Juco v.

NLRC – NHA project engr, gocc (charter)

Facts: Benjamin C. Juco was hired as a project engineer of National Housing Corporation (NHC) from November 16, 1970 to May 14, 1975.
On May 14, 1975, he was separated from the service for having been implicated in a crime of theft and/or malversation of public funds. On
March 25, 1977, Juco filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the NHC with the Department of Labor. On September 17, 1977, the Labor
Arbiter rendered a decision dismissing the complaint on the ground that the NLRC had no jurisdiction over the case. Juco then elevated the
case to the NLRC which rendered a decision on December 28, 1982, reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter. NHC then appealed the
NLRC decision before the Supreme Court and on January 17, 1985 which petition the Court granted thereby setting aside the NLRC decision
and reinstating the labor arbiter’s decision of dismissing the case.
On January 6, 1989, Juco filed with the Civil Service Commission a complaint for illegal dismissal, with preliminary mandatory
injunction. On February 6, 1989, NHC moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the Civil Service Commission has no
jurisdiction over the case. CSC granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
On April 28, 1989, Juco filed with NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal with preliminary mandatory injunction against NHC. NLRC
find NHC guilty of illegal dismissal. On June 1, 1990, NHC filed its appeal before the NLRC and on March 14, 1991, the NLRC promulgated a
decision which reversed the decision of Labor Arbiter Manuel R. Caday on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Issue: Whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner is not governed by the Labor Code

Held: Yes. Under the laws then in force, employees of government-owned and/or controlled corporations were governed by the Civil Service
Law and not by the Labor Code. Although in National Housing Corporation v. Juco, it was held that employees of government-owned and/or
controlled corporations, whether created by special law or formed as subsidiaries under the general Corporation Law, are governed by the
Civil Service Law and not by the Labor Code, this ruling has been supplanted by the 1987 Constitution which states that the civil service
embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government owned or controlled
corporations with original charter. In National Service Corporation (NASECO) v. National Labor Relations Commission, it was held that the
NLRC has jurisdiction over the employees of NASECO on the ground that it is the 1987 Constitution that governs because it is the Constitution
in place at the time of the decision. It was further held that the new phrase "with original charter" means that government-owned and
controlled corporations refer to corporations chartered by special law as distinguished from corporations organized under the Corporation
Code. Thus, NASECO which had been organized under the general incorporation statute and a subsidiary of the National Investment
Development Corporation, which in turn was a subsidiary of the Philippine National Bank, is excluded from the purview of the Civil Service
Commission. The above doctrine applies in this case. In the case at bench, the National Housing Corporation is a government owned
corporation organized in 1959 in accordance with Executive Order No. 399, otherwise known as the Uniform Charter of Government
Corporation, dated January 1, 1959. Its shares of stock are and have been one hundred percent (100%) owned by the Government from its
incorporation under Act 1459, the former corporation law. The government entities that own its shares of stock are the Government Service
Insurance System, the Social Security System, the Development Bank of the Philippines, the National Investment and Development
Corporation and the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation. Considering the fact that the NHA had been incorporated under Act 1459,
the former corporation law, it is but correct to say that it is a government-owned or controlled corporation whose employees are subject to
the provisions of the Labor Code. This observation is reiterated in the recent case of Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS)
v. National Housing
Corporation, where the SC held that the NHA is now within the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor and Employment, it being a
government-owned and/or controlled corporation without an original charter. Furthermore, the Court previously ruled that the workers or
employees of the NHC (now NHA) undoubtedly have the right to form unions or employee's organization and that there is no impediment to
the holding of a certification election among them as they are covered by the Labor Code.

MATURAN vs MAGLANA, Police provisional appointment reinstatement

FACTS Petitioner Tereso Maturan is a police sergeant at San Franciso, Southern Leyte. He got promoted from being a patrolman (February
1965) to a police sergeant (September 1972) through appointments which were provisional. His provisional appointment was annually
renewed for the span of seven years including respective increase in the salary. Respondent Mayor Maglana suspended Maturan on
September 1972 because of two pending cases against him (1. Falsification of public document by making untruthful statement in the
narration of facts and 2. Falsification of public document). A month after, respondent Vice Mayor Magoncia who was then the Acting Mayor
instructed Maturan to tender his resignation pursuant to the Letter of Instruction No. 14 of the President of the Philippines. Maturan submitted
his letter of resignation on the same month. The resignation was approved on January 19, 1973 and petitioner was accordingly informed
thereof. Days after, his case on falsification of public document by making untruthful statement in the narration of facts was dismissed. On
November of that same year his other case was also dismissed. A month after Maturan sought to have his resignation rendered null and void
for on the ground that Letter of Instruction No. 14 does not apply to him. Given that criminal charges against him were already dismissed, the
NaPolCom chairman stated that the preventive suspension is lifted and he could go back to work. However, the Chief of Police refused to
accept Maturan. Hence, he appealed to the court. He filed for a claim for back wages and reinstatement. The lower court denied the claim
ruling that his appointment was provisional and he can be removed at any time by the appointing power.

ISSUE Can Maturan be reinstated to his position as police sergeant?

RULING NOPE. Maturan cannot be reinstated to his former post. This is so because he was not qualified for the position nor was he possessing
any civil service eligibility for any position in the government. Lack of civil service eligibility makes his appointment temporary and is dependent
upon the pleasure of the appointing power. When he was appointed as patrolman and as a police sergeant, he had no eligibility. It does
not matter if he gained eligibility subsequently or during his post; this does not apply to his provisional temporary appointment. Gaining civil
service eligibility while actively serving his appointment does not make his temporary appointment automatically permanent; it does not
follow. Upon his appointment, he had no eligibility and that should apply until the end of his temporary appointment. What is required is a
new appointment and not merely a reinstatement. Also, the Mayor cannot be compelled to appoint him for such power of the Mayor is
discretionary.
CORPUS VS CUADERNO (3-31-65), BSP Special assistant, loss of confidence on highly tech

Facts:
Petitioner R. Marino Corpus, is a "Special Assistant to the Governor, In Charge of the Export Department" of the Central Bank, a
position declared by the President of the Philippines as highly technical in nature, was administratively charged by several employees in the
export department with dishonesty, incompetence, neglect of duty, and/or abuse of authority, oppression, conduct unbecoming of a public
official, and of violation of the internal regulations of the Central Bank. The Monetary Board suspended the petitioner from office and created
a three-man investigating committee. After a thorough investigation the committee found no basis to recommend disciplinary action and
recommended the immediate reinstatement of the respondent. However, the Board issued a resolution considering the respondents
resignation as of the day he was suspended due to the statement of the Central Bank Governor that he had loss confidence of the
respondent.

Corpus moved for the reconsideration of the above resolution, but the Board denied it, after which he filed an action for certiorari,
mandamus, quo warranto, and damages, with preliminary injunction, with the Court of First Instance of Manila. The court rendered judgment
declaring the Board resolution null and void, and ordered for the payment of damages. The appeal of the Central Bank and its Monetary
Board is planted on the proposition that officers holding highly technical positions may be removed at any time for lack of confidence by
the appointing power, and that such power of removal is implicit in section 1, Art. XII, of the Constitution.

Issue: W/N the lack of confidence of the one making the appointment constitutes sufficient and legitimate cause of removal

Rulings: The loss of confidence ground, on which the dismissal is sought to be predicated, is a clear and evident afterthought resorted to when
the charges, subject matter of the investigation, were not proved or substantiated. The Monetary Board nowhere stated anything in the record
which the committee failed to consider in recommending exoneration from the charges; it nowhere pointed to any substantiation of the
charges; it, therefore, relied only on the statement of the loss of confidence made by Governor Cuaderno. We find in the particular set of
facts herein that the alleged loss of confidence is clearly a pretext to cure the inability of substantiating the charges upon which the
investigation had proceeded. And inasmuch as the charges against petitioner were unsubstantiated, that leaves no other alternative but to
follow the mandate that: “No public officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by
law.”

Since in the interest of the service reasonable protection should be afforded civil servants in positions that are by their nature important, such
as those that are "highly technical," the Constitutional safeguard requiring removal or suspension to be "for cause as provided by law" at least
demands that their dismissal for alleged "loss of confidence" if at all allowed, be attended with prudence and deliberation adequate to
show that said ground exists. The tenure of officials holding primarily confidential positions (such as private secretaries of public functionaries)
ends upon loss of confidence, because their term of office lasts only as long as confidence in them endures; and thus their cessation involves
no removal. But the situation is different for those holding highly technical posts, requiring special skills and qualifications. The Constitution
clearly distinguished the primarily confidential from the highly technical, and to apply the loss of confidence rule to the latter incumbents is
to ignore and erase the differentiation expressly made by our fundamental charter.

Pineda v. Claudio, 28 SCRA 334 - (SALVACION), Chief Police, Next in Line-no such law,

Facts: Upon the death of Col. Mariano Tumaliuan on August 28, 1968, the position of chief of police of Pasay City became vacant. To fill the
vacancy, Mayor Jovito Claudio appointed the Francisco Villa, a state prosecutor in the Department of Justice, but the respondent
Commissioner of Civil Service Abelardo Subido held the appointment in abeyance until other persons who, in Subido's opinion, had
preferential right to appointment have been considered.

The Deputy Chief of Police, Basilio Pineda, assailed the appointment of Villa as he claimed that he has preferential rights over Villa because
he is next in line, which was supported by the Commissioner. Subido cited a previous ruling by the Supreme Court (Millares vs Subido) and the
Civil Service Act to bolster his side. Such case provided the order of priority in filling up the vacancies in local offices:
1. Promotion (next in rank) 2. Transfer (lateral movement) 3. Reinstatement/Reemployment 4. Certification (usually certified outsiders)
Subido argued that that in case a promotion is untenable due to “special reasons”, only then subsequent order of transfer, reinstatement, or
certification be followed. He also averred that no special reason by the Mayor was given explaining his preference for Villa over Pineda.
Mayor Claudio replied that in his 8 years as an official of Pasay, Pineda et al “cannot boast of any improvement they have introduced to lift
the sagging inefficiency of the local police organization. The actual members of untrained and undisciplined men still persist”
Mayor Claudio’s position was supported by the DOJ Secretary stating that in as far as filling up a vacancy in the police department is
concerned, the Police Act of 1966 and applies, which provides that it is within the mayor’s discretion as to who he should appoint to said
office.
ISSUE: Whether or not Deputy Chief Pineda, has a preferential right to the said public office.
HELD: No. The ruling in the Millares case is not conclusive because such case has different circumstances. It must be clarified though that as
far as practicable, in case of a vacancy, the next in line shall be promoted by the appointing authority. But if not, the vacancy may be filled
either by transfer, reinstatement, reemployment or certification — not necessarily in that order. There is no rule which states that the mayor
must appoint the next in line. It is not his ministerial duty to do so nor is it mandatory. The appointing power can choose whether to appoint
by promotion, transfer, reinstatement, or certification. It is necessary for effective public administration that the mayor appoints men of his
confidence, provided they are qualified and eligible, who in his best estimation are possessed of the requisite reputation, integrity,
knowledgeability, energy and judgment. After all, it is the local executive, more than anyone else, who is primarily responsible for efficient
governmental administration in the locality and the effective maintenance of peace and order therein, and is directly answerable to the
people who elected him.
The Supreme Court also clarified that the only time that an appointing power is required to provide specific reasons on why a next in rank is
not appointed is that if the appointing power chose promotion as the method to fill up the vacancy.
National Service Corp. v. NLRC, 168 SCRA 125 (1988) -- The civil service does not include Government owned or controlled corporations
(GOCC) which are organized as subsidiaries of GOCC under the general corporation law.

GOCC subsidiaries don’t have original charter, 1973 vs 1985 Consti coverage of SCS

F: Eugenio Credo was an employee of the National Service Corporation. She claims she was illegally dismissed. NLRC ruled ordering her
reinstatement. NASECO argues that NLRC has no jurisdiction to order her reinstatement. NASECO as a government corporation by virtue of
its being a subsidiary of the NIDC, which is wholly owned by the Phil. National Bank which is in turn a GOCC, the terms and conditions of
employment of its employees are governed by the Civil Service Law citing National Housing v Juco.

Eugenia C. Credo, respondent, was an employee of the National Service Corporation (NASECO), a corporation which provides manpower
services to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and its agencies. She was administratively charged by Sisinio S. Lloren, for not complying
instructions to correct/add remarks in the Statement of Billings Adjustment and for showing resentment and disrespect after being called to
explain. She was placed on "Forced Leave" status for 15 days. She filed a complaint in the Ministry of Labor and Employment against NASECO
for placing her on forced leave without due process. NASECO's Committee on Personnel Affairs deliberated and evaluated a number of past
acts of misconduct or infractions attributed to her and recommended Credo's termination, with forfeiture of benefits. She was made to
explain her side in connection with the charges filed but unable to do so and was handed a Notice of Termination. Credo filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal, alleging absence of just or authorized cause for her dismissal and lack of opportunity to be heard. T

The labor arbiter rendered a dismissed Credo's complaint, and direct NASECO to pay Credo separation pay equivalent to one half month's
pay for every year of service. Both parties appealed to NLRC,

NLRC rendered a decision directing NASECO to reinstate Credo to her former position with six months’ back wagesand without loss of seniority
rights and other privileges appertaining thereto and dismissed claim for her attorney's fees, moral and exemplary damages. Both parties filed
their respective motions for reconsideration but denied.

In G.R. No. 68970, petitioners contend that in arriving at said questioned order, the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in finding that:
1) Petitioners violated the requirements mandated by law on termination, 2) Petitioners failed of proving that the termination of Credo was for
a valid or authorized cause, 3) The alleged infractions committed by Credo were not proven or, even if proved, could be considered to have
been condoned. 4) Termination of Credo was not for a valid or authorized cause. In G.R. No. 70295, petitioner Credo challenges as grave
abuse of discretion the dispositive portion of the decision which dismissed her claim for attorney's fees, moral and exemplary damages and
limited her right to back wages to only six (6) months.

ISSUE:

WON NLRC has jurisdiction to order reinstatement

Yes. On the premise that it is the 1987 Constitution that governs the instant case because it is the Constitution in place at the time of decision
thereof, the NLRC has jurisdiction to accord relief to the parties. As an admitted subsidiary of the NIDC, in turn a subsidiary of the PNB, the
NASECO is a government-owned or controlled corporation without original charter.

The holding in NHC v Juco should not be given retroactive effect, that is to cases that arose before its promulgation of Jan 17, 1985. To do
otherwise would be oppressive to Credo and other employees similarly situated because under the 1973 Consti but prior to the ruling in NHC
v Juco, this court recognized the applicability of the Labor jurisdiction over disputes involving terms and conditions of employment in GOCC's,
among them NASECO. In the matter of coverage by the civil service of GOCC, the 1987 Consti starkly differs from the 1973 consti where NHC
v Juco was based. It provides that the "civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government,
including government owned or controlled corporation with original charter." Therefore by clear implication, the civil service does not include
GOCC which are organized as subsidiaries of GOCC under the general corporation law.

Rationale: A government-owned corporation could create several subsidiary corporations. These subsidiary corporations would enjoy the
best of two worlds. Their officials and employees would be privileged individuals, free from the strict accountability required by the Civil
Service Decree and the regulations of the Commission on Audit. Their incomes would not be subject to the competitive restrains of the open
market nor to the terms and conditions of civil service employment. Conceivably, all government-owned or controlled corporations could
be created, no longer by special charters, but through incorporations under the general law. The Constitutional amendment including such
corporations in the embrace of the civil service would cease to have application. Certainly, such a situation cannot be allowed to exist

As an admitted subsidiary of the NIDC, in turn a subsidiary of the PNB, the NASECO is a government-owned or controlled corporation without
original charter.

MONSANTO vs FACTORAN, PARDON forgives, not forget- assistant treasurer

Facts: The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) of the crime of estafa
through falsification of public documents. She was sentenced to jail and to indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50.The SC affirmed
the decision. She then filed a motion for reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she was extended by then President Marcos
absolute pardon which she accepted (at that time, the rule was that clemency could be given even before conviction). By reason of said
pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since the
same was still vacant. Her letter was referred to the Minister of Finance who ruled that she may be reinstated to her position without the
necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the date she was extended the absolute pardon.

Petitioner wrote the Ministry stressing that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the crime which implies that her service in the
government has never been interrupted and therefore the date of her reinstatement should correspond to the date of her preventive
suspension; that she is entitled to backpay for the entire period of her suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the
proportionate share of the amount of P4,892.50

The Ministry referred the issue to the Office of the President. Deputy Executive Secretary Factoran denied Monsanto’s request averring that
Monsanto must first seek appointment and that the pardon does not reinstate her former position.

Issues:Is Is a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, entitled to reinstatement to her former position
without need of a new appointment?

Held: 1. Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the
individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private, though official act of
the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not communicated officially to the Court.

While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as
though he never committed the offense, it does not operate for all purposes. The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt.
Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It does not wash out the moral
stain. It involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness.

A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the
offender. It does not impose upon the government any obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered. “Since the offense has
been established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully
done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required.” This would explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled
to receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits.

2. The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond
that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.

3. Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the Revised Penal Code. It subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the
sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence. Petitioner's civil liability may only be extinguished by the same
causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor,
compensation and novation

Social Security System (SSS) Employees Association vs. Court of Appeals

SSS has original charter, under CSC…no strike

Facts: The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the union’sdemands concerning the implementation of their CBA. SSS
filed before the court action for damages with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners for staging an illegal strike. The court
issued a temporary restraining order pending the resolution of the application for preliminary injunction while petitioners filed a motion to
dismiss alleging the court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Petitioners contend that the court made reversible error in taking
cognizance on the subject matter since the jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the National Labor Relations Commission as the case involves a
labor dispute. The Social Security System contends on one hand that the petitioners are covered by the Civil Service laws, rules and regulation
thus have no right to strike. They are not covered by the NLRC or DOLE therefore the court may enjoin the petitioners from striking.

Issue:Whether or not Social Security System employers have the right to strike.

Held: The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and Social Justice provides guarantee among workers with the right to organize
and conduct peaceful concerted activities such as strikes. On one hand, Section 14 of E.O No. 180 provides that “the Civil Service law and
rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed,

subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress” referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission
which states that “prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by government employees enjoins under pain of
administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms
of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service.” Therefore in the absence of any legislation allowing
govt. employees to strike they are prohibited from doing so.

In Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 the employees in the civil service are denominated as “government employees” and that the SSS is one such
government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil
service and are covered by the Civil Service Commission’s memorandum prohibiting strikes.
Neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the subject matter but instead it is the Public Sector Labor-Management Council which is
not granted by law authority to issue writ of injunction in labor disputes within its jurisdiction thus the resort of SSS before the general court for
the issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate.

TUPAS v. NHA

GOCC w/o OC- Labor Code, Union, Stage strike

GOCC w OC- CSC, Form assoc, No Strike

Facts: Respondent National Housing Corporation (hereinafter referred to as NHC) is a corporation organized in 1959 in accordance with
Executive Order No. 399, otherwise known as the Uniform Charter of Government Corporations, dated January 1, 1951. Its shares of stock are
and have been one hundred percent (100%) owned by the Government from its incorporation under Act 459, the former corporation law.
The government entities that own its shares of stock are the Government Service Insurance System, the Social Security System, the
Development Bank of the Philippines, the National Investment and Development Corporation and the People’s Homesite and Housing
Corporation. Petitioner Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) is a legitimate labor organization with a chapter in NHC.

On July 13, 1977, TUPAS filed a petition for the conduct of a certification election with Regional Office No. IV of the Department of Labor in
order to determine the exclusive bargaining representative of the workers in NHC. It was claimed that its members comprised the majority of
the employees of the corporation. The petition was dismissed by med-arbiter Eusebio M. Jimenez in an order, dated November 7, 1977,
holding that NHC “being a government-owned and/or controlled corporation its employees/workers are prohibited to form, join or assist any
labor organization for purposes of collective bargaining pursuant to Section 1, Rule II, Book V of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Labor Code.”

From this order of dismissal, TUPAS appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations where Director Carmelo C. Noriel reversed the order of dismissal
and ordered the holding of a certification election. This order was, however, set aside by Officer-in-Charge Virgilio S.J. Sy in his resolution of
November 21, 1978 upon a motion for reconsideration of respondent NHC.

Issue: whether or not the employees of NHA are not covered by Civil Service law, rules and regulations and have therefore the right to
unionize

Held: Yes. The civil service now covers only government owned or controlled corporations with original or legislative charters, that is, those
created by an act of Congress or by special law, and not those incorporated under and pursuant to a general legislation. The Civil Service
does not include government-owned or controlled corporations which are organized as subsidiaries of government-owned or controlled
corporations under the general corporation law.

