finding that the divorce decree  ipso facto  clothed
respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to
show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to
contract the second marriage.
Same;  Same;  Same;  Same;  The Court may not declare the second marriage of a divorcee null and
void on the ground of bigamy where there is a possibility that, under the foreign law, the divorcee was
really capacitated to remarry as a result of the divorce decree—the most judicious course is to remand the
case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show the divorcee’s legal capacity to remarry.—
Neither can we grant petitioner’s prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on the
ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to
marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that the most judicious course
is to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show petitioner’s legal capacity
to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties’ marriage on
the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were
both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in
Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan
City, Br. 28.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
442
442 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Garcia vs. Recio
     Olivia Velasco-Jacoba for petitioner.
     Anarica De Jesus Castillo co-counsel for petitioner.
     Gomez and Associates for respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such
decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and
the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgments; hence, like any other facts,
both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according
to our law on evidence.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for 1Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the
2
January 7, 1999 Decision   and the March 24, 1999 Order   of the Regional Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in  Civil Case No. 3026-AF. The assailed Decision disposed as
follows:
“WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A. Recio
solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved 3
and both parties can now remarry
under existing and applicable laws to any and/or both parties.”
The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.
_______________
1 Penned by Judge Feliciano V. Buenaventura; Rollo, pp. 7-9.
2 Rollo, p. 10.
3 Ibid., p. 9.
 16
443 court marked and admitted the documentary evidence of both parties.  After they submitted
17
their respective memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution.
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.
VOL. 366, OCTOBER 2, 2001 443
Garcia vs. Recio
Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in
Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not
The Facts on the basis of any defect in an essential element of the marriage; that is, respondent’s alleged
lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in
4 by respondent. The Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more
Malabon, Rizal,5 on March 1, 1987.  They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On
marital union to nullify18or annul.
May 18, 1989,   a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an
Hence, this Petition.
Austrian family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as 6
shown by a “Certificate of
Australian Citizenship” issued by the Australian government. Petitioner—a Filipina—and ______________
respondent were married
7
on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in 12 Amended Answer, p. 2; Rollo, p. 39.
Cabanatuan City.   In 8their  application  for a marriage license, respondent was declared as 13 Id., pp. 77-78.
14 Id.,
“single” and “Filipino.” p. 43.
15 Rollo, pp. 48-51.
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial 16 TSN, December 16, 1998, pp. 1-8; Records, pp. 172-179.
dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were 17 RTC Order of December 16, 1998; ibid., p. 203.
divided on9
May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in 18 The case was deemed submitted for decision on January 11, 2000, upon this Court’s receipt of the Memorandum

Australia. 10
for petitioner, signed by Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba. The Memorandum for respondent, signed by
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage   in
445
the court  a quo,  on the ground of bigamy—respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting
marriage at the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of
respondent’s marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997. VOL. 366, OCTOBER 2, 2001 445
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far11back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner
his prior marriage andits subsequent dissolution.  He contended that his first marriage to an Garcia vs. Recio
Australian

________________
Issues
4 Rollo, p. 37.
5 Ibid., p. 47.
6 Id., p. 44.
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
7 Id., p. 36.
“1
8 Annex “1”; Temporary Rollo, p. 9.
9  The couple secured an Australian “Statutory Declaration” of their legal separation and division of conjugal
The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by the
assets. See Annexes “3” and “4” of Respondent’s Comment; Rollo, p. 48. respondent  ipso facto  terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating him to
10 Id., pp. 33-35.
11 Id., p. 39.
contract a second marriage with the petitioner.

“2
444
The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a certificate of legal
capacity to marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite voiding the petitioner’s marriage to the
444 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED respondent.
Garcia vs. Recio “3

citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989;  thus, he
12
The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this case.
was legally capacitated to many petitioner in 1994. “4
On July 7, 1998—or about five years after the couple’s wedding and while the suit for the
declaration of nullity was pending—respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from 13
a The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53 of the
family court in Sydney, Australia because the “marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down.” Family Code as the applicable provisions in this case.
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complaint be dismissed on the ground that it
14 15 “5
stated no cause of action. The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent.   The
16
 The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce decree obtained by the respondent in 447
Australia  ipso factocapacitated the parties to remarry,19
without first securing a recognition of the
judgment granting the divorce decree before our courts.”
VOL. 366, OCTOBER 2, 2001 447
The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall concentrate on two
pivotal ones: (1) whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and Garcia vs. Recio
(2) whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to many petitioner. Because of our 24 25
ruling on these two, there is no more necessity to take up the rest. Civil Code.  In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26  of the Family
Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the26 divorce is “validly
_______________ obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.”  A divorce obtained
abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may27be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is
Atty. Gloria V. Gomez of Gomez and Associates, had been filed on December 10, 1999.
19 Petitioner’s Memorandum, pp. 8-9; Rollo, pp. 242-243.
consistent with their respective national laws.
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned,
446 can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. decrees that “aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which
may 28be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national
law.” Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party
446 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED pleading it 29must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
Garcia vs. Recio allowing it.  Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.

_______________

toms shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
The Court’s Ruling agreed upon in a foreign country.”
24 Tenchaves v. Escano, 15 SCRA 355, 362, November 29, 1965; Barretto Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 58 Phil. 67, 71-72,

The Petition is partly meritorious. March 7, 1933.

25 “Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country

where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
First Issue:  Articles 35(1), (4), (5), and (6), 36, 37, and 38. (71a)
Proving the Divorce Between  “Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity
Respondent and Editha Samson to remarry under Philippine law.” (As amended by EO 227, prom. July 27, 1987)
26 Cf Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., 139 SCRA 139, 143-144, October 8, 1985; and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA 653,
Petitioner assails the trial court’s recognition
20
of the divorce between respondent and Editha 663, June 30, 1989.
Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,  petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like any 27 Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., supra.
28 Ibid., p. 143.
other foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction only upon proof of the
29  For a derailed discussion of Van Dorn, see Salonga,  Private International Law, 1995 ed., pp. 295-300.  See
existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute divorce, and (2) the alleged divorce decree
also Jose C. Vitug, Compendium of Civil Law and Jurisprudence, 1993 ed., p. 16.
itself. She adds that respondent miserably failed to establish these elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, 448
marriages solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the place where they were celebrated
(the lex loci celebrationis). In effect, the Code requires the presentation of the foreign law to
show the conformity of the marriage in question to the legal requirements of the place where 448 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
the marriage was performed. Garcia vs. Recio
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our
discussion.
21
Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant
it.  A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad,
22 23
Divorce as a Question of Fact
because of Articles 15  and 17  of the
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must first comply
_______________ with the registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code. These
articles read as follows:
20 43 Phil. 43, 49, March 3, 1922.
21 Ruben F. Balane, “Family Courts and Significant Jurisprudence in Family Law,” Journal of the Integrated Bar of “ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file separately a
the Philippines, 1st & 2nd Quarters, 2001, Vol. XXVII, No. 1, p. 25. sworn application for such license with the proper local civil registrar which shall specify the following:
22 “ART. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
x x x      x x x      x x x
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.” “(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or annulled;
23 “ART. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the
x x x      x x x      x x x”
laws of the country in which they are executed. “ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant shall be
x x x      x x x      x x x
required to furnish, instead of the birth or baptismal certificate required in the last preceding article, the
“Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order,
public policy and good cus-
death certificate of the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of the absolute divorce, or the judicial
decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her previous marriage, x x x.
“ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the children’s presumptive legitimes
shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall
not affect their persons.”
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public document
—a written official act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of
its authenticity and due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive
30
evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence.  A divorce
obtained
_______________
30“SEC. 19. Classes of documents.—For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either public
or private.
“Public documents are:
“(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals,
and public officers, whether in the Philippines, or of a foreign country.
449
VOL. 366, OCTOBER 2, 2001 449
Garcia vs. Recio
abroad is proven 31
by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the
judgment itself.  The decree purports
32
to be a written act or record of an act of an official body
or tribunal of a foreign country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be
proven as a public or official
33
record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication, or
(2) a copy thereof attested  by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is
not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
34
country in which the record is kept, and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
_______________
x x x      x x x      x x x.
31 Burr W. Jones, Commentaries on the Law of Evidence in Civil Cases,Vol. IV, 1926 ed., p. 3511; §3, Rule 130 of the
Rules on Evidence provides that “when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself.”
32 “SEC. 19. Classes of documents.—For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either public
or private. Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals,
and public officers, whether in the Philippines, or of a foreign country.
x x x      x x x      x x x.”
33  “Sec. 25.  What attestation of copy must state.—Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the
purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a
specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there
be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.”
34 “Sec. 24. Proof of official record.—The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer
having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines,
with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the
certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or
450
450 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Garcia vs. Recio
The divorce decree between respondent 35
and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one
issued by an Australian family court.  However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with
the aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent’s cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted
in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but 36only to the fact that it
had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan
37
City.  The trial court ruled
that it was admissible, subject to petitioner’s qualification. Hence, it was admitted in evidence
and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner’s failure to object properly rendered the
38
divorce decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary,
respondent was no39longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian
citizenship in 1992.  Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with
the political and civil rights belonging to a citi-
_______________
consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which
the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.”
See also  Asiavest Ltd. v. Court of Appeals,  296 SCRA 539, 550-551, September 25, 1998;  Pacific Asia Overseas
Shipping Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 161 SCRA 122, 133-134, May 6, 1988.
35 The transcript of stenographic notes states that the original copies of the divorce decrees were presented in court
(TSN, December 16, 1998, p. 5; records, p. 176), but only photocopies of the same documents were attached to the
records (Records, Index of Exhibits, p. 1.).
36 TSN, December 15, 1998, p. 7; records, p. 178.
37 TSN, December 16, 1998, p. 7; records, p. 178.
38 People v. Yatco, 97 Phil. 941, 945, November 28, 1955; Marella v. Reyes, 12 Phil. 1, 3, November 10, 1908; People
v. Diaz,  271 SCRA 504, 516, April 18, 1997;  De la Torre v. Court of Appeals,  294 SCRA 196, 203-204, August 14,
1998; Maunlad Savings & Loan Asso., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114942, November 27, 2000, pp. 8-9,  346
SCRA 35.
39 Art. 15, Civil Code.
451
VOL. 366, OCTOBER 2, 2001 451
Garcia vs. Recio
40
zen.   Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former states, don the
attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his
allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juristhat had tied him to Philippine personal
laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner,
because she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that
petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the
marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a long
time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts; thus, judges 453
may take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with “the party who alleges the existence of
41 VOL. 366, OCTOBER 2, 2001 453
a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.”  In civil cases, plaintiffs
have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by Garcia vs. Recio
the answer; and defendants have the burden 42
of proving the material allegations in their
answer when they introduce new matters.   Since the divorce was a defense raised by
ground of adultery may be prohibited from marrying again. The court may allow a remarriage
respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely 47
only after proof of good behavior.
upon him.
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:
It 43is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws.  Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not “1. A party to a marriage who marries again
48
before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party
among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judi- has died) commits the offence of bigamy.”

_______________
40 Joaquin Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 566.
41 Ricardo J. Francisco, Evidence: Rules of Court in the Philippines, second edition, p. 382.
42 Ibid.,
p. 384.
43 Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119602, October 6, 2000, p. 7, 342 SCRA 213.
452
452 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Garcia vs. Recio
44
rial function.   The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every
reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.
Second Issue: Respondent’s Legal Capacity to Remarry
Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent was legally
incapacitated to marry her in 1994. Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void  ab
initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in
evidence, adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law.
Respondent’s contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense,  divorce  means the legal
dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different
types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or  a vinculo matrimony,  and (2) limited
divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first 45kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends
it and leaves the bond in full force.   There is no showing in the case at bar which type of
divorce was procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree—a conditional or provisional
judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although an
absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no
46
reconciliation is effected.
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and
practices, still restrict remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited
by statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the
_______________
44 Francisco, p. 29, citing De los Angeles v. Cabahug, 106 Phil. 839, December 29, 1959.
45 27 A CJS, 15-17, §1.
46 Ibid., pp. 611-613, §161.
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been
restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his
national law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously
assumed that the Australian divorce  ipso facto  restored respondent’s capacity to remarry
despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable 49
presumption or presumptive evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court, for the simple reason that no proof has been presented on the legal effects of
the divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the Family
Code was not submitted together with
_______________
47 27A CJS, 625, §162.
48 Rollo, p. 36.
49 “SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a
foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
x x x      x x x      x x x
“(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a
right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.
“In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to
the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.”
454
454 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Garcia vs. Recio
the application for a marriage license. According to her, its absence is proof that respondent
did not have legal capacity to remarry.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national
law of the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would
have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in
court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie
50
evidence of legal capacity to
marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license.
As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent’s legal capacity to
marry petitioner. A review of the records before this Court shows that only the following
exhibits were51
presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit “A”—
Complaint;   (b) Exhibit “B”—Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino-
 58 Id.,
Australian)
52
and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva pp. 40-41.
59 Id., p. 183.
Ecija;   (c) Exhibit “C”—Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino)
53
and 60 Id., pp. 184-187.
Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila;   (d) Exhibit
“D”—Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City Certification that no information 54
of 456
annulment between Rederick A. Redo and Editha D. Samson was in 55
its records;   and (e)
Exhibit “E”—Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;  (2) for respondent: (a)
Exhibit “1”— 456 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Garcia vs. Recio
_______________
50 In passing, we note that the absence of the said certificate is merely an irregularity in complying with the formal
legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties’ marriage void
requirement for procuring a marriage license. Under Article 4 of the Family Code, an irregularity will not affect the on the ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.
validity of a marriage celebrated on the basis of a marriage license issued without that certificate.
SO ORDERED.
(Vitug, Compendium, pp. 120-126; Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, 1997 reprint, p. 17;
Rufus Rodriguez, The Family Code of the Philippines Annotated, 1990 ed., p. 42; Melencio Sta. Maria, Jr., Persons and
Family Relations Law, 1999 ed., p. 146.).      Melo (Chairman), Vitug and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
51 Records, pp. 1-3.
52 Ibid., p. 4. Case remanded to trial court for reception of evidence.
53 Id., p. 5.
54 Id., p. 180. Notes.—Once proved that a wife was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce
55 Id., pp. 170-171.
from her husband, then she could very well lose her right to inherit from the latter. (Quita vs.
455
Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 406[1998])
The ruling in  People v. Mendoza,  95 Phil. 843  (1954) and  People v. Aragon,  100 Phil.
1033 (1957) that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a marriage which
VOL. 366, OCTOBER 2, 2001 455 is void ab initio has been overturned—the prevailing rule is found in Article 40 of the Family
Code. (Te vs. Court of Appeals, 346 SCRA 327 [2000])
Garcia vs. Recio
56
Amended Answer;   (b) Exhibit “2”—Family Law 57
Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of
Marriage in the Family Court 58of Australia;   (c) Exhibit “3”—Certificate of Australian
Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;  (d) Exhibit 59
“4”—Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in
the Family Court of Australia Certificate;   and Exhibit “5”—Statutory Declaration of the
Legal60Separation Between Rederick A. Recio and Grace J. Garcia Recio since October 22,
1995.
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a
naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12,
1994. We agree with petitioner’s contention that the court  a quo  erred in finding that the
divorce decree  ipso factoclothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without
requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his
status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioner’s prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and
void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was
really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we
believe that the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive
evidence, if any, which show petitioner’s legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that,
then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties’ marriage on the ground of bigamy,
there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in
the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in
Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, we REMAND
the case to the court  a quo  for the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show
respondent’s

_______________
56 Id., pp. 84-89.
57 Id., pp. 181-182.

G.R. No. 186571. August 11, 2010.*
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, petitioner, vs. DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR
GENERAL, respondents.
Marriages; Family Code; Husband and Wife; Declaration of Nullity; Divorce; The Family Code
recognizes only two types of defective marriages—void and voidable marriages—and in both cases, the
basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the
time of the marriage; Divorce contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the
marriage.—The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages—void and voidable
marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the
marriage exists  before  or  at the time  of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the
dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising  after  the marriage. Our family laws do not recognize
absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Legal Research; Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, Executive Order No. (EO) 227 effectively incorporated into the law this Court’s holding in
Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., 139 SCRA 139 (1985), and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA 653 (1989).—
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and an alien,
President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution,
enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its present
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
267
VOL. 628, AUGUST 11, 2010 267
Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas
wording, as follows: “Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with
the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid
in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.  Where a
marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry,
the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.” Through the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into the law this
Court’s holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., 139 SCRA 139 (1985), and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,174 SCRA
653 (1989). In both cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouse’s assertion of marital rights
after a foreign court’s divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that
the foreign divorce had already severed the marital bond between the spouses.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse
considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry.—As the RTC correctly stated, the provision
was included in the law “to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the
alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.” The legislative
intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts
created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien
spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry.  Without the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce,
whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding,
would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of
severing the marital bond; Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces
cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second
paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as
268
268 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas
basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien
spouse.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; An action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code is not limited  to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree—if the court finds that the
decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise
capacitated to contract another marriage.—An action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the
decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise
capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar
declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose status and
legal capacity are generally governed by his national law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Parties; Only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code—the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.—Given the
rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the
Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Conflict of Laws; Recognition of Foreign Judgments; The
unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip
such aliens of legal interest to petition the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the recognition of his foreign
divorce decree—direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a
party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign
judgment.—We qualify our above conclusion—i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens—with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not
sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). In other words, the
unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily
269
VOL. 628, AUGUST 11, 2010 269
Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas
strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree.
The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national law have
been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of
Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign
judgments. * * * To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient
to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of
the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an
alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her
national law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The starting point in any recognition of a
foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign
judgments and laws—the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules
on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the
alien himself or herself.—The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the
acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice
Herrera explained that, as a rule, “no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment
rendered by a tribunal of another country.” This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity
must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to
show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an action
instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an
integral aspect of his claim or defense.
Conflict of Laws; Recognition of Foreign Judgments; In the instant case where the foreigner seeking
recognition of the foreign divorce decree attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the
required certificates proving its authenticity, but failed to include a copy of the foreign law on divorce, the
Court deems it more appropriate to remand the case to the trial court to determine whether the divorce
decree is consistent with the foreign divorce law, given the Article 26 interests that will be served and the
Filipina wife’s obvious
270
270 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas
conformity with the petition.—In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the
national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of
a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires
proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the
documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied
by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the
required certificates proving its authenticity, but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce.
Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting
evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to
determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law. We deem it more
appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests that will be served and the
Filipina wife’s (Daisylyn’s) obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow
other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioner’s presumptive evidence
of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before
a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of  res
judicata between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
Same; Same; More than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition
of foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as
the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its terms.
—More than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign
judgments between nations, the  res judicata  effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the
deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its terms.
This same effect, as discussed above, will not
271
VOL. 628, AUGUST 11, 2010 271
Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas
obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code provides.
Same; Same; Civil Registry; While the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry,
the law and the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decree’s registration
—there must first be a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata
effect; The registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is patently
void and cannot produce any legal effect.—But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in
the civil registry, the law and the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the
decree’s registration. The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition
of the foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no
judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry
Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce
decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree
presented by Gerbert. Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a
court recognition, as it cited National Statistics Office (NSO) Circular No. 4, series of 1982, and
Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 1982—both of which required a final order from a
competent Philippine court  before  a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the
civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the
registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and
cannot produce any legal effect.
Same; Same; Same; Cancellation of Entries; The recognition that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) may
extend to a foreign divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil
registry—a petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under
the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry; The Rules of Court supplements
Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in
the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected—Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the
jurisdictional and procedural requirements that
272
272 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas
must be complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be
annotated in the civil registry.—Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize
the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not
the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil
registry. Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that “no entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected, without judicial order.” The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by
specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be
judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and
procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or
correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified
petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located; that
the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties to the
proceedings; and that the time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of general
circulation. As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present case, we cannot
consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is
precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact.—We hasten to point out, however,
that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two separate proceedings for the registration of a
foreign divorce decree in the civil registry—one for recognition of the foreign decree and another
specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the
foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings
(such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial
proceeding by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and
273
VOL. 628, AUGUST 11, 2010 273
Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas
tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Br.
11.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court
  Gilbert U. Medrano for petitioner.
  Michael P. Mejia for private respondent.
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition for review on certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court (present petition).
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian
citizenship through naturalization on November 29, 2000.3  On January 18, 2005, Gerbert
married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.4 Due to work and other
professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the
Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his
wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to
Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario,
Canada granted Gerbert’s petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took
effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.5
_______________
1 Dated October 30, 2008, penned by Judge Perla B. Querubin; Rollo, pp. 24-31.
2 Id., at pp. 3-20.
3 Id., at p. 27.
4 Marriage Certificate, id., at p. 37.
5 Certificate of Divorce, id., at p. 38.
274
274 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love.
Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig
City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyn’s
marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National
Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still
subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be
judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series
of 1982.6
Accordingly,  Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce
and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved  (petition) with the RTC. Although
summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized
letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition to Gerbert’s petition and, in
fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but was prevented by financial and
personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest
with a similar prayer to Gerbert’s.
In its October 30, 2008 decision,7 the RTC denied Gerbert’s petition. The RTC concluded
that Gerbert was  not the proper party  to institute the action for judicial recognition of the
foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino
spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Fam-
_______________
6 Id., at pp. 47-50; the pertinent portion of NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982, states:
It would therefore be premature to register the decree of annulment in the Register of Annulment of
Marriages in Manila, unless and until final order of execution of such foreign judgment is issued by competent
Philippine court.
7 Supra note 1.
275
VOL. 628, AUGUST 11, 2010 275
Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas
ily Code,8 in order for him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law.9 Article 26 of the
Family Code reads:
“Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.”
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the enactment
of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by the Court
in Republic v. Orbecido III;10 the provision was enacted to “avoid the absurd situation where
the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse.”11
The Petition
From the RTC’s ruling,12 Gerbert filed the present petition.13
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief, similar
to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his rights un-
_______________
8  Executive Order No. 209, enacted on July 6, 1987.
9 Rollo, p. 31.
10 G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005, 472 SCRA 114.
11 Id., at p. 121.
 12  Gerbert’s motion for reconsideration of the RTC’s October 30, 2008 decision was denied in an order dated “Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
February 17, 2009; Rollo, p. 32. the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
13 Supra note 2. except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
276
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.”
276 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
15 The void marriages are those enumerated under Articles 35, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41, 44, and 53 in relation to Article
Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas 52 of the Family Code.
16 The voidable marriages are those enumerated under Article 45 of the Family Code.
17 Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 437, 452.
der the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account the rationale 18 Ibid. See A. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Volume One, with
behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends that the provision the Family Code of the Philippines (2004 ed.), p. 262.
applies as well to the benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly 19 Proclamation No. 3, issued on March 25, 1996.
stretched the doctrine in  Orbecido  by limiting the standing to file the petition only to the 278
Filipino spouse—an interpretation he claims to be contrary to the essence of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. He considers himself as a proper party, vested
with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a possibility that he might be 278 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiancée in the Philippines since two marriage
certificates, involving him, would be on file with the Civil Registry Office. The Office of the Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas
Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective Comments,14  both support Gerbert’s
position. Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article 26 incorporated into the law this Court’s holding in  Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.20  and  Pilapil  v.
of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction Ibay-Somera.21 In both cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouse’s assertion of
for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree. marital rights after a foreign court’s divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The
Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce had already severed the marital bond between
The Court’s Ruling the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:
The alien spouse can claim no right  “To maintain x  x  x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered still
under the second paragraph of  married to [the alien spouse] and still subject to a wife’s obligations x x x cannot be just. [The
Article 26 of the Family Code as the Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
substantive right it establishes is in support to [the alien spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to
favor of the Filipino spouse conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of
justice are to be served.”22
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law “to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
_______________ divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.”23 The legislative intent is for the benefit
of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by
14 Rollo, pp. 79-87 and 125-142, respectively.
the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
277 provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the
alien spouse considered as dis-

VOL. 628, AUGUST 11, 2010 277

_______________
Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas 20 G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985, 139 SCRA 139.
21 G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989, 174 SCRA 653.
22 Van Dorn v. Romillo, supra note 20 at p. 144.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages—void15  and
23 Republic v. Orbecido, supra note 10 at p. 121.
voidable16 marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or
annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other 280
hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising  after  the
marriage.17 Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.18
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and an 280 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas
Freedom Constitution,19  enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the
Family Code to its present wording, as follows:
solved, capacitating him or her to remarry.24 Without the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a
proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding,
would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a
mode of severing the marital bond;25Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy
against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country.
The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct
exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage
between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is
not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree
capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is
likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can
make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the
decree), whose status
_______________
24  The capacity of the Filipino spouse to remarry, however, depends on whether the foreign divorce decree
capacitated the alien spouse to do so.
25 See Article 17 in relation to Article 15 of the Civil Code:
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons
are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
x x x x
Art. 17. x x x Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their
object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
280
280 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas
and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law.26
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of
the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can
invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no
right under this provision.
The foreign divorce decree is
presumptive evidence of a right that
clothes the party with legal interest to 
petition for its recognition in this
jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion—i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens—with the complementary statement that this
conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other words,
the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not
necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign
divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the
alien’s national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a
presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This Section states:
_______________
26 Parenthetically, we add that an alien’s legal capacity to contract is evidenced by a certificate issued by his or her
respective diplomatic and consular officials, which he or she must present to secure a marriage license (Article 21,
Family Code). The Filipino spouse who seeks to remarry, however, must still resort to a judicial action for a
declaration of authority to remarry.
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Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas
“SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—The effect of a judgment or final order of a
tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is conclusive
upon the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to
the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.”
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to
clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the
recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the
divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce
is valid according to his or her national law.27
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment
that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera
explained that, as a rule, “no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a
judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country.”28 This means that the foreign judgment
and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the
alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or her-
_______________
27 Garcia v. Recio, supra note 17 at p. 447; citing Van Dorn v. Romillo,supra note 20.
28 Remedial Law, Volume II, Rules 23-56 (2007 ed.), p. 529.
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282 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas
self.29 The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in
another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or
defense.
In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien,
recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign
authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires
proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody
of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well
as the required certificates proving its authenticity,30  but failed to include a copy of the
Canadian law on divorce.31  Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the
petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to
remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the
Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26
interests that will be served and the Filipina wife’s (Daisylyn’s) obvious conformity with the
petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow other inter-
_______________
29 Republic v. Orbecido III, supra note 10 at p. 123 and Garcia v. Recio,supra note 17 at p. 448; see also Bayot v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 155635, November 7, 2008, 570 SCRA 472.
30 Rollo, pp. 38-41.
31 The foreign divorce decree only stated that the marriage between Gerbert and Daisylyn was dissolved by the
Canadian court. The full text of the court’s judgment was not included.
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VOL. 628, AUGUST 11, 2010 283
Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas
ested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioner’s presumptive evidence
of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity
with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall
have the effect of res judicata32 between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court.33
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal
recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the  res judicata  effect of the foreign
judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for
considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not
obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code provides.
_______________
32 Literally means “a thing adjudged,” Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed.), p. 1178; it establishes a rule that a final
judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their
privies in all later suits, on points and matters determined in the former. Supra note 28 at p. 462.
33 See Philsec Investment Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103493, June 19, 1997, 274 SCRA 102, 110,
where the Court said:
While this Court has given the effect of  res judicata  to foreign judgments in several cases, it was after the
parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to repel them on grounds allowed under the
law. It is not necessary for this purpose to initiate a separate action or proceeding for enforcement of the foreign
judgment. What is essential is that there is opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the
court to properly determine its efficacy. This is because in this jurisdiction, with respect to actions in personam,
as distinguished from actions  in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes  prima facie  evidence of the
justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.
284
284 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas
Considerations beyond the
recognition of the foreign divorce
decree
As a matter of “housekeeping” concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office
has already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage
certificate based on the mere presentation of the decree.34 We consider the recording to
be legally improper; hence, the need to draw attention of the bench and the bar to what had
been done.Article 407 of the Civil Code states that “[a]cts, events and judicial decrees
concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.” The law requires
the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon
a person’s legal capacity and status,  i.e., those affecting “all his personal qualities and
relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as
his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not.”35
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a person’s legal
capacity and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of
Civil Status specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry:
“Sec. 1. Civil Register.—A civil register is established for recording the civil status of persons, in
which shall be entered:
(a) births;
(b) deaths;
_______________
34 On the face of the marriage certificate, the word “DIVORCED” was written in big, bold letters; Rollo, p. 37.
35 Silverio v. Republic, G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007, 537 SCRA 373, 390, citing Beduya v. Republic, 120 Phil.
114; 11 SCRA 109 (1964).
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VOL. 628, AUGUST 11, 2010 285
Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas
(c) marriages;
(d) annulments of marriages;
(e) divorces;
(f) legitimations;
(g) adoptions;
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
(i) naturalization; and
(j) changes of name.
x x x x
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books.—The local registrars shall keep and preserve in their offices the following books,
in which they shall, respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil status of persons:
(1) Birth and death register;
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages solemnized but also divorces and
dissolved marriages.
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and naturalization register.”
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and
the submission of the decree by themselves do not  ipso  facto  authorize the
decree’s registration. The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial
recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of
the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus,
the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when
it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate, on
the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.
 Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake
recognition, as it cited NSO Circu- of law or fact.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the October
286
30, 2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February
17, 2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in
286 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar
General. No costs.
Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas SO ORDERED.

lar No. 4, series of 1982,36 and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 198237—both Carpio-Morales (Chairperson), Bersamin, Abad** and Villarama, Jr., concur. 
of which required a final order from a competent Philippine court before  a foreign judgment,
dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the _______________ 
registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce 41 When the entry sought to be corrected is substantial (i.e., the civil status of a person), a Rule 108 proceeding is
decree without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal deemed adversarial in nature. See Co v. Civil Register of Manila, G.R. No. 138496, February 23, 2004, 423 SCRA 420,
effect. 430.
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may extend ** Designated additional Member of the Third Division, in view of the retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno,
to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in per Special Order No. 843 dated May 17, 2010.
the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding,
contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that “no entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected, without judicial order.” The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil
Code by specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil
registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail
the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment,
authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also
requires, among others, that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province
where the corresponding civil registry is located;38 that the civil registrar and all persons who
have or claim any interest must be made parties to the proceedings;39 and that the time and
place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of general circulation.40As these basic
jurisdictional requirements have not

_______________

36 Rollo, pp. 47-50.

37 Id., at p. 51.
38 Section 1, Rule 108, Rules of Court.
39 Section 3, Rule 108, Rules of Court.
40 Section 4, Rule 108, Rules of Court.

287

VOL. 628, AUGUST 11, 2010 287

Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas

been met in the present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as
one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two
separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry—one
for recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a
Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact.
Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial
proceeding41 by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in

198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Court of Appeals
*
G.R. No. 108763. February 13, 1997.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,  vs.  COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL
OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.
Family Code; Marriage; Psychological incapacity must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.—
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that
“psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity x x x and that
(t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
‘psychological incapacity’ to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.” Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, Justice
Vitug wrote that “the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability.”
Same; Same; Mere showing of “irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting personalities” in no wise
constitutes psychological incapacity.—On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to
us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a “difficulty,” if
not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of
“irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting personalities” in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.
It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married
persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological
(not physical) illness.
Same; Same.—The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could
not get along with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its
juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert
____________________________
* EN BANC.
199
VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 13, 1997 199
Republic vs. Court of Appeals
testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not
psychological incapacity.
Same; Same; Guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code.—From
their submissions and the Court’s own deliberations, the following guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the
bar: (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage
and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it “as
the foundation of the nation.” It decrees marriage as legally “inviolable,” thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be “protected” by the state.
Same; Same; Root cause of psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness and
its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.—The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological—not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court
that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be
given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
Same;  Same;  The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the
marriage.—The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage.
The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their “I do’s.” The
manifestation of the illness
200
200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Court of Appeals
need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or
prior thereto.
Same; Same; Such incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.—
Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or  incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate,
bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
Same; Same; Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage.—Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of
the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, “mild characteriological peculiarities,
mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts” cannot be accepted as root  causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other
words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
Same; Same; Non-complied marital obligation(s) must be stated in the petition, proven by evidence
and included in the text of the decision.—The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and
225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that
Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of
Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides: “The following are incapable of
contracting mar-
 201
VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 13, 1997 201
Republic vs. Court of Appeals
riage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of
psychological nature.”
Same; Same; Trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state.—The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for
his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date
the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor vinculicontemplated under Canon 1095.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     The Solicitor General for petitioner.
     Juanito A. Orallo for respondent.
     Oscar V. Cruz and Ricardo C. Puno amici curiae.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to those
enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail the validity of a marriage, namely, “psychoogical
incapacity.” Since the Code’s effectivity, our courts have been swamped with various petitions
to declare marriages void based on this ground. Although this Court had interpreted the
meaning of psychological incapacity in the recent case of  Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still
many judges and lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel provision in specific cases. In
the present case and in the context of the herein assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, the
Solicitor General has labelled—exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive of his
frustration—Article 36 as the “most liberal divorce procedure in the world.” Hence, this Court
in
202
202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Court of Appeals
addition to resolving the present case, finds the need to lay down specific guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Before us is1 a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January 25,
2
1993 Decision  of the Court of Appeals  in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14,
3
1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad,   Benguet, which declared the
marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void  ab initio, on the
ground of “psychological incapacity” under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina
of a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially,
the petition alleged
4
that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San
Agustin Church   in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of
marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of “immaturity and irresponsibility” as a husband and a
father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he
squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never
honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them;
that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then
Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a
very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged; that in March
1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her par-
____________________________
1 Rollo pp. 25-3.
2 Sixteenth Division composed of J. Segundino G. Chua,  ponente  and chairman;  JJ. Serafin V.C. Guingona and
Ricardo P. Galvez, concurring.
3 Presided by Judge Heilia S. Mallare-hillipps.
4 Solemnized by Fr. Jesus G. Encinas.
203
VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 13, 1997 203
Republic vs. Court of Appeals
ents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had
since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically
incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly immature and
habitually quarrelsome individual who thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it
would be to the couple’s best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order to
free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel
could  no  longer live together as husband and wife, but contended that their
misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to: (1) Roridel’s strange behavior of
insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel’s refusal to
perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel’s failure to run the
household and handle their finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:
“1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church of St.
Augustine, Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born on
July 29, 1986;
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;
5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife.”
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends
Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker,
and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical
Center. She also submitted documents marked as Exhibits “A” to “E-1.” Reynaldo did not
present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference.
204
204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Court of Appeals
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of
petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed  in toto  the RTC’s decision.
Hence, the present recourse.
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that “the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and
incorrect interpretation of the phrase ‘psychological incapacity’ (as provided under Art. 36 of
the Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case,” adding
that the appealed Decision tended “to establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in
the world which is anathema to our culture.”
5
In denying the Solicitor General’s appeal, the respondent Court relied  heavily on the trial
court’s findings “that the
____________________________
5 The Court of Appeals reproduced in its Decision a substantial portion of the RTC Decision as follows:
“To sustain her claim that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply with his marital obligations, petitioner testified
that he is immature, irresponsible, dependent, disrespectful, arrogant, a chronic liar, and an infidel. These characteristics of
respondent are based on petitioner’s testimony that the former failed to be gainfully employed after he was relieved from the Office
of the Government Corporate Counsel sometime in February, 1986, leaving petitioner as the sole breadwinner of the family. Also
when they were separated in fact, respondent practically abandoned both petitioner-mother and son except during the first few
months of separation when respondent regularly visited his son and gave him a monthly allowance of P1,000.00 for about two to
four months. Respondent is likewise dependent on his parents for financial aid and support as he has no savings, preferring to
spend his money with his friends and peers. A year after their marriage, respondent informed petitioner that he bought a house
and lot at BF Homes, Parañaque for about a million pesos. They then transferred there only for the petitioner to discover a few
months later that they were actually renting the house with the respondent’s parents responsible for the payment of the
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marriage between the parties broke up because of their opposing and conflicting
personalities.” Then, it added its own
____________________________
rentals. Aside from this, respondent would also lie about his salary and ability. And that at present, respondent is living with his
mistress and their child, which fact he does not deny.
It is unfortunate that the marriage between petitioner and respondent turned sour if we look at the background of their
relationship. During their college days, when they were still going steady, respondent observed petitioner to be conservative,
homely, and intelligent causing him to believe then that she would make an ideal wife and mother. Likewise, petitioner fell in love
with respondent because of his thoughtfulness and gentleness. After a year, however, they decided to break their relationship
because of some differences in their personalities. Almost five (5) years later, while they were working in Manila, petitioner and
respondent rekindled their love affair. They became very close and petitioner was glad to observe a more mature respondent.
Believing that they know each other much better after two years of going steady, they decided to settle down and get married. It
would seem, therefore, that petitioner and respondent knew each other well and were then prepared for married life.
During their marriage, however, the true personalities of the parties cropped-up and dominated their life together. Unexpectedly
on both their parts, petitioner and respondent failed to respond properly to the situation. This failure resulted in their frequent
arguments and fightings. In fact, even with the intervention and help of their parents who arranged for their possible
reconciliation, the parties could not come to terms.
It seems clear at this stage that the marriage between the parties broke-up because of their opposing and conflicting
personalties (sic). Neither of them can accept and understand the weakness of the other. No one gives in and instead, blame each
other for whatever problem or misunderstanding/s they encounter. In fine, respondent cannot be solely responsible for the failure of
other (sic) marriage. Rather, this resulted because both parties cannot relate to each other as husband and wife which is unique
and requisite in marriage.
Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman with the basic objective of establishing a
conjugal and family life. (Article 1, Family Code). The
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opinion that “the Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as the Committee)
intended to liberalize the application of our civil laws on personal and family rights x x x.” It
concluded that:
“As a ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychological incapacity as a broad range of mental
and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital union,
his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for
the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage. If said conduct, observed and considered as a
whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, then
there is enough reason to leave the spouses to their individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed noindiscretion in analyzing and deciding
the instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions thus
made.”
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that “opposing and conflicting personalities” is not
equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground “is not simply
the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect  in
their psychological nature which
____________________________
unique element of permanency of union signifies a continuing, developing, and lifelong relationship between the parties. Towards
this end, the parties must fully understand and accept the (implications and consequences of being permanently) united in
marriage. And the maintenance of this relationship demands from the parties, among others, determination to succeed in their
marriage as well as heartfelt understanding, acceptance, cooperation, and support for each other. Thus, the Family Code requires
them to live together, to observe mutual (love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. Failure to observe) and
perform these fundamental roles of a husband and a wife will most likely lead to the break-up of the marriage. Such is the
unfortunate situation in this case.” (Decision, pp. 5-8; Original Records, pp. 70-73)
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renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties.”
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
6
 6
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals,  this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug,
ruled that “psychological incapacity should refer to  no  less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity x x x and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been
to confine the meaning of ‘psychological incapacity’ to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated.” Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former 7presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage
Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila,   Justice Vitug wrote that “the psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.”
On the other hand, in the present case, there is  no  clear showing to us that the
psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a “difficulty,” if
not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere
showing of “irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting personalities” in  no  wise constitutes
psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their
responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to
be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could not get
along with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem;
____________________________
6 240 SCRA 20, 34, January 4, 1995.
7 Quoted from Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code, First Edition, 1988.
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neither its juridicial antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison
showed  no  incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological
8
incapacity. Dr. Sison testified:
“COURT
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the
psychiatrist based on your findings that it is
better for the Court to annul (sic) the marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the marriage?
A There is no hope, the man is also living with
another woman.
Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the
parties are psychologically unfit for each other but
they are psycho logically fit with other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their
professions?
A Yes, Your Honor.
  The Court has no more questions.”
In the case of Reynaldo, there is  no  showing that his alleged personality traits were
constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. While
some effort was made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of
“thoughtfulness and gentleness” on Reynaldo’s part and of being “conservative, homely and
intelligent” on the part of Roridel, such failure of expectation is not indicative of antecedent
psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love’s temporary blindness to the faults and
blemishes of the beloved.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this
case vis-a-vis existing law and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family
Code and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts in interpreting and applying it, the
Court decided to invite two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V.
____________________________
8 TSN, April 6, 1991, p. 5.
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9
Cruz,  Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial
10
Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno,   a member of the Family
Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this occasion to thank these friends of the Court
for their informative and interesting discussions during the oral argument on December 3,
1996, which they followed up with written memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court’s own deliberations, the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the
guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution
and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and11 unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,  recognizing it “as
____________________________
9 The National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal reviews all decisions of the marriage tribunals of each archdiocese
or diocese in the country. Aside from heading the Appellate Tribunal, Most Rev. Cruz is also incumbent president of
the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines, Archbishop of Dagupan-Lingayen, and holds the degrees of Doctor
of Canon Law and Doctor of Divinity. Archbishop Cruz was also Secretary-General of the Second Plenary Council of
the Philippines—PCP II—held from January 20, 1991 to February 17, 1991, which is the rough equivalent of a
parliament or a constitutional convention in the Philippine Church, and where the  ponente, who was a Council
member, had the privilege of being overwhelmed by his keen mind and prayerful discernments.
10 Justice Puno was a former member of the Court of Appeals, retired Minister of Justice, author, noted civil law
professor and law practitioner.
11
“Article XV 
THE FAMILY
Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino Family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity
and actively promote its total development.
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the foundation of the nation.” It decrees marriage as legally “inviolable,” thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
are to be “protected” by the state.
12
The Family Code  echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The  root cause  of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological—not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms
may be physiccal. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or
____________________________
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the state.
Section 3. The State shall defend:
(1) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible
parenthood;
(2) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect,
abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development;
(3) The right of the family to a family living wage and income;
(4) The right of families or family associations to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that
affect them.
Section 4. The family has the duty to care for its elderly members but the state may also do so through just programs of social
security.”
12  “Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an
inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits
provided by this Code.”
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one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not
have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given
valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here
so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of  ejusdem
13
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and
its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their “I do’s.” The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at
such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing
illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, “mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts” cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness
must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in
____________________________
13 Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994.
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212 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
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the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision
Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in
1983 and which provides:
“The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those14 who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.”
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil
laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate
tribunal. Ideally—subject to our law on evi-
____________________________
14 This text is taken from the Memorandum of Archbishop Cruz. On the other hand, the text used in Santos vs.
CA reads:
“Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
x x x      x x x      x x x
3. Who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage.”
The difference in wording between this and that in Arch. Cruz’s Memorandum is due to the fact that the original Canon is
written in Latin and both versions are differently-worded English translations.
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Republic vs. Court of Appeals
dence—what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code
provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the
State and the Church—while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other—
shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing
marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General
to appear as counsel for the state.  No  decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the
petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to
the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the petition.
Such ruling becomes even more cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
SO ORDERED.
          Narvasa  (C.J.),  Davide, Jr.,  Bellosillo,  Melo,  Puno,  Francisco,  Hermosisima,
Jr. and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
     Padilla, J., See Separate Statement.
     Regalado, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., In the result.
     Romero, J., Please see my separate opinion.
     Vitug, J., Please see concurring opinion.
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SEPARATE STATEMENT
PADILLA, J.:
I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr. Justice Panganiban but only because of the
peculiar facts of the case. As to whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case
calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on
the facts of the case. In  Leouel Santos v. Court of Appeals and Julia Rosario-Bedia
Santos, G.R. No. 112019, 4 January 1995, 240 SCRA 20-36, I maintained, and I still maintain,
that there was psychological incapacity on the part of the wife to discharge the duties of a wife
in a valid marriage. The facts of the present case, after an indepth study, do not support a
similar conclusion. Obviously, each case must be judged, not on the basis of  a
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In the field
of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say
that no case is on “all fours” with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining
the factual millieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its
own judgment for that of the trial court.
SEPARATE OPINION
ROMERO, J.:
The majority opinion, overturning that of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Regional
Trial Court ruling, upheld petitioner Solicitor General’s position that “opposing and conflicting
personalities” is not equivalent to psychological incapacity, for the latter “is not simply
the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect  in
their psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital
responsibilities and duties.”
In the present case, the alleged personality traits of Reynaldo, the husband, did not
constitute so much “psychological incapacity” as a “difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or “neg-
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Republic vs. Court of Appeals
lect” in the performance of some marital obligations. “it is not enough to prove that the parties
failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they
must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness.”
I would add that neither should the incapacity be the result of mental illness. For if it were
due to insanity or defects in the mental faculties short of insanity, there is a resultant defect
or vice of consent, thus rendering the marriage annullable under Art. 45 of the Family Code.
That the intent of the members of the U.P. Law Center’s Civil Code Revision Committee
was to exclude  mental inability  to understand the essential nature of marriage and focus
strictly on psychological incapacity is demonstrated in the way the provision in question
underwent revisions.
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:
“(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the
sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack
of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.”
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the following revised
provision even before the session was over:
“(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest after the
celebration.”
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any reference to
“wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature or
marriage” and to “mentally incapacitated.” It was explained that these phrases refer to
“defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of appre-
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ciation of one’s marital obligation.” There being a defect in consent, “it is clear that it should be
a ground for viodable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of
convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are cases when the
insanity is curable . . . . Psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has
1 shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage.”
My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological incapacity is,
in a sense, insanity of a lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term “psychological or mental impotence,”
Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in the earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term “is an
invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered
a weak phrase.” He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as “psychological
or mental incapacity to discharge . . . .” Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a
person may be psychologically impotent with one but not with another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation and
application of Art. 36 is: “Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to
the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.”
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the phrase
“and is incurable” but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would give rise to the
question of how they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be
more problematic. Yet the possibility that one may be cured after the psychological incapacity
becomes manifest after the marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice
Sempio-Diy. Justice
____________________________
1 Justice Caguioa’s explanation in the Minutes of July 26, 1986 of the Civil Code Revision Committee of the U.P.
Law Center.
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Republic vs. Court of Appeals
Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages, viz:
1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under “special cases and special
situations,” hence its special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or
annulling marriages that even comes close to being psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the marriage, such
marriage which stands valid until annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites, some
marriages are void from the beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on Marriage, the
drafters, now open to fresh winds of change in keeping with the more permissive mores and
practices of the time, took a leaf from the relatively liberal provisions of Canon Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of contracting
marriage: “3. (those) who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume
the essential obligations of marriage” provided the model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family
Code: “A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
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It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types of marriages
with respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an intermediate
state, the voidable or annullable marriages. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal “annuls” a
marriage, it actually declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never really existed in the
first place, for a valid sacramental marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly
performed and consummated marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be
nullified by the formal annulment process which entails a full tribunal procedure with a Court
selection and a formal hearing.
Such so-called church “annulments” are not recognized by Civil Law as severing the
marriage ties as to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds
for nullifying civil marriage, not being congruent with those laid down by Canon Law, the
former being more strict, quite a number of married couples have found themselves in limbo—
freed from the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a
valid civil marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions, some persons contract
new marriages or enter into live-in relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations that the
Civil Law Revision Committee decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological
incapacity into the Family Code—and classified the same as a ground for declaring marriages
void ab initio or totally inexistent from the beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it did not provide
directly for psychological incapacity, in effect recognized the same indirectly from a
combination of three old canons: “Canon #1081 required persons to be ‘capable according to
law’ in order to give valid consent: Canon #1082 required that persons ‘be at least not ignorant
of the major elements required in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and fear category)
required that internal and external freedom be present in order for consent to be valid. This
line of interpretation produced two distinct but
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Republic vs. Court of Appeals
related grounds for annulment, called ‘lack of due discretion’ and lack of due competence.’ Lack
of due discretion means that the person did not have the ability to give valid consent at the time
of the wedding  and therefore the union is invalid. Lack of due competence means that the

person was incapable of carrying out the obligations of the promise he or she made during the
wedding ceremony.
“Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s
involving sexual disorders such as homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a
broader approach to the kind of proof necessary for psychological grounds for annulment. The
Rota had reasoned for the first time in several cases that the capacity to give valid consent at
the time of marriage was probably not present in persons who had displayed such problems
shortly after the marriage. The nature of this change was nothing short of revolutionary. Once
the Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way
was paved for what came after 1970.  Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of serious
psychological problems that manifested themselves shortly after the ceremony as proof of an
inability to give valid consent at the time of the ceremony.
Furthermore, and equally significant,  the professional opinion of a psychological expert
became increasingly important in such cases. Data about the person’s entire life, both before
and after the ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked to give professional
opinions about a party’s mental capacity at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely
challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to the
addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to
the  advances made in psychology during the past decades. There was now the expertise to
provide the all–important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital
causes.
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During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal
contract to that of a covenant. The result of this was that  it could  no  longer be assumed  in
annulment cases  that a person who could intellectually understand the concept of marriage
could necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real
obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment  are now considered a necessary prerequisite to
2
valid matrimonial consent.”
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, “not
only to sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or
both spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For
marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each other’s body for
heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality, the right to the community of the whole of life, i.e., the
right to a developing, lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning
of psychological or psychic capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of an adult
personality; as  meaning the capacity of the spouses to give themselves to each other and to
accept the other as a distinct person; that the spouses must be `other oriented’ since the
obligations of marriage are rooted in a self–giving love; and that the spouses  must have the
capacity for interpersonal relationship  because marriage is more than just a physical reality
but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations of marriage
depends, according to Church decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal relationship. A
serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the relationship and
consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of one
spouse is not3 considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental relationship to the
other spouse.
____________________________
2 Zwack,
Joseph P., Annulment, A Step-by-Step Guide.
3 The Code of Canon Law, A Text and Commentary, The Canon Law Society of America, Paulist Press, New York,
1985.
221
VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 13, 1997 221
Republic vs. Court of Appeals
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature marital
relationship:
“The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a permanent and
faithful commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3) stability; (4)
emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and
strains of marriage, etc.”
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to the failure of
a marriage:
“At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion even with the best
intentions of the parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability to fulfill
marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to
persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom of sexual
choice; (3) the inadequate personality where personal responses consistently fall short of reasonable
expectations.
x x x      x x x      x x x
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts whether he or she has a case
for an annulment on any other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the more traditional
categories often fits very easily into the psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift in their use. Whereas
originally the emphasis was on the parties’ inability to exercise proper judgment at the time of the
marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating  on the parties’ incapacity to
assume or carry out their responsibilities and obligations as promised  (lack of due competence). An
advantage to using the ground of lack of due competence is that at the time the marriage was entered
into  civil divorce and breakup of the family almost always is proof of someone’s
4
failure to carry out
marital responsibilities as promisedat the time the marriage was entered into.”
In the instant case, “opposing and conflicting personalities” of the spouses were not considered
equivalent to psychological
____________________________
4 Zwack, ibid., p. 47.
222
222 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Court of Appeals
incapacity. As well in Santos v. Court of Appeals cited in the ponencia, the Court held that the
failure of the wife to return home from the U.S. or to communicate with her husband for more
than five years is not proof of her psychological incapacity as to render the marriage a
5
nullity.  Therefore, Art. 36 is inapplicable and the marriages remain valid and subsisting.
6
However in the recent case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,  this Court upheld both
the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals in declaring the presence of psychological
incapacity on the part of the husband. Said petitioner husband, after ten (10) months’ sleeping
with his wife never had coitus with her, a fact he did not deny but he alleged that it was due to
the physical disorder of his wife which, however, he failed to prove. Goaded by the indifference
and stubborn refusal of her husband to fulfill a basic marital obligation described as “to
procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual
cooperation is the basic end of marriage,” the wife brought the action in the lower court to
declare the marriage null.
The Court, quoting Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan
Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch I) on psychological
incapacity, concluded:
“If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage
obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to
psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal.  Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to
psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or
her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.”
We declared:
____________________________
5 G.R. No. 112019, 240 SCRA 20 (1995).
6 G.R. No. 119190 (1997).
223
VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 13, 1997 223
Republic vs. Court of Appeals
“This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped
in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the
studied judgment of respondent appellate court.”
I concur with the majority opinion that the herein marriage remains valid and subsisting
absent psychological incapacity (under Art. 36 of the Family Code) on the part of either or both
of the spouses.
CONCURRING OPINION
VITUG, J.:
I fully concur with my esteemed colleague Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in his ponencia,
and I find to be most helpful the guidelines that he prepared for the bench and the bar in the
proper appreciation of Article 36 of Executive Order  No. 209 (“The Family Code of the
Philippines”). The term “psychological incapacity” was neither defined nor exemplified by the
Family Code. Thus—
“Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.”
The Revision Committee, constituted under the auspices of the U.P. Law Center, which
drafted the Code explained:
“(T)he Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals which, although not binding
1
on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the
provision was taken from Canon Law.”
____________________________
1 Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo, quoting Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis, 233 SCRA
100.
224
224 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Court of Appeals
Article 36 of the Family Code was concededly taken from Canon 1095 of the New Code of
Canon Law—
“Canon 1095. (The following persons) are incapable of contracting marriage; (those)—
“1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
“2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights
and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;
“3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage”—
that should give that much value to Canon Law 2
jurisprudence as an aid to the interpretation
and construction of the statutory enactment.
The principles in the proper application of the law teach us that the several provisions of a
Code must be read like a congruent whole. Thus, in determining the import of “psychological
incapacity” under Article 36, one must also read it along with, albeit  to be taken as distinct
from, the other grounds enumerated in the Code, like Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that would
likewise, but for distinct reasons, render the marriage void ab initio, or Article 45 that would
make the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal
separation. Care must be observed so that these various circumstances are not applied so
indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter.
3
I would wish to reiterate the Court’s statement in Santos vs. Court of Appeals;  viz:
“(T)he use of the phrase ‘psychological incapacity’ under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to
comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical
authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances x x x. Article 36 of the
Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with,
____________________________
2 In Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 20.
3 Supra.
225
VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 13, 1997 225
Republic vs. Court of Appeals
existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, ‘psychological incapacity’ should refer
to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of ‘psychological incapacity’ to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have
sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which
considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be
‘legitimate.’
“The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of
unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism,
merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become
mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code,
however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being 4
themselves,
depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.”
In fine, the term “psychological incapacity,” to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code, must be able to pass the following tests: viz:
First, the incapacity must be psychological or mental, not physical, in nature;
Second, the psychological incapacity must relate to the inability, not mere refusal, to
understand, assume and discharge the basic marital obligations of living together,
____________________________
4 At pages 34-35.
VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 13, 1997 227
People vs. Letigio
constitutional provisions are to be considered mandatory unless by necessary implication, a
different intention is manifest such that to have them enforced strictly would cause more
harm than by disregarding them. It is quite clear to me that the constitutional mandate on
marriage and the family has not been meant to be simply directory in character, nor for mere
expediency or convenience, but one that demands a meaningful, not half-hearted, respect.
Petition granted. Judgment reversed and set aside, the marriage subsists and remains valid.
Notes.—Psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. (Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 20[1995])
Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must
stand in conjunction with existing precepts in our law on marriage. (Ibid.)
The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensibility
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. (Id.)

226

226 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Republic vs. Court of Appeals

observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering mutual help and support;
Third, the psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is contracted although
its overt manifestations may occur only thereafter; and
Fourth, the mental disorder must be grave or serious and incurable.
It may well be that the Family Code Revision Committee has envisioned Article 36, as not a
few observers would suspect, as another form of absolute divorce or, as still others would also
put it, to be an alternative to divorce; however, the fact still remains that the language of the
law has failed to carry out, even if true, any such intendment. It might have indeed turned out
for the better; if it were otherwise, there could be good reasons to doubt the constitutionality of
the measure. The fundamental law itself, no less, has laid down in terse language its
unequivocal command on how the State should regard marriage and the family, thus—
Section 2, Article XV:
“Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State.”

Section 12, Article II:

“Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a
basic autonomous social institution x x x.”

Section 1, Article XV:

“Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.” (The 1987 Constitution)

The case of Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, might here be significant not so much for the
specific issue there resolved but for the tone it has set. The Court there has held that
227
 Same;  Same;  Same;  Same;  Same;  Legal Separation;  Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal
VOL. 343, OCTOBER 19, 2000 755 separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence,
moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual
Marcos vs. Marcos infidelity, abandonment and the like.—Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which
the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure,
*
G.R. No. 136490. October 19, 2000. moral

757
BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner, vs. WILSON G. MARCOS, respondent.

Actions; Marriage; Husband and Wife; Declaration of Nullity;  Psychological Incapacity;  Words and

Phrases;  Guidelines Governing the Application and Interpretation of Psychological Incapacity; The VOL. 343, OCTOBER 19, 2000 757
guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated
—what is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party’s psychological Marcos vs. Marcos
condition, for indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.—In Republic
v. CA and Molina, the guidelines govern- corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment
and the like. At best, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not
_______________
for declaring a marriage void.

* THIRD DIVISION. PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

756      Jimeno, Jalandoni & Cope Law Offices for petitioner.
     Macaraig Law Office for private respondent.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
756 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be
ANNOTATED
established by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however, that the
respondent should be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a conditio sine qua non for
Marcos vs. Marcos
such declaration.

ing the application and the interpretation of psychological incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the
Family Code were laid down by this Court as follows: x x x x x x x x x The guidelines incorporate the The Case
three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in  Santos v. Court of Appeals:  “psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.” The Before us is a Petition for Review
1
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing
foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically the July 24, 1998 Decision   of the Court of Appeals (CA) in  CA-GR  CV  No. 55588, which
incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be “medically or clinically identified.” What is important is the disposed as follows:
presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party’s psychologicalcondition. For indeed, if the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual “WHEREFORE,2 the contested decision is set aside and the marriage between the parties is hereby
medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. declared valid.”

Same;  Same;  Same;  Same;  Same;  There could be no conclusion of psychological incapacity where Also challenged by petitioner is the December 3, 1998 CA Resolution denying her Motion for
there is absolutely no showing that the “defects” were already present at the inception of the marriage or Reconsideration.
that they are incurable.—Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide
Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had ruled thus:
material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of
his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no
showing that his “defects” were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are _______________
incurable. 1 Penned by Justice Bernardo LL Salas with the concurrence of Justices Fermin A. Martin, Jr. (Division chairman)
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Divorce; Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a and Candido V. Rivera (member).
divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves.—Article 36 of 2 CA Decision, pp. 12-13; rollo, pp. 38-39.

the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the
time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party 758
even before the celebration of the marriage, it is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These
marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code. 758 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Marcos vs. Marcos
“WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and respondent Wilson G. Marcos,
solemnized on September 6, 1982 in Pasig City is declared null and void ab initiopursuant to Art. 36 of
the Family Code. The conjugal properties, if any, is dissolved [sic] in accordance with Articles 126 and
129 of the same Code in relation to Articles 50, 51 and 52 relative to the delivery of the legitime of [the]
parties’ children. In the best interest and welfare of the minor children, their custody is granted to
petitioner subject to the visitation rights of respondent.
“Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City
where the marriage was solemnized, the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila and the Register
of Deeds of Mandaluyong City for their appropriate action consistent with this Decision.
“SO ORDERED.”
The Facts
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
“It was established during the trial that the parties were married twice: (1) on September 6, 1982 which
was solemnized by Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu at the Municipal Court of Pasig (Exh. A); and (2) on May
8, 1983 which was solemnized by Rev. Eduardo L. Eleazar, Command Chaplain, at the Presidential
Security Command Chapel in Malacanang Park, Manila (Exh. A-1). Out of their marriage, five (5)
children were born (Exhs. B, C, D, E and F).
“Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1973. Later on, he was
transferred to the Presidential Security Command in Malacañang during the Marcos Regime. Appellee
Brenda B. Marcos, on the other hand, joined the Women’s Auxilliary Corps under the Philippine Air
Force in 1978. After the Edsa Revolution, both of them sought a discharge from the military service.
“They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the Malacañang Palace, she as
an escort of Imee Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand Marcos. Through
telephone conversations, they became acquainted and eventually became sweethearts.
“After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at  No. 1702 Daisy Street, Hulo Bliss,
Mandaluyong, a housing unit which she acquired from the Bliss Development Corporation when she was
still single.
759
VOL. 343, OCTOBER 19, 2000 759
Marcos vs. Marcos
“After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in 1987 and then engaged in
different business ventures that did not however prosper. As a wife, she always urged him to look for
work so that their children would see him, instead of her, as the head of the family and a good provider.
Due to his failure to engage in any gainful employment, they would often quarrel and as a consequence,
he would hit and beat her. He would even force her to have sex with him despite her weariness. He
would also inflict physical harm on their children for a slight mistake and was so severe in the way he
chastised them. Thus, for several times during their cohabitation, he would leave their house. In 1992,
they were already living separately.
“All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling “magic uling” and chickens. While she was
still in the military, she would first make deliveries early in the morning before going to Malacañang.
When she was discharged from the military service, she concentrated on her business. Then, she became
a supplier in the Armed Forces of the Philippines until she was able to put up a trading and construction
company, NS Ness Trading and Construction Development Corporation.
“The ‘straw that broke the camel’s back’ took place on October 16, 1994, when they had a bitter
quarrel. As they were already living separately, she did not want him to stay in their house anymore. On
that day, when she saw him in their house, she was so angry that she lambasted him. He then turned
violent, inflicting physical harm on her and even on her mother who came to her aid. The following day,
October 17, 1994, she and their children left the house and sought refuge in her sister’s house.
“On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical examination at the Mandaluyong Medical
Center where her injuries were diagnosed as contusions (Exh. G, Records, 153).
“Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and driver, went to him at the Bliss unit
in Mandaluyong to look for their missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he got mad. After knowing the
reason for their unexpected presence, he ran after them with a samurai and even [beat] her driver.
“At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were renting a house in Camella.
Parañaque, while the appellant was residing at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong.
“In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the children described their father as
cruel and physically abusive to them (Exh. UU, Records, pp. 85-100).
760
760 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Marcos vs. Marcos
“The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph. D., for psychological evaluation
(Exh. YY, Records, pp. 207-216), while the appellant on the other hand, did not.
“The court  a quo  found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations mainly because of his failure 3to find work to support his family and his violent attitude
towards appellee and their children. x x x.”
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity had not been established by the
totality of the evidence presented. It ratiocinated in this wise:
“Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the root cause of the spouse’s psychological
incapacity which should also be medically or clinically identified, sufficiently proven by experts and
clearly explained in the decision.  The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage and shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It must also
be grave enough to bring about the disability of the parties to assume the essential obligations of
marriage as set forth in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 225 of the Family Code and such non-
complied marital obligations must similarly be alleged in the petition, established by evidence and
explained in the decision.
“In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to any psychological or psychiatric evaluation.
The psychological findings about the appellant by psychiatrist Natividad Dayan were based only on the
interviews conducted with the appellee. Expert evidence by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists is essential if only to prove that the parties were or any one of them was mentally or
psychically ill to be truly incognitive of the marital obligations he or she was assuming, or as would make
him or her x x x unable to assume them. In fact, he offered testimonial evidence to show that he Iwasl
not psychologically incapacitated. The root cause of his supposed incapacity was not alleged in the
petition, nor medically or clinically identified as a psychological illness or sufficiently proven by an
expert. Similarly, there is no evidence at all that would show that the appellant was suffering from an
incapacity which [was] psychological or mental—not physical to the extent that he could not have known
_______________
3 CA Decision, pp. 5-7; rollo, pp. 31-33.
761
VOL. 343, OCTOBER 19, 2000 761
Marcos vs. Marcos
the obligations
4
he was assuming: that the incapacity [was] grave, ha[d] preceded the marriage and [was]
incurable.”
5
 5
Hence, this Petition.
Issues
6 x x x      x x x      x x x
In her Memorandum,  petitioner presents for this Court’s consideration the following issues:
“I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set aside the findings by the
Regional Trial Court of psychological incapacity of a respondent in a Petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage simply because the respondent did not subject
himself to psychological evaluation.
II. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the demeanor of 7all the
witnesses should be the basis of the determination of the merits of the Petition.”
The Court’s Ruling
We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or psychological examination of respondent
_______________
is not a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality of
the evidence she presented does not show such incapacity.
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
Preliminary Issue:  incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Need for Personal Medical Examination
celebration.”
Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results of various tests that were submitted
to determine respondent’s psychological incapacity to perform the obligations of marriage
should not have been brushed aside by the Court of Appeals, simply because
_______________
4 CA Decision, pp. 10-11; rollo, pp. 36-37.
5 This case was deemed submitted for resolution on February 24, 2000, upon receipt by this Court of respondent’s
Memorandum, which was signed by Atty. Virgilio V. Macaraig. Petitioner’s Memorandum, signed by Atty. Rita Linda
V. Jimeno, had been filed earlier on November 5, 1999.
6 Rollo, p. 70; original in upper case.
7 Memorandum for petitioner, p. 6; rollo, p. 70.
762
762 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Marcos vs. Marcos
respondent had not taken those tests himself. Petitioner adds that the CA should have
realized that under the circumstances, she had  no  choice but to rely on other sources of
information in order to determine the psychological capacity of respondent, who had refused to
submit himself to such tests. 8
In  Republic v. CA and Molina,   the guidelines governing the application 9 and the
interpretation of psychological incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the Family Code were laid
down by this Court as follows:
“1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution
and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it ‘as the foundation
of the nation.’ It decrees marriage as legally ‘inviolable,’ thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
‘protected’ by the state. 
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological—not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms
may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them,
was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known
the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as
not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of  ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and
its incapacitating
8 268 SCRA 198, February 13, 1997, per Panganiban, J.
9  “Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
“The action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under this Article shall prescribe in ten years after its
763
VOL. 343, OCTOBER 19, 2000 763
Marcos vs. Marcos
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration’ of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their ‘I do’s.’ The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at
such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing
illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be psychologically
capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation
of marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, ‘mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness
must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
 incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts. 
x x x      x x x      x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General
to appear as counsel for the state.  No  decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the
petition. The So-
764
764 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Marcos vs. Marcos
licitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
10
the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.”
The guidelines incorporate the11
three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court
in Santos v. Court of Appeals:  “psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity,
(b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.” The foregoing guidelines do not require that a
physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root
cause may be “medically or clinically identified.” What is important is the presence of evidence
that can adequately establish the party’s psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual
medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.
Main Issue: 
Totality of Evidence Presented
The main question, then, is whether the totality of the evidence presented in the present case
—including the testimonies of petitioner, the common children, petitioner’s sister and the
social worker—was enough to sustain a finding that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated.
We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed
to provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and
abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity
on his part. There is absolutely  no  showing that his “defects” were already present at the
inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and
was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this period that
he became
_______________
10 Supra, pp. 209-213.
11 40 SCRA 20, 34, January 4, 1995, per Vitug, J.
765
VOL. 343, OCTOBER 19, 2000 765
Marcos vs. Marcos
intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and even left the family home.
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the
inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his condition
is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver.
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts
the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a
malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations are
those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.
Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be
rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption,
civil 12interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the
like. At best, the evidence presented by
_______________
12 “Article 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a
child of the petitioner;
(2) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political affiliation;
(3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner, to
engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;
(4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six years, even if pardoned;
(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;
(6) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;
(7) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the Philippines or abroad;
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
(9) Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner; or
766
766 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Marcos vs. Marcos
petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.
Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law, this Court laid down the
procedural requirements for its invocation in  Molina.  Petitioner, however, has not faithfully
observed them.
In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of petitioner to
show that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability; and for her failure to observe the guidelines outlined in Molina.
 WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed Decision AFFIRMED, except that
portion requiring personal medical examination as a  conditio sine qua non  to a finding of
psychological incapacity. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

     Melo (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Petition denied, judgment affirmed.

Notes.—Whether one spouse is psychologically incapacitated should be immediately

determined as there is no point in unreasonably delaying the resolution of the petition and
prolonging the agony of the wedded couple who still have the right to a renewed blissful life
either alone or in the company of each other. (Salita vs. Magtolis,233 SCRA 100 [1994])
Where the respondent in a petition for annulment vehemently opposed the same, and
where he does not allege that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties, the
non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney to assure lack of collusion between the contending
parties is not fatal to the validity of the proceedings in the trial court. (Tuason vs. Court of
Appeals, 256 SCRA 158 [1996])

——o0o——

_______________

(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year.

For purposes of this Article, the term ‘child’ shall include a child by nature or by adoption.”

324 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of Appeals
* TORRES, JR., J.:
G.R. No. 119190. January 16, 1997.
CHI MING TSOI, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.
Civil Law; Family Code; Marriage; The prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with
his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.—“If a spouse, although physically
capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is
senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than
to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the
prolonged refusal
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
325
VOL. 266, JANUARY 16, 1997 325
Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of Appeals
of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological
incapacity.”
Same; Same; Same; One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is “to procreate
children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the
basic end of marriage.”—Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is “To
procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual
cooperation is the basic end of marriage.” Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy
the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one
of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
Same; Same; Same; While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, the sanction therefor is actually the spontaneous, mutual
affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order.—While the law provides
that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art.
68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the “spontaneous, mutual affection between husband
and wife and not any legal mandate or court order” (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno, 120 Phil. 1298). Love is
useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in
marriage is to say “I could not have cared less.” This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self.
The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses
wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a
function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
      Arturo S. Santos for petitioner.
      Prisciliano I. Casis for private respondent.
326
326 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of Appeals
Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its journey over
troubled waters. Laws are seemingly inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been placed in
the works of the unseen hand of Him who created all things.
Who is to blame when a marriage fails?
This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her uncaring husband in
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of the
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner appealed the decision of the
trial court to respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which affirmed the Trial
Court’s decision on November 29, 1994 and correspondingly denied the motion for
reconsideration in a resolution dated February 14, 1995.
The statement1 of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and reproduced by the
Court of Appeals  in its decision are as follows:
“From the evidence adduced, the following facts were preponderantly established:
“Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila Cathedral, x x x
Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage Contract. (Exh. “A”)
“After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati, they went
and proceeded to the house of defendant’s mother.
“There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their married life.
“It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as newlyweds they were
supposed to enjoy making love, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, the defendant just went to
bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned his back and went
_______________
1 Thirteenth Division: Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, J., ponente, Eduardo G. Montenegro and Antonio P. Solano,  JJ.,
concurring.
327
VOL. 266, JANUARY 16, 1997 327
Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of Appeals
to sleep. There was no sexual intercourse between them during the first night. The same thing happened
on the second, third and fourth nights.
“In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy together during their
first week as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with her mother, an
uncle, his mother and his nephew. They were all invited by the defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed in
Baguio City for four (4) days. But, during this period, there was no sexual intercourse between them,
since the defendant avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking
chair located at the living room. They slept together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22,
1988 until March 15, 1989. But during this period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between
them. [S]he claims, that she did not even see her husband’s private parts nor did he see hers.
“Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a
urologist at the Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.
“The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin, while
that of her husband’s examination was kept confidential up to this time. While no medicine was
prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed medications for her husband which was also kept confidential.
No treatment was given to her. For her husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but he never did.
 “The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis.
She said, that she had observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing
cream of his mother. And that, according to her, the defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire
or maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal
man.
“The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.
“On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage shall be annulled by reason
of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.
“But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for several reasons, viz: (1)
that he loves her very much; (2) that he has no defect on his part and he is physically and psychologically
capable; and, (3) since the relationship is still very young
328
328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of Appeals
and if there is any differences between the two of them, it can still be reconciled and that, according to
him, if either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that this will not be cured. He
further claims, that if there is any defect, it can be cured by the intervention of medical technology or
science.
“The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March
15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this, according to the defendant,
was that everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and
whenever he caresses her private parts, she always removed his hands. The defendant claims, that he
forced his wife to have sex with him only once but he did not continue because she was shaking and she
did not like it. So he stopped.
“There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant, why the plaintiff filed this case against him,
and these are: (1) that she is afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his mother,
and, (2) that her husband, the defendant, will consummate their marriage.
”The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they are still very young and
there is still a chance to overcome their differences.
“The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was examined by Dr. Sergio
Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of finding out whether he is impotent. As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza
submitted his Doctor’s Medical Report. (Exh. “2”). It is stated there, that there is no evidence of
impotency (Exh. “2-B”), and he is capable of erection. (Exh. “2-C”)
“The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out whether or not he has an
erection and he found out that from the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the penis of
the defendant lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the defendant had
only a soft erection which is why his penis is not in its full length. But, still is capable of further erection,
in that with his soft erection, the defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman.
“In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion between the parties and
2
that the evidence is not fabricated.”
_______________
2 Rollo, pp. 20-24.
329
VOL. 266, JANUARY 16, 1997 329
Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of Appeals
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
“ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the marriage entered into by the
plaintiff with the defendant on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate
Concepcion, Intramuros, Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera. Without costs. Let a copy of
this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City. Let another copy be furnished the
Local Civil Registrar of Manila.
“SO ORDERED.”
 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:
I
in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual intercourse between the parties
without making any findings of fact.
II
in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner is a
psychological incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent.
III
in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with
each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both.
IV
in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed by the lower court without fully
satisfying itself that there was no collusion between them.
330
330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of Appeals
 
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.
Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141, private respondent
has the burden of proving the allegations in her complaint; that since there was no
independent evidence to prove the alleged non-coitus between the parties, there remains no
other basis for the court’s conclusion except the admission of petitioner; that public policy
should aid acts intended to validate marriage and should retard acts intended to invalidate
them; that the conclusion drawn by the trial court on the admissions and confessions of the
parties in their pleadings and in the course of the trial is misplaced since it could have been a
product of collusion; and that in actions 3for annulment of marriage, the material facts alleged
in the complaint shall always be proved.
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:
“Section 1.  Judgment on the pleadings.—Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise
admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading, the court may, on motion of that party,
direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation the
material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.”
The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said provision seeks
to prevent is annulment of marriage without trial. The assailed decision was not based on such
a judgment on the pleadings. When private respondent testified under oath before the trial
court and was crossexamined by oath before the trial court and was crossexamined by the
adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in the form of a testimony. After such evidence
was presented, it became incumbent upon petitioner to present his side. He admitted that
since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no
sexual intercourse between them.
_______________
3 Ibid.
331
VOL. 266, JANUARY 16, 1997 331
Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of Appeals
 
To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the petitioner, the
Civil Code provides that no judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a
stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and 101 [par. 2]) and the Rules of
Court prohibit such annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).
The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage to be
annulled. This only shows that there is no collusion between the parties. When petitioner
admitted that he and his wife (private respondent) have never had sexual contact with each
other, he must have been only telling the truth. We are reproducing the relevant portion of the
challenged resolution denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, penned with
magisterial lucidity by Associate Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:
“The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not based on a stipulation of
facts. The issue of whether or not the appellant is psychologically incapacitated to discharge a basic
marital obligation was resolved upon a review of both the documentary and testimonial evidence on
record. Appellant admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his wife after almost ten months of
cohabitation, and it appears that he is not suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal
reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality
disorder which to the mind of this Court clearly demonstrates an ‘utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage’ within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code
(See Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995).”
4
 
Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged refusal
of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes
psychological incapacity of both. He points out as error the failure of the trial court to make “a
categorical finding about the alleged psychological incapacity and an in-depth analysis
_______________
4 Rollo, p. 34.
332
332 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of Appeals
of the reasons for such refusal which may not be necessarily due to psychological disorders”
because there might have been other reasons,—i.e., physical disorders, such as aches, pains or
other discomforts,—why private respondent would not want to have sexual intercourse from
May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a short span of 10 months.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding
on who between petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the
other. The fact remains, however, that there has never been coitus between them. At any rate,
since the action to declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the
psychologically incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes
immaterial.
Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show that any of the
parties is suffering from psychological incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted to
have sex with private respondent; that the reason for private respondent’s refusal may not be
psychological but physical disorder as stated above.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed with private
respondent or asked her what is ailing her, and why she balks and avoids him everytime he
wanted to have sexual intercourse with her. He never did. At least, there is nothing in the
record to show that he had tried to find out or discover what the problem with his wife could
be. What he presented in evidence is his doctor’s Medical Report that there is no evidence of
5
his impotency and he is capable of erection.  Since it is petitioner’s claim that the reason is not
psychological but perhaps physical disorder on the part of private respondent, it became
incumbent upon him to prove such a claim.
“If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage
obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the
_______________
5 Exhs. “2,” “2-B” and “2-C.”
333
VOL. 266, JANUARY 16, 1997 333
Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of Appeals
causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is
equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a6 spouse to have sexual intercourse
with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.”
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is “To procreate
children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual
cooperation is the basic end of marriage.” Constant nonfulfillment of this obligation will finally
destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and
protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to
psychological incapacity.
As aptly stated by the respondent court,
“An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband’s plea that the wife did not want
carnal intercourse with him does not inspire belief. Since he was not physically impotent, but he
refrained from sexual intercourse during the entire time (from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989) that he
occupied the same bed with his wife, purely out of sympathy for her feelings, he deserves to be doubted
for not having asserted his rights even though she balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in
I Paras, Civil Code, at p. 330). Besides, if it were true that it is the wife who was suffering from
incapacity, the fact that defendant did not go to court and seek the declaration of nullity weakens his
claim. This case was instituted by the wife whose normal expectations of her marriage were frustrated by
her husband’s inadequacy. Considering the innate modesty of the Filipino woman, it is hard to believe unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the
that she would expose her private life to public scrutiny and fabricate testimony against her husband if it studied judgment of respondent appellate court.
were not necessary to put her life in order and put to rest her marital status. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
“We are not impressed by defendant’s claim that what the evidence proved is the unwillingness or lack
dated November 29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby
of intention to perform the sexual act, which is not psychological incapacity, and which can be achieved
“through proper motivation.” After almost ten months of DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
_______________ Regalado (Chairman), Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
6 Psychological Incapacity, G.T. Veloso, p. 20, cited in The Family Code of the Philippines Annotated, Pineda, 1989
ed., p. 51. Judgment affirmed.

334 Note.—View that a spouse’s obligation to live and cohabit with his/her partner in marriage
is a basic ground rule in marriage. (Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 20 [1995])
334 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of Appeals

cohabitation, the admission that the husband is reluctant or unwilling to perform the sexual act with his
wife whom he professes to love very dearly, and who has not posed any insurmountable resistance to his
alleged approaches, is indicative of a hopeless situation, and of a serious personality disorder that
constitutes psychological
7
incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants within the contemplation of
the Family Code.”

 
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the
“spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court
order” (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno, 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with
another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say “I
could not have cared less.” This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist
has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses
wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of
creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation
of family relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent.
That is—a shared feeling which between husband and wife must be experienced not only by
having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is
a two-way process. An expressive interest in each other’s feelings at a time it is needed by the
other can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for
children but for two consenting adults who view the relationship with love  amor gignit
amorem,respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value
as a sublime social institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found
themselves trapped in its mire of

_______________
7 Decision, pp. 11-12; Rollo, pp. 30-31.

335

VOL. 266, JANUARY 20, 1997 335

People vs. Ramirez

G.R. No. 167523. June 27, 2008.*
NILDA V. NAVALES, petitioner, vs. REYNALDO NAVALES, respondent.**
Marriage; Declaration of Nullity; Family Code; A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; Let it be stressed that it is the
policy of our Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution,
and marriage as the foundation of the family—the Constitution decrees marriage as legally inviolable and
protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties; While the guidelines in Molina, 268 SCRA 198
(1997) requiring the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)  to issue a certification on whether or not it is
agreeing or objecting to the petition for annulment has been dispensed with by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or
the Rule on the Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
** The Court of Appeals having been included as a co-respondent, is deleted from the title pursuant to Section 4, Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.
273
VOL. 556, JUNE 27, 2008 273
Navales vs. Navales
still, Article 48 mandates the appearance and active participation of the State through the fiscal or
the prosecuting attorney.—Let it be stressed that it is the policy of our Constitution to protect and
strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution, and marriage as the foundation of the
family. The Constitution decrees marriage as legally inviolable and protects it from dissolution at the
whim of the parties. The Family Code under Article 48 therefore requires courts to order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal assigned, in cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, to appear
on behalf of the State in order to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that
the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Indeed, only the active participation of the Public
Prosecutor or the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) will ensure that the interest of the State is
represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and declarations of nullity of marriage by
preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or suppression of evidence. While the
guidelines in Molina, 268 SCRA 198 (1997) requiring the OSG to issue a certification on whether or not it
is agreeing or objecting to the petition for annulment has been dispensed with by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
or the Rule on the Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages, still, Article 48 mandates the appearance and active participation of the State through the
fiscal or the prosecuting attorney.
Same; Same; Same; Appeals; The principle that the factual findings of trial courts, when affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, are binding on the Supreme Court does not apply when the findings of the appellate
court go beyond the issues of the case, run contrary to the admissions of the parties, fail to notice certain
relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different  conclusion, or when there is a
misappreciation of facts.—The Court finds that the totality of evidence presented by Reynaldo, contrary
to its appreciation by the RTC and the CA, is insufficient to sustain a finding that Nilda is
psychologically incapacitated. Generally, factual findings of trial courts, when affirmed by the CA, are
binding on this Court. Such principle however is not absolute, such as when the findings of the appellate
court go beyond the issues of the case; run contrary to the admissions of the parties; fail to notice certain
relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; or when there is a
misappreciation of facts. Such is the case at bar.
274
274 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Navales vs. Navales
Same; Same; Same; Psychological Incapacity; Words and Phrases; Psychological incapacity, in order
to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of marriage—it is a malady that is so
grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial
bond one is about to assume; Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability.—Psychological incapacity, in order to be a ground for the nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party
even before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady that is so grave and permanent as to deprive one
of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. As all
people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated traits associated with certain personality
disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the intention of the law has been to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. In  Santos v. Court of
Appeals, 240 SCRA 20 (1995), the Court held that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations—mere “difficulty,” “refusal” or “neglect” in the
performance of marital obligations or “ill will” on the part of the spouse is different from “incapacity”
rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or illness.—Reynaldo and his witnesses sought to
establish that Nilda was a flirt before the marriage, which flirtatiousness recurred when she started
working as an aerobics instructress. The instances alleged by Reynaldo,  i.e., the occasion when Nilda
chose to ride home with another man instead of him, that he saw Nilda being kissed by another man
while in a car, and that Nilda allowed other men to touch her body, if true, would understandably hurt
and embarrass him. Still, these acts by themselves are insufficient to establish a psychological or mental
defect that is serious, incurable or grave as contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code. Article 36
contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obliga-
275
VOL. 556, JUNE 27, 2008 275
Navales vs. Navales
tions. Mere “difficulty,” “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of marital obligations or “ill will” on
the part of the spouse is different from “incapacity” rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or
illness. Indeed, irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under
Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person’s refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential
obligations of marriage and not due to some psychological illness that is contemplated by said rule.
Same; Same; Same; Same; An admission of a good and harmonious relationship during the early
part of the marriage weakens the assertion of psychological defect existing at the time of the celebration of
the marriage which deprived the party of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its
concomitant responsibilities.—As admitted by Reynaldo, his marriage with Nilda was not all that bad; in
fact, it went well in the first year of their marriage. As in other cases, an admission of a good and
harmonious relationship during the early part of the marriage weakens the assertion of psychological
defect existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage which deprived the party of the ability to
assume the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities. In determining the import
of “psychological incapacity” under Article 36, the same must be read in conjunction with, although to be
taken as distinct from, Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 of the Family Code that would likewise, but for different
reasons, render the marriage void ab initio; or Article 45 that would make the marriage merely voidable;
or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal separation. These various circumstances are not
applied so indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter. Indeed, Article 36 should not be
equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on
physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like.
Same; Same; Same; Same; While it is true that the Court relies heavily on psychological experts for its
understanding of the human personality, and that there is no requirement that the defendant spouse be
personally examined by a physician or psychologist before the nullity of marriage based on psychological
incapacity may be
276
276 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Navales vs. Navales
declared, still, the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological
illness, its incapacitating nature fully explained, and said incapacity established by the totality of the
evidence presented during trial.—Reynaldo also presented Clinical Psychologist Vatanagul to bolster his
claim that Nilda is psychologically incapacitated. While it is true that the Court relies heavily on
psychological experts for its understanding of the human personality, and that there is no requirement
that the defendant spouse be personally examined by a physician or psychologist before the nullity of
marriage based on psychological incapacity may be declared, still, the root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness, its incapacitating nature fully explained, and
said incapacity established by the totality of the evidence presented during trial. The Court finds that
the psychological report presented in this case is insufficient to establish Nilda’s psychological incapacity.
In her report, Vatanagul concluded that Nilda is a nymphomaniac, an emotionally immature individual,
has a borderline personality, has strong sexual urges which are incurable, has complete denial of her
actual role as a wife, has a very weak conscience or superego, emotionally immature, a social deviant, not
a good wife as seen in her infidelity on several occasions, an alcoholic, suffers from anti-social personality
disorder, fails to conform to social norms, deceitful, impulsive, irritable and aggressive, irresponsible and
vain. She further defined “nymphomia” as a psychiatric disorder that involves a disturbance in motor
behavior as shown by her sexual relationship with various men other than her husband. The report
failed to specify, however, the names of the men Nilda had sexual relationship with or the circumstances
surrounding the same. As pointed out by Nilda, there is not even a single proof that she was ever
involved in an illicit relationship with a man other than her husband.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A marriage, no matter how unsatisfactory, is not a null and void
marriage.—While Reynaldo and Nilda’s marriage failed and appears to be without hope of reconciliation,
the remedy, however, is not always to have it declared void  ab initio  on the ground of psychological
incapacity. A marriage, no matter how unsatisfactory, is not a null and void marriage. And this Court,
even as the highest one, can only apply the letter and spirit of the law, no matter how harsh it may be.
277
VOL. 556, JUNE 27, 2008 277
Navales vs. Navales
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
   Aquilino C. Felicitas, Jr. for petitioner.
   Fermin O. Poloyapoy for private respondent.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorariassailing the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 76624 promulgated on February 16, 2005 which affirmed the
Judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 59 of Toledo City, in Civil Case No. T-
799 dated January 2, 2002, declaring the nullity of the marriage of Reynaldo and Nilda
Navales on the ground of psychological incapacity.
The facts are as follows:
Reynaldo Navales (Reynaldo) and Nilda Navales (Nilda) met in 1986 in a local bar where
Nilda worked as a waitress. The two became lovers and Nilda quit her job, managed a
boarding house owned by her uncle and studied Health Aide financed by Reynaldo. Upon
learning that Nilda’s uncle was prodding her to marry an American, Reynaldo, not wanting to
lose her, asked her to marry him. This, despite his knowledge that Nilda was writing her
penpals and was asking money from them and that she had an illegitimate son by a man
whose identity she did not reveal to him.3 The two got married on December 29, 1988, before
the Municipal Trial Court Judge of San Fernando, Cebu.4
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Arsenio J. Magpale and concurred in by Associate Justices Sesinando E. Villon and
Vicente L. Yap, Rollo, pp. 28-35.
2 Judge Gaudioso D. Villarin, Records, pp. 359-372.
3 Rollo, p. 29 (CA Decision); Records, p. 363 (RTC Decision).
4 Id.; Records, p. 249.
278
278 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Navales vs. Navales
Reynaldo claims that during the first year of their marriage, their relationship went well.
Problems arose, however, when Nilda started selling RTWs and cosmetics, since she could no
longer take care of him and attend to household chores.5 Things worsened when she started
working as an aerobics instructor at the YMCA, where, according to Reynaldo, Nilda’s
flirtatiousness and promiscuity recurred. She wore tight-fitting outfits, allowed male clients to
touch her body, and introduced herself as single. Reynaldo received phone calls from different
men looking for Nilda. There was also a time when Nilda chose to ride with another man
instead of Reynaldo; and another when Nilda went home late, riding in the car of the man who
kissed her. Reynaldo also claims that Nilda refused to have a child with him, as it would
destroy her figure.6  On June 18, 1992, Reynaldo left Nilda and never reconciled with her
again.7
On August 30, 1999, Reynaldo filed a Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage and Damages before the RTC, Toledo City, Cebu, docketed as Civil Case No. T-799
claiming that his marriage with Nilda did not cure Nilda’s flirtatiousness and sexual
promiscuity, and that her behavior indicates her lack of understanding and appreciation of the
meaning of marriage, rendering the same void under Article 36 of the Family Code.8
Reynaldo testified in support of his petition and presented telephone directories showing
that Nilda used her maiden name “Bacon” instead of “Navales.”9  Reynaldo also presented
Josefino Ramos, who testified that he was with Reynaldo
_______________
5 Records, p. 364 (RTC Decision).
6 Rollo, pp. 29-30 (CA Decision).
7 Records, p. 364 (RTC Decision).
8 Records, pp. 1, 3.
 9 Exhibit “B,” machine copy of page 13 of the telephone directory for the year 1993-1994, Records, p. 250; Exhibit The RTC held that:
“C,” machine copy of page 15 of the telephone directory for the year 1994-1995, id., at p. 251.
“x x x From the testimonies and evidences x x x adduced, it was clearly established that the defendant
279 had no full understanding of [the] effects of marriage and had no appreciation of [the] consequences of
marriage as shown by her x x x act of concealing her marital status by using her maiden name “Nilda T.
Bacon,” augmenting her pretense of being still single through the telephone directories; by her refusal to
VOL. 556, JUNE 27, 2008 279 accompany with [sic] her husband despite of the latter’s insistence, but rather opted to ride other man’s
Navales vs. Navales jeep, whose name her husband did not even know; by her act of allowing a man other than her husband
to touch her legs even in her husband’s presence; by allowing another man to kiss her even in the full
view of her husband; by preferring to loss [sic] her husband rather than losing her job as aerobic
when Reynaldo first met Nilda at the bar called “Appetizer,” and that he (Ramos) himself was instructress and on top of all, by refusing to bear a child fathered by her husband because it will destroy
attracted to Nilda since she was sexy, beautiful, and jolly to talk with.10Reynaldo also her figure, is a clear indication of the herein defendant’s psychological incapacity.”19
presented Violeta Abales, his cousin, who testified that she was a vendor at the YMCA where
Nilda worked and was known by her maiden name; that she knows Nilda is sexy and wears _______________
tight fitting clothes; that her companions are mostly males and she flirts with them; and that
16 Exhibit “2,” Records, p. 343.
there was one time that Reynaldo fetched Nilda at YMCA but Nilda went with another man, 17 Exhibit “3,” “4,” “5,” “6,” “7,” “8” and “9,” id., at pp. 344-350.
which angered Reynaldo.11 18 Records, p. 372.
Finally, Reynaldo presented Leticia Vatanagul, a Clinical Psychologist and Social Worker 19 Id., at pp. 370-371.
who drafted a Psychological Assessment of Marriage dated March 28, 2001.12  In said
281
Assessment, Vatanagul concluded that Nilda is a nymphomaniac, who has a borderline
personality, a social deviant, an alcoholic, and suffering from anti-social personality disorder,
among others, which illnesses are incurable and are the causes of Nilda’s psychological VOL. 556, JUNE 27, 2008 281
incapacity to perform her marital role as wife to Reynaldo.13
Nilda, for her part, claims that Reynaldo knew that she had a child before she met him, yet Navales vs. Navales
Reynaldo continued courting her; thus, their eventual marriage.14  She claims that it was
actually Reynaldo who was linked with several women, who went home very late, kept his  
earnings for himself, and subjected her to physical harm whenever she called his attention to Nilda filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the RTC denied on April 10, 2002.20
his vices. She worked at the YMCA to cope with the needs of life, and she taught only female The CA dismissed Nilda’s appeal, ruling that the RTC correctly held that Nilda concealed
students. Reynaldo abandoned her for other women, the latest of whom was Liberty Lim her marital status, as shown by the telephone listings in which Nilda used her maiden name;
whom she charged, together with Reynaldo, with concubinage.15  Nilda presented a that nymphomania, the condition which the expert said Nilda was afflicted with, was a ground
certification from the YMCA for psychological incapacity; and that the RTC correctly gave weight to the four pieces of
testimonial evidence presented by Reynaldo vis-a-vis the lone testimony of Nilda.21
_______________ Nilda now comes before the Court alleging that:
10 TSN, October 17, 2000, pp. 6-8; Records, pp. 520-522. I
11 TSN, February 12, 2001, pp. 6-9; id., at pp. 510-513. The petitioner is not psychologically incapacitated to comply [with] her marital obligations as a wife.
12 TSN, March 28, 2001, pp. 2, 8; id., at pp. 475, 254-263. II
13 Id., at pp. 260-263.
Psychological incapacity, if ever existing, of the wife is NOT PERMAMENT or INCURABLE and was
14 Id., at p. 13.
NEVER EXISTING AT THE TIME OF THE CELEBRATION OF MARRIAGE.
15 Records, pp. 12-13; see also Rollo, p. 30 (CA Decision).
III
280 The petitioner is not a nymphomaniac.
IV
The effort of herein petitioner into the case shows that she is consciously and nobly preserving and
280 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED continue to believe that marriage is inviolable rather [sic].
V
Navales vs. Navales The guidelines of Molina case in the application of Article 36 of the New Family Code has not been
strictly complied with.22
dated October 17, 2001 stating that she was an aerobics instructress for a program that was
_______________
exclusively for ladies,16as well as a statement of accounts from PLDT showing that she used
her married name, Nilda B. Navales.17 20 Id., at pp. 400-402; 423.
21 Rollo, pp. 32-34.
On January 2, 2002, the RTC rendered its Decision disposing as follows: 22 Id., at pp. 15-16.

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in the above-entitled case 282
declaring defendant Nilda B. Navales as psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her marital obligations
with plaintiff Reynaldo V. Navales and further declaring their marriage contracted on December 29,
1988, before the Municipal Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of San Fernando, Cebu, as null and 282 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
void.”18
Navales vs. Navales

Nilda claims that she did not fail in her duty to observe mutual love, respect and fidelity;
that she never had any illicit relationship with any man; that no case for inchastity was
initiated by Reynaldo against her, and that it was actually Reynaldo who had a pending case
for concubinage.23 She questions the lower courts’ finding that she is a nymphomaniac, since
she was never interviewed by the expert witness to verify the truth of Reynaldo’s allegations.
There is also not a single evidence to show that she had sexual intercourse with a man other
than her husband while they were still living together.24
Nilda also avers that the guidelines in  Republic of the Philippines. v. Molina25  were not
complied with. The RTC resolved the doubt on her motive for using her maiden name in the
telephone directory in favor of the dissolution of the marriage instead of its preservation. The
expert opinion was given weight, even though it was baseless to establish that petitioner had
psychological incapacity to comply with her marital obligations as a wife; and that, assuming
that such incapacity existed, it was already existing at the time of the marriage; and that such
incapacity was incurable and grave enough to bring about the disability of the wife to assume
the essential obligations of marriage.26
Reynaldo, for his part, argues that while the petition is captioned as one under Rule 45, it is
actually a petition for  certiorari  under Rule 65, since it impleads the CA as respondent and
alleges that the CA acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction.27 Reynaldo also claims that the issues raised by
Nilda necessarily require a review of the factual findings of the lower courts, which matters
have al-
_______________
23 Id., at pp. 17-19.
24 Id., at p. 20.
25 335 Phil. 664; 268 SCRA 198 (1997).
26 Rollo, pp. 21-23.
27 Id., at p. 45.
283
VOL. 556, JUNE 27, 2008 283
Navales vs. Navales
ready been decided and passed upon, and factual findings of the courts a quo  are binding on
this Court; that only questions of law may be raised before this Court; that the RTC, in
reaching its decision, complied with the requirements of  Molina; that the Solicitor General
was represented by the City Prosecutor of Toledo City; and that Reynaldo discharged the
burden of proof to show the nullity of his marriage to Nilda.
Reynaldo further averred that he testified on his behalf; presented corroborating witnesses,
one of whom is an expert clinical psychologist, as well as documentary evidence in support of
his cause of action; that Molina did not require that the psychologist examine the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated; that Nilda did not rebut the psychologist’s findings and
did not present her own expert to disprove the findings of Vatanagul; that Nilda’s
psychological incapacity, caused by nymphomania, was duly proven to have been existing prior
to and at the time of her marriage to Reynaldo and to have become manifest during her
marriage, based on the testimonies of Reynaldo and his witnesses; and that such incapacity
was proven to be incurable, as shown by the report of Vatanagul.28
Nilda filed a Reply, and both parties filed their respective memoranda reiterating their
arguments.29
Simply stated, the issue posed before the Court is whether the marriage between Reynaldo
and Nilda is null and void on the ground of Nilda’s psychological incapacity.
The answer, contrary to the findings of the RTC and the CA, is in the negative.
Preliminarily, let it be stressed that it is the policy of our Constitution to protect and
strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution, and marriage as the founda-
_______________
28 Rollo, pp. 46-50.
29 Id., at pp. 58-60; 66-95; 98-110.
284
284 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Navales vs. Navales
tion of the family.30  The Constitution decrees marriage as legally inviolable and protects it
from dissolution at the whim of the parties.31  The Family Code under Article 4832therefore
requires courts to order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned, in cases of annulment or
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, to appear on behalf of the State in order to take
steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed. Indeed, only the active participation of the Public Prosecutor or the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) will ensure that the interest of the State is represented
and protected in proceedings for annulment and declarations of nullity of marriage by
preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or suppression of evidence.33
While the guidelines in Molina requiring the OSG to issue a certification on whether or not
it is agreeing or objecting to the petition for annulment has been dispensed with by A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC or the Rule on the Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages,34 still, Article 48 mandates the appearance and active
_______________
30 Republic v. Cuison-Melgar, G.R. No. 139676, March 31, 2006, 486 SCRA 177, 184-185.
31 Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris, G.R. No. 162368, July 17, 2006, 495 SCRA 396, 403.
32  Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between
the parties and to take care the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or
confession of judgment.
33 Republic v. Cuison-Melgar, supra, note 30, at pp. 187-188.
34  Took effect on March 15, 2003; see also Antonio v. Reyes, G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA 353,
375; Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco, G.R. No. 158896, October 27, 2004, 441 SCRA 422, 435.
285
VOL. 556, JUNE 27, 2008 285
Navales vs. Navales
participation of the State through the fiscal or the prosecuting attorney.35
In this case, contrary to the assertion of the RTC that the OSG actively participated in the
case through the Office of the City Prosecutor, records show that the State’s participation
consists only of the Report dated November 29, 1999 by Assistant City Prosecutor Gabriel L.
Trocio, Jr. stating that no collusion exists between the parties;36 the OSG’s Opposition to the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage dated June 2, 2000;37 and the cross-examination
conducted by Prosecutor Trocio on Reynaldo38 and his witness Abales.39 There were no other
pleadings, motions, or position papers filed by the Public Prosecutor or OSG; and no
controverting evidence presented by them before the judgment was rendered. Considering the VOL. 556, JUNE 27, 2008 287
interest sought to be protected by the aforestated rules, the Court finds the State’s
participation in this case to be wanting.40 Navales vs. Navales
But even on the merits, the Court finds that the totality of evidence presented by Reynaldo,
contrary to its appreciation by the RTC and the CA, is insufficient to sustain a finding that sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
Nilda is psychologically incapacitated. requires that the incapacity must be psychological—not physical, although its manifestation and/or
Generally, factual findings of trial courts, when affirmed by the CA, are binding on this symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known that obligations he
Court. Such principle however is not absolute, such as when the findings of the appellate court
was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of
go beyond the issues of the case; run contrary to the admissions of the parties; fail to notice such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the
certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; or when principle ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and
there is a misappreciation of facts.41 Such is the case at bar. its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.
_______________ 3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their “I do’s.” The
35 Antonio v. Reyes, supra note 34. manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
36 Records, pp. 40-41. attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
37 Id., at pp. 109-110. 4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or  incurable. Such
38 Id., at pp. 527-537. incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
39 Id., at pp. 498-503. absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
40 See Republic v. Cuison-Melgar, supra note 30, at p. 187. assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
41 Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris, supra note 31, at p. 400.
profession or employment in a job. x x x.
286 5. Such illness must be  grave  enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, “mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts” cannot be accepted as  root  causes. The illness must be shown as downright
286 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a
natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality
Navales vs. Navales structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
6. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Psychological incapacity, in order to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to
3642 of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
the celebration of marriage. It is a malady that is so grave and permanent as to deprive one of
288
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
As all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated traits associated with
certain personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the intention of the law has been 288 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and Navales vs. Navales
significance to the marriage.43
In  Santos v. Court of Appeals,44  the Court held that psychological incapacity must be obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.45 In Republic of the decision.
7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
Philippines v. Molina,46  the Court further set forth guidelines in the interpretation and
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x.”47
application of Article 36 of the Family Code, thus:
“1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should In this case, Reynaldo and his witnesses sought to establish that Nilda was a flirt before
be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and the marriage, which flirtatiousness recurred when she started working as an aerobics
nullity. x x x instructress. The instances alleged by Reynaldo,  i.e., the occasion when Nilda chose to ride
2. The  root cause  of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) home with another man instead of him, that he saw Nilda being kissed by another man while
alleged in the complaint, (c) in a car, and that Nilda allowed other men to touch her body, if true, would understandably
hurt and embarrass him. Still, these acts by themselves are insufficient to establish a
_______________ psychological or mental defect that is serious, incurable or grave as contemplated by Article 36
42 Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply of the Family Code.
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to
solemnization.
43 Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris, supra note 31, at pp. 400-401. assume basic marital obligations.48 Mere “difficulty,” “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance
44 310 Phil. 21; 240 SCRA 20 (1995). of marital obligations or “ill will” on the part of the spouse is different from “incapacity” rooted
45 Id., at p. 39; p. 33. See also Republic v. Iyoy, G.R. No. 152577, September 21, 2005, 470 SCRA 508, 521; Republic v. Cuison-
Melgar, supra note 30, at p. 188.
on some debilitating psychological condition or illness.49  Indeed, irreconcilable differences,
46 Supra note 25. sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not
287
by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may
only be due to a person’s refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of
marriage and not
_______________
47 Id., at pp. 676-678.
48 Republic v. Iyoy, supra note 45, at p. 525.
49 Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris, supra note 31, at p. 402; Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, supra note 25, at p.
674; p. 207; Republic v. Iyoy, supra note 45, at p. 525; Navarro, Jr. v. Cecilio-Navarro, G.R. No. 162049, April 13, 2007,
521 SCRA 121, 129.
289
VOL. 556, JUNE 27, 2008 289
Navales vs. Navales
due to some psychological illness that is contemplated by said rule.50
As admitted by Reynaldo, his marriage with Nilda was not all that bad; in fact, it went well
in the first year of their marriage. As in other cases, an admission of a good and harmonious
relationship during the early part of the marriage weakens the assertion of psychological
defect existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage which deprived the party of the
ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities.51
In determining the import of “psychological incapacity” under Article 36, the same must be
read in conjunction with, although to be taken as distinct from, Articles 35,5237,53  3854  and
4155  of the Family Code that would likewise, but for different reasons, render the marriage
void ab initio; or Article 45 that would make the marriage merely voidable; or Article 55 that
could justify a petition for legal separation.56 These various circumstances are not applied so
indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter.57 Indeed, Article 36 should not
be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological
incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil
_______________
50 Republic v. Iyoy, supra note 45, at p. 525.
51  See  Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris,  supra  note 31, at p. 401;  Republic v. Cuison-Melgar,  supra  note 30, at p.
190; Navarro v. Cecilio-Navarro,supra note 49.
52 Art. 35. (Marriages that are void from the beginning).
53 Art. 37. (Marriages that are incestuous and void from the beginning).
54 Art. 38. (Marriages that are void from the beginning for reasons of public policy).
55 Art. 41. (Void subsequent marriage, unless spouse presumptively dead).
56 Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris, supra, note 31, at p. 405.
57 Id.
290
290 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Navales vs. Navales
interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the
like.58
Reynaldo presented telephone directories in which Nilda used her maiden name “Bacon” to
prove that Nilda represented herself as single. As noted by the CA, however, the telephone
listings presented by Reynaldo were for the years 1993 to 1995,59 after Reynaldo admittedly
left Nilda on June 18, 1992. Apart from Reynaldo and Abalales’s testimony, therefore,
Reynaldo has no proof that Nilda represented herself as single while they were still living
together. The Court cannot agree with the RTC, therefore, that said telephone listings show
that Nilda represented herself to be single, which in turn manifests her lack of understanding
of the consequences of marriage.
Reynaldo also presented Clinical Psychologist Vatanagul to bolster his claim that Nilda is
psychologically incapacitated. While it is true that the Court relies heavily on psychological
experts for its understanding of the human personality,60  and that there is no requirement
that the defendant spouse be personally examined by a physician or psychologist before the
nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity may be declared,61 still, the root cause of
the psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness, its incapacitating
nature fully explained,62  and said incapacity established by the totality of the evidence
presented during trial.63
The Court finds that the psychological report presented in this case is insufficient to
establish Nilda’s psychological incapacity. In her report, Vatanagul concluded that Nilda is a
_______________
58 Id.; Republic v. Cuison-Melgar, supra note 30, at pp. 193-194.
59 Rollo, p. 32 (CA Decision).
60 Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris, supra note 31, at p. 401.
61 Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840, 850; 343 SCRA 755, 764 (2000).
62 Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris, supra note 31, at p. 401.
63 Marcos v. Marcos, supra note 61; see also Republic v. Cuison-Melgar,supra note 30, at p. 190.
291
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Navales vs. Navales
nymphomaniac, an emotionally immature individual, has a borderline personality, has strong
sexual urges which are incurable, has complete denial of her actual role as a wife, has a very
weak conscience or superego, emotionally immature, a social deviant, not a good wife as seen
in her infidelity on several occasions, an alcoholic, suffers from anti-social personality disorder,
fails to conform to social norms, deceitful, impulsive, irritable and aggressive, irresponsible
and vain.64  She further defined “nymphomia” as a psychiatric disorder that involves a
disturbance in motor behavior as shown by her sexual relationship with various men other
than her husband.65
The report failed to specify, however, the names of the men Nilda had sexual relationship
with or the circumstances surrounding the same. As pointed out by Nilda, there is not even a
single proof that she was ever involved in an illicit relationship with a man other than her
husband. Vatanagul claims, during her testimony, that in coming out with the report, she
interviewed not only Reynaldo but also Jojo Caballes, Dorothy and Lesley who were
Reynaldo’s sister-in-law and sister, respectively, a certain Marvin and a certain
Susan.66 Vatanagul however, did not specify the identities of these persons, which information
were supplied by whom, and how they came upon their respective informations. Indeed, the
conclusions drawn by the report are vague, sweeping and lack sufficient factual bases. As the
report lacked specificity, it failed to show the root cause of Nilda’s psychological incapacity;
and failed to demonstrate that there was a “natal or supervening disabling factor” or an
“adverse integral element” in Nilda’s character that effectively incapacitated her from
accepting, and thereby complying with, the essential marital obligations, and that her
psychological or mental malady existed even
_______________
64 Records, pp. 260-263.
65 Id., at p. 260.
 66 TSN, June 27, 2001, pp. 5-6, 14; Records, pp. 459-460, 468. One who is not a real party in interest in a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage
292
cannot ask for the setting aside of the decision therein—his invocation of the State’s interest in
protecting the sanctity of marriage does not give him the standing to question the decision.
(Salmingo vs. Rubica, 527 SCRA 1 [2007])
292 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Navales vs. Navales

before the marriage.67 Hence, the Court cannot give weight to said assessment.
The standards used by the Court in assessing the sufficiency of psychological reports may
be deemed very strict, but that is only proper in view of the principle that any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage and the indissolubility of the marital
vinculum.68
Reynaldo also claims that Nilda does not want to get pregnant which allegation was upheld
by the trial court. A review of the records shows, however, that apart from the testimony of
Reynaldo, no other proof was presented to support such claim. Mere allegation and nothing
more is insufficient to support such proposition. As petitioner before the trial court, it devolves
upon Reynaldo to discharge the burden of establishing the grounds that would justify the
nullification of the marriage.69
While Reynaldo and Nilda’s marriage failed and appears to be without hope of
reconciliation, the remedy, however, is not always to have it declared void  ab initio  on the
ground of psychological incapacity. A marriage, no matter how unsatisfactory, is not a null and
void marriage.70 And this Court, even as the highest one, can only apply the letter and spirit of
the law, no matter how harsh it may be.71
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 76624 promulgated on February 16, 2005 and the Decision dated January 2,
2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59 of Toledo City, in Civil Case No. T-799 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition for declaration of absolute nullity of

_______________

67 See Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris, supra note 31, at p. 402.

68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id., at p. 403.
71 Republic v. Cuison-Melgar, supra note 30, at p. 195.

293

VOL. 556, JUNE 27, 2008 293

Navales vs. Navales

marriage and damages, docketed as Civil Case No. T-799, is DISMISSED.

Costs against respondent.
SO ORDERED.

Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Chico-Nazario, Nachura and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Petition granted, assailed decision reversed and set aside.

