Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-37007 July 20, 1987

RAMON S. MILO, in his capacity as Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan, and ARMANDO
VALDEZ, petitioners,
vs.
ANGELITO C. SALANGA, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan (Branch IV), and
JUAN TUVERA, SR., respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of an order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Third Judicial
District, in Criminal Case No. D-529 entitled "The People of the Philippines versus Juan Tuvera, Sr., et al.,"
granting the motion to quash the information filed by accused Juan Tuvera, Sr., herein respondent. The issue is
whether a barrio captain can be charged of arbitrary detention.

The facts are as follows:

On October 12, 1972, an information for Arbitrary Detention was filed against Juan Tuvera, Sr., Tomas
Mendoza and Rodolfo Mangsat, in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which reads as follows:

The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal accuses Juan Tuvera, Sr., Tomas Mendoza and Rodolfo
Mangsat alias Rudy, all of Manaoag, Pangasinan, of the crime of ARBITRARY DETENTION, committed as
follows:

That on or about the 21st day of April 1973, at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening, in barrio Baguinay,
Manaoag, Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Juan
Tuvera, Sr., a barrio captain, with the aid of some other private persons, namely Juan Tuvera, Jr.,
Bertillo Bataoil and one Dianong, maltreated one Armando Valdez by hitting with butts of their guns
and fists blows and immediately thereafter, without legal grounds, with deliberate intent to deprive
said Armando Valdez of his constitutional liberty, accused Barrio captain Juan Tuvera, Sr., Cpl. Tomas
Mendoza and Pat. Rodolfo Mangsat, members of the police force of Mangsat, Pangasinan conspiring,
confederating and helping one another, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, lodge
and lock said Armando Valdez inside the municipal jail of Manaoag, Pangasinan for about eleven (11)
hours. (Emphasis supplied.)

CONTRARY TO ARTICLE 124 of the R.P.C.

Dagupan City, October 12, 1972.

(SGD.) VICENTE C. CALDONA

Assistant Provincial Fiscal

All the accused, including respondent Juan Tuvera, Sr., were arraigned and pleaded not guilty.
On April 4, 1973, Tuvera filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense and that the proofs adduced at the investigation are not sufficient to support the filing
of the information. Petitioner Assistant Provincial Fiscal Ramon S. Milo filed an opposition thereto.

Finding that respondent Juan Tuvera, Sr. was not a public officer who can be charged with Arbitrary Detention,
respondent Judge Angelito C. Salanga granted the motion to quash in an order dated April 25, 1973.

Hence, this petition.

Arbitrary Detention is committed by a public officer who, without legal grounds, detains a person. 1 The
elements of this crime are the following:

1. That the offender is a public officer or employee.

2. That he detains a person.

3. That the detention is without legal grounds.2

The ground relied upon by private respondent Tuvera for his motion to quash the information which was
sustained by respondent Judge, is that the facts charged do not constitute an offense,3 that is, that the facts
alleged in the information do not constitute the elements of Arbitrary Detention.

The Information charges Tuvera, a barrio captain, to have conspired with Cpl. Mendoza and Pat. Mangsat, who
are members of the police force of Manaoag, Pangasinan in detaining petitioner Valdez for about eleven (11)
hours in the municipal jail without legal ground. No doubt the last two elements of the crime are present.

The only question is whether or not Tuvera, Sr., a barrio captain is a public officer who can be liable for the
crime of Arbitrary Detention.

The public officers liable for Arbitrary Detention must be vested with authority to detain or order the
detention of persons accused of a crime. Such public officers are the policemen and other agents of the law,
the judges or mayors.4

Respondent Judge Salanga did not consider private respondent Tuvera as such public officer when the former
made this finding in the questioned order:

Apparently, if Armando Valdez was ever jailed and detained more than six (6) hours, Juan Tuvera, Sr.,
has nothing to do with the same because he is not in any way connected with the Police Force of
Manaoag, Pangasinan. Granting that it was Tuvera, Sr., who ordered Valdez arrested, it was not he
who detained and jailed him because he has no such authority vested in him as a mere Barrio Captain
of Barrio Baguinay, Manaoag, Pangasinan. 5

In line with the above finding of respondent Judge Salanga, private respondent Tuvera asserts that the motion
to quash was properly sustained for the following reasons: (1) That he did not have the authority to make
arrest, nor jail and detain petitioner Valdez as a mere barrio captain; 6 (2) That he is neither a peace officer nor
a policeman,7 (3) That he was not a public official;8 (4) That he had nothing to do with the detention of
petitioner Valdez;9 (5) That he is not connected directly or indirectly in the administration of the Manaoag
Police Force;10 (6) That barrio captains on April 21, 1972 were not yet considered as persons in authority and
that it was only upon the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 299 that Barrio Captain and Heads of
Barangays were decreed among those who are persons in authority; 11 and that the proper charge was Illegal
Detention and Not Arbitrary Detention.12

We disagree.

Long before Presidential Decree 299 was signed into law, barrio lieutenants (who were later named barrio
captains and now barangay captains) were recognized as persons in authority. In various cases, this Court
deemed them as persons in authority, and convicted them of Arbitrary Detention.

In U.S. vs. Braganza,13 Martin Salibio, a barrio lieutenant, and Hilario Braganza, a municipal councilor, arrested
Father Feliciano Gomez while he was in his church. They made him pass through the door of the vestry and
afterwards took him to the municipal building. There, they told him that he was under arrest. The priest had
not committed any crime. The two public officials were convicted of Arbitrary Detention.14

In U.S. vs. Gellada,15 Geronimo Gellada, a barrio lieutenant, with the help of Filoteo Soliman, bound and tied
his houseboy Sixto Gentugas with a rope at around 6:00 p.m. and delivered him to the justice of the peace.
Sixto was detained during the whole night and until 9:00 a.m. of the next day when he was ordered released
by the justice of the peace because he had not committed any crime, Gellada was convicted of Arbitrary
Detention.16

Under Republic Act No. 3590, otherwise known as The Revised Barrio Charter, the powers and duties of a
barrio captain include the following: to look after the maintenance of public order in the barrio and to assist
the municipal mayor and the municipal councilor in charge of the district in the performance of their duties in
such barrio;17 to look after the general welfare of the barrio;18 to enforce all laws and ordinances which are
operative within the barrio;19 and to organize and lead an emergency group whenever the same may be
necessary for the maintenance of peace and order within the barrio.20

In his treatise on Barrio Government Law and Administration, Professor Jose M. Aruego has this to say about
the above-mentioned powers and duties of a Barrio Captain, to wit:

"Upon the barrio captain depends in the main the maintenance of public order in the barrio. For public
disorder therein, inevitably people blame him.

"In the event that there be a disturbing act to said public order or a threat to disturb public order, what can
the barrio captain do? Understandably, he first resorts to peaceful measures. He may take preventive
measures like placing the offenders under surveillance and persuading them, where possible, to behave well,
but when necessary, he may subject them to the full force of law.

"He is a peace officer in the barrio considered under the law as a person in authority. As such, he may make
arrest and detain persons within legal limits.21 (Emphasis supplied.)

One need not be a police officer to be chargeable with Arbitrary Detention. It is accepted that other public
officers like judges and mayors, who act with abuse of their functions, may be guilty of this crime.22 A perusal
of the powers and function vested in mayors would show that they are similar to those of a barrio
captain23 except that in the case of the latter, his territorial jurisdiction is smaller. Having the same duty of
maintaining peace and order, both must be and are given the authority to detain or order detention.
Noteworthy is the fact that even private respondent Tuvera himself admitted that with the aid of his rural
police, he as a barrio captain, could have led the arrest of petitioner Valdez. 24
From the foregoing, there is no doubt that a barrio captain, like private respondent Tuvera, Sr., can be held
liable for Arbitrary Detention.

Next, private respondent Tuvera, Sr. contends that the motion to quash was validly granted as the facts and
evidence on record show that there was no crime of Arbitrary Detention;25 that he only sought the aid and
assistance of the Manaoag Police Force;26 and that he only accompanied petitioner Valdez to town for the
latter's personal safety.27

Suffice it to say that the above allegations can only be raised as a defense at the trial as they traverse what is
alleged in the Information. We have repeatedly held that Courts, in resolving a motion to quash, cannot
consider facts contrary to those alleged in the information or which do not appear on the face of the
information. This is because a motion to quash is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the
information.28 Matters of defense cannot be proved during the hearing of such a motion, except where the
Rules expressly permit, such as extinction of criminal liability, prescription, and former jeopardy.29 In the case
of U.S. vs. Perez,30 this Court held that a motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense cannot allege new facts not only different but diametrically opposed to those alleged in
the complaint. This rule admits of only one exception and that is when such facts are admitted by the
prosecution.31 lawphi1

Lastly, private respondent claims that by the lower court's granting of the motion to quash jeopardy has
already attached in his favor32 on the ground that here, the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent.

Respondent's contention holds no water. An order granting a motion to quash, unlike one of denial, is a final
order. It is not merely interlocutory and is therefore immediately appealable. The accused cannot claim
double jeopardy as the dismissal was secured not only with his consent but at his instance.33

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The questioned Order of April
25, 1973 in Criminal Case No. D-529 is hereby set aside. Let this case be remanded to the appropriate trial
court for further proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Cruz and Paras, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Art. 124, Revised Penal Code.

2 Supra U.S. vs. Braganza, et al., 10 Phil, 79; Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book Two, 1981 Ed., p. 39.

3 UnderRule 117, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court, the following are the grounds on which an accused may
move to quash a complaint or information on any of the following grounds.

(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person of
the accused;

(c) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;

(d) That it does not conform substantially in the probed form;

(e) That more than one offense is charged except in those cases in which existing laws prescribe
a single punishment for various offenses;

(f) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;

(g) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification;
and

(h) That the accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of being convicted, or
acquitted of the offense charged.

Respondent Tuvera set forth another ground in his motion to quash which is not included in the
above enumeration and will therefore not be discussed in this decision
ASTORGA VS PEOPLE
GR NO. 154130
OCTOBER 1, 2003

FACTS:
On September 1, 1997, Regional Special Operations Group (RSOG) of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) Office No. 8, Tacloban City sent a team to the island of Daram, Western Samar to
conduct intelligence gathering and forest protection operations in line with the governments campaign against
illegal logging. The team was composed of Forester II Moises dela Cruz, Scaler Wenifredo Maniscan, Forest
Ranger Renato Militante, and Tree Marker Crisanto Pelias, with Elpidio E. Simon, Chief of the Forest Protection
and Law Enforcement Section, as team leader. The team was escorted by SPO3 Andres B. Cinco, Jr. and SPO1
Rufo Capoquian.
En route to Brgy. Manungca, Sta. Rita, Samar, the team spotted two more boats being constructed in the
vicinity of Brgy. Lucob-Lucob, Daram, Samar, between 4:30-5:00 p.m., prompting them to stop and investigate.
Thus, Maniscan and Militante disembarked from the DENRs service pump boat and proceeded to the site of
the boat construction. There, they met Mayor Astorga. After conversing with the mayor, Militante returned to
their boat for the purpose of fetching Simon, at the request of Mayor Astorga.
Simon then asked Mayor Astorga to allow the team to go home, at which Mayor Astorga retorted that they
would not be allowed to go home and that they would instead be brought to Daram.
The team was brought to a house where they were told that they would be served dinner. The team had
dinner with Mayor Astorga and several others at a long table, and the meal lasted between 7:00-8:00
p.m.14 After dinner, Militante, Maniscan and SPO1 Capoquian were allowed to go down from the house, but
not to leave the barangay.15 On the other hand, SPO3 Cinco and the rest just sat in the house until 2:00 a.m.
when the team was finally allowed to leave.

Complainants filed a criminal complaint for arbitrary detention against Mayor Astorga and his men, which led
to the filing of the above-quoted Information.

Mayor Astorga was subsequently arraigned on July 3, 2000, wherein he pleaded not guilty to the offenses
charged.17 At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of SPO1 Capoquian and SPO3 Cinco, as well
as their Joint Affidavit.18 However, the presentation of Simons testimony was not completed, and none of his
fellow team members came forward to testify. Instead, the members of the team sent by the DENR RSOG
executed a Joint Affidavit of Desistance.19cräläwvirtualibräry

Petitioner contends that the prosecution failed to establish the required quantum of evidence to prove the
guilt of the accused,26 especially in light of the fact that the private complainants executed a Joint Affidavit of
Desistance.27 Petitioner asserts that nowhere in the records of the case is there any competent evidence that
could sufficiently establish the fact that restraint was employed upon the persons of the team
members.28 Furthermore, he claims that the mere presence of armed men at the scene does not qualify as
competent evidence to prove that fear was in fact instilled in the minds of the team members, to the extent
that they would feel compelled to stay in Brgy. Lucob-Lucob.29cräläwvirtualibräry
ISSUES:
(a) Whether or not accused Astorga is liable of Arbitrary Detention
 (b) whether or not the team was actually detained.

RULING:

(a) Arbitrary Detention is committed by any public officer or employee who, without legal grounds, detains a
person.30 The elements of the crime are:

1. That the offender is a public officer or employee.

2. That he detains a person.

3. That the detention is without legal grounds.31

That petitioner, at the time he committed the acts assailed herein, was then Mayor of Daram, Samar is not
disputed. Hence, the first element of Arbitrary Detention, that the offender is a public officer or employee, is
undeniably present.

Also, the records are bereft of any allegation on the part of petitioner that his acts were spurred by some legal
purpose. On the contrary, he admitted that his acts were motivated by his "instinct for self-preservation" and
the feeling that he was being "singled out."32 The detention was thus without legal grounds, thereby satisfying
the third element enumerated above.

(b). In the case of People v. Acosta,33 which involved the illegal detention of a child, we found the accused-
appellant therein guilty of kidnapping despite the lack of evidence to show that any physical restraint was
employed upon the victim. However, because the victim was a boy of tender age and he was warned not to
leave until his godmother, the accused-appellant, had returned, he was practically a captive in the sense that
he could not leave because of his fear to violate such instruction

In the case of People v. Cortez,35 we held that, in establishing the intent to deprive the victim of his liberty, it is
not necessary that the offended party be kept within an enclosure to restrict her freedom of locomotion. At
the time of her rescue, the offended party in said case was found outside talking to the owner of the house
where she had been taken. She explained that she did not attempt to leave the premises for fear that the
kidnappers would make good their threats to kill her should she do so. We ruled therein that her fear was not
baseless as the kidnappers knew where she resided and they had earlier announced that their intention in
looking for her cousin was to kill him on sight. Thus, we concluded that fear has been known to render people
immobile and that appeals to the fears of an individual, such as by threats to kill or similar threats, are
equivalent to the use of actual force or violence

The prevailing jurisprudence on kidnapping and illegal detention is that the curtailment of the victims liberty
need not involve any physical restraint upon the victims person. If the acts and actuations of the accused can
produce such fear in the mind of the victim sufficient to paralyze the latter, to the extent that the victim is
compelled to limit his own actions and movements in accordance with the wishes of the accused, then the
victim is, for all intents and purposes, detained against his will.