The workers or employees of NHC undoubtedly have the right to form unions or employees’ organizations. The right to unionize or to
form organizations is now explicitly recognized and granted to employees in both the governmental and the private sectors.

There is, therefore, no impediment to the holding of a certification election among the workers of NHC for it is clear that they are covered by
the Labor Code, the NHC being a government-owned and/or controlled corporation without an original charter. Statutory implementation
of the last cited section of the Constitution is found in Article 244 of the Labor Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 111, thus:

... Right of employees in the public service — Employees of the government corporations established under the Corporation Code shall have
the right to organize and to bargain collectively with their respective employers. All other employees in the civil service shall have the right
to form associations for purposes not contrary to law.

VICENTE GARCIA vs: THE HONORABLE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE HONORABLE MINISTER, LAND TRANSPORTATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS, THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, TELECOM REGIONAL OFFICE NO. IV

PARDON BASED on INNOCENCE

FACTS: Petitioner GARCIA was a supervising lineman in the Region IV Station of the Bureau of Telecommunications in Lucena City. A criminal
case of qualified theft was filed against him. The president grated him an executive clemency. The petitioner filed a claim for back payment
of salaries. The petitioner was later recalled to the service on 12 March 1984 but the records do not show whether petitioner’s reinstatement
was to the same position of Supervising Lineman.

ISSUE: Whether Garcia is entitled to the payment of back wages after having been reinstated pursuant to the grant of executive clemency.

HELD: The pardoned offender regains his eligibility for appointment to public office which was forfeited by reason of the conviction of the
offense. But since pardon does not generally result in automatic reinstatement because the offender has to apply for reappointment, he is
not entitled to back wages.

If the pardon is based on the innocence of the individual, it affirms this innocence and makes him a new man and as innocent; as if he had
not been found guilty of the offense charged. 7 When a person is given pardon because he did not truly commit the offense, the pardon
relieves the party from all punitive consequences of his criminal act, thereby restoring to him his clean name, good reputation and unstained
character prior to the finding of guilt.

In the case at bar, the acquittal of petitioner by the trial court was founded not on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt but on the fact
that petitioner did not commit the offense imputed to him. Aside from finding him innocent of the charge, the trial court commended
petitioner for his concern and dedication as a public servant. Verily, petitioner’s innocence is the primary reason behind the grant of executive
clemency to him, bolstered by the favorable recommendations for his reinstatement. This signifies that petitioner need no longer apply to be
reinstated to his former employment; he is restored to his office ipso facto upon the issuance of the clemency.

Petitioner’s automatic reinstatement to the government service entitles him to back wages. This is meant to afford relief to petitioner who is
innocent from the start and to make reparation for what he has suffered as a result of his unjust dismissal from the service. The right to back
wages is afforded to those with have been illegally dismissed and were thus ordered reinstated or to those otherwise acquitted of the charges
against them.

Therefore, the court ordered the full back wages from April 1 1975 (date when he was illegally dismissed) to March 12 1984 (reinstated) to the
petitioner. the petition is GRANTED.

Juco v. NLRC – NHA project engr, gocc (charter)

Facts: Benjamin C. Juco was hired as a project engineer of National Housing Corporation (NHC) from November 16, 1970 to May 14, 1975.
On May 14, 1975, he was separated from the service for having been implicated in a crime of theft and/or malversation of public funds. On
March 25, 1977, Juco filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the NHC with the Department of Labor. On September 17, 1977, the Labor
Arbiter rendered a decision dismissing the complaint on the ground that the NLRC had no jurisdiction over the case. Juco then elevated the
case to the NLRC which rendered a decision on December 28, 1982, reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter. NHC then appealed the
NLRC decision before the Supreme Court and on January 17, 1985 which petition the Court granted thereby setting aside the NLRC decision
and reinstating the labor arbiter’s decision of dismissing the case.
On January 6, 1989, Juco filed with the Civil Service Commission a complaint for illegal dismissal, with preliminary mandatory
injunction. On February 6, 1989, NHC moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the Civil Service Commission has no
jurisdiction over the case. CSC granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
On April 28, 1989, Juco filed with NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal with preliminary mandatory injunction against NHC. NLRC
find NHC guilty of illegal dismissal. On June 1, 1990, NHC filed its appeal before the NLRC and on March 14, 1991, the NLRC promulgated a
decision which reversed the decision of Labor Arbiter Manuel R. Caday on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Issue: Whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner is not governed by the Labor Code

Held: Yes. Under the laws then in force, employees of government-owned and/or controlled corporations were governed by the Civil Service
Law and not by the Labor Code. Although in National Housing Corporation v. Juco, it was held that employees of government-owned and/or
controlled corporations, whether created by special law or formed as subsidiaries under the general Corporation Law, are governed by the
Civil Service Law and not by the Labor Code, this ruling has been supplanted by the 1987 Constitution which states that the civil service
embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government owned or controlled
corporations with original charter. In National Service Corporation (NASECO) v. National Labor Relations Commission, it was held that the
NLRC has jurisdiction over the employees of NASECO on the ground that it is the 1987 Constitution that governs because it is the Constitution
in place at the time of the decision. It was further held that the new phrase "with original charter" means that government-owned and
controlled corporations refer to corporations chartered by special law as distinguished from corporations organized under the Corporation
Code. Thus, NASECO which had been organized under the general incorporation statute and a subsidiary of the National Investment
Development Corporation, which in turn was a subsidiary of the Philippine National Bank, is excluded from the purview of the Civil Service
Commission. The above doctrine applies in this case. In the case at bench, the National Housing Corporation is a government owned
corporation organized in 1959 in accordance with Executive Order No. 399, otherwise known as the Uniform Charter of Government
Corporation, dated January 1, 1959. Its shares of stock are and have been one hundred percent (100%) owned by the Government from its
incorporation under Act 1459, the former corporation law. The government entities that own its shares of stock are the Government Service
Insurance System, the Social Security System, the Development Bank of the Philippines, the National Investment and Development
Corporation and the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation. Considering the fact that the NHA had been incorporated under Act 1459,
the former corporation law, it is but correct to say that it is a government-owned or controlled corporation whose employees are subject to
the provisions of the Labor Code. This observation is reiterated in the recent case of Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS)
v. National Housing
Corporation, where the SC held that the NHA is now within the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor and Employment, it being a
government-owned and/or controlled corporation without an original charter. Furthermore, the Court previously ruled that the workers or
employees of the NHC (now NHA) undoubtedly have the right to form unions or employee's organization and that there is no impediment to
the holding of a certification election among them as they are covered by the Labor Code.

MATURAN vs MAGLANA, Police provisional appointment reinstatement

FACTS Petitioner Tereso Maturan is a police sergeant at San Franciso, Southern Leyte. He got promoted from being a patrolman (February
1965) to a police sergeant (September 1972) through appointments which were provisional. His provisional appointment was annually
renewed for the span of seven years including respective increase in the salary. Respondent Mayor Maglana suspended Maturan on
September 1972 because of two pending cases against him (1. Falsification of public document by making untruthful statement in the
narration of facts and 2. Falsification of public document). A month after, respondent Vice Mayor Magoncia who was then the Acting Mayor
instructed Maturan to tender his resignation pursuant to the Letter of Instruction No. 14 of the President of the Philippines. Maturan submitted
his letter of resignation on the same month. The resignation was approved on January 19, 1973 and petitioner was accordingly informed
thereof. Days after, his case on falsification of public document by making untruthful statement in the narration of facts was dismissed. On
November of that same year his other case was also dismissed. A month after Maturan sought to have his resignation rendered null and void
for on the ground that Letter of Instruction No. 14 does not apply to him. Given that criminal charges against him were already dismissed, the
NaPolCom chairman stated that the preventive suspension is lifted and he could go back to work. However, the Chief of Police refused to
accept Maturan. Hence, he appealed to the court. He filed for a claim for back wages and reinstatement. The lower court denied the claim
ruling that his appointment was provisional and he can be removed at any time by the appointing power.

ISSUE Can Maturan be reinstated to his position as police sergeant?

RULING NOPE. Maturan cannot be reinstated to his former post. This is so because he was not qualified for the position nor was he possessing
any civil service eligibility for any position in the government. Lack of civil service eligibility makes his appointment temporary and is dependent
upon the pleasure of the appointing power. When he was appointed as patrolman and as a police sergeant, he had no eligibility. It does
not matter if he gained eligibility subsequently or during his post; this does not apply to his provisional temporary appointment. Gaining civil
service eligibility while actively serving his appointment does not make his temporary appointment automatically permanent; it does not
follow. Upon his appointment, he had no eligibility and that should apply until the end of his temporary appointment. What is required is a
new appointment and not merely a reinstatement. Also, the Mayor cannot be compelled to appoint him for such power of the Mayor is
discretionary.

CORPUS VS CUADERNO (3-31-65), BSP Special assistant, loss of confidence on highly tech

Facts:
Petitioner R. Marino Corpus, is a "Special Assistant to the Governor, In Charge of the Export Department" of the Central Bank, a
position declared by the President of the Philippines as highly technical in nature, was administratively charged by several employees in the
export department with dishonesty, incompetence, neglect of duty, and/or abuse of authority, oppression, conduct unbecoming of a public
official, and of violation of the internal regulations of the Central Bank. The Monetary Board suspended the petitioner from office and created
a three-man investigating committee. After a thorough investigation the committee found no basis to recommend disciplinary action and
recommended the immediate reinstatement of the respondent. However, the Board issued a resolution considering the respondents
resignation as of the day he was suspended due to the statement of the Central Bank Governor that he had loss confidence of the
respondent.

Corpus moved for the reconsideration of the above resolution, but the Board denied it, after which he filed an action for certiorari,
mandamus, quo warranto, and damages, with preliminary injunction, with the Court of First Instance of Manila. The court rendered judgment
declaring the Board resolution null and void, and ordered for the payment of damages. The appeal of the Central Bank and its Monetary
Board is planted on the proposition that officers holding highly technical positions may be removed at any time for lack of confidence by
the appointing power, and that such power of removal is implicit in section 1, Art. XII, of the Constitution.

Issue: W/N the lack of confidence of the one making the appointment constitutes sufficient and legitimate cause of removal

Rulings: The loss of confidence ground, on which the dismissal is sought to be predicated, is a clear and evident afterthought resorted to when
the charges, subject matter of the investigation, were not proved or substantiated. The Monetary Board nowhere stated anything in the record
which the committee failed to consider in recommending exoneration from the charges; it nowhere pointed to any substantiation of the
charges; it, therefore, relied only on the statement of the loss of confidence made by Governor Cuaderno. We find in the particular set of
facts herein that the alleged loss of confidence is clearly a pretext to cure the inability of substantiating the charges upon which the
investigation had proceeded. And inasmuch as the charges against petitioner were unsubstantiated, that leaves no other alternative but to
follow the mandate that: “No public officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by
law.”

Since in the interest of the service reasonable protection should be afforded civil servants in positions that are by their nature important, such
as those that are "highly technical," the Constitutional safeguard requiring removal or suspension to be "for cause as provided by law" at least
demands that their dismissal for alleged "loss of confidence" if at all allowed, be attended with prudence and deliberation adequate to
show that said ground exists. The tenure of officials holding primarily confidential positions (such as private secretaries of public functionaries)
ends upon loss of confidence, because their term of office lasts only as long as confidence in them endures; and thus their cessation involves
no removal. But the situation is different for those holding highly technical posts, requiring special skills and qualifications. The Constitution
clearly distinguished the primarily confidential from the highly technical, and to apply the loss of confidence rule to the latter incumbents is
to ignore and erase the differentiation expressly made by our fundamental charter.

Pineda v. Claudio, 28 SCRA 334 - (SALVACION), Chief Police, Next in Line-no such law,

Facts: Upon the death of Col. Mariano Tumaliuan on August 28, 1968, the position of chief of police of Pasay City became vacant. To fill the
vacancy, Mayor Jovito Claudio appointed the Francisco Villa, a state prosecutor in the Department of Justice, but the respondent
Commissioner of Civil Service Abelardo Subido held the appointment in abeyance until other persons who, in Subido's opinion, had
preferential right to appointment have been considered.

The Deputy Chief of Police, Basilio Pineda, assailed the appointment of Villa as he claimed that he has preferential rights over Villa because
he is next in line, which was supported by the Commissioner. Subido cited a previous ruling by the Supreme Court (Millares vs Subido) and the
Civil Service Act to bolster his side. Such case provided the order of priority in filling up the vacancies in local offices:
1. Promotion (next in rank) 2. Transfer (lateral movement) 3. Reinstatement/Reemployment 4. Certification (usually certified outsiders)
Subido argued that that in case a promotion is untenable due to “special reasons”, only then subsequent order of transfer, reinstatement, or
certification be followed. He also averred that no special reason by the Mayor was given explaining his preference for Villa over Pineda.
Mayor Claudio replied that in his 8 years as an official of Pasay, Pineda et al “cannot boast of any improvement they have introduced to lift
the sagging inefficiency of the local police organization. The actual members of untrained and undisciplined men still persist”
Mayor Claudio’s position was supported by the DOJ Secretary stating that in as far as filling up a vacancy in the police department is
concerned, the Police Act of 1966 and applies, which provides that it is within the mayor’s discretion as to who he should appoint to said
office.
ISSUE: Whether or not Deputy Chief Pineda, has a preferential right to the said public office.
HELD: No. The ruling in the Millares case is not conclusive because such case has different circumstances. It must be clarified though that as
far as practicable, in case of a vacancy, the next in line shall be promoted by the appointing authority. But if not, the vacancy may be filled
either by transfer, reinstatement, reemployment or certification — not necessarily in that order. There is no rule which states that the mayor
must appoint the next in line. It is not his ministerial duty to do so nor is it mandatory. The appointing power can choose whether to appoint
by promotion, transfer, reinstatement, or certification. It is necessary for effective public administration that the mayor appoints men of his
confidence, provided they are qualified and eligible, who in his best estimation are possessed of the requisite reputation, integrity,
knowledgeability, energy and judgment. After all, it is the local executive, more than anyone else, who is primarily responsible for efficient
governmental administration in the locality and the effective maintenance of peace and order therein, and is directly answerable to the
people who elected him.
The Supreme Court also clarified that the only time that an appointing power is required to provide specific reasons on why a next in rank is
not appointed is that if the appointing power chose promotion as the method to fill up the vacancy.

National Service Corp. v. NLRC, 168 SCRA 125 (1988) -- The civil service does not include Government owned or controlled corporations
(GOCC) which are organized as subsidiaries of GOCC under the general corporation law.

GOCC subsidiaries don’t have original charter, 1973 vs 1985 Consti coverage of SCS

F: Eugenio Credo was an employee of the National Service Corporation. She claims she was illegally dismissed. NLRC ruled ordering her
reinstatement. NASECO argues that NLRC has no jurisdiction to order her reinstatement. NASECO as a government corporation by virtue of
its being a subsidiary of the NIDC, which is wholly owned by the Phil. National Bank which is in turn a GOCC, the terms and conditions of
employment of its employees are governed by the Civil Service Law citing National Housing v Juco.

Eugenia C. Credo, respondent, was an employee of the National Service Corporation (NASECO), a corporation which provides manpower
services to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and its agencies. She was administratively charged by Sisinio S. Lloren, for not complying
instructions to correct/add remarks in the Statement of Billings Adjustment and for showing resentment and disrespect after being called to
explain. She was placed on "Forced Leave" status for 15 days. She filed a complaint in the Ministry of Labor and Employment against NASECO
for placing her on forced leave without due process. NASECO's Committee on Personnel Affairs deliberated and evaluated a number of past
acts of misconduct or infractions attributed to her and recommended Credo's termination, with forfeiture of benefits. She was made to
explain her side in connection with the charges filed but unable to do so and was handed a Notice of Termination. Credo filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal, alleging absence of just or authorized cause for her dismissal and lack of opportunity to be heard. T

The labor arbiter rendered a dismissed Credo's complaint, and direct NASECO to pay Credo separation pay equivalent to one half month's
pay for every year of service. Both parties appealed to NLRC,

NLRC rendered a decision directing NASECO to reinstate Credo to her former position with six months’ back wagesand without loss of seniority
rights and other privileges appertaining thereto and dismissed claim for her attorney's fees, moral and exemplary damages. Both parties filed
their respective motions for reconsideration but denied.

In G.R. No. 68970, petitioners contend that in arriving at said questioned order, the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in finding that:
1) Petitioners violated the requirements mandated by law on termination, 2) Petitioners failed of proving that the termination of Credo was for
a valid or authorized cause, 3) The alleged infractions committed by Credo were not proven or, even if proved, could be considered to have
been condoned. 4) Termination of Credo was not for a valid or authorized cause. In G.R. No. 70295, petitioner Credo challenges as grave
abuse of discretion the dispositive portion of the decision which dismissed her claim for attorney's fees, moral and exemplary damages and
limited her right to back wages to only six (6) months.

ISSUE:

WON NLRC has jurisdiction to order reinstatement

Yes. On the premise that it is the 1987 Constitution that governs the instant case because it is the Constitution in place at the time of decision
thereof, the NLRC has jurisdiction to accord relief to the parties. As an admitted subsidiary of the NIDC, in turn a subsidiary of the PNB, the
NASECO is a government-owned or controlled corporation without original charter.

The holding in NHC v Juco should not be given retroactive effect, that is to cases that arose before its promulgation of Jan 17, 1985. To do
otherwise would be oppressive to Credo and other employees similarly situated because under the 1973 Consti but prior to the ruling in NHC
v Juco, this court recognized the applicability of the Labor jurisdiction over disputes involving terms and conditions of employment in GOCC's,
among them NASECO. In the matter of coverage by the civil service of GOCC, the 1987 Consti starkly differs from the 1973 consti where NHC
v Juco was based. It provides that the "civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government,
including government owned or controlled corporation with original charter." Therefore by clear implication, the civil service does not include
GOCC which are organized as subsidiaries of GOCC under the general corporation law.

Rationale: A government-owned corporation could create several subsidiary corporations. These subsidiary corporations would enjoy the
best of two worlds. Their officials and employees would be privileged individuals, free from the strict accountability required by the Civil
Service Decree and the regulations of the Commission on Audit. Their incomes would not be subject to the competitive restrains of the open
market nor to the terms and conditions of civil service employment. Conceivably, all government-owned or controlled corporations could
be created, no longer by special charters, but through incorporations under the general law. The Constitutional amendment including such
corporations in the embrace of the civil service would cease to have application. Certainly, such a situation cannot be allowed to exist

As an admitted subsidiary of the NIDC, in turn a subsidiary of the PNB, the NASECO is a government-owned or controlled corporation without
original charter.

MONSANTO vs FACTORAN, PARDON forgives, not forget- assistant treasurer

Facts: The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) of the crime of estafa
through falsification of public documents. She was sentenced to jail and to indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50.The SC affirmed
the decision. She then filed a motion for reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she was extended by then President Marcos
absolute pardon which she accepted (at that time, the rule was that clemency could be given even before conviction). By reason of said
pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since the
same was still vacant. Her letter was referred to the Minister of Finance who ruled that she may be reinstated to her position without the
necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the date she was extended the absolute pardon.

Petitioner wrote the Ministry stressing that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the crime which implies that her service in the
government has never been interrupted and therefore the date of her reinstatement should correspond to the date of her preventive
suspension; that she is entitled to backpay for the entire period of her suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the
proportionate share of the amount of P4,892.50

The Ministry referred the issue to the Office of the President. Deputy Executive Secretary Factoran denied Monsanto’s request averring that
Monsanto must first seek appointment and that the pardon does not reinstate her former position.

Issues:Is Is a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, entitled to reinstatement to her former position
without need of a new appointment?

Held: 1. Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the
individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private, though official act of
the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not communicated officially to the Court.

While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as
though he never committed the offense, it does not operate for all purposes. The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt.
Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It does not wash out the moral
stain. It involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness.

A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the
offender. It does not impose upon the government any obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered. “Since the offense has
been established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully
done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required.” This would explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled
to receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits.

2. The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond
that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.

3. Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the Revised Penal Code. It subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the
sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence. Petitioner's civil liability may only be extinguished by the same
causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor,
compensation and novation

Social Security System (SSS) Employees Association vs. Court of Appeals

SSS has original charter, under CSC…no strike

Facts: The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the union’sdemands concerning the implementation of their CBA. SSS
filed before the court action for damages with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners for staging an illegal strike. The court
issued a temporary restraining order pending the resolution of the application for preliminary injunction while petitioners filed a motion to
dismiss alleging the court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Petitioners contend that the court made reversible error in taking
cognizance on the subject matter since the jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the National Labor Relations Commission as the case involves a
labor dispute. The Social Security System contends on one hand that the petitioners are covered by the Civil Service laws, rules and regulation
thus have no right to strike. They are not covered by the NLRC or DOLE therefore the court may enjoin the petitioners from striking.