Notes.—The purpose of the active participation of the Public Prosecutor or the Solicitor
General is to ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings
for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing collusion between the
parties, or the fabrication or suppression of evidence. (Maquilan vs. Maquilan, 524 SCRA 166
[2007])

G.R. No. 161793. February 13, 2009.*
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE, petitioner,  vs.  ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ YU-TE,
respondent, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor.
Marriages; Husband and Wife; Declaration of Nullity; Judgments; In hindsight, it may have been
inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina, 268 SCRA 198 (1997), in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity; The unintended
consequences of Molina has taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity
and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites, con-
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
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194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Ngo Te vs. Yu-Te
sume little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions—far from what
was intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by
it.—In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one
in  Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then
alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSG’s
exaggeration of Article 36 as the “most liberal divorce procedure in the world.” The unintended
consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior,
moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little the very
foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far from what was intended by the
Court,  Molina  has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or
unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying  Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths,
schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity
of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled marriages on account of the personality disorders
of the said individuals.
Same; Same; In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party’s psychological incapacity, the
Court is not demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage,
because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or
assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond; To indulge in imagery, the
declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn marriage.—The
Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36, for there are ample
safeguards against this contingency, among which is the intervention by the State, through the public
prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence. The Court
should rather be alarmed by the rising number of cases involving marital abuse, child abuse, domestic
violence and incestuous rape. In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party’s psychological
incapacity, the Court is not demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the
sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who
cannot comply with or assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. It
may be
195
VOL. 579, FEBRUARY 13, 2009 195
Ngo Te vs. Yu-Te
stressed that the infliction of physical violence, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence
or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic personality anomaly. Let it
be noted that in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the
very beginning. To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a
decent burial to a stillborn marriage.
Same; Same; Judgments; Legal Research; Lest it be misunderstood, the Court is not suggesting the
abandonment of Molina in the instant case—it is simply declaring that there is need to emphasize other
perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under
Article 36.—Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this case. We
simply declare that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes, 484 SCRA 353 (2006),
there is need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more the
principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of  a priori  assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
Same; Same; Evidence; Witnesses; Expert Witnesses; By the very nature of Article 36 of the Family
Code, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but,
instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental
temperaments of the parties.—The parties’ whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6) months.
They met in January 1996, eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June.
The psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically incapacitated.
Petitioner’s behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent personality disorder, and
respondent’s, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder. By the very nature of Article 36,
courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making,  must not discount but,
instead, must consider as
196
196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Ngo Te vs. Yu-Te
decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of
the parties.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth
assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and
incurable presence of psychological incapacity.—Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, 320 SCRA 76 (1999)
emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to establish the precise cause of a party’s
psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v.
Marcos, 343 SCRA 755 (2000) asserts, there is no requirement that the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented
is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical
or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of expert proof
presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a
conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.
Parenthetically, the Court, at this point, finds it fitting to suggest the inclusion in the  Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, an option for
the trial judge to refer the case to a court-appointed psychologist/expert for an independent assessment
and evaluation of the psychological state of the parties. This will assist the courts, who are no experts in
the field of psychology, to arrive at an intelligent and judicious determination of the case. The rule,
however, does not dispense with the parties’ prerogative to present their own expert witnesses.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolutions of the Court of Appeals.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Froilan M. Bacungan and Associates for petitioner.
  The Solicitor General for oppositor.
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VOL. 579, FEBRUARY 13, 2009 197
Ngo Te vs. Yu-Te
NACHURA, J.:
Far from novel is the issue involved in this petition. Psychological incapacity, since its
incorporation in our laws, has become a clichéd subject of discussion in our jurisprudence. The
Court treats this case, however, with much ado, it having realized that current jurisprudential
doctrine has unnecessarily imposed a perspective by which psychological incapacity should be
viewed, totally inconsistent with the way the concept was formulated—free in form and devoid
of any definition.
For the resolution of the Court is a petition for review on certiorari  under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court assailing the August 5, 2003 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 71867. The petition further assails the January 19, 2004 Resolution2  denying the
motion for the reconsideration of the challenged decision.
The relevant facts and proceedings follow.
Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te first got a glimpse of respondent Rowena Ong Gutierrez
Yu-Te in a gathering organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in their college. Edward
was then initially attracted to Rowena’s close friend; but, as the latter already had a boyfriend,
the young man decided to court Rowena. That was in January 1996, when petitioner was a
sophomore student and respondent, a freshman.3
Sharing similar angst towards their families, the two understood one another and developed a
certain degree of closeness towards each other. In March 1996, or around three months after
their first meeting, Rowena asked Edward that
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Remedios Salazar-Fernando, with Associate Justices Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and
Edgardo F. Sundiam, concurring; Rollo, pp. 23-36.
2 Id., at pp. 38-39.
3 TSN, September 12, 2000, p. 2.
198
198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ngo Te vs. Yu-Te
they elope. At first, he refused, bickering that he was young and jobless. Her persistence,
however, made him relent. Thus, they left Manila and sailed to Cebu that month; he,
providing their travel money and she, purchasing the boat ticket.4
However, Edward’s P80,000.00 lasted for only a month. Their pension house
accommodation and daily sustenance fast depleted it. And they could not find a job. In April
1996, they decided to go back to Manila. Rowena proceeded to her uncle’s house and Edward to
his parents’ home. As his family was abroad, and Rowena kept on telephoning him,
threatening him that she would commit suicide, Edward agreed to stay with Rowena at her
uncle’s place.5
On April 23, 1996, Rowena’s uncle brought the two to a court to get married. He was then
25 years old, and she, 20.6 The two then continued to stay at her uncle’s place where Edward
was treated like a prisoner—he was not allowed to go out unaccompanied. Her uncle also
showed Edward his guns and warned the latter not to leave Rowena.7 At one point, Edward
was able to call home and talk to his brother who suggested that they should stay at their
parents’ home and live with them. Edward relayed this to Rowena who, however, suggested
that he should get his inheritance so that they could live on their own. Edward talked to his
father about this, but the patriarch got mad, told Edward that he would be disinherited, and
insisted that Edward must go home.8
After a month, Edward escaped from the house of Rowena’s uncle, and stayed with his
parents. His family then hid him from Rowena and her family whenever they telephoned to
ask for him.9
_______________
4 Id.
5 Id., at pp. 2-3.
6 Records, p. 8.
7 TSN, September 12, 2000, pp. 3-4.
8 Id.
9 Id.
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Ngo Te vs. Yu-Te
In June 1996, Edward was able to talk to Rowena. Unmoved by his persistence that they
should live with his parents, she said that it was better for them to live separate lives. They
then parted ways.10
After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 106, for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena
on the basis of the latter’s psychological incapacity. This was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-00-
39720.11
As Rowena did not file an answer, the trial court, on July 11, 2000, ordered the Office of the
City Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City to investigate whether there was collusion between the
parties.12 In the meantime, on July 27, 2000, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered
its appearance and deputized the OCP to appear on its behalf and assist it in the scheduled
hearings.13
On August 23, 2000, the OCP submitted an investigation report stating that it could not
determine if there was collusion between the parties; thus, it recommended trial on the
merits.14
The clinical psychologist who examined petitioner found both parties psychologically
incapacitated, and made the following findings and conclusions:
BACKGROUND DATA & BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY:
“EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE is a [29-year-old] Filipino male adult born and baptized Born Again
Christian at Manila. He finished two years in college at AMA Computer College last 1994 and is
currently unemployed. He is married to and separated from ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE. He
presented himself at my office
_______________
10 Id., at p. 4.
 11 Records, p. 1.
12 Id., at p. 24.
13 Id., at pp. 36-37.
14 Id., at p. 39.
200
200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ngo Te vs. Yu-Te
for a psychological evaluation in relation to his petition for Nullification of Marriage against the latter by
the grounds of psychological incapacity. He is now residing at 181 P. Tuazon Street, Quezon City.
Petitioner got himself three siblings who are now in business and one deceased sister. Both his
parents are also in the business world by whom he [considers] as generous, hospitable, and patient. This
said virtues are said to be handed to each of the family member. He generally considers himself to be
quiet and simple. He clearly remembers himself to be afraid of meeting people. After 1994, he tried his
luck in being a Sales Executive of Mansfield International Incorporated. And because of job
incompetence, as well as being quiet and loner, he did not stay long in the job until 1996. His interest
lie[s] on becoming a full servant of God by being a priest or a pastor. He [is] said to isolate himself from
his friends even during his childhood days as he only loves to read the Bible and hear its message.
Respondent is said to come from a fine family despite having a lazy father and a disobedient wife. She
is said to have not finish[ed] her collegiate degree and shared intimate sexual moments with her
boyfriend prior to that with petitioner.
In January of 1996, respondent showed her kindness to petitioner and this became the foundation of
their intimate relationship. After a month of dating, petitioner mentioned to respondent that he is
having problems with his family. Respondent surprisingly retorted that she also hates her family and
that she actually wanted to get out of their lives. From that [time on], respondent had insisted to
petitioner that they should elope and live together. Petitioner hesitated because he is not prepared as
they are both young and inexperienced, but she insisted that they would somehow manage because
petitioner is rich. In the last week of March 1996, respondent seriously brought the idea of eloping and
she already bought tickets for the boat going to Cebu. Petitioner reluctantly agreed to the idea and so
they eloped to Cebu. The parties are supposed to stay at the house of a friend of respondent, but they
were not able to locate her, so petitioner was compelled to rent an apartment. The parties tried to look
for a job but could not find any so it was suggested by respondent that they should go back and seek help
from petitioner’s parents. When the parties arrived at the house of petitioner, all of his whole family was
all out of the country so respondent decided to go back to her home for the meantime while petitioner
stayed behind at
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Ngo Te vs. Yu-Te
their home. After a few days of separation, respondent called petitioner by phone and said she wanted to
talk to him. Petitioner responded immediately and when he arrived at their house, respondent
confronted petitioner as to why he appeared to be cold, respondent acted irrationally and even
threatened to commit suicide. Petitioner got scared so he went home again. Respondent would call by
phone every now and then and became angry as petitioner does not know what to do. Respondent went to
the extent of threatening to file a case against petitioner and scandalize his family in the newspaper.
Petitioner asked her how he would be able to make amends and at this point in time[,] respondent
brought the idea of marriage. Petitioner[,] out of frustration in life[,] agreed to her to pacify her. And so
on April 23, 1996, respondent’s uncle brought the parties to Valenzuela[,] and on that very same day[,]
petitioner was made to sign the Marriage Contract before the Judge. Petitioner actually never applied for
any Marriage License.
Respondent decided that they should stay first at their house until after arrival of the parents of
petitioner. But when the parents of petitioner arrived, respondent refused to allow petitioner to go home.
Petitioner was threatened in so many ways with her uncle showing to him many guns. Respondent even
threatened that if he should persist in going home, they will commission their military friends to harm
his family. Respondent even made petitioner sign a declaration that if he should perish, the authorities
should look for him at his parents[‫ ]ۥ‬and relatives[‫ ]ۥ‬houses. Sometime in June of 1996, petitioner was able
to escape and he went home. He told his parents about his predicament and they forgave him and
supported him by giving him military escort. Petitioner, however, did not inform them that he signed a
marriage contract with respondent. When they knew about it[,] petitioner was referred for counseling.
Petitioner[,] after the counseling[,] tried to contact respondent. Petitioner offered her to live instead to
[sic] the home of petitioner’s parents while they are still studying. Respondent refused the idea and
claimed that she would only live with him if they will have a separate home of their own and be away
from his parents. She also intimated to petitioner that he should already get his share of whatever he
would inherit from his parents so they can start a new life. Respondent demanded these not knowing
[that] the petitioner already settled his differences with his own family. When respondent refused to live
with petitioner where he chose for them to stay, petitioner decided to tell her to stop harassing the home
of his parents.
202
202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ngo Te vs. Yu-Te
He told her already that he was disinherited and since he also does not have a job, he would not be able
to support her. After knowing that petitioner does not have any money anymore, respondent stopped
tormenting petitioner and informed petitioner that they should live separate lives.
The said relationship between Edward and Rowena is said to be undoubtedly in the wreck and
weakly-founded. The break-up was caused by both parties[‘] unreadiness to commitment and their young
age. He was still in the state of finding his fate and fighting boredom, while she was still egocentrically
involved with herself.
TESTS ADMINISTERED:
Revised Beta Examination
Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test
Draw A Person Test
Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test
Sach’s Sentence Completion Test
MMPI
TEST RESULTS & EVALUATION:
“Both petitioner and respondent are dubbed to be emotionally immature and recklessly impulsive
upon swearing to their marital vows as each of them was motivated by different notions on marriage.
Edward Kenneth Ngo Te, the petitioner in this case[,] is said to be still unsure and unready so as to
commit himself to marriage. He is still founded to be on the search of what he wants in life. He is
absconded as an introvert as he is not really sociable and displays a lack of interest in social interactions
and mingling with other individuals. He is seen too akin to this kind of lifestyle that he finds it boring
and uninteresting to commit himself to a relationship especially to that of respondent, as aggravated by
her dangerously aggressive moves. As he is more of the reserved and timid type of person, as he prefer to
be religiously attached and spend a solemn time alone.
ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE, the respondent, is said to be of the aggressive-rebellious type of woman.
She is seen to be somewhat exploitative in her [plight] for a life of wealth and glamour. She is seen to
take move on marriage as she thought that her marriage
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Ngo Te vs. Yu-Te
with petitioner will bring her good fortune because he is part of a rich family. In order to have her
dreams realized, she used force and threats knowing that [her] husband is somehow weak-willed. Upon
the realization that there is really no chance for wealth, she gladly finds her way out of the relationship.
REMARKS:
Before going to marriage, one should really get to know himself and marry himself before submitting
to marital vows. Marriage should not be taken out of intuition as it is profoundly a serious institution
solemnized by religious and law. In the case presented by petitioner and respondent[,] (sic) it is evidently
clear that both parties have impulsively taken marriage for granted as they are still unaware of their
own selves. He is extremely introvert to the point of weakening their relationship by his weak behavioral
disposition. She, on the other hand[,] is extremely exploitative and aggressive so as to be unlawful,
insincere and undoubtedly uncaring in her strides toward convenience. It is apparent that she is
suffering the grave, severe, and incurable presence of Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality Disorder
that started since childhood and only manifested during marriage. Both parties display psychological
incapacities that made marriage a big mistake for them to take.”15
The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its Decision16
declaring the marriage of the parties null and void on the ground that both parties were
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.17 The Repub-
_______________
15 Id., at pp. 48-55.
16 Id., at pp. 61-66.
17 The dispositive portion of the RTC’s July 30, 2001 Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage between plaintiff EDWARD KENNETH
NGO TE and defendant ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ UY-TE, officiated by Honorable Judge Evelyn Corpus-
Cabochan, of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 82, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, on April 23, 1996, NULL
AND VOID, ab initio, on the ground of the couple’s psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
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18
lic, represented by the OSG, timely filed its notice of appeal.
On review, the appellate court, in the assailed August 5, 2003 Decision19 in CA-G.R. CV No.
71867, reversed and set aside the trial court’s ruling.20 It ruled that petitioner failed to prove
the psychological incapacity of respondent. The clinical psychologist did not personally
examine respondent, and relied only on the information provided by petitioner. Further, the
psychological incapacity was not shown to be attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and
incurability. In sum, the evidence adduced fell short of the requirements stated in Republic v.
Court of Appeals and Molina21  needed for the declaration of nullity of the marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code.22  The CA faulted the lower court for rendering the decision
without the required certification of the OSG
_______________
Family Code; and dissolving their property regime in accordance with law, if there is any.
Let copy of this Decision be furnished the City Civil Registry of Valenzuela City where the marriage took
place and City Civil Registry of Quezon City where this decision originated for proper recording.
SO ORDERED. (Id., at p. 66.)
18 Records, pp. 67-68.
19 Supra note 1.
20 The dispositive portion of the CA’s August 5, 2003 Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the assailed decision dated July 30, 2001 of the Regional
Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 106, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-00-39720, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered declaring the marriage between petitioner-appellee
Edward Kenneth Ngo Te and respondent Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te VALID and SUBSISTING. The petition
is ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 35.)
21 335 Phil. 664; 268 SCRA 198 (1997).
22 Executive Order No. 209, entitled “The Family Code of the Philippines,” enacted on July 6, 1987.
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briefly stating therein the OSG’s reasons for its agreement with or opposition to, as the case
may be, the petition.23The CA later denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in the
likewise assailed January 19, 2004 Resolution.24
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before this Court the instant petition for review on certiorari.
On June 15, 2005, the Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit
their respective memoranda.25
In his memorandum,26  petitioner argues that the CA erred in substituting its own
judgment for that of the trial court. He posits that the RTC declared the marriage void, not
only because of respondent’s psychological incapacity, but rather due to both parties’
psychological incapacity. Petitioner also points out that there is no requirement for the
psychologist to personally examine respondent. Further, he avers that the OSG is bound by
the actions of the OCP because the latter represented it during the trial; and it had been
furnished copies of all the pleadings, the trial court orders and notices.27
For its part, the OSG contends in its memorandum,28that the annulment petition filed
before the RTC contains no statement of the essential marital obligations that the parties
failed to comply with. The root cause of the psychological incapacity was likewise not alleged
in the petition; neither was it medically or clinically identified. The purported incapacity of
both parties was not shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. And the
clinical psychologist did not personally examine the respondent. Thus, the OSG
_______________
23 Rollo, pp. 28-35.
24 Supra note 2.
25 Rollo, p. 79.
26 Id., at pp. 95-104.
27 Id., at pp. 100-102.
28 Id., at pp. 82-93.
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concludes that the requirements in Molina29 were not satisfied.30
The Court now resolves the singular issue of whether, based on Article 36 of the Family
Code, the marriage between the parties is null and void.31
I.
We begin by examining the provision, tracing its origin and charting the development of
jurisprudence interpreting it.
Article 36 of the Family Code32 provides:
“Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise
be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.”
As borne out by the deliberations of the Civil Code Revision Committee that drafted the
Family Code, Article 36 was based on grounds available in the Canon Law. Thus, Justice
Flerida Ruth P. Romero elucidated in her separate opinion in Santos v. Court of Appeals:33
 “However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Civil Code Revision Commission of the UP Law Center, I wish to add some
observations. The letter dated April 15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the
Family Law and Civil Code Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro
traced the background of the inclusion of the present Article 36 in the Family Code.
_______________
29 Supra note 21.
30 Rollo, pp. 86-92.
31 Supra note 22.
32 Id.
33 G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, 240 SCRA 20.
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“During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought of including a chapter on absolute
divorce in the draft of a new Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been tasked by the IBP
and the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact, some members of the Committee were in favor of a no-fault
divorce between the spouses after a number of years of separation, legal or de facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes
was then requested to prepare a proposal for an action for dissolution of marriage and the effects thereof
based on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of separation between the spouses, with or without a
judicial decree of legal separation, and (b) whenever a married person would have obtained a decree of
absolute divorce in another country. Actually, such a proposal is one for absolute divorce but called by
another name. Later, even the Civil Code Revision Committee took time to discuss the proposal of
Justice Reyes on this matter.
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee and Family Law Committee started
holding joint meetings on the preparation of the draft of the New Family Code, they agreed and
formulated the definition of marriage as—
‘a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage
within the limits provided by law.’
With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional concept of marriage of the
Filipino people as a permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon which the family
and society are founded, and also realizing the strong opposition that any provision on absolute
divorce would encounter from the Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of our citizenry to whom
the great majority of our people belong, the two Committees in their joint meetings did not pursue
the idea of absolute divorce and, instead, opted for an action for judicial declaration of invalidity of
marriage based on grounds available in the Canon Law. It was thought that such an action
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would not only be an acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve the nagging problem of
church annulments of marriages on grounds not recognized by the civil law of the State.  Justice
Reyes was, thus, requested to again prepare a draft of provisions on such action for celebration of
invalidity of marriage. Still later, to avoid the overlapping of provisions on void marriages as found
in the present Civil Code and those proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial declaration of invalidity
of marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law, the two Committees now working as a Joint
Committee in the preparation of a New Family Code decided to consolidate the present provisions
on void marriages with the proposals of Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of an additional
kind of void marriage in the enumeration of void marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit:
‘(7) those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of
marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital
obligations, even if such lack or incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.
as well as the following implementing provisions:
‘Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or pleaded only on the basis
of a final judgment declaring the marriage void, without prejudice to the provision of Article
34.’
‘Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage
shall not prescribe.’
x x x x x x x x x
It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today may already be dissolved or
annulled on the grounds proposed by the Joint Committee on declaration of nullity as well as annulment
of marriages, thus rendering an absolute divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a conference with
Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo University, as well as another meeting with Archbishop Oscar Cruz of
the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint Committee was informed that since Vatican II, the Catholic
Church has been
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declaring marriages null and void on the ground of “lack of due discretion” for causes that, in other
jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for divorce, like teen-age or premature marriages; marriage to a
man who, because of some personality disorder or disturbance, cannot support a family; the foolish or
ridiculous choice of a spouse by an otherwise perfectly normal person; marriage to a woman who refuses
to cohabit with her husband or who refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also informed the Committee
that they have found out in tribunal work that a lot of machismo among husbands are manifestations of
their sociopathic personality anomaly, like inflicting physical violence upon their wives, constitutional
indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly.”34
In her separate opinion in Molina,35 she expounded:
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:
“(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the
sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack
of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.”
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the following revised
provision even before the session was over:
“(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity becomes
manifest after the celebration.”
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any reference to “wanting in
the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage” and to “mentally
incapacitated.” It was explained that these phrases refer to “defects in the mental faculties vitiating
consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of appreciation of one’s marital obligation.” There
_______________
34 Id., at pp. 38-41. (Italics supplied.)
35 Supra note 21.
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being a defect in consent, “it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the
appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid
intervals and there are cases when the insanity is curable . . . Psychological incapacity does not refer to
mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage.”
My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological incapacity is, in a sense,
insanity of a lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term “psychological or mental impotence,” Archbishop
Oscar Cruz opined in the earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term “is an invention of some
churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase.” He said that
the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as “psychological or mental incapacity to discharge . . .”
Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but
not with another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation and application of Art.
36 is: “Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex.”
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the phrase “and is
incurable” but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question of how they
will determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic. Yet, the
possibility that one may be cured after the psychological incapacity becomes manifest after the marriage
was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that the
remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages, viz.:
1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special situations.
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The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under “special cases and special situations,” hence,
its special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or annulling
marriages that even comes close to being psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the marriage, such marriage
which stands valid until annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites, some marriages are void
from the beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on Marriage, the drafters,
now open to fresh winds of change in keeping with the more permissive mores and practices of the time,
took a leaf from the relatively liberal provisions of Canon Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of contracting marriage:
“3. (those) who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage” provided the model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: “A marriage
contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.”
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types of marriages with
respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an intermediate state, the
voidable or annullable marriages. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal “annuls” a marriage, it actually
declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never really existed in the first place, for a valid sacramental
marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed and consummated marriage between two
living Roman Catholics can only be nullified by the formal annulment process which entails a full
tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a formal hearing.
Such so-called church “annulments” are not recognized by Civil Law as severing the marriage ties as to
capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil marriage,
not being congruent with those laid down by Canon Law,
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the former being more strict, quite a number of married couples have found themselves in limbo—freed
from the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil
marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions, some persons contract new marriages or enter
into live-in relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations that the Civil Law
Revision Committee decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological incapacity into the
Family Code—and classified the same as a ground for declaring marriages void  ab initio  or totally
inexistent from the beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it did not provide directly
for psychological incapacity, in effect, recognized the same indirectly from a combination of three old
canons: “Canon #1081 required persons to be ‘capable according to law’ in order to give valid consent;
Canon #1082 required that persons ‘be at least not ignorant’ of the major elements required in marriage;
and Canon #1087 (the force and fear category) required that internal and external freedom be present in
order for consent to be valid. This line of interpretation produced two distinct but related grounds for
annulment called ‘lack of due discretion’ and ‘lack of due competence.’ Lack of due discretion means
that the person did not have the ability to give valid consent at the time of the wedding and, therefore, the
union is invalid. Lack of due competence means that the person was  incapable of carrying out the
obligations of the promise he or she made during the wedding ceremony.”
Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s involving  sexual disorders
such as homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader approach to the kind of proof
necessary for psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had reasoned for the first time in several
cases that the capacity to give valid consent at the time of marriage was probably not present in persons
who had displayed such problems shortly after the marriage. The nature of this change was nothing
short of revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious willingness to use this kind of
hindsight, the way was paved for what came after 1970.  Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of
serious psychological problems that manifested themselves shortly after the
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ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid consent at the time of the ceremony.36
Interestingly, the Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear
that by so doing, it might limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis. The Committee desired that the courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case
basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil
courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision itself was taken from the Canon
Law.37 The law is then so designed as to allow some resiliency in its application.38
Yet, as held in Santos,39 the phrase “psychological incapacity” is not meant to comprehend
all possible cases of psychoses. It refers to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly noncognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must
be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as expressed by Article
6840 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity; and render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine it to
the most serious of cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inabil-
_______________
36 Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, supra note 21, at pp. 681-685.
37 Salita v. Magtolis, G.R. No. 106429, June 13, 1994, 233 SCRA 100, 107-108, quoting Sempio-Dy, Handbook on
the Family Code of the Philippines, 1998, p. 37.
38 Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 33, at p. 31.
39 Id.
40 Article 68 of the Family Code provides in full:
Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and
render mutual help and support.
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ity to give meaning and significance to the marriage.41  This interpretation is, in fact,
consistent with that in Canon Law, thus:
3.5.3.1. The Meaning of Incapacity to Assume. A sharp conceptual distinction must be made
between the second and third paragraphs of C.1095, namely between the grave lack of discretionary
judgment and the incapacity to assume the essential obligation. Mario Pompedda, a rotal judge, explains
the difference by an ordinary, if somewhat banal, example. Jose wishes to sell a house to Carmela, and
on the assumption that they are capable according to positive law to enter such contract, there remains
the object of the contract, viz., the house. The house is located in a different locality, and prior to the
conclusion of the contract, the house was gutted down by fire unbeknown to both of them. This is the
hypothesis contemplated by the third paragraph of the canon. The third paragraph does not deal with
the psychological process of giving consent because it has been established a priori that both have such a
capacity to give consent, and they both know well the object of their consent [the house and its
particulars]. Rather, C.1095.3 deals with the object of the consent/contract which does not exist. The
contract is invalid because it lacks its formal object. The consent as a psychological act is both valid and
sufficient. The psychological act, however, is directed towards an object which is not available. Urbano
Navarrete summarizes this distinction: the third paragraph deals not with the positing of consent but
with positing the object of consent. The person may be capable of positing a free act of consent, but he is
not capable of fulfilling the responsibilities he assumes as a result of the consent he elicits.
Since the address of Pius XII to the auditors of the Roman Rota in 1941 regarding psychic incapacity
with respect to marriage arising from pathological conditions, there has been an increasing trend to
understand as ground of nullity different from others, the incapacity to assume the essential obligations
of marriage, especially the incapacity which arises from sexual anomalies. Nymphomania is a sample
which ecclesiastical jurisprudence has studied under this rubric.
_______________
41 Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 33, at p. 34.
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The problem as treated can be summarized, thus: do sexual anomalies always and in every case imply a
grave psychopathological condition which affects the higher faculties of intellect, discernment, and
freedom; or are there sexual anomalies that are purely so – that is to say, they arise from certain
physiological dysfunction of the hormonal system, and they affect the sexual condition, leaving intact the
higher faculties however, so that these persons are still capable of free human acts. The evidence from
the empirical sciences is abundant that there are certain anomalies of a sexual nature which may impel
a person towards sexual activities which are not normal, either with respect to its frequency
[nymphomania, satyriasis] or to the nature of the activity itself [sadism, masochism, homosexuality].
However, these anomalies notwithstanding, it is altogether possible that the higher faculties remain
intact such that a person so afflicted continues to have an adequate understanding of what marriage is
and of the gravity of its responsibilities. In fact, he can choose marriage freely. The question though is
whether such a person can assume those responsibilities which he cannot fulfill, although he may be able
to understand them. In this latter hypothesis, the incapacity to assume the essential obligations of
marriage issues from the incapacity to posit the object of consent, rather than the incapacity to posit
consent itself.
Ecclesiastical jurisprudence has been hesitant, if not actually confused, in this regard. The initial steps
taken by church courts were not too clear whether this incapacity is incapacity to posit consent or
incapacity to posit the object of consent. A case c. Pinna, for example, arrives at the conclusion that the
intellect, under such an irresistible impulse, is prevented from properly deliberating and its judgment
lacks freedom. This line of reasoning supposes that the intellect, at the moment of consent, is under the
influence of this irresistible compulsion, with the inevitable conclusion that such a decision, made as it
was under these circumstances, lacks the necessary freedom. It would be incontrovertible that a decision
made under duress, such as this irresistible impulse, would not be a free act. But this is precisely the
question: is it, as a matter of fact, true that the intellect is always and continuously under such an
irresistible compulsion? It would seem entirely possible, and certainly more reasonable, to think that
there are certain cases in which one who is sexually hyperaesthetic can understand perfectly and
evaluate quite maturely what marriage is and what it implies; his consent would be juridically
ineffective for this one reason that he cannot posit the object of
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Ngo Te vs. Yu-Te
consent, the exclusive jus in corpus to be exercised in a normal way and with usually regularity. It would
seem more correct to say that the consent may indeed be free, but is juridically ineffective because the
party is consenting to an object that he cannot deliver. The house he is selling was gutted down by fire.
3.5.3.2. Incapacity as an Autonomous Ground. Sabattaniseems to have seen his way more clearly
through this tangled mess, proposing as he did a clear conceptual distinction between the inability to
give consent on the one hand, and the inability to fulfill the object of consent, on the other. It is his
opinion that nymphomaniacs usually understand the meaning of marriage, and they are usually able to
evaluate its implications. They would have no difficulty with positing a free and intelligent consent.
However, such persons, capable as they are of eliciting an intelligent and free consent, experience
difficulty in another sphere: delivering the object of the consent. Anne, another rotal judge, had likewise
treated the difference between the act of consenting and the act of positing the object of consent from the
point of view of a person afflicted with nymphomania. According to him, such an affliction usually leaves
the process of knowing and understanding and evaluating intact. What it affects is the object of consent:
the delivering of the goods.
3.5.3.3 Incapacity as Incapacity to Posit the Object of Consent. From the selected rotal
jurisprudence cited, supra, it is possible to see a certain progress towards a consensus doctrine that the
incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage (that is to say, the formal object of consent)
can coexist in the same person with the ability to make a free decision, an intelligent judgment, and a
mature evaluation and weighing of things. The decision  coram Sabattani  concerning a nymphomaniac
affirmed that such a spouse can have difficulty not only with regard to the moment of consent but also,
and especially, with regard to the matrimonium in facto esse.  The decision concludes that a person in
such a condition is incapable of assuming the conjugal obligation of fidelity, although she may have no
difficulty in understanding what the obligations of marriage are, nor in the weighing and evaluating of
those same obligations.
Prior to the promulgation of the Code of Canon Law in 1983, it was not unusual to refer to this ground as
moral impotence or psychic impotence, or similar expressions to express a specific incapacity
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rooted in some anomalies and disorders in the personality. These anomalies leave intact the faculties of
the will and the intellect. It is qualified as moral or psychic, obviously to distinguish it from the
impotence that constitutes the impediment dealt with by C.1084. Nonetheless, the anomalies render the
subject incapable of binding himself in a valid matrimonial pact, to the extent that the anomaly renders
that person incapable of fulfilling the essential obligations. According to the principle affirmed by the
long tradition of moral theology: nemo ad impossibile tenetur.
x x x x
3.5.3.5 Indications of Incapacity. There is incapacity when either or both of the contractants are not
capable of initiating or maintaining this consortium. One immediately thinks of those cases where one of
the parties is so self-centered [e.g., a narcissistic personality] that he does not even know how to begin a
union with the other, let alone how to maintain and sustain such a relationship. A second incapacity
could be due to the fact that the spouses are incapable of beginning or maintaining a heterosexual
consortium, which goes to the very substance of matrimony. Another incapacity could arise when a
spouse is unable to concretize the good of himself or of the other party. The canon speaks, not of
the  bonum partium,  but of the  bonum conjugum.  A spouse who is capable only of realizing or
contributing to the good of the other party  qua persona  rather than  qua conjunx  would be deemed
incapable of contracting marriage. Such would be the case of a person who may be quite capable of
procuring the economic good and the financial security of the other, but not capable of realizing
the bonum conjugale of the other. These are general strokes and this is not the place for detained and
individual description.
A rotal decision  c. Pinto  resolved a petition where the concrete circumstances of the case concerns a
person diagnosed to be suffering from serious sociopathy. He concluded that while the respondent may
have understood, on the level of the intellect, the essential obligations of marriage, he was not capable of
assuming them because of his “constitutional immorality.”
Stankiewicz clarifies that the maturity and capacity of the person as regards the fulfillment of
responsibilities is determined not only at the moment of decision but also and especially during the
moment of execution of decision. And when this is applied to constitution of the
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marital consent, it means that the actual fulfillment of the essential obligations of marriage is a
pertinent consideration that must be factored into the question of whether a person was in a position to
assume the obligations of marriage in the first place. When one speaks of the inability of the party to
assume and fulfill the obligations, one is not looking at  matrimonium in fieri, but also and especially
at matrimonium in facto esse. In [the] decision of 19 Dec. 1985, Stankiewicz collocated the incapacity of
the respondent to assume the essential obligations of marriage in the psychic constitution of the person,
precisely on the basis of his irresponsibility as regards money and his apathy as regards the rights of
others that he had violated. Interpersonal relationships are invariably disturbed in the presence of this
personality disorder. A lack of empathy (inability to recognize and experience how others feel) is
common. A sense of entitlement, unreasonable expectation, especially favorable treatment, is usually
present. Likewise common is interpersonal exploitativeness, in which others are taken advantage of in
order to achieve one’s ends.
Authors have made listings of obligations considered as essential matrimonial obligations. One of them is
the right to the communio vitae. This and their corresponding obligations are basically centered around
the good of the spouses and of the children. Serious psychic anomalies, which do not have to be
necessarily incurable, may give rise to the incapacity to assume any, or several, or even all of these
rights. There are some cases in which interpersonal relationship is impossible. Some characteristic
features of inability for interpersonal relationships in marriage include affective immaturity, narcissism,
and antisocial traits.
Marriage and Homosexuality. Until 1967, it was not very clear under what rubric homosexuality was
understood to be invalidating of marriage – that is to say, is homosexuality invalidating because of the
inability to evaluate the responsibilities of marriage, or because of the inability to fulfill its obligations.
Progressively, however, rotal jurisprudence began to understand it as incapacity to assume the
obligations of marriage so that by 1978, Parisella was able to consider, with charity, homosexuality as an
autonomous ground of nullity. This is to say that a person so afflicted is said to be unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. In this same rotal decision, the object of matrimonial consent is
understood to refer not only to the jus in corpus but also the consortium totius vitae. The
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third paragraph of C.1095 [incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage] certainly seems to
be the more adequate juridical structure to account for the complex phenomenon that homosexuality is.
The homosexual is not necessarily impotent because, except in very few exceptional cases, such a person
is usually capable of full sexual relations with the spouse. Neither is it a mental infirmity, and a person
so afflicted does not necessarily suffer from a grave lack of due discretion because this sexual anomaly
does not by itself affect the critical, volitive, and intellectual faculties. Rather, the homosexual person is
unable to assume the responsibilities of marriage because he is unable to fulfill this object of the
matrimonial contract. In other words, the invalidity lies, not so much in the defect of consent, as in the
defect of the object of consent.
3.5.3.6 Causes of Incapacity. A last point that needs to be addressed is the source of incapacity
specified by the canon: causes of a psychological nature. Pompedda proffers the opinion that the clause is
a reference to the personality of the contractant. In other words, there must be a reference to the psychic
part of the person. It is only when there is something in the psyche or in the psychic constitution of the
person which impedes his capacity that one can then affirm that the person is incapable according to the
hypothesis contemplated by C.1095.3. A person is judged incapable in this juridical sense only to the
extent that he is found to have something rooted in his psychic constitution which impedes the
assumption of these obligations. A bad habit deeply engrained in one’s consciousness would not seem to
qualify to be a source of this invalidating incapacity. The difference being that there seems to be some
freedom, however remote, in the development of the habit, while one accepts as given one’s psychic
constitution. It would seem then that the law insists that the source of the incapacity must be one which
is not the fruit of some degree of freedom.”42
Conscious of the law’s intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-case basis, that should
determine whether a party to a marriage is psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in
sustaining the lower court’s judgment of annulment in Tuason v.
_______________
42 Dacanay, Canon Law on Marriage: Introductory Notes and Comments, 2000 ed., pp. 110-119.
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220 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ngo Te vs. Yu-Te
Court of Appeals,43  ruled that the findings of the trial court are final and binding on the
appellate courts.44
Again, upholding the trial court’s findings and declaring that its decision was not a
judgment on the pleadings, the Court, in  Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,45  explained that when
private respondent testified under oath before the lower court and was cross-examined by the
adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in the form of testimony. Importantly, the
Court, aware of parallel decisions of Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that the senseless and
protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the marital obligation of procreating children
is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which
the provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been
rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina,46 thus:
 “From their submissions and the Court’s own deliberations, the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of
the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage
and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it “as
the foundation of the nation.” It decrees marriage as legally “inviolable,” thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be “protected” by the state.
_______________
43 326 Phil. 169; 256 SCRA 158 (1996).
44 Id., at p. 182; p. 170.
45 334 Phil. 294, 300-304; 266 SCRA 324, 333 (1997).
46 Supra note 21.
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Ngo Te vs. Yu-Te
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological—not physical, although
its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of
the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their “I do’s.” The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate,
bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, “mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts” cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness
222
222 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ngo Te vs. Yu-Te
must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will.
In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to
parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear
that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of
Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
“The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.”
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with
the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive
weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally—subject to our law on evidence—
what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church
—while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other—shall walk together in synodal
cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable
base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification,
which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
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Ngo Te vs. Yu-Te
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen
(15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General
shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculicontemplated under Canon 1095.”47
Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Court’s membership concurred in
the  ponencia  of then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three
justices concurred “in the result” and another three—inclu-ding, as aforesaid, Justice Romero
—took pains to compose their individual separate opinions. Then Justice Teodoro R. Padilla
even emphasized that “each case must be judged, not on the basis of  a priori  assumptions,
predelictions or generalizations, but according to its own facts. In the field of psychological
incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on ‘all fours’
with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the
appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the
trial court.”48
Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases,49  the Court has applied the aforesaid
standards, without too much
_______________
47 Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, supra note 21, at pp. 676-680; 209-213.
48 Id., at p. 680; p. 214.
49  See  Republic of the Philippines v. Lynnette Cabantug-Baguio, G.R. No. 171042, June 30, 2008, 556 SCRA
711; Nilda V. Navales v. Reynaldo Navales, G.R. No. 167523, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 272; Lester Benjamin S. Halili
v. Chona M. Santos-Halili, et al., G.R. No. 165424, April 16, 2008, 551 SCRA 576;  Bier v. Bier, G.R. No. 173294,
February 27, 2008, 547 SCRA 123; Paras v. Paras, G.R. No. 147824, August 2, 2007, 529 SCRA 81; Navarro, Jr. v.
Cecilio-Navarro, G.R. No. 162049, April 13, 2007, 521 SCRA 121;  Republic v. Tanyag-San Jose, G.R. No. 168328,
February 28, 2007, 517 SCRA 123;  Zamora v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141917, February 7, 2007, 515 SCRA
19; Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris, G.R. No. 162368, July 17, 2006, 495 SCRA
224
224 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED b. Hypersexuality-Nymphomania,
c. Hypersexuality-Satyriasis, and
Ngo Te vs. Yu-Te d. Affective Immaturity and Passive Dependent Personality.
10. Coram Monsigneur Lucien Anne on February 25, 1969 on Lesbianism.
11. Coram De Jorio on April 30, 1969 on Maturity of Judgment.
regard for the law’s clear intention that each case is to be treated differently, as “courts 12. Coram Jose Maria Pinto Gomez on the following:
should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of a. Serious Paranoid Schizophrenia (November 26, 1969),
b. Anti-Social Personality Disorder (March 18, 1971),
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.”
c. Vaginismus or Psychic impotence; Frigidity (July 15, 1977)
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as d. Neurasthenic Psychopath (April 20, 1979)
the one in  Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the e. Sexual Disorder (December 3, 1982)
Court was then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and 13. Coram Bruno on the following:
was sensitive to the OSG’s exaggeration of Article 36 as the “most liberal divorce procedure in a. Hypersexuality-Nymphomania (December 15, 1972)
the world.”50  The unintended consequences of  Molina, however, has taken its toll on people b. Sexual Neurosis (March 27, 1981)
c. Psychoneurosis (December 17, 1982)
who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly,
which, like termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic 226
social institutions. Far from what was intended by the Court,  Molina  has become a strait-
jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in
conveniently applying  Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, 226 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously Ngo Te vs. Yu-Te

_______________
The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36, for
396; Republic v. Cuison-Melgar, G.R. No. 139676, March 31, 2006, 486 SCRA 177; Antonio v. Reyes, G.R. No. 155800, there are ample safeguards against this contingency, among which is the intervention by the
March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA 353; Villalon v. Villalon, G.R. No. 167206, November 18, 2005, 475 SCRA 572; Republic v. State, through the public prosecutor, to guard against
Iyoy, G.R. No. 152577, September 21, 2005, 470 SCRA 508; Carating-Siayngco, G.R. No. 158896, October 27, 2004, 441
SCRA 422; Republic v. Quintero-Hamano, G.R. No. 149498, May 20, 2004, 428 SCRA 735; Ancheta v. Ancheta, 468
Phil. 900; 424 SCRA 725 (2004); Barcelona v. Court of Appeals, 458 Phil. 626; 412 SCRA 41 (2003); Choa v. Choa, 441 _______________
Phil. 175; 392 SCRA 641 (2002); Pesca v. Pesca, 408 Phil. 713; 356 SCRA 588 (2001); Republic v. Dagdag, G.R. No.
109975, February 9, 2001, 351 SCRA 425; Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840; 343 SCRA 755 (2000); Hernandez v. Court 14. Coram Jose Maria Serrano Ruiz on the following:
of Appeals, G.R. No. 126010, December 8, 1999, 320 SCRA 76. a. Hypersexuality-Satyriasis (April 5, 1973)
b. Lack of Interpersonal Integration (April 15, 1973)
50 See Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, supra note 21, at p. 668; p. 201. c. Immature Personality (July 9, 1976)
d. Psychic Immaturity (November 18, 1977)
225 e. Depressive Neurosis (July 12, 1978)
f. Obsessive-Compulsive Personality (May 23, 1980)
g. Frigidity (July 28, 1981)
VOL. 579, FEBRUARY 13, 2009 225 h. Affective Immaturity (January 15, 1977)
15. Coram Ewers on the following:
Ngo Te vs. Yu-Te a. Affective Immaturity (January 15, 1977)
b. Sexual Neurosis (April 4, 1981)
16. Coram Pariscella on the following:
debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled a. Obsessive-Compulsive Neurosis (February 23, 1978)
marriages on account of the personality disorders of the said individuals.51 b. Homosexuality (June 11, 1978)
17. Coram Fiore (May 27, 1981)
18. Coram Agustoni (March 23, 1982)
_______________ “6.3. After the Promulgation of the 1983 Code of Canon Law
19. Rotal Case No. 41:c. Colagiovanni on March 3, 1983 on Homosexuality
51  Ng, Apruebo & Lepiten, Legal  and Clinical Bases of Psychological Incapacity, 2006 ed., pp. 14-16, cites the
20. Rotal Case No. 42 c. Huot on July 18, 1983 on Alcoholism and Immature Personality.
following:
21. Rotal Case No. 43: c. Giannechini on July 19, 1983 on Homosexuality.
“Canon 1095, 3  concerning psychological incapacity pointed out cases of various psychological disorders from
22. Rotal Case No. 45: c. Colagiovanni on November 22, 1983 about an ex-priest who was a “liar, cheat and
the Roman Rota as enumerated below (Fr. Bacareza, 1999).
swindler” (Anti-Social Personality)
“6.1. From the 1917 Code of the Second Vatican Council
23. Rotal Case No. 46: c. Stankiewiez on November 24, 1983 on Homosexuality.
1. Coram Teodori in Italy on January 19, 1940 on Nymphomania.
24. Rotal Case No. 47: c. Egan on March 29, 1984 on Hysterical Personality.
2. Coram Heard on June 5, 1941 on Nymphomania.
25. Rotal Case No. 48: c. Di Felice on June 9, 1984 on Psychic Immaturity.
3. Coram Heard in Quebec on January 30, 1954 on Lethargic Encephalitis.
26. Rotal Case No. 49: c. Pinto on May 30, 1986 on Alcoholism and Gambling.
4. Coram Mattioli in Quebec, Canada on November 6, 1956 on General Paralysis.
27. Rotal Case No. 50: c. Giannecchini on December 20, 1988 on Hypersexuality-Nymphomania.
5. Coram Sabbatani in Naples, Italy on June 21, 1957 on Nymphomania.
6. Coram Mattioli in Rome on November 28, 1957 on Schizophrenia. 227
7. Coram Lefebvre on December 19, 1959 on Nymphomania.
8. Coram De Jorio on December 19, 1961 on Schizophrenia.
“6.2 From the Second Vatican Council to the Promulgation of the 1983 Code
VOL. 579, FEBRUARY 13, 2009 227
9. Coram Monsigneur Charles Lefebre on the following:
a. Homosexuality,
 Ngo Te vs. Yu-Te
collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence.52  The Court should rather be
alarmed by the rising number of cases involving marital abuse, child abuse, domestic violence
and incestuous rape.
In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party’s psychological incapacity, the Court
is not demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of
marriage, because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who
cannot comply with or assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred
bond. It may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence, constitutional indolence or
laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a
sociopathic personality anomaly.53 Let it be noted that in Article 36, there is no marriage to
speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the very beginning.54  To indulge in
imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial to a
stillborn marriage.
The prospect of a possible remarriage by the freed spouses should not pose too much of a
concern for the Court.  First  and foremost, because it is none of its business. And  second,
because the judicial declaration of psychological incapacity operates as a warning or a lesson
learned. On one hand, the normal spouse would have become vigilant, and never again marry
a person with a personality disorder. On the other hand, a would-be spouse of the
psychologically incapacitated runs the risk of the latter’s disorder recurring in their marriage.
_______________
52 Justice Padilla’s Dissenting Opinion, Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 33, at pp. 36-37; Ancheta v. Ancheta,
supra note 49, at p. 917.
53 Supra note 34.
54  See  Article 36 of the Family Code; see  also  Justice Carpio’s Dissenting Opinion,  Tenebro v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004, 423 SCRA 272, 299.
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228 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ngo Te vs. Yu-Te
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina  in this case.
We simply declare that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes,55 there
is need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of
petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being redundant, we
reiterate once more the principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of  a
priori  assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to
repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals.
II.
We now examine the instant case.
The parties’ whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6) months. They met in January
1996, eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The
psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically incapacitated.
Petitioner’s behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent personality disorder,
and respondent’s, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder.56
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of
decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence
the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.57
_______________
55 Supra note 49, at p. 370.
56 Records, pp. 54-55; TSN, November 7, 2000, pp. 5-6.
57  Archbishop Oscar V. Cruz, D.D., of the Archdiocese of Lingayen-Dagupan, explains in  Marriage Tribunal
Ministry, 1992 ed., that “[s]tandard practice shows the marked advisability of Expert intervention in Marriage Cases
accused of nullity on the ground of
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Ngo Te vs. Yu-Te
Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:
“Furthermore, and equally significant,  the professional opinion of a psychological expert became
increasingly important in such cases. Data about the person’s entire life, both before and after the
ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked to give professional opinions about a party’s
mental capacity at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be
accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to the addition
of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to the advances made in
psychology during the past decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-important connecting
link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal contract to
that of a covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment cases that a
person who could intellectually understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid consent to
marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment  are
now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent.
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, “not only to
sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from
assuming or carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely
cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each other’s body for heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality the
right to the community of the whole of life; i.e., the right to a  developing lifelong relationship. Rotal
decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for marriage  as
presupposing the development of an adult personality; as mean-
_______________
defective matrimonial consent on account of natural incapacity by reason of any factor causative of lack of sufficient use of reason,
grave lack of due discretion and inability to assume essential obligations—although the law categorically mandates said
intervention only in the case of impotence and downright mental disorder x x x.” (p. 106).
230
230 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ngo Te vs. Yu-Te
ing the capacity of the spouses to give themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct person;
that the spouses must be ‘other oriented’ since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love;
and that the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal relationship because marriage is more than
just a physical reality but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations
of marriage depends, according to Church decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal relationship. A
serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the relationship and
consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is
not considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse.
Fr. Green, in an article in  Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature marital
relationship:
“The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a permanent
and faithful commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3)
stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the ordinary
stresses and strains of marriage, etc.”
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to the failure of a
marriage:
“At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion even with the
best intentions of the parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability
to fulfill marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with its fundamental lack
of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real
freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where personal responses consistently fall
short of reasonable expectations.
x x x x
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts whether he or she has a
case for an annulment on any other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the more
traditional categories often fits very easily into the psychological category.
231
VOL. 579, FEBRUARY 13, 2009 231
Ngo Te vs. Yu-Te
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift in their use.
Whereas originally the emphasis was on the parties’ inability to exercise proper judgment at the
time of the marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties’
incapacity to assume or carry out their responsibilities and obligations as promised  (lack of due
competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of due competence is that at the time the
marriage was entered into  civil divorce and breakup of the family almost always is proof of
someone’s failure to carry out marital responsibilities as promised  at the time the marriage was
entered into.”58
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals59 emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to
establish the precise cause of a party’s psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at
the inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos60 asserts, there is no requirement that
the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician,
if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity.61 Ver-
_______________
58 Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, supra note 21, at pp. 685-688; p. 221.
59 Supra note 49, at p. 88; see also Republic v. Quintero-Hemano, supranote 49, at p. 743.
60 Supra  note 49, at p. 850; see also  Republic v. Quintero-Hemano, supra  note 49, at p. 742;  Republic v. Iyoy,
supra note 49, at p. 526; Zamora v. Court of Appeals, supra note 49, at p. 27; Paras v. Paras, supra note 49, at pp. 96-
97.
61 The Court, however, by saying—
[T]he assessment of petitioner by Dr. Gauzon was based merely on descriptions communicated to him by
respondent. The doctor never conducted any psychological examination of her. Neither did he ever claim to have done
so. In fact, his Professional Opinion began with the statement “[I]f what Alfonso Choa said about his wife Leni is true,
x x x”
x x x x
Obviously, Dr. Guanzon had no personal knowledge of the facts he testified to, as these had merely been relayed to
him by respondent. The former was working on pure suppositions and secondhand information fed to him by
232
232 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ngo Te vs. Yu-Te
ily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest
psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of
expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the
psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of
psychological incapacity.62
_______________
one side. Consequently, his testimony can be dismissed as unscientific and unreliable.
Dr. Guanzon tried to save his credibility by asserting that he was able to assess petitioner’s character, not only
through the descriptions given by respondent, but also through the former’s at least fifteen hours of study of the
voluminous transcript of records of this case. Even if it took the good doctor a whole day or a whole week to examine
the records of this case, we still find his assessment of petitioner’s psychological state sorely insufficient and
methodologically flawed.
in Choa v. Choa (Supra note 49, at pp. 190-191), in effect, required the personal examination of the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated.
62 Psychologists of the Psychological Extension Evaluation Research Services (PEERS) enumerate the segments of
the psychological evaluation report for psychological incapacity as follows:
• Identifying Data: Personal Information
• Referral Question:  Data coming from informants and significant others (psychologists, psychiatrists,
physicians, parents, brothers, sisters, relatives, friends, etc.).
• Test Administered (Dates): List by name
• Background Information:
Current Life Situation:  Presenting complaint (personal and marital conflict), history of problem, and
consequences in client’s life.
Life History Information: Childhood development, educational history, vocational history, medical history,
sexual and marital history, personal goals.
• Behavior Observations: Description of client, relationship with examiner, and test related behaviors.
• Interpretation of Test Results:
Intellectual Functioning: Wechsler tests, Stanford-Binet, etc. Obtained IQ scores and specific strengths and
deficits.
Cognitive Functioning: Rorschach, TAT, MMPI, etc. Perception of reality or perceptual efficiency, conceptual
organization, psychological
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Ngo Te vs. Yu-Te
Parenthetically, the Court, at this point, finds it fitting to suggest the inclusion in the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute
_______________
needs, conflicts, preoccupations, suspiciousness, hallucinations, or delusions.
Emotional Functioning (MMPI, Rorschach, etc.):  Liability  of emotions, impulse control, predominant
concerns like aggression, anxiety, depression, guilt, dependency, and hostility.
Relationship Patterns (MMPI, Rorschach, TAT, etc.): Problem areas in work or school, friendships, intimate
relationships, difficulties such as immaturity, irresponsibility, cooperativeness, sociability, introversion,
impulsivity, aggression, dangerousness to self or others.
Defenses and compensations: Evidence of any strength, any coping mechanisms, or any useful compensation
that might be helping the client maintain himself/herself.
 • Integration of Test Results with Life History: Presenting a clinical picture of the client as a total person
against the background of his marital discords and life circumstances. Hypotheses posed through the referral
question and generated and integrated via test results and other reliable information.
• Summary, Conclusion, Diagnosis, Prognosis:
Summary: Emphasis should be on conciseness and accuracy so that the reader can quickly find the essential
information and overall impression.
Conclusion:  Integrating the material (data) into a more smoothly stated conceptualization of the client’s
personality and problem areas as regards root causes and characteristics as ground for nullity of marriage.
Diagnosis:  Diagnostic impression is evolved form the data obtained, formed impression of personality
disorders, and classified mental disorders based on the criteria and multi axial system of the DSM IV.
Prognosis: Predicting the behavior based on the data obtained that are relevant to the current functioning of
the client, albeit under ideal conditions.
• Recommendation:  Providing a careful specific recommendation is based on the referral sources and
obtained data in dealing with a particular client that may be ameliorative, remedial, or unique
treatment/intervention approaches. As to psychological incapacity, specific recommendation on the nullity of
marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code and expertise and clinical judgment of the Clinical
Psychologist should be given emphasis. (Ng, Apruebo & Lepiten, Legal  and Clinical Bases of Psychological
Incapacity, supranote 51, at pp. 179-181.)
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234 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ngo Te vs. Yu-Te
Nullity of  Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,63  an option for the trial
judge to refer the case to a court-appointed psychologist/expert for an independent assessment
and evaluation of the psychological state of the parties. This will assist the courts, who are no
experts in the field of psychology, to arrive at an intelligent and judicious determination of the
case. The rule, however, does not dispense with the parties’ prerogative to present their own
expert witnesses.
Going back, in the case at bench, the psychological assessment, which we consider as
adequate, produced the findings that both parties are afflicted with personality disorders—to
repeat, dependent personality disorder for petitioner, and narcissistic and antisocial
personality disorder for respondent. We note that  The Encyclopedia of Mental
Health discusses personality disorders as follows—
“A group of disorders involving behaviors or traits that are characteristic of a person’s recent and long-
term functioning. Patterns of perceiving and thinking are not usually limited to isolated episodes but are
deeply ingrained, inflexible, maladaptive and severe enough to cause the individual mental stress or
anxieties or to interfere with interpersonal relationships and normal functioning. Personality disorders
are often recognizable by adolescence or earlier, continue through adulthood and become less obvious in
middle or old age. An individual may have more than one personality disorder at a time.
The common factor among individuals who have personality disorders, despite a variety of character
traits, is the way in which the disorder leads to pervasive problems in social and occupational
adjustment. Some individuals with personality disorders are perceived by others as overdramatic,
paranoid, obnoxious or even criminal, without an awareness of their behaviors. Such qualities may lead
to trouble getting along with other people, as well as difficulties in other areas of life and often a
tendency to blame others for their problems. Other individuals with personality disorders are not
unpleasant or difficult to work with but tend to be lonely, isolated or
_______________
63 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, effective March 15, 2003.
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Ngo Te vs. Yu-Te
dependent. Such traits can lead to interpersonal difficulties, reduced self-esteem and dissatisfaction with
life.
Causes of Personality Disorders Different mental health viewpoints propose a variety of causes of
personality disorders. These include Freudian, genetic factors, neurobiologic theories and brain wave
activity.
Freudian  Sigmund Freud believed that fixation at certain stages of development led to certain
personality types. Thus, some disorders as described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders  (3d ed., rev.) are derived from his oral, anal and phallic character types. Demanding and
dependent behavior (dependent and passive-aggressive) was thought to derive from fixation at the oral
stage. Characteristics of obsessionality, rigidity and emotional aloofness were thought to derive from
fixation at the anal stage; fixation at the phallic stage was thought to lead to shallowness and an
inability to engage in intimate relationships. However, later researchers have found little evidence that
early childhood events or fixation at certain stages of development lead to specific personality patterns.
Genetic Factors Researchers have found that there may be a genetic factor involved in the etiology of
antisocial and borderline personality disorders; there is less evidence of inheritance of other personality
disorders. Some family, adoption and twin studies suggest that schizotypal personality may be related to
genetic factors.
Neurobiologic Theories In individuals who have borderline personality, researchers have found that
low cerebrospinal fluid 5-hydroxyindoleacetic acid (5-HIAA) negatively correlated with measures of
aggression and a past history of suicide attempts. Schizotypal personality has been associated with low
platelet monoamine oxidase (MAO) activity and impaired smooth pursuit eye movement.
Brain Wave Activity Abnormalities in electroencephalograph (EEG) have been reported in antisocial
personality for many years; slow wave is the most widely reported abnormality. A study of borderline
patients reported that 38 percent had at least marginal EEG abnormalities, compared with 19 percent in
a control group.
Types of Disorders  According to the American Psychiatric Association’s  Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev., 1987), or DSM-III-R, personality disorders are categorized into
three major clusters:
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236 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ngo Te vs. Yu-Te
Cluster A:  Paranoid, schizoid and schizotypal personality disorders. Individuals who have these
disorders often appear to have odd or eccentric habits and traits.
Cluster B:  Antisocial, borderline, histrionic and narcissistic personality disorders. Individuals who
have these disorders often appear overly emotional, erratic and dramatic.
Cluster C:  Avoidant, dependent, obsessive-compulsive and passive-aggressive personality disorders.
Individuals who have these disorders often appear anxious or fearful.
The DSM-III-R also lists another category, “personality disorder not otherwise specified,” that can be
used for other specific personality disorders or for mixed conditions that do not qualify as any of the
specific personality disorders.
Individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually have long-term concerns, and thus therapy
may be long-term.”64
Dependent personality disorder is characterized in the following manner—
“A personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and submissive behavior. Such
individuals usually lack self-esteem and frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism and are
easily hurt by others’ comments. At times they actually bring about dominance by others through a quest
for overprotection.
Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood. Individuals who have this disorder
may be unable to make everyday decisions without advice or reassurance from others, may allow others
to make most of their important decisions (such as
_______________
 64 Kahn and Fawcett, The Encyclopedia of Mental Health, 1993 ed., pp. 291-292. See Bernstein, Penner, Clarke-Stewart, Roy,
Psychology, 7th ed., 2006, pp. 613-614, defining personality disorders as “long-standing, inflexible ways of behaving that are not so
much severe mental disorders as dysfunctional styles of living. These disorders affect all areas of functioning and, beginning in
childhood or adolescence, create problems for those who display them and for others. Some psychologists view personality disorders
as interpersonal strategies or as extreme, rigid, and maladaptive expressions of personality traits.” (Citations omitted.)
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Ngo Te vs. Yu-Te
where to live), tend to agree with people even when they believe they are wrong, have difficulty starting
projects or doing things on their own, volunteer to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval
from other people, feel uncomfortable or helpless when alone and are often preoccupied with fears of
being abandoned.”65
and antisocial personality disorder described, as follows—
“Characteristics include a consistent pattern of behavior that is intolerant of the conventional behavioral
limitations imposed by a society, an inability to sustain a job over a period of years, disregard for the
rights of others (either through exploitiveness or criminal behavior), frequent physical fights and, quite
commonly, child or spouse abuse without remorse and a tendency to blame others. There is often a façade
of charm and even sophistication that masks disregard, lack of remorse for mistreatment of others and
the need to control others.
Although characteristics of this disorder describe criminals, they also may befit some individuals who
are prominent in business or politics whose habits of self-centeredness and disregard for the rights of
others may be hidden prior to a public scandal.
During the 19th century, this type of personality disorder was referred to as moral insanity. The term
described immoral, guiltless behavior that was not accompanied by impairments in reasoning.
According to the classification system used in the  Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders  (3d ed., rev. 1987), anti-social personality disorder is one of the four “dramatic” personality
disorders, the others being borderline, histrionic and narcissistic.”66
abandoned.67 As clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed everything dictated to him by
the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a
person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life.
Although on a different plane, the same may also be said of the respondent. Her being
afflicted with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to assume the essential marital
obligations. This finding takes into account her disregard for the rights of others, her abuse,
mistreatment and control of others without remorse, her tendency to blame others, and her
intolerance of the conventional behavioral limitations imposed by society.68Moreover, as shown
in this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating
petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of committing suicide.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the
precipitous marriage which they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.
_______________
67 Supra note 65.
68 Supra note 66.
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Ngo Te vs. Yu-Te
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The
August 5, 2003 Decision and the January 19, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 71867 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision, dated July 30, 2001,
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

The seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravity of the disorders considered, the Court, in Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, Chico-Nazario and Peralta, JJ., concur.
this case, finds as decisive the psychological evaluation made by the expert witness; and, thus,
rules that the marriage of the parties is null and void on ground of both parties’ psychological Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and set aside.
incapacity. We further
Notes.—A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with
the danger of collusion, hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage
_______________
and legal separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the
65 Id., at p. 131. state for the purpose of preventing any collusion between the parties and to take care that
66 Id., at pp. 50-51. their evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. (Tuason vs. Court of Appeals, 256 SCRA 158
238
[1996])
A subsequent pronouncement that the accused’s marriage is void from the beginning is not
a defense in a charge for concubinage—he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
238 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
(Beltran vs. People, 334 SCRA 106 [2000])
Ngo Te vs. Yu-Te

consider that the trial court, which had a first-hand view of the witnesses’ deportment, arrived
at the same conclusion.
Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the
essential marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and
rendering help and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from
others, allows others to make most of his important decisions (such as where to live), tends to
agree with people even when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his
own, volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people,
feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being
601 Phil. 676
In her complaint, Carmen stated that prior to their marriage, she was already aware that

THIRD DIVISION Benjamin used to drink and gamble occasionally with his friends.[14] But after they were
married, petitioner continued to drink regularly and would go home at about midnight or
sometimes in the wee hours of the morning drunk and violent. He would confront and
[ G.R. No. 166562, March 31, 2009 ] insult respondent, physically assault her and force her to have sex with him. There were
also instances when Benjamin used his gun and shot the gate of their house.[15] Because
BENJAMIN G. TING, PETITIONER, VS. CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING, of his drinking habit, Benjamin's job as anesthesiologist was affected to the point that he
RESPONDENT. often had to refuse to answer the call of his fellow doctors and to pass the task to other
anesthesiologists. Some surgeons even stopped calling him for his services because they
DECISION perceived petitioner to be unreliable. Respondent tried to talk to her husband about the
latter's drinking problem, but Benjamin refused to acknowledge the same.[16]

NACHURA, J.:
Carmen also complained that petitioner deliberately refused to give financial support to
their family and would even get angry at her whenever she asked for money for their
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the November 17, 2003
children. Instead of providing support, Benjamin would spend his money on drinking and
Amended Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), and its December 13, 2004
gambling and would even buy expensive equipment for his hobby.[17] He rarely stayed
Resolution[2] in CA-G.R. CV No. 59903. The appellate court, in its assailed decision and
home[18] and even neglected his obligation to his children.[19]
resolution, affirmed the January 9, 1998 Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 23, Cebu City, declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and
Aside from this, Benjamin also engaged in compulsive gambling.[20] He would gamble two
void ab initio pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.[4] or three times a week and would borrow from his friends, brothers, or from loan sharks
whenever he had no money. Sometimes, Benjamin would pawn his wife's own jewelry to
The facts follow.
finance his gambling.[21] There was also an instance when the spouses had to sell their
family car and even a portion of the lot Benjamin inherited from his father just to be able
Petitioner Benjamin Ting (Benjamin) and respondent Carmen Velez-Ting (Carmen) first
to pay off his gambling debts.[22] Benjamin only stopped going to the casinos in 1986
met in 1972 while they were classmates in medical school.[5] They fell in love, and they
after he was banned therefrom for having caused trouble, an act which he said he
were wed on July 26, 1975 in Cebu City when respondent was already pregnant with their
first child. purposely committed so that he would be banned from the gambling establishments.[23]

In sum, Carmen's allegations of Benjamin's psychological incapacity consisted of the

At first, they resided at Benjamin's family home in Maguikay, Mandaue City.[6] When their
following manifestations:
second child was born, the couple decided to move to Carmen's family home in Cebu City.
[7] In September 1975, Benjamin passed the medical board examinations[8] and 1. Benjamin's alcoholism, which adversely affected his family relationship and his
thereafter proceeded to take a residency program to become a surgeon but shifted to profession;
anesthesiology after two years. By 1979, Benjamin completed the preceptorship program
for the said field[9] and, in 1980, he began working for Velez Hospital, owned by 2. Benjamin's violent nature brought about by his excessive and regular drinking;
Carmen's family, as member of its active staff,[10] while Carmen worked as the hospital's
3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which Benjamin found it necessary to
Treasurer.[11]
sell the family car twice and the property he inherited from his father in order to pay
off his debts, because he no longer had money to pay the same; and
The couple begot six (6) children, namely Dennis, born on December 9, 1975; James
Louis, born on August 25, 1977; Agnes Irene, born on April 5, 1981; Charles Laurence,
4. Benjamin's irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure and refusal to
born on July 21, 1986; Myles Vincent, born on July 19, 1988; and Marie Corinne, born on
give regular financial support to his family.[24]
June 16, 1991.[12]
In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. He maintained that
On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to petitioner and while he is a respectable person, as his peers would confirm. He said that he is an active
their youngest child was only two years old, Carmen filed a verified petition before the member of social and athletic clubs and would drink and gamble only for social reasons
RTC of Cebu City praying for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article and for leisure. He also denied being a violent person, except when provoked by
36 of the Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity
circumstances.[25] As for his alleged failure to support his family financially, Benjamin
even at the time of the celebration of their marriage, which, however, only became
claimed that it was Carmen herself who would collect his professional fees from Velez
manifest thereafter. [13]
Hospital when he was still serving there as practicing anesthesiologist.[26] In his
testimony, Benjamin also insisted that he gave his family financial support within his
means whenever he could and would only get angry at respondent for lavishly spending
his hard-earned money on unnecessary things.[27] He also pointed out that it was he who
often comforted and took care of their children, while Carmen played mahjong with her
friends twice a week.[28]
During the trial, Carmen's testimony regarding Benjamin's drinking and gambling habits
and violent behavior was corroborated by Susana Wasawas, who served as nanny to the
spouses' children from 1987 to 1992.[29] Wasawas stated that she personally witnessed
instances when Benjamin maltreated Carmen even in front of their children.[30]
Carmen also presented as witness Dr. Pureza Trinidad-Oñate, a psychiatrist.[31] Instead of
the usual personal interview, however, Dr. Oñate's evaluation of Benjamin was limited to
the transcript of stenographic notes taken during Benjamin's deposition because the latter
had already gone to work as an anesthesiologist in a hospital in South Africa. After
reading the transcript of stenographic notes, Dr. Oñate concluded that Benjamin's
compulsive drinking, compulsive gambling and physical abuse of respondent are clear
indications that petitioner suffers from a personality disorder.[32]
To refute Dr. Oñate's opinion, petitioner presented Dr. Renato D. Obra, a psychiatrist and
a consultant at the Department of Psychiatry in Don Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical
Center, as his expert witness.[33] Dr. Obra evaluated Benjamin's psychological behavior
based on the transcript of stenographic notes, as well as the psychiatric evaluation report
prepared by Dr. A.J.L. Pentz, a psychiatrist from the University of Pretoria in South Africa,
and his (Dr. Obra's) interview with Benjamin's brothers.[34] Contrary to Dr. Oñate's
findings, Dr. Obra observed that there is nothing wrong with petitioner's personality,
considering the latter's good relationship with his fellow doctors and his good track record
as anesthesiologist.[35]
On January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered its Decision[36] declaring the marriage
between petitioner and respondent null and void. The RTC gave credence to Dr. Oñate's
findings and the admissions made by Benjamin in the course of his deposition, and found
him to be psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. Specifically, the trial court found Benjamin an excessive drinker, a compulsive
gambler, someone who prefers his extra-curricular activities to his family, and a person
with violent tendencies, which character traits find root in a personality defect existing
even before his marriage to Carmen. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring the marriage between plaintiff and defendant null and void ab initio
pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. x x x
xxxx
SO ORDERED.[37]
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA. On October 19, 2000, the CA rendered a
Decision[38] reversing the trial court's ruling. It faulted the trial court's finding, stating
that no proof was adduced to support the conclusion that Benjamin was psychologically
incapacitated at the time he married Carmen since Dr. Oñate's conclusion was based only
on theories and not on established fact,[39] contrary to the guidelines set forth in Santos
v. Court of Appeals[40] and in Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals and Molina.[41]
Because of this, Carmen filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the Molina
guidelines should not be applied to this case since the Molina decision was promulgated
only on February 13, 1997, or more than five years after she had filed her petition with
the RTC.[42] She claimed that the Molina ruling could not be made to apply retroactively,
as it would run counter to the principle of stare decisis. Initially, the CA denied the motion
for reconsideration for having been filed beyond the prescribed period. Respondent
thereafter filed a manifestation explaining compliance with the prescriptive period but the
same was likewise denied for lack of merit. Undaunted, respondent filed a petition for
certiorari[43] with this Court. In a Resolution[44] dated March 5, 2003, this Court granted
the petition and directed the CA to resolve Carmen's motion for reconsideration.[45] On
review, the CA decided to reconsider its previous ruling. Thus, on November 17, 2003, it
issued an Amended Decision[46] reversing its first ruling and sustaining the trial court's
decision.[47]
A motion for reconsideration was filed, this time by Benjamin, but the same was denied
by the CA in its December 13, 2004 Resolution.[48]
Hence, this petition.
For our resolution are the following issues:
I. Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to
follow the guidelines set forth under the Santos and Molina cases;
II. Whether the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of
psychological incapacity for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
based on Article 36 of the Family Code has been liberalized; and
III. Whether the CA's decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and
respondent null and void [is] in accordance with law and jurisprudence.
We find merit in the petition.
I. On the issue of stare decisis.
The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules
established by this Court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a
question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed
to further argument.[49] Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issues,
[50] necessary for two simple reasons: economy and stability. In our jurisdiction, the
principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code.[51]
This doctrine of adherence to precedents or stare decisis was applied by the English
courts and was later adopted by the United States. Associate Justice (now Chief Justice)
Reynato S. Puno's discussion on the historical development of this legal principle in his
dissenting opinion in Lambino v. Commission on Elections[52] is enlightening:
The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means "stand by the thing
and do not disturb the calm." The doctrine started with the English Courts.
Blackstone observed that at the beginning of the 18th century, "it is an
established rule to abide by former precedents where the same points come
again in litigation." As the rule evolved, early limits to its application were
recognized: (1) it would not be followed if it were "plainly unreasonable"; (2)
where courts of equal authority developed conflicting decisions; and, (3) the
binding force of the decision was the "actual principle or principles necessary
for the decision; not the words or reasoning used to reach the decision."
The doctrine migrated to the United States. It was recognized by the framers
of the U.S. Constitution. According to Hamilton, "strict rules and precedents"
are necessary to prevent "arbitrary discretion in the courts." Madison agreed
but stressed that "x x x once the precedent ventures into the realm of altering
or repealing the law, it should be rejected." Prof. Consovoy well noted that
Hamilton and Madison "disagree about the countervailing policy considerations
that would allow a judge to abandon a precedent." He added that their ideas
"reveal a deep internal conflict between the concreteness required by the rule
of law and the flexibility demanded in error correction. It is this internal
conflict that the Supreme Court has attempted to deal with for over two
centuries."
Indeed, two centuries of American case law will confirm Prof. Consovoy's
observation although stare decisis developed its own life in the United States.
Two strains of stare decisis have been isolated by legal scholars. The first,
known as vertical stare decisis deals with the duty of lower courts to apply
the decisions of the higher courts to cases involving the same facts. The
second, known as horizontal stare decisis requires that high courts must
follow its own precedents. Prof. Consovoy correctly observes that vertical stare
decisis has been viewed as an obligation, while horizontal stare decisis, has
been viewed as a policy, imposing choice but not a command. Indeed, stare
decisis is not one of the precepts set in stone in our Constitution.
It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of horizontal stare decisis --
constitutional stare decisis and statutory stare decisis. Constitutional stare
decisis involves judicial interpretations of the Constitution while statutory
stare decisis involves interpretations of statutes. The distinction is important
for courts enjoy more flexibility in refusing to apply stare decisis in
constitutional litigations. Justice Brandeis' view on the binding effect of the
doctrine in constitutional litigations still holds sway today. In soothing prose,
Brandeis stated: "Stare decisis is not . . . a universal and inexorable command.
The rule of stare decisis is not inflexible. Whether it shall be followed or
departed from, is a question entirely within the discretion of the court, which is
again called upon to consider a question once decided." In the same vein, the
venerable Justice Frankfurter opined: "the ultimate touchstone of
constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not what we have said about it."
In contrast, the application of stare decisis on judicial interpretation of statutes
is more inflexible. As Justice Stevens explains: "after a statute has been
construed, either by this Court or by a consistent course of decision by other
federal judges and agencies, it acquires a meaning that should be as clear as if
the judicial gloss had been drafted by the Congress itself." This stance reflects
both respect for Congress' role and the need to preserve the courts' limited
resources.
In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of reasons, viz.:
(1) it legitimizes judicial institutions; (2) it promotes judicial economy; and,
(3) it allows for predictability. Contrariwise, courts refuse to be bound by the
stare decisis rule where (1) its application perpetuates illegitimate and
unconstitutional holdings; (2) it cannot accommodate changing social and
political understandings; (3) it leaves the power to overturn bad constitutional
law solely in the hands of Congress; and, (4) activist judges can dictate the
policy for future courts while judges that respect stare decisis are stuck
agreeing with them.
In its 200-year history, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to follow the stare
decisis rule and reversed its decisions in 192 cases. The most famous of these
reversals is Brown v. Board of Education which junked Plessy v. Ferguson's
"separate but equal doctrine." Plessy upheld as constitutional a state law
requirement that races be segregated on public transportation. In Brown, the
U.S. Supreme Court, unanimously held that "separate . . . is inherently
unequal." Thus, by freeing itself from the shackles of stare decisis, the U.S.
Supreme Court freed the colored Americans from the chains of inequality. In
the Philippine setting, this Court has likewise refused to be straitjacketed by
the stare decisis rule in order to promote public welfare. In La Bugal-B'laan
Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, we reversed our original ruling that certain
provisions of the Mining Law are unconstitutional. Similarly, in Secretary of
Justice v. Lantion, we overturned our first ruling and held, on motion for
reconsideration, that a private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and
hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
An examination of decisions on stare decisis in major countries will show that
courts are agreed on the factors that should be considered before overturning
prior rulings. These are workability, reliance, intervening developments in the
law and changes in fact. In addition, courts put in the balance the following
determinants: closeness of the voting, age of the prior decision and its merits.
The leading case in deciding whether a court should follow the stare decisis
rule in constitutional litigations is Planned Parenthood v. Casey. It established
a 4-pronged test. The court should (1) determine whether the rule has proved
to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability; (2) consider whether
the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to
the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation; (3)
determine whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have
the old rule no more than a remnant of an abandoned doctrine; and, (4) find
out whether facts have so changed or come to be seen differently, as to have
robbed the old rule of significant application or justification.[53]
To be forthright, respondent's argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos
and Molina should not be applied retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare
decisis is no longer new. The same argument was also raised but was struck down in
Pesca v. Pesca,[54] and again in Antonio v. Reyes.[55] In these cases, we explained that
the interpretation or construction of a law by courts constitutes a part of the law as of the
date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court is overruled, and a
different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in
favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith, in
accordance therewith under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non respicit."
II. On liberalizing the required proof for the declaration of nullity of marriage
under Article 36.
Now, petitioner wants to know if we have abandoned the Molina doctrine.
We have not.
In Edward Kenneth Ngo Te v. Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te,[56] we declared that, in
hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as
the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. We said that instead
of serving as a guideline, Molina unintentionally became a straightjacket, forcing all cases
involving psychological incapacity to fit into and be bound by it, which is not only contrary
to the intention of the law but unrealistic as well because, with respect to psychological
incapacity, no case can be considered as on "all fours" with another.[57]
By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and
understandable to give weight to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding
the psychological temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause, juridical
antecedence, gravity and incurability of the psychological incapacity. However, such
opinions, while highly advisable, are not conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage.[58] At best, courts must treat such opinions as decisive
but not indispensable evidence in determining the merits of a given case. In fact, if the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity,
then actual medical or psychological examination of the person concerned need not be
resorted to.[59] The trial court, as in any other given case presented before it, must
always base its decision not solely on the expert opinions furnished by the parties but also
on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings.
It was for this reason that we found it necessary to emphasize in Ngo Te that each case
involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the
basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own
attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals.
Far from abandoning Molina, we simply suggested the relaxation of the stringent
requirements set forth therein, cognizant of the explanation given by the Committee on
the Revision of the Rules on the rationale of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC), viz.:
To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root cause of
the psychological incapacity and to attach thereto the verified written report of
an accredited psychologist or psychiatrist have proved to be too expensive for
the parties. They adversely affect access to justice o poor litigants. It is also a
fact that there are provinces where these experts are not available. Thus, the
Committee deemed it necessary to relax this stringent requirement enunciated
in the Molina Case. The need for the examination of a party or parties by a
psychiatrist or clinical psychologist and the presentation of psychiatric experts
shall now be determined by the court during the pre-trial conference.[60]
But where, as in this case, the parties had the full opportunity to present professional and
expert opinions of psychiatrists tracing the root cause, gravity and incurability of a party's
alleged psychological incapacity, then such expert opinion should be presented and,
accordingly, be weighed by the court in deciding whether to grant a petition for nullity of
marriage.
III. On petitioner's psychological incapacity.
Coming now to the main issue, we find the totality of evidence adduced by respondent
insufficient to prove that petitioner is psychologically unfit to discharge the duties
expected of him as a husband, and more particularly, that he suffered from such
psychological incapacity as of the date of the marriage eighteen (18) years ago.
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's and the appellate court's rulings declaring the
marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio.
The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article 36 to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.[61] The psychological illness
that must have afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady so
grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of
the matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume.[62]
In this case, respondent failed to prove that petitioner's "defects" were present at the
time of the celebration of their marriage. She merely cited that prior to their marriage,
she already knew that petitioner would occasionally drink and gamble with his friends;
but such statement, by itself, is insufficient to prove any pre-existing psychological defect
on the part of her husband. Neither did the evidence adduced prove such "defects" to be
incurable.
The evaluation of the two psychiatrists should have been the decisive evidence in
determining whether to declare the marriage between the parties null and void. Sadly,
however, we are not convinced that the opinions provided by these experts strengthened
respondent's allegation of psychological incapacity. The two experts provided diametrically
contradicting psychological evaluations: Dr. Oñate testified that petitioner's behavior is a
positive indication of a personality disorder,[63] while Dr. Obra maintained that there is
nothing wrong with petitioner's personality. Moreover, there appears to be greater weight
in Dr. Obra's opinion because, aside from analyzing the transcript of Benjamin's
deposition similar to what Dr. Oñate did, Dr. Obra also took into consideration the
psychological evaluation report furnished by another psychiatrist in South Africa who
personally examined Benjamin, as well as his (Dr. Obra's) personal interview with
Benjamin's brothers.[64] Logically, therefore, the balance tilts in favor of Dr. Obra's
findings.
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not condoning petitioner's drinking and gambling
problems, or his violent outbursts against his wife. There is no valid excuse to justify such
a behavior. Petitioner must remember that he owes love, respect, and fidelity to his
spouse as much as the latter owes the same to him. Unfortunately, this court finds
respondent's testimony, as well as the totality of evidence presented by the respondent,
to be too inadequate to declare him psychologically unfit pursuant to Article 36. [13] Id. at 35.

It should be remembered that the presumption is always in favor of the validity of [14] TSN, January 6, 1995, pp. 3, 8-9.
marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.[65] In this case, the presumption has not
been amply rebutted and must, perforce, prevail. [15] Rollo, p. 36.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. [16] Id. at 37.
The November 17, 2003 Amended Decision and the December 13, 2004 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59903 are accordingly REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
[17] Id.

SO ORDERED.
[18] Id. at 40.

Ynares-Santiago, (Chairperson), Carpio Morales,* Chico-Nazario, and Peralta, JJ., concur.

[19] Id. at 44.

[20] Id. at 40.

* Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez per Special

Order No. 602 dated March 20, 2009. [21] Id.

[1] Penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes, with Associate Justices Rodrigo V.
[22] Id. at 36.
Cosico and Sergio L. Pestaño, concurring; rollo, pp. 78-89.
[23] Id. at 40.
[2] Rollo, pp. 110-111.

[24] Id. at 48-49.

[3] Id. at 35-45.

[25] Id. at 42, 49.

[4] Art. 36 of the Family Code provides in full:

[26] Id. at 49.

Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
[27] TSN, December 7, 1994, morning, pp. 23-25.
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization. [as amended by Executive Order No. 227 dated July 17, 1987]
[28] Id. at 26.
[5] TSN, December 7, 1994, morning, p. 4.
[29] TSN, August 31, 1995, pp. 5-26.
[6] Id. at 12.
[30] Id. at 7-9.
[7] Id. at 17.
[31] Rollo, p. 38.
[8] Id. at 14; Exhibit "3."
[32] Id. at 39.
[9] Id. at 13, 15.
[33] Id. at 41.
[10] Id. at 21-23.
[34] Id. at 54-55.
[11] Id. at 10.
[35] Id. at 42.
[12] Rollo, p. 48.
[36] Id. at 35-45.
 [50] Id. at 438.
[37] Id. at 45.
[51] Art. 8 of the Civil Code provides in full:
[38] Id. at 47-65.

Article 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form
[39] Id. at 64. part of the legal system of the Philippines.

[40] G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, 240 SCRA 20. [52] G.R. Nos. 174153 and 174299, October 25, 2006, 505 SCRA 160.

[41] 335 Phil. 664 (1997). [53] Id. at 308-312. (Citations and emphasis omitted.)

[42] Rollo, pp. 80-81. [54] 408 Phil. 713 (2001).

[43] Docketed as G.R. No. 150479. [55] G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA 353.

[44] CA rollo, pp. 199-202. [56] G.R. No. 161793, February 13, 2009.

[45] Rollo, pp. 78-79. [57] Supra note 41, at 680.

[46] Supra note 1. [58] Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840 (2000).

[47] Pertinent portion of the CA's Amended Decision dated November 17, 2003 reads: [59] Id. at 850.

The foregoing considered and taking a cue on the adoption x x x of the Honorable Justices [60] Rationale for the New Rules as submitted by the Committee on the Revision of Rules

of the Supreme Court of the new "Rule On Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages" (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) which took
effect on March 15, 2003, this Court hereby RECONSIDERS itself and GRANTS the motion
for reconsideration filed by the herein petitioner-appellee on November 29, 2000.
Consequently, respondent-appellant's appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the DECISION of
the court below declaring the marriage between CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING and BENJAMIN
G. TING null and void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines is
hereby AFFIRMED.
to the Supreme Court, November 11, 2002, p. 3, as cited in Sta. Maria, Jr., Court
Procedures in Family Law Cases, 2007 ed., pp. 10-11.
[61] Supra note 40, at 34.
[62] Marcos v. Marcos, supra note 58, at 850-851.
[63] Rollo, p. 39.

WHEREFORE, in view thereof, we can not do any less but sustain the decision dated 29
[64] Id. at 54-55.
August 2002 of the court below in Civil Case No. CEB-14826 declaring the marriage
between petitioner-appellee Carmen Velez-Ting and respondent-appellant Benjamin G.
Ting void from the beginning under Article 36, Family Code (as amended by E.O. No. 227 [65] Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco, G.R. No. 158896, October 27, 2004, 441 SCRA 422,

dated 17 July 1987). 437.

Consequently, the Decision of this Court promulgated on October 19, 2000 is hereby SET
ASIDE and a new one rendered AFFIRMING the appealed Decision of the Court a quo.

SO ORDERED. (Id. at 88-89.) Source: Supreme Court E-Library | Date created: May 06, 2014
This page was dynamically generated by the E-Library Content Management System

[48] Rollo, pp. 110-111.

Supreme Court E-Library

[49] De Mesa v. Pepsi Cola Products Phils., Inc., G.R. Nos. 153063-70, August 19, 2005,

467 SCRA 433, 440.

 *
G.R. No. 155800. March 10, 2006.
LEONILO ANTONIO, petitioner, vs. MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, respondent.
Civil Procedure; Appeals; It is a settled principle of civil procedure that the conclusions of the trial
court regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from the appellate courts because
the trial court had an opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which may
indicate their candor or lack thereof.—It is a settled principle of civil procedure that the conclusions of
the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from the appellate
courts because the trial court had an opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while giving
testimony which may indicate their candor or lack thereof. The Court is likewise guided by the fact that
the Court of Appeals did not dispute the veracity of the evidence presented by petitioner.
Civil Law;  Family Code;  Marriages;  Annulment;  Psychological Incapacity; The concept of
psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of marriage is novel in our body of laws, although mental
incapacity has long been recognized as a ground for the dissolution of a marriage.—Article 36 of the
Family Code states that “[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise
be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.” The concept of
psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of marriage is novel in our body of laws, although mental
incapacity has long been recognized as a ground for the dissolution of a marriage.
Same; Same; Same;  Same;  Same;  Jurisprudence has recognized that psychological incapacity “is a
malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume.”—The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the
inability to understand the obligations of marriage, as opposed to a mere inability to comply with
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
354
354 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Antonio vs. Reyes
them, was further affirmed in the Molina case. Therein, the Court, through then Justice (now Chief
Justice) Panganiban observed that “[t]he evidence [to establish psychological incapacity] must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereto.” Jurisprudence since then has recognized that psychological incapacity “is a malady
so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume.”
Same;  Same;  Same;  Same;  Same;  Given the avowed State interest in promoting marriage as the
foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding
interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life.—Article 36 of the
Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity,
should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional protection of marriage. Given the avowed State
interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the foundation of
the nation, there is a corresponding interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-equipped to
promote family life. Void ab initiomarriages under Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the State
concerning marriage and family, as they promote wedlock among persons who, for reasons independent
of their will, are not capacitated to understand or comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
Same;  Same;  Same;  Same;  Same;  The requirement provided in the Molina case for the Solicitor
General to issue a certification stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition to the petition for
annulment of marriage has been dispensed with following the implementation of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or
the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.—
Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the Solicitor General issue a certification stating
his reasons for his agreement or opposition to the petition. This requirement however was dispensed
with following the implementation of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Still, Article 48 of the Family Code
mandates that the appearance of the prosecuting attor-
355
VOL. 484, MARCH 10, 2006 355
Antonio vs. Reyes
ney or fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties
and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Obviously, collusion is not an issue in this
case, considering the consistent vigorous opposition of respondent to the petition for declaration of
nullity. In any event, the fiscal’s participation in the hearings before the trial court is extant from the
records of this case.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The root causes of respondent’s psychological incapacity has been
medically or clinically identified and proven by experts as perennially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous
stories and inventing personalities and situations, of writing letters to petitioner using fictitious names,
and of lying about her actual occupation, income, educational attainment and family background, among
others.—The root cause of respondent’s psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically
identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial
court’s decision. The initiatory complaint alleged that respondent, from the start, had exhibited unusual
and abnormal behavior “of peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories, and inventing
personalities and situations,” of writing letters to petitioner using fictitious names, and of lying about her
actual occupation, income, educational attainment, and family background, among others.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court had already held in Marcos vs. Marcos, 343
SCRA 755 (2000) that personal examination of the subject by the physician is not required for the spouse
to be declared psychologically incapacitated.—The Court had already held in  Marcos v. Marcos, 343
SCRA 755 (2000), that personal examination of the subject by the physician is not required for the
spouse to be declared psychologically incapacitated. We deem the methodology utilized by petitioner’s
witnesses as sufficient basis for their medical conclusions. Admittedly, Drs. Abcede and Lopez’s common
conclusion of respondent’s psychological incapacity hinged heavily on their own acceptance of petitioner’s
version as the true set of facts. However, since the trial court itself accepted the veracity of petitioner’s
factual premises, there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn therefrom
by petitioner’s expert witnesses.
356
356 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Antonio vs. Reyes
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A person unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality would
similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond, much less its psychic meaning,
and the corresponding obligations attached to marriage, including parenting.—It should be noted that _______________
the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false pretenses in order to induce petitioner into 1 Penned by Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes, concurred in by Associate Justices Renato C. Dacudao and Mariano
marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of respondent to distinguish truth from
C. Del Castillo; See Rollo, pp. 67-84.
fiction, or at least abide by the truth. Petitioner’s witnesses and the trial court were emphatic on 2 Rollo, p. 86.
respondent’s inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the pathologic nature of her mistruths, which 3 Penned by Judge (now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals) Josefina Guevara-Salonga.
according to them, were revelatory of respondent’s inability to understand and perform the essential
obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality would 358
similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond, much less its psychic meaning,
and the corresponding obligations attached to marriage, including parenting. One unable to adhere to
reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional commitments. 358 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Same;  Same;  Same;  Same;  Same;  The psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or
Antonio vs. Reyes
clinically permanent or incurable.—The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such
psychological incapacity be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It was on this
score that the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court, the appellate court noting that it
did not appear certain that respondent’s condition was incurable and that Dr. Abcede did not testify to
such effect. Antecedent Facts
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The requirement that psychological incapacity must be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable is one that necessarily cannot be divined without expert Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and
opinion.—The requirement that psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically respondent was 36 years of 4age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married before
permanent or incurable is one that necessarily cannot be divined without expert opinion. Clearly in this a minister
5
of the Gospel   at the Manila City Hall, and through a subsequent church
case, there was no categorical averment from the expert witnesses that respondent’s psychological wedding6
 at the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila on 6 December
incapacity was curable or incurable simply because there was no legal necessity yet to elicit such a 1990.  Out of their union, a child was born on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5) months
declaration and the appropriate question was not accordingly propounded to him. If we later. 7
apply  Pesca  without deep reflection, there would be undue prejudice to those cases tried On 8 March 1993,  petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared
before Molina or Santos, especially those presently on appellate review, where presuma-
null and void. He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging
357
that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. He asserted that respondent’s incapacity
8
existed at the time their marriage was
celebrated and still subsists up to the present.
As manifestations of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that
VOL. 484, MARCH 10, 2006 357 respondent persistently lied about herself, the people
9
around her, her occupation, income,
educational attainment and other events or things,  to wit:
Antonio vs. Reyes (1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son,   and
10

instead introduced the boy to petitioner as the adopted child of her family. She only
bly the respective petitioners and their expert witnesses would not have seen the need to adduce a confessed the truth about the boy’s11
parentage when petitioner learned about it from
diagnosis of incurability. It may hold in those cases, as in this case, that the psychological incapacity of a other sources after their marriage.
spouse is actually incurable, even if not pronounced as such at the trial court level.
_______________
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
4 Solemnized by Rev. Victor M. Navarro, Minister of the PCCC, Las Piñas, Metro Manila.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. 5 Solemnized by the Parish Priest, Rev. Fr. Rodolfo Aguirre Gallardo.
     Tomas M. Guno for petitioner. 6 Rollo, pp. 69, 91.
7 Records, pp. 1-5.
     Roberto L. Mendoza for respondent.
8 Id., at pp. 1-2.
9 Id., at pp. 2-3. See also Rollo, pp. 69, 91.
TINGA, J.: 10 Named Tito F. Reyes II, born on 21 January 1982.
11 Supra note 8.
Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad truth has unsettled many a
love transformed into matrimony. Any sort of deception between spouses, no matter the 359
gravity, is always disquieting. Deceit to the depth and breadth unveiled in the following pages,
dark and irrational as in the modern  noir  tale, dims any trace of certitude on the guilty
spouse’s capability to fulfill the marital obligations even more.1 VOL. 484, MARCH 10, 2006 359
2
The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the  Decision   and  Resolution   of the Court of Antonio vs. Reyes
Appeals dated
3
29 November 2001 and 24 October 2002. The Court of Appeals had reversed the
judgment  of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati declaring the marriage of Leonilo N.
Antonio (petitioner) and Marie Ivonne F. Reyes (respondent), null and void. After careful (2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law,12 Edwin David, attempted to rape and
consideration, we reverse and affirm instead the trial court. kill her when in fact, no such incident occurred.
 (3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her marital obligations by
Gardiner, and told some 13
of her friends that she graduated with a degree in psychology, attending to all the needs of her husband. She asserted that there was no truth to the
when she was neither.
(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold _______________
Recording Company (Blackgold); yet, not a single member of her family ever witnessed 19 Rollo, pp. 71, 92.
her alleged singing activities with the group. In the same vein, she postulated that a 20 Id.; Records, p. 3.
luncheon show was held at the Philippine14
Village Hotel in her honor and even 21 Rollo, pp. 71, 92.
presented an invitation to that effect  but petitioner discovered per 15
certification by the 22 Id., at pp. 71-72, 92-93.
23 Id.
Director of Sales of said hotel that no such occasion had taken place.
(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those names, 361
sent lengthy letters to petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and touting16her as the
“number one moneymaker” in the commercial industry worth P2 million. Petitioner
later found out that respondent herself was the one who wrote and sent the letters to VOL. 484, MARCH 10, 2006 361
17
him when she admitted the truth in one of their quarrels.  He likewise realized that
Antonio vs. Reyes
Babes Santos and Via Marquez were only figments of her 18imagination when he
discovered they were not known in or connected with Blackgold. 24
allegation that she fabricated stories, told lies and invented personalities.  She presented her
(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her payslip
version, thus:
to make it appear that she
(1) She concealed her 25child by another man from petitioner because she was afraid of
_______________ losing her husband.
12 Rollo, pp. 69, 92. (2) She told petitioner about David’s attempt to rape and kill her because she surmised 26
13 Id., at pp.70, 92. such intent from David’s act of touching her back and ogling her from head to foot.
14 Id., at p. 95.
15 Supra note 13.
(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate 27
and had been teaching
16 Id., at pp. 70, 92.
psychology at the Pasig Catholic School for two (2) years.
17 TSN, 8 September 1993, p. 12. (4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive producer of Channel
18 Id., at pp. 12-13. See also Records, p. 91.
9 and she had done three (3) commercials with McCann Erickson for the advertisement
of Coca-cola, Johnson & Johnson, and Traders Royal Bank. She told petitioner she was
360
a Blackgold recording artist although she was not under contract with the company,
yet she reported to the Blackgold office after office hours. She claimed that a luncheon
360 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED show 28was indeed held in her honor at the Philippine Village Hotel on 8 December
1979.
Antonio vs. Reyes
(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by her and the writers
thereof were not fictitious. Bea Marquez Recto of the Recto political clan29was a resident
earned a higher income. She bought a sala set from a public19market but told petitioner of the United States while Babes Santos was employed with Saniwares.
that she acquired it from a famous furniture dealer.   She spent lavishly on (6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband but averred that she
unnecessary
20
items and ended up borrowing money from other people on false merely asked the latter in a diplomatic matter if she was the one asking for chocolates
pretexts.
(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his
_______________
officemates to monitor his whereabouts. When he could no longer take her unusual
behavior, he separated from her in August 1991. He tried to attempt a reconciliation 21
24 Id., at p. 93.
25 Id.,
but since her behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in November 1991. at pp. 74, 94.
26 Id.
27 Id., at pp. 73, 93.
In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede (Dr. Abcede), a 28 Id.
psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V. Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based 29 Id.

on the tests they conducted, that petitioner was essentially a normal, introspective, shy and
conservative type of person. On the other hand, they observed that respondent’s persistent and 362
constant lying to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. 22
It undermined the basic
relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect.   They further asserted that 362 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
respondent’s extreme jealousy was also pathological. It reached the point of paranoia since
there was no actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner was having an affair with another Antonio vs. Reyes
woman. They concluded based on the foregoing that 23
respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations. 30
from petitioner, and not to monitor her husband’s whereabouts.
 She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported almost ten people _______________
(7) 31
from her monthly budget of P7,000.00. 36 Rollo, pp. 95-96.
37 Id., at pp. 97-98.
In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a child prior to their 38 Id., at pp. 99-100.
39 Id., at pp. 101-103.
marriage, the other lies attributed to her by petitioner were mostly hearsay and unconvincing.
40 335 Phil. 664; 268 SCRA 198 (1997).
Her stance was that the totality of32the evidence presented is not sufficient for a finding of
psychological incapacity on her part. 364
In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a psychiatrist, to
refute the allegations anent her psychological condition. Dr. Reyes testified that the series of
364 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
33
tests conducted by his assistant,   together with the screening procedures and the
Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological Rating Scale (CPRS) he himself conducted, led him to Antonio vs. Reyes
conclude that respondent was not psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential
marital obligations. He postulated that regressive behavior, gross neuroticism, psychotic
tendencies, and poor control of impulses, which are34 signs that might point to the presence of cation and interpretation of psychological incapacity had not been satisfied.
disabling trends, were not elicited from respondent. Taking exception to the appellate court’s pronouncement, petitioner elevated the case to
In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the evaluation conducted by Dr. this Court. He contends herein that the evidence conclusively establish respondent’s
Reyes as (i) he was not the one who administered and interpreted respondent’s psychological psychological incapacity.
evaluation, and (ii) he made use of only one instrument called CPRS which was not reliable In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily
41
influenced by the credence
35
because a good liar can fake the results of such test. accorded by the RTC to the factual allegations of petitioner.  It is a settled principle of civil
procedure that the conclusions of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses are
entitled to great respect from the appellate courts because the trial court had an opportunity
_______________
to observe the demeanor
42
of witnesses while giving testimony which may indicate their candor
30 Id., at pp. 74, 94. or lack thereof.   The Court is likewise guided by the fact that the Court of Appeals did not
31 Id., at pp. 73, 94.
32 Id.,
dispute the veracity of the evidence presented by petitioner. Instead, the appellate court
at pp. 77-78.
33 Miss Francianina Sanches. concluded that
43
such evidence was not sufficient to establish the psychological incapacity of
34 Rollo, p. 94. respondent.
35 Id., at pp. 72, 93; TSN, 23 March 1995, pp. 15-17. Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of petitioner as the operative facts.
Still, the crucial question remains as to whether the state of facts as presented by petitioner
363
sufficiently meets the standards set for the declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code. These standards
44
were definitively laid down45
in the Court’s 1997 ruling
VOL. 484, MARCH 10, 2006 363 in Republic v. Court of Appeals   (also known as the  Molina  case ), and indeed the Court of
Appeals cited the
Antonio vs. Reyes
_______________
After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioner’s evidence and held that respondent’s 41 Rollo, p. 95.
propensity to lying about almost anything—her occupation, state of health, singing abilities 42 Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 321 Phil. 105, 126; 250 SCRA 523, 542 (1995), citing Serrano v.
and her income, among others—had been duly established. According to the trial court, Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA 107 (1991).
respondent’s fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to 43 Rollo, p. 82.
44 Supra note 40.
live in a world of make-believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated
36
as it rendered her
45 The petitioning spouse and co-respondent in the case being Roridel O. Molina. Id.
incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage.  The trial court thus declared
the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void. 365
Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the
Archdiocese of Manila annulled the Catholic37
marriage of the parties, on the ground of lack of
due discretion on the part of the parties. During the pendency of the appeal before the Court VOL. 484, MARCH 10, 2006 365
of Appeals, the Metropolitan Tribunal’s ruling was affirmed with modification by both the
Antonio vs. Reyes
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal,38
which held instead that only respondent was
impaired by a lack of due discretion. Subsequently, the decision of 39
the National Appellate 46

Matrimonial Tribunal was upheld by the Roman Rota of the Vatican.
Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the Catholic tribunals. Still,
the appellate court reversed the RTC’s judgment. While conceding that respondent may not
have been completely honest with petitioner, the Court of Appeals nevertheless held that the
totality of the evidence presented was insufficient to establish respondent’s psychological
incapacity. It declared that the requirements in the case of  Republic v. Court of
40
Appeals  governing the appli-
Molina guidelines in reversing the RTC in the case at bar. Since Molina was decided in 1997,
the Supreme Court has yet to47 squarely affirm the declaration of nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code.  In fact, even48before Molina was handed down, there was only
one case, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,  wherein the Court definitively concluded that a
spouse was psychologically incapacitated under Article 36.
This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the misperception that the remedy
afforded by49
Article 36 of the Family Code is hollow, insofar as the Supreme Court is
concerned.   Yet what  Molina  and the succeeding cases did ordain was a set of guidelines
which, while undoubtedly onerous on the petitioner seeking the declaration of nullity, still
leave room for a decree of nullity under the proper circumstances. Molina did not foreclose the
grant of a decree of nullity under Article 36, even as it raised the bar for its allowance.
_______________
46 Rollo, p. 78.
47 There
were two cases since 1997 wherein the Court did let stand a lower court order declaring as a nullity a
marriage on the basis of Article 36. These cases are  Sy v. Court of Appeals,  386 Phil. 760;  330 SCRA 550(2000),
and Buenaventura v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 127358 & 127449, 31 March 2005, 454 SCRA 261. However, in Sy,
the Court found that the marriage was void ab initio due to the lack of a marriage license at the time the marriage
was solemnized, and thus declined to pass upon the question of psychological incapacity. In Buenaventura, since the
parties chose not to challenge the trial court’s conclusion of psychological incapacity and instead raised questions on
the award of damages and support, the Court did not review the finding of psychological incapacity.
48 334 Phil. 294; 266 SCRA 324 (1997).
49  It does not escape this Court’s attention that many lower courts do grant petitions for declaration of nullity
under Article 36, and that these decisions are not elevated for review to the Supreme Court.
366
366 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Antonio vs. Reyes
Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36
Article 36 of the Family Code states that “[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, 50shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization.”   The concept of psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of
marriage is novel in our body of laws, although mental incapacity has long been recognized as
a ground for the dissolution of a marriage.
The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting marriage persons 51
“who are not
in the full enjoyment of their reason52 at the time of contracting marriage.”   Marriages with
such persons were ordained as void,   in the same class as marriages with underage parties
and persons already married, among others. A party’s mental capacity was not a ground for
53
divorce under the Divorce Law of 1917,  but a marriage where “either party was of unsound
mind” at the 54time of its celebration was cited as an “annullable marriage” under the Marriage
Law of 1929.  Divorce on the ground of a spouse’s incurable insanity was permitted under the
55
divorce law enacted during the Japanese occupation.  Upon the enactment of the Civil Code in
1950, a marriage contracted by a party of “unsound mind” was classified under Article 85 of
the
_______________
50 See FAMILY CODE, Art. 36.
51  Translated from the original Spanish by Justice F.C. Fisher. See F.C. Fisher,  The Civil Code of Spain with
Philippine Notes and References  45 (Fifth Ed., 1947). The original text of Article 83 (2) of the Spanish Civil Code
reads: “No pueden contraer matrimonio: x x x (2) Los que no estuvieren en el pleno ejercicio du su razon al tiempo de
contraer matrimonio.”
52 See SPANISH CIVIL CODE. (1889) Art. 101.
53 Act No. 2710 (1917).
54 See Act No. 3613 (1929), Sec. 30 (c).
55 See Executive Order No. 141 (1943), Sec. 2 (5).
367
VOL. 484, MARCH 10, 2006 367
Antonio vs. Reyes
56
Civil Code as a voidable marriage.   The mental capacity, or lack thereof, 57
of the marrying
spouse was not among the grounds for declaring a marriage void ab initio.  Similarly, among
the marriages classified as voidable under Article 45 (2) of the Family Code is one contracted
58
by a party of unsound mind.
Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a vice of consent, just like
insanity 59impinges on consent freely given which is one of the essential requisites of a
contract.   The initial common consensus on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code was that it did not constitute a specie of vice of consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and
Caguioa, both members of the Family Code revision committee that drafted the Code, have
opined that psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent, and conceded that the spouse may
have given free and voluntary consent 60
to a marriage but was nonetheless incapable of
fulfilling such rights and obligations.  Dr. Tolentino likewise stated in the 1990 edition of his
commentaries on the Family Code that this “psychological incapacity61 to comply with the
essential marital obligations does not affect the consent to the marriage.”
There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of Article 36 as phrased by the
Family Code committee. To-
_______________
56 Unless the party of unsound mind, after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife.
See CIVIL CODE, Art. 85 (3).
57 See CIVIL CODE, Art. 80.
58 Subject to the same qualifications under Article 85 (3) of the Civil Code. See note 56.
59 See CIVIL CODE, Art. 1327 (2) in relation to Art. 1318 (1).
60 See Santos v. Court of Appeals, 310 Phil. 21, 32-33; 240 SCRA 20, 30 (1995). See also A. Sempio Diy, Handbook
on the Family Code of the Philippines 37 (1988). A contrary view though was expressed by Justice Ricardo Puno, also a
member of the Family Code commission. See Santos v. Court of Appeals, Ibid.
61 I A. Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines: Commentaries and Jurisprudence 274-275 (1990 ed.).
368
368 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Antonio vs. Reyes
lentino opined that “psychologically incapacity to comply would not be juridically different
from physical incapacity of consummating the marriage, which makes the marriage only
voidable under Article 45 (5) of the
62
Civil Code x x x [and thus] should have been a cause for
annulment of the marriage only.”  At the same time, Tolentino noted “[it] would be different if
it were psychological incapacity to understand the essential
63
marital obligations, because then
this would amount to lack of consent to the marriage.”
64
These concerns though were answered,
beginning with  Santos v. Court of Appeals,   wherein the Court, through Justice Vitug,
acknowledged that “psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be  truly incognitive  of the basic marital
covenants 65that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage.”
The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the
obligations of marriage,66
as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them, was further
affirmed in the  Molina   case. Therein, the Court, through then Justice (now Chief Justice)
Panganiban observed that “[t]he evidence [to establish psychological incapacity] must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such extent that
the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is
67
have given valid assumption thereto.”  Jurisprudence since on “all fours” with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the
appellate
72
court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial
court.”
_______________
62 Id. The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological incapacity, as intended by
63 Id., at p. 274. the revision committee, was not cast in intractable specifics. Judicial understanding of
64 Supra note 60. psychological incapacity may be informed by evolving standards, taking into account the
65 Id., at p. 40, emphasis supplied. The Court further added, “[t]here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the
particulars of each case, current trends in psychological and even canonical thought, and
law has been to confine the meaning of ‘psychological incapacity’ to the most serious cases of personality disorders experience. It is under the auspices of the deliberate ambiguity of the framers that the Court
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to marriage.” Id.
66 Supra note 40. has developed the Molina rules, which have been consistently applied since 1997. Molina has
67 Id., at p. 677. proven indubitably useful in providing a unitary framework that guides courts in adjudicating
petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the same time, the  Molinaguidelines
369 are not set in stone, the clear legislative intent mandating a case-to-case perception of each
situation, and Molina itself arising from this evolutionary understanding of Article 36. There
is no cause to disavow  Molina  at present, and indeed the disposition of this case shall rely
VOL. 484, MARCH 10, 2006 369
primarily on that precedent. There is need though to emphasize other perspectives as well
Antonio vs. Reyes which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.
Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first in Santos then in Molina, of the
then has recognized that psychological incapacity “is a malady so grave and permanent as to considered opinion of canon law experts in the interpretation of psychological incapacity. This
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is is but unavoidable, considering that the Family Code
68
about to assume.”
It might seem that this present understanding of psychological incapacity deviates from the _______________
literal wording of Article 36, with its central phase reading “psychologically
69
incapacitated  to 72 Id., at p. 431; citing Republic v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 198, 214 (1997), Padilla, J., Separate Statement.
comply  with the essential marital obligations of marriage.”   At the same time, it has been
consistently recognized by this Court that the intent of the Family Code committee was to 371
design the law as to allow some resiliency in its application, by avoiding specific examples that
would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis.  Rather,
VOL. 484, MARCH 10, 2006 371
the preference of the revision committee was for “the judge to interpret the provision on  a
case-to-case basis, guided by experience, in the findings of experts and researchers Antonio vs. Reyes
in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although
not binding on the civil courts,  may be given persuasive effect since the provision was
70
committee had bluntly acknowledged that the concept of psychological incapacity was derived
taken from Canon Law.” 73
71
from canon law,   and as one member admitted, enacted as a solution to the problem of
We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag: 74
marriages already annulled by the Catholic Church but still existent under civil law.  It would
be disingenuous to disregard the influence of Catholic Church doctrine in the formulation and
_______________
subsequent understanding of Article 36, and the Court has expressly acknowledged that
68 Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840, 851; 343 SCRA 755, 765 (2000). interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the 75
local Church,
69 It may be noted that a previous incarnation of Article 36, subsequently rejected by the Family Code Commission, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.  Still, it must be
stated that among those void  ab initio  marriages are those “contracted by any party who, at the time of the emphasized that the Catholic Church is hardly the sole source of influence in the
celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or interpretation of Article 36. Even though the concept may have been derived from canon law,
was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of
incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.” See Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 60, at p. 30; p. 40.
its incorporation into the Family Code and subsequent judicial interpretation occurred in
70 Salita v. Magtolis, G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994, 233 SCRA 100, 107-108; citing A. Sempio-Diy, supra note 60, wholly secular progression. Indeed, while Church thought on psychological incapacity is
at p. 37, emphasis supplied. See also Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 60, at p. 36; p. 31; Republic v. Court of merely persuasive on the trial courts, judicial
76
decisions of this Court interpreting psychological
Appeals, supra note 40, at p. 677; p. 212. incapacity are binding on lower courts.
71 G.R. No. 109975, 9 February 2001, 351 SCRA 425.
Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the
370 adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this
Court and lower courts, in denying petitions of the kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2,
Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively state that “[t]he State recognizes the
370 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it
Antonio vs. Reyes
_______________

“Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage,
depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged,
not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In
73 See Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 60, at pp. 32-39; p. 31.
74 SeeSempio-Diy, supra note 60, at p. 36.
75 Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra note 40, at p. 678; p. 212.
 76 Thus, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, supra note 48, wherein the psychological incapacity of the petitioner
was recognized by the Court from the fact that he did not engage in sexual relations with his wife during their ten (10)
month marital cohabitation, remains a binding precedent, even though it was decided shortly before the Molina case.
372
372 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Antonio vs. Reyes
shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total developmen[t],” and that
“[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State.” These provisions highlight the importance of the family and the
constitutional protection accorded to the institution of marriage.
But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage
as a social institution and the foundation of the family. It remains the province of the
legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities
to protect it, based on whatever socio-political influences it deems proper, and subject of course
to the qualification that such legislative enactment itself adheres to the Constitution and the
Bill of Rights. This being the case, it also falls on the legislature to put into operation the
constitutional provisions that protect marriage and the family. This has been accomplished at
present through the enactment of the Family Code, which defines marriage and the family,
spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect married and
family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal
separation. While it may appear that the judicial denial of a petition for declaration of nullity
is reflective of the constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such action in fact merely
enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a constitutionally ordained decree of what
marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not be the
only constitutional considerations to be taken into account in resolving a petition for
declaration of nullity.
Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a
psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement of this
constitutional protection of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in promoting marriage
as the foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a
corresponding interest for the State to defend against marriages
373
VOL. 484, MARCH 10, 2006 373
Antonio vs. Reyes
ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio marriages under Article 36 do not further the
initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as they promote wedlock among
persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to understand or
comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the present petition.
Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case
As stated earlier,  Molina  established the guidelines presently recognized in the judicial
disposition of petitions for nullity under Article 36. The Court has consistently
applied  Molina  since its promulgation in 1997, and the guidelines therein operate as the
general rules. They warrant citation in full:
1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution
and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it “as the foundation
of the nation.” It decrees marriage as legally “inviolable,” thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
“protected” by the state. 
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological—not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms
may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them,
was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known
the obligations
374
374 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Antonio vs. Reyes
he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such
root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature
fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their “I do’s.” The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at
such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing
illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be psychologically
capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation
of marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, “mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts” cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness
must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
 the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.
VOL. 484, MARCH 10, 2006 375
Antonio vs. Reyes
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision
Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in
1983 and which provides:
“The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage due to causes of psychological nature.”
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the
religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive
weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally—subject to our law on evidence—
77
what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.”
Molina  had provided for an additional requirement that the Solicitor General issue
78
certification stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition to the petition. This
requirement however was dispensed with following the implementation of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC, or the Rule on79 Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages.  Still, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that the appearance of the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent
collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
Obviously, collusion is not an issue in this case, considering the consistent vigorous opposition
of respondent to the petition for declaration of nullity. In any event, the fiscal’s participation in
the hearings before the trial court is extant from the records of this case.
_______________
77 Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra note 40, at pp. 676-680; pp. 209-213.
78 Id., at p. 680; p. 213.
79 See Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco, G.R. No. 158896, 27 October 2004, 441 SCRA 422, 435.
376 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Antonio vs. Reyes
As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now deemed binding on this Court, owing
to the great weight accorded to the opinion of the primary trier of facts, and the refusal of the
Court of Appeals to dispute the veracity of these facts. As such, it must be considered that
respondent had consistently lied about many material aspects as to her character and
personality. The question remains whether her pattern of fabrication sufficiently establishes
her psychological incapacity, consistent with Article 36 and generally, the Molina guidelines.
We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina.
First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological
incapacity of his spouse. Apart from his own testimony, he presented witnesses who
corroborated his allegations on his wife’s behavior, and certifications from Blackgold Records
and the Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed respondent’s claims pertinent to her
alleged singing career. He also presented two (2) expert witnesses from the field of psychology
who testified that the aberrant behavior of respondent was tantamount to psychological
375 incapacity. In any event, both courts below considered petitioner’s evidence as credible enough.
Even the 80appellate court acknowledged that respondent was not totally honest with
petitioner.
As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of nullity under Article 36
must be able to establish the cause of action with a preponderance of evidence. However, since
the action cannot be considered as a non-public matter between private parties, but is
impressed with State interest, the Family Code likewise requires the participation of the
State, through the prosecuting attorney, fiscal, or Solicitor General, to take steps to prevent
collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or sup-
_______________
80 Rollo, p. 82.
377
VOL. 484, MARCH 10, 2006 377
Antonio vs. Reyes
a
pressed. Thus, even if the petitioner is able establish the psychological incapacity of
respondent with preponderant evidence, any finding of collusion among the parties would
necessarily negate such proofs.
Second. The root cause of respondent’s psychological incapacity has been medically or
clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly
explained in the trial court’s decision. The initiatory complaint alleged that respondent, from
the start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal behavior “of peren[n]ially telling lies,
fabricating ridiculous stories, and inventing personalities and situations,” of writing letters to
petitioner using fictitious names, and of lying about81 her actual occupation, income, educational
attainment, and family background, among others.
These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further linked to medical or
clinical causes by expert witnesses from the field of psychology. Petitioner presented two (2)
such witnesses in particular. Dr. Abcede, a 82psychiatrist who had headed the department of
psychiatry of at least two (2) major hospitals,  testified as follows:
WITNESS:
376
      Given that as a fact, which is only based on the
affidavit provided to me, I can say that there are
a couple of things that [are] terribly wrong with
the standards. There are a couple of things that
seems (sic) to be repeated over and over again in
the affidavit. One of which is the
persistent,constant and repeated lying of the
“respondent”; which, I think, based on
assessment of normal behavior of an individual,
is abnormal or pathological. x x x
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
_______________ the extreme, then that is pathological. That is not
81 Records,pp. 2-3. abnormal. We all feel jealous, in the same way as
82 University of Santo Tomas Hospital and UERM Memorial Medical Center. Dr. Abcede likewise was the past
we also lie every now and then; but everything
president of the Philippine Psychiatrist Association. TSN, February 23, 1994, p. 6. that is carried out in extreme is abnormal or
378 pathological. If there is no basis in reality to the
fact that the husband is having an affair with
another woman and if she persistently believes
378 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
that the husband is having an
Antonio vs. Reyes
379
Q Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because of
these actuations of the respondent she is then VOL. 484, MARCH 10, 2006 379
incapable of performing the basic obligations of
her marriage? Antonio vs. Reyes

A Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one   affair with different women, then that is
owes towards another. The lack of concern, the pathological and we call that paranoid jealousy.
lack of love towards the person, and it is also
something that endangers human relationship. Q Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would
You see, relationship is based on communication she be considered psychologically incapacitated to
between individuals and what we generally perform the basic obligations of the marriage?
83
communicate are our thoughts and feelings. But A Yes, Ma’am.
then when one talks and expresse[s] their
feelings, [you] are expected to tell the truth. And The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only the psychological incapacity
therefore, if you constantly lie, what do you think of respondent, but also the psychological capacity of petitioner. He concluded that respondent 84
is going to happen as far as this relationship is “is [a] pathological liar, that [she continues] to lie [and] she loves to fabricate about herself.”
concerned. Therefore, it undermines that basic These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological incapacity on the case record,
relationship that should be based on love, trust particularly the trial transcripts of respondent’s testimony, as well as the supporting affidavits
and respect. of petitioner. While these witnesses 85
did not personally examine respondent, the Court had
already held in Marcos v. Marcos  that personal examination of the subject by86the physician is
Q Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the not required for the spouse to be declared psychologically incapacitated.   We deem the
behavior of the respondent in constantly lying and methodology utilized by petitioner’s witnesses as sufficient basis for their medical conclusions.
fabricating stories, she is then incapable of Admittedly, Drs. Abcede and Lopez’s common conclusion of respondent’s psychological
performing the basic obligations of the marriage? incapacity hinged heavily on their own acceptance of petitioner’s version as the true set of
facts. However, since the trial court itself accepted the veracity of petitioner’s factual premises,
  xxx there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn therefrom by
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness) petitioner’s expert witnesses.
Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial court explicated its
Q Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy finding of psychological incapacity in its decision in this wise:
Mendoza, who is the third witness for the
petitioner, testified that the respondent has been _______________
calling up the petitioner’s officemates and ask 83 TSN, 23 February 1994, pp. 7-9, 11-12.
him (sic) on the activities of the petitioner and ask 84 TSN, 23 March 1995, p. 12.
him on the behavior of the petitioner. And this is 85 397 Phil. 840; 343 SCRA 755 (2000).
specifically stated on page six (6) of the transcript 86 Id., at p. 850; p. 764.

of stenographic notes, what can you say about 380

this, Mr. witness?
A If an individual is jealous enough to the point that 380 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
he is paranoid, which means that there is no
actual basis on her suspect (sic) that her husband Antonio vs. Reyes
is having an affair with a woman, if carried on to
“To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage. It has been shown clearly from her
actuations that respondent has that propensity for telling lies about almost anything, be it her
occupation, her state of health, her singing abilities, her income,  etc. She has this fantastic ability to
invent and fabricate stories and personalities. She practically lived in a world of make believe making
her therefore not in a position to give meaning and significance to her marriage to petitioner. In
persistently and constantly lying to petitioner, respondent undermined the basic tenets of relationship
between spouses that is based on love, trust and respect. As concluded by the psychiatrist presented 87by
petitioner, such repeated lying is abnormal and pathological and amounts to psychological incapacity.”
Third. Respondent’s psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the
time of and even before the celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends and made up
letters from fictitious characters well before she married petitioner. Likewise, she kept
petitioner in the dark about her natural child’s real parentage as she only confessed when the
latter had found out the truth after their marriage.
Fourth. The gravity of respondent’s psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her
disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. It is immediately discernible that
the parties had shared only a little over a year of cohabitation before the exasperated
petitioner left his wife. Whatever such circumstance speaks of the degree of tolerance of
petitioner, it likewise supports the belief that respondent’s psychological incapacity, as borne
by the record, was so grave in extent that any prolonged marital life was dubitable.
It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false pretenses
in order to induce petitioner into marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the
part of respondent to distinguish truth from fiction, or at least abide by the truth. Petitioner’s
witnesses and the
_______________
87 Rollo,
pp. 95-96.
381
VOL. 484, MARCH 10, 2006 381
Antonio vs. Reyes
trial court were emphatic on respondent’s inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the
pathologic nature of her mistruths, which according to them, were revelatory of respondent’s
inability to understand and perform the essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person
unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend
the legal nature of the marital bond, much less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding
obligations attached to marriage, including parenting. One unable to adhere to reality cannot
be expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional commitments.
The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent allegedly tried her best to
effect a reconciliation, she had amply exhibited her ability to perform her marital obligations.
We are not convinced. Given the nature of her psychological condition, her willingness to
remain in the marriage hardly banishes nay extenuates her lack of capacity to fulfill the
essential marital obligations. Respondent’s ability to even comprehend what the essential
marital obligations are is impaired at best. Considering that the evidence convincingly
disputes respondent’s ability to adhere to the truth, her avowals as to her commitment to the
marriage cannot be accorded much credence.
At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family Code which states that a
marriage may be annulled if the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, and Article 46
which enumerates the circumstances constituting fraud under the previous article, clarifies
that “no other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity
shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage.” It
would be improper to draw linkages between misrepresentations made by respondent and the
misrepresentations under Articles 45 (3) and 46. The fraud under Article 45(3) vitiates the
consent of the spouse who is lied to, and does not allude to vitiated consent of the lying spouse.
In this case, the misrepresentations
382
382 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Antonio vs. Reyes
of respondent point to her own inadequacy to cope with her marital obligations, kindred to
psychological incapacity under Article 36.
Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as
embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses
to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and
support. As noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar
would be able to commit to the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love,
trust and respect.
Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact
that the marriage of the parties was annulled by the Catholic Church. The appellate court
apparently deemed this detail totally inconsequential as no reference was made to it anywhere
88
in the assailed decision despite petitioner’s efforts to bring the matter to its attention.  Such
deliberate ignorance is in contravention of  Molina, which held that interpretations given by
the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while
not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila decreed the
89
invalidity of the marriage in question in a Conclusion
90
 dated 30 March 1995, citing the “lack
of due discretion” on the part of respondent.  Such decree of
_______________
88 As shown by the Motion(s) for Early Resolution of the Case filed by petitioner with the canonical declarations
attached as annexes.
89 Id., at pp. 97-98.
90 The Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila based the decree of invalidity on the ground of lack of
due discretion on the part of both parties. On appeal, however, the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal modified
the judgment by holding that lack of due discretion applied to respondent but there was no suffi
383
VOL. 484, MARCH 10, 2006 383
Antonio vs. Reyes
91
nullity was affirmed92by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal,  and the Roman
Rota of the Vatican.   In fact, respondent’s psychological incapacity was considered so grave
93
that a restrictive clause  was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibiting respondent from
contracting another marriage without the Tribunal’s consent.
In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
pronounced:
“The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial consent is considered ontologically
defective and wherefore judicially ineffective when elicited by a Part Contractant in possession and
employ of a discretionary judgment faculty with a perceptive vigor markedly inadequate for the practical
understanding of the conjugal Covenant or serious impaired from the correct appreciation of the integral
significance and implications of the marriage vows. a cure thereof a remarkable feat. Certainly, it would have been easier had petitioner’s expert
The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude required by law that based on the witnesses characterized respondent’s condition as incurable. Instead, they remained silent on
depositions of the Partes in Causa and premised on the testimonies of the Common and Expert whether the psychological incapacity was curable or incurable.
Witnesse[s],  the Respondent made the marriage option in tenure of adverse personality But on careful examination, there was good reason for the experts’ taciturnity on this point.
constracts that were markedly antithetical to the substantive content and implications of the
Marriage Covenant, and that seriously undermined the integrality of her matrimonial
The petitioner’s expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the trial court rendered its
consent in terms of its deliberative component. In other words, afflicted with a discretionary decision on 10 August 1995. These events transpired well before Molina was promulgated in
faculty impaired in its practico-concrete judgment formation on account of an adverse action 1997 and made explicit the requirement that the psychological incapacity must be shown to be
and reaction pattern, the Respondent was impaired from eliciting a judicially bind- medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such requirement was not expressly stated in
Article 36 or any other provision of the Family Code.
_______________ On the other hand, the Court in  Santos, which was decided in January 96
1995, began its
cient evidence to prove lack of due discretion on the part of petitioner. See also note 38.
discussion by first citing
97
the deliberations of the Family Code committee,  then the opinion of
91 Rollo, pp. 99-100. canonical scholars,   before
98
arriving at its formulation of the doctrinal definition of
92 Id., at pp. 101-103.
93 “A restrictive clause is herewith attached to this sentence of nullity to the effect that the respondent may not enter into
psychological incapacity.  Santos did refer to Justice Caguioa’s
99
opinion expressed during the
another marriage without the express consent of this Tribunal, in deference to the sanctity and dignity of the sacrament of deliberations that “psychological incapacity is incurable,”  and the view of a former presiding
matrimony, as well as for the protection of the intended spouse.”; Rollo, p. 97. judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila that psychological
384 incapacity must
100
be characterized “by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability.”   However, in formulating the doctrinal rule on psychological incapacity, the
Court in Santos omitted any reference to incurability as a characteris-
384 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
_______________
Antonio vs. Reyes
96 Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 60, at pp. 30-36; pp. 26-31.
97 Id., at pp. 37-39; pp. 31-33.
ing matrimonial consent. There is no sufficient evidence in 94
the Case however to prove as well the
98 Id., at pp. 39-40; p. 34.
fact of grave lack of due discretion on the part of the Petitioner.”
99 Id., at p. 33; p. 27.
100 Id., at p. 39; p. 33.
Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at not only by the trial court,
but also by canonical bodies. Yet, we must clarify the proper import of the Church rulings 386
annulling the marriage in this case. They hold sway since they are drawn from a similar
recognition, as the trial court, of the veracity of petitioner’s allegations. Had the trial court
instead appreciated respondent’s version as correct, and the appellate court affirmed such 386 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
conclusion, the rulings of the Catholic Church on this matter would have diminished
Antonio vs. Reyes
persuasive value. After all, it is the factual findings of the judicial trier of facts, and not that of
the canonical courts, that are accorded significant recognition by this Court. 101

Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such psychological tic of psychological incapacity.
incapacity be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It was on this score
that the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court, the appellate court noting _______________
that it did not appear certain 95
that respondent’s condition was incurable and that Dr. Abcede 101  “It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the
did not testify to such effect. deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase “psy-chological incapacity”
Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially separated, he returned under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise
to her, desiring to make their marriage work. However, respondent’s aberrant behavior mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in
remained unchanged, as she continued to lie, fabricate stories, and maintained her excessive Fr. Artemio Baluma’s “Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law,” quoting
jealousy. From this fact, he draws the conclusion that respondent’s condition is incurable. from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson’s
“Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases”). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed
From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded that respondent’s
independently of but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated,
condition is incurable? It would seem, at least, that respondent’s psychosis is quite grave, and “psychological incapacity” should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
_______________ the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
94 Rollo, p. 99. Emphasis supplied, citations omitted. intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of
95 Rollo, p. 82. personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently
385 envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is
implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of
nullity of the void marriage to be “legitimate.”
VOL. 484, MARCH 10, 2006 385 “The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound
mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the
Antonio vs. Reyes marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or
homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 that the incurability of respondent’s psychological incapacity has been established by the
of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not petitioner. Any lingering doubts are further dispelled by the fact that the Catholic Church
387 tribunals, which indubitably consider incurability as an integral requisite of psychological
incapacity, were sufficiently convinced that respondent was so incapacitated to contract
marriage to the degree that annulment was warranted.
VOL. 484, MARCH 10, 2006 387 All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of
nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC correctly ruled, and the Court of Appeals
Antonio vs. Reyes
erred in reversing the trial court.
There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing as it does the marital
This disquisition is material as  Santos  was decided months before the trial court came out bond as having been inexistent in the first place. It is possible that respondent, despite her
with its own ruling that remained silent on whether respondent’s psychological incapacity was psychological state, remains in love with petitioner, as exhibited by her persistent challenge to
incurable. Certainly, Santos did not clearly mandate that the incurability of the psychological the petition for nullity. In fact, the appellate court placed undue emphasis on respondent’s
incapacity be established in an action for declaration of nullity. At least, there was no avowed commitment to remain in the marriage.
jurisprudential clarity at the time of the trial of this case and the subsequent promulgation of
the trial court’s decision that required a medical finding of incurability. Such requisite arose 389
only with  Molina  in 1997, at a time when this case was on appellate review, or after the
reception of evidence. 102 VOL. 484, MARCH 10, 2006 389
We are aware that in  Pesca v. Pesca,   the Court countered an argument
that  Molina  and  Santos  should not apply retroactively with the observation that the Antonio vs. Reyes
interpretation or construction placed
103
by the courts of a law constitutes a part of that law as of
the date the statute in enacted.   Yet we approach this present case from utterly practical Yet the Court decides these cases on legal reasons and not vapid sentimentality. Marriage, in
considerations. The requirement that psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically legal contemplation, is more than the legitimatization of a desire of people in love to live
or clinically permanent or incurable is one that necessarily cannot be divined without expert together.
opinion. Clearly in this case, there was no categorical averment from the expert witnesses that WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC dated 10 August 1995,
respondent’s psychological incapacity was curable or incurable simply because there was no declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36
of the Family Code, is REINSTATED. No costs.
_______________ SO ORDERED.
necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and
severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
     Quisumbing (Chairperson), Carpio and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
“Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that may have some
bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and Petition granted, decision of the Regional Trial Court declaring the marriage between
evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of petitioner and respondent null and void reinstated.
psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even
desirable.” Santos v. Court of Appeals, Id., at pp. 39-41; pp. 34-35. Notes.—The guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared
102 G.R. No. 136921, 17 April 2001, 356 SCRA 588.
103 Id., at p. 593.
psychologically incapacitated—what is important is the presence of evidence that can
adequately establish the party’s psychological condition, for indeed, if the totality of evidence
388 presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. (Marcos vs. Marcos, 343 SCRA
755 [2000])
388 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED A mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise
Antonio vs. Reyes constitutes psychological incapacity. (Choa vs. Choa, 392 SCRA 641[2002])
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (1) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence,
and (c) incurability. (Carating-Siayngo vs. Siayngo, 441 SCRA 422 [2004])
legal necessity yet to elicit such a declaration and the appropriate question was not
accordingly propounded to him. If we apply  Pesca  without deep reflection, there would be
undue prejudice to those cases tried before  Molina  or  Santos, especially those presently on
appellate review, where presumably the respective petitioners and their expert witnesses
would not have seen the need to adduce a diagnosis of incurability. It may hold in those cases,
as in this case, that the psychological incapacity of a spouse is actually incurable, even if not
pronounced as such at the trial court level.
We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the interpretation of Article 36
relies heavily on a case-to-case perception. It would be insensate to reason to mandate in this
case an expert medical or clinical diagnosis of incurability, since the parties would have had no
impelling cause to present evidence to that effect at the time this case was tried by the RTC
more than ten (10) years ago. From the totality of the evidence, we are sufficiently convinced

G.R. No. 164493. March 12, 2010.*
JOCELYN M. SUAZO, petitioner,  vs.  ANGELITO SUAZO and REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Civil Law; Family Code; Marriages; Annulment of Marriage; Psychological Incapacity; Psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability; It must be
confined to “the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.”—Santos v. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 20
(1995) declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)  gravity; (b)  juridical
antecedence; and (c) incurability. It should refer to “no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.” It must be confined to “the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; There is no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse
should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the
declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity.—A later case, Marcos v. Marcos, 343
SCRA 755 (2000), further clarified that there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse
should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition  sine qua non  for the
declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longer necessary
to introduce expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of evidence
shows that psychological incapacity exists and its  gravity,  juridical antecedence,
and incurability can be duly established.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
155
VOL. 615, March 12, 2010 155
Suazo vs. Suazo
   The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
  Carreon & Associates Law Office for petitioner.
BRION, J.:
We resolve the appeal filed by petitioner Jocelyn Suazo (Jocelyn) from the July 14, 2004
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 62443, which reversed the January
29, 1999 judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 119, Pasay City in Civil Case
No. 97-1282.2The reversed RTC decision nullified Jocelyn’s marriage with respondent Angelito
Suazo (Angelito) on the ground of psychological incapacity.
The Facts
Jocelyn and Angelito were 16 years old when they first met in June 1985; they were
residents of Laguna at that time. After months of courtship, Jocelyn went to Manila with
Angelito and some friends. Having been gone for three days, their parents sought Jocelyn and
Angelito and after finding them, brought them back to Biñan, Laguna. Soon thereafter,
Jocelyn and Angelito’s marriage was arranged and they were married on March 3, 1986 in a
ceremony officiated by the Mayor of Biñan.
Without any means to support themselves, Jocelyn and Angelito lived with Angelito’s
parents after their marriage. They had by this time stopped schooling. Jocelyn took odd jobs
and worked for Angelito’s relatives as household help. Angelito, on the other hand, refused to
work and was most of the time drunk. Jocelyn urged Angelito to find work and violent
quarrels often resulted because of Jocelyn’s efforts.
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Mario L. Guariña III, and concurred in by Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon and
Associate Justice Santiago Javier Rañada (both retired).
2 Penned by Judge Pedro de Leon Gutierrez.
156
156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Suazo vs. Suazo
Jocelyn left Angelito sometime in July 1987. Angelito thereafter found another woman with
whom he has since lived. They now have children.
Ten years after their separation, or on October 8, 1997, Jocelyn filed with the RTC a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, as
amended. She claimed that Angelito was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage. In addition to the above historical narrative of their
relationship, she alleged in her complaint:
“x x x x
8. That from the time of their marriage up to their separation in July 1987, their relationship had
been marred with bitter quarrels which caused unbearable physical and emotional pains on the part of
the plaintiff because defendant inflicted physical injuries upon her every time they had a troublesome
encounter;
9. That the main reason for their quarrel was always the refusal of the defendant to work or his
indolence and his excessive drinking which makes him psychologically incapacitated to perform his
marital obligations making life unbearably bitter and intolerable to the plaintiff causing their separation
in fact in July 1987;
10. That such psychological incapacity of the defendant started from the time of their marriage and
became very apparent as time went and proves to be continuous, permanent and incurable;
x x x x”
Angelito did not answer the petition/complaint. Neither did he submit himself to a
psychological examination with psychologist Nedy Tayag (who was presumably hired by
Jocelyn).
The case proceeded to trial on the merits after the trial court found that no collusion existed
between the parties. Jocelyn, her aunt Maryjane Serrano, and the psychologist testified at the
trial.
In her testimony, Jocelyn essentially repeated the allegations in her petition, including the
alleged incidents of physical beating she received from Angelito. On cross-examination,
157
VOL. 615, March 12, 2010 157
Suazo vs. Suazo
she remained firm on these declarations but significantly declared that Angelito had not A. That is the clinical findings. Personality Disorder labeled on Anti-Social Personality Disorder (sic).
Q. How was shown during the marriage (sic)?
treated her violently before they were married. A. The physical abuses on the petitioner also correlated without any employment exploitative and silent (sic) on the
Asst. Sol. Gen. Kim Briguera: part of the respondent is clearly Anti-Social Disorder.
Q. Can you describe your relationship with the respondent before you got married? Q. Do the respondent know that he has that kind of psychological disorder (sic)?
A. He always go (sic) to our house to court me. A. Usually a person suffering that psychological disorder will not admit that they are suffering that kind of disorder
Q. Since you cited violence, after celebration of marriage, will you describe his behavioural (sic) pattern before you (sic).
got married? Court:
A. He show (sic) kindness, he always come (sic) to the house. Q. So because of this Anti-Social Disorder the petitioner suffers a lot (sic)?
Q. So you cannot say his behavioral pattern composing of violent nature before you got married (sic), is there any A. Yes, because the petitioner is a victim of hardships of marital relation to the respondent (sic).
signs (sic) of violence? Court:
A. None maam (sic), because we were not sweethearts. Q. Was the Anti-Social Personality Disorder also shown to the parents (sic)?
Q. Even to other people? A. Yes, according to the petitioner, respondent never give due respect more often than not he even shouted at them
A. He also quarrel (sic).3 for no apparent reason (sic).
Court:
Q. Did you say Anti-Social Disorder incurable (sic)?
Maryjane Serrano corroborated parts of Jocelyn’s testimony.
A. Yes, sir.
When the psychologist took the witness stand, she declared: Court:
Q. Is there a physical violence (sic)?
Q. What about the respondent, did you also make clinical interpretation of his behavior?
A. Actually, I could see the petitioner is tortured mentally of the respondent (sic).
A. Apparently, the behavior and actuation of the respondent during the time of the marriage the respondent is
Court:
suffering from anti-social personality Disorder this is a serious and severe apparently incurable (sic). This disorder
Q. How was the petitioner tortured?
is chronic and long-standing before the marriage.
A. She was able to counter-act by the time she was separated by the respondent (sic).
Q. And you based your interpretation on the report given by the petitioner?
Court:
A. Based on the psychological examination wherein there is no pattern of lying when I examined her, the petitioner
Q. Do you mean to tell us that Anti-Social disorder is incurable?
_______________ 160