In the case at bar, the restraint resulting from fear is evident. Inspite of their pleas, the witnesses and the
complainants were not allowed by petitioner to go home.37 This refusal was quickly followed by the call for
and arrival of almost a dozen "reinforcements," all armed with military-issue rifles, who proceeded to encircle
the team, weapons pointed at the complainants and the witnesses.38 Given such circumstances, we give
credence to SPO1 Capoquians statement that it was not "safe" to refuse Mayor Astorgas orders.39 It was not
just the presence of the armed men, but also the evident effect these gunmen had on the actions of the team
which proves that fear was indeed instilled in the minds of the team members, to the extent that they felt
compelled to stay in Brgy. Lucob-Lucob. The intent to prevent the departure of the complainants and
witnesses against their will is thus clear.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case No. 24986, dated July 5, 2001 finding petitioner BENITO ASTORGA guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Arbitrary Detention and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4)
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional, as
maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-13484 May 20, 1960

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
DOMINADOR CAMERINO, MANUEL PAKINGAN, CRISANTO SARATAN, BIENVENIDO OSTERIA, ET AL.,
defendants-appellees.

Actg. Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Eriberto D. Ignacio for appellant.
Avelino A. Velasco for appellees.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

Dominador Camerino and eighty-six others were accused before the Court of First Instance of Cavite of the
crime of sedition, said to have been committed on or about and during the period comprised by and between
the months of October, 1953, to November 15, 1953 and for sometime prior thereto; under an information
charging conspiracy among the said accused in having allegedly perpetrated for political and social ends,
insistent, repeated and continuous acts of hate, terrorism and revenge against private persons, leaders,
members and sympathizers of the Nacionalista Party in the town of Bacoor, Cavite, and frustrating by force,
threats and violence, and intimidation the free expression of the popular will in the election held on
November 10, 1953. The information described in detail the manner in which the alleged seditious acts were
performed, specifying the dates and the places where they were committed and the persons who were
victims thereof, under fourteen different overt acts of sedition. Before arraignment, forty-eight of the
eighty-seven accused, headed by Dominador Camerino, filed a motion to quash the information on the ground
of double jeopardy, claiming in support thereof that they had been previously convicted or been in jeopardy of
being convicted and/or acquitted of the offense charged in other cases of the same nature before the court.

The Assistant Provincial Fiscal filed written opposition to the motion, saying that although it was alleged in the
information that the accused had been charged with various crimes under different and separate
informations, that would not place them in double jeopardy, because those previous charges were being
specified in the information only as a bill of particulars for the purpose of describing in detail the offense of
sedition, but not to hold the defendants liable for punishment under said separate and different
specifications; in other words, the specifications describing separate crimes were alleged in the information
merely to complete the narration of facts which constitute the crime of sedition.

Later, all the accused filed a supplemental motion to quash, raising as additional grounds that more than one
offense was charged, and that the criminal action or liability of said defendants had been extinguished.

On March 14, 1956, the trial court issued an order sustaining the reasons of the motion to quash and
dismissing the information on the grounds:(1) that the information charged more than one offense, (2) that it
was vague, ambiguous and uncertain, (3) that it described crimes for which some of the accused had either
been convicted or acquitted, and (4) some violation of the election law described in the specification had
already prescribed. A motion for reconsideration filed by the Fiscal was denied. The Government is appealing
from that order of dismissal, as well as the order denying the motion for reconsideration.
In determining the present appeal, we deem it necessary to discuss only the first ground of the dismissal of
the information by the trial court, namely, multiplicity of offenses, that is to say, that the information allegedly
charged more than one offense. We agree with the Provincial Fiscal and the Solicitor General representing the
Government that the accused herein were being charged only with one offense, namely, that of sedition,
defined in Article 139 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 202, and penalized
under Article 140 of the same code. the fourteen different acts or specifications charging some or all of the
accused with having committed the offenses charged therein, were included in the information merely to
describe and to narrate the different and specific acts the sum total of which constitutes the crime of sedition.
Different and separate acts constituting different and separate offenses may serve as a basis for prosecuting
the accused to hold them criminally liable for said different offenses. Yet, those different acts of offenses may
serve merely as a basis for the prosecution of one single offense like that of sedition. For instance, one may be
accused of sedition, and at the same time be prosecuted under another information for murder or homicide
as the case may be, if the killing was done in pursuance of and to carry out the acts constituting sedition. In
case of the People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil., 64, this Tribunal said:

The nearest analogy to the two crimes of murder and sedition growing out of practically the same facts, which
can be found in the American authorities, relate to the crimes of assault and riot or unlawful assembly. A
majority of the American courts have held that the offense of unlawful assembly and riot and the offense of
assault and battery are distinct offense; and that conviction or an acquittal for either does not bar a
prosecution for other offense, even though based on the same acts. (Freeland vs. People (1855), 16 Ill., 380;
U.S. vs. Peaco (1835), 27 Fed.Cas., 477; People vs. Vasquez (1905), 9 Puerto Rico, 488; contra, State vs. Lindsay
(18868), 61 N.C., 458.)

It is merely stating the obvious to say that sedition is not the same offense as murder. Sedition is a crime
against public order; murder is a crime against persons. Sedition is a crime directed against the existence of
the State, the authority of the government, and the general public tranquility; murder is a crime directed
against the lives of individuals. (U.S. vs. Abad [1902], 1 Phil., 437.) Sedition in its more general sense is the
raising of commotions or disturbances in the state; murder at common law is where a person of sound mind
and discretion unlawfully kills any human being, in the peace of the sovereign, with malice aforethought,
express or implied.

The offenses charged in the two informations for sedition and murder are perfectly distinct in point of law
however nearly they may be connected in point of fact. Not alone are the offenses eonomine different, but
the allegations in the body of the informations are different. The gist of the information for sedition is the
public and tumultuous uprising of the constabulary in order to attain by force and outside of legal methods
the object of inflicting an act of hate and revenge upon the persons of the police force of the city of Manila by
firing at them in several places in the city of Manila; the gist of the information in the murder case is that the
Constabulary, conspiring together, illegally and criminally killed eight persons and gravely wounded three
others. The crimes of the murder and serious physical injuries were not necessarily included in the information
for sedition; and the defendants could not have been convicted of these crimes under the first information.

In the case of U.S. vs. Cernias, 10 Phil., 682, this Court held that while it is true that each of those acts charged
against the conspirators was itself a crime, the prosecutor in setting them out in the information did no more
than to furnish the defendants with a bill of particulars of the facts which it intended to prove at the trial, not
only as a basis upon which to be found an inference of guilt of the crime of conspiracy but also as evidence of
the extremely dangerous and wicked nature of that conspiracy.
The charge is not defective for duplicity when one single crime is set forth in different modes prescribed by
law for its commission, or the felony is set forth under different counts specifying the way of its perpetuation,
or the acts resulted from a single criminal impulse. Neither is there duplicity when the other offense described
is but an ingredient or an essential element of the real offense charged nor when several acts are related in
describing the offense. (Padilla: Criminal Procedure Annotated, 1959 ed., p. 101).

In the case of People vs. Bacolod, 89 Phil., 621, the defendant therein was convicted on a plea of guilty of
physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Based on the same facts, he was also accused of having caused
public disturbance. The plea of double jeopardy interposed by the accused was rejected on the ground that
the two offenses were not the same, although they arose from the same act.

Following the reasoning of the trial court that more than one offense was charged, the trial court should have
ordered that the information be amended, or if that was not possible, that a new information be filed.

Under section 2 of this Rule, the Court may deny or sustain the motion to quash but may not defer it till the
trial of the case on the merits. In sustaining the motion, the court may order the filing of a new information or
may dismiss the case. In the new information, the defects of the previous information may be cured. For
instance, if the motion to quash is sustained on the ground that more than one offense is charged in the
information, the court may order that another information be filed charging only one offense. But the court
may or may not issue such order in the exercise of its discretion. The order may be made if the defects found
in the first information may be cured in a new information. If the order is made, the accused, if he is in
custody, should not be discharged, unless otherwise, admitted to bail. But if no such order is made, or, having
been made, the prosecuting attorney fails to file another information within the time specified by the court,
the accused, if in custody must be discharged, unless he is also in custody for another charge, or if is out on
bail, the bail must be exonerated. In such event, however, the fiscal is free to institute another criminal
proceeding since such ground of objection is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense. (Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1957 ed., Vol. II, pp. 778-779).

In conclusion, we hold that the information filed in this case did not charged more than one offense but only
that of sedition; that in specifying the separate and different criminal acts attributed to the defendants, it was
not the purpose or intention of the Government to hold them criminally liable in the present proceedings, but
merely to complete the narration of facts, though specifying different offenses which as a whole, supposedly
constitute the crime of sedition. Consequently, we believe that the information is valid.

We deem it unnecessary to discuss the other points raised in the appeal.

In view of the foregoing, the appealed orders are hereby set aside and the case is hereby remanded to the trial
court of further proceedings, without pronouncement as to costs.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 95322 March 1, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PABLITO DOMASIAN AND DR. SAMSON TAN, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Silvestre L. Tagarao for appellant Pablito Domasian.

Lino M. Patajo for appellant Dr. Samson Tan.

CRUZ, J.:

The boy was detained for only about three hours and was released even before his parents received the
ransom note. But it spawned a protracted trial spanning all of 8 years and led to the conviction of the two
accused.1

The victim was Enrico Paulo Agra, who was 8 years old at the time of the incident in question. The accused
were Pablito Domasian and Samson Tan, the latter then a resident physician in the hospital owned by Enrico's
parents. They were represented by separate lawyers at the trial and filed separate briefs in this appeal.

The evidence of the prosecution showed that in the morning of March 11, 1982, while Enrico was walking with
a classmate along Roque street in the poblacion of Lopez, Quezon, he was approached by a man who
requested his assistance in getting his father's signature on a medical certificate. Enrico agreed to help and
rode with the man in a tricycle to Calantipayan, where he waited outside while the man went into a building
to get the certificate. Enrico became apprehensive and started to cry when, instead of taking him to the
hospital, the man flagged a minibus and forced him inside, holding him firmly all the while. The man told him
to stop crying or he would not be returned to his father. When they alighted at Gumaca, they took another
tricycle, this time bound for the municipal building from where they walked to the market. Here the man
talked to a jeepney driver and handed him an envelope addressed to Dr. Enrique Agra, the boy's father. The
two then boarded a tricycle headed for San Vicente, with the man still firmly holding Enrico, who continued
crying. This aroused the suspicion of the driver, Alexander Grate, who asked the man about his relationship
with the boy. The man said he and the boy were brothers, making Grate doubly suspicious because of the
physical differences between the two and the wide gap between their ages. Grate immediately reported the
matter to two barangay tanods when his passengers alighted from the tricycle. Grate and the tanods went
after the two and saw the man dragging the boy. Noticing that they were being pursued, the man told Enrico
to run fast as their pursuers might behead them. Somehow, the man managed to escape, leaving Enrico
behind. Enrico was on his way home in a passenger jeep when he met his parents, who were riding in the
hospital ambulance and already looking for him.2

At about 1:45 in the afternoon of the same day, after Enrico's return, Agra received an envelope containing a
ransom note. The note demanded P1 million for the release of Enrico and warned that otherwise the boy
would be killed. Agra thought the handwriting in the note was familiar. After comparing it with some records
in the hospital, he gave the note to the police, which referred it to the NBI for examination. 3

The test showed that it bad been written by Dr. Samson Tan.4 On the other hand, Enrico was shown a folder of
pictures in the police station so be could identify the man who had detained him, and he pointed to the
picture of Pablito Domasian.5 Domasian and Tan were subsequently charged with the crime of kidnapping with
serious illegal detention in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon.6

The defense of both accused was denial and alibi. Domasian claimed that at the time of the incident he was
watching a mahjong game in a friend's house and later went to an optical clinic with his wife for the refraction
of his eyeglasses.7 Dr. Tan for his part said he was in Manila.8

After trial Judge Enrico A. Lanzanas found both accused guilty as charged and sentenced them to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and all accessory penalties. They were also required to pay P200,000.00 to Dr.
and Mrs. Enrique Agra as actual and moral damages and attorney's fees.

In the present appeal, the accused-appellants reiterate their denial of any participation in the incident in
question. They belittle the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and submit that their own witnesses are
more believable. Tan specifically challenges the findings of the NBI and offers anew the opposite findings of
the PC/INP showing that he was not the writer of the ransom note. He maintains that in any case, the crime
alleged is not kidnapping with serious illegal detention as no detention in an enclosure was involved. If at all, it
should be denominated and punished only as grave coercion. Finally, both Domasian and Tan insist that there
is no basis for the finding of a conspiracy between them to make them criminally liable in equal degree.

First, on the credibility of the witnesses. This is assessed in the first instance by the trial judge, whose finding
in this regard is received with much respect by the appellate court because of his opportunity to directly
observe the demeanor of the witnesses on the stand.

In the case at bar, Judge Lanzanas relied heavily on the testimony of the victim himself, who positively
identified Domasian as the person who detained him for three hours. The trial court observed that the boy
was "straight-forward, natural and consistent" in the narration of his detention. The boy's naivete made him
even more believable. Tirso Ferreras, Enrico's classmate and also his age, pointed to Domasian with equal
certainty, as the man who approached Enrico when they were walking together that morning of March 11,
1982. Grate, the tricycle driver who suspected Enrico's companion and later chased him, was also positive in
identifying Domasian. All these three witnesses did not know Domasian until that same morning and could
have no ill motive in testifying against him. By contrast, Eugenia Agtay, who testified for the defense, can
hardly be considered a disinterested witness because she admitted she had known Domasian for 3 years.

The defense asks why Domasian openly took Enrico to several public places if the intention was to kidnap and
detain him. That is for Domasian himself to answer. We do no have to probe the reasons for the irrational
conduct of an accused. The more important question, as we see it, is why Domasian detained Enrico in the
first place after pretending he needed the boy's help. That is also for Domasian to explain. As for Enrico's
alleged willingness to go with Domasian, this was manifested only at the beginning, when he believed the man
sincerely needed his assistance. But he was soon disabused. His initial confidence gave way to fear when
Domasian, after taking him so far away from the hospital where he was going, restrained and threatened him
if he did not stop crying.