Issue:Whether or not Social Security System employers have the right to strike.

Held: The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and Social Justice provides guarantee among workers with the right to organize
and conduct peaceful concerted activities such as strikes. On one hand, Section 14 of E.O No. 180 provides that “the Civil Service law and
rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed,

subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress” referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission
which states that “prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by government employees enjoins under pain of
administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms
of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service.” Therefore in the absence of any legislation allowing
govt. employees to strike they are prohibited from doing so.

In Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 the employees in the civil service are denominated as “government employees” and that the SSS is one such
government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil
service and are covered by the Civil Service Commission’s memorandum prohibiting strikes.

Neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the subject matter but instead it is the Public Sector Labor-Management Council which is
not granted by law authority to issue writ of injunction in labor disputes within its jurisdiction thus the resort of SSS before the general court for
the issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate.

TUPAS v. NHA

GOCC w/o OC- Labor Code, Union, Stage strike

GOCC w OC- CSC, Form assoc, No Strike

Facts: Respondent National Housing Corporation (hereinafter referred to as NHC) is a corporation organized in 1959 in accordance with
Executive Order No. 399, otherwise known as the Uniform Charter of Government Corporations, dated January 1, 1951. Its shares of stock are
and have been one hundred percent (100%) owned by the Government from its incorporation under Act 459, the former corporation law.
The government entities that own its shares of stock are the Government Service Insurance System, the Social Security System, the
Development Bank of the Philippines, the National Investment and Development Corporation and the People’s Homesite and Housing
Corporation. Petitioner Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) is a legitimate labor organization with a chapter in NHC.

On July 13, 1977, TUPAS filed a petition for the conduct of a certification election with Regional Office No. IV of the Department of Labor in
order to determine the exclusive bargaining representative of the workers in NHC. It was claimed that its members comprised the majority of
the employees of the corporation. The petition was dismissed by med-arbiter Eusebio M. Jimenez in an order, dated November 7, 1977,
holding that NHC “being a government-owned and/or controlled corporation its employees/workers are prohibited to form, join or assist any
labor organization for purposes of collective bargaining pursuant to Section 1, Rule II, Book V of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Labor Code.”

From this order of dismissal, TUPAS appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations where Director Carmelo C. Noriel reversed the order of dismissal
and ordered the holding of a certification election. This order was, however, set aside by Officer-in-Charge Virgilio S.J. Sy in his resolution of
November 21, 1978 upon a motion for reconsideration of respondent NHC.

Issue: whether or not the employees of NHA are not covered by Civil Service law, rules and regulations and have therefore the right to
unionize

Held: Yes. The civil service now covers only government owned or controlled corporations with original or legislative charters, that is, those
created by an act of Congress or by special law, and not those incorporated under and pursuant to a general legislation. The Civil Service
does not include government-owned or controlled corporations which are organized as subsidiaries of government-owned or controlled
corporations under the general corporation law.

The workers or employees of NHC undoubtedly have the right to form unions or employees’ organizations. The right to unionize or to
form organizations is now explicitly recognized and granted to employees in both the governmental and the private sectors.

There is, therefore, no impediment to the holding of a certification election among the workers of NHC for it is clear that they are covered by
the Labor Code, the NHC being a government-owned and/or controlled corporation without an original charter. Statutory implementation
of the last cited section of the Constitution is found in Article 244 of the Labor Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 111, thus:
... Right of employees in the public service — Employees of the government corporations established under the Corporation Code shall have
the right to organize and to bargain collectively with their respective employers. All other employees in the civil service shall have the right
to form associations for purposes not contrary to law.

VICENTE GARCIA vs: THE HONORABLE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE HONORABLE MINISTER, LAND TRANSPORTATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS, THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, TELECOM REGIONAL OFFICE NO. IV

PARDON BASED on INNOCENCE

FACTS: Petitioner GARCIA was a supervising lineman in the Region IV Station of the Bureau of Telecommunications in Lucena City. A criminal
case of qualified theft was filed against him. The president grated him an executive clemency. The petitioner filed a claim for back payment
of salaries. The petitioner was later recalled to the service on 12 March 1984 but the records do not show whether petitioner’s reinstatement
was to the same position of Supervising Lineman.

ISSUE: Whether Garcia is entitled to the payment of back wages after having been reinstated pursuant to the grant of executive clemency.

HELD: The pardoned offender regains his eligibility for appointment to public office which was forfeited by reason of the conviction of the
offense. But since pardon does not generally result in automatic reinstatement because the offender has to apply for reappointment, he is
not entitled to back wages.

If the pardon is based on the innocence of the individual, it affirms this innocence and makes him a new man and as innocent; as if he had
not been found guilty of the offense charged. 7 When a person is given pardon because he did not truly commit the offense, the pardon
relieves the party from all punitive consequences of his criminal act, thereby restoring to him his clean name, good reputation and unstained
character prior to the finding of guilt.

In the case at bar, the acquittal of petitioner by the trial court was founded not on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt but on the fact
that petitioner did not commit the offense imputed to him. Aside from finding him innocent of the charge, the trial court commended
petitioner for his concern and dedication as a public servant. Verily, petitioner’s innocence is the primary reason behind the grant of executive
clemency to him, bolstered by the favorable recommendations for his reinstatement. This signifies that petitioner need no longer apply to be
reinstated to his former employment; he is restored to his office ipso facto upon the issuance of the clemency.

Petitioner’s automatic reinstatement to the government service entitles him to back wages. This is meant to afford relief to petitioner who is
innocent from the start and to make reparation for what he has suffered as a result of his unjust dismissal from the service. The right to back
wages is afforded to those with have been illegally dismissed and were thus ordered reinstated or to those otherwise acquitted of the charges
against them.

Therefore, the court ordered the full back wages from April 1 1975 (date when he was illegally dismissed) to March 12 1984 (reinstated) to the
petitioner. the petition is GRANTED.

Juco v. NLRC – NHA project engr, gocc (charter)

Facts: Benjamin C. Juco was hired as a project engineer of National Housing Corporation (NHC) from November 16, 1970 to May 14, 1975.
On May 14, 1975, he was separated from the service for having been implicated in a crime of theft and/or malversation of public funds. On
March 25, 1977, Juco filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the NHC with the Department of Labor. On September 17, 1977, the Labor
Arbiter rendered a decision dismissing the complaint on the ground that the NLRC had no jurisdiction over the case. Juco then elevated the
case to the NLRC which rendered a decision on December 28, 1982, reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter. NHC then appealed the
NLRC decision before the Supreme Court and on January 17, 1985 which petition the Court granted thereby setting aside the NLRC decision
and reinstating the labor arbiter’s decision of dismissing the case.
On January 6, 1989, Juco filed with the Civil Service Commission a complaint for illegal dismissal, with preliminary mandatory
injunction. On February 6, 1989, NHC moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the Civil Service Commission has no
jurisdiction over the case. CSC granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
On April 28, 1989, Juco filed with NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal with preliminary mandatory injunction against NHC. NLRC
find NHC guilty of illegal dismissal. On June 1, 1990, NHC filed its appeal before the NLRC and on March 14, 1991, the NLRC promulgated a
decision which reversed the decision of Labor Arbiter Manuel R. Caday on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Issue: Whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner is not governed by the Labor Code

Held: Yes. Under the laws then in force, employees of government-owned and/or controlled corporations were governed by the Civil Service
Law and not by the Labor Code. Although in National Housing Corporation v. Juco, it was held that employees of government-owned and/or
controlled corporations, whether created by special law or formed as subsidiaries under the general Corporation Law, are governed by the
Civil Service Law and not by the Labor Code, this ruling has been supplanted by the 1987 Constitution which states that the civil service
embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government owned or controlled
corporations with original charter. In National Service Corporation (NASECO) v. National Labor Relations Commission, it was held that the
NLRC has jurisdiction over the employees of NASECO on the ground that it is the 1987 Constitution that governs because it is the Constitution
in place at the time of the decision. It was further held that the new phrase "with original charter" means that government-owned and
controlled corporations refer to corporations chartered by special law as distinguished from corporations organized under the Corporation
Code. Thus, NASECO which had been organized under the general incorporation statute and a subsidiary of the National Investment
Development Corporation, which in turn was a subsidiary of the Philippine National Bank, is excluded from the purview of the Civil Service
Commission. The above doctrine applies in this case. In the case at bench, the National Housing Corporation is a government owned
corporation organized in 1959 in accordance with Executive Order No. 399, otherwise known as the Uniform Charter of Government
Corporation, dated January 1, 1959. Its shares of stock are and have been one hundred percent (100%) owned by the Government from its
incorporation under Act 1459, the former corporation law. The government entities that own its shares of stock are the Government Service
Insurance System, the Social Security System, the Development Bank of the Philippines, the National Investment and Development
Corporation and the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation. Considering the fact that the NHA had been incorporated under Act 1459,
the former corporation law, it is but correct to say that it is a government-owned or controlled corporation whose employees are subject to
the provisions of the Labor Code. This observation is reiterated in the recent case of Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS)
v. National Housing
Corporation, where the SC held that the NHA is now within the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor and Employment, it being a
government-owned and/or controlled corporation without an original charter. Furthermore, the Court previously ruled that the workers or
employees of the NHC (now NHA) undoubtedly have the right to form unions or employee's organization and that there is no impediment to
the holding of a certification election among them as they are covered by the Labor Code.

MATURAN vs MAGLANA, Police provisional appointment reinstatement

FACTS Petitioner Tereso Maturan is a police sergeant at San Franciso, Southern Leyte. He got promoted from being a patrolman (February
1965) to a police sergeant (September 1972) through appointments which were provisional. His provisional appointment was annually
renewed for the span of seven years including respective increase in the salary. Respondent Mayor Maglana suspended Maturan on
September 1972 because of two pending cases against him (1. Falsification of public document by making untruthful statement in the
narration of facts and 2. Falsification of public document). A month after, respondent Vice Mayor Magoncia who was then the Acting Mayor
instructed Maturan to tender his resignation pursuant to the Letter of Instruction No. 14 of the President of the Philippines. Maturan submitted
his letter of resignation on the same month. The resignation was approved on January 19, 1973 and petitioner was accordingly informed
thereof. Days after, his case on falsification of public document by making untruthful statement in the narration of facts was dismissed. On
November of that same year his other case was also dismissed. A month after Maturan sought to have his resignation rendered null and void
for on the ground that Letter of Instruction No. 14 does not apply to him. Given that criminal charges against him were already dismissed, the
NaPolCom chairman stated that the preventive suspension is lifted and he could go back to work. However, the Chief of Police refused to
accept Maturan. Hence, he appealed to the court. He filed for a claim for back wages and reinstatement. The lower court denied the claim
ruling that his appointment was provisional and he can be removed at any time by the appointing power.

ISSUE Can Maturan be reinstated to his position as police sergeant?

RULING NOPE. Maturan cannot be reinstated to his former post. This is so because he was not qualified for the position nor was he possessing
any civil service eligibility for any position in the government. Lack of civil service eligibility makes his appointment temporary and is dependent
upon the pleasure of the appointing power. When he was appointed as patrolman and as a police sergeant, he had no eligibility. It does
not matter if he gained eligibility subsequently or during his post; this does not apply to his provisional temporary appointment. Gaining civil
service eligibility while actively serving his appointment does not make his temporary appointment automatically permanent; it does not
follow. Upon his appointment, he had no eligibility and that should apply until the end of his temporary appointment. What is required is a
new appointment and not merely a reinstatement. Also, the Mayor cannot be compelled to appoint him for such power of the Mayor is
discretionary.

CORPUS VS CUADERNO (3-31-65), BSP Special assistant, loss of confidence on highly tech

Facts:
Petitioner R. Marino Corpus, is a "Special Assistant to the Governor, In Charge of the Export Department" of the Central Bank, a
position declared by the President of the Philippines as highly technical in nature, was administratively charged by several employees in the
export department with dishonesty, incompetence, neglect of duty, and/or abuse of authority, oppression, conduct unbecoming of a public
official, and of violation of the internal regulations of the Central Bank. The Monetary Board suspended the petitioner from office and created
a three-man investigating committee. After a thorough investigation the committee found no basis to recommend disciplinary action and
recommended the immediate reinstatement of the respondent. However, the Board issued a resolution considering the respondents
resignation as of the day he was suspended due to the statement of the Central Bank Governor that he had loss confidence of the
respondent.

Corpus moved for the reconsideration of the above resolution, but the Board denied it, after which he filed an action for certiorari,
mandamus, quo warranto, and damages, with preliminary injunction, with the Court of First Instance of Manila. The court rendered judgment
declaring the Board resolution null and void, and ordered for the payment of damages. The appeal of the Central Bank and its Monetary
Board is planted on the proposition that officers holding highly technical positions may be removed at any time for lack of confidence by
the appointing power, and that such power of removal is implicit in section 1, Art. XII, of the Constitution.

Issue: W/N the lack of confidence of the one making the appointment constitutes sufficient and legitimate cause of removal

Rulings: The loss of confidence ground, on which the dismissal is sought to be predicated, is a clear and evident afterthought resorted to when
the charges, subject matter of the investigation, were not proved or substantiated. The Monetary Board nowhere stated anything in the record
which the committee failed to consider in recommending exoneration from the charges; it nowhere pointed to any substantiation of the
charges; it, therefore, relied only on the statement of the loss of confidence made by Governor Cuaderno. We find in the particular set of
facts herein that the alleged loss of confidence is clearly a pretext to cure the inability of substantiating the charges upon which the
investigation had proceeded. And inasmuch as the charges against petitioner were unsubstantiated, that leaves no other alternative but to
follow the mandate that: “No public officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by
law.”

Since in the interest of the service reasonable protection should be afforded civil servants in positions that are by their nature important, such
as those that are "highly technical," the Constitutional safeguard requiring removal or suspension to be "for cause as provided by law" at least
demands that their dismissal for alleged "loss of confidence" if at all allowed, be attended with prudence and deliberation adequate to
show that said ground exists. The tenure of officials holding primarily confidential positions (such as private secretaries of public functionaries)
ends upon loss of confidence, because their term of office lasts only as long as confidence in them endures; and thus their cessation involves
no removal. But the situation is different for those holding highly technical posts, requiring special skills and qualifications. The Constitution
clearly distinguished the primarily confidential from the highly technical, and to apply the loss of confidence rule to the latter incumbents is
to ignore and erase the differentiation expressly made by our fundamental charter.

Pineda v. Claudio, 28 SCRA 334 - (SALVACION), Chief Police, Next in Line-no such law,

Facts: Upon the death of Col. Mariano Tumaliuan on August 28, 1968, the position of chief of police of Pasay City became vacant. To fill the
vacancy, Mayor Jovito Claudio appointed the Francisco Villa, a state prosecutor in the Department of Justice, but the respondent
Commissioner of Civil Service Abelardo Subido held the appointment in abeyance until other persons who, in Subido's opinion, had
preferential right to appointment have been considered.

The Deputy Chief of Police, Basilio Pineda, assailed the appointment of Villa as he claimed that he has preferential rights over Villa because
he is next in line, which was supported by the Commissioner. Subido cited a previous ruling by the Supreme Court (Millares vs Subido) and the
Civil Service Act to bolster his side. Such case provided the order of priority in filling up the vacancies in local offices:
1. Promotion (next in rank) 2. Transfer (lateral movement) 3. Reinstatement/Reemployment 4. Certification (usually certified outsiders)
Subido argued that that in case a promotion is untenable due to “special reasons”, only then subsequent order of transfer, reinstatement, or
certification be followed. He also averred that no special reason by the Mayor was given explaining his preference for Villa over Pineda.
Mayor Claudio replied that in his 8 years as an official of Pasay, Pineda et al “cannot boast of any improvement they have introduced to lift
the sagging inefficiency of the local police organization. The actual members of untrained and undisciplined men still persist”
Mayor Claudio’s position was supported by the DOJ Secretary stating that in as far as filling up a vacancy in the police department is
concerned, the Police Act of 1966 and applies, which provides that it is within the mayor’s discretion as to who he should appoint to said
office.
ISSUE: Whether or not Deputy Chief Pineda, has a preferential right to the said public office.
HELD: No. The ruling in the Millares case is not conclusive because such case has different circumstances. It must be clarified though that as
far as practicable, in case of a vacancy, the next in line shall be promoted by the appointing authority. But if not, the vacancy may be filled
either by transfer, reinstatement, reemployment or certification — not necessarily in that order. There is no rule which states that the mayor
must appoint the next in line. It is not his ministerial duty to do so nor is it mandatory. The appointing power can choose whether to appoint
by promotion, transfer, reinstatement, or certification. It is necessary for effective public administration that the mayor appoints men of his
confidence, provided they are qualified and eligible, who in his best estimation are possessed of the requisite reputation, integrity,
knowledgeability, energy and judgment. After all, it is the local executive, more than anyone else, who is primarily responsible for efficient
governmental administration in the locality and the effective maintenance of peace and order therein, and is directly answerable to the
people who elected him.
The Supreme Court also clarified that the only time that an appointing power is required to provide specific reasons on why a next in rank is
not appointed is that if the appointing power chose promotion as the method to fill up the vacancy.

National Service Corp. v. NLRC, 168 SCRA 125 (1988) -- The civil service does not include Government owned or controlled corporations
(GOCC) which are organized as subsidiaries of GOCC under the general corporation law.

GOCC subsidiaries don’t have original charter, 1973 vs 1985 Consti coverage of SCS

F: Eugenio Credo was an employee of the National Service Corporation. She claims she was illegally dismissed. NLRC ruled ordering her
reinstatement. NASECO argues that NLRC has no jurisdiction to order her reinstatement. NASECO as a government corporation by virtue of
its being a subsidiary of the NIDC, which is wholly owned by the Phil. National Bank which is in turn a GOCC, the terms and conditions of
employment of its employees are governed by the Civil Service Law citing National Housing v Juco.

Eugenia C. Credo, respondent, was an employee of the National Service Corporation (NASECO), a corporation which provides manpower
services to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and its agencies. She was administratively charged by Sisinio S. Lloren, for not complying
instructions to correct/add remarks in the Statement of Billings Adjustment and for showing resentment and disrespect after being called to
explain. She was placed on "Forced Leave" status for 15 days. She filed a complaint in the Ministry of Labor and Employment against NASECO
for placing her on forced leave without due process. NASECO's Committee on Personnel Affairs deliberated and evaluated a number of past
acts of misconduct or infractions attributed to her and recommended Credo's termination, with forfeiture of benefits. She was made to
explain her side in connection with the charges filed but unable to do so and was handed a Notice of Termination. Credo filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal, alleging absence of just or authorized cause for her dismissal and lack of opportunity to be heard. T

The labor arbiter rendered a dismissed Credo's complaint, and direct NASECO to pay Credo separation pay equivalent to one half month's
pay for every year of service. Both parties appealed to NLRC,
NLRC rendered a decision directing NASECO to reinstate Credo to her former position with six months’ back wagesand without loss of seniority
rights and other privileges appertaining thereto and dismissed claim for her attorney's fees, moral and exemplary damages. Both parties filed
their respective motions for reconsideration but denied.

In G.R. No. 68970, petitioners contend that in arriving at said questioned order, the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in finding that:
1) Petitioners violated the requirements mandated by law on termination, 2) Petitioners failed of proving that the termination of Credo was for
a valid or authorized cause, 3) The alleged infractions committed by Credo were not proven or, even if proved, could be considered to have
been condoned. 4) Termination of Credo was not for a valid or authorized cause. In G.R. No. 70295, petitioner Credo challenges as grave
abuse of discretion the dispositive portion of the decision which dismissed her claim for attorney's fees, moral and exemplary damages and
limited her right to back wages to only six (6) months.

ISSUE:

WON NLRC has jurisdiction to order reinstatement

Yes. On the premise that it is the 1987 Constitution that governs the instant case because it is the Constitution in place at the time of decision
thereof, the NLRC has jurisdiction to accord relief to the parties. As an admitted subsidiary of the NIDC, in turn a subsidiary of the PNB, the
NASECO is a government-owned or controlled corporation without original charter.

The holding in NHC v Juco should not be given retroactive effect, that is to cases that arose before its promulgation of Jan 17, 1985. To do
otherwise would be oppressive to Credo and other employees similarly situated because under the 1973 Consti but prior to the ruling in NHC
v Juco, this court recognized the applicability of the Labor jurisdiction over disputes involving terms and conditions of employment in GOCC's,
among them NASECO. In the matter of coverage by the civil service of GOCC, the 1987 Consti starkly differs from the 1973 consti where NHC
v Juco was based. It provides that the "civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government,
including government owned or controlled corporation with original charter." Therefore by clear implication, the civil service does not include
GOCC which are organized as subsidiaries of GOCC under the general corporation law.