3 TSN, March 31, 1998, pp. 16-17.

158 160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ANNOTATED
158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Suazo vs. Suazo
ANNOTATED
Suazo vs. Suazo A. Yes, sir.
Court:
Q. Why did you know?
was found to be very responsive, coherent, relevant to marital relationship with respondent. A. Anti-Social disorder is incurable again because the person itself, the respondent is not aware that this kind of
Q. And the last page of Exhibit “E” which is your report there is a statement rather on the last page, last paragraph personality affect the other party (sic).
which state: It is the clinical opinion of the undersigned that marriage between the two, had already hit bottom Court:
rock (sic) even before the actual celebration of marriage. Respondent(’s) immature, irresponsible and callous Q. This Anti-Social behavior is naturally affected the petitioner (sic)?
emotionality practically harbors (sic) the possibility of having blissful relationship. His general behavior fulfill(s) A. They do not have children because more often than not the respondent is under the influence of alcohol, they do
the diagnostic criteria for a person suffering from Anti Social Personality Disorder. Such disorder is serious and not have peaceful harmonious relationship during the less than one year and one thing what is significant,
severe and it interferred (sic) in his capacity to provide love, caring, concern and responsibility to his family. The respondent allowed wife to work as housemaid instead of he who should provide and the petitioner never receive
disorder is chronic and long-standing in proportion and appear(s) incurable. The disorder was present at the time and enjoy her earning for the five months that she work and it is also the petitioner who took sustainance of the
of the wedding and became manifest thereafter due to stresses and pressure of married life. He apparently grew vices. (sic)
up in a dysfunctional family. Could you explain what does chronic mean? Q. And because of that Anti-Social disorder he had not shown love to the petitioner?
A. Chronic is a clinical language which means incurable it has been there long before he entered marriage A. From the very start the respondent has no emotion to sustain the marital relationship but what he need is to
apparently, it came during early developmental (sic) Basic trust was not develop (sic). sustain his vices thru the petitioner (sic).
Q. And this long standing proportion (sic). Court:
A. That no amount of psychological behavioral help to cure such because psychological disorder are not detrimental to Q. What are the vices?
men but to others particularly and this (sic) because the person who have this kind of disorder do not know that A. Alcohol and gambling.
they have this kind of disorder. Court:
Q. So in other words, permanent? Q. And this affected psychological incapacity to perform marital obligation?
A. Permanent and incurable. A. Not only that up to this time from my clinical analysis of Anti-Social Personality Disorder, he is good for nothing
Q. You also said that this psychological disorder is present during the wedding or at the time of the wedding or person.4
became manifest thereafter?
A. Yes, ma’am.” The psychologist also identified the Psychological Report she prepared. The Report
xxxx
pertinently states:5
159

_______________
VOL. 615, March 12, 2010 159
4 TSN, July 16, 1998, pp. 15-22.
Suazo vs. Suazo 5 Record, pp. 36-39.

161
Court:
Q. Is there a clinical findings (sic)?
 VOL. 615, March 12, 2010 161
Suazo vs. Suazo
“Report on the psychological condition of JOCELYN M. SUAZO, a petitioner for “Nullity of Marriage”
versus ANGELITO D. SUAZO
GENERAL DATA
[This pertains to Jocelyn’s]
BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY
xxxx
Husband is Angelito D. Suazo, 28 years old reached 3rd year high school, a part time tricycle driver,
eldest among 4 siblings. Father is a machine operator, described to be an alcoholic, womanizer and a
heavy gambler. While mother is a sales agent. It was a common knowledge within their vicinity that she
was also involved in an illicit relationship. Familial relationship was described to be stormy, chaotic
whose bickering and squabbles were part and parcel of their day to day living.
TEST RESULTS AND EVALUATION
Projective data reveal an introvert person whose impulse life is adequately suppressed so much so
that it does not create inner tension and anxiety. She is fully equipped in terms of drives and motivation
particularly in uplifting not, only her socio-emotional image but was as her morale. She may be sensitive
yet capable of containing the effect of such sensitiveness; in order to remain in goodstead (sic) with her
immediate environment.
She is pictured as a hard-working man (sic) who looks forward for a better future in spite of
difficulties she had gone through in the past. She is fully aware of external realities of life that she set
simple life goals which is (sic) commensurate with her capabilities and limitations. However, she needs
to prioritize her interest in order to direct her energy toward specific goals. Her tolerance for frustration
appears to be at par with her coping mechanism that she is able to discharge negative trends
appropriately.
REMARKS :
[Already cited in full in the psychologist’s testimony quoted above]”6
_______________
6 Parenthetical notes supplied.
162
162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Suazo vs. Suazo
    The Office of the Solicitor General—representing the Republic of the Philippines—
strongly opposed the petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage. Through a Certification
filed with the RTC, it argued that the psychologist failed to examine and test Angelito; thus,
what she said about him was purely hearsay.
The RTC Ruling
The RTC annulled the marriage under the following reasoning:
“While there is no particular instance setforth (sic) in the law that a person may be considered as
psychologically incapacitated, there as (sic) some admitted grounds that would render a person to be
unfit to comply with his marital obligation, such as “immaturity, i.e., lack of an effective sense of rational
judgment and responsibility, otherwise peculiar to infants (like refusal of the husband to support the
family or excessive dependence on parents or peer group approval) and habitual alcoholism, or the
condition by which a person lives for the next drink and the next drinks” (The Family Code of the Phils,
Alicia Sempio-Diy, p. 39, 1988 ed.)
The evidence presented by the petitioner and the testimony of the petitioner and Dr. Tayag, points
(sic) to one thing—that the petitioner failed to establish a harmonious family life with the respondent.
On the contrary, the respondent has not shown love and respect to the petitioner manifested by the
former’s being irresponsible, immature, jobless, gambler, drunkard and worst of all—a wife beater. The
petitioner, unable to bear any longer the misbehavior and attitude of the respondent, decided, after one
year and four months of messy days, to leave the respondent.
In this regard, the petitioner was able to prove that right from the start of her married life with the
respondent, she already suffered from maltreatment, due to physical injuries inflicted upon her and that
she was the one who worked as a housemaid of a relative of her husband to sustain the latter’s niece (sic)
and because they were living with her husband’s family, she was obliged to do the household chores—an
indication that she is a battered wife coupled with the fact that she served as a servant in his (sic)
husband’s family.
163
VOL. 615, March 12, 2010 163
Suazo vs. Suazo
    This situation that the petitioner had underwent may be attributed to the fact that at the time of
their marriage, she and her husband are still young and was forced only to said marriage by her
relatives. The petitioner and the respondent had never developed the feeling of love and respect, instead,
the respondent blamed the petitioner’s family for said early marriage and not to his own liking.”
Applying the principles and the requisites of psychological incapacity enunciated by this
Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals,7 the RTC concluded:
The above findings of the psychologist [referring to the psychologist’ testimony quoted above] would
only tend to show that the respondent was, indeed, suffering from psychological incapacity which is not
only grave but also incurable.
Likewise, applying the principles set forth in the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina,
268 SCRA 198, wherein the Supreme Court held that:
x x x x [At this point, the RTC cited the pertinent Molina ruling]
The Court is satisfied that the evidence presented and the testimony of the petitioner and Dr.
Familiar (sic)  [the psychologist who testified in this case was Nedy Tayag, not a Dr.
Familiar] attesting that there is psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent to comply with
the essential marital obligations has been sufficiently and clearly proven and, therefore, petitioner is
entitled to the relief prayed for.
A claim that the marriage is valid as there is no psychological incapacity of the respondent is a
speculation and conjecture and without moral certainty. This will enhanced (sic) a greater tragedy
_______________
7 The RTC enumerated the requisites as follows: (1) that psychological incapacity refers to no less than a mental not physical
incapacity; (2) that the law intended psychological incapacity to be confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to marriage; and (3) that the
psychological condition must exist at the time of the marriage and must be characterized by  gravity,  juridical
antecedence and incurability. See citation at note 9.
164
164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Suazo vs. Suazo
as the battered wife/petitioner will still be using the surname of the respondent, although they are now
separated, and a grim and sad reminder of her husband who made here a slave and a punching bag
during the short span of her marriage with him. The law on annulment should be liberally construed in
favor of an innocent suffering petitioner otherwise said law will be an instrument to protect persons with
mental illness like the serious anti-social behavior of herein respondent.”8
The CA Ruling
 The Republic appealed the RTC decision to the CA. The CA reversed the RTC decision,
ruling that:
“True, as stated in  Marcos vs. Marcos, 343 SCRA 755, the guidelines set in  Santos vs. Court of
Appeals and Republic vs. Court of Appeals do not require that a physician personally examine the person
to be declared psychologically incapacitated. The Supreme Court adopted the  totality of
evidence  approach which allows the fact of psychological incapacity to be drawn from evidence that
medically or clinically identify the root causes of the illness. If the totality of the evidence is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned
need not be resorted to. Applied in Marcos, however, the aggregate testimony of the aggrieved spouse,
children, relatives and the social worker were not found to be sufficient to prove psychological incapacity,
in the absence of any evaluation of the respondent himself, the person whose mental and psychological
capacity was in question.
In the case at bench, there is much scarcer evidence to hold that the respondent was psychologically
incapable of entering into the marriage state, that is, to assume the essential duties of marriage due to
an underlying psychological illness. Only the wife gave first-hand testimony on the behavior of the
husband, and it is inconclusive. As observed by the Court in Marcos, the respondent may have failed to
provide material support to the family and has resorted to physical abuse, but it is still necessary to show
that they were manifestations of a deeper psychological malaise that was clinically or medically
identified. The theory of the psychologist that
_______________
8 Parenthetical notes supplied.
165
VOL. 615, March 12, 2010 165
Suazo vs. Suazo
the respondent was suffering from an anti-social personality syndrome at the time of the marriage was
not the product of any adequate medical or clinical investigation. The evidence that she got from the
petitioner, anecdotal at best, could equally show that the behavior of the respondent was due simply to
causes like immaturity or irresponsibility which are not equivalent to psychological incapacity, Pesca vs.
Pesca, 356 SCRA 588, or the failure or refusal to work could have been the result of rebelliousness on the
part of one who felt that he had been forced into a loveless marriage. In any event, the respondent was
not under a permanent compulsion because he had later on shown his ability to engage in productive
work and more stable relationships with another. The element of permanence or incurability that is one
of the defining characteristic of psychological incapacity is not present.
There is no doubt that for the short period that they were under the same roof, the married life of the
petitioner with the respondent was an unhappy one. But the marriage cannot for this reason be
extinguished. As the Supreme Court intimates in  Pesca, our strict handling of Article 36 will be a
reminder of the inviolability of the marriage institution in our country and the foundation of the family
that the law seeks to protect. The concept of psychological incapacity is not to be a mantra to legalize
what in reality are convenient excuses of parties to separate and divorce.”
The Petition
Jocelyn now comes to us via the present petition to challenge and seek the reversal of the
CA ruling based on the following arguments:
1. The Court of Appeals went beyond what the law says, as it totally disregarded the legal basis of
the RTC in declaring the marriage null and void—Tuason v. Tuason  (256 SCRA 158; to be accurate,
should be Tuason v. Court of Appeals) holds that “the finding of the Trial Court as to the existence or
non-existence of petitioner’s psychological incapacity at the time of the marriage is final and binding on
us (the Supreme Court); petitioner has not sufficiently shown that the trial court’s factual findings and
evaluation of the testimonies of private respondent’s witnesses vis-à-vis petitioner’s defenses are clearly
and manifestly erroneous”;
166
166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Suazo vs. Suazo
      2. Article 36 of the Family Code did not define psychological incapacity; this omission was
intentional to give the courts a wider discretion to interpret the term without being shackled by statutory
parameters. Article 36 though was taken from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which gives
three conditions that would make a person unable to contract marriage from mental incapacity as
follows:
“1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
(1) who lack the sufficient use of reason;
(2) who suffer from grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial
rights and duties which are to be mutually given and accepted;
(3) who are not capable of assuming the essential obligations of matrimony due to causes of a
psychic nature.”
The decision of the RTC, Jocelyn claims, intelligently conforms to these criteria. The RTC,
being clothed with discretionary functions, applied its finding of psychological incapacity based
on existing jurisprudence and the law itself which gave lower court magistrates enough
latitude to define what constitutes psychological incapacity. On the contrary, she further
claims, the OSG relied on generalities without being specific on why it is opposed to the
dissolution of a marriage that actually exists only in name.
Simply stated, we face the issue of whether there is basis to nullify Jocelyn’s marriage with
Angelito under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Court’s Ruling
We find the petition devoid of merit. The CA committed no reversible error of law in
setting aside the RTC decision, as no basis exists to declare Jocelyn’s marriage with Angelito a
nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code and its related jurisprudence.
167
VOL. 615, March 12, 2010 167
Suazo vs. Suazo
The Law, Molina and Te
Article 36 of the Family Code provides that a marriage contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization.
A unique feature of this law is its intended open-ended application, as it merely introduced
an abstract concept—psychological incapacity that disables compliance with the contractual
obligations of marriage—without any concrete definition or, at the very least, an illustrative
example. We must therefore apply the law based on how the concept of psychological
incapacity was shaped and developed in jurisprudence.
Santos v. Court of Appeals9 declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. It should refer to “no less than
a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage.” It must be confined to “the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.”10
The Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of the
law in Republic v. Court of Appeals11 (Molina) as follows:
 “(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution
and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution
_______________
9 310 Phil. 21; 240 SCRA 20 (1995).
10 Id., at pp. 39-40; p. 34.
11 335 Phil. 664; 268 SCRA 198 (1997).
168
168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Suazo vs. Suazo
and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an
entire Article on the Family, recognizing it “as the foundation of the nation.” It decrees marriage as
legally “inviolable,” thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be “protected” by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological—not physical, although
its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties or one of them was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of
the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their “I do’s.” The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.
169
VOL. 615, March 12, 2010 169
Suazo vs. Suazo
Thus, “mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts” cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in
the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to
parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts
xxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear
as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculicontemplated under Canon 1095.”12
Molina, subsequent jurisprudence holds, merely expounded on the basic requirements
of Santos.13
A later case,  Marcos v. Marcos,14  further clarified that there is no requirement that the
defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist
_______________
12 Id., at pp. 676-680; pp. 209-213.
13 See Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840, 850; 343 SCRA 755, 764 (2000).
14 Id.
170
170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Suazo vs. Suazo
as a condition sine qua non  for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological
incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition
under Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that psychological
incapacity exists and its  gravity,  juridical antecedence, and  incurabilitycan be duly
established.15
Pesca v. Pesca16  clarifies that the  Molina  guidelines apply even to cases then already
pending, under the reasoning that  the court’s interpretation or construction establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent of the law; the latter as so interpreted and construed would
thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior
ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new
doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old
doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of “lex
prospicit, non respicit.”
On March 15, 2003, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 08-11-10 SC,  Rules) promulgated by the Court
took effect. Section 2(d) of the Rules pertinently provides:
(d) What to allege.—A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the
complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying
with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.”
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological
incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.”
_______________
15 Id., at p. 850; p. 764.
16 408 Phil. 713, 720; 356 SCRA 588, 593-594 (2001).
171
 VOL. 615, March 12, 2010 171
Suazo vs. Suazo
   Section 12(d) of the Rules requires a pre-trial brief containing all the evidence presented,
including expert opinion, if any, briefly stating or describing the nature and purpose of these
pieces of evidence. Section 14(b) requires the court to consider during the pre-trial conference
the advisability of receiving expert testimony and such other matters as may aid in the prompt
disposition of the petition. Under Section 17 of the Rules, the grounds for the declaration of the
absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must be proved.
All cases—involving the application of Article 36 of the Family Code—that came to us were
invariably decided based on the principles in the cited cases. This was the state of law and
jurisprudence on Article 36 when the Court decided  Te v. Yu-Te17  (Te) which revisited
the Molina guidelines.
Te begins with the observation that the Committee that drafted the Family Code did not
give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that by so doing, it would limit the
applicability of the provision under the principle of  ejusdem generis; that the Committee
desired that the courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, by the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals that, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision itself was taken from the Canon Law.18 Te thus assumes
it a basic premise  that the law is so designed to allow some resiliency in its
application.19
Te then sustained Santos’ doctrinal value, saying that its interpretation is consistent with
that of the Canon Law.
Going back to its basic premise, Te said:
_______________
17 G.R. No. 161793, February 13, 2009, 579 SCRA 193.
18 Id., at p. 213.
19 Id.
172
172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Suazo vs. Suazo
“Conscious of the law’s intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-case basis, that should determine
whether a party to a marriage is psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in sustaining the lower court’s
judgment of annulment in Tuason v. Court of Appeals, ruled that the findings of the trial court are final
and binding on the appellate courts.
Again, upholding the trial court’s findings and declaring that its decision was not a judgment on the
pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, explained that when private respondent testified under
oath before the lower court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence
in the form of testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware of parallel decisions of Catholic marriage
tribunals, ruled that the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the marital
obligation of procreating children is equivalent to psychological incapacity.”
With this as backdrop,  Te  launched an attack on  Molina. It said that  the resiliency with
which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the provision should be
interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the
imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina. Molina, to  Te, has become a strait-jacket,
forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it; wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in
conveniently applying  Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics,
nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of
marriage.
Te  then enunciated the principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of  a
priori  assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts. Courts
should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
As a final note though,  Te  expressly stated that it is not suggesting the abandonment
of  Molina, but that, following  Antonio v. Reyes, it merely looked at other perspectives that
should also govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. The
subsequent Ting v. Velez-
173
VOL. 615, March 12, 2010 173
Suazo vs. Suazo
Ting20  follows  Te’s lead when it reiterated that  Te  did not abandon  Molina;  far from
abandoning Molina, it simply suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements,
cognizant of the explanation given by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules on the
rationale of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages:21
“To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root cause of the psychological
incapacity and to attach thereto the verified written report of an accredited psychologist or psychiatrist
have proved to be too expensive for the parties. They adversely affect access to justice of poor litigants. It
is also a fact that there are provinces where these experts are not available. Thus, the Committee
deemed it necessary to relax this stringent requirement enunciated in the Molina Case. The need for the
examination of a party or parties by a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist and the presentation of
psychiatric experts shall now be determined by the court during the pre-trial conference.”
Te,  therefore, instead of substantially departing from  Molina,22  merely stands for a more
flexible approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on
psychological incapacity. It is also noteworthy for its evidentiary approach in these cases,
which it expounded on as follows:
“By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-
making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion
on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.
xxxx
_______________
20 G.R. No. 166562, March 31, 2009, 582 SCRA 694.
21 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
22 A step that Te, a Third Division case, could not have legally undertaken because the Molina ruling is an En Banc ruling, in
light of Article VIII, Section 4(3) of the Constitution.
174
174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Suazo vs. Suazo
          Hernandez v. Court of Appeals  emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to
establish the precise cause of a party’s psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the
inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos asserts, there is no requirement that the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a
link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of
expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the
psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of
psychological incapacity.”23 [Underscoring supplied]T
his evidentiary approach is repeated in Ting v. Velez-Ting.24
Under this evolutionary development, as shown by the current string of cases on
Article 36 of the Family Code, what should not be lost on us is the intention of the
law to confine the application of Article 36 to the most serious cases of personality
disorders, clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage; that the psychological illness that must
have afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave
and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of
the matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume.25  It is not enough that the
respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his
marital
_______________
23 Supra note 16, pp. 231-232.
24 Supra note 19.
25 See So v. Valera, G.R. No. 150677, June 5, 2009, 588 SCRA 319, and Padilla-Rumbaua v. Rumbaua, G.R. No.
166738, August 14, 2009, 596 SCRA 157.
175
VOL. 615, March 12, 2010 175
Suazo vs. Suazo
obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening
disabling factor—an adverse integral element in the respondent’s personality structure that
effectively incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital obligations—must be
shown.26Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will
on the part of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological
condition or illness; irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person’s refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.27
If all these sound familiar, they do, for they are but iterations of Santos’ juridical
antecedence, gravity and incurability requisites. This is proof of Santos’ continuing
doctrinal validity.
The Present Case
As the CA did, we find Jocelyn’s evidence insufficient to establish Angelito’s psychological
incapacity to perform essential marital obligations. We so conclude based on our own
examination of the evidence on record, which we were compelled to undertake because of the
differences in the trial court and the appellate court’s appreciation and evaluation of Jocelyn’s
presented evidence.
a. The Expert Opinion Evidence
Both the psychologist’s testimony and the psychological report did not conclusively show the
root cause, gravity and incurability of Angelito’s alleged psychological condition.
_______________
26 Id., Padilla-Rumbaua v. Rumbaua.
27 Navales v. Navales, G.R. No. 167523, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 272, 288-289.
176
176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Suazo vs. Suazo
We first note a critical factor in appreciating or evaluating the expert opinion evidence—the
psychologist’s testimony and the psychological evaluation report—that Jocelyn presented.
Based on her declarations in open court, the psychologist evaluated Angelito’s psychological
condition only in an indirect manner—she derived all her conclusions from information coming
from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause cannot of course be doubted. Given the source of the
information upon which the psychologist heavily relied upon, the court must evaluate the
evidentiary worth of the opinion with due care and with the application of the more rigid and
stringent set of standards outlined above,  i.e., that there must be a thorough and in-depth
assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a
psychological incapacity that is grave, severe and incurable.
In saying this, we do not suggest that a personal examination of the party alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated is mandatory; jurisprudence holds that this type of examination
is not a mandatory requirement. While such examination is desirable, we recognize that it
may not be practical in all instances given the oftentimes estranged relations between the
parties. For a determination though of a party’s complete personality profile, information
coming from persons intimately related to him (such as the party’s close relatives and friends)
may be helpful. This is an approach in the application of Article 36 that allows flexibility, at
the same time that it avoids, if not totally obliterate, the credibility gaps spawned by
supposedly expert opinion based entirely on doubtful sources of information.
From these perspectives, we conclude that the psychologist, using meager information
coming from a directly interested party, could not have secured a complete personality profile
and could not have conclusively formed an objective opinion or diagnosis of Angelito’s
psychological condition. While the report or evaluation may be conclusive with respect to
Jocelyn’s psychological condition, this is not true for An-
177
VOL. 615, March 12, 2010 177
Suazo vs. Suazo
gelito’s. The methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the required depth and
comprehensiveness of examination required to evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a
psychological disorder. In short, this is not the psychological report that the Court can rely on
as basis for the conclusion that psychological incapacity exists.
Other than this credibility or reliability gap, both the psychologist’s report and testimony
simply provided a general description of Angelito’s purported anti-social personality disorder,
supported by the characterization of this disorder as chronic, grave and incurable. The
psychologist was conspicuously silent, however, on the bases for her conclusion or the
particulars that gave rise to the characterization she gave. These particulars are simply not in
the Report, and neither can they be found in her testimony.
For instance, the psychologist testified that Angelito’s personality disorder is chronic or
incurable; Angelito has long been afflicted with the disorder prior to his marriage with Jocelyn
or even during his early developmental stage, as basic trust was not developed. However, she
did not support this declaration with any factual basis. In her Report, she based her conclusion
on the presumption that  Angelito apparently grew up in a dysfunctional family. Quite
noticeable, though, is the psychologist’s own equivocation on this point—she was not firm in account of the physical beatings she received from Angelito were true, this evidence does not
her conclusion for she herself may have realized that it was simply conjectural. The veracity, satisfy the requirement of Article 36 and its related jurisprudence, specifically
too, of this finding is highly suspect, for it was based entirely on Jocelyn’s assumed knowledge the Santos requisites.
of Angelito’s family background and upbringing. On the whole, the CA correctly reversed the RTC judgment, whose factual bases we now
Additionally, the psychologist merely generalized on the questions of why and to what find to be clearly and manifestly erroneous. Our ruling in Tuasonrecognizing the finality of the
extent was Angelito’s personality disorder grave and incurable, and on the effects of the factual findings of the trial court in Article 36 cases (which is Jocelyn’s main anchor in her
disorder on Angelito’s awareness of and his capability to undertake the duties and present appeal with us) does not therefore apply in this case. We find that, on the contrary,
responsibilities of marriage. the CA correctly applied Article 36 and its related jurisprudence to the facts and the evidence
The psychologist therefore failed to provide the answers to the more important concerns or of the present case.
requisites of psychological WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit. We AFFIRM
the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62443. Costs against the
178
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Carpio (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Abad and Perez, JJ., concur.
Suazo vs. Suazo
Petition denied, judgment affirmed.
incapacity, all of which are critical to the success of Jocelyn’s cause. Note.—A mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities does not
b. Jocelyn’s Testimony equate to psychological incapacity. (Halili vs. Santos-Halili, 551 SCRA 576 [2008])
The inadequacy and/or lack of probative value of the psychological report and the
psychologist’s testimony impel us to proceed to the evaluation of Jocelyn’s testimony, to find
out whether she provided the court with sufficient facts to support a finding of Angelito’s
psychological incapacity.
Unfortunately, we find Jocelyn’s testimony to be insufficient. Jocelyn merely testified on
Angelito’s habitual drunkenness, gambling, refusal to seek employment and the physical
beatings she received from him—all of which occurred  after  the marriage. Significantly, she
declared in her testimony that Angelito showed no signs of violent behavior, assuming this to
be indicative of a personality disorder, during the courtship stage or at the earliest stages of
her relationship with him. She testified on the alleged physical beatings after the marriage,
not before or at the time of the celebration of the marriage. She did not clarify when these
beatings exactly took place—whether it was near or at the time of celebration of the marriage
or months or years after. This is a clear evidentiary gap that materially affects her cause, as
the law and its related jurisprudence require that the psychological incapacity must exist at
the time of the celebration of the marriage.
Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative of psychological
incapacity, do not, by themselves, show psychological incapacity. All these simply indicate
difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to perform marital obligations that, as the cited
jurisprudence holds, cannot be considered to be constitutive of psychological incapacity in the
absence of proof that these are manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some debilitating
psychological condition or illness.
179

VOL. 615, March 12, 2010 179

Suazo vs. Suazo

The physical violence allegedly inflicted on Jocelyn deserves a different treatment. While
we may concede that physical violence on women indicates abnormal behavioral or personality
patterns, such violence, standing alone, does not constitute psychological incapacity.
Jurisprudence holds that there must be evidence showing a link, medical or the like, between
the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. The
evidence of this nexus is irretrievably lost in the present case under our finding that the
opinion of the psychologist cannot be relied upon. Even assuming, therefore, that Jocelyn’s

G.R. No. 171557. February 12, 2014.*
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. RODOLFO O. DE GRACIA, respondent.
Civil Law; Family Law; Marriages; Husband and Wife; Annulment of Marriage; Psychological
Incapacity; “Psychological incapacity,” as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code, should refer to no less than a mental — not merely physical — incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, among others, include
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.
—“Psychological incapacity,” as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
should refer to no less than a mental — not merely physical — incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, among others,
include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
“psychological incapacity” to the  most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. In Santos v. CA, 240 SCRA 20 (1995),  (Santos), the Court first declared that psychological
incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity(i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party
would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage);  (b)  juridical
antecedence (i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the
overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage); and(c)  incurability  (i.e., it must be
incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved). The
Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the
Family Code in
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
 
 
9 PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Republic of the Phils. v. CA, 268 SCRA 198 (1997), whose salient points are footnoted hereunder.
These guidelines incorporate the basic requirements that the Court established in Santos.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court, in Dedel v. Court of Appeals, 421 SCRA
461 (2004), held that therein respondent’s emotional immaturity and irresponsibility could not be equated
with psychological incapacity as it was not shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered
personality which make her completely unable to discharge the essential marital obligations of the marital
state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity.—The Court, in  Dedel v. Court of
Appeals,  421 SCRA 461 (2004),  held that therein respondent’s  emotional immaturity and
irresponsibilitycould not be equated with psychological incapacity as it was not shown that these acts
are manifestations of a disordered personality which make her completely unable to discharge the
essential marital obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her  youth, immaturity or
sexual promiscuity. In the same light, the Court, in the case of  Pesca v. Pesca,  356 SCRA 588
(2001),  (Pesca), ruled against a declaration of nullity, as petitioner therein “utterly failed, both in her
allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the
part of respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant a declaration of
nullity of the marriage,” significantly noting that the “[e]motional immaturity and irresponsibility,
invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological incapacity.” In  Pesca, the Court upheld the
appellate court’s finding that the petitioner therein had not established that her husband “showed signs
of mental incapacity as would cause him to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenant, as so
provided for in Article 68 of the Family Code; that the incapacity is grave, has preceded the marriage and
is incurable; that his incapacity to meet his marital responsibility is because of a psychological, not
physical illness; that the root cause of the incapacity has been identified medically or clinically, and has
been proven by an expert; and that the incapacity is permanent and incurable in nature.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Although expert opinions furnished by psychologists
regarding the psychological temperament of parties are usually given considerable weight by the courts,
the existence of psychological incapacity must still be proven
 
10
by independent evidence.—Verily, although expert opinions furnished by psychologists
regarding the psychological temperament of parties are usually given considerable weight by
the courts, the existence of psychological incapacity must still be proven by independent
evidence. After poring over the records, the Court, however, does not find any such evidence
sufficient enough to uphold the court  a quo’s nullity declaration. To the Court’s mind,
Natividad’s refusal to live with Rodolfo and to assume her duties as wife and mother as well as
her emotional immaturity, irresponsibility and infidelity do not rise to the level of
psychological incapacity that would justify the nullification of the parties’ marriage. Indeed, to
be declared clinically or medically incurable is one thing; to refuse or be reluctant to perform
one’s duties is another.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Psychological incapacity refers only to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage.—Psychological incapacity refers only to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. In the final analysis, the Court
does not perceive a disorder of this nature to exist in the present case. Thus, for these reasons,
coupled too with the recognition that marriage is an inviolable social institution and the
foundation of the family, the instant petition is hereby granted.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner.
  Cadigal & Associates Law Offices for respondent.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
 
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 28-52.
 
11
Decision2 dated June 2, 2005 and Resolution3 dated February 3, 2006 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 69103 which affirmed the Decision4  dated October 17, 2000 of the
Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte, Branch 11 (RTC) in Civil Case No. S-665
declaring the marriage of respondent Rodolfo O. De Gracia (Rodolfo) and Natividad N.
Rosalem (Natividad) void on the ground of psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of
the Family Code of the Philippines5 (Family Code).
 
The Facts
Rodolfo and Natividad were married on February 15, 1969 at the Parish of St. Vincent
Ferrer in Salug, Zamboanga del Norte.6  They lived in Dapaon, Sindangan, Zamboanga del
Norte and have two (2) children, namely, Ma. Reynilda R. De Gracia (Ma. Reynilda) and Ma.
Rizza R. De Gracia (Ma. Rizza), who were born on August 20, 1969 and January 15, 1972,
respectively.7
On December 28, 1998, Rodolfo filed a verified complaint for declaration of nullity of
marriage (complaint) before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. S-665, alleging that
Natividad was psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations.
In compliance with the Order8  dated January 5, 1999 of the RTC, the public prosecutor
conducted an investigation to determine if collusion exists be-
_______________
2 Id., at pp. 55-68. Penned by Associate Justice Romulo V. Borja, with Associate Justices Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr. and
Normandie B. Pizarro, concurring.
3 Id., at pp. 70-72.
4 Id., at pp. 87-100. Penned by Judge Wilfredo G. Ochotorena.
5 Executive Order No. 209, as amended, entitled “THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES.”
6 Records, p. 4.
7 See Rollo, p. 56.
8 Records, p. 7.
 
 
12
tween Rodolfo and Natividad and found that there was none.9 Trial on the merits then ensued.
In support of his complaint, Rodolfo testified, among others, that he first met Natividad
when they were students at the Barangay High School of Sindangan,10 and he was forced to
marry her barely three (3) months into their courtship in light of her accidental
pregnancy.11 At the time of their marriage, he was 21 years old, while Natividad was 18 years
of age. He had no stable job and merely worked in the gambling cockpits as “kristo” and
“bangkero sa hantak.” When he decided to join and train with the army,12 Natividad left their
conjugal home and sold their house without his consent.13  Thereafter, Natividad moved to
Dipolog City where she lived with a certain Engineer Terez (Terez), and bore him a child
named Julie Ann Terez.14  After cohabiting with Terez, Natividad contracted a second
marriage on January 11, 1991 with another man named Antonio Mondarez and has lived since
then with the latter in Cagayan de Oro City.15From the time Natividad abandoned them in
1972, Rodolfo was left to take care of Ma. Reynilda and Ma. Rizza16 and he exerted earnest
efforts to save their marriage which, however, proved futile because of Natividad’s
psychological incapacity that appeared to be incurable.17
For her part, Natividad failed to file her answer, as well as appear during trial, despite
service of summons.18Nonetheless, she informed the court that she submitted herself for
_______________
9 Id., at p. 8-A.
10 Id., at p. 83.
11 Id., at pp. 83-84.
12 Id., at p. 84.
13 Id., at p. 85.
14 Id., at p. 89.
15 Id., at p. 45.
16 Id.
17 Id., at pp. 89-90.
18 Id., at pp. 19-20.
 
 
13
psychiatric examination to Dr. Cheryl T. Zalsos (Dr. Zalsos) in response to Rodolfo’s
claims.19 Rodolfo also underwent the same examination.20
In her two-page psychiatric evaluation report,21  Dr. Zalsos stated that both Rodolfo and
Natividad were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations,
finding that both parties suffered from “utter emotional immaturity [which] is unusual and
unacceptable behavior considered [as] deviant from persons who abide by established norms of
conduct.”22 As for Natividad, Dr. Zalsos also observed that she lacked the willful cooperation
of being a wife and a mother to her two daughters. Similarly, Rodolfo failed to perform his
obligations as a husband, adding too that he sired a son with another woman. Further, Dr.
Zalsos noted that the mental condition of both parties already existed at the time of the
celebration of marriage, although it only manifested after. Based on the foregoing, Dr. Zalsos
concluded that the “couple’s union was bereft of the mind, will and heart for the obligations of
marriage.”23
On February 10, 1999, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing petitioner
Republic of the Philippines (Republic), filed an opposition24 to the complaint, contending that
the acts committed by Natividad did not demonstrate psychological incapacity as
contemplated by law, but are mere grounds for legal separation under the Family Code.25
_______________
19 Id., at p. 28.
20 See Rollo, p. 94.
21 Records, pp. 37-38.
22 Id., at p. 38.
23 Id.
24 Id., at pp. 9-14.
25 See Article 55 of the Family Code.
 
 
14
The RTC Ruling
 
In a Decision26  dated October 17, 2000, the RTC declared the marriage between Rodolfo
and Natividad void on the ground of psychological incapacity. It relied on the findings and
testimony of Dr. Zalsos, holding that Natividad’s emotional immaturity exhibited a behavioral
pattern which in psychiatry constitutes a form of personality disorder that existed at the time
of the parties’ marriage but manifested only thereafter. It likewise concurred with Dr. Zalsos’s
observation that Natividad’s condition is incurable since it is deeply rooted within the make-
up of her personality. Accordingly, it concluded that Natividad could not have known, much
more comprehend the marital obligations she was assuming, or, knowing them, could not have
given a valid assumption thereof.27
The Republic appealed to the CA, averring that there was no showing that Natividad’s
personality traits constituted psychological incapacity as envisaged under Article 36 of the
Family Code, and that the testimony of the expert witness was not conclusive upon the their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
court.28 support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
  meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders
The CA Ruling clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
  significance to the marriage.[35] In Santos v. CA[36] (Santos), the Court first declared that
In a Decision29  dated June 2, 2005, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC, finding that psychological incapacity must be characterized by:  (a)  gravity  (i.e., it must be grave and
while Natividad’s emotional immaturity, irresponsibility and promiscuity by themselves do serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in
not necessarily equate to psychological incapacity, “their degree or severity, as duly testified to a marriage);  (b)  juridical antecedence(i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party
by Dr. Zalsos, has sufficiently established a case of psychological disorder so pro- antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage); and  (c)  incurability  (i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the
_______________ cure would be beyond the means of the party involved).[37]
The Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article
26 Rollo, pp. 87-100. 36 of the Family Code in Republic of the Phils. v. CA,[38]  whose salient points are footnoted
27 Id., at p. 96.
28 CA Rollo, p. 27.
hereunder.[39] These guidelines incorporate the basic
29 Rollo, pp. 55-68.
_______________
  35 Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, 240 SCRA 20, 40 (1995).
  36 Id., at p. 39.
37 Dimayuga-Laurena v. Court of Appeals, 587 Phil. 597, 607-608; 566 SCRA 154, 161-162 (2008).
15 38 Supra note 34.
39 (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
found as to render [Natividad] incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations.”30 Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on
the Family, recognizing it “as the foundation of the nation.” It decrees marriage as legally “inviolable,” thereby protecting it from
The Republic moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied in a Resolution31 dated dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be “protected” by the state.
February 3, 2006, hence, the instant petition. The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and
  solidarity.

The Issue Before the Court  

The primordial issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in sustaining the RTC’s
finding of psychological incapacity.
The Ruling of the Court
 
The petition is meritorious.
“Psychological incapacity,” as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 3632  of the
Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental — not merely physical — incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in
Article 6833 of the Family Code, among others,34 include
_______________
30 Id., at p. 67.
31 Id., at pp. 70-72.
32  Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
33  Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and
render mutual help and support.
34 Also includes those provided under Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well
as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same code in regard to parents and their children. (See Guideline 6 in Rep. of the
Phils. v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 664, 678; 268 SCRA 198, 211 [1997].)
16
17
requirements that the Court established in Santos.40
_______________
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological — not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the
court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless
such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be
given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage. The evidence must show that
the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their “I do’s.” The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute
or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job. x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Thus, “mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts” cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there
is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to par-
18
 Keeping with these principles, the Court, in  Dedel v. CA,41  held that therein
respondent’s  emotional immaturity and irresponsibility  could not be equated with
psychological incapacity as it was not shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered
personality which make her  completely unable to discharge the essential marital
obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her  youth, immaturity or sexual
promiscuity.42  In the same light, the Court, in the case of  Pesca v. Pesca43  (Pesca), ruled
against a declaration of nullity, as petitioner therein “utterly failed, both in her allegations in
the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of
respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant a
declaration of nullity of the marriage,” significantly noting that the “[e]motional
immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological
incapacity.” In Pesca, the Court upheld the appellate court’s
_______________
ents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included
in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x
xxxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted
for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095. (Id., at pp. 276-280.)
40 Republic v. Galang, G.R. No. 168335, June 6, 2011, 650 SCRA 524, 535-537.
41 466 Phil. 226; 421 SCRA 461 (2004).
42 Id., at p. 233; p. 466.
43 408 Phil. 713; 356 SCRA 588 (2001).
 
 
19
finding that the petitioner therein had not established that her husband “showed signs of
mental incapacity as would cause him to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenant, as
so provided for in Article 68 of the Family Code; that the incapacity is grave, has preceded the
marriage and is incurable; that his incapacity to meet his marital responsibility is because of a
psychological, not physical illness; that the root cause of the incapacity has been identified
medically or clinically, and has been proven by an expert; and that the incapacity is
permanent and incurable in nature.”44
The Court maintains a similar view in this case. Based on the evidence presented, there
exists insufficient factual or legal basis to conclude that Natividad’s emotional immaturity,
irresponsibility, or even sexual promiscuity, can be equated with psychological incapacity.
The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, heavily relied on the psychiatric evaluation report of Dr.
Zalsos which does not, however, explain in reasonable detail how Natividad’s condition could
be characterized as grave, deeply-rooted, and incurable within the parameters of psychological
incapacity jurisprudence. Aside from failing to disclose the types of psychological tests which
she administered on Natividad, Dr. Zalsos failed to identify in her report the root cause of
Natividad’s condition and to show that it existed at the time of the parties’ marriage. Neither
was the gravity or seriousness of Natividad’s behavior in relation to her failure to perform the
essential marital obligations sufficiently described in Dr. Zalsos’s report. Further, the finding
contained therein on the incurability of Natividad’s condition remains unsupported by any
factual or scientific basis and, hence, appears to be drawn out as a bare conclusion and even
self-serving. In the same vein, Dr. Zalsos’s testimony during trial, which is essentially a
reiteration of her report, also fails to convince the Court of her conclusion that Natividad was
psychologically incapacitated.
_______________
44 Id., at p. 718; p. 592.
 
 
20
Verily, although expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological
temperament of parties are usually given considerable weight by the courts, the existence of
psychological incapacity must still be proven by independent evidence.45 After poring over the
records, the Court, however, does not find any such evidence sufficient enough to uphold the
court a quo’s nullity declaration. To the Court’s mind, Natividad’s refusal to live with Rodolfo
and to assume her duties as wife and mother as well as her emotional immaturity,
irresponsibility and infidelity do not rise to the level of psychological incapacity that would
justify the nullification of the parties’ marriage. Indeed, to be declared clinically or medically
incurable is one thing; to refuse or be reluctant to perform one’s duties is another. To hark
back to what has been earlier discussed, psychological incapacity refers only to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.46 In the final analysis, the Court
does not perceive a disorder of this nature to exist in the present case. Thus, for these reasons,
coupled too with the recognition that marriage is an inviolable social institution and the
foundation of the family,47the instant petition is hereby granted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is  GRANTED. The Decision dated June 2, 2005 and
Resolution dated February 3, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. CV No. 69103
are  REVERSED  and  SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the complaint for declaration of nullity of
marriage filed under Article 36 of the Family Code is DISMISSED.
_______________
45 See Mendoza v. Republic, G.R. No. 157649, November 12, 2012, 685 SCRA 16, 25-32.
46 Republic v. Galang, supra note 40, at p. 535.
47 See Section 2, Article XV of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
 
 
21
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo and Perez, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and set aside.
Notes.—The Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed that psychological incapacity
contemplates “downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic
marital obligations”; not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part
of the errant spouse. (Republic vs. Encelan, 688 SCRA 215 [2013])
Aside from the time element involved, a wife’s psychological fitness as a spouse cannot
simply be equated with her professional/work relationship; workplace obligations and
responsibilities are poles apart from their marital counterparts. (Id.)
 [No. L-5877. September 28, 1954]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee,  vs.  ARTURO MENDOZA,
defendant and appellant.
BIGAMY; MARRIAGE CONTRACTED DURING THE EXISTENCE OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE
is VOID AB INITIO; No JUDICIAL DECREE is NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH ITS INVALIDITY.—A
subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his espouse is illegal and void
from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity. A prosecution for
bigamy based on said void marriage will not lie.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Laguna. Yatco. J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Nestor A. Andrada for appellant.
Solicitor General Pompeyo Diaz and Solicitor Felicisimo R. Rosete for appellee.
846
846 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Mendoza
PARÁS, C. J.:
The defendant, Arturo Mendoza, has appealed from a judgment of the Court of First Instance
of Laguna, finding him guilty of the crime of bigamy and sentencing him to imprisonment for
an indeterminate term of from 6 months and 1 day to 6 years, with costs.
The f following f facts are undisputed: On August 5, 1936, the appellant and Jovita de Asis
were married in Marikina, Rizal. On May 14, 1941, during the subsistence of the first
marriage, the appellant was married to Olga Lema in the City of Manila. On Febrauary 2,
1943, Jovita de Asis died. On August 19, 1949, the appellant contracted another marriage with
Carmencita Panlilio in Calamba, Laguna. This last marriage gave rise to his prosecution for
and conviction of the crime of bigamy.
The appellant contends that his marriage with Olga Lema on May 14, 1941 is null and void
and, therefore, non-existent, having been contracted while his first marriage with Jovita de
Asis August 5, 1936 was still in effect, and that his third marriage to Carmencita Panlilio on
August 19, 1949 cannot be the basis of a charge for bigamy because it took place after the
death of Jovita de Asis. The Solicitor General, however, argues that, even assuming that
appellant's second marriage to Olga Lema is void, he is not exempt from criminal liability, in
the absence of a previous judicial annulment of said bigamous marriage; and the case
of People vs. Cotas, 40 Off. Gaz., 3134, is cited. The decision invoked by the Solicitor General,
rendered by the Court of Appeals, is not controlling. Said case is essentially different, because
the defendant therein, Jose Cotas, impeached the validity of his first marriage for lack of
necessary formalities, and the Court of Appeals found his factual contention to be without
merit.
In the case at bar, it is admitted that appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema was
contracted during the existence of his first marriage with Jovita de Asis. Section 29 of the
marriage law (.act 3613), in force at the time the
847
VOL. 95, SEPTEMBER 28, 1954 847
People vs. Mendoza
appellant contracted his second marriage in 1941, provides as follows:
Illegal marriages.—Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first
spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its
performance, unless:
(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;
(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage
without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or the absentee being generally
considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such
subsequent marriage, the marriage so contracted being valid in either case until declared null and void
by a competent court.
This statutory provision plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted by any person
during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its perf ormance, and no judicial
decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annulable
marriages. There is here no pretence that appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema was
contracted in the belief that the first spouse, Jovita de Asis, has been absent ex or seven
consecutive years or generally considered as dead, so as to render said marriage valid until
declared null and void by a competent court.
Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed and the defendant-appellant acquitted, with
costs de officio so ordered.
Pablo,  Bengzon,  Jugo,  Bautista Angelo,  Labrador,  Concepcion, and  Reyes, J. B. L.,
JJ., concur.
REYES, J., dissenting:
I, dissent.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code punishes with prison mayor  "any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has
been legally dissolved".
848
848 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cañaveral and Bautista vs. Encarnacion, etc., et al.
Though the logician may say that where the former marriage was void there would be nothing
to dissolve still it is not for the spouses to judge whether that marriage was void or not. That
judgment is reserved to the courts. As Viada says "La santidad e importancia del matrinonio
no permite que los casados juzguen por si mismos de su nulidad; esta ha de someterse
precisamente al judicio del Tribunal competente, y cuando este declare la nulidad del
matrimonio, y solo entonces, se tendra por nulo; mientras no exista esta declaración, la
presuncion esta siempre a favor de la validez del matrimonio, y de consiguiente, el que contrae
otro segundo antes de dicha declaración de nulidad, no puede menos de incurrir la pena de
este articulo." (3 Viada, Código penal p. 275.)
"This is a sound opinion," says Mr. Justice Tuason in the case of People vs. Jose Cotas, (CA), 40 Off. Gaz.,
3145, "and is in line with the well-known rule established in cases of adultery, that "until by competent
authority in a final judgment the marriage contract is set aside, the offense to the vows taken and the
attack on the family exist.'"
Padilla and Montemayor, JJ., concur.
Judgment reversed.

[No. L-10016. February 28, 1957]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee,  vs.  PROCESO S. ARAGON,
defendant and appellant.
MARRIAGE LAW;  NULL AND VOID MARRIAGES;  JUDICIAL DECREE TO ESTABLISH
INVALIDITY, NOT NECESSARY.—A subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the
lifetime of his first spouse is illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary
to establish its invalidity as distinguished from mere annulable marriages. (People vs.  Mendoza, L-
5877, September 28, 1954.)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Mejia, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Adolfo Brillantes for appellee.
Prospero V. Manuel,  Fernando Moncada  and  Antonio Abad Tornis  for defendant and
appellant.
LABRADOR, J.:
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu finding appellant guilty of
bigamy. The facts are not disputed and, as found by the trial court, are as follows:
“On September 28, 1925, the accused, under the name of Proceso Rosima, contracted marriage with a
certain Maria Gorrea in the Philippine Independent Church in Cebu (Exhibits “1" and “1-A"). While his
mariage with Maria Gorrea was subsisting, the accused, under the name of Proceso Aragon, contracted a
canonical marriage with Maria Faicol on August 27, 1934, in the Santa Teresita Church in Iloilo City.
“The sponsors of the accused and Maria Faicol were Eulogio Giroy, who was then an employee of the
Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Iloilo, and a certain Emilio Tomesa, a clerk in the said office (Exhibit
“A", and testimonies of Eulogio Giroy and complainant Maria Faicol). After the said marriage, the
accused and Maria Faicol established residence in Iloilo. As the accused was then a traveling salesman,
he commuted between Iloilo where he maintained Maria Faicol, and Cebu where he maintained his
1034
1034 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Aragon
first wife, Maria Gorrea. Maria Gorrea died in Cebu City on August 5, 1939 (Exhibit “2")- After Maria
Gorrea’s death, and seeing that the coast was clear in Cebu, the accused brought Maria Faicol to Cebu
City in 1940, where she worked as a teachernurse.
“It would seem that the accused and Maria Faicol did not live a happy marital life in Cebu, for it
appears that in 1949 and 1950,. Maria Faicol suffered injuries to her eyes because of physical
maltreatment in the hands of the accused. On January 22, 1953, the accused sent Maria Faicol to Iloilo,
allegedly for the purpose of undergoing treatment of her eyesight. During her absence, the accused
contracted a third marriage with a certain Jesusa C. Maglasang on October 3, 1953, in Sibonga, Cebu.
(See Exhibits “C", “D", “E" and “F").
“The accused admitted having contracted marriage with Jesusa C. Maglasang in Sibonga, Cebu, on
October 3, 1953. Although the accused made an attempt to deny his previous marriage with Maria
Faicol, the Court, however, believes that the attempt is futile for the fact of the said second marriage was
fully established not only by the certificate of the said marriage, but also by the testimony of Maria
Faicol and of Eulogio Giroy, one of the sponsors of the wedding, and the identification of the accused
made by Maria Faicol. (See Exhibits “A" and “B"; t.s.n. pp. 32–33, 40, 41, hearing of April 27, 1954)."
The Court of First Instance of Cebu held that even in the absence of an express provision in
Act No. 3613 authorizing the filing of an action for judicial declaration of nullity of a marriage
void  ab initio,  defendant could not legally contract marriage with Jesusa C. Maglasang
without the dissolution of his marriage to Maria Faicol, either by the death of the latter or by
the judicial declaration of the nullity of such marriage, at the instance of the latter.
Authorities given for this ruling are 5 Viada, 5th edition, 651; 35 American Jurisprudence,
Marriage, Sec. 46, p. 212; Bickford vs. Bickford, 74 N.H. 466, 69 A. 579.
Appellant in this Court relies on the case of People vs.Mendoza, (95 Phil., 845; 50 Off. Gaz.,
[10] 4767). In this case the majority of this Court declared:
“The statutory provision (section 29 of the Marriage Law or Act No. 3613) plainly makes a subsequent
marriage contracted by any
1035
VOL. 100, FEBRUARY 28, 1957 1035
People vs. Aragon
person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree
is necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annulable marriages. There is here no
pretense that appellant’s second marriage with Olga Lema was contracted in the belief that the first
spouse, Jovita de Asis, had been absent for seven consecutive years or generally considered as dead, so as
to render said marriage valid until declared null and void by a subsequent court.”
We are aware of the very weighty reasons expressed by Justice Alex Reyes in his dissent in the
case above-quoted But these weighty reasons notwithstanding, the very fundamental principle
of strict construction of penal laws in favor of the accused, which principle we may not ignore,
seems to justify our stand in the above-cited case of People  vs.  Mendoza. Our Revised Penal
Code is of recent enactment and had the rule enunciated in Spain and in America requiring
judicial declaration of nullity of ab initiovoid marriages been within the contemplation of the
legislature, an express provision to that effect would or should have been inserted in the law.
In its absence, we are bound by said rule of strict interpretation already adverted to.
It is to be noted that the action was instituted upon complaint of the second wife, whose
marriage with the appellant was not renewed after the death of the first wife and before the
third marriage was entered into. Hence, the last marriage was a valid one and appellant’s
prosecution for contracting this marriage can not prosper.
For the foregoing considerations, the judgment ap-, pealed from is hereby reversed and the
defendant-appellant acquitted, with costs  de oficio,  without prejudice to his prosecution for
having contracted the second bigamous marriage. So ordered.
Parás, C.J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B. L.,Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur.
REYES, A., J., dissenting:
I dissent.
1036
1036 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Phil. Bank of Commerce vs. Santos
Dissenting in the case of People vs. Mendoza, replied on by the majority, I there said:
“Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code punishes with  prision mayor  ‘any person who shall contract a
second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved.’
“Though the logician may say that where the former marriage was void there would be nothing to
dissolve, still it is- not for the spouses to judge whether that marriage was void or not. That judgment is
reserved to the courts. As Viada says, ‘La satidad e importancia del matrimonio no permite que los
casados juzguen por si mismos de su nulidad; esta ha de someterse precisamente al juicio del Tribunal
competente, vs cuando este declare la nulidad del matrimonio, vs solo entonces, se tendra por nulo;
mientras no exista esta declaración, la presuncion esta siempre a favor de la validez del matrimonio, vs
de consiguiente, el que contrae otro segundo antes de dicha declaracion de nulidad, no puede menos de
incurrir la pena de este articulo.’ (3 Viada, Codigo Penal, p. 275.)
“‘This is a sound opinion,’ says Mr. Justice Tuason in the case of People vs. Jose Cotas, (CA), 40 Off.
Gaz. 3145, ‘and is in line with the well-known rule established in cases of adultery, that “until by
competent authority in a final judgment the marriage contract is set aside, the offense to the vows taken
and the attack on the family exists.’ "

I may add that the construction placed by the majority upon the law penalizing bigamy would
frustrate the legislative intent rather than give effect thereto.

Padilla and Montemayor, JJ., concur.

Judgment reversed.

VOL. 143, AUGUST 19, 1986 499
Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy
*
No. L-53703. August 19, 1986.
LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, petitioner,  vs.  THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY (as
presiding judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City) and KARL
HEINZ WIEGEL, respondents.
Civil Law; Persons and Family Relations;  Marriage;  Nullity of marriage;  Proof that first marriage
was vitiated by force, not necessary in an action for a declaration of nullity of marriage filed by the second
husband; Reason.—There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force
committed against both parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely
voidable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made,
it is clear that when she married respondent she was still validly married to her first husband,
consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code).
_________________
* SECOND
DIVISION.
500
500 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Introducing evidence about existing prior marriage, not necessary
as the first marriage though void, still needs a judicial declaration of such fact; Woman’s marriage to
second husband void; Case at bar.—There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing
prior marriage of her first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though
void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and
purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with
respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel); accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be
regarded VOID under the law.
PETITION to review the orders of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan
City.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Dapucanta, Dulay & Associates for petitioner.
     Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Ongsiako Law Officefor private respondent.
PARAS, J.:
In an action (Family Case No. 483) filed before the erstwhile Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of Caloocan City, herein respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel (plaintiff therein) asked for the
declaration of Nullity of his marriage (celebrated on July, 1978 at the Holy Catholic Apostolic
Christian Church Branch in Makati, Metro Manila) with herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel
(Lilia, for short, and defendant therein) on the ground of Lilia’s previous existing marriage to
one Eduardo A. Maxion, the ceremony having been performed on June 25, 1972 at our Lady of
Lourdes Church in Quezon City. Lilia, while admitting the existence of said prior subsisting
marriage claimed that said marriage was null and void, she and the first husband Eduardo A.
Maxion having been allegedly forced to enter said marital union. In the pre-trial that ensued,
the issue agreed upon by both parties was the status of the first marriage (assuming the
presence of force exerted against both parties): was said prior marriage void or was it
merely  voidable?  Contesting the validity of the pre-trial order, Lilia asked the respondent
court for an opportunity to present evidence—
501
VOL. 143, AUGUST 19, 1986 501
Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy
(1) that the first marriage was vitiated by force exercised upon both her and the first
husband; and
(2) that the first husband was at the time of the marriage in 1972 already married
to someone else.
Respondent judge ruled against the presentation of evidence because the existence of force
exerted on both parties of the first marriage had already been agreed upon. Hence, the present
petition for certiorari assailing the following Orders of the respondent Judge—
(1) the Order dated March 17, 1980 in which the parties were compelled to submit the
case for resolution based on “agreed facts;” and
(2) the Order dated April 14, 1980, denying petitioner’s motion to allow her to present
evidence in her favor.
We find the petition devoid of merit.
There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force
committed against both parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void
but merely voidable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled. Since no
annulment has yet been made, it is dear that when she married respondent she was still
validly married to her first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art.
80, Civil Code).
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her
first husband at the time they married each other, 1for then such a marriage though void still
needs according to this Court a judicial declaration  of such fact and for all legal intents and
purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her
marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel); accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and
respondent would be regarded VOID under the law.
WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, for
________________
1 Vda. de Consuegra vs. GSIS, 37 SCRA 315.
502
502 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Valisno vs. Plan
lack of merit, and the Orders complained of are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
 SO ORDERED.

     Feria (Chairman), Fernan, Alampay and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

Petition dismissed, orders affirmed.

Note.—The conclusion that the second marriage is the better one that deserves the law’s
recognition and protection over the first is a dangerous proposition. It legalizes a continuing
polygamy by permitting a spouse to just drop at pleasure her consort for another in as many
jurisdiction as would grant divorce on the excuse that the new marriage is better than the
previous one; and, instead of fitting the concept of marriage as a social institution, the
proposition altogether does away with the social aspects of marriage in favor of its being a
matter of private contract and personal adventure. (Tenchavez vs. Escaho, 17 SCRA 674.)

VOL. 145, OCTOBER 28, 1986 229
Yap vs. Court of Appeals
*
No. L-40003. October 28,1986.
SHIRLEY YAP, in her own behalf and in her capacity as Administratrix of the estate of
MANING YAP, JAIME YAP, and TALINA BIANONG VDA. DE YAP, petitioners, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS, NANCY J. YAP, MANING YAP, JR., JULIA YAP, JASMIN YAP, and
SAMUEL YAP, respondents.
Successiorty; Eights to inheritance of a person who died after the new Civil Code took effect skall be
governed by said Code.—We have accordingly ruled that the rights to the inheritance of a person who
died before the ef fectivity of the New Civil Code shall be goveraed by the Civil Code of 1889, by other
previous laws and by the Rules of Court (See Vidaurrazaga v. Court of Appeals, 91 PhiL 492; Canales v,
Arrogante, 91 PhiL 9; and Morales, et al v. Yaftez, 98 Pha 677), whiie the rights to the inheritance of a
person who died after the effectivity of the New Civil Code shall be governed by the New C4vii Code (Del
Prado v. Santos, 18 SCRA 68).
Marriages; A second marriage (civilj contracted after a first marriage (Muslim rites) by a man with
another woman is ittegal and void—There is no dispute that the marriage of Talina Bianong to Maning
Yap was vaiid and that the second marriage contracted by the latter with Nancy Yap was iiiegal and void
pursuant to Act 3613 of the Philippine Legislature, the Marriage Law which was in foree when the two
marriages were celebrated.
Same; Succession; Where a man dies leaving his surviving spouse and children by his first marriage
and his spouse and ckildren by his second marriage, the children by tke second marriage are natural
children by legal fiction and entitled to inherit after the conjugal estate is divided equally between the
decedent and the 1st wife. Tke2nd wife is not entitled to inherit—Pursuant to these provisions, the net
remainder of the conjugal partnership of gains after money claims filed by creditors against the intestate
estate of Maning Yap approved by the lower eourt have beeii paid by the administratrix should be
equally divided between Maning Yap and Talina Bianong as their shares. The one-half share of Maning
Yap would then comprise his intestate estate to be distributed among his heirs.
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
230
230 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Yap vs. Court of Appeals
Same; Same; Same.—Under the law of succession in the New Civii Code, Maning Yap’s iegai heirs
are Taiina Bianong, her chiidren Shirley Yap and Jaime Yap and the children of Nancy Yap by Maning
Yap namely: Maning Yap, Jr., Julia Yap, Jasmin Yap and Samuel Yap. Talina Bianong, the first wife
had not lost or relinquished her status as putative heir of her husband. She is entitled to share in
Maning Yap’s estate upon his death (Gomez v. Lipana, 33 SCRA 615). On the other hand, Nancy Yap,
the second wife cannot inherit from Maning Yap because their marriage was void ab initio. (Art. 83, New
Civil Code; People v. Mendoza, 95 PhiL 845) However, Nancy Yap’s children by Maning Yap have the
status of natural children by legal fiction and are considered compulsory heirs of the late Maning Yap.
(Articles 89 and 997, New Civil Code).
Same; Same; How to divide intestate estate where decedent has also children by a second marriage.—
Considering  the foregoing, the estate of Maning Yap which is one-half (1/2) pro indiviso of the net
rfrmainder of the conjugal partnership of gains of the first marriage (Articles 142 and 185, New Civil
Code), the other half being the share of Talina Bianong, should be distributed as follows: a. To the
legitimate children, Shirley Yap and Jaime Yap—one-half (1/2) of the resulting net estate to be divided
equally between them pursuant to Article 888 of the New Civil Code; b. To the legitimate widow Talina
Bianong—one-fourth (1/4) of the net estate taken from the free portion or disposable half of the estate
pursuani to Article 999 in relation to Article 897 of the New Civil Code; and c. To the natural children by
legal fiction—Maning Yap, Jr., Julian Yap, Jasmin Yap and Samuel Yap—the remaining one-fourth (1/4)
of the net estate to be shared equally between them pursuant to the first and third paragraphs of Article
895 in relation to Article 983 of the New Civil Code.
PETITION to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Francisco Vittanueva for petitioners.
     Ramon Tuangco for respondents.
GUTIERREZ,JR., J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals which set aside the earlier
decision of the then Court of First Instance of Lanao del Sur in Special Proceeding No. 1334
231
VOL. 145, OCTOBER 28, 1986 231
Yap vs. Court of Appeals
(R-61), declaring the petitioners as the legal heirs of the late Maning Yap entitled to inherit
his estate and dismissing the opposition filed by the private respondents. The dispositive
portion of the decision on appeal reads:
“WHEREFORE, the decisiou appealed from is hereby set aside and, after a complete and correct
inventory is returned by the administratrix, the entire estate of the deceased Maning Yap shall be
divided into two equal parts, one-half (1/2) corresponding to the petitioner Talina Bianong and her
children Shiriey Yap and Jaime Yap and the other half corresponding to the oppositors Nancy J. Yap and
her children Maning Yap, Jr., Julia Yap, Jasmin Yap and Samuel Yap, without pronouncement as to
costs.”
Maning Yap, during his lifetime married twice: first, to Talina Bianong in 1939 and second, to
Nancy Yap on Decemberl 1,1948.
Maning Yap and Talina Bianong were married at Bara-as Plantation, Malabang, Lanao del
Sur, in accordance with the Muslim rites and practices prescribed by the Islam religion
professed by both of thein. Immediately, after the marriage, the couple lived in the house of
the parents of Maning Yap at the pobiacion of Malabang, Lanao dei Sur. Out of the marriage,
four children were born; two of them died in infancy dur~ ing the Japanese occupation, while
the two others are petitioners Shirley Yap and Jaime Yap.
While the first marriage was still subsisting, Maning Yap married Nancy J. Yap on
December 11, 1948 in a civil ceremony performed by District Judge Juan Sarenas of the Court
of First Instance of Cotabato. Nancy Yap entered into the marriage in the belief that Maning
Yap was not a married man. They had four children, namely respondents Maning Yap, Jr.,
Julia Yap, Jasmin Yap and Samuel Yap. On Febraary 21, 1964, Maning Yap died in Piagapo,
Lanao del Sur, in the crash of an airplane of the Philippine Air Lines. At the time of his death,
hef therefore, had two families iiving separately about 80 kilometers apart.
On March 3,1964, Talina Bianong Vda. de Yap filed Special Proceeding No. 1334 (Intestate
Estate of Maning Yap) before the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Sur, seeking the is-
 232
232 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Yap vs. Court ofAppeals
suance of letters of administration for the estate of Maning Yap. Among other things, the
petition alleged that Maning Yap left personal and real properties all located at Malabang,
Lanao del Sur, with an approximate value of P100,000.00.
The petition was opposed by Nancy J. Yap and her minor children on the ground that she is
the legitimate widow of Maning Yap and that Maning Yap, Jr., Julia Yap, Jasmin Yap and
Samuel Yap, all minors, are their legitimate children.
Talina Bianong was initially appointed special administratrix of the intestate estate of
Maning Yap. However, after a formal hearing and on recommendation of Talina, the lower
court appointed Shirley Yap as regular administratrix of the intestate estate of Maning Yap.
Various claims filed by the creditors against the intestate estate of Maning Yap were duly
approved by the court and paid by the administratrix. Since there still existed a residue of the
intestate estate consisting of real and personal properties and collectible debts after payments
to creditors, the court set the case for hearing to arrive at a declaration of heirship for the
purpose of liquidating the conjugal partnership of the late Maning Yap and his surviving
spouse and to determine the heirs entitled to inherit his intestate estate.
After trial, the lower court rendered decision declaring Talina Bianong and her children as
the legal heirs of Maning Yap. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
“IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered:
"(a) Declaring Talina Bianong, Shirley Yap and Jaime Yap, the legal heirs of the late Maning Yap and
entitled to inherit or succeed to his intestate estate with Talina Bianong. as his surviving spouse,
and Shirley Yap and Jaime Yap, as his surviving legitimate children;
"(b) Adjudicating to Talina Bianong one-third (1/3) of the whole intestate estate of the late Maning
Yap, as her share, pursuant to Art. 996 of the New Civil Code; to Shirley Yap, the other one-third
(1/3) as her share and to Jaime Yap the remaining one-third (1/3), also as his share, pursuant to
Art. 980 in conjunction with Art. 996 of the new Civil Code.
233
VOL. 145, OCTOBER 28, 1986 233
Yap vs. Court ofAppeals
“The opposition and claim of the opposition is hereby dismissed withoutcosts.”
Upon appeal by Nancy Yap and her children, the appellate court reversed and set aside the
decision. As stated earlier, the Court of Appeals ruled that the estate of Maning Yap should be
equally divided into two equal parts: one-half (1/2) to Talina Bianong and her children and the
other half (1/2) to Nancy Yap and her children.
The appellate court applied the ruling in Lao and Lao v. Dee Tim (45 Phil. 739). The facts
in the cited case are similar to the case at bar in that Yap Siong in his lifetiine contracted two
marriages; first to Dee Tim on Septeinber 14, 1893 in China with whom he had three children
and second to Maria Lao on June 24, 1903 with whom he had one child. Moreover, Maria Lao
entered into the marriage beiieving that Yap Siong was not then a married man, Yap Siong
died on September 1922 leaving properties which were claimed by the two farnilies. In
resolving the issue on how the properties of Yap Siong should be divided, this Court applied
the Leyes de Partidas (Law 1; Title 13, Partida 4), to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
“x x x [W]here two women innocently and in good faith are legaily united in holy matriinony to the same
man, their children and each family will be entitied to one-half of the estate of the husband upon
distribution of his estate. That provision of the Leyes de Partidas is a very humane and wise law. It justly
protects those who innoeently have entered into the solemn relation of marriage and their descendants.
The good faith of all the parties will be presumed until the contrary is positively proved. (Article 69, Civil
Code; Las Leyes de Matrimonio, section 96; Gaines v. Hennen, 65 U.S., 553.)
“A woman who is deceived by a man who represents himself as singie and who marries him, she and
her children born while the deception lasted, under the Spanish law, are entitled to all the rights of a
legitimate wife and children, The common kw allowing none of the incidents of a true marriage to follow
another marriage entered into during the continuance of a first, was early found to work a great injustice
upon the innocent parties to the second marriage, and specially upon the off spring of such second
marriage. x x x.”
234
234 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Yap vs. Court ofAppeals
The petitioners now contend that Maning Yap died in 1964 when the New Civil Code had
already superseded the old Spanish Civil Code. They state that pursuant to Article 2263 of the
New Civil Code, the distribution of the estate of Maning Yap should be in accordance with the
new codal provisions and not the Leyes Partidas, which is an old law no longer applicable.
We agree.
Article 2263, a transitional provision in the New Civil Code which took effect on August
30,1950 states:
“Rights to the inheritance of a person who died, with or without a will, before the effectivity of this Code,
shall be governed by the CivilCode of 1889, by other previous laws, and by the Rules of Court. The
inheritance of those who, with or without a will, die after the beginning of the effectivity of this Code,
shall be adjudicated and distributed in accordance with this new body of laws and by the Rules of Court;
but the testamentary provisions shall be carried out insofar as they may be permitted by this Code.
Therefore, legitimes, betterments. legaciea and bequests shall be respeeted; however. their amount shall
be reduced if in no other manner can every compulsory heir be given his full share according to this
Code. (Rule 12a)"
The Report of the Code Commission explains the rule, to wit:
‘The decisive fact which gives origin to the right of the heirs, devisees and legatees is the death of the
decedent. This is the basis of the foregoing rule. No heir, devisee or legatee has any vested right until the
moment of such death (Civil Code, Padilla, Volume VII, 1975, p. 712)."
We have accordingly ruled that the rights to the inheritance of a person who died before the
effectivity of the New Civil Code shall be governed by the Civil Code of 1889, by other previous
laws and by the Rules of Court (See Vidaurrazaga v. Court of Appeals, 91 Phil. 492; Canales v.
Arrogante,  91 Phil. 9; and  Morales, et al. v. Yanez, 98 PWl. 677), while the rights to the
inheritance of a person who died after the effectivity of the New Civil Code shall be governed
by the New Civil Code (Del Prado v. Santos, 18 SCRA 68).
235
VOL. 145, OCTOBER 28, 1986 235
Yap vs. Court of Appeals
There is no dispute that the marriage of Talina Bianong to Maning Yap was valid and that the marriage was void ab initio. (Art. 83, New Civil Code;  People v. Mendoza,  95 Phil. 845)
second marriage contracted by the latter with Nancy Yap was illegal and void pursuant to Act However, Nancy Yap’s children by Maning Yap have the status of natural children by legal f
3613 of the Philippine Legislature, the Marriage Law which was in force when the two iction and are considered compulsory heirs of the late Maning Yap. (Articles 89 and 887, New
marriages were celebrated to wit: Civil Code).
Considering the foregoing, the estate of Maning Yap which is one-half (1/2) pro indiviso of
“SEC. 29. lllegal Marriages.—Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the net remainder of the conjugal partnership of gains of the first niarriage (Articles 142 and
the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from
its performance, unless;
185 New Civil Code), the other half being the share of Talina Bianong, should be distributed
as follows:
"(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; a. To the legitimate children, Shirley Yap and Jaime Yap—one-half (1/2) of the resulting
"(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage net estate to be divided
without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or the absentee being
237
generaliy considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of
contracting such subsequent inarriage, the marriage so contracted being valid in either case until
declared nuli and void by a competent court.”
VOL. 145, OCTOBER 28, 1986 237
Bearing this in mind, how must the estate of Maning Yap be distributed? Yap vs. Court of Appeals
The records show that the real and personai properties under admmistration in the
intestate estate proceedings of Maning Yap were acquired by Talina Bianong and the deeeased
equally between them pursuant to Article 888 of the New Civil Code;
Maning Yap during their marriage. Hence, these properties, in the absence of any evidence to
b. To the legitimate widow Talina Bianong—one-fourth (1/4) of the net estate taken from
the contrary are considered conjugal properties of Talina Bianong and Maning Yap (Article
the free portion or disposable half of the estate pursuant to Article 999 in relation to Article
142, New Civil Code). Considering that there was no liquidation of the conjugal partnership of
897 of the New Civil Code; and
gains during the lifetime of Maning Yap, such liquidation must be carried out in the intestate
c. To the natural children by legal fiction—Maning Yap, Jr., Julia Yap, Jasmin Yap and
proceedings of Maning Yap, the deceased spouse as expressly provided in Section 2, Rule 73,
Samuel Yap—the remaining one-fourth (1/4) of the net estate to be shared equally between
Revised Rules of Court (Lapuz v. Eufemio, 43 SCRA 177).
them pursuant to the first and third paragraphs of Article 895 in relation to Article 983 of the
Article 142 of the New Civil Code provides:
New Civil Code.
“By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place in a cominon fund the fruits WHEREFORE, the instant PETITION is GRANTED. The questioned decision of the Court
of their separate property and the income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The widow, Talina Bianong shall receive
dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or one half (1/2) of the whole intestate estate as her share in the net remainder of the conjugal
partnership of gains. The other half, which is the net estate of the late Maning Yap, is
236
distributed and adjudicated as stated above.
SO ORDERED.
236 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
     Feria (Chairman), Fernan, Alampay and Paras, JJ.,concur.
Yap vs. Court ofAppeals
Petition granted. Decision reversed and set aside.
benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.”
Note.—The compulsory heirs as enumerated in Art. 887 of the New Civil Cotfe may be
and Article 185 thereof states: classified into primary compulsory heirs and secondary compulsory heirs. Primary compulsory
heirs are those who are always entitled to their legitime as provided by law regardless of the
“The net remaincler of the conjugal partnership of gains shall be divided equally between the husband class of compulsory heirs with which they may concur, while secondary compulsory heirs are
and the wife or their respective heirs, unless a different basis of division was agreed upon in the those who may be excluded by other classes of compulsory heirs. The first includes all kinds of
marriage settlements.” compulsory heirs with the exception of parents or ascendanis, while the second embraces only
Pursuant to these provisions, the net remainder of the conjugal partnership of gains after parents or ascendants.  (Turado: Comments and Jurisprudence on Succession,  1970 Fifth
money claims filed by creditors against the intestate estate of Maning Yap approved by the Edition, p. 230.)
lower court have been paid by the administratrix should be equally divided between Maning
Yap and Talina Bianong as their shares. The one-half share of Maning Yap would then
comprise his intestate estate to be distributed among his heirs. (See also  Vda. de Delizo v.
Delizo, 69 SCRA 216)
Under the law of succession in the New Civil Code, Maning Yap’s legal heirs are Talina
Bianong, her children Shirley Yap and Jaime Yap and the children of Nancy Yap by Maning
Yap namely: Maning Yap, Jr., Julia Yap, Jasmin Yap and Samuel Yap. Talina Bianong, the
first wife had not iost or reiinquished her status as putative heir of her husband. She is
entitled to share in Maning Yap’s estate upon his death (Gomez v. Lipana, 33 SCRA 615). On
the other hand, Nancy Yap, the second wife cannot inherit from Maning Yap because their

572 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Domingo vs. Court of Appeals
* 574
G.R. No. 104818. September 17, 1993.
ROBERTO DOMINGO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA
represented by her Attorney-in-Fact MOISES R. AVERA, respondents.
Marriages; A marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact under the. Family
Code even for purposes other than remarriage.—Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the
conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now
explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
573
VOL. 226, SEPTEMBER 17, 1993 573
Domingo vs. Court of Appeals
marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity
is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
Same; Same.—In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for
the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again.
With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again
cannot be charged with bigamy.
Same; Same.—That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes that such
final judgment declaring the previous marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of
remarriage. Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a party might well invoke the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of an action
for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property between the erstwhile spouses, as well
as an action for the custody and support of their common children and the delivery of the latters’
presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to
prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be
limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. Hence, in the
instance where a party who has previously contracted a marriage which remains subsisting desires to
enter into another marriage which is legally unassailable, he is required by law to prove that the
previous one was an absolute nullity. But this he may do on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void.
Same; Actions; Declaration of nullity of marriage carries ipso facto a judgment for the liquidation of
property, custody and support of children, etc. There is no need of filing a separate civil action for such
purposes.—Based on the foregoing provisions, private respondent’s ultimate prayer for separation of
property will simply be one of the necessary consequences of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of
their marriage. Thus, petitioner’s suggestion that in order for their properties to be separated, an
ordinary civil action has to be instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has clearly
provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property
according to the regime of property relations governing them. It stands to reason that the lower court
before whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage is brought is likewise clothed with jurisdiction to
decide the incidental questions regarding the couple’s properties. Accordingly, the respondent court
committed no reversible
574 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Domingo vs. Court of Appeals
error in finding that the lower court committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s
motion to dismiss SP No. 1989-J.
VITUG, J., Concurring:
Marriages;  Certain effects of a valid marriage can flow out of a void marriage.—A void marriage,
even without its being judicially declared a nullity, albeit the preferability for, and justiciability (fully
discussed in the majority opinion) of, such a declaration, will not give it the status or the consequences of
a valid marriage, saving only specific instances where certain effects of a valid marriage can still flow
from the void marriage. Examples of these cases are children of void marriages under Article 36 (due to
psychological incapacity) and Article 53, in relation to Article 52 (due to failure of partition, delivery of
presumptive legitimes of children and recording thereof following the annulment or declaration of nullity
of a prior marriage), conceived or born before the judicial declaration of nullity of such void marriages,
who the law deems as legitimate (Article 54, Family Code).
PETITION for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Jose P.O. Aliling IV for petitioner.
     De Guzman, Meneses & Associates for private respondent.
ROMERO, J.:
The instant petition seeks the reversal of respondent court’s ruling finding no grave abuse of
discretion in the lower court’s order denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property.
On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a petition before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig entitled “Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of
Property” against petitioner Roberto Domingo. The petition which was docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 1989-J alleged among others that: they were married on November 29, 1976
at the YMCA Youth Center Bldg., as evidenced by a Marriage Contract Registry No. 1277K-76
with Marriage License No. 4999036 issued at Carmona, Cavite; unknown to her, he had a
previous marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid and
still existing; she came to know of the prior marriage
575
VOL. 226, SEPTEMBER 17, 1993 575
Domingo vs. Court of Appeals

only sometime in 1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued them for bigamy; from January 23, 1979
up to the present, she has been working in Saudi Arabia and she used to come to the
Philippines only when she would avail of the one-month annual vacation leave granted by her
foreign employer; since 1983 up to the present, he has been unemployed and completely
dependent upon her for support and subsistence; out of her personal earnings, she purchased
real and personal properties with a total amount of approximately P350,000.00, which are
under the possession and administration of Roberto; sometime in June 1989, while on her one-
month vacation, she discovered that he was cohabiting with another woman; she further
discovered that he had been disposing of some of her properties without her knowledge or
consent; she confronted him about this and thereafter appointed her brother Moises R. Avera
as her attorney-in-fact to take care of her properties; he failed and refused to turn over the
possession and administration of said properties to her brother/attorney-in-fact; and he is not
authorized to administer and possess the same on account of the nullity of their marriage. The
petition prayed that a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction be
issued enjoining Roberto from exercising any act of administration and ownership over said
properties; their marriage be declared null and void and of no force and effect; and Delia
Soledad be declared the sole and exclusive owner of all properties acquired at the time of their
void marriage and such properties be placed under the proper management and
administration of the attorney-in-fact.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the petition stated no cause of
action. The marriage being void  ab initio,  the petition for the declaration of its nullity is,
therefore, superfluous and unnecessary. It added that private respondent has no property
which is in his possession.
On August 20, 1991, Judge Maria Alicia M. Austria issued an Order denying the motion to
dismiss for lack of merit. She explained:
“Movant argues that a second marriage contracted after a first marriage by a man with another woman
is illegal and void (citing the case of Yap v. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 229) and no judicial decree is
necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage (citing the cases
576
576 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Domingo vs. Court of Appeals
of People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033; People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845). Indeed, under the Yap case there is
no dispute that the second marriage contracted by respondent with herein petitioner after a first
marriage with another woman is illegal and void. However, as to whether or not the second marriage
should first be judicially declared a nullity is not an issue in said case. In the case of Vda. de Consuegra
v. GSIS, the Supreme Court ruled in explicit terms, thus:
And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that although the second marriage can be
presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for
judicial declaration of its nullity. (37 SCRA 316, 326)
The above ruling which is of later vintage deviated from the previous rulings of the Supreme Court in the
aforecited cases of Aragon and Mendoza.
Finally, the contention of respondent movant 1that petitioner has no property in his possession is an issue that
may be determined only after trial on the merits.”
A motion for reconsideration
2
was filed stressing the erroneous application of  Vda. de
Consuegra v. GSIS  and the absence of justiciable controversy as to the nullity of the marriage.
On September 11, 1991, Judge Austria denied the motion for reconsideration and gave
petitioner fifteen (15) days from receipt within which to file his answer.
Instead of filing the required answer, petitioner filed a special civil action of certiorari and
mandamus on the ground that the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction in denying the motion to dismiss.
3
3
On February 7,4
1992, the Court of Appeals   dismissed the petition. It explained that the
case of Yap v. CA  cited by petitioner and that of Consuegra v. GSIS relied upon by the lower
court do not have relevance in the case at bar, there being no identity of facts because these
cases dealt with the successional rights of the second wife while the instant case prays for
separa-
_______________
1 Annex “C,” Rollo, pp. 28-29.
2 L-28093, January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 315.
3 Annex “J,” Rollo, pp. 62-67, Justice Jorge S. Imperial, ponente and Justices Luis A. Javellana and Serafin V.C.
Guingona, concurring.
4 L-40003, October 28, 1986, 145 SCRA 229.
577
VOL. 226, SEPTEMBER 17, 1993 577
Domingo vs. Court of Appeals
tion of property corollary with the declaration of nullity of marriage. It observed that the
separation and subsequent distribution of the properties acquired during the union can be had
only upon proper determination of the status of the marital relationship between said parties,
whether or not the validity of the first marriage is denied by petitioner. Furthermore, in order
to avoid duplication and multiplicity of suits, the declaration of nullity of marriage may be
invoked in this proceeding together with the partition and distribution of the properties
involved. Citing Articles 48, 50 and 52 of the Family Code, it held that private respondent’s
prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage may be raised together with other
incidents of their marriage such as the separation of their properties. Lastly, it noted that
since the Court has jurisdiction, the alleged error in refusing to grant the motion to dismiss is
merely one of law for which the remedy ordinarily would have been to file an answer, proceed
with the trial and in case of an adverse decision, reiterate5 the issue on appeal. The motion for
reconsideration was subsequently denied for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.
The two basic issues confronting the Court in the instant case are the following.
First, whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in
the affirmative, whether the same should be filed only for purposes of remarriage.
Second, whether or not SP N6. 1989-J is the proper remedy of private respondent to recover
certain real and personal properties allegedly belonging 6
to her exclusively. 7
Petitioner, invoking the ruling in People v. Aragon  and People v. Mendoza,   contends that
SP. No. 1989-J for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property filed by
private respondent must be dismissed for being unnecessary and superfluous. Furthermore,
under his own interpretation of Article 40 of the Family Code, he submits that a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is required only for purposes of remarriage. Since
the petition in SP No. 1989-J contains no
_______________
5 Annex “M,” Rollo, p. 80.
6 100 Phil. 1033 (1957).
7 95 Phil. 845 (1954).
578
578 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
 Domingo vs. Court of Appeals
allegation of private respondent’s intention to remarry, said petition should, therefore, be
dismissed.
On the other hand, private respondent insists on the necessity of a judicial declaration of
the nullity of their marriage, not for purposes of remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for
the separation and distribution of the properties acquired during coverture.
There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private respondent celebrated
while the former’s previous marriage with one Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting, is
8
bigamous. As such, it is void from the beginning. Petitioner himself does not dispute the
9
absolute nullity of their marriage.
The cases of  People v. Aragon  and  People v. Mendozarelied upon by petitioner are cases
where the Court had earlier ruled that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the
invalidity of a void, bigamous marriage. It is noteworthy to observe that Justice Alex Reyes,
however, dissented on these occasions stating that:
“Though the logician may say that where the former marriage was void there would be nothing to
dissolve, still it is not for the10 spouses to judge whether that marriage was void or not. That judgment is
reserved to the courts. x x x”
This dissenting opinion was adopted as the majority position in subsequent cases involving the
11
same issue. Thus, in  Gomez v. Lipana,   the Court abandoned its earlier ruling in
the Aragon and Mendoza cases. In reversing the lower court’s order forfeiting the husband’s
share of the disputed property acquired during the second marriage, the Court stated that “if
the nullity, or annulment of the marriage is the basis for the application of Article 1417, there
is need for a judicial declaration thereof, which of course contemplates an action for that
purpose.”
Citing Gomez v. Lipana, the Court subsequently held in Vda. de Consuegra v. Government
Service Insurance System, that
_______________
8 CIVIL CODE, art. 80, par. 4; FAMILY CODE, arts. 35, par. 4 and 41.
9 Rollo,
pp. 102 and 106.
10 See: Note 6 at p. 1036; Note 7 at p. 848.
11 L-23214, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 615, 620-621.
579
VOL. 226, SEPTEMBER 17, 1993 579
Domingo vs. Court of Appeals
“although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while
the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such
nullity.” 12
In  Tolentino v. Paras,   however, the Court turned around and applied
the Aragon and Mendoza ruling once again. In granting the prayer of the first wife asking for
a declaration as the lawful surviving spouse and the correction of the death certificate of her
deceased husband, it explained that “(t)he second marriage that he contracted with private
respondent during the lifetime of his first spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no
force and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity
13
of a void marriage.”
However, in the more recent case of  Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy   the Court reverted to
the  Consuegra  case and held that there was “no need of introducing evidence about the
existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they married each other, for then such
a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration of such fact
and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the
time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel.”
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the
matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as
14
a cause of action or a ground for defense.  Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is
sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable
in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring
15
the previous marriage void.
16
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee   which
drafted what is now the Family
_______________
12 L-43905, May 30, 1983, 122 SCRA 525.
13 G.R. No. 53703, August 19, 1986, 143 SCRA 499.
14 FAMILY CODE, art. 39.
15 Id., art. 40. See also: arts. 11, 13, 42, 44, 48, 50, 52, 54, 86, 99, 147, 148.
16 The Family Law Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) prepared the draft of the
revision of Book I of the
580
580 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Domingo vs. Court of Appeals
Code of the Philippines took the position that parties to a marriage should not be allowed to
assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial
declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again. This is
borne out by the following minutes of the 152nd Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family
Law Committees where the present Article 40, then Art. 39, was discussed.
“B. Article 39.—
The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage
void, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that the above provision should include not only void but also voidable
marriages. He then suggested that the above provision be modified as follows:
The validity of a marriage may be invoked only . . . Justice Reyes (J.B.L. Reyes), however, proposed that they say:
The validity or invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only. . .
On the other hand. Justice Puno suggested that they say:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only . . . Justice Caguioa explained that his idea is that one cannot
determine for himself whether or not his marriage is valid and that a court action is needed. Justice Puno accordingly
proposed that the provision be modified to read:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final judgment annulling the marriage or
declaring the marriage void, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that in annulment, there is no question. Justice Puno, however, pointed out
that, even if it is a judgment of annulment, they still have to produce the judgment. Justice Caguioa
suggested that they say.
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the
_______________
Civil Code of the Philippines. After more than four years, the draft was turned over to the Civil Code Revision Committee of the
UP Law Center which reviewed and revised the same for more than three years.
 581
VOL. 226, SEPTEMBER 17, 1993 581
Domingo vs. Court of Appeals
basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage invalid, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Puno raised the question: When a marriage is declared invalid, does it include the annulment
of a marriage and the declaration that the marriage is void? Justice Caguioa replied in the affirmative.
Dean Gupit added that in some judgments, even if the marriage is annulled, it is declared void. Justice
Puno suggested that this matter be made clear in the provision.
Prof. Baviera remarked that the original idea in the provision is to require first a judicial declaration
of a void marriage and not annullable marriages, with which the other members concurred. Judge Diy
added that annullable marriages are presumed valid until a direct action is filed to annul it, which the
other members affirmed. Justice Puno remarked that if this is so, then the phrase ‘absolute nullity’ can
stand since it might result in confusion if they change the phrase to ‘invalidity’ if what they are referring
to in the provision is the declaration that the marriage is void.
Prof. Bautista commented that they will be doing away with collateral defense as well as collateral
attack. Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the provision is that there should be a final judgment
declaring the marriage void and a party should not declare for himself whether or not the marriage is
void, which the other members affirmed. Justice Caguioa added that they are, therefore, trying to avoid a
collateral attack on that point. Prof. Bautista stated that there are actions which are brought on the
assumption that the marriage is valid. He then asked: Are they depriving one of the right to raise the
defense that he has no liability because the basis of the liability is void? Prof. Bautista added that they
cannot say that there will be no judgment on the validity or invalidity of the marriage because it will be
taken up in the same proceeding. It will not be a unilateral declaration that it is a void marriage. Justice
Caguioa saw the point of Prof. Bautista and suggested that they limit the provision to remarriage.He then
proposed that Article 39 be reworded as follows:
The absolute nullity of a marriage for purposes of remarriage may be invoked only on the basis of final judgment . . .
Justice Puno suggested that the above be modified as follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of establishing the validity of a
subsequent marriage only on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void, except as provided
in Article 41. Justice Puno later modified the above as follows:
For the purpose of establishing the validity of a subsequent
582
582 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Domingo vs. Court of Appeals
marriage, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may only be invoked on the basis of a final judgment declaring
such nullity, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa commented that the above provision is too broad and will not solve the objection of
Prof. Bautista. He proposed that they say:
For the purpose of entering into a subsequent marriage, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may only be
invoked on the basis of a final judgment declaring such nullity, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the above provision is that if one enters into a subsequent
marriage without obtaining a final judgment declaring the nullity of a previous marriage, said
subsequent marriage is void ab initio.
After further deliberation, Justice Puno suggested that they go back to the original wording of the
provision as follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage only on the basis of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void, except as provided in Article 41.”
17
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the
protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries
again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who
18
marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.
Just over a year ago, the Court made the pronouncement that there is a necessity for a
judicial declaration of absolute nullity of a 19prior subsisting marriage before contracting
another in the recent case of  Terre v. Terre.   The Court, in turning down the defense of
respondent Terre who was charged with grossly immoral conduct consisting of contracting a
second marriage and living with another woman other than complainant while his prior
marriage with the latter remained subsisting, said that “for purposes of determining whether
a person is legally free to
_______________
17 August23, 1986, pp. 4-7.
18 J. A.V.
SEMPIO-DIY, HANDBOOK OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 46 (1988).
19 Adm. Case No. 2349, July 3, 1992, 211 SCRA 6, 11.
583
VOL. 226, SEPTEMBER 17, 1993 583
Domingo vs. Court of Appeals
contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab
initio is essential.”
As regards the necessity for a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, petitioner
submits that the same can be maintained only if it is for the purpose of remarriage. Failure to
allege this purpose, according to petitioner’s theory, will warrant dismissal of the same.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
“ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.” (n)
Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the position in the provision of the word
“solely.” As it is placed, the same shows that it is meant to qualify “final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void.” Realizing the need for careful craftsmanship in conveying the
precise intent of the Committee members, the provision in question, as it finally emerged, did
not state “The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked solely  for purposes of
remarriage . . .,” in which case “solely” would clearly qualify the phrase “for purposes of
remarriage.” Had the phraseology been such, the interpretation of petitioner would have been
correct and, that is, that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for
purposes of remarriage, thus rendering irrelevant the clause “on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void.”
That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes that such final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of
remarriage. Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a party might well invoke
the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage, such as in case
of an action for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property between the
erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for the custody and support of their common children
and the delivery of the latters’ presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs must be
adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a
previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an
584
584 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Domingo vs. Court of Appeals
earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. Hence, in the instance
where a party who has previously contracted a marriage which remains subsisting desires to
enter into another marriage which is legally unassailable, he is required by law to prove that
the previous one was an absolute nullity. But this he may do on the basis  solely  of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
This leads us to the question: Why the distinction? In other words, for purposes of
remarriage, why should the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an
absolute nullity be a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void? Whereas, for
purposes other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable?
Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an “inviolable social 20
institution, is the foundation of the family;” as such, it “shall be protected by the State.”   In
more explicit terms, the Family Code characterizes it as a “special contract of permanent
union between a man and a21woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment
of conjugal and family life.”  So crucial are marriage and the family to the stability and peace
of the nation that their “nature,
22
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not
subject to stipulation . . .,”  As a matter of policy, therefore, the nullification of a marriage for
the purpose of contracting another cannot be accomplished merely on the basis of the
perception of both parties or of one that their union is so defective with respect to the essential
requisites of a contract of marriage as to render it void ipso jure and with no legal effect—and
nothing more. Were this so, this inviolable social institution would be reduced to a mockery
and would rest on very shaky foundations indeed. And the grounds for nullifying marriage
would be as diverse and farranging as human ingenuity and fancy could conceive. For such a
socially significant institution, an official state pronouncement through the courts, and
nothing less, will satisfy the exacting norms of society. Not only would such an open and public
_______________
20 CONST., art. XV, sec. 2.
21 FAMILY CODE, art. 1.
22 Id.
585
VOL. 226, SEPTEMBER 17, 1993 585
Domingo vs. Court of Appeals
declaration by the courts definitively confirm the nullity of the contract of marriage, but the
same would be easily verifiable through records accessible to everyone.
That the law seeks to ensure that a prior marriage is no impediment to a second sought to
be contracted by one of the parties may be gleaned from new information required in the
Family Code to be included in the application for a marriage license, viz, “If23previously
married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved and annulled.”
Reverting to the case before us, petitioner’s interpretation of Art. 40 of the Family Code is,
undoubtedly, quite restrictive. Thus, his position that private respondent’s failure to state in
the petition that the same is filed to enable her to remarry will result in the dismissal of SP
No. 1989-J is untenable. His misconstruction of Art. 40 resulting from the misplaced emphasis
on the term “solely” was in fact anticipated by the members of the Committee.
“Dean Gupit commented that the word “only” may be misconstrued to refer to “for purposes of remarriage.”
Judge Diy stated that “only” refers to “final judgment.” Justice Puno suggested that they say “on the basis
only of a final judgment.” Prof. Baviera
24
suggested that they use the legal term “solely” instead of “only,”
which the Committee approved.”  (Italics supplied)
Pursuing his previous argument that the declaration for absolute nullity of marriage is
unnecessary, petitioner suggests that private respondent should have filed an ordinary civil
action for the recovery of the properties alleged to have been acquired during their union. In
such an eventuality, the lower court would not be acting as a mere special court but would be
clothed with jurisdiction to rule on the issues of possession and ownership. In addition, he
pointed out that there is actually nothing to separate or partition as the petition admits that
all the properties were acquired with private respondent’s money.
The Court of Appeals disregarded this argument and concluded that “the prayer for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be raised together with the other incident of
their
_______________
23 Id., art. 11.
24 See: Note 17, at p. 7.
586
586 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Domingo vs. Court of Appeals
marriage such as the separation of their properties.”
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment therein
shall provide for “the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses,
the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of their presumptive 25
legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.”  Other
specific effects flowing therefrom, in proper cases, are the following:
“Art. 43. x x x      x x x      x x x
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be
dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her
share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be
forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by
a previous marriage or, in default of children, the innocent spouse;
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee contracted the
marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said donee are revoked by operation of law;
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who acted in bad faith as a
beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit
from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession. (n)
Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab
initio and all donations by reason of marriage and testamentary disposition made by one in favor of the
26
other are revoked by operation of law. (n)”
Based on the foregoing provisions, private respondent’s ultimate prayer for separation of
property will simply be one of the necessary consequences of the judicial declaration of
absolute nullity of their marriage. Thus, petitioner’s suggestion that in
_______________
25 Art. 50 (2).
 26 In relation to Art. 50 (1)—The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and in Article 44
shall also apply in proper cases to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under
Articles 40 and 45.
587
VOL. 226, SEPTEMBER 17, 1993 587
Domingo vs. Court of Appeals
order for their properties to be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be instituted for that
purpose is baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of
nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to the regime of
property relations governing them. It stands to reason that the lower court before whom the
issue of nullity of a first marriage is brought is likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the
incidental questions regarding the couple’s properties. Accordingly, the respondent court
committed no reversible error in finding that the lower court committed no grave abuse of
discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss SP No. 1989-J.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of respondent Court
dated February 7, 1992 and the Resolution dated March 20, 1992 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
     Bidin and Melo, JJ., concur.
     Feliciano, J., On official leave.
     Vitug, J., With concurring opinion.
CONCURRING OPINION
VITUG, J.:
I concur with the opinion so well expressed by Mme. Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero. I should
like, however, to put in a modest observation.
Void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning and, I believe, no judicial decree
is required to establish their nullity, except in the following instances:
(a) For purposes of remarriage pursuant to the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code;
viz:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely
of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. (n)
(b) A marriage celebrated prior to the effectivity of the Fam-
588
588 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Domingo vs. Court of Appeals
ily Code in case a party thereto was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage (Article 36, Family Code), where an action or defense for the
declaration of nullity prescribes ten (10) years after the Family Code took effect (Article 39,
Family Code); otherwise, the marriage is deemed unaffected by the Family Code.
A void marriage, even without its being judicially declared a nullity, albeit the preferability
for, and justiciability (fully discussed in the majority opinion) of, such a declaration, will not
give it the status or the consequences of a valid marriage, saving only specific instances where
certain effects of a valid marriage can still flow from the void marriage. Examples of these
cases are children of void marriages under Article 36 (due to psychological incapacity) and
Article 53, in relation to Article 52 (due to failure of partition, delivery of presumptive
legitimes of children and recording thereof following the annulment or declaration of nullity of
a prior marriage), conceived or born before the judicial declaration of nullity of such void
marriages, who the law deems as legitimate (Article 54, Family Code).
In most, if not in all, other cases, a void marriage is to be considered extant per se. Neither
the conjugal partnership of gain under the old regime nor the absolute community of property
under the new Code (absent a marriage settlement), will apply; instead, their property
relations shall be governed by the co-ownership rules under either Article 147 or Article 148 of
the Family Code. I must hasten to add as a personal view, however, that the exceptional
effects on children of a void marriage because of the psychological incapacity of a party thereto
should have been extended to cover even the personal and property relations of the spouses.
Unlike the other cases of void marriages where the grounds therefor may be established by
hard facts and with little uncertainty, the term “psychological incapacity” is so relative and
unsettling that until a judicial declaration of nullity is made its interim effects can long and
literally hang on the balance not only insofar as the spouses themselves are concerned but also
as regards third persons with whom the spouses deal.
Petition denied. Questioned decision affirmed.
Notes.—Obligation to give or the right to ask for support does
589
VOL. 226, SEPTEMBER 17, 1993 589
Arambulo vs. Court of Appeals
not cease permanently. Right to support subsists throughout the period that the marriage
subsists (Canonizado vs. Benitez, 127 SCRA 610).
The best documentary evidence of a marriage is the marriage contract itself (Villanueva vs.
Court of Appeals,198 SCRA 472).

32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Atienza vs. Brillantes, Jr.
* moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary.
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706. March 29, 1995.
LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant, vs. JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR.,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 20, Manila, respondent.
Civil Law; Family Code; Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage.—Article 40 is applicable to
remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date
of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given “retroactive
effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil
Code or other laws.” This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent
has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case.
Same;  Same;  Remedial Law;  The retroactive application of procedural law is not violative of any
right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected.—The fact that procedural statutes may
somehow affect the litigants’ rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions.
The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that
he is adversely affected (Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 229 [1968]). The reason is that as a
general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws (Billones v. Court of
Industrial Relations, 14 SCRA 674 [1965]).
Same; Same;  Same;  Respondent was given an opportunity to correct the flaw in his first marriage
when he and Ongkiko were married for the second time. His failure to secure a marriage license on these
two occasions betrays his sinister motives and bad faith.—Respondent passed the Bar examinations in
1962 and was admitted to the practice of law in 1963. At the time he went through the two marriage
ceremonies with Ongkiko, he was already a lawyer. Yet, he never secured any marriage license. Any law
student would know that a marriage license is necessary before one can get married. Respondent was
given an opportunity to correct the flaw in his first marriage when he and Ongkiko were married for the
second time. His failure to secure
______________
* EN BANC.
33
VOL. 243, MARCH 29, 1995 33
Atienza vs. Brillantes, Jr.
a marriage license on these two occasions betrays his sinister motives and bad faith.
Courts; Judges; Respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal
profession.—It is evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in
the legal profession. While the deceit employed by respondent existed prior to his appointment as a
Metropolitan Trial Judge, his immoral and illegal act of cohabiting with De Castro began and continued
when he was already in the judiciary.
Same; Same; A judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times, in the performance of his judicial duties and in his
everyday life.—The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff
of impropriety, not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties but also as to his behavior
as a private individual. There is no duality of morality. A public figure is also judged by his private life. A
judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must
behave with propriety at all times, in the performance of his judicial duties and in his everyday life.
These are judicial guideposts too self-evident to be overlooked. No position exacts a greater demand on
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Gross Immorality and Impropriety.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
QUIASON,J.:
This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety
against Judge Francisco Brillantes, Jr., Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch 20, Manila.
Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro, who are living
together at No. 34 Galaxy Street, Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila. He stays in said
house, which he purchased in 1987, whenever he is in Manila.
In December 1991, upon opening the door to his bedroom, he saw respondent sleeping on
his (complainant’s) bed. Upon in-
34
34 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Atienza vs. Brillantes, Jr.
quiry, he was told by the houseboy that respondent had been cohabiting with De Castro.
Complainant did not bother to wake up respondent and instead left the house after giving
instructions to his houseboy to take care of his children.
Thereafter, respondent prevented him from visiting his children and even alienated the
affection of his children for him.
Complainant claims that respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has
five children, as appearing in his 1986 and 1991 sworn statements of assets and liabilities.
Furthermore, he alleges that respondent caused his arrest on January 13, 1992, after he had a
heated argument with De Castro inside the latter’s office.
For his part, respondent alleges that complainant was not married to De Castro and that
the filing of the administrative action was related to complainant’s claim on the Bel-Air
residence, which was disputed by De Castro.
Respondent denies that he caused complainant’s arrest and claims that he was even a
witness to the withdrawal of the complaint for Grave Slander filed by De Castro against
complainant. According to him, it was the sister of De Castro who called the police to arrest
complainant.
Respondent also denies having been married to Ongkiko, although he admits having five
children with her. He alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony
before a Nueva Ecija town mayor on April 25, 1965, the same was not a valid marriage for lack
of a marriage license. Upon the request of the parents of Ongkiko, respondent went through
another marriage ceremony with her in Manila on June 5, 1965. Again, neither party applied
for a marriage license. Ongkiko abandoned respondent 19 years ago, leaving their children to
his care and custody as a single parent.
Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California
on December 4, 1991, he believed, in all good faith and for all legal intents and purposes, that
he was single because his first marriage was solemnized without a license.
Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous
marriage before a party thereto can enter into a second marriage. Article 40 of said Code
provides: overlooked. No position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an
individual than a seat in the judiciary (Imbing v. Tiongzon, 229 SCRA 690 [1994]).
35
WHEREFORE, respondent is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all leave and
retirement benefits and with prejudice to reappointment in any branch, instrumentality, or
VOL. 243, MARCH 29, 1995 35 agency of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations. This
decision is immediately executory.
Atienza vs. Brillantes, Jr. SO ORDERED.

“The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the purposes of remarriage on the basis           Narvasa  (C.J.),  Feliciano,  Padilla,  Bidin,  Regalado,  Davide,
solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.” Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him Judge Francisco F. Brillantes dismissed from the judiciary.
considering that his first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of
the Philippines; while the second marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the Family Note.—A marriage contracted in good faith with woman already married is valid. Hence,
Code. contracting a subsequent marriage with another woman would be bigamous and criminal in
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code character. (Terre vs. Terre, 211 SCRA 6 [1992])
on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the
Family Code, said Article is given “retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.” This is particularly
true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right
that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case.
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants’ rights may not preclude
their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws
is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected (Gregorio v.
Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 229 [1968]). The reason is that as a general rule no vested right
may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws (Billones v. Court of Industrial Relations,  14
SCRA 674 [1965]).
Respondent is the last person allowed to invoke good faith. He made a mockery of the
institution of marriage and employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a woman, who begot him
five children.
Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was admitted to the practice of law in
1963. At the time he went through the two marriage ceremonies with Ongkiko, he was already
a lawyer. Yet, he never secured any marriage license. Any law student would know that a
marriage license is necessary before one can get married. Respondent was given an
opportunity to correct the flaw in his first marriage when he and Ongkiko were married for
the second time. His failure to secure a marriage license on these two occasions betrays his
sinister motives and bad faith.
36

36 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Atienza vs. Brillantes, Jr.

It is evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in
the legal profession.
While the deceit employed by respondent existed prior to his appointment as a Metropolitan
Trial Judge, his immoral and illegal act of cohabiting with De Castro began and continued
when he was already in the judiciary.
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of
impropriety, not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties but also as to his
behavior as a private individual. There is no duality of morality. A public figure is also judged
by his private life. A judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times, in the performance of his
judicial duties and in his everyday life. These are judicial guideposts too self-evident to be

VOL. 336, JULY 31, 2000 747
Marbella-Bobis vs. Bobis
*
G.R. No. 138509. July 31, 2000.
IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS, petitioner, vs. ISAGANI D. BOBIS, respondent.
Criminal Procedure; Prejudicial Questions; Elements; Words and Phrases;  A prejudicial question is
one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein.—A
prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the
issue involved therein. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. It must appear not
only that the civil case involves facts upon which the criminal action is based, but also that the resolution
of the issues raised in the civil action would necessarily be determinative of the criminal case.
Consequently, the defense must involve an issue similar or intimately related to the same issue raised in
the criminal action and its resolution determinative of whether or not the latter action may proceed. Its
two essential elements are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed.
Same;  Same;  Pleadings and Practice;  A party who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have
hypothetically admitted that all the essential elements of a crime have been adequately alleged in the
information, considering that the prosecution has not yet presented a single evidence on the indictment or
may not yet have rested its case.—A  prejudicial question does not conclusively resolve the guilt or
innocence of the accused but simply tests the sufficiency of the allegations in the information in order to
sustain the further prosecution of the criminal case. A party who raises a prejudicial question is deemed
to have hypothetically admitted that all the essential elements of a crime have been adequately alleged
in the information, considering that the prosecution has not yet presented a single evidence on the
indictment or may not yet have rested its case. A challenge of the allegations in the information on the
ground of prejudicial question is in effect a question on the merits of the criminal charge through a non-
criminal suit.
Same;  Same;  Bigamy;  Family Code;  Article 40 of the Family Code requires a prior judicial
declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before a party may remarry.—Article 40 of the Family Code,
which was effective at
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
748
748 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Marbella-Bobis vs. Bobis
the time of celebration of the second marriage, requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a
previous marriage before a party may remarry. The clear implication of this is that it is not for the
parties, particularly the accused, to determine the validity or invalidity of the marriage. Whether or not
the first marriage was void for lack of a license is a matter of defense because there is still no judicial
declaration of its nullity at the time the second marriage was contracted. It should be remembered that
bigamy can successfully be prosecuted provided all its elements concur—two of which are a previous
marriage and a subsequent marriage which would have been valid had it not been for the existence at
the material time of the first marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity,
only competent courts having such authority.—Respondent’s clear intent is to obtain a judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent
his prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous
bigamist has to do is to disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage and
escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent
marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even
enter into a marriage aware of the absence of a requisite—usually the marriage license—and thereafter
contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption
that the first marriage is void. Such scenario would render nugatory the provisions on bigamy. As
succinctly held in  Landicho v. Relova:  (P)arties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, only competent courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity,
the validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
Same; Same; Same; Elements.—People v. Dumpo, 62 Phil. 246 (1935). The elements of bigamy are:
(1) the offender has been legally married; (2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in
case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead;
(3) that he contracts a subsequent marriage; (4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it
not been for the existence of the first. The exception to prosecution for bigamy are those covered by
Article 41 of the Family Code and by PD 1083 otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of
the Philippines, which provides that penal laws relative to the crime of bigamy “shall not apply to a
person married x x x under Muslim Law” where the requirements set therein are
749
VOL. 336, JULY 31, 2000 749
Marbella-Bobis vs. Bobis
met. See also Sulu Islamic Association v. Malik, 226 SCRA 193 (1993); Merced v. Diez, 109 Phil. 155
(1960).
Same; Same; Same; Concubinage; The pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage
is not a prejudicial question in a prosecution for concubinage or bigamy.—Parties should not be permitted
to judge for themselves the nullity of their marriage, for the same must be submitted to the
determination of competent courts. Only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as
void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. No matter
how obvious, manifest or patent the absence of an element is, the intervention of the courts must always
be resorted to. That is why Article 40 of the Family Code requires a “final judgment,” which only the
courts can render. Thus, as ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who contracts a second marriage before the
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and
in such a case the criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for
declaration of nullity. In a recent case for concubinage, we held that the pendency of a civil case for
declaration of nullity of marriage is not a prejudicial question. This ruling applies here by analogy since
both crimes presuppose the subsistence of a marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Ignorance of Law; The legality of a marriage is a matter of law and every person
is presumed to know the law.—Ignorance of the existence of Article 40 of the Family Code cannot even be
successfully invoked as an excuse. The contracting of a marriage knowing that the requirements of the
law have not been complied with or that the marriage is in disregard of a legal impediment is an act
penalized by the Revised Penal Code. The legality of a marriage is a matter of law and every person is
presumed to know the law. As respondent did not obtain the judicial declaration of nullity when he
entered into the second marriage, why should he be allowed to belatedly obtain that judicial declaration
in order to delay his criminal prosecution and subsequently defeat it by his own disobedience of the law?
If he wants to raise the nullity of the previous marriage, he can do it as a matter of defense when he
presents his evidence during the trial proper in the criminal case.
 Same; Same; Same; A marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any
party can marry again, otherwise the second marriage will also be void.—In the light of Article 40 of the
Family Code, respondent, without first having obtained the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage, can not be said to have validly entered into the second marriage. Per current jurisprudence, a
marriage though void
750
750 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Marbella-Bobis vs. Bobis
still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any party can marry again; otherwise the second
marriage will also be void. The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first
marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and
purposes regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner.
Against this legal backdrop, any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that
respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in
the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial
question. As stated above, respondent cannot be permitted to use his own malfeasance to defeat the
criminal action against him.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Br.
226.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Francisco L. Daria for petitioner.
     Josieline A. Tia for private respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce B. Javier.
Without said marriage having been annulled, nullified or terminated, the same respondent
contracted a second marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis on January 25, 1996 and
allegedly a third marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez. Based on petitioner’s
complaint-affidavit, an information for bigamy was filed against respondent on February 25,
1998, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q98-75611 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 226, Quezon City. Sometime thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the
judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was
celebrated without a marriage license. Respondent then filed a motion to suspend the
proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy invoking the pending civil case for nullity of the
first marriage as a prejudicial question to the criminal ease. The trial judge granted the
motion to suspend the criminal case in an Order dated Decem-
751
VOL. 336, JULY 31, 2000 751
Marbella-Bobis vs. Bobis
1 accused, to determine the validity or invalidity of the marriage.   Whether or not the first
ber 29, 1998.  Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner argues that respondent should have
first obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage before entering into the
second marriage, inasmuch as the alleged prejudicial question justifying suspension 2
of the
bigamy case is no longer a legal truism pursuant to Article 40 of the Family Code.
The issue to be resolved in this petition is whether the subsequent filing of a civil action for
declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal
case for bigamy.
A prejudicial question is one which 3arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein.  It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate
from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of
4
the accused.  It must appear not only that the civil case involves facts upon which the criminal
action is based, but also that the resolution of 5the issues raised in the civil action would
necessarily be determinative of the criminal case.  Consequently, the defense must involve an
issue similar or intimately related to the same issue raised in the criminal action and its
resolution de-
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 29-30.
2 Petition, p. 6; Rollo, p. 23.
3 Fortich-Celdran v. Celdran, 19 SCRA 502 (1967); Zapanta v. Montessa, 114 Phil. 428 (1962); Merced v. Diez, 109
Phil. 155 (1960); See also People v. Aragon, 94 Phil. 357 (1954) cited in Dichaves v. Judge Apalit, AM-MTJ-00-1274,
June 8, 2000, 333 SCRA 54.
4  Yap v. Paras,  205 SCRA 625  (1992);  Donato v. Luna,  160 SCRA 441(1998);  Quiambao v. Osorio,  158 SCRA
674  (1988);  Mendiola v. Macadaeg,  1 SCRA 593  (1961);  Aleria v. Mendoza,  83 Phil. 427  (1949);  Berbari v.
Concepcion, 40 Phil. 837 (1920).
5 Ras v. Rasul, 100 SCRA 125 (1980); Benitez v. Concepcion, Jr.,2 SCRA 178 (1961) citing De Leon v. Mabanag, 70
Phil. 202 (1940).
752
752 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Marbella-Bobis vs. Bobis
6 7
terminative of whether or not the latter action may proceed.  Its two essential elements are:
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
criminal action; and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
A prejudicial question does not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused but
simply tests the sufficiency of the allegations in the information in order to sustain the further
prosecution of the criminal case. A party who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have
hypothetically admitted that all the essential elements of a crime have been adequately
alleged in the information, considering that the prosecution has not yet presented a single
evidence on the indictment or may not yet have rested its case. A challenge of the allegations
in the information on the ground of prejudicial question is in effect a question on the merits of
the criminal charge through a non-criminal suit.
Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the time of celebration of the second
marriage, requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before a party
may remarry. The clear implication of this is that it is not for the 8
parties, particularly the
marriage was void for lack of a license is a matter of defense because there is still no judicial
declaration of its nullity at the time the second marriage was contracted. It should be
remembered that bigamy can successfully be prosecuted provided all its elements concur—two
of which are a
_______________
6 Yap v. Paras, 205 SCRA 625 (1992).
7 Rules
of Court, Rule 111, Sec. 5. Elements of prejudicial question.—The two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial
question are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal
action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. (See
also Prado v. People, 218 Phil. 571).
8 Niñal v. Badayog, G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000, 328 SCRA 122.
753
VOL. 336, JULY 31, 2000 753
Marbella-Bobis vs. Bobis
previous marriage and a subsequent marriage which would 9
have been valid had it not been for
the existence at the material time of the first marriage.
In the case at bar, respondent's clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of
his first marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his prosecution
for bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous
bigamist has to do is to disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a subsequent
marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and
that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of
the first. A party may even enter into a marriage aware of the absence of a requisite—usually
the marriage license—and thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining a
declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is void. Such
scenario10 would render nugatory the provisions on bigamy. As succinctly held in Landicho v.
Relova:
(P)arties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent courts
having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond
question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
_______________
9 People v. Dumpo, 62 Phil. 246 (1935). The elements of bigamy are: (1) the offender has been legally married; (2)
that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not
been judicially declared presumptively dead; (3) that he contracts a subsequent marriage; (4) the subsequent marriage
would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first. The exception to prosecution for bigamy are those
covered by Article 41 of the Family Code and by P.D. 1083 otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of
the Philippines, which provides that penal laws relative to the crime of bigamy “shall not apply to a person married x
x x under Muslim Law” where the requirements set therein are met. See also Sulu Islamic Association v. Malik, 226
SCRA 193 (1993); Merced v. Diez, 109 Phil. 155(1960).
10 22 SCRA 731, 735 (1968).
754
754 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Marbella-Bobis vs. Bobis
Respondent alleges that the first marriage in the case before us was void for lack of a marriage
license. Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that her marriage to respondent was exempt
from the requirement of a marriage license. More specifically, petitioner claims that prior to
their marriage, they had already attained11
the age of majority and had been living together as
husband and wife for at least five years.  The issue in this case is limited to the existence of a
prejudicial question, and we are not called upon to resolve the validity of the first marriage. Be
that as it may, suffice it to state that the Civil Code, under which the first marriage was
celebrated, provides that “every intendment of law 12
or fact leans toward the validity of
marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds.” Hence, parties should not be permitted
to judge for themselves the nullity of their marriage, for the same must be submitted to the
determination of competent courts. Only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it
be held as void,13 and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the
marriage exists.  No matter how obvious, manifest or patent the absence of an element is, the
intervention of the courts must always be resorted to. That is why Article 40 of the Family
Code requires
14
a “final judgment,” which only the courts can render. Thus, as ruled in Landicho
v. Relova,  he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the
first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the
criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for
declaration of nullity. In a recent case for concubinage, we held that the pendency of a civil
15
case for declaration of nullity of marriage is not a prejudicial question.   This ruling applies
here by analogy since both crimes presuppose the subsistence of a marriage.
_______________
11 CivilCode, Article 76.
12 CivilCode, Article 220.
13 Landicho v. Relova, supra.
14 Supra.
15 Beltran v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 137567, June 20, 2000, 334 SCRA 106.
755
VOL. 336, JULY 31, 2000 755
Marbella-Bobis vs. Bobis
Ignorance of the
16
existence of Article 40 of the Family Code cannot even be successfully invoked
as an excuse.  The contracting of a marriage knowing that the requirements of the law have
not been complied with or that the marriage is in disregard of a legal impediment is an act
17
penalized by the Revised Penal Code.  The legality of a marriage is a matter of law and every
person is presumed to know the law. As respondent did not obtain the judicial declaration of
nullity when he entered into the second marriage, why should he be allowed to belatedly
obtain that judicial declaration in order to delay his criminal prosecution and subsequently
defeat it by his own disobedience of the law? If he wants to raise the nullity of the previous
marriage, he can do it as a matter of defense when he presents his evidence during the trial
proper in the criminal case.
The burden of proof to show the dissolution
18
of the first marriage before the second marriage
was contracted rests upon the defense,  but that is a matter that can be raised in the trial of
the bigamy case. In the meantime, it should be stressed that not every defense raised in the
civil action may be used as a prejudicial question to obtain the suspension of the criminal
action. The lower court, therefore, erred in suspending the criminal case for bigamy. Moreover,
when respondent was indicted for bigamy, the fact that he entered into two marriage
ceremonies appeared indubitable. It was only after he was sued by petitioner for bigamy that
he thought of seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. The obvious intent,
therefore, is that respondent merely resorted to the civil action as a potential prejudicial
question for the purpose of frustrating or delaying his criminal prosecution. As has been
discussed above, this cannot be done.
 In the light of Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having obtained the
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, can not be said to have validly entered into
the second marriage. Per current jurisprudence, a marriage though void still needs a judicial
declaration of such fact before any party can marry

_______________
16 Civil Code, Article 3.
17 Revised Penal Code, Article 350.
18 People v. Dungao, 56 Phil. 805 (1931).

756

756 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Marbella-Bobis vs. Bobis
19
again; otherwise the second marriage will also be void. The reason is that, without a judicial
declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar,
respondent was for all legal intents and purposes 20
regarded as a married man at the time he
contracted his second marriage with petitioner.  Against this legal backdrop, any decision in
the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second
marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not
essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial
question. As stated above, respondent21 cannot be permitted to use his own malfeasance to
defeat the criminal action against him.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The order dated December 29, 1998 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 226 of Quezon City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the trial
court is ordered to IMMEDIATELY proceed with Criminal Case No. Q98-75611.
SO ORDERED.

     Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Puno, Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.

Petition granted, order reversed and set aside.