Domasian's alibi cannot stand against his positive identification by Enrico, Grate and Ferreras, let alone the
contradictions made by his corroborating witness, Dr. Irene Argosino, regarding the time he was in the optical
clinic and the manner of his payment for the refraction.9 Tan's alibi is not convincing either. The circumstance
that he may have been in Manila at the time of the incident does not prove that he could not have written the
ransom note except at that time.

Concerning the note, Rule 132, Section 22, of the Rules of Court provides as follows:
 The handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the
handwriting of such person and has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be
his upon which the witness has acted or been charged and has thus acquired knowledge of the
handwriting of such person. Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a
comparison, made by the witness or the court with writings admitted or treated as genuine by
the party against whom the evidence is offered or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of
the judge.

Two expert witnesses were presented in the case at bar, one from the NBI, 10 who opined that the ransom
note and the standard documents were written by one and the same person, and another from the
PC/INP 11 who expressed a contrary conclusion. The trial court chose to believe the NBI expert because his
examination and analysis "was more comprehensive than the one conducted by the PC/INP handwriting
expert, who virtually limited his reliance on the perceived similarities and dissimilarities in the pattern and
style of the writing, thereby disregarding the basic principle in handwriting identification that it is not the form
alone nor anyone feature but rather a combination of all the qualities that identify."

We have held that the value of the opinion of a handwriting expert depends not upon his mere statements of
whether a writing is genuine or false, but upon the assistance he may afford in pointing out distinguishing
marks, characteristics and discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens of writing which would
ordinarily escape notice or detection from an unpracticed observer. 12 The test of genuineness ought to be the
resemblance, not the formation of letters in some other specimens but to the general character of writing,
which is impressed on it as the involuntary and unconscious result
of constitution, habit or other permanent course, and is, therefore itself permanent. 13

Presented with the conflicting opinions of the witnesses in the case at bar, the Court feels that the scales
should tilt in favor of the prosecution. Significantly, the NBI opinion was bolstered by the testimony of Agra,
who believed that the ransom note was written by Tan, with whose handwriting he was familiar because they
had been working in the hospital for four years and he had seen that handwriting every day in Tan's
prescriptions and daily reports. 14

Cesar v. Sandiganbayan 15 is not applicable because that case involved a forgery or the deliberate imitation of
another person's signature. In the case before us, there was in fact an effort to disguise the ransom note
writer's penmanship to prevent his discovery.

As for the nature of the crime committed, Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows:

Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. — Any private individual who shall kidnap or
detain another, or in any manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death:

1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than five days.

2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.

3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained; of if threats to kill him shall have been made.

4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, female or a public officer.

 The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose
of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person; even if none of the circumstances
above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.

Contrary to Tan's submission, this crime may consist not only in placing a person in an enclosure but also in
detaining him or depriving him in any manner of his liberty. 16 In the case at bar, it is noted that although the
victim was not confined in an enclosure, he was deprived of his liberty when Domasian restrained him from
going home and dragged him first into the minibus that took them to the municipal building in Gumaca,
thence to the market and then into the tricycle bound for San Vicente. The detention was committed by
Domasian, who was a private individual, and Enrico was a minor at that time. The crime clearly comes under
Par. 4 of the above-quoted article.

Tan claims that the lower court erred in not finding that the sending of the ransom note was an impossible
crime which he says is not punishable. His reason is that the second paragraph of Article 4 of the Revised Penal
Code provides that criminal liability shall be incurred "by any person performing an act which would be an
offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on
account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means." As the crime alleged is not against persons
or property but against liberty, he argues that it is not covered by the said provision.

Tan conveniently forgets the first paragraphs of the same article, which clearly applies to him, thus:

Art. 4. Criminal liability. — Criminal liability shall be incurred:

1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended.

xxx xxx xxx

Even before the ransom note was received, the crime of kidnapping with serious illegal detention had already
been committed. The act cannot be considered an impossible crime because there was no inherent
improbability of its accomplishment or the employment of inadequate or ineffective means. The delivery of
the ransom note after the rescue of the victim did not extinguish the offense, which had already been
consummated when Domasian deprived Enrico of his liberty. The sending of the ransom note would have had
the effect only of increasing the penalty to death under the last paragraph of Article 267 although this too
would not have been possible under the new Constitution.

On the issue of conspiracy, we note first that it exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it, whether they act through physical volition of
one or all, proceeding severally or collectively. 17

It is settled that conspiracy can be inferred from and proven by the acts of the accused themselves when said
acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interests. 18 In the instant case,
the trial court correctly held that conspiracy was proved by the act of Domasian in detaining Enrico; the
writing of the ransom note by Tan; and its delivery by Domasian to Agra. These acts were complementary to
each other and geared toward the attainment of the common ultimate objective, viz., to extort the ransom of
P1 million in exchange for Enrico's life.

The motive for the offense is not difficult to discover. According to Agra, Tan approached him six days before
the incident happened and requested a loan of at least P15,000.00. Agra said he had no funds at that moment
and Tan did not believe him, angrily saying that Agra could even raise a million pesos if he really wanted to
help. 19 The refusal obviously triggered the plan to kidnap Enrico and demand P1 million for his release.

The constitutional issues raised by Domasian do not affect the decision in this case. His claim that he was
arrested without warrant and then tortured and held incommunicado to extort a confession from him does
not vitiate his conviction. He never gave any confession. As for the allegation that the seizure of the
documents used for comparison with the ransom note was made without a search warrant, it suffices to say
that such documents were taken by Agra himself and not by the NBI agents or other police authorities. We
held in the case of People vs. Andre Marti, 20 that the Bill of Rights cannot be invoked against acts of private
individuals, being directed only against the government and its law-enforcement agencies and limitation on
official action.

We are satisfied that Tan and Domasian, in conspiracy with each other, committed the crime of kidnapping as
defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code and so deserve the penalty imposed upon
them by the trial court.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED, with costs against the accused-appellants.

Let a copy of this decision be sent to the Commission on Human Rights for investigation of the alleged
violation of the constitutional rights of Pablito Domasian.

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 9294. March 30, 1914. ]

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EULOGIO SANCHEZ, Defendant-Appellant.

Leodegario Azarraga for Appellant.

Acting Attorney-General Harvey for Appellee.

Eulogio Sanchez was accused of the crime of illegal detention, provided for and punished in article 200 of the
Penal Code, for having detained one Benigno Aranzanso by keeping him in the municipal jail of the pueblo of
Caloocan, Province of Rizal, for a period of less than three days.

The Court of First Instance of said province sentenced the defendant as guilty of said crime to a fine of 1,000
pesetas and to the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, such imprisonment not to
exceed six months. From this judgment the defendant appealed.

It appears from the evidence that the defendant, being a municipal policeman of the town of Caloocan, did, at
about 9 o’clock in the morning of August 13, 1912, arrest Benigno Aranzanso in the cockpit of Maypajo of that
town and take him to the town hall, where he was detained until just before nightfall of the same day, when
he was set at liberty by order of the president. But it also appears from the same evidence: (1) That both the
municipal president and the sergeant of police, who was acting as chief of police of the town, had information
that two nights previous a robbery had occurred in a boat on the Maypajo River in that jurisdiction, for the
boatman had presented himself to the said sergeant and indicated as one of the assailants of the boat an
individual who was the son of one Eto and who had been in a billiard room the same night; (2) that on the said
night of the 12th of August the Constabulary had been in Caloocan to investigate, in company with the
policemen of the pueblo, a robbery that had occurred in a billiard room, and the said sergeant had acquired
the information that Benigno Aranzanso had been in that billiard room that night and that about five minutes
before he had left on the run; (3) that in view of this the sergeant of police directed not only the defendant
Eulogio Sanchez but also all the patrolmen under his orders to look for the said Benigno Aranzanso in order
that he might be identified by the boatmen; and (4) that by virtue of said order and because the description
they had given him of the person who had been in the billiard room fitted Aranzanso, the defendant Eulogio
Sanchez proceeded to arrest him in the cockpit on the next morning, the 13th, and took him to the town hall,
as has already been stated, where he remained in confinement until before nightfall of the same day. He was
not identified because when the sergeant of police arrived at the station he had already been set at liberty. No
warrant was previously issued for his detention because the fact had not been reported to the justice of the
peace and the 13th of August was a legal holiday.

The defendant, therefore, acted in compliance with orders of his chief, the sergeant of police, in asserting
Benigno Aranzanso and his detention was justified for the purpose of identifying his person, since, according
to the sergeant himself, reasonable grounds existed for believing in the existence of a crime and suspicion
pointed to that individual.

It was not necessary that the fact of the robbery committed in the boat should have been established in order
to regard such detention as legal:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The legality of the detention does not depend upon the fact of the crime, but . . . upon the nature of the
deed, wherefrom such characterization may reasonably be inferred by the officer or functionary to whom the
law at that moment leaves the decision for the urgent purpose of suspending the liberty of the citizen."
(Decision of the supreme court of Spain, January 27, 1885.)

One of the duties of the police is to arrest lawbreakers in order to place them at the disposal of the judicial or
executive authorities upon whom devolves the duty to investigate the act constituting the violation or to
prosecute and secure the punishment thereof. One of the means conducing to these ends being the
identification of the person of the alleged criminal or lawbreaker, the duty that directly devolves upon the
police to make the arrests or detentions for the purposes of such investigation cannot be questioned.

The same supreme court has so declared in a decision of April 21, 1884, in a case wherein the person who had
threatened another was unknown and suspicion pointed to a man whom an officer of the law proceeded to
arrest. The court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The mere fact that an officer of the law compelled a person to appear before the chief of the department to
establish or prove his identity does not justify the classification of illegal detention. It was merely in the nature
of an administrative measure, justified by the suspicion that he may have made certain threats against
another person."cralaw virtua1aw library

It is, therefore, beyond dispute that the defendant Eulogio Sanchez did not commit the crime charged against
him in the complaint, and we therefore reverse the judgment appealed from and freely acquit him; with the
costs of both instances de officio.

Arellano, C.J., Carson Moreland and Trent, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-2128 May 12, 1948

MELENCIO SAYO and JOAQUIN MOSTERO, petitioners,

vs.
THE CHIEF OF POLICE and THE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF MUNICIPAL JAIL, BOTH OF CITY OF MANILA,
respondents.

Enrique Q. Jabile for petitioners.

Acting City Fiscal A. P. Montesa, Assistant City Fiscal Arsenio Nañawa and D. Guinto Lazaro for respondents.

FERIA, J.:

Upon complaint of Bernardino Malinao, charging the petitioners with having committed the crime of robbery,
Benjamin Dumlao, a policeman of the City of Manila, arrested the petitioners on April 2, 1948, and presented
a complaint against them with the fiscal's office of Manila. Until April 7, 1948, when the petition for habeas
corpus filed with this Court was heard, the petitioners were still detained or under arrest, and the city fiscal
had not yet released or filed against them an information with the proper courts justice.

This case has not been decided before this time because there was not a sufficient number of Justices to form
a quorum in Manila, And it had to be transferred to the Supreme Court acting in division here in Baguio for
deliberation and decision. We have not until now an official information as to the action taken by the office of
the city fiscal on the complaint filed by the Dumlao against the petitioners. But whatever night have been the
action taken by said office, if there was any, we have to decide this case in order to lay down a ruling on the
question involved herein for the information and guidance in the future of the officers concerned.

The principal question to be determined in the present case in order to decide whether or not the petitioners
are being illegally restrained of their liberty, is the following: Is the city fiscal of manila a judicial authority
within the meaning of the provisions of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code?

Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "the penalties provided in the next proceeding article shall
be imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall
fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of six hours."

Taking into consideration the history of the provisions of the above quoted article, the precept of our
Constitution guaranteeing individual liberty, and the provisions of Rules of Court regarding arrest and habeas
corpus, we are of the opinion that the words "judicial authority", as used in said article, mean the courts of
justices or judges of said courts vested with judicial power to order the temporary detention or confinement
of a person charged with having committed a public offense, that is, "the Supreme Court and such inferior
courts as may be established by law". (Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.)

Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code was substantially taken from article 202 of the old Penal Code formerly
in force of these Islands, which penalized a public officer other than a judicial officer who, without warrant,
"shall arrest a person upon a charge of crime and shall fail to deliver such person to the judicial authority
within twenty four hours after his arrest." There was no doubt that a judicial authority therein referred to was
the judge of a court of justice empowered by law, after a proper investigation, to order the temporary
commitment or detention of the person arrested; and not the city fiscals or any other officers, who are not
authorized by law to do so. Because article 204, which complements said section 202, of the same Code
provided that "the penalty of suspension in its minimum and medium degrees shall be imposed upon the
following persons: 1. Any judicial officer who, within the period prescribed by the provisions of the law of
criminal procedure in force, shall fail to release any prisoner under arrest or to commit such prisoner formally
by written order containing a statement of the grounds upon which the same is based."

Although the above quoted provision of article 204 of the old Penal Code has not been incorporated in the
Revised Penal Code the import of said words judicial authority or officer can not be construed as having been
modified by the mere omission of said provision in the Revised Penal Code.

Besides, section 1 (3), Article III, of our Constitution provides that "the right of the people to be secure in their
persons...against unreasonable seizure shall not be violated, and no warrant [of arrest, detention or
confinement] shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after the examination under
oath or affirmation of the complaint and the witness he may produce." Under this constitutional precept no
person may be deprived of his liberty, except by warrant of arrest or commitment issued upon probable cause
by a judge after examination of the complainant and his witness. And the judicial authority to whom the
person arrested by a public officers must be surrendered can not be any other but court or judge who alone is
authorized to issue a warrant of commitment or provisional detention of the person arrested pending the trial
of the case against the latter. Without such warrant of commitment, the detention of the person arrested for
than six hours would be illegal and in violation of our Constitution.

Our conclusion is confirmed by section 17, Rule 109 of the Rules of court, which, referring to the duty of an
officer after arrest without warrant, provides that "a person making arrest for legal ground shall, without
unnecessary delay, and within the time prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, take the person arrested to the
proper court or judge for such action for they may deem proper to take;" and by section 11 of Rule 108, which
reads that "after the arrest by the defendant and his delivery to the Court, he shall be informed of the
complaint or information filed against him. He shall also informed of the substance of the testimony and
evidence presented against him, and, if he desires to testify or to present witnesses or evidence in his favor,
he may be allowed to do so. The testimony of the witnesses need not be reduced to writing but that of the
defendant shall be taken in writing and subscribed by him.