Rationale: A government-owned corporation could create several subsidiary corporations. These subsidiary corporations would enjoy the
best of two worlds. Their officials and employees would be privileged individuals, free from the strict accountability required by the Civil
Service Decree and the regulations of the Commission on Audit. Their incomes would not be subject to the competitive restrains of the open
market nor to the terms and conditions of civil service employment. Conceivably, all government-owned or controlled corporations could
be created, no longer by special charters, but through incorporations under the general law. The Constitutional amendment including such
corporations in the embrace of the civil service would cease to have application. Certainly, such a situation cannot be allowed to exist

As an admitted subsidiary of the NIDC, in turn a subsidiary of the PNB, the NASECO is a government-owned or controlled corporation without
original charter.

MONSANTO vs FACTORAN, PARDON forgives, not forget- assistant treasurer

Facts: The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) of the crime of estafa
through falsification of public documents. She was sentenced to jail and to indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50.The SC affirmed
the decision. She then filed a motion for reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she was extended by then President Marcos
absolute pardon which she accepted (at that time, the rule was that clemency could be given even before conviction). By reason of said
pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since the
same was still vacant. Her letter was referred to the Minister of Finance who ruled that she may be reinstated to her position without the
necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the date she was extended the absolute pardon.

Petitioner wrote the Ministry stressing that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the crime which implies that her service in the
government has never been interrupted and therefore the date of her reinstatement should correspond to the date of her preventive
suspension; that she is entitled to backpay for the entire period of her suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the
proportionate share of the amount of P4,892.50

The Ministry referred the issue to the Office of the President. Deputy Executive Secretary Factoran denied Monsanto’s request averring that
Monsanto must first seek appointment and that the pardon does not reinstate her former position.

Issues:Is Is a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, entitled to reinstatement to her former position
without need of a new appointment?

Held: 1. Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the
individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private, though official act of
the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not communicated officially to the Court.

While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as
though he never committed the offense, it does not operate for all purposes. The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt.
Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It does not wash out the moral
stain. It involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness.
A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the
offender. It does not impose upon the government any obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered. “Since the offense has
been established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully
done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required.” This would explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled
to receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits.

2. The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond
that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.

3. Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the Revised Penal Code. It subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the
sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence. Petitioner's civil liability may only be extinguished by the same
causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor,
compensation and novation

Social Security System (SSS) Employees Association vs. Court of Appeals

SSS has original charter, under CSC…no strike

Facts: The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the union’sdemands concerning the implementation of their CBA. SSS
filed before the court action for damages with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners for staging an illegal strike. The court
issued a temporary restraining order pending the resolution of the application for preliminary injunction while petitioners filed a motion to
dismiss alleging the court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Petitioners contend that the court made reversible error in taking
cognizance on the subject matter since the jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the National Labor Relations Commission as the case involves a
labor dispute. The Social Security System contends on one hand that the petitioners are covered by the Civil Service laws, rules and regulation
thus have no right to strike. They are not covered by the NLRC or DOLE therefore the court may enjoin the petitioners from striking.

Issue:Whether or not Social Security System employers have the right to strike.

Held: The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and Social Justice provides guarantee among workers with the right to organize
and conduct peaceful concerted activities such as strikes. On one hand, Section 14 of E.O No. 180 provides that “the Civil Service law and
rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed,

subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress” referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission
which states that “prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by government employees enjoins under pain of
administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms
of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service.” Therefore in the absence of any legislation allowing
govt. employees to strike they are prohibited from doing so.

In Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 the employees in the civil service are denominated as “government employees” and that the SSS is one such
government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil
service and are covered by the Civil Service Commission’s memorandum prohibiting strikes.

Neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the subject matter but instead it is the Public Sector Labor-Management Council which is
not granted by law authority to issue writ of injunction in labor disputes within its jurisdiction thus the resort of SSS before the general court for
the issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate.

TUPAS v. NHA

GOCC w/o OC- Labor Code, Union, Stage strike

GOCC w OC- CSC, Form assoc, No Strike

Facts: Respondent National Housing Corporation (hereinafter referred to as NHC) is a corporation organized in 1959 in accordance with
Executive Order No. 399, otherwise known as the Uniform Charter of Government Corporations, dated January 1, 1951. Its shares of stock are
and have been one hundred percent (100%) owned by the Government from its incorporation under Act 459, the former corporation law.
The government entities that own its shares of stock are the Government Service Insurance System, the Social Security System, the
Development Bank of the Philippines, the National Investment and Development Corporation and the People’s Homesite and Housing
Corporation. Petitioner Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) is a legitimate labor organization with a chapter in NHC.

On July 13, 1977, TUPAS filed a petition for the conduct of a certification election with Regional Office No. IV of the Department of Labor in
order to determine the exclusive bargaining representative of the workers in NHC. It was claimed that its members comprised the majority of
the employees of the corporation. The petition was dismissed by med-arbiter Eusebio M. Jimenez in an order, dated November 7, 1977,
holding that NHC “being a government-owned and/or controlled corporation its employees/workers are prohibited to form, join or assist any
labor organization for purposes of collective bargaining pursuant to Section 1, Rule II, Book V of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Labor Code.”
From this order of dismissal, TUPAS appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations where Director Carmelo C. Noriel reversed the order of dismissal
and ordered the holding of a certification election. This order was, however, set aside by Officer-in-Charge Virgilio S.J. Sy in his resolution of
November 21, 1978 upon a motion for reconsideration of respondent NHC.

Issue: whether or not the employees of NHA are not covered by Civil Service law, rules and regulations and have therefore the right to
unionize

Held: Yes. The civil service now covers only government owned or controlled corporations with original or legislative charters, that is, those
created by an act of Congress or by special law, and not those incorporated under and pursuant to a general legislation. The Civil Service
does not include government-owned or controlled corporations which are organized as subsidiaries of government-owned or controlled
corporations under the general corporation law.

The workers or employees of NHC undoubtedly have the right to form unions or employees’ organizations. The right to unionize or to
form organizations is now explicitly recognized and granted to employees in both the governmental and the private sectors.

There is, therefore, no impediment to the holding of a certification election among the workers of NHC for it is clear that they are covered by
the Labor Code, the NHC being a government-owned and/or controlled corporation without an original charter. Statutory implementation
of the last cited section of the Constitution is found in Article 244 of the Labor Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 111, thus:

... Right of employees in the public service — Employees of the government corporations established under the Corporation Code shall have
the right to organize and to bargain collectively with their respective employers. All other employees in the civil service shall have the right
to form associations for purposes not contrary to law.

VICENTE GARCIA vs: THE HONORABLE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE HONORABLE MINISTER, LAND TRANSPORTATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS, THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, TELECOM REGIONAL OFFICE NO. IV

PARDON BASED on INNOCENCE

FACTS: Petitioner GARCIA was a supervising lineman in the Region IV Station of the Bureau of Telecommunications in Lucena City. A criminal
case of qualified theft was filed against him. The president grated him an executive clemency. The petitioner filed a claim for back payment
of salaries. The petitioner was later recalled to the service on 12 March 1984 but the records do not show whether petitioner’s reinstatement
was to the same position of Supervising Lineman.

ISSUE: Whether Garcia is entitled to the payment of back wages after having been reinstated pursuant to the grant of executive clemency.

HELD: The pardoned offender regains his eligibility for appointment to public office which was forfeited by reason of the conviction of the
offense. But since pardon does not generally result in automatic reinstatement because the offender has to apply for reappointment, he is
not entitled to back wages.

If the pardon is based on the innocence of the individual, it affirms this innocence and makes him a new man and as innocent; as if he had
not been found guilty of the offense charged. 7 When a person is given pardon because he did not truly commit the offense, the pardon
relieves the party from all punitive consequences of his criminal act, thereby restoring to him his clean name, good reputation and unstained
character prior to the finding of guilt.

In the case at bar, the acquittal of petitioner by the trial court was founded not on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt but on the fact
that petitioner did not commit the offense imputed to him. Aside from finding him innocent of the charge, the trial court commended
petitioner for his concern and dedication as a public servant. Verily, petitioner’s innocence is the primary reason behind the grant of executive
clemency to him, bolstered by the favorable recommendations for his reinstatement. This signifies that petitioner need no longer apply to be
reinstated to his former employment; he is restored to his office ipso facto upon the issuance of the clemency.

Petitioner’s automatic reinstatement to the government service entitles him to back wages. This is meant to afford relief to petitioner who is
innocent from the start and to make reparation for what he has suffered as a result of his unjust dismissal from the service. The right to back
wages is afforded to those with have been illegally dismissed and were thus ordered reinstated or to those otherwise acquitted of the charges
against them.

Therefore, the court ordered the full back wages from April 1 1975 (date when he was illegally dismissed) to March 12 1984 (reinstated) to the
petitioner. the petition is GRANTED.

Juco v. NLRC – NHA project engr, gocc (charter)

Facts: Benjamin C. Juco was hired as a project engineer of National Housing Corporation (NHC) from November 16, 1970 to May 14, 1975.
On May 14, 1975, he was separated from the service for having been implicated in a crime of theft and/or malversation of public funds. On
March 25, 1977, Juco filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the NHC with the Department of Labor. On September 17, 1977, the Labor
Arbiter rendered a decision dismissing the complaint on the ground that the NLRC had no jurisdiction over the case. Juco then elevated the
case to the NLRC which rendered a decision on December 28, 1982, reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter. NHC then appealed the
NLRC decision before the Supreme Court and on January 17, 1985 which petition the Court granted thereby setting aside the NLRC decision
and reinstating the labor arbiter’s decision of dismissing the case.
On January 6, 1989, Juco filed with the Civil Service Commission a complaint for illegal dismissal, with preliminary mandatory
injunction. On February 6, 1989, NHC moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the Civil Service Commission has no
jurisdiction over the case. CSC granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
On April 28, 1989, Juco filed with NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal with preliminary mandatory injunction against NHC. NLRC
find NHC guilty of illegal dismissal. On June 1, 1990, NHC filed its appeal before the NLRC and on March 14, 1991, the NLRC promulgated a
decision which reversed the decision of Labor Arbiter Manuel R. Caday on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Issue: Whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner is not governed by the Labor Code

Held: Yes. Under the laws then in force, employees of government-owned and/or controlled corporations were governed by the Civil Service
Law and not by the Labor Code. Although in National Housing Corporation v. Juco, it was held that employees of government-owned and/or
controlled corporations, whether created by special law or formed as subsidiaries under the general Corporation Law, are governed by the
Civil Service Law and not by the Labor Code, this ruling has been supplanted by the 1987 Constitution which states that the civil service
embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government owned or controlled
corporations with original charter. In National Service Corporation (NASECO) v. National Labor Relations Commission, it was held that the
NLRC has jurisdiction over the employees of NASECO on the ground that it is the 1987 Constitution that governs because it is the Constitution
in place at the time of the decision. It was further held that the new phrase "with original charter" means that government-owned and
controlled corporations refer to corporations chartered by special law as distinguished from corporations organized under the Corporation
Code. Thus, NASECO which had been organized under the general incorporation statute and a subsidiary of the National Investment
Development Corporation, which in turn was a subsidiary of the Philippine National Bank, is excluded from the purview of the Civil Service
Commission. The above doctrine applies in this case. In the case at bench, the National Housing Corporation is a government owned
corporation organized in 1959 in accordance with Executive Order No. 399, otherwise known as the Uniform Charter of Government
Corporation, dated January 1, 1959. Its shares of stock are and have been one hundred percent (100%) owned by the Government from its
incorporation under Act 1459, the former corporation law. The government entities that own its shares of stock are the Government Service
Insurance System, the Social Security System, the Development Bank of the Philippines, the National Investment and Development
Corporation and the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation. Considering the fact that the NHA had been incorporated under Act 1459,
the former corporation law, it is but correct to say that it is a government-owned or controlled corporation whose employees are subject to
the provisions of the Labor Code. This observation is reiterated in the recent case of Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS)
v. National Housing
Corporation, where the SC held that the NHA is now within the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor and Employment, it being a
government-owned and/or controlled corporation without an original charter. Furthermore, the Court previously ruled that the workers or
employees of the NHC (now NHA) undoubtedly have the right to form unions or employee's organization and that there is no impediment to
the holding of a certification election among them as they are covered by the Labor Code.

MATURAN vs MAGLANA, Police provisional appointment reinstatement

FACTS Petitioner Tereso Maturan is a police sergeant at San Franciso, Southern Leyte. He got promoted from being a patrolman (February
1965) to a police sergeant (September 1972) through appointments which were provisional. His provisional appointment was annually
renewed for the span of seven years including respective increase in the salary. Respondent Mayor Maglana suspended Maturan on
September 1972 because of two pending cases against him (1. Falsification of public document by making untruthful statement in the
narration of facts and 2. Falsification of public document). A month after, respondent Vice Mayor Magoncia who was then the Acting Mayor
instructed Maturan to tender his resignation pursuant to the Letter of Instruction No. 14 of the President of the Philippines. Maturan submitted
his letter of resignation on the same month. The resignation was approved on January 19, 1973 and petitioner was accordingly informed
thereof. Days after, his case on falsification of public document by making untruthful statement in the narration of facts was dismissed. On
November of that same year his other case was also dismissed. A month after Maturan sought to have his resignation rendered null and void
for on the ground that Letter of Instruction No. 14 does not apply to him. Given that criminal charges against him were already dismissed, the
NaPolCom chairman stated that the preventive suspension is lifted and he could go back to work. However, the Chief of Police refused to
accept Maturan. Hence, he appealed to the court. He filed for a claim for back wages and reinstatement. The lower court denied the claim
ruling that his appointment was provisional and he can be removed at any time by the appointing power.

ISSUE Can Maturan be reinstated to his position as police sergeant?

RULING NOPE. Maturan cannot be reinstated to his former post. This is so because he was not qualified for the position nor was he possessing
any civil service eligibility for any position in the government. Lack of civil service eligibility makes his appointment temporary and is dependent
upon the pleasure of the appointing power. When he was appointed as patrolman and as a police sergeant, he had no eligibility. It does
not matter if he gained eligibility subsequently or during his post; this does not apply to his provisional temporary appointment. Gaining civil
service eligibility while actively serving his appointment does not make his temporary appointment automatically permanent; it does not
follow. Upon his appointment, he had no eligibility and that should apply until the end of his temporary appointment. What is required is a
new appointment and not merely a reinstatement. Also, the Mayor cannot be compelled to appoint him for such power of the Mayor is
discretionary.

CORPUS VS CUADERNO (3-31-65), BSP Special assistant, loss of confidence on highly tech

Facts:
 Petitioner R. Marino Corpus, is a "Special Assistant to the Governor, In Charge of the Export Department" of the Central Bank, a
position declared by the President of the Philippines as highly technical in nature, was administratively charged by several employees in the
export department with dishonesty, incompetence, neglect of duty, and/or abuse of authority, oppression, conduct unbecoming of a public
official, and of violation of the internal regulations of the Central Bank. The Monetary Board suspended the petitioner from office and created
a three-man investigating committee. After a thorough investigation the committee found no basis to recommend disciplinary action and
recommended the immediate reinstatement of the respondent. However, the Board issued a resolution considering the respondents
resignation as of the day he was suspended due to the statement of the Central Bank Governor that he had loss confidence of the
respondent.

Corpus moved for the reconsideration of the above resolution, but the Board denied it, after which he filed an action for certiorari,
mandamus, quo warranto, and damages, with preliminary injunction, with the Court of First Instance of Manila. The court rendered judgment
declaring the Board resolution null and void, and ordered for the payment of damages. The appeal of the Central Bank and its Monetary
Board is planted on the proposition that officers holding highly technical positions may be removed at any time for lack of confidence by
the appointing power, and that such power of removal is implicit in section 1, Art. XII, of the Constitution.

Issue: W/N the lack of confidence of the one making the appointment constitutes sufficient and legitimate cause of removal

Rulings: The loss of confidence ground, on which the dismissal is sought to be predicated, is a clear and evident afterthought resorted to when
the charges, subject matter of the investigation, were not proved or substantiated. The Monetary Board nowhere stated anything in the record
which the committee failed to consider in recommending exoneration from the charges; it nowhere pointed to any substantiation of the
charges; it, therefore, relied only on the statement of the loss of confidence made by Governor Cuaderno. We find in the particular set of
facts herein that the alleged loss of confidence is clearly a pretext to cure the inability of substantiating the charges upon which the
investigation had proceeded. And inasmuch as the charges against petitioner were unsubstantiated, that leaves no other alternative but to
follow the mandate that: “No public officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by
law.”

Since in the interest of the service reasonable protection should be afforded civil servants in positions that are by their nature important, such
as those that are "highly technical," the Constitutional safeguard requiring removal or suspension to be "for cause as provided by law" at least
demands that their dismissal for alleged "loss of confidence" if at all allowed, be attended with prudence and deliberation adequate to
show that said ground exists. The tenure of officials holding primarily confidential positions (such as private secretaries of public functionaries)
ends upon loss of confidence, because their term of office lasts only as long as confidence in them endures; and thus their cessation involves
no removal. But the situation is different for those holding highly technical posts, requiring special skills and qualifications. The Constitution
clearly distinguished the primarily confidential from the highly technical, and to apply the loss of confidence rule to the latter incumbents is
to ignore and erase the differentiation expressly made by our fundamental charter.

Pineda v. Claudio, 28 SCRA 334 - (SALVACION), Chief Police, Next in Line-no such law,

Facts: Upon the death of Col. Mariano Tumaliuan on August 28, 1968, the position of chief of police of Pasay City became vacant. To fill the
vacancy, Mayor Jovito Claudio appointed the Francisco Villa, a state prosecutor in the Department of Justice, but the respondent
Commissioner of Civil Service Abelardo Subido held the appointment in abeyance until other persons who, in Subido's opinion, had
preferential right to appointment have been considered.

The Deputy Chief of Police, Basilio Pineda, assailed the appointment of Villa as he claimed that he has preferential rights over Villa because
he is next in line, which was supported by the Commissioner. Subido cited a previous ruling by the Supreme Court (Millares vs Subido) and the
Civil Service Act to bolster his side. Such case provided the order of priority in filling up the vacancies in local offices:
1. Promotion (next in rank) 2. Transfer (lateral movement) 3. Reinstatement/Reemployment 4. Certification (usually certified outsiders)
Subido argued that that in case a promotion is untenable due to “special reasons”, only then subsequent order of transfer, reinstatement, or
certification be followed. He also averred that no special reason by the Mayor was given explaining his preference for Villa over Pineda.
Mayor Claudio replied that in his 8 years as an official of Pasay, Pineda et al “cannot boast of any improvement they have introduced to lift
the sagging inefficiency of the local police organization. The actual members of untrained and undisciplined men still persist”
Mayor Claudio’s position was supported by the DOJ Secretary stating that in as far as filling up a vacancy in the police department is
concerned, the Police Act of 1966 and applies, which provides that it is within the mayor’s discretion as to who he should appoint to said
office.
ISSUE: Whether or not Deputy Chief Pineda, has a preferential right to the said public office.
HELD: No. The ruling in the Millares case is not conclusive because such case has different circumstances. It must be clarified though that as
far as practicable, in case of a vacancy, the next in line shall be promoted by the appointing authority. But if not, the vacancy may be filled
either by transfer, reinstatement, reemployment or certification — not necessarily in that order. There is no rule which states that the mayor
must appoint the next in line. It is not his ministerial duty to do so nor is it mandatory. The appointing power can choose whether to appoint
by promotion, transfer, reinstatement, or certification. It is necessary for effective public administration that the mayor appoints men of his
confidence, provided they are qualified and eligible, who in his best estimation are possessed of the requisite reputation, integrity,
knowledgeability, energy and judgment. After all, it is the local executive, more than anyone else, who is primarily responsible for efficient
governmental administration in the locality and the effective maintenance of peace and order therein, and is directly answerable to the
people who elected him.
The Supreme Court also clarified that the only time that an appointing power is required to provide specific reasons on why a next in rank is
not appointed is that if the appointing power chose promotion as the method to fill up the vacancy.

National Service Corp. v. NLRC, 168 SCRA 125 (1988) -- The civil service does not include Government owned or controlled corporations
(GOCC) which are organized as subsidiaries of GOCC under the general corporation law.
GOCC subsidiaries don’t have original charter, 1973 vs 1985 Consti coverage of SCS

F: Eugenio Credo was an employee of the National Service Corporation. She claims she was illegally dismissed. NLRC ruled ordering her
reinstatement. NASECO argues that NLRC has no jurisdiction to order her reinstatement. NASECO as a government corporation by virtue of
its being a subsidiary of the NIDC, which is wholly owned by the Phil. National Bank which is in turn a GOCC, the terms and conditions of
employment of its employees are governed by the Civil Service Law citing National Housing v Juco.