Note.—American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which

are in pari materia with ours, yields the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent
spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings against the offenders where the statute
provides that the innocent spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for
adultery. (Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA 653 [1989])

_______________
19 Apiag v. Judge Cantero, 268 SCRA 47, 61 (1997).
20 Wiegel v. Hon. Sempio-Dy, 143 SCRA 499, 501 (1986).
21 People v. Aragon, 94 Phil. 357, 360 (1954).
 *
G.R. No. 137110. August 1, 2000.
VINCENT PAUL G. MERCADO a.k.a. VINCENT G. MERCADO, petitioner, vs.  CONSUELO
TAN, respondent.
Criminal Law; Bigamy; Family Code; Jurisprudence regarding the need for a judicial declaration of
nullity of the previous marriage has been characterized as “conflicting”;  Under the Family Code, a
declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a
ground for defense.—Jurisprudence regarding the need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous
marriage has been characterized as “conflicting.” x x x x x x x x x In Domingo v. CA, the issue raised was
whether a judicial declaration of nullity was still necessary for the recovery and the separation of
properties of erstwhile spouses. Ruling in the affirmative, the Court declared: “The Family Code has
settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
123
VOL. 337, AUGUST 1, 2000 123
Mercado vs. Tan
absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for
defense;  in fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the
protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With
the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be
charged with bigamy.”
Same; Same; Same; Absent that declaration, Court holds that one may be charged with and convicted
of bigamy.—The statutory mooring of the ruling in  Mendoza  and  Aragon—that there is no need for a
judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage—has been cast aside by Article 40 of the Family Code.
Such declaration is now necessary before one can contract a second marriage. Absent that declaration,
we hold that one may be charged with and convicted of bigamy.
Same; Same; Same; By contracting a second marriage while the first was still subsisting, petitioner
committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.—Petitioner contracted a
second marriage although there was yet no judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he
instituted the Petition to have the first marriage declared void only after complainant had filed a letter-
complaint charging him with bigamy. By contracting a second marriage while the first was still
subsisting, he committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
Same; Same; Same; Fact that he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first
marriage was immaterial.—That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first
marriage was immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already been consummated by then. Moreover, his
view effectively encourages delay in the prosecution of bigamy cases; an accused could simply file a
petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial
question in the criminal case.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Tan, Acut & Madrid for petitioner.
     Julius C. Baldado for private respondent.
124
124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mercado vs. Tan
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one
can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining
such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is
characterized by statutes as “void.”
The Case
Before us is a Petition1 for Review on Certiorari assailing the July 14, 1998 Decision of the
Court of Appeals (CA)  in CA-GR CR No. 19830  and its January 4, 1999 Resolution denying
reconsideration. The assailed Decision affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Bacolod City in Criminal Case No. 13848, which convicted herein petitioner of bigamy as
follows:
“WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of accused Dr. Vincent Paul G. Mercado a.k.a. Dr. Vincent G. Mercado
of the crime of Bigamy punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code to have been proven
beyond reasonable doubt, [the court hereby renders] judgment imposing upon him a prison term of three
(3) years, four (4) months and fifteen (15) days of prision correccional, as minimum of his indeterminate
sentence, to eight (8) years and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor, as maximum, plus accessory
penalties provided by law.2
Costs against accused.”
The Facts
The facts are quoted by Court of Appeals (CA) from the trial court’s judgment, as follows:
“From the evidence adduced by the parties, there is no dispute that accused Dr. Vincent Mercado and
complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan got married on June 27, 1991 before MTCC-Bacolod City Br. 7 Judge
Gorgo-
_______________
1 Penned by J. Salome A. Montoya, Division chairman; with the concurrence of JJ. Conchita Carpio Morales and Bernardo P.
Abesamis, members.
2 RTC Decision, pp. 16-17; rollo, pp. 136-137. This was written by Judge Edgar G. Garvilles.
125
VOL. 337, AUGUST 1, 2000 125
Mercado vs. Tan
nio J. Ibañez [by reason of] which a Marriage Contract was duly executed and signed by the parties. As
entered in said document, the status of accused was ‘single.’ There is no dispute either that at the time of
the celebration of the wedding with complainant, accused was actually a married man, having been in
lawful wedlock with Ma. Thelma Oliva in a marriage ceremony solemnized on April 10, 1976 by Judge
Leonardo B. Cañares, CFI-Br. XIV, Cebu City per Marriage Certificate issued in connection therewith,
which matrimony was further blessed by Rev. Father Arthur Baur on October 10, 1976 in religious rites
at the Sacred Heart Church, Cebu City. In the same manner, the civil marriage between accused and
complainant was confirmed in a church ceremony on June 29, 1991 officiated by Msgr. Victorino A. 3 CA Decision, pp. 2-4; rollo, pp. 45-47.
4 Ibid., p. 6; rollo, p. 13.
Rivas, Judicial Vicar, Diocese of Bacolod City. Both marriages were consummated when out of the first
5  The case was deemed submitted for resolution on May 26, 2000, upon receipt by this Court of the OSG
consortium, Ma. Thelma Oliva bore accused two children, while a child, Vincent Paul, Jr. was sired by
accused with complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan. Memorandum signed by Sol. Gen. Ricardo P. Galvez, Asst. Sol. Gen. Mariano M. Martinez and Sol. Jesus P. Castelo.
“On October 5, 1992, a letter-complaint for bigamy was filed by complainant through counsel with the Respondent’s Memorandum, which was signed by Atty. Julius C. Baldado, was received on November 11, 1999; while
City Prosecutor of Bacolod City, which eventually resulted [in] the institution of the present case before petitioner’s Memorandum, signed by Attys. Bernard B. Lopez and Maritoni Z. Liwanag, had been filed earlier on
September 30, 1999.
this Court against said accused, Dr. Vincent C. Mercado, on March 1, 1993 in an Information dated
January 22, 1993. 127
“On November 13, 1992, or more than a month after the bigamy case was lodged in the Prosecutor’s
Office, accused filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Ma. Thelma V. Oliva in
RTC-Br. 22, Cebu City, and in a Decision dated May 6, 1993 the marriage between Vincent C. Mercado VOL. 337, AUGUST 1, 2000 127
and Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was declared null and void.
“Accused is charged [with] bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code for having contracted Mercado vs. Tan
a second marriage with herein complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991 when at that time he
was previously united in lawful marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva on April 10, 1976 at Cebu City,
without said first marriage having been legally dissolved. As shown by the evidence and admitted by “A
accused, all the essential elements of the crime are present, namely: (a) that the offender has been
Whether or not the element of previous legal marriage is present in order to convict petitioner.
previously legally married; (2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or in case the spouse
is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he “B
contract[ed] a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage ha[d] all
the essential requisites for validity, x x x Whether or not a liberal interpretation in favor of petitioner of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code
“While acknowledging the existence of the two marriage[s], accused posited the defense that his punishing bigamy, in relation to Articles 36 and 40 of the Family Code, negates the guilt of petitioner.
previous marriage ha[d] been judicially de-
“C
126
6
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to an acquittal on the basis of reasonable doubt.”

126 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Mercado vs. Tan The Court’s Ruling

dared null and void and that the private complainant had knowledge of the first marriage of accused.
“It is an admitted fact that when the second marriage was entered into with Ma. Consuelo Tan on
June 27, 1991, accused’s prior marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was subsisting, no judicial action
having yet been initiated or any judicial declaration obtained as to the nullity of such prior marriage
with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva. Since no declaration of the nullity of his first marriage ha[d] yet been made at
the time of his, second marriage, it is clear that accused was a married man when he contracted such
second3 marriage with complainant on June 27, 1991. He was still at the time validly married to his first
wife.”
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Petition is not meritorious.
Main Issue: 
Effect of Nullity of Previous Marriage
Petitioner was convicted of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which
provides:
“The penalty of  prision mayor  shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse
has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.”

Agreeing with the lower court, the Court of Appeals stated: The elements of this crime are as follows:
“Under Article 40 of the Family Code, ‘the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.’
But here, the final judgment declaring null and void accused’s previous marriage came not before the
celebration of the second marriage, but after, when the case for bigamy against accused was already tried
in court. And what constitutes the crime of bigamy is the act of any person who
4
shall contract a second
subsequent marriage ‘before’ the former marriage has been legally dissolved.”
“1. That the offender has been legally married;
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent,
the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.”
7

5
Hence, this Petition.
_______________
6 Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 5; rollo, p. 215.
The Issues 7 Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book Two, 13th ed. (1993), p. 828.
In his Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues: 128

_______________

128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mercado vs. Tan
When the Information was filed on January 22, 1993, all the elements of bigamy were present.
It is undisputed that petitioner married Thelma G. Oliva on April 10, 1976 in Cebu City.
While that marriage was still subsisting, he contracted a second marriage, this time with
Respondent Ma. Consuelo Tan who subsequently filed the Complaint for bigamy.
Petitioner contends, however, that he obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, thereby rendering it void  ab initio.Unlike
voidable marriages which are considered valid until set aside by8 a competent court, he argues
that a void marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all.  Thus, he concludes
9
that there
is no first marriage to speak of. Petitioner also quotes the commentaries   of former Justice
Luis Reyes that “it is now settled that if the first marriage is void from the beginning, it is a
defense in a bigamy charge. But if the first marriage is voidable, it is not a defense.”
Respondent, on the other hand, admits that the first marriage was declared null and void
under Article 36 of the Family Code, but she points out that that declaration came
only  after  the Information had been filed. Hence, by then, the crime had already been
consummated. She argues that a judicial declaration of nullity of a void previous marriage
must be obtained before a person can marry for a subsequent time.
We agree with the respondent.
To be sure, jurisprudence regarding the need for a judicial
10
declaration of nullity
11
of the
previous marriage has been characterized as “conflicting.”   In  People v. Mendoza, a bigamy
case involving an accused who married three times, the Court ruled that there was no need for
such declaration. In that case, the accused contracted a second marriage during the
subsistence of the first. When the first
_______________
8 CitingTolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Commentaries and Jurisprudence, Vol. I, p. 265.
9 Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book Two, 12th ed. (1981), p. 907.
10 Domingo v. CA, 226 SCRA 572, September 17, 1993, per Romero, J.
11 95 Phil. 845, September 28, 1954.
129
VOL. 337, AUGUST 1, 2000 129
Mercado vs. Tan
wife died, he married for the third time. The second wife then charged him with bigamy.
Acquitting him, the Court held that the second marriage was void  ab initio  because it had
been contracted while the first marriage was still in effect. Since the second marriage was
obviously void and illegal, the Court ruled that there was no need for a judicial declaration of
its nullity. Hence, the accused did not commit bigamy when 12
he married for the third time.
This ruling was affirmed by the Court in People v. Aragon, which involved substantially the
same facts.
But in subsequent cases, the13Court impressed the need for a judicial declaration of nullity.
In  Vda de Consuegra v. GSIS,   Jose Consuegra married for the second time while the first
marriage was still subsisting. Upon his death, the Court awarded one half of the proceeds of
his retirement benefits to the first wife and the other half to the second wife and her children,
notwithstanding the manifest nullity of the second marriage. It held: “And with respect to the
right of the second wife, this Court observes that although the second marriage can be
presumed to be void  ab initio  as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still
subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity.”
14
14
In Tolentino v. Paras  however, the Court again held that judicial declaration of nullity of a
void marriage was not necessary. In that case, a man married twice. In his Death Certificate,
his second wife was named as his surviving spouse. The first wife then filed a Petition to
correct the said entry in the Death Certificate. The Court ruled in favor of the first wife,
holding that “the second marriage that he contracted with private respondent during the
lifetime of the first spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no force and effect.  No
judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage.”
_______________
12 100 Phil. 1033, February 28, 1957.
13 37 SCRA 315, 326, January 30, 1971, per Zaldivar, J. Emphasis supplied. See also Gomez v. Lipana, 33 SCRA
615, June 30, 1970.
14 122 SCRA 525, 529, May 30, 1983; per Melencio-Herrera, J.Emphasis supplied.
130
130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mercado vs. Tan
15
In Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy,  the Court stressed the need for such declaration. In that case, Karl
Heinz Wiegel filed an action for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lilia Olivia Wiegel
on the ground that the latter had a prior existing marriage. After pretrial, Lilia asked that she
be allowed to present evidence to prove, among others, that her first husband had previously
been married to another woman. In holding that there was no need for such evidence, the
Court ruled: “x x x There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior
marriage of her first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage
though void still needs, according to this Court, a judicial declaration of such fact and for all
legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she
contracted her marriage with respondent
16
Karl Heinz Wiegel; x x x.”
Subsequently, in Yap v. CA,  the Court reverted to the ruling in People v. Mendoza, holding
that there was no need 17
for such declaration of nullity.
In Domingo v. CA,  the issue raised was whether a judicial declaration of nullity was still
necessary for the recovery and the separation of properties of erstwhile spouses. Ruling in the
affirmative, the Court declared: “The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting
jurisprudence on the matter.  A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now
explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense; in fact, the requirement
for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who,
believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial
declaration of the nullity
18
of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be
charged with bigamy.”
Unlike  Mendoza  and  Aragon, Domingo  as well as the other cases herein cited was not a
criminal prosecution for bigamy. Nonetheless,  Domingo  underscored the need for a judicial
declaration of
________________
15 143 SCRA 499, August 19, 1986, per Paras, J. Emphasis supplied
16 145 SCRA 229, October 28, 1986.
17  226 SCRA 572, September 17, 1993, per Romero,  J,  citing SempioDiy,  Handbook of the Family Code of the
Philippines, 1988 p. 46.
18 Supra, p. 579.
131
 VOL. 337, AUGUST 1, 2000 131
Mercado vs. Tan
nullity of a void marriage on the basis of a new provision of the Family Code, which came into
effect several years after the promulgation of Mendoza and Aragon.
In  Mendoza  and  Aragon,  the Court relied on Section 29 of Act No. 3613 (Marriage Law),
which provided:
“Illegal marriages.—Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first
spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;
(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage
without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or the absentee being
generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of
contracting such subsequent marriage, the marriage as contracted being valid in either case until
declared null and void by a competent court.”
The Court held in those two cases that the said provision “plainly makes a subsequent
marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from
its performance, and no judicial decree
19
is necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished
from mere annulable marriages.”
The provision appeared in substantially the same form under Article 83 of the 1950 Civil
Code and Article 41 of the Family Code. However, Article 40 of the Family Code, a new
provision, expressly requires a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage, as
follows:
“ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage void.”
In view of this provision, Domingo stressed that a final judgment declaring such marriage void
was necessary. Verily, the Family Code and Domingo affirm the earlier ruling in Wiegel.
_______________
19 People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845, 847, September 28, 1954, per Paras, CJ. See also People v. Aragon,  100 Phil.
1033, 1034-1035, February 28, 1957, per Labrador, J.
132
132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mercado vs. Tan
Thus, a Civil Law authority and member of the Civil Code Revision Commitee has observed:
“[Article 40] is also in line with the recent decisions of the Supreme Court that the marriage of a person
may be null and void but there is need of a judicial declaration of such fact before that person can marry
again; otherwise, the second marriage will also be void (Wiegel v. SempioDiy, Aug. 19/86,  143 SCRA
499,  Vda. De Consuegra v. GSIS,  37 SCRA 315).  This provision changes the old rule that where a
marriage is illegal and void from its performance, no judicial decree is necessary to establish its validity
20
(People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 843; People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033)  Appeals insofar as it denied her claim of damages and attorney’s fees.
In this light, the statutory mooring of the ruling in  Mendoza  and  Aragon—that there is no
need for a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage—has been cast aside by Article 40
of the Family Code. Such declaration is not necessary before one can contract a second
marriage. Absent that declaration, we hold that one may be charged with and convicted of
bigamy.
21
The present ruling is consistent with our pronouncement in Terre v. Terre,  which involved
an administrative Complaint against a lawyer for marrying twice. In rejecting the lawyer’s
argument that he was free to enter into a second marriage because the first one was void ab
initio,  the Court ruled: “for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to
contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab
initio is essential.” The Court further noted that the said rule was “cast into statutory form by
Article 40 of the Family Code.” Significantly, it observed that the second marriage, contracted
without a judicial declaration that the first marriage was void, was “bigamous and criminal in
character.”
Moreover, Justice Reyes, an authority in Criminal Law whose earlier work was cited by
petitioner, changed his view on the subject in view of Article 40 of the Family Code and wrote
in 1993 that
_______________
20 Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, 1995 ed., p. 56.
21 211 SCRA 6, 11, July 3, 1992, per curiam.
133
VOL. 337, AUGUST 1, 2000 133
Mercado vs. Tan
a person must first obtain a judicial
22
declaration of the nullity of a void marriage before
contracting a subsequent marriage:
“It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in a
bigamy charge. As with a voidable marriage, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a
marriage before contracting the second marriage.Article 40 of the Family Code states that x x x. The Code
Commission believes that the parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage
is void, even if such is the fact, but must first secure a judicial declaration of nullity of their marriage
before they should be allowed to marry again, x x x.”
In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first
marriage declared void only after complainant had filed a letter-complaint charging him with
bigamy. By contracting a second marriage while the first was still subsisting, he committed
the acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was
immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already been consummated by then. Moreover, his view
effectively encourages delay in the prosecution of bigamy cases; an accused could simply file a
petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a
prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.
Under the circumstances of the present case, he is guilty of the charge against him.
Damages
In her Memorandum, respondent prays that the Court set aside the 23
ruling of the Court of
_______________
22  Reyes,  Revised Penal Code,  Book Two, 13th ed. (1993), p. 829. Emphasis supplied. Petitioner had cited the
statement of Justice Reyes that “if the first marriage is void from the beginning, it is a defense in a big-amy charge.”
This statement, however, appeared in the 1981 edition of Reyes’ book, before the enactment of the Family Code. The  civil law  rule stated in Article 40 of the Family Code is a given but I have strong
23 Respondent’s Memorandum, p. 16; rollo, p. 259.
reservations on its application beyond what appears to be its expressed context. The subject of
134 the instant petition is a criminal prosecution, not a civil case, and the  ponencia  affirms the
conviction of petitioner Vincent Paul G. Mercado for bigamy.
Article 40 of the Family Code reads:
134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
“ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
Mercado vs. Tan basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.”

Her prayer has no merit. She did not appeal 24the ruling of the CA against her; hence, she
cannot obtain affirmative relief from this Court.  In any event, we find no reason to reverse or
set aside the pertinent ruling of the CA on this point, which we quote hereunder:
“We are convinced from the totality of the evidence presented in this case that Consuelo Tan is not the
innocent victim that she claims to be; she was well aware of the existence of the previous marriage when
she contracted matrimony with Dr. Mercado. The testimonies of the defense witnesses prove this, and we
find no reason to doubt said testimonies.
x x x      x x x      x x x
“Indeed, the claim of Consuelo Tan that she was not aware of his previous marriage does not inspire
belief, especially as she had seen that Dr. Mercado had two (2) children with him. We are convinced that
she took the plunge anyway, relying on the fact that the first wife would no longer return to Dr. Mercado,
she being by then already living with another man.
“Consuelo Tan can therefore not claim damages in this case where she was fully conscious of the
consequences of her act. She should have known that she would suffer humiliation in the event the truth
[would] come out, as it did in this case, ironically because of her personal
25
instigation. If there are indeed
damages caused to her reputation, they are of her own willful making.”
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
     Melo (Chairman), Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
     Vitug, J., Please see Concurring and Dissenting Opinion.
_______________
24 Lagandaon
v. Court of Appeals, 290 SCRA 330, May 21, 1998; Dio v. Concepcion, 296 SCRA 579, September 25,
1998.
25 CA Decision, pp. 7-9; rollo, pp. 50-52.
The phrase “for purposes of remarriage” is not at all insignificant. Void marriages, like void
contracts, are inexistent from the very beginning. It is only by way of exception that the
Family Code requires a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage before a
subsequent marriage is contracted; without such declaration, the validity and the full legal
consequence of the subsequent marriage would itself be in similar jeopardy under Article 53,
in relation to Article 52, of the Family Code. Parenthetically, I would daresay that the
necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage for the purpose of remarriage
should be held to refer merely to cases where it can be said that a marriage, at least
ostensibly, had taken place. No such judicial declaration of nullity, in my view, should still be
deemed essential when the “marriage,” for instance, is between persons of the same sex or
when either or both parties had not at all given consent to the “marriage.” Indeed, it is likely
that Article 40 of the Family Code has been meant and in-
136
136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mercado vs. Tan
tended to refer only to marriages declared void under the provisions of Articles 35, 36, 37, 38
and 53 thereof.
In fine, the Family Code I respectfully submit, did not have the effect of overturning the
rule in criminal law and related jurisprudence. The Revised Penal Code expresses:
“Art. 349. Bigamy.—The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a
second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.

135 Surely, the foregoing provision contemplated an existing, not void, prior marriage. Covered by
Article 349 would thus be, for instance, a voidable marriage, it obviously being
1
valid and
subsisting until set aside by a competent court. As early as People vs. Aragon,  this Court has
VOL. 337, AUGUST 1, 2000 135 underscored:
Mercado vs. Tan “x x x Our Revised Penal Code is of recent enactment and had the rule enunciated in Spain and in
America requiring judicial declaration of nullity of ab  initio  void marriages been within the
contemplation of the legislature, an express provision to that effect would or should have been inserted in
the law. In its absence, we are bound by said rule of strict interpretation.”
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
Unlike a voidable marriage which legally exists until judicially annulled (and therefore not a
defense in bigamy if the second marriage were contracted prior to the decree
VITUG, J.: of annulment), the complete nullity however, of a previously contracted marriage, being a total
nullity and inexistent, should be capable of being independently raised by way of a defense in a
At the pith of the controversy is the defense of the absolute nullity of a previous marriage in criminal case for bigamy. I see no incongruence between this rule in criminal law and that of
an indictment for bigamy. The majority opinion, penned by my esteemed brother, Mr. Justice the Family Code, and each may be applied within the respective spheres of governance.
Artemio V. Panganiban, enunciates that it is only a judicially decreed prior void marriage Accordingly, I vote to grant the petition.
which can constitute a defense against the criminal charge. Petition denied, judgment affirmed.
_______________
1 100 Phil. 1033 (1957).

137

VOL. 337, AUGUST 1, 2000 137

Garcia vs. Court of Appeals

Note.—While it is true that bigamy is a public offense, it is entirely incorrect to state that
only the State is the offended party in such case and, therefore, only the State’s discovery of
the crime could effectively commence the running of the period of prescription therefor.
(Garcia vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 678 [1997])

86 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ty vs. Court of Appeals
* giving her defense due consideration and weight. She adds that the interest of the State in protecting the
G.R. No. 127406. November 27, 2000.
OFELIA P. TY, petitioner,  vs.  THE COURT OF APPEALS and EDGARDO M. REYES,
respondents.
Marriages; Husband and Wife; Bigamy; Where the second marriage of a person was entered into in
1979, before Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, 143 SCRA 499 (1986), during which time the prevailing rule was
found in Odayat v. Amante, 77 SCRA 338 (1977), People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845 (1954) and People v.
Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033 (1957), there was no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of a marriage for
lack of license and consent, before such person may contract a second marriage.—A recent case applied
the old rule because of the peculiar circumstances of the case. In Apiag v. Cantero, (1997) the first wife
charged a municipal trial judge of immorality for entering into a second marriage. The judge claimed
that his first marriage was void since he was merely forced into marrying his first wife whom he got
pregnant. On the issue of nullity of the first marriage, we applied Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. We held
that since the second marriage took place and all the children thereunder were born  before  the
promulgation of Wiegel and the effectivity of the Family Code, there is no need for a judicial declaration
of nullity of the first marriage pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence at that time. Similarly, in the
present case, the second marriage of private respondent was entered into in 1979, before Wiegel. At that
time, the prevailing rule was found in  Odayat, Mendoza  and  Aragon. The first marriage of private
respondent being void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nul-
________________
* SECOND DIVISION.
87
VOL. 346, NOVEMBER 27, 2000 87
Ty vs. Court of Appeals
lity before he could contract a second marriage. In this case, therefore, we conclude that private
respondent’s second marriage to petitioner is valid.
Same; Same; Same; Family Code; The provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied
where to do so would prejudice the vested rights of a party and of her children.—We find that the
provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present case, for to do so would
prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her children. As held in  Jison v. Court of Appeals, the
Family Code has retroactive effect unless there be impairment of vested rights.
Same; Same; Same; Marriage Licenses; That a marriage license was used legally in the celebration of
the civil ceremony does not detract from the ceremonial use thereof in the church wedding of the same
parties to the marriage, for the latter rites served not only to ratify but also to fortify the first.—In the
present case, that impairment of vested rights of petitioner and the children is patent. Additionally, we
are not quite prepared to give assent to the appellate court’s finding that despite private respondent’s
“deceit and perfidy“ in contracting marriage with petitioner, he could benefit from her silence on the
issue. Thus, coming now to the civil effects of the church ceremony wherein petitioner married private
respondent using the marriage license used three years earlier in the civil ceremony, we find that
petitioner now has raised this matter properly. Earlier petitioner claimed as untruthful private
respondent’s allegation that he wed petitioner but they lacked a marriage license. Indeed we find there
was a marriage license, though it was the same license issued on April 3, 1979 and used in both the civil
and the church rites. Obviously, the church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage. As
petitioner contends, the appellate court erred when it refused to recognize the validity and salutary
effects of said canonical marriage on a technicality, i.e. that petitioner had failed to raise this matter as
affirmative defense during trial. She argues that such failure does not prevent the appellate court from
inviolability of marriage, as a legal and social institution, outweighs such technicality. In our view,
petitioner and private respondent had complied with all the essential and formal requisites for a valid
marriage, including the requirement of a valid license in the first of the two ceremonies. That this license
was used legally in the celebration of the civil ceremony does not detract from the ceremonial use thereof
in the church wedding of the same parties to the marriage, for we hold that the latter rites served not
only to ratify but also to fortify the first. The appellate court might have its reasons for brushing aside
this possible defense of the defendant below which undoubtedly could have
88
88 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Ty vs. Court of Appeals
tendered a valid issue, but which was not timely interposed by her before the trial court. But we are
now persuaded we cannot play blind to the absurdity, if not inequity, of letting the wrongdoer profit from
what the CA calls “his own deceit and perfidy.”
Same; Same; Same; Damages; Our laws do not comprehend an action for damages between husband
and wife merely because of breach of a marital obligation—there are other remedies.—Like the lower
courts, we are also of the view that no damages should be awarded in the present case, but for another
reason. Petitioner wants her marriage to private respondent held valid and subsisting. She is suing to
maintain her status as legitimate wife. In the same breath, she asks for damages from her husband for
filing a baseless complaint for annulment of their marriage which caused her mental anguish, anxiety,
besmirched reputation, social humiliation and alienation from her parents. Should we grant her prayer,
we would have a situation where the husband pays the wife damages from conjugal or common funds. To
do so, would make the application of the law absurd. Logic, if not common sense, militates against such
incongruity. Moreover, our laws do not comprehend an action for damages between husband and wife
merely because of breach of a marital obligation. There are other remedies.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Caguioa Law Office for petitioner.
     Ceballos and Associates Law Office for private respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This appeal seeks the reversal of the decision dated July 24, 1996, of the Court of Appeals
in  C.A.-G.R. CV 37897, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
Branch 160, declaring the marriage contract between private respondent Edgardo M. Reyes
and petitioner Ofelia P. Ty null and void ab initio. It also ordered private respondent to pay
P15,000.00 as monthly support for their children Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes.
89
VOL. 346, NOVEMBER 27, 2000 89
Ty vs. Court of Appeals
As shown in the records of the case, private respondent married Anna Maria Regina
Villanueva in a civil ceremony on March 29, 1977, in Manila. Then they had a church wedding
on August 27, 1977. However, on August 4, 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
of Quezon City declared their marriage null and  void ab initio  for lack of a valid marriage
license. The church wedding on August 27, 1977, was also declared null and void ab initio for
lack of consent of the parties.
1. The marriage contracted by plaintiff-appellant [herein private respondent] Eduardo M. Reyes
and defendant-appellant [herein petitioner] Ofelia P. Ty is declared null and void ab initio;
2. Plaintiff-appellant Eduardo M. Reyes is ordered to give monthly support in the amount of
P15,000.00 to his children Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes from November 4, 1991; and
3. Cost against plaintiff-appellant Eduardo M. Reyes.
2

Even before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Anna Maria, private SO ORDERED.
respondent wed Ofelia P. Ty, herein petitioner, on April 4, 1979, in ceremonies officiated by
the judge of the City Court of Pasay. On April 4, 1982, they also had a church wedding in ________________
Makati, Metro Manila. 1 See also Tison vs. CA, 276 SCRA 582, 593 (1997); Quebral vs. CA, 252 SCRA 353, 365 (1996); Son vs. Son,  251
On January 3, 1991, private respondent filed a Civil Case 1853-J  with the RTC of Pasig, SCRA 556, 564 (1995); re proof of facts cited.
Branch 160, praying that his marriage to petitioner be declared null and void.He alleged that 2 Rollo, pp. 48-52.

they had no marriage license when they got married. He also averred that at the time he
91
married petitioner, he was still married to Anna Maria. He stated that at the time he married
petitioner the decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria had not been issued. The decree
of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria was rendered only on August 4, 1980, while his civil VOL. 346, NOVEMBER 27, 2000 91
marriage to petitioner took place on April 4, 1979.
Petitioner, in defending her marriage to private respondent, pointed out that his claim that Ty vs. Court of Appeals
their marriage was contracted without a valid license is untrue. She submitted their Marriage
License No. 5739990 issued at Rosario, Cavite on April 3, 1979, as Exhs. 11, 12 and 12-A. He Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this instant petition asserting that
did not question this document when it was submitted in evidence. Petitioner also submitted the Court of Appeals erred:
the decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City dated August 4,
1980, which declared null and  void  his civil marriage to Anna Maria Regina Villanueva I
celebrated on March 29, 1977, and his church marriage to said Anna Maria on August 27,
BOTH IN THE DECISION AND THE RESOLUTION, IN REQUIRING FOR THE VALIDITY OF
1977. These documents were submitted as evidence during trial and, according to petitioner,
PETITIONER’S MARRIAGE TO RESPONDENT, A JUDICIAL DECREE NOT REQUIRED BY LAW.
are therefore deemed sufficient proof of the facts therein. The fact that the civil marriage of
private respondent and petitioner took place on April 4, 1979, before the judgment declaring II
his prior marriage as null and void is undisputed. It also ap-
IN THE RESOLUTION, IN APPLYING THE RULING IN DOMINGO VS. COURT OF APPEALS.
90
III

90 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED IN BOTH THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION IN NOT CONSIDERING THE CIVIL EFFECTS OF
THE RELIGIOUS RATIFICATION WHICH USED THE SAME MARRIAGE LICENSE.
Ty vs. Court of Appeals
IV

pears indisputable
1
that private respondent and petitioner had a church wedding ceremony on IN THE DECISION NOT GRANTING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES TO THE
April 4, 1982. DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
The Pasig RTC sustained private respondent’s civil suit and declared his marriage to herein
petitioner null and  void ab initio  in its decision dated November 4, 1991. Both parties The principal issue in this case is whether the decree of nullity of the first marriage is required
appealed to respondent Court of Appeals. On July 24, 1996, the appellate court affirmed the before a subsequent marriage can be entered into validly? To resolve this question, we shall go
trial court’s decision. It ruled that a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage (to over applicable laws and pertinent cases to shed light on the assigned errors, particularly the
Anna Maria) must first be secured before a subsequent marriage could be validly contracted. first and the second which we shall discuss jointly.
Said the appellate court: In sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals declared the marriage of petitioner to
private respondent null and void for lack of a prior judicial decree of nullity of the marriage
We can accept, without difficulty, the doctrine cited by defendant’s counsel that ’no judicial decree is between private respondent and Villanueva. The appellate court rejected petitioner’s claim
3 4
necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages.’ It does not say, however, that a second marriage that  People v. Mendoza    and  People v. Aragon    are applicable in this case. For these cases
may proceed even without a judicial decree. While it is true that if a marriage is null and  void, ab held that where a marriage is  voidfrom its performance, no judicial decree is necessary to
initio,  there is in fact no subsisting marriage, we are unwilling to rule that the matter of whether a
establish its invalidity. But the appellate court said these cases, decided before the enactment
marriage is valid or not is for each married spouse to determine for himself—for this would be the
consequence of allowing a spouse to proceed to a second marriage even before a competent court issues a of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209 as
judicial decree of nullity of his first marriage. The results would be disquieting, to say the least, and
could not have been the intendment of even the now-repealed provisions of the Civil Code on marriage. ________________
xxx
3 95 Phil. 845 (1954).
WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing ratiocination, We modify the appealed Decision in this wise: 4 100 Phil. 1033 (1957).

92
 be conflicting. 10 11
Originally, in People v. Mendoza,  and People v. Aragon,   this Court held that no judicial
92 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED decree is necessary to establish the nullity of a void marriage. Both cases involved the same
Ty vs. Court of Appeals factual milieu. Accused contracted a second marriage during the subsistence of his first
marriage. After the death of his first wife, accused contracted a third marriage during the
subsistence of the second marriage. The second wife initiated a complaint for bigamy. The
amended by E.O. No. 227), no longer control. A5 binding decree is now needed and must be read Court acquitted accused on the ground that the second marriage is void, having been
into the provisions of law previously obtaining. contracted during the existence of the first marriage. There is no need for a judicial
In refusing to consider petitioner’s appeal favorably, the appellate court also said: declaration that said second marriage is void. Since the second marriage is void, and the first
Terre v. Attorney Terre, Adm. Case No. 2349, 3 July 1992 is mandatory precedent for this case. Although one terminated by the death of his wife, there are no two subsisting valid marriages. Hence,
decided by the High Court in 1992, the facts situate it within the regime of the now-repealed provisions there can be no bigamy. Justice Alex Reyes
of the Civil Code, as in the instant case.
xxx ________________
For purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a 6second marriage, a judicial
10 95 Phil. 845 (1954).
declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential. . . .
11 100 Phil. 1033 (1957).
At the outset, we must note that private respondent’s first and second marriages contracted in
94
1977 and 1979, respectively, are governed by the provisions of the
7
Civil Code. The present
8
case
differs significantly from the recent cases of  Bobis v. Bobis    and  Mercado v. Tan,   both
involving a criminal case for bigamy
9
where the bigamous marriage was contracted during the 94 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
effectivity of the Family Code,   under which a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage is
clearly required. Ty vs. Court of Appeals

________________ dissented in both cases, saying that it is not for the spouses but the court to judge whether a
5 Rollo,
marriage is void or not. 12
p. 47. 13

6 Rollo, p. 49.
7 G.R. No. 138509, July 31, 2000, 336 SCRA 747.
8 G.R. No. 137110, August 1, 2000, 337 SCRA 122. In his dissenting and concurring opinion, Justice Vitug opined
that the necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage for the purpose of remarriage should be held to
refer merely to cases where it can be said that a marriage, at least ostensibly, had taken place. No such judicial
declaration of nullity, in his view, should still be deemed essential when the “marriage,“ for instance, is between
persons of the same sex or when either or both parties had not at all given consent to the marriage. Indeed, it is likely
that Article 40 of the Family Code has been meant and intended to refer only to marriages declared void under the
provisions of Articles 35, 36, 37, 38 and 53 thereof.
9 E.O. No. 209, which took effect on August 3, 1988.
93
VOL. 346, NOVEMBER 27, 2000 93
Ty vs. Court of Appeals
Pertinent to the present controversy, Article 83 of the Civil Code provides that:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of
such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance,
unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the
spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less
than seven years, is generally considered as dead and before any person believed to be so by the spouse
present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according
to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null
and void by a competent court.
In  Gomez v. Lipana,   and  Consuegra v. GSIS,   however, we recognized the right of the
second wife who entered into the marriage in good faith, to share in their acquired estate and
in proceeds of the retirement insurance of the husband. The Court observed that although the
second marriage can be presumed to be  void ab initio  as it was celebrated while the first
marriage was still subsisting, still there was a need for judicial declaration of such nullity (of
the second marriage). And since the death of the husband supervened before such declaration,
we upheld the right14
of the second wife to share in the estate they acquired, on grounds of
justice and equity. 15
But in  Odayat v. Amante  (1977),   the Court adverted to  Aragon  and  Mendoza  as
precedents. We exonerated a clerk of court of the charge of immorality on the ground that his
marriage to Filomena Abella in October of 1948 was void, since she was already previously
married to one Eliseo Portales in February of the same year. The Court held that no judicial
decree is necessary to 16
establish the invalidity of void marriages. This ruling was affirmed
in Tolentino v. Paras.
17
Yet again in Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy (1986),  the Court held that there is a need for a judicial
declaration of nullity of a void marriage. In Wiegel, Lilia married Maxion in 1972. In 1978, she
married another man, Wiegel. Wiegel filed a petition with the Juvenile Domestic Relations
Court to declare his marriage to Lilia as void on the ground 18
of her previous valid marriage.
The Court, expressly relying on Consuegra, concluded that:
________________
12 33 SCRA 615 (1970).
13 37 SCRA 315 (1971).
14 See also Lao v. Dee, 45 Phil. 739 (1924) and Pisalbon v. Bejec, 74 Phil. 88 (1943).
15 77 SCRA 338 (1977).
16 122 SCRA 525 (1983).
17 143 SCRA 499 (1986).
18 Id. at 501.

As to whether a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary, the Civil Code 95
contains no express provision to that effect. Jurisprudence on the matter, however, appears to
 VOL. 346, NOVEMBER 27, 2000 95
Ty vs. Court of Appeals
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband
at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this
Court a judicial declaration (citing  Consuegra)  of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she
would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent
Karl Heinz Wiegel; accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID
under the law. (Emphasis supplied).
19
In Yap v. Court of Appeals,  however, the Court found the second marriage void without need
of judicial declaration, thus reverting to the Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon rulings.
At any rate, the confusion under the Civil Code was put to rest under the Family Code. Our
rulings20
in Gomez, Consuegra, and Wiegel were eventually embodied in Article 40 of the Family
Code.  Article 40 of said Code expressly required a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage—
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
21
In  Terre v. Terre  (1992)   the Court, applying  Gomez, Consuegra  and  Wiegel,  categorically
stated that a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary. Thus, we disbarred
a lawyer for contracting a bigamous marriage during the subsistence of his first marriage. He
claimed that his first marriage in 1977 was void since his first wife was already married in
1968. We held that Atty. Terre should have known that the prevailing case law is that “for
purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a
judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential.”
The Court 22 applied this ruling in subsequent cases. In  Domingo v. Court of
Appeals (1993),  the Court held:
________________
19 145 SCRA 229 (1986).
20 The
Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.
21 211 SCRA 7 (1992).
22 226 SCRA 572 (1993).
96
96 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ty vs. Court of Appeals
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a
ground for defense. (Art. 39 of the Family Code). Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is
sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for
said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous 23
marriage void. (Family Code, Art. 40; See also arts. 11, 13, 42, 44, 48, 50, 52, 54, 86, 99, 147, 148).
However, a recent case applied the old rule because of the peculiar circumstances of the case.
24
In  Apiag v. Cantero,(1997)   the first wife charged a municipal trial judge of immorality for
entering into a second marriage. The judge claimed that his first marriage was void since he
was merely forced into marrying his first wife whom he got pregnant. On the issue of nullity of
the first marriage, we applied  Odayat, Mendoza  and  Aragon.  We held that since the second
marriage took place and all the children thereunder were born  before  the promulgation
of Wiegeland the effectivity of the Family Code, there is no need for a judicial declaration of
nullity of the first marriage pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence at that time.
Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was entered into
in 1979,  before Wiegel.At that time, the prevailing rule was found in  Odayat,
Mendoza and Aragon. The first marriage of private respondent being void for lack of license
and consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a
second marriage. In this case, therefore, we conclude that private respondent’s second
marriage to petitioner is valid.
Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to
the present case, for to do so would prejudice the vested 25
rights of petitioner and of her
children. As held in  Jison v. Court of Appeals, the Family Code has retroactive
effect  unless  there be impairment of vested rights. In the present case, that impairment of
vested rights of petitioner and the chil-
________________
23 Id.at 579.
24 268 SCRA 47 (1997).
25 286 SCRA 495, 530 (1998).
97
VOL. 346, NOVEMBER 27, 2000 97
Ty vs. Court of Appeals
dren is patent. Additionally, we are not quite prepared to give assent to the appellate court’s
finding that despite private respondent’s “deceit and perfidy“ in contracting marriage with
petitioner, he could benefit from her silence on the issue. Thus, coming now to the civil effects
of the church ceremony wherein petitioner married private respondent using the marriage
license used three years earlier in the civil ceremony, we find that petitioner now has raised
this matter properly. Earlier petitioner claimed as untruthful private respondent’s allegation
that he wed petitioner but they lacked a marriage license. Indeed we find there was a
marriage license, though it was the same license issued on April 3, 1979 and used in both the
civil and the church rites. Obviously, the church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil
marriage. As petitioner contends, the appellate court erred when it refused to recognize the
validity and salutary effects of said canonical marriage on a technicality,  i.e.  that petitioner
had failed to raise this matter as affirmative defense during trial. She argues that such failure
does not prevent the appellate court from giving her defense due consideration and weight.
She adds that the interest of the State in protecting the inviolability of marriage, as a legal
and social institution, outweighs such technicality. In our view, petitioner and private
respondent had complied with all the essential and formal requisites for a valid marriage,
including the requirement of a valid license in the first of the two ceremonies. That this license
was used legally in the celebration of the civil ceremony does not detract from the ceremonial
use thereof in the church wedding of the same parties to the marriage, for we hold that the
latter rites served not only to ratify but also to fortify the first. The appellate court might have
its reasons for brushing aside this possible defense of the defendant below which undoubtedly
could have tendered a valid issue, but which was not timely interposed by her before the trial
court. But we are now persuaded we cannot play blind to the absurdity, if not inequity, of
letting the wrongdoer profit from what the CA calls “his own deceit and perfidy.”
On the matter of petitioner’s counterclaim for damages and attorney’s fees. Although the
appellate court admitted that they found private respondent acted “duplicitously and craftily”
in mar-
98
98 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ty vs. Court of Appeals

rying petitioner, it26did not award moral damages because the latter did not adduce evidence to
support her claim.
Like the lower courts, we are also of the view that no damages should be awarded in the
present case, but for another reason. Petitioner wants her marriage to private respondent held
valid and subsisting. She is suing to maintain her status as legitimate wife. In the same
breath, she asks for damages from her husband for filing a baseless complaint for annulment
of their marriage which caused her mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, social
humiliation and alienation from her parents. Should we grant her prayer, we would have a
situation where the husband pays the wife damages from conjugal or common funds. To do so,
would make the application of the law absurd. Logic, if not common sense, militates against
such incongruity. Moreover, our laws do not comprehend an action for27 damages between
husband 28and wife merely because of breach of a marital obligation.   There are other
remedies.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated July 24, 1996 and its Resolution dated November 7, 1996, are reversed partially, so that
the marriage of petitioner Ofelia P. Ty and private respondent Edgardo M. Reyes is hereby
DECLARED VALID AND SUBSISTING; and the award of the amount of P15,000.00 is
RATIFIED and MAINTAINED as monthly support to their two children, Faye Eloise Reyes
and Rachel Anne Reyes, for as long as they are of minor age or otherwise legally entitled
thereto. Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.

     Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

________________
26 Rollo, p. 51.
27 Tolentino, Arturo M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 1, Manila: 1990,
p. 223.
28 Among them legal separation, or prosecution for adultery and concubinage.

99

VOL. 346, NOVEMBER 27, 2000 99

Villanueva vs. Velasco

Petition granted, judgment and resolution declared valid and subsisting.

Notes.—Where the complaint alleges that the couple were married in accordance with the
Civil Code, it is the said Code that is applicable in a complaint for declaration of nullity of
marriage. (Tamano vs. Ortiz, 291 SCRA 584[19981)
A marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any party can
marry again, otherwise the second marriage will also be void. (Marbella-Bobis vs. Bobis,  336
SCRA 747 [2000]

VOL. 351, FEBRUARY 2, 2001 127
Cariño vs. Cariño
G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001.*
SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO, petitioner, vs. SUSAN YEE CARIÑO, respondent.
Civil Law; Family Code; Marriages; Property; For purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action
is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.—Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable
in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the
previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination
of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a
criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of
the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so
long as it is essential to the determination of the case. In such instances, evidence must be adduced,
testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an
absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such
previous marriage void.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Court is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of the
two marriages in this case, as the same is essential to the determination of who is rightfully entitled to the
subject “death benefits’’ of the deceased.—It is clear therefore that the Court is
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
128
128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Cariño vs. Cariño
clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of the two marriages in this case, as the
same is essential to the determination of who is rightfully entitled to the subject “death benefits” of the
deceased.
Same;  Same;  Same;  Same;  A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and the absence
thereof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio.—Under the Civil Code, which
was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in
1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and the absence thereof, subject to certain
exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio.
Same;  Same;  Same;  Same;  Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable
property regime would not be absolute community or conjugal partnership of property, but rather, be
governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code on “Property Regime of Unions
Without Marriage.”—Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage
of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with
respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a
judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the
marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio. One of the effects of the
declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property of the spouses according to the
applicable property regime. Considering that the two marriages are void  ab initio, the applicable
property regime would not be absolute community or conjugal partnership of property, but rather, be
governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code on “Property Regime of Unions
Without Marriage.”
Same;  Same;  Same;  Same;  Under Article 148 of the Family Code, the properties acquired by the
parties through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership.—Under Article 148 of the
Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships,
relationships in a state of concubine, relationships where both man and woman are married to other
persons, multiple alliances of the same married man,—x x x In this property regime, the properties
acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages
and salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of
care of the home, children and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this regime.
129
VOL. 351, FEBRUARY 2, 2001 129
Cariño vs. Cariño
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Gancayco, Balasbas and Associates for petitioner.
     Agapito P. Oquindo, Jr. for respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the validity of the two marriages
contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, whose “death benefits” is now the subject
of the controversy between the two Susans whom he married. 1
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the decision
2
  of
the Court of Appeals in  CA-G.R. CV No. 51263, which affirmed  in toto  the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632.
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, he contracted two marriages, the
first was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño (hereafter referred to as
Susan Nicdao), with whom he had two offsprings, namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cariño; and the
second was on November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cariño (hereafter referred to as
Susan Yee), with whom he had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation starting way
back in 1982.
In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated by
pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee,
who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for
monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various
government agencies. Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 from
“MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM,
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 43-47.
2 Rollo,
pp. 49-55.
130
130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED II.

Cariño vs. Cariño THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING EQUITY IN THE
INSTANT CASE INSTEAD OF THE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL MANDATE OF THE FAMILY
3 CODE.
[and] Pag-ibig,”  while respondent4
Susan Yee received a total of P21,000.00 from “GSIS Life,
Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS).” III.
On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum of
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE CASE OF
money against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to return VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS. GSIS TO HAVE BEEN MODIFIED, AMENDED AND EVEN
to her at least one-half of the one hundred forty-six thousand pesos (P146,000.00) collectively ABANDONED BY THE ENACTMENT OF THE FAMILY CODE.
8

denominated as “death benefits” which she (petitioner) received from “MBAI, PCCUI,
Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig.” Despite service of summons, petitioner failed to Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
file her answer, prompting the trial court to declare her in default. invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought
subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law,
between petitioner and the deceased. She, however, claimed that she had no knowledge of the for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring
previous marriage and that she became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased, where
she met petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. To bolster her action for ________________
collection of sum of money, respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner and the
7 Rollo, p. 55.
deceased is void  ab initio  because the same was solemnized without the required marriage 8 Rollo, p. 18.
license. In support thereof, respondent presented: 1) the marriage5
certificate of the deceased
and the petitioner which bears no marriage license number;   and 2) a certification dated 132
March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, which reads—
This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage license of the spouses SANTIAGO CARIÑO 132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
(Sic) and SUSAN NICDAO, who are married in this municipality on June 20, 1969. Hence, we cannot
issue as requested a true copy or transcription of Marriage License number from the records of this Cariño vs. Cariño
archives.
This certification is issued upon the request of Mrs. Susan Yee Cariño for whatever legal purpose it 9

may serve.
6
the previous marriage void.  However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is
necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not
limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of
_______________
estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass
3 Exhibit “F,” Records, p. 38. upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not
4 Ibid.
directly instituted to question10
the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the
5 Exhibit “D-1,” Records, p. 36.
6 Exhibit
determination of the case.   In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or
“E,” Records, p. 37.
documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an
131 absolute nullity. These need not be limited
11
solely to an earlier final judgment of a court
declaring such previous marriage void.
It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the
VOL. 351, FEBRUARY 2, 2001 131 validity of the two marriages in this case, as the same is essential to the determination of who
Cariño vs. Cariño is rightfully entitled to the subject “death benefits” of the deceased.
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan
Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage 13license is a requisite of
On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, Susan Yee, holding as follows: 12
marriage,   and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions,   renders the marriage
14

WHEREFORE, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of P73,000.00, half of the void ab initio.
amount which was paid to her in the form of death benefits arising from the death of SPO4 Santiago S.
Cariño, plus attorney’s fees
7
in the amount of P5,000.00, and costs of suit. _________________
IT IS SO ORDERED.
9 Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 572, 579 [1993].
10 Niñal,et al. v. Bayadog, G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000, 328 SCRA 122.
On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed in toto the decision of the 11 Domingo v. Court of Appeals, supra.
trial court. Hence, the instant petition, contending that: 12 ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:

I. (1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF
THE LOWER COURT THAT VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS. GSIS IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT (3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
BAR. (4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.
 13 ART. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of this Title, but not those under
Article 75, no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the
municipality where either contracting party habitually resides.
14 ART.80.The following marriages shall be void from the begin- ning:
x x x      x x x      x x x
(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character;
x x x      x x x      x x x
133
VOL. 351, FEBRUARY 2, 2001 133
Cariño vs. Cariño
In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does
not fall within the marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license,
therefore, was indispensable to the validity of their marriage. This notwithstanding, the
records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage
license number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro15
Manila, their
office has no record of such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals,  the Court held
that such a certification is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent
any circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case, the certification issued by the local civil
registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of
all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased
has been sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their
marriage is valid and that they secured the required marriage license. Although she was
declared in default before the trial court, petitioner could have squarely met the issue and
explained the absence of a marriage license in her pleadings before the Court of Appeals and
this Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and chose to refrain from pursuing
an argument that will put her case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their
marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one
of the
_______________
15 236 SCRA 257, 261-262; citing the Rules of Court, Rule 132, Section 29.
134
134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cariño vs. Cariño
marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the marriage of
petitioner and the deceased is declared void  ab initio,  the “death benefits” under scrutiny
would now be awarded to respondent Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family
Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity
of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage,
otherwise, the second marriage would also be void.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the
deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the deceased
with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without
first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise,
void ab initio.
One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the
16
separation of the property
of the spouses according to the applicable property regime.   Considering that the two
marriages are void
_______________
16 Art. 50. The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and in Article 44 shall also apply
in proper cases to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45.
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition, and distribution of the properties of
the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless
such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
x x x      x x x      x x x
Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the following
effects:
x x x      x x x      x x x
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and
liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net
135
VOL. 351, FEBRUARY 2, 2001 135
Cariño vs. Cariño
ab initio,  the applicable property regime would not be absolute community or conjugal
partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of
the Family Code on “Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.”
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous
marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubine, relationships where
both 17man and woman are married to other persons, multiple alliances of the same married
man, —
“. . . [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions . . .”
In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their  actual joint
contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong
to him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of care of the
18
home, children and
household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this regime.
Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is a bigamous
marriage, having been solemnized during the subsistence of a previous marriage then
presumed to be valid (between petitioner and the deceased), the application of Article 148 is
therefore in order.
_______________
profits of the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common
children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or, in default of children, the
innocent spouse;
x x x      x x x      x x x
Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab initio and all
donations by reason of marriage and testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of the other are revoked by
operation of law.
 17 Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, pp. 233-234 (1995).
18 Id., p. 234.
136
136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cariño vs. Cariño
The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM,
Commutation, Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly remunerations, incentives and benefits from
governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a police officer. Unless respondent Susan
Yee presents proof to the contrary, it could not be said that she contributed money, property or
industry in the acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence, they are not owned in common
by respondent and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and respondent has no right
whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate succession, the said “death benefits” of the
deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent, not being the legal wife of the deceased
is not one of them.
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of the
Family Code governs. This article applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and
not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void
for other reasons, like the absence of a marriage license. Article 147 of the Family Code reads
— 138
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each
other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and
salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their
work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in
equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other
party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
x x x      x x x      x x x
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in
the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by
any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective
surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In
all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
137
VOL. 351, FEBRUARY 2, 2001 137
Cariño vs. Cariño
In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries earned by either
party during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided
equally between them, even if only one party earned the wages and the other did not
19
contribute thereto.   Conformably, even if the disputed “death benefits” were earned by the
deceased alone as a government employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect
thereto, entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof. As there is no allegation of bad faith
in the present case, both parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in good faith. Thus,
one-half of the subject “death benefits” under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share in
the property regime, and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by, intestate
succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court20 of Appeals relied on the case of  Vda.
de Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance System,  where the Court awarded one-half of
the retirement benefits of the deceased to the first wife and the other half, to the second wife,
holding that:
“. . . [S]ince the defendant’s first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void the conjugal
partnership established by that marriage has not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or relinquished her
status as putative heir of her husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to share in his estate upon his
death should she survive him. Consequently, whether as conjugal partner in a still subsisting marriage
or as such putative heir she has an interest in the husband’s share in the property here in dispute . . .”
And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that although the second marriage
can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting,
still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch as the conjugal partnership
formed by the second marriage was dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity, “[t]he only just and
equitable solution in this case would be to recognize the right of the second wife to her share of one-half
in the property acquired by her and her husband, and consider the
_______________
19 Id., p. 230.
20 37 SCRA 316 [1971].
138
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cariño vs. Cariño
other half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage.”
21
It should be stressed, however, that the aforecited decision is premised on the rule which
requires a prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity of marriage. This is the reason why
in the said case, the Court determined the rights of the parties in accordance with their
existing property regime. 22
In Domingo v. Court of Appeals,  however, the Court, construing Article 40 of the Family
Code, clarified that a prior and separate declaration of nullity of a marriage is an all important
condition precedent only for purposes of remarriage. That is, if a party who is previously
married wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she has to obtain first a judicial decree
declaring the first marriage void, before he or she could contract said second marriage,
otherwise the second marriage would be void. The same rule applies even if the first marriage
is patently void because the parties are not free to determine for themselves the validity or
invalidity of their marriage. However, for purposes other than to remarry, like for filing a case
for collection of sum of money anchored on a marriage claimed to be valid, no prior and
separate judicial declaration of nullity is necessary.  All that a party has to do is to present
evidence, testimonial or documentary, that would prove that the marriage from which his or
her rights flow is in fact valid. Thereupon, the court, if material to the determination of the
issues before it, will rule on the status of the marriage involved and proceed to determine the
rights of the23 parties in accordance with the applicable laws and jurisprudence. Thus, in Niñal
v. Bayadog,  the Court explained:
[T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the
same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that
may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even
if the purpose is other than to remarry. The
________________
21 Id., p. 326.
22 Supra.
 23 Supra.

139

VOL. 351, FEBRUARY 2, 2001 139

Cariño vs. Cariño

clause “on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void” in Article 40 of the
Family Code connoted that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 51263 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City ordering
petitioner to pay respondent the sum of P73,000.00 plus attorney’s fees in the amount of
P5,000.00, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632, is
hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

     Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Kapunan** and Pardo, JJ., concur.

     Puno, J., On official leave.

Petition granted, judgment reversed and set aside. Complaint dismissed.

Note.—Burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests upon petitioner and any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. (Hernandez vs. Court of
Appeals, 320 SCRA 76 [1999])

376 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Morigo vs. People
* In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada.
G.R. No. 145226. February 6, 2004.
LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Criminal Law;  Bigamy;  Elements;  In Marbella-Bobis vs. Bobis, the elements of bigamy were laid
down.—In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis we laid down the elements of bigamy thus: (1) the offender has been
legally married; (2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead; (3) he contracts a
subsequent marriage; and (4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the
existence of the first.
Same;  Same;  Same;  Declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio retroacts to the date of the
celebration of the first marriage.—There was no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of
nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned
from the date of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the
first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law, never married.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Jordan M. Pizarras and Joselito T. Lopez for petitioner.
     The Solicitor General for the People.
QUISUMBING, J.:
1 5
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the decision  dated October
2
21, 1999 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, which affirmed the judgment dated August 5,
1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol, Branch 4, in Criminal Case No. 8688. The
trial court found herein petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
bigamy and sen-
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
1 Rollo, pp. 38-44. Penned by Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria and concurred in by Associate Justices Marina
L. Buzon and Edgardo P.Cruz.
2 Records, pp. 114-119.
377
VOL. 422, FEBRUARY 6, 2004 377
Morigo vs. People
tenced him to a prison term of seven (7) months of prision correccional as minimum to six (6)
years and3 one (1) day of  prision mayor  as maximum. Also assailed in this petition is the
resolution   of the appellate court, dated September 25, 2000, denying Morigo’s motion for
reconsideration.
The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are as follows:
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor at
Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4) years (from 1974-1978).
After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other.
In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The former
replied and after an exchange of letters, they became sweethearts.
In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While in Canada,
they maintained constant communication.
Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 at the  Iglesia de Filipina
Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.
On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition for divorce
against appellant which was granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on February 17,
1992. 4
On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago   at the  Virgen sa
Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the
Regional Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The complaint seek (sic) among others,
the declaration of nullity of accused’s marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony
actually took place.
_______________
3  Rollo, pp. 46-58. Per Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz, with Associate Justices Cancio C. Garcia and Marina L. Buzon,
concurring and Eugenio S. Labitoria and Bernardo P. Abesamis, dissenting.
4 Her correct name is Maria Jececha Limbago (Italics for emphasis). See Exh. “B”, the copy of their marriage contract. Records,
p. 10.
378
378 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Morigo vs. People
On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an 6
Information   filed by the City
Prosecutor of Tagbilaran [City], with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.
The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for
judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy
case. His motion was granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for reconsideration by the
prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy case, which was docketed as Criminal Case No.
8688, herein petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereafter ensued.
On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment in Criminal Case No. 8688,
as follows:
“WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds accused Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy and sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
ranging from Seven (7) Months of Prision Correccional  as minimum to Six (6) Years and One (1) Day
of Prision Mayor as 7maximum.
“SO ORDERED.”
In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioner’s claim that 8his first
marriage to Lucia was null and void ab initio. Following Domingo v. Court of Appeals, the trial
court ruled that want of a valid marriage ceremony is not a defense in a charge of bigamy. The
parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such
be the fact but must
_______________
5 The accusatory portion of the charge sheet found in Records, p. 1, reads:
“That, on or about the 4th day of October, 1992, in the City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused being previously united in lawful marriage with Lucia Barrete on August 23, 1990 and without
the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained by Lucia from the
with Maria Jececha Limbago to the damage and prejudice of Lucia Barrete in the amount to be proved during trial. 13
“Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.” Canadian court could not be accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant to Article 15  of the
6 Rollo,
Civil Code14 and given the fact that it is contrary to public policy in this jurisdiction. Under
pp. 38-40.
7 Records, p. 119.
Article 17  of the Civil Code, a declaration of public policy cannot be rendered ineffectual by a
8 G.R. No. 104818, 17 September 1993, 226 SCRA 572. judgment promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration
15
of the appellate court’s decision, contending that the
379 doctrine in Mendiola v. People,  allows mistake upon a difficult question of law (such as the
effect of a foreign divorce decree) to be a basis for good faith. 16

VOL. 422, FEBRUARY 6, 2004 379 On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion for lack of merit.  However,
the denial was by a split vote. The ponente of the appellate court’s original decision in CA-G.R.
Morigo vs. People CR No. 20700, Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, joined in the opinion prepared by Justice
Bernardo P. Abesamis. The dissent observed that as the first marriage was validly declared
first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to void  ab initio,  then there was no first marriage to speak of. Since the date of the nullity
marry again. retroacts to the date of the first marriage and since herein petitioner was, in the eyes of the
Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court cited  Ramirez v. law, never married, he cannot be convicted beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.
9
Gmur,  which held that the court of a country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled and
in which one or both spouses may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce, has no _______________
jurisdiction to determine the matrimonial status of the parties. As such, a divorce granted by 13 Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
said court is not entitled to recognition anywhere. Debunking Lucio’s defense of good faith in binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
contracting
10
the second marriage, the trial court stressed that following  People v. 14 Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws

Bitdu,  everyone is presumed to know the law, and the fact that one does not know that his of the country in which they are executed.
act constitutes a violation of the law does not exempt him from the consequences thereof. When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines
in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution.
Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order,
No. 20700. public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was pending before the determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
appellate court, the trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the 15 G.R. Nos. 89983-84, 6 March 1992, 207 SCRA 85.
16 Rollo, p. 51.
marriage between Lucio and Lucia void  ab initio  since no marriage ceremony actually took
place. No appeal was taken from this decision, which then became final and executory. 381
On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 as follows:
“WHEREFORE, finding
11
no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. VOL. 422, FEBRUARY 6, 2004 381
“SO ORDERED.”
Morigo vs. People
In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court stressed that the
subsequent declaration of nullity of Lucio’s marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020 could not
12
acquit Lucio. The reason is that what is sought to be punished by Article 349  of The present petition raises the following issues for our resolution:
A.
_______________
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT
9 42 Phil. 855, 863 (1918). IN CRIMES PENALIZED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE, CRIMINAL INTENT IS AN
10 58 Phil. 817 (1933). INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE. COROLLARILY, WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
11 Rollo, p. 43.
12 ART. 349. Bigamy.—The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second
ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE [THE] PETITIONER’S LACK OF CRIMINAL INTENT WHEN
HE CONTRACTED THE SECOND MARRIAGE.
or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. B.
380
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULING
IN PEOPLE VS. BITDU (58 PHIL. 817) IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
380 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED C.
Morigo vs. People WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE
THAT EACH AND EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE
17
FAVORING THE INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED
the Revised Penal Code is the act of contracting a second marriage before the first marriage MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.
had been dissolved. Hence, the CA held, the fact that the first marriage was void from the
To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and
beginning is not a valid defense in a bigamy case.
if so, whether his defense of good faith is valid.
 The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon the
divorce decree of the Ontario court. He highlights the fact that he contracted the second
marriage openly and publicly, which a person intent upon committing bigamy would not be
doing. The petitioner further argues that his lack of criminal intent is material to a conviction
or acquittal in the instant case. The crime of bigamy, just like other felonies punished under
the Revised Penal Code, is mala in se, and hence, good faith and lack of criminal intent are
allowed as a complete defense. He stresses that there is a difference between the intent to
commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. Hence, it does not necessarily follow
that his intention to contract a second marriage is tantamount to an intent to commit bigamy.
_______________
17 Id., at pp. 20-21.
382
382 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Morigo vs. People
For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that good faith in the
instant case is a convenient but flimsy excuse. The Solicitor General relies upon our ruling
18
in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,  which held that bigamy can be19 successfully prosecuted provided
all the elements concur, stressing that under Article 40   of the Family Code, a judicial
declaration of nullity is a must before a party may re-marry. Whether or not the petitioner was
aware of said Article 40 is of no account as everyone is presumed to know the law. The OSG
counters that petitioner’s contention that he was in good faith because he relied on the divorce
decree of the Ontario court is negated by his act of filing Civil Case No. 6020, seeking a
judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lucia.
Before we delve into petitioner’s defense of good faith and lack of criminal intent, we must
first determine whether all the elements of bigamy are present in this case. In Marbella-Bobis
20
v. Bobis   we laid down the elements of bigamy thus:
(1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent,
the absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead;
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the
first.
Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that during the pendency of CA-G.R.
CR No. 20700, the RTC of Bohol Branch 1, handed down the following decision in Civil Case
No. 6020, to wit:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the annulment of the
marriage entered into by petitioner Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete on August 23, 1990 in Pilar, Bohol
and further directing the Local Civil Registrar of Pilar, Bohol to effect the cancellation of the marriage
contract.
_______________
18 G.R. No. 138509, 31 July 2000, 336 SCRA 747, 752-753.
19 Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
20 Supra.
383
VOL. 422, FEBRUARY 6, 2004 383
Morigo vs. People
21
“SO ORDERED.”
The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio
and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the
marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer.22The trial 23
court
thus held that the marriage is void  ab initio,  in accordance with Articles 3   and 4   of the
Family Code. As the dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, “This
simply means that there was no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity
retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes,
reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of
the celebration
24
of the first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law, never
married.”  The records show that no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court in
Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the decision had long become final and executory.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally
married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete.
Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage
being declared void ab initio, the two were never married “from the beginning.” The contract of
marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for
_______________
21 CA Rollo, p. 38.
22 Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing
officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less
than two witnesses of legal age.
23 Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio except as
stated in Article 35 (2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
24 Rollo, p. 54.
384
384 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Morigo vs. People
legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage
with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential
element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be
sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be
acquitted of the instant charge. 25
The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan.  In the
latter case, the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was likewise
obtained after the second marriage was already celebrated. We held therein that:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be
legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial
declaration is guilty
26
of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by
statutes as “void.”

It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized not just
once, but twice: first before a judge where a marriage certificate was duly issued and then
again six months later before a priest in religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage
appeared to have transpired, although later declared void ab initio.
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly
authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage
contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance
to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without
more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might
be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he
contracts a subsequent marriage.
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute
in favor of an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence
to ensure that justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present case, we held that
petitioner has not committed bigamy. Further, we also find that we need not tarry on the issue
of the validity of

_______________
25 G.R. No. 137110, 1 August 2000, 337 SCRA 122.
26 Id., at p. 124.

385

VOL. 422, FEBRUARY 6, 2004 385

People vs. Santiago

his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision, dated October 21,
1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the resolution of the
appellate court dated September 25, 2000, denying herein petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho is
ACQUITTED from the charge of BIGAMY on the ground that his guilt has not been proven
with moral certainty.
SO ORDERED.

      Puno (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr.and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Petition granted, judgment and resolution set aside.

Note.—A judge ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment

impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void. (Borja-Manzano vs.
Sanchez, 354 SCRA 1 [2001])

272 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tenebro vs. Court of Appeals
* rendered in the proper proceedings.” A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the
G.R. No. 150758. February 18, 2004.
VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner,  vs.  THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
respondent.
Civil Law; Family Code; Marriages; Evidence; The certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a
public officer in custody thereof, is admissible as the best evidence of its contents.–This being the case, the
certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a public officer in custody thereof, was admissible as the
best evidence of its contents. The marriage contract plainly indicates that a marriage was celebrated
between petitioner and Villareyes on November 10, 1986, and it should be accorded the full faith and
credence given to public documents.
Same; Same; Same;  Same;  There is absolutely no requirement in the law that a marriage contract
needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a condition precedent for the validity of a marriage; The
mere fact that no record of a marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all the requisites
for its validity are present.–The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive
evidence as to the existence of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given
greater credence than documents testifying merely as to absence of any record of the marriage, especially
considering that there is absolutely no requirement in the law that a marriage contract needs to be
submitted to the civil registrar as a condition precedent for the validity of a marriage. The mere fact that
no record of a marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are
present. There is no evidence presented by the defense that would indicate that the marriage between
Tenebro and Villareyes lacked any requisite for validity, apart from the self-serving testimony of the
accused himself.
Same;  Same;  Same;  Same;  A declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are concerned.–
Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the Family Code. What petitioner fails to realize is that a
declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely
no moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are concerned.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Bigamy; A marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage
is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of
criminal
_______________
* EN BANC.
273
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 18, 2004 273
Tenebro vs. Court of Appeals
liability for bigamy; Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes the mere act of contracting a
second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.–As a second or subsequent
marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner’s valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioner’s
marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioner’s psychological
capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage
is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of
criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes “any person
who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence
of a valid marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The requisites for the validity of a marriage are classified by the
Family Code into essential (legal capacity of the contracting parties and their consent freely given in the
presence of the solemnizing officer) and formal (authority of the solemnizing officer, marriage license, and
marriage ceremony wherein the parties personally declare their agreement to marry before the solemnizing
officer in the presence of at least two witnesses).–Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is  not  an indicator that petitioner’s marriage to
Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity. The requisites for the validity of a marriage are
classified by the Family Code into essential (legal capacity of the contracting parties and their consent
freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer) and formal (authority of the solemnizing officer,
marriage license, and marriage ceremony wherein the parties personally declare their agreement to
marry before the solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two witnesses). Under Article 5 of the
Family Code, any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the
impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38 may contract marriage.
VITUG, J., Separate Opinion:
Civil Law; Family Code; Marriages: Evidence; Bigamy; The Revised Penal Code itself does not, unlike
the rule then prevailing in Spain, require the judicial declaration of nullity of a prior void marriage before
it can be raised by way of a defense in a criminal case for bigamy; The complete nullity however of a
previously contracted marriage, being void ab initio and legally inexistent, can outrightly be a defense in
an indictment for bigamy.–Void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning, and no judicial decree
is required to establish their nullity. As early as the case of
274
274 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Tenebro vs. Court of Appeals
People vs. Aragon, this Court has underscored the fact that the Revised Penal Code itself does not,
unlike the rule then prevailing in Spain, require the judicial declaration of  nullity  of a prior void
marriage before it can be raised by way of a defense in a criminal case for bigamy. Had the law
contemplated otherwise, said the Court, “an express provision to that effect would or should have been
inserted in the law, (but that in) its absence, (the courts) are bound by (the) rule of strict interpretation”
of penal statutes. In contrast to a voidable marriage which legally exists until judicially annulled (and,
therefore, not a defense in a bigamy charge if the second marriage were contracted prior to the decree of
annulment), the complete nullity, however, of a previously contracted marriage, being void ab initio and
legally inexistent, can outrightly be a defense in an indictment for bigamy.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A civil case questioning the validity of the first marriage would not
be a prejudicial issue much in the same way that a civil case assailing a prior “voidable” marriage (being
valid until annulled) would not be a prejudicial question to the prosecution of a criminal offense for
bigamy.–Considerations, both logical and practical, would point to the fact that a “void” marriage due to
psychological incapacity remains, for all intents and purposes, to be binding and efficacious until
judicially declared otherwise. Without such marriage having first been declared a nullity (or otherwise
dissolved), a subsequent marriage could constitute bigamy. Thus, a civil case questioning the validity of
the first marriage would not be a prejudicial issue much in the same way that a civil case assailing a
prior “voidable” marriage (being valid until annulled) would not be a prejudicial question to the
prosecution of a criminal offense for bigamy.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; For a person to be held guilty of bigamy, it must, even as it needs
only, be shown that the subsequent marriage has all the essential elements of a valid marriage were it not
for the subsisting first union.–In cases where the  second marriage  is void on grounds other than the
existence of the first marriage, this Court has declared in a line of cases that no crime of bigamy is
committed. The Court has explained that for a person to be held guilty of bigamy, it must, even as it needs
only, be shown that the subsequent marriage has all the essential elements of a valid marriage, were it not
for the subsisting first union. Hence, where it is established that the second marriage has been
contracted without the necessary license and thus void, or that the accused is merely forced to enter into
the second (voidable) marriage, no criminal liability for the crime of bigamy can attach.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The judicial declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity merely nullifies the effects of the marriage but it does not negate the
fact of perfec-
275
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 18, 2004 275
Tenebro vs. Court of Appeals
tion of the bigamous marriage.–Since psychological incapacity, upon the other hand, does not relate to
an infirmity in the elements, either essential or formal, in contracting a valid marriage, the declaration of
nullity subsequent to the bigamous marriage due to that ground, without more, would be inconsequential
in a criminal charge for bigamy. The judicial declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage on the ground
of psychological incapacity merely nullifies the  effects  of the marriage but it does not negate the fact
of perfection of the bigamous marriage. Its subsequent declaration of nullity dissolves the relationship of
the spouses but, being alien to the requisite conditions for the perfection of the marriage, the judgment of
the court is no defense on the part of the offender who has entered into it.
CARPIO, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Civil Law; Family Code; Marriages; Evidence; Bigamy; Court has consistently ruled that if the second
marriage is void on grounds other than the existence of the first marriage, there is no crime of bigamy.–
For more than 75 years now, this Court has consistently ruled that if the second marriage is void on
grounds other than the existence of the first marriage, there is no crime of bigamy.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Decisions of the Court declaring there is no crime of bigamy if the
second marriage is void on grounds other than the existence of the first marriage merely apply the clear
language and intent of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.–These decisions of the Court declaring
there is no crime of bigamy if the second marriage is void on grounds other than the existence of the first
marriage merely apply the clear language and intent of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A marriage contracted by one psychologically incapacitated at the
time of the marriage is legally inexistent and void from the beginning; Such void marriage cannot
constitute a second marriage to sustain a conviction for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code.–If the second marriage is void ab initio on grounds other than the existence of the first marriage,
then legally there exists no second marriage. Article 35 of the Family Code enumerates the marriages
that are “void from the beginning.” The succeeding article, Article 36, declares that a marriage
contracted by one psychologically incapacitated “shall likewise be void.” Article 1409 of the Civil Code
declares “inexistent and void from the beginning” contracts “expressly x x x declared void by law.” Thus,
a marriage contracted by one psychologically incapacitated at the time of the marriage is  legally
inexistent  and void from the beginning. Such void marriage cannot constitute a second marriage to
sustain a conviction for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
276
276 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Tenebro vs. Court of Appeals
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Article 349 speaks of a “second or subsequent marriage” which, as
commonly understood and applied consistently by the Court, means a valid second marriage were it not
for the existence of the first marriage.–Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code does not state that it is
immaterial whether the second marriage is valid or void ab initio. This Article does not also state that
the mere act of celebration of the second marriage, while the first marriage subsists, constitutes the
crime of bigamy. Article 349 speaks of a “second or subsequent marriage” which, as commonly
understood and applied consistently by the Court, means a valid second marriage were it not for the
existence of the first marriage.
CALLEJO, SR., J., Separate Dissenting Opinion:
Civil Law; Family Code; Marriages; Evidence; Bigamy; Since the second marriage is null and void ab
initio, such marriage in contemplation of criminal law never existed and for that reason, one of the
essential elements of bigamy has disappeared.–The prosecution was burdened to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the  corpus delicti, namely, all the elements of the crime. In this case, the prosecution adduced
evidence that the petitioner contracted marriage with Hilda and during the subsistence of said marriage,
he contracted a second marriage with the private respondent. However, the petitioner adduced in
evidence the decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. AU-885 before the court  a
quo  rendered judgment convicting the petitioner of bigamy declaring null and void  ab initio  the
petitioner’s marriage with the private respondent on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity.
Since the second marriage is null and void  ab initio, such marriage in contemplation of criminal law
never existed and for that reason, one of the essential elements of bigamy has disappeared.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Urbano, Palamos & Fabros for petitioner.
     The Solicitor General for respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning the effect of the judicial declaration of
the nullity of a second or subsequent marriage, on the ground of psychological incapacity, on
an individual’s criminal liability for bigamy. We hold that the subsequent
277
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 18, 2004 277
Tenebro vs. Court of Appeals
judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity does not
retroact to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippines’ penal laws
are concerned. As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during
the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the
subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void  ab initio  on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant
Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City
Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and without
interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been
previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed
Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this _______________
previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal 1dwelling which he shared with
6 Id.,
Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes. p. 66.
7 TSN, 11 December 1996, p. 6.
On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain 8 Id., pp. 6-7.
Nilda
2
Villegas, before Judge German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 9 Id., pp. 7-8.
15.   When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from3
Villareyes whether the 10 Penned by Judge Rumoldo F. Fernandez, Rollo, pp. 156-162.

latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter, Villareyes confirmed that
petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband. 279
4 5
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner.  The Information,  which
was docketed as Criminal Case No. 013095-L, reads: VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 18, 2004 279
“That on the 10th day of April 1990, in the City of Lapu-lapu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of Tenebro vs. Court of Appeals
this Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused, having been previously united in lawful marriage with
Hilda Villareyes, and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE ACCUSED AND PRIVATE COMPLAINANT HAD
BEEN DECLARED
11
NULL AND VOID  AB INITIO  AND WITHOUT LEGAL FORCE
_______________ AND EFFECT.
1 TSN, 24 July 1995, pp. 4-11.
2 Record,
3 Record,
p. 78. After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason to disturb the
p. 84.
4 TSN, 24 July 1995, pp. 11-12; TSN, 13 September 1995, pp. 6-9. assailed judgment.
5 Record, pp. 1-2.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of Bigamy are:
278 (1) that the offender has been legally married;
(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the
278 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
Tenebro vs. Court of Appeals
12
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.

marriage with LETICIA ANCAJAS, which second or subsequent marriage of the accused has all the Petitioner’s assignment of errors presents a two-tiered defense, in which he (1) denies the
essential requisites for validity were it not for the subsisting first marriage. existence of his first marriage to Villareyes, and (2) argues that the declaration of the nullity
“CONTRARY TO LAW.” of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, which is an alleged indicator
6 that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity, retroacts to the date on
When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of “not guilty.” During the trial, petitioner admitted 13
which the second marriage was celebrated.   Hence, petitioner argues that all four of the
having cohabited with Villareyes from 1984-1988, with whom he sired two children. However, elements of the crime of bigamy are absent, and prays for his acquittal.
14

he denied that he and Villareyes were validly married 7

to each other, claiming that no Petitioner’s defense must fail on both counts.
marriage ceremony took place to solemnize their union.  He alleged that he signed a marriage First,  the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both documentary and oral, to prove
contract merely8
to enable her to get the allotment from his office in connection with his work the existence of the first marriage between petitioner and Villareyes. Documentary evidence
as a seaman.   He further testified that he requested his brother to verify from the Civil presented was in the form of: (1) a copy of a marriage contract between Tenebro and
Register in Manila whether there was 9
any marriage at all between him and Villareyes, but Villareyes, dated November 10, 1986, which, as seen on the document, was solemnized at the
there was no record of said marriage. Manila City Hall before Rev. Julieto Torres, a Minister of the Gospel, and certified to by the
On November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, Branch 54, rendered a 15
Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila;  and (2) a handwritten
decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to four (4) years and two (2) months
_______________
of  prision correccional,
10
as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day  of prision mayor, as
maximum.   On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. 11 Rollo, p. 7.
12 Reyes,
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit. L.B., THE REVISED PENAL CODE, Book Two, 14th ed., 1998, p. 907.
13 Rollo, pp. 7-16.
Hence, the instant petition for review on the following assignment of errors: 14 Id., pp. 16-18.
15 Record, p. 85.
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND THIS ERROR IS
CORRECTIBLE IN THIS APPEAL–WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE 280
HONORABLE COURT A QUO CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME
OF BIGAMY, DESPITE THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE AND
INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE. 280 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF Tenebro vs. Court of Appeals
BIGAMY DESPITE CLEAR PROOF THAT THE
letter from Villareyes to Ancajas
16
dated July 12, 1994, informing Ancajas that Villareyes and
Tenebro were legally married.
To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, petitioner17 presented (1) a certification
issued by the National Statistics Office dated October 7, 1995;18  and (2) a certification issued
by the City Civil Registry of Manila, dated February 3, 1997.   Both these documents attest
that the respective issuing offices have no record of a marriage celebrated between Veronica B.
Tenebro and Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986.
To our mind, the documents presented by the defense cannot adequately assail the
marriage contract, which in itself would already have been sufficient to establish the existence
of a marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.
All three of these documents fall in the category of  public documents, and the Rules of
Court provisions relevant to public documents are applicable to all. Pertinent to the marriage
contract, Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court reads as follows:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record.–When the original of a document
is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office,  its contents may be proved by a
certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof. (Emphasis ours)
This being the case, the certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a public officer in
custody thereof, was admissible as the best evidence of its contents. The marriage contract
plainly indicates that a marriage was celebrated between petitioner and Villareyes on
November 10, 1986, and it should be accorded the full faith and credence given to public
documents.
Moreover, an examination of the wordings of the certification issued by the National
Statistics Office on October 7, 1995 and that issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila on
February 3, 1997 would plainly show that neither document attests as a positive fact that there
was no marriage celebrated  between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on
November 10, 1986. Rather, the documents merely attest that the respective issuing offices
have no record of such a marriage. Documentary evidence as to the absence
_______________
16 Record,
p. 84.
17 Record, p. 148.
18 Record, p. 149.
281
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 18, 2004 281
Tenebro vs. Court of Appeals
of a record  is quite different from documentary evidence as to the  absence of a marriage
ceremony, or documentary evidence as to the invalidity of the marriage between Tenebro and
Villareyes.
The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive evidence as to the
existence of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given greater
credence than documents testifying merely as to  absence of any record of the
marriage,  especially considering that there is absolutely no requirement in the law that a
marriage contract needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a condition precedent for the
validity of a marriage. The mere fact that no record of a marriage exists does not invalidate
19
the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present.   There is no evidence
presented by the defense that would indicate that the marriage between Tenebro and
Villareyes lacked any requisite for validity, apart from the self-serving testimony of the
accused himself. Balanced against this testimony are Villareyes’ letter, Ancajas’ testimony
that petitioner informed her of the existence of the valid first marriage, and petitioner’s own
conduct, which would all tend to indicate that the first marriage had all the requisites for
validity.
Finally, although the accused claims that he took steps to verify the non-existence of the
first marriage to Villareyes by requesting his brother to validate such purported non-
existence, it is significant to note that the certifications issued by the National Statistics Office
and the City Civil Registry of Manila are dated October 7, 1995 and February 3, 1997,
respectively. Both documents, therefore, are dated after the accused’s marriage to his second
wife, private respondent in this case.
As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient evidence presented by the prosecution to
prove the first and second requisites for the crime of bigamy.
The second
20
tier of petitioner’s defense hinges on the effects of the subsequent judicial
declaration  of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
_______________
19  Mariategui v. Court of Appeals,  G.R. No. 57062, 24 January 1992,  205 SCRA 337, 343, citing  People v.
Borromeo, 218 Phil. 122, 126; 133 SCRA 106 [1984]).
20 Decision dated November 20, 1995, penned by Judge Epifanio C. Llano of the Regional Trial Court of Argao,
Cebu, Branch 26, in Civil Case No. AV-885 (Annex “C,” Rollo, p. 43).
282
282 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tenebro vs. Court of Appeals
Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial declaration retroacts to the date of the
celebration of the marriage to Ancajas. As such, he argues that, since his marriage to Ancajas
21
was subsequently declared void ab initio, the crime of bigamy was not committed.
This argument is not impressed with merit.
Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the Family Code. What petitioner
fails to realize is that a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are
concerned.
As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner’s valid
marriage to Villareyes, petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null and22 void  ab
initio  completely regardless of petitioner’s psychological capacity or incapacity.   Since a
marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is  automatically  void, the
nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability
for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes “any person who
shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.” A plain reading of the law, therefore, would
indicate that the provision penalizes  the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during
the subsistence of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy  had already been
consummated. To our mind, there is no cogent reason for distinguishing between a subsequent
marriage that is null and void purely  because  it is a second or subsequent marriage, and a
subsequent marriage that is null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity, at least
insofar as criminal liability for bigamy is concerned. The State’s penal laws protecting the
institution of marriage are in recognition of the sacrosanct character of this special contract
between spouses, and punish an individual’s deliberate disregard of the permanent char-
_______________ contracted the second marriage with the required license before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of
21 Record,pp. 16-18.
the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least two witnesses.
22 Family Code, Art. 41. Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as
283 the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is
not without legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or born28 before the
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 18, 2004 283 judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered legitimate.   There is
therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio,
Tenebro vs. Court of Appeals may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal
liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the State’s penal laws on bigamy
acter of the special bond between spouses, which petitioner has undoubtedly done. completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract
Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple
psychological incapacity is  notan indicator that petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas lacks the marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and
essential requisites for validity. The requisites for the validity of a marriage are classified by commitment.
the Family Code into essential (legal capacity of the contracting parties and their consent As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for the crime of bigamy are present in
23
freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer)   and formal (authority of the this case, and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
solemnizing officer, marriage license, and marriage ceremony wherein the parties personally As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record, petitioner contracted
declare their agreement to marry before the solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two marriage a  third  time, while his marriages to Villareyes and Ancajas were  both  still
24
witnesses).   Under Article 5 of the Family Code, any male or female of the age of eighteen subsisting. Although this is irrelevant in the determination of the accused’s guilt for purposes
years or upwards 27
25
not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37  and 38   may
26
of this particular case, the act of the accused displays a deliberate disregard for the sanctity of
contract marriage. marriage, and the State does not look kindly on such activities. Marriage is a special contract,
the key characteristic of which is its permanence. When an individual manifests a deliberate
pattern of flouting the foundation of the State’s basic social institution, the State’s criminal
_______________
laws on bigamy step in.
23 Family Code, Art. 2.
24 Family Code, Art. 3; Vitug, Civil Law and Jurisprudence, 1993 Edition, pp. 119-120, citing the Family Code, _______________
Articles 2 and 3.
25 Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning, whether the relationship 28 Family Code, Art. 54.
between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate:
285
(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and
(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full- or half-blood.
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 18, 2004 285
26 Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy:
Tenebro vs. Court of Appeals
(1) Between collateral blood relatives; whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree;
(2) Between step-parents and stepchildren;
(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law; Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for the crime of bigamy
(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child; is prision mayor, which has a duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years.
(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and theadopted child; There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the same shall be imposed in its
(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter; medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner shall be entitled to a
(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;
minimum term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree,  i.e.,  prision
(8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and
correccional which has a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Hence, the
(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other person’s spouse or his or
Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the decision of the trial court which sentenced petitioner to
her own spouse. suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years, and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.
27 Valdes v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 102, Quezon City, G.R. No. 122749, 31 July 1996, 260 SCRA 221. WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The
284
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21636, convicting petitioner
Veronico Tenebro of the crime of Bigamy and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8)
284 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Tenebro vs. Court of Appeals
     Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage were satisfied      Puno, J., I join the opinion of J. Vitug.
by petitioner and Ancajas. Both were over eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily      Vitug, J., Please see separate opinion.
     Quisumbing, J., I join the dissent in view of void nuptia.
      Carpio, J., See Dissenting Opinion. interpretation” of penal statutes. In contrast to a voidable marriage which legally exists until
     Austria-Martinez, J., I join the dissent of J. Carpio. judicially annulled (and, therefore, not a defense in a4 bigamy charge if the second marriage
     Carpio-Morales, J., I join the dissent of J. Carpio. were contracted prior to the decree of annulment),   the complete nullity, however, of a
     Callejo, Sr., J., See my Separate Dissent. previously contracted marriage, being void ab initio and legally inexistent, can outrightly be a
     Tinga, J., I join Mr. Justice Carpio’s dissent. defense in an indictment for bigamy.
It has been held that, by virtue of Article 40 of the Family Code, a person may be convicted
286 of bigamy although the first marriage is ultimately adjudged void ab initio if, at the time the
second marriage 5
is contracted, there has as yet been no judicial declaration of nullity of the
286 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED prior marriage.  I maintain strong reservations to this ruling. Article 40 of the Family Code
reads:
Tenebro vs. Court of Appeals
“Article 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.”

SEPARATE OPINION
VITUG, J.:
Veronico Tenebro has been charged with bigamy for contracting, while still being married to
Hilda Villareyes, a second marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas. Tenebro argues
that since his second marriage with Ancajas has ultimately been declared void ab initio on the
ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity, he should be acquitted for the crime of bigamy.
The offense of bigamy is committed when one contracts “a second or subsequent marriage
before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively
1
dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.”   Bigamy presupposes a valid prior marriage and a subsequent marriage,
contracted during the subsistence of the prior union, which would have been binding were it
not for its being bigamous.
It is only “for purposes of remarriage” that the law has expressed that the absolute nullity of
the previous marriage may be invoked “on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void.” It may not be amiss to state that under 6
the regime of the Civil Code
of 1950, the Supreme Court in  Wiegel vs. Judge Sempio-Diy,   has held that a subsequent
marriage of one of the spouses of a prior void marriage is itself (the subsequent marriage) void
if it were contracted before a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage. Although
this pronouncement
7
has been abandoned in a later decision of the court in  Yap vs. Court of
Appeals,   the Family Code, however, has seen it fit to adopt the  Wiegelrule but only  for
purposes of remarriage  which is just to say that the subsequent marriage shall itself be
considered void. There is no clear indication to conclude that the Family Code has
_______________
4 See People
vs. Mendoza, 50 O.G. 4767.
5 Mercadovs. Tan, 337 SCRA 122 (2000); Te vs. Court of Appeals, 346 SCRA 327 (2000).
6 143 SCRA 499 (1986).

Would the absolute nullity of either the first or the second marriage, prior to its judicial 7 145 SCRA 229 (1986).

declaration as being void, constitute a valid defense in a criminal action for bigamy?
288
I believe that, except for a void marriage on account of the psychological incapacity of a
party or both parties to the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code (as so hereinafter
explained), the answer must be in the affirmative. Void marriages are inexistent
2
from the very 288 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
beginning, and no judicial decree is required to establish their nullity.   As early as the case
3
of  People vs. Aragon, this Court has underscored the fact that  the Revised Penal Code itself Tenebro vs. Court of Appeals
does not, unlike the rule then prevailing in Spain, require the judicial declaration of nullity of a
prior void marriage before it can be raised by way of a defense in a criminal case for bigamy. amended or intended to amend the 8Revised Penal Code or to abandon the settled and
Had the law contemplated otherwise, said the Court, “an express provision to that effect would prevailing jurisprudence on the matter.
or should have been inserted in the law, (but that in) its absence, (the courts) are bound by A void marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is a class by itself. The provision has
(the) rule of strict been taken from Canon Law primarily9 to reconcile the grounds for nullity of marriage under
civil law with those of church laws.   The “psychological incapacity to comply” with the
_______________ essential marital obligations of the spouses is completely distinct from other grounds for
1 Article
nullity which are confined to the essential or formal requisites of a marriage, such as lack of
349, Revised Penal Code.
2 Odayat vs. Amante, 77 SCRA 338 (1977), see also People vs. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033.
legal capacity or disqualification of the contracting parties, want of consent, absence of a
3 100 Phil. 1033. marriage license, or the like.
The effects of a marriage attended by psychological incapacity of a party or the parties
287 thereto may be said to have the earmarks of a voidable, more than a void, marriage, remaining
to be valid until it is judicially decreed to be a nullity. Thus, Article 54 of the Family Code
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 18, 2004 287 considers children conceived or born of such a void marriage before its judicial declaration of
nullity to be legitimate similar to the rule on a voidable marriage. It is expected, even as I
Tenebro vs. Court of Appeals believe it safe to assume, that the spouses’ rights and obligations, property regime and
successional rights would continue unaffected, as if it were a voidable marriage, unless and
until the marriage is judicially declared void for basically two reasons: First, psychological
incapacity, a newly-added ground for the nullity of a marriage under the Family Code,
10
 10
breaches neither the essential nor the formal requisites of a valid marriage;  and second, unlike
the other
_______________
8 I
might add, parenthetically, that the necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage even for
purposes of remarriage should refer merely to cases when it can be said that the marriage, at least ostensibly, has
taken place. For instance, no such judicial declaration of nullity would yet be required when either or both parties
have not at all given consent thereto that verily results in a “no” marriage situation or when the prior “marriage” is
between persons of the same sex.
9 Deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee, 9 August 1996.
10 Art. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites are present:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female; and
(2) Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer. (53a)
289
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 18, 2004 289
Tenebro vs. Court of Appeals
grounds for nullity of marriage (i.e., relationship, minority of the parties, lack of license,
mistake in the identity of the parties) which are capable of relatively easy demonstration,
11
psychological incapacity, however, being a mental state, may not so readily be as evident.  It
would have been logical for the Family Code to consider such a marriage explicitly voidable
rather than void if it were not for an apparent attempt to make it closely coincide with the
Canon Law rules and nomenclature.
Indeed, a void marriage due to psychological incapacity appears to merely differ from a
voidable marriage in that, unlike the latter, it is not convalidated by either cohabitation or
prescription. It might be recalled that prior to Republic Act No. 8533, further amending the
Family Code, an action or defense of absolute nullity of marriages falling under Article 36,
celebrated before the effectivity of the Code, could prescribe in ten years following the
effectivity of the Family Code. The initial provision of the ten-year period of prescription seems
to betray a real consciousness by the framers that marriages falling under Article 36 are truly
meant to be inexistent.
Considerations, both logical and practical, would point to the fact that a “void” marriage
due to psychological incapacity remains, for all intents and purposes, to be binding and
efficacious until judicially declared otherwise. Without such marriage having first been
declared a nullity (or otherwise dissolved), a subsequent marriage could constitute bigamy.
Thus, a civil case questioning the
_______________
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing
officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less
than two witnesses of legal age. (53a, 55a)
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as
stated in Article 35(2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. (n)
11 One might observe that insanity, which could be worse than psychological incapacity, merely renders a marriage
voidable, not void.
290
290 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tenebro vs. Court of Appeals
validity of the  first  marriage would not be a prejudicial issue much in the same way that a
civil case assailing a prior “voidable” marriage (being valid until annulled) would not be a
prejudicial question to the prosecution of a criminal offense for bigamy.
In cases where the second marriage is void on grounds other than the existence of the12 first
marriage, this Court has declared in a line of cases that no crime of bigamy is committed.  The
Court has explained that for a person to be held guilty of bigamy, it must, even as it needs
only, be shown that the subsequent marriage has all the essential elements of a valid
marriage, were it not for the subsisting first union. Hence, where it is established that the
13
second marriage has been contracted without the necessary license and 14
thus void,  or that the
accused is merely forced to enter into the second (voidable) marriage,  no criminal liability for
the crime of bigamy can attach. In both and like instances, however, the lapse refers to the
elements required for contracting a valid marriage. If, then, all the requisites for the
perfection of the contract of marriage, freely and voluntarily entered into, are shown to be
extant, the criminal liability for bigamy can unassailably arise.
Since psychological incapacity, upon the other hand, does not relate to an infirmity in the
elements, either essential or formal, in contracting a valid marriage, the declaration of nullity
subsequent to the bigamous marriage due to that ground, without more, would be
inconsequential in a criminal charge for bigamy. The judicial declaration of nullity of a
bigamous marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity merely nullifies the effects of the
marriage but it does not negate the fact of perfection of the bigamous marriage. Its subsequent
declaration of nullity dissolves the relationship of the spouses but, being alien to the requisite
conditions for the perfection of the marriage, the judgment of the court is no defense on the
part of the offender who has entered into it.
Accordingly, I vote to dismiss the petition.
_______________
12 De la Cruz vs. Hon. Ejercito, G.R. No. L-40895, 6 November 1975, 68 SCRA 1; Merced vs. Hon. Diez, et al., 109
Phil. 155; Zapanta vs. Hon. Montesa, et al., 114 Phil. 1227; 4 SCRA 510; People vs. Mora Dumpo, 62 Phil. 246; People
vs. Lara, 51 O.G. 4079.
13 People vs. Lara, supra.
14 De la Cruz vs. Hon. Ejercito, supra; Merced vs. Hon. Diez, supra.
291
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 18, 2004 291
Tenebro vs. Court of Appeals
DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO, J.:
I dissent from the decision of the majority, as expressed in the ponencia  of Justice Consuelo
Ynares-Santiago. The majority opinion reverses a well-settled doctrine, established in a long
line of decisions, applying Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The reversal finds no support
in the plain and ordinary meaning of Article 349. The reversal also violates the constitutional
guarantees of the accused and the separation of powers.
The majority opinion makes the following ruling:
We hold that the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity does not retroact to the date of celebration of the marriage insofar
as the Philippines’ penal laws are concerned. As such, an individual who contracts a second
or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for
bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second marriage is voidab
initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.
The issue may be stated thus: if the second marriage is void ab initio on grounds other than
the existence of the first marriage such as psychological incapacity, is there a crime of bigamy?
In the present case, the prosecution filed the information for bigamy against the accused
Veronico Tenebro before the judicial declaration of nullity of his second marriage. However,
before his conviction for bigamy by the trial court, another court judicially declared his second
marriage void ab initio because of psychological incapacity.
The majority opinion is premised on two basic assertions.  First, the mere act of entering
into a second marriage contract while the first marriage subsists consummates the crime of
bigamy, even if the second marriage is void ab initio on grounds other than the mere existence
of the first marriage.  Second, a marriage declared by law void  ab initio,  and judicially
confirmed void from the beginning; is deemed valid for the purpose of a criminal prosecution
for bigamy. I shall examine the correctness of these assertions.
The majority opinion holds that the validity of the second marriage is immaterial and
the mere act of entering into a second
292
292 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tenebro vs. Court of Appeals
marriage, even if void  ab initio  on grounds other than the existence of the first
marriage, consummates the crime of bigamy. Thus, the majority opinion states:
As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner’s valid marriage to
Villareyes, petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null and void  ab initiocompletely regardless of
petitioner’s psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a
valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the
avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes
“any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been
legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.”  A plain reading of the  law, therefore, would
indicate that the provision penalizes  the  mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the
subsistence of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy  had already been consummated.  To our
mind, there is no cogent reason for distinguishing between a subsequent marriage that is null
and void purely because  it is a second or subsequent marriage, and a subsequent marriage
that is null and voidon the ground of psychological incapacity, at least insofar as  criminal
liability for bigamy is concerned. x x x. (Bold underscoring supplied; italics in the original)
The majority opinion concedes that the second marriage in the present case is void  ab
initio, even without need of judicial declaration. The majority expressly admits that the second
marriage does not legally exist, and thus in legal contemplation never took place at all.
Nevertheless, the majority holds that the second marriage is a marriage that exists in law
sufficient to convict the accused of the crime of bigamy.
The majority opinion holds that a judicial declaration of nullity of Tenebro’s second
marriage is immaterial in a prosecution for the crime of bigamy. Such judicial declaration that
the second marriage is void from the beginning is absolutely of no moment.
Prior to appellant Tenebro’s conviction by the trial court of the crime of bigamy, his second
marriage was in fact judicially declared void  ab initio  on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
293
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 18, 2004 293
Tenebro vs. Court of Appeals
Tenebro could count in his favor not only an express provision of law declaring his second
marriage void  ab initio,  he also had a judicial confirmation of such nullity even prior to his
conviction of bigamy by the trial court. The majority opinion, however, simply brushes aside
the law and the judicial confirmation. The majority opinion holds that the fact that the second
marriage is void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity, and judicially declared as
void from the very beginning, is immaterial in a bigamy charge.
For more than 75 years now, this Court has consistently ruled that if the second marriage
is void on grounds other than the existence of the first marriage, there is no crime1 of bigamy.
The Court first enunciated this doctrine in the 1935 case of People v. Mora Dumpo,  where the
Court held:
Moro Hassan and Mora Dumpo have been legally married according to the rites and practices of the
Mohammedan religion. Without this marriage being dissolved, it is alleged that Dumpo contracted
another marriage with Moro Sabdapal after which the two lived together as husband and wife. Dumpo
was prosecuted for and convicted of the crime of bigamy in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga and
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty with a maximum of eight years and one day of prision mayor and
a minimum of two years, four months and twenty-one days of prision correccional, with costs. From this
judgment the accused interposed an appeal. The records of the case disclose that it has been established
by the defense, without the prosecution having presented any objection nor evidence to the contrary, that
the alleged second marriage of the accused is null and void according to Mohammedan rites on the
ground that her father had not given his consent thereto.
xxx
It is an essential element of the crime of bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having
all the essential requisites, would be  valid were it not for the subsistence of the first
marriage. It appearing that the marriage alleged to have been contracted by the accused with Sabdapal,
her former marriage with Hassan being undissolved, cannot be considered as such, there is no
justification to hold her guilty of the crime charged in the information. (Emphasis supplied)
_______________
1 62 Phil. 246 (1935).
294
294 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tenebro vs. Court of Appeals
2
In  People v.  Mendoza,   decided in 1954, the Court acquitted the accused of bigamy on the
ground that the first marriage was void having been contracted during the subsistence of a
still earlier marriage. The Court held:
The following facts are undisputed: On August 5, 1936, the appellant and Jovita de Asis were married in
Marikina, Rizal. On May 14, 1941, during the subsistence of the first marriage, the appellant was
married to Olga Lema in the City of Manila. On February 2, 1943, Jovita de Asis died. On August 19,
1949, the appellant contracted another marriage with Carmencita Panlilio in Calamba, Laguna. This
last marriage gave rise to his prosecution for and conviction of the crime of bigamy.
The appellant contends that his marriage with Olga Lema on May 14, 1941 is null and void and,
therefore, non-existent, having been contracted while his first marriage with Jovita de Asis August 5,
1936 was still in effect, and that his third marriage to Carmencita Panlilio on August 19, 1949 cannot be
the basis of a charge for bigamy because it took place after the death of Jovita de Asis. The Solicitor
General, however, argues that, even assuming that appellant’s second marriage to Olga Lema is void, he
is not exempt from criminal liability, in the absence of a previous judicial annulment of said bigamous
marriage; and the case of People vs. Cotas, 40 Off. Gaz., 3134, is cited.
xxx
In the case at bar, it is admitted that appellant’s second marriage with Olga Lema was contracted
during the existence of his first marriage with Jovita de Asis. Section 29 of the marriage law (act 3613),
in force at the time the appellant contracted his second marriage in 1941, provides as follows:
Illegal marriages.–Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of
such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be “illegal and void from its performance, unless.
(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;
(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the
spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or the absentee being generally considered as dead
and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, the
marriage so contracted being valid in either case until declared null and void by a competent court.
_______________
2 95 Phil. 845 (1954).
295
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 18, 2004 295
Tenebro vs. Court of Appeals
This statutory provision plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the
lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to
establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annullable marriages. There is here no pretense that
appellant’s second marriage with Olga Lema was contracted in the belief that the first spouse, Jovita de
Asis, has been absent for seven consecutive years or generally considered as dead, so as to render said
marriage valid until declared null and void by a competent court.
Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed and the defendantappellant acquitted, with costs  de
officio so ordered.
3
In People v. Lara,  decided in 1955, the Court acquitted the accused of bigamy on the ground
that his second marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. Declared the Court in Lara:
It is not disputed that the [accused] and Anacoreta Dalanida were married on July 1, 1947 x x x. Neither
is it denied that on August 18, 1951, while the marriage just referred to was subsisting, appellant
entered into a second marriage, this time with Josefa A. Rosales x x x.
In connection with the contract [for the second marriage], undisputed documentary evidence show
that x x x it was only on August 19, 1951, that the marriage license x x x was issued x x x.
We are x x x of the opinion that the evidence in this case virtually beyond reasonable doubt that the
marriage license x x x was issued x x x on the date appearing thereon x x x namely, August 19, 1951.
xxx
Article 53 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, x x x which “no marriage shall be solemnized,” one of
them being a marriage license duly issued at the time of the celebration of the marriage x x x. Related to
this point, Article 80(3) of the new Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage performed without the
corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate consequence flowing
from the fact that the license is the essence of the marriage contract.
Under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code there can be possible conviction for bigamy without
proof that the accused had voluntarily contracted a second marriage during the subsistence of his first
marriage with another person. Such was the interpretation given by the Court in  People v. Mora
Dumpo that: “It is an essential element of the crime of bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having
all the essential requisites, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.”
_______________
3 51 O.G. 4079, 14 February 1955.
296
296 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tenebro vs. Court of Appeals
xxx
As to its validity, the marriage should be examined as of the time it was entered into. On that precise
date all the essential requisites must be present x x x. In the case before us, the evidence discloses that
the marriage preceded the issuance of the marriage license by one day. The subsequent issuance of the
license cannot in law, to our mind, render valid what in the eyes of the law itself was void from the
beginning x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
4
In the 1960 case of  Merced v. Diez,   the Court held that a prior case for annulment of the
second marriage on the ground of vitiated consent constitutes
5
a prejudicial question
warranting the suspension of the criminal case for bigamy.  The Court declared:
Before this Court the sole question raised is whether an action to annul the second marriage is a
prejudicial question in a prosecution for bigamy.
xxx
In order that a person may be held guilty of the crime of bigamy, the second and subsequent marriage
must have all the essential elements of a valid marriage, were it not for the subsistence of the first
marriage. This was the ruling of this Court in People vs. Dumpo, 62 Phil. 246, x x x. One of the essential
elements of a valid marriage is that the consent thereto of the contracting parties must be freely and
voluntarily given. Without the element of consent a marriage would be illegal and void. (Section 29, Act
No. 3613, otherwise known as the Marriage Law.) But the question of invalidity cannot ordinarily be
decided in the criminal action for bigamy but in a civil action for annulment. Since the validity of the
second marriage, subject of the action for bigamy, cannot be determined in the criminal case and since
prosecution for bigamy does not lie unless the elements of the second marriage appear to exist, it is
necessary that a
_______________
4 109 Phil. 155 (1960).
5 In the 1954 case of People v. Aragon (94 Phil. 357), the Court refused to consider as a prejudicial question the action to annul
the second marriage because the accused was the one who employed force and intimidation on the woman in the second marriage.
The Court said that the accused “may not use his own malfeasance to defeat the action based on his criminal act.” The Court also
said that if the woman in the second marriage “were she the one charged with bigamy, [she] could perhaps raise said force or
intimidation as a defense, because she may not be considered as having freely and voluntarily committed the act if she was forced
to the marriage by intimidation.”
297
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 18, 2004 297
Tenebro vs. Court of Appeals
decision in a civil action to the effect that the second marriage contains all the essentials of a marriage
must first be secured.
We have, therefore, in the case at bar, the issue of the validity of the second marriage, which must be
determined before hand in the civil action, before the criminal action can proceed. We have a situation
where the issue of the validity of the second marriage can be determined or must first be determined in
the civil action before the criminal action for bigamy can be prosecuted. The question of the validity of the
second marriage is, therefore, a prejudicial question, because determination of the validity of the second
marriage is determinable in the civil action and must precede the criminal action for bigamy. (Emphasis
supplied)
6
In Zapanta v. Montesa,  decided in 1962, the Court likewise suspended the proceedings in the
criminal case for bigamy because of a subsequent civil action filed by the accused to annul his
second marriage on the ground of vitiated consent. The Court ruled:
We have heretofore defined a prejudicial question as that which arises in a case, the resolution of which
is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another
tribunal (People vs. Aragon, G.R. No. L-5930, February 17, 1954). The prejudicial question–we further
said–must be determinative of the case before the court, and jurisdiction to try the same must be lodged
in another court (People vs. Aragon, supra). These requisites are present in the case at bar. Should the
question for annulment of the second marriage pending in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga
prosper on the ground that, according to the evidence, petitioner’s consent thereto was obtained by
means of duress, force and intimidation, it is obvious that his act was involuntary and can not be the
basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy with which he was charged in the Court of First Instance
of Bulacan. Thus the issue involved in the action for the annulment of the second marriage is
determinative of petitioner’s guilt or innocence of the crime of bigamy. On the other hand, there can be
no question that the annulment of petitioner’s marriage with respondent Yco on the grounds relied upon
in the complaint filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga is within the jurisdiction of said court.
7
In  De la Cruz v. Ejercito,   decided in 1975, the Court, speaking through Justice Ramon C.
Aquino, dismissed a bigamy case against the accused in view of a final judgment the accused
obtained annulling her second marriage on the ground of vitiated
_______________
6 No. L-14534, 28 February 1962, 4 SCRA 510.
7 No. L-40895, 6 November 1975, 68 SCRA 1.
298
298 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tenebro vs. Court of Appeals
consent. The Court, ruling that the annulment of the second mar
riage rendered the criminal case “moot and untenable,” explained:
The issue is whether the bigamy case became moot or untenable after the second marriage, on which the
prosecution for bigamy is based, was annulled.
The City Fiscal of Angeles City contends that the lower court acted correctly in denying the motion to
dismiss the bigamy charge. He argues that the decision in the annulment case should be set up as a
defense by Milagros de la Cruz during the trial and that it would not justify the outright dismissal of the
criminal case.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General manifested that the stand of Milagros de la Cruz should be
sustained because one element of bigamy is that the alleged second marriage, having all the requisites,
would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage (People vs. Mora Dumpo, 62 Phil. 246,
248; Merced vs. Hon. Diez, 109 Phil. 155; Zapanta vs. Montesa, 114 Phil. 1227).
We hold that the finding in the annulment case that the second marriage contracted by Milagros de la
Cruz with Sergeant Gaccino was a nullity is determinative of her innocence and precludes the rendition of
a verdict that she committed bigamy.  To try the criminal case in the face of such a finding would be
unwarranted. (Emphasis supplied)
These decisions of the Court declaring there is no crime of bigamy if the second marriage is
void on grounds other than the existence of the first marriage merely apply the clear language
and intent of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. This Article provides as follows:
Article 349. Bigamy.–The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who
shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the essential elements of the crime of bigamy
are:
1. The offender is legally married;
2. The marriage is not legally dissolved;
3. The offender contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
4. The second or subsequent marriage is valid except for the existence of the first
marriage.
299
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 18, 2004 299
Tenebro vs. Court of Appeals
The first three elements reiterate the language of the law. The lastelement, the validity of the
second marriage except for the existence of the first marriage, necessarily follows from the
language ofthe law that the offender contracts a “second or subsequent marriage.”
If the second marriage is void  ab initio  on grounds other than the existence of the first
marriage, then legally there exists no second marriage. Article 35 of the Family Code
enumerates the marriages that are “void from the beginning.” The succeeding article, Article
36, declares that a marriage contracted by one psychologically incapacitated “shall likewise be
void.” Article 1409 of the Civil Code declares “inexistent and void from the beginning”
contracts “expressly x x x declared void by law.” Thus, a marriage contracted by one
psychologically incapacitated at the time of the marriage is legally inexistent and void from the
beginning. Such void marriage cannot constitute a second marriage to sustain a conviction for
bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
If the second marriage is void solely because of the existence of the first marriage, the
nullity of the second marriage proceeds from its illegality or bigamous nature. However, if the
second marriage is void on grounds other than the existence of the first marriage, the nullity
does not proceed from its illegality or bigamous nature. The first situation results in the crime
of bigamy while the second does not. This is clear from Article 1411 of the Civil Code which
provides:
     Article 1411. When the nullity proceeds from the illegality of the cause or object of the contract, and
the act constitutes a criminal act, both parties being in pari delicto, they shall have no action against
each other, and both shall be prosecuted. x x x.
     The rule shall be applicable when only one of the parties is guilty;
x x x.
Thus, if the second marriage is void because of psychological incapacity, the nullity does not
proceed from an illegal or criminal cause, and no prosecution could ensue. However, if the
second marriage is void solely because of the existence of the first marriage, the nullity
proceeds from an illegal or criminal cause, and thus prosecution should follow.
The plain and ordinary meaning of Article 349 could only be that the second marriage must
be valid were it not for the existence of
300
300 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tenebro vs. Court of Appeals
the first marriage. This has been the consistent interpretation of the Court for more than
seven decades since the enactment of the Revised Penal Code. Text writers in criminal law
have never entertained or advanced any other interpretation. There is no cogent reason to
depart from the well-established jurisprudence on Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, there is doubt on the interpretation of Article
349, substantive due process of law requires a strict interpretation of Article 349 against the
State and a liberal interpretation in favor of the accused. The majority opinion reverses this
principle and interprets Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code strictly against the accused and
liberally in favor of the State.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code does not state that it is immaterial whether the
second marriage is valid or void ab initio. This Article does not also state that the mere act of
celebration of the second marriage, while the first marriage subsists, constitutes the crime of
bigamy. Article 349 speaks of a “second or subsequent marriage” which, as commonly
understood and applied consistently by the Court, means a valid second marriage were it not
for the existence of the first marriage.
To hold that the validity of the second marriage is immaterial, as the majority opinion so
holds, would interpret Article 349 too liberally in favor of the State and too strictly against the
accused. This violates the 8well-settled principle of statutory construction that the Court
declared in People v. Garcia:
Criminal and penal statutes must be strictly construed, that is, they cannot be enlarged or extended by
intendment, implication, or by any equitable considerations. In other words, the language cannot be
enlarged beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms in order to carry into effect the general purpose for
which the statute was enacted. Only those persons, offenses, and penalties, clearly included, beyond any
reasonable doubt, will be considered within the statute’s operation. They must come clearly within both
the spirit and the letter of the statute, and where there is any reasonable doubt, it must be resolved in
favor of the person accused of violating the statute; that is, all questions in doubt will be resolved in favor
of those from whom the penalty is sought. (Statutory Construction, Crawford, pp. 460-462.)
_______________
8 85 Phil. 651 (1950).
301
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 18, 2004 301
Tenebro vs. Court of Appeals
The principle of statutory construction that penal laws are liberally construed in favor of the
accused and9 strictly against the State is deeply rooted in the need to protect constitutional
guarantees.  This principle serves notice to the public that only those acts clearly and plainly
prohibited in penal laws are subject to criminal sanctions. To expand penal laws beyond their
clear and plain meaning is no longer fair notice to the public. Thus, the principle insures
observance of due process of law. The principle also prevents discriminatory application of
penal laws. State prosecutors have no power to broaden arbitrarily the application of penal
laws beyond the plain and common understanding of the people who are subject to their
penalties. Hence, the principle insures equal protection of the law.
The principle is also rooted in the need to maintain the separation of powers by insuring
10
that the legislature, and not the judiciary, defines crimes and prescribes their penalties.   As
aptly stated by the U.S. Supreme
11
Court, speaking through Chief Justice John Marshall,
in United States v. Wiltberger:
The rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly, is perhaps not much less old than construction
itself. It is founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals; and on the plain principle
that the power of punishment is vested in the legislature, not in the judicial department.  It is the
legislature, not the Court, which is to define a crime, and ordain its punishment.(Emphasis supplied)
This Court has specifically applied the rule on strict interpretation of a criminal statute to the
12
crime of bigamy. In People v. Aragon,  decided in 1957, the Court ruled:
Appellant in this Court relies on the case of People vs. Mendoza, (95 Phil., 845; 50 Off. Gaz., [10] 4767).
In this case the majority of this Court declared:
“The statutory provision (section 29 of the Marriage Law or Act No. 3613) plainly makes a
subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal
and void from its
_______________
9  ESKRIDGE, JR., FRICKLEY AND GARRET,  LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION  362
(2000).
10 Ibid., p. 363.
11 18 U.S. 76 (1820).
12 100 Phil. 1033 (1957).
302
302 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tenebro vs. Court of Appeals
performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annullable
marriages. There is here no pretense that appellant’s second marriage with Olga Lema was contracted in the belief
that the first spouse, Jovita de Asis, had been absent for seven consecutive years or generally considered as dead, so
as to render said marriage valid until declared null and void by a subsequent court.”
We are aware of the very weighty reasons expressed by Justice Alex Reyes in his dissent in the case
above-quoted. But these weighty reasons notwithstanding,  the very fundamental principle of strict
construction of penal laws in favor of the accused, which principle we may not ignore, seems to justify our
stand in the above-cited case of People vs. Mendoza. Our Revised Penal Code is of recent enactment and
had the rule enunciated in Spain and in America requiring judicial declaration of nullity of ab initio void
marriages been within the contemplation of the legislature, an express provision to that effect would or
should have been inserted in the law. In its absence, we are bound by said rule of strict interpretation
already adverted to. (Emphasis supplied)
The majority opinion interprets Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code to mean that a second
marriage, even if void ab initio on grounds other than the existence of the first marriage, gives
rise to the crime of bigamy. This dissent interprets Article 349 to mean that for the crime of
bigamy to exist, the second marriage must be a valid marriage except for the existence of the
first marriage. Otherwise, the language of the law would mean nothing when it expressly
declares certain marriages void ab initio or void from the very beginning.
These opposing interpretations of a criminal statute call for the application of another well-
established rule that as between two reasonable interpretations, the more lenient one should
be applied to penal statutes. A leading English decision puts it in this wise:
If there is a reasonable interpretation which will avoid the penalty in any particular case, we must adopt
that construction. If there are two reasonable constructions, we must give the more lenient one. That is
13
the settled rule for construction of penal sections.
_______________
 13 Tuck & Sons v. Priester, 19 QBD 629 (1887), cited in Cross on Statutory Construction, p. 172, 3rd Edition (1995). never existed and for that reason, one of the essential elements of bigamy has disappeared. To
303
quote Groizard:
. . . El matrimonio entonces, en realidad, no existe, pierde toda fuerza en virtud del vicio intrinseco que
lleva, y, por tanto, uno de los elementos del delito desaparece y la declaracion de inculpabilidad procede.
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 18, 2004 303 Esto que es logico y llano en 2el teireno de los principios, no puede, sin embargo, admitirse sin ciertas
Tenebro vs. Court of Appeals restricciones en la practica . . .

Whether or not the decision of the RTC declaring the second marriage null and void ab initio,
In summary, the majority opinion reverses the well-settled doctrine that there is no bigamy if is erroneous is beside the point. Neither the private respondent nor the State, through the
the second marriage is void on grounds other than the existence of the first marriage. The Office of the Solicitor General, appealed the decision of the court. Entry of judgment was made
Court has consistently applied this doctrine in several cases since 1935. The majority opinion of record before the court a quo rendered its decision. Hence, both the State and the private
reverses this doctrine by disregarding the plain and ordinary meaning of the clear language of respondent are bound by said decision.
a criminal statute–Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The majority opinion then proceeds Petition denied, assailed decision affirmed in toto.
to interpret the criminal statute strictly against the accused and liberally in favor of the State.
The majority opinion makes this new interpretation even as Article 349 has remained Note.–Burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests upon petitioner and any
unchanged since its enactment into law on 1 January 1932. The majority opinion effectively doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. (Hernandez vs. Court of
amends the language of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code in violation of the separation of Appeals, 320 SCRA 76 [1999])
powers.
A final word. Even before appellant Tenebro’s conviction of the crime of bigamy, he had
already secured a judicial declaration of nullity of his second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity. This judicial declaration merely confirmed what the law already
explicitly provides–that a marriage contracted by one psychologically incapacitated to marry is
void from the very beginning and thus legally inexistent. Inexplicably, the majority opinion
still holds that the second marriage exists to warrant Tenebro’s conviction of the crime of
bigamy.
Accordingly, I dissent from the majority opinion and vote to grant the petition.

SEPARATE DISSENTING OPINION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

I vote to grant pro hac vice the petition.

