[G.R. No. 132753.
February 15, 1999]
SIASOCO, ET. AL., vs. CA, ET. AL.,
FACTS: Petitioners were the registered owners of nine parcels of
land located in Montalban, Rizal. In December 1994, they began to
offer the subject properties for sale. Petitioners made a final offer to
the INC. The latter’s counsel sent a reply received by Petitioner
Mario Siasoco on December 24, 1996, stating that the offer was
accepted, but that the INC was “not amenable to your proposal to an
undervaluation of the total consideration.” In their letter dated
January 8, 1997, petitioners claimed that the INC had not really
accepted the offer, adding that, prior to their receipt of the
aforementioned reply on December 24, 1996, they had already
“contracted” with Carissa for the sale of the said properties “due to
the absence of any response to their offer from INC.”
Maintaining that a sale had been consummated, INC demanded that
the corresponding deed be executed in its favor. Petitioners
refused.
Private respondent filed a civil suit for [s]pecific [p]erformance and
[d]amages against petitioners and Carissa Homes and Development
& Properties. Pending resolution of petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss,
private respondent negotiated with Carissa Homes which culminated
in the purchase of the subject properties of Carissa Homes by
private respondent. Private respondent filed an [A]mended
[C]omplaint, dropping Carissa Homes as one of the defendants and
changing the nature of the case to a mere case for damages.
CA ruled that although private respondent could no longer amend its
original Complaint as a matter of right, it was not precluded from
doing so with leave of court. Thus, the CA concluded that the RTC
had not acted with grave abuse of discretion in admitting private
respondent’s Amended Complaint.
ISSUE: Did the CA err in affirming the two Orders of the RTC which
had allowed the Amended Complaint?
RULING: The petition is devoid of merit. We sustain the Court of
Appeals, but for reasons different from those given in the assailed
Decision.
Main Issue: Admission of Amended Complaint
It is clear that plaintiff (herein
private respondent) can amend its complaint once, as a matter of
right, before a responsive pleading is filed. Contrary to the
petitioners’ contention, the fact that Carissa had already filed its
Answer did not bar private respondent from amending its original
Complaint once, as a matter of right, against herein
petitioners. Indeed, where some but not all the defendants have
answered, plaintiffs may amend their Complaint once, as a matter of
right, in respect to claims asserted solely against the non-answering
defendants, but not as to claims asserted against the other
defendants.
The rationale for the aforementioned rule is in Section 3, Rule 10 of
the Rules of Court, which provides that after a responsive pleading
has been filed, an amendment may be rejected when the defense is
substantially altered. Such amendment does not only prejudice the
rights of the defendant; it also delays the action. In the first place,
where a party has not yet filed a responsive pleading, there are no
defenses that can be altered. Furthermore, the Court has held that
“[a]mendments to pleadings are generally favored and should be
liberally allowed in furtherance of justice in order that every case may
so far as possible be determined on its real facts and in order to
speed the trial of cases or prevent the circuity of action and
unnecessary expense, unless there are circumstances such as
inexcusable delay or the taking of the adverse party by surprise or
the like, which might justify a refusal of permission to amend.”
True, Carissa had already filed its own Answer. Petitioners,
however, have not yet filed any. Moreover, they do not allege that
their defense is similar to that of Carissa. On the contrary, private
respondent’s claims against the latter and against petitioners are
different. Against petitioners, whose offer to sell the subject parcels
of land had allegedly been accepted by private respondent, the latter
is suing for specific performance and damages for breach of
contract. Although private respondent could no longer amend, as a
matter of right, its Complaint against Carissa, it could do so against
petitioners who, at the time, had not yet filed an answer.

The amendment did not prejudice the petitioners or delay the
action. Au contraire, it simplified the case and tended to
expedite its disposition. The Amended Complaint became simply an
action for damages, since the claims for specific performance and
declaration of nullity of the sale have been deleted.
RTC Had Jurisdiction
Petitioners also insist that the RTC of Quezon City did not have
jurisdiction over the original Complaint; hence, it did not have any
authority to allow the amendment. They maintain that the original
action for specific performance involving parcels of land in
Montalban, Rizal should have been filed in the RTC of that
area. Thus, they chide the CA for allegedly misunderstanding the
distinction between territorial jurisdiction and venue, thereby
erroneously holding that the RTC had jurisdiction over the original
Complaint, although the venue was improperly laid.
We disagree. True, an amendment cannot be allowed when the
court has no jurisdiction over the original Complaint and the purpose
of the amendment is to confer jurisdiction on the court. In the
present case, however, the RTC had jurisdiction because the original
Complaint involved specific performance with damages. In La
Tondeña Distillers v. Ponferrada, this Court ruled that a complaint for
“specific performance with damages” is a personal action and may
be filed in the proper court where any of the parties reside, viz.:
“Finally, [w]e are not also persuaded by petitioner’s argument
that venue should be lodged in Bago City where the lot is
situated. The complaint is one for “specific performance with
damages.” Private respondents do not claim ownership of the lot
but in fact [recognize the] title of defendants by annotating a
notice of lis pendens. In one case, a similar complaint for
“specific performance with damages” involving real property, was
held to be a personal action, which may be filed in the proper
court where the party resides. Not being an action involving title
to or ownership of real property, venue, in this case, was not
improperly laid before the RTC of Bacolod City.”