Eugenia C. Credo, respondent, was an employee of the National Service Corporation (NASECO), a corporation which provides manpower
services to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and its agencies. She was administratively charged by Sisinio S. Lloren, for not complying
instructions to correct/add remarks in the Statement of Billings Adjustment and for showing resentment and disrespect after being called to
explain. She was placed on "Forced Leave" status for 15 days. She filed a complaint in the Ministry of Labor and Employment against NASECO
for placing her on forced leave without due process. NASECO's Committee on Personnel Affairs deliberated and evaluated a number of past
acts of misconduct or infractions attributed to her and recommended Credo's termination, with forfeiture of benefits. She was made to
explain her side in connection with the charges filed but unable to do so and was handed a Notice of Termination. Credo filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal, alleging absence of just or authorized cause for her dismissal and lack of opportunity to be heard. T

The labor arbiter rendered a dismissed Credo's complaint, and direct NASECO to pay Credo separation pay equivalent to one half month's
pay for every year of service. Both parties appealed to NLRC,

NLRC rendered a decision directing NASECO to reinstate Credo to her former position with six months’ back wagesand without loss of seniority
rights and other privileges appertaining thereto and dismissed claim for her attorney's fees, moral and exemplary damages. Both parties filed
their respective motions for reconsideration but denied.

In G.R. No. 68970, petitioners contend that in arriving at said questioned order, the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in finding that:
1) Petitioners violated the requirements mandated by law on termination, 2) Petitioners failed of proving that the termination of Credo was for
a valid or authorized cause, 3) The alleged infractions committed by Credo were not proven or, even if proved, could be considered to have
been condoned. 4) Termination of Credo was not for a valid or authorized cause. In G.R. No. 70295, petitioner Credo challenges as grave
abuse of discretion the dispositive portion of the decision which dismissed her claim for attorney's fees, moral and exemplary damages and
limited her right to back wages to only six (6) months.

ISSUE:

WON NLRC has jurisdiction to order reinstatement

Yes. On the premise that it is the 1987 Constitution that governs the instant case because it is the Constitution in place at the time of decision
thereof, the NLRC has jurisdiction to accord relief to the parties. As an admitted subsidiary of the NIDC, in turn a subsidiary of the PNB, the
NASECO is a government-owned or controlled corporation without original charter.

The holding in NHC v Juco should not be given retroactive effect, that is to cases that arose before its promulgation of Jan 17, 1985. To do
otherwise would be oppressive to Credo and other employees similarly situated because under the 1973 Consti but prior to the ruling in NHC
v Juco, this court recognized the applicability of the Labor jurisdiction over disputes involving terms and conditions of employment in GOCC's,
among them NASECO. In the matter of coverage by the civil service of GOCC, the 1987 Consti starkly differs from the 1973 consti where NHC
v Juco was based. It provides that the "civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government,
including government owned or controlled corporation with original charter." Therefore by clear implication, the civil service does not include
GOCC which are organized as subsidiaries of GOCC under the general corporation law.

Rationale: A government-owned corporation could create several subsidiary corporations. These subsidiary corporations would enjoy the
best of two worlds. Their officials and employees would be privileged individuals, free from the strict accountability required by the Civil
Service Decree and the regulations of the Commission on Audit. Their incomes would not be subject to the competitive restrains of the open
market nor to the terms and conditions of civil service employment. Conceivably, all government-owned or controlled corporations could
be created, no longer by special charters, but through incorporations under the general law. The Constitutional amendment including such
corporations in the embrace of the civil service would cease to have application. Certainly, such a situation cannot be allowed to exist

As an admitted subsidiary of the NIDC, in turn a subsidiary of the PNB, the NASECO is a government-owned or controlled corporation without
original charter.

MONSANTO vs FACTORAN, PARDON forgives, not forget- assistant treasurer

Facts: The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) of the crime of estafa
through falsification of public documents. She was sentenced to jail and to indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50.The SC affirmed
the decision. She then filed a motion for reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she was extended by then President Marcos
absolute pardon which she accepted (at that time, the rule was that clemency could be given even before conviction). By reason of said
pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since the
same was still vacant. Her letter was referred to the Minister of Finance who ruled that she may be reinstated to her position without the
necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the date she was extended the absolute pardon.
Petitioner wrote the Ministry stressing that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the crime which implies that her service in the
government has never been interrupted and therefore the date of her reinstatement should correspond to the date of her preventive
suspension; that she is entitled to backpay for the entire period of her suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the
proportionate share of the amount of P4,892.50

The Ministry referred the issue to the Office of the President. Deputy Executive Secretary Factoran denied Monsanto’s request averring that
Monsanto must first seek appointment and that the pardon does not reinstate her former position.

Issues:Is Is a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, entitled to reinstatement to her former position
without need of a new appointment?

Held: 1. Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the
individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private, though official act of
the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not communicated officially to the Court.

While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as
though he never committed the offense, it does not operate for all purposes. The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt.
Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It does not wash out the moral
stain. It involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness.

A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the
offender. It does not impose upon the government any obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered. “Since the offense has
been established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully
done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required.” This would explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled
to receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits.

2. The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond
that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.

3. Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the Revised Penal Code. It subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the
sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence. Petitioner's civil liability may only be extinguished by the same
causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor,
compensation and novation

Social Security System (SSS) Employees Association vs. Court of Appeals

SSS has original charter, under CSC…no strike

Facts: The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the union’sdemands concerning the implementation of their CBA. SSS
filed before the court action for damages with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners for staging an illegal strike. The court
issued a temporary restraining order pending the resolution of the application for preliminary injunction while petitioners filed a motion to
dismiss alleging the court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Petitioners contend that the court made reversible error in taking
cognizance on the subject matter since the jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the National Labor Relations Commission as the case involves a
labor dispute. The Social Security System contends on one hand that the petitioners are covered by the Civil Service laws, rules and regulation
thus have no right to strike. They are not covered by the NLRC or DOLE therefore the court may enjoin the petitioners from striking.

Issue:Whether or not Social Security System employers have the right to strike.

Held: The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and Social Justice provides guarantee among workers with the right to organize
and conduct peaceful concerted activities such as strikes. On one hand, Section 14 of E.O No. 180 provides that “the Civil Service law and
rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed,

subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress” referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission
which states that “prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by government employees enjoins under pain of
administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms
of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service.” Therefore in the absence of any legislation allowing
govt. employees to strike they are prohibited from doing so.

In Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 the employees in the civil service are denominated as “government employees” and that the SSS is one such
government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil
service and are covered by the Civil Service Commission’s memorandum prohibiting strikes.

Neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the subject matter but instead it is the Public Sector Labor-Management Council which is
not granted by law authority to issue writ of injunction in labor disputes within its jurisdiction thus the resort of SSS before the general court for
the issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate.
TUPAS v. NHA

GOCC w/o OC- Labor Code, Union, Stage strike

GOCC w OC- CSC, Form assoc, No Strike

Facts: Respondent National Housing Corporation (hereinafter referred to as NHC) is a corporation organized in 1959 in accordance with
Executive Order No. 399, otherwise known as the Uniform Charter of Government Corporations, dated January 1, 1951. Its shares of stock are
and have been one hundred percent (100%) owned by the Government from its incorporation under Act 459, the former corporation law.
The government entities that own its shares of stock are the Government Service Insurance System, the Social Security System, the
Development Bank of the Philippines, the National Investment and Development Corporation and the People’s Homesite and Housing
Corporation. Petitioner Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) is a legitimate labor organization with a chapter in NHC.

On July 13, 1977, TUPAS filed a petition for the conduct of a certification election with Regional Office No. IV of the Department of Labor in
order to determine the exclusive bargaining representative of the workers in NHC. It was claimed that its members comprised the majority of
the employees of the corporation. The petition was dismissed by med-arbiter Eusebio M. Jimenez in an order, dated November 7, 1977,
holding that NHC “being a government-owned and/or controlled corporation its employees/workers are prohibited to form, join or assist any
labor organization for purposes of collective bargaining pursuant to Section 1, Rule II, Book V of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Labor Code.”

From this order of dismissal, TUPAS appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations where Director Carmelo C. Noriel reversed the order of dismissal
and ordered the holding of a certification election. This order was, however, set aside by Officer-in-Charge Virgilio S.J. Sy in his resolution of
November 21, 1978 upon a motion for reconsideration of respondent NHC.

Issue: whether or not the employees of NHA are not covered by Civil Service law, rules and regulations and have therefore the right to
unionize

Held: Yes. The civil service now covers only government owned or controlled corporations with original or legislative charters, that is, those
created by an act of Congress or by special law, and not those incorporated under and pursuant to a general legislation. The Civil Service
does not include government-owned or controlled corporations which are organized as subsidiaries of government-owned or controlled
corporations under the general corporation law.

The workers or employees of NHC undoubtedly have the right to form unions or employees’ organizations. The right to unionize or to
form organizations is now explicitly recognized and granted to employees in both the governmental and the private sectors.

There is, therefore, no impediment to the holding of a certification election among the workers of NHC for it is clear that they are covered by
the Labor Code, the NHC being a government-owned and/or controlled corporation without an original charter. Statutory implementation
of the last cited section of the Constitution is found in Article 244 of the Labor Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 111, thus:

... Right of employees in the public service — Employees of the government corporations established under the Corporation Code shall have
the right to organize and to bargain collectively with their respective employers. All other employees in the civil service shall have the right
to form associations for purposes not contrary to law.

VICENTE GARCIA vs: THE HONORABLE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE HONORABLE MINISTER, LAND TRANSPORTATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS, THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, TELECOM REGIONAL OFFICE NO. IV

PARDON BASED on INNOCENCE

FACTS: Petitioner GARCIA was a supervising lineman in the Region IV Station of the Bureau of Telecommunications in Lucena City. A criminal
case of qualified theft was filed against him. The president grated him an executive clemency. The petitioner filed a claim for back payment
of salaries. The petitioner was later recalled to the service on 12 March 1984 but the records do not show whether petitioner’s reinstatement
was to the same position of Supervising Lineman.

ISSUE: Whether Garcia is entitled to the payment of back wages after having been reinstated pursuant to the grant of executive clemency.

HELD: The pardoned offender regains his eligibility for appointment to public office which was forfeited by reason of the conviction of the
offense. But since pardon does not generally result in automatic reinstatement because the offender has to apply for reappointment, he is
not entitled to back wages.

If the pardon is based on the innocence of the individual, it affirms this innocence and makes him a new man and as innocent; as if he had
not been found guilty of the offense charged. 7 When a person is given pardon because he did not truly commit the offense, the pardon
relieves the party from all punitive consequences of his criminal act, thereby restoring to him his clean name, good reputation and unstained
character prior to the finding of guilt.
In the case at bar, the acquittal of petitioner by the trial court was founded not on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt but on the fact
that petitioner did not commit the offense imputed to him. Aside from finding him innocent of the charge, the trial court commended
petitioner for his concern and dedication as a public servant. Verily, petitioner’s innocence is the primary reason behind the grant of executive
clemency to him, bolstered by the favorable recommendations for his reinstatement. This signifies that petitioner need no longer apply to be
reinstated to his former employment; he is restored to his office ipso facto upon the issuance of the clemency.

Petitioner’s automatic reinstatement to the government service entitles him to back wages. This is meant to afford relief to petitioner who is
innocent from the start and to make reparation for what he has suffered as a result of his unjust dismissal from the service. The right to back
wages is afforded to those with have been illegally dismissed and were thus ordered reinstated or to those otherwise acquitted of the charges
against them.

Therefore, the court ordered the full back wages from April 1 1975 (date when he was illegally dismissed) to March 12 1984 (reinstated) to the
petitioner. the petition is GRANTED.

Juco v. NLRC – NHA project engr, gocc (charter)

Facts: Benjamin C. Juco was hired as a project engineer of National Housing Corporation (NHC) from November 16, 1970 to May 14, 1975.
On May 14, 1975, he was separated from the service for having been implicated in a crime of theft and/or malversation of public funds. On
March 25, 1977, Juco filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the NHC with the Department of Labor. On September 17, 1977, the Labor
Arbiter rendered a decision dismissing the complaint on the ground that the NLRC had no jurisdiction over the case. Juco then elevated the
case to the NLRC which rendered a decision on December 28, 1982, reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter. NHC then appealed the
NLRC decision before the Supreme Court and on January 17, 1985 which petition the Court granted thereby setting aside the NLRC decision
and reinstating the labor arbiter’s decision of dismissing the case.
On January 6, 1989, Juco filed with the Civil Service Commission a complaint for illegal dismissal, with preliminary mandatory
injunction. On February 6, 1989, NHC moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the Civil Service Commission has no
jurisdiction over the case. CSC granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
On April 28, 1989, Juco filed with NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal with preliminary mandatory injunction against NHC. NLRC
find NHC guilty of illegal dismissal. On June 1, 1990, NHC filed its appeal before the NLRC and on March 14, 1991, the NLRC promulgated a
decision which reversed the decision of Labor Arbiter Manuel R. Caday on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Issue: Whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner is not governed by the Labor Code

Held: Yes. Under the laws then in force, employees of government-owned and/or controlled corporations were governed by the Civil Service
Law and not by the Labor Code. Although in National Housing Corporation v. Juco, it was held that employees of government-owned and/or
controlled corporations, whether created by special law or formed as subsidiaries under the general Corporation Law, are governed by the
Civil Service Law and not by the Labor Code, this ruling has been supplanted by the 1987 Constitution which states that the civil service
embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government owned or controlled
corporations with original charter. In National Service Corporation (NASECO) v. National Labor Relations Commission, it was held that the
NLRC has jurisdiction over the employees of NASECO on the ground that it is the 1987 Constitution that governs because it is the Constitution
in place at the time of the decision. It was further held that the new phrase "with original charter" means that government-owned and
controlled corporations refer to corporations chartered by special law as distinguished from corporations organized under the Corporation
Code. Thus, NASECO which had been organized under the general incorporation statute and a subsidiary of the National Investment
Development Corporation, which in turn was a subsidiary of the Philippine National Bank, is excluded from the purview of the Civil Service
Commission. The above doctrine applies in this case. In the case at bench, the National Housing Corporation is a government owned
corporation organized in 1959 in accordance with Executive Order No. 399, otherwise known as the Uniform Charter of Government
Corporation, dated January 1, 1959. Its shares of stock are and have been one hundred percent (100%) owned by the Government from its
incorporation under Act 1459, the former corporation law. The government entities that own its shares of stock are the Government Service
Insurance System, the Social Security System, the Development Bank of the Philippines, the National Investment and Development
Corporation and the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation. Considering the fact that the NHA had been incorporated under Act 1459,
the former corporation law, it is but correct to say that it is a government-owned or controlled corporation whose employees are subject to
the provisions of the Labor Code. This observation is reiterated in the recent case of Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS)
v. National Housing
Corporation, where the SC held that the NHA is now within the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor and Employment, it being a
government-owned and/or controlled corporation without an original charter. Furthermore, the Court previously ruled that the workers or
employees of the NHC (now NHA) undoubtedly have the right to form unions or employee's organization and that there is no impediment to
the holding of a certification election among them as they are covered by the Labor Code.

MATURAN vs MAGLANA, Police provisional appointment reinstatement

FACTS Petitioner Tereso Maturan is a police sergeant at San Franciso, Southern Leyte. He got promoted from being a patrolman (February
1965) to a police sergeant (September 1972) through appointments which were provisional. His provisional appointment was annually
renewed for the span of seven years including respective increase in the salary. Respondent Mayor Maglana suspended Maturan on
September 1972 because of two pending cases against him (1. Falsification of public document by making untruthful statement in the
narration of facts and 2. Falsification of public document). A month after, respondent Vice Mayor Magoncia who was then the Acting Mayor
instructed Maturan to tender his resignation pursuant to the Letter of Instruction No. 14 of the President of the Philippines. Maturan submitted
his letter of resignation on the same month. The resignation was approved on January 19, 1973 and petitioner was accordingly informed
thereof. Days after, his case on falsification of public document by making untruthful statement in the narration of facts was dismissed. On
November of that same year his other case was also dismissed. A month after Maturan sought to have his resignation rendered null and void
for on the ground that Letter of Instruction No. 14 does not apply to him. Given that criminal charges against him were already dismissed, the
NaPolCom chairman stated that the preventive suspension is lifted and he could go back to work. However, the Chief of Police refused to
accept Maturan. Hence, he appealed to the court. He filed for a claim for back wages and reinstatement. The lower court denied the claim
ruling that his appointment was provisional and he can be removed at any time by the appointing power.

ISSUE Can Maturan be reinstated to his position as police sergeant?

RULING NOPE. Maturan cannot be reinstated to his former post. This is so because he was not qualified for the position nor was he possessing
any civil service eligibility for any position in the government. Lack of civil service eligibility makes his appointment temporary and is dependent
upon the pleasure of the appointing power. When he was appointed as patrolman and as a police sergeant, he had no eligibility. It does
not matter if he gained eligibility subsequently or during his post; this does not apply to his provisional temporary appointment. Gaining civil
service eligibility while actively serving his appointment does not make his temporary appointment automatically permanent; it does not
follow. Upon his appointment, he had no eligibility and that should apply until the end of his temporary appointment. What is required is a
new appointment and not merely a reinstatement. Also, the Mayor cannot be compelled to appoint him for such power of the Mayor is
discretionary.

CORPUS VS CUADERNO (3-31-65), BSP Special assistant, loss of confidence on highly tech

Facts:
Petitioner R. Marino Corpus, is a "Special Assistant to the Governor, In Charge of the Export Department" of the Central Bank, a
position declared by the President of the Philippines as highly technical in nature, was administratively charged by several employees in the
export department with dishonesty, incompetence, neglect of duty, and/or abuse of authority, oppression, conduct unbecoming of a public
official, and of violation of the internal regulations of the Central Bank. The Monetary Board suspended the petitioner from office and created
a three-man investigating committee. After a thorough investigation the committee found no basis to recommend disciplinary action and
recommended the immediate reinstatement of the respondent. However, the Board issued a resolution considering the respondents
resignation as of the day he was suspended due to the statement of the Central Bank Governor that he had loss confidence of the
respondent.

Corpus moved for the reconsideration of the above resolution, but the Board denied it, after which he filed an action for certiorari,
mandamus, quo warranto, and damages, with preliminary injunction, with the Court of First Instance of Manila. The court rendered judgment
declaring the Board resolution null and void, and ordered for the payment of damages. The appeal of the Central Bank and its Monetary
Board is planted on the proposition that officers holding highly technical positions may be removed at any time for lack of confidence by
the appointing power, and that such power of removal is implicit in section 1, Art. XII, of the Constitution.

Issue: W/N the lack of confidence of the one making the appointment constitutes sufficient and legitimate cause of removal

Rulings: The loss of confidence ground, on which the dismissal is sought to be predicated, is a clear and evident afterthought resorted to when
the charges, subject matter of the investigation, were not proved or substantiated. The Monetary Board nowhere stated anything in the record
which the committee failed to consider in recommending exoneration from the charges; it nowhere pointed to any substantiation of the
charges; it, therefore, relied only on the statement of the loss of confidence made by Governor Cuaderno. We find in the particular set of
facts herein that the alleged loss of confidence is clearly a pretext to cure the inability of substantiating the charges upon which the
investigation had proceeded. And inasmuch as the charges against petitioner were unsubstantiated, that leaves no other alternative but to
follow the mandate that: “No public officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by
law.”

Since in the interest of the service reasonable protection should be afforded civil servants in positions that are by their nature important, such
as those that are "highly technical," the Constitutional safeguard requiring removal or suspension to be "for cause as provided by law" at least
demands that their dismissal for alleged "loss of confidence" if at all allowed, be attended with prudence and deliberation adequate to
show that said ground exists. The tenure of officials holding primarily confidential positions (such as private secretaries of public functionaries)
ends upon loss of confidence, because their term of office lasts only as long as confidence in them endures; and thus their cessation involves
no removal. But the situation is different for those holding highly technical posts, requiring special skills and qualifications. The Constitution
clearly distinguished the primarily confidential from the highly technical, and to apply the loss of confidence rule to the latter incumbents is
to ignore and erase the differentiation expressly made by our fundamental charter.

Pineda v. Claudio, 28 SCRA 334 - (SALVACION), Chief Police, Next in Line-no such law,

Facts: Upon the death of Col. Mariano Tumaliuan on August 28, 1968, the position of chief of police of Pasay City became vacant. To fill the
vacancy, Mayor Jovito Claudio appointed the Francisco Villa, a state prosecutor in the Department of Justice, but the respondent
Commissioner of Civil Service Abelardo Subido held the appointment in abeyance until other persons who, in Subido's opinion, had
preferential right to appointment have been considered.