The prosecution was burdened1 to prove beyond reasonable doubt the corpus delicti, namely,
all the elements of the crime.   In this case, the prosecution adduced evidence that the
petitioner contracted marriage with Hilda and during the subsistence of said marriage, he
contracted a second marriage with the private respondent. However, the petitioner adduced in
evidence the decision

_______________
1 Fuquay v. State of Alabama, 56 American Law Reports, 1264 (1927).

304

304 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Tenebro vs. Court of Appeals

of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. AU-885 before the court a quo rendered judgment
convicting the petitioner of bigamy declaring null and void ab initio the petitioner’s marriage
with the private respondent on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity. Since the
second marriage is null and void  ab initio,such marriage in contemplation of criminal law

G.R. No. 164435. September 29, 2009.*
VICTORIA S. JARILLO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Criminal Law; Bigamy; Husband and Wife; Prejudicial Questions; Penalties; He who contracts a
second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the
pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity.—It is true that right after the presentation of the
prosecution evidence, petitioner moved for suspension of the proceedings on the ground of the pendency
of the petition for declaration of nullity of petitioner’s marriages to Alocillo, which, petitioner claimed
involved a prejudicial question. In her appeal, she also asserted that the petition for declaration of nullity
of her marriage to Uy, initiated by the latter, was a ground for suspension of the proceedings. The RTC
denied her motion for suspension, while the CA struck down her arguments. In  Marbella-Bobis v.
Bobis (336 SCRA 747 [2000]), the Court categorically stated that: x x x as ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he
who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes
the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
237
VOL. 601, SEPTEMBER 29, 2009 237
Jarillo vs. People
case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration
of nullity. x x x x x x x x x x The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the
first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents
and purposes regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner.
Against this legal backdrop, any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact
that respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first
marriage.  Thus,  a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the
criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question. x x x
Same; Same; Same; Annulment of Marriage; The moment a person contracts a second marriage
without the previous one having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy is already
consummated because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage the previous marriage which
has not yet been declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction is deemed valid and
subsisting.—The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of petitioner’s two marriages to Alocillo cannot
be considered a valid defense in the crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a second
marriage without the previous one having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy
was already consummated because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage, petitioner’s
marriage to Alocillo, which had not yet been declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction,
was deemed valid and subsisting. Neither would a judicial declaration of the nullity of petitioner’s
marriage to Uy make any difference. As held in  Tenebro, “[s]ince a marriage contracted during the
subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an
argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. x x x A plain reading of [Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code], therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a
second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.”
238
238 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Jarillo vs. People
              Same; Same; Penalties; Prescription; Crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall
prescribe in fifteen years.—Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, bigamy is punishable by prision
mayor,  which is classified under Article 25 of said Code as an afflictive penalty. Article 90 thereof
provides that “[c]rimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years,” while
Article 91 states that “[t]he period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime
is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents x x x.”
Same; Same; Same; Evidence; Burden of Evidence; The party who raises a fact as a matter of defense,
such as prescription, has the burden of proving it.—Petitioner asserts that Uy had known of her previous
marriage as far back as 1978; hence, prescription began to run from that time. Note that the party who
raises a fact as a matter of defense has the burden of proving it. The defendant or accused is obliged to
produce evidence in support of its defense; otherwise, failing to establish the same, it remains self-
serving. Thus, for petitioner’s defense of prescription to prosper, it was incumbent upon her to adduce
evidence that as early as the year 1978, Uy already obtained knowledge of her previous marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy should be counted only
from the day on which the said crime was discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agents,
as opposed to being counted from the date of registration of the bigamous marriage.—As ruled
in Sermonia v. Court of Appeals (233 SCRA 155 [1994]), “the prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy
should be counted only from the day on which the said crime was discovered  by the offended
party, the authorities or their [agents],” as opposed to being counted from the date of registration of the
bigamous marriage. Since petitioner failed to prove with certainty that the period of prescription began
to run as of 1978, her defense is, therefore, ineffectual.
239
VOL. 601, SEPTEMBER 29, 2009 239
Jarillo vs. People
     Same; Penalties; Indeterminate Sentence Law; The Indeterminate Sentence Law leaves it entirely
within the sound discretion of the court to determine the minimum penalty, as long as it is anywhere
within the range of the penalty next lower without any reference to the periods into which it might be
subdivided.—The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that the accused shall be sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum of which
shall be within the range of the penalty next lower than that prescribed by the Code for the offense,
without first considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. The
Indeterminate Sentence Law leaves it entirely within the sound discretion of the court to determine the
minimum penalty, as long as it is anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without any
reference to the periods into which it might be subdivided. The modifying circumstances are considered
only in the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Nelson A. Clemente for petitioner.
  The Solicitor General for respondent.
PERALTA, J.:
This resolves the Petition for Review on  Certiorari  under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
praying that the Decision1 of
_______________
1  Penned by Associate Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis, with Associate Justices Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and Jose C.
Mendoza, concurring; Rollo, pp. 8-21.
240
240 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Jarillo vs. People
the Court of Appeals (CA), dated July 21, 2003, and its Resolution2  dated July 8, 2004, be
reversed and set aside.
On May 31, 2000, petitioner was charged with Bigamy before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 117 under the following Information in Criminal Case No. 00-08-
11:
INFORMATION
“The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses VICTORIA S. JARILLO of the crime of BIGAMY,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of November 1979, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Victoria S. Jarillo, being previously
united in lawful marriage with Rafael M. Alocillo, and without the said marriage having been legally
dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with
Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy which marriage was only discovered on January 12, 1999.
Contrary to law.”
On July 14, 2000, petitioner pleaded not guilty during arraignment and, thereafter, trial
proceeded.
The undisputed facts, as accurately summarized by the CA, are as follows.
“On May 24, 1974, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo were married in a civil wedding ceremony
solemnized by Hon. Monico C. Tanyag, then Municipal Mayor of Taguig, Rizal (Exhs. “A,,”“A-
_______________
2  Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., with Associate Justices Mariano C. del Castillo and Jose C. Mendoza,
concurring; Rollo, pp. 22-23.
241
VOL. 601, SEPTEMBER 29, 2009 241
Jarillo vs. People
1,” “H,” “H-1,” “H-2,” “O,” “O-1,” pp. 20-21, TSN dated November 17, 2000).
On May 4, 1975, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo again celebrated marriage in a church wedding
ceremony before Rev. Angel Resultay in San Carlos City, Pangasinan (pp. 25-26, TSN dated November
17, 2000). Out of the marital union, appellant begot a daughter, Rachelle J. Alocillo on October 29, 1975
(Exhs. “F,” “R,” “R-1”).
Appellant Victoria Jarillo thereafter contracted a subsequent marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos
Uy, at the City Court of Pasay City, Branch 1, before then Hon. Judge Nicanor Cruz on November 26,
1979 (Exhs. “D,” “J,” “J-1,” “Q,” “Q-1,” pp. 15-18, TSN dated November 22, 2000).
On April 16, 1995, appellant and Emmanuel Uy exchanged marital vows anew in a church wedding in
Manila (Exh. “E”).
In 1999, Emmanuel Uy filed against the appellant Civil Case No. 99-93582 for annulment of marriage
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Thereafter, appellant Jarillo was charged with bigamy before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City
x x x.
x x x x
Parenthetically, accused-appellant filed against Alocillo, on October 5, 2000, before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Civil Case No. 00-1217, for declaration of nullity of their marriage.
On July 9, 2001, the court a quo promulgated the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which
states:
WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing premises, this court hereby finds accused Victoria Soriano
Jarillo GUILTYbeyond reasonable doubt of the crime of BIGAMY.
Accordingly, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of  SIX (6)
YEARS of prision correccional, as minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor, as maximum.
242
242 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Jarillo vs. People
This court makes no pronouncement on the civil aspect of this case, such as the nullity of
accused’s bigamous marriage to Uy and its effect on their children and their property. This aspect
is being determined by the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 99-93582.
Costs against the accused.
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the same court in that assailed Order dated 2
August 2001.”3
For her defense, petitioner insisted that (1) her 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo were
null and void because Alocillo was allegedly still married to a certain Loretta Tillman at the
time of the celebration of their marriage; (2) her marriages to both Alocillo and Uy were null
and void for lack of a valid marriage license; and (3) the action had prescribed, since Uy knew
about her marriage to Alocillo as far back as 1978.
On appeal to the CA, petitioner’s conviction was affirmed in toto. In its Decision dated July
21, 2003, the CA held that petitioner committed bigamy when she contracted marriage with
Emmanuel Santos Uy because, at that time, her marriage to Rafael Alocillo had not yet been
declared null and void by the court. This being so, the presumption is, her previous marriage
to Alocillo was still existing at the time of her marriage to Uy. The CA also struck down, for
lack of sufficient evidence, petitioner’s contentions that her marriages were celebrated without
a marriage license, and that Uy had notice of her previous marriage as far back as 1978.
In the meantime, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140, rendered a Decision dated March
28, 2003, declaring petitioner’s 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo null and void
_______________
3 Rollo, pp. 9-10.
243
VOL. 601, SEPTEMBER 29, 2009 243
Jarillo vs. People
ab initio  on the ground of Alocillo’s psychological incapacity. Said decision became final and
executory on July 9, 2003. In her motion for reconsideration, petitioner invoked said
declaration of nullity as a ground for the reversal of her conviction. However, in its Resolution
dated July 8, 2004, the CA, citing  Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,4denied reconsideration and
ruled that “[t]he subsequent declaration of nullity of her first marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity, while it retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage
insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, the said marriage is not without
legal consequences, among which is incurring criminal liability for bigamy.”5
Hence, the present petition for review on  certiorari  under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
where petitioner alleges that:
 V.1. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN PROCEEDING WITH
THE CASE DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF A CASE WHICH IS PREJUDICIAL TO THE OUTCOME
OF THIS CASE.
V.2. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE
CONVICTION OF PETITIONER FOR THE CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE THE SUPERVENING
PROOF THAT THE FIRST TWO MARRIAGES OF PETITIONER TO ALOCILLO HAD BEEN
DECLARED BY FINAL JUDGMENT NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.
V.3. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING
THAT THERE IS A PENDING ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE AT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
BRANCH 38 BETWEEN EMMANUEL SANTOS AND VICTORIA S. JARILLO.
_______________
4 467 Phil. 723; 423 SCRA 272 (2004).
5 CA Rollo, p. 404.
244
244 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Jarillo vs. People
  V.4. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING
THAT THE INSTANT CASE OF BIGAMY HAD ALREADY PRESCRIBED.
V.5. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING
THAT THE MARRIAGE OF VICTORIA JARILLO AND EMMANUEL SANTOS UY HAS NO VALID
MARRIAGE LICENSE.
V.6. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT ACQUITTING THE
PETITIONER BUT IMPOSED AN ERRONEOUS PENALTY UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE
AND THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW.
The first, second, third and fifth issues, being closely related, shall be discussed jointly. It is
true that right after the presentation of the prosecution evidence, petitioner moved for
suspension of the proceedings on the ground of the pendency of the petition for declaration of
nullity of petitioner’s marriages to Alocillo, which, petitioner claimed involved a prejudicial
question. In her appeal, she also asserted that the petition for declaration of nullity of her
marriage to Uy, initiated by the latter, was a ground for suspension of the proceedings. The
RTC denied her motion for suspension, while the CA struck down her arguments. In Marbella-
Bobis v. Bobis,6 the Court categorically stated that:
“x x x as ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration
of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case  the
criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for
declaration of nullity. x x x
_______________
6 391 Phil. 648; 336 SCRA 747 (2000).
245
VOL. 601, SEPTEMBER 29, 2009 245
Jarillo vs. People
x x x x
x  x  x The reason is that,  without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is
presumed to be subsisting.  In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes
regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner. Against this
legal backdrop,  any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that
respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a
decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is,
therefore, not a prejudicial question.x x x”7
The foregoing ruling had been reiterated in Abunado v. People,8 where it was held thus:
“The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial
because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been
consummated.  Moreover, petitioner’s assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases
considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke
the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to [private
complainant] had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the
criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is
that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until
declared otherwise in a
_______________
7 Id., at pp. 655-657; 754-756. (Emphasis supplied.)
8 G.R. No. 159218, March 30, 2004, 426 SCRA 562.
246
246 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Jarillo vs. People
judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first
marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before
the first marriage was annulled.”9
For the very same reasons elucidated in the above-quoted cases, petitioner’s conviction of the
crime of bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of petitioner’s
two marriages to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense in the crime of bigamy. The
moment petitioner contracted a second marriage without the previous one having been
judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated because at
the time of the celebration of the second marriage, petitioner’s marriage to Alocillo, which had
not yet been declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction, was deemed valid and
subsisting. Neither would a judicial declaration of the nullity of petitioner’s marriage to Uy
make any difference.10  As held in  Tenebro, “[s]ince a marriage contracted during the
subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is
not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. x x x A plain reading
of [Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code], therefore, would indicate that the provision
penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of
a valid marriage.”11
Petitioner’s defense of prescription is likewise doomed to fail.
_______________
9  Id., at pp. 567-568. (Emphasis supplied.)
10 Abunado v. People, supra note 8; Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, supranote 4, at p. 752.
11 Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, supra, at p. 742; p. 292.
247
VOL. 601, SEPTEMBER 29, 2009 247
 Jarillo vs. People 15 Id., at p. 161.

249
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, bigamy is punishable by prision mayor, which
is classified under Article 25 of said Code as an afflictive penalty. Article 90 thereof provides
VOL. 601, SEPTEMBER 29, 2009 249
that “[c]rimes punishable by other afflictive penalties  shall prescribe in fifteen years,”
while Article 91 states that “[t]he period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on Jarillo vs. People
which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents x x x.”
Petitioner asserts that Uy had known of her previous marriage as far back as 1978; hence,
imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence.16
prescription began to run from that time. Note that the party who raises a fact as a matter of
Applying the foregoing rule, it is clear that the penalty imposed on petitioner is proper.
defense has the burden of proving it. The defendant or accused is obliged to produce evidence
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty for bigamy is  prision
in support of its defense; otherwise, failing to establish the same, it remains self-
mayor. The penalty next lower is prision correccional, which ranges from 6 months and 1 day
serving.12 Thus, for petitioner’s defense of prescription to prosper, it was incumbent upon her
to 6 years. The minimum penalty of six years imposed by the trial court is, therefore, correct
to adduce evidence that as early as the year 1978, Uy already obtained knowledge of her
as it is still within the duration of  prision correccional.  There being no mitigating or
previous marriage.
aggravating circumstances proven in this case, the prescribed penalty of prision mayor should
A close examination of the records of the case reveals that petitioner utterly failed to
be imposed in its medium period, which is from 8 years and 1 day to 10 years. Again, the trial
present sufficient evidence to support her allegation. Petitioner’s testimony that her own
court correctly imposed a maximum penalty of 10 years.
mother told Uy in 1978 that she (petitioner) is already married to Alocillo does not inspire
However, for humanitarian purposes, and considering that petitioner’s marriage to Alocillo
belief, as it is totally unsupported by any corroborating evidence. The trial court correctly
has after all been declared by final judgment17 to be void  ab initio  on account of the latter’s
observed that:
psychological incapacity, by reason of which, petitioner was subjected to manipulative abuse,
“x x x She did not call to the witness stand her mother—the person who allegedly actually told Uy about the Court deems it proper to reduce the penalty imposed by the lower courts. Thus, petitioner
her previous marriage to Alocillo. It must be obvious that without the confirma- should be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from Two (2) years,
Four (4) months and One (1) day of  prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day
_______________ of prision mayor, as maximum.
12 Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. v. Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc., G.R. No. 151890, June 20, 2006, 491 SCRA 411, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of the
433. Court of Appeals dated July 21, 2003, and its Resolution dated July 8, 2004
248
_______________

248 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 16 Abunado v. People, supra note 8, at p. 568.

17 See Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City in Civil Case No. 00-1217, CA Rollo, pp. 343-347.
Jarillo vs. People

tory testimony of her mother, the attribution of the latter of any act which she allegedly did is hearsay.”13

As ruled in Sermonia v. Court of Appeals,14 “the prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy
should be counted only from the day on which the said crime was discovered by the
offended party, the authorities or their [agents],” as opposed to being counted from the date of
registration of the bigamous marriage.15  Since petitioner failed to prove with certainty that
the period of prescription began to run as of 1978, her defense is, therefore, ineffectual.
Finally, petitioner avers that the RTC and the CA imposed an erroneous penalty under the
Revised Penal Code. Again, petitioner is mistaken.
The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that the accused shall be sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and the
minimum of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower than that prescribed by
the Code for the offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance attendant to
the commission of the crime. The Indeterminate Sentence Law leaves it entirely within the
sound discretion of the court to determine the minimum penalty, as long as it is anywhere
within the range of the penalty next lower without any reference to the periods into which it
might be subdivided. The modifying circumstances are considered only in the

_______________

13 Records, p. 383.
14 G.R. No. 109454, June 14, 1994, 233 SCRA 155.
 _______________
1 Rollo, pp. 54-55; Per Judge Sonia T. Yu-Casano.
G.R. No. 181089. October 22, 2012.* 2 Id., at pp. 52-53.
3 Id., at p. 60.
MERLINDA CIPRIONA MONTAÑEZ, respondent,  vs.LOURDES TAJOLOSA CIPRIANO, 4 Id., at p. 62.
complainant. 5 Id., at pp. 66-68.
6 Id., at p. 69.
Criminal Law; Bigamy; Elements of; It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged 7 Id., at p. 71.
second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of 317
the first marriage.―The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married;
(b) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse
could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent VOL. 684, OCTOBER 22, 2012 317
marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The
felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage. It is essential Montañez vs. Cipriano
in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements,
would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.
Bigamy against respondent, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 41972. Attached to the
Same; Same; The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage would not change the
complaint was an Affidavit8 (Malayang Sinumpaang Salaysay) dated August 23, 2004, thumb-
fact that she contracted the second marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage.―At the time
respondent contracted the second marriage, the first marriage was still subsisting as it had not yet been marked and signed by Silverio,9which alleged, among others, that respondent failed to reveal
legally dissolved. As ruled in the above-mentioned jurisprudence, the subsequent judicial declaration of to Silverio that she was still married to Socrates. On November 17, 2004, an Information10 for
nullity of the first marriage would not change the fact that she contracted the second marriage during Bigamy was filed against respondent with the RTC of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31. The case
the subsistence of the first marriage. Thus, respondent was properly charged of the crime of bigamy, was docketed as Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL. The Information reads:
since the essential elements of the offense charged were sufficiently alleged.
That on or about January 24, 1983, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna, Philippines,
PETITION for review on certiorari of the order and resolution of the Regional Trial Court of and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused did then and there willfully,
San Pedro, Laguna, Br. 31. unlawfully and feloniously contract a second or subsequent marriage with one SILVERIO CIPRIANO
VINALON while her first marriage with SOCRATES FLORES has not been judicially dissolved by
  The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
proper judicial authorities.11

_______________ On July 24, 2007 and before her arraignment, respondent, through counsel, filed a Motion
* THIRD DIVISION. to Quash Information (and Dismissal of the Criminal Complaint)12alleging that her marriage
316
with Socrates had already been declared void  ab initio  in 2003, thus, there was no more
marriage to speak of prior to her marriage to Silverio on January 24, 1983; that the basic
element of the crime of bigamy,  i.e., two valid marriages, is therefore wanting. She also
316 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED claimed that since the second marriage was held in 1983, the crime of bigamy had already
prescribed. The prosecution filed its Comment13 arguing that the crime of bigamy had already
Montañez vs. Cipriano been consummated when respondent filed her petition for declaration of nullity; that the law
punishes the act of contracting a second marriage
  Jose Marlon P. Pabiton for petitioner.
  Robert Sison for respondent. _______________
8 Id., at p. 72.
PERALTA, J.: 9 Died on May 27, 2007; id., at p. 59.
For our resolution is a petition for review on  certiorari  which seeks to annul the 10 Id., at p. 75.
Order1  dated September 24, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pedro, Laguna, 11 Id.
12 Id., at pp. 80-81.
Branch 31, issued in Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL which dismissed the Information for 13 Id., at pp. 82-83.
Bigamy filed against respondent Lourdes Tajolosa Cipriano. Also assailed is the RTC
Resolution2 dated January 2, 2008 denying the motion for reconsideration. 318
On April 8, 1976, respondent married Socrates Flores (Socrates) in Lezo, Aklan.3  On
January 24, 1983, during the subsistence of the said marriage, respondent married Silverio V.
318 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cipriano (Silverio) in San Pedro, Laguna.4  In 2001, respondent filed with the RTC of
Muntinlupa, Branch 256, a Petition for the Annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the Montañez vs. Cipriano
ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity as defined under Article 36 of the Family Code,
which was docketed as Civil Case No. 01-204. On July 18, 2003, the RTC of Muntinlupa,
which appears to be valid, while the first marriage is still subsisting and has not yet been
Branch 256, rendered an Amended Decision5  declaring the marriage of respondent with
annulled or declared void by the court.
Socrates null and void. Said decision became final and executory on October 13, 2003.6
In its Order14  dated August 3, 2007, the RTC denied the motion. It found respondent’s
On May 14, 2004, petitioner Merlinda Cipriano Montañez, Silverio’s daughter from the first
argument that with the declaration of nullity of her first marriage, there was no more first
marriage, filed with the Municipal Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, a Complaint7 for
marriage to speak of and thus the element of two valid marriages in bigamy was absent, to
have been laid to rest by our ruling in Mercado v. Tan15 where we held:
In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first marriage
declared void only after complainant had filed a letter-complaint charging him with bigamy. For
contracting a second marriage while the first is still subsisting, he committed the acts punishable under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was
immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already been consummated by then. x x x16
As to respondent’s claim that the action had already prescribed, the RTC found that while
the second marriage indeed took place in 1983, or more than the 15-year prescriptive period
for the crime of bigamy, the commission of the crime was only discovered on November 17,
2004, which should be the reckoning period, hence, prescription has not yet set in.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration17claiming that the  Mercado  ruling was not
applicable, since respondent contracted her first marriage in 1976,  i.e., before the Family
Code; that the petition for annulment was granted and be-
_______________
14 Id., at p. 84.
15 G.R. No. 137110, August 1, 2000, 337 SCRA 122; 391 Phil. 809 (2000).
16 Mercado v. Tan, supra, at p. 133; at p. 824.
17 Rollo, pp. 85-87.
319
VOL. 684, OCTOBER 22, 2012 319
Montañez vs. Cipriano
came final before the criminal complaint for bigamy was filed; and, that Article 40 of the
Family Code cannot be given any retroactive effect because this will impair her right to
remarry without need of securing a declaration of nullity of a completely void prior marriage.
On September 24, 2007, the RTC issued its assailed Order,18  the dispositive portion of
which reads:
Wherefore, the Order of August 3, 2007 is reconsidered and set aside. Let a new one be entered
quashing the information. Accordingly, let the instant case be DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
In so ruling, the RTC said that at the time the accused had contracted a second marriage on
January 24, 1983, i.e., before the effectivity of the Family Code, the existing law did not
require a judicial declaration of absolute nullity as a condition precedent to contracting a
subsequent marriage; that jurisprudence before the Family Code was ambivalent on the issue
of the need of prior judicial declaration of absolute nullity of the first marriage. The RTC found
that both marriages of respondent took place before the effectivity of the Family Code, thus,
considering the unsettled state of jurisprudence on the need for a prior declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage before commencing a second marriage and the principle that laws should
be interpreted liberally in favor of the accused, it declared that the absence of a judicial
declaration of nullity should not prejudice the accused whose second marriage was declared
once and for all valid with the annulment of her first marriage by the RTC of Muntinlupa City
in 2003.
Dissatisfied, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the prosecution, but opposed by
respondent. In a Resolution dated January 2, 2008, the RTC denied the same ruling, among
others, that the judicial declaration of nullity of respondent’s
_______________
18 Id., at pp. 88-89.
320
320 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Montañez vs. Cipriano
marriage is tantamount to a mere declaration or confirmation that said marriage never
existed at all, and for this reason, her act in contracting a second marriage cannot be
considered criminal.
Aggrieved, petitioner directly filed the present petition with us raising the following issues:
I. Whether the judicial nullity of a first marriage prior to the enactment of the Family Code and the
pronouncement in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy on the ground of psychological incapacity is a valid defense for
a charge of bigamy for entering into a second marriage prior to the enactment of the Family Code and the
pronouncement in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy?
II. Whether the trial court erred in stating that the jurisprudence prior to the enactment of the
Family Code and the pronouncement in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy regarding the necessity of securing a
declaration of nullity of the first marriage before entering a second marriage ambivalent, such that a
person was allowed to enter a subsequent marriage without the annulment of the first without incurring
criminal liability.19
Preliminarily, we note that the instant petition assailing the RTC’s dismissal of the
Information for bigamy was filed by private complainant and not by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) which should represent the government in all judicial proceedings filed before
us.20Notwithstanding, we will
_______________
19 Id., at pp. 8-9.
20 Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III of Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code provides:
Sec. 35. Powers and Functions.―The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the
Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation
or matter requiring the services of lawyers. xxx It shall have the following specific powers and functions:
(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings;
represent
321
VOL. 684, OCTOBER 22, 2012 321
Montañez vs. Cipriano
give due course to this petition as we had done in the past. In  Antone v. Beronilla,21  the
offended party (private complainant) questioned before the Court of Appeals (CA) the RTC’s
dismissal of the Information for bigamy filed against her husband, and the CA dismissed the
petition on the ground, among others, that the petition should have been filed in behalf of the
People of the Philippines by the OSG, being its statutory counsel in all appealed criminal
cases. In a petition filed with us, we said that we had given due course to a number of actions
even when the respective interests of the government were not properly represented by the
OSG and said:
In Labaro v. Panay, this Court dealt with a similar defect in the following manner:
It must, however, be stressed that if the public prosecution is aggrieved by any order ruling of
the trial judge in a criminal case, the OSG, and not the prosecutor, must be the one to question the
order or ruling before us. x x x
 Nevertheless, since the challenged order affects the interest of the State or the plaintiff
People of the Philippines, we opted not to dismiss the petition on this technical ground.
Instead, we required the OSG to comment on the petition, as we had done before in some cases. In
light of its Comment, we rule that the OSG has ratified and adopted as
_______________
the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil
actions and special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party.
As an exception to this rule, the Solicitor General is allowed to:
(8) Deputize legal officers of government departments, bureaus, agencies and offices to assist the Solicitor General and appear
or represent the Government in cases involving their respective offices, brought before the courts and exercise supervision and
control over such legal officers with respect to such cases.
21 G.R. No. 183824, December 8, 2010, 637 SCRA 615.
322
322 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Montañez vs. Cipriano
its own the instant petition for the People of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)22
Considering that we also required the OSG to file a Comment on the petition, which it did,
praying that the petition be granted in effect, such Comment had ratified the petition filed
with us.
As to the merit of the petition, the issue for resolution is whether or not the RTC erred in
quashing the Information for bigamy filed against respondent.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes bigamy as follow:
Art. 349. Bigamy.―The penalty of  prision mayor  shall be imposed upon any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or
before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the
proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the
marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (c) that he contracts a
second or subsequent marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the
essential requisites for validity. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second
marriage or subsequent marriage.23  It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the
alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for
the subsistence of the first marriage.24
_______________
22 Antone v. Beronilla, supra, at p. 623.
23 Manuel v. People, G.R. No. 165842, November 29, 2005, 476 SCRA 461, 477; 512 Phil. 818, 833-834 (2005).
24 Id., at p. 833.
323
VOL. 684, OCTOBER 22, 2012 323
Montañez vs. Cipriano
In this case, it appears that when respondent contracted a second marriage with Silverio in
1983, her first marriage with Socrates celebrated in 1976 was still subsisting as the same had
not yet been annulled or declared void by a competent authority. Thus, all the elements of
bigamy were alleged in the Information. In her Motion to Quash the Information, she alleged,
among others, that:
xxxx
2. The records of this case would bear out that accused’s marriage with said Socrates Flores was declared void ab
initio on 14 April 2003 by Branch 256 of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City. The said decision was never
appealed, and became final and executory shortly thereafter.
3. In other words, before the filing of the Information in this case, her marriage with Mr. Flores had already been
declared void from the beginning.
4. There was therefore no marriage prior to 24 January 1983 to speak of. In other words, there was only one
marriage.
5. The basic element of the crime of bigamy, that is, two valid marriages, is therefore wanting.25
Clearly, the annulment of respondent’s first marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity was declared only in 2003. The question now is whether the declaration of nullity of
respondent’s first marriage justifies the dismissal of the Information for bigamy filed against
her.
We rule in the negative.
In Mercado v. Tan,26 we ruled that the subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the
first marriage was immaterial, because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime of
_______________
25 Rollo, p. 80.
26 Supra note 15, at p. 133; at p. 824.
324
324 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Montañez vs. Cipriano
bigamy had already been consummated. And by contracting a second marriage while the first
was still subsisting, the accused committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code.
In Abunado v. People,27 we held that what is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is
that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.28 Even if
the accused eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the
point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was
annulled.29
In  Tenebro v. CA,30  we declared that although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of
the marriage insofar as the vinculumbetween the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note
that said marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived
or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered legitimate.
There is, therefore, a recognition  written into the law itself  that such a marriage, although
void  ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is
incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the State’s penal laws
on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital
contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting
multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity
and commitment.31
_______________
27 G.R. No. 159218, March 30, 2004, 426 SCRA 562.
28 Id., at p. 568.
29 Id.
30 G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004, 423 SCRA 272; 467 Phil. 723 (2004).
31 Id., at p. 284; at p. 744.
 325
VOL. 684, OCTOBER 22, 2012 325
Montañez vs. Cipriano
And in Jarillo v. People,32 applying the foregoing jurisprudence, we affirmed the accused’s
conviction for bigamy, ruling that the moment the accused contracted a second marriage
without the previous one having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy
was already consummated because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage, the
accused’s first marriage which had not yet been declared null and void by a court of competent
jurisdiction was deemed valid and subsisting.
Here, at the time respondent contracted the second marriage, the first marriage was still
subsisting as it had not yet been legally dissolved. As ruled in the above-mentioned
jurisprudence, the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage would not
change the fact that she contracted the second marriage during the subsistence of the first
marriage. Thus, respondent was properly charged of the crime of bigamy, since the essential
elements of the offense charged were sufficiently alleged.
Respondent claims that Tenebro v. CA33 is not applicable, since the declaration of nullity of
the previous marriage came after the filing of the Information, unlike in this case where the
declaration was rendered before the information was filed. We do not agree. What makes a
person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage
during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the
same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the
marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists.34 Therefore, he who contracts a second mar-
_______________
32 G.R. No. 164435, September 29, 2009, 601 SCRA 236.
33 Supra note 30.
34 Landicho v. Relova, G.R. No. L-22579, February 23, 1968, 22 SCRA 731, 734; 130 Phil. 745, 748 (1968).
326
326 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Montañez vs. Cipriano
riage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy.35
Anent respondent’s contention in her Comment that since her two marriages were
contracted prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, Article 40 of the Family Code cannot be
given retroactive effect because this will impair her right to remarry without need of securing
a judicial declaration of nullity of a completely void marriage.
We are not persuaded.
In  Jarillo v. People,36  where the accused, in her motion for reconsideration, argued that
since her marriages were entered into before the effectivity of the Family Code, then the
applicable law is Section 29 of the Marriage Law (Act 3613),37  instead of Article 40 of the
Family Code, which requires a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void before a
person may contract a subsequent marriage. We did not find the argument meritorious and
said:
As far back as 1995, in Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr., the Court already made the declaration that Article
40, which is a rule of procedure, should be applied retroactively because Article 256 of the Family Code
itself provides that said “Code shall have retroactive
_______________
35 Id.
36 G.R. No. 164435, June 29, 2010, 622 SCRA 24.
37 Section 29 of Act No. 3613 (Marriage Law), which provided:
Illegal marriages.―Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal
and void from its performance, unless:
(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;
(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse
present having news of the absentee being alive, or the absentee being generally considered as dead and believed to be so by
the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, the marriage as contracted being valid in either
case until declared null and void by a competent court.
327
VOL. 684, OCTOBER 22, 2012 327
Montañez vs. Cipriano
effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights.” The Court went on to
explain, thus:
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants’ rights may not preclude
their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is
not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. The reason is that
as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.
In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, the Court pointed out the danger of not enforcing the provisions of Article
40 of the Family Code, to wit:
 In the case at bar, respondent’s clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his
first marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for
bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has to
do is disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy
charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is
equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even enter
into a marriage aware of the absence of a requisite―usually the marriage license―and thereafter
contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on the
assumption that the first marriage is void. Such scenario would render nugatory the provision on
bigamy.38
WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated
September 24, 2007 and the Resolution dated January 2, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of
San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31, issued in Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL, are hereby SET
ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL is ordered REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings.
_______________
38 Jarillo v. People, supra note 36, at pp. 25-26. (Citation omitted)
328
328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Montañez vs. Cipriano
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro,** Abadand Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, order and resolution set aside.
 Notes.―Under the Family Code a subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first
marriage is immaterial in a bigamy case because, by then, the crime had already been
consummated. (Antone vs. Beronilla, 637 SCRA 615 [2010])
The elements of bigamy are as follows: 1. That the offender has been legally married; 2.
That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; 3. That he contracts
a second or subsequent marriage; and 4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the
essential requisites for validity. (Teves vs. People, 656 SCRA 307 [2011])
――o0o――

_______________
**  Designated Acting Member, per Special Order No. 1343 dated October 9, 2012.

20 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Nolasco
* she was dead.
G.R. No. 94053. March 17, 1993.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.GREGORIO NOLASCO, respondent.
Marriages; Art. 41 of the Family Code has stricter requirements before absent spouse may be declared
presumably dead.—Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise has been shortened
to four (4) years; however, there is need for a judicial declaration of presumptive death to enable the
spouse present to remarry. Also, Article 41 of the Family Code imposes a stricter standard than the Civil
Code: Article 83 of the Civil Code merely requires either that there be no news that such absentee is still
alive; or the absentee is generally considered to be dead and believed to be so by the spouse present,  or
is presumed dead under Article 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. The Family Code, upon the other hand,
prescribes a "well founded belief' that the absentee is  already dead  before a petition for declaration of
presumptive death can be granted.
Same;  Same.—As pointed out by the Solicitor-General, there are four (4) requisites for the
declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code: "1. That the absent spouse has
been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where
there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code; 2. That the
present spouse wishes to remarry; 3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee
is dead; and 4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee."
Same;  Evidence;  Where is there "well-founded belief' that spouse is dead.—In the case at bar, the
Court considers that the investigation allegedly conducted by respondent in his attempt to ascertain
Janet Monica Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief
that she was already dead. When he arrived in San Jose, Antique after learning of Janet Monica's
departure, instead of seeking the help of local authorities or of the British Embassy, he secured another
seaman's contract and went to London, a vast city of many millions of inhabitants, to look for her there.
_____________
* THIRD DIVISION.
21
VOL. 220, MARCH 17, 1993 21
Republic vs. Nolasco
Same; Same; Same.—There is no analogy between Manila and its neighboring cities, on one hand,
and London and Liverpool, on the other, which, as pointed out by the Solicitor-General, are around three
hundred fifty (350) kilometers apart. We do not consider that walking into a major city like Liverpool or
London with a simple hope of somehow bumping into one particular person there—which is in effect
what Nolasco says he did—can be regarded as a reasonably diligent search.
Same;  Same;  Same.—The Court also views respondent's claim that Janet Monica declined to give
any information as to her personal background even after, she had married respondent too convenient an
excuse to justify his failure to locate her. The same can be said of the loss of the alleged letters
respondent had sent to his wife which respondent claims were all returned to him. Respondent said he
had lost these returned letters, under unspecified circumstances.
Same; Same; Same.—Neither can this Court give much credence to respondent's bare assertion that
he had inquired from their friends of her whereabouts, considering that respondent did not identify those
friends in his testimony. The Court of Appeals ruled that since the prosecutor failed to rebut this
evidence during trial, it is good evidence. But this kind of evidence cannot, by its nature, be rebutted. In
any case, admissibility is not synonymous with credibility. As noted before, there are serious doubts to
respondent's credibility. Moreover, even if admitted as evidence, said testimony merely tended to show
that the missing spouse had chosen not to communicate with their common acquaintances, and not that
Same; Policy of doctrine of presumptive death must not be circumvented for spouse's convenience.—By
the same token, the spouses should not be allowed, by the simple expedient of agreeing that one of them
leave the conjugal abode and never to return again, to circumvent the policy of the laws on marriage. The
Court notes that respondent even tried to have his marriage annulled before the trial court in the same
proceeding.
PETITION for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
     The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
     Warloo G. Cardenal for respondent.
22
22 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Nolasco
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Antique, Branch 10, a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet
Monica Parker, invoking Article 41 of the Family Code. The petition prayed that respondent's
wife be declared
1
presumptively dead or, in the alternative, that the marriage be declared null
and void.
The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition through the Provincial Prosecutor of
Antique who had been deputized to assist the Solicitor-General in the instant case. The
Republic argued, first, that
2
Nolasco did not possess a "well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead;"  and second, Nolasco's attempt to have his marriage 3
annulled in the
same proceeding was a "cunning attempt" to circumvent the law on marriage.
During trial, respondent Nolasco testified that he was a seaman and that he had first met
Janet Monica Parker, a British subject, in a bar in England during one of his ship's port calls.
From that chance meeting onwards, Janet Monica Parker lived with respondent Nolasco on
his ship for six (6) months until they returned respondent's hometown of San Jose, Antique on
19 November 1980 after his seaman's contract expired. On 15 January 1982, respondent
married Janet Monica Parker in San Jose, Antique, in Catholic rites officiated by Fr. Henry
van Tilborg in the Cathedral of San Jose.
Respondent Nolasco further testified that after the marriage celebration, he obtained
another employment contract as a seaman and left his wife with his parents in San Jose,
Antique. Sometime in January 1983, while working overseas, respondent received a letter
from his mother informing him that Janet Monica had given birth to his son. The same letter
informed him that Janet Monica had left Antique. Respondent claimed he then immediately
asked permission to leave his ship to return home. He arrived in Antique in November 1983.
_____________
 1 Petition,
p. 2; Record, p. 7.
2 Records, p. 13.
3 Records, p. 14.
23
VOL. 220, MARCH 17, 1993 23
Republic vs. Nolasco
Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her himself whenever his ship docked
in England proved fruitless. He also stated that all the letters he had sent to his missing
spouse at No. 38 Ravena Road, Allerton, Liverpool, England, the address of the bar where he
and Janet Monica first met, were all returned to him. He also claimed that he inquired from
among friends but they too had no news of Janet Monica.
On cross-examination, respondent stated that he had lived with and later married Janet
Monica Parker despite his lack of knowledge as to her family background. He insisted that his
wife continued to refuse to give him such information even after they were married. He also
testified that he did not report the matter of Janet Monica's disappearance to the Philippine
government authorities.
Respondent Nolasco presented his mother, Alicia Nolasco, as his witness. She testified that
her daughter-in-law Janet Monica had expressed a desire to return to England even before she
had given birth to Gerry Nolasco on 7 December 1982. When asked why her daughter-in-law
might have wished to leave Antique, respondent's mother replied that Janet Monica never got
used to the rural way of life in San Jose, Antique. Alicia Nolasco also said that she had tried to
dissuade Janet Monica from leaving as she had given birth to her son just fifteen days before,
but when she (Alicia) failed to do so, she gave Janet Monica P22,000.00 for her expenses before
she left on 22 December 1982 for England. She further claimed that she had no information as
to the missing person's present whereabouts.
The trial court granted Nolasco's petition in a Judgment dated 12 October 1988 the
dispositive portion of which reads:
"Wherefore, under Article 41, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Executive Order No.
209, July 6, 1987, as amended by Executive Order No. 227, July 17, 1987) this Court hereby
4
declares as
presumptively dead Janet Monica Parker Nolasco, without prejudice to her reappearance."
The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that the trial court erred in
declaring Janet Monica Parker
_____________
4 Trial Court Decision, p. 4; Records, p. 39.
24
24 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Nolasco
presumptively dead because respondent Nolasco had failed to show that there existed a well
founded belief for such declaration.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that respondent had
sufficiently established a basis to form a belief that his absent spouse had already died.
The Republic, through the Solicitor-General, is now before this Court on a Petition for
Review where the following allegations are made:
"1. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's finding that there existed a
well-founded belief on the part of Nolasco that Janet Monica Parker was already dead;
and
2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Trial Court's declaration that the petition
was a 5proper case of the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41, Family
Code."
The issue before this Court, as formulated by petitioner
6
is "[w]hether or not Nolasco has a
well-founded belief that his wife is already dead."
The present case was filed before the trial court pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code
which provides that:
"Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null
and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for
four consecutive years and the  spouse present had a well founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth
in the provision of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse." (Italics
supplied).
When Article 41 is compared with the old provision of the Civil
_____________
5 Petition, p. 9; Rollo, p. 13.
6 Id.
25
VOL. 220, MARCH 17, 1993 25
Republic vs. Nolasco
7
Code, which it superseded,   the following crucial differences emerge. Under Article 41, the
time required for the presumption to arise has been shortened to four (4) years; however, there
is need 8for a judicial declaration of presumptive death to enable the spouse present to
remarry.  Also, Article 41 of the Family Code imposes a stricter standard than the Civil Code:
Article 83 of the Civil Code merely requires either that there be no news that such absentee is
still alive; or the absentee is generally considered to be dead and believed to 9be so by the spouse
present, or is presumed dead under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code.  The Family Code,
upon the other hand, prescribes a  "well founded belief'  that the absentee is  already
dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted.
As pointed out by the Solicitor-General, there are four (4) requisites for the declaration of
presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code:
"1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive
years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the
circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
_____________
7 Pertinent portions of Article 83 of the Civil Code reads:
 14
"Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any other authorities or of the British Embassy,   he secured another seaman's contract and went to
person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
x x x      x x x      x x x London, a vast city of many millions of inhabitants, to look for her there.
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present
having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally
considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of the contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the "Q After arriving here in San Jose, Antique, did you
absentee is presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases exert efforts to inquire the whereabouts of your
until declared null and void by a competent court."
wife?
8 See A. V. Sempio Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines (1988), p. 48.
9 See generally Jones v. Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 179 (1937). A Yes, Sir.
26 Court:
  How did you do that?
26 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
A I secured another contract with the ship and we
Republic vs. Nolasco had a trip to London and I went to London15
to
look for her I could not find her (sic)."  (Italics
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and supplied)
4. That the present spouse 10
files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee." Respondent's testimony, however, showed that he confused London for Liverpool and this
11
casts doubt on his supposed efforts to locate his wife in England. The Court of Appeal's
Respondent naturally asserts that he had complied with all these requirements. justification of the mistake, to wit:
Petitioner's argument, upon the other hand, boils down to this: that respondent failed to
"x x x, Well, while the cognoscente (sic) would readily know the geographical difference between London
prove that he had complied with the third requirement, i.e., the existence of a "well-founded
and Liverpool, for a humble seaman like Gregorio the two places could mean one—place in England, the
belief' that the absent spouse is already dead. port where his ship docked and where he found Janet. Our own provincial folks, every time they leave
The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his missing wife home to visit relatives in Pasay City, Kalookan City, or Parañaque, would announce to friends and
with such diligence as to give
12
rise to a "well-founded belief' that she is dead. relatives, We're
16
going to Manila.' This apparent error in naming of places of destination does not appear
United States v. Biasbas,  is instructive as to degree of diligence required in searching for a to be fatal."
missing spouse. In that case, defendant Macario Biasbas was charged with the crime of
bigamy. He set-up the defense of a good faith belief that his first wife had already died. The is not well taken. There is no analogy between Manila and its neighboring cities, on one hand,
Court held that defendant had not exercised due diligence to ascertain the whereabouts of his and London and Liverpool, on the other, which, as pointed out by the Solicitor-General, are
first wife, noting that: around three hundred fifty (350) kilometers apart. We do not consider that walking into a
major city like Liverpool or London with a simple hope of somehow bumping into one
"While the defendant testified that he had made inquiries concerning the whereabouts of his wife, he particular person there—which is in effect what Nolasco says he did—can be regarded as a
fails to state of whom he made such inquiries. He did not even write to the parents of his first wife, who reasonably diligent search.
lived in the Province of Pampanga, for the purpose of securing information concerning her whereabouts. The Court also views respondent's claim that Janet Monica declined to give any information
He admits that he had a suspicion only that his first wife was dead. He admits that the only basis of his
suspicion was the fact that she had been absent. x x x"
13
as to her personal background

In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation allegedly conducted by _____________
respondent in his attempt to ascertain Janet Monica Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to 14 TSN, 28 September 1988, p. 16.
form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief that she was already dead. When he 15 Id., p. 8.
arrived in San Jose, Antique after learning of Janet Monica's departure, instead of seeking the 16 Court of Appeal's Decision, p. 6.
help of local
28

_____________
10 Petition, p. 11; Rollo; p. 15.
28 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
11 Memorandum for Respondent, p. 4.
12 25 Phil. 71 (1913). Republic vs. Nolasco
13 25 Phil. at 73.
17

27
even after she had married respondent  too convenient an excuse to justify his failure to locate
her. The same can be said of the loss of the alleged letters respondent had sent to his wife
which respondent claims were all returned to him. Respondent said he had lost these returned
VOL. 220, MARCH 17, 1993 27 letters, under unspecified circumstances.
Neither can this Court give much credence to respondent's bare assertion that he had
Republic vs. Nolasco inquired from their friends of her whereabouts, considering that respondent did not identify
those friends in his testimony. The Court of Appeals ruled that since the prosecutor failed to
14
rebut this evidence during trial, it is good evidence. But this kind of evidence cannot,18
by its _____________
nature, be rebutted. In any case, admissibility is not synonymous with credibility.  As noted 21 35Phil. at 254.
before, there are serious doubts to respondent's credibility. Moreover, even if admitted as 22 81Phil. 461 (1948).
evidence, said testimony merely tended to show that the missing spouse had chosen not to 23 203 SCRA 750 (1991).

communicate with their common acquaintances, and not that she was dead.
30
Respondent testified that immediately after receiving his mother's letter sometime in
January 1983, he cut short his employment contract to return to San Jose, Antique. However,
he did not explain the delay of nine (9) months from January 1983, when he allegedly asked 30 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
leave from his captain, to November 1983 when he finally reached San Jose. Respondent,
moreover, claimed he married Janet Monica Parker without inquiring about her parents and Republic vs. Nolasco
19
their place of residence.  Also, respondent failed to explain why he did not even try to get the
help of the police or other authorities in London and Liverpool in his effort to find his wife. The 'The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
circumstances of Janet Monica's departure and respondent's subsequent behavior make it very social institution. x x x'
difficult to regard the claimed belief that Janet Monica was dead a well-founded one.
20 The same sentiment has been expressed in the Family Code of the Philippines in Article 149:
In Goitia v. Campos-Rueda,  the Court stressed that:
'The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and
"x x x. Marriage is an institution, the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply protects. Consequently, family relations are governed by law and no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the
24
interested. It is a relationship for life and the family shall be recognized or given effect.'

____________ In fine, respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded belief required by law that
17 TSN, 28 September 1988, p. 14.
his absent wife was already dead that would sustain the issuance of a court order declaring
18 See generally Ramos v. Sandiganbayan, 191 SCRA 671 (1990). Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead.
19 TSN, 28 September 1988, p. 10.
20 35 Phil. 252 (1919). WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 February 1990, affirming the
trial court's decision declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead is hereby REVERSED
29 and both Decisions are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Costs against respondent.

     Bidin, Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

VOL. 220, MARCH 17, 1993 29      Gutierrez, Jr., J., On terminal leave.
Republic vs. Nolasco
Decision reversed, nullified and set aside.
21
parties cannot terminate it at any shorter period by virtue of any contract they make.  x x x."   (Italics Notes.—A  person who marries another, knowing that the latter is already married and
supplied) that his marriage is valid and subsisting, can be prosecuted for bigamy (People vs. Archilla, L-
15632, February 28, 1961, 1 SCRA 698).
By the same token, the spouses should not be allowed, by the simple expedient of agreeing
As a general rule, a marriage contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse is null and
that one of them leave the conjugal abode and never to return again, to circumvent the policy
void. The only exceptions are mentioned in subsections (a) & (b) of Section 29 of the Marriage
of the laws on marriage. The Court notes that respondent even tried to have his marriage
Law (People vs. Archilla, L-15632, February 28, 1961, 1 SCRA 698).
annulled before the trial
22
court in the same proceeding.
In In Re Szatraw,  the Court warned against such collusion between the parties when they
find it impossible to dissolve the marital bonds through existing legal means.
While the Court understands the need of respondent's young son, Gerry Nolasco, for
maternal care, still the requirements of the law must prevail. Since respondent failed to
satisfy the clear requirements of the law, his petition for a judicial declaration of presumptive
death must be denied. The law does not view marriage like an ordinary contract. Article 1 of
the Family Code emphasizes that
"x x x Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman  entered into in
accordance with law  for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the  foundation of the
family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law
and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the
marriage within the limits provided by this Code." (Italics supplied)

In Arroyo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,23 the Court stressed strongly the need to protect
"x x x the basic social institutions of marriage and the family in the preservation of which the State has
the strongest interest; the public policy here involved is of the most fundamental kind. In Article II,
Section 12 of the Constitution there is set forth the following basic state policy:
 The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
VOL. 477, DECEMBER 9, 2005 277      The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Republic vs. Court of Appeals 279

*
G.R. No. 159614. December 9, 2005. VOL. 477, DECEMBER 9, 2005 279

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,  vs.  THE HONORABLE COURT OF

Republic vs. Court of Appeals
APPEALS (TENTH DIVISION) and ALAN B. ALEGRO, respondents.
     Anastacio D. Yong for respondent.
Civil Law; The Family Code; Declaration of Absence; The spouse present is burdened to prove that his CALLEJO, SR., J.:
spouse has been absent and that he has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before
the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage.—The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove On March 29, 2001, Alan B. Alegro filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
that his spouse has been absent and that he has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already
Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 27, for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife, Rosalia
dead before the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is
meant by a well-grounded belief. Cuello Callon writes that “es menester que su creencia sea firme se funde (Lea) A. Julaton.
1

en motivos racionales.”
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
278
278 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Court of Appeals
Same; Same; Same;  Belief may be proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence which may
tend even in a slight degree to elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determination probably founded in truth.
—Belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an overt act. It may be proved by direct
evidence or circumstantial evidence which may tend, even in a slight degree, to elucidate the inquiry or
assist to a determination probably founded in truth. Any fact or circumstance relating to the character,
habits, conditions, attachments, prosperity and objects of life which usually control the conduct of men,
and are the motives of their actions, was, so far as it tends to explain or characterize their disappearance
or throw light on their intentions, competence evidence on the ultimate question of his death.
Same; Same; Same; Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the
absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before
and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by
present spouse.—The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness
inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is
still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of
the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances occurring
before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made
by present spouse.
Same; Same; Same; Court warned against collusion between the parties when they find it impossible
to dissolve the marital bonds through existing legal means.—Although testimonial evidence may suffice
to prove the well-founded belief of the present spouse that the absent spouse is already dead, in Republic
v. Nolasco, the Court warned against collusion between the parties when they find it impossible to
dissolve the marital bonds through existing legal means. It is also the maxim that “men readily believe
what they wish to be true.”
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
In an Order  dated April 16, 2001, the court set the petition for hearing on May 30, 2001 at
8:30 a.m. and directed that a copy of the said order be published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in the Samar Reporter, a newspaper of general circulation in the Province
of Samar, and that a copy be posted in the court’s bulletin board for at least three weeks before
the next scheduled hearing. The court also directed that copies of the order be served on the
Solicitor General, the Provincial Prosecutor of Samar, and Alan, through counsel, and that
copies be sent2 to Lea by registered mail. Alan complied with all the foregoing jurisdictional
requirements.
On May 28, 2001, the Republic of the3 Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), filed a Motion to Dismiss   the petition, which 4
was, however, denied by the
court for failure to comply with Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
At the hearing, Alan5 adduced evidence that he and Lea were married on January 20, 1995
in Catbalogan, Samar. He testified that, on February 6, 1995, Lea arrived home late in the
evening and he berated her for being always out of their house. He told her that if6 she enjoyed
the life of a single person, it would be better for her to go back to her parents.   Lea did not
reply. Alan narrated that, when he reported for work the following day, Lea was still in
_______________
1 Records, p. 1.
2 Exhibits “C” to “H” and “H-1,” folder of exhibits, pp. 10-21.
3 Records, pp. 3-6.
4 Id., at p. 9.
5 Exhibit “A,” folder of exhibits, p. 5.
6 TSN, 20 September 2001, p. 6.
280
280 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Court of Appeals
7
the house, but when he arrived home later in the day, Lea was nowhere to be found.   Alan
thought8 that Lea merely went to her parents’ house in Bliss, Sto. Niño, Catbalogan,
Samar.  However, Lea did not return to their house anymore.
Alan further testified that, on February 14, 1995, after his work, he went to the house of
Lea’s parents to see if she was there, but he was told that she was not there. He also went to
the house of Lea’s friend, Janeth Bautista, at Barangay Canlapwas, but he9 was informed by
Janette’s brother-in-law, Nelson Abaenza, that Janeth had left for Manila.  When Alan went
back to the house of his parents-in-law, he learned
10
from his father-in-law that Lea had been to
 10
20 Records,
their house but that she left without notice.  Alan sought the help of Barangay Captain Juan pp. 23-24.
Magat, who promised to help 11
him locate his wife. He also inquired from his friends of Lea’s 282
whereabouts but to no avail.
Sometime in June 1995, he decided to go to Manila to look for Lea, but his mother asked
him to leave after 12the town fiesta of Catbalogan, hoping that Lea may come home for the 282 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
fiesta. Alan agreed.  However, Lea did not show up. Alan then left for Manila on August 27,
1995. He went to a house in Navotas where Janeth, Lea’s friend, was staying. When asked Republic vs. Court of Appeals
13
where Lea was, Janeth told him that she had not seen her.   He failed to find out Lea’s 21 22
whereabouts despite his repeated talks with Janeth. Alan decided to work as a part-time taxi of the RTC.  The CA cited the ruling of this Court in Republic v. Nolasco.
driver. On his free time, he would look for Lea in the malls 14but still to no avail. He returned to The OSG filed a petition for review on  certiorari  of the CA’s decision alleging that
Catbalogan in 1997 and again looked for his wife but failed. respondent Alan
23
B. Alegro failed to prove that he had a well-founded belief that Lea was
already dead.  It averred that the respondent failed to exercise reasonable and diligent efforts
_______________ to locate his wife. The respondent even admitted that Lea’s father told him on February 14,
1995 that Lea had been to their house but left without notice. The OSG pointed out that the
7 Id., at p. 9.
8 Id.,
respondent reported his wife’s disappearance to the local police and also to the NBI only after
at p. 7.
9 TSN, 20 September 2001, p. 12. the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the petition. The petitioner avers that, as gleaned from
10 Id., at p. 16. the evidence, the respondent did not really want to find and locate Lea. Finally, the petitioner
11 Id., at pp. 13-15. averred:
12 Id., at p. 16.
13 Id., at pp. 17-19. “In view of the summary nature of proceedings under Article 41 of the Family Code for the declaration of
14 Id., at pp. 20-21. presumptive death of one’s spouse, the degree of due diligence set by this Honorable Court in the above-
mentioned cases in locating the whereabouts of a missing spouse must be strictly complied with. There
281 have been times when Article 41 of the Family Code had been resorted to by parties wishing to remarry
knowing fully well that their alleged missing spouses are alive and well. It is even possible that those
who cannot have their marriages x x x declared null and voidunder Article 36 of the Family Code resort
VOL. 477, DECEMBER 9, 2005 281 to Article 41 of the Family Code for relief because of the x x x summary nature of its proceedings. It is the
policy of the State to protect and strengthen the family as a basic social institution. Marriage is the
Republic vs. Court of Appeals
foundation of the family. Since marriage is an inviolable social institution that the 1987 Constitution
15
seeks to protect from dissolution at the whim of the parties. For respondent’s failure to prove that he had
On June 20, 2001, Alan reported Lea’s disappearance to the local police station.   The police a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead and that he exerted the required amount of diligence
16
authorities issued an Alarm Notice on July 4, 2001.  Alan also reported Lea’s disappearance in searching for his missing wife, the petition for declaration of presumptive
17
to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on July 9, 2001.
_______________
Barangay  Captain Juan Magat corroborated the testimony of Alan. He declared that on
February 14, 1995, at 2:00 p.m., Alan inquired from him if Lea passed by his house and he told 21  Penned by Associate Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos, with Associate Justices Edgardo P. Cruz and Noel G. Tijam,
concurring; Rollo, pp. 33-40.
Alan that she did not. Alan
18
also told him that Lea had disappeared. He had not seen Lea in 22 G.R. No. 94053, March 17, 1993, 220 SCRA 20.
the barangay ever since.  Lea’s father, who was
19
his compadreand the owner of Radio DYMS, 23 Rollo, p. 17.

told him that he did not know where Lea was.

283
After Alan rested his case, neither the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor nor the Solicitor
General adduced evidence in opposition to the petition.
On January 8, 2002, the court rendered judgment granting the petition. The  fallo  of the VOL. 477, DECEMBER 9, 2005 283
decision reads:
Republic vs. Court of Appeals
“WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, petitioner’s absent spouse ROSALIA JULATON is
hereby declared PRESUMPTIVELY DEAD for the purpose of the petitioner’s subsequent marriage under 24

Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the death should have been denied by the trial court and the Honorable Court of Appeals.”
said absent spouse.20
The petition is meritorious.
SO ORDERED.”
Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines reads:
The OSG appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA) which rendered judgment on
“Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null
August 4, 2003, affirming the decision and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent
for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
_______________ already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger under the circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
15 Exhibits “I” and “I-1,” folder of exhibits, p. 22.
16 Exhibit
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse
“J,” Id., at p. 23. present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive
17 Exhibit “K,” Id., at p. 24. 25

18 TSN, November 5, 2001, pp. 4-6.

death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
19 Id., at p. 8.
The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he VOL. 477, DECEMBER 9, 2005 285
has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may
contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is meant by a well-grounded Republic vs. Court of Appeals
belief. Cuello
26
Callon writes that “es menester que su creencia sea firme se funde en motivos
racionales.” Neither did she communicate with the respondent after leaving the conjugal abode because of
Belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an overt act. It may be her resentment to the chastisement she received from him barely a month after their
proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence which may tend, even in a slight degree, marriage. What is so worrisome is that, the respondent failed to make inquiries from his
to elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determination probably founded in truth. Any fact or parents-in-law regarding Lea’s whereabouts before filing his petition in the RTC. It could have
circumstance relating to the character, habits, conditions, attachments, prosperity and objects enhanced the credibility of the respondent had he made inquiries from his parents-in-law
of life which usually control the conduct of men, and are the motives of their actions, was, so about Lea’s whereabouts considering that Lea’s father was the owner of Radio DYMS.
far as it tends to explain or characterize their disappearance or throw The respondent did report and seek the help of the local police authorities and the NBI to
locate Lea, but it was only an afterthought. He did so only after the OSG filed its notice to
_______________ dismiss his petition in the RTC.
24 Id.,
In sum, the Court finds and so holds that the respondent failed to prove that he had a well-
at pp. 26-28.
25 Emphases supplied.
founded belief, before he filed his petition in the RTC, that his spouse Rosalia (Lea) Julaton
26 Derecho Penal, Vol. II, p. 633. was already dead.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the
284 Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73749 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Consequently, the
Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 27, is ORDERED to DISMISS the
284 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED respondent’s petition.
SO ORDERED.
Republic vs. Court of Appeals
     Puno (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
27
light on their intentions,  competence evidence on the ultimate question of his death. Petition granted, judgment reversed and set aside. Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, Br.
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness 27 ordered to dismiss respondent’s petition.
inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the
absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a Note.—Judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse in the New Civil Code is not
well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from necessary as long as the prescribed period of absence is met. (Armas vs. Calisterio, 330 SCRA
a great many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance28
of the absent spouse 201 [2000])
and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse.
Although testimonial evidence may suffice to prove the wellfounded belief 29
of the present
spouse that the absent spouse is already dead, in  Republic v. Nolasco,   the Court warned
against collusion between the parties when they find it impossible to dissolve the marital
bonds through existing legal means. It is also the maxim that “men readily believe what they
wish to be true.”
In this case, the respondent failed to present a witness other than Barangay Captain Juan
Magat. The respondent even failed to present Janeth Bautista or Nelson Abaenza or any other
person from whom he allegedly made inquiries about Lea to corroborate his testimony. On the
other hand, the respondent admitted that when he returned to the house of his parents-in-law
on February 14, 1995, his father-in-law told him that Lea had just been there but that she left
without notice.
The respondent declared that Lea left their abode on February 7, 1995 after he chided her
for coming home late and for being always out of their house, and told her that it would be
better for her to go home to her parents if she enjoyed the life of a single person. Lea, thus, left
their conjugal abode and never returned.

_______________
27 Tyrrell v. Prudential Insurance Company of America, 115 A.L.R., 392 (1937), citing In re: Hurlburt’s Estate, 35

L.R.A. 794 68 Vt. 366, 35 A.77.

28 Gall v. Gall, 69 Sickels 109, 21 NE 106 (1889).
29 Supra, note 19.

285

G.R. No. 180863. September 8, 2009.*
ANGELITA VALDEZ, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Civil Procedure; Question of Law; Question of Fact; A question of law lies, on one hand, when the
doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain set of facts; on the other hand, a question of
facts exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts.—We
discuss a procedural issue. Under the Rules of Court, a party may directly appeal to this Court from a
decision of the trial court only on pure questions of law. A question of law lies, on one hand, when the
doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain set of facts; on the other hand, a question of
fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts. Here, the
facts are not disputed; the controversy merely relates to the correct application of the law or
jurisprudence to the undisputed facts.
Civil Law; Presumption of Death; The Court explained that presumption of death cannot be the
subject of court proceedings independent of the settlement of the absentee’s estate.—The Court explained
that presumption of death cannot be the subject of court proceedings independent of the settlement of the
absentee’s estate.
Same; Same; A judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because he had been
unheard from in seven years, being a
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
647
presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become final.
—The petition is not for the settlement of the estate of Nicolai Szatraw, because it does not appear that
he possessed property brought to the marriage and because he had acquired no property during his
married life with the petitioner. The rule invoked by the latter is merely one of evidence which permits
the court to presume that a person is dead after the fact that such person had been unheard from in
seven years had been established. This presumption may arise and be invoked and made in a case, either
in an action or in a special proceeding, which is tried or heard by, and submitted for decision to, a
competent court.  Independently of such an action or special proceeding, the presumption of
death cannot be invoked, nor can it be made the subject of an action or special proceeding. In
this case, there is no right to be enforced nor is there a remedy prayed for by the petitioner against her
absent husband. Neither is there a prayer for the final determination of his right or status or for the
ascertainment of a particular fact (Hagans v. Wislizenus, 42 Phil. 880), for the petition does not pray for
a declaration that the petitioner’s husband is dead, but merely asks for a declaration that he be
presumed dead because he had been unheard from in seven years. If there is any pretense at securing a
declaration that the petitioner’s husband is dead, such a pretension cannot be granted because it is
unauthorized. The petition is for a declaration that the petitioner’s husband is presumptively dead. But
this declaration, even if judicially made, would not improve the petitioner’s situation, because such a
presumption is already established by law. A judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final
and executory, would still be a  prima faciepresumption only. It is still disputable. It is for
that reason that it cannot be the subject of a judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is
the only question or matter involved in a case, or upon which a competent court has to
pass. The latter must decide finally the controversy between the parties, or determine finally the right or
status of a party or establish finally a particular fact, out of which certain rights and obligations arise or
may arise; and once such controversy is decided by a final judgment, or such right or status determined,
or such particular fact established, by a final decree, then the judgment on the subject of the controversy,
or the decree upon the right or status of a party or upon the existence of a particular fact, becomes res
judicata, subject to no collateral attack, except in a few rare in-
648
stances especially provided by law. It is, therefore, clear that a judicial declaration that a person is
presumptively dead, because he had been unheard from in seven years, being a
presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or
become final. Proof of actual death of the person presumed dead because he had been unheard from in
seven years, would have to be made in another proceeding to have such particular fact finally
determined. If a judicial decree declaring a person presumptively dead, because he had not been heard
from in seven years, cannot become final and executory even after the lapse of the reglementary period
within which an appeal may be taken, for such presumption is still disputable and remains subject to
contrary proof, then a petition for such a declaration is useless, unnecessary, superfluous and of no
benefit to the petitioner.
Same; Same; Under the Civil Code, the presumption of death is established by law and no court
declaration is needed for the presumption to arise.—Under the Civil Code, the presumption of death is
established by law and no court declaration is needed for the presumption to arise. Since death is
presumed to have taken place by the seventh year of absence, Sofio is to be presumed dead starting
October 1982.
Same; Evidence; Considering that it is the Civil Code that applies, proof of well-founded belief is not
required.—At the time of petitioner’s marriage to Virgilio, there existed no impediment to petitioner’s
capacity to marry, and the marriage is valid under paragraph 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code. Further,
considering that it is the Civil Code that applies, proof of “well-founded belief” is not required. Petitioner
could not have been expected to comply with this requirement since the Family Code was not yet in effect
at the time of her marriage to Virgilio. The enactment of the Family Code in 1988 does not change this
conclusion. The Family Code itself states: Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it
does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
Same; Same; To retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code requiring petitioner to exhibit
“well-founded belief” will, ultimately, result in the invalidation of her second marriage, which was valid
at the time it was celebrated.—To retroactively apply the provi-
649
sions of the Family Code requiring petitioner to exhibit “well-founded belief” will, ultimately, result in
the invalidation of her second marriage, which was valid at the time it was celebrated. Such a situation
would be untenable and would go against the objectives that the Family Code wishes to achieve. In sum,
we hold that the Petition must be dismissed since no decree on the presumption of Sofio’s death can be
granted under the Civil Code, the same presumption having arisen by operation of law. However, we
declare that petitioner was capacitated to marry Virgilio at the time their marriage was celebrated in
1985 and, therefore, the said marriage is legal and valid.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Camiling,
Tarlac.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Dennis V. Niño for petitioner.
  The Solicitor General for respondent.
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Camiling, Tarlac dated November
12, 2007 dismissing petitioner Angelita Valdez’s petition for the declaration of presumptive
death of her husband, Sofio Polborosa (Sofio).
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner married Sofio on January 11, 1971 in Pateros, Rizal. On December 13, 1971,
petitioner gave birth to the spouses’ only child, Nancy. According to petitioner, she and Sofio
argued constantly because the latter was unemployed and did not bring home any money. In
March 1972, Sofio left their conjugal dwelling. Petitioner and their child waited for him to
return but, finally, in May 1972, petitioner decided to go back to her parents’ home in Bancay
1st, Camiling, Tarlac. Three years passed without any word from Sofio. In October 1975, Sofio
showed up at Bancay 1st. He and petitioner talked
650

for several hours and they agreed to separate. They executed a document to that effect.1 That
was the last time petitioner saw him. After that, petitioner didn’t hear any news of Sofio, his
whereabouts or even if he was alive or not.2
Believing that Sofio was already dead, petitioner married Virgilio Reyes on June 20,
1985.3  Subsequently, however, Virgilio’s application for naturalization filed with the United
States Department of Homeland Security was denied because petitioner’s marriage to Sofio
was subsisting.4  Hence, on March 29, 2007, petitioner filed a Petition before the RTC of
Camiling, Tarlac seeking the declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.
The RTC rendered its Decision5 on November 12, 2007, dismissing the Petition for lack of
merit. The RTC held that Angelita “was not able to prove the well-grounded belief that her
husband Sofio Polborosa was already dead.” It said that under Article 41 of the Family Code,
the present spouse is burdened to prove that her spouse has been absent and that she has a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may
contract a subsequent marriage. This belief, the RTC said, must be the result of proper and
honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse.
The RTC found that, by petitioner’s own admission, she did not try to find her husband
anymore in light of their mutual agreement to live separately. Likewise, petitioner’s daughter
testified that her mother prevented her from looking for her father. The RTC also said there is
a strong possibility that Sofio is still alive, considering that he would have been only 61 years
old by then, and people who have reached their 60s
_______________
1 Rollo, p. 33.
2 Id., at pp. 5-6.
3 Id., at p. 10.
4 Id., at p. 11.
5 Penned by Judge Jose S. Vallo, Id., at pp. 35-39.
651
have not become increasingly low in health and spirits, and, even assuming as true
petitioner’s testimony that Sofio was a chain smoker and a drunkard, there is no evidence that
he continues to drink and smoke until now.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.6  She argued that it is the Civil Code that
applies in this case and not the Family Code since petitioner’s marriage to Sofio was
celebrated on January 11, 1971, long before the Family Code took effect. Petitioner further
argued that she had acquired a vested right under the provisions of the Civil Code and the
stricter provisions of the Family Code should not be applied against her because Title XIV of
the Civil Code, where Articles 384 and 390 on declaration of absence and presumption of
death, respectively, can be found, was not expressly repealed by the Family Code. To apply the
stricter provisions of the Family Code will impair the rights petitioner had acquired under the
Civil Code.
The RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution dated December 10, 2007.7
Petitioner now comes before this Court seeking the reversal of the RTC Decision and
Motion for Reconsideration.
In its Manifestation and Motion,8  the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) recommended
that the Court set aside the assailed RTC Decision and grant the Petition to declare Sofio
presumptively dead. The OSG argues that the requirement of “well-founded belief” under
Article 41 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case. It said that petitioner could
not be expected to comply with this requirement because it was not yet in existence during her
marriage to Virgilio Reyes in 1985. The OSG further argues that before the effectivity of the
Family Code, petitioner already acquired a vested right as to the validity of her marriage to
Virgilio Reyes based on the
_______________
6 Rollo, pp. 40-55.
7 Id., at pp. 56-61.
8 Id., at pp. 86-98.
652
presumed death of Sofio under the Civil Code. This vested right and the presumption of Sofio’s
death, the OSG posits, could not be affected by the obligations created under the Family
Code.9
Next, the OSG contends that Article 390 of the Civil Code was not repealed by Article 41 of
the Family Code.10Title XIV of the Civil Code, the OSG said, was not one of those expressly
repealed by the Family Code. Moreover, Article 256 of the Family Code provides that its
provisions shall not be retroactively applied if they will prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights.11
The RTC Decision, insofar as it dismissed the Petition, is affirmed. However, we must state
that we are denying the Petition on grounds different from those cited in the RTC Decision.
Initially, we discuss a procedural issue. Under the Rules of Court, a party may directly
appeal to this Court from a decision of the trial court only on pure questions of law. A question
of law lies, on one hand, when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain
set of facts; on the other hand, a question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as
to the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts. Here, the facts are not disputed; the controversy
merely relates to the correct application of the law or jurisprudence to the undisputed facts.12
The RTC erred in applying the provisions of the Family Code and holding that petitioner
needed to prove a “well-founded belief” that Sofio was already dead. The RTC applied Article
41 of the Family Code, to wit:
_______________
9  Id., at pp. 92-93.
10 Id., at p. 94.
11 Id., at p. 96.
12 Philippine Veterans Bank v. Monillas, G.R. No. 167098, March 28, 2008, 550 SCRA 251. (Citations omitted.)
653
“Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be
null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent
for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger under the circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.”
It is readily apparent, however, that the marriages of petitioner to Sofio and Virgilio on
January 11, 1971 and June 20, 1985, respectively, were both celebrated under the auspices of
the Civil Code.
The pertinent provision of the Civil Code is Article 83:
“Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse
of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its
performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage
without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, of if the absentee, though he has
been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse
present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead
according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases
until declared null and void by a competent court.”
Article 390 of the Civil Code states:
654
“Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives,
he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an
absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall
be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.”
The Court, on several occasions, had interpreted the above-quoted provision in this wise:
“For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially
declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil
Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of
the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the
former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the
spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that such former spouse is generally
reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage.”13
Further, the Court explained that presumption of death cannot be the subject of court
proceedings independent of the settlement of the absentee’s estate.
In re Szatraw14  is instructive. In that case, petitioner contracted marriage with a Polish
national in 1937. They lived together as husband and wife for three years. Sometime in 1940,
the husband, on the pretext of visiting some friends, left the conjugal abode with their child
and never returned. After inquiring from friends, petitioner found that her husband went to
Shanghai, China. However, friends who came from Shanghai told her that the husband was
not seen there. In 1948, petitioner filed a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of
her husband arguing that since the latter
_______________
13 Jones v. Hortigüela, 64 Phil. 179, 183 (1937).
14 In re Szatraw, 81 Phil. 461 (1948).
655
had been absent for more than seven years and she had not heard any news from him and
about her child, she believes that he is dead. In deciding the case, the Court said:
“The petition is not for the settlement of the estate of Nicolai Szatraw, because it does not appear that
he possessed property brought to the marriage and because he had acquired no property during his
married life with the petitioner. The rule invoked by the latter is merely one of evidence which permits
the court to presume that a person is dead after the fact that such person had been unheard from in
seven years had been established. This presumption may arise and be invoked and made in a case, either
in an action or in a special proceeding, which is tried or heard by, and submitted for decision to, a
competent court.  Independently of such an action or special proceeding, the presumption of
death cannot be invoked, nor can it be made the subject of an action or special proceeding. In
this case, there is no right to be enforced nor is there a remedy prayed for by the petitioner against her
absent husband. Neither is there a prayer for the final determination of his right or status or for the
ascertainment of a particular fact (Hagans v. Wislizenus, 42 Phil. 880), for the petition does not pray for
a declaration that the petitioner’s husband is dead, but merely asks for a declaration that he be
presumed dead because he had been unheard from in seven years. If there is any pretense at securing a
declaration that the petitioner’s husband is dead, such a pretension cannot be granted because it is
unauthorized. The petition is for a declaration that the petitioner’s husband is presumptively dead. But
this declaration, even if judicially made, would not improve the petitioner’s situation, because such a
presumption is already established by law. A judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final
and executory, would still be a  prima faciepresumption only. It is still disputable. It is for
that reason that it cannot be the subject of a judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is
the only question or matter involved in a case, or upon which a competent court has to
pass. The latter must decide finally the controversy between the parties, or determine finally the right or
status of a party or establish finally a particular fact, out of which certain rights and obligations arise or
may arise; and once such controversy is decided by a final judgment, or such right or status determined,
or such particular fact established, by a final decree, then the judgment on the subject of the controversy,
or the decree
656
upon the right or status of a party or upon the existence of a particular fact, becomes res judicata, subject
to no collateral attack, except in a few rare instances especially provided by law. It is, therefore, clear
that a judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because he had been unheard
from in seven years, being a presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot
reach the stage of finality or become final. Proof of actual death of the person presumed dead
because he had been unheard from in seven years, would have to be made in another proceeding to have
such particular fact finally determined. If a judicial decree declaring a person presumptively dead,
because he had not been heard from in seven years, cannot become final and executory even after the
lapse of the reglementary period within which an appeal may be taken, for such presumption is still
disputable and remains subject to contrary proof, then a petition for such a declaration is useless,
unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit to the petitioner.”15
In Lukban v. Republic,16 petitioner Lourdes G. Lukban contracted marriage with Francisco
Chuidian on December 10, 1933. A few days later, on December 27, Francisco left Lourdes
after a violent quarrel. She did not hear from him after that day. Her diligent search, inquiries
from his parents and friends, and search in his last known address, proved futile. Believing
her husband was already dead since he had been absent for more than twenty years,
petitioner filed a petition in 1956 for a declaration that she is a widow of her husband who is
presumed to be dead and has no legal impediment to contract a subsequent marriage. On the
other hand, the antecedents in Gue v. Republic17 are similar to Szatraw. On January 5, 1946,
Angelina Gue’s husband left Manila where they were residing and went to Shanghai, China.
From that day on, he had not been heard of, had not written to her, nor in anyway
communicated with her as to his whereabouts. Despite her efforts and diligence, she failed
_______________
15 Id., at pp. 462-463. (Emphasis supplied.)
16 98 Phil. 574 (1956).
17 107 Phil. 381 (1960).
657
to locate him. After 11 years, she asked the court for a declaration of the presumption of death
of Willian Gue, pursuant to the provisions of Article 390 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
In both cases, the Court reiterated its ruling in Szatraw. It held that a petition for judicial
declaration that petitioner’s husband is presumed to be dead cannot be entertained because it
is not authorized by law.18
From the foregoing, it can be gleaned that, under the Civil Code, the presumption of death
is established by law19 and no court declaration is needed for the presumption to arise. Since
death is presumed to have taken place by the seventh year of absence,20  Sofio is to be
presumed dead starting October 1982.
Consequently, at the time of petitioner’s marriage to Virgilio, there existed no impediment
to petitioner’s capacity to marry, and the marriage is valid under paragraph 2 of Article 83 of
the Civil Code.
 Further, considering that it is the Civil Code that applies, proof of “well-founded belief” is
not required. Petitioner could not have been expected to comply with this requirement since
the Family Code was not yet in effect at the time of her marriage to Virgilio. The enactment of
the Family Code in 1988 does not change this conclusion. The Family Code itself states:
“Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.”

To retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code requiring petitioner to exhibit
“well-founded belief” will, ultimately, result in the invalidation of her second marriage,

_______________

18 Id., at p. 386.
19 In re Szatraw, supra note 14.
20 Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 1, 5th ed., p. 738.

658

which was valid at the time it was celebrated. Such a situation would be untenable and would
go against the objectives that the Family Code wishes to achieve.
In sum, we hold that the Petition must be dismissed since no decree on the presumption of
Sofio’s death can be granted under the Civil Code, the same presumption having arisen by
operation of law. However, we declare that petitioner was capacitated to marry Virgilio at the
time their marriage was celebrated in 1985 and, therefore, the said marriage is legal and
valid.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr. and Peralta, JJ., concur.

Judgment denied.

Note.—Any doubt as to the validity of a marriage is to be resolved in favor of its validity.

(Paras vs. Paras, 529 SCRA 81 [2007] )

G.R. No. 184621. December 10, 2013.*
 
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,  vs.  MARIA FE ESPINOSA CANTOR,
respondent.
Civil Law; Family Law; Declaration of Presumptive Death; The Family Code was explicit that the
court’s judgment in summary proceedings, such as the declaration of presumptive death of an absent
spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code, shall be immediately final and executory.—The Family Code
was explicit that the court’s judgment in summary proceedings, such as the declaration of presumptive
death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code, shall be immediately final and executory.
Article 41, in relation to Article 247, of the Family Code provides: Art. 41. A marriage
_______________
* EN BANC.
 
 
2 Civil Code. The Family Code, upon the other hand, prescribes as “well founded belief” that the
contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive
years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case
of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of
Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient. For the purpose of
contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute
a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. Art. 247. The judgment of the
court  shall be immediately final and executory. [underscores ours] With the judgment being final, it
necessarily follows that it is no longer subject to an appeal, the dispositions and conclusions therein
having become immutable and unalterable not only as against the parties but even as against the courts.
Modification of the court’s ruling, no matter how erroneous is no longer permissible. The final and
executory nature of this summary proceeding thus prohibits the resort to appeal.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; While jurisprudence tells us that no appeal can be
made from the trial court’s judgment, an aggrieved party may, nevertheless, file a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to question any abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction that transpired.—While jurisprudence tells us that no appeal can be made from the trial
court’s judgment, an aggrieved party may, nevertheless, file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court to question any abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction that
transpired. As held in De los Santos v. Rodriguez, et al., 22 SCRA 451, 455 (1968), the fact that a decision
has become final does not automatically negate the original action of the CA to issue  certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus in connection with orders or processes issued by the trial
court. Certiorari may be availed of where a court has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion, and where the ordinary remedy of appeal is not available.
Civil Law; Family Law; Declaration of Presumptive Death; Before a judicial declaration of
presumptive death can be obtained, it
 
 
3 that: In view of the summary nature of proceedings under Article 41 of the Family Code for the
must be shown that the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse
had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse was already dead.—Before a judicial declaration of
presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse was already
dead. Under Article 41 of the Family Code, there are four (4) essential requisites for the declaration of
presumptive death: 1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two
consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances
laid down in Article 391, Civil Code; 2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry; 3. That the present
spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and 4. That the present spouse files a
summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.
Same; Same; Same; Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present spouse the burden of
proving the additional and more stringent requirement of “well-founded belief” which can only be
discharged upon a showing of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the
absent spouse’s whereabouts but, more importantly, that the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead.
—Article 41 of the Family Code, compared to the old provision of the Civil Code which it superseded,
imposes a stricter standard. It requires a “well-founded belief” that the absentee is already dead before
a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted. We have had occasion to make the same
observation in Republic v. Nolasco, 220 SCRA 20 (1993), where we noted the crucial differences between
Article 41 of the Family Code and Article 83 of the Civil Code, to wit: Under Article 41, the time required
for the presumption to arise has been shortened to four (4) years; however, there is need for a judicial
declaration of presumptive death to enable the spouse present to remarry. Also, Article 41 of the Family
Code imposes a  stricter standard  than the Civil Code: Article 83 of the Civil Code merely requires
either that there be no news that such absentee is still alive; or the absentee is generally considered to be
dead and believed to be so by the spouse present, or is presumed dead under Articles 390 and 391 of the
absentee is  already dead  before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be
granted. Thus, mere absence of the
 
 
4
spouse (even for such period required by the law), lack of any news that such absentee is still alive,
failure to communicate or general presumption of absence under the Civil Code would not suffice. This
conclusion proceeds from the premise that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present spouse
the burden of proving the additional and more stringent requirement of “well-founded belief” which can
only be discharged upon a showing of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain
not only the absent spouse’s whereabouts but, more importantly, that the absent spouse is still alive or is
already dead.
Same; Same; Same; The law did not define what is meant by “well-founded belief;” Its determination,
so to speak, remains on a case-to-case basis.—The law did not define what is meant by “well-founded
belief.” It depends upon the circumstances of each particular case. Its determination, so to speak,
remains on a case-to-case basis. To be able to comply with this requirement, the present spouse must
prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the
absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the
circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It requires exertion of active effort (not a mere
passive one).
Same; Same; Same; In view of the summary nature of proceedings under Article 41 of the Family
Code for the declaration of presumptive death of one’s spouse, the degree of due diligence set by this
Honorable Court in locating the whereabouts of a missing spouse must be strictly complied with.—The
Court, fully aware of the possible collusion of spouses in nullifying their marriage, has consistently
applied the “strict standard” approach. This is to ensure that a petition for declaration of presumptive
death under Article 41 of the Family Code is not used as a tool to conveniently circumvent the laws.
Courts should never allow procedural shortcuts and should ensure that the stricter standard required by
the Family Code is met. In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.), we emphasized
declaration of presumptive death of one’s spouse, the degree of due diligence set by this Honorable
Court in the above-mentioned cases in locating the whereabouts of a missing spouse must be
strictly complied with. There have been times when Article 41 of the Family
 
 
 5 to find Jerry. Verily, it is as if she searched the patient’s directory only when she was in a hospital by
Code had been resorted to by parties wishing to remarry knowing fully well that their alleged
missing spouses are alive and well. It is even possible that those who cannot have their marriages xxx
declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code resort to Article 41 of the Family Code for
relief because of the xxx summary nature of its proceedings.
Same; Same; Same; Since marriage serves as the family’s foundation and since it is the state’s policy
to protect and strengthen the family as a basic social institution, marriage should not be permitted to be
dissolved at the whim of the parties.—The application of this stricter standard becomes even more
imperative if we consider the State’s policy to protect and strengthen the institution of marriage. Since
marriage serves as the family’s foundation and since it is the state’s policy to protect and strengthen the
family as a basic social institution, marriage should not be permitted to be dissolved at the whim of the
parties. In interpreting and applying Article 41, this is the underlying rationale — to uphold the sanctity
of marriage.  Arroyo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 203 SCRA 750 (1991), reflected this sentiment when we
stressed: [The] protection of the basic social institutions of marriage and the family in the preservation of
which the State has the strongest interest; the public policy here involved is of the most fundamental
kind. In Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution there is set forth the following basic state policy: The
State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution.
Same; Same; Same; For purposes of remarriage, it is necessary to strictly comply with the stringent
standard and have the absent spouse judicially declared presumptively dead.—The requisite judicial
declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse (and consequently, the application of a stringent
standard for its issuance) is also for the present spouse’s benefit. It is intended to protect him/her from a
criminal prosecution of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code which might come into play
if he/she would prematurely remarry  sans  the court’s declaration. Upon the issuance of the decision
declaring his/her absent spouse presumptively dead, the present spouse’s good faith in contracting a
second marriage is effectively established. The decision of the competent court constitutes sufficient proof
of his/her good faith and his/her criminal intent in case of remarriage is effectively negated. Thus, for
purposes of
 
 
6 the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
remarriage, it is necessary to strictly comply with the stringent standard and have the absent spouse
judicially declared presumptively dead.
 
VELASCO, JR., J., Concurring Opinion:
 
Civil Law; Family Code; Declaration of Presumptive Death; View that whether or not one has a “well-
founded belief” that his or her spouse is dead depends on the unique circumstances of each case and that
there is no set standard or procedure in determining the same.—I fully agree that whether or not one has
a “well-founded belief” that his or her spouse is dead depends on the unique circumstances of each case
and that there is no set standard or procedure in determining the same. It is my opinion that Maria Fe
failed to conduct a search with such diligence as to give rise to a “well-founded belief” that her husband is
dead. Further, the circumstances of Jerry’s departure and Maria Fe’s behavior after he left make it
difficult to consider her belief a well-founded one. To reiterate, Maria Fe’s alleged “well-founded” belief
arose when: (1) Jerry’s relatives and friends could not give her any information on his whereabouts; and
(2) she did not find Jerry’s name in the patients’ directory whenever she went to a hospital. To my mind,
Maria Fe’s reliance on these alone makes her belief weak and flimsy rather than “well-founded.” Further,
it appears that Maria Fe did not actively look for her husband in hospitals and that she searched for
Jerry’s name in these hospitals’ list of patients merely as an afterthought. Moreover, it may be sensed
from the given facts that her search was not intentional or planned. This may be noted from the fact that
whenever Maria Fe went to a hospital, she made it a point to look through the patients’ directory, hoping
coincidence.
Same; Same; Same; View that it is the policy of the State to protect and preserve marriage. Courts
should be ever mindful of this policy and, hence, must exercise prudence in evaluating petitions for
declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse.—Were it not for the finality of the RTC ruling, the
declaration of presumptive death should have been recalled and set aside for utter lack of factual basis.
It is the policy of the State to protect and preserve marriage. Courts should be ever mindful of this policy
and, hence, must
 
 
7
exercise prudence in evaluating petitions for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse.
Otherwise, spouses may easily circumvent the policy of the laws on marriage by simply agreeing that one
of them leave the conjugal abode and never return again.
 
LEONEN, J., Dissenting Opinion:
 
Civil Law; Family Law; Declaration of Presumptive Death; View that certiorari lies as a remedy to
annul a judgment in proceedings for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse where grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Regional Trial Court is
clearly and convincingly shown.—I agree that  certiorari  lies as a remedy to annul a judgment in
proceedings for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse where grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Regional Trial Court is clearly and
convincingly shown. A petition for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse for the
purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage is a summary proceeding. Article 41 of the Family Code is
clear on this point: Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years
shall be sufficient. For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph the spouse present must institute a  summary proceeding  as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the
absent spouse.
Same; Same; Same; View that while a trial court’s judgment relating to a petition for the declaration
of presumptive death of an absent spouse is considered immediately final and executory, the Office of the
Solicitor General is not entirely without remedy to assail the propriety of a trial court’s judgment.—It is
clear that a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse is a summary
proceeding; more so, judgments of a trial court relating to such petitions shall be considered immediately
final and executory. However, while a trial court’s judgment relating to a petition for the
 
 
8
declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse is considered immediately final and executory,
the Office of the Solicitor General is not entirely without remedy to assail the propriety of a trial court’s
judgment. Where the judgment is attended by grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, the Office of the Solicitor General may file with the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 and have the judgment annulled. Should the Court of Appeals still render an
adverse decision, the Office of the Solicitor General may then file a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 with this court. This is what the Office of the Solicitor General did in this case.
 Same; Same; Same; View that in cases for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the
Family Code, we cannot ask the impossible from a spouse who was abandoned.—I disagree with the
position that “well-founded belief” should be interpreted as an imposition of stringent standards in
evaluating the efforts and inquiries made by the present spouse in ascertaining the absent spouse’s
status and whereabouts. “Well-founded belief” should be based on the circumstances of each case. It
should not be based on a prior limited enumeration of what acts indicate a “well-founded belief.” In cases
for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code, we cannot ask the impossible
from a spouse who was abandoned. In interpreting this provision, we must keep in mind that both
spouses are under many obligations in the Family Code, all of which require their presence.
Same; Same; Same; View that from the text of Article 41 of the Family Code, there are two substantive
requirements and two procedural requirements for a spouse to be declared presumptively dead for the
purpose of remarriage.—From the text of Article 41, there are two substantive requirements and two
procedural requirements for a spouse to be declared presumptively dead for the purpose of remarriage.
The two substantive requirements are the following: first, the absent spouse has been missing for four (4)
consecutive years or two (2) consecutive years if the disappearance occurred under circumstances where
there is danger of death per Article 391 of the Civil Code; second, the present spouse has a well-founded
belief that the absent spouse is dead. The two procedural requirements are the following:  first, the
present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absent
spouse; second, there is the underlying intent of the present spouse to remarry.
 
9 is deceased in case he or she becomes absent. It is unfortunate that the majority fails to appreciate Maria
Same; Same; Same; View that in declaring a person presumptively dead, a court is called upon to
sustain a presumption. It is not called upon to conclude on verity or to establish actuality. In so doing, a
court infers despite an acknowledged uncertainty.—Belief is a state of mind and can only be ascertained
in reference to a person’s overt acts. In making such an evaluation, one must evaluate a case on the basis
of its own merits — cognizant of its unique facts, context, and other nuances — rather than be compelled
to satisfy a pre-conceived determination of what acts are sufficiently indicative of the belief being
ascertained. A belief is well-founded when a person has reasonable basis for holding on to such belief. It
is to say that such belief is not arbitrary and whimsical. Such belief must, thus, be evaluated on the basic
and uncomplicated standard of rationality. In declaring a person presumptively dead, a court is called
upon to sustain a presumption. It is not called upon to conclude on verity or to establish actuality. In so
doing, a court infers despite an acknowledged uncertainty. Thus, to insist on such demanding and
extracting evidence as to practically require enough proof  of a well-founded belief, as the Office of the
Solicitor General suggests, is to insist on an inordinate, intemperate, and non-rational standard.
Same; Same; Same; View that it behooves the Supreme Court not to have pre-conceived expectations of
a standard operating procedure for spouses who are abandoned. Instead, it should, with the public
interest in mind and human sensitivity at heart, understand the domestic situation.—To require more
from Maria Fe who did what she could, given the resources available to her, is to assert the
oppressiveness of our laws. It is to tell her that she has to suffer from causes which she cannot
understand for more years to come. It should be in the public interest to assume that Jerry, or any
husband for that matter, as a matter of moral and legal obligation, would get in touch with Maria Fe
even if only to tell her that he is alive. It behooves this court not to have pre-conceived expectations of a
standard operating procedure for spouses who are abandoned. Instead, it should, with the public interest
in mind and human sensitivity at heart, understand the domestic situation.
Same; Same; Same; View that we are called upon to make an appreciation of the reasonable, not of
the exceptional. In adjudicating this case, the Supreme Court must ground itself on what is real, not dwell
on a projected ideal.—While it may be true that it would have
 
 
10
been  ideal  for Maria Fe to have exerted more exceptional efforts in locating her husband, the
hypothetical issue of what else she could have done or ought to have done should not diminish the import
of her efforts. It is for Maria Fe to resort to the courses of action permitted to her given her stature and
means. We are called upon to make an appreciation of the  reasonable, not of the  exceptional. In
adjudicating this case, this court must ground itself on what is real, not dwell on a projected ideal.
Same; Same; Same; View that the insistence on the need for Maria Fe to ascertain the whereabouts of
her deserting husband undermines the significance and weight of her husband’s own duty.—Also, the
insistence on the need for Maria Fe to ascertain the whereabouts of her deserting husband undermines
the significance and weight of her husband’s own duty. In the normal course of things, a spouse is well in
a position to expect that the other spouse will return to their common dwelling. Article 68 of the Family
Code obliges the husband and the wife “to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and
render mutual help and support.”
Same; Same; Same; View that precisely, it is a deserting spouse’s failure to comply with what is
reasonably expected of him or her and to fulfill the responsibilities that are all but normal to a spouse
which makes reasonable (i.e., well-founded) the belief that should he or she fail to manifest his or her
presence within a statutorily determined reasonable period, he or she must have been deceased.—
Precisely, it is a deserting spouse’s failure to comply with what is reasonably expected of him or her and
to fulfill the responsibilities that are all but normal to a spouse which makes reasonable (i.e., well-
founded) the belief that should he or she fail to manifest his or her presence within a statutorily
determined reasonable period, he or she must have been deceased. The law is of the confidence that
spouses will in fact “live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and
support” such that it is not the business of the law to assume any other circumstance than that a spouse
Fe’s predicament and instead places upon her the burden to prove good faith in her painstaking efforts.
11
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  The Solicitor General for petitioner.
  Eliordo U. Ocena for respondent. 
BRION, J.:
The petition for review on certiorari1 before us assails the decision2 dated August 27, 2008
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 01558-MIN which affirmed the order3 dated
December 15, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 25, Koronadal City, South
Cotabato, in SP Proc. Case No. 313-25, declaring Jerry F. Cantor, respondent Maria Fe
Espinosa Cantor’s husband, presumptively dead under Article 41 of the Family Code.
 
The Factual Antecedents
 
The respondent and Jerry were married on September 20, 1997. They lived together as
husband and wife in their conjugal dwelling in Agan Homes, Koronadal City, South Cotabato.
Sometime in January 1998, the couple had a violent quarrel brought about by: (1) the
respondent’s inability to reach “sexual climax” whenever she and Jerry would have intimate
moments; and (2) Jerry’s expression of animosity toward the respondent’s father.
After their quarrel, Jerry left their conjugal dwelling and this was the last time that the
respondent ever saw him. Since then, she had not seen, communicated nor heard anything
from Jerry or about his whereabouts.
_______________
 1 Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; Rollo, pp. 9-31.
2 Id., at pp. 33-41.
3 Id., at pp. 42-47.
 
 
12
On May 21, 2002, or more than four (4) years from the time of Jerry’s disappearance, the
respondent filed before the RTC a petition4  for her husband’s declaration of presumptive
death, docketed as SP Proc. Case No. 313-25. She claimed that she had a well-founded belief
that Jerry was already dead. She alleged that she had inquired from her mother-in-law, her
brothers-in-law, her sisters-in-law, as well as her neighbors and friends, but to no avail. In the
hopes of finding Jerry, she also allegedly made it a point to check the patients’ directory
whenever she went to a hospital. All these earnest efforts, the respondent claimed, proved
futile, prompting her to file the petition in court.
 
The Ruling of the RTC
 
After due proceedings, the RTC issued an order granting the respondent’s petition and
declaring Jerry presumptively dead. It concluded that the respondent had a well-founded
belief that her husband was already dead since more than four (4) years had passed without
the former receiving any news about the latter or his whereabouts. The dispositive portion of
the order dated December 15, 2006 reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares, as it hereby declared that respondent Jerry F. Cantor is
presumptively dead pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines without prejudice to the
effect of the reappearance of the absent spouse Jerry F. Cantor.5
 
The Ruling of the CA
The case reached the CA through a petition for certiorari6 filed by the petitioner, Republic
of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). In its August 27,
_______________
4 Id., at p. 48.
5 Id., at p. 47.
6 Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
 
 
13
2008 decision, the CA dismissed the petitioner’s petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion
on the RTC’s part, and, accordingly, fully affirmed the latter’s order, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises foregoing (sic), the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed
Order dated December 15, 2006 declaring Jerry F. Cantor presumptively dead is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto.7
 
The petitioner brought the matter via a Rule 45 petition before this Court.
The Petition
 
The petitioner contends that  certiorari  lies to challenge the decisions, judgments or final
orders of trial courts in petitions for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse
under Rule 41 of the Family Code. It maintains that although judgments of trial courts in
summary judicial proceedings, including presumptive death cases, are deemed immediately
final and executory (hence, not appealable under Article 247 of the Family Code), this rule
does not mean that they are not subject to review on certiorari.
The petitioner also posits that the respondent did not have a well-founded belief to justify
the declaration of her husband’s presumptive death. It claims that the respondent failed to
conduct the requisite diligent search for her missing husband. Likewise, the petitioner invites
this Court’s attention to the attendant circumstances surrounding the case, particularly, the
degree of search conducted and the respondent’s resultant failure to meet the strict standard
under Article 41 of the Family Code.
 
The Issues
 
The petition poses to us the following issues:
_______________
7 Rollo, p. 40.
 
 
14
(1) Whether  certiorari  lies to challenge the decisions, judgments or final orders of trial
courts in petitions for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of
the Family Code; and
(2) Whether the respondent had a well-founded belief that Jerry is already dead.
The Court’s Ruling
 
We grant the petition.
 
a. On the Issue of the Propriety of Certiorari as a Remedy
 
Court’s Judgment in the Judicial
Proceedings for Declaration of
Presumptive Death Is Final and
Executory, Hence, Unappealable
The Family Code was explicit that the court’s judgment in summary proceedings, such as
the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code,
shall be immediately final and executory.
Article 41, in relation to Article 247, of the Family Code provides:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be
null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent
for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth
in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive
death of the ab-
  
 
15
sentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory. [underscores ours]
 
With the judgment being final, it necessarily follows that it is no longer subject to an
appeal, the dispositions and conclusions therein having become immutable and unalterable
not only as against the parties but even as against the courts.8  Modification of the court’s
ruling, no matter how erroneous is no longer permissible. The final and executory nature of
this summary proceeding thus prohibits the resort to appeal. As explained in Republic of the
Phils. v. Bermudez-Lorino,9 the right to appeal is not granted to parties because of the express
mandate of Article 247 of the Family Code, to wit:
In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no reglementary period
within which to perfect an appeal, precisely because judgments rendered thereunder, by
express provision of [Article] 247, Family Code,  supra, are “immediately final and
executory.”  It was erroneous, therefore, on the part of the RTC to give due course to the Republic’s
appeal and order the transmittal of the entire records of the case to the Court of Appeals.
An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which, by express
provision of law, is immediately final and executory. As we have said in Veloria vs. Comelec, “the
right to appeal is not a natural right nor is it a part of due process, for it is merely a statutory
privilege.” Since, by express mandate of Article 247 of the Family Code, all judgments rendered
in summary judicial proceedings in Family Law are “immediately final and executory,” the
right to appeal was not granted to any of
_______________
8 Philippine National Bank v. Spouses Bernard and Cresencia Marañon, G.R. No. 189316, July 1, 2013, 700 SCRA
297.
9 489 Phil. 761, 767; 449 SCRA 57, 62-63 (2005).
 
 
16
the parties therein.  The Republic of the Philippines, as oppositor in the petition for declaration of
presumptive death, should not be treated differently. It had no right to appeal the RTC decision of
November 7, 2001. [emphases ours; italics supplied]
 
Certiorari Lies to Challenge the
Decisions, Judgments or Final
Orders of Trial Courts in a Sum-
mary Proceeding for the Declara-
tion of Presumptive Death Under
the Family Code
A losing party in this proceeding, however, is not entirely left without a remedy. While
jurisprudence tells us that no appeal can be made from the trial court’s judgment, an
aggrieved party may, nevertheless, file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court to question any abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction that
transpired.
As held in De los Santos v. Rodriguez, et al.,10 the fact that a decision has become final does
not automatically negate the original action of the CA to issue  certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus in connection with orders or processes issued by the trial court. Certiorari may be
availed of where a court has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion, and where the ordinary remedy of appeal is not available. Such a procedure finds
support in the case of Republic v. Tango,11wherein we held that:
This case presents an opportunity for us to settle the rule on appeal of judgments rendered in
summary proceedings under the Family Code and accordingly, refine our previous decisions thereon.
_______________
10 130 Phil. 459, 464; 22 SCRA 451, 455 (1968).
11 G.R. No. 161062, July 31, 2009, 594 SCRA 560, 566-567.
 
 
17
Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE
FAMILY LAW, establishes the rules that govern summary court proceedings in the Family Code:
“ART. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all
cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an
expeditious manner without regard to technical rules.”
In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the cases covered by the rules in chapters two and
three of the same title. It states:
“ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters  2  and 3 hereof shall likewise govern  summary
proceedings  filed under Articles  41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are applicable.”
(Emphasis supplied.)
In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title reads:
“ART. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.”
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately
final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court’s
judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under
Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file
a petition for  certiorari  to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of
Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court’s original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is
concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction
an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. [emphasis ours]
 
 
18
Viewed in this light, we find that the petitioner’s resort to certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court to question the RTC’s order declaring Jerry presumptively dead was proper.
 
b. On the Issue of the Existence of Well-Founded Belief
The Essential Requisites for the
Declaration of Presumptive Death
Under Article 41 of the Family Code
 
Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that
the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-
founded belief that the prior spouse was already dead. Under Article 41 of the Family Code,
there are four (4) essential requisites for the declaration of presumptive death:  13 Guidangen v. Wooden, G.R. No. 174445, February 15, 2012, 666 SCRA 119, 131.
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article
391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
 
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee.12
The Present Spouse Has the Bur-
den of Proof to Show that All the
Requisites Under Article 41 of the
Family Code Are Present
The burden of proof rests on the present spouse to show that all the requisites under Article
41 of the Family Code are
_______________
12 Republic v. Nolasco, G.R. No. 94053, March 17, 1993, 220 SCRA 20, 25-26; emphasis ours.
 
 
19
present. Since it is the present spouse who, for purposes of declaration of presumptive death,
substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue, it stands to reason that the burden of proof
lies with him/her. He who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not
evidence.13
 
Declaration of Presumptive Death
Under Article 41 of the Family Code
Imposes a Stricter Standard
Notably, Article 41 of the Family Code, compared to the old provision of the Civil Code
which it superseded, imposes a stricter standard. It requires a “well-founded belief” that the
absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted.
We have had occasion to make the same observation in Republic v. Nolasco,14 where we noted
the crucial differences between Article 41 of the Family Code and Article 83 of the Civil Code,
to wit:
Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise has been shortened to four (4) years;
however, there is need for a judicial declaration of presumptive death to enable the spouse present to
remarry. Also, Article 41 of the Family Code imposes a stricter standard than the Civil Code: Article
83 of the Civil Code merely requires either that there be no news that such absentee is still alive; or the
absentee is generally considered to be dead and believed to be so by the spouse present, or is  presumed
dead  under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code.  The Family Code, upon the other hand,
prescribes as “well founded belief” that the absentee is  already dead  before a petition for
declaration of presumptive death can be granted.
_______________
14 Supra note 12, at p. 25; emphases ours, italics supplied, citations omitted.
 
20
Thus, mere absence of the spouse (even for such period required by the law), lack of any
news that such absentee is still alive, failure to communicate or general presumption of
absence under the Civil Code would not suffice. This conclusion proceeds from the premise
that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present spouse the burden of proving the
additional and more stringent requirement of “well-founded belief” which can only be
discharged upon a showing of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain
not only the absent spouse’s whereabouts but, more importantly, that the absent spouse is still
alive or is already dead.15
The Requirement of Well-
Founded Belief
The law did not define what is meant by “well-founded belief.” It depends upon the
circumstances of each particular case. Its determination, so to speak, remains on a case-to-
case basis. To be able to comply with this requirement, the present spouse must prove that
his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the
absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the
circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It requires exertion of active effort (not
a mere passive one).
To illustrate this degree of “diligent and reasonable search” required by the law, an analysis
of the following relevant cases is warranted:
 
i.     Republic of the Philippines v.
Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.)16
15 Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.), 513 Phil. 391, 397-398; 477 SCRA 277, 284 (2005).
16 Ibid.
 
21
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.),17 the Court ruled that the
present spouse failed to prove that he had a well-founded belief that his absent spouse was
already dead before he filed his petition. His efforts to locate his absent wife allegedly
consisted of the following:
(1)  He went to his in-laws’ house to look for her;
(2)  He sought the barangay captain’s aid to locate her;
(3)  He went to her friends’ houses to find her and inquired about her whereabouts among
his friends;
(4) He went to Manila and worked as a part-time taxi driver to look for her in malls during
his free time;
(5)  He went back to Catbalogan and again looked for her; and
(6) He reported her disappearance to the local police station and to the NBI.
 Despite these alleged “earnest efforts,” the Court still ruled against the present spouse. The
Court found that he failed to present the persons from whom he allegedly made inquiries and
only reported his wife’s absence after the OSG filed its notice to dismiss his petition in the
RTC.
The Court also provided the following criteria for determining the existence of a “well-
founded belief” under Article 41 of the Family Code:
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries
and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse
is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of
death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances
occurring before and after
_______________
17 Ibid.
 
22
the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by [the]
present spouse.18
ii. Republic v. Granada19
Similarly in  Granada, the Court ruled that the absent spouse failed to prove her “well-
founded belief” that her absent spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the petition. In
this case, the present spouse alleged that her brother had made inquiries from their relatives
regarding the absent spouse’s whereabouts. The present spouse did not report to the police nor
seek the aid of the mass media. Applying the standards in Republic of the Philippines v. Court
of Appeals (Tenth Div.),20 the Court ruled against the present spouse, as follows:
Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that respondent Yolanda
did not initiate a diligent search to locate her absent husband. While her brother Diosdado
Cadacio testified to having inquired about the whereabouts of Cyrus from the latter’s
relatives, these relatives were not presented to corroborate Diosdado’s testimony.  In short,
respondent was allegedly not diligent in her search for her husband. Petitioner argues that if she were,
she would have sought information from the Taiwanese Consular Office or assistance from other
government agencies in Taiwan or the Philippines. She could have also utilized mass media for this end,
but she did not. Worse, she failed to explain these omissions.
_______________
18 Id., at pp. 397-398; p. 284; emphases ours.
19 G.R. No. 187512, June 13, 2012, 672 SCRA 432, 444-445; emphasis ours.
20 Supra note 15.
 
 
23
iii. Republic v. Nolasco21
In Nolasco, the present spouse filed a petition for declaration of presumptive death of his
wife, who had been missing for more than four years. He testified that his efforts to find her
consisted of:
(1) Searching for her whenever his ship docked in England;
(2)  Sending her letters which were all returned to him; and
(3) Inquiring from their friends regarding her whereabouts, which all proved fruitless.
The Court ruled that the present spouse’s investigations were too sketchy to form a basis
that his wife was already dead and ruled that the pieces of evidence only proved that his wife
had chosen not to communicate with their common acquaintances, and not that she was dead.
iv. The present case
In the case at bar, the respondent’s “well-founded belief” was anchored on her alleged
“earnest efforts” to locate Jerry, which consisted of the following:
(1)  She made inquiries about Jerry’s whereabouts from her in-laws, neighbors and friends;
and
(2)  Whenever she went to a hospital, she saw to it that she looked through the patients’
directory, hoping to find Jerry.
These efforts, however, fell short of the “stringent standard” and degree of diligence
required by jurisprudence for the following reasons:
_______________
21 Supra note 12.
 
24
First, the respondent did not actively look for her missing husband. It can be inferred from
the records that her hospital visits and her consequent checking of the patients’ directory
therein were unintentional. She did not purposely undertake a diligent search for her husband
as her hospital visits were not planned nor primarily directed to look for him. This Court thus
considers these attempts insufficient to engender a belief that her husband is dead.
Second, she did not report Jerry’s absence to the police nor did she seek the aid of the
authorities to look for him. While a finding of well-founded belief varies with the nature of the
situation in which the present spouse is placed, under present conditions, we find it proper
and prudent for a present spouse, whose spouse had been missing, to seek the aid of the
authorities or, at the very least, report his/her absence to the police.
Third, she did not present as witnesses Jerry’s relatives or their neighbors and friends,
who can corroborate her efforts to locate Jerry. Worse, these persons, from whom she allegedly
made inquiries, were not even named. As held in Nolasco, the present spouse’s bare assertion
that he inquired from his friends about his absent spouse’s whereabouts is insufficient as the
names of the friends from whom he made inquiries were not identified in the testimony nor
presented as witnesses.
Lastly, there was no other corroborative evidence to support the respondent’s claim that
she conducted a diligent search. Neither was there supporting evidence proving that she had a
well-founded belief other than her bare claims that she inquired from her friends and in-laws
about her husband’s whereabouts.
In sum, the Court is of the view that the respondent merely engaged in a “passive search”
where she relied on uncorroborated inquiries from her in-laws, neighbors and friends.  She
failed to conduct a diligent searchbecause her alleged efforts are insufficient to form a
well-founded belief that her husband was already dead. As held in Republic of the Philip-
 
 
25
pines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.),22 “[w]hether or not the spouse present acted on a well-
founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a
great many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse
and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by [the] present spouse.”
 
Strict Standard Approach Is
Consistent with the State’s Policy to
Protect and Strengthen Marriage
 
In the above-cited cases, the Court, fully aware of the possible collusion of spouses in
nullifying their marriage, has consistently applied the “strict standard” approach. This is to
ensure that a petition for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family
Code is not used as a tool to conveniently circumvent the laws. Courts should never allow
procedural shortcuts and should ensure that the stricter standard required by the Family
Code is met. In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.),23 we emphasized
that:
In view of the summary nature of proceedings under Article 41 of the Family Code for the declaration
of presumptive death of one’s spouse, the degree of due diligence set by this Honorable Court in
the above-mentioned cases in locating the whereabouts of a missing spouse must be strictly
complied with. There have been times when Article 41 of the Family Code had been resorted to by
parties wishing to remarry knowing fully well that their alleged missing spouses are alive and well. It is
even possible that those who cannot have their marriages xxx declared null and void under Article 36 of
the Family Code resort to Article 41 of the Family Code for relief because of the xxx summary nature of
its proceedings.
_______________
22 Supra note 15, at p. 398; p. 284.
23 Id., at p. 396; p. 282; emphasis ours, italics supplied.
 
 
26
The application of this stricter standard becomes even more imperative if we consider the
State’s policy to protect and strengthen the institution of marriage.24 Since marriage serves as
the family’s foundation25 and since it is the state’s policy to protect and strengthen the family
as a basic social institution,26 marriage should not be permitted to be dissolved at the whim of
the parties. In interpreting and applying Article 41, this is the underlying rationale — to
uphold the sanctity of marriage.  Arroyo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals27  reflected this sentiment
when we stressed:
[The] protection of the basic social institutions of marriage and the family in the preservation of which
the State has the strongest interest; the public policy here involved is of the most fundamental kind. In
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution there is set forth the following basic state policy:
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a
basic autonomous social institution.
Strict Standard Prescribed Under
Article 41 of the Family Code Is for
the Present Spouse’s Benefit
The requisite judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse (and
consequently, the application of a stringent standard for its issuance) is also for the present
spouse’s benefit. It is intended to protect him/her from a criminal prosecution of bigamy under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code which might come into play if he/she would prematurely
remarry sans the court’s declaration.
_______________
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 CONSTITUTION, Article 2, Section 12.
27 G.R. Nos. 96602 and 96715, November 19, 1991, 203 SCRA 750, 761.
 
 
27
Upon the issuance of the decision declaring his/her absent spouse presumptively dead, the
present spouse’s good faith in contracting a second marriage is effectively established. The
decision of the competent court constitutes sufficient proof of his/her good faith and his/her
criminal intent in case of remarriage is effectively negated.28 Thus, for purposes of remarriage,
it is necessary to strictly comply with the stringent standard and have the absent spouse
judicially declared presumptively dead.
 
Final Word
 
As a final word, it has not escaped this Court’s attention that the strict standard required
in petitions for declaration of presumptive death has not been fully observed by the lower
courts. We need only to cite the instances when this Court, on review, has consistently ruled
on the sanctity of marriage and reiterated that anything less than the use of the strict
standard necessitates a denial. To rectify this situation, lower courts are now expressly put on
notice of the strict standard this Court requires in cases under Article 41 ofthe Family Code.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed decision dated August 27, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals, which affirmed the order dated December 15, 2006 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 25, Koronadal City, South Cotabato, declaring Jerry F. Cantor presumptively
dead is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno (CJ.), Carpio, Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta,Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr.,
Perez, Reyes andPerlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Velasco, Jr., J., Please see Concurring Opinion.
_______________
28 Manuel v. People, 512 Phil. 818, 836; 476 SCRA 461, 479 (2005).
 
28
Abad, J., I join the Dissenting Opinion of Justice M.M.V.F. Leonen.
Mendoza, J., I join J. Leonen in his position.
Leonen, J., See Dissenting Opinion.
 
CONCURRING OPINION
  30
VELASCO, JR., J.:
 
ble from a spouse who was abandoned, it is not too much to expect the foregoing actions from
I vote for the granting of the petition.
someone who has lost a spouse.
The facts of this case are simple. Sometime in January 1998, Jerry F. Cantor (Jerry) left his
This Court has been consistent in its strict application of Article 41 of the Family Code.
wife, Maria Fe Espinosa Cantor (Maria Fe), after a violent quarrel. Since then, Maria had not
This is clear in the cases cited in the ponencia where the Court, notwithstanding the evidence
seen or heard from him.
on the efforts of the present spouse to search for the absent spouse, still found that the present
After more than four (4) years of not seeing or hearing from Jerry, Maria Fe filed a petition
spouse’s search was not diligent enough and that the said spouse failed to prove that he or she
for the declaration of presumptive death of her husband with the Regional Trial Court, Branch
had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. I would like to share my
25, Koronadal City, South Cotabato (RTC). In sum, Maria Fe alleged that she conducted a
observation that compared to Maria Fe, the present spouses in the said cases exerted similar,
diligent search for her husband and exerted earnest efforts to find him. She allegedly inquired
or if not, even more effort in their searches, and presented similar evidence to prove the same.
from her mother-in-law, brothers-in-law, sisters-in-law, neighbors, and friends but no one
Yet, the Court found their efforts and evidence wanting.
could tell her where Jerry was. Whenever she went to a hospital, she made it a point to look
For instance, in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Alegro,1 respondent Alegro testified that
through the patients’ directory, hoping to find Jerry. On the basis of the foregoing, Maria Fe
when his wife Lea went missing, he asked Lea’s parents as well as their friends if they knew
claimed that she had a well-founded belief that her husband, Jerry, was already dead.
where she was. He stated that he went to Manila to search for her among her friends and
The RTC granted her petition and thus declared Jerry as presumptively dead pursuant to
would even look for her in malls. Alegro reported Lea’s disappearance to the local police
Article 41 of the Family Code. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the RTC Decision and
station and the National Bureau of Investigation. Despite these efforts, this Court held that
held that there had been no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in having
Alegro failed to prove that he had a well-founded belief, before he filed his petition in the RTC,
declared Jerry presumptively dead. Dissatisfied with the ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA),
that his spouse was already dead. The Court explained:
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed the present Petition for Review
on Certiorariunder Rule 45 of the In this case, the respondent failed to present a witness other than Barangay Captain Juan Magat. The
  respondent even failed to present Janeth Bautista or Nelson Abaenza or any other person from whom he
  allegedly made inquiries about Lea to corroborate his testimony. On the other hand, the respondent
admitted that when he returned to the house of his parents-in-law on Febru-
29

Rules of Civil Procedure arguing that Maria Fe did not have a well-founded belief that Jerry
was dead.
I fully agree that whether or not one has a “well-founded belief” that his or her spouse is
dead depends on the unique circumstances of each case and that there is no set standard or
procedure in determining the same. It is my opinion that Maria Fe failed to conduct a search
with such diligence as to give rise to a “well-founded belief” that her husband is dead. Further,
the circumstances of Jerry’s departure and Maria Fe’s behavior after he left make it difficult to
consider her belief a well-founded one.
To reiterate, Maria Fe’s alleged “well-founded” belief arose when: (1) Jerry’s relatives and
friends could not give her any information on his whereabouts; and (2) she did not find Jerry’s
name in the patients’ directory whenever she went to a hospital. To my mind, Maria Fe’s
reliance on these alone makes her belief weak and flimsy rather than “well-founded.”
Further, it appears that Maria Fe did not actively look for her husband in hospitals and
that she searched for Jerry’s name in these hospitals’ list of patients merely as an
afterthought. Moreover, it may be sensed from the given facts that her search was not
intentional or planned. This may be noted from the fact that whenever Maria Fe went to a
hospital, she made it a point to look through the patients’ directory, hoping to find Jerry.
Verily, it is as if she searched the patient’s directory only when she was in a hospital by
coincidence.
Maria Fe’s search for Jerry was far from diligent. At the very least, Maria Fe should have
looked for Jerry in the places he frequented. Moreover, she should have sought the assistance
of the  barangay  or the police in searching for her husband, like what could be reasonably
expected of any person with a missing spouse or loved one. These very basic things, she did not
do. It may have been advantageous, too, if Maria Fe approached the media for help or posted
photos of Jerry in public places with requests for information on his whereabouts. While I
agree that We cannot ask the impossi-
_______________
1 G.R. No. 159614, December 9, 2005, 477 SCRA 277.
 
 
31
ary 14, 1995, his father-in-law told him that Lea had just been there but that she left without notice.
The respondent declared that Lea left their abode on February 7, 1995 after he chided her for coming
home late and for being always out of their house, and told her that it would be better for her to go home
to her parents if she enjoyed the life of a single person. Lea, thus, left their conjugal abode and never
returned. Neither did she communicate with the respondent after leaving the conjugal abode because of
her resentment to the chastisement she received from him barely a month after their marriage. What is
so worrisome is that, the respondent failed to make inquiries from his parents-in-law regarding Lea’s
whereabouts before filing his petition in the RTC. It could have enhanced the credibility of the
respondent had he made inquiries from his parents-in-law about Lea’s whereabouts considering that
Lea’s father was the owner of Radio DYMS.
The respondent did report and seek the help of the local police authorities and the NBI to locate Lea,
but it was only an afterthought. He did so only after the OSG filed its notice to dismiss his petition in the
RTC.2
Similarly, in Republic v. Nolasco,3 this Court ruled in favor of the Republic and agreed with
the position of the OSG that the respondent therein failed to establish that he had a well-
founded belief that his absent wife was dead. In this case, Nolasco, who was a seaman, went
back home to Antique upon learning that his wife left their conjugal abode. He testified that
no one among their friends could tell him where his wife was. He claimed that his efforts to
look for her whenever his ship docked in England proved fruitless and also stated that all the
letters he had sent to his missing spouse at an address in Liverpool, England, the address of
the bar where they met, were all returned to him. This Court believed that Nolasco failed to  
conduct a search for his missing wife with such dili- Also, in Republic v. Granada,4 while the Court denied the petition of the OSG on procedural
grounds and consequently upheld the declaration of presumptive death of the missing
_______________ husband, this Court agreed with the OSG’s assertion that the respondent therein was not
diligent in her search for her husband when she, just like Maria Fe in this case, merely
2 Id., at pp. 284-285.
3 G.R. No. 94053, March 17, 1993, 220 SCRA 20.
_______________
 
4 G.R. No. 187512, June 13, 2012, 672 SCRA 432.
 
32
 
 
34
gence as to give rise to a “well-founded belief” that she is dead. In the said case, it was held:
In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation allegedly conducted by respondent in his
attempt to ascertain Janet Monica Parker’s whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable inquired about the whereabouts of his spouse from the latter’s relatives and failed to seek
or well-founded belief that she was already dead. When he arrived in San Jose, Antique after learning of information and assistance from government agencies and the mass media. The Court held: 
Janet Monica’s departure, instead of seeking the help of local authorities or of the British Embassy, he
Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that respondent Yolanda
secured another seaman’s contract and went to London, a vast city of many millions of inhabitants, to
did not initiate a diligent search to locate her absent husband. While her brother Diosdado Cadacio
look for her there.
testified to having inquired about the whereabouts of Cyrus from the latter’s relatives, these relatives
“Q: After arriving here in San Jose, Antique, did you exert efforts to inquire the whereabouts of
were not presented to corroborate Diosdado’s testimony. In short, respondent was allegedly not diligent
your wife:
in her search for her husband. Petitioner argues that if she were, she would have sought information
A: Yes, Sir.
from the Taiwanese Consular Office or assistance from other government agencies in Taiwan or the
Court: How did you do that?
Philippines. She could have also utilized mass media for this end, but she did not. Worse, she failed to
A: I secured another contract with the ship and we had a trip to London and I went to London to
explain these omissions.
look for her I could not find her (sic).”
The Republic’s arguments are well-taken. Nevertheless, we are constrained to deny the Petition.
Respondent’s testimony, however, showed that he confused London for Liverpool and this casts doubt
The RTC ruling on the issue of whether respondent was able to prove her “well-founded belief” that
on his supposed efforts to locate his wife in England. The Court of Appeals’ justification of the mistake, to
her absent spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the Petition to declare him presumptively dead
wit:
is already final and can no longer be modified or reversed. Indeed, “[n]othing is more settled in law than
“. . . Well, while the cognoscente (sic) would readily know the geographical difference between
that when a judgment becomes final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. The same
London and Liverpool, for a humble seaman like Gregorio the two places could mean one — place
may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived
in England, the port where his ship docked and where he found Janet. Our own provincial folks,
to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law.”5
every time they leave home to visit relatives in Pasay City, Kalookan City or Parañaque, would
announce to friends and relatives, ‘We’re going to Manila.’ This apparent error in naming of places
 
of destination does not appear to be fatal,”
Were it not for the finality of the RTC ruling, the declaration of presumptive death should
  have been recalled and set aside for utter lack of factual basis.
  It is the policy of the State to protect and preserve marriage. Courts should be ever mindful
of this policy and, hence, must exercise prudence in evaluating petitions for declaration
33

_______________
is not well taken. There is no analogy between Manila and its neighboring cities, on one hand, and
5 Id., at p. 445.
London and Liverpool, on the other, which, as pointed out by the Solicitor-General, are around three
hundred fifty (350) kilometers apart. We do not consider that walking into a major city like Liverpool or
 
London with a simple hope of somehow bumping into one particular person there — which is in effect
what Nolasco says he did — can be regarded as a reasonably diligent search.  
The Court also views respondent’s claim that Janet Monica declined to give any information as to her 35
personal background even after she had married respondent too convenient an excuse to justify his
failure to locate her. The same can be said of the loss of the alleged letters respondent had sent to his
wife which respondent claims were all returned to him. Respondent said he had lost these returned of presumptive death of an absent spouse. Otherwise, spouses may easily circumvent the
letters, under unspecified circumstances. policy of the laws on marriage by simply agreeing that one of them leave the conjugal abode
Neither can this Court give much credence to respondent’s bare assertion that he had inquired from and never return again.
their friends of her whereabouts, considering that respondent did not identify those friends in his
 
testimony. The Court of Appeals ruled that since the prosecutor failed to rebut this evidence during trial,
it is good evidence. But this kind of evidence cannot, by its nature, be rebutted. In any case, admissibility DISSENTING OPINION
is not synonymous with credibility. As noted before, there are serious doubts to respondent’s credibility.  
Moreover, even if admitted as evidence, said testimony merely tended to show that the missing spouse LEONEN, J.:
had chosen not to communicate with their common acquaintances, and not that she was dead. “Love cannot endure indifference. It needs to be wanted. Like a lamp it needs
to be fed out of the oil of another’s heart or its flames burn low.”
 Henry Ward Beecher
I dissent.
A wife, abandoned with impunity, also deserves to be happy.
The Case
 
Through this Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari, the Office of the Solicitor General for
the Republic of the Philippines prays that the decision1  of the Court of Appeals be reversed
and set aside and that a new judgment be entered annulling and setting aside the order2 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Koronadal City, South Cotabato.
On May 21, 2002, Maria Fe Espinosa Cantor filed a petition3  for the declaration of
presumptive death of her husband, Jerry F. Cantor.4 She claimed that she had a well-founded
_______________
1 This order was dated August 27, 2008 and docketed under CA-G.R. SP. No. 01558-MIN, Rollo, p. 33.
2 This order was dated December 15, 2006, Rollo, p. 42.
3 Rollo, pp. 48-50. This petition was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 313-25.
4 This petition falls under Article 41 of the Family Code.
 
 
36
belief that her husband was already dead since four (4) years had lapsed without Jerry
making his presence known to her.
Trial began after the Regional Trial Court found Maria Fe’s petition sufficient in form and
substance.
According to their Certificate of Marriage,5 Maria Fe and Jerry were married on September
20, 1997 at the Christ the King Cathedral in Koronadal City, South Cotabato. They lived
together in their conjugal dwelling in Agan Homes, Koronadal City, South Cotabato.6
In her petition, Maria Fe alleges that sometime in January 1998, she and Jerry had a
violent quarrel in their house. During the trial, she admitted that the quarrel had to do with
her not being able to reach her “climax” whenever she would have sexual intercourse with
Jerry. Maria Fe emphasized that she even suggested to him that he consult a doctor, but Jerry
brushed aside this suggestion. She also said that during the quarrel, Jerry had expressed
animosity toward her father, saying “I will not respect that old man outside.”7
Jerry left after their quarrel.8  Since then, Maria Fe had not seen or heard from him. On
May 21, 2002 after more than four (4) years without word from Jerry, Maria Fe filed her
petition with the Regional Trial Court.
Maria Fe exerted “earnest efforts x x x to locate the whereabouts or actual address of
[Jerry].”9 She inquired from her mother-in-law, brothers-in-law, sisters-in-law, neighbors, and
friends, but no one could tell her where Jerry had gone.10 Whenever she went to a hospital, she
would check the patients’ directory, hoping to find Jerry.11
_______________
5  Rollo, p. 51.
6  Id., at pp. 34 and 44.
7  Id., at p. 45.
8  Id., at p. 48.
9  Id., at p. 49.
10 Id., at p. 34.
11 Id.
 
 
37
On December 15, 2006, the Regional Trial Court issued an order granting her petition
declaring Jerry presumptively dead. The Regional Trial Court agreed that she had a well-
founded belief that Jerry was dead. It declared that Jerry had not been heard from and his
fate uncertain and whereabouts unknown for more than four (4) years at the time Maria Fe’s
petition was filed. When the Regional Trial Court issued its order, Jerry had been absent for
eight (8) years.
The fallo of the Regional Trial Court’s order12 reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares, as it hereby declared [sic] that respondent Jerry F. Cantor
is presumptively dead pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines without prejudice to
the effect of the reappearance of the absent spouse Jerry F. Cantor.13
 
Not satisfied with the Regional Trial Court’s order, the Republic of the Philippines through
the Office of the Solicitor General filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
In a decision dated August 27, 2008, the Court of Appeals affirmed  in toto  the Regional
Trial Court’s order dated December 15, 2006. The Court of Appeals held that there was no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Regional Trial Court in having declared Jerry
presumptively dead. The Court of Appeals also emphasized “that by express mandate of
Article 247 of the Family Code, all judgments rendered in summary judicial proceedings in
Family Law are ‘immediately final and executory’ upon notice to the parties; hence, no longer
appealable.”14
Still dissatisfied with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the Office of the Solicitor General
filed the present petition for
_______________
12 Id., at p. 42. This order was dated December 15, 2006.
13 Id., at p. 47.
14 Id., at p. 35.
 