And it is further corroborated by the provisions of section 1 and 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court. According to
the provision of said section, "a writ of habeas corpus shall extend any person to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is illegally deprived of his liberty"; and "if it appears that the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or
judge, or by virtue of a judgement or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to
issue the process, render judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed. "Which a contrario sensu
means that, otherwise, the writ shall be allowed and the person detained shall be released.

The judicial authority mentioned in section 125 of the Revised Penal Code can not be construed to include the
fiscal of the City of Manila or any other city, because they cannot issue a warrant of arrest or of commitment
or temporary confinement of a person surrendered to legalize the detention of a person arrested without
warrant. (Section 7, Rule 108; Hashim vs. Boncan, 40 Off. Gaz. 13th Supp., p.13; Lino vs. Fugoso, L-1159,
promulgated on January 30, 1947, 43 Off. Gaz., 1214). The investigation which the city of fiscal of Manila
makes is not the preliminary investigation proper provided for in section 11, Rule 108, above quoted, to which
all person charged with offenses cognizable by the Court of First Instance in provinces are entitled, but it is a
mere investigation made by the city fiscal for the purpose of filing the corresponding information against the
defendant with the proper municipal court or Court of First Instance of Manila if the result of the investigation
so warrants, in order to obtain or secure from the court a warrant of arrest of the defendant. It is provided by
a law as a substitute, in a certain sense, of the preliminary investigation proper to avoid or prevent a hasty or
malicious prosecution, since defendant charged with offenses triable by the courts in the City of Manila are
not entitled to a proper preliminary investigation.

The only executive officers authorized by law to make a proper preliminary investigation in case of temporary
absence of both the justice of the peace and the auxiliary justice of the peace from the municipality, town or
place, are the municipal mayors who are empowered in such case to issue a warrant of arrest of the caused.
(Section 3, Rule 108, in connection with section 6, Rule 108, and section 2 of Rule 109.) The preliminary
investigation which a city fiscal may conduct under section 2, Rule 108, is the investigation referred to in the
proceeding paragraph.

Under the law, a complaint charging a person with the commission of an offense cognizable by the courts of
Manila is not filed with municipal court or the Court of First Instance of Manila, because as above stated, the
latter do not make or conduct a preliminary investigation proper. The complaint must be made or filed with
the city fiscal of Manila who, personally or through one of his assistants, makes the investigation, not for the
purpose of ordering the arrest of the accused, but of filing with the proper court the necessary information
against the accused if the result of the investigation so warrants, and obtaining from the court a warrant of
arrest or commitment of the accused.

When a person is arrested without warrant in cases permitted bylaw, the officer or person making the arrest
should, as abovestated, without unnecessary delay take or surrender the person arrested, within the period of
time prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, to the court or judge having jurisdiction to try or make a
preliminary investigation of the offense (section 17, Rule 109); and the court or judge shall try and decide the
case if the court has original jurisdiction over the offense charged, or make the preliminary investigation if it is
a justice of the peace court having no original jurisdiction, and then transfer the case to the proper Court of
First Instance in accordance with the provisions of section 13, Rule 108.

In the City of Manila, where complaints are not filed directly with the municipal court or the Court of First
Instance, the officer or person making the arrest without warrant shall surrender or take the person arrested
to the city fiscal, and the latter shall make the investigation above mentioned and file, if proper, the
corresponding information within the time prescribed by section 125 of the Revised Penal Code, so that the
court may issue a warrant of commitment for the temporary detention of the accused. And the city fiscal or
his assistants shall make the investigation forthwith, unless it is materially impossible for them to do so,
because the testimony of the person or officer making the arrest without warrant is in such cases ready and
available, and shall, immediately after the investigation, either release the person arrested or file the
corresponding information. If the city fiscal has any doubt as to the probability of the defendant having
committed the offense charged, or is not ready to file the information on the strength of the testimony or
evidence presented, he should release and not detain the person arrested for a longer period than that
prescribed in the Penal Code, without prejudice to making or continuing the investigation and filing afterwards
the proper information against him with the court, in order to obtain or secure a warrant of his arrest. Of
course, for the purpose of determining the criminal liability of an officer detaining a person for more than six
hours prescribed by the Revised Penal Code, the means of communication as well as the hour of arrested and
other circumstances, such as the time of surrender and the material possibility for the fiscal to make the
investigation and file in time the necessary information, must be taken into consideration.
To consider the city fiscal as the judicial authority referred to in article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, would
be to authorize the detention of a person arrested without warrant for a period longer than that permitted by
law without any process issued by a court of competent jurisdiction. The city fiscal, may not, after due
investigation, find sufficient ground for filing an information or prosecuting the person arrested and release
him, after the latter had been illegally detained for days or weeks without any process issued by a court or
judge.

A peace officer has no power or authority to arrest a person without a warrant upon complaint of the
offended party or any other person, except in those cases expressly authorized by law. What he or the
complainant may do in such case is to file a complaint with the city fiscal of Manila, or directly with the justice
of the peace courts in municipalities and other political subdivisions. If the City Fiscal has no authority, and he
has not, to order the arrest even if he finds, after due investigation, that there is a probability that a crime has
been committed and the accused is guilty thereof, a fortiori a police officer has no authority to arrest and
detain a person charged with an offense upon complaint of the offended party or other persons even though,
after investigation, he becomes convinced that the accused is guilty of the offense charged.

In view of all the foregoing, without making any pronouncement as to the responsibility of the officers who
intervened in the detention of the petitioners, for the policeman Dumlao may have acted in good faith, in the
absence of a clear cut ruling on the matter in believing that he had complied with the mandate of article 125
by delivering the petitioners within six hours to the office of the city fiscal, and the latter might have ignored
the fact that the petitioners were being actually detained when the said policeman filed a complaint against
them with the city fiscal, we hold that the petitioners are being illegally restrained of their liberty, and their
release is hereby ordered unless they are now detained by virtue of a process issued by a competent court of
justice. So ordered.

Paras, Actg. C.J., Pablo, and Bengzon, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No.L-1159. January 30, 1947.]

CECILIO M. LINO, Petitioner, v. VALERIANO E. FUGOSO, LAMBERTO JAVALERA, and JOHN DOE, in their
capacity as Mayor, Chief of Police and Officer in charge of municipal jail, all of the City of Manila,
respectively, Respondents.

Emanuel Peldez, Francisco A. Rodrigo, Enrique M. Fernando, Manuel M. Crudo, Claudio Teehankee and Jose
W. Diokno Fiscal Jose P. Bengzon, for Respondent.

City Fiscal Jose P. Bengzon, for Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. HABEAS CORPUS; ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT; DETENTION AFTER SIX HOURS WITHOUT DELIVERY TO
JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES; ILLEGALITY OF, NOT CURED BY FILING OF INFORMATION; CASE AT BAR. — Assuming
that P. D. and P. M. were legally arrested without warrant, their continued detention became illegal upon the
expiration of six hours without their having been delivered to the corresponding judicial authorities. The
illegality of their detention was not cured by the filing of informations against them, since no warrants of
arrest or orders of commitment have been issued by the municipal court up to the hearing of this case before
this Court.

2. ID.; ARREST WHEN INFORMATION IS FOR LIGHT OFFENSE; ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT; DETENTION
THEREUNDER. — The general rule is that when the offense charged is light the accused should not be arrested
except in particular instances when the court expressly so orders in the exercise of its discretion. While an
arrest may be made without warrant when there are reasonable grounds therefor (Rule 109 section 6 Rules of
Court), the prisoner cannot be retained beyond the period provided by law unless a warrant is procured from
a competent court.

3. ID.; ARREST; CITY FISCAL AUTHORITY OF, TO ISSUE WARRANT OF. — The City Fiscal has no authority to issue
warrants of arrest, and is powerless to validate an illegal detention by merely filing informations or by any
order of his own either express or implied.

4. ID.; CITY FISCAL; POWER OF, TO ORDER COMMITMENT OR RELEASE ON BAIL OF ACCUSED. — The City Fiscal
has no power to order either the commitment or the release on bail of persons charged with penal offenses.

Per PERFECTO, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

5. EXPEDITING HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDING. — Cases of habeas corpus, by their very nature if the remedy is
to be effective and there is an earnest desire to avoid a failure of justice should be disposed of without any
delay, as was done in Tañada v. Quirino (42 Off. Gaz., 934).

6. RESPONDENTS’ ACTIONS NEED BE COUNTERACTED. — Speedy action is necessary to squelch the tactics of
respondents who are bent on exerting all the power and ability that they command to mock at the action of
the courts as exemplified by the case of Villavicencio v. Lukban (39 Phil. 778-812).

7. OFFICIAL DISREGARD FOR FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS. — Twelve humble peaceful and law-abiding
citizens while in the peaceful exercise of their constitutional rights of freedom of expression and to peaceably
assemble, the right to enlist public support in the pursuit of their right to a decent living wage, and the right to
petition their own government for the redress of their grievances are abruptly interrupted in the exercise of
their rights and violently hauled into prison as dangerous criminals.

8. IGNORANCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS. — Ignorance of the constitutional Bill of Rights by
the erring officials is no justification. It only aggravates the situation. It shows unpardonable dereliction of
duty and recklessness of responsible high authorities.

9. PEACE OFFICERS. — Peace officers are duty bound to know the law. They are also known as law officers,
because it is their essential function to enforce the laws. At least, they ought to know the Constitution and
learn by heart the Bill of Rights.

10. OFFER OF PROVISIONAL RELEASE OF BAIL. — That the twelve detainees were offered provisional release if
they should post a bail of P12,000 each, does not make legal their illegal detention. The required bail only
tends to show respondents stubbornness in the exercise of an illegal power, and the fact that the amount of
P12,000 was required of persons who were not receiving even the miserable pittance, to secure the increase
of which they went into strike, appears to be an unbearable sarcasm.

11. SEDITION. — The allegation that the arresting officers believe that the detainees, are guilty of sedition
holds no water when respondents themselves confess that no such crime was committed. Sedition is the
crime usually resorted to by tyrants as a pretext to silence or suppress those persons who have the firmness of
character to oppose them and expose their abuses.

12. ONE-FOURTH OF A CENTURY PRONOUNCEMENTS. — The pronouncements made by the Supreme Court
one-fourth of a century ago on fundamental civil rights are quoted in the opinion.

13. VIRUS OF THE JAPANESE FEUDALISTIC IDEOLOGY. — The wanton disregard by those responsible for the
arrest of the twelve detainees of their fundamental rights as guaranteed by the Constitution, shows that the
Japanese feudalistic ideology, as propagated during enemy occupation, has left its pernicious virus in our soil.

14. ARBITRARINESS AND ILLEGAL DETENTION. — These Government officers who are responsible for the
detention and confinement of the twelve detainees are liable for prosecution under articles 124 and 125 of
the Revised Penal Code.

15. POOR FACE-SAVING DEVICE. — The filing of information for insignificant misdemeanors against P. M. and
P. D. appears to us as a poor face-saving device to justify, in some way, their further detention and should not
be countenanced as a means to defeat the release of said two detainees.

16. PERILOUS PATH. — Those who under the pretext of subduing allegedly seditious persons, committed the
arbitrariness complained of in the petition, trod a perilous path that, as shown by the experience of other
countries, usually leads to the implantation of a dictatorship, whose whole philosophy is built upon the hateful
slogan that everything, including the most cherished possessions and the most blessed ideals of the people,
should be sacrificed for the sake of state supremacy.

17. PRICE OF HUMAN RIGHTS. — Eternal vigilance and constant willingness and readiness to fight for them are
the price of human rights. The existence of liberal elements, always watchful and ready to defend victims of
violations of the Bill of Rights, is necessary to vitalize democracy and to give tangible reality to the guarantees
of the Constitution.
18. CONDITIONS AND QUALITIES REQUIRED. — The attainment of great ideals needs faith, passionate
adherence to them, the militant attitude manifested in the inflicting readiness to fight and face hardships and
sacrifices, unconquerable steadfastness and unbreakable perseverance in the face of obstacles and setbacks.
These are the conditions and qualities needed by all liberal and progressive spirits to keep lighted the torch of
liberty, to squelch the hydra of reaction, to conserve the moral heritage of advancement and conquests in the
emporium of human rights bequeathed by the champions and martyrs who waged the heroic battles for real
spiritual values and for the dignity if man as the image of God.

DECISION

MORAN, C.J. :

This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed in behalf of twelve persons alleged to be unlawfully detained
by respondents Valeriano E. Fugoso, Lamberto Javalera and John Doe in their capacity as mayor, chief of police
and officer in charge of the municipal jail of the City of Manila, respectively. It is alleged in respondents’ return
that ten of the petitioners had already been released, no sufficient evidence having been found to warrant
their prosecution for inciting to sedition, but that the remaining two, Pascual Montaniel and Facifico Deoduco,
are being held in custody because of charges filed against them in the municipal court unjust vexation and
disobedience to police orders, respectively.

After hearing, by minute resolution we dismissed the case with respect to the petitioners already released and
we ordered the release of the remaining two, Montaniel and Deoduco, without prejudice to a reasoned
decision which we now proceed to render.

The case of the ten petitioners has become academic by their release. The purpose of a writ of habeas corpus
is only to set them free. After they are freed, the writ is purposeless. If they have been the victims of illegal
arrest or detention, they can have recourse to criminal actions in the proper courts.

As regards the remaining two petitioners, the pertinent facts as admitted at the hearing by respondents, are
as follows: Pascual Montaniel was arrested without warrant by the police officers of Manila on November 8,
1946, for inciting to sedition, and Pacifico Deoduco, on November 7, 1946, for resisting arrest and
disobedience to police orders. On November 11 when this petition for habeas corpus was filed, these two
petitioners were still under arrest. They were thus held in confinement for three and four days, respectively,
without warrants and without charges formally filed in court. The papers of their cases were not transmitted
to the City Fiscal’s office until late in the afternoon of November 11. Upon investigation by that office, no
sufficient evidence was found to warrant the prosecution of Pascual Montaniel for inciting to sedition and of
Pacifico Deoduco for resisting arrest, but both remained under custody because of informations filed with
minuet charging Montaniel with unjust vexation and Deoduco with disobedience to an agent of a person in
authority under the second paragraph of article 151 of Revised Penal Code. These informations were filed on
the same day when this case was heard before this Court, that is, on November 12, 1946. And so far, no
warrants of arrest or orders of commitment are shown to have been issued by the municipal court pursuant to
the informations thus filed.