The Deputy Chief of Police, Basilio Pineda, assailed the appointment of Villa as he claimed that he has preferential rights over Villa because
he is next in line, which was supported by the Commissioner. Subido cited a previous ruling by the Supreme Court (Millares vs Subido) and the
Civil Service Act to bolster his side. Such case provided the order of priority in filling up the vacancies in local offices:
1. Promotion (next in rank) 2. Transfer (lateral movement) 3. Reinstatement/Reemployment 4. Certification (usually certified outsiders)
Subido argued that that in case a promotion is untenable due to “special reasons”, only then subsequent order of transfer, reinstatement, or
certification be followed. He also averred that no special reason by the Mayor was given explaining his preference for Villa over Pineda.
Mayor Claudio replied that in his 8 years as an official of Pasay, Pineda et al “cannot boast of any improvement they have introduced to lift
the sagging inefficiency of the local police organization. The actual members of untrained and undisciplined men still persist”
Mayor Claudio’s position was supported by the DOJ Secretary stating that in as far as filling up a vacancy in the police department is
concerned, the Police Act of 1966 and applies, which provides that it is within the mayor’s discretion as to who he should appoint to said
office.
ISSUE: Whether or not Deputy Chief Pineda, has a preferential right to the said public office.
HELD: No. The ruling in the Millares case is not conclusive because such case has different circumstances. It must be clarified though that as
far as practicable, in case of a vacancy, the next in line shall be promoted by the appointing authority. But if not, the vacancy may be filled
either by transfer, reinstatement, reemployment or certification — not necessarily in that order. There is no rule which states that the mayor
must appoint the next in line. It is not his ministerial duty to do so nor is it mandatory. The appointing power can choose whether to appoint
by promotion, transfer, reinstatement, or certification. It is necessary for effective public administration that the mayor appoints men of his
confidence, provided they are qualified and eligible, who in his best estimation are possessed of the requisite reputation, integrity,
knowledgeability, energy and judgment. After all, it is the local executive, more than anyone else, who is primarily responsible for efficient
governmental administration in the locality and the effective maintenance of peace and order therein, and is directly answerable to the
people who elected him.
The Supreme Court also clarified that the only time that an appointing power is required to provide specific reasons on why a next in rank is
not appointed is that if the appointing power chose promotion as the method to fill up the vacancy.

National Service Corp. v. NLRC, 168 SCRA 125 (1988) -- The civil service does not include Government owned or controlled corporations
(GOCC) which are organized as subsidiaries of GOCC under the general corporation law.

GOCC subsidiaries don’t have original charter, 1973 vs 1985 Consti coverage of SCS

F: Eugenio Credo was an employee of the National Service Corporation. She claims she was illegally dismissed. NLRC ruled ordering her
reinstatement. NASECO argues that NLRC has no jurisdiction to order her reinstatement. NASECO as a government corporation by virtue of
its being a subsidiary of the NIDC, which is wholly owned by the Phil. National Bank which is in turn a GOCC, the terms and conditions of
employment of its employees are governed by the Civil Service Law citing National Housing v Juco.

Eugenia C. Credo, respondent, was an employee of the National Service Corporation (NASECO), a corporation which provides manpower
services to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and its agencies. She was administratively charged by Sisinio S. Lloren, for not complying
instructions to correct/add remarks in the Statement of Billings Adjustment and for showing resentment and disrespect after being called to
explain. She was placed on "Forced Leave" status for 15 days. She filed a complaint in the Ministry of Labor and Employment against NASECO
for placing her on forced leave without due process. NASECO's Committee on Personnel Affairs deliberated and evaluated a number of past
acts of misconduct or infractions attributed to her and recommended Credo's termination, with forfeiture of benefits. She was made to
explain her side in connection with the charges filed but unable to do so and was handed a Notice of Termination. Credo filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal, alleging absence of just or authorized cause for her dismissal and lack of opportunity to be heard. T

The labor arbiter rendered a dismissed Credo's complaint, and direct NASECO to pay Credo separation pay equivalent to one half month's
pay for every year of service. Both parties appealed to NLRC,

NLRC rendered a decision directing NASECO to reinstate Credo to her former position with six months’ back wagesand without loss of seniority
rights and other privileges appertaining thereto and dismissed claim for her attorney's fees, moral and exemplary damages. Both parties filed
their respective motions for reconsideration but denied.

In G.R. No. 68970, petitioners contend that in arriving at said questioned order, the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in finding that:
1) Petitioners violated the requirements mandated by law on termination, 2) Petitioners failed of proving that the termination of Credo was for
a valid or authorized cause, 3) The alleged infractions committed by Credo were not proven or, even if proved, could be considered to have
been condoned. 4) Termination of Credo was not for a valid or authorized cause. In G.R. No. 70295, petitioner Credo challenges as grave
abuse of discretion the dispositive portion of the decision which dismissed her claim for attorney's fees, moral and exemplary damages and
limited her right to back wages to only six (6) months.

ISSUE:

WON NLRC has jurisdiction to order reinstatement

Yes. On the premise that it is the 1987 Constitution that governs the instant case because it is the Constitution in place at the time of decision
thereof, the NLRC has jurisdiction to accord relief to the parties. As an admitted subsidiary of the NIDC, in turn a subsidiary of the PNB, the
NASECO is a government-owned or controlled corporation without original charter.

The holding in NHC v Juco should not be given retroactive effect, that is to cases that arose before its promulgation of Jan 17, 1985. To do
otherwise would be oppressive to Credo and other employees similarly situated because under the 1973 Consti but prior to the ruling in NHC
v Juco, this court recognized the applicability of the Labor jurisdiction over disputes involving terms and conditions of employment in GOCC's,
among them NASECO. In the matter of coverage by the civil service of GOCC, the 1987 Consti starkly differs from the 1973 consti where NHC
v Juco was based. It provides that the "civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government,
including government owned or controlled corporation with original charter." Therefore by clear implication, the civil service does not include
GOCC which are organized as subsidiaries of GOCC under the general corporation law.

Rationale: A government-owned corporation could create several subsidiary corporations. These subsidiary corporations would enjoy the
best of two worlds. Their officials and employees would be privileged individuals, free from the strict accountability required by the Civil
Service Decree and the regulations of the Commission on Audit. Their incomes would not be subject to the competitive restrains of the open
market nor to the terms and conditions of civil service employment. Conceivably, all government-owned or controlled corporations could
be created, no longer by special charters, but through incorporations under the general law. The Constitutional amendment including such
corporations in the embrace of the civil service would cease to have application. Certainly, such a situation cannot be allowed to exist

As an admitted subsidiary of the NIDC, in turn a subsidiary of the PNB, the NASECO is a government-owned or controlled corporation without
original charter.

MONSANTO vs FACTORAN, PARDON forgives, not forget- assistant treasurer

Facts: The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) of the crime of estafa
through falsification of public documents. She was sentenced to jail and to indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50.The SC affirmed
the decision. She then filed a motion for reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she was extended by then President Marcos
absolute pardon which she accepted (at that time, the rule was that clemency could be given even before conviction). By reason of said
pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since the
same was still vacant. Her letter was referred to the Minister of Finance who ruled that she may be reinstated to her position without the
necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the date she was extended the absolute pardon.

Petitioner wrote the Ministry stressing that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the crime which implies that her service in the
government has never been interrupted and therefore the date of her reinstatement should correspond to the date of her preventive
suspension; that she is entitled to backpay for the entire period of her suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the
proportionate share of the amount of P4,892.50

The Ministry referred the issue to the Office of the President. Deputy Executive Secretary Factoran denied Monsanto’s request averring that
Monsanto must first seek appointment and that the pardon does not reinstate her former position.

Issues:Is Is a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, entitled to reinstatement to her former position
without need of a new appointment?

Held: 1. Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the
individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private, though official act of
the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not communicated officially to the Court.

While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as
though he never committed the offense, it does not operate for all purposes. The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt.
Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It does not wash out the moral
stain. It involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness.

A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the
offender. It does not impose upon the government any obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered. “Since the offense has
been established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully
done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required.” This would explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled
to receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits.

2. The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond
that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.

3. Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the Revised Penal Code. It subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the
sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence. Petitioner's civil liability may only be extinguished by the same
causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor,
compensation and novation

Social Security System (SSS) Employees Association vs. Court of Appeals

SSS has original charter, under CSC…no strike

Facts: The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the union’sdemands concerning the implementation of their CBA. SSS
filed before the court action for damages with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners for staging an illegal strike. The court
issued a temporary restraining order pending the resolution of the application for preliminary injunction while petitioners filed a motion to
dismiss alleging the court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Petitioners contend that the court made reversible error in taking
cognizance on the subject matter since the jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the National Labor Relations Commission as the case involves a
labor dispute. The Social Security System contends on one hand that the petitioners are covered by the Civil Service laws, rules and regulation
thus have no right to strike. They are not covered by the NLRC or DOLE therefore the court may enjoin the petitioners from striking.

Issue:Whether or not Social Security System employers have the right to strike.

Held: The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and Social Justice provides guarantee among workers with the right to organize
and conduct peaceful concerted activities such as strikes. On one hand, Section 14 of E.O No. 180 provides that “the Civil Service law and
rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed,

subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress” referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission
which states that “prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by government employees enjoins under pain of
administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms
of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service.” Therefore in the absence of any legislation allowing
govt. employees to strike they are prohibited from doing so.

In Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 the employees in the civil service are denominated as “government employees” and that the SSS is one such
government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil
service and are covered by the Civil Service Commission’s memorandum prohibiting strikes.

Neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the subject matter but instead it is the Public Sector Labor-Management Council which is
not granted by law authority to issue writ of injunction in labor disputes within its jurisdiction thus the resort of SSS before the general court for
the issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate.

TUPAS v. NHA

GOCC w/o OC- Labor Code, Union, Stage strike

GOCC w OC- CSC, Form assoc, No Strike

Facts: Respondent National Housing Corporation (hereinafter referred to as NHC) is a corporation organized in 1959 in accordance with
Executive Order No. 399, otherwise known as the Uniform Charter of Government Corporations, dated January 1, 1951. Its shares of stock are
and have been one hundred percent (100%) owned by the Government from its incorporation under Act 459, the former corporation law.
The government entities that own its shares of stock are the Government Service Insurance System, the Social Security System, the
Development Bank of the Philippines, the National Investment and Development Corporation and the People’s Homesite and Housing
Corporation. Petitioner Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) is a legitimate labor organization with a chapter in NHC.

On July 13, 1977, TUPAS filed a petition for the conduct of a certification election with Regional Office No. IV of the Department of Labor in
order to determine the exclusive bargaining representative of the workers in NHC. It was claimed that its members comprised the majority of
the employees of the corporation. The petition was dismissed by med-arbiter Eusebio M. Jimenez in an order, dated November 7, 1977,
holding that NHC “being a government-owned and/or controlled corporation its employees/workers are prohibited to form, join or assist any
labor organization for purposes of collective bargaining pursuant to Section 1, Rule II, Book V of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Labor Code.”

From this order of dismissal, TUPAS appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations where Director Carmelo C. Noriel reversed the order of dismissal
and ordered the holding of a certification election. This order was, however, set aside by Officer-in-Charge Virgilio S.J. Sy in his resolution of
November 21, 1978 upon a motion for reconsideration of respondent NHC.

Issue: whether or not the employees of NHA are not covered by Civil Service law, rules and regulations and have therefore the right to
unionize

Held: Yes. The civil service now covers only government owned or controlled corporations with original or legislative charters, that is, those
created by an act of Congress or by special law, and not those incorporated under and pursuant to a general legislation. The Civil Service
does not include government-owned or controlled corporations which are organized as subsidiaries of government-owned or controlled
corporations under the general corporation law.

The workers or employees of NHC undoubtedly have the right to form unions or employees’ organizations. The right to unionize or to
form organizations is now explicitly recognized and granted to employees in both the governmental and the private sectors.

There is, therefore, no impediment to the holding of a certification election among the workers of NHC for it is clear that they are covered by
the Labor Code, the NHC being a government-owned and/or controlled corporation without an original charter. Statutory implementation
of the last cited section of the Constitution is found in Article 244 of the Labor Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 111, thus:

... Right of employees in the public service — Employees of the government corporations established under the Corporation Code shall have
the right to organize and to bargain collectively with their respective employers. All other employees in the civil service shall have the right
to form associations for purposes not contrary to law.
VICENTE GARCIA vs: THE HONORABLE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE HONORABLE MINISTER, LAND TRANSPORTATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS, THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, TELECOM REGIONAL OFFICE NO. IV

PARDON BASED on INNOCENCE

FACTS: Petitioner GARCIA was a supervising lineman in the Region IV Station of the Bureau of Telecommunications in Lucena City. A criminal
case of qualified theft was filed against him. The president grated him an executive clemency. The petitioner filed a claim for back payment
of salaries. The petitioner was later recalled to the service on 12 March 1984 but the records do not show whether petitioner’s reinstatement
was to the same position of Supervising Lineman.

ISSUE: Whether Garcia is entitled to the payment of back wages after having been reinstated pursuant to the grant of executive clemency.

HELD: The pardoned offender regains his eligibility for appointment to public office which was forfeited by reason of the conviction of the
offense. But since pardon does not generally result in automatic reinstatement because the offender has to apply for reappointment, he is
not entitled to back wages.

If the pardon is based on the innocence of the individual, it affirms this innocence and makes him a new man and as innocent; as if he had
not been found guilty of the offense charged. 7 When a person is given pardon because he did not truly commit the offense, the pardon
relieves the party from all punitive consequences of his criminal act, thereby restoring to him his clean name, good reputation and unstained
character prior to the finding of guilt.

In the case at bar, the acquittal of petitioner by the trial court was founded not on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt but on the fact
that petitioner did not commit the offense imputed to him. Aside from finding him innocent of the charge, the trial court commended
petitioner for his concern and dedication as a public servant. Verily, petitioner’s innocence is the primary reason behind the grant of executive
clemency to him, bolstered by the favorable recommendations for his reinstatement. This signifies that petitioner need no longer apply to be
reinstated to his former employment; he is restored to his office ipso facto upon the issuance of the clemency.

Petitioner’s automatic reinstatement to the government service entitles him to back wages. This is meant to afford relief to petitioner who is
innocent from the start and to make reparation for what he has suffered as a result of his unjust dismissal from the service. The right to back
wages is afforded to those with have been illegally dismissed and were thus ordered reinstated or to those otherwise acquitted of the charges
against them.

Therefore, the court ordered the full back wages from April 1 1975 (date when he was illegally dismissed) to March 12 1984 (reinstated) to the
petitioner. the petition is GRANTED.

Juco v. NLRC – NHA project engr, gocc (charter)

Facts: Benjamin C. Juco was hired as a project engineer of National Housing Corporation (NHC) from November 16, 1970 to May 14, 1975.
On May 14, 1975, he was separated from the service for having been implicated in a crime of theft and/or malversation of public funds. On
March 25, 1977, Juco filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the NHC with the Department of Labor. On September 17, 1977, the Labor
Arbiter rendered a decision dismissing the complaint on the ground that the NLRC had no jurisdiction over the case. Juco then elevated the
case to the NLRC which rendered a decision on December 28, 1982, reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter. NHC then appealed the
NLRC decision before the Supreme Court and on January 17, 1985 which petition the Court granted thereby setting aside the NLRC decision
and reinstating the labor arbiter’s decision of dismissing the case.
On January 6, 1989, Juco filed with the Civil Service Commission a complaint for illegal dismissal, with preliminary mandatory
injunction. On February 6, 1989, NHC moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the Civil Service Commission has no
jurisdiction over the case. CSC granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
On April 28, 1989, Juco filed with NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal with preliminary mandatory injunction against NHC. NLRC
find NHC guilty of illegal dismissal. On June 1, 1990, NHC filed its appeal before the NLRC and on March 14, 1991, the NLRC promulgated a
decision which reversed the decision of Labor Arbiter Manuel R. Caday on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Issue: Whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner is not governed by the Labor Code

Held: Yes. Under the laws then in force, employees of government-owned and/or controlled corporations were governed by the Civil Service
Law and not by the Labor Code. Although in National Housing Corporation v. Juco, it was held that employees of government-owned and/or
controlled corporations, whether created by special law or formed as subsidiaries under the general Corporation Law, are governed by the
Civil Service Law and not by the Labor Code, this ruling has been supplanted by the 1987 Constitution which states that the civil service
embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government owned or controlled
corporations with original charter. In National Service Corporation (NASECO) v. National Labor Relations Commission, it was held that the
NLRC has jurisdiction over the employees of NASECO on the ground that it is the 1987 Constitution that governs because it is the Constitution
in place at the time of the decision. It was further held that the new phrase "with original charter" means that government-owned and
controlled corporations refer to corporations chartered by special law as distinguished from corporations organized under the Corporation
Code. Thus, NASECO which had been organized under the general incorporation statute and a subsidiary of the National Investment
Development Corporation, which in turn was a subsidiary of the Philippine National Bank, is excluded from the purview of the Civil Service
Commission. The above doctrine applies in this case. In the case at bench, the National Housing Corporation is a government owned
corporation organized in 1959 in accordance with Executive Order No. 399, otherwise known as the Uniform Charter of Government
Corporation, dated January 1, 1959. Its shares of stock are and have been one hundred percent (100%) owned by the Government from its
incorporation under Act 1459, the former corporation law. The government entities that own its shares of stock are the Government Service
Insurance System, the Social Security System, the Development Bank of the Philippines, the National Investment and Development
Corporation and the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation. Considering the fact that the NHA had been incorporated under Act 1459,
the former corporation law, it is but correct to say that it is a government-owned or controlled corporation whose employees are subject to
the provisions of the Labor Code. This observation is reiterated in the recent case of Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS)
v. National Housing
Corporation, where the SC held that the NHA is now within the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor and Employment, it being a
government-owned and/or controlled corporation without an original charter. Furthermore, the Court previously ruled that the workers or
employees of the NHC (now NHA) undoubtedly have the right to form unions or employee's organization and that there is no impediment to
the holding of a certification election among them as they are covered by the Labor Code.

MATURAN vs MAGLANA, Police provisional appointment reinstatement

FACTS Petitioner Tereso Maturan is a police sergeant at San Franciso, Southern Leyte. He got promoted from being a patrolman (February
1965) to a police sergeant (September 1972) through appointments which were provisional. His provisional appointment was annually
renewed for the span of seven years including respective increase in the salary. Respondent Mayor Maglana suspended Maturan on
September 1972 because of two pending cases against him (1. Falsification of public document by making untruthful statement in the
narration of facts and 2. Falsification of public document). A month after, respondent Vice Mayor Magoncia who was then the Acting Mayor
instructed Maturan to tender his resignation pursuant to the Letter of Instruction No. 14 of the President of the Philippines. Maturan submitted
his letter of resignation on the same month. The resignation was approved on January 19, 1973 and petitioner was accordingly informed
thereof. Days after, his case on falsification of public document by making untruthful statement in the narration of facts was dismissed. On
November of that same year his other case was also dismissed. A month after Maturan sought to have his resignation rendered null and void
for on the ground that Letter of Instruction No. 14 does not apply to him. Given that criminal charges against him were already dismissed, the
NaPolCom chairman stated that the preventive suspension is lifted and he could go back to work. However, the Chief of Police refused to
accept Maturan. Hence, he appealed to the court. He filed for a claim for back wages and reinstatement. The lower court denied the claim
ruling that his appointment was provisional and he can be removed at any time by the appointing power.

ISSUE Can Maturan be reinstated to his position as police sergeant?

RULING NOPE. Maturan cannot be reinstated to his former post. This is so because he was not qualified for the position nor was he possessing
any civil service eligibility for any position in the government. Lack of civil service eligibility makes his appointment temporary and is dependent
upon the pleasure of the appointing power. When he was appointed as patrolman and as a police sergeant, he had no eligibility. It does
not matter if he gained eligibility subsequently or during his post; this does not apply to his provisional temporary appointment. Gaining civil
service eligibility while actively serving his appointment does not make his temporary appointment automatically permanent; it does not
follow. Upon his appointment, he had no eligibility and that should apply until the end of his temporary appointment. What is required is a
new appointment and not merely a reinstatement. Also, the Mayor cannot be compelled to appoint him for such power of the Mayor is
discretionary.