 
38
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Office of the Solicitor General argued that a petition for  certiorari  lies to challenge
decisions, judgments or final orders of trial courts in petitions for the declaration of
presumptive death of a missing or absent spouse. The Office of the Solicitor General agreed
that under Article 247 of the Family Code, decisions and final orders of trial courts in petitions
for the declaration of the presumptive death of a missing or absent spouse are immediately
final and executory, and therefore, cannot be appealed. However, the Office of the Solicitor
General disagreed with the assertion that judgments or decisions in these cases can no longer
be reviewed by the higher courts. It maintained that even though judgments or final orders in
summary judicial proceedings such as presumptive death cases are no longer appealable, they
may still be reviewed by the Court of Appeals, and, ultimately, by this court.15
The Office of the Solicitor General pointed out that “appeal” and “certiorari” are not
synonymous remedies. By filing a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, it could
not be considered to have “appealed” the challenged order of the Regional Trial Court. A
petition for certiorariunder Rule 65 is not, in its strict sense, an appeal. It is an original action
and a mode of review under which the Court of Appeals may re-examine the challenged order
to determine whether it was rendered in accordance with law and established jurisprudence.
Hence, judgments of trial courts in presumptive death cases are not immutable because such
decisions may be reviewed by higher courts. The only possible recourse of a losing party in
summary judicial proceedings is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.16
_______________
15 Id., at p. 16.
16 Id., at pp. 17-19.
39
The Office of the Solicitor General likewise argued that Maria Fe did not have a well-
founded belief that Jerry was dead. It claimed that she failed to conduct a diligent search for
her missing husband. Its theory was that Jerry consciously chose not to return to their
conjugal home and that he chose not to communicate with Maria Fe. The Office of the Solicitor
General claimed that it was possible that Jerry did not want to be found and that he chose to
live in a place where even his family and friends could not reach him. From the perspective of
the Office of the Solicitor General, it was Jerry’s choice to disappear; thus, in all likelihood, he
was not dead.
The Office of the Solicitor General claimed that Article 41 of the Family Code requires more
than the absence of the missing spouse for him or her to be declared presumptively dead.
There must be events, circumstances, and reasons sufficient in themselves to at least support
the proposition that the absentee spouse is already dead. Absence per se is not enough.
The Office of the Solicitor General capitalized on the failure of Maria Fe to give the names
of relatives and friends she had approached when she testified. It asserted that she failed to
present them at the witness stand.17Moreover, the Office of the Solicitor General assailed the
description of her husband as “not really healthy” when he left the conjugal dwelling. It
characterized this description as being “too vague to even support the speculation that Jerry is
already dead.”18
On June 26, 2009, Maria Fe filed her comment on the Office of the Solicitor General’s
petition. She argued that there was no factual or legal basis for the Office of the Solicitor
General to seek a reversal of the Court of Appeal’s decision. She asserted that the declaration
of Jerry’s death was in or-
_______________
17 Id., at p. 24.
18 Id., at p. 23.
 
 
40
der as it was in accord or consistent with established facts, as well as with law and
jurisprudence on the matter.
This court is asked to decide on the following issues:
1. Whether certiorari lies to challenge decisions, judgments or final orders of trial courts in
petitions for the declaration of presumptive death of a missing person or absent spouse;
and
2. Whether Maria Fe has a well-founded belief that Jerry is already dead.
Certiorari lies as a remedy to
annul the judgment of a trial
court in summary proceedings
for the declaration of presump-
tive death of an absent spouse
I agree that  certiorari  lies as a remedy to annul a judgment in proceedings for the
declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse where grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Regional Trial Court is clearly
and convincingly shown.
A petition for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse for the purpose of
contracting a subsequent marriage is a summary proceeding. Article 41 of the Family Code is
clear on this point: 
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null
and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for
four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth
in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
41
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
 
Articles 238, 247, and 252 of Title XI of the Family Code (Summary Judicial Proceedings in
the Family Law) provide: 
Art. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules provided for in this Title shall
apply as regards separation in fact between husband and wife, abandonment by one of the other, and
incidents involving parental authority.
Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.
Art. 252. The rules in Chapter 2 hereof shall also govern summary proceedings under this Chapter
insofar as they are applicable. (n) 
 
From these provisions, it is clear that a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of
an absent spouse is a summary proceeding; more so, judgments of a trial court relating to such
petitions shall be considered immediately final and executory.
However, while a trial court’s judgment relating to a petition for the declaration of
presumptive death of an absent spouse is considered immediately final and executory, the
Office of the Solicitor General is not entirely without remedy to assail the propriety of a trial
court’s judgment. Where the judgment is attended by grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, the Office of the Solicitor General may file with the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 and have the judgment annulled. Should the
Court of Appeals still render an adverse decision, the Office of the Solicitor General may then
file a petition for
42
review on  certiorari  under Rule 45 with this court. This is what the Office of the Solicitor
General did in this case.
Any doubt on this matter was settled in Republic v. Granada:19
At any rate, four years after Jomoc, this Court settled the rule regarding appeal of judgments
rendered in summary proceedings under the Family Code when it ruled in Republic v. Tango:
“This case presents an opportunity for us to settle the rule on appeal of judgments rendered in
summary proceedings under the Family Code and accordingly, refine our previous decisions
thereon.
Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE
FAMILY LAW, establishes the rules that govern summary court proceedings in the Family Code:
ART. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in
all cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be
decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules.
In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the cases covered by the rules in chapters two and
three of the same title. It states:
ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary
proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are applicable.
(Emphasis supplied.)
In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title reads:
_______________
19 G.R. No. 187512, June 13, 2012, 672 SCRA 432. [Second Division, per Sereno, J.]
 
 
43
ART. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately
final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court’s
judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under
Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a
petition for  certiorari  to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition
should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be
sure, even if the Court’s original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and
the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of
choice of court forum. From the decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing party may then file a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. This is because the
errors which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which
are the proper subject of an appeal.”
In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death may file a petition for certiorari  with the CA on the ground that, in
rendering judgment thereon, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. From the decision of the CA, the aggrieved party may elevate the matter to this Court via a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.20
_______________
20 Id., at pp. 440-441.
 
44
Strict standards should not be
imposed upon the present spouse
in evaluating his or her efforts
to search for the absent spouse
 
However, I disagree with the position that “well-founded belief” should be interpreted as an
imposition of stringent standards in evaluating the efforts and inquiries made by the present
spouse in ascertaining the absent spouse’s status and whereabouts. “Well-founded belief”
should be based on the circumstances of each case. It should not be based on a prior limited
enumeration of what acts indicate a “well-founded belief.”
In cases for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code, we
cannot ask the impossible from a spouse who was abandoned. In interpreting this provision,
we must keep in mind that both spouses are under many obligations in the Family Code,21 all
of which require their presence.
_______________
21 Title III
Rights and Obligations Between Husband and Wife
Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and
render mutual help and support.
Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide.
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are other valid
and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with
the solidarity of the family.
Art. 70. The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. The expenses for such support and
other conjugal obligations shall be paid from the community property and, in the absence thereof, from the income
or fruits of their separate properties. In case of insufficiency or absence of said income or fruits, such obligations
shall be satisfied from the separate properties.
 
 
45
Article 41 of the Family Code provides: 
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null
and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for
four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth
in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
_______________
Art. 71. The management of the household shall be the right and the duty of both spouses. The expenses for
such management shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of Article 70.
Art. 72. When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to the conjugal union or commits acts which tend to
bring danger, dishonor or injury to the other or to the family, the aggrieved party may apply to the court for relief.
Art. 73. Either spouse may exercise any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity without the
consent of the other. The latter may object only on valid, serious, and moral grounds.
In case of disagreement, the court shall decide whether or not:
(1) The objection is proper, and
(2) Benefit has occurred to the family prior to the objection or thereafter. If the benefit accrued prior to the
objection, the resulting obligation shall be enforced against the separate property of the spouse who has not
obtained consent.
The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the rights of creditors who acted in good faith.
 
 
46
From the text of Article 41, there are two substantive requirements and two procedural
requirements for a spouse to be declared presumptively dead for the purpose of remarriage.
The two substantive requirements are the following:  first, the absent spouse has been
missing for four (4) consecutive years or two (2) consecutive years if the disappearance
occurred under circumstances where there is danger of death per Article 391 of the Civil
Code; second, the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is dead.
The two procedural requirements are the following:  first, the present spouse files a
summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse;  second,
there is the underlying intent of the present spouse to remarry.
In this case, it is necessary to interpret what is meant by “well-founded belief.”
We said in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Alegro:22
The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may contract a
subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is meant by a well-grounded belief. Cuello Callon
writes that “es menester que su creencia sea firme se funde en motivos racionales.”
Belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an overt act. It may be proved by
direct evidence or circumstantial evidence which may tend, even in a slight degree, to elucidate the
inquiry or assist to a determination probably founded in truth. Any fact or circumstance relating to the
character, habits, conditions, attachments, prosperity and objects of life which usually control the
conduct of men, and are the motives of their actions, was, so far as it tends to explain or characterize
_______________
22 513 Phil. 391; 477 SCRA 277 (2005).
 
 
47
their disappearance or throw light on their intentions, competence evidence on the ultimate question of
his death.
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and
efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or
is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent
spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before and
after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by present
spouse.23
Applying its construction of what constitutes a “well-founded belief” in  Republic v.
Nolasco,24 this court reversed the Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals decisions which
declared an absent spouse presumptively dead as the present spouse was deemed to have
“failed to conduct a search for his missing wife with such diligence as to give rise to a ‘well-
founded belief’ that she is dead.”25 In 2005, Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and
Alegro,26  which relied heavily on Nolasco, likewise held that “the respondent failed to prove
that he had a well-founded belief x x x that his spouse x x x was already dead.”27 In the 2012
case of  Republic v. Granada,28  while this court denied the Office of the Solicitor General’s
petition on procedural grounds, this court nevertheless favorably considered the Office of the
Solicitor General’s
_______________
23 Id., at pp. 397-398; pp. 283-284.
24 G.R. No. 94053, March 17, 1993, 220 SCRA 20. [Third Division, per Feliciano, J.]
25 Id., at p. 26.
26 Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Alegro, supra.
27 Id., at p. 399; p. 285.
28 G.R. No. 187512, June 13, 2012, 672 SCRA 432. [Second Division, per Sereno, J.]
 
 
48
assertions that “respondent was allegedly not diligent in her search for her husband.”29
Belief is a state of mind and can only be ascertained in reference to a person’s overt acts. In
making such an evaluation, one must evaluate a case on the basis of its own merits —
cognizant of its unique facts, context, and other nuances — rather than be compelled to satisfy
a pre-conceived determination of what acts are sufficiently indicative of the belief being
ascertained.
A belief is well-founded when a person has reasonable basis for holding on to such belief. It
is to say that such belief is not arbitrary and whimsical. Such belief must, thus, be evaluated
on the basic and uncomplicated standard of rationality.
In declaring a person presumptively dead, a court is called upon to sustain a presumption.
It is not called upon to conclude on verity or to establish actuality. In so doing, a court infers
despite an acknowledged uncertainty. Thus, to insist on such demanding and extracting
evidence as to practically require enough  proof  of a well-founded belief, as the Office of the
Solicitor General suggests, is to insist on an inordinate, intemperate, and non-rational
standard.
Maria Fe testified in court that months after their wedding, she and her husband had a
violent quarrel, and he had left after the fight. She noted the two (2) causes of the
quarrel: first, she could not “climax” every time they would have sexual intercourse;  second,
Jerry disrespected her father every time he would visit them. She likewise stated that she
went to see her mother-in-law, brothers-in-law, sisters-in-law, neighbors, and friends to ask
about her husband’s whereabouts. She said that every time she would go to a hospital, she
would check its directory to find out anything about her husband, but her efforts proved futile.
_______________
29 Id., at p. 445.
 
 
49
The Office of the Solicitor General faulted her for “fall[ing] short of the degree of diligence
required for the search of a missing spouse.”30  In effect, the Office of the Solicitor General
insinuated that she should have exerted more painstaking efforts to ascertain  her husband’s
whereabouts.
The majority agrees with the Office of the Solicitor General. The majority views Maria Fe’s
efforts as a mere “passive search” that is short of the diligent search required to form a well-
founded belief that her husband was already dead.31
Maria Fe exerted the best efforts to ascertain the location of her husband but to no avail.
She bore the indignity of being left behind. She suffered the indifference of her husband. Such
indifference was not momentary. She anguished through years of never hearing from him. The
absence of a few days between spouses may be tolerable, required by necessity. The absence of
months may test one’s patience. But the absence of years of someone who made the solemn
promise to stand by his partner in sickness and in health, for richer or poorer, is intolerable.
The waiting is as painful to the spirit as the endless search for a person that probably did not
want to be found or could no longer be found.
To require more from Maria Fe who did what she could, given the resources available to
her, is to assert the oppressiveness of our laws. It is to tell her that she has to suffer from
causes which she cannot understand for more years to come. It should be in the public interest
to assume that Jerry, or any husband for that matter, as a matter of moral and legal
obligation, would get in touch with Maria Fe even if only to tell her that he is alive.
It behooves this court not to have pre-conceived expectations of a standard operating
procedure for spouses who are abandoned. Instead, it should, with the public interest in
_______________
30 Rollo, p. 24.
31 Majority opinion, p. 12.
 
 
50
mind and human sensitivity at heart, understand the domestic situation.
A review of the cases that the Office of the Solicitor General cited reveals this same
conclusion.
Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Alegro32 acknowledges that “testimonial
evidence may suffice to prove the well-founded belief of the present spouse that the absent
spouse is already dead x x x.”33
In another case cited by the Office of the Solicitor General,  Republic v. Nolasco,34  which
similarly considered the matter of whether respondent therein was able to establish a well-
founded belief of the death of his absent spouse, this court cited the 1913 case of United States
v. Biasbas,35 finding it to be “instructive as to degree [sic] of diligence required in searching for
a missing spouse.”36 In Biasbas, defendant Biasbas’ defense of a good faith belief that his wife
was already dead was not sustained, and his conviction for bigamy was affirmed. Speaking on
Biasbas’ lack of due diligence, this court said:
While the defendant testified that he had made inquiries concerning the whereabouts of his wife, he
fails to state of whom he made such inquiries. He did not even write to the parents of his first wife, who
lived in the Province of Pampanga, for the purpose of securing information concerning her or her
whereabouts. He admits that he had a suspicion only that his first wife was dead. He admits that the
only basis of his suspicion was the fact that she had been absent.37 (Emphasis supplied)
_______________
32 Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Alegro, supranote 22.
33 Id., at p. 398; p. 284.
34 Republic v. Nolasco, supra note 24.
35 25 Phil. 71 (1913).
36 Republic v. Nolasco, supra note 24, at p. 26.
37 United States v. Biasbas, supra at p. 73.
 
51
What was involved in Biasbas was a mere suspicion — totally bereft of any other rational
basis. Moreover, the defendant himself admitted that all he had was a mere suspicion.
What is involved in this case is not a mere suspicion. In Biasbas, the defendant could be
faulted for failing to even write the parents of his wife. Here, Maria Fe testified to her
having visited and personally inquired with her mother-in-law, brothers-in-law, sisters-in-law,
neighbors, and friends. Moreover, Maria Fe repeatedly checked hospital entries to check if her
husband was admitted or otherwise was pronounced deceased.
While it may be true that it would have been  ideal  for Maria Fe to have exerted more
exceptional efforts in locating her husband, the hypothetical issue of what else she could have
done or ought to have done should not diminish the import of her efforts. It is for Maria Fe to
resort to the courses of action permitted to her given her stature and means. We are called
upon to make an appreciation of the  reasonable, not of the  exceptional. In adjudicating this
case, this court must ground itself on what is real, not dwell on a projected ideal.
In the case of Maria Fe, she did what, in her circumstances, are to be considered as an
efficient search. Again, she got in touch with her husband’s relatives and searched hospitals.
More importantly, she waited for more than four (4) long years for her husband to get in touch
with her.
Also, the insistence on the need for Maria Fe to ascertain the whereabouts of her deserting
husband undermines the significance and weight of her husband’s own duty. In the normal
course of things, a spouse is well in a position to expect that the other spouse will return to
their common dwelling. Article 68 of the Family Code obliges the husband and the wife “to live
together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.”
The opinions of a recognized authority in civil law, Arturo M. Tolentino, are particularly
enlightening:
 
 
52
Meaning of “Absent” Spouse.—The provisions of this article are of American origin, and must be
construed in the light of American jurisprudence. An identical provision (except for the period) exists in
the California civil code (section 61); California jurisprudence should, therefore, prove enlightening. It
has been held in that jurisdiction that, as respects the validity of a husband’s subsequent marriage, a
presumption as to the death of his first wife cannot be predicated upon an absence resulting from his
leaving or deserting her, as it is his duty to keep her advised as to his whereabouts. The spouse who has
been left or deserted is the one who is considered as the “spouse present”; such spouse is not required to
ascertain the whereabouts of the deserting spouse, and after the required number of years of absence of
the latter, the former may validly remarry.38 (Underscoring supplied)
 
Precisely, it is a deserting spouse’s failure to comply with what is reasonably expected of
him or her and to fulfill the responsibilities that are all but normal to a spouse which makes
reasonable  (i.e., well-founded) the belief that should he or she fail to manifest his or her
presence within a statutorily determined reasonable period, he or she must have been
deceased. The law is of the confidence that spouses will in fact “live together, observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support”39  such that it is not the
business of the law to assume any other circumstance than that a spouse is deceased in case
he or she becomes absent.
It is unfortunate that the majority fails to appreciate Maria Fe’s predicament and instead
places upon her the burden to prove good faith in her painstaking efforts.
_______________
38 A.M. TOLENTINO, COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES  281-282 (Vol. I, 1990)
citing People v. Glab, 13 App. (2d) 528, 57 Pac. (2d) 588 and Harrington Estate, 140 Cal. 244, 73 Pac. 1000.
39 FAMILY CODE, Art. 68.
 
 
53

To be present in any human relationship especially that of marriage is a complex affair.

There are interests to be compromised for each other, temperaments to be adjusted, evolving
personalities to be understood in the crucible of common experiences. The moments of bliss are
paid for by the many moments of inevitable discomfort as couples adjust their many
standpoints, attitudes, and values for each other. It is a journey that takes time and in that
time, presence.
This case does not present that kind of complexity. It is simple enough. Maria Fe was left
behind. She looked for Jerry, in good faith. Jerry could not be found. He did not leave word. He
did not make the slightest effort to get in touch with Maria Fe. His absence did not make the
difficult compromises possible. There were no adjustments in their temperaments, no
opportunities to further understand each other, no journey together. His absence was
palpable: not moments, not days, not months, but years. Maria Fe deserves more. The law, in
Article 41, allows her succor.
Given the circumstances, Maria Fe acted adequately. Her actions were sufficient to form
the well-founded belief that her husband passed away. It was proper that he be declared
presumptively dead. In the far possibility that he reappears and is not dead, the law provides
remedies for him. In the meantime, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in
affirming the Regional Trial Court’s declaration.
WHEREFORE, I vote to DENY the petition.

Judgment reversed and set aside.

Note.—No appeal can be had of the trial court’s judgment in a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code.
(Republic vs. Tango, 594 SCRA 560 [2009])

G.R. No. 198780. October 16, 2013.*
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, respondent.
Civil Law; Marriages; “Limited Purpose” Marriages; Words and Phrases; In the United States,
marriages where a couple marries only to achieve a particular purpose or acquire specific benefits, have
been referred to as “limited purpose” marriages. A common limited purpose marriage is one entered into
solely for the legitimization of a child. Another is for immigration purposes.―The institution of marriage
carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led to the development of marriage fraud for the sole
purpose of availing of particular benefits. In the United States, marriages where a couple marries only to
achieve a particular purpose or acquire specific benefits, have been referred to as “limited purpose”
marriages. A common limited purpose marriage is one entered into solely for the legitimization of a child.
Another, which is the subject of the present case, is for immigration purposes. Immigration law is
usually concerned with the intention of the couple at the time of their marriage, and it attempts to filter
out those who use marriage solely to achieve immigration status.
Same; Same; Same; A “marriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not intend to establish a life
together at the time they were married.”―In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service, established the principal test for determining the presence of marriage fraud in
immigration cases. It ruled that a “marriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not intend to establish
a life together at the time they were married.” This standard was modified with the passage of the
Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead
demonstrate that the marriage was not “entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws of
the United States.” The focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to establish a life together, to
determining the intention of evading immigration laws. It must be noted, however, that this standard is
used purely for
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
585
VOL. 707, OCTOBER 16, 2013 585
Republic vs. Albios
immigration purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the legal validity or existence of a
marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely
given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer.―Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent
is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the same Code provides that the absence of any
essential requisite shall render a marriage void ab initio. Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it
must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A “freely given” consent
requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must
be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under
Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence. Consent
must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding
the nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act. Their understanding
should not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.
Same; Same; Marriages in Jest; A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered
into as a joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear
understanding that the parties would not be bound; Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated,
defective, or unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of consent.―In ruling that Albios’ marriage
was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such as akin to a marriage by way of jest. A marriage
in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a joke, with no real intention of entering
into the actual marriage status, and with a clear understanding that the parties would not be bound. The
ceremony is not followed by any conduct indicating a purpose to enter into such a relation. It is a
pretended marriage not intended to be real and with no intention to create any legal ties whatsoever,
hence, the absence of any genuine consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective,
or unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of consent. There is no genuine consent because the
parties have absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose.
586
586 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Albios
Same; Same; A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or voidable under the grounds provided by
law; There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the
Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship; Therefore, so long as all the
essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the
grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.―The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of
the Family Code is for the couple to establish a conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties
in a marriage might have no real intention to establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a
marriage freely entered into in accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature,
consequences, and incidents of marriage are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage
may, thus, only be declared void or voidable under the grounds provided by law. There is no law that
declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law
declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal
requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by
law, it shall be declared valid.
Same; Same; Marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience,
companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites, are
equally valid.―Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and
cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle
would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions. The
right to marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they see
fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not, and so on.
Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience,
companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites, are
equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for
marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.
587
VOL. 707, OCTOBER 16, 2013 587
Republic vs. Albios
Same; Same; No other misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as a ground for an action to
annul a marriage. Entering into a marriage for the sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not
qualify under any of the listed circumstances.―Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the
ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of the Family Code. Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of
the same Code may constitute fraud, namely, (1) nondisclosure of a previous conviction involving moral
turpitude; (2) concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a sexually
transmitted disease; and (4) concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other
misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul a marriage.
Entering into a marriage for the sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not qualify under any of
the listed circumstances. Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground of fraud may only be brought by
the injured or innocent party. In the present case, there is no injured party because Albios and Fringer
both conspired to enter into the sham marriage.
Same; Same; No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an inviolable social institution,
is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State; The Supreme Court cannot leave the
impression that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as
easily nullified when no longer needed.―No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an
inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. It must,
therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot
leave the impression that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and
just as easily nullified when no longer needed.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner.
  Albert T. Villaseca for respondent.
588
588 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Albios
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
September 29, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414, which
affirmed the April 25, 2008 Decision2  of the Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite (RTC),
declaring the marriage of Daniel Lee Fringer (Fringer) and respondent Liberty Albios (Albios)
as void from the beginning.
The Facts
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before Judge
Ofelia I. Calo of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as
evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588.3
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity4 of her
marriage with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and
never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering into a
married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She described their
marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio.
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007,
Albios filed a motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC ordered
the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an investiga-
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 26-32; penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justice Ramon
M. Bato, Jr. and Associate Justice Florito S. Macalino of the Fifth Division, Manila.
2 Id., at pp. 38-39.
3 Id., at p. 37.
4 Id., at pp. 33-35.
589
VOL. 707, OCTOBER 16, 2013 589
Republic vs. Albios
tion and determine the existence of a collusion. On October 2, 2007, the Assistant Prosecutor
complied and reported that she could not make a determination for failure of both parties to
appear at the scheduled investigation.
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not
attend the hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing on
the merits ensued.
Ruling of the RTC
In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of
Liberty Albios and Daniel Lee Fringer as void from the very beginning. As a necessary consequence
of this pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using the surname of respondent as she never
acquired any right over it and so as to avoid a misimpression that she remains the wife of
respondent.
x x x x
SO ORDERED.6
The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience only. Giving
credence to the testimony of Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a
marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she
agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their
separate ways; that Fringer returned to the United States and never again communicated
with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him the $2,000.00 because he never processed her
petition for citizenship. The RTC, thus, ruled that when
_______________
5 Id., at pp. 38-39.
6 Id., at p. 39.
590
590 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Albios
marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family
life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration. The RTC issued the Order,7 dated February 5, 2009,
denying the motion for want of merit. It explained that the marriage was declared void
because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention
to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means to acquire American citizenship in
consideration of $2,000.00.
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling which
found that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. The CA stated that the parties
clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting married and that their case
was similar to a marriage in jest. It further explained that the parties never intended to enter
into the marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family. It
concluded that their purpose was primarily for personal gain, that is, for Albios to obtain
foreign citizenship, and for Fringer, the consideration of $2,000.00.
Hence, this petition.
Assignment of Error
 THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW WHEN IT HELD THAT A
MARRIAGE CONTRACTED FOR THE PURPOSE OF OBTAINING FOREIGN
CITIZENSHIP WAS DONE
_______________
7 Id., at pp. 48-49.
591
VOL. 707, OCTOBER 16, 2013 591
Republic vs. Albios
IN JEST, HENCE, LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF CONSENT.8
The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American citizenship
and for Fringer to be paid $2,000.00, both parties freely gave their consent to the marriage, as
they knowingly and willingly entered into that marriage and knew the benefits and
consequences of being bound by it. According to the OSG, consent should be distinguished
from motive, the latter being inconsequential to the validity of marriage.
The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept of a marriage in
jest. The parties here intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it
were otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship would be rendered
futile.
On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment9 to the petition, reiterating her stand that
her marriage was similar to a marriage by way of jest and, therefore, void from the beginning.
On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply10 reiterating its arguments in its petition for
review on certiorari.
Ruling of the Court
The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a marriage, contracted for
the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void  ab
initio on the ground of lack of consent?
The Court resolves in the negative.
_______________
8  Id., at p. 13.
9  Id., at pp. 61-71.
10 Id., at pp. 89-95.
592
592 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Albios
Before the Court delves into its ruling, it shall first examine the phenomenon of marriage
fraud for the purposes of immigration.
Marriage Fraud in Immigration
The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led to the
development of marriage fraud for the sole purpose of availing of particular benefits. In the
United States, marriages where a couple marries only to achieve a particular purpose or
acquire specific benefits, have been referred to as “limited purpose” marriages.11  A common
limited purpose marriage is one entered into solely for the legitimization of a child.12 Another,
which is the subject of the present case, is for immigration purposes. Immigration law is
usually concerned with the intention of the couple at the time
_______________
11  Abrams, Kerry.  Marriage Fraud. 100 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (2012); http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2000956. Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 612-613 (U.S. 1953).
12  Abrams, Kerry.  Marriage Fraud. 100 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (2012); http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2000956; citing Schibi v. Schibi, 69 A.2d 831 (Conn. 1949) (denying annulment where parties married
only to give a name to a prospective child); Bishop v. Bishop, 308 N.Y.S.2d 998 (Sup. Ct. 1970); Erickson v. Erickson,
48 N.Y.S.2d 588 (Sup. Ct. 1944) (holding similarly to Schibi);  Delfino v. Delfino, 35 N.Y.S.2d 693 (Sup. Ct. 1942)
(denying annulment where purpose of marriage was to protect the girl’s name and there was an understanding that
the parties would not live together as man and wife); Bove v. Pinciotti, 46 Pa. D. & C. 159 (1942); Campbell v. Moore,
189 S.E.2d 497 (S.C.1939) (refusing an annulment where parties entered marriage for the purpose of legitimizing a
child); Chander v. Chander, No. 2937-98-4, 1999 WL 1129721 (Va. Ct. App. June 22, 1999) (denying annulment where
wife married husband to get his pension with no intention to consummate marriage because husband knew that was
the purpose of the marriage).
593
VOL. 707, OCTOBER 16, 2013 593
Republic vs. Albios
of their marriage,13  and it attempts to filter out those who use marriage solely to achieve
immigration status.14
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,15 established
the principal test for determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It
ruled that a “marriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not intend to establish a life
together at the time they were married.” This standard was modified with the passage of the
Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to
instead demonstrate that the marriage was  not “entered into for the purpose of evading the
immigration laws  of the United States.” The focus, thus, shifted from determining the
intention to establish a life together, to determining the intention of evading immigration
laws.16 It must be noted, however, that this standard is used purely for immigration purposes
and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the legal validity or existence of a marriage.
The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or fraudulent for
the limited purpose of immigration is also legally void and inexistent. The early cases on
limited purpose marriages in the United States made
_______________
13  Abrams, Kerry.  Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage; 91 Minn. L. Rev. 1625 (2007);
http://www.minnesotalawreview.
org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Abrams_Final.pdf; citing Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), § 237(a)(1)(G), 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(G) (2000).
14  Abrams, Kerry. Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage; 91 Minn. L. Rev. 1625 (2007);
http://www.minnesotalawreview.
org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Abrams_Final.pdf; citing 132 CONG. REC. 27,012, 27,015 (1986) (statement of Rep
McCollum) (promoting the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986).
15 511 F.2d 1200, 1201 (9th Cir. 1975).
16  Abrams, Kerry.  Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage; 91 Minn. L. Rev. 1625 (2007);
http://www.minnesotalawreview.
org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Abrams_Final.pdf.
594
594 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Albios
no definitive ruling. In 1946, the notable case of  United States v. Rubenstein17  was
promulgated, wherein in order to allow an alien to stay in the country, the parties had agreed
to marry but not to live together and to obtain a divorce within six months. The Court,
through Judge Learned Hand, ruled that a marriage to convert temporary into permanent
permission to stay in the country was not a marriage, there being no consent, to wit:
x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. Mutual consent is necessary to
every contract; and no matter what forms or ceremonies the parties may go through indicating the
contrary, they do not contract if they do not in fact assent, which may always be proved. x  x  x
Marriage is no exception to this rule: a marriage in jest is not a marriage at all. x  x  x It is quite
true that a marriage without subsequent consummation will be valid; but if the spouses agree to a
marriage only for the sake of representing it as such to the outside world and with the
understanding that they will put an end to it as soon as it has served its purpose to deceive, they
have never really agreed to be married at all. They must assent to enter into the relation as it is
ordinarily understood, and it is not ordinarily understood as merely a pretence, or cover, to deceive
others.18
(Italics supplied)
On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of  Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines,19  which
declared as valid a marriage entered into solely for the husband to gain entry to the United
States, stating that a valid marriage could not be avoided “merely because the marriage was
entered into for a
_______________
17 151 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1945).
18 United States v. Rubenstein, 151 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1945).
19 Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 323 F. Supp. 865 (S.D. Tex. 1969), aff’d, 440 F.2d 1163 (5th Cir. 1971).
595
VOL. 707, OCTOBER 16, 2013 595
Republic vs. Albios
limited purpose.”20 The 1980 immigration case of Matter of McKee,21 further recognized that a
fraudulent or sham marriage was intrinsically different from a nonsubsisting one.
Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore, been
recognized as problematic. The problem being that in order to obtain an immigration benefit, a
legal marriage is first necessary.22  At present, United States courts have generally denied
annulments involving “limited purpose” marriages where a couple married only to achieve a
particular purpose, and have upheld such marriages as valid.23
The Court now turns to the case at hand.
Respondent’s marriage not void
In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was
entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was
a farce and should not be recognized from its inception. In its resolution denying the OSG’s
motion for reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that the marriage was declared void
because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention
to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means for the respondent to acquire American
citizenship.
Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. It
held that the parties
_______________
20  Abrams, Kerry.  Marriage Fraud. 100 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (2012); http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2000956; citing Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 323 F. Supp. 865 (S.D. Tex. 1969), aff’d, 440 F.2d 1163
(5th Cir. 1971).
21 Matter of McKee, 17 I. & N. Dec. 332, 333 (B.I.A. 1980).
22 Lynn D. Wardle and Laurence C. Nolan, Family Law in the USA, (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International,
2011) p. 86.
23  Abrams, Kerry.  Marriage Fraud. 100 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (2012); http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2000956.
596
596 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Albios
clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting married. As in
the Rubenstein case, the CA found the marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest considering
that the parties only entered into the marriage for the acquisition of American citizenship in
exchange of $2,000.00. They never intended to enter into a marriage contract and never
intended to live as husband and wife or build a family.
The CA’s assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties’ supposed lack of
consent. Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage.
Article 4 of the same Code provides that the absence of any essential requisite shall render a
marriage void ab initio.
Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the
presence of a solemnizing officer. A “freely given” consent requires that the contracting parties
willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is
not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles 45 and 46 of
the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence.24Consent must also
be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding
the nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act.25  Their
understanding should not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.26
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there
was real consent because it
_______________
24 Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, (Quezon City, Philippines: Joer Printing
Services, 2005), p. 4.
25  Melencio S. Sta. Maria, Jr.,  Persons and Family Relations Law, (Quezon City, Philippines: Rex Printing
Company, Inc., 2010), Fifth Edition, p. 121.
26  Arturo M. Tolentino,  Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, (Manila,
Philippines: Central Book Supply, Inc., 2004), Volume I, p. 231.
597
VOL. 707, OCTOBER 16, 2013 597
Republic vs. Albios
was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was
also  conscious and intelligent  as they understood the nature and the beneficial and
inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That
their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring
American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and
deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid
marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There
was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them,
since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
In ruling that Albios’ marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such as
akin to a marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but
entered into as a joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and
with a clear understanding that the parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not followed
by any conduct indicating a purpose to enter into such a relation.27 It is a pretended marriage
not intended to be real and with no intention to create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the
absence of any genuine consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective,
or unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of consent. There is no genuine consent
because the parties have absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose.
The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest. Albios and Fringer
had an undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to
_______________
27  Arturo M. Tolentino,  Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, (Manila,
Philippines: Central Book Supply, Inc., 2004), Volume I, p. 231; citing McClurg v. Terry, 21 N.J. 225.
598
598 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Albios
allow the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married
would allow them to further their objective, considering that only a valid marriage can
properly support an application for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to
enter into the actual marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose.
Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to
establish a conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have
no real intention to establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage
freely entered into in accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature,
consequences, and incidents of marriage are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A
marriage may, thus, only be declared void or voidable under the grounds provided by law.
There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what
the Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so
long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void
or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.28
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot
dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle
would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional
questions.29 The right to marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages
in almost any way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to
love one another or not, and so on.30Thus, marriages entered into for other
_______________
28 Article 4, Family Code.
29 Bark v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 511 F.2d 1200, 1201 (9th Cir. 1975).
30  Abrams, Kerry.  Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage; 91 Minn. L. Rev. 1625 (2007);
http://www.minnesotalawreview.
599
VOL. 707, OCTOBER 16, 2013 599
Republic vs. Albios
purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and title,
provided that they comply with all the legal requisites,31 are equally valid. Love, though the
ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other
considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.
Although the Court views with disdain the respondent’s attempt to utilize marriage for
dishonest purposes, it cannot declare the marriage void. Hence, though the respondent’s
marriage may be considered a sham or fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is not
void ab initio and continues to be valid and subsisting.
Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under Article 45
(3) of the Family Code. Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same Code may
constitute fraud, namely, (1) nondisclosure of a previous conviction involving moral turpitude;
(2) concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a sexually
transmitted disease; and (4) concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality. No
other misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul a
marriage. Entering into a marriage for the sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not
qualify under any of the listed circumstances. Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground of
fraud may only be brought by the injured or innocent party. In the present case, there is no
injured party because Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter into the sham marriage.
Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her
marriage with Fringer to be declared void would only further trivialize this inviolable insti-
_______________
org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Abrams_Final.pdf; citing  McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336, 337 (Neb.
1953). Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
31 Article 4, Family Code.
600
600 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Albios
tution. The Court cannot declare such a marriage void in the event the parties fail to qualify
for immigration benefits, after they have availed of its benefits, or simply have no further use
for it. These unscrupulous individuals cannot be allowed to use the courts as instruments in
their fraudulent schemes. Albios already misused a judicial institution to enter into a
marriage of convenience; she should not be allowed to again abuse it to get herself out of an
inconvenient situation.
No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is
the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.32  It must, therefore, be
safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave
the impression that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the parties,
and just as easily nullified when no longer needed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 is  ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06
is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro,**  Brion *** and Peralta, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, judgment annulled.
Notes.―Annulment of marriage is not a prejudicial question in criminal case for parricide.
(Pimentel vs. Pimentel, 630 SCRA 436 [2010])
 _______________
32 Const. (1987), Article XV, Section 2.
**  Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen, per Special Order No.
1570 dated October 14, 2013.
***  Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad, per Special Order No. 1554 dated
September 19, 2013.

601

VOL. 707, OCTOBER 16, 2013 601

Republic vs. Albios

Under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a
spouse of foreign nationality provided it is valid according to his/her national law. (Vda. de
Catalan vs. Catalan-Lee, 665 SCRA 487 [2012])

G.R. No. 165803. September 1, 2010.*
SPOUSES REX AND CONCEPCION AGGABAO, petitioners,  vs.  DIONISIO Z. PARULAN,
JR. and MA. ELENA PARULAN, respondents.
Civil Law; Family Code; The Family Code has expressly repealed several titles under the Civil Code.
—To start with, Article 254 the Family Code has expressly repealed several titles under the Civil Code,
among them the entire Title VI in which the provisions on the property relations between husband and
wife, Article 173 included, are found.
Same; Same; Conjugal Property; Sales; It is settled that any alienation or encumbrance of conjugal
property made during the effectivity of the Family Code is governed by Article 124 of the Family Code.—
The sale was made on March 18, 1991, or after August 3, 1988, the effectivity of the Family Code. The
proper law to apply is, therefore, Article 124 of the Family Code, for it is settled that any alienation or
encumbrance of conjugal property made during the effectivity of the Family Code is governed by Article
124 of the Family Code.
Same; Same; Same; Same; According to Article 256 of the Family Code, the provisions of the Family
Code may apply retroactively provided no vested rights are impaired.—According to Article 256 of
the Family Code, the provisions of the Family Code may apply retroactively provided no vested rights are
impaired. In Tumlos v. Fernandez, 330 SCRA 718 (2000), the Court rejected the petitioner’s argument
that the Family Code did not apply because the acquisition of the contested property had occurred prior
to the effectivity of the  Family Code, and pointed out that Article 256 provided that the  Family
Code could apply retroactively if the application would not prejudice vested or acquired rights existing
before the effectivity of the Family Code. Herein, however, the petitioners did not show any vested right
in the property acquired prior to August 3, 1988 that exempted their situation from the retroactive
application of the Family Code.
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
563
VOL. 629, SEPTEMBER 1, 2010 563
Aggabao vs. Parulan, Jr.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The power of administration does not include acts of disposition or
encumbrance, which are acts of strict ownership.—We stress that the power of administration does not
include acts of disposition or encumbrance, which are acts of strict ownership. As such, an authority to
dispose cannot proceed from an authority to administer, and vice versa, for the two powers may only be
exercised by an agent by following the provisions on agency of the Civil Code (from Article 1876 to Article
1878). Specifically, the apparent authority of Atty. Parulan, being a special agency, was limited to the
sale of the property in question, and did not include or extend to the power to administer the property.
Same; Same; Same; Same; In the absence of the other spouse’s consent, the transaction should be
construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be
perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or upon authorization by the court
before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.—On the other hand, we agree with Dionisio that
the void sale was a continuing offer from the petitioners and Ma. Elena that Dionisio had the option of
accepting or rejecting before the offer was withdrawn by either or both Ma. Elena and the petitioners.
The last sentence of the second paragraph of Article 124 of the Family Code  makes this clear, stating
that in the absence of the other spouse’s consent, the transaction should be construed as a continuing
offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding
contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or upon authorization by the court before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both offerors.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Buyer in Good Faith; Who is Deemed a Purchaser in Good Faith; The
status of a buyer in good faith is never presumed but must be proven by the person invoking it.—A
purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property of another, without notice that some other person
has a right to, or interest in, such property, and pays the full and fair price for it at the time of such
purchase or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property. He buys
the property with the belief that the person from whom he receives the thing was the owner and could
convey title to the property. He cannot close his eyes to facts that should put a reasonable man on his
guard and still
564
564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Aggabao vs. Parulan, Jr.
claim he acted in good faith. The status of a buyer in good faith is never presumed but must be
proven by the person invoking it.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Article 124 of the Family Code categorically requires the consent of both
spouses before the conjugal property may be disposed of by sale, mortgage, or other modes of disposition;
Requisite diligence to be observed by buyers of conjugal property.—Article 124 of the  Family
Code categorically requires the consent of both spouses before the conjugal property may be disposed of
by sale, mortgage, or other modes of disposition. In Bautista v. Silva, 502 SCRA 334 (2006), the Court
erected a standard to determine the good faith of the buyers dealing with a seller who had title to and
possession of the land but whose capacity to sell was restricted, in that the consent of the other spouse
was required before the conveyance, declaring that in order to prove good faith in such a situation, the
buyers must show that they inquired not only into the title of the seller but also into the seller’s capacity
to sell. Thus, the buyers of conjugal property must observe two kinds of requisite diligence, namely: (a)
the diligence in verifying the validity of the title covering the property; and (b) the diligence in inquiring
into the authority of the transacting spouse to sell conjugal property in behalf of the other spouse.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Espina & Yumul-Espina for petitioners.
  Parulan, Soncuya, Rama & Trinidad Law Offices for respondent Dionisio Parulan, Jr.
BERSAMIN, J.:
On July 26, 2000, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 136, in Makati City annulled the
deed of absolute sale executed in favor of the petitioners covering two parcels of registered
land the respondents owned for want of the written consent of respondent husband Dionisio
Parulan, Jr. On July
565
VOL. 629, SEPTEMBER 1, 2010 565
Aggabao vs. Parulan, Jr.
2, 2004, in CA-G.R. CV No. 69044,1 the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC decision.
Hence, the petitioners appeal by petition for review on  certiorari,  seeking to reverse the
decision of the CA. They present as the main issue whether the sale of conjugal property made
by respondent wife by presenting a special power of attorney to sell (SPA) purportedly
executed by respondent husband in her favor was validly made to the vendees, who allegedly
acted in good faith and paid the full purchase price, despite the showing by the husband that
his signature on the SPA had been forged and that the SPA had been executed during his
absence from the country.
We resolve the main issue against the vendees and sustain the CA’s finding that the
vendees were not buyers in good faith, because they did not exercise the necessary prudence to
inquire into the wife’s authority to sell. We hold that the sale of conjugal property without the
consent of the husband was not merely voidable but void; hence, it could not be ratified.
Antecedents
Involved in this action are two parcels of land and their improvements (property) located at
No. 49 Miguel Cuaderno Street, Executive Village, BF Homes, Parañaque City and registered
under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 633762  and TCT No. 633773  in the name of
respondents Spouses Maria Elena A. Parulan (Ma. Elena) and Dionisio Z. Parulan, Jr.
(Dionisio), who have been estranged from one another.
_______________
1  Rollo, pp. 55-66; penned by Associate Justice Jose C. Mendoza (now a Member of this Court), with Associate
Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria (retired) and Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz (retired) concurring.
2 Id., at pp. 174-175.
3 Id., at pp. 176-178.
566
566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Aggabao vs. Parulan, Jr.
In January 1991, real estate broker Marta K. Atanacio (Atanacio) offered the property to
the petitioners, who initially did not show interest due to the rundown condition of the
improvements. But Atanacio’s persistence prevailed upon them, so that on February 2, 1991,
they and Atanacio met with Ma. Elena at the site of the property. During their meeting, Ma.
Elena showed to them the following documents, namely: (a) the owner’s original copy of TCT
No. 63376; (b) a certified true copy of TCT No. 63377; (c) three tax declarations; and (d) a copy
of the special power of attorney (SPA) dated January 7, 1991 executed by Dionisio authorizing
Ma. Elena to sell the property.4  Before the meeting ended, they paid P20,000.00 as earnest
money, for which Ma. Elena executed a handwritten  Receipt of Earnest Money, whereby the
parties stipulated that: (a) they would pay an additional payment of P130,000.00 on February
4, 1991; (b) they would pay the balance of the bank loan of the respondents amounting to
P650,000.00 on or before February 15, 1991; and (c) they would make the final payment of
P700,000.00 once Ma. Elena turned over the property on March 31, 1991.5
On February 4, 1991, the petitioners went to the Office of the Register of Deeds and the
Assessor’s Office of Parañaque City to verify the TCTs shown by Ma. Elena in the company of
Atanacio and her husband (also a licensed broker).6 There, they discovered that the lot under
TCT No. 63376 had been encumbered to Banco Filipino in 1983 or 1984, but that the
encumbrance had already been cancelled due to the full payment of the obligation.7  They
noticed that the Banco Filipino loan had been effected through an SPA executed by Dionisio in
favor of Ma. Elena.8 They found on TCT No. 63377 the annotation of an existing mortgage in
favor of the Los Baños
_______________
4 Id., at p. 23.
5 Id., at p. 123.
6 Id., at p. 23.
7 Id., at pp. 23-24.
8 Id., at p. 23.
567
VOL. 629, SEPTEMBER 1, 2010 567
Aggabao vs. Parulan, Jr.
Rural Bank, also effected through an SPA executed by Dionisio in favor of Ma. Elena, coupled
with a copy of a court order authorizing Ma. Elena to mortgage the lot to secure a loan of
P500,000.00.9
The petitioners and Atanacio next inquired about the mortgage and the court order
annotated on TCT No. 63377 at the Los Baños Rural Bank. There, they met with Atty. Noel
Zarate, the bank’s legal counsel, who related that the bank had asked for the court order
because the lot involved was conjugal property.10
Following their verification, the petitioners delivered P130,000.00 as additional down
payment on February 4, 1991; and P650,000.00 to the Los Baños Rural Bank on February 12,
1991, which then released the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 63377 to them.11
On March 18, 1991, the petitioners delivered the final amount of P700,000.00 to Ma. Elena,
who executed a deed of absolute sale in their favor. However, Ma. Elena did not turn over the
owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 63376, claiming that said copy was in the possession of a
relative who was then in Hongkong.12  She assured them that the owner’s duplicate copy of
TCT No. 63376 would be turned over after a week.
On March 19, 1991, TCT No. 63377 was cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of
the petitioners.
Ma. Elena did not turn over the duplicate owner’s copy of TCT No. 63376 as promised. In
due time, the petitioners learned that the duplicate owner’s copy of TCT No. 63376 had been
all along in the custody of Atty. Jeremy Z. Parulan, who
_______________
9  Id., at p. 23-24.
10 Id.
11 Id., at pp. 24-25.
12 Id., at p. 57.
568
568 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Aggabao vs. Parulan, Jr.
appeared to hold an SPA executed by his brother Dionisio authorizing him to sell both lots.13
At Atanacio’s instance, the petitioners met on March 25, 1991 with Atty. Parulan at the
Manila Peninsula.14 For that meeting, they were accompanied by one Atty. Olandesca.15 They
recalled that Atty. Parulan “smugly demanded P800,000.00” in exchange for the duplicate
owner’s copy of TCT No. 63376, because Atty. Parulan represented the current value of the
property to be P1.5 million. As a counter-offer, however, they tendered P250,000.00, which
Atty. Parulan declined,16 giving them only until April 5, 1991 to decide.
Hearing nothing more from the petitioners, Atty. Parulan decided to call them on April 5,
1991, but they informed him that they had already fully paid to Ma. Elena.17
Thus, on April 15, 1991, Dionisio, through Atty. Parulan, commenced an action (Civil Case
No. 91-1005entitled Dionisio Z. Parulan, Jr., represented by Jeremy Z. Parulan, as attorney in
fact, v. Ma. Elena Parulan, Sps. Rex and Coney Aggabao), praying for the declaration of the
nullity of the deed of absolute sale executed by Ma. Elena, and the cancellation of the title
issued to the petitioners by virtue thereof. The RTC rejected the petitioners’ defense of being buyers in good faith because of their
In turn, the petitioners filed on July 12, 1991 their own action for specific performance with failure to exercise ordinary prudence, including demanding from Ma. Elena a court order
damages against the respondents. authorizing her to sell the properties similar to the order that the Los Baños Rural Bank had
Both cases were consolidated for trial and judgment in the RTC.18 required before accepting the mortgage of the property.23 It observed that they had appeared
to be in a hurry to consummate the transaction despite Atanacio’s advice that they first
_______________ consult a lawyer before buying the property; that with ordinary prudence, they should first
have obtained the owner’s duplicate copies of the TCTs before paying the full amount of the
13 Id., at p. 110. consideration; and that the sale was void pursuant to Article 124 of the Family Code.24
14 Id., at p. 26.
15 Id., at p. 110.
Ruling of the CA
16 Id., at p. 26.
17 Id., at p. 105.
18 Id., at pp. 14-15. As stated, the CA affirmed the RTC, opining that Article 124 of the  Family Code  applied
because Dionisio had not consented to the sale of the conjugal property by Ma. Elena; and that
569 the RTC correctly found the SPA to be a forgery.
The CA denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.25
VOL. 629, SEPTEMBER 1, 2010 569 Issues
Aggabao vs. Parulan, Jr.
The petitioners now make two arguments: (1) they were buyers in good faith; and (2) the
CA erred in affirming the RTC’s finding that the sale between Mrs. Elena and the petitioners
Ruling of the RTC had been a nullity under Article 124 of the Family Code.
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment, as follows: The petitioners impute error to the CA for not applying the “ordinary prudent man’s
standard” in determining their status as buyers in good faith. They contend that the more
“WHEREFORE, and in consideration of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
plaintiff Dionisio A. Parulan, Jr. and against defendants Ma. Elena Parulan and the Sps. Rex and appropriate law to apply was Article 173 of the Civil Code, not Article 124 of the Family Code;
Concepcion Aggabao, without prejudice to any action that may be filed by the Sps. Aggabao against co- and that even if the SPA held
defendant Ma. Elena Parulan for the amounts they paid her for the purchase of the subject lots, as
follows: _______________
1. The Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 18, 1991 covering the sale of the lot located at No. 49 M.
Cuaderno St., Executive Village, BF Homes, Parañaque, Metro Manila, and covered by TCT Nos. 63376 23 Id., at pp. 59-60.
and 63377 is declared null and void. 24 Id., at p. 60.
2. Defendant Mrs. Elena Parulan is directed to pay litigation expenses amounting to P50,000.00 and 25 Supra, at note 3.
the costs of the suit. 571
SO ORDERED.”19

VOL. 629, SEPTEMBER 1, 2010 571

The RTC declared that the SPA in the hands of Ma. Elena was a forgery, based on its finding
that Dionisio had been out of the country at the time of the execution of the SPA;20that NBI
Sr. Document Examiner Rhoda B. Flores had certified that the signature appearing on the
SPA purporting to be that of Dionisio and the set of standard sample signatures of Dionisio
had not been written by one and the same person;21  and that Record Officer III Eliseo O.
Terenco and Clerk of Court Jesus P. Maningas of the Manila RTC had issued a certification to
the effect that Atty. Alfred Datingaling, the Notary Public who had notarized the SPA, had not
been included in the list of Notaries Public in Manila for the year 1990-1991.22
_______________
19 Id., at p. 56.
20 Id., at p. 58.
21 Id., at p. 59.
22 Id., at pp. 58-59.
570
Aggabao vs. Parulan, Jr.
by Ma. Elena was a forgery, the ruling in Veloso v. Court of Appeals26 warranted a judgment in
their favor.
Restated, the issues for consideration and resolution are as follows:
1) Which between Article 173 of the Civil Code and Article 124 of the Family Code should
apply to the sale of the conjugal property executed without the consent of Dionisio?
2) Might the petitioners be considered in good faith at the time of their purchase of the
property?
3) Might the ruling in  Veloso v. Court of Appeals  be applied in favor of the petitioners
despite the finding of forgery of the SPA?
Ruling
The petition has no merit. We sustain the CA.

1.
570 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Article 124, Family Code, applies to sale of conjugal 
Aggabao vs. Parulan, Jr.
 properties made after the effectivity
of the Family Code
The petitioners submit that Article 173 of the  Civil Code,  not Article 124 of the  Family
Code, governed the property relations of the respondents because they had been married prior
to the effectivity of the  Family Code; and that the second paragraph of Article 124 of
the Family Code should not apply because the other spouse held the administration over the
conjugal property. They argue that notwithstanding his absence from the country Dionisio still
held the administration of the conjugal property by virtue of his execution of the SPA in favor
of his brother; and that even assuming that Article 124 of the Family Codeproperly applied,
Dionisio ratified the
_______________
26 G.R. No. 102737, August 21, 1996, 260 SCRA 593.
572
572 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Aggabao vs. Parulan, Jr.
sale through Atty. Parulan’s counter-offer during the March 25, 1991 meeting.
We do not subscribe to the petitioners’ submissions.
To start with, Article 25427  the  Family Code  has expressly repealed several titles under
the  Civil Code, among them the  entire  Title VI in which the provisions on the property
relations between husband and wife, Article 173 included, are found.
Secondly, the sale was made on March 18, 1991, or after August 3, 1988, the effectivity of
the Family Code. The proper law to apply is, therefore, Article 124 of the Family Code, for it is
settled that any alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property made during the effectivity of
the Family Code is governed by Article 124 of the Family Code.28
Article 124 of the Family Code provides:
“Article 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to
both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to
the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the
contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do
_______________
27 Article 254. Titles III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, XI and XV of Book I of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the Civil
Code of the Philippines, as amended, and Articles 17, 18, 19, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 39, 40, 41 and 42 of Presidential Decree No. 603,
otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended, and all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, rules
and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed.
28 Alfredo v. Borras, G.R. No. 144225, June 17, 2003, 404 SCRA 145; Heirs of Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes v. Mijares, G.R. No. 143826,
August 28, 2003, 410 SCRA 97; Sps. Guiang v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125172, June 26, 1998, 291 SCRA 372.
573
VOL. 629, SEPTEMBER 1, 2010 573
Aggabao vs. Parulan, Jr.
not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent
of  the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the
part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the
acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or
both offerors.”
Thirdly, according to Article 25629  of the  Family Code,the provisions of the  Family
Code  may apply retroactively provided no vested rights are impaired. In  Tumlos v.
Fernandez,30 the Court rejected the petitioner’s argument that the Family Code did not apply
because the acquisition of the contested property had occurred prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code, and pointed out that Article 256 provided that the Family Code could apply
retroactively if the application would not prejudice vested or acquired rights existing before
the effectivity of the Family Code. Herein, however, the petitioners did not show any vested
right in the property acquired prior to August 3, 1988 that exempted their situation from the
retroactive application of the Family Code.
Fourthly, the petitioners failed to substantiate their contention that Dionisio, while holding
the administration over the property, had delegated to his brother, Atty. Parulan, the
administration of the property, considering that they did not present in court the SPA
granting to Atty. Parulan the authority for the administration.
Nonetheless, we stress that the power of administration does not include acts of disposition
or encumbrance, which are acts of strict ownership. As such, an authority to dispose cannot
proceed from an authority to administer, and vice versa,
_______________
29  Article 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
30 G.R. No. 137650, April 12, 2000, 330 SCRA 718.
574
574 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Aggabao vs. Parulan, Jr.
for the two powers may only be exercised by an agent by following the provisions on agency of
the Civil Code (from Article 1876 to Article 1878). Specifically, the apparent authority of Atty.
Parulan, being a special agency, was limited to the sale of the property in question, and did
not include or extend to the power to administer the property.31
Lastly, the petitioners’ insistence that Atty. Parulan’s making of a counter-offer during the
March 25, 1991 meeting ratified the sale merits no consideration. Under Article 124 of
the Family Code, the transaction executed sans the written consent of Dionisio or the proper
court order was void; hence, ratification did not occur, for a void contract could not be
ratified.32
On the other hand, we agree with Dionisio that the void sale was a continuing offer from
the petitioners and Ma. Elena that Dionisio had the option of accepting or rejecting before the
offer was withdrawn by either or both Ma. Elena and the petitioners. The last sentence of the
second paragraph of Article 124 of the  Family Code  makes this clear, stating that in the
absence of the other spouse’s consent, the transaction should be construed as a continuing
offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a
binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or upon authorization by the court
before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
2.
Due diligence required in verifying not only vendor’s title, but also agent’s
authority to sell the property
A purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property of another, without notice that some
other person has a right to,
_______________
31 Under Article 1876, Civil Code, a general agency comprises all the business of the principal, but a special agency
comprises one or more specific transactions.
32 Article 1409, Civil Code.
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Aggabao vs. Parulan, Jr.
or interest in, such property, and pays the full and fair price for it at the time of such purchase
or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property. He buys
the property with the belief that the person from whom he receives the thing was the owner
and could convey title to the property. He cannot close his eyes to facts that should put a
reasonable man on his guard and still claim he acted in good faith.33 The status of a buyer in
good faith is never presumed but must be proven by the person invoking it.34
Here, the petitioners disagree with the CA for not applying the “ordinary prudent man’s
standard” in determining their status as buyers in good faith. They insist that they exercised
due diligence by verifying the status of the TCTs, as well as by inquiring about the details
surrounding the mortgage extended by the Los Baños Rural Bank. They lament the holding of
the CA that they should have been put on their guard when they learned that the Los Baños
Rural Bank had first required a court order before granting the loan to the respondents
secured by their mortgage of the property.
The petitioners miss the whole point.
Article 124 of the Family Code categorically requires the consent of both spouses before the
conjugal property may be disposed of by sale, mortgage, or other modes of disposition.
In Bautista v. Silva,35 the Court erected a standard to determine the good faith of the buyers
dealing with a seller who had title to and possession of the land but whose capacity to sell was
restricted, in that the consent of the other spouse was required before the conveyance,
declaring that in order to
_______________
33 Heirs of Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes v. Mijares, G.R. No. 143826, August 28, 2003, 410 SCRA 97, 107.
34 Bautista v. Silva, G.R. No. 157434, September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 334, 346; Aguirre v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 122249, January 29, 2004, 421 SCRA 310, 321.
35 Id., at p. 348.
576
576 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Aggabao vs. Parulan, Jr.
prove good faith in such a situation, the buyers must show that they inquired not only into the
title of the seller  but also into the seller’s capacity to sell.36  Thus, the buyers of conjugal
property must observe two kinds of requisite diligence, namely: (a) the diligence in verifying
the validity of the title covering the property; and (b) the diligence in inquiring into the
authority of the transacting spouse to sell conjugal property in behalf of the other spouse.
It is true that a buyer of registered land needs only to show that he has relied on the face of
the certificate of title to the property, for he is not required to explore beyond what the
certificate indicates on its face.37 In this respect, the petitioners sufficiently proved that they
had checked on the authenticity of TCT No. 63376 and TCT No. 63377 with the Office of the
Register of Deeds in Pasay City as the custodian of the land records; and that they had also
gone to the Los Baños Rural Bank to inquire about the mortgage annotated on TCT No. 63377.
Thereby, the petitioners observed the requisite diligence in examining the validity of the TCTs
concerned.
Yet, it ought to be plain enough to the petitioners that the issue was whether or not they
had diligently inquired into the authority of Ma. Elena to convey the property, not whether or
not the TCT had been valid and authentic, as to which there was no doubt. Thus, we cannot
side with them.
Firstly, the petitioners knew fully well that the law demanded the written consent of
Dionisio to the sale, but yet they did not present evidence to show that they had made
inquiries into the circumstances behind the execution of the SPA purportedly executed by
Dionisio in favor of Ma. Elena. Had they made the appropriate inquiries, and not simply
accepted the SPA for what it represented on its face, they would have uncovered soon enough
that the respondents had
_______________
36 Id., at p. 348.
37 Abad v. Guimba, G.R. No. 157002, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 356, 366-367.
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Aggabao vs. Parulan, Jr.
been estranged from each other and were under  de factoseparation, and that they probably
held conflicting interests that would negate the existence of an agency between them. To lift
this doubt, they must, of necessity, further inquire into the SPA of Ma. Elena. The omission to
inquire indicated their not being buyers in good faith, for, as fittingly observed in Domingo v.
Reed:38
“What was required of them by the appellate court, which we affirm, was merely to investigate—as
any prudent vendee should—the authority of Lolita to sell the property and to bind the partnership.
They had knowledge of facts that should have led them to inquire and to investigate, in order to acquaint
themselves with possible defects in her title. The law requires them to act with the diligence of a prudent
person; in this case, their only prudent course of action was to investigate whether respondent had
indeed given his consent to the sale and authorized his wife to sell the property.”39
Indeed, an unquestioning reliance by the petitioners on Ma. Elena’s SPA without first
taking precautions to verify its authenticity was not a prudent buyer’s move.40  They should
have done everything within their means and power to ascertain whether the SPA had been
genuine and authentic. If they did not investigate on the relations of the respondents  vis-à-
vis  each other, they could have done other things towards the same end, like attempting to
locate the notary public who had notarized the SPA, or checked with the RTC in Manila to
confirm the authority of Notary Public Atty. Datingaling. It turned out that Atty. Datingaling
was not authorized to act as a Notary Public for Manila during the period 1990-1991, which
was a fact that they could easily discover with a modicum of zeal.
Secondly, the final payment of P700,000.00 even without the owner’s duplicate copy of the
TCT No. 63376 being
_______________
38 G.R. No. 157701, December 9, 2005, 477 SCRA 227.
39 Id., at p. 244.
40 Bautista v. Silva, note 34.
578
578 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED his signature had been definitely forged, as borne out by the entries in his passport showing
that he was out of the country at the time of the execution of the questioned SPA; and that the
Aggabao vs. Parulan, Jr. alleged notary public, Atty. Datingaling, had no authority to act as a Notary Public for Manila
during the period of 1990-1991.
handed to them by Ma. Elena indicated a revealing lack of precaution on the part of the WHEREFORE, we deny the petition for review on certiorari, and affirm the decision dated
petitioners. It is true that she promised to produce and deliver the owner’s copy within a week July 2, 2004 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69044 entitled “Dionisio Z.
because her relative having custody of it had gone to Hongkong, but their passivity in such an Parulan, Jr. vs. Ma. Elena Parulan and Sps. Rex and Concepcion Aggabao” and “Sps. Rex and
essential matter was puzzling light of their earlier alacrity in immediately and diligently Concepcion Aggabao vs. Dionisio Z. Parulan, Jr. and Ma. Elena Parulan.”
validating the TCTs to the extent of inquiring at the Los Baños Rural Bank about the Costs of suit to be paid by the petitioners. 
annotated mortgage. Yet, they could have rightly withheld the final payment of the balance.
That they did not do so reflected their lack of due care in dealing with Ma. Elena.
Lastly, another reason rendered the petitioners’ good faith incredible. They did not take
immediate action against Ma. Elena upon discovering that the owner’s original copy of TCT
No. 63376 was in the possession of Atty. Parulan, contrary to Elena’s representation. Human
experience would have impelled them to exert every effort to proceed against Ma. Elena,
including demanding the return of the substantial amounts paid to her. But they seemed not
to mind her inability to produce the TCT, and, instead, they contented themselves with
meeting with Atty. Parulan to negotiate for the possible turnover of the TCT to them.

3.
Veloso v. Court of Appeals cannot help petitioners

The petitioners contend that the forgery of the SPA notwithstanding, the CA could still
have decided in their favor conformably with  Veloso v. Court of Appeals,41  a casewhere the
petitioner husband claimed that his signature and that of the notary public who had notarized
the SPA the petitioner supposedly executed to authorize his wife to sell the property had been
forged. In denying relief, the Court upheld the right of the vendee as an innocent purchaser for
value.

_______________

41 Supra note 26.

579

VOL. 629, SEPTEMBER 1, 2010 579

Aggabao vs. Parulan, Jr.

Veloso  is inapplicable, however, because the contested property therein was exclusively
owned by the petitioner and did not belong to the conjugal regime. Veloso being upon conjugal
property, Article 124 of the Family Code did not apply.
In contrast, the property involved herein pertained to the conjugal regime, and,
consequently, the lack of the written consent of the husband rendered the sale void pursuant
to Article 124 of the  Family Code. Moreover, evenassuming that the property involved
in Veloso was conjugal, its sale was made on November 2, 1987, or prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code; hence, the sale was still properly covered by Article 173 of the  Civil Code,
which provides that a sale effected without the consent of one of the spouses is only voidable,
not void. However, the sale herein was made already during the effectivity of the Family Code,
rendering the application of Article 124 of the Family Code clear and indubitable.
The fault of the petitioner in Veloso was that he did not adduce sufficient evidence to prove
that his signature and that of the notary public on the SPA had been forged. The Court
pointed out that his mere allegation that the signatures had been forged could not be
sustained without clear and convincing proof to substantiate the allegation. Herein, however,
both the RTC and the CA found from the testimonies and evidence presented by Dionisio that

G.R. No. 176556. July 4, 2012.*
BRIGIDO B. QUIAO, petitioner, vs. RITA C. QUIAO, KITCHIE C. QUIAO, LOTIS C. QUIAO,
PETCHIE C. QUIAO, represented by their mother RITA QUIAO, respondents.
Civil Procedure; Appeals; Fresh Period Rule; To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules
and to afford litigants fair
_______________
**  Per Special Order No. 1226 dated May 30, 2012.
***  Per Special Order No. 1247 dated June 29, 2012.
****  Per Special Order No. 1227 dated May 30, 2012.
* SECOND DIVISION.
643
VOL. 675, JULY 4, 2012 643
Quiao vs. Quiao
opportunity to appeal their cases, we held that “it would be practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days
within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), counted from receipt of the
order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.”—In  Neypes v. Court of
Appeals, 469 SCRA 633 (2005), we clarified that to standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules
and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, we held that “it would be practical to allow a
fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the
order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.” In Neypes, we explained that the
“fresh period rule” shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the
RTCs; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the RTCs to the Court of Appeals (CA); Rule 43 on appeals
from quasi-judicial agencies to the CA and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court.
We also said, “The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from
receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial)
or any final order or resolution.” In other words, a party litigant may file his notice of appeal within a
fresh 15-day period from his receipt of the trial court’s decision or final order denying his motion for new
trial or motion for reconsideration. Failure to avail of the fresh 15-day period from the denial of the
motion for reconsideration makes the decision or final order in question final and executory.
Same; Finality of Judgments; A judgment becomes final and executory when the reglementary period
to appeal lapses and no appeal is perfected within such period.—A judgment becomes final and executory
when the reglementary period to appeal lapses and no appeal is perfected within such period.
Consequently, no court, not even this Court, can arrogate unto itself appellate jurisdiction to review a
case or modify a judgment that became final.
Same; Void Judgments; A judgment is null and void when the court which rendered it had no power
to grant the relief or no jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties or both.—“A judgment is
null and void when the court which rendered it had no power to grant the relief or no jurisdiction over
the subject matter or over the parties or both.” In other words, a court, which does not have the power to
decide a case or that has no jurisdiction over the subject
644
644 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Quiao vs. Quiao
matter or the parties, will issue a void judgment or a coram non judice.
Civil Law; Family Courts; Regional Trial Courts; Republic Act No. 8369; Republic Act No. 8369
confers upon an Regional Trial Court (RTC), designated as the Family Court of a city, the exclusive
original jurisdiction to hear and decide, among others, complaints or petitions relating to marital status
and property relations of the husband and wife or those living together.—Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8369
confers upon an RTC, designated as the Family Court of a city, the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear
and decide, among others, complaints or petitions relating to marital status and property relations of the
husband and wife or those living together. The Rule on Legal Separation provides that “the petition [for
legal separation] shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner or the
respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing or in the case of a non-
resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner.”
Same; Property Relations; Conjugal Partnership; Since at the time of the exchange of marital vows,
the operative law was the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386) and since they did not agree on a
marriage settlement, the property relations between the petitioner and the respondent is the system of
relative community or conjugal partnership of gains.—Since at the time of the exchange of marital vows,
the operative law was the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386) and since they did not agree on a
marriage settlement, the property relations between the petitioner and the respondent is the system of
relative community or conjugal partnership of gains. Article 119 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 119. The
future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative community of property,
or upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the absence of marriage
settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of
gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property relations between husband and wife.
Family Code; Property Relations; Since at the time of the dissolution of the petitioner and the
respondent’s marriage the operative law is already the Family Code, the same applies in the instant case
645
VOL. 675, JULY 4, 2012 645
Quiao vs. Quiao
and the applicable law in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is
concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code.—Since at the
time of the dissolution of the petitioner and the respondent’s marriage the operative law is already the
Family Code, the same applies in the instant case and the applicable law in so far as the liquidation of
the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation
to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. The latter provision is applicable because according to Article 256 of
the Family Code “[t]his Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested
or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other law.”
Vested Rights; While one may not be deprived of his “vested right,” he may lose the same if there is due
process and such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence.—In our  en bancResolution dated
October 18, 2005 for ABAKADA Guro Party List Officer Samson S. Alcantara, et al. v. The Hon. Executive
Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita, we also explained: The concept of “vested right” is a consequence of
the  constitutional guaranty of due process  that expresses a present fixed interest which in right
reason and natural justice is protected against arbitrary state action; it includes not only legal or
equitable title to the enforcement of a demand but also exemptions from new obligations created after
the right has become vested. Rights are considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a present
interest, absolute, unconditional, and perfect or fixed and irrefutable. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied) From the foregoing, it is clear that while one may not be deprived of his “vested right,” he may
lose the same if there is due process and such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence.
Family Code; Property Relations; Absolute Community; When a couple enters into a regime of
absolute community, the husband and the wife becomes joint owners of all the properties of the marriage.
Whatever property each spouse brings into the marriage, and those acquired during the marriage (except
those excluded under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common mass of the couple’s properties.—
When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the wife becomes joint
owners of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the marriage,
and those acquired during the marriage (except those
646
646 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Quiao vs. Quiao
excluded under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common mass of the couple’s properties. And
when the couple’s marriage or community is dissolved, that common mass is divided between the
spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the proportion the parties have established, irrespective
of the value each one may have originally owned.
Same; Same; Same; Under Article 102 of the Family Code, upon dissolution of marriage, an inventory
is prepared, listing separately all the properties of the absolute community and the exclusive properties of
each; then the debts and obligations of the absolute community are paid out of the absolute community’s
assets and if the community’s properties are insufficient, the separate properties of each of the couple will
be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance.—Under Article 102 of the Family Code, upon dissolution of
marriage, an inventory is prepared, listing separately all the properties of the absolute community and
the exclusive properties of each; then the debts and obligations of the absolute community are paid out of
the absolute community’s assets and if the community’s properties are insufficient, the separate
properties of each of the couple will be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance. Whatever is left of the
separate properties will be delivered to each of them. The net remainder of the absolute community is its
net assets, which shall be divided between the husband and the wife; and for purposes of computing the
net profits subject to forfeiture, said profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of
the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time
of its dissolution.
Civil Law; Property Relations; Conjugal Partnership; When a couple enters into a regime of conjugal
partnership of gains under Article 142 of the Civil Code, “the husband and the wife place in common fund
the fruits of their separate property and income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the
dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by
either spouse during the marriage.”—When a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of
gains under Article 142 of the Civil Code, “the husband and the wife place in common fund the fruits of
their separate property and income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution
of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits ob-
647
VOL. 675, JULY 4, 2012 647
Quiao vs. Quiao
tained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.” From the foregoing provision, each of
the couple has his and her own property and debts. The law does not intend to effect a mixture or merger
of those debts or properties between the spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete separation of capitals.
Family Code; Conjugal Partnership; Property Relations; Since the trial court found the petitioner the
guilty party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common
children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code.—Ordinarily, what remains in the above-listed
properties should be divided equally between the spouses and/or their respective heirs. However, since
the trial court found the petitioner the guilty party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal
partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code.
Again, lest we be confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing will be returned to the guilty
party in the conjugal partnership regime, because  there is no separate property which may be
accounted for in the guilty party’s favor.
PETITION for review on certiorari of an order of the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City, Br.
1.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Reserva, Filoteo Law Office for petitioner.
  Noreen Salise-Gonzaga for respondents.
REYES, J.:
The family is the basic and the most important institution of society. It is in the family
where children are born and molded either to become useful citizens of the country or
troublemakers in the community. Thus, we are saddened when parents have to separate and
fight over properties, without regard to the message they send to their children.
Notwithstanding this, we must not shirk from our obligation to rule on this case involving
legal separation escalating to questions on dissolution and partition of properties.
648
648 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Quiao vs. Quiao
The Case
This case comes before us via Petition for Review onCertiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court. The petitioner seeks that we vacate and set aside the Order2dated January 8, 2007 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 1, Butuan City. In lieu of the said order, we are asked
to issue a Resolution defining the net profits subject of the forfeiture as a result of the decree
of legal separation in accordance with the provision of Article 102(4) of the Family Code, or
alternatively, in accordance with the provisions of Article 176 of the Civil Code.
Antecedent Facts
On October 26, 2000, herein respondent Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal
separation against herein petitioner Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido).3  Subsequently, the RTC
rendered a Decision4 dated October 10, 2005, the dispositive portion of which provides:
“WHEREFORE, viewed from the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the
legal separation of plaintiff Rita C. Quiao and defendant-respondent Brigido B. Quiao pursuant to Article
55.
As such, the herein parties shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the marriage bond
shall not be severed.
Except for Letecia C. Quiao who is of legal age, the three minor children, namely, Kitchie, Lotis and
Petchie, all surnamed Quiao shall remain under the custody of the plaintiff who is the innocent spouse.
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 7-35.
2 Penned by Judge Eduardo S. Casals; id., at pp. 115-122.
3 Id., at p. 36.
4 Id., at pp. 36-57.
649
VOL. 675, JULY 4, 2012 649
Quiao vs. Quiao
 Further, except for the personal and real properties already foreclosed by the RCBC, all the remaining
properties, namely:
1. coffee mill in Balongagan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
2. coffee mill in Durian, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
3. corn mill in Casiklan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
4. coffee mill in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur;
5. a parcel of land with an area of 1,200 square meters located in Tungao, Butuan City;
6. a parcel of agricultural land with an area of 5 hectares located in Manila de Bugabos, Butuan
City;
7. a parcel of land with an area of 84 square meters located in Tungao, Butuan City;
8. Bashier Bon Factory located in Tungao, Butuan City;
shall be divided equally between herein [respondents] and [petitioner] subject to the respective
legitimes of the children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities of [P]45,740.00.
[Petitioner’s] share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor
of the common children.
He is further ordered to reimburse [respondents] the sum of [P]19,000.00 as attorney’s fees and
litigation expenses of [P]5,000.00[.]
SO ORDERED.”5
Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the period provided for
under Section 17(a) and (b) of the Rule on Legal Separation.6
On December 12, 2005, the respondents filed a motion for execution7 which the trial court
granted in its Order dated December 16, 2005, the dispositive portion of which reads:
_______________
5 Id., at pp. 56-57.
6 A.M. No. 02-11-11-SC.
7 Rollo, p. 185.
650
650 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Quiao vs. Quiao
_______________
8   Id., at p. 59.
9   Id., at pp. 58-59.
10  Id., at p. 59.
11  Id., at p. 60.
651
VOL. 675, JULY 4, 2012 651
Quiao vs. Quiao
On July 7, 2006, or after more than nine months from the promulgation of the Decision, the
petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification,12  asking the RTC to define the term
“Net Profits Earned.”
To resolve the petitioner’s Motion for Clarification, the RTC issued an Order13  dated
August 31, 2006, which held that the phrase “NET PROFIT EARNED” denotes “the remainder
of the properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each [of the] spouse
and the debts.”14  The Order further held that after determining the remainder of the
properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of the common children because the offending spouse
does not have any right to any share of the net profits earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2)
and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code.15  The dispositive portion of the Order states:
“WHEREFORE, there is no blatant disparity when the sheriff intends to forfeit all the remaining
properties after deducting the payments of the debts for only separate properties of the defendant-
respondent shall be delivered to him which he has none.
The Sheriff is herein directed to proceed with the execution of the Decision.
IT IS SO ORDERED.”16
Not satisfied with the trial court’s Order, the petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration17  on September 8, 2006. Consequently, the RTC issued another Order18 
dated November 8, 2006, holding that although the Decision dated October 10, 2005 has
become final and executory, it may still consider

“Wherefore, finding the motion to be well taken, the same is hereby granted. Let a writ of execution be _______________
issued for the immediate enforcement of the Judgment. 12  Id., at pp. 61-69.
SO ORDERED.”8 13  Id., at pp. 70-76.
14  Id., at p. 75.
Subsequently, on February 10, 2006, the RTC issued a Writ of Execution9 which reads as 15  Id., at pp. 74-75.
16  Id., at pp. 75-76.
follows:
17  Id., at pp. 77-86.
18  Id., at pp. 87-91.
“NOW THEREFORE, that of the goods and chattels of the [petitioner] BRIGIDO B. QUIAO you cause
to be made the sums stated in the afore-quoted DECISION [sic], together with your lawful fees in the 652
service of this Writ, all in the Philippine Currency.
But if sufficient personal property cannot be found whereof to satisfy this execution and your lawful
fees, then we command you that of the lands and buildings of the said [petitioner], you make the said 652 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
sums in the manner required by law. You are enjoined to strictly observed Section 9, Rule 39, Rule [sic]
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Quiao vs. Quiao
You are hereby ordered to make a return of the said proceedings immediately after the judgment has
been satisfied in part or in full in consonance with Section 14, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended.”10  the Motion for Clarification because the petitioner simply wanted to clarify the meaning of
“net profit earned.”19  Furthermore, the same Order held:
On July 6, 2006, the writ was partially executed with the petitioner paying the respondents
the amount of P46,870.00, representing the following payments: “ALL TOLD, the Court Order dated August 31, 2006 is hereby ordered set aside. NET PROFIT
EARNED, which is subject of forfeiture in favor of [the] parties’ common children, is ordered to be
(a) P22,870.00—as petitioner’s share of the payment of the conjugal share;
computed in accordance [with] par. 4 of Article 102 of the Family Code.”20
(b) P19,000.00—as attorney’s fees; and
(c) P5,000.00—as litigation expenses.11 On November 21, 2006, the respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration,21  praying for
the correction and reversal of the Order dated November 8, 2006. Thereafter, on January 8,
2007,22  the trial court had changed its ruling again and granted the respondents’ Motion for 654 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Reconsideration whereby the Order dated November 8, 2006 was set aside to reinstate the
Order dated August 31, 2006. Quiao vs. Quiao
Not satisfied with the trial court’s Order, the petitioner filed on February 27, 2007 this
instant Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising the following: Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:

Issues “Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal.—The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant
  shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or
final order.
I The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No
IS THE DISSOLUTION AND THE CONSEQUENT LIQUIDATION OF THE COMMON PROPERTIES motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.”
OF THE HUSBAND AND WIFE BY VIRTUE OF THE DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION
GOVERNED BY ARTICLE 125 (SIC) OF THE FAMILY CODE? In  Neypes v. Court of Appeals,25    we clarified that to standardize the appeal periods
II provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, we held
WHAT IS THE MEANING OF THE NET PROFITS EARNED BY THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP that “it would be practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of
FOR PURPOSES OF EFFECT- appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or
motion for reconsideration.”26
_______________
19  Id., at p. 90.
In Neypes, we explained that the “fresh period rule” shall also apply to Rule 40 governing
20  Id., at p. 91. appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the RTCs; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the
21  Id., at pp. 92-97.
22  Id., at pp. 115-122.
RTCs to the Court of Appeals (CA); Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the CA
and Rule 45 governing appeals by  certiorari  to the Supreme Court. We also said, “The new
653 rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the
order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or
VOL. 675, JULY 4, 2012 653 any final order or resolution.”27  In other words, a party litigant may file his notice of appeal
within a fresh 15-day period from his receipt of the trial court’s decision or final order denying
Quiao vs. Quiao his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Failure to avail of the fresh 15-day
period from the
ING THE FORFEITURE AUTHORIZED UNDER ARTICLE 63 OF THE FAMILY CODE?
III _______________
WHAT LAW GOVERNS THE PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN THE HUSBAND AND WIFE WHO 25  506 Phil. 613, 629; 469 SCRA 633, 644 (2005).
GOT MARRIED IN 1977? CAN THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES BE GIVEN 26  Id., at p. 626; p. 644.
RETROACTIVE EFFECT FOR PURPOSES OF DETERMINING THE NET PROFITS SUBJECT OF 27  Id., at p. 627; p. 645.
FORFEITURE AS A RESULT OF THE DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION WITHOUT IMPAIRING
VESTED RIGHTS ALREADY ACQUIRED UNDER THE CIVIL CODE? 655
IV
WHAT PROPERTIES SHALL BE INCLUDED IN THE FORFEITURE OF THE SHARE OF THE
GUILTY SPOUSE IN THE NET CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP AS A RESULT OF THE ISSUANCE OF VOL. 675, JULY 4, 2012 655
THE DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION?23 
Quiao vs. Quiao
Our Ruling
denial of the motion for reconsideration makes the decision or final order in question final and
While the petitioner has raised a number of issues on the applicability of certain laws, we executory.
are well-aware that the respondents have called our attention to the fact that the Decision In the case at bar, the trial court rendered its Decision on October 10, 2005. The petitioner
dated October 10, 2005 has attained finality when the Motion for Clarification was filed.24  neither filed a motion for reconsideration nor a notice of appeal. On December 16, 2005, or
Thus, we are constrained to resolve first the issue of the finality of the Decision dated October after 67 days had lapsed, the trial court issued an order granting the respondent’s motion for
10, 2005 and subsequently discuss the matters that we can clarify. execution; and on February 10, 2006, or after 123 days had lapsed, the trial court issued a writ
The Decision dated October 10, 2005 of execution. Finally, when the writ had already been partially executed, the petitioner, on
has become final and executory at  July 7, 2006 or after 270 days had lapsed, filed his Motion for Clarification on the definition of
the time the Motion for Clarification the “net profits earned.” From the foregoing, the petitioner had clearly slept on his right to
was filed on July 7, 2006. question the RTC’s Decision dated October 10, 2005. For 270 days, the petitioner never raised
a single issue until the decision had already been partially executed. Thus at the time the
_______________ petitioner filed his motion for clarification, the trial court’s decision has become final and
23  Id., at p. 18. executory. A judgment becomes final and executory when the reglementary period to appeal
24  Id., at pp. 143-146.
lapses and no appeal is perfected within such period. Consequently, no court, not even this
654 Court, can arrogate unto itself appellate jurisdiction to review a case or modify a judgment
that became final.28
 The petitioner argues that the decision he is questioning is a void judgment. Being such,
the petitioner’s thesis is that it can still be disturbed even after 270 days had lapsed from the
issuance of the decision to the filing of the motion for clarification. He said that “a void
judgment is no judgment at all. It never attains finality and cannot be a source of any right
nor any obligation.”29  But what precisely is a void judgment in our jurisdiction? When does a
judgment becomes void?
_______________
28  PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc., v. Milan, G.R. No. 151215, April 5, 2010, 617 SCRA 258.
29  Rollo, p. 166.
656
656 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Quiao vs. Quiao
“A judgment is null and void when the court which rendered it had no power to grant the relief
or no jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties or both.”30  In other words, a
court, which does not have the power to decide a case or that has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter or the parties, will issue a void judgment or a coram non judice.31
The questioned judgment does not fall within the purview of a void judgment. For sure, the
trial court has jurisdiction over a case involving legal separation. Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8369
confers upon an RTC, designated as the Family Court of a city, the exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and decide, among others, complaints or petitions relating to marital
status and property relations of the husband and wife or those living together.32  The Rule on
Legal Separation33  provides that “the petition [for legal separation] shall be filed in the
Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner or the respondent has been residing
for at least six months prior to the date of filing or in the case of a non-resident respondent,
where he may be found in the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner.”34  In the instant
case, herein respondent Rita is found to reside in Tungao, Butuan City for more than six
months prior to the date of filing of the petition; thus, the RTC, clearly has jurisdiction over
the respondent’s petition below. Furthermore, the RTC also acquired jurisdiction over the
persons of both parties, considering that summons and a copy of the complaint with its
annexes were served upon the herein petitioner on December 14, 2000 and that the herein
petitioner filed his Answer to the Complaint
_______________
30  See Moreno, Federico B., Philippine Law Dictionary, 3rd ed., 1988, p. 998.
31  People v. Judge Navarro, 159 Phil. 863, 874; 63 SCRA 264, 274 (1975).
32  R.A. No. 8369, Section 5(d).
33  A.M. No. 02-11-11-SC.
34  Id., at Section 2(c).
657
VOL. 675, JULY 4, 2012 657
Quiao vs. Quiao
on January 9, 2001.35  Thus, without doubt, the RTC, which has rendered the questioned
judgment, has jurisdiction over the complaint and the persons of the parties.
From the aforecited facts, the questioned October 10, 2005 judgment of the trial court is
clearly not void  ab initio, since it was rendered within the ambit of the court’s jurisdiction.
Being such, the same cannot anymore be disturbed, even if the modification is meant to
correct what may be considered an erroneous conclusion of fact or law.36  In fact, we have
ruled that for “[as] long as the public respondent acted with jurisdiction, any error committed
by him or it in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than an error of judgment
which may be reviewed or corrected only by appeal.”37  Granting without admitting that the
RTC’s judgment dated October 10, 2005 was erroneous, the petitioner’s remedy should be an
appeal filed within the reglementary period. Unfortunately, the petitioner failed to do this. He
has already lost the chance to question the trial court’s decision, which has become immutable
and unalterable. What we can only do is to clarify the very question raised below and nothing
more.
For our convenience, the following matters cannot anymore be disturbed since the October
10, 2005 judgment has already become immutable and unalterable, to wit:
(a) The finding that the petitioner is the offending spouse since he cohabited with a
woman who is not his wife;38
(b) The trial court’s grant of the petition for legal separation of respondent Rita;39
_______________
35  Rollo, p. 38.
36  Sps. Edillo v. Sps. Dulpina, G.R. No. 188360, January 21, 2010, 610 SCRA 590, 601-602.
37  Lim v. Judge Vianzon, 529 Phil. 472, 483-484; 497 SCRA 482, 485 (2006); See also  Herrera v. Barretto and
Joaquin, 25 Phil. 245, 256 (1913), citing Miller v. Rowan, 251 Ill., 344.
38  Rollo, pp. 50-51.
39  Id., at p. 51.
658
658 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Quiao vs. Quiao
   (c) The dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership;40
(d) The forfeiture of the petitioner’s right to any share of the net profits earned by the
conjugal partnership;41
(e) The award to the innocent spouse of the minor children’s custody;42
(f) The disqualification of the offending spouse from inheriting from the innocent spouse
by intestate succession;43
(g) The revocation of provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in the will of the
innocent spouse;44
(h) The holding that the property relation of the parties is conjugal partnership of gains
and pursuant to Article 116 of the Family Code, all properties acquired during the marriage,
whether acquired by one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is
proved;45
(i) The finding that the spouses acquired their real and personal properties while they
were living together;46
(j) The list of properties which Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC)
foreclosed;47
(k) The list of the remaining properties of the couple which must be dissolved and
liquidated and the fact that respondent Rita was the one who took charge of the
administration of these properties;48
(l) The holding that the conjugal partnership shall be liable to matters included under
Article 121 of the Family Code
_______________
40  Id.
41  Id., at pp. 51-52.
42  Id., at pp. 52 and 56.
43  Id., at p. 52.
 44  Id. Philippines (R.A. No. 386) and since they did not agree on a marriage settlement, the property
45  Id. relations between the petitioner and the respondent is the system of relative community or
46  Id.
47  Id., at pp. 52-53.
conjugal partnership of gains.55  Article 119 of the Civil Code provides:
48  Id., at p. 53.
“Art. 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative
659 community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the
absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property relations between
VOL. 675, JULY 4, 2012 659 husband and wife.”

Quiao vs. Quiao Thus, from the foregoing facts and law, it is clear that what governs the property relations
of the petitioner and of the respondent is conjugal partnership of gains. And under this
property relation, “the husband and the wife place in a common fund the fruits of their
and the conjugal liabilities totaling P503,862.10 shall be charged to the income generated by
separate property and the income from their work or industry.”56  The husband and wife also
these properties;49
own
(m) The fact that the trial court had no way of knowing whether the petitioner had
separate properties which can satisfy his share for the support of the family;50
(n) The holding that the applicable law in this case is Article 129(7);51 _______________
55  CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Art. 119.
(o) The ruling that the remaining properties not subject to any encumbrance shall 56  Id., at Art. 142.
therefore be divided equally between the petitioner and the respondent without prejudice to
the children’s legitime;52 661
(p) The holding that the petitioner’s share of the net profits earned by the conjugal
partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children;53  and
(q) The order to the petitioner to reimburse the respondents the sum of P19,000.00 as
VOL. 675, JULY 4, 2012 661
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses ofP5,000.00.54  Quiao vs. Quiao
After discussing lengthily the immutability of the Decision dated October 10, 2005, we will
discuss the following issues for the enlightenment of the parties and the public at large.
Article 129 of the Family Code  in common all the property of the conjugal partnership of gains.57
applies to the present case since Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the petitioner and the respondent’s marriage
the parties’ property relation is the operative law is already the Family Code, the same applies in the instant case and the
governed by the system of rela- applicable law in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is
tive community or conjugal concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. The
partnership of gains. latter provision is applicable because according to Article 256 of the Family Code “[t]his Code
shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights
in accordance with the Civil Code or other law.”58 
_______________
49  Id., at pp. 53-54.
Now, the petitioner asks: Was his vested right over half of the common properties of the
50  Id., at p. 55. conjugal partnership violated when the trial court forfeited them in favor of his children
51  Id. pursuant to Articles 63(2) and 129 of the Family Code?
52  Id., at p. 56. We respond in the negative.
53  Id., at p. 57. Indeed, the petitioner claims that his vested rights have been impaired, arguing: “As earlier
54  Id.
adverted to, the petitioner acquired vested rights over half of the conjugal properties, the same
660 being owned in common by the spouses. If the provisions of the Family Code are to be given
retroactive application to the point of authorizing the forfeiture of the petitioner’s share in the
net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties, the same impairs his rights acquired
660 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED prior to the effectivity of the Family Code.”59  In other words, the petitioner is saying that
Quiao vs. Quiao since the property relations between the spouses is governed by the regime of Conjugal
Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code, the petitioner acquired vested rights over half of
the properties of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil Code,
The petitioner claims that the court  a quo  is wrong when it applied Article 129 of the which
Family Code, instead of Article 102. He confusingly argues that Article 102 applies because
there is no other provision under the Family Code which defines net profits earned subject of _______________
forfeiture as a result of legal separation. 57  Id., at Art. 143.
Offhand, the trial court’s Decision dated October 10, 2005 held that Article 129(7) of the 58  FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Art. 256.
Family Code applies in this case. We agree with the trial court’s holding. 59  Rollo, p. 29.
First, let us determine what governs the couple’s property relation. From the record, we can 662
deduce that the petitioner and the respondent tied the marital knot on January 6, 1977. Since
at the time of the exchange of marital vows, the operative law was the Civil Code of the
662 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Quiao vs. Quiao
provides: “All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common by the
husband and wife.”60  Thus, since he is one of the owners of the properties covered by the
conjugal partnership of gains, he has a vested right over half of the said properties, even after
the promulgation of the Family Code; and he insisted that no provision under the Family Code
may deprive him of this vested right by virtue of Article 256 of the Family Code which
prohibits retroactive application of the Family Code when it will prejudice a person’s vested
right.
However, the petitioner’s claim of vested right is not one which is written on stone. In Go,
Jr. v. Court of Appeals,61  we define and explained “vested right” in the following manner:
“A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent do not depend upon events foreign to the
will of the holder, or to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is immediate and perfect in
itself and not dependent upon a contingency. The term “vested right” expresses the concept of present
fixed interest which, in right reason and natural justice, should be protected against arbitrary State
action, or an innately just and imperative right which enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and
irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny.
To be vested, a right must have become a title—legal or equitable—to the present or future enjoyment
of property.”62  (Citations omitted)
In our  en banc  Resolution dated October 18, 2005 for  ABAKADA Guro Party List Officer
Samson S. Alcantara, et  al. v. The Hon. Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita,63  we also
explained:
_______________
60  CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Art. 143.
61  G.R. No. 172027, July 29, 2010, 626 SCRA 180, 201.
62  Id., at p. 199.
63  The Court consolidated the following cases: ABAKADA Guro Party List Officer Samson S. Alcantara, et al. v.
The Hon. Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita, G.R. No. 168056; Aquilino Q. Pimen-
663
VOL. 675, JULY 4, 2012 663
Quiao vs. Quiao
“The concept of “vested right” is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty of due process that
expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is protected against arbitrary
state action; it includes not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand but also
exemptions from new obligations created after the right has become vested. Rights are considered vested
when the right to enjoyment is a present interest, absolute, unconditional, and perfect or fixed and
irrefutable.”64  (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
From the foregoing, it is clear that while one may not be deprived of his “vested right,” he
may lose the same if there is due process and such deprivation is founded in law and
jurisprudence.
In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process. First, he was well-
aware that the respondent prayed in her complaint that all of the conjugal properties be
awarded to her.65  In fact, in his Answer, the petitioner prayed that the trial court divide the
community assets between the petitioner and the respondent as circumstances and evidence
warrant after the accounting and inventory of all the community properties of the
parties.66  Second, when the Decision dated October 10, 2005 was promulgated, the petitioner
never questioned the trial court’s ruling forfeiting what the trial court termed as “net profits,”
pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code.67  Thus, the petitioner cannot claim being
deprived of his right to due process.
_______________
tel, Jr., et al. v. Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita, et al.,  G.R. No. 168207;  Association of Pilipinas Shell
Dealers, Inc., et al. v. Cesar V. Purisima, et al., G.R. No. 168461; Francis Joseph G. Escudero v. Cesar V. Purisima, et
al., G.R. No. 168463; and Bataan Governor Enrique T. Garcia, Jr. v. Hon. Eduardo R. Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 168730.
64  Id.
65  Rollo, p. 37.
66  Id., at p. 39.
67  Id., at pp. 55-57.
664
664 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Quiao vs. Quiao
Furthermore, we take note that the alleged deprivation of the petitioner’s “vested right” is
one founded, not only in the provisions of the Family Code, but in Article 176 of the Civil Code.
This provision is like Articles 63 and 129 of the Family Code on the forfeiture of the guilty
spouse’s share in the conjugal partnership profits. The said provision says:
“Art. 176. In case of legal separation, the guilty spouse shall forfeit his or her share of the conjugal
partnership profits, which shall be awarded to the children of both, and the children of the guilty spouse
had by a prior marriage. However, if the conjugal partnership property came mostly or entirely from the
work or industry, or from the wages and salaries, or from the fruits of the separate property of the guilty
spouse, this forfeiture shall not apply.
In case there are no children, the innocent spouse shall be entitled to all the net profits.”
From the foregoing, the petitioner’s claim of a vested right has no basis considering that
even under Article 176 of the Civil Code, his share of the conjugal partnership profits may be
forfeited if he is the guilty party in a legal separation case. Thus, after trial and after the
petitioner was given the chance to present his evidence, the petitioner’s vested right claim may
in fact be set aside under the Civil Code since the trial court found him the guilty party.
More, in Abalos v. Dr. Macatangay, Jr.,68  we reiterated our long-standing ruling that:
“[P]rior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the interest of each spouse in the conjugal assets is
inchoate, a mere expectancy, which constitutes neither a legal nor an equitable estate, and does not ripen
into title until it appears that there are assets in the community as a result of the liquidation and
settlement. The interest of each spouse is limited to the net remainder or “remanente liquido” (haber
ganancial) resulting from the liquidation of the affairs of the partnership after its dissolution. Thus, the
right of the husband or
_______________
68  482 Phil. 877-894; 439 SCRA 649, 663-664 (2004).
665
VOL. 675, JULY 4, 2012 665
Quiao vs. Quiao
wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal
partnership, or after dissolution of the marriage, when it is finally determined that, after settlement of
conjugal obligations, there are net assets left which can be divided between the spouses or their
respective heirs.”69  (Citations omitted)
 Finally, as earlier discussed, the trial court has already decided in its Decision dated _______________
October 10, 2005 that the applicable law in this case is Article 129(7) of the Family Code.70  72  FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Art. 102(4).
The petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration nor a notice of appeal. Thus, the 667
petitioner is now precluded from questioning the trial court’s decision since it has become final
and executory. The doctrine of immutability and unalterability of a final judgment prevents us
from disturbing the Decision dated October 10, 2005 because final and executory decisions can VOL. 675, JULY 4, 2012 667
no longer be reviewed nor reversed by this Court.71 
Quiao vs. Quiao
From the above discussions, Article 129 of the Family Code clearly applies to the present
case since the parties’ property relation is governed by the system of relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains and since the trial court’s Decision has attained finality and Let us now discuss the difference in the processes between the absolute community regime
immutability. and the conjugal partnership regime.
The net profits of the conjugal  On Absolute Community Regime:
partnership of gains are all the When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the wife
fruits of the separate properties becomes joint owners of  all the properties of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse
of the spouses and the products brings into the marriage, and those acquired during the marriage (except those excluded
of their labor and industry. under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common mass of the couple’s properties. And
The petitioner inquires from us the meaning of “net profits” earned by the conjugal when the couple’s marriage or community is dissolved, that common mass is divided between
partnership for purposes of effecting the spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the proportion the parties have established,
irrespective of the value each one may have originally owned.73
_______________ Under Article 102 of the Family Code, upon dissolution of marriage, an inventory is
69  Id., at pp. 890-891; p. 663. prepared, listing separately all the properties of the absolute community and the exclusive
70  Rollo, p. 55. properties of each; then the debts and obligations of the absolute community are paid out of
71  Malayan Employees Association-FFW v. Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., G.R. No. 181357, February 2, 2010, 611 the absolute community’s assets and if the community’s properties are insufficient, the
SCRA 392, 399; Catmon Sales Int’l. Corp. v. Atty. Yngson, Jr., G.R. No. 179761, January 15, 2010, 610 SCRA 236, 245. separate properties of each of the couple will be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance.
666 Whatever is left of the separate properties will be delivered to each of them. The net
remainder of the absolute community is its net assets, which shall be divided between the
husband and the wife; and for purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture, said
666 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community property at
the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its
Quiao vs. Quiao
dissolution.74

the forfeiture authorized under Article 63 of the Family Code. He insists that since there is no _______________
other provision under the Family Code, which defines “net profits” earned subject of forfeiture 73    Id., at Art. 91; See also Tolentino, Arturo, M.,  COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL CODE OF THE
as a result of legal separation, then Article 102 of the Family Code applies. PHILIPPINES: VOLUME ONE WITH THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 379 (1990).
What does Article 102 of the Family Code say? Is the computation of “net profits” earned in 74  FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Art. 102.
the conjugal partnership of gains the same with the computation of “net profits” earned in the 668
absolute community?
Now, we clarify.
First and foremost, we must distinguish between the applicable law as to the property 668 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
relations between the parties and the applicable law as to the definition of “net profits.” As
earlier discussed, Article 129 of the Family Code applies as to the property relations of the Quiao vs. Quiao
parties. In other words, the computation and the succession of events will follow the provisions
under Article 129 of the said Code. Moreover, as to the definition of “net profits,” we cannot Applying Article 102 of the Family Code, the “net profits” requires that we first find the
but refer to Article 102(4) of the Family Code, since it expressly provides that for purposes of market value of the properties at the time of the community’s dissolution. From the totality of
computing the net profits subject to forfeiture under Article 43, No. (2) and Article 63, No. (2), the market value of all the properties, we subtract the debts and obligations of the absolute
Article 102(4) applies. In this provision, net profits “shall be the increase in value between the community and this result to the net assets or net remainder of the properties of the absolute
market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the community, from which we deduct the market value of the properties at the time of marriage,
market value at the time of its dissolution.”72  Thus, without any iota of doubt, Article 102(4) which then results to the net profits.75 
applies to both the dissolution of the absolute community regime under Article 102 of the Granting without admitting that Article 102 applies to the instant case, let us see what will
Family Code, and to the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime under Article 129 of happen if we apply Article 102:
the Family Code. Where lies the difference? As earlier shown, the difference lies in the (a) According to the trial court’s finding of facts, both husband and wife have no separate
processes used under the dissolution of the absolute community regime under Article 102 of properties, thus, the remaining properties in the list above are all part of the absolute
the Family Code, and in the processes used under the dissolution of the conjugal partnership community. And its market value at the time of the dissolution of the absolute community
regime under Article 129 of the Family Code. constitutes the “market value at dissolution.”
 (b) Thus, when the petitioner and the respondent finally were legally separated, all the
properties which remained will be liable for the debts and obligations of the community. Such
debts and obligations will be subtracted from the “market value at dissolution.”
(c) What remains after the debts and obligations have been paid from the total assets of
the absolute community constitutes the net remainder or net asset. And from such net
asset/remainder of the petitioner and respondent’s remaining properties, the market value at
the time of marriage will be subtracted and the resulting totality constitutes the “net profits.”
_______________
75  Tolentino, Arturo, M., COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES: VOLUME ONE WITH
THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, pp. 401-402 (1990).
669
VOL. 675, JULY 4, 2012 669
Quiao vs. Quiao
(d) Since both husband and wife have no separate properties, and nothing would
be returned to each of them, what will be divided equally between them is simply the “net
profits.” However, in the Decision dated October 10, 2005, the trial court forfeited the half-
share of the petitioner in favor of his children. Thus, if we use Article 102 in the instant case
(which should not be the case), nothing is left to the petitioner since both parties entered into
their marriage without bringing with them any property.
“Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, the following procedure shall
apply:
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the conjugal partnership
and the exclusive properties of each spouse.
(2) Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership in payment of personal debts and obligations of
either spouse shall be credited to the conjugal partnership as an asset thereof.
(3) Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of his or her exclusive funds in the acquisition of
property or for the value of his or her exclusive property, the ownership of which has been vested by law
in the conjugal partnership.
(4) The debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership shall be paid out of the conjugal assets. In
case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their
separate properties, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (2) of Article 121.
(5) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered to each
of them.
(6) Unless the owner had been indemnified from whatever source, the loss or deterioration of
movables used for the benefit of the family, belonging to either spouse, even due to fortuitous event, shall
be paid to said spouse from the conjugal funds, if any.
(7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall constitute the profits, which shall
be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon
in the marriage settlements or unless there has been a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as
provided in this Code.
(8) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon the partition in
accordance with Article 51.
(9) In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall,
unless otherwise agreed
671

On Conjugal Partnership Regime:

Before we go into our disquisition on the Conjugal Partnership Regime, we make it clear
that Article 102(4) of the Family Code applies in the instant case  for purposes only of
defining “net profit.” As earlier explained, the definition of “net profits” in Article 102(4) of
the Family Code applies to both the absolute community regime and conjugal partnership
regime as provided for under Article 63, No. (2) of the Family Code, relative to the provisions
on Legal Separation.
Now, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of gains under Article
142 of the Civil Code, “the husband and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their
separate property and income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the
dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained
indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.”76  From the foregoing provision, each
of the couple has his and her own property and debts. The law does not intend to effect a
mixture or merger of those debts or properties between the spouses. Rather, it establishes a
complete separation of capitals.77
VOL. 675, JULY 4, 2012 671
Quiao vs. Quiao
upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the common children choose
to remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court
has decided otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration
the best interests of said children.”
In the normal course of events, the following are the steps in the liquidation of the
properties of the spouses:
(a) An inventory of all the actual properties shall be made, separately listing the couple’s
conjugal properties and their separate properties.78  In the instant case,  the trial court
found that the couple has no separate properties when they married.79  Rather, the
trial court identified the following conjugal properties, to wit:

_______________ 1. coffee mill in Balongagan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;

76  CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Art. 142. 2. coffee mill in Durian, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
77  Tolentino, Arturo, M., COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES: VOLUME ONE, p. 3. corn mill in Casiklan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
365 (1974). 4. coffee mill in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur;
5. a parcel of land with an area of 1,200 square meters located in Tungao, Butuan City;
670 6. a parcel of agricultural land with an area of 5 hectares located in Manila de Bugabos, Butuan
City;
7. a parcel of land with an area of 84 square meters located in Tungao, Butuan City;
670 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 8. Bashier Bon Factory located in Tungao, Butuan City.80
Quiao vs. Quiao
(b) Ordinarily, the benefit received by a spouse from the conjugal partnership during the
marriage is returned in equal
Considering that the couple’s marriage has been dissolved under the Family Code, Article
129 of the same Code applies in the liquidation of the couple’s properties in the event that the _______________
conjugal partnership of gains is dissolved, to wit: 78  Tolentino, Arturo, M., COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES: VOLUME ONE WITH
THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, p. 472 (1990).
 79  Rollo, p. 55. Notes.—With the advent of the fresh period rule, parties who availed themselves of the
80  Id., at pp. 56-57. remedy of motion for reconsideration are now allowed to file a notice of appeal within fifteen
672 days from the denial of that motion. (Sumiran vs. Damaso, 596 SCRA 450 [2009])
The fresh period rule can be made applicable to actions pending upon its effectivity without
danger of violating anyone else’s rights. (Id.)
672 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED In  Neypes v. Court of Appeals, 469 SCRA 633 (2005), the Court allowed a fresh period of
fifteen (15) days within which to file a notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court to be
Quiao vs. Quiao
counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration; The “fresh period rule” shall also apply to Rule 45 governing appeals
amount to the assets of the conjugal partnership;81  and if the community is enriched at the by certiorari to the Supreme Court. (Tejano, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, 584 SCRA 191 [2009])
expense of the separate properties of either spouse, a restitution of the value of such properties
to their respective owners shall be made.82
(c) Subsequently, the couple’s conjugal partnership shall pay the debts of the conjugal
partnership; while the debts and obligation of each of the spouses shall be paid from their
respective separate properties. But if the conjugal partnership is not sufficient to pay all its
debts and obligations, the spouses with their separate properties shall be solidarily liable.83
(d) Now, what remains of the separate or exclusive properties of the husband and of the
wife shall be returned to each of them.84  In the instant case,  since it was already
established by the trial court that the spouses have no separate properties,85  there
is nothing to return to any of them. The listed properties above are considered part of the
conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the above-listed properties should be
divided equally between the spouses and/or their respective heirs.86  However, since the trial
court found the petitioner the guilty party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal
partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the
Family Code. Again, lest we be confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing will
be returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime, because  there is no
separate property which may be accounted for in the guilty party’s favor.

_______________
81  FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Art. 129(2).
82  Id., at Art. 129(3).
83  Id., at Art. 129(4).
84  Id., at Art. 129(5).
85  Rollo, p. 55.
86  FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Art. 129(7).

673

VOL. 675, JULY 4, 2012 673

Quiao vs. Quiao

In the discussions above, we have seen that in both instances, the petitioner is not entitled
to any property at all. Thus, we cannot but uphold the Decision dated October 10, 2005 of the
trial court. However, we must clarify, as we already did above, the Order dated January 8,
2007.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 10, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1
of Butuan City is AFFIRMED. Acting on the Motion for Clarification dated July 7, 2006 in the
Regional Trial Court, the Order dated January 8, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court is hereby
CLARIFIED in accordance with the above discussions.
SO ORDERED.

Carpio (Chairperson), Brion, Perez and Sereno, JJ.,

concur. 

Judgment affirmed.
 community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable
VOL. 260, JULY 31, 1996 221 marriages (in the latter case until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-
ownership that exists between common-law spouses. The first paragraph of Article 50 of the Family
Valdes vs. Regional Trial Court, Br. 102, Quezon Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5)of Article 43, relates only, by its explicit terms,
City to  voidablemarriages and, exceptionally, to  void  marriages under Article 40 of the Code, i.e., the
declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the
* latter is judicially declared void. The latter is a special rule that somehow recognizes the philosophy and
G.R. No. 122749. July 31, 1996. an old doctrine that void marriages are inexistent

223
ANTONIO A.S. VALDES, petitioner,  vs.  REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102,
QUEZON CITY, and CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-VALDES, respondents.

Civil Law; Family Code; In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of VOL. 260, JULY 31, 1996 223
the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148 of
the Family Code.—The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause
Valdes vs. Regional Trial Court, Br. 102, Quezon
thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the
provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code. City
Same; Same; Property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by
the rules on equal co-ownership.—Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses from the very beginning and no judicial decree is necessary to establish their nullity.
through their  work  and  industry  shall be governed by the rules on  equal  co-ownership. Any property
acquired during the union PETITION for review of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 102.

_______________ The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles for petitioner.
* FIRST DIVISION.      Roco, Buñag, Kapunan & Migallos for private respondent.

VITUG, J.:
222
The petition for review bewails, purely on a question of law, an alleged error committed by the
Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. Q-92-12539. Petitioner avers that the court a quo  has
failed to apply the correct law that should govern the disposition of a family dwelling in a
222 SUPREME COURT REPORTS situation where a marriage is declared void ab initio because of psychological incapacity on the
ANNOTATED part of either or both of the parties to the contract.
The pertinent facts giving rise to this incident are, by and large, not in dispute.
Valdes vs. Regional Trial Court, Br. 102, Quezon Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 January 1971. Begotten during
City the marriage were five children. In a petition, dated 22 June 1992, Valdes sought the
declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code (docketed Civil
Case No. Q-92-12539, Regional Trial Court of Quezon 1
City, Branch 102). After hearing the
is  prima facie  presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not parties following the joinder of issues, the trial court,  in its decision of 29 July 1994, granted
participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be considered as having contributed thereto the petition; viz:
jointly if said party’s “efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household.” Unlike the
conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple’s separate property are not included in the co- “WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
ownership. “(1) The marriage of petitioner Antonio Valdez and respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdes is hereby
Same; Same; When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do declared null and void under
not live exclusively with each other, only the property acquired by both of them through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their ________________
respective contributions.—When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or 1 Hon. Perlita Tria Tirona, presiding.
when they do not live exclusively with each other (as husband and wife), only the property acquired by
both of them through their  actual jointcontribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in 224
common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares,
however, are prima faciepresumed to be equal. The share of any party who is married to another shall
accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, as the case may be, if so existing under a valid 224 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
marriage. If the party who has acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall
be forfeited in the manner already heretofore expressed. Valdes vs. Regional Trial Court, Br. 102, Quezon
Same; Same; The first paragraph of Article 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) City
and (5) of Article 43 relates only by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and exceptionally, to void
marriages under Article 40 of the Code.—The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute
Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity to comply with their “II
essential marital obligations;
“(2) The three older children, Carlos Enrique III, Antonio Quintin and Angela Rosario shall choose “Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code govern the disposition of
which parent they would want to stay with. the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio, including a marriage declared
“Stella Eloisa and Joaquin Pedro shall be placed in the custody of their mother, herein respondent void by reason of the psychological incapacity of the spouses.
Consuelo Gomez-Valdes.
“The petitioner and respondent shall have visitation rights over the children who are in the custody of _________________
the other. 3 Rollo, p. 42.
“(3) The petitioner and respondent are directed to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common 4 Rollo, pp. 38-39.
properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with the provisions of Articles 50,
51 and 52 of the same code, within thirty (30) days from notice of this decision. 226
“Let a copy of this decision be furnished the
2
Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, for
proper recording in the registry of marriages.”  (Italics ours.)
226 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision directing compliance with
Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code. She asserted that the Family Code contained no Valdes vs. Regional Trial Court, Br. 102, Quezon
provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in “unions without City
marriage.” Parenthetically, during the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint
affidavit expressing their desire to remain with their father, Antonio Valdes, herein petitioner. “III
In an Order, dated 05 May 1995, the trial court made the following clarification:
“Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared void ab initio on the ground of the
“Consequently, considering that Article 147 of the Family Code explicitly provides that the property psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same may be read consistently with Article 129.
acquired by both parties during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have
been obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff “IV
and defendant will own their ‘family home’ and all their other properties for that matter in equal shares. 5
“It is necessary to determine the parent with whom majority of the children wish to stay.”

_________________ The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof,
2 Rollo, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the
p. 22.
provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code. Article
225 147 is6 a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in previous
cases;  it provides:
VOL. 260, JULY 31, 1996 225 “ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages
Valdes vs. Regional Trial Court, Br. 102, Quezon and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through
City their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
“In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in
“In the liquidation and partition of the properties owned in common
3
by the plaintiff and defendant, the equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other
provisions on co-ownership found in the Civil Code shall apply.”  (Emphasis supplied.) party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
In addressing specifically the issue regarding the disposition of the family dwelling, the trial “Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired
court said: during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the
“Considering that this Court has already declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent as
__________________
null and void ab initio, pursuant to Art. 147, the property regime of petitioner and respondent shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership. 5 Rollo, pp. 24-25.
“The provisions of Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code finds no application since Article 102 refers 6 See Margaret Maxey vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 187; Aznar, et al. vs. Garcia, et al., 102 Phil. 1055.
to the procedure for the liquidation of the  conjugal partnership property  and Article 129 refers to the
4
227
procedure for the liquidation of the absolute community of property.”

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the order. The motion was denied on 30 October
VOL. 260, JULY 31, 1996 227
1995.
In his recourse to this Court, petitioner submits that Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Valdes vs. Regional Trial Court, Br. 102, Quezon
Code should be held controlling; he argues that: City
“I
termination of their cohabitation.
“Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are psychologically “When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in
incapacitated. the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by
any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective (6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;
surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In (7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;
all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.” (8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and
(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other person’s spouse or his or
This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no legal her own spouse.
impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void
marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The term “capacitated” in the provision (in the 8 Article 147, Family Code.
9 Article
first paragraph of the law) refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any 147, Family Code.
10 Articles 43, 50 and 51, Family Code.
“male or female of the age of eighteen
7
years or upwards not under any of the impediments
mentioned in Articles 37 and 38”  of the Code. 229

___________________
VOL. 260, JULY 31, 1996 229
7 Art. 5. Any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned
in Articles 37 and 38, may contract marriage. Valdes vs. Regional Trial Court, Br. 102, Quezon
Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning, whether the relationship City
between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate:

(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and
(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full-or half-blood.
Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy:
(1) Between collateral blood relatives; whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree;
(2) Between step-parents and stepchildren;
(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;
228
228 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Valdes vs. Regional Trial Court, Br. 102, Quezon
City
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through
their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on  equal  co-ownership. Any property
acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be
considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party’s “efforts consisted in the care
8 matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
and maintenance of the family household.”   Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the
fruits of the couple’s separate property are not included in the co-ownership.
Article 147 of the Family Code, in substance and to the above extent, has clarified Article
144 of the Civil Code; in addition, the law now expressly provides that—
(a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act  inter vivos  his or her share in co-
ownership property, without the consent of the other, during the period of cohabitation; and
(b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her share in the
co-ownership in favor of their common children; in default thereof or waiver by any or all of
the common children, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants,
or still in default thereof, to the innocent party. The forfeiture shall10take place upon the
9
termination of the cohabitation  or declaration of nullity of the marriage.
When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do not
live exclusively with each
__________________
other (as husband and wife), only the property acquired by both of them through their actual
joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion
to their respective contributions.  Such contributions and corresponding shares, however,
are prima facie presumed to be equal. The share of any party who is married to another shall
accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, as the case may be, if so existing
under a valid marriage. If the party who has acted in bad faith is not validly married 11
to
another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner already heretofore expressed.
In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the parties’ common
property, the trial court acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court which had
jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed with authority
to resolve incidental and consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling
that petitioner and private respondent own the “family home” and all their common property
in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property
owned in common by them, the provisions on co-ownership
12
under the Civil Code, not Articles
50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129,  of the Family Code,
_______________
11 Article 148, Family Code.
12 Art. 50. The effects provided for in paragraph (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and in Article 44 shall also apply in
proper cases to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45.
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the
spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be notified of the
proceedings for liquidation.
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance with
the provisions of
230
230 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Valdes vs. Regional Trial Court, Br. 102, Quezon
City
should aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership
__________________
Articles 102 and 129.
Art. 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children, computed as of the date of
the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound securities, unless the parties, by
mutual agreement judicially approved, had already provided for such matters.
The children or their guardian, or the trustee of their property, may ask for the enforcement of the judgment.
The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the ultimate successional
rights of the children accruing upon the death of either or both of the parents; but the value of the properties already
received under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as advances on their legitime.
Art. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the children’s presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate
civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect their persons.
Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following procedure shall apply:
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the absolute community and the
exclusive properties of each spouse.
(2) The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall be paid out of its assets. In case of insufficiency of
said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties in
accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 94.
(3) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered to each of them.
(4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall constitute its net assets, which shall be
divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the
marriage settlements, or unless there has been a voluntary waiver of such share as provided in this Code. For
purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with Article 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2),
the said profits shall be the increase in
231
VOL. 260, JULY 31, 1996 231
Valdes vs. Regional Trial Court, Br. 102, Quezon
City
of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case
until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership
_________________
value between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the
market value at the time of its dissolution.
(5) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon partition, in accordance with
Article 51.
(6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the
lot on which it is situated shall be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the common children
choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the
court has decided otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration
the best interests of said children.
Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, the following procedure shall apply;
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the conjugal partnership and the
exclusive properties of each spouse.
(2) Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership in payment of personal debts and obligations of either spouse
shall be credited to the conjugal partnership as an asset thereof.
(3) Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of his or her exclusive funds in the acquisition of property or for
the value of his or her exclusive property, the ownership of which has been vested by law in the conjugal
partnership.
(4) The debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership shall be paid out of the conjugal assets. In case of
insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate
properties, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (2) of Article 121.
(5) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered to each of them.
(6) Unless the owner has been indemnified from whatever source, the loss or deterioration of movables used for
the benefit of the family, belonging to either spouse, even due to fortuitous event, shall be paid to said spouse
from the conjugal
232
232 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Valdes vs. Regional Trial Court, Br. 102, Quezon
City
that exists between common-law spouses. The first paragraph
13
of Article 50 of the Family Code,
applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43,  relates only, by its explicit terms, to
________________
funds, if any.
(7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall constitute the profits, which shall be divided
equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage
settlements or unless there has been a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code.
(8) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon partition in accordance with Article
51.
(9) In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall, unless
otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the common
children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother,
unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into
consideration the best interests of said children.
13  Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the
following effects:
(1) The children of the subsequent marriage conceived prior to its termination shall be considered legitimate, and
their custody and support in case of dispute shall be decided by the court in a proper proceeding;
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and
liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the
community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if
there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or, in default of children, the innocent
spouse;
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee contracted the marriage in bad
faith, such donations made to said donee are revoked by operation of law;
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who acted in bad faith as a beneficiary in
any insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated as ir-
233
VOL. 260, JULY 31, 1996 233
Valdes vs. Regional Trial Court, Br. 102, Quezon
City
14
voidable  marriages and, exceptionally, to  void  marriages under Article 40   of the Code, i.e.,
the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void
marriage before the latter is judicially declared void. The latter is a special rule that somehow
recognizes the philosophy and an old doctrine that void marriages are inexistent from the very
beginning and no judicial decree is necessary to establish their nullity. In now requiring
for  purposes of remarriage,  the declaration of nullity by final judgment of the previously parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person, with due notice to the spouses of the
contracted void marriage, the present law aims to do away with any continuing uncertainty on subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is
disputed.
the status of the second
15
marriage.
16
It is not then illogical for the provisions of Article 43, in
relation to Articles 41  and 42,  of the Family

_________________

revocable; and
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit from the
innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession.

14 Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis

solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.

15 Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and

void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive
years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the
Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must
institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
16 Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically terminated by the

recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous
marriage or declaring it void ab initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the
residence of the

234

234 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Valdes vs. Regional Trial Court, Br. 102, Quezon
City

Code, on the effects of the termination of a subsequent marriage contracted during the
subsistence of a previous marriage to be made applicable pro hac vice. In all other cases, it is
not to be assumed that the law has also meant to have coincident property relations, on the
one hand, between spouses in valid and voidable marriages (before annulment) and, on the
other, between common-law spouses or spouses of void marriages, leaving to ordain, in the
latter case, the ordinary rules on co-ownership subject to the provision of Article 147 and
Article 148 of the Family Code. It must be stressed, nevertheless, even as it may merely state
the obvious, that the provisions of the Family Code on the “family home,” i.e., the provisions
found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the Family Code, remain in force and effect regardless of the
property regime of the spouses.
WHEREFORE, the questioned orders, dated 05 May 1995 and 30 October 1995, of the trial
court are AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

     Padilla (Chairman), Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

     Bellosillo, J., On leave.

Orders affirmed.

——o0o——

________________

G.R. No. 130623. February 29, 2008.*
LOREA DE UGALDE, petitioner, vs. JON DE YSASI, respondent.  5 De Ugalde alleged that de Ysasi drove her out of their home. On the other hand, de Ysasi
Marriages; Husband and Wife; Conjugal Partnership; Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership;
Compromise Agreements; Judgments; A court order approving the spouses separation of property results
in the termination of the conjugal partnership of gains; A judgment upon a compromise agreement has all
the force and effect of any other judgment, and conclusive only upon parties thereto and their privies, and
not binding on third persons who are not parties to it.—The finality of the 6 June 1961 Order in Civil
Case No. 4791 approving the parties’ separation of property resulted in the termination of the conjugal
partnership of gains in accordance with Article 175 of the Family Code. Hence, when the trial court
decided Special Proceedings No. 3330, the conjugal partnership between petitioner and respondent was
already dissolved. Petitioner alleges that the CFI had no authority to approve the Compromise
Agreement because the case was for custody, and the creditors were not given notice by the parties, as
also required under Article 191 of the Civil Code. Petitioner cannot repudiate the Compromise
Agreement on this ground. A judgment upon a compromise agreement has all the force and effect of any
other judgment, and conclusive only upon parties thereto and their privies, and not binding on third
persons who are not parties to it.
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
172
172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
De Ugalde vs. De Ysasi
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
   Santiago, Cruz & Sarte Law Offices for petitioner.
   Dinglasan Law Office for respondent.
 