Under these facts, the detention of Pacifico Deoduco and Pascual Montaniel is illegal. Even assuming that they
were legally arrested without warrant on November 7 and 8, 1946, respectively, their continued detention
became illegal upon the exploration of six hours without their having been delivered to the corresponding
judicial authorities. (Article 125, Rev. Pen Code, as amended by Act No. 3940.) Their cases were referred to the
City Fiscal late in the afternoon of November 11, 1946, that is, four and three days, respectively, after they
were arrested. The illegally of their detention was not cured by the filing of information against them, since no
warrants of arrest or orders of commitment have been issued by the municipal court to the hearing of this
case before this Court.

It must be observed, in this connection, that in said informatons, the two petitioners are charged with light
offenses punishable by law with arresto mayor or an fine ranging from 5 to 200 pesos or both, according to
the second paragraphs of articles 151 and 287, respectively, of the Revised Penal Code. Under Rule 108,
section 10, when the offense charged is of that character, "the judge with whom the complaint or information
is filled, shall not issue any warrant for order for the arrest of the defendant, but shall order the letter to
appear on the day and hour fixed in the order to answer to the complaint of information," although in
particular instances he may also "order that a defendant charged with such offense be arrested and not
released except upon furnishing bail." The general rule, therefore, is that when the offense charged is light the
accused should not be arrested, except in particular instances when the court expressly so orders in the
experience of its discretion. In the instant case, the municipal court has not yet acted on the informations nor
exercised its discretion the arrest of the two petitioners and, therefore, they are still detained not because of
the informations filed against them but as a continuance of their illegal detention by the police officers, While
an arrest may be made without warrant there are reasonable grounds therefor (Rule 109, section 6 Rules of
Court), the prisoner cannot be retained beyond the period provided by law, unless a warrant is procured from
a competent court. (4 Am. Jur., p. 49; Diers v. Mallon, 46 Neb., 121; 50 Am. St. Rep., 598; Burk v. Howley, 179
Penn., 539; 57 Am. St. Rep., 607; Karner v. Stump, 12 Tex. Civ. App., 460; 34 S. W., 656; Johnson v. Americus,
46 Ga., 80; Leger v. Warren, L. R. A., 216-281 [Bk. 51. ] It is obvious in the instant case that the City Fiscal had
no authority to issue warrants of arrest (vide authorities cited above, and Hashim v. Boncan and City of
Manila, 71 Phil., 216) and was powerless to validate such illegal detention by merely filing informations or by
any order of his own, either express or implied

It is not necessary now to determine whether the City Fiscal is a judicial authority within the purview of article
125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 3940, for even if he were, the petitioners’ case was
referred to him long after the expiration of the six hours provided by law. And since the City Fiscal, unlike a
judicial authority, has no power to order either the commitment or the release on bail of persons charged with
penal offenses (Adm. Code, section 2460), the petitioners’ further their confinement after their case had been
referred to the City Fiscal was but a mere continuation of their illegal detention by the police officers. In the
eyes of the law, therefore, these prisoners should have been out of prison long before the informations were
filed with the municipal court, and they should not be retained therein merely because of the filing of such
informations it appearing particularly that the offenses charged are light and are not, as a general rule,
grounds for arrest, under Rule 108, section 10. Under such circumstances, only an order of commitment could
legalize the prisoner’s continued confinement, and no such order has ever been issued. Indeed, the municipal
court could acquire jurisdiction over said prisoners only by the issuance of a warrant of arrest, an order of
commitment or a writ of summons as provided in the aforementioned rule.

We reiterate the minute-resolution above mentioned.

Paras, Feria, Pablo and Hilado, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 70133 July 2, 1990

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JESUS ACOSTA alias "Jerry," accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Anorlito A. Alvero for accused-appellant.

CRUZ, J.:

On April 28, 1980, at about seven o'clock in the evening, Rafael Villavicencio, Jr. was shot to death at the
Travel Lodge Restaurant in Lucena City by a person who managed to escape in the ensuing confusion. Two
months later, Jesus Acosta was identified as the killer by three witnesses and charged with murder before the
regional trial court of that city. Convicted after trial in a decision penned by Judge Manuel A. Patron, 1 the
accused-appellant is now on appeal before this Court.

His appeal is based mainly on the insufficiency of the evidence of the prosecution identifying him as the
person who shot Villavicencio. He also reiterates his defense of alibi which he claims was improperly rejected
by the trial court.

The principal witness of the prosecution was Freddie Osmillo, a waiter of the said restaurant, who declared
that he served the accused-appellant shortly before the killing. He testified that Acosta arrived at the
restaurant at about five o'clock in the afternoon and asked for a beer, which he immediately brought him.
Acosta was carrying a paper bag. At that time there was no other customer in the place, but when Acosta
asked for a second bottle of beer, there were already around ten other customers. These left after a while. At
about 6:40 p.m. Villavicencio arrived with Mayor Ramon Vera Cruz of Unisan, Quezon, and his secretary, Jose
Tolentino, and they sat at a table about five meters from the accused-appellant. By this time Acosta had
already ordered his third bottle of beer, also served by Osmillo. A brown-out then occurred and on
Villavicencio's order (he was the manager of the restaurant), Osmillo lit a kerosene lamp and placed a lighted
candle on each table. It was at this juncture that Acosta asked for his bill, paid for the beers, and left. 2

Osmillo said that shortly thereafter, Acosta came back to the restaurant, entering through the back door, and
ordered another bottle of beer from him. Osmillo went to the counter to get it but minutes later, when his
back was turned, he heard a shot. He never saw Acosta again that night. 3

Nida de Chavez-Ayado, the restaurant bookkeeper, corroborated Osmillo's testimony in practically every
important detail. 4 She did not say, however, that she actually saw the accused-appellant shoot Villavicencio.
For his part, Jose Tolentino said it was Acosta who approached their table during the brown-out when
Villavicencio was shot from behind. Although he did not actually see the shooting, Tolentino declared he saw
the accused-appellant lower the gun he was carrying and step backwards to flee through the back
door. 5
Two other witnesses for the prosecution testified on the possible motive for the killing. 6 They suggested that
it might have been a dispute over a cockpit bet and rivalry in the jueteng business and that Acosta had acted
as a hired gunman.

For his part, Acosta declared that he was at the time of the killing nowhere near the restaurant, being then in
Atimonan, Quezon, an hour's ride away by public transportation. 7 He was supported by his friend, M/Sgt.
Gabriel de Guzman, who testified that he met the accused-appellant in Atimonan at one o'clock in the
afternoon of April 28, 1980, and the two of them had attended a court hearing in Macalelon, Quezon, the
following day. 8

The identification of the offender is crucial in every criminal prosecution where the defense pleads alibi.
Unless the identity of the culprit is established beyond reasonable doubt, the charge against the accused must
be dismissed on the ground that the constitutional presumption of innocence has not been overcome.

In its brief, the defense contends that the identification of the accused-appellant as Villavicencio's killer had
not been sufficiently proved, being based merely on unlawful suggestions made by the investigating
authorities. These suggestions unduly influenced the witnesses into pointing to the accused-appellant.

The only lead the investigators had of the killer was that he was about five feet tall and lean, as described by
Osmillo. Proceeding on this information, they asked the three prosecution witnesses to take a look at Jesus
Acosta, who was then being detained in Camp Nakar, and see if he was the person who had shot Villavicencio.
At the time he was identified by Osmillo and Ayado, Acosta was alone in his detention cell. 9 There was no one
else beside him with whom he might be compared by the two onlookers. The argument of the defense is that
as there was no police line-up, Acosta's identification was a manipulated conclusion.

In the case of Tolentino, there was admittedly a police line-up when he was asked to identify the accused-
appellant, but this reaction was practically suggested if not actually induced by the investigators. Earlier he
had been shown a picture of Acosta which had not been mixed with other pictures so as to give him a choice.
10 At the police line-up, Acosta was wearing the same shirt he wore in the picture. 11 Moreover, he was the
shortest person in the line-up, which should have been confined to persons of the same height and build as
he, to prevent improper suggestiveness. 12 All this was deliberately designed to insure Acosta's identification
as the killer.

It is clear that the manner in which all three witnesses were asked to identify the accused-appellant was less
than objective. It impaired the trustworthiness of their identification insofar as it was elicited only by that
questionable procedure.

In U . S. v. Wade, 13 the U.S. Supreme Court observed through Justice Brennan:

What facts have been disclosed in specific cases about the conduct of pre-trial confrontations for
identification illustrate both the potential for substantial prejudice to the accused at that stage and the need
for its revelation at trial. A commentator provides some striking examples:

In a Canadian case . . . the defendant had been picked out of a line-up of six men, of which he was the only
Oriental. In other cases, a black-haired suspect was placed among a group of light-haired persons, tall suspects
have been made to stand with short non-suspects, and, in a case where the perpetrator of the crime was
known to be a youth, a suspect under twenty was placed in a line-up with five other persons, all of whom
were forty or over.
Similarly state reports, in the course of describing prior identifications admitted as evidence of guilt, reveal
numerous instances of suggestive procedures, for example, that all in the lineup but the suspect were known
to the identifying witness, that the other participants in a lineup were grossly dissimilar in appearance to the
suspect, that only the suspect was required to wear distinctive clothing which the culprit allegedly wore, that
the witness is told by the police that they have caught the culprit after which the defendant is brought before
the witness alone or is viewed in jail, that the suspect is pointed out before or during a lineup, and that the
participants in the lineup are asked to try on an article of clothing which fits only the suspect.

In the case of People v. Cruz, 14 a robbery with homicide was committed by a band of persons wearing masks
(which allegedly fell off the face of the accused) in a house that was either completely dark or adequately
lighted, depending on the conflicting versions of the two witnesses. These witnesses were later made to
identify the accused-appellant in the following manner:

That very same afternoon, Angeles Cruz was picked up in front of a moviehouse and brought to the police
station for questioning. He was made to walk and turn around in the presence of Zenaida and Emma. Cruz was
not placed in a police lineup, contrary to standard stationhouse verification procedure, to test the accuracy of
the witnesses' memory, and to afford a mere suspect a fair chance of early relief from the inconvenience
inflicted on one who is mistakenly identified. Moreover, Zenaida and Emma testified that the several accused,
including Cruz, were pointed out to them as the persons suspected by the police as the perpetrators of the
robbery committed in Goso-on, and as notorious "tough guys" in Butuan City. The identification at the police
station was attended, as the two girls themselves admitted, by a great deal of whispered conversations as well
as by at least one unexplained conference elsewhere in the municipal building, at which they were present,
immediately prior to their being confronted with the accused.

In rejecting the identification made by the two witnesses, Justice Fred Ruiz Castro said for the Court:

The manner by which Emma and Zenaida were made to identify the accused at the police station was
pointedly suggestive, generated confidence where there was none, activated visual imagination, and, all told,
subverted their realibility as eyewitnesses. This unusual, coarse and highly singular method of identification,
which revolts against the accepted principles of scientific crime detection, alienates the esteem of every just
man, and commands neither our respect nor acceptance.

Apart from the above considerations, we agree that the testimony of Tolentino suffers from the added defect
that by his own admission he saw Acosta only for a few seconds and in fact did not pay much attention to him
before the shooting. 15 It is no less significant that after the shooting, not only was it dark because of the
brown-out but there was already a great deal of alarm and confusion that could easily have beclouded his
remembrance of the incident and its principal protagonists. As for Ayado, it is not really believable that she
could have followed Osmillo's every movement during the period covered by his own testimony, as she would
also have been attending to her own duties at that time as bookkeeper of the restaurant. The Court discerns in
her declaration a palpable effort to corroborate every detail of Osmillo's testimony that renders her own
testimony suspect.

But the testimony of Osmillo is another matter.

We do not think it is flawed by the irregular manner in which he and Ayado were made to identify Acosta at
Camp Nakar, as such identification was not really necessary in his case. We agree that in the case of Ayado and
Tolentino, there was improper suggestiveness exerted on them to induce them to believe that Acosta was the
same person they had seen two months earlier when Villavicencio was killed. In our view, however, that
suggestiveness did not induce or impair Osmillo's own identification, which was made on a different basis.

Osmillo's identification was not based on his own observation of Acosta in his detention cell at Camp Nakar,
but on his previous experience with the accused-appellant on the day of the killing. The incident at Camp
Nakar only seconded his earlier identification of Acosta on April 28, 1980, before Villavicencio was shot in the
neck by the lone gunman.

Osmillo testified that Acosta arrived at the restaurant at five o'clock in the afternoon and left at about twenty
to seven. He was the waiter who served Acosta three bottles of beer during that period of more than one-and-
a-half hours and it was he who met Acosta again when, after paying his bill and leaving through the main door,
he re-entered through the back door of the restaurant and ordered another bottle of beer from Osmillo. He
did not see Acosta for only a few seconds, as Tolentino did, or from a distance, like Ayado. They talked to each
other for at least five times, the first three when Acosta placed his successive orders of beer, the fourth when
he asked for his chit and paid it, and the fifth when he returned and ordered another beer. During that period,
he saw Acosta long enough to retain recollection of him after the incident even without the necessity of his
going to Camp Nakar to take a look at the accused-appellant.

That identification at Camp Nakar merely affirmed his earlier impressions of Acosta that he had acquired
during the time he served him at the Travel Lodge Restaurant. In other words, when Osmillo went to Camp
Nakar, he was not identifying Acosta for the first time at the prodding of the authorities. Osmillo merely
recognized Acosta then.

On the basis of this conclusion, we find that there is sufficient evidence to establish the identity of the
accused-appellant as the person who killed Villavicencio. The identification made by Ayado and Tolentino
must be, as it is hereby, rejected. Even so, the testimony alone of Osmillo, who had a long enough time to
retain his recollections of that tragic afternoon, including the physical description of Acosta, who was his
customer, justifies the accused-appellant's conviction.

The defense of alibi is less than persuasive and must also be dismissed. The testimony of de Guzman is hardly
believable and does not deserve much comment. Even the distance between Atimonan and Lucena City is
against the accused-appellant, who could easily have come from Atimonan, assuming he was really there on
that date, committed the crime in Lucena City, and thereafter gone back to join his friend in Atimonan that
same night or the following morning. Moreover, we have held in a long line of decisions that alibi is unavailing
against the positive identification of the culprit, 16 which has been clearly and unmistakably established in the
case at bar.