CORPUS VS CUADERNO (3-31-65), BSP Special assistant, loss of confidence on highly tech

Facts:
Petitioner R. Marino Corpus, is a "Special Assistant to the Governor, In Charge of the Export Department" of the Central Bank, a
position declared by the President of the Philippines as highly technical in nature, was administratively charged by several employees in the
export department with dishonesty, incompetence, neglect of duty, and/or abuse of authority, oppression, conduct unbecoming of a public
official, and of violation of the internal regulations of the Central Bank. The Monetary Board suspended the petitioner from office and created
a three-man investigating committee. After a thorough investigation the committee found no basis to recommend disciplinary action and
recommended the immediate reinstatement of the respondent. However, the Board issued a resolution considering the respondents
resignation as of the day he was suspended due to the statement of the Central Bank Governor that he had loss confidence of the
respondent.

Corpus moved for the reconsideration of the above resolution, but the Board denied it, after which he filed an action for certiorari,
mandamus, quo warranto, and damages, with preliminary injunction, with the Court of First Instance of Manila. The court rendered judgment
declaring the Board resolution null and void, and ordered for the payment of damages. The appeal of the Central Bank and its Monetary
Board is planted on the proposition that officers holding highly technical positions may be removed at any time for lack of confidence by
the appointing power, and that such power of removal is implicit in section 1, Art. XII, of the Constitution.

Issue: W/N the lack of confidence of the one making the appointment constitutes sufficient and legitimate cause of removal

Rulings: The loss of confidence ground, on which the dismissal is sought to be predicated, is a clear and evident afterthought resorted to when
the charges, subject matter of the investigation, were not proved or substantiated. The Monetary Board nowhere stated anything in the record
which the committee failed to consider in recommending exoneration from the charges; it nowhere pointed to any substantiation of the
charges; it, therefore, relied only on the statement of the loss of confidence made by Governor Cuaderno. We find in the particular set of
facts herein that the alleged loss of confidence is clearly a pretext to cure the inability of substantiating the charges upon which the
investigation had proceeded. And inasmuch as the charges against petitioner were unsubstantiated, that leaves no other alternative but to
follow the mandate that: “No public officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by
law.”
Since in the interest of the service reasonable protection should be afforded civil servants in positions that are by their nature important, such
as those that are "highly technical," the Constitutional safeguard requiring removal or suspension to be "for cause as provided by law" at least
demands that their dismissal for alleged "loss of confidence" if at all allowed, be attended with prudence and deliberation adequate to
show that said ground exists. The tenure of officials holding primarily confidential positions (such as private secretaries of public functionaries)
ends upon loss of confidence, because their term of office lasts only as long as confidence in them endures; and thus their cessation involves
no removal. But the situation is different for those holding highly technical posts, requiring special skills and qualifications. The Constitution
clearly distinguished the primarily confidential from the highly technical, and to apply the loss of confidence rule to the latter incumbents is
to ignore and erase the differentiation expressly made by our fundamental charter.

Pineda v. Claudio, 28 SCRA 334 - (SALVACION), Chief Police, Next in Line-no such law,

Facts: Upon the death of Col. Mariano Tumaliuan on August 28, 1968, the position of chief of police of Pasay City became vacant. To fill the
vacancy, Mayor Jovito Claudio appointed the Francisco Villa, a state prosecutor in the Department of Justice, but the respondent
Commissioner of Civil Service Abelardo Subido held the appointment in abeyance until other persons who, in Subido's opinion, had
preferential right to appointment have been considered.

The Deputy Chief of Police, Basilio Pineda, assailed the appointment of Villa as he claimed that he has preferential rights over Villa because
he is next in line, which was supported by the Commissioner. Subido cited a previous ruling by the Supreme Court (Millares vs Subido) and the
Civil Service Act to bolster his side. Such case provided the order of priority in filling up the vacancies in local offices:
1. Promotion (next in rank) 2. Transfer (lateral movement) 3. Reinstatement/Reemployment 4. Certification (usually certified outsiders)
Subido argued that that in case a promotion is untenable due to “special reasons”, only then subsequent order of transfer, reinstatement, or
certification be followed. He also averred that no special reason by the Mayor was given explaining his preference for Villa over Pineda.
Mayor Claudio replied that in his 8 years as an official of Pasay, Pineda et al “cannot boast of any improvement they have introduced to lift
the sagging inefficiency of the local police organization. The actual members of untrained and undisciplined men still persist”
Mayor Claudio’s position was supported by the DOJ Secretary stating that in as far as filling up a vacancy in the police department is
concerned, the Police Act of 1966 and applies, which provides that it is within the mayor’s discretion as to who he should appoint to said
office.
ISSUE: Whether or not Deputy Chief Pineda, has a preferential right to the said public office.
HELD: No. The ruling in the Millares case is not conclusive because such case has different circumstances. It must be clarified though that as
far as practicable, in case of a vacancy, the next in line shall be promoted by the appointing authority. But if not, the vacancy may be filled
either by transfer, reinstatement, reemployment or certification — not necessarily in that order. There is no rule which states that the mayor
must appoint the next in line. It is not his ministerial duty to do so nor is it mandatory. The appointing power can choose whether to appoint
by promotion, transfer, reinstatement, or certification. It is necessary for effective public administration that the mayor appoints men of his
confidence, provided they are qualified and eligible, who in his best estimation are possessed of the requisite reputation, integrity,
knowledgeability, energy and judgment. After all, it is the local executive, more than anyone else, who is primarily responsible for efficient
governmental administration in the locality and the effective maintenance of peace and order therein, and is directly answerable to the
people who elected him.
The Supreme Court also clarified that the only time that an appointing power is required to provide specific reasons on why a next in rank is
not appointed is that if the appointing power chose promotion as the method to fill up the vacancy.

National Service Corp. v. NLRC, 168 SCRA 125 (1988) -- The civil service does not include Government owned or controlled corporations
(GOCC) which are organized as subsidiaries of GOCC under the general corporation law.

GOCC subsidiaries don’t have original charter, 1973 vs 1985 Consti coverage of SCS

F: Eugenio Credo was an employee of the National Service Corporation. She claims she was illegally dismissed. NLRC ruled ordering her
reinstatement. NASECO argues that NLRC has no jurisdiction to order her reinstatement. NASECO as a government corporation by virtue of
its being a subsidiary of the NIDC, which is wholly owned by the Phil. National Bank which is in turn a GOCC, the terms and conditions of
employment of its employees are governed by the Civil Service Law citing National Housing v Juco.

Eugenia C. Credo, respondent, was an employee of the National Service Corporation (NASECO), a corporation which provides manpower
services to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and its agencies. She was administratively charged by Sisinio S. Lloren, for not complying
instructions to correct/add remarks in the Statement of Billings Adjustment and for showing resentment and disrespect after being called to
explain. She was placed on "Forced Leave" status for 15 days. She filed a complaint in the Ministry of Labor and Employment against NASECO
for placing her on forced leave without due process. NASECO's Committee on Personnel Affairs deliberated and evaluated a number of past
acts of misconduct or infractions attributed to her and recommended Credo's termination, with forfeiture of benefits. She was made to
explain her side in connection with the charges filed but unable to do so and was handed a Notice of Termination. Credo filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal, alleging absence of just or authorized cause for her dismissal and lack of opportunity to be heard. T

The labor arbiter rendered a dismissed Credo's complaint, and direct NASECO to pay Credo separation pay equivalent to one half month's
pay for every year of service. Both parties appealed to NLRC,

NLRC rendered a decision directing NASECO to reinstate Credo to her former position with six months’ back wagesand without loss of seniority
rights and other privileges appertaining thereto and dismissed claim for her attorney's fees, moral and exemplary damages. Both parties filed
their respective motions for reconsideration but denied.
In G.R. No. 68970, petitioners contend that in arriving at said questioned order, the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in finding that:
1) Petitioners violated the requirements mandated by law on termination, 2) Petitioners failed of proving that the termination of Credo was for
a valid or authorized cause, 3) The alleged infractions committed by Credo were not proven or, even if proved, could be considered to have
been condoned. 4) Termination of Credo was not for a valid or authorized cause. In G.R. No. 70295, petitioner Credo challenges as grave
abuse of discretion the dispositive portion of the decision which dismissed her claim for attorney's fees, moral and exemplary damages and
limited her right to back wages to only six (6) months.

ISSUE:

WON NLRC has jurisdiction to order reinstatement

Yes. On the premise that it is the 1987 Constitution that governs the instant case because it is the Constitution in place at the time of decision
thereof, the NLRC has jurisdiction to accord relief to the parties. As an admitted subsidiary of the NIDC, in turn a subsidiary of the PNB, the
NASECO is a government-owned or controlled corporation without original charter.

The holding in NHC v Juco should not be given retroactive effect, that is to cases that arose before its promulgation of Jan 17, 1985. To do
otherwise would be oppressive to Credo and other employees similarly situated because under the 1973 Consti but prior to the ruling in NHC
v Juco, this court recognized the applicability of the Labor jurisdiction over disputes involving terms and conditions of employment in GOCC's,
among them NASECO. In the matter of coverage by the civil service of GOCC, the 1987 Consti starkly differs from the 1973 consti where NHC
v Juco was based. It provides that the "civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government,
including government owned or controlled corporation with original charter." Therefore by clear implication, the civil service does not include
GOCC which are organized as subsidiaries of GOCC under the general corporation law.

Rationale: A government-owned corporation could create several subsidiary corporations. These subsidiary corporations would enjoy the
best of two worlds. Their officials and employees would be privileged individuals, free from the strict accountability required by the Civil
Service Decree and the regulations of the Commission on Audit. Their incomes would not be subject to the competitive restrains of the open
market nor to the terms and conditions of civil service employment. Conceivably, all government-owned or controlled corporations could
be created, no longer by special charters, but through incorporations under the general law. The Constitutional amendment including such
corporations in the embrace of the civil service would cease to have application. Certainly, such a situation cannot be allowed to exist

As an admitted subsidiary of the NIDC, in turn a subsidiary of the PNB, the NASECO is a government-owned or controlled corporation without
original charter.

MONSANTO vs FACTORAN, PARDON forgives, not forget- assistant treasurer

Facts: The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) of the crime of estafa
through falsification of public documents. She was sentenced to jail and to indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50.The SC affirmed
the decision. She then filed a motion for reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she was extended by then President Marcos
absolute pardon which she accepted (at that time, the rule was that clemency could be given even before conviction). By reason of said
pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since the
same was still vacant. Her letter was referred to the Minister of Finance who ruled that she may be reinstated to her position without the
necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the date she was extended the absolute pardon.

Petitioner wrote the Ministry stressing that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the crime which implies that her service in the
government has never been interrupted and therefore the date of her reinstatement should correspond to the date of her preventive
suspension; that she is entitled to backpay for the entire period of her suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the
proportionate share of the amount of P4,892.50

The Ministry referred the issue to the Office of the President. Deputy Executive Secretary Factoran denied Monsanto’s request averring that
Monsanto must first seek appointment and that the pardon does not reinstate her former position.

Issues:Is Is a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, entitled to reinstatement to her former position
without need of a new appointment?

Held: 1. Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the
individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private, though official act of
the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not communicated officially to the Court.

While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as
though he never committed the offense, it does not operate for all purposes. The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt.
Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It does not wash out the moral
stain. It involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness.

A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the
offender. It does not impose upon the government any obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered. “Since the offense has
been established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully
done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required.” This would explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled
to receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits.

2. The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond
that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.

3. Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the Revised Penal Code. It subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the
sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence. Petitioner's civil liability may only be extinguished by the same
causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor,
compensation and novation

Social Security System (SSS) Employees Association vs. Court of Appeals

SSS has original charter, under CSC…no strike

Facts: The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the union’sdemands concerning the implementation of their CBA. SSS
filed before the court action for damages with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners for staging an illegal strike. The court
issued a temporary restraining order pending the resolution of the application for preliminary injunction while petitioners filed a motion to
dismiss alleging the court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Petitioners contend that the court made reversible error in taking
cognizance on the subject matter since the jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the National Labor Relations Commission as the case involves a
labor dispute. The Social Security System contends on one hand that the petitioners are covered by the Civil Service laws, rules and regulation
thus have no right to strike. They are not covered by the NLRC or DOLE therefore the court may enjoin the petitioners from striking.

Issue:Whether or not Social Security System employers have the right to strike.

Held: The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and Social Justice provides guarantee among workers with the right to organize
and conduct peaceful concerted activities such as strikes. On one hand, Section 14 of E.O No. 180 provides that “the Civil Service law and
rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed,

subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress” referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission
which states that “prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by government employees enjoins under pain of
administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms
of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service.” Therefore in the absence of any legislation allowing
govt. employees to strike they are prohibited from doing so.

In Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 the employees in the civil service are denominated as “government employees” and that the SSS is one such
government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil
service and are covered by the Civil Service Commission’s memorandum prohibiting strikes.

Neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the subject matter but instead it is the Public Sector Labor-Management Council which is
not granted by law authority to issue writ of injunction in labor disputes within its jurisdiction thus the resort of SSS before the general court for
the issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate.

TUPAS v. NHA

GOCC w/o OC- Labor Code, Union, Stage strike

GOCC w OC- CSC, Form assoc, No Strike

Facts: Respondent National Housing Corporation (hereinafter referred to as NHC) is a corporation organized in 1959 in accordance with
Executive Order No. 399, otherwise known as the Uniform Charter of Government Corporations, dated January 1, 1951. Its shares of stock are
and have been one hundred percent (100%) owned by the Government from its incorporation under Act 459, the former corporation law.
The government entities that own its shares of stock are the Government Service Insurance System, the Social Security System, the
Development Bank of the Philippines, the National Investment and Development Corporation and the People’s Homesite and Housing
Corporation. Petitioner Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) is a legitimate labor organization with a chapter in NHC.

On July 13, 1977, TUPAS filed a petition for the conduct of a certification election with Regional Office No. IV of the Department of Labor in
order to determine the exclusive bargaining representative of the workers in NHC. It was claimed that its members comprised the majority of
the employees of the corporation. The petition was dismissed by med-arbiter Eusebio M. Jimenez in an order, dated November 7, 1977,
holding that NHC “being a government-owned and/or controlled corporation its employees/workers are prohibited to form, join or assist any
labor organization for purposes of collective bargaining pursuant to Section 1, Rule II, Book V of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Labor Code.”

From this order of dismissal, TUPAS appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations where Director Carmelo C. Noriel reversed the order of dismissal
and ordered the holding of a certification election. This order was, however, set aside by Officer-in-Charge Virgilio S.J. Sy in his resolution of
November 21, 1978 upon a motion for reconsideration of respondent NHC.
Issue: whether or not the employees of NHA are not covered by Civil Service law, rules and regulations and have therefore the right to
unionize

Held: Yes. The civil service now covers only government owned or controlled corporations with original or legislative charters, that is, those
created by an act of Congress or by special law, and not those incorporated under and pursuant to a general legislation. The Civil Service
does not include government-owned or controlled corporations which are organized as subsidiaries of government-owned or controlled
corporations under the general corporation law.

The workers or employees of NHC undoubtedly have the right to form unions or employees’ organizations. The right to unionize or to
form organizations is now explicitly recognized and granted to employees in both the governmental and the private sectors.

There is, therefore, no impediment to the holding of a certification election among the workers of NHC for it is clear that they are covered by
the Labor Code, the NHC being a government-owned and/or controlled corporation without an original charter. Statutory implementation
of the last cited section of the Constitution is found in Article 244 of the Labor Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 111, thus:

... Right of employees in the public service — Employees of the government corporations established under the Corporation Code shall have
the right to organize and to bargain collectively with their respective employers. All other employees in the civil service shall have the right
to form associations for purposes not contrary to law.

VICENTE GARCIA vs: THE HONORABLE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE HONORABLE MINISTER, LAND TRANSPORTATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS, THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, TELECOM REGIONAL OFFICE NO. IV

PARDON BASED on INNOCENCE

FACTS: Petitioner GARCIA was a supervising lineman in the Region IV Station of the Bureau of Telecommunications in Lucena City. A criminal
case of qualified theft was filed against him. The president grated him an executive clemency. The petitioner filed a claim for back payment
of salaries. The petitioner was later recalled to the service on 12 March 1984 but the records do not show whether petitioner’s reinstatement
was to the same position of Supervising Lineman.

ISSUE: Whether Garcia is entitled to the payment of back wages after having been reinstated pursuant to the grant of executive clemency.

HELD: The pardoned offender regains his eligibility for appointment to public office which was forfeited by reason of the conviction of the
offense. But since pardon does not generally result in automatic reinstatement because the offender has to apply for reappointment, he is
not entitled to back wages.

If the pardon is based on the innocence of the individual, it affirms this innocence and makes him a new man and as innocent; as if he had
not been found guilty of the offense charged. 7 When a person is given pardon because he did not truly commit the offense, the pardon
relieves the party from all punitive consequences of his criminal act, thereby restoring to him his clean name, good reputation and unstained
character prior to the finding of guilt.

In the case at bar, the acquittal of petitioner by the trial court was founded not on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt but on the fact
that petitioner did not commit the offense imputed to him. Aside from finding him innocent of the charge, the trial court commended
petitioner for his concern and dedication as a public servant. Verily, petitioner’s innocence is the primary reason behind the grant of executive
clemency to him, bolstered by the favorable recommendations for his reinstatement. This signifies that petitioner need no longer apply to be
reinstated to his former employment; he is restored to his office ipso facto upon the issuance of the clemency.

Petitioner’s automatic reinstatement to the government service entitles him to back wages. This is meant to afford relief to petitioner who is
innocent from the start and to make reparation for what he has suffered as a result of his unjust dismissal from the service. The right to back
wages is afforded to those with have been illegally dismissed and were thus ordered reinstated or to those otherwise acquitted of the charges
against them.

Therefore, the court ordered the full back wages from April 1 1975 (date when he was illegally dismissed) to March 12 1984 (reinstated) to the
petitioner. the petition is GRANTED.

Juco v. NLRC – NHA project engr, gocc (charter)

Facts: Benjamin C. Juco was hired as a project engineer of National Housing Corporation (NHC) from November 16, 1970 to May 14, 1975.
On May 14, 1975, he was separated from the service for having been implicated in a crime of theft and/or malversation of public funds. On
March 25, 1977, Juco filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the NHC with the Department of Labor. On September 17, 1977, the Labor
Arbiter rendered a decision dismissing the complaint on the ground that the NLRC had no jurisdiction over the case. Juco then elevated the
case to the NLRC which rendered a decision on December 28, 1982, reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter. NHC then appealed the
NLRC decision before the Supreme Court and on January 17, 1985 which petition the Court granted thereby setting aside the NLRC decision
and reinstating the labor arbiter’s decision of dismissing the case.
 On January 6, 1989, Juco filed with the Civil Service Commission a complaint for illegal dismissal, with preliminary mandatory
injunction. On February 6, 1989, NHC moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the Civil Service Commission has no
jurisdiction over the case. CSC granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
On April 28, 1989, Juco filed with NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal with preliminary mandatory injunction against NHC. NLRC
find NHC guilty of illegal dismissal. On June 1, 1990, NHC filed its appeal before the NLRC and on March 14, 1991, the NLRC promulgated a
decision which reversed the decision of Labor Arbiter Manuel R. Caday on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Issue: Whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner is not governed by the Labor Code

Held: Yes. Under the laws then in force, employees of government-owned and/or controlled corporations were governed by the Civil Service
Law and not by the Labor Code. Although in National Housing Corporation v. Juco, it was held that employees of government-owned and/or
controlled corporations, whether created by special law or formed as subsidiaries under the general Corporation Law, are governed by the
Civil Service Law and not by the Labor Code, this ruling has been supplanted by the 1987 Constitution which states that the civil service
embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government owned or controlled
corporations with original charter. In National Service Corporation (NASECO) v. National Labor Relations Commission, it was held that the
NLRC has jurisdiction over the employees of NASECO on the ground that it is the 1987 Constitution that governs because it is the Constitution
in place at the time of the decision. It was further held that the new phrase "with original charter" means that government-owned and
controlled corporations refer to corporations chartered by special law as distinguished from corporations organized under the Corporation
Code. Thus, NASECO which had been organized under the general incorporation statute and a subsidiary of the National Investment
Development Corporation, which in turn was a subsidiary of the Philippine National Bank, is excluded from the purview of the Civil Service
Commission. The above doctrine applies in this case. In the case at bench, the National Housing Corporation is a government owned
corporation organized in 1959 in accordance with Executive Order No. 399, otherwise known as the Uniform Charter of Government
Corporation, dated January 1, 1959. Its shares of stock are and have been one hundred percent (100%) owned by the Government from its
incorporation under Act 1459, the former corporation law. The government entities that own its shares of stock are the Government Service
Insurance System, the Social Security System, the Development Bank of the Philippines, the National Investment and Development
Corporation and the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation. Considering the fact that the NHA had been incorporated under Act 1459,
the former corporation law, it is but correct to say that it is a government-owned or controlled corporation whose employees are subject to
the provisions of the Labor Code. This observation is reiterated in the recent case of Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS)
v. National Housing
Corporation, where the SC held that the NHA is now within the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor and Employment, it being a
government-owned and/or controlled corporation without an original charter. Furthermore, the Court previously ruled that the workers or
employees of the NHC (now NHA) undoubtedly have the right to form unions or employee's organization and that there is no impediment to
the holding of a certification election among them as they are covered by the Labor Code.