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 21 November 1996 Decision2 and 2
September 1997 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 41121.
The Antecedent Facts
On 15 February 1951, Lorea de Ugalde (petitioner) and Jon de Ysasi (respondent) got
married before Municipal Judge Remigio Peña of Hinigaran, Negros Occidental. On 1 March
1951,4  Rev. Msgr. Flaviano Arriola solemnized their church wedding at the San Sebastian
Cathedral in Bacolod City. Petitioner and respondent did not execute any ante-nuptial
agreement. They had a son named Jon de Ysasi III.
Petitioner and respondent separated sometime in April 1957.5 On 26 May 1964, respondent
allegedly contracted another marriage with Victoria Eleanor Smith (Smith) before
_______________
1 Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
2 Rollo, pp. 40-52. Penned by Associate Justice Fidel P. Purisima with Associate Justices
Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez and Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., concurring.
3 Id., at p. 54.
4  Not 1 March 1954 as stated in the Decision of the Court of Appeals. See Certificate of
Marriage, records, p. 145.
alleged that de Ugalde left their home.
173
VOL. 547, FEBRUARY 29, 2008 173
De Ugalde vs. De Ysasi
Judge Lucio M. Tanco of Pasay City. Petitioner further alleged that respondent and Smith had
been acquiring and disposing of real and personal properties to her prejudice as the lawful
wife. Petitioner alleged that she had been defrauded of rental income, profits, and fruits of
their conjugal properties.
On 12 December 1984, petitioner filed a petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership
of gains against respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Bacolod
City, Branch 48 (trial court). The case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3330. In
particular, petitioner asked for her conjugal share in respondent’s inheritance as per the
settlement of the estate of respondent’s parents, Juan Ysasi6 and Maria Aldecoa de Ysasi, who
died on 17 November 1975 and 25 February 1979, respectively.7 Petitioner also prayed for a
monthly support of P5,000 to be deducted from her share in the conjugal partnership; the
appointment of a receiver during the pendency of the litigation; the annulment of all contracts,
agreements, and documents signed and ratified by respondent with third persons without her
consent; and payment of appearance and attorney’s fees.
Respondent countered that on 2 June 1961, he and petitioner entered into an agreement
which provided, among others, that their conjugal partnership of gains shall be deemed
dissolved as of 15 April 1957. Pursuant to the agreement, they submitted an Amicable
Settlement in Civil Case No. 47918 then pending before the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental (CFI). The Amicable Settlement stipulates:
“2. That the petitioner shall pay the respondent the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P30,000.00) in full satisfaction of and/or consideration for and to cover any and all money and/or prop-
 
_______________
6 Also referred to as Juan Isasi.
7 Records, pp. 154-160.
8 Action for custody of then minor Jon de Ysasi III and for support.
174
174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
De Ugalde vs. De Ysasi
erty claims she has or may have against the petitioner in the future, including but not limited to
pensions, allowances, alimony, support, share in the conjugal property (if any), inheritance, etc.;
3. That for and in consideration of the foregoing premises and the payment of THIRTY THOUSAND
pesos (P30,000.00), the receipt of which sum is hereby acknowledged and confessed by and to the entire
satisfaction of the respondent, she hereby completely and absolutely transfer, convey, assign, set over,
waive, remise, release and forever quitclaim, unto petitioner, his successors and administrators, any and
all rights, claims and interests which the respondent has or may hereafter have against the petitioner
arising, directly or indirectly, from the fact that the petitioner and respondent were married on March 1,
1951, including but not limited to any and all money and/or property claims mentioned in the paragraph
immediately preceding;
 4. That, except with reference to the custody of the boy, the parties herein hereby waive any and all
rights to question the validity and effectivity of the provisions of this amicable settlement, as well as the
right to raise these matters on appeal[.]”9
In its Order10 dated 6 June 1961, the CFI approved the Amicable Settlement.
Respondent further alleged that petitioner already obtained a divorce from him before the
Supreme Court of Mexico. Petitioner then contracted a second marriage with Richard Galoway
(Galoway). After Galoway’s death, petitioner contracted a third marriage with Frank Scholey.
Respondent moved for the dismissal of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership
of gains on the grounds of estoppel, laches, and res judicata.
In his Supplemental Affirmative Defense, respondent alleged that the marriage between
him and petitioner was void because it was executed without the benefit of a marriage license.
_______________
9  Records, pp. 235-236.
10 Id., at pp. 237-239.
175
VOL. 547, FEBRUARY 29, 2008 175
De Ugalde vs. De Ysasi
The Ruling of the Trial Court
On 22 November 1991, the trial court11 rendered judgment as follows:  inchoate, thus, no property devolved to respondent and no conjugal partnership was formed.
“WHEREFORE, after collating the evidence, the evidence for the respondent is preponderant to prove
his affirmative and special defenses that the petition does not state a sufficient cause of action. On these
bases and under the doctrine of res judicata, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Without
pronouncements as to costs and attorney’s fees.
SO ORDERED.”12
The trial court ruled that the existence of a conjugal partnership of gains is predicated on a
valid marriage. Considering that the marriage between petitioner and respondent was
solemnized without a marriage license, the marriage was null and void, and no community of
property was formed between them. The trial court further ruled that assuming that the
marriage was valid, the action was barred by res judicata. The trial court noted that petitioner
and respondent entered into an amicable settlement in Civil Case No. 4791. The amicable
settlement was approved by the CFI and petitioner may no longer repudiate it. Finally, the
trial court ruled that there was no proof to show that during their union, petitioner and
respondent acquired properties.
Petitioner appealed from the trial court’s Decision before the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On 21 November 1996, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s Decision.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the absence of a marriage license is fatal and made the
marriage between petitioner and
 
_______________
11 CA Rollo, pp. 93-101. Through Judge Romeo J. Hibionada.
12 Id., at p. 101.
176
176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
De Ugalde vs. De Ysasi
respondent a complete nullity. Hence, the trial court did not err in finding that there was no
conjugal partnership of gains between petitioner and respondent. The Court of Appeals further
ruled that the compromise agreement is a valid contract between the parties. Since the
compromise agreement was entered into freely, voluntarily, and with the full understanding of
its consequences, it is conclusive and binding on the parties. The Court of Appeals also ruled
that the action was barred by laches since it was filed by petitioner 23 years from the time the
CFI approved the additional amicable settlement in Civil Case No. 4791. The Court of Appeals
sustained the trial court’s ruling that respondent’s right over the estate of his deceased
parents was only inchoate and there was no evidence that petitioner and respondent acquired
any property that could be considered conjugal.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 2 September 1997 Resolution, the Court
of Appeals denied the motion for lack of merit.
Hence, the petition before this Court, raising the following assignment of errors:
“The lower court erred in ruling that since the marriage of the plaintiff and respondent was void due to
the absence of a marriage license, no conjugal partnership arose from their union.
The lower court erred in ruling that the amicable settlement in Civil Case No. 4791 bars all claims by the
plaintiff under the principle of res judicata.
The lower court erred in ruling that respondent’s right to [the] estate of his deceased parents was merely
The lower court erred in ruling that the appellant’s petition did not sufficiently state a cause of action.”13
 
_______________
13 Rollo, p. 133.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in
affirming the trial court’s Decision which dismissed the action for dissolution of conjugal
partnership of gains.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition is without merit.
Validity of Petitioner and Respondent’s Marriage is the Subject of a 
Different Court Proceeding
Special Proceedings No. 3330 is an action for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership of Gains.
In its 22 November 1991 Decision, the trial court ruled that the existence of conjugal
partnership of gains is predicated on a valid marriage. The trial court then proceeded to rule
on the validity of petitioner and respondent’s marriage. The trial court ruled that it was shown
by competent evidence that petitioner and respondent failed to obtain a marriage license.
Hence, the marriage between petitioner and respondent was null and void, and no community
of property was formed between them.
The trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in ruling on the validity of petitioner and
respondent’s marriage, which was only raised by respondent as a defense to the action for
dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains. The validity of petitioner and respondent’s
marriage was the subject of another action, Civil Case No. 430 for Judicial Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Himamaylan, Negros
Occidental, Branch 55. In a Decision14 dated 31 May 1995, Civil Case No. 430 was resolved, as
follows:
_______________
14 Id., at pp. 89-94. Penned by Executive Judge Jose Y. Aguirre, Jr.
178
178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
De Ugalde vs. De Ysasi
“In this jurisdiction it is required, except in certain cases, that the marriage license must first be
secured by the parties and shown to the judge before the latter can competently solemnize the marriage.
In this present case, none was ever secured. Failure to comply with the formal and essential
requirements of the law renders the marriage void ab initio. Since void marriage can be assailed anytime
as the action on assailing it does not prescribe, the plaintiff is well within his right to seek judicial relief.
WHEREFORE, premises considered[,] judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage between
JON A. DE YSASI and LOREA DE UGALDE as NULL and VOID AB INITIO. The Local Civil Registrar
for the Municipality of Hinigaran is hereby directed to cancel the entry of marriage between JON A. DE
YSASI and LOREA DE UGALDE from the Marriage register and to render the same of no force and
effect.
Lastly, furnish copy of this decision the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila, to make the
necessary cancellation of the entry of marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant.
SO ORDERED.”15
No appeal or motion for reconsideration of the 31 May 1995 Decision in Civil Case No. 430
has been filed by any of the parties, and a Certification of finality was issued on 20 November
1995. Thus, the marriage between petitioner and respondent was already judicially annulled
as of 20 November 1995. The trial court had no jurisdiction to annul again in Special
Proceedings No. 3330 the marriage of petitioner and respondent.
Conjugal Partnership of Gains Dissolved  The Amicable Settlement had become final as between petitioner and respondent when it
in Civil Case No. 4791
The finality of the 6 June 1961 CFI Order in Civil Case No. 4791 resulted in the dissolution
of the petitioner and respondent’s conjugal partnership of gains.
_______________
15 Id., at p. 94.
179
VOL. 547, FEBRUARY 29, 2008 179
De Ugalde vs. De Ysasi
Petitioner and respondent were married on 15 February 1951. The applicable law at the
time of their marriage was Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the Civil Code of the
Philippines (Civil Code) which took effect on 30 August 1950.16 Pursuant to Article 119 of the
Civil Code, the property regime of petitioner and respondent was conjugal partnership of
gains, thus:
“Art. 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative
community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the
absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property relations between
husband and wife.”
Article 142 of the Civil Code defines conjugal partnership of gains, as follows:
“Art. 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place in a common
fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or industry, and divide equally,
upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained
indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.”
Under Article 175 of the Civil Code, the judicial separation of property results in the
termination of the conjugal partnership of gains:
“Art. 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled;
(4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article 191.”
(Emphasis supplied)
_______________
16 See Lara, et al. v. Del Rosario, Jr., 94 Phil. 778 (1954).
The finality of the 6 June 1961 Order in Civil Case No. 4791 approving the parties’ separation
of property resulted in the termination of the conjugal partnership of gains in accordance with
Article 175 of the Family Code. Hence, when the trial court decided Special Proceedings No.
3330, the conjugal partnership between petitioner and respondent was already dissolved.
Petitioner alleges that the CFI had no authority to approve the Compromise Agreement
because the case was for custody, and the creditors were not given notice by the parties, as
also required under Article 191 of the Civil Code. Petitioner cannot repudiate the Compromise
Agreement on this ground. A judgment upon a compromise agreement has all the force and
effect of any other judgment, and conclusive only upon parties thereto and their privies, and
not binding on third persons who are not parties to it.17
was approved by the CFI on 6 June 1961. The CFI’s approval of the Compromise Agreement
on 6 June 1961 resulted in the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains between
petitioner and respondent on even date.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the result of the 21 November 1996
Decision and of the 2 September 1997 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
41121.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga and Velasco, Jr., JJ.,concur.
Petition denied, result of decision dated 21 November 1996 and of resolution dated 2
September 1997 affirmed.
_______________
17 See Philippine Journalists, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 166421, 5 September 2006,
501 SCRA 75.
 G.R. No. 178044. January 19, 2011.*

ALAIN M. DIÑO, petitioner, vs. MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO, respondent.

Civil Law; Family Law; Property Relations; In a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property
relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of
the Family Code.—The Court has ruled in  Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City, 260 SCRA 221
(1996), that in a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties during the
period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. Article 147 of
the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any
impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, such as petitioner and
respondent in the case before the Court.
Same; Same; Same; Elements of Article 147 of the Family Code to apply.—For Article 147 of the
Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present: (1) The man and the woman must be
capacitated to marry each other; (2) They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3)
Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.
Same; Same; Same; Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared
void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the
liquidation of the properties of the parties.—It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section
19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages which are declared void  ab initio  or annulled by final
judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does
not apply to marriages which are declared void  ab initio  under Article 36 of the Family Code, which
should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.
Same; Same; Same; In both instances under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are governed either by
absolute community of property

_______________

* SECOND DIVISION.

179

VOL. 640, JANUARY 19, 2011 179

Diño vs. Diño

or conjugal partnership of gains unless the parties agree to a complete separation of property in a
marriage settlement entered into before the marriage.—Article 45 of the Family Code, on the other hand,
refers to voidable marriages, meaning, marriages which are valid until they are set aside by final
judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment. In both instances under Articles 40 and 45,
the marriages are governed either by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains
unless the parties agree to a complete separation of property in a marriage settlement entered into
before the marriage. Since the property relations of the parties is governed by absolute community of
property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the
properties before a decree of annulment could be issued. That is not the case for annulment of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-
ownership.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision and order of the Regional Trial Court of Las
Piñas City, Br. 254.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Riguera & Riguera Law Office for petitioner.
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 18 October 2006 Decision2 and the 12
March 2007 Order3 of the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, Branch 254 (trial court) in
Civil Case No. LP-01-0149.

The Antecedent Facts

Alain M. Diño (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Diño (respondent) were childhood friends
and sweethearts. They

_______________

1 Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

2 Rollo, pp. 28-34. Penned by Presiding Judge Gloria Butay Aglugub.
3 Id., at pp. 45-46.

180

180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Diño vs. Diño

started living together in 1984 until they decided to separate in 1994. In 1996, petitioner and
respondent decided to live together again. On 14 January 1998, they were married before
Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Piñas City.
On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against
respondent, citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Petitioner
alleged that respondent failed in her marital obligation to give love and support to him, and
had abandoned her responsibility to the family, choosing instead to go on shopping sprees and
gallivanting with her friends that depleted the family assets. Petitioner further alleged that
respondent was not faithful, and would at times become violent and hurt him.
Extrajudicial service of summons was effected upon respondent who, at the time of the
filing of the petition, was already living in the United States of America. Despite receipt of the
summons, respondent did not file an answer to the petition within the reglementary period.
Petitioner later learned that respondent filed a petition for divorce/dissolution of her marriage
with petitioner, which was granted by the Superior Court of California on 25 May 2001.
Petitioner also learned that on 5 October 2001, respondent married a certain Manuel V.
Alcantara.
On 30 April 2002, the Office of the Las Piñas prosecutor found that there were no indicative
facts of collusion between the parties and the case was set for trial on the merits.
Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), a clinical psychologist, submitted a psychological report
establishing that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was
deeply ingrained in her system since her early formative years. Dr. Tayag found that
respondent’s disorder was long-lasting and by nature, incurable.
In its 18 October 2006 Decision, the trial court granted the petition on the ground that
respondent was psychologically incapacited to comply with the essential marital obligations at
the time of the celebration of the marriage.
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Diño vs. Diño
 The Decision of the Trial Court

The trial court ruled that based on the evidence presented, petitioner was able to establish
respondent’s psychological incapacity. The trial court ruled that even without Dr. Tayag’s
psychological report, the allegations in the complaint, substantiated in the witness stand,
clearly made out a case of psychological incapacity against respondent. The trial court found
that respondent committed acts which hurt and embarrassed petitioner and the rest of the
family, and that respondent failed to observe mutual love, respect and fidelity required of her
under Article 68 of the Family Code. The trial court also ruled that respondent abandoned
petitioner when she obtained a divorce abroad and married another man.
The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1) Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIÑO and defendant MA. CARIDAD L.
DIÑO on January 14, 1998, and all its effects under the law, as NULL and VOID from the beginning;
and
2) Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.
A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be issued upon compliance with
Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the parties, the Office of the Solicitor General, Office of the
City Prosecutor, Las Piñas City and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las Piñas City, for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.”4

Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration questioning the dissolution of the
absolute community of property and the ruling that the decree of annulment shall only be

_______________

4 Id., at p. 34.

182

182 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Diño vs. Diño

issued upon compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code.

In its 12 March 2007 Order, the trial court partially granted the motion and modified its 18
October 2006 Decision as follows:

“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

1) Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIÑO and defendant MA. CARIDAD L.
DIÑO on January 14, 1998, and all its effects under the law, as NULL and VOID from the beginning;
and
2) Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.
A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after liquidation, partition and
distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
Let copies of this Order be furnished the parties, the Office of the Solicitor General, the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City and the Local Civil Registrar of Las Piñas City, for their information
and guidance.”5

Hence, the petition before this Court.

The Issue
 The sole issue in this case is whether the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of
absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of
the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.

The Ruling of this Court

The petition has merit.

Petitioner assails the ruling of the trial court ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage shall only be issued

_______________

5 Id., at p. 46.

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after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the
Family Code. Petitioner argues that Section 19(1) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Null Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages6 (the Rule) does not apply to
Article 147 of the Family Code.
We agree with petitioner.
The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City that in a void marriage,
regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is
governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.7 Article 147 of the Family
Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment
to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void,8  such as petitioner and
respondent in the case before the Court.
Article 147 of the Family Code provides:
“Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their
wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them
through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in
equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other
party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.

_______________

6 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, effective 15 March 2003.

7 328 Phil. 1289; 260 SCRA 221 (1996).
8 Mercado-Fehr v. Bruno Fehr, 460 Phil. 445; 414 SCRA 288 (2003).

184

184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Diño vs. Diño

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired
during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination
of their cohabitation.
 When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in
the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by
any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective
surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In
all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.

For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:
(1) The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
(2) They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
(3) Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.9

All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the
Family Code applies to the property relations between petitioner and respondent.
We agree with petitioner that the trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute
nullity of marriage shall be issued only after liquidation, partition and distribution of the
parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling has no basis because
Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the
Family Code. Section 19(1) of the Rule provides:

“Sec. 19. Decision.—(1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein
that the decree of absolute

_______________

9 Id.

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Diño vs. Diño

nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51
of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of
Properties.”

The pertinent provisions of the Family Code cited in Section 19(1) of the Rule are:
“Article 50. The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and in Article 44
shall also apply in proper cases to marriages which are declared void  ab initio  or annulled by final
judgment under Articles 40 and 45.10

_______________

10  Article 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the following
effects:
(1) The children of the subsequent marriage conceived prior to its termination shall be considered legitimate and their custody
and support in case of dispute shall be decided by the court in a proper proceeding;
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but
if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal
partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a
previous marriage or in default of children, the innocent spouse;
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee contracted the marriage in bad faith, such
donations made to said donee are revoked by operation of law;
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who acted in bad faith as a beneficiary in any
insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse
by testate and intestate succession.
Article 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void.

186
186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Diño vs. Diño

    The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of their
presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community of the conjugal partnership shall be
notified of the proceedings for liquidation.
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in
accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.

_______________

Article 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years of age or over but below
twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents, guardian or person having substitute parental
authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the other and
both lived together as husband and wife;
(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as
husband and wife;
(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts
constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the same having
disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other and such incapacity continues
and appears to be incurable; or
(6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually transmissible disease found to be serious and appears to be incurable.

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Diño vs. Diño

Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children,
computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or
sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had already provided for
such matters.
The children of their guardian, or the trustee of their property, may ask for the enforcement of the
judgment.
The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the ultimate
successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either or both of the parents; but the value
of the properties already received under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered
as advances on their legitime.”

It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to
marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40
and  45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to
marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should
be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.
Article 40 of the Family Code contemplates a situation where a second or bigamous
marriage was contracted. Under Article 40, “[t]he absolute nullity of a previous marriage may
be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void.” Thus we ruled:
“x  x  x where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free
from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring a previous marriage void.”11

_______________

11 Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño, 403 Phil. 861; 351 SCRA 127 (2001).
 188

188 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Diño vs. Diño

   Article 45 of the Family Code, on the other hand, refers to voidable marriages, meaning,
marriages which are valid until they are set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an
action for annulment.12  In both instances under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are
governed either by absolute community of property13 or conjugal partnership of gains14 unless
the parties agree to a complete separation of property in a marriage settlement entered into
before the marriage. Since the property relations of the parties is governed by absolute
community of property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition
and distribute the properties before a decree of annulment could be issued. That is not the
case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is
governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.
In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 3615 of the
Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties
owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the
Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of
cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.16The rules on
co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance with
the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, “[p]artition
may be made 

_______________

12 Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay, 360 Phil. 932; 300 SCRA 760 (1998).

13 Article 88 of the Family Code.
14 Article 105 of the Family Code.
15  Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
16 Supra note 7.

684 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals
*
G.R. No. 76873. October 26, 1989.
DOROTEA, VIRGILIO, APOLINARIO, JR., SULPICIO & DOMINADOR, all surnamed
UYGUANGCO, petitioners,  vs.  COURT OF APPEALS, Judge SENEN PEÑARANDA and
GRACIANO BACJAO UYGUANGCO, respondents.
Civil Law; Paternity and Filiation; Civil Code provisions invoked by the parties have been superseded
or at least modified by the corresponding articles in the Family Code.—We find that this case must be
decided under a new if not entirely dissimilar set of rules because the parties have been overtaken by
events, to use the popular phrase. The Civil Code provisions they invoke have been superseded, or at
least modified, by the corresponding articles in the Family Code, which became effective on August 3,
1988.
Same; Same; Same; Open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child now also
available as evidence of filiation.—While the private respondent has admitted that he has none of the
documents mentioned in the first paragraph (which are practically the same documents mentioned in
Article 278 of the Civil Code except for the “private handwritten instrument signed by the parent
himself”), he insists that he has nevertheless been “in open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child,” which is now also
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
685
VOL. 178, OCTOBER 26, 1989 685
Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals
admissible as evidence of filiation.
Same; Same; Same; The illegitimate child is now also allowed to establish his claimed filiation by
“any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.”—It must be added that the illegitimate
child is now also allowed to establish his claimed filiation by “any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws,” like his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his
name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the
testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Same; Same;  Same;  Action of private respondent under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the
Family Code is now barred because of his alleged father’s death in 1975.—The problem of the private
respondent, however, is that, since he seeks to prove his filiation under the second paragraph of Article
172 of the Family Code, his action is now barred because of his alleged father’s death in 1975. The second
paragraph of this Article 175 reads as follows: The action must be brought within the same period
specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which
case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Private respondent no longer allowed at this time to introduce evidence of
his open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child or prove his alleged filiation
through any of the means allowed by the Rules of Court or special laws;  Reason.—It is clear that the
private respondent can no longer be allowed at this time to introduce evidence of his open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child or prove his alleged filiation through any of the means
allowed by the Rules of Court or special laws. The simple reason is that Apolinario Uyguangco is already
dead and can no longer be heard on the claim of his alleged son’s illegitimate filiation.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Rationale of the rule explained.—In her Handbook on the Family
Code of the Philippines, Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy explains the rationale of the rule, thus: “It is a truism
that unlike legitimate children who are publicly recognized, illegitimate children are usually begotten
and raised in secrecy and without the legitimate family being aware of their existence. Who then can be
sure of their filiation but the parents themselves? But suppose the child claiming to be the illegitimate
child of a certain
686
686 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals
person is not really the child of the latter? The putative parent should thus be given the opportunity
to affirm or deny the child’s filiation, and this, he or she cannot do if he or she is already dead.”
Same;  Same;  Same;  Same;  Court expresses the hope that the parties will arrive at some kind of
rapprochement based on fraternal and moral ties if not the strict language of the law.—Considering that
the private respondent has, as we see it, established at least prima facie proof of his alleged filiation, we
find it regrettable that his action should be barred under the said article. But that is the law and we
have no choice but to apply it. Even so, the Court expresses the hope that the parties will arrive at some
kind of rapprochement, based on fraternal and moral ties if not the strict language of the law, that will
allow the private respondent an equitable share in the disputed estate. Blood should tell.
PETITION to review the decision of the Court of Appeals. Kalalo, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Constantino G. Jaraula for petitioners.
     Anthony Santos for respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
The issue before the Court is not the status of the private respondent, who has been excluded
from the family and inheritance of the petitioners. What we are asked to decide is whether he
should be allowed to prove that he is an illegitimate child of his claimed father, who is already
dead, in the absence of the documentary evidence required by the Civil Code. 1
The trial court said he could and was sustained by the respondent Court of Appeals.   The
latter court held that the trial judge had not committed any grave abuse of discretion or acted
without jurisdiction in allowing the private respondent to prove his filiation. Moreover, the
proper remedy was an ordinary appeal and not a petition for prohibition. The petitioners ask
for a reversal of these rulings on the ground that they are not in
_______________
1  Kalalo,  J., ponente,  with Castro-Bartolome and Lising,  JJ.,concurring. The challenged decision was issued by
Judge Senen C. Peñaranda of the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 20.
 687
VOL. 178, OCTOBER 26, 1989 687
Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals
accordance with law and jurisprudence.
Apolinario Uyguangco died intestate in 1975, leaving his wife, Dorotea, four legitimate
children (her co-petitioners here-in), and considerable properties which they divided among
2 Under the Family Code, it is provided that:
themselves.  Claiming to be an illegitimate son of the deceased Apolinario, and having been
left out in the extrajudicial settlement of his estate,
3
Graciano Bacjao Uyguangco filed a
complaint for partition against all the petitioners.
Graciano alleged that he was born in 1952 to Apolinario Uyguangco and Anastacia Bacjao
and that at the age of 15 he moved to his father’s hometown at Medina, Misamis Oriental, at
the latter’s urging and also of Dorotea and his half-brothers. Here he received support from his
father while he was studying at the Medina High School, where he eventually graduated. He
was also assigned by his father, without objection from4
the rest of the family, as storekeeper at
the Uyguangco store in Mananom from 1967 to 1973.
In the course of his presentation of evidence at the trial, the petitioners elicited an
admission from Graciano that he had none of the documents5 mentioned in Article 278 to show
that he was the illegitimate son of Apolinario Uyguangco.   These are “the record of birth, a
will, a statement before a court of record, or (in) any authentic writing.” The petitioners
thereupon moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the private respondent 6
could
no longer prove his alleged filiation under the applicable provisions of the Civil Code.
Specifically, the petitioners argued that the only evidence allowed under Article 278 to
prove the private respondent’s claim was not available to him as he himself had admitted.
Neither could he now resort to the provisions of Article 285 because he was already an adult
when his alleged father died in 1975, and his claim did not come under the exceptions. The
said article provides as follows:
_______________
2 Rollo, pp. 51-60.
3 Records,
pp. 9-11.
4 TSN, September 17, 1985, pp. 22-24.
5 Ibid., pp. 5, 6, 64-71.
6 Records, p. 30.
688
688 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals
ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of
the presumed parents, except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the
action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority;
(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had
been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child.
In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the finding of the document.
As earlier related, the motion to dismiss was denied, prompting the petitioners to seek relief in
vain from the respondent court. In the case now before us, the petitioners reiterate and
emphasize their position that allowing the trial to proceed would only be a waste of time and
effort. They argue that the complaint for partition is actually an action for recognition as an
illegitimate child, which, being already barred, is a clear attempt to circumvent the said
provisions. The private respondent insists, on the other hand, that he has a right to show
under Article 283 that he is “in continuous possession of the status of a child of his alleged
father by the direct acts of the latter or of his family.”
We find that this case must be decided under a new if not entirely dissimilar set of rules
because the parties have been overtaken by events, to use the popular phrase. The Civil Code
provisions they invoke have been superseded, or at least modified, by the corresponding
articles in the Family Code, which became effective on August 3, 1988.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.
The following provision is therefore also available to the private respondent in proving his
illegitimate filiation:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
689
VOL. 178, OCTOBER 26, 1989 689
Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
While the private respondent has admitted that he has none of the documents mentioned in
the first paragraph (which are practically the same documents mentioned in Article 278 of the
Civil Code except for the “private handwritten instrument signed by the parent himself”), he
insists that he has nevertheless been “in open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child,” which is now also admissible as evidence of filiation.
Thus, he claims that he lived with his father from 1967 until 1973, receiving support from
him during that time; that he has been using the surname Uyguangco without objection from
his father and the petitioners as shown in his high school diploma, a special power of attorney
executed in his favor by Dorotea Uyguangco, and another one by Sulpicio Uyguangco; that he
has shared in the profits of the copra business of the Uyguangcos, which is a strictly family
business; that he was a director, together with the petitioners, of the Alu and Sons
Development Corporation, a family corporation; and that in the addendum to the original
extrajudicial settlement
7
concluded by the petitioners he was given a share in his deceased
father’s estate.
It must be added that the illegitimate child is now also allowed to establish his claimed
filiation by “any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws,” like his
baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered,
common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses,
and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules
_______________
 7 TSN, September 17, 1985, pp. 27-46, 53-54. complaint, where the issue of Graciano’s filiation is being raised only collaterally. The
690
complaint is indeed a circumvention of Article 172, which allows proof of the illegitimate
child’s filiation under the second paragraph thereof only during the lifetime of the alleged
parent.
690 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Considering that the private respondent has, as we see it, established at least  prima
facie proof of his alleged filiation, we find it regrettable that his action should be barred under
Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals the said article. But that is the law and we have no choice but to apply it. Even so, the Court
8
expresses the hope that the parties will arrive at some kind of rapprochement, based on
of Court. fraternal and moral ties if not the strict language of the law, that will allow the private
The problem of the private respondent, however, is that, since he seeks to prove his filiation respondent an equitable share in the disputed estate. Blood should tell.
under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code, his action is now barred WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and Civil Case No. 9067 in the Regional Trial
because of his alleged father’s death in 1975. The second paragraph of this Article 175 reads as Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 20, is hereby DISMISSED. It is so ordered.
follows:
     Narvasa, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is
based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought  during the Petition granted.
lifetime of the alleged parent. (Italics supplied.)
Notes.—The rules on proof of filiation of natural children or rules on voluntary and
It is clear that the private respondent can no longer be allowed at this time to introduce compulsory acknowledgment for natural children are applicable to spurious children.
evidence of his open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child or prove (Divinagracia vs. Rovira, 72 SCRA 307.)
his alleged filiation through any of the means allowed by the Rules of Court or special laws. Affidavits are insufficient to show filiation. (Berciles vs. Government Service Insurance
The simple reason is that Apolinario Uyguangco is already dead and can no longer be heard on System, 128 SCRA 53.)
the claim of his alleged son’s illegitimate filiation.
In her Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy explains
the rationale of the rule, thus: “It is a truism that unlike legitimate children who are publicly
recognized, illegitimate children are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and without the
legitimate family being aware of their existence. Who then can be sure of their filiation but the
parents themselves? But suppose the child claiming to be the illegitimate child of a certain
person is not really the child of the latter? The putative parent should thus be given the
opportunity to9 affirm or deny the child’s filiation, and this, he or she cannot do if he or she is
already dead.”
Finally, it must be observed that the provisions invoked by the parties are among those
affected by the following articles in the Family Code:
Art. 254. Titles III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, XI and XV of Book I of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known
as the Civil Code of the Philippines, as amended, and Articles 17, 18, 19, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 39, 40, 41 and
42 of Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the

_______________
8 Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines by Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, p. 246.
9 Ibid., p. 250.

691

VOL. 178, OCTOBER 26, 1989 691

Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals

Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended, and all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, rules
and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed.
Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

Graciano’s complaint is based on his contention that he is the illegitimate child of Apolinario
Uyguangco, whose estate is the subject of the partition sought. If this claim can no longer be
proved in an action for recognition, with more reason should it be rejected in the said
 * Birth Certificate itself, such as it was not signed by the local civil registrar, and that the alleged
G.R. No. 138493. June 15, 2000. mother’s signature therein was different from her other signatures, as well as such other circumstance
showing that the latter is not the real mother, sufficiently negate such presumption.—While it is true that
TEOFISTA BABIERA, petitioner, vs. PRESENTACION B. CATOTAL, respondent. an official document such as petitioner’s Birth Certificate enjoys the presumption of regularity, the
specific facts attendant in the case at bar, as well as the totality of the evidence presented during trial,
sufficiently negate such presumption.  First,  there were already irregularities regarding the Birth
Actions; Filiation; Parties; Real Parties in Interest;  A legitimate child has the requisite standing to Certificate itself. It was not signed by the local civil registrar. More important, the Court of Appeals
initiate an action to cancel the birth certificate of one claiming to be a child of the former’s mother.— observed that the mother’s signature therein was different from her signatures in other documents
presented during the trial.  Second,  the circumstances surrounding the birth of petitioner show that
Hermogena is not the former’s real mother. For one, there is no evidence of Hermogena’s pregnancy, such
_______________
as medical records and doctor’s prescriptions, other than the Birth Certificate itself. In fact, no witness
* THIRD DIVISION. was presented to attest to the pregnancy of Hermogena during that time. Moreover, at the time of her
supposed birth, Hermogena was already 54 years old. Even if it were possible for her to have given birth
at such a late age, it was highly suspicious that she did so in her own home, when her advanced age
488 necessitated proper medical care normally available only in a hospital.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

488 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Pablito C. Pielago, Sr. for petitioner.
Babiera vs. Catotal      Dulcesimo Tampus for respondent.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
Petitioner contends that respondent has no standing to sue, because Article 171 of the Family Code
states that the child’s filiation can be impugned only by the father or, in special circumstances, his heirs. A birth certificate may be ordered cancelled upon adequate proof that it is fictitious. Thus,
She adds that the legitimacy of a child is not subject to a collateral attack. This argument is incorrect. void is a certificate which shows that the mother was already fifty-four years old at the time of
Respondent has the requisite standing to initiate the present action. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of the child’s birth and which was signed neither by the civil registrar nor by the supposed
Court, provides that a real party in interest is one “who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment mother. Because her inheritance rights are adversely affected, the legitimate child of
in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.” The interest of respondent in the civil status of
petitioner stems from an action for partition which the latter filed against the former. The case 490
concerned the properties inherited by respondent from her parents.
Same; Same; Family Code; Article 171 of the Family Code applies to instances in which the father 490 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
impugns the legitimacy of his wife’s child, i.e., to declare that such child is an illegitimate child, but not to
an action to establish that such child is not the wife’s child at all.—Article 171 of the Family Code is not Babiera vs. Catotal
applicable to the present case. A close reading of this provision shows that it applies to instances in
which the father impugns the legitimacy of his wife’s child. The provision, however, presupposes that the
child was the undisputed offspring of the mother. The present case alleges and shows that Hermogena such mother is a proper party in the proceedings for the cancellation of the said certificate.
did not give birth to petitioner. In other words, the prayer herein is not to declare that petitioner is an
illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to establish that the former is not the latter’s child at all. Verily, the
present action does not impugn petitioner’s filiation to Spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera, Statement of the Case
because there is no blood relation to impugn in the first place. 1

Same; Same; Birth Certificates; Prescription; An action to cancel a person’s Birth Certificate for being Submitted for this Court’s consideration is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
2
 under Rule 45
allegedly void ab initio does not prescribe, and the prescriptive period set forth in Article 170 of the Family of the Rules
3
of Court, seeking reversal of the March 18, 1999 Decision   of the Court of
Code does not apply.—This argument is bereft of merit. The present action involves the cancellation of Appeals  (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 56031. Affirming the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte
petitioner’s Birth Certificate; it does not impugn her legitimacy. Thus, the prescriptive period set forth in in Special Proceedings No. 3046, the CA ruled as follows:
Article 170 of the Family Code does not apply. Verily, the action to nullify the Birth Certificate does not
prescribe, because it was allegedly void ab initio. “IN VIEW HEREOF, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the instant appeal is
DISMISSED for 4 lack of merit. Costs against the defendant-appellant, TEOFISTA BABIERA, a.k.a.
Same; Same; Same; While it is true that an official document such as a Birth Certificate enjoys the Teofista Guinto.”
presumption of regularity, the specific facts that there were already irregularities regarding the
The dispositive portion of the affirmed RTC Decision reads:
489
“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing findings and pronouncements of the Court, judgment is hereby
rendered, to wit:

1) Declaring the Certificate of Birth of respondent Teofista Guinto as null and void ‘ab initio’;
VOL. 333, JUNE 15, 2000 489
2) Ordering the respondent Local Civil Registrar of Iligan to cancel from the registry of live birth of
Iligan City BIRTH CERTIFICATE recorded as Registry No. 16035;
Babiera vs. Catotal
 Furnish copies of this decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Iligan City, the City Prosecutor, counsel
for private respondent Atty. Tomas Cabili and to counsel for petitioner.
SO ORDERED.”
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 9-16.
2 Rollo, pp. 22-29.
3 Fifteenth Division.
4  CA Decision, p. 10; rollo, p. 29. The Decision was written by  J.Demetrio G. Demetria, with the concurrence
of JJ. Ramon A. Bercelona (Division chairman) and Presbiterio J. Velasco, Jr. (member).
491
VOL. 333, JUNE 15, 2000 491
Babiera vs. Catotal
The Facts
The undisputed facts are summarized by the Court of Appeals in this wise:
“Presentation B. Catotal (hereafter referred to as PRESENTACION) filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Lanao del Norte, Branch II, Iligan City, a petition for the cancellation of the entry of birth of Teofista
Babiera (herafter referred to as TEOFISTA) in the Civil Registry of Iligan City. The case was docketed as
Special Proceedings No. 3046.
“From the petition filed, PRESENTACION asserted ‘that she is the only surviving child of the late
spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariñosa, who died on May 26, 1996 and July 6, 1990
respectively; that on September 20, 1996 a baby girl was delivered by ‘hilot’ in the house of spouses
Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera and without the knowledge of said spouses, Flora Guinto, the mother of
the child and a housemaid of spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera, caused the registration/recording
of the facts of birth of her child, by simulating that she was the child of the spouses Eugenio, then 65
years old and Hermogena, then 54 years old, and made Hermogena Babiera appear as the mother by
forging her signature x x x; that petitioner, then 15 years old, saw with her own eyes and personally
witnessed Flora Guinto give birth to Teofista Guinto, in their house, assisted by ‘hilot’; that the birth
certificate x x x of Teofista Guinto is void ab initio, as it was totally a simulated birth, signature of
informant forged, and it contained false entries, to wit: a) The child is made to appear as the legitimate
child of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariñosa, when she is not; b) The signature of
Hermogena Cariñosa, the mother, is falsified/forged. She was not the informant; c) The family name
BABIERA is false and unlawful and her correct family name is GUINTO, her mother being single; d) Her
real mother was Flora Guinto and her status, an illegitimate child; The natural father, the carpenter, did
not sign it; that the respondent Teofista Barbiera’s birth certificate is void ab initio, and it is patently a
simulation of birth, since it is clinically and medically impossible for the supposed parents to bear a child
in 1956 because: a) Hermogena Cariñosa Babiera, was already 54 years old; b) Hermogena’s last child
birth was in the year 1941, the year petitioner was born; c) Eugenio was already 65 years old, that the
void and simulated birth certificate of Teofista Guinto would affect the hereditary rights of petitioner
who
492
492 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Babiera vs. Catotal
inherited the estate of cancelled and declared void and theretofore she prays that after publication,
notice and hearing, judgment [be] render[ed] declaring x x x the certificate of birth of respondent Teofista
Guinto as declared void, invalid and ineffective and ordering the respondent local civil registrar of Iligan
to cancel from the registry of live birth of Iligan City BIRTH CERTIFICATE recorded as Registry No.
16035.
“Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the trial court issued an order directing
the publication of the petition and the date of hearing thereof ‘in a newspaper, the Local Civil Registrar
of Iligan City, the office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City and TEOFISTA.
“TEOFISTA filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that ‘the petition states no cause of action, it
being an attack on the legitimacy of the respondent as the child of the spouses Eugenio Babiera and
Hermogena Cariñosa Babiera; that plaintiff has no legal capacity to file the instant petition pursuant to
Article 171 of the Family Code; and finally that the instant petition is barred by prescription in
accordance with Article 170 of the Family Code.’ The trial court denied the motion to dismiss.
“Subsequently, ‘Attys. Padilla, Ulindang and Padilla appeared and filed an answer/opposition in
behalf of private respondent Teofista Babiera, [who] was later on substituted by Atty. Cabili as counsel
for private respondent.’
“In the answer filed, TEOFISTA averred ‘that she was always known as Teofista Babiera and not
Teofista Guinto; that plaintiff is not the only surviving child of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and
Hermogena C. Babiera, for the truth of the matter [is that] plaintiff Presentation B. V. Catotal and
[defendant] Teofista Babiera are sisters of the full-blood. Her Certificate of Birth, signed by her mother
Hermogena Babiera, x x x Certificate of Baptism, x x x Student’s Report Card x x x all incorporated in
her answer, are eloquent testimonies of her filiation. By way of special and affirmative defenses,
defendant/respondent contended that the petition states no cause of action, it being an attack on the
legitimacy of the respondent as the child of the spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariñoza
Babiera; that plaintiff has no legal capacity to file the instant petition pursuant to Article 171 of the
Family Code; and
493
VOL. 333, JUNE 15, 2000 493
Babiera vs. Catotal
finally5 that the instant petition is barred by prescription in accordance with Article 170 of the Family
Code.”
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals held that the evidence adduced during trial proved that petitioner was
not the biological child of Hermogena Babiera. It also ruled that no evidence was presented to
show that Hermogena became pregnant in 1959. It further observed that she was already 54
years old at the time, and that her last pregnancy had occurred way back in 1941. The CA
noted that the supposed birth took place at home, notwithstanding the advanced age of
Hermogena and its concomitant medical complications. Moreover, petitioner’s Birth Certificate
was not signed by the local civil registrar, and the signature therein, which was purported to
be that of Hermogena, was different from her other signatures.
The CA also deemed inapplicable Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code, which stated
that only the father could impugn the child’s legitimacy, and that the same was not subject to
a collateral attack. It held that said provisions contemplated a situation wherein the husband
or his heirs asserted that the child of the wife was not his. In this case, the action involved the
cancellation of the child’s Birth Certificate for being void ab initio on the ground that the child
did not belong to either6
the father or the mother.
Hence, this appeal.
Issues
Petitioner presents the following assignment of errors:
_______________
5 CA Decision, pp. 2-4; rollo, pp, 22-24. est of respondent in the civil status
10
of petitioner stems from an action for partition which the
6 The case was deemed submitted for resolution on December 24, 1999, upon receipt by this Court of Petitioner’s latter filed against the former.   The case concerned the properties inherited by respondent
Memorandum, which was signed by Atty. Pablito C. Pielago, Sr. Respondent’s Memorandum, signed by Atty. from her parents.
Dulcesimo Tampos, had been received earlier.
Moreover, Article 171 of the Family Code is not applicable to the present case. A close
494 reading of this provision shows that it applies to instances in which the father impugns the
legitimacy of his wife’s child. The provision, however, presupposes that the child was the
undisputed offspring of the mother. The present case alleges and shows that Hermogena did
494 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED not give birth to petitioner. In other words, the prayer herein is not to declare that petitioner
Babiera vs. Catotal is an illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to establish that the former is not the latter’s child
at all. Verily, the present action does not impugn petitioner’s filiation to Spouses Eugenio and
Hermogena Babiera, because there is no 11blood relation to impugn in the first place.
“1) Respondent (plaintiff in the lower court a quo) does not have the legal capacity to file In Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals,  the Court ruled thus:
the special proceeding of appeal under  CA GR No. CV-56031subject matter of this
review on certiorari; “Petitioner’s insistence on the applicability of Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code to the
case at bench cannot be sustained. These articles provide:
2) The special proceeding on appeal under  CA GR No. CV-56031  is improper and is
x x x      x x x      x x x
barred by [the] statute of limitation (prescription); [and] “A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not contemplate a situation, like in the
3) The Honorable Court of Appeals, the fifteenth division utterly failed to hold, that the instant case, where a child is alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child of a certain couple.
ancient public record of petitioner’s birth is superior to the self-serving oral testimony Rather, these articles govern a situation where a husband
7
of respondent.”
_______________

graphical or clerical errors and not material or substantial ones (see Leonor v. CA, 256 SCRA 69, April 2, 1996), the propriety of
the present remedy was not raised as an issue. Hence, the Court finds no reason to pass upon it. It should be observed, however,
The Court’s Ruling that the trial court ordered the publication of the Petition and the date of hearing in a newspaper of general publication and caused
the service of copies thereof to the Office of the Solicitor General, the Iligan City local civil registrar and the Office of the Iligan City
Prosecutor.
The Petition is not meritorious. 10 Civil Case No. 2389.
11 229 SCRA 468, January 24, 1994.

496
First Issue: Subject of the Present Action
8
Petitioner contends that respondent has no standing to sue, because Article 171  of the Family 496 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Code states that the child’s filiation can be impugned only by the father or, in special
circumstances, his heirs. She adds that the legitimacy of a child is not subject to a collateral Babiera vs. Catotal
attack.
This argument is incorrect. Respondent has the requisite standing to initiate the present (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who can
action. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, provides that a real party in interest is one impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual
“who stands to be 9benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth
avails of the suit.”  The inter- of the child; (2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child; (3)
that in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or
ratification by either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue
_______________ influence.  Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as they speak of the prescriptive period within
7 Petition,p. 3; rollo, p. 11. which the  husband or any of his heirs  should file the action impugning the legitimacy of said child.
8  Art.171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period prescribed in the Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err when it refused to apply these articles to the case at
preceding article only in the following cases: bench. For the case at bench is not one where the heirs of the late Vicente are contending that petitioner is
not his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is that petitioner was not born to Vicente and
(1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing his action; Isabel. Our ruling in  Cabatbat-Lim vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,  166 SCRA 451, 457 cited in the
(2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint without having desisted therefrom; or impugned decision is apropos, viz.:
(3) If the child was born after the death of the husband.
‘Petitioners’ recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code [now Art. 170 of the Family Code] is not well-taken. This
9  It legal provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case because this is not an action to
appears that respondent invoked Rule 108 in the present action. Although the said Rule allows only the
impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private respondents to claim their inheritance as legal heirs of
correction of typo
their childless deceased aunt. They do not claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the
495 deceased, but that she is not the decedent’s child at all. Being neither [a] legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged
natural child,
12
nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the
deceased.’”  (Emphasis supplied.)
VOL. 333, JUNE 15, 2000 495
Babiera vs. Catotal
 Second, the circumstances surrounding the birth of petitioner show that Hermogena is not
the former’s real mother. For one, there is no evidence of Hermogena’s pregnancy, such as
Second Issue: Prescription medical records and doctor’s prescriptions, other than the Birth Certificate itself. In fact, no
witness was presented to attest to the pregnancy of Hermogena during that time. Moreover, at
Petitioner next contends that the action to contest her status as a child of the late Hermogena
the time of her supposed birth, Hermogena was already 54 years old. Even if it were possible
Babiera has already prescribed. She cites Article 170 of the Family Code which provides the
for her to have given birth at such a late age, it was highly suspicious that she did so in her
prescriptive period for such action:
own home, when her advanced age necessitated proper medical care normally available only in
a hospital.
_______________ The most significant piece of evidence, however, is the deposition of Hermogena Babiera
12 Ibid., pp. 472-474, per Puno, J. which states that she did not give birth to petitioner, and that the latter was not hers nor her
husband Eugenio’s. The deposition reads in part:
497
“q Who are your children?
VOL. 333, JUNE 15, 2000 497 a Presentacion and Florentino Babiera.
Babiera vs. Catotal q Now, this Teofista Babiera claims that she is your
legitimate child with your husband Eugenio
“Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year from the Babiera, what can you say about that?
knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil register, if the husband or, in a proper case, any of his
heirs, should reside in the city or municipality where the birth took place or was recorded. a She is not our child.
“If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the place of birth as defined in the
  x x x      x x x      x x x
first paragraph or where it was recorded, the period shall be two years if they should reside in the
Philippines; and three years if abroad. If the birth of the child has been concealed from or was unknown q Do you recall where she was born?
to the husband or his heirs, the period shall be counted from the discovery or knowledge of the birth of
the child or of the fact of registration of said birth, whichever is earlier.” a In our house because her mother was our house
helper.
This argument is bereft of merit. The present action involves the cancellation of petitioner’s
Birth Certificate; it does not impugn her legitimacy. Thus, the prescriptive period set forth in q Could you recall for how long if ever this Teofista
Article 170 of the Family Code does not apply. Verily, the 13action to nullify the Birth Certificate Babiera lived with you in your residence?
does not prescribe, because it was allegedly void ab initio.
a Maybe in 1978 but she [would] always go ou[t]
from time to time.
Third Issue: Presumption in Favor of the Birth Certificate
q Now, during this time, do you recall if you ever
Lastly, petitioner argues that the evidence presented, especially Hermogena’s testimony that assert[ed] her as your daughter with your
petitioner was not her real child, cannot overcome the presumption of regularity in the husband?
issuance of the Birth Certificate. 15

While it is true that an official document such as petitioner’s Birth Certificate enjoys the
a No, sir.”
presumption of regularity, the specific facts attendant in the case at bar, as well as the totality
of the evidence presented during trial, sufficiently negate such presumption. First, there were _______________
already irregularities
14
regarding the Birth Certificate itself. It was not signed by the local civil
15 CA Decision, pp. 9-10; rollo, pp. 28-29. The same was taken from Special Proceedings No. 1794, entitled “In the
registrar.  More important, the Court of Appeals observed that the mother’s signature therein
matter of the
was
499
_______________
13 See Santos v. Aranzanso, 116 SCRA 1, August 21, 1982. VOL. 333, JUNE 15, 2000 499
14 The civil registrar was G.L. Caluen.
Babiera vs. Catotal
498

Relying merely on the assumption of validity of the Birth Certificate, petitioner has presented
498 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED no other evidence other than the said document to show that she is really Hermogena’s child.
Neither has she provided any reason why her supposed mother would make a deposition
Babiera vs. Catotal
stating that the former was not the latter’s child at all.
All in all, we find no reason to reverse or modify the factual finding of the trial and the
different from her signatures in other documents presented during the trial. appellate courts that petitioner was not the child of respondent’s parents.
 WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

     Melo (Chairman), Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
     Vitug, J., Abroad on official business.

Petition denied, judgment affirmed.

Notes.—Documentary evidence rejected as insufficient to prove filiation; Photographs of a

person at baptism and in the house do not prove that he is the father. (Fernandez vs. Court of
Appeals, 230 SCRA 130 [1994])
An unrecognized spurious child has no rights from his parents or to their estate. (llano vs.
Court of Appeals, 230 SCRA 242 [1994])
An action for compulsory recognition and enforcement of successional rights which was filed
prior to the advent of the Family Code must be governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code and
not by Article 175, paragraph 2 of the Family Code. (Aruego, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals,  254
SCRA 711 [1996])
A blood test could eliminate all possibility that the accused is the father of the child, if none
of the putative father’s phenotype(s) are present in the child’s blood type—while the

_______________

Perpetuation of the Testimony of Hermogena C. Babiera, Presentacion B. Catotal, Petitioner.”

500

500 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Re: Pilferage of Supplies in the Stockroom of the
Property Division, OCA Committed by Teodoro L.
Saquin, Clerk II

converse does not hold true (i.e., that the presence of identical phenotypes in both individuals
establishes paternity), the absence of the former’s phenotype in the child’s would make his
paternity biologically untenable. (People vs. Cartuano, Jr., 255 SCRA 403 [1996])

VOL. 460, JUNE 15, 2005 315
Agustin vs. Court of Appeals
* competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress.
G.R. No. 162571. June 15, 2005.
ARNEL L. AGUSTIN, petitioner,  vs.  HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND MINOR MARTIN
JOSE PROLLAMANTE, REPRESENTED BY HIS MOTHER/GUARDIAN FE ANGELA
PROLLAMANTE, respondents.
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Recognition; That the two causes of action, one to compel recognition
and the other to claim inheritance, may be joined in one complaint is not new in our jurisprudence.—That
the two causes of action, one to compel recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may be joined in
one complaint is not new in our jurisprudence. As early as [1922] we had occasion to rule thereon in Briz
vs. Briz, et al. (43 Phil. 763 [1922]) wherein we said: The question whether a person in the position of the
present plaintiff can in any event maintain a complex action to compel recognition as a natural child and
at the same time to obtain ulterior relief in the character of heir, is one which in the opinion of this court
must be answered in the affirmative, provided always that the conditions justifying the joinder of the two
distinct causes of action are present in the particular case. In other words, there is no absolute necessity
requiring that the action to compel acknowledgment should have been instituted and prosecuted to a
successful conclusion prior to the action in which that same plaintiff seeks additional relief in the
character of heir. Certainly, there is nothing so peculiar to the action to compel acknowledgment as to
require that a rule should be here applied different from that generally applicable in other cases. x x x
The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitly formulated by this court, is undoubtedly to
some extent supported by our prior decisions. Thus, we have held in numerous cases, and the doctrine
must be considered well settled, that a natural child having a right to compel acknowledgment, but who
has not been in fact legally acknowledged, may maintain partition proceedings for the division of the
inheritance against his coheirs x x x; and the same person may intervene in proceedings for the
distribution of the estate of his deceased natural father, or mother x x x. In neither of these situations
has it been thought necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior decree compelling acknowledgment. The
obvious reason
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
316
316 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Agustin vs. Court of Appeals
is that in partition suits and distribution proceedings the other persons who might take by
inheritance are before the court; and the declaration of heirship is appropriate to such proceedings.
Civil Law;  Family Code;  Filiation;  Paternity;  DNA Testing;Parentage will still be resolved using
conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways available; fortunately, we have now
the facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage testing.—Parentage will still
be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways available.
Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage
testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis
Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The
analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother
and the other from the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to
establish parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still
open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the
admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science when
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Appeals; Certiorari; Grave Abuse of Discretion; Where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and it must be so
patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.—Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words,  where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal
hostility, and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to
a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.  The
special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not
errors of judgment. The raison d’etre for the rule is when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error
committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the
317
VOL. 460, JUNE 15, 2005 317
Agustin vs. Court of Appeals
jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a court
would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. In such a
scenario, the administration of justice would not survive. Hence, where the issue or question involved
affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision—not the jurisdiction of the court to render said
decision—the same is beyond the province of a special civil action for certiorari. The proper recourse of
the aggrieved party from a decision of the CA is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court. On the other hand, if the error subject of the recourse is one of jurisdiction, or the
act complained of was perpetrated by a quasi-judicial officer or agency with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the proper remedy available to the aggrieved party is a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the said Rules.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Ciriaco A. Macapagal for petitioner.
     Alexander Bansil for respondent.
CORONA, J.:
1
At issue in this petition for certiorari   is whether or not the Court of Appeals (CA) gravely
erred in2 exercising its 3discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in issuing a
decision  and resolution  upholding the resolution and order of
_______________
1 Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
2 CA Decision dated January 28, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 80961, penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama,
Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Mario L. Guariña III and Jose C. Reyes, Jr. of the Seventeenth Division;
Rollo, pp. 32-39.
3  CA Resolution dated March 8, 2004 (affirming the January 28, 2004 CA Decision) in  CA-G.R. SP No. 80961,
penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Mario L. Guariña III and
Jose C. Reyes, Jr. of the Seventeenth Division.; Rollo, pp. 41-43.
 8
318 intimacy was sometime in 1998.”  Exasperated, Fe started calling Arnel’s wife and family. On
January 19, 2001, Fe followed Arnel to the Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club parking lot to
demand that he acknowledge Martin as his child. According to Arnel, he could not get through
318 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Fe and the discussion became so heated that he9 had no “alternative but to move on but
Agustin vs. Court of Appeals without bumping or hitting any part of her body.”  Finally, Arnel claimed that the signature
and the community tax certificate (CTC) attributed to him in the acknowledgment of Martin’s
4 birth certificate were falsified. The CTC erroneously
the trial court,  which denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss private respondents’ complaint for
support and directed the parties to submit themselves to deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)
paternity testing. _______________
Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martin’s alleged biological 7 Rollo, p. 103.
father, petitioner Arnel L. Agustin, for support5
and support pendente lite before the Regional 8 Rollo, p. 104.
9 Rollo, p. 105.
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 106.
In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe in 1992, after which they 320
entered into an intimate relationship. Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday
on November 10, 1999. Despite Arnel’s insistence on abortion, Fe decided otherwise and gave
birth to their child out of wedlock, Martin, on August 11, 2000 at the Capitol Medical Hospital 320 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
in Quezon City. The baby’s birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father.
Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later refused Fe’s repeated requests Agustin vs. Court of Appeals
for Martin’s support despite his adequate financial capacity and even suggested to have the
child committed for adoption. Arnel also denied having fathered the child. reflected his marital status as single when10
he was actually married and that his birth year
On January 19, 2001, while Fe was carrying five-month old Martin at the Capitol Hills Golf was 1965 when it should have been 1964.
and Country Club parking lot, Arnel sped off in his van, with the open car door hitting Fe’s In his pre-trial brief filed on May 17, 2002, Arnel vehemently denied
11
having sired Martin
leg. This incident was reported to the police. In July 2001, Fe was diagnosed with leukemia but expressed willingness to consider any proposal to settle the case.
and has, since then,
6
been undergoing chemotherapy. On March 5, 2002, Fe and Martin sued On July 23, 2002, Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties
12
Arnel for support. to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court.
Arnel opposed
13
said motion by invoking his constitutional right against self-
_______________ incrimination.  He also moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action, considering
that his signature on the birth certificate was a forgery and that, under the 14law, an
4 Resolution dated November 8, 2002 and order dated February 5, 2003 in Civil Case No. Q-02-46301, both penned
illegitimate child is not entitled to support if not recognized by the putative father.   In his
by Presiding Judge Natividad Giron-Dizon of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 106; Rollo, pp. 157-159
and 171-172. motion, Arnel manifested that he had filed criminal charges for falsification of documents
5 Docketed as Civil Case No. Q-02-46301. Rollo, pp. 55-60. against Fe (I.S. Nos. 02-5723 and 02-7192) and a petition for cancellation of his name
6 Rollo, pp. 55-60. appearing in Martin’s birth certificate (docketed as Civil Case No. Q-02-46669). He attached
the certification of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory that his signature in the
319
birth certificate was forged.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered the parties to
VOL. 460, JUNE 15, 2005 319 submit themselves to DNA paternity testing at the expense of the applicants. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court.
Agustin vs. Court of Appeals Thus, this petition.
In a nutshell, petitioner raises two issues: (1) whether a complaint for support can be
In his amended answer, Arnel denied having sired Martin because his affair and intimacy converted to a petition for recog-
with Fe had allegedly ended in 1998, long before Martin’s conception. He claimed that Fe had
at least one other secret lover. Arnel admitted that their relationship started in 1993 but “he _______________
never really fell in love with (Fe) not only because (she) had at least one secret lover, a certain 10 Rollo, pp. 101-109.
Jun, but also because she proved to be scheming and overly demanding and possessive. As a 11 Rollo, pp. 111-114.
result, theirs was a stormy on-and-off affair. What started as a romantic liaison between two 12 Rollo, pp. 132-137.
consenting adults eventually turned out to be a case of fatal attraction where (Fe) became so 13 Rollo, pp. 138-139.
14 Rollo, pp. 140-143.
obsessed with (Arnel), to the point of even entertaining the idea of marrying him, that she
resorted to various devious ways and means to alienate (him) from his wife and family . . . . 321
Unable to bear the prospect of losing his wife and children, Arnel terminated the affair
although he still treated
7
her as a friend such as by referring potential customers to the car
aircon repair shop”   where she worked. Later on, Arnel found out that Fe had another VOL. 460, JUNE 15, 2005 321
erstwhile secret lover. In May 2000, Arnel and his entire family went to the United States for
a vacation. Upon their return in June 2000, Arnel learned that Fe was telling people that he Agustin vs. Court of Appeals
had impregnated her. Arnel refused to acknowledge the child as his because their “last
8

nition and (2) whether DNA paternity testing can be ordered in a proceeding for support
without violating petitioner’s constitutional right to privacy and right against self-
15
incrimination.
The petition is without merit.
First of all, the trial court properly denied the petitioner’s motion to dismiss because the
private respondents’ complaint on its face showed that they had a cause of action against the
petitioner. The elements of a cause of action are: (1) the plaintiff’s primary right and the
defendant’s corresponding primary duty, and (2) the delict or wrongful act or omission of the
defendant, by which the primary right and duty have been violated.16 The cause of action is
determined not by the prayer of the complaint but by the facts alleged.
In the complaint, private respondents alleged that Fe had amorous relations with the
petitioner, as a result of which she gave birth to Martin out of wedlock. In his answer,
petitioner admitted that he had sexual relations with Fe but denied that he fathered Martin,
claiming that he had ended the relationship long before the child’s conception and birth. It is
undisputed and even admitted by the parties that there existed a sexual relationship between
Arnel and Fe. The only remaining question is whether such sexual relationship produced the
child, Martin. If it did, as respondents have alleged, then Martin should be supported by his
father Arnel. If not, petitioner and Martin are strangers to each other and Martin has no right
to demand and petitioner has no obligation to give support.
Preliminaries aside, we now tackle the main issues.
Petitioner refuses to recognize Martin as his own child and denies the genuineness and
authenticity of the child’s birth certificate which he purportedly signed as the father. He also
_______________
15 Rollo, pp. 10-11 and 21.
16 Nicanor G. de Guzman, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 92029, 20 December 1990, 192 SCRA 507.
322
322 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agustin vs. Court of Appeals
claims that the order and resolution of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
effectively converted the complaint for support to a petition for recognition, which is
supposedly proscribed by law. According to petitioner, Martin, as an unrecognized child, has
no right
17
to ask for support and must
18
first establish his filiation in a separate suit
19
under Article
283   in relation to Article 265   of the Civil Code and Section 1, Rule 105   of the Rules of
Court.
The petitioner’s contentions are without merit.
The assailed resolution and order did not convert the action for support into one for
recognition but merely allowed the respondents to prove their cause of action against
petitioner who had been denying the authenticity of the documentary evidence of
acknowledgement. But even if the assailed resolution and order effectively integrated an
action to compel rec-
_______________
17 Art.
283. In any of the following cases, the father is obliged to recognize the child as his natural child:
(1) In cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense coincides more or less with that of the conception;
(2) When the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or of his
family;
(3) When the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the supposed father;
(4) When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father.
(5)
18 Art. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record of birth appearing in the Civil Register, or by
an authentic document or a final judgment.
19 SECTION 1. Venue.—Where judicial approval of a voluntary recognition of a minor natural child is required,
such child or his parents shall obtain the same by filing a petition to that effect with the Court of First Instance of the
province in which the child resides. In the City of Manila, the petition shall be filed in the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court.
323
VOL. 460, JUNE 15, 2005 323
Agustin vs. Court of Appeals
ognition with an action for support, such was valid and in accordance with jurisprudence.
20
In Tayag v. Court of Appeals,  we allowed the integration of an action to compel recognition
with an action to claim one’s inheritance:
. . . In Paulino, we held that an illegitimate child, to be entitled to support and successional rights from
the putative or presumed parent, must prove his filiation to the latter. We also said that it is necessary
to allege in the complaint that the putative father had acknowledged and recognized the illegitimate
child because such acknowledgment is essential to and is the basis of the right to inherit. There being no
allegation of such acknowledgment, the action becomes one to compel recognition which cannot be
brought after the death of the putative father. The  ratio decidendi  in  Paulino, therefore, is not the
absence of a cause of action for failure of the petitioner to allege the fact of acknowledgment in the
complaint, but the prescription of the action.
Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, although petitioner contends that the complaint
filed by herein private respondent merely alleges that the minor Chad Cuyugan is an illegitimate child of
the deceased and is actually a claim for inheritance, from the allegations therein the same may be
considered as one to compel recognition.  Further, that the two causes of action, one to compel
recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may be joined in one complaint is not new in
our jurisprudence.
As early as [1922] we had occasion to rule thereon in Briz vs. Briz, et al. (43 Phil. 763 [1922]) wherein
we said:
The question whether a person in the position of the present plaintiff can in any event maintain a complex action to
compel recognition as a natural child and at the same time to obtain ulterior relief in the character of heir, is one
which in the opinion of this court must be answered in the affirmative, provided always that the conditions justifying
the joinder of the two distinct causes of action are present in the particular case. In other words, there is no
absolute necessity requiring that the action to compel acknowledgment
_______________
20 G.R. No. 95299, 9 June 1992, 209 SCRA 665.
324
324 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agustin vs. Court of Appeals
should have been instituted and prosecuted to a successful conclusion prior to the action in which that
same plaintiff seeks additional relief in the character of heir. Certainly, there is nothing so peculiar to the
action to compel acknowledgment as to require that a rule should be here applied different from that generally
applicable in other cases. x x x
The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitly formulated by this court, is undoubtedly to some
extent supported by our prior decisions. Thus, we have held in numerous cases, and the doctrine must be
considered well settled, that a natural child having a right to compel acknowledgment, but who has not
been in fact legally acknowledged, may maintain partition proceedings for the division of the
inheritance against his coheirs x x x; and the same person may intervene in proceedings for the distribution of
the estate of his deceased natural father, or mother x x x. In neither of these situations has it been thought
necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior decree compelling acknowledgment. The obvious reason is that in partition
suits and distribution proceedings the other persons who might take by inheritance are before the court; and the
declaration of heirship is appropriate to such proceedings. (Underscoring supplied)
Although the instant case deals with support rather than inheritance, as in Tayag, the basis
or rationale for integrating them remains the same. Whether or not respondent Martin is
entitled to support depends completely on the determination of filiation. A separate action will
only result in a multiplicity of suits, given how intimately related the main issues in both
cases are. To paraphrase  Tayag, the declaration of filiation is entirely appropriate to these
proceedings.
On the second issue, petitioner posits that DNA is not recognized by this Court as a
conclusive means of proving paternity. He also contends that compulsory testing violates his
right to privacy and right against self-incrimination as guaranteed under the 1987
Constitution. These contentions have no merit.
325
VOL. 460, JUNE 15, 2005 325
Agustin vs. Court of Appeals
Given that this is the very first time that the admissibility of DNA testing as a means for
determining paternity has actually been the focal issue in a controversy, a brief historical
sketch of our past decisions featuring or mentioning
21
DNA testing is called for.
In the 1995 case of People v. Teehankee  where the appellant was convicted of murder on
the testimony of three eyewitnesses, we stated as an  obiter dictum  that “while eyewitness
identification is significant, it is not as accurate and authoritative as the scientific forms of
identification evidence such as the fingerprint or the DNA test result (emphasis supplied).”
Our faith in DNA testing,
22
however, was not quite so steadfast in the previous decade. In Pe
Lim v. Court of Appeals,  promulgated in 1997, we cautioned against the use of DNA because
“DNA, being a relatively new science, (had) not as yet been accorded official recognition by our
courts. Paternity (would) still have to be resolved by such conventional evidence as the
relevant incriminating acts, verbal and written, by the putative father.”
In 2001, however, we opened the possibility of admitting DNA as evidence of parentage, as
enunciated in Tijing v. Court of Appeals:
23
A final note. Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and
scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for
identification and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research
Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short
tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two
(2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from the
_______________
21 319 Phil. 128; 249 SCRA 54 (1995).
22 336 Phil. 741; 270 SCRA 1 (1997).
23 G.R. No. 125901, 8 March 2001, 354 SCRA 17.
326
326 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agustin vs. Court of Appeals
mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of course, being a novel
scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the
appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it
was said, that courts should apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of situations
presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress.
The first real breakthrough of DNA as admissible and authoritative evidence 24
in Philippine
jurisprudence came in 2002 with our en banc decision in People v. Vallejo  where the rape and
murder victim’s DNA samples from the bloodstained clothes of the accused were admitted in
evidence. We reasoned that “the purpose of DNA testing (was) to ascertain whether an
association exist(ed) between the evidence sample and the reference sample. The samples
collected (were) subjected to various chemical
25
processes to establish their profile.”
A year later, in People v. Janson,  we acquitted the accused charged with rape for lack of
evidence because “doubts persist(ed) in our mind as to who (were) the real malefactors. Yes, a
complex offense (had) been perpetrated but who (were) the perpetrators? How we wish we had
DNA or other scientific evidence to still our
26
doubts!”
In 2004, in Tecson, et al. v. COMELEC  where the Court en banc was faced with the issue
of filiation of then presidential candidate Fernando Poe, Jr., we stated:
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to
obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and
any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. A positive match would clear up
filiation or paternity. In
_______________
24 G.R. No. 144656, 9 May 2002, 382 SCRA 192.
25 G.R. No. 125938, 4 April 2003, 400 SCRA 584.
26 G.R. Nos. 161434, 161634, and 161824, 3 March 2004, 424 SCRA 277.
327
VOL. 460, JUNE 15, 2005 327
Agustin vs. Court of Appeals
Tijing vs. Court of Appeals, this Court has acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing. . .
27
Moreover, in our  en banc  decision in  People v. Yatar,   we affirmed the conviction of the
accused for rape with homicide, the principal evidence for which included DNA test results.
We did a lengthy discussion of DNA, the process of DNA testing and the reasons for its
admissibility in the context of our own Rules of Evidence:
Deoxyribonucleic Acid, or DNA, is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in all living
organisms. A person’s DNA is the same in each cell and it does not change throughout a person’s lifetime;
the DNA in a person’s blood is the same as the DNA found in his saliva, sweat, bone, the root and shaft
of hair, earwax, mucus, urine, skin tissue, and vaginal and rectal cells. Most importantly, because of
polymorphisms in human genetic structure, no two individuals have the same DNA, with the notable
exception of identical twins.
xxx      xxx      xxx
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider,  inter alia, the following
factors: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the
samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether proper standards and procedures
were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the prosecution as an
expert witness on DNA print or identification techniques. Based on Dr. de Ungria’s testimony, it was
determined that the gene type and DNA profile of appellant are identical to that of the extracts subject of
examination. The blood sample taken from the appellant showed that he was of the following gene types:
vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8, DHFRP29/10 and CSF1PO 10/11, which are identical with semen taken from the
victim’s vaginal canal. Verily, a DNA match exists between the semen found in the
_______________
 27 G.R. No. 150224, 19 May 2004; 428 SCRA 504.
328
328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agustin vs. Court of Appeals
victim and the blood sample given by the appellant in open court during the course of the trial.
Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances in science and technology in the
Philippine criminal justice system, so we must be cautious as we traverse these relatively uncharted
waters. Fortunately, we can benefit from the wealth of persuasive jurisprudence that has developed in
other jurisdictions. Specifically, the prevailing doctrine in the U.S. has proven instructive.
In  Daubert v. Merrell Dow  (509 U.S. 579  [1993]; 125 L. Ed. 2d 469) it was ruled that pertinent
evidence based on scientifically valid principles could be used as long as it was relevant and reliable.
Judges, under Daubert, were allowed greater discretion over which testimony they would allow at trial,
including the introduction of new kinds of scientific techniques. DNA typing is one such novel procedure.
Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to induce belief
in its existence or nonexistence. Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA evidence obtained
through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis, and which was appreciated by the court  a quo  is
relevant and reliable since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid principles of human genetics and
molecular biology.
Significantly, we upheld the constitutionality of compulsory DNA testing and the admissibility
of the results thereof as evidence. In that case, DNA samples from semen recovered from a
rape victim’s vagina were used to positively identify the accused Joel “Kawit” Yatar as the
rapist. Yatar claimed that the compulsory extraction of his blood sample for DNA testing, as
well as the testing itself, violated his right against self-incrimination, as embodied in both
Sections 12 and 17 of Article III of the Constitution. We addressed this as follows:
The contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against
testimonial compulsion. The right against self-incrimination is simply against the legal process of
extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought
to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence.
329
VOL. 460, JUNE 15, 2005 329
Agustin vs. Court of Appeals
Over the years, we have expressly excluded several kinds of object evidence taken from the
person of 28the 29accused from the realm 30 of self-incrimination. These include
photographs,   hair,   and other bodily substances.   We have also declared as constitutional
several procedures performed on the accused such32 as pregnancy tests for women accused of
31
adultery,  expulsion of morphine from one’s mouth  and the tracing34 of one’s foot to determine
33
its identity with bloody footprints.   In  Jimenez v. Cañizares  , we even authorized the
examination of a woman’s genitalia, in an action for annulment filed by her husband, to verify
his claim that she was impotent, her orifice being too small for his penis. Some of these
procedures were, to be sure, rather invasive and involuntary, but all of them 35
were
constitutionally sound. DNA testing and its results, per our ruling in  Yatar,   are now
similarly acceptable.
Nor 36 does petitioner’s invocation of his right to privacy persuade us. In  Ople v.
Torres,   where we struck down the proposed national computerized identification system
embodied in Administrative Order No. 308, we said:
In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into
individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that
enhance public service and the common good . . . Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper
safeguards that enhance public service and the common good.
_______________
28 People v. Gallarde, 382 Phil. 718; 325 SCRA 835 (2000).
29 People v. Rondero, 378 Phil. 123; 320 SCRA 383 (1999).
30 U.S. v. Tan Teng, 23 Phil. 145 (1912).
31 Villaflor v. Summers, 41 Phil. 62 (1920).
32 U.S. v. Ong Siu Hong, 36 Phil. 735 (1917).
33 U.S. v. Salas, 25 Phil. 337 (1913).
34 109 Phil. 273 (1960).
35 Supra.
36 354 Phil. 948; 293 SCRA 141 (1998).
330
330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agustin vs. Court of Appeals
37
Historically, it has mostly been in the areas38
of legality of searches and seizures,   and the
infringement of privacy of communication  where the constitutional right to privacy has been
critically at issue. Petitioner’s case involves neither and, as already stated, his argument that
his right against self-incrimination is in jeopardy holds no water. His hollow invocation of his
constitutional rights elicits no sympathy here for the simple reason that they are not in any
way being violated. If, in a criminal case, an accused whose very life is at stake can be
compelled to submit to DNA testing, we see no reason why, in this civil case, petitioner herein
who does not face such dire consequences cannot be ordered to do the same.
DNA paternity testing first came to prominence in the United States, where it yielded its
first official results sometime in 39
1985. In the decade that followed, DNA rapidly found
widespread general acceptance.   Several cases decided by various State Supreme Courts
reflect the total assimilation of40DNA testing into their rules of procedure and evidence.
The case of Wilson v. Lumb  shows that DNA testing is so commonly accepted that, in some
instances, ordering the procedure has become a ministerial act. The Supreme Court of St.
Lawrence County, New York allowed a party who had already acknowledged paternity to
subsequently challenge his prior acknowledgment. The Court pointed out that, under the
_______________
37  Republic v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,  G.R. No. 104768, 21 July 2003,  407 SCRA 10;  People v. Valdez,  363 Phil
481; 304 SCRA 140 (1999); Aniag v. Comelec, et al., G.R. No. 104961, 7 October 1994, 237 SCRA 424; MHP Garments
v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 86720, 2 September 1994, 236 SCRA 227; 20th Century Fox v. Court of Appeals, et
al., No. L-76649-51, 19 August 1988, 164 SCRA 655; People v. Burgos, 228 Phil. 1; 144 SCRA 1 (1986); Villanueva v.
Querubin, 150-C Phil. 519; 48 SCRA 345(1972).
38 Waterous Drug v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., 345 Phil. 982; 280 SCRA 735 (1997); Zulueta v.
Court of Appeals, et al., 324 Phil. 63; 253 SCRA 699 (1996).
39 Greco v. Coleman, 615 N.W. 2d 218 (Mich. 2000).
40 181 Misc 2d 1033 (1999).
331
VOL. 460, JUNE 15, 2005 331
Agustin vs. Court of Appeals
law, specifically Section 516 of the New York Family Court Act, the Family Court examiner alleged father is or is not the father of the child. No such test shall be ordered, however, upon a
41
had the duty, upon receipt of the challenge, to order DNA tests: written finding by the court that it is not in the best interests of the child on the basis of

§ 516-a. Acknowledgment of paternity. (a) An acknowledgment of paternity executed pursuant to section _______________
one hundred eleven-k of the social services law or section four thousand one hundred thirty-five-b of the 42 NYSCL, Ch. 686, Article 5, Part 3, Section 532.
public health law shall establish the paternity of and liability for the support of a child pursuant to this
act. Such acknowledgment must be reduced to writing and filed pursuant to section four thousand one 333
hundred thirty-five-b of the public health law with the registrar of the district in which the birth
occurred and in which the birth certificate has been filed. No further judicial or administrative
proceedings are required to ratify an unchallenged acknowledgment of paternity. VOL. 460, JUNE 15, 2005 333
(b) An acknowledgment of paternity executed pursuant to section one hundred eleven-k of the social
services law or section four thousand one hundred thirty-five-b of the public health law may be rescinded Agustin vs. Court of Appeals
by either signator’s filing of a petition with the court to vacate the acknowledgment within the earlier of
sixty days of the date of signing the acknowledgment or the date of an administrative or a judicial
res judicata, equitable estoppel, or the presumption of legitimacy of a child born to a married
proceeding (including a proceeding to establish a support order) relating to the child in which either
woman. The record or report of the results of any such genetic marker or DNA test ordered pursuant to
signator is a party. For purposes of this section, the “date of an administrative or a judicial proceeding”
this section or pursuant to section one hundred eleven-k of the social services law shall be received in
shall be the date by which the respondent is required to answer the petition. After the expiration of sixty
evidence by the court pursuant to subdivision (e) of rule forty-five hundred eighteen of the civil practice
days of the execution of the acknowledgment, either signator may challenge the acknowledgment of
law and rules where no timely objection in writing has been made thereto and that if such timely
paternity in court only on the basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact, with the burden of proof
objections are not made, they shall be deemed waived and shall not be heard by the court. If the record
on the party challenging the voluntary acknowledgment. Upon receiving a party’s challenge to an
or report of the results of any such genetic marker or DNA test or tests indicate at least a
acknowledgment, the court shall order genetic marker tests or DNA tests for the
ninety-five percent probability of paternity, the admission of such record or report shall
determination of the child’s paternity and shall make a finding of paternity, if appropriate, in
create a rebuttable presumption of paternity, and shall establish, if unrebutted, the paternity
accordance with this article.  Neither signator’s legal obligations, including the obligation for child
of and liability for the support of a child pursuant to this article and article four of this act.
support arising from the acknowledgment, may be suspended during the challenge to the
(b) Whenever the court directs a genetic marker or DNA test pursuant to this section, a report made
acknowledgment except for good cause as the court may find. If a party petitions to rescind an
as provided in subdivision (a) of this section may be received in evidence pursuant to rule forty-five
acknowledgment
hundred eighteen of the civil practice law and rules if offered by any party.
(c) The cost of any test ordered pursuant to subdivision (a) of this section shall be, in the first instance,
_______________
paid by the moving party. If the moving party is financially unable to pay such cost, the court may direct
41 NYSCL, Ch. 686, Article 5, Part 1, Section 516. any qualified public health officer to conduct such test, if practicable; otherwise, the court may direct
payment from the funds of the appropriate local social services district. In its order of disposition,
332 however, the court may direct that the cost of any such test be apportioned between the parties according
to their respective abilities to pay or be assessed against the party who does not prevail on the issue of
paternity, unless such party is financially unable to pay. (emphasis supplied)
332 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 43
In R.E. v. C.E.W.,  a decision of the Mississippi Supreme Court, DNA tests were used to prove
Agustin vs. Court of Appeals
that H.W., previously thought to be an offspring of the marriage between A.C.W. and C.E.W.,
was actually the child of R.E. with whom C.E.W.
and if the court determines that the alleged father is not the father of the child, or if the court finds that
an acknowledgment is invalid because it was executed on the basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake
_______________
of fact, the court shall vacate the acknowledgment of paternity and shall immediately provide a copy of
the order to the registrar of the district in which the child’s birth certificate is filed and also to the 43 752 So. 2d 1019 (Miss. 1999).
putative father registry operated by the department of social services pursuant to section three hundred
seventy-two-c of the social services law. In addition, if the mother of the child who is the subject of the 334
acknowledgment is in receipt of child support services pursuant to title six-A of article three of the social
services law, the court shall immediately provide a copy of the order to the child support enforcement
unit of the social services district that provides the mother with such services. 334 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
(c) A determination of paternity made by any other state, whether established through the parents’
acknowledgment of paternity or through an administrative or judicial process, must be accorded full Agustin vs. Court of Appeals
faith and credit, if and only if such acknowledgment meets the requirements set forth in section 452(a)(7)
of the social security act. (emphasis supplied) had, at the time of conception, maintained an adulterous relationship. 44
42
In Erie County Department of Social Services on behalf of Tiffany M.H. v. Greg G.,  the 4th
DNA testing also appears elsewhere in the New York Family Court Act:
Department of the New York Supreme Court’s Appellate Division allowed G.G., who had been
§532. Genetic marker and DNA tests; admissibility of records or reports of test results; costs of tests. adjudicated as T.M.H.’s father by default, to have the said judgment vacated, even after six
a) The court shall advise the parties of their right to one or more genetic marker tests or DNA tests years, once he had shown through a genetic marker test that he was not the child’s father. In
and, on the court’s own motion or the motion of any party, shall order the mother, her child and the this case, G.G. only requested the tests after the Department of Social Services, six years after
alleged father to submit to one or more genetic marker or DNA tests of a type generally acknowledged as G.G. had been adjudicated as T.M.H.’s father, sought an increase in his support obligation to
reliable by an accreditation body designated by the secretary of the federal department of health and her.
human services and performed by a laboratory approved by such an accreditation body and by the 45
In Greco v. Coleman,  the Michigan Supreme Court while ruling on the constitutionality of
commissioner of health or by a duly qualified physician to aid in the determination of whether the
a provision of law allowing non-modifiable support agreements pointed out that it was because
of the difficulty of determining paternity before the advent of DNA testing that such support
agreements were necessary:
As a result of DNA testing, the accuracy with which paternity can be proven has increased significantly
since the parties in this lawsuit entered into their support agreement . . . (current testing methods can
determine the probability of paternity to 99.999999% accuracy). However, at the time the parties before
us entered into the disputed agreement, proving paternity was a very significant obstacle to an
illegitimate child’s access to child support. The first reported results of modern DNA paternity testing
did not occur until 1985. (“In fact, since its first reported results in 1985, DNA matching has progressed
to ‘general acceptance in less than a decade’ ”). Of course, while prior blood-testing methods could exclude
some males from being the possible father of a child, those methods could not affirmatively pinpoint a
particular male as being the father. Thus, when the settlement agreement between the present parties
was entered in 1980, establishing paternity was a far more difficult ordeal than at present. Contested
paternity actions at that time were
_______________
44 273 AD 2d 919 (NY 2000).
45 Supra.
335
VOL. 460, JUNE 15, 2005 335
Agustin vs. Court of Appeals
often no more than credibility contests. Consequently, in every contested paternity action, obtaining
child support depended not merely on whether the putative father was, in fact, the child's biological
father, but rather on whether the mother could prove to a court of law that she was only sexually
involved with one man--the putative father. Allowing parties the option of entering into private
agreements in lieu of proving paternity eliminated the risk that the mother would be unable meet her
burden of proof.
It is worth
46
noting that amendments to Michigan’s Paternity law have included the use of DNA
testing:
§722.716 Pretrial proceedings; blood or tissue typing determinations as to mother, child, and alleged
father; court order; refusal to submit to typing or identification profiling; qualifications of person
conducting typing or identification profiling; compensation of expert; result of typing or identification
profiling; filing summary report; objection; admissibility; presumption; burden of proof; summary
disposition.
Sec. 6.
(1) In a proceeding under this act before trial, the court, upon application made by or on
behalf of either party, or on its own motion, shall order that the mother, child, and alleged
father submit to blood or tissue typing determinations, which may include, but are not
limited to, determinations of red cell antigens, red cell isoenzymes, human leukocyte
antigens, serum proteins, or DNA identification profiling, to determine whether the alleged
father is likely to be, or is not, the father of the child. If the court orders a blood or tissue
typing or DNA identification profiling to be conducted and a party refuses to submit to the
typing or DNA identification profiling, in addition to any other remedies available, the court
may do either of the following:
(a) Enter a default judgment at the request of the appropriate party.
_______________
46 MCLA 722.716 § 6.
336
336 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agustin vs. Court of Appeals
(b) If a trial is held, allow the disclosure of the fact of the refusal unless good cause is shown
for not disclosing the fact of refusal.
(2) A blood or tissue typing or DNA identification profiling shall be conducted by a person accredited
for paternity determinations by a nationally recognized scientific organization, including, but not limited
to, the American association of blood banks.
xxx      xxx      xxx
(5)  If the probability of paternity determined by the qualified person described in
subsection (2) conducting the blood or tissue typing or DNA identification profiling is 99% or
higher, and the DNA identification profile and summary report are admissible as provided in
subsection (4), paternity is presumed. If the results of the analysis of genetic testing material
from 2 or more persons indicate a probability of paternity greater than 99%, the contracting
laboratory shall conduct additional genetic paternity testing until all but 1 of the putative
fathers is eliminated, unless the dispute involves 2 or more putative fathers who have
identical DNA.
(6) Upon the establishment of the presumption of paternity as provided in subsection (5), either party
may move for summary disposition under the court rules. This section does not abrogate the right of
either party to child support from the date of birth of the child if applicable under section 7. (emphasis
supplied)
47
In Rafferty v. Perkins,  the Supreme Court of Mississippi ruled that DNA test results showing
paternity were sufficient to overthrow the presumption of legitimacy of a child born during the
course of a marriage:
The presumption of legitimacy having been rebutted by the results of the blood test eliminating Perkins
as Justin's father, even considering the evidence in the light most favorable to Perkins, we find that no
reasonable jury could find that Easter is not Justin's father based upon the 99.94% probability of
paternity concluded by the DNA testing.
_______________
47 757
So. 2d 992 (Miss. 2000).
337
VOL. 460, JUNE 15, 2005 337
Agustin vs. Court of Appeals
48
In S.J.F. and J.C.F. v. R.C.W.,  the North Dakota Supreme Court upheld an order for genetic
testing given by the Court of Appeals, even after trial on the merits had concluded without
such order being given. Significantly, when J.C.F., the mother, first filed the case for paternity
and support with the District Court, neither party requested genetic testing. It was only upon
appeal from dismissal of the case that the appellate court remanded the case and ordered the
testing, which the North Dakota Supreme49
Court upheld.
The case of  Kohl v. Amundson,   decided by the Supreme Court of South Dakota,
demonstrated that even default judgments of paternity could be vacated after the adjudicated
father had, through DNA testing, established non-paternity. In this case, Kohl, having
excluded himself as the father of Amundson’s child through DNA testing, was able to have the
default judgment against him vacated. He then obtained a ruling ordering Amundson to
reimburse him for the amounts withheld from his wages for child support. The Court said
“(w)hile Amundson may have a remedy against the father of the child, she submit(ted) no
authority that require(d) Kohl to support her child. Contrary to Amundson’s position, the fact
that a default judgment was entered, but subsequently vacated, (did) not foreclose Kohl from
obtaining a money judgment for the amount withheld from his wages.”
50
 50
In  M.A.S. v. Mississippi Dept. of Human Services, another case decided by the Supreme
Court of Mississippi, it was held that even if paternity was established through an earlier
agreed order of filiation, child support and visitation orders could still be vacated once DNA
testing established someone other than the named individual to be the51 biological father. The
Mississippi High Court reiterated this doctrine in Williams v. Williams.
_______________
48 615 N.W. 2d 533 (ND 2000).
49 620 N.W.2d 606 (SD 2001).
50 842 So. 2d 527 (Miss. 2003).
51 843 So. 2d 720 (Miss. 2003).
338
338 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agustin vs. Court of Appeals
The foregoing considered, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the public
respondent for upholding the orders of the trial court which both denied the petitioner’s
motion to dismiss and ordered him to submit himself for DNA testing. Under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the remedy of certiorari is only available “when any tribunal,
board or officer has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there
52
is no appeal, nor any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy
53
in the ordinary course of law.”  In Land Bank of the Philippines
v. The Court of Appeals where we dismissed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65,
we discussed at length the nature of such a petition and just what was meant by “grave abuse
of discretion”:
Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by
reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and it must be so patent or gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or
to act at all in contemplation of law.
The special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction
and not errors of judgment. The raison d’être for the rule is when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an
error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is
committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every
erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. In such a scenario, the administration of justice would
not survive. Hence, where the issue or question involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the
decision—not the jurisdiction of the court to render said decision—the same is beyond the province of a
special civil action for certiorari.
of jurisdiction, or the act complained of was perpetrated by a quasi-judicial officer or agency with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the proper remedy available to the
aggrieved party is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the said Rules. (emphasis supplied)
In the instant case, the petitioner has in no way shown any arbitrariness, passion, prejudice or
personal hostility that would amount to grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of
Appeals. The respondent court acted entirely within its jurisdiction in promulgating its
decision and resolution, and any error made would have only been an error in judgment. As we
have discussed, however, the decision of the respondent court, being firmly anchored in law
and jurisprudence, was correct.
Epilogue
For too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by fathers who choose to deny their
existence. The growing sophistication of DNA testing technology finally provides a much
needed equalizer for such ostracized and abandoned progeny. We have long believed in the
merits of DNA testing and have repeatedly expressed as much in the past. This case comes at
a perfect time when DNA testing has finally evolved into a dependable and authoritative form
of evidence gathering. We therefore take this opportunity to forcefully reiterate our stand that
DNA testing is a valid means of determining paternity.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Court of
Appeals’ decision dated January 28, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 80961 is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto.
Costs against petitioner.
340
340 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cruz vs. Coca-Cola Bottlers, Phils., Inc.
SO ORDERED.
     Panganiban (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio-Morales and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment affirmed in toto.
Note.—While a birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence prescribed by both the
Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code for purposes of recognition and filiation, it offers
only  prima facie  evidence of filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence. (Solinap vs.
Locsin, Jr., 370 SCRA 711 [2001])

_______________
52 Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court.
53 G.R. No. 129368, 25 August 2003, 409 SCRA 455.

339

VOL. 460, JUNE 15, 2005 339

Agustin vs. Court of Appeals

The proper recourse of the aggrieved party from a decision of the CA is a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. On the other hand, if the error subject of the recourse is one

G.R. No. 177066. September 11, 2009.*
JOSELITO MUSNI PUNO (as heir of the late Carlos Puno), petitioner,  vs.  PUNO
ENTERPRISES, INC., represented by JESUSA PUNO, respondent.
Paternity; Evidence; Birth Certificates; Baptismal Certificates; A certificate of live birth purportedly
identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the
putative father had a hand in the preparation of the certificate; A baptismal certificate can only serve as
evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the date specified but not of the veracity of the entries
with respect to the child’s paternity.—A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father
is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in
the preparation of the certificate. The local civil registrar has no authority to record the paternity of an
illegitimate child on the information of a third person. As correctly observed by the CA, only petitioner’s
mother supplied the data in the birth certificate and signed the same. There was no evidence that Carlos
L. Puno acknowledged petitioner as his son. As for the baptismal certificate, we have already decreed
that it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the date specified but not of
the veracity of the entries with respect to the child’s paternity.
Corporation Law; Stockholders’ Right of Inspection; The stockholder’s right of inspection of the
corporation’s books and records is based upon his ownership of shares in the corporation and the necessity
for self-protection.—The stockholder’s right of inspection of the corporation’s books and records is based
upon his ownership of shares in the corporation and the necessity for self-protection. After all, a
shareholder has the right to be intelligently informed about corporate affairs. Such right rests upon the
stockholder’s underlying ownership of the corporation’s assets and property. Similarly, only stockholders
of record are entitled to receive dividends declared by the corporation, a right inherent in the ownership
of the shares.
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
586
586 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Puno vs. Puno Enterprises, Inc.
Same; Same; Succession; Upon the death of a shareholder, the heirs do not automatically become
stockholders of the corporation and acquire the rights and privileges of the deceased as shareholder of the
corporation—the stocks must be distributed first to the heirs in estate proceedings, and the transfer of the
stocks must be recorded in the books of the corporation; During such interim period, the heirs stand as the
equitable owners of the stocks, the executor or administrator duly appointed by the court being vested with
the legal title to the stock.—Upon the death of a shareholder, the heirs do not automatically become
stockholders of the corporation and acquire the rights and privileges of the deceased as shareholder of
the corporation. The stocks must be distributed first to the heirs in estate proceedings, and the transfer
of the stocks must be recorded in the books of the corporation. Section 63 of the Corporation Code
provides that no transfer shall be valid, except as between the parties, until the transfer is recorded in
the books of the corporation. During such interim period, the heirs stand as the equitable owners of the
stocks, the executor or administrator duly appointed by the court being vested with the legal title to the
stock. Until a settlement and division of the estate is effected, the stocks of the decedent are held by the
administrator or executor. Consequently, during such time, it is the administrator or executor who is
entitled to exercise the rights of the deceased as stockholder. Thus, even if petitioner presents sufficient
evidence in this case to establish that he is the son of Carlos L. Puno, he would still not be allowed to
inspect respondent’s books and be entitled to receive dividends from respondent, absent any showing in
its transfer book that some of the shares owned by Carlos L. Puno were transferred to him. This would
only be possible if petitioner has been recognized as an heir and has participated in the settlement of the
estate of the deceased.
Same; Same; Same; A determination of whether a person, claiming proprietary rights over the estate
of a deceased person, is an heir of the deceased must be ventilated in a special proceeding instituted
precisely for the purpose of settling the estate of the latter.—Corollary to this is the doctrine that a
determination of whether a person, claiming proprietary rights over the estate of a deceased person, is an
heir of the deceased must be ventilated in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of
settling the estate of the latter. The status of an illegitimate child who claims to be an heir to a
decedent’s estate cannot be adjudicated in an ordinary civil
587
VOL. 599, SEPTEMBER 11, 2009 587
Puno vs. Puno Enterprises, Inc.
action, as in a case for the recovery of property. The doctrine applies to the instant case, which is one
for specific performance—to direct respondent corporation to allow petitioner to exercise rights that
pertain only to the deceased and his representatives.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Enrico G. Barin for petitioner.
  Joey D. Morales for respondent.
NACHURA, J.:
Upon the death of a stockholder, the heirs do not automatically become stockholders of the
corporation; neither are they mandatorily entitled to the rights and privileges of a stockholder.
This, we declare in this petition for review on  certiorari  of the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision1  dated October 11, 2006 and Resolution dated March 6, 2007 in CA-G.R. CV No.
86137.
The facts of the case follow:
Carlos L. Puno, who died on June 25, 1963, was an incorporator of respondent Puno
Enterprises, Inc. On March 14, 2003, petitioner Joselito Musni Puno, claiming to be an heir of
Carlos L. Puno, initiated a complaint for specific performance against respondent. Petitioner
averred that he is the son of the deceased with the latter’s common-law wife, Amelia Puno. As
surviving heir, he claimed entitlement to the rights and privileges of his late father as
stockholder of respondent. The complaint thus prayed that respondent allow petitioner to
inspect its corporate book, render an accounting of all the
_______________
1  Penned by Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. (now Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals) with
Associate Justices Mariano C. del Castillo (now Associate Justice of the Supreme Court) and Santiago Javier Ranada,
concurring; Rollo, pp. 28-36.
588
588 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Puno vs. Puno Enterprises, Inc.
transactions it entered into from 1962, and give petitioner all the profits, earnings, dividends,
or income pertaining to the shares of Carlos L. Puno.2
 Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioner did not have the legal
personality to sue because his birth certificate names him as “Joselito Musni Muno.” Apropos,
there was yet a need for a judicial declaration that “Joselito Musni Puno” and “Joselito Musni
Muno” were one and the same.
The court ordered that the proceedings be held in abeyance, ratiocinating that petitioner’s
certificate of live birth was no proof of his paternity and relation to Carlos L. Puno.
Petitioner submitted the corrected birth certificate with the name “Joselito M. Puno,”
certified by the Civil Registrar of the City of Manila, and the Certificate of Finality thereof. To
hasten the disposition of the case, the court conditionally admitted the corrected birth
certificate as genuine and authentic and ordered respondent to file its answer within fifteen
days from the order and set the case for pretrial.3
On October 11, 2005, the court rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering Jesusa Puno and/or Felicidad Fermin to allow
the plaintiff to inspect the corporate books and records of the company from 1962 up to the present
including the financial statements of the corporation.
The costs of copying shall be shouldered by the plaintiff. Any expenses to be incurred by the defendant
to be able to comply with this order shall be the subject of a bill of costs.
SO ORDERED.”4
On appeal, the CA ordered the dismissal of the complaint in its Decision dated October 11,
2006. According to the CA,
_______________
2 Records, pp. 1-4.
3 Id., at p. 96.
4 Rollo, p. 30.
589
VOL. 599, SEPTEMBER 11, 2009 589
Puno vs. Puno Enterprises, Inc.
petitioner was not able to establish the paternity of and his filiation to Carlos L. Puno since
his birth certificate was prepared without the intervention of and the participatory
acknowledgment of paternity by Carlos L. Puno. Accordingly, the CA said that petitioner had
no right to demand that he be allowed to examine respondent’s books. Moreover, petitioner
was not a stockholder of the corporation but was merely claiming rights as an heir of Carlos L.
Puno, an incorporator of the corporation. His action for specific performance therefore
appeared to be premature; the proper action to be taken was to prove the paternity of and his
filiation to Carlos L. Puno in a petition for the settlement of the estate of the latter.5
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA in its Resolution6 dated March
6, 2007.
In this petition, petitioner raises the following issues:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE JOSELITO PUNO IS
ENTITLED TO THE RELIEFS DEMANDED HE BEING THE HEIR OF THE LATE CARLOS PUNO, ONE
OF THE INCORPORATORS [OF] RESPONDENT CORPORATION.
II. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT FILIATION OF JOSELITO PUNO, THE
PETITIONER[,] IS NOT DULY PROVEN OR ESTABLISHED.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT JOSELITO MUNO AND JOSELITO PUNO
REFERS TO THE ONE AND THE SAME PERSON.
IV. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT WHAT RESPONDENT
MERELY DISPUTES IS THE SURNAME OF THE PETITIONER WHICH WAS MISSPELLED AND THE
FACTUAL AL-
_______________
5 Id., at pp. 31-35.
6 CA Rollo, pp. 90-91.
590
590 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Puno vs. Puno Enterprises, Inc.
LEGATION E.G. RIGHTS OF PETITIONER AS HEIR OF CARLOS PUNO ARE DEEMED
ADMITTED HYPOTHETICALLY IN THE RESPONDENT[’S] MOTION TO DISMISS.
V. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS THEREFORE ERRED I[N] DECREEING THAT PETITIONER
IS NOT ENTITLED TO INSPECT THE CORPORATE BOOKS OF DEFENDANT CORPORATION.7
The petition is without merit. Petitioner failed to establish the right to inspect respondent
corporation’s books and receive dividends on the stocks owned by Carlos L. Puno.
Petitioner anchors his claim on his being an heir of the deceased stockholder. However, we
agree with the appellate court that petitioner was not able to prove satisfactorily his filiation
to the deceased stockholder; thus, the former cannot claim to be an heir of the latter.
Incessantly, we have declared that factual findings of the CA supported by substantial
evidence, are conclusive and binding.8 In an appeal via  certiorari, the Court may not review
the factual findings of the CA. It is not the Court’s function under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court to review, examine, and evaluate or weigh the probative value of the evidence
presented.9
A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent
evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the
preparation of the certificate. The local civil registrar has no authority to record the paternity
of an illegitimate child on
_______________
7 Rollo, pp. 21-22.
8 Fernandez v. Tarun, 440 Phil. 334, 349; 391 SCRA 653, 664 (2002).
9 Social Security System v. Aguas, G.R. No. 165546, February 27, 2006, 483 SCRA 383, 395-396.
591
VOL. 599, SEPTEMBER 11, 2009 591
Puno vs. Puno Enterprises, Inc.
the information of a third person.10 As correctly observed by the CA, only petitioner’s mother
supplied the data in the birth certificate and signed the same. There was no evidence that
Carlos L. Puno acknowledged petitioner as his son.
As for the baptismal certificate, we have already decreed that it can only serve as evidence
of the administration of the sacrament on the date specified but not of the veracity of the
entries with respect to the child’s paternity.11
In any case, Sections 74 and 75 of the Corporation Code enumerate the persons who are
entitled to the inspection of corporate books, thus—
“Sec. 74. Books to be kept; stock transfer agent.—x x x.
The records of all business transactions of the corporation and the minutes of any meeting shall be
open to the inspection of any  director, trustee, stockholder  or member of the corporation at
reasonable hours on business days and he may demand, in writing, for a copy of excerpts from said
records or minutes, at his expense.
 x x x x Thus, even if petitioner presents sufficient evidence in this case to establish that he is the
Sec. 75. Right to financial statements.—Within ten (10) days from receipt of a written request of any son of Carlos L. Puno, he would still not be allowed to inspect respondent’s books and be
stockholder or member, the corporation shall furnish to him its most recent financial statement, which entitled to receive dividends from respondent, absent any showing in its transfer book that
shall include a balance sheet as of the end of the last taxable year and a profit or loss of statement for
some of the shares owned by Carlos L. Puno were transferred to him. This would only be
said taxable year, showing in reasonable detail its assets and liabilities and the result of its
operations.”12 possible if petitioner has been recognized as an heir and has participated in the settlement of
the estate of the deceased.
The stockholder’s right of inspection of the corporation’s books and records is based upon Corollary to this is the doctrine that a determination of whether a person, claiming
his ownership of shares in the corporation and the necessity for self-protection. After all, a proprietary rights over the estate of a deceased person, is an heir of the deceased must be
shareholder has the right to be intelligently informed about ventilated in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of settling the estate of
the latter. The status of an illegitimate child who claims to be an heir to a decedent’s estate
_______________ cannot be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action, as in a case for the recovery of
property.19 The doctrine applies to the instant case, which is one for specific performance—to
10 Cabatania v. Court of Appeals, 484 Phil. 42, 51; 441 SCRA 96, 103-104 (2004). direct respondent corporation to allow petitioner to exercise rights that pertain only to the
11 Id. deceased and his representatives.
12 Emphasis supplied.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals
592 Decision dated October 11, 2006 and Resolution dated March 6, 2007 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
592 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr. and Peralta, JJ., concur.
Puno vs. Puno Enterprises, Inc. Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.

corporate affairs.13  Such right rests upon the stockholder’s underlying ownership of the Notes.—When a putative father manifests openly through words and deeds his recognition
corporation’s assets and property.14 of a child, the courts can do no less than confirm said acknowledgment. (Lim vs. Court of
Similarly, only stockholders of record are entitled to receive dividends declared by the Appeals, 270 SCRA 1 [1997])
corporation, a right inherent in the ownership of the shares.15
Upon the death of a shareholder, the heirs do not automatically become stockholders of the _______________
corporation and acquire the rights and privileges of the deceased as shareholder of the
19 Joaquino v. Reyes, G.R. No. 154645, July 13, 2004, 434 SCRA 260, 274.
corporation. The stocks must be distributed first to the heirs in estate proceedings, and the
transfer of the stocks must be recorded in the books of the corporation. Section 63 of the
Corporation Code provides that no transfer shall be valid, except as between the parties, until
the transfer is recorded in the books of the corporation.16 During such interim period, the heirs
stand as the equitable owners of the stocks, the executor or administrator duly appointed by
the court being vested with the legal title to the stock.17 Until a settlement and division of the
estate is effected, the stocks of the decedent are held by the administrator or
executor.18 Consequently, during such time, it is the administrator or executor who is entitled
to exercise the rights of the deceased as stockholder.

_______________

13 5A Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations, §2213.

14 Gokongwei, Jr. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 178 Phil. 266, 314; 89 SCRA 336 (1979).
15 Cesar Villanueva, Philippine Corporate Law, p. 259, citing Nielson & Co., Inc. v. Lepanto Consolidated Mining
Co., 26 SCRA 540 (1968); Lopez, Rosario, The Corporation Code of the Philippines, p. 617, citing Knight v. Schultz,
141 Ohio St. 267, 47 NE (2d) 286.
16 Rosario Lopez, The Corporation Code of the Philippines, Vol. 2, p. 718, citing Miguel A.B. Sison, et al. v. Hon.
Agellon et al., SEC-EB No. 293, November 23, 1992.
17 5A Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations, §2213.
18 Tan v. Sycip, G.R. No. 153468, August 17, 2006, 499 SCRA 216, 231.

593

VOL. 599, SEPTEMBER 11, 2009 593

Puno vs. Puno Enterprises, Inc.

VOL. 498, AUGUST 7, 2006 37
Cruz vs. Cristobal
*
G.R. No. 140422. August 7, 2006.
MERCEDES CRISTOBAL CRUZ, ANSELMO A. CRISTOBAL and ELISA CRISTOBAL
SIKAT, petitioners,  vs.  EUFROSINA CRISTOBAL, FLORENCIO CRISTOBAL, JOSE
CRISTOBAL, HEIRS OF NORBERTO CRISTOBAL and THE COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents.
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Even if the original complaint filed by petitioners before the RTC is
denominated as “Annulment of Title and Damages,” the Court finds it practicable to rule on the division
of the subject property based on the rules of succession as prayed for in the complaint, considering that the
averments in the complaint, not the title are controlling.—While the title of the complaint alone implies
that the action involves property rights to a piece of land, the afore-quoted prayer in the complaint
reveals that, more than property rights, the action involves hereditary or successional rights of
petitioners to their deceased father’s estate solely, composed of the subject property. Thus, even if the
original complaint filed by petitioners before the RTC is denominated as “Annulment of Title and
Damages,” we find it practicable to rule on the division of the subject property based on the rules of
succession as prayed for in the complaint, considering that the averments in the complaint, not the title
are controlling.
Appeals; Findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the Supreme Court;
Exceptions.—Although it is settled that in the exercise of the Supreme Court’s power of review, the
findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the Supreme Court, there are
recognized exceptions to this rule, namely: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3)
when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5)
when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making the findings the Court of Appeals went
beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellee and the
appellant; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
38
38 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Cruz vs. Cristobal
court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are
not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of facts are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which if properly considered, would justify
a different conclusion. Since exceptions (4) and (11) are present in the case at bar, this Court shall make
its own determination of the facts relevant for the resolution of the case.
Parent and Child; Filiation; Words and Phrases; “Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
Special Laws,” may consist of the child’s baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in
which the child’s name has been entered, common reputation respecting the child’s pedigree, admission by
silence, the testimony of witnesses, and other kinds of proof of admission under Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court.—The initial fact that needs to be established is the filiation of petitioners with the deceased
Buenaventura Cristobal. Article 172 of the Family Code provides: Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate
children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate
filiation shall be proved by: (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. “Any other means allowed by the
Rules of Court and Special Laws,” may consist of the child’s baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a
family bible in which the child’s name has been entered, common reputation respecting the child’s
pedigree, admission by silence, the testimony of witnesses, and other kinds of proof of admission under
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Same; Same; Baptismal certificate is one of the acceptable documentary evidence to prove filiation in
accordance with the Rules of Court and jurisprudence.—The baptismal certificates of Elisa, Anselmo, and
the late Socorro were presented. Baptismal certificate is one of the acceptable documentary evidence to
prove filiation in accordance with the Rules of Court and jurisprudence. In the case of
39
VOL. 498, AUGUST 7, 2006 39
Cruz vs. Cristobal
Mercedes, who was born on 31 January 1909, she produced a certification issued by the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, attesting to the fact that records of birth for the years
1901, 1909, 1932 to 1939, 1940, 1943, and 1948 were all destroyed due to ordinary wear and tear.
Succession; Extrajudicial Partition of Estate; Without the participation of all persons involved in the
proceedings, the extrajudicial settlement is not binding on said persons.—As to the validity of the Deed of
Partition of the subject property executed by the private respondents among themselves to the exclusion
of petitioners, the applicable rule is Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, which states: The fact of the
extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the
manner provided in the next succeeding section;  but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon
any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof. (Italics supplied) Under the said
provision, without the participation of all persons involved in the proceedings, the extrajudicial
settlement is not binding on said persons. In the case at bar, since the estate of the deceased
Buenaventura Cristobal is composed solely of the subject property, the partition thereof by the private
respondents already amounts to an extrajudicial settlement of Buenaventura Cristobal’s estate. The
partition of the subject property by the private respondents shall not bind the petitioners since
petitioners were excluded therefrom.
Extrajudicial Partition of Estate;  Prescription;  The action for partition is imprescriptible.—As the
extrajudicial settlement executed by the private respondents in February 1948 did not affect the right of
petitioners to also inherit from the estate of their deceased father, it was incorrect for the trial and
appellate court to hold that petitioners’ right to challenge the said settlement had prescribed.
Respondents defense of prescription against an action for partition is a vain proposition. Pursuant to
Article 494 of the Civil Code, “no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Such co-owner
may demand at anytime the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.”
In Budlong v. Bondoc, 79 SCRA 24 (1977), this Court has interpreted said provision of law to mean that
the action for partition is imprescriptible. It cannot be barred by prescription. For Article 494 of the Civil
Code explicitly declares: “No

40
40 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Cruz vs. Cristobal
prescription shall lie in favor of a co-owner or co-heirs as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes
the co-ownership.”
Filiation; Where both parents’ deaths occurred before the enactment of the New Civil Code in 1950, all
the children of the first marriage and the children of the second marriage shall share equally in the
subject property in accordance with the Old Civil Code.—It appears that the 535 square meters subject
property was a conjugal property of Buenaventura Cristobal and Donata Enriquez, the second wife, as
the property was purchased in 1926, during the time of their marriage. Upon the deaths of
Buenaventura in 1930 and Donata in 1936, both deaths occurring before the enactment of the New Civil
Code in 1950, all the four children of the first marriage and the four children of the second marriage
shall share equally in the subject property in accordance with the Old Civil Code. Absent any allegation
showing that Buenaventura Cristobal left any will and testament, the subject property shall be divided
into eight equal parts pursuant to Articles 921 and 931 of the Old Civil Code on intestate succession,
each receiving 66.875 square meters thereof.
Laches; Doctrine of Stale Demands; Words and Phrases; Laches is the negligence or omission to assert
a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has
abandoned it or declined to assert it; The doctrine of stale demands would apply only where for the reason
of the lapse of time, it would be inequitable to allow a party to enforce his legal rights.—Respondents’
defense of laches is less than convincing. Laches is the negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has abandoned it or
declined to assert it. It does not involve mere lapse or passage of time, but is principally an impediment
to the assertion or enforcement of a right, which has become under the circumstances inequitable or
unfair to permit. In our view, the doctrine of laches does not apply in the instant case. Note that upon
petitioner Elisa’s knowledge in 1994 that the title to the subject property had been transferred to the
private respondents to the exclusion of herself and her siblings from the first marriage of Buenaventura
Cristobal, petitioners filed in 1995 a petition with their barangay to settle the case among themselves
and private respondents, but since no settlement was had, they lodged a complaint before the RTC on 27
March 1995, to annul private respondents’ title over the land. There
41
VOL. 498, AUGUST 7, 2006 41
Cruz vs. Cristobal
is no evidence showing failure or neglect on their part, for an unreasonable and unexplained length
of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. The
doctrine of stale demands would apply only where for the reason of the lapse of time, it would be
inequitable to allow a party to enforce his legal rights.
Same; Same; In the absence of any strong or compelling reason, the Supreme Court is not disposed to
apply the doctrine of laches to prejudice or defeat the rights of an owner.—Absence any strong or
compelling reason, this Court is not disposed to apply the doctrine of laches to prejudice or defeat the
rights of an owner. Laches is a creation of equity and its application is controlled by equitable
considerations. Laches cannot be used to defeat justice or perpetuate an injustice. Neither should its
application be used to prevent the rightful owners of a property from recovering what has been
fraudulently registered in the name of another.
Damages;  Nominal damages is adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been
violated and invaded by defendant, may be vindicated and recognized, and not for the purpose of
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered.—Considering that (1) petitioners were unlawfully
deprived of their legal participation in the partition of the subject property; (2) this case has dragged on
for more than a decade, and (3) undoubtedly, petitioners sustained injury but the exact amount of which,
unfortunately, was not proved, we find it reasonable to grant in petitioners’ favor nominal damages.
Nominal damages is adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated and
invaded by defendant, may be vindicated and recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the
plaintiff for any loss suffered. Where these are allowed, they are not treated as an equivalent of a wrong
but simply in recognition of the existence of a technical injury. The amount to be awarded as such
damages should at least be commensurate to the injury sustained by the petitioners considering the
concept and purpose of said damages. Such award is given in view of the peculiar circumstances cited
and the special reasons extant in the present case.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
42
42 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cruz vs. Cristobal
     Rolando K. Javier for petitioners.
     Virgilio C. Papa for respondents.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
1
This Petition assails the Decision  of the Court of Appeals dated 22 July 1999 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 56402, affirming  in toto  the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City,
Branch 156, in Civil Case No. 65035 entitled, “Mercedes Cristobal, Anselmo A. Cristobal and
Elisa Cristobal Sikat vs. Eufrosina Cristobal, Florencio Cristobal, Jose Cristobal, Heirs of
Norberto Cristobal and The Register of Deeds, San Juan, M.M.”
Facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioners (Mercedes Cristobal, Anselmo Cristobal, the heirs of the deceased Socorro
Cristobal, and Elisa Cristobal-Sikat) claim that they are the legitimate children of
Buenaventura Cristobal during his first marriage to Ignacia Cristobal. On the other hand,
private respondents (Norberto, Florencio, Eufrosina and Jose, all surnamed Cristobal) are also
the children of Buenaventura Cristobal resulting from his second marriage to Donata
Enriquez.
On 18 June 1926, Buenaventura Cristobal purchased a parcel of land with an area of 535
square meters located at 194 P. Parada St., Sta. Lucia, San Juan, Metro Manila, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 10878-2 (the subject property).
Sometime in the year 1930, Buenaventura Cristobal died intestate.
More than six decades later, petitioners learned that private respondents had executed an
extrajudicial partition of the subject property and transferred its title to their names.
_______________
1  Penned by Associate Justice Teodoro P. Regino with Associate Justices Salome A. Montoya and Conrado M.
Vasquez, Jr., concurring.
 43 Cristobal wanted to construct an apartment on the lot. She said that she will have to ask the opinion of
her other brothers and sisters.
Thereafter witness testified that she made an inquiry regarding the land and she found out that the
VOL. 498, AUGUST 7, 2006 43 property belonging to their father Buenaventura Cristobal had been transferred to the defen-dants as
evidenced by transfer certificates of title issued under the names of Florencio Cristobal (Exhibit “E”),
Cruz vs. Cristobal Norberto Cristobal (Exhibit “F”), Eufrosina Cristobal (Exhibit “G”) and Jose Cristobal (Exhibit “H”).
She declared that she felt bad when she learned that the title to the property belonging to her father
Petitioners filed a petition in their barangay to attempt to settle the case 2 between them and had been transferred to her half brothers and sisters with the exclusion of herself and the other children
from the first marriage.
private respondents, but no settlement was reached. Thus, a Complaint   for Annulment of
She filed a petition in the barangay to settle the issue among themselves, however, no settlement was
Title and Damages was filed before the RTC by petitioners against private respondents to reached therein. This prompted the [petitioners] to file the present case.
recover their alleged pro-indiviso shares in the subject property. In their prayer, they sought On cross-examination, [petitioner] Elisa Cristobal Sikat admitted that she was aware that the subject
the annulment of the Deed of Partition executed by respondents on 24 February 1948; the property was owned by her father Buenaventura Cristobal even before the latter died. She like-
cancellation of TCTs No. 165132, No. 165133, No. 165134 and No. 165135 issued in the
individual names of private respondents; re-partitioning of the subject property in accordance 45
with the law of succession and the payment of P1,000,000.00 as actual or compensatory
damages; P300,000.00 as moral damages; P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees and P100,000.00 as VOL. 498, AUGUST 7, 2006 45
exemplary damages.
To prove their 3 filiation with
4
the deceased 5Buenaventura Cristobal, the baptismal Cruz vs. Cristobal
certificates of Elisa,  Anselmo, and the late Socorro  were presented.
6
In the case of Mercedes
who was born on 31 January 1909, she produced a certification   issued by the Office of the wise stated that the [private respondents] are the ones paying the real estate tax due on the lot.
Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, attesting to the fact that records of birth for Ester Santos testified for the [petitioners]. In her “Sinumpaang Salaysay” she claimed that she was a
the years 1901, 1909, 1932 to 1939, 1940, 1943, and 1948 were all destroyed due to ordinary neighbor of Mercedes, Anselmo, Socorro, Elisa, Norberto, Florencio, Eufrosina and Jose Cristobal in San
wear and tear. Juan, Metro Manila. She said that she knows that Mercedes, Anselmo, Socorro and Elisa are the
The testimonies of the parties as summarized by the trial court are as follows: children of Buenaventura Cristobal from the latter’s first marriage and the Norberto, Florencio,
Eufrosina, and Jose are the children of Buenaventura Cristobal from the latter’s second marriage.
“Witness [petitioner Elisa] further testified that her mother died when she was only one year and seven The said witness testified that Buenaventura Cristobal and his first family lived right across where
months old. She lived with the sister of her father because the latter married his second wife, Donata she stayed.
Enriquez. Her brother Anselmo and sister Socorro lived with their father and the latter’s family in the Witness corroborated the testimony of Elisa Cristobal Sikat regarding that the fact that Martina
subject property at P. Parada St., San Juan, Metro Manila. Cristobal is the sister of Buenaventura Cristobal. The said sister of Buenaventura Cristobal allegedly
took care of Elisa. Anselmo and Socorro were taken care of by Buenaventura Cristobal and the latter’s
second wife, Donata Enriquez, at P. Parada St., San Juan, Metro Manila.
_______________
When Buenaventura Cristobal died Anselmo was taken care of by Martina Cristobal together with
2 Records, pp. 1-6. Elisa. Socorro on the other hand lived with Mercedes who was then married.
3 Id., at p. 122. Witness testified that she and Elisa were classmates from Grade I until they finished high school at
4 Id., at p. 121. the Philippine School of Commerce in Manila.
5 Id., at p. 123. When the second wife of Buenaventura Cristobal died, Martina Cristobal took care of Norberto,
6 Id., at p. 124.
Florencio, Eufrosina and Jose Cristobal.
Witness said that the brothers and sisters from the first and second marriages lived together with
44
their aunt Martina Cristobal for a long time.
When Elisa got married, she and her husband built their house on the lot located at 194 P. Parada St.,
San Juan, Metro Manila. Until at present, Elisa and her family lives in the said vicinity. Witness Ester
44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Santos declared that the children from the second marriage namely Norberto, Eufrosina, Florencio and
Cruz vs. Cristobal Jose built their houses and factory at 194 P. Parada St., San Juan, Metro Manila.