YPON v RICAFORTE
GR No. 198680, July 8, 2013
FACTS: On July 29, 2010, the Ypons filed a complaint for
Cancellation of Title and Reconveyance with Damages (subject
complaint) against respondent Gaudioso Ponteras Ricaforte. In their
complaint, they alleged that Magdaleno Ypon (Magdaleno) died
intestate and childless on June 28, 1968. Claiming to be the sole heir
of Magdaleno, Gaudioso executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication
and caused the cancellation of the aforementioned certificates of
title, leading to their subsequent transfer in his name. In his Answer,
Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno as
evidenced by: (a) his certificate of Live Birth; (b) two (2) letters from
Polytechnic School; and (c) a certified true copy of his passport.
Further, by way of affirmative defense, he claimed that: (a)
petitioners have no cause of action against him; (b) the complaint
fails to state a cause of action; and (c) the case is not prosecuted by
the real parties-in-interest, as there is no showing that the petitioners
have been judicially declared as Magdaleno’s lawful heirs.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) RTC-Toledo: dismissed the case for lack of cause of action.
The Court also denied their motion for reconsideration due to the
counsel’s failure to state the date on which his Mandatory Continuing
Legal Education Certificate of Compliance was issued.
Direct to the Supreme Court (pure questions of law)
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC’s dismissal of the case on the
ground that the subject complaint failed to state a cause of action
was proper
RULING: Yes, it was proper. The rule is that the determination of a
decedent’s lawful heirs should be made in the corresponding special
proceeding precludes the RTC, in an ordinary action for cancellation
of title and reconveyance, from granting the same. In the case of
Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan v. CA, the Court, citing several other
precedents, held that the determination of who are the decedent’s
lawful heirs must be made in the proper special proceeding for such
purpose, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and/or
possession, as in this case. The trial court cannot make a declaration
of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration
can only be made in a special proceeding. By way of exception, the
need to institute a separate special proceeding for the determination
of heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as
when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue
to the trial court and already presented their evidence regarding the
issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment
thereon, or when a special proceeding had been instituted but had
been finally closed and terminated, and hence, cannot be re-opened.
In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar
nature, appear to exist.
Other notes (Remedial law related):
1. Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party
violates a right of another. It is well-settled that the existence of a
cause of action is determined by the allegations in the complaint. In
this relation, a complaint is said to assert a sufficient cause of action
if, admitting what appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff
would be entitled to the relief prayed for. Accordingly, if the
allegations furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be
maintained, the same should not be dismissed, regardless of the
defenses that may be averred by the defendants.
2. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a
civil action is defined as one by which a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks
to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively
clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special
proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the
establishment of a status or right.
DE LIMA v. GATDULA, G.R. No. 204528 February 19, 2013
FACTS: Respondent Magtanggol B. Gatdula filed a Petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Amparo directed against petitioners Justice
Secretary Leila M. De Lima, et al. Gatdula wanted De Lima, et al. “to
cease and desist from framing up Petitioner [Gatdula] for the fake
ambush incident by filing bogus charges of Frustrated Murder
against him in relation to the alleged ambush incident.” Instead of
deciding on whether to issue a Writ of Amparo, the judge issued
summons and ordered De Lima, et al. to file an Answer. The case
was set for hearing. The judge noted that the Rules of Court apply
suppletorily in Amparo cases. Judge Pampilo proceeded to conduct
a hearing on the main case, even without a Return nor an Answer,
and ordered the parties to file their respective memoranda. The RTC
rendered a “Decision” granting the issuance of the Writ of Amparo,
and the interim reliefs prayed for. The RTC denied the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by De Lima, et al. Petitioners thus came to this
Court assailing the RTC “Decision” through a Petition for Review on
Certiorari via Rule 45.
ISSUE: Whether or not a Petition for Review under Rule 45 is the
proper remedy in this case.
RULING: The remedy of the Writ of Amparo is an equitable and
extraordinary remedy to safeguard the right of the people to life,
liberty and security as enshrined in the 1987 Constitution. The Rule
on the Writ of Amparo was issued as an exercise of the Supreme
Court’s power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights. It aims to address concerns
such as, among others, extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. Due to the delicate and urgent nature of these
controversies, the procedure was devised to afford swift but decisive
relief. It is the Court’s view that the “Decision” granting the writ of
Amparo is not the judgment or final order contemplated under this
rule. Hence, a Petition for Review under Rule 45 may not yet be the
proper remedy at this time. The confusion of the parties arose due
from the procedural irregularities in the RTC. The insistence on filing
of an Answer was inappropriate. It is the Return that serves as the
responsive pleading for petitions for the issuance of Writs of Amparo.
The requirement to file an Answer is contrary to the intention of the
Court to provide a speedy remedy to those whose right to life, liberty
and security are violated or are threatened to be violated. In utter
disregard of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, Judge Pampilo insisted
on issuing summons and requiring an Answer. The procedural
irregularities in the RTC affected the mode of appeal that petitioners
used in elevating the matter to this Court. Procedural rules are meant
to assist the parties and courts efficiently deal with the substantive
issues pertaining to a case. When it is the judge himself who
disregards the rules of procedure, delay and confusion result. Simply
dismissing the present petition, however, will cause grave injustice to
the parties involved. It undermines the salutary purposes for which
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo were promulgated. In many
instances, the Court adopted a policy of liberally construing its rules
in order to promote a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of
every action and proceeding. The rules can be suspended on the
following grounds: (1) matters of life, liberty, honor or property, (2)
the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (3) the merits
of the case, (4) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (5) a
lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and
dilatory, and (6) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced
thereby.In the interest of justice, the Court RESOLVES to NULLIFY
all orders that are the subject of this Resolution issued by Judge
Pampilo, and DIRECT Judge Pampilo to determine within 48 hours
from his receipt of this Resolution whether the issuance of the Writ of
Amparo is proper on the basis of the petition and its attached
affidavits.