MATURAN vs MAGLANA, Police provisional appointment reinstatement

FACTS Petitioner Tereso Maturan is a police sergeant at San Franciso, Southern Leyte. He got promoted from being a patrolman (February
1965) to a police sergeant (September 1972) through appointments which were provisional. His provisional appointment was annually
renewed for the span of seven years including respective increase in the salary. Respondent Mayor Maglana suspended Maturan on
September 1972 because of two pending cases against him (1. Falsification of public document by making untruthful statement in the
narration of facts and 2. Falsification of public document). A month after, respondent Vice Mayor Magoncia who was then the Acting Mayor
instructed Maturan to tender his resignation pursuant to the Letter of Instruction No. 14 of the President of the Philippines. Maturan submitted
his letter of resignation on the same month. The resignation was approved on January 19, 1973 and petitioner was accordingly informed
thereof. Days after, his case on falsification of public document by making untruthful statement in the narration of facts was dismissed. On
November of that same year his other case was also dismissed. A month after Maturan sought to have his resignation rendered null and void
for on the ground that Letter of Instruction No. 14 does not apply to him. Given that criminal charges against him were already dismissed, the
NaPolCom chairman stated that the preventive suspension is lifted and he could go back to work. However, the Chief of Police refused to
accept Maturan. Hence, he appealed to the court. He filed for a claim for back wages and reinstatement. The lower court denied the claim
ruling that his appointment was provisional and he can be removed at any time by the appointing power.

ISSUE Can Maturan be reinstated to his position as police sergeant?

RULING NOPE. Maturan cannot be reinstated to his former post. This is so because he was not qualified for the position nor was he possessing
any civil service eligibility for any position in the government. Lack of civil service eligibility makes his appointment temporary and is dependent
upon the pleasure of the appointing power. When he was appointed as patrolman and as a police sergeant, he had no eligibility. It does
not matter if he gained eligibility subsequently or during his post; this does not apply to his provisional temporary appointment. Gaining civil
service eligibility while actively serving his appointment does not make his temporary appointment automatically permanent; it does not
follow. Upon his appointment, he had no eligibility and that should apply until the end of his temporary appointment. What is required is a
new appointment and not merely a reinstatement. Also, the Mayor cannot be compelled to appoint him for such power of the Mayor is
discretionary.

CORPUS VS CUADERNO (3-31-65), BSP Special assistant, loss of confidence on highly tech

Facts:
Petitioner R. Marino Corpus, is a "Special Assistant to the Governor, In Charge of the Export Department" of the Central Bank, a
position declared by the President of the Philippines as highly technical in nature, was administratively charged by several employees in the
export department with dishonesty, incompetence, neglect of duty, and/or abuse of authority, oppression, conduct unbecoming of a public
official, and of violation of the internal regulations of the Central Bank. The Monetary Board suspended the petitioner from office and created
a three-man investigating committee. After a thorough investigation the committee found no basis to recommend disciplinary action and
recommended the immediate reinstatement of the respondent. However, the Board issued a resolution considering the respondents
resignation as of the day he was suspended due to the statement of the Central Bank Governor that he had loss confidence of the
respondent.

Corpus moved for the reconsideration of the above resolution, but the Board denied it, after which he filed an action for certiorari,
mandamus, quo warranto, and damages, with preliminary injunction, with the Court of First Instance of Manila. The court rendered judgment
declaring the Board resolution null and void, and ordered for the payment of damages. The appeal of the Central Bank and its Monetary
Board is planted on the proposition that officers holding highly technical positions may be removed at any time for lack of confidence by
the appointing power, and that such power of removal is implicit in section 1, Art. XII, of the Constitution.

Issue: W/N the lack of confidence of the one making the appointment constitutes sufficient and legitimate cause of removal

Rulings: The loss of confidence ground, on which the dismissal is sought to be predicated, is a clear and evident afterthought resorted to when
the charges, subject matter of the investigation, were not proved or substantiated. The Monetary Board nowhere stated anything in the record
which the committee failed to consider in recommending exoneration from the charges; it nowhere pointed to any substantiation of the
charges; it, therefore, relied only on the statement of the loss of confidence made by Governor Cuaderno. We find in the particular set of
facts herein that the alleged loss of confidence is clearly a pretext to cure the inability of substantiating the charges upon which the
investigation had proceeded. And inasmuch as the charges against petitioner were unsubstantiated, that leaves no other alternative but to
follow the mandate that: “No public officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by
law.”

Since in the interest of the service reasonable protection should be afforded civil servants in positions that are by their nature important, such
as those that are "highly technical," the Constitutional safeguard requiring removal or suspension to be "for cause as provided by law" at least
demands that their dismissal for alleged "loss of confidence" if at all allowed, be attended with prudence and deliberation adequate to
show that said ground exists. The tenure of officials holding primarily confidential positions (such as private secretaries of public functionaries)
ends upon loss of confidence, because their term of office lasts only as long as confidence in them endures; and thus their cessation involves
no removal. But the situation is different for those holding highly technical posts, requiring special skills and qualifications. The Constitution
clearly distinguished the primarily confidential from the highly technical, and to apply the loss of confidence rule to the latter incumbents is
to ignore and erase the differentiation expressly made by our fundamental charter.

Pineda v. Claudio, 28 SCRA 334 - (SALVACION), Chief Police, Next in Line-no such law,

Facts: Upon the death of Col. Mariano Tumaliuan on August 28, 1968, the position of chief of police of Pasay City became vacant. To fill the
vacancy, Mayor Jovito Claudio appointed the Francisco Villa, a state prosecutor in the Department of Justice, but the respondent
Commissioner of Civil Service Abelardo Subido held the appointment in abeyance until other persons who, in Subido's opinion, had
preferential right to appointment have been considered.

The Deputy Chief of Police, Basilio Pineda, assailed the appointment of Villa as he claimed that he has preferential rights over Villa because
he is next in line, which was supported by the Commissioner. Subido cited a previous ruling by the Supreme Court (Millares vs Subido) and the
Civil Service Act to bolster his side. Such case provided the order of priority in filling up the vacancies in local offices:
1. Promotion (next in rank) 2. Transfer (lateral movement) 3. Reinstatement/Reemployment 4. Certification (usually certified outsiders)
Subido argued that that in case a promotion is untenable due to “special reasons”, only then subsequent order of transfer, reinstatement, or
certification be followed. He also averred that no special reason by the Mayor was given explaining his preference for Villa over Pineda.
Mayor Claudio replied that in his 8 years as an official of Pasay, Pineda et al “cannot boast of any improvement they have introduced to lift
the sagging inefficiency of the local police organization. The actual members of untrained and undisciplined men still persist”
Mayor Claudio’s position was supported by the DOJ Secretary stating that in as far as filling up a vacancy in the police department is
concerned, the Police Act of 1966 and applies, which provides that it is within the mayor’s discretion as to who he should appoint to said
office.
ISSUE: Whether or not Deputy Chief Pineda, has a preferential right to the said public office.
HELD: No. The ruling in the Millares case is not conclusive because such case has different circumstances. It must be clarified though that as
far as practicable, in case of a vacancy, the next in line shall be promoted by the appointing authority. But if not, the vacancy may be filled
either by transfer, reinstatement, reemployment or certification — not necessarily in that order. There is no rule which states that the mayor
must appoint the next in line. It is not his ministerial duty to do so nor is it mandatory. The appointing power can choose whether to appoint
by promotion, transfer, reinstatement, or certification. It is necessary for effective public administration that the mayor appoints men of his
confidence, provided they are qualified and eligible, who in his best estimation are possessed of the requisite reputation, integrity,
knowledgeability, energy and judgment. After all, it is the local executive, more than anyone else, who is primarily responsible for efficient
governmental administration in the locality and the effective maintenance of peace and order therein, and is directly answerable to the
people who elected him.
The Supreme Court also clarified that the only time that an appointing power is required to provide specific reasons on why a next in rank is
not appointed is that if the appointing power chose promotion as the method to fill up the vacancy.

National Service Corp. v. NLRC, 168 SCRA 125 (1988) -- The civil service does not include Government owned or controlled corporations
(GOCC) which are organized as subsidiaries of GOCC under the general corporation law.

GOCC subsidiaries don’t have original charter, 1973 vs 1985 Consti coverage of SCS
F: Eugenio Credo was an employee of the National Service Corporation. She claims she was illegally dismissed. NLRC ruled ordering her
reinstatement. NASECO argues that NLRC has no jurisdiction to order her reinstatement. NASECO as a government corporation by virtue of
its being a subsidiary of the NIDC, which is wholly owned by the Phil. National Bank which is in turn a GOCC, the terms and conditions of
employment of its employees are governed by the Civil Service Law citing National Housing v Juco.

Eugenia C. Credo, respondent, was an employee of the National Service Corporation (NASECO), a corporation which provides manpower
services to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and its agencies. She was administratively charged by Sisinio S. Lloren, for not complying
instructions to correct/add remarks in the Statement of Billings Adjustment and for showing resentment and disrespect after being called to
explain. She was placed on "Forced Leave" status for 15 days. She filed a complaint in the Ministry of Labor and Employment against NASECO
for placing her on forced leave without due process. NASECO's Committee on Personnel Affairs deliberated and evaluated a number of past
acts of misconduct or infractions attributed to her and recommended Credo's termination, with forfeiture of benefits. She was made to
explain her side in connection with the charges filed but unable to do so and was handed a Notice of Termination. Credo filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal, alleging absence of just or authorized cause for her dismissal and lack of opportunity to be heard. T

The labor arbiter rendered a dismissed Credo's complaint, and direct NASECO to pay Credo separation pay equivalent to one half month's
pay for every year of service. Both parties appealed to NLRC,

NLRC rendered a decision directing NASECO to reinstate Credo to her former position with six months’ back wagesand without loss of seniority
rights and other privileges appertaining thereto and dismissed claim for her attorney's fees, moral and exemplary damages. Both parties filed
their respective motions for reconsideration but denied.

In G.R. No. 68970, petitioners contend that in arriving at said questioned order, the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in finding that:
1) Petitioners violated the requirements mandated by law on termination, 2) Petitioners failed of proving that the termination of Credo was for
a valid or authorized cause, 3) The alleged infractions committed by Credo were not proven or, even if proved, could be considered to have
been condoned. 4) Termination of Credo was not for a valid or authorized cause. In G.R. No. 70295, petitioner Credo challenges as grave
abuse of discretion the dispositive portion of the decision which dismissed her claim for attorney's fees, moral and exemplary damages and
limited her right to back wages to only six (6) months.

ISSUE:

WON NLRC has jurisdiction to order reinstatement

Yes. On the premise that it is the 1987 Constitution that governs the instant case because it is the Constitution in place at the time of decision
thereof, the NLRC has jurisdiction to accord relief to the parties. As an admitted subsidiary of the NIDC, in turn a subsidiary of the PNB, the
NASECO is a government-owned or controlled corporation without original charter.

The holding in NHC v Juco should not be given retroactive effect, that is to cases that arose before its promulgation of Jan 17, 1985. To do
otherwise would be oppressive to Credo and other employees similarly situated because under the 1973 Consti but prior to the ruling in NHC
v Juco, this court recognized the applicability of the Labor jurisdiction over disputes involving terms and conditions of employment in GOCC's,
among them NASECO. In the matter of coverage by the civil service of GOCC, the 1987 Consti starkly differs from the 1973 consti where NHC
v Juco was based. It provides that the "civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government,
including government owned or controlled corporation with original charter." Therefore by clear implication, the civil service does not include
GOCC which are organized as subsidiaries of GOCC under the general corporation law.

Rationale: A government-owned corporation could create several subsidiary corporations. These subsidiary corporations would enjoy the
best of two worlds. Their officials and employees would be privileged individuals, free from the strict accountability required by the Civil
Service Decree and the regulations of the Commission on Audit. Their incomes would not be subject to the competitive restrains of the open
market nor to the terms and conditions of civil service employment. Conceivably, all government-owned or controlled corporations could
be created, no longer by special charters, but through incorporations under the general law. The Constitutional amendment including such
corporations in the embrace of the civil service would cease to have application. Certainly, such a situation cannot be allowed to exist

As an admitted subsidiary of the NIDC, in turn a subsidiary of the PNB, the NASECO is a government-owned or controlled corporation without
original charter.

MONSANTO vs FACTORAN, PARDON forgives, not forget- assistant treasurer

Facts: The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) of the crime of estafa
through falsification of public documents. She was sentenced to jail and to indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50.The SC affirmed
the decision. She then filed a motion for reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she was extended by then President Marcos
absolute pardon which she accepted (at that time, the rule was that clemency could be given even before conviction). By reason of said
pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since the
same was still vacant. Her letter was referred to the Minister of Finance who ruled that she may be reinstated to her position without the
necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the date she was extended the absolute pardon.

Petitioner wrote the Ministry stressing that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the crime which implies that her service in the
government has never been interrupted and therefore the date of her reinstatement should correspond to the date of her preventive
suspension; that she is entitled to backpay for the entire period of her suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the
proportionate share of the amount of P4,892.50

The Ministry referred the issue to the Office of the President. Deputy Executive Secretary Factoran denied Monsanto’s request averring that
Monsanto must first seek appointment and that the pardon does not reinstate her former position.

Issues:Is Is a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, entitled to reinstatement to her former position
without need of a new appointment?

Held: 1. Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the
individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private, though official act of
the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not communicated officially to the Court.

While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as
though he never committed the offense, it does not operate for all purposes. The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt.
Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It does not wash out the moral
stain. It involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness.

A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the
offender. It does not impose upon the government any obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered. “Since the offense has
been established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully
done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required.” This would explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled
to receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits.

2. The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond
that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.

3. Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the Revised Penal Code. It subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the
sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence. Petitioner's civil liability may only be extinguished by the same
causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor,
compensation and novation

Social Security System (SSS) Employees Association vs. Court of Appeals

SSS has original charter, under CSC…no strike

Facts: The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the union’sdemands concerning the implementation of their CBA. SSS
filed before the court action for damages with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners for staging an illegal strike. The court
issued a temporary restraining order pending the resolution of the application for preliminary injunction while petitioners filed a motion to
dismiss alleging the court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Petitioners contend that the court made reversible error in taking
cognizance on the subject matter since the jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the National Labor Relations Commission as the case involves a
labor dispute. The Social Security System contends on one hand that the petitioners are covered by the Civil Service laws, rules and regulation
thus have no right to strike. They are not covered by the NLRC or DOLE therefore the court may enjoin the petitioners from striking.

Issue:Whether or not Social Security System employers have the right to strike.

Held: The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and Social Justice provides guarantee among workers with the right to organize
and conduct peaceful concerted activities such as strikes. On one hand, Section 14 of E.O No. 180 provides that “the Civil Service law and
rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed,

subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress” referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission
which states that “prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by government employees enjoins under pain of
administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms
of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service.” Therefore in the absence of any legislation allowing
govt. employees to strike they are prohibited from doing so.

In Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 the employees in the civil service are denominated as “government employees” and that the SSS is one such
government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil
service and are covered by the Civil Service Commission’s memorandum prohibiting strikes.

Neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the subject matter but instead it is the Public Sector Labor-Management Council which is
not granted by law authority to issue writ of injunction in labor disputes within its jurisdiction thus the resort of SSS before the general court for
the issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate.

TUPAS v. NHA
GOCC w/o OC- Labor Code, Union, Stage strike

GOCC w OC- CSC, Form assoc, No Strike

Facts: Respondent National Housing Corporation (hereinafter referred to as NHC) is a corporation organized in 1959 in accordance with
Executive Order No. 399, otherwise known as the Uniform Charter of Government Corporations, dated January 1, 1951. Its shares of stock are
and have been one hundred percent (100%) owned by the Government from its incorporation under Act 459, the former corporation law.
The government entities that own its shares of stock are the Government Service Insurance System, the Social Security System, the
Development Bank of the Philippines, the National Investment and Development Corporation and the People’s Homesite and Housing
Corporation. Petitioner Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) is a legitimate labor organization with a chapter in NHC.

On July 13, 1977, TUPAS filed a petition for the conduct of a certification election with Regional Office No. IV of the Department of Labor in
order to determine the exclusive bargaining representative of the workers in NHC. It was claimed that its members comprised the majority of
the employees of the corporation. The petition was dismissed by med-arbiter Eusebio M. Jimenez in an order, dated November 7, 1977,
holding that NHC “being a government-owned and/or controlled corporation its employees/workers are prohibited to form, join or assist any
labor organization for purposes of collective bargaining pursuant to Section 1, Rule II, Book V of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Labor Code.”

From this order of dismissal, TUPAS appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations where Director Carmelo C. Noriel reversed the order of dismissal
and ordered the holding of a certification election. This order was, however, set aside by Officer-in-Charge Virgilio S.J. Sy in his resolution of
November 21, 1978 upon a motion for reconsideration of respondent NHC.

Issue: whether or not the employees of NHA are not covered by Civil Service law, rules and regulations and have therefore the right to
unionize

Held: Yes. The civil service now covers only government owned or controlled corporations with original or legislative charters, that is, those
created by an act of Congress or by special law, and not those incorporated under and pursuant to a general legislation. The Civil Service
does not include government-owned or controlled corporations which are organized as subsidiaries of government-owned or controlled
corporations under the general corporation law.

The workers or employees of NHC undoubtedly have the right to form unions or employees’ organizations. The right to unionize or to
form organizations is now explicitly recognized and granted to employees in both the governmental and the private sectors.

There is, therefore, no impediment to the holding of a certification election among the workers of NHC for it is clear that they are covered by
the Labor Code, the NHC being a government-owned and/or controlled corporation without an original charter. Statutory implementation
of the last cited section of the Constitution is found in Article 244 of the Labor Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 111, thus:

... Right of employees in the public service — Employees of the government corporations established under the Corporation Code shall have
the right to organize and to bargain collectively with their respective employers. All other employees in the civil service shall have the right
to form associations for purposes not contrary to law.

VICENTE GARCIA vs: THE HONORABLE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE HONORABLE MINISTER, LAND TRANSPORTATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS, THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, TELECOM REGIONAL OFFICE NO. IV

PARDON BASED on INNOCENCE

FACTS: Petitioner GARCIA was a supervising lineman in the Region IV Station of the Bureau of Telecommunications in Lucena City. A criminal
case of qualified theft was filed against him. The president grated him an executive clemency. The petitioner filed a claim for back payment
of salaries. The petitioner was later recalled to the service on 12 March 1984 but the records do not show whether petitioner’s reinstatement
was to the same position of Supervising Lineman.

ISSUE: Whether Garcia is entitled to the payment of back wages after having been reinstated pursuant to the grant of executive clemency.

HELD: The pardoned offender regains his eligibility for appointment to public office which was forfeited by reason of the conviction of the
offense. But since pardon does not generally result in automatic reinstatement because the offender has to apply for reappointment, he is
not entitled to back wages.

If the pardon is based on the innocence of the individual, it affirms this innocence and makes him a new man and as innocent; as if he had
not been found guilty of the offense charged. 7 When a person is given pardon because he did not truly commit the offense, the pardon
relieves the party from all punitive consequences of his criminal act, thereby restoring to him his clean name, good reputation and unstained
character prior to the finding of guilt.

In the case at bar, the acquittal of petitioner by the trial court was founded not on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt but on the fact
that petitioner did not commit the offense imputed to him. Aside from finding him innocent of the charge, the trial court commended
petitioner for his concern and dedication as a public servant. Verily, petitioner’s innocence is the primary reason behind the grant of executive
clemency to him, bolstered by the favorable recommendations for his reinstatement. This signifies that petitioner need no longer apply to be
reinstated to his former employment; he is restored to his office ipso facto upon the issuance of the clemency.

Petitioner’s automatic reinstatement to the government service entitles him to back wages. This is meant to afford relief to petitioner who is
innocent from the start and to make reparation for what he has suffered as a result of his unjust dismissal from the service. The right to back
wages is afforded to those with have been illegally dismissed and were thus ordered reinstated or to those otherwise acquitted of the charges
against them.

Therefore, the court ordered the full back wages from April 1 1975 (date when he was illegally dismissed) to March 12 1984 (reinstated) to the
petitioner. the petition is GRANTED.