46
She claimed that when their father died on February 12, 1930, his brother Anselmo stayed with her and
her auntie while Socorro stayed with their eldest sister, Mercedes, who was then married.
Meanwhile, when her stepmother Donata Enriquez died, the children from the second marriage lived 46 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
with them and her aunt Martina Cristobal.
Witness testified that she is now residing at No. 194 P. Parada St., Sta. Lucia, San Juan, Metro Cruz vs. Cristobal
Manila, the property subject of the present litigation. She has been living in the said property since 1948.
She claimed that there are other houses in the area particularly those which belong to her half brothers She said that the children from the first and second marriages of Buenaventura Cristobal had a
and sisters which were now converted into factories. harmonious relationship until sometime in 1994 when [petitioners] and Elisa Cristobal’s grandchildren
She claimed that out of the five hundred thirty-five (535) square meters she occupies only thirty-six were called “squatters” by the [private respondents] and their grandchildren for residing in the subject
(36) square meters of the subject lot. parcel of land.
She testified that the [private respondents] divided the property among themselves without giving the On cross-examination, witness Ester Santos said she cannot recall the name of the first wife of
[petitioners] their share. She said that she was offered by [private respondent] Eufrosina to choose Buenaventura Cristobal and that she only knew them to be married although she is not aware of the
between a portion of the land in question or money because one of the children of defendant Jose date when they were married.
 [Petitioners] presented Jose Cristobal to bolster the claim that they are brothers and sisters of the
[private respondents].
He claimed that the only time when he became aware that [petitioners] are his brothers and sisters
was when he lived with their aunt Martina.
He said that the reason why they were giving a portion of the lot in question to Elisa Cristobal Sikat
was because the [private respondents] want her to have a piece of property of her own and is not an
admission that she is their sister.
[Private respondents] on the other hand presented Eufrosina Cristobal as their first witness. She
testified that her parents, Buenaventura Cristobal and Donata Enriquez were married on March 24,
1919 at San Felipe Neri, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. Out of the said union, Norberto, Florentino,
Eufrosina and Jose Cristobal were born.
The witness professed that on June 18, 1926, her parents were able to buy a certain property
containing five hundred thirty-five (535) square meters.
Said witness claimed that her brother Norberto died on September 20, 1980 leaving his wife
Marcelina and children Buenaflor and Norberto, Jr.
The witness presented marked as Exhibit “33” for Norberto, Exhibit “34” for Florencio, Exhibit “35” for
Eufrosina and Exhibit “36’ for Jose the birth certificates of her brothers and sisters.
On February 24, 1948, Eufrosina admitted having executed an Extrajudicial Partition (Exhibit “D-4”)
with her brothers and sisters of the property left by their parents.
47
48 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cruz vs. Cristobal
The petition is impressed with merit. We agree with petitioners that the Court of Appeals
committed reversible error in upholding the claim of private respondents that they acquired
ownership of the entire subject property and that the claim of petitioners to the subject
property was barred by laches.
Before anything else, it must be noted that the title of the original complaint filed by
petitioners before the RTC was denominated as “Annulment of Title and Damages”;
nevertheless, the complaint prayed for the following:
1 . Declaring the Extrajudicial Partition executed by the defendants NORBERTO
CRISTOBAL, FLORENCIO CRISTOBAL, EUFROCINA CRISTOBAL and JOSE
CRISTOBAL on February 24, 1948 as null and void for being fraudulent contrary to
law on succession.
2. Canceling the following Transfer Certificates of Titles issued by the Register of Deeds
for the Province of Rizal to wit:

(a) TCT No. 165132 issued in the name of FLORENCIO CRISTOBAL married to MAURA
VOL. 498, AUGUST 7, 2006 47 RUBIO;
(b) TCT No. 165133 issued in the name of NORBERTO CRISTOBAL, married to
Cruz vs. Cristobal
PAULINA IBANEZ;
(c) TCT No. 165134 issued in the name of EUFROCINA CRISTOBAL married to
She declared that since her father died in 1930, Elisa, Mercedes, and Anselmo never asserted their
FORTUNATO DELA GUERRA; and
alleged right over the property subject of the present litigation.
She claimed that the [private respondents] have been paying all the taxes due on the parcel of land (d) TCT No. 165135 issued in the name of JOSE CRISTOBAL married to ADELAIDA
and that title to the property has been subdivided under their respective names. IBANEZ and/or TCT No. 3993—(if TCT No. 165035 was cancelled and in lieu thereof to
On cross-examination, she said that when their parents passed away they were taken care of by their ISABELITA/MA. VICTORIA, EMMA, MA. CRISTINA, JOSELITO and NELIA, all
aunt Martina who was the sister of her father. She testified that she addressed Elisa Cristobal as “Kaka” surnamed CRISTOBAL and children of JOSE CRISTOBAL, one of the defendants.)
and that7 since the time they were kids, she had known that the [petitioners] are their brothers and
sisters.”
3. Re-partitioning the subject property left by deceased BUENAVENTURA CRISTOBAL
8
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a judgment  on 11 July 1997, dismissing the according to the law on succession applicable at the time of his death.
case, ruling that petitioners failed to prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura 4. Awarding ONE-HALF of the subject property to herein plaintiffs as their lawful
Cristobal as the baptismal and birth certificates presented have scant evidentiary value and portions in the inheritance.
that petitioners’ inaction for a long period of time amounts to laches. 5. Ordering the defendants to pay to the plaintiffs the follow-ing sums of money, to wit:
Not satisfied,
9
petitioners sought recourse in the Court of Appeals which, in its
Decision   dated 22 July 1999, ruled that they were able to prove their filiation with the 49
deceased Buenaventura Cristobal thru “other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws,” but affirmed the ruling of the trial court barring their right to recover their share of the
subject property because of laches. VOL. 498, AUGUST 7, 2006 49
Hence, this Petition anchored on the sole ground that: Cruz vs. Cristobal
RESPONDENT COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF LACHES TO
THE CASE AT BAR RESULTING AS IT DOES TO GROSS INJUSTICE AND INEQUITY
10
WHICH ARE a. P1,000,000.00 as actual or compensatory damages
EXACTLY THE VERY EVILS SOUGHT TO BE PREVENTED BY SUCH PRINCIPLE
b. P300,000.00 as moral damages
c. P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees
_______________ 11
d. P100,000.0 as exemplary damages
7 Id., at pp. 314-318.
8 Id., at pp. 312-323.
9 Rollo, While the title of the complaint alone implies that the action involves property rights to a
pp. 16-24.
10 Id., at p. 8. piece of land, the aforequoted prayer in the complaint reveals that, more than property rights,
the action involves hereditary or successional rights of petitioners to their deceased father’s
48 estate solely, composed of the subject property.
 Thus, even if the original complaint filed by petitioners before the RTC is denominated as 51
“Annulment of Title and Damages,” we find it practicable to rule on the division of the subject
property based on the rules of succession as prayed for 12 in the complaint, considering that the
VOL. 498, AUGUST 7, 2006 51
averments in the complaint, not the title are controlling.
To arrive at the final resolution of the instant Petition and the lone assignment of error Cruz vs. Cristobal
therein, the following need to be resolved first: (1) whether or not petitioners were able to
prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal; (2) whether or not the
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument
petitioners are bound by the Deed of Partition of the subject property executed by the private and signed by the parent concerned.
respondents; (3) whether or not petitioners’ right to question the Deed of Partition had
prescribed; and (4) whether or not petitioners’ right to recover their share of the subject In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
property is barred by laches.
Undeniably, the foregoing issues can be resolved only after certain facts have been (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
established. Although it is settled that in the exercise of the Supreme Court’s power of review, (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the Supreme Court,
there are recognized excep- “Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and Special Laws,” may consist of the child’s
baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which the child’s name has been
_______________
entered, common reputation respecting the child’s pedigree, admission by silence, the
testimony
14
of witnesses, and other kinds of proof of admission under Rule 130 of the Rules of
11 Records, p. 5. Court. 15 16
12 Vlason Enterprises Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 369 Phil. 269, 304; 310 SCRA 26, 59 (1999). In the17
present case, the baptismal certificates of Elisa, Anselmo,   and the late
50 Socorro  were presented. Baptismal certificate is one of the acceptable documentary evidence
to prove filiation in accordance with the Rules of Court and jurisprudence.18 In the case of
Mercedes, who was born on 31 January 1909, she produced a certification   issued by the
50 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, attesting to the fact that records
of birth for the years 1901, 1909, 1932 to 1939, 1940, 1943, and 1948 were all destroyed due to
Cruz vs. Cristobal
ordinary wear and tear.
Petitioners likewise presented Ester Santos as witness who testified that petitioners
tions to this rule, namely: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, enjoyed that common reputation in
surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on _______________
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making the
14  Trinidad v. Court of Appeals,  352 Phil. 12, 32-33;  289 SCRA 188, 206-207 (1998);  Uyguangco v. Court of
findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to
Appeals, G.R. No. 76873, 26 October 1989, 178 SCRA 684, 689.
the admissions of both the appellee and the appellant; (7) when the findings are contrary to 15 Records, p. 122.
the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on 16 Id., at p. 121.
which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s 17 Id., at p. 123.

main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of facts are 18 Id., at p. 124.

premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and
52
(11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed 13
by
the parties, which if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.   Since
exceptions (4) and (11) are present in the case at bar, this Court shall make its own 52 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
determination of the facts relevant for the resolution of the case.
The initial fact that needs to be established is the filiation of petitioners with the deceased Cruz vs. Cristobal
Buenaventura Cristobal.
Article 172 of the Family Code provides: the community where they reside as being the children of Buenaventura Cristobal with his
“Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
first wife. Testimonies of witnesses were also 19
presented to prove filiation by continuous
possession of the status as a legitimate child.
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or In contrast, it bears to point out that private respondents were unable to present any proof
to refute the petitioners’ claim and evidences of filiation to Buenaventura Cristobal.
The foregoing evidence thus suffice to convince this Court that petitioners are, indeed,
_______________
children of the late Buenaventura Cristobal during the first marriage.
13 Langkaan Realty Development, Inc v. United Coconut Planters Bank, G.R. No. 139437, 8 December 2000,  347 As to the validity of the Deed of Partition of the subject property executed by the private
SCRA 542, 549;  Nokom v. National Labor Relations Commission,  390 Phil. 1228, 1243;  336 SCRA 97, 110 respondents among themselves to the exclusion of petitioners, the applicable rule is Section 1,
(2000); Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Embroidery and Garments Industries (Phils.), Inc., 364 Phil. 541, 546- Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, which states:
547;  305 SCRA 70, 74-75 (1999);  Sta. Maria v. Court of Appeals,  349 Phil. 275, 282-283;  285 SCRA 351, 357-358
(1998).
“The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of general
circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be
binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.” (Italics supplied)
Under the said provision, without the participation of all persons
20
involved in the proceedings,
the extrajudicial settlement is not binding on said persons.  In the case at bar, since the estate
of the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal is composed solely of the subject property, the
partition thereof by the private respondents already amounts to an extrajudicial settlement of
Buenaventura Cristobal’s estate. The partition of the subject property by the private
respondents shall not bind the petitioners since petitioners were excluded therefrom.
Petitioners were not aware of the Deed of Partition executed by private respondents among
themselves in 1948. Petitioner Elisa became aware of the transfer and registration
_______________
19 Id.,
at pp. 315-317.
20 Pedrosa
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118680, 5 March 2001, 353 SCRA 620, 628.
53
Cruz vs. Cristobal
scription shall lie in favor of24
a co-owner or co-heirs as long as he expressly or impliedly
recognizes the co-ownership.”
Considering that the Deed of Partition of the subject property does not affect the right of
petitioners to inherit from their deceased father, this Court shall then proceed to divide the
subject property between petitioners and private respondents, as the rule on succession
prescribes.
It appears that the 535 square meters subject property was a conjugal property of
Buenaventura Cristobal and Donata Enriquez, the second wife, as the property was purchased
25
in 1926, during the time of their marriage. Upon the deaths of Buenaventura in 1930 and
Donata in 1936, both deaths occurring before the enactment of the New Civil Code in 1950, all
the four children of the first marriage and the four children of the second marriage shall share
equally in the subject property in accordance with the Old Civil Code. Absent any allegation
showing that Buenaventura Cristobal left any will and testament, the subject property shall
26 27
be divided into eight equal parts pursuant to Articles 921  and 931  of the Old Civil Code on
intestate succession, each receiving 66.875 square meters thereof.

VOL. 498, AUGUST 7, 2006 53 _______________

24 Tomas Claudio Memorial College, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 374 Phil. 859, 866; 316 SCRA 502, 510 (1999).
Cruz vs. Cristobal 25 Buenaventura Cristobal and Donata Enriquez were married on 24 March 1919.
26 Article 921. In every inheritance the relative nearest in degree excludes the one more remote, except in cases in

of the subject property in the names of private respondents only in 1994 when she was offered which the right of representation exists.
by private respondent Eufrocina to choose between a portion of the subject property or money, Relatives in the same degree shall inherit in equal portions, subject to the provisions of Article 949 with respect to relationship by
the whole blood.
as one of the children
21
of private respondent Jose wanted to construct an apartment on the
subject property.  This led petitioner Elisa to inquire as to the status of the subject property. 27  Article 931. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other ascendants, without

She learned afterwards that the title to the subject property had been transferred to the distinction of sex or age, even though they spring from different marriages.
names of private respondents, her half brothers and sisters, to the exclusion of herself and her
55
siblings from the first marriage of Buenaventura Cristobal. The Deed of Partition excluded
four of the eight heirs of Buenaventura Cristobal who were also entitled to their respective
shares in the subject property. Since petitioners were not able to participate in the execution VOL. 498, AUGUST 7, 2006 55
of the Deed of Partition, which constitutes as an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the
late Buenaventura Cristobal by private respondents, such settlement is not binding on Cruz vs. Cristobal
22
them.  As the extrajudicial settlement executed by the private respondents in February 1948
did not affect the right of petitioners to also inherit from the estate of their deceased father, it At the time of death of Buenaventura Cristobal in 1930, Donata was only entitled to the
was incorrect for the trial and appellate court to hold that petitioners’ right to challenge the usufruct of the land pursuant to Article 834 of the Old Civil Code, which provides:
said settlement had prescribed. Respondents defense of prescription against an action for
partition is a vain proposition. Pursuant to Article 494 of the Civil Code, “no co-owner shall be “ART. 834. A widower or widow who, on the death of his or her spouse, is not divorced, or should be so by
obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Such co-owner may demand at anytime the partition of the fault of the deceased, shall be entitled to a portion in usufruct equal to that corresponding by way of
23
legitime to each of the legitimate children or descendants who has not received any betterment.
the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.” In Budlong v. Bondoc,   this
If only one legitimate child or descendant survives, the widow or widower shall have the usufruct of
Court has interpreted said provision of law to mean that the action for partition is the third availment for betterment, such child or descendant to have the naked ownership until, on the
imprescriptible. It cannot be barred by prescription. For Article 494 of the Civil Code explicitly death of the surviving spouse, the whole title is merged in him.”
declares: “No pre-
Donata’s right to usufruct of the subject property terminated upon her death in 1936.
_______________ Accordingly, the  pro indiviso  shares of Buenaventura Cristobal’s eight children and their
heirs, by right of representation, upon his death in 1930, are as follows:
21 TSN, 15 March 1995, p. 10.
22 Pedrosa v. Court of Appeals, supra  note 20;  Ancog v. Court of Appeals,  G.R. No. 1122260, 30 June 1997,  274 (1) Mercedes Cristobal — 66.875 square meters
SCRA 676.
23 G.R. No. L-27702, 9 September 1977, 79 SCRA 24.
(2) Amselmo Cristobal — 66.875 square meters
54 (3) Socorrro Cristobal — 66.875 square meters
(4) Elisa Cristobal- — 66.875 square meters
54 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Sikat
 erty; (2) this case has dragged on for more than a decade, and (3) undoubtedly, petitioners
(5) Norberto Cristobal — 66.875 square meters
sustained injury but the exact amount of which, unfortunately, was not proved, we find it
(6) Florencio Cristobal — 66.875 square meters reasonable to grant in petitioners’ favor nominal damages. Nominal damages is adjudicated in
order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated and invaded by defendant, may be
(7) Eufrocina Cristobal — 66.875 square meters vindicated and recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss
31

(8) Jose Cristobal — 66.875 square suffered.   Where these are allowed, they are not treated as an equivalent of a wrong but
meters      simply in recognition of the existence of a technical injury. The amount to be awarded as such
damages should at least be commensurate to the 32injury sustained by the petitioners
considering the concept and purpose of said damages.   Such award is given 33in view of the
The Court will now determine whether petitioners’ right to their shares in the subject property peculiar circumstances cited and the special reasons extant in the present case.
can be barred by laches. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court rules as follows:
Respondents’ defense of laches is less than convincing. Laches is the negligence or omission
to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to (1) The Petition is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
assert it has abandoned it or declined to assert it. It does not involve mere lapse or passage of REVERSED and SET ASIDE;
time, but is prin- (2) Petitioners are RECOGNIZED and DECLARED as children of the late Buenaventura
56 Cristobal from his first marriage to Ignacia Cristobal;
(3) The Deed of Partition executed by private respondents is DECLARED not binding
upon petitioners who were not notified or did not participate in the execution thereof;
56 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cruz vs. Cristobal _______________
31 PNOC Shipping and Transport Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107518, 8 October 1998, 297 SCRA 402, 426,

cipally an impediment to the assertion or enforcement

28
of a right, which has become under the
circumstances inequitable or unfair to permit.
In our view, the doctrine of laches does not apply in the instant case. Note that upon
petitioner Elisa’s knowledge in 1994 that the title to the subject property had been transferred
to the private respondents to the exclusion of herself and her siblings from the first marriage
of Buenaventura Cristobal, petitioners filed in 1995 a petition with their  barangay  to settle
the case among themselves and private respondents, but since no settlement was had, they
lodged a complaint before the RTC on 27 March 1995, to annul private respondents’ title over
the land. There is no evidence showing failure or neglect on their part, for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should
have been done earlier. The doctrine of stale demands would apply only where for the reason
of the lapse of time, it would be inequitable to allow a party to enforce his legal rights.
Moreover, absence any strong or compelling reason, this Court is not disposed to apply the
29
doctrine of laches to prejudice or defeat the rights of an owner.  Laches is a creation of equity
and its application is controlled by equitable considerations. Laches cannot be used to defeat
justice or perpetuate an injustice. Neither should its application be used to prevent the
rightful owners of30
a property from recovering what has been fraudulently registered in the
name of another.
Considering that (1) petitioners were unlawfully deprived of their legal participation in the
partition of the subject prop-
_______________
28 Aguirre v. Court of Appeals, G.R No. 122249, 29 January 2004, 421 SCRA 310, 323.
29 Tsai v. Court of Appeals, 418 Phil. 606, 621; 366 SCRA 324, 338 (2001); Noel v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 59550,
11 January 1995, 240 SCRA 78.
30 Occeña v. Esponilla, G.R. No. 156973, 4 June 2004, 431 SCRA 116, 126.
57
VOL. 498, AUGUST 7, 2006 57
Cruz vs. Cristobal
citing RobesFrancisco Realty & Development Corporation v. Court of First Instance of Rizal (Branch XXXIV), G.R. No.
L-41093, 30 October 1978, 86 SCRA 59, 65.
32 China Air Lines, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 45985, 18 May 1990, 185 SCRA 449, 460.
33 PNOC Shipping and Transport Corp. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 31.
58
58 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cruz vs. Cristobal
(4) The subject property, covered by TCTs No. 165132, No. 165133, 165134, and No.
165135, in the name of private respondents consisting of 535 square meters is
ORDERED to be partitioned and distributed in accordance with this Decision and
appropriate certificates of title be issued in favor of each of the recognized heirs of the
late Cristobal Buenaven-tura, and
(5) Petitioners are AWARDED the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P100,000.00) PESOS as damages, to be paid by private respondents.
Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
     Panganiban (C.J., Chairperson), Ynares-Santiago, Aus-tria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr.,
JJ., concur.
Petition granted, assailed decision reversed and set aside; petitioners recognized and
declared children of the late Buenaventura Cristobal from his first marriage to Ignacia
Cristobal; Deed of Partition declared not binding upon petitioners who were not notified or did
not participate in execution thereof; and subject property ordered partitioned and distributed.
Notes.—Trial court has no jurisdiction to entertain an action for partition and recovery of
properties belonging to the estate of a deceased person while the proceedings for the
settlement of said estate are still pending in another branch of the same court. (Solivio vs.
Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA 119 [1990])
Children born prior to marriage cannot be legitimated nor in any way considered legitimate
if at the time they were born there was an existing valid marriage between the father and his
first wife. (Abadilla vs. Tabiliran, Jr., 249 SCRA 447 [1995])

VOL. 205, JANUARY 23, 1992 321
Sayson vs. Court of Appeals
*
G.R. Nos. 89224-25. January 23, 1992.
MAURICIO SAYSON, ROSARIO SAYSON-MALONDA, BASILISA SAYSON-LIRIO,
REMEDIOS SAYSON-REYES and JUANA C. BAUTISTA, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, DELIA SAYSON, assisted by her husband, CIRILO CEDO, JR.,
EDMUNDO SAYSON AND DORIBEL SAYSON, respondents.
Civil Law; Adoption; Petitioners' challenge to the validity of the adoption cannot be made collaterally
but in a direct proceedings frontally addressing the issue.—A  no less important argument against the
petitioners is that their challenge to the validity of the adoption
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
322
322 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Sayson vs. Court of Appeals
cannot be made collaterally, as in their action for partition, but in a direct proceeding frontally
addressing the issue. The settled rule is that a finding that the requisite jurisdictional facts exists,
whether erroneous or not, cannot be questioned in a collateral proceeding,  for a presumption arises in
such cases where the validity of the judgment is thus attacked that the necessary jurisdictional facts
were proven [Freeman on Judgments, Vol. I, Sec. 350, pp. 719-720]. (Emphasis supplied.) In the case of
Santos v. Aranzanso, this Court declared: Anent this point, the rulings are summed up in 2 American
Jurisprudence, 2nd Series, Adoption, Sec. 75, p. 922, thus: An adoption order implies the finding of the
necessary facts and the burden of proof is on the party attacking it; it cannot be considered void merely
because the fact needed to show statutory compliance is obscure. While a judicial determination of some
particular fact, such as the abandonment of his next of kin to the adoption, may be essential to the
exercise of jurisdiction to enter the order of adoption, this does not make it essential to the jurisdictional
validity of the decree that the fact be determined upon proper evidence, or necessarily in accordance with
the truth; a mere error cannot affect the jurisdiction, and the determination must stand until reversed on
appeal, and hence cannot be collaterally attacked. If this were not the rule, the status of adopted children
would always be uncertain, since the evidence might not be the same at all investigations, and might be
regarded with different effect by different tribunals, and the adoption might be held by one court to have
been valid, while another court would hold it to have been of no avail. (Emphasis supplied.)
Same;  Family Code;  Paternity and filiation;  Proof of filiation;Doribel's birth certificate is a
formidable piece of evidence. It is one of the prescribed means of recognition under Art. 265 of the Civil
Code and Art. 172 of the Family Code.—On the question of Doribel's legitimacy, we hold that the findings
of the trial courts as affirmed by the respondent court must be sustained. Doribel's birth certificate is a
formidable piece of evidence. It is one of the prescribed means of recognition under Article 265 of the
Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code. It is true, as the petitioners stress, that the birth
certificate offers only prima facieevidence of filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence. However,
such evidence is lacking in the case at bar.
Same;  Same;  Same;  Same;  Remedial Law;  Evidence;  The evidentiary nature of public documents
must be sustained in the absence of strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity.—
Mauricio's
323
VOL. 205, JANUARY 23, 1992 323
Sayson vs. Court of Appeals
testimony that he was present when Doribel was born to Edita Abila was understandably suspect,
coming as it did from an interested party. The affidavit of Abila denying her earlier statement in the
petition for the guardianship of Doribel is of course hearsay, let alone the fact that it was never offered in
evidence in the lower courts. Even without it, however, the birth certificate must be upheld in line with
Legaspi v. Court of Appeals, where we ruled that "the evidentiary nature of public documents must be
sustained in the absence of strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity."
Same;  Same;  Same;  Same;  Same;  Special Civil Actions;  Partition;  Doribel's legitimacy cannot be
questioned in a complaint for partition and accounting but in a direct action seasonably filed by the
proper party.—Another reason why the petitioners' challenge must fail is the impropriety of the present
proceedings for that purpose. Doribel's legitimacy cannot be questioned in a complaint for partition and
accounting but in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party. The presumption of legitimacy in
the Civil Code x x x does not have this purely evidential character. It serves a more fundamental
purpose. It actually fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and that civil status  cannot be
attacked collaterally.  The legitimacy of the child  can be impugned only in a direct action brought for
that by the proper parties, and within the period limited by law. The legitimacy of the child  cannot be
contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue  in another action for a different purpose. x x x.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Same; Adoption; Succession; Representation; While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to
be a legitimate child and have the same rights as the latter, these rights do not include the right of
representation.—There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the
granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent her deceased father in the
distribution of the intestate estate of her grandparents. Under Article 981, quoted above, she is entitled
to the share her father would have directly inherited had he survived, which shall be equal to the shares
of her grandparents' other children. But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and
Edmundo, to whom the grandparents were total strangers. While it is true that the adopted child shall
be deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same rights as the latter, these rights do not include the
right of representation. The relationship created by the adoption is between only the adopting parents
and the adopted child and does not extend to the blood relatives of either party.
324
324 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sayson vs. Court of Appeals
PETITION for review by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
CRUZ, J.:
At issue in this case is the status of the private respondents and their capacity to inherit from
their alleged parents and grandparents. The petitioners deny them that right, asserting it for
themselves to the exclusion of all others.

The relevant genealogical facts are as follows.
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa,
Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno died on November 10, 1952, and Rafaela on May 15, 1976.
Teodoro, who had married Isabel Bautista, died on March 23, 1972. His wife died nine years
later, on March 26,1981. Their properties were left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo, and
Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who claim to be their children.
On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with Juana C.
Bautista, Isabel's mother, filed a complaint for partition and accounting of the intestate estate
of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. It was docketed as  Civil Case No. 1030  in Branch 13 of the
Regional Trial Court of Albay. The action was resisted by Delia, Edmundo and Doribel Sayson,
who alleged successional rights to the disputed estate as the decedent's lawful descendants.
On July 11, 1983, Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint, this time for the
accounting and partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, against the
couple's four surviving children. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 1042 in the Regional
Trial Court of Albay, Branch 12. The complainants asserted the defense they raised in Civil
Case No. 1030, to wit, that Delia and Edmundo were the adopted children and Doribel was the
legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As such, they were entitled to inherit Teodoro's
share in his parents' estate by right of representation.
Both cases were decided in favor of the herein private respondents on the basis of
practically the same evidence.
Judge Rafael P. Santelices declared in his decision dated May
325
VOL. 205, JANUARY 23, 1992 325
Sayson vs. Court of Appeals
1
26, 1986,   that Delia and Edmundo were the legally adopted children
2
of Teodoro and Isabel
Sayson by virtue of the decree of adoption dated March 9, 1967.  Doribel was
3
their legitimate
daughter as evidenced by her birth certificate dated February 27, 1967.   Consequently, the
three children were entitled to inherit from Eleno and Rafaela by right of representation. In
4
his decision dated September 30, 1986,  Judge Jose S. Sañez dismissed  Civil Case No. 1030,
holding that the defendants, being the legitimate heirs of Teodoro and Isabel as established by
the aforementioned evidence, excluded the plaintiffs from sharing in their estate.
Both cases were appealed to the Court of Appeals, where they were consolidated. In its own
decision dated February 28, 1989,5 the respondent court disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, in Civil Case No. 1030 (CA-G.R. No. 11541), the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
In  Civil Case No. 1042(CAG.R. No. 12364), the appealed decision is MODIFIED in that Delia and
Edmundo Sayson are disqualified from inheriting from the estate of the deceased spouses Eleno and
Rafaela Sayson, but is affirmed in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
That judgment is now before us in this petition for review by  certiorari.  Reversal of the
respondent court is sought on the ground that it disregarded the evidence of the petitioners
and misapplied the pertinent law and jurisprudence when it declared the private respondents
as the exclusive heirs of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson.
The contention of the petitioners is that Delia and Edmundo were not legally adopted
because Doribel had already been born on February 27, 1967, when the decree of adoption was
issued on March 9, 1967. The birth of Doribel disqualified her parents
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 66-71.
2 Exhibit C.
3 Exhibit
B.
4 Rollo,
pp. 60-64.
5 Martinez, J., ponente, with Castro-Bartolome and Elbinias, JJ.,concurring.
326
326 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sayson vs. Court of Appeals
from adopting. The pertinent provision is Article 335 of the Civil Code, naming among those
who cannot adopt "(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children,
or natural children by legal fiction."
Curiously enough, the petitioners also argue that Doribel herself is not the legitimate
daughter of Teodoro and Isabel but was in fact born to one Edita Abila, 6
who manifested in a
petition for guardianship of the child that she was her natural mother.
The inconsistency of this position is immediately apparent. The petitioners seek to annul
the adoption of Delia and Edmundo on the ground that Teodoro and Isabel already had a
legitimate daughter at the time but in the same breath try to demolish this argument by
denying that Doribel was born to the couple.
On top of this, there is the vital question of timeliness. It is too late now to challenge the
decree7 of adoption, years after it became final and executory. That was way back in
1967.   Assuming that the petitioners were proper parties, what they should have done was
seasonably appeal the decree of adoption, pointing to the birth of Doribel that disqualified
Teodoro and Isabel from adopting Delia and Edmundo. They did not. In fact, they should have
done this earlier, before the decree of adoption was issued. They did not, although Mauricio
claimed he had personal knowledge of such birth.
As the respondent court correctly observed:
When Doribel was born on February 27, 1967, or about TEN (10) days before the issuance of the Order of
Adoption, the petitioners could have notified the court about the fact of birth of DORIBEL and perhaps
withdrew the petition or perhaps petitioners could have filed a petition for the revocation or rescission of
the adoption (although the birth of a child is not one of those provided by law for the revocation or
rescission of an adoption). The court is of the considered opinion that the adoption of the plaintiffs
DELIA and EDMUNDO SAYSON is valid, outstanding and binding to the present, the same not having
been revoked or rescinded.
Not having any information of Doribel's birth to Teodoro and
_______________
6 Original Records of Civil Case No. 1042, pp. 115-117
7 Exhibit C.
327
VOL. 205, JANUARY 23, 1992 327
Sayson vs. Court of Appeals
Isabel Sayson, the trial judge cannot be faulted for granting the petition for adoption on the
finding inter aliathat the adopting parents were not disqualified.
A no less important argument against the petitioners is that their challenge to the validity
of the adoption cannot be made collaterally, as in their action for partition, but in a direct
proceeding frontally addressing the issue.
The settled rule is that a finding that the requisite jurisdictional facts exists, whether erroneous or
not, cannot be questioned in a collateral proceeding,  for a presumption arises in such cases where the
validity of the judgment is thus attacked that the necessary jurisdictional facts were proven [Freeman on
Judgments, Vol. I, Sec. 350, pp. 719-720]. (Emphasis supplied.)
8
In the case of Santos v. Aranzanso,  this Court declared:
Anent this point, the rulings are summed up in 2 American Jurisprudence, 2nd Series, Adoption, Sec. 75,
p. 922, thus:
An adoption order implies the finding of the necessary facts and the burden of proof is on the party attacking it; it
cannot be considered void merely because the fact needed to show statutory compliance is obscure. While a judicial
determination of some particular fact, such as the abandonment of his next of kin to the adoption, may be essential
to the exercise of jurisdiction to enter the order of adoption, this does not make it essential to the jurisdictional
validity of the decree that the fact be determined upon proper evidence, or necessarily in accordance with the truth;
a mere error cannot affect the jurisdiction, and the determination must stand until reversed on appeal, and
hence  cannot be collaterally attacked.  If this were not the rule, the status of adopted children would always be
uncertain, since the evidence might not be the same at all investigations, and might be regarded with different effect
by different tribunals, and the adoption might be held by one court to have been valid, while another court would
hold it to have been of no avail. (Emphasis supplied.)
On the question of Doribel's legitimacy, we hold that the find-
_______________
8 16 SCRA 344.
328
328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sayson vs. Court of Appeals
ings of the trial courts as affirmed by the respondent court must be sustained. Doribers birth
certificate is a formidable piece of evidence. It is one of the prescribed means of recognition
under Article 265 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code. It9 is true, as the
petitioners stress, that the birth certificate offers  only prima facie  evidence   of filiation and
may be refuted by contrary evidence. However, such evidence is lacking in the case at bar.
Mauricio's testimony that he was present when Doribel was born to Edita Abila was
understandably suspect, coming as it did from an interested party. The affidavit of
10
Abila   denying her earlier statement in the petition for the guardianship of Doribel is of
course hearsay, let alone the fact that it was never offered in evidence in the lower courts.
Even without it, however, the birth certificate must be upheld in line with Legaspi v. Court of
11
Appeals,  where we ruled that "the evidentiary nature of public documents must be sustained
in the absence of strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity."
Another reason why the petitioners' challenge must fail is the impropriety of the present
proceedings for that purpose. Doribel's legitimacy cannot be questioned in a complaint for
partition and accounting but in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party.
The presumption of legitimacy in the Civil Code x x x does not have this purely evidential character. It
serves a more fundamental purpose. It actually fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and that
civil status cannot be attacked collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct
action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties, and within the period limited by law.
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue  in another
12
action for a different purpose. x x x.
_______________
9 Rule 131, Sec. 5(m), which provides the disputable presumption that official duty has been regularly performed; Article 410 of
the Civil Code, which provides: "The books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto shall be considered
public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained."
10 Rollo, pp. 52-53.
11 142 SCRA 82.
12 Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 1, p. 559.
329
VOL. 205, JANUARY 23, 1992 329
Sayson vs, Court of Appeals
(Emphasis supplied.)
In consequence of the above observations, we hold that Doribel, as the legitimate daughter of
Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and Delia and Edmundo, as their adopted children, are the
exclusive heirs to the intestate estate of the deceased couple, conformably to the following
Article 979 of the Civil Code:
Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other ascendants, without
distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should come from different marriages.
An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting parents in the same manner as a legitimate
child.
The philosophy underlying this article is that a person's love descends first to his children and
grandchildren before it ascends to his parents and thereafter spreads among his collateral
relatives. It is also supposed that one of his purposes in acquiring properties is to leave them
eventually to his children as a token of his love for them and as a provision for their continued
care even after he is gone from this earth.
Coming now to the right of representation, we stress first the following pertinent provisons
of the Civil Code:
Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the representative is
raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights which the latter
would have if he were living or if he could have inherited.
Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the person represented.
The representative does not succeed the person represented but the one whom the person represented
would have succeeded.
Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other children who are dead, survive, the
former shall inherit in their own right, and the latter by right of representation.
There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the granddaughter of
Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent her deceased father in the distribution of
the intestate estate of her grandparents. Under Article 981, quoted above, she is entitled to
the share her father would have
330
330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sayson vs. Court of Appeals
directly inherited
13
had he survived, which shall be equal to the shares of her grandparents'
other children.
But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo, to whom the
grandparents were total strangers. While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to
be a legitimate child and have the same right as the latter, these rights do not include the
right of representation. The relationship created by the adoption is between only the adopting
14
parents and the adopted child and does not extend to the blood relatives of either party.
 In sum, we agree with the lower courts that Delia and Edmundo as the adopted children
and Doribel as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro Sayson and Isabel Bautista, are their
exclusive heirs and are under no obligation to share the estate of their parents with the
petitioners. The Court of Appeals was correct however, in holding that only Doribel has the
right of representation in the inheritance of her grandparents' intestate estate, the other
private respondents being only the adoptive children of the deceased Teodoro.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the challenged decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the petitioners.

     Narvasa (C.J.), Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ.,concur.

Petition denied; decision affirmed.

Note.—The testimonies of complainant and witnesses, another maid, to show unusual

closeness between respondent and Jewel, like playing with him and giving him toys, are not
convincing enough to prove paternity. (Tan vs. Trocio, 191 SCRA 764.)

——o0o——

_______________
13 Article 972, Civil Code.
14 Teotico v. Del Val, 13 SCRA 406.

518 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tamargo vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 85044. June 3, 1992.*
MACARIO TAMARGO, CELSO TAMARGO and AURELIA TAMARGO, petitioners,  vs.  THE
HON. COURT OF APPEALS; THE HON. ARISTON L. RUBIO, RTC Judge, Branch 20, Vigan,
IIocos Sur; VICTOR BUNDOC; and CLARA BUNDOC, respondents.
Supreme Court; Motions; While notice of time and place of hear-ing is mandatory in motion, Supreme
Court may suspend its rules thereon to prevent manifest injustice to appellant—As in fact repeatedly held
by this Court, what is mandatory is the service of the motion
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
519
VOL. 209, JUNE 3, 1992 519
Tamargo vs. Court of Appeals
on the opposing counsel indicating the time.and place of hearing. In view, however, of the nature of
the issue raised in the instant Petition, and in order that substantial justice may be served, the Court,
invoking its right to suspend the application of technical rules to prevent manifest injustice, elects to
treat the notice of appeal as having been seasonably filed before the trial court, and the motion (and
supplemental motion) for reconsideration filed by petitioner in the trial court as having interrupted the
reglementary period for appeal.
Actions; Quasi-delicts; Parents and Child; Adoption; The natural parents of a minor still living with
the former when the latter accidentally shot a girl with an air rifle are liable for damages thus caused
rather than the adopter even if petition for adoption filed before the accident and granted thereafter.—We
do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as having been retroactively transferred to
and vested in the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle shooting happened.
We do not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a
liability upon the adopting parents accruing  at a time when the adopting parents had no actual or
physical custody over the adopted child.Retroactive effect may perhaps be given to the granting of the
petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor
of the adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority had been retroactively
lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could not
have foreseen and which they could not have prevented (since they were at the time in the United States
and had no physical custody over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable. Such a result,
moreover, would be inconsistent with the philosophical and policy basis underlying the doctrine of
vicarious liability. Put a little differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the
adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to their
control at the time the tort was committed.
Same; Same.—Under the above Article 35, parental authority is provisionally vested in the adopting
parents during the period of trial custody, i.e., before the issuance of a decree of adoption,  precisely
because the adopting parents are given actual custody of the child during such trial period. In the instant
case, the trial custody period either had not yet begun or had already been completed at the time of the
air rifle shooting; in any case, actual custody of Adelberto was then with his natural parents, not the
adopting parents.
520
520 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tamargo vs. Court of Appeals
PETITION for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
FELICIANO, J.:
On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo
with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil complaint for
damages was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur, docketed as
Civil Case No. 3457-V, by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting parent, and
petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents, against respondent
spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was living at the
time of the tragic incident, In addition to this case for damages, a criminal information for
Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was filed [Criminal Case No. 1722-V] against
Adelberto Bundoc. Adelberto, however, was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability on
the ground that he had acted without discernment.
Prior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981, the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had
filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc in Special Proceedings No. 0373-T before
the then Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. This petition for adoption was granted on 18
November 1982, that is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.
In their Answer, respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the
result of the foregoing petition for adoption, claimed that not they, but rather the adopting
parents, namely the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the
action since parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the
successful petition for adoption was filed.
Petitioners in their Reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living
with his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished by the mere
filing and granting of a petition for adoption.
The trial court on 3 December 1987 dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling that
respondent natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not indispensable parties to the action.
521
VOL. 209, JUNE 3, 1992 521
Tamargo vs. Court of Appeals
Petitioners received a copy of the trial court's Decision on 7 December 1987. Within the 15-day
reglementary period, or on 14 December 1987, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
followed by a supplemental motion for reconsideration on 15 January 1988. It appearing,
however, that the motions failed to comply with Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Revised
Rules of Court—that notice of the motion shall be given to all parties concerned at least three
(3) days before the hearing of said motion; and that said notice shall state the time and place
of hearing—both motions were denied by the trial court in an Order dated 18 April 1988. On
28 April 1988, petitioners filed a notice of appeal. In its Order dated 6 June 1988, the trial

court dismissed the notice of appeal, this time ruling that the notice had been filed beyond the
15-day reglementary period ending 22 December 1987.
Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for mandamus and certiorari
questioning the trial court's Decision dated 3 December 1987 and the Orders dated 18 April
1988 and 6 June 1988. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, ruling that petitioners
had lost their right to appeal.
In the present Petition for Review, petitioners once again contend that respondent spouses
Bundoc are the indispensable parties to the action for damages caused by the acts of their
minor child, Adelberto Bundoc. Resolution of this Petition hinges on the following issues: (1)
whether or not petitioners, notwithstanding loss of their right to appeal, may still file the
instant Petition; conversely, whether the Court may still take cognizance of the case even
through petitioners' appeal had been filed out of time; and (2) whether or not the effects of
adoption, insofar as parental authority is concerned, may be given retroactive effect so as to
make the adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed against their
adopted child, for acts committed by the latter when actual custody was yet lodged with the
biological parents.
1. It will be recalled that petitioners' motion (and supplemental motion) for reconsideration
filed before the trial court, not having complied with the requirements of Section 13, Rule 41,
and Section 4, Rule 15, of the Revised Rules of Court, were considered pro forma and hence did
not interrupt and suspend the reglementary period to appeal: the trial court held that the
522
522 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tamargo vs. Court of Appeals
motions, not having contained a notice of time and place of 1hearing, had become useless pieces
of paper which did not interrupt the reglementary period.  As in fact repeatedly held by this
Court, what is mandatory2 is the service of the motion on the opposing counsel indicating the
time and place of hearing.
In view, however, of the nature of the issue raised in the instant Petition, and in order that
substantial justice may be served, the Court, invoking its right to suspend the application of
technical rules to prevent manifest injustice, elects to treat the notice of appeal as having been
seasonably filed before the trial court, and the motion (and supplemental motion) for
reconsideration filed by petitioner in the trial court as having interrupted
3
the reglementary
period for appeal. As the Court held in Gregorio v. Court of Appeals:
"Dismissal of appeal purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the courts is to
encourage hearings of appeal on their merits. The rules of procedure ought not be applied in a very rigid
technical sense, rules of procedure are used only to help secure not override, substantial
4
justice. If a
technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made, their aim would be defeated."
2. It is not disputed that Adelberto Bundoc's voluntary act of shooting Jennifer Tamargo with
an air rifle gave rise to a cause of action on quasi-delict against him. As Article 2176 of the
Civil Code provides:
"Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict x x x."
Upon the other hand, the law imposes civil liability upon the father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, for
______________
1 Pojas
v. Hon. Gozo-Dalole, 192 SCRA 575 (1990).
2  Fecundo v. Berjamen,  180 SCRA 235  (1989);  Filipinas Fabricators and Sales, Inc. v. Magsino,  157 SCRA
469 (1988).
3 72 SCRA 120 (1976).
4 Id, at 126.
523
VOL, 209, JUNE 3, 1992 523
Tamargo vs. Court of Appeals
any damages that may be caused by a minor child who lives with them. Article 2180 of the
Civil Code reads:
"The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused
by the minor children who live in their company.
xxx      xxx      xxx
The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the person herein mentioned prove that
they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage." (Italics supplied)
This principle of parental liability is a species of what is frequently designated as vicarious
liability, or the doctrine of "imputed negligence" under Anglo-American tort law, where a
person is not only liable for torts committed by himself, but also for torts committed by others
with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is responsible. Thus, parental
liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities of parents—
their 5parental authority—which includes the instructing, controlling and disciplining of the
child.  The basis for the
6
doctrine of vicarious liability was explained by the Court in Cangco v.
Manila Railroad Co.   in the following terms:
"With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from negligence, whether of act or omission, it is
competent for the legislature to elect—and our Legislature has so elected—to limit such liability to cases
in which the person upon whom such an obligation is imposed is morally culpable or, on the contrary, for
reasons of public policy, to extend that liability , without regard to the lack of moral culpability, so as to
include responsibility for the negligence of those persons whose acts or omissions are imputable,by a legal
fiction, to others who are in a position to exercise an absolute or limited control over them. The legislature
which adopted our Civil Code has elected to limit extra-
_______________
5 See in this connection, Art. 311, 316, 357, Civil Code; Exconde v. Capuno, 101 Phil. 843 (1957).
6 38 Phil. 768 (1918).
524
524 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tamargo vs. Court of Appeals
contractual liability—with certain well-defined exceptions—to cases in which moral culpability can be
directly imputed to the persons to be charged. This moral responsibility may consist in having failed to
exercise due care in one's own acts, or in having failed to exercise due care in the selection and control of
one's agents or servants, or in the control of persons who, by reasons of their status, occupy a position of
dependency with respect to the person made liable for their conduct."7 (Italics supplied)
The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their minor children living with them,
may be seen to be based upon the parental authority vested by the Civil Code upon such
parents. The civil law assumes that when an unemancipated child living with its parents
commits a tortious act, the parents were negligent in the performance of their legal and
natural duty closely to supervise the child who is in their custody and control. Parental
liability is, in other words, anchored upon parental authority coupled with presumed parental
dereliction in the discharge of the duties accompanying such authority. The parental
dereliction is, of course, only presumed and the presumption can be overturned under Article
2180 of the Civil Code by proof that the parents had exercised all the diligence of a good father
of a family to prevent the damage.
In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle occurred when
parental authority was still lodged in respondent Bundoc spouses, the natural parents of the
minor Adelberto. It would thus follow that the natural parents who had then actual custody of
the minor Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.
The natural parents of Adelberto, however, stoutly maintain that because a decree of
adoption was issued by the adoption court in favor of the Rapisura spouses, parental authority
was vested in the latter as adopting parents  as of the time of the filing of the petition for
adoption  that is,  before  Adelberto had shot Jennifer with an air rifle. The Bundoc spouses
contend that they were therefore free of any parental responsibility for Adelberto's allegedly
tortious conduct.
______________
7 Id., at 775-776.
525
VOL. 209, JUNE 3, 1992 525
Tamargo us. Court of Appeals
Respondent Bundoc spouses rely on Article 36 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code   which
8
reads as follows:
"Article 36. Decree of Adoption.—If, after considering the report of the Department of Social Welfare or
duly licensed child placement agency and the evidence submitted before it, the court is satisfied that the
petitioner is qualified to maintain, care for, and educate the child, that the trial custody period has been
completed, and that the best interests of the child will be promoted by the adoption, a decree of adoption
shall be entered, which shall be effective as of the date the original petition was filed. The decree shall
state the name by which the child is thenceforth to be known." (Italics supplied)
The Bundoc spouses further argue that the above Article 36 should be read in relation to
Article 39 of the same Code:
"Art, 39. Effect of Adoption.—The adoption shall:
xxx     xxx     xxx
(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the natural parents, except where the adopter is the spouse of the
surviving natural parent;"
xxx     xxx     xxx" (Italics supplied)
and urge that their parental authority must be deemed to have been dissolved as of the time
the petition for adoption was filed.
The Court is not persuaded. As earlier noted, under the Civil Code, the basis of parental
liability for the torts of a minor child is the relationship existing between the parents and the
minor child living with them and over whom, the law presumes, the parents exercise
supervision and control. Article 58 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, re-enacted this rule:
"Article 58. Torts—Parents and guardians are responsible for the damage caused by the child under their
parental authority in accordance with the Civil Code." (Italics supplied)
9
Article 221 of the Family Code of the Philippines   has similarly insisted upon the requisite
that the child, doer of the tortious
_______________
8 Presidential Decree No. 603, dated 10 December 1974.
9 Executive Order No. 209, dated 6 July 1987.
526
526 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tamargo vs. Court of Appeals
act, shall have been in the actual custody of the parents sought to be held liable for the
ensuing damage:
"Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries
and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children  living in their
company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law." (Italics
supplied)
We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as having been retroactively
transferred to and vested in the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, at the time the air
rifle shooting happened. We do not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree
of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when the
adopting parents had no actual or physical custody over the adopted child.Retroactive effect
may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption where such is essential to
permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. In the instant
case, however, to hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura
spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen
and which they could not have prevented (since they were at the time in the United States and
had no physical custody over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable. Such a
result, moreover, would be inconsistent with the philosophical and policy basis underlying the
doctrine of vicarious liability. Put a little differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on
the part of the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto was
not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort was committed.
Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code fortifies the conclusion reached above.
Article 35 provides as follows:
"Art. 35. Trial Custody.—No petition for adoption shall be finally granted unless and until the adopting
parents are given by the courts a supervised trial custody period of at least six months to assess their
adjustment and emotional readiness for the legal union.  During the period of trial custody, parental
authority shall be vested in the adopting parents." (Italics supplied)
527
VOL. 209, JUNE 3, 1992 527
Tamargo vs. Court of Appeals
Under the above Article 35, parental authority is provisionallyvested in the adopting parents
during the period of trial custody, i.e., before the issuance of a decree of
adoption, preciselybecause the adopting parents are given actual custody of thechild during
such trial period. In the instant case, the trialcustody period either had not yet begun or had
already beencompleted at the time of the air rifle shooting; in any case,actual custody of
Adelberto was then with his natural parents,not the adopting parents.
Accordingly, we conclude that respondent Bundoc spouses, Adelberto's natural parents,
were indispensable parties to the suit for damages brought by petitioners, and that the
dismissal by the trial court of petitioners' complaint, the indispensable parties being already
before the court, constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED DUE
COURSE and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 6 September 1988, in CA-G.R. No.
SP15016 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners' complaint filed before the trial
court is hereby REINSTATED and this case is REMANDED to that court for further
proceedings consistent with this Decision. Costs against respondent Bundoc spouses. This
Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

     Gutierrez, Jr. (Chairman), Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.

Petition granted; decision reversed and set aside.

Note.—The notice of hearing is an integral component of procedural due process. It is

intended to afford the adverse parties a chance to be heard before the motion is resolved by the
court (Estipona vs. Navarro, 69 SCRA 285).

VOL. 21, SEPTEMBER 29, 1967 379
Santos, Jr. vs. Republic
No. L-22523. September 29, 1967.
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF THE MINOR,EDWIN VILLA Y MENDOZA.LUIS
E. SANTOS,JR.and EDIPOLA V. SANTOS, petitioners-appellants  vs.  REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellee.
Civil law; Adoption; Relatives by blood or affinity are not prohibited from adopting another.—There
is no provision in the law prohibiting relatives, by blood or by affinity, from adopting one another. To say
that adoption should not be allowed when the adopter and the adopted are related to each other, except
in those cases enumerated in Article 338 of the Civil Code, is to preclude adoption among relatives, no
matter how far removed or in whatever degree that relationship might be, which is not the policy of the
law.
Same; Interest and welfare of child to be adopted should be paramount consideration.—The interest
and welfare of the child to be adopted should be of paramount consideration. Adoption statutes, being
humane and salutary and designed to provide homes, care and education for unfortunate children,
should be construed so as to encourage the adoption of such children by persons who can properly rear
and educate them.
Same; Elder sister may adopt a younger brother.—The fact that the adoption in this case will result
in dual relationship between the parties, that the adopted brother will also be the son of the adopting
elder sister, should not prevent the adoption. One is by nature, while the other is by fiction of law.
Same; Same; Relationship established by adoption is limited to adopting parents.—The relationship
established by the adoption is limited to the adopting parents and does not extend to their other
relatives, except as expressly provided by law. Thus, the adopted child cannot be considered as a relative
of the ascendants and collaterals of the adopting parents, nor of the legitimate children which they may
have after the adoption, except that the law imposes certain impediments to marriage by reason of
adoption. Neither are the children of the adopted considered as descendants of the adopter.
APPEAL from a decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila. Juliano-
Agrava, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     A. E. Dacanay for petitioners-appellants.
     Solicitor General for oppositor-appellee.
ANGELES, J.:
An appeal from the decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, in Special
Proceeding No. 0001, dismissing the petition instituted by the spouses Luis R.
380
380 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Santos, Jr. vs. Republic
Santos, Jr. and Edipola V. Santos for the adoption of the minor Edwin Villa y Mendoza.
The issue before Us is, whether or not an elder sister may adopt a younger brother. The
trial court dismissed the petition reasoning thus:
“A critical consideration in this case is the fact that the parents of the minor to be adopted are also the
parents of the petitioner-wife. The minor, therefore, is the latter’s legitimate brother.
“In this proceeding, the adoption will result in an incongruous situation where the minor Edwin Villa,
a legitimate brother of the petitioner-wife, will also be her son. In the opinion of the court, that
incongruity, not neutralized by other circumstances absent herein, should prevent the adoption.”
The petitioners moved to reconsider the decision but the same was denied. Hence, this appeal.
The facts are not disputed.
The above-named spouses filed the petition before the court  a quo  on January 8, 1963,
praying that the minor Edwin Villa y Mendoza, 4 years old, be declared their (petitioner’s) son
by adoption. Evidence was presented that the order setting the case for hearing has been duly
published, Exhibit A. There having been no opposition registered to the petition, the
petitioners were permitted to adduce their evidence.
It was established that the petitioners are both 32 years of age, Filipinos, residing in the
City of Manila. They were married in 1957 and have maintained a conjugal home of their own.
They do not have a child of their own blood. Neither spouse has any legitimate, legitimated,
illegitimate, acknowledged natural child, or natural child by legal fiction, nor has any one of
them been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Edwin Villa y Mendoza, 4 years old,
is a child of Francisco Villa and Florencia Mendoza who are the common parents of the
petitioner-wife Edipola Villa Santos and the minor. Luis E. Santos, Jr., is a lawyer, with
business interests in a textile development enterprise and the IBA electric plant, and is the
general manager of Medry, Inc. and the secretary-treasurer of Bearen Enterprises. His income
is approximately P600.00 a month. His co-petitioner-wife
381
VOL. 21, SEPTEMBER 29, 1967 381
Santos, Jr. vs. Republic
is a nurse by profession, with an average monthly earning of about P300.00.
It was also shown that Edwin Villa y Mendoza was born on May 22, 1958, Exhibit C. He
was a sickly child since birth. Due to the child’s impairing health, his parents entrusted him to
the petitioners who reared and brought him up for the years thereafter, and as a result, there
developed between the petitioners and the child, a deep and profound love for each other. The
natural parents of the minor testified that they have voluntarily given their consent to the
adoption of their son by the petitioners, and submitted their written consent and conformity to
the adoption, and that they fully understand the legal consequences of the adoption of their
child by the petitioners.
We are not aware of any provision in the law, and none has been pointed to Us by the
Solicitor General who argues for the State in this case, that relatives, by blood or by affinity,
are prohibited from adopting one another. The only objection raised is the alleged
“incongruity” that will result in the relation of the petitioner-wife and the adopted, in the
circumstance that the adopted who is the legitimate brother of the adopter, will also be her son
by adoption. The theory is, therefore, advanced that adoption among people who are related by
nature should not be allowed, in order that dual relationship should not result, reliance being
made upon the views expressed by this  Court in McGee vs. Republic,  L-5387, April 29,
1954, 94 Phil. 820.
In that case, an American citizen, Clyde E. McGee, married to a Filipina by whom he had
one child, instituted a proceeding for the adoption of two minor children of the wife had by her
first husband. The lower court granted the petition of McGee to adopt his two minor step-
children. On appeal by the State. We reversed the decision. We said:
‘The purpose of adoption is to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation where none existed
before. Where therefore the relationship of parent and child already exists whether by blood or by
affinity as in the case of illegitimate and stepchildren, it would be unnecessary and superfluous to
establish
 382
382 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Santos, Jr. vs. Republic
and superimpose another relationship of parent and child through adoption. Consequently, an express
authorization of law like article 338 is necessary, if not to render it proper and legal, at least, to remove
any and all doubt on the subject matter. Under this view, article 338 may not be regarded as a
surplusage. That may have been the reason why in the old Code of Civil Procedure, particularly its
provisions regarding adoption, authority to adopt a step-child by a step-father was provided in section
766 notwithstanding the general authorization in section 765 extended to any inhabitant of the
Philippines to adopt a minor child. The same argument of surplusage could plausibly have been
advanced as regards section 766, that is to say, section 766 was unnecessary and superfluous because
without it a step-father could adopt a minor step-child anyway. However, the inserting of section 766 was
not entirely without reason. It seems to be an established principle in American jurisprudence that a
person may not adopt his own relative, the reason being that it is unnecessary to establish a relationship
where such already exists (the same philosophy underlying our codal provisions on adoption). So some
states have special laws authorizing the adoption of relatives such as a grandfather adopting a
grandchild and a father adopting his illegitimate or natural child.”
Notwithstanding the views thus expressed, a study of American precedents would reveal that
there is a variance in the decisions of the courts in different jurisdictions regarding the matter
of adoption of relatives. It cannot be stated as a general proposition that the adoption of a
blood relative is contrary to the policy of the law, for in many states of the Union, no
restriction of that sort is contained in the statutes authorizing adoption, although laws of
other jurisdiction expressly provide that adoption may not take place within persons within a
certain degree of relationship (1 Am. Tur. 628629). Courts in some states hold that in the
absence of express statutory restriction, a blood relationship between the parties is not a legal
impediment to the adoption of one by the other, and there may be a valid adoption where the
relation of parent and child already exists by nature (2 Am. Jur. 2d 869). Principles vary
according to the particular adoption statute of a state under which any given case is
considered. It would seem that in those states originally influenced by the civil law countries
where adoption originated, the rules are liberally
383
being humane and salutary, and designed to provide homes, care and education for
unfortunate children, should be construed so as to encourage the adoption of such children by
person who can properly rear and educate them (In re Havsgord’s Estate, 34 S.D. 131, 147
N.W. 378).
With respect to the objection that the adoption in this particular case will result in a dual
relationship between the parties, that the adopted brother will also be the son of the adopting
elder sister, that fact alone should not prevent the adoption. One is by nature, while the other
is by fiction of law. The relationship established by the adoption is limited to the adopting
parents and does not extend to their other relatives, except as expressly provided by law.
Thus, the adopted child cannot be considered as a relative of the ascendants and collaterals of
the adopt-
384
384 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ramirez vs. Ramirez
ing parents, nor of the legitimate children which they may have after the adoption except that
the law imposes certain impediments to marriage by reason of adoption. Neither are the
children of the adopted considered as descendants of the adopter (Tolentino, Civil Code, Vol. I,
1960 Ed., p. 652, citing 1 Oyuelos 284; Perez, Gonzales and Castan; 4-11 Enneccerus, Kipp &
Wolff 177; Munoz, p. 104). So even considered in relation to the rules on succession which are
in  pari materia,  the adoption under consideration would not be objectionable on the ground
alone of the resulting relationship between the adopter and the adopted. Similar dual
relationships also result under our law on marriage when persons who are already related, by
blood or by affinity, marry each other. But as long as the relationship is not within the degrees
prohibited by law, such marriages, are allowed notwithstanding the resulting dual
relationship. And as We do not find any provision in the law that expressly prohibits adoption
among relatives, they ought not to be prevented. For all the foregoing considerations, the
decision appealed from is set aside, and the petition for the adoption of the subject minor,
granted. No pronouncement as to costs.
          Concepcion, C.J.,  Reyes, J.B.L.,  Dizon,  Makalintal,Bengzon,
J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Fernando. JJ., concur.

VOL. 21, SEPTEMBER 29, 1967 383 Decision set aside and petition for adoption granted.
Santos, Jr. vs. Republic

construed, while in other states where common law principles predominate, adoption laws are
more strictly applied because they are regarded to be in derogation of the common law.
Article 335 of the Civil Code enumerates those persons who may not adopt, and it has been
shown that petitioners-appellants herein are not among those prohibited from adopting.
Article 339 of the same code names those who cannot be adopted, and the minor child whose
adoption is under consideration, is not one of those excluded by the law. Article 338, on the
other hand, allows the adoption of a natural child by the natural father or mother, of other
illegitimate children by their father or mother, and of a step-child by the step-father or
stepmother. This last article is, of course, necessary to remove all doubts that adoption is not
prohibited even in these cases where there already exist a relationship of parent and child
between them by nature. To say that adoption should not be allowed when the adopter and the
adopted are related to each other, except in these cases enumerated in Article 338, is to
preclude adoption among relatives no matter how far removed or in whatever degree that
relationship might be, which in our opinion is not the policy of the law. The interest and
welfare of the child to be adopted should be of paramount consideration. Adoption statutes,

VOL. 454, MARCH 31, 2005 541
In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy
Astorga Garcia
*
G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005.
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA,
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.
Parents and Children; Adoption; Names; It is both of personal as well as public interest that every
person must have a name.—For all practical and legal purposes, a man’s name is the designation by
which he is known and called in the community in which he lives and is best known. It is defined as the
word or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the
label or appellation which he bears for the convenience of the world at large addressing him, or in
speaking of or dealing with him. It is both of personal as well as public interest that every person must
have a name.
Same;  Same;  Same;  The name of an individual has two parts—the given or proper name and the
surname or family name; The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the
surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.—The name of an individual has  two parts: (1)
the given or proper nameand (2) the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which is
given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The surname or
family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child.
The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which the child is
entitled is fixed by law.
Same;  Same;  Same;  Words and Phrases;  Adoption is defined as the process of making a child,
whether related or not to the adopter, possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child; The
modern trend is to consider adoption not merely as an act to establish a relationship of paternity and
filiation, but also as an act which endows the child with a legitimate status.—Adoption is defined as the
process of making a child, whether related or not to the adopter, possess in general, the rights accorded
to a legitimate child. It is a
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
542
542 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy
Astorga Garcia
juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two persons a relationship similar to that
which results from legitimate paternity and filiation.  The modern trend is to consider adoption not
merely as an act to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation, but also as an act which endows the
child with a legitimate status.  This was, indeed, confirmed in 1989, when the  Philippines, as a  State
Party to the Convention of the Rights of the Child initiated by the United Nations, accepted the principle
that adoption is impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent is geared to
favor the adopted child. Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the “Domestic Adoption Act of 1998,”
secures these rights and privileges for the adopted.
Same; Same; Same; An adopted child is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child
without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother.
—Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights
provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the
surname of her father and her mother, as discussed above. This is consistent with the intention of the
members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees as earlier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino
custom that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father.
Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction;  Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should
be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption.—It is a settled rule that adoption
statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes
of adoption. The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary and paramount consideration,
hence, every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and
compassionate objectives of the law.
Same;  Same;  Same;  Same;  Article 10 of the Civil Code which presumes in the interpretation of
application of law that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail was intended to
strengthen the determination of the courts to avoid an injustice which may apparently be authorized by
some way of interpreting the law.— Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that: “In case of doubt in the
interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the law-
543
VOL. 454, MARCH 31, 2005 543
In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy
Astorga Garcia
making body intended right and justice to prevail.” This provision, according to the Code
Commission, “is necessary so that it may tip the scales in favor of right and justice when the law is
doubtful or obscure. It will strengthen the determination of the courts to avoid an injustice which may
apparently be authorized by some way of interpreting the law.”
Same;  Same;  Same;  Same;  Since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her
natural father to use, as middle name her mother’s surname, the Court finds no reason why she should
not be allowed to do so.—Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate  child adopted by her
natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother’s surname, we find no reason why she
should not be allowed to do so.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan, Br. 13.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Catindig, Tiongco & Nibungco for petitioner.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural
mother as her middle name? This is the issue raised in the instant case.
The facts are undisputed. 1
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition  to adopt his
minor illegitimate child  Stephanie Nathy Astorga
2
Garcia. He alleged therein, among others,
that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that her mother is  Gemma Astorga Garcia; that
Stephanie has been using her mother’s middle name and surname; and that he is now a
widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name Hence, the present petition raising the issue of whether an illegitimate child may use the
Astorga be changed to surname of her mother as her middle name when she is subsequently adopted by her natural
father.
_______________ Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in depriving Stephanie of a middle name as a
consequence of adoption because: (1) there is no law prohibiting an adopted child from having
1 Rollo at pp. 34-36.
2 Annex
a middle name in case there is only one adopting parent; (2) it is customary for every Filipino
“C”, Id., at p. 33.
to have as middle name the surname of the mother; (3) the middle name or initial is a part of
544 the name of a person; (4) adoption is for the benefit and best interest of the adopted child,
hence, her right to bear a proper name should not be violated; (5) permitting Stephanie to use
the middle name “Garcia” (her mother’s surname) avoids the stigma of her illegitimacy; and;
544 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED (6) her continued use of “Garcia” as her middle name is not opposed by either the Catindig or
In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Garcia families.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees with petitioner that
Astorga Garcia
Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle name, the surname of her natural mother
for the following reasons:
“Garcia,” her mother’s surname, and that her surname “Garcia” be changed to “Catindig,” his First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanie’s filiation with her natural mother
surname. 3 because under Article 189 of the Family Code, she remains to be an intestate heir of the latter.
On March 23, 2001,  the trial court rendered the assailed Decision granting the adoption, Thus, to prevent any confusion and needless hardship in the future, her relationship or proof
thus: of that relationship with her natural mother should be maintained.
Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of her natural
“After a careful consideration of the evidence presented by the petitioner, and in the absence of any
opposition to the petition, this Court finds that the petitioner possesses all the qualifications and none of mother as her middle name. What the law does not prohibit, it allows.
the disqualification provided for by law as an adoptive parent, and that as such he is qualified to
maintain, care for and educate the child to be adopted; that the grant of this petition would redound to _______________
the best interest and welfare of the minor Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. The Court further holds that
6 Annex “H”, Id., at p. 49.
the petitioner’s care and custody of the child since her birth up to the present constitute more than
enough compliance with the requirement of Article 35 of Presidential Decree No. 603. 546
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same is GRANTED. Henceforth, Stephanie
Nathy Astorga Garcia is hereby freed from all obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to
her natural mother, and for civil purposes, shall henceforth be the petitioner’s legitimate child and legal 546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
heir. Pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code of the Philippines, the minor shall be known as
STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG. In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy
Upon finality of this Decision, let the same be entered in the Local Civil Registrar concerned pursuant Astorga Garcia
to Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.
Let copy of this Decision
4
be furnished the National Statistics Office for record purposes.
SO ORDERED.” Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily the surname
5 of the mother. This custom has been recognized by the Civil Code and Family Code. In fact,
On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration   praying the Family Law Committees agreed that “the initial or surname of the mother should
that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her immediately precede the7 surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the
middle name. surname of the mother.”
We find merit in the petition.
_______________
3 Annex
Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law—
“F”, Id., at pp. 41-43.
4 Rollo
at pp. 42-43.
5 Annex “G”, Id., at pp. 44-48. For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he is known
and called in the community in which he lives and is best known. It is defined as the word or
545 combination of words by which a person is distinguished from other individuals and, also, as
the label or appellation which he bears for8
the convenience of the world at large addressing
him, or in speaking of or dealing with him.  It is both of personal as well as public interest that
VOL. 454, MARCH 31, 2005 545
every person must have a name.
In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper name and (2) the surname
Astorga Garcia or family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or at
baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The surname or family name is that which
6 identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given
On May 28, 2001,  the trial court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration holding that name may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which the child is
there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological entitled is fixed by law.
9

mother as his middle name.

_______________ Art. 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, the word
7 Minutes
‘Junior’ can be used only by a son. Grandsons and other direct male descendants shall either:
of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees, August 10, 1985, p. 8.
8 Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Maximo Wong, G.R. No. 97906, May 21, 1992, 209 SCRA 189, citing 38 Am. (1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname, or
Jur., Name 594-595.
9  Republic vs. Hon. Hernandez, et al.,  G.R. No. 117209, February 9, 1996,  253 SCRA 509, citing Tolentino, (2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.
A.M., Civil Code of the Philippines, Commentaries and Jurisprudence, Vol. I, 1993 ed., 672.
x x x”
547
Law Is Silent As To The Use Of 
Middle Name—
VOL. 454, MARCH 31, 2005 547
In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy As correctly submitted
11
by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle name.
Even Article 176  of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known
Astorga Garcia
as “An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father,” is silent as to
what middle name a child may use.
Thus, Articles 364
10
to 380 of the Civil Code provides the substantive rules which regulate the The middle name or the mother’s surname is only considered in Article 375(1), quoted
use of surname  of an individual whatever may be his status in life, i.e., whether he may be above, in case there is identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants,
legitimate or illegitimate, an adopted child, a married woman or a previously married woman, in which case, the middle name or the mother’s surname shall be added.
or a widow, thus:
_______________
“Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.
Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter. 11 “Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother,

xxx and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the surname of
Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable marriage shall principally use their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the
the surname of the father. civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the
Art. 370. A married woman may use: father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during
his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.”
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband’s surname, or
549
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband’s surname or
(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as ‘Mrs.’
VOL. 454, MARCH 31, 2005 549
Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall resume her
maiden name and  surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name and In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy
surname. However, she may choose to continue employing her former husband’s surname, unless: Astorga Garcia
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or
(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person. Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may
use.  Article 365 of the Civil Code merely provides that “an adopted child shall bear the
Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name surname of the adopter.” Also, Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of
and surname employed before the legal separation. adoption, is likewise silent on the matter, thus:
Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased husband’s surname as though he were still living, in “(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both
accordance with Article 370. shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child,
including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters;
x x x”
_______________
10Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Maximo Wong, supra. However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the Civil Code and Family Law
Committees that drafted the Family Code  recognized the Filipino custom of adding the
548 surname of the child’s mother as his middle name. In the Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the
Civil Code and Family Law Committees, the members approved the suggestion that the initial
548 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father, thus:

In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy “Justice Caguioa commented that there is a difference between the use by the wife of the surname and
that of the child because  the father’s surname indicates the family to which he belongs, for
Astorga Garcia which reason he would insist on the use of the father’s surname by the child but that, if he
wants to, the child may also use the surname of the mother.
Art. 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger person shall be obliged to use such Justice Puno posed the question: If the child chooses to use the surname of the mother, how will his
additional name or surname as will avoid confusion. name be written? Justice Caguioa replied that it is up to him but that his point is that it should be
mandatory that the child uses the surname of the father and permissive in the case of the Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the adopter,
15
surname of the mother. possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child.  It is a juridical act, a proceeding
Prof. Baviera remarked that Justice Caguioa’s point is covered by the present Article 364, which in rem which creates between two persons a relationship similar to that which results from
reads: 16
legitimate paternity and filiation.  The modern trend is to consider adoption not merely as an
550 act to establish a relationship17of paternity and filiation, but also as an act which endows the
child with a legitimate status.  This was, indeed, confirmed in 1989, when the Philippines, as
a  State Party  to the  Convention of the Rights of the Child initiated by the United Nations,
550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED accepted the principle that adoption is impressed with social18 and moral responsibility, and that
its underlying intent is geared to favor the adopted child. Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise
In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy 19
known as the “Domestic Adoption Act of 1998,”  secures these rights
Astorga Garcia
_______________
Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.
14 Republic vs. Hon. Hernandez, et al., supra; Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Maximo Wong, supra.
Justice Puno pointed out that many names change through no choice of the person himself precisely 15 Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated, Vol. I, Fifteenth Edition, 2002, p. 685.
because of this misunderstanding. He then cited the following example: Alfonso Ponce Enrile’s correct 16 Pineda, The Family Code of the Philippines Annotated, 1989 Edition, p. 272-273, citing 4 Valverde, 473.
surname is Ponce since the mother’s surname is Enrile but everybody calls him Atty. Enrile. Justice Jose 17 Paras, supra, citing Prasnick vs. Republic, 98 Phil. 665.

Gutierrez David’s family name is Gutierrez and his mother’s surname is David but they all call him 18  Lahom vs. Sibulo,  G.R. No. 143989, July 14, 2003,  406 SCRA 135, citing  United Nation General

Justice David. Assembly/44/49 (1989).

Justice Caguioa suggested that the proposed Article (12) be modified to the effect that it 19  “Sec. 17.  Legitimacy.—The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate son/daughter of the adopter(s) for all

shall be mandatory on the child to use the surname of the father but he may use the surname intents and purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and obligations provided by law to legitimate
of the mother by way of an initial or a middle name. Prof. Balane stated that they take note of this sons/daughters born to them without discrimina
for inclusion in the Chapter on Use of Surnames since in the proposed Article (10) they are just
552
enumerating the rights of legitimate children so that the details can be covered in the appropriate
chapter.
xxx
552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Justice Puno remarked that there is logic in the simplification suggested by Justice Caguioa that the
surname of the father should always be last because there are so many traditions like the American In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy
tradition where they like to use their second given name and the Latin tradition, which is also followed
by the Chinese wherein they even include the Clan name.
Astorga Garcia
xxx
20
Justice Puno suggested that they agree in principle that in the Chapter on the Use of and privileges for the adopted.
Surnames, they should say that initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the
the surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the surname of the 21
adopter for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 189  of the Family Code and Section
mother. Prof. Balane added that this is really the Filipino way. The Committee approved the 22 23
12
suggestion.”  (Emphasis supplied) 17  Article V of RA 8552.
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all
In the case of13an adopted child, the law provides that “the adopted shall bear the surname of the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including
the adopters.”  Again, it is the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother, as discussed above. This is
consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees as
_______________ earlier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother
should immediately precede the surname of the father.
12 Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family law Committees, August 10, 1985, pp. 16-18. Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanie’s continued use of her mother’s
13 Article 365 of the New Civil Code.
surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain24 her maternal lineage. It is to be noted
551 that Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section 18 , Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption)
provide that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence,
Stephanie can well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the
VOL. 454, MARCH 31, 2005 551 future.
In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy
Astorga Garcia _______________

tion of any kind. To this end, the adoptee is entitled to love, guidance and support in keeping with the means of the
family.”
silent whether he can use a middle name. What it only expressly allows, as a matter of right 20Id.
and obligation, is 14
for the adoptee to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the 21 “Art. 189. (1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both

decree of adoption. shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including the right
of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters;”
The Underlying Intent of Adoption  22Supra.
23 Domestic Adoption Act of 1998.
Is In Favor of the Adopted Child—
 24  “Sec. 18.  Succession.—In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee shall have reciprocal
middle name.
rights of succession without distinction from legitimate filiation. However, if the adoptee and his/her biological Let the corresponding entry of her correct and complete name be entered in the decree of
parent(s) had left a will, the law on testamentary succession shall govern.”
adoption.
553 SO ORDERED.

VOL. 454, MARCH 31, 2005 553
In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy
Astorga Garcia
Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together in the house built
by petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan. Petitioner provides for all
their needs. Stephanie is closely attached to both her mother and father. She calls them
“Mama” and “Papa.” Indeed, they are one normal happy family. Hence, to allow Stephanie to
use her mother’s surname as her middle name will not only sustain her continued loving
relationship with her mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy.
Liberal Construction of Adoption 
Statutes In Favor Of Adoption—
     Panganiban (Chairman), Corona, Carpio-Moralesand Garcia, JJ., concur.
Petition granted.
Notes.—A person may be known by several aliases, irrespective of his knowledge or
consent to the use thereof. (People vs. Bergonio, Jr., 340 SCRA 269 [2000])
Since the use of initials, instead of a given name, before a surname, has become a practice,
the necessity that these initials be all given and correctly given in court proceedings has
become of importance in every case, and in many, absolutely essential to a correct designation
of the person intended—a middle name is very important or even decisive in a case in which
the issue is as between two persons who have the same first name and surname, did the act
complained of, or is injured or sued or the like. (United Coconut Planters Bank vs. Ramos, 415
SCRA 596[2003])

It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane 25and salutary, should be liberally
construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption.  The 26interests and welfare of the
adopted child are of primary and paramount consideration,   hence, every reasonable
intendment should 27be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate
objectives of the law.
Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that:
“In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail.”

This provision, according to the Code Commission, “is necessary so that it may tip the scales in
favor of right and justice when the law is doubtful or obscure. It will strengthen

_______________
25 Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 92326, January 24, 1992, 205 SCRA 356, citing 2

Am. Jur. 2d, Adoption, 865.

26 Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al., Id., citing 2 Am. Jur. 2d, Adoption, 910.
27 Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al., Id., citing Bobanovic, et al. vs. Montes, etc., et al.,  142

SCRA 485 (1986).

554

554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy
Astorga Garcia

the determination of the courts to28avoid an injustice which may apparently be authorized by
some way of interpreting the law.”
Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimatechild adopted by her natural father,
like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother’s surname, we find no reason why she
should not be allowed to do so.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is partly MODIFIED in
the sense that Stephanie should be allowed to use her mother’s surname “GARCIA” as her

G.R. Nos. 168992-93. May 21, 2009.*
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM, MONINA P. LIM, petitioner.
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHAEL JUDE P. LIM, MONINA P. LIM,
petitioner.
Adoption; Husband and Wife; Husband and wife must jointly adopt.—It is undisputed that, at the
time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner had already remarried. She filed the petitions by
herself, without being joined by her husband Olario. We have no other recourse but to affirm the trial
court’s decision denying the petitions for adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit. Section 7, Article
III of RA 8552 reads: SEC. 7.  Who May Adopt.—The following may adopt: x  x  x  Husband and
wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases: x x x The use of the word “shall” in the above-
quoted provision means that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in
consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the
child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to
adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses. The law is clear. There is no room for
ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the time the petitions for adop-
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
99
VOL. 588, MAY 21, 2009 99
In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim,
Monina P. Lim
tion were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner
herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for
adoption on this ground. Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in
Section 7. First, the children to be adopted are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband
Olario.  Second, the children are not the illegitimate children of petitioner. And  third, petitioner and
Olario are not legally separated from each other.
Same; Same; Domestic Adoption Act of 1998 (Republic Act No. 8552); A foreigner adopting together
with his or her Philippine spouse must meet the qualifications set forth in Republic Act No. 8552, and the
requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt cannot be waived.—The
fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent does not suffice.
There are certain requirements that Olario must comply being an American citizen. He must meet the
qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic
relations with the Republic of the Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the Philippines for at least
three continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption; (3) he must maintain such
residency until the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and
(5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopter’s country as the latter’s adopted child. None of these
qualifications were shown and proved during the trial. These requirements on residency and certification
of the alien’s qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7. The children or
adoptees are not relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or of Olario.
Neither are the adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner.
Same; Effects; Even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still considered a
legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights of a legitimate child.—Adoption has, thus, the following
effects: (1) sever all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee, except when the biological
parent is the spouse of the adopter; (2) deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the adopter; and (3) give
adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child,
including but not limited to: (i) the right of the adopter to choose the name the child is to be known; and
(ii) the right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of each other. Therefore, even if
emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still considered a legitimate child of the
adopter with all the rights of a legitimate
100
100 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim,
Monina P. Lim
child such as: (1) to bear the surname of the father and the mother; (2) to receive support from their
parents; and (3) to be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights. Conversely, the adoptive
parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to which biological parents are
entitled such as support and successional rights.
Same; Separation of Powers; Judicial Legislation; While the Court is not unmindful of the main
purpose of adoption statutes, which is the promotion of the welfare of the children, regrettably, the law is
clear and it cannot be modified without violating the proscription against judicial legislation.—We are
mindful of the fact that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of
the child to be of paramount consideration. They are designed to provide homes, parental care and
education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of society and
family, as well as to allow childless couples or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them
legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental instincts.
Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate
objectives of the law. But, as we have ruled in Republic v. Vergara (270 SCRA 206 [1997]): We are not
unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes, which is the promotion of the welfare of the
children. Accordingly, the law should be construed liberally, in a manner that will sustain rather than
defeat said purpose. The law must also be applied with compassion, understanding and less severity in
view of the fact that it is intended to provide homes, love, care and education for less fortunate children.
Regrettably, the Court is not in a position to affirm the trial court’s decision favoring adoption in the case
at bar,  for the law is clear and it cannot be modified without violating the proscription
against judicial legislation.  Until such time however, that the law on the matter is amended, we
cannot sustain the respondent-spouses’ petition for adoption. Petitioner, being married at the time the
petitions for adoption were filed, should have jointly filed the petitions with her husband. We cannot
make our own legislation to suit petitioner.
Same; Husband and Wife; Dissolution of Marriage; The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage
between the spouses is of no moment—it is not equivalent to a decree of dissolution of marriage; Since, at
the time the petitions for adoption were filed, the petitioner was married, joint adoption with the husband
is mandatory.—Petitioner, in her Memorandum, insists that subsequent events would show that joint
adoption could no
101
VOL. 588, MAY 21, 2009 101
In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim,
Monina P. Lim
longer be possible because Olario has filed a case for dissolution of his marriage to petitioner in the
Los Angeles Superior Court. We disagree. The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between
petitioner and Olario is of no moment. It is not equivalent to a decree of dissolution of marriage. Until
and unless there is a judicial decree for the dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario,
the marriage still subsists. That being the case, joint adoption by the husband and the wife is required.
We reiterate our ruling above that since, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner was
married to Olario, joint adoption is mandatory.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of General Santos
City, Br. 22.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Teodoro P. Sales for petitioner.
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Monina P. Lim (petitioner) seeking to set
aside the Decision1 dated 15 September 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, General Santos City,
Branch 22 (trial court), in SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259, which dismissed without
prejudice the consolidated petitions for adoption of Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim.
The Facts
The following facts are undisputed. Petitioner is an optometrist by profession. On 23 June
1974, she married Primo Lim (Lim). They were childless. Minor children, whose parents were
unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban). Being so eager to have
a child of their own, petitioner and Lim registered the children to make it appear that they
were the children’s par-
_______________
1 Penned by Judge Antonio C. Lubao. Records of SPL. PROC. Case No. 1258, pp. 161-162 and SPL. PROC. Case
No. 1259, pp. 163-164.
102
102 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim,
Monina P. Lim
ents. The children2  were named Michelle P. Lim (Michelle) and Michael Jude P. Lim
(Michael). Michelle was barely eleven days old when brought to the clinic of petitioner. She
was born on 15 March 1977.3  Michael was 11 days old when Ayuban brought him to
petitioner’s clinic. His date of birth is 1 August 1983.4
The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. They sent the
children to exclusive schools. They used the surname “Lim” in all their school records and
documents. Unfortunately, on 28 November 1998, Lim died. On 27 December 2000, petitioner
married Angel Olario (Olario), an American citizen.
Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty5 given under
Republic Act No. 85526  (RA 8552) to those individuals who simulated the birth of a child.
Thus, on 24 April 2002, petitioner filed separate petitions for the adoption of
_______________
2 Three children were actually entrusted to petitioner and Lim. The third, who was named Primo Jude P. Lim, was
still a minor at the time the petition for adoption was filed. The case was docketed as SPL. PROC. No. 1260. Petitioner
opted not to appeal the decision insofar as the minor Primo Jude P. Lim was concerned.
3 Records (SPL. Proc. Case No. 1258), pp. 94-96.
4 Records (SPL. Proc. Case No. 1259), pp. 69-71.
5 Section 22 of RA 8552 provides:
SEC. 22. Rectification of Simulated Births.—A person who has, prior to the effectivity of this Act, simulated the
birth of a child shall not be punished for such act:  Provided,  That the simulation of birth was made for the best
interest of the child and that he/she has been consistently considered and treated by that person as his/her own
son/daughter: Provided, further, That the application for correction of the birth registration and petition for adoption
shall be filed within five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act and completed thereafter: Provided, finally,  That
such person complies with the procedure as specified in Article IV of this Act and other requirements as determined
by the Department.
6 An Act Establishing the Rules and Policies on the Domestic Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other
Purposes, otherwise known as the “Domestic Adoption Act of 1998.” Approved on 25 February 1998.
103
VOL. 588, MAY 21, 2009 103
In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim,
Monina P. Lim
Michelle and Michael before the trial court docketed as SPL PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259,
respectively. At the time of the filing of the petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25 years old
and already married, while Michael was 18 years and seven months old.
Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption as evidenced by their
Affidavits of Consent.7Michael also gave his consent to his adoption as shown in his Affidavit
of Consent.8  Petitioner’s husband Olario likewise executed an Affidavit of Consent9  for the
adoption of Michelle and Michael.
In the Certification issued by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD),
Michelle was considered as an abandoned child and the whereabouts of her natural parents
were unknown.10 The DSWD issued a similar Certification for Michael.11
The Ruling of the Trial Court
On 15 September 2004, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the petitions. The
trial court ruled that since petitioner had remarried, petitioner should have filed the petition
jointly with her new husband. The trial court ruled that joint adoption by the husband and the
wife is mandatory citing Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552 and Article 185 of the Family
Code.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision but the motion was denied in
the Order dated 16 June 2005. In denying the motion, the trial court ruled that petitioner did
not fall under any of the exceptions under Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552. Petitioner’s
argument that mere consent of her husband would suffice was untenable because, under the
law, there are additional requirements, such as residency and certification of his qualification,
which the husband, who was not even made a party in this case, must comply.
_______________
7 Records (SPL. Proc. Case No. 1258), pp. 147-148.
8  Id., at p. 147.
9  Id., at p. 149.
10 Id., at p. 145.
11 Records (SPL. Proc. Case No. 1259), p. 8.
104
104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim,
Monina P. Lim
 As to the argument that the adoptees are already emancipated and joint adoption is merely
for the joint exercise of parental authority, the trial court ruled that joint adoption is not only
for the purpose of exercising parental authority because an emancipated child acquires certain
rights from his parents and assumes certain obligations and responsibilities.
Hence, the present petition.
Issue
Petitioner appealed directly to this Court raising the sole issue of whether or not petitioner,
who has remarried, can singly adopt.
The Court’s Ruling
Petitioner contends that the rule on joint adoption must be relaxed because it is the duty of
the court and the State to protect the paramount interest and welfare of the child to be
adopted. Petitioner argues that the legal maxim “dura lex sed lex” is not applicable to adoption
cases. She argues that joint parental authority is not necessary in this case since, at the time
the petitions were filed, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while Michael was
already 18 years of age. Parental authority is not anymore necessary since they have been
emancipated having attained the age of majority.
We deny the petition.
Joint Adoption by Husband and Wife
It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner had
already remarried. She filed the petitions by herself, without being joined by her husband
Olario. We have no other recourse but to affirm the trial court’s decision denying the petitions
for adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 reads:
“SEC. 7. Who May Adopt.—The following may adopt:
105
VOL. 588, MAY 21, 2009 105
In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim,
Monina P. Lim
(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights, of good moral
character, has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude, emotionally and
psychologically capable of caring for children, at least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, and who
is in a position to support and care for his/her children in keeping with the means of the family. The
requirement of sixteen (16) year difference between the age of the adopter and adoptee may be waived
when the adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptee’s parent;
  (b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino nationals:  Provided,
That his/her country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines, that he/she has been
living in the Philippines for at least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the application for
adoption and maintains such residence until the adoption decree is entered, that he/she has been
certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government agency that he/she has
the legal capacity to adopt in his/her country, and that his/her government allows the adoptee to enter
his/her country as his/her adopted son/
daughter:  Provided, further,  That the requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s
qualification to adopt in his/her country may be waived for the following:
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of
consanguinity or affinity; or
(ii )one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a
relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouses; or
(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship and clearance of
his/her financial accountabilities.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, however, That
the other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
106
106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim,
Monina P. Lim
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the
other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses.” (Emphasis supplied)
The use of the word “shall” in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by the
husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental
authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to
the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule
also insures harmony between the spouses.12
The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the time
the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were
filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the trial court was correct
in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.
Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section
7.  First, the children to be adopted are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of her
husband Olario. Second, the children are not the illegitimate children of petitioner. And third,
petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each other.
The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent
does not suffice. There are certain requirements that Olario must comply being an American
citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must
prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines; (2) he
must have been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the filing
of the application for adoption; (3) he must maintain such residency until the adoption decree
is entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed
to enter the adopter’s country as the latter’s adopted child. None of these qualifications were
shown and proved during the trial.
_______________
12 Republic v. Toledano, G.R. No. 94147, 8 June 1994, 233 SCRA 9.
107
VOL. 588, MAY 21, 2009 107
In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim,
Monina P. Lim
These requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt
cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7. The children or adoptees are not relatives
within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or of Olario. Neither are the
adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner.
 Effects of Adoption
Petitioner contends that joint parental authority is not anymore necessary since the
children have been emancipated having reached the age of majority. This is untenable.
Parental authority includes caring for and rearing the children for civic consciousness and
efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and physical character and well-
being.13 The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of
their common children.14  Even the remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the
parental authority over the children, unless the court appoints another person to be the
guardian of the person or property of the children.15
It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation—that is, when he attains the
age of majority or 18 years of age16—emancipation terminates parental authority over the
person and property of the child, who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil
life.17 However, parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. Article V
of RA 8552 enumerates the effects of adoption, thus:
_______________
13 Article 209, Family Code.
14 Article 210, Family Code.
15 Article 212, Family Code.
16 Republic Act No. 6809, An Act Lowering the Age of Majority from Twenty-One to Eighteen Years, Amending for
the Purpose Executive Order Numbered Two Hundred Nine, and For Other Purposes.
17 Article 236, Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6809.
108
108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim,
Monina P. Lim
ARTICLE V
EFFECTS OF ADOPTION
“SEC. 16. Parental Authority.—Except in cases where the biological parent is the spouse of the
adopter, all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee shall be severed and the same
shall then be vested on the adopter(s).
SEC. 17. Legitimacy.—The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate son/daughter of the adopter(s)
for all intents and purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and obligations provided by law to
legitimate sons/daughters born to them without discrimination of any kind. To this end, the adoptee is
entitled to love, guidance, and support in keeping with the means of the family.
SEC. 18. Succession.—In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee shall have
reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from legitimate filiation. However, if the adoptee and
his/her biological parent(s) had left a will, the law on testamentary succession shall govern.”
Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1) sever all legal ties between the biological
parent(s) and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter; (2)
deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the adopter; and (3) give adopter and adoptee
reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including
but not limited to: (i) the right of the adopter to choose the name the child is to be known; and
(ii) the right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of each
other.18  Therefore, even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still
considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights19 of a legitimate child such as:
(1) to bear the surname of the father and the mother; (2) to receive support from their parents;
and (3) to be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights. Conversely, the adoptive
parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to
_______________
18 Section 33, Article VI, Rules and Regulations to Implement the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998.
19 Article 174, Family Code.
109
VOL. 588, MAY 21, 2009 109
In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim,
Monina P. Lim
which biological parents are entitled20 such as support21and successional rights.22
We are mindful of the fact that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the
interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration. They are designed to
provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and
give them the protection of society and family, as well as to allow childless couples or persons
to experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the adopted
for the manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment should
be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.23 But,
as we have ruled in Republic v. Vergara:24
“We are not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes, which is the promotion of the welfare
of the children. Accordingly, the law should be construed liberally, in a manner that will sustain rather
than defeat said purpose. The law must also be applied with compassion, understanding and less
severity in view of the fact that it is intended to provide homes, love, care and education for less
fortunate children. Regrettably, the Court is not in a position to affirm the trial court’s decision favoring
adoption in the case at bar, for the law is clear and it cannot be modified without violating the
proscription against judicial legislation.  Until such time however, that the law on the matter is
amended, we cannot sustain the respondent-spouses’ petition for adoption.” (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner, being married at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, should have
jointly filed the petitions with her husband. We cannot make our own legislation to suit
petitioner.
_______________
20 Section 34, Article VI, Rules and Regulations to Implement the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998.
21 Article 195, Family Code.
22 Section 18, Article V, RA 8552.
23 Bobanovic v. Montes, 226 Phil. 404; 142 SCRA 485 (1986).
24 336 Phil. 944, 948-949; 270 SCRA 206, 210 (1997).
110
110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim,
Monina P. Lim
Petitioner, in her Memorandum, insists that subsequent events would show that joint
adoption could no longer be possible because Olario has filed a case for dissolution of his
marriage to petitioner in the Los Angeles Superior Court.
We disagree. The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and
Olario is of no moment. It is not equivalent to a decree of dissolution of marriage. Until and
unless there is a judicial decree for the dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and
Olario, the marriage still subsists. That being the case, joint adoption by the husband and the
wife is required. We reiterate our ruling above that since, at the time the petitions for adoption
were filed, petitioner was married to Olario, joint adoption is mandatory.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 15 September 2004
of the Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch 22 in SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258
and 1259. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Puno (C.J., Chairperson), Corona, Leonardo-De Castro and Bersamin, JJ., concur.

Petition denied, judgment affirmed.

Notes.—While the right of a natural parent to name the child is recognized, guaranteed
and protected under the law, the so-called right of an adoptive parent to re-name an adopted
child by virtue or as a consequence of adoption, even for the most noble intentions and moving
supplications, is unheard of in law and consequently cannot be favorably considered. (Republic
vs. Hernandez, 253 SCRA 509 [1996])
Since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father to use,
as middle name her mother’s surname, the Court finds no reason why she should not be
allowed to do so. (In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia, 454 SCRA
541 [2005])

VOL. 242, MARCH 16, 1995 407
Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals
* position to support the boy. The fact that he was unable to provide financial support for his minor son
G.R. No. 113054. March 16, 1995.
LEOUEL SANTOS, SR., petitioner-appellant,  vs.  COURT OF APPEALS, and SPOUSES
LEOPOLDO and OFELIA BEDIA, respondents-appellees.
Civil Law; Family Code; Parent and Child; The right of custody accorded to parents springs from the
exercise of parental authority.—The right of custody accorded to parents springs from the exercise of
parental authority. Parental authority or  patria potestas  in Roman Law is the juridical institution
whereby parents rightfully assume control and protection of their unemancipated children to the extent
required by the latter’s needs. It is a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants to parents for
the purpose of the children’s physical preservation and development, as well as the cultivation of their
intellect and the education of their heart and senses. As regards parental authority, “there is no power,
but a task; no complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of
the minor.”
Same; Same; Same; Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred
or renounced except in cases authorized by law.—Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable
and may not be transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to
parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of
adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children’s home or an orphan institution. When a parent
entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is
given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if
a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same.
Same; Same; Same; The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated children,
are duty-bound and entitled to keep them in their custody and company.—The father and mother, being
the natural guardians of unemancipated children, are duty-bound and entitled to keep them in their
custody and company. The child’s welfare is always the paramount consideration in all questions
concerning his care and custody.
_______________
* THIRD
DIVISION.
408
408 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals
Same;  Same;  Same;  Only in case of the parents’ death, absence or unsuitability may substitute
parental authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent.—The law vests on the father and mother
joint parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of absence or death of either
parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. Only in case of the parents’ death,
absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent.
Same;  Same;  Same;  Private respondents’ demonstrated love and affection for the boy,
notwithstanding, the legitimate father is still preferred over the grandparents.—We find the
aforementioned considerations insufficient to defeat petitioner’s parental authority and the concomitant
right to have custody over the minor Leouel Santos, Jr., particularly since he has not been shown to be
an unsuitable and unfit parent. Private respondents’ demonstrated love and affection for the boy,
notwithstanding, the legitimate father is still preferred over the grandparents. The latter’s wealth is not
a deciding factor, particularly because there is no proof that at the present time, petitioner is in no
from birth up to over three years when he took the boy from his in-laws without permission, should not
be sufficient reason to strip him of his permanent right to the child’s custody. While petitioner’s previous
inattention is inexcusable and merits only the severest criticism, it cannot be construed as abandonment.
PETITION for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Elam Law Offices for petitioner.
     Manuel S. Gemarino for private respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
In this 1 petition for review, we are asked to overturn the decision of the Court of
Appeals  granting custody of six-year old
_______________
1 CA-GR CV No. 30563, “In the matter of petition for care, custody and control of minor Leouel Santos, Jr., spouses
Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia, petitioners-appellees, v. Leouel Santos, Sr., respondent-appellant,” Rollo, p. 21.
409
VOL. 242, MARCH 16, 1995 409
Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals
Leouel Santos, Jr. to his maternal grandparents and not to his father, Santos, Sr. What is
sought is a decision which should definitively settle the matter of the care, custody and control
of the boy.
Happily, unlike King Solomon, we need not merely rely on a “wise and understanding
heart,” for there is man’s law to guide us and that is, the Family Code.
The antecedent facts giving rise to the case at bench are as follows:
Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia, a nurse by profession,
were married in Iloilo City in 1986. Their union begot only one child, Leouel Santos, Jr. who
was born July 18, 1987.
From the time the boy was released from the hospital until sometime thereafter, he had
been in the care and custody of his maternal grandparents, private respondents herein,
Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.
Petitioner and wife Julia agreed to place Leouel, Jr. in the temporary custody of the latter’s
parents, the respondent spouses Bedia. The latter alleged that they paid for all the hospital
bills, as well as the subsequent support of the boy because petitioner could not afford to do so.
The boy’s mother, Julia-Bedia-Santos, left for the United States in May 1988 to work.
Petitioner alleged that he is not aware of her whereabouts and his efforts to locate her in the
United States proved futile. Private respondents claim that although abroad, their daughter
Julia had been sending financial support to them for her son.
On September 2, 1990, petitioner along with his two brothers, visited the Bedia household,
where three-year old Leouel, Jr. was staying. Private respondents contend that through deceit
and false pretensions, petitioner abducted the boy and clandestinely spirited him away to his
hometown in Bacong, Negros Oriental.
 The spouses Bedia then filed a “Petition for Care, Custody and Control of Minor Ward ation is what is best for the happiness and welfare of the latter. As maternal grandparents
Leouel Santos,
2
Jr.,” before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, with Santos, Sr. as who have amply demonstrated their love and affection for the boy since his infancy, they claim
respondent. to be in the best position to promote the child’s welfare.
The issue to be resolved here boils down to who should properly be awarded custody of the
_______________ minor Leouel Santos, Jr.
The right of custody accorded to parents springs from the exercise of parental authority.
2 Spec. Proc. No. 4588, Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City, Branch 29, Judge Ricardo P. Galvez, presiding. Parental authority or  patria potestas  in Roman Law is the juridical institution whereby
410 parents rightfully assume control7
and protection of their unemancipated children to the extent
required by the latter’s needs.  It is a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants to
parents for the purpose of the children’s physical preservation and development,
8
as well as the
410 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED cultivation of their intellect and the education of their heart and senses.  As regards parental
authority, “there is no power, but a task; no complex of9 rights, but a sum of duties; no
Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals
sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor.”
Parental authority and responsibility are 10
inalienable and may not be transferred or
After an ex-parte hearing on October 8, 1990, the trial court issued an order on the same day renounced except in cases authorized by law.  The right attached to parental authority, being
awarding
3
custody of the child Leouel Santos, Jr. to his grandparents, Leopoldo and Ofelia purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases 11
of adoption,
Bedia. 4
guardianship and surrender to a children’s home or an orphan institution.   When a parent
Petitioner appealed this Order to the Court of Appeals. In 5its decision dated April 30, 1992, entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document,
respondent appellate 6
court affirmed the trial court’s order.   His motion for reconsideration what is given is merely
12
temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of
having been denied,  petitioner now brings the instant petition for review for a reversal of the parental
13
authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the
appellate court’s decision. same.
The Court of Appeals erred, according to petitioner, in awarding custody of the boy to his
grandparents and not to himself. He contends that since private respondents have failed to _______________
show that petitioner is an unfit and unsuitable father, substitute parental authority granted
7 Puig Peña, cited in I J. REYES AND R. PUNO, AN OUTLINE OF THE PHILIPPINE CIVIL LAW, 295 (4th ed.,
to the boy’s grandparents under Art. 214 of the Family Code is inappropriate.
1964).
Petitioner adds that the reasons relied upon by the private respondents in having custody 8  Reyes v. Alvarez,  8 Phil. 732; 2 Manresa 21; cited in I A. TOLENTINO,  CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILS.,
over the boy, are flimsy and insufficient to deprive him of his natural and legal right to have COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE 604 (1990 ed.).
custody. 9 Puig Peña cited in Reyes and Puno, supra at note 7.

On the other hand, private respondents aver that they can provide an air-conditioned room 10 Family Code, Arts. 210, 223 and 224.
11 Family Code, Arts. 222-224; Act No. 3094.
for the boy and that petitioner would not be in a position to take care of his son since he has to
12 Celis v. Cafuir, 86 Phil. 555; De La Cruz v. Lim Chai Lay (CA) GR 14080-R, August 15, 1955; Bacayo v. Calum,
be assigned to different places. They also allege that the petitioner did not give a single
(CA) O.G. 8607.
centavo for the boy’s support and maintenance. When the boy was about to be released from 13 Family Code, Art. 210, taken from Art. 313 of the Civil Code.
the hospital, they were the ones who paid the fees because their daughter and petitioner had
no money. Besides, Julia Bedia-Santos, their daughter, had entrusted the boy to them before 412
she left for the United States. Furthermore, petitioner’s use of trickery and deceit in abducting
the child in 1990, after being hospitably treated by private respondents, does not speak well of
412 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
his fitness and suitability as a parent.
The Bedias argue that although the law recognizes the right of a parent to his child’s Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals
custody, ultimately the primary consider-
The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated
14
children, are duty-
_______________
bound and entitled to keep them in their custody and company.  The child’s welfare
15
is always
3 Rollo, p. 50. the paramount consideration in all questions concerning his care and custody.
4 Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 30563. The law vests on16
the father and mother joint parental authority over the persons of their
5 Penned by Justice Serafin V.C. Guingona, with Justices Vicente V. Mendoza and Jaime M. Lantin, concurring; common children.   In case of absence  17or death  of either parent, the parent present shall
Rollo, p. 21.
6 Resolution dated November 16, 1993, Rollo, p. 34.
continue exercising parental authority.   Only in case of the parents’ death, absence or
unsuitability 18 may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving
411 grandparent.   The situation obtaining in the case at bench is one where the mother of the
minor Santos, Jr., is working in the United States while the father, petitioner Santos, Sr., is
present. Not only are they physically apart but are also emotionally separated. There has been
VOL. 242, MARCH 16, 1995 411 no decree of legal separation and petitioner’s attempt to obtain19 an annulment of the marriage
Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals on the ground of psychological incapacity of his wife has failed.
Petitioner assails the decisions of both the trial court and the appellate court to award
custody of his minor son to his parents-in-law, the Bedia spouses on the ground that under
Art. 214 of the Family Code, substitute parental authority of the grandparents is proper only
when both parents are dead, absent or unsuitable. Petitioner’s unfitness, according to him, has 414 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
not been successfully shown by private respondents.
The Court of Appeals held that although there is no evidence to show that petitioner Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals
(Santos, Sr.) is “depraved, a habitual
petitioner is in no position to support the boy. The fact that he was unable to provide financial
_______________ support for his minor son from birth up to over three years when he took the boy from his in-
14  Family Code, Art. 209 and 211;  Aldecoa v. Hongkong and Shanghai Bank,  30 Phil. 228  cited in A.
laws without permission, should not be sufficient reason to strip him of his permanent right to
Tolentino, supra at p. 618.
the child’s custody. While petitioner’s previous inattention is inexcusable and merits only the
15 Art. 8, Pres. Decree No. 603, Child and Youth Welfare Code; Cervantes v. Fajardo, G.R. No. 79955, January 27, severest criticism, it cannot be construed as abandonment. His appeal of the unfavorable
1989, 169 SCRA 575; Unson v. Navarro, L-52242, November 17, 1980, 101 SCRA 182. decision against him and his efforts to keep his only child in his custody may be regarded as
16 Family Code, Art. 211.
serious efforts to rectify his past misdeeds. To award him custody would help enhance the
17 Family Code, Art. 212.
18 Family Code, Art. 214.
bond between parent and son. It would also give the father a chance to prove his love for his
19 On January 4, 1995, the Court en banc, denied Leouel Santos, Sr.’s petition for review where he sought to have
son and for the son to experience the warmth and support which a father can give.
his marriage to Julia Bedia-Santos annulled on the ground of psychological incapacity. Leouel Santos v. Hon. Court of His being a soldier is likewise no bar to allowing him custody over the body. So many men
Appeals and Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos, G.R. No. 112019. in uniform who are assigned to different parts of the country in the service of the nation, are
still the natural guardians of their children. It is not just to deprive our soldiers of authority,
413 care and custody over their children merely because of the normal consequences of their duties
and assignments, such as temporary separation from their families.
VOL. 242, MARCH 16, 1995 413 Petitioner’s employment of trickery in spiriting away his boy from his in-laws, though
unjustifiable, is likewise not a ground to wrest custody from him.
Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals Private respondents’ attachment to the young boy whom they have reared for the past three
years is understandable. Still and all, the law considers the natural love of a parent to
drunkard or poor, he may nevertheless be considered, as he is in 20fact so considered, to be outweigh that of the grandparents, such that only when the parent present is shown to be
unsuitable to be allowed to have custody of minor Leouel Santos, Jr.” unfit or unsuitable may the grandparents exercise substitute parental authority, a fact which
The respondent appellate court, in affirming the trial court’s order of October 8, 1990, has not been proven here.
adopted as its own the latter’s observations, to wit: The strong bonds of love and affection possessed by private respondents as grandparents
should not be seen as incompatible with petitioner’s right to custody over the child as a father.
“From the evidence adduced, this Court is of the opinion that it is to be (sic) best interest of the minor Moreover, who is to say whether the petitioner’s financial standing may improve in the future?
Leouel Santos, Jr. that he be placed under the care, custody, and control of his maternal grandparents, WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent Court of Appeals
the petitioners herein. The petitioners have amply demonstrated their love and devotion to their dated April 30, 1992 as well as its Resolution dated November 13, 1992 are hereby
grandson while the natural father, respondent herein, has shown little interest in his welfare as reflected REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Custody over the minor Leouel Santos Jr. is awarded to his
by his conduct in the past. Moreover, the fact that petitioners are well-off financially, should be carefully
legitimate father, herein petitioner Leouel Santos,
considered in awarding to them the custody of the minor herein, lest the breaking of such ties with his
maternal grandparents might deprive the boy of an eventual college education and other material 415
advantages (Consaul vs. Consaul,  63 N.Y.S. 688) Respondent had never given any previous financial
support to his son, while, upon the other hand, the latter receives so much bounty from his maternal
grandparents and his mother as well, who is now gainfully employed in the United States. Moreover, the VOL. 242, MARCH 16, 1995 415
fact that respondent, as a military personnel who has to shuttle from one assignment to another, and, in
these troubled times, may have pressing and compelling military duties which may prevent him from Montejo vs. Commission on Elections
attending to his son at times when the latter needs him most, militates strongly against said respondent.
Additionally, the child is sickly and asthmatic and needs the loving and tender care of those who can
provide for it.”
21
Sr.
SO ORDERED.
We find the aforementioned considerations insufficient to defeat petitioner’s parental
authority and the concomitant right to have custody over the minor Leouel Santos, Jr.,      Feliciano (Chairman), Melo, Vitug and Francisco, JJ., concur.
particularly since he has not been shown to be an unsuitable and unfit parent. Private
respondents’ demonstrated love and affection 22for the boy, notwithstanding, the legitimate Petition granted.
father is still preferred over the grandparents.   The latter’s wealth is not a deciding factor,
Note.—The Supreme Court gives effect to the policy of the Civil Code and the Family Code
particularly because there is no proof that at the present time,
to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity of illegitimate children. (Mendoza vs.
Court of Appeals, 201 SCRA 675 [1991])
_______________
20 Rollo,
p. 29.
21 Rollo,
pp. 31-32.
22 Bacayo v. Calum, (CA) 53 O.G. 8607.

414

VOL. 209, JUNE 9, 1992 665
Tayag vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 95229. June 9, 1992.
*
CORITO OCAMPO TAYAG, petitioner,  vs.  HON. COURT OF APPEALS and EMILIE
DAYRIT CUYUGAN, respondents.
Succession; Action; Action to compel recognition and a claim to inheritance may be joined in a single
complaint.—Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, although petitioner contends that the
complaint filed by herein private respondent merely alleges that the minor Chad Cuyugan is an
illegitimate child of the deceased and is actually a claim for inheritance, from the allegations therein the
same may be considered as one to compel recognition. Further, that the two causes of action, one to
compel recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may be joined in one complaint is not new in our
jurisprudence.
Same; Same; Statutes; Where a complaint for recognition was filed before the Family Code took effect,
the same should be resolved under the provisions of the New Civil Code.—Under the circumstances
obtaining in the case at bar, we hold that the right of action of the minor child has been vested by the
filing of the complaint in court under the regime of the Civil Code and prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code. We herein adopt our ruling in the recent case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of
Appeals, et al. where we held that the fact of filing of the petition already vested in the petitioner her
right to file it and to have the same proceed to final adjudication in accordance with the law in force at
the time, and such right can no longer be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law.
Same; Same; Same; Rule that statutory changes in procedure shall apply to pending actions cannot
be applied where it will affect vested rights.—Even assuming ex gratia argumenti  that the provision of
the Family Code in question is procedural in nature, the rule that a statutory change in matters of
procedure may affect pending actions and proceedings, unless the language of the act excludes them from
its operation, is not so pervasive that it may be used to validate or invalidate proceedings taken before it
goes into effect, since procedure must be governed by the law regulating it at the time the question of
procedure arises especially where vested rights may be prejudiced. Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family
Code finds no proper applica-
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
666
666 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Tayag vs. Court of Appeals
tion to the instant case since it will ineluctably affect adversely a right of private respondent and,
consequentially, of the minor child she represents, both of which have been vested with the filing of the
complaint in court. The trial court is, therefore, correct in applying the provisions of Article 285 of the
Civil Code and in holding that private respondent's cause of action has not yet prescribed.
PETITION for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Isnani, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Lorenzo G. Timbol for petitioner.
     Jose P. Bondoc for E. Cuyugan.
REGALADO, J.:
1
The instant petition seeks to reverse and set aside the decision  of respondent Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 20222, entitled "Corito Tayag vs. Hon. Norberto C. Ponce, Judge, Regional
Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga and Emilie Dayrit Cuyugan," promulgated on May
2
10,1990, and its resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.  Said decision, now
before us for review, dismissed petitioner's Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction on the ground that the denial of the motion to dismiss Civil Case No.
7938 of the court a quo is an interlocutory order and cannot be the subject of the said special
civil action, ordinary appeal in due time being petitioner's remedy.
In said Civil Case No. 7938, herein private respondent, in her capacity as mother and legal
guardian of minor Chad D. Cuyugan, filed on April 9, 1987 a complaint denominated "Claim
for Inheritance" against herein petitioner as the administratrix of the estate of the late Atty.
Ricardo Ocampo. The operative allegations in said complaint are as follows:
________________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Asaali S. Isnani, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Oscar M. Herrera and
Luis L. Victor Rollo 119-124.
2 Rollo, 142.
667
VOL. 209, JUNE 9, 1992 667
Tayag vs. Court of Appeals
"2. Plaintiff is the mother and legal guardian of her minor son, Chad Cuyugan, by the father of the
defendant, the late Atty, Ricardo Ocampo; and the defendant is the known administratrix of the
real and personal properties left by her deceased father, said Atty. Ocampo, who died intestate in
Angeles City on September 28, 1983;
"3. Plaintiff has been estranged from her husband, Jose Cuyugan, for several years now and during
which time, plaintiff and Atty. Ricardo Ocampo had illicit amorous relationship with each other
that, as a consequence thereof, they begot a child who was christened Chad Cuyugan in
accordance with the ardent desire and behest of said Atty. Ocampo;
"4. Chad, the son of plaintiff by the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo, who was born in Angeles City on
October 5, 1980 had been sired, showered with exceptional affection, fervent love and care by his
putative father for being his only son as can be gleaned from indubitable letters and documents of
the late Atty. Ocampo to herein plaintiff, excerpts from some of which are hereunder reproduced;
'x x x Keep good keep faith keep Chad and yourself for me alone and for me all the time. As I have now I shall save
my heart to you and to Chad/
'x x x Please take good care and pray to Sto. Niño for our sake and for the child sake.'
'x x x Keep him. Take good care of him.'
'x x x I'm proud that you are his mother ... I'm proud of him and you. Let me bless him by my name and let me
entitle him to all what I am and what I've got.'
'x x x I have vowed to recognize him and be my heir.'
'x x x How is CHAD and you . . .'
'x x x Why should we not start now to own him, jointly against the whole world. After all we love each other and
CHAD is the product of our love."
"5. The minor, Chad D. Cuyugan, although illegitimate is nevertheless entitled to a share in the
intestate estate left by his deceased father, Atty. Ricardo Ocampo as one of the surviving heirs;
"6. The deceased Atty. Ricardo Ocampo, at the time of his death was the owner of real and personal
property, located in Baguio City, Angeles City and in the Province of Pampanga with
 approximate value of several millions of pesos;
"7. The estate of the late Atty. Ocampo has not as yet been inventoried by the defendant and the
inheritance of the surviving heirs including that of said Chad has not likewise been ascertained;
"8. The only known surviving heirs of the deceased Atty. Ricardo Ocampo are his children, namely:
Corito O. Tayag, Rivina O.
668
668 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tayag vs. Court of Appeals
Tayag, Evita O. Florendo, Felina Ocampo, and said minor Chad, for and in whose behalf this
instant complaint is filed;
"9. Plaintiff has no means of livelihood and she only depends on the charity of friends and relatives
for the sustenance of her son, Chad, such that it is urgent, necessary and imperative that said
child be extended financial support from the estate of his putative father, Atty. Ricardo Ocampo;
"10. Several demands, verbal and written, have been made for defendant to grant Chad's lawful
inheritance, but despite said demands, defendant failed and refused and still3 fails and refuses to
satisfy the claim for inheritance against the estate of the late Atty. Ocampo;"
xxx
Plaintiff thereafter prays, among others, that judgment be rendered ordering defendant to
render an inventory and accounting of the real and personal properties left by Atty. Ricardo
Ocampo; to determine and deliver the share of the minor child Chad in the estate of the
deceased; and to give him support pendente lite.
Petitioner, as defendant therein, filed her answer with counterclaim on June 3, 1987,
disputing the material allega-tions in the complaint. She maintained by way of affirmative
defenses, inter alia, that the complaint states no cause of action; that the action is premature;
that the suit is barred by prescription; that respondent Cuyugan has no legal and judicial
personality to bring the suit; that the lower court has no jurisdiction
4
over the nature of the
action; and that there is improper joinder of causes of action.
After the hearing of the motion to dismiss on the grounds asserted as affirmative defenses,
the trial court issued the following order on October 20, 1987:
xxx
The Court is of the considered opinion that there is a need of further proceedings to adduce evidence
on the various claims of the parties so as to hear their respective sides.
_______________
3 Rollo,
43-45.
4 Ibid., 48-52.
669
VOL. 209, JUNE 9, 1992 669
Tayag vs. Court of Appeals
"WHEREFORE, resolution on the preliminary hearing which partakes of the nature of a motion to
dismiss requiring additional evidence is in the meantime
5
held in abeyance. The Motion to Dismiss is
hereby denied and the case is set for pre-trial x x x."
With 6 the denial of her motion for reconsideration of said order on November 19,
1987,  petitioner filed on December 10, 1987 a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the
Court of Appeals, docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 13464, which was granted by the Sixth
Division of respondent court on August 2, 1989 and enjoined respondent judge to resolve
petitioner's motion praying for the dismissal 7of the complaint based on the affirmative
defenses within ten (10) days from notice thereof.
In compliance with said decision of respondent court, the trial court acted on and thereafter
denied the motion to dismiss, which had been pleaded in the affirmative defenses in Civil Case
No. 7938, in an order dated October 24,1989, resolving the said motion in the following
manner:
xxx
"The Court now resolves:
No. 1. The complaint sufficiently shows that a cause of action exists in favor of the plaintiff. A cause of
action being the 'primary right to redress a wrong' (Marquez vs. Valera, 48 OG 5272), which apparently
on the face of the complaint, plaintiff has a right to enforce through this case. Defendant's protestation
that there is no sufficient cause of action is therefore untenable.
No. 2. The present action, despite the claim of defendant is not premature. It is exactly filed in order
to prove filiation, and then recognition. To go about the step by step procedure outlined by the defendant
by filing one action after another is definitely violative of the prohibition against splitting a cause of
action.
No. 3. It is not the plaintiff that is now bringing the case before the Court. It is (her) spurious child
that she represents as natural guardian that is instituting the action.
No, 4, Prescription has not set in if we consider that a spurious child may file an action for recognition
within four years from his
_______________
5 Ibid., 68.
6 Rollo, CA-G.R.
7 Ibid.,
SP No. 20222, 64.
id., 65-68.
670
670 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tayag vs. Court of Appeals
attainment of majority (New Civil Code, Art, 285, No, 2). Whether the letters of the putative father, Atty.
Ocampo, is evidence, that should be inquired into in a hearing on the merits.
No. 5. Several causes of action may be joined in one complaint as was done in this case. The
defendant's claim that there was a misjoinder is untenable.
No. 6. The Court being a court of general jurisdiction, and of special jurisdiction, such as a probate
court has capacity to entertain a complaint such as the one now before it.
'The nature of the case 'CLAIM FOR INHERITANCE' does not control the body of the complaint.
"From all the foregoing, the Court finds that the complaint is sufficient in form and substance and,
therefore, the motion to dismiss could not be granted until after trial on the merits in which it should be
shown that the allegations of the complaint are unfounded or a8 special defense to the action exists.
"WHEREFORE, the Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED."
Petitioner's
9
motion for reconsideration of said order was denied by the trial court on January
30, 1990.  As a consequence, another petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction was filed by petitioner on March 12, 1990 with respondent court, docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 20222, praying that the orders dated October 24,1989 and January 30, 1990 of the
trial court be annulled and set aside for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
On May 10,1990, as earlier stated, respondent court promulgated its decision dismissing
the petition, and likewise denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated
September 5, 1990, hence the present petition for review on certiorari.
In elevating the case before us, petitioner relies on these grounds:
 The Honorable Respondent Court of Appeals dismissed Petitioner's Petition for
"a.
Certiorari and Prohibition in UTTER DISRE
_______________
8 Rollo, 69-70.
9 Ibid,, 81-83.
671
VOL. 209, JUNE 9, 1992 671
Tayag vs. Court of Appeals
GARD OF APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT providing
clear exceptions to the general rule that interlocutory orders may not be elevated by
way of the special civil action of certiorari;
"b. Respondent Court refused to resolve certain issues raised by Petitioner before the
Regional Trial Court and before Respondent Court of Appeals involving QUESTIONS
OF SUBSTANCE not theretofore determined by this Honorable Court, such as the
interpretation and application of Art. 281 of the Civil Code requiring judicial approval
when the recognition of an illegitimate minor child does not take place in a record of
birth or in a will; of Art. 175, Par. 2, in relation to Art. 172, Par. 2 of the Family Code,
providing for the prescriptive period with respect to the action to establish illegitimate
filiation; and of Art. 285 of the Civil Code, providing for the prescriptive period with
respect to the action for recognition of a natural child; and
"c. Respondent Court has sanctioned a DEPARTURE by10 the Regional Trial Court from
the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings."
Petitioner contends that the action to claim for inheritance filed by herein private respondent
in behalf of the minor child, Chad Cuyugan, is premature and the complaint states no cause of
action. She submits that the recognition of the minor child, either voluntarily or by judicial
action, by the alleged putative father must first be established before the former can invoke
his right to succeed and participate in the estate of the latter. Petitioner asseverates that since
there is no allegation of such recognition in the complaint denominated as "Claim for
Inheritance," then there exists no basis for private respondent's aforesaid claim and,
consequently, the complaint should be dismissed. 11
The instant case is similar to the case of Paulino vs. Paulino, et al.,  wherein the petitioner,
as plaintiff, brought an action against the private respondents, as defendants, to compel them
to give her share of inheritance in the estate of the late Marcos Paulino, claiming and
alleging, inter alia, that she is the illegitimate child of the deceased; that no proceedings for
the set-
_______________
10 Ibid., 8-9.
11 3 SCRA 730 (1961).
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672 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tayag vs. Court of Appeals
tlement of the deceased's estate had been commenced in court; and that the defendants had
refused and failed to deliver her share in the estate of the deceased. She accordingly prayed
that the defendants therein be ordered to deliver her aforesaid share. The defendants moved
for the dismissal of her complaint on the ground that it states no cause of action and that, even
if it does, the same is barred by prescription.
The only difference between the aforecited case and the case at bar is that at the time of the
filing of the complaint therein, the petitioner in that case had already reached the age of
majority, whereas the claimant in the present case is still a minor. In Paulino, we held that an
illegitimate child, to be entitled to support and successional rights from the putative or
presumed parent, must prove his filiation to the latter. We also said that it is necessary to
allege in the complaint that the putative father had acknowledged and recognized the
illegitimate child because such acknowledgment is essential to and is the basis of the right to
inherit. There being no allegation of such acknowledgment, the action becomes one to compel
recognition which cannot be brought after the death of the putative father. The  ratio
decidendi  in  Paulino,  therefore, is not the absence of a cause of action for failure of the
petitioner to allege the fact of acknowledgment in the complaint, but the prescription of the
action.
Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, although petitioner contends that the
complaint filed by herein private respondent merely alleges that the minor Chad Cuyugan is
an illegitimate child of the deceased and is actually a claim for inheritance, from the
allegations therein the same may be considered as one to compel recognition. Further, that the
two causes of action, one to compel recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may be
joined in one complaint is not new in our jurisprudence. 12
As early as 1992, we had occasion to rule thereon in Briz vs. Briz, et al.,  wherein we said:
The question whether a person in the position of the present plaintiff can in any event maintain a
complex action to compel recog-
________________
12 43 Phil. 763 (1922).
673
VOL. 209, JUNE 9, 1992 673
Tayag vs. Court of Appeals
nition as a natural child and at the same time to obtain ulterior relief in the character of heir, is one
which in the opinion of this court must be answered in the affirmative, provided always that the
conditions justifying the joinder of the two distinct causes of action are present in the particular case. In
other words, there is no absolute necessity requiring that the action to compel acknowledgment should
have been instituted and prosecuted to a successful conclusion prior to the action in which that same
plaintiff seeks additional relief in the character of heir. Certainly, there is nothing so peculiar to the
action to compel acknowledgment as to require that a rule should be here applied different from that
generally applicable in other cases. x x x.
"The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitly formulated by this court, is undoubtedly
to some extent supported by our prior decisions. Thus, we have held in numerous cases, and the doctrine
must be considered well settled, that a natural child having a right to compel acknowledgment, but who
has not been in fact legally acknowledged, may maintain partition proceedings for the division of the
inheritance against his coheirs x x x; and the same person may intervene in proceedings for the
distribution of the estate of his deceased natural father, or mother x x x. In neither of these situations
has it been thought necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior decree compelling acknowledgment. The
obvious reason is that in partition suits and distribution proceedings the other persons who might take
by inheritance are before the court; and the declaration of heirship is appropriate to such proceedings."
The next question to be resolved is whether the action to compel recognition has prescribed.
 Petitioner argues that assuming  arguendo  that the action is one to compel recognition,
private respondent's cause of action has prescribed for the reason that since filiation is sought
to be proved by means of a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned,
then under paragraph 2, Article 175 of the Family Code, the action to establish filiation of the
illegitimate minor child must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged putative father. In
the case at bar, considering that the complaint was filed after the death of the alleged parent,
the action has prescribed and this is another ground for the dismissal of the complaint.
Petitioner theorizes that Article 285 of the Civil Code is not applicable to the case at bar and,
instead, paragraph 2, Article 175 of the Family Code should be given retroactive effect. The
theory is premised on the supposition
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674 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tayag vs. Court of Appeals
that the latter provision of law being merely procedural in nature, no vested rights are
created, hence it can be made to apply retroactively.
Article 285 of the Civil Code provides:
"Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of
the presumed parents, except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the
action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority;"
xxx
On the other hand, Article 175 of the Family Code reads:
"Art. 175, Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is
based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the
lifetime of the alleged parent"
Under the last-quoted provision of law, therefore, if the action is based on the record of birth of
the child, a final judgment, or an admission by the parent of the child's filiation in a public
document or in a private handwritten signed instrument, then the action may be brought
during the lifetime of the child. However, if the action is based on the open and continuous
possession by the child of the status of an illegitimate child, or on other evidence allowed by
the Rules of Court and special laws, the view has been expressed that the action must be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
13
Petitioner submits that Article 175 of the Family Code applies in which case the complaint
should have been filed during the lifetime of the putative father, failing which the same must
be dismissed on the ground of prescription. Private respondent,
_______________
13 Sempio-Diy, The Family Code of the Philippines, 1989 ed., 249.
675
VOL. 209, JUNE 9, 1992 675
Tayag vs. Court of Appeals
however, insists that Article 285 of the Civil Code is controlling and, since the alleged parent
died during the minority of the child, the action for filiation may be filed within four years
from the attainment of majority of the minor child,
Article 256 of the Family Code states that "[t]his Code shall have retroactive effect insofar
as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code
or other laws." It becomes essential, therefore, to determine whether the right of the minor
child to file an action for recognition is a vested right or not.
Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we hold that the right of action of the
minor child has been vested by the filing of the complaint 14
in court under the regime of the
Civil Code and prior to the effectivity of the Family Code.  We herein 15
adopt our ruling in the
recent case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al.  where we held that the
fact of filing of the petition already vested in the petitioner her right to file it and to have the
same proceed to final adjudication in accordance with the law in force at the time, and such
right can no longer be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law.
Even assuming  ex gratia argumenti  that the provision of the Family Code in question is
procedural in nature, the rule that a statutory change in matters of procedure may affect
pending actions and proceedings, unless the language of the act excludes them from its
operation, is not so pervasive that it may be used to validate or invalidate proceedings taken
before it goes into effect, since procedure must be governed by the law regulating it at the time
the question of procedure arises especially where vested rights may be prejudiced.
Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family Code finds no proper application to the instant case
since it will ineluctably affect adversely a right of private respondent and, consequentially, of
the minor child she represents, both of which have been vested with the filing of the
________________
14 The Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988, pursuant to the clarification in Memorandum Circular No. 85 of
the Office of the President, dated November 7, 1988.
15 G.R. No. 92326, January 24,1992.
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676 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tayag vs. Court of Appeals
complaint in court. The trial court is, therefore, correct in applying the provisions of Article
285 of the Civil Code and in holding that private respondent's cause of action has not yet
prescribed.
Finally, we conform with the holding of the Court of Appeals that the questioned order of
the court below denying the motion to dismiss is interlocutory and cannot be the subject of a
petition for certiorari. The exceptions to this rule invoked by petitioner and allegedly obtaining
in the case at bar, are obviously not present and may not be relied upon.
WHEREFORE, the petition at bar is DENIED and the assailed decision and resolution of
respondent Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Paras and Padilla, JJ.,concur.
Nocon, J., On leave.
Petition denied; decision affirmed in toto.
Note.—Law in force at the time of recognition governs the act of recognition (Lim vs. Court
of Appeals, 65 SCRA 160).
 Recognition must be made in the record of birth, in a will, or in some other public document
(Lim vs. Court of Appeals, 65 SCRA 160).