The killing was qualified by alevosia, the murderer having shot the victim from behind without warning.
Evident premeditation not having been proved and there being no mitigating circumstances, the penalty of
reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed, together with the civil indemnity of P30,000.00 payable to the
victim's heirs, and the costs of the suit.

WHEREFORE, the challenged judgment is AFFIRMED and the appeal is DISMISSED, with costs against the
accused-appellant. It is so ordered.

Narvasa, C.J., Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-27360 February 28, 1968

HON. RICARDO G. PAPA, as Chief of Police of Manila; HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, as Commissioner of
Customs; PEDRO PACIS, as Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila; and MARTIN ALAGAO, as Patrolman
of the Manila Police Department, petitioners,
vs.
REMEDIOS MAGO and HILARION U. JARENCIO, as Presiding Judge of Branch 23, Court of First Instance of
Manila, respondents.

Office of the Solicitor General for petitioners.

Juan T. David for respondents.

ZALDIVAR, J.:

This is an original action for prohibition and certiorari, with preliminary injunction filed by Ricardo Papa,
Chief of Police of Manila; Juan once Enrile, Commissioner of Customs; Pedro Pacis, Collector of Customs of the
Port of Manila; and Martin Alagao, a patrolman of the Manila Police Department, against Remedios Mago and
Hon. Hilarion Jarencio, Presiding Judge of Branch 23 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, praying for the
annulment of the order issued by respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila under date of March 7, 1967, which authorized the release under bond of certain goods which were
seized and held by petitioners in connection with the enforcement of the Tariff and Customs Code, but which
were claimed by respondent Remedios Mago, and to prohibit respondent Judge from further proceeding in
any manner whatsoever in said Civil Case No. 67496. Pending the determination of this case this Court issued
a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the respondent Judge from executing, enforcing and/or
implementing the questioned order in Civil Case No. 67496 and from proceeding with said case.

Petitioner Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence unit of the Manila Police Department, acting
upon a reliable information received on November 3, 1966 to the effect that a certain shipment of personal
effects, allegedly misdeclared and undervalued, would be released the following day from the customs zone of
the port of Manila and loaded on two trucks, and upon orders of petitioner Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of
Manila and a duly deputized agent of the Bureau of Customs, conducted surveillance at gate No. 1 of the
customs zone. When the trucks left gate No. 1 at about 4:30 in the afternoon of November 4, 1966, elements
of the counter-intelligence unit went after the trucks and intercepted them at the Agrifina Circle, Ermita,
Manila. The load of the two trucks consisting of nine bales of goods, and the two trucks, were seized on
instructions of the Chief of Police. Upon investigation, a person claimed ownership of the goods and showed
to the policemen a "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected in Informal Entry No. 147-5501", issued by the
Bureau of Customs in the name of a certain Bienvenido Naguit.

Claiming to have been prejudiced by the seizure and detention of the two trucks and their cargo,
Remedios Mago and Valentin B. Lanopa filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition "for
mandamus with restraining order or preliminary injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 67496, alleging, among
others, that Remedios Mago was the owner of the goods seized, having purchased them from the Sta. Monica
Grocery in San Fernando, Pampanga; that she hired the trucks owned by Valentin Lanopa to transport, the
goods from said place to her residence at 1657 Laon Laan St., Sampaloc, Manila; that the goods were seized by
members of the Manila Police Department without search warrant issued by a competent court; that anila
Chief of Police Ricardo Papa denied the request of counsel for Remedios Mago that the bales be not opened
and the goods contained therein be not examined; that then Customs Commissioner Jacinto Gavino had
illegally assigned appraisers to examine the goods because the goods were no longer under the control and
supervision of the Commissioner of Customs; that the goods, even assuming them to have been misdeclared
and, undervalued, were not subject to seizure under Section 2531 of the Tariff and Customs Code because
Remedios Mago had bought them from another person without knowledge that they were imported illegally;
that the bales had not yet been opened, although Chief of Police Papa had arranged with the Commissioner of
Customs regarding the disposition of the goods, and that unless restrained their constitutional rights would be
violated and they would truly suffer irreparable injury. Hence, Remedios Mago and Valentin Lanopa prayed for
the issuance of a restraining order, ex parte, enjoining the above-named police and customs authorities, or
their agents, from opening the bales and examining the goods, and a writ of mandamus for the return of the
goods and the trucks, as well as a judgment for actual, moral and exemplary damages in their favor.

On November 10, 1966, respondent Judge Hilarion Jarencio issued an order ex parte restraining the
respondents in Civil Case No. 67496 — now petitioners in the instant case before this Court — from opening
the nine bales in question, and at the same time set the hearing of the petition for preliminary injunction on
November 16, 1966. However, when the restraining order was received by herein petitioners, some bales had
already been opened by the examiners of the Bureau of Customs in the presence of officials of the Manila
Police Department, an assistant city fiscal and a representative of herein respondent Remedios Mago.

Under date of November 15, 1966, Remedios Mago filed an amended petition in Civil Case No. 67496,
including as party defendants Collector of Customs Pedro Pacis of the Port of Manila and Lt. Martin Alagao of
the Manila Police Department. Herein petitioners (defendants below) filed, on November 24, 1966, their
"Answer with Opposition to the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction", denying the alleged illegality of
the seizure and detention of the goods and the trucks and of their other actuations, and alleging special and
affirmative defenses, to wit: that the Court of First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction to try the case; that
the case fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals; that, assuming that the court had
jurisdiction over the case, the petition stated no cause of action in view of the failure of Remedios Mago to
exhaust the administrative remedies provided for in the Tariff and Customs Code; that the Bureau of Customs
had not lost jurisdiction over the goods because the full duties and charges thereon had not been paid; that
the members of the Manila Police Department had the power to make the seizure; that the seizure was not
unreasonable; and the persons deputized under Section 2203 (c) of the Tariff and Customs Code could effect
search, seizures and arrests in inland places in connection with the enforcement of the said Code. In opposing
the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, herein petitioners averred in the court below that the writ
could not be granted for the reason that Remedios Mago was not entitled to the main reliefs she prayed for;
that the release of the goods, which were subject to seizure proceedings under the Tariff and Customs Code,
would deprive the Bureau of Customs of the authority to forfeit them; and that Remedios Mago and Valentin
Lanopa would not suffer irreparable injury. Herein petitioners prayed the court below for the lifting of the
restraining order, for the denial of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, and for the dismissal of
the case.

At the hearing on December 9, 1966, the lower Court, with the conformity of the parties, ordered that an
inventory of the goods be made by its clerk of court in the presence of the representatives of the claimant of
the goods, the Bureau of Customs, and the Anti-Smuggling Center of the Manila Police Department. On
December 13, 1966, the above-named persons filed a "Compliance" itemizing the contents of the nine bales.
 Herein respondent Remedios Mago, on December 23, 1966, filed an ex parte motion to release the
goods, alleging that since the inventory of the goods seized did not show any article of prohibited importation,
the same should be released as per agreement of the patties upon her posting of the appropriate bond that
may be determined by the court. Herein petitioners filed their opposition to the motion, alleging that the
court had no jurisdiction to order the release of the goods in view of the fact that the court had no jurisdiction
over the case, and that most of the goods, as shown in the inventory, were not declared and were, therefore,
subject to forfeiture. A supplemental opposition was filed by herein petitioners on January 19, 1967, alleging
that on January 12, 1967 seizure proceedings against the goods had been instituted by the Collector of
Customs of the Port of Manila, and the determination of all questions affecting the disposal of property
proceeded against in seizure and forfeiture proceedings should thereby be left to the Collector of Customs. On
January 30, 1967, herein petitioners filed a manifestation that the estimated duties, taxes and other charges
due on the goods amounted to P95,772.00. On February 2, 1967, herein respondent Remedios Mago filed an
urgent manifestation and reiteration of the motion for the release under bond of the goods.

On March 7, 1967, the respondent Judge issued an order releasing the goods to herein respondent
Remedios Mago upon her filing of a bond in the amount of P40,000.00, and on March 13, 1967, said
respondent filed the corresponding bond.

On March 13, 1967, herein petitioner Ricardo Papa, on his own behalf, filed a motion for reconsideration
of the order of the court releasing the goods under bond, upon the ground that the Manila Police Department
had been directed by the Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila to hold the goods pending termination of
the seizure proceedings.

Without waiting for the court's action on the motion for reconsideration, and alleging that they had no
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, herein petitioners filed the present action
for prohibition and certiorari with preliminary injunction before this Court. In their petition petitioners alleged,
among others, that the respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction in ordering the release to respondent
Remedios Mago of the disputed goods, for the following reasons: (1) the Court of First Instance of Manila,
presided by respondent Judge, had no jurisdiction over the case; (2) respondent Remedios Mago had no cause
of action in Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila due to her failure to exhaust all
administrative remedies before invoking judicial intervention; (3) the Government was not estopped by the
negligent and/or illegal acts of its agent in not collecting the correct taxes; and (4) the bond fixed by
respondent Judge for the release of the goods was grossly insufficient.

In due time, the respondents filed their answer to the petition for prohibition and certiorari in this case.
In their answer, respondents alleged, among others: (1) that it was within the jurisdiction of the lower court
presided by respondent Judge to hear and decide Civil Case No. 67496 and to issue the questioned order of
March 7, 1967, because said Civil Case No. 67496 was instituted long before seizure, and identification
proceedings against the nine bales of goods in question were instituted by the Collector of Customs; (2) that
petitioners could no longer go after the goods in question after the corresponding duties and taxes had been
paid and said goods had left the customs premises and were no longer within the control of the Bureau of
Customs; (3) that respondent Remedios Mago was purchaser in good faith of the goods in question so that
those goods can not be the subject of seizure and forfeiture proceedings; (4) that the seizure of the goods was
affected by members of the Manila Police Department at a place outside control of jurisdiction of the Bureau
of Customs and affected without any search warrant or a warrant of seizure and detention; (5) that the
warrant of seizure and detention subsequently issued by the Collector of Customs is illegal and
unconstitutional, it not being issued by a judge; (6) that the seizing officers have no authority to seize the
goods in question because they are not articles of prohibited importation; (7) that petitioners are estopped to
institute the present action because they had agreed before the respondent Judge that they would not
interpose any objection to the release of the goods under bond to answer for whatever duties and taxes the
said goods may still be liable; and (8) that the bond for the release of the goods was sufficient.

The principal issue in the instant case is whether or not, the respondent Judge had acted with jurisdiction
in issuing the order of March 7, 1967 releasing the goods in question.

The Bureau of Customs has the duties, powers and jurisdiction, among others, (1) to assess and collect
all lawful revenues from imported articles, and all other dues, fees, charges, fines and penalties, accruing
under the tariff and customs laws; (2) to prevent and suppress smuggling and other frauds upon the customs;
and (3) to enforce tariff and customs laws. 1 The goods in question were imported from Hongkong, as shown
in the "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry". 2 As long as the importation has not
been terminated the imported goods remain under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of customs. Importation is
deemed terminated only upon the payment of the duties, taxes and other charges upon the articles, or
secured to be paid, at the port of entry and the legal permit for withdrawal shall have been granted. 3 The
payment of the duties, taxes, fees and other charges must be in full. 4

The record shows, by comparing the articles and duties stated in the aforesaid "Statement and Receipts
of Duties Collected on Informal Entry" with the manifestation of the Office of the Solicitor General 5 wherein it
is stated that the estimated duties, taxes and other charges on the goods subject of this case amounted to
P95,772.00 as evidenced by the report of the appraiser of the Bureau of Customs, that the duties, taxes and
other charges had not been paid in full. Furthermore, a comparison of the goods on which duties had been
assessed, as shown in the "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry" and the
"compliance" itemizing the articles found in the bales upon examination and inventory, 6 shows that the
quantity of the goods was underdeclared, presumably to avoid the payment of duties thereon. For example,
Annex B (the statement and receipts of duties collected) states that there were 40 pieces of ladies' sweaters,
whereas Annex H (the inventory contained in the "compliance") states that in bale No. 1 alone there were 42
dozens and 1 piece of ladies' sweaters of assorted colors; in Annex B, only 100 pieces of watch bands were
assessed, but in Annex H, there were in bale No. 2, 209 dozens and 5 pieces of men's metal watch bands
(white) and 120 dozens of men's metal watch band (gold color), and in bale No. 7, 320 dozens of men's metal
watch bands (gold color); in Annex B, 20 dozens only of men's handkerchief were declared, but in Annex H it
appears that there were 224 dozens of said goods in bale No. 2, 120 dozens in bale No. 6, 380 dozens in bale
No. 7, 220 dozens in bale No. 8, and another 200 dozens in bale No. 9. The articles contained in the nine bales
in question, were, therefore, subject to forfeiture under Section 2530, pars. e and m, (1), (3), (4), and (5) of the
Tariff and Customs Code. And this Court has held that merchandise, the importation of which is effected
contrary to law, is subject to forfeiture, 7 and that goods released contrary to law are subject to seizure and
forfeiture. 8

Even if it be granted, arguendo, that after the goods in question had been brought out of the customs
area the Bureau of Customs had lost jurisdiction over the same, nevertheless, when said goods were
intercepted at the Agrifina Circle on November 4, 1966 by members of the Manila Police Department, acting
under directions and orders of their Chief, Ricardo C. Papa, who had been formally deputized by the
Commissioner of Customs, 9 the Bureau of Customs had regained jurisdiction and custody of the goods.
Section 1206 of the Tariff and Customs Code imposes upon the Collector of Customs the duty to hold
possession of all imported articles upon which duties, taxes, and other charges have not been paid or secured
to be paid, and to dispose of the same according to law. The goods in question, therefore, were under the
custody and at the disposal of the Bureau of Customs at the time the petition for mandamus, docketed as Civil
Case No. 67496, was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila on November 9, 1966. The Court of First
Instance of Manila, therefore, could not exercise jurisdiction over said goods even if the warrant of seizure and
detention of the goods for the purposes of the seizure and forfeiture proceedings had not yet been issued by
the Collector of Customs.

The ruling in the case of "Alberto de Joya, et al. v. Hon. Gregorio Lantin, et al.," G.R. No. L-24037, decided by
this Court on April 27, 1967, is squarely applicable to the instant case. In the De Joya case, it appears that
Francindy Commercial of Manila bought from Ernerose Commercial of Cebu City 90 bales of assorted textiles
and rags, valued at P117,731.00, which had been imported and entered thru the port of Cebu. Ernerose
Commercial shipped the goods to Manila on board an inter-island vessel. When the goods where about to
leave the customs premises in Manila, on October 6, 1964, the customs authorities held them for further
verification, and upon examination the goods were found to be different from the declaration in the cargo
manifest of the carrying vessel. Francindy Commercial subsequently demanded from the customs authorities
the release of the goods, asserting that it is a purchaser in good faith of those goods; that a local purchaser
was involved so the Bureau of Customs had no right to examine the goods; and that the goods came from a
coastwise port. On October 26, 1964, Francindy Commercial filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila a
petition for mandamus against the Commissioner of Customs and the Collector of Customs of the port of
Manila to compel said customs authorities to release the goods.

Francindy Commercial alleged in its petition for mandamus that the Bureau of Customs had no
jurisdiction over the goods because the same were not imported to the port of Manila; that it was not liable
for duties and taxes because the transaction was not an original importation; that the goods were not in the
hands of the importer nor subject to importer's control, nor were the goods imported contrary to law with its
(Francindy Commercial's) knowledge; and that the importation had been terminated. On November 12, 1964,
the Collector of Customs of Manila issued a warrant of seizure and identification against the goods. On
December 3, 1964, the Commissioner of Customs and the Collector of Customs, as respondents in the
mandamus case, filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, lack of cause of
action, and in view of the pending seizure and forfeiture proceedings. The Court of First Instance held
resolution on the motion to dismiss in abeyance pending decision on the merits. On December 14, 1964, the
Court of First Instance of Manila issued a preventive and mandatory injunction, on prayer by Francindy
Commercial, upon a bond of P20,000.00. The Commissioner of Customs and the Collector of Customs sought
the lifting of the preliminary and mandatory injunction, and the resolution of their motion to dismiss. The
Court of First Instance of Manila, however, on January 12, 1965, ordered them to comply with the preliminary
and mandatory injunction, upon the filing by Francindy Commercial of an additional bond of P50,000.00. Said
customs authorities thereupon filed with this Court, on January 14, 1965, a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction. In resolving the question raised in that case, this Court held:

This petition raises two related issues: first, has the Customs bureau jurisdiction to seize the goods and
institute forfeiture proceedings against them? and (2) has the Court of First Instance jurisdiction to entertain
the petition for mandamus to compel the Customs authorities to release the goods?

Francindy Commercial contends that since the petition in the Court of first Instance was filed (on
October 26, 1964) ahead of the issuance of the Customs warrant of seizure and forfeiture (on November 12,
1964),the Customs bureau should yield the jurisdiction of the said court.

The record shows, however, that the goods in question were actually seized on October 6, 1964, i.e.,
before Francindy Commercial sued in court. The purpose of the seizure by the Customs bureau was to verify
whether or not Custom duties and taxes were paid for their importation. Hence, on December 23, 1964,
Customs released 22 bales thereof, for the same were found to have been released regularly from the Cebu
Port (Petition Annex "L"). As to goods imported illegally or released irregularly from Customs custody, these
are subject to seizure under Section 2530 m. of the Tariff and Customs Code (RA 1957).
 The Bureau of Customs has jurisdiction and power, among others to collect revenues from imported
articles, fines and penalties and suppress smuggling and other frauds on customs; and to enforce tariff and
customs laws (Sec. 602, Republic Act 1957).

The goods in question are imported articles entered at the Port of Cebu. Should they be found to have
been released irregularly from Customs custody in Cebu City, they are subject to seizure and forfeiture, the
proceedings for which comes within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs pursuant to Republic Act 1937.

Said proceeding should be followed; the owner of the goods may set up defenses therein (Pacis v.
Averia, L-22526, Nov. 20, 1966.) From the decision of the Commissioner of Customs appeal lies to the Court of
Tax Appeals, as provided in Sec. 2402 of Republic Act 1937 and Sec. 11 of Republic Act, 1125. To permit
recourse to the Court of First Instance in cases of seizure of imported goods would in effect render ineffective
the power of the Customs authorities under the Tariff and Customs Code and deprive the Court of Tax Appeals
of one of its exclusive appellate jurisdictions. As this Court has ruled in Pacis v. Averia, supra, Republic Acts
1937 and 1125 vest jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture proceedings exclusively upon the Bureau of
Customs and the Court of Tax Appeals. Such law being special in nature, while the Judiciary Act defining the
jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance is a general legislation, not to mention that the former are later
enactments, the Court of First Instance should yield to the jurisdiction of the Customs authorities.

It is the settled rule, therefore, that the Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over imported
goods, for the purposes of enforcement of the customs laws, from the moment the goods are actually in its
possession or control, even if no warrant of seizure or detention had previously been issued by the Collector
of Customs in connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings. In the present case, the Bureau of Customs
actually seized the goods in question on November 4, 1966, and so from that date the Bureau of Customs
acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the purposes of the enforcement of the tariff and customs laws, to the
exclusion of the regular courts. Much less then would the Court of First Instance of Manila have jurisdiction
over the goods in question after the Collector of Customs had issued the warrant of seizure and detention on
January 12, 1967. 10 And so, it cannot be said, as respondents contend, that the issuance of said warrant was
only an attempt to divest the respondent Judge of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The court
presided by respondent Judge did not acquire jurisdiction over the goods in question when the petition for
mandamus was filed before it, and so there was no need of divesting it of jurisdiction. Not having acquired
jurisdiction over the goods, it follows that the Court of First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction to issue the
questioned order of March 7, 1967 releasing said goods.

Respondents also aver that petitioner Martin Alagao, an officer of the Manila Police Department, could
not seize the goods in question without a search warrant. This contention cannot be sustained. The Chief of
the Manila Police Department, Ricardo G. Papa, having been deputized in writing by the Commissioner of
Customs, could, for the purposes of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, effect searches, seizures,
and arrests, 11 and it was his duty to make seizure, among others, of any cargo, articles or other movable
property when the same may be subject to forfeiture or liable for any fine imposed under customs and tariff
laws. 12 He could lawfully open and examine any box, trunk, envelope or other container wherever found
when he had reasonable cause to suspect the presence therein of dutiable articles introduced into the
Philippines contrary to law; and likewise to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or person reasonably
suspected of holding or conveying such article as aforesaid. 13 It cannot be doubted, therefore, that petitioner
Ricardo G. Papa, Chief of Police of Manila, could lawfully effect the search and seizure of the goods in
question. The Tariff and Customs Code authorizes him to demand assistance of any police officer to effect said
search and seizure, and the latter has the legal duty to render said assistance. 14 This was what happened
precisely in the case of Lt. Martin Alagao who, with his unit, made the search and seizure of the two trucks
loaded with the nine bales of goods in question at the Agrifina Circle. He was given authority by the Chief of
Police to make the interception of the cargo. 15

Petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to effect the seizure without any
search warrant issued by a competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant in the
instant case. The Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and
Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a
dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, or
envelope or any person on board, or to stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected
of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law,
without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases. 16 But in the search of a dwelling house, the
Code provides that said "dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon warrant issued by a judge or
justice of the peace. . . ." 17 It is our considered view, therefor, that except in the case of the search of a
dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure
without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws.

Our conclusion finds support in the case of Carroll v. United States, 39 A.L.R., 790, 799, wherein the
court, considering a legal provision similar to Section 2211 of the Philippine Tariff and Customs Code, said as
follows:

Thus contemporaneously with the adoption of the 4th Amendment, we find in the first Congress, and in
the following second and fourth Congresses, a difference made as to the necessity for a search warrant
between goods subject to forfeiture, when concealed in a dwelling house of similar place, and like goods in
course of transportation and concealed in a movable vessel, where readily they could be put out of reach of a
search warrant. . . .

Again, by the 2d section of the Act of March 3, 1815 (3 Stat. at L.231, 232, chap. 94), it was made lawful
for customs officers not only to board and search vessels within their own and adjoining districts, but also to
stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or person on which or whom they should suspect there was
merchandise which was subject to duty, or had been introduced into the United States in any manner contrary
to law, whether by the person in charge of the vehicle or beast or otherwise, and if they should find any
goods, wares, or merchandise thereon, which they had probably cause to believe had been so unlawfully
brought into the country, to seize and secure the same, and the vehicle or beast as well, for trial and
forfeiture. This Act was renewed April 27, 1816 (3 Sta. at L. 315, chap. 100), for a year and expired. The Act of
February 28, 1865, revived § 2 of the Act of 1815, above described, chap. 67, 13 Stat. at L. 441. The substance
of this section was re-enacted in the 3d section of the Act of July 18, 1866, chap. 201, 14 Stat. at L. 178, and
was thereafter embodied in the Revised Statutes as § 3061, Comp. Stat. § 5763, 2 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p.
1161. Neither § 3061 nor any of its earlier counterparts has ever been attacked as unconstitutional. Indeed,
that section was referred to and treated as operative by this court in Von Cotzhausen v. Nazro, 107 U.S. 215,
219, 27 L. ed. 540, 541, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 503. . . .

In the instant case, we note that petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen did not have to
make any search before they seized the two trucks and their cargo. In their original petition, and amended
petition, in the court below Remedios Mago and Valentin Lanopa did not even allege that there was a search.
18 All that they complained of was,

That while the trucks were on their way, they were intercepted without any search warrant near the
Agrifina Circle and taken to the Manila Police Department, where they were detained.
 But even if there was a search, there is still authority to the effect that no search warrant would be
needed under the circumstances obtaining in the instant case. Thus, it has been held that:

The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is construed as recognizing a
necessary difference between a search of a dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a search
warrant may readily be obtained and a search of a ship, motorboat, wagon, or automobile for contraband
goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. (47 Am. Jur., pp. 513-514, citing Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 69 L. ed., 543, 45 S. Ct., 280, 39 A.L.R., 790; People v. Case, 320 Mich., 379, 190 N.W.,
389, 27 A.L.R., 686.)

In the case of People v. Case (320 Mich., 379, 190 N.W., 389, 27 A.L.R., 686), the question raised by
defendant's counsel was whether an automobile truck or an automobile could be searched without search
warrant or other process and the goods therein seized used afterwards as evidence in a trial for violation of
the prohibition laws of the State. Same counsel contended the negative, urging the constitutional provision
forbidding unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court said:

. . . Neither our state nor the Federal Constitution directly prohibits search and seizure without a
warrant, as is sometimes asserted. Only "unreasonable" search and seizure is forbidden. . . .

. . . The question whether a seizure or a search is unreasonable in the language of the Constitution is a
judicial and not a legislative question; but in determining whether a seizure is or is not unreasonable, all of the
circumstances under which it is made must be looked to.

The automobile is a swift and powerful vehicle of recent development, which has multiplied by quantity
production and taken possession of our highways in battalions until the slower, animal-drawn vehicles, with
their easily noted individuality, are rare. Constructed as covered vehicles to standard form in immense
quantities, and with a capacity for speed rivaling express trains, they furnish for successful commission of
crime a disguising means of silent approach and swift escape unknown in the history of the world before their
advent. The question of their police control and reasonable search on highways or other public places is a
serious question far deeper and broader than their use in so-called "bootleging" or "rum running," which is
itself is no small matter. While a possession in the sense of private ownership, they are but a vehicle
constructed for travel and transportation on highways. Their active use is not in homes or on private premises,
the privacy of which the law especially guards from search and seizure without process. The baffling extent to
which they are successfully utilized to facilitate commission of crime of all degrees, from those against
morality, chastity, and decency, to robbery, rape, burglary, and murder, is a matter of common knowledge.
Upon that problem a condition, and not a theory, confronts proper administration of our criminal laws.
Whether search of and seizure from an automobile upon a highway or other public place without a search
warrant is unreasonable is in its final analysis to be determined as a judicial question in view of all the
circumstances under which it is made.

Having declared that the seizure by the members of the Manila Police Department of the goods in
question was in accordance with law and by that seizure the Bureau of Customs had acquired jurisdiction over
the goods for the purpose of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, to the exclusion of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, We have thus resolved the principal and decisive issue in the present case. We do not
consider it necessary, for the purposes of this decision, to discuss the incidental issues raised by the parties in
their pleadings.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:

 (a) Granting the writ of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by petitioners;

(b) Declaring null and void, for having been issued without jurisdiction, the order of respondent Judge
Hilarion U. Jarencio, dated March 7, 1967, in Civil Code No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila;

(c) Declaring permanent the preliminary injunction issued by this Court on March 31, 1967 restraining
respondent Judge from executing, enforcing and/or implementing his order of March 7, 1967 in Civil Case No.
67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and from proceeding in any manner in said case;

(d) Ordering the dismissal of Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila;
and1äwphï1.ñët

(e) Ordering the private respondent, Remedios Mago, to pay the costs.

It is so ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ.,
concur.1äwphï1.ñët
 [ GR No. L-6858, May 31, 1956 ]

FERNANDO IGNACIO v. NORBERTO ELA +

DECISION

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Petitioners, in their behalf and for the benefit of other Jehovah's Witnesses in the province of Zambales,
brought this action to compel respondent to grant them a permit to hold a public meeting at the public
plaza of Sta. Cruz, Zambales, together with the kiosk, on such date and time as may be applied for by them.

Respondent, in his answer stated that he had not refused the request of petitioners to hold a religious
meeting at the public plaza as in fact he gave them permission to use the northwestern part of the plaza on
July 27, 1952, but they declined to avail of it. He prayed that the action be dismissed.

The questions of fact raised in the pleadings being not controverted, and petitioners having submitted a
motion for judgment on. the pleading?, which was concurred in by respondent, the court rendered a
decision dismissing the case without pronouncement as to costs. Plaintiffs appealed from this decision.

It appears that petitioners are members of the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society, commonly known as
Jehovah's Witnesses, whose tenets and principles are derogatory to those professed by the Catholic
organization. In its publication "face the pacts", that society branded the latter as a religious organization
which is "a part of the monstrosity now appearing in and claiming the right to rule the earth." Desiring to
hold a meeting in furtherance of its objectives, petitioners asked respondent to give them permission to
use the public plaza together with the kiosk, but, instead of granting the permission, respondent allowed
them to hold their meeting on the northwestern part corner of the plaza. He adopted as a policy not to
allow the use of the kiosk for any meeting by any religious denomination as it is his belief that said kiosk
should only be used "for legal purposes." And when their request for reconsideration was denied,
petitioners instituted the present action for mandamus. It is now contended by petitioners that the action
taken by respondent is unconstitutional being an abridgment of the freedom of speech, assembly, and
worship guaranteed by our Constitution.

The issue raised involves a little digression on the extent to which the right to peacefully assemble
guaranteed by the Constitution may be invoked. Fortunately, this issue has already been passed upon by this
Court in Primicias vs. Fugoso, 45 Official Gazette, 3280, wherein this Court said:

"The right to freedom of speech, and to peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by the constitutions of
democratic countries. But it is a settled principle growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil societies
that the exercise of those rights is not absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to
the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society.
The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign 'police
power', which is the power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good
order or safety, and general welfare of the people. This sovereign police power is exercised by the
government through its legislative branch by the enactment of laws regulating those and other constitutional
and civil rights, and it may be delegated to political subdivisions, such as towns, municipalities and cities by
authorizing their legislative bodies called municipal and city councils to enact ordinances for the purpose."

It therefore appears that the right to freedom of speech and to peacefully assemble, though guaranteed by
our Constitution, is not absolute, for it may be regulated in order that it may not be "injurious to the
equal, enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society", and
this power may be exercised under the "police power" of the state, which is the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the
people. It is true that there is no law nor ordinance which expressly confers upon respondents the power to
regulate the use of the public plaza, together.with its kiosk, for the purposes for which it was established,
but such power may be exercised under his broad powers as chief executive in connection with his specific
duty "to issue orders relating to the police or to public safety" within the municipality (section 2194,
paragraph c, Revised Administrative Code). And it may even be said that the above regulation has been
adopted as an implementation of the constitutional provision which prohibits any public property to be used,
directly or indirectly, by any religious denomination (paragraph 3, section 23, Article VI of the
Constitution).

The power exercised by respondent cannot be considered as capricious or arbitrary considering the peculiar
circumstances of this case. It appears that the public plaza, particularly the kiosk, is located at a short
distance from the Roman Catholic Church. The proximity of said church to the kiosk has caused some
concern on the part of the authorities that to avoid disturbance of peace and order, or the happening of
untoward incidents, they deemed it necessary to prohibit the use of that kiosk by any religious denomination
as a place of meeting of its members. This was the policy adopted by respondent for sometime previous to
the request made by petitioners. Respondent never denied such request but merely tried to enforce his
policy by assigning them the northwestern part of the public plaza. It cannot therefore be said that
petitioners were denied their constitutional right to assemble for, as was said, such right is subject to
regulation to maintain public order and public safety. This is especially so considering that the tenets of
petitioners congregation are derogatory to those of the Roman Catholic Church, a factor which respondent
must have considered in denying their request.

It is true that the foregoing conclusion is predicated on facts which do not appear in the pleadings nor are
supported by any evidence because none was presented for the reason that the case was submitted on a
motion for judgment on the pleadings, but those facts like the situation of the "kiosko" and the occurrence of
religious controversies which disturbed the peace and order in the municipality of Sta. Cruz are matters
which may be deemed to come within the judicial knowledge of the court as in fact they were so considered
by the trial judge in his decision. This is what he said on this point: "The presiding judge, through information,
personal experience and through the papers, has known of unfortunate events which caused the
disturbance of peace and order in the community. If the petitioners should be allowed to use the 'kiosko'
which is within the hearing distance of the catholic church, this may give rise to disturbance of other religious
ceremonies performed in the church." (Italics supplied.) This action of the judge may be justified under
section 5, Rule 123, of the Rules of Court, which is elaborated by this Court in the following wise:

There are facts, indeed of which courts should take judicial cognizance. These facts refer to a variety of
subjects legislative, political, historical, geographical, commercial scientific, and artificial in addition, to a
wide range of matters, arising in the ordinary course of nature or the general current of human events.
The matter of judicial notice is ever expanding and will surely keep pace with the advance! of the sciences
and the arts. But, a matter to be judicially cognizable must be well-established or authoritatively settled,
or of common or general knowledge. Obviously, courts should take notice of whatever is or should be
generally known because judges should not be more ignorant than the rest of mankind.' (The Municipal
Board of the City of Manila, et al. vs. Segundo Agustin, 65 Phil., 144.) (Italics supplied.)
The contention that the northwestern part of the plaza, cannot be considered as part of said plaza but of the
road in the northwestern portion beyond the concrete fence is untenable, for it appears that that portion is
part of the plaza and has a space capable of accommodating hundreds of people. In fact, during the past
celebrations of the traditional town fiesta of the municipality, said portion has been utilized by the
authorities as a place for staging dramas, zarzuelas, and cinematograph shows. Verily, the pretense of
petitioners cannot be attributed to the unsuitability of that portion as a meeting place but rather to their
obstinate desire to use the kiosk knowing it to be contrary to the policy of the municipality.[1]

The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs

against petitioners.

Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Jugo, Labrador, and Endencia, JJ., concur.

[1] These facts are not disputed by appellant in the memoranda they have submitted after oral argument.

DISSENTING:

CONCEPCION, J.,

With due respect to the majority opinion, I am constrained to dissent for the following reasons:

1. It is admitted in respondent's answer that (as stated in paragraph VIII of the petition) counsel for the
petitioners had, on August 25, 1952, written to respondent a letter reading in part as follows:

"May I therefore, request your kind office to grant a permit to Messrs. Fernando Ignacio and Simeon de la
Cruz to use the public plaza with the 'kiosko' therein located for the purpose of holding a public lecture to be
held on such date and time as shall be chosen by them and subject of course to your final approval."

and that (as alleged in paragraph IX of the petition) "respondent mayor has not by any manner answered
and responded" to the aforementioned letter. In other words, respondent herein has not granted any
permit for the holding, anywhere or under any condition, of the public lecture referred to in said letter,
although it is impliedly conceded that petitioners are entitled to hold such public lecture.
 2. The majority decision, and that of the lower court, invoke the police power of the State as authority
for the policy of respondent herein of not permitting the use of the town plaza proper, including
the stand or kiosko therein, by petitioners herein. I do not believe that this view is supported by
the pleadings, which, in the case at bar, are controlling, the case having been submitted for decision
on the pleadings.

In an effort to justify his failure to act on the above quoted letter of the petitioners, respondent (who,
seemingly, is a lawyer or has studied law, for he signed his pleadings and appeared, in the lower court, in
his own behalf) alleged, in his answer, by way of special defense, that he had

"put up an off-limit to use the 'kiosko' for any religious meeting, conference, or rites by any religious
denominations, as it is his belief, in good faith, that said 'kiosko', although a public edifice is intended for
use by the general public, only on legal purposes and objectives other than religious one." (Record on
Appeal, pp. 12- 13.)

This allegation indicates that respondent's policy was prompted, not by considerations of public order, but
by his belief that no public property may be used for religious purposes, even if there were no danger of
breach of peace. In other words, what he had in mind was the provision of Article VI, section 23, paragraph
3, of the Constitution; reading:

"No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use,
benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or for
the/use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such,
except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal
institution, orphanage, or leprosarium."

Indeed, had his policy been motivated by a concern for the preservation of harmony and good will among the
people, respondent would have applied his off-limit policy not merely to religious meetings, but, also, to any
activity which might lead to a public, disturbance.

There is another clear proof that the protection of peace and order had nothing to do with said policy of
respondent herein. In paragraph XII of the petition it is asserted:

"That petitioners desire to hold peaceful meetings, in the town of Sta. Cruz, in the province of Zambales."

Replying thereto, respondent said, in paragraph (6) of his answer:

"That the respondent has no knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the statements contained
in paragraphs XI and XII of the petition"

Had respondent refrained from acting upon petitioners request for permit, or adopted his aforementioned
off-limit policy, for fear that petitioners may provoke a public disorder, said respondent would have so
alleged in his answer, instead of stating therein that he had "no knowledge sufficient to form a belief" in
connection with the peaceful nature of petitioners' proposed meetings. If he had no such knowledge
sufficient to form a belief, then he could not have entertained' the aforesaid fear of breach of the peace.

3. The above quoted special defense in respondent's answer advances the proposition that religious
assemblies or gatherings may not be held in public property, which is obviously false. Public squares,
roads, highways and buildings are devoted to public use, and, as such, are open to all, without
distinction. Incidentally to such use, religious acts may be performed in said public property. It is the
appropriation thereof mainly for religious purposes that the. Constitution does not sanction. Thus,
 for injstance, public lands may not be donated for the construction thereon of churches, convents
or seminaries. However, public streets, boulevards and thoroughfares are used, almost daily, for
religious processions in the Philippines. Masses and. other religious services are often held at the
Luneta, the Quirino Grandstand and the Rizal Memorial Stadium, in the City of Manila, as well as in
other public property, such as penal institutions, leprosaria and army camps. So long as the use of
public property for religious purposes is incidental and temporary, and such as to be reasonably
compatible with the use td which other members of th« community are similarly entitled, or may
be authorized to make, the injunction in section 23(3) of Article VI of the Constitution is not infringed
(see Aglipay vs. Ruiz, 64 Phil., 201; People vs. Fernandez, CA-G. R. No. 1128-R).

4. A mere general possibility which, at any rate, may be remote that, if petitioners were allowed to use
the grandstand in the,town square of Sta. Cruz, Zambales, they may say or do something tending to
disturb public order, is insufficient to warrant denial of the license prayed for. Otherwise, we
would, in effect, nullify the Bill of Eights, for all rights are susceptible of abuse and, hence, the
possibility of such abuse, is always present in the exercise of any right. In this connection, it is
important to note that petitioner's aforementioned request is covered by the constitutional
mandates on due process, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and freedom of religion.
Obviously, a right of such magnitude as to be guaranteed by no less than four (4) provisions of the
fundamental law and these of the most transcendental and vital to the democratic system underlying
the structure of our Republic cannot be curtailed on the basis of an abstract and speculative possibility
of a threat to peace or breach of peace, which may or may not result, if and when, in the exercise of
their religious profession, petitioners should transcend the proper bounds, for which, at any rate,
they could, and would, be punished under existing laws.

5. In an effort to bolster up the position therein taken, the decision appealed from says that the permit
sought by petitioners, If granted "may give rise to disturbance of other religious ceremonies
performed" in the Catholic Church, which is said to be "within hearing distance'* from the
aforementioned kiosko and would amount to giving petitioners a "license to disturb anytime the
religious practices or ceremonies of that rival denomination". The weakness of this view is patent.

To begin with, respondent could and, perhaps, should limit the time at which petitioners could give their
lectures on religion. Secondly, a license to hold such lectures is not a grant of authority to disturb the
religious services held in said Catholic Church. Thirdly, it is a matter of common knowledged that Catholic
Churches are not open throughout the day. Masses, if any, are held in the morning. There may be
weddings, baptisms and other religious services before noon and often times in the late afternoon, but,
generally, such churches are closed in the evening. Masses, and other religious activities are not held daily
in some churches, particularly in chapels. Hence, petitioners could be authorized to give their lectures at such
times as would avoid any possible interference with the normal activities of said Catholic Church.

6. Said decision further states that the stand in the public square is within the hearing distance of said
Catholic Church. The majority decision adds that "the proximity of said church to the kiosko has
caused some concern on the part of the authorities". There is, however, no allegation in the
pleadings, or proof, to this effect. Such is merely the impression that the Judge a quo tended to
convey in his decision, without anything in the record to bear it, but predicated, in the language of
said decision, upon his avowed knowledge acquired "through information, personal experience and
through the papers" of "unfortunate events which caused the disturbance of peace and order in
community". Regardless of the propriety of considering such knowledge and information of the trial
Judge as a factor in deciding the case, it seems evident that the events alluded to did not take place in
Sta. Cruz, Zambales, and did not refer to incidents t provoked, either by petitioners herein, or by
 Jehovah's Witnesses, the sect to which they belong. Otherwise, said events would have surely been
pleaded specifically in respondent's answer. The same, in fact, indicates that there had been no such
"events" in Sta. Cruz, Zambales, as may be deduced from respondent's above quoted allegation to the
effect that he has "no knowledge sufficient to form a beliefh on the peaceful character of the
meetings sought to be held by petitioners herein.
7.
8. I cannot but take exception to the statement, in the majority opinion, that "the situation of
the kiosko and the occurrence of religious controversies which disturbed the peace and order in the
municipality of Sta. Cruz, are matters which may be deemed to come within the judicial knowledge
of the court, as in fact they were so considered by the trial Judge in his decision". The lower court did
not mention and, I think, it did not have in mind any particular breach of peace in the municipality of
Sta. Cruz. It did not say so in the decision appealed from. In fact, respondent's brief has not
specified, or even hinted, any such incident "in the municipality of Sta. Cruz."

Moreover, such incident, if any, is not one of which courts may take judicial cognizance of. Rule 123,
section 5 of the Rules of Court specifies what matters are subject to judicial notice. It provides:

"The existence and territorial extent of states, their forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law
of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and
history of, the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the
Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, the geographical divisions and political history of the
world, and all smaller matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable
demonstration, or sought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions, shall be judicially
recognized by the court without the introduction of proof; but the court may receive evidence upon any of
the subjects in this section stated, when it shall find it necessary for its own information, and may resort
for its aid to appropriate books or documents of reference."

Nothing contained in this section has any bearing on the events above referred to, except possibly the
clause relative to "all similar matters which are of public knowledge". I believe, however, that there is no
public or common knowledge of any religious controversy that has brought about a disturbance of the
peace and order in Sta. Cruz, Zambales. What is more, the allegations in respondent's answer, as well as
the tenor of his brief, palpably show, to my mind, that there has never been any such breach of peace in
said municipality. Hence, in- dependently of the technical aspect of the question, would it not be too
hazardous for this Court to take judicial notice of something, the existence of which is, to say the least, so
debatable, that it may not be an objective reality?

8. Even, however, if the grandstand in the public square of Sta. Cruz, Zambales, were within the hearing
distance of the Catholic Church, the decision appealed from must, to my mind, be reversed.
Practically, all plazas in the Philippines have a church nearby. Besides, thousands of churches and
chapels may be found in the populated portions of our municipalities, barrios, sitios or other
smaller communities. Affirmance of the decision appealed from would imply, therefore, that religious
sects or denominations, other than those to which said churches or chapels belong, could be barred
from engaging in religious activities within the hearing distance thereof. Considering that modern
technology, particularly the use of amplifiers, has extended, and is still extending, considerably the
range of the hearing distance, it is clear that, in order to be beyond that range, said religious sects or
denominations would have to hold their services or gatherings far away from the town or the
populated localities where people are less likely to be. In other words, the late commers would have
to preach in the desert or, at least, in deserted places.
 9. The majority decision, likewise, states:

"It appears that petitioners are members of the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society, commonly known as
Jehovah's Witnesses, whose tenets and principles are deregatory to those professed by the Catholic
organization. In its publication 'Face the Facts', that society branded the latter as a religious organization
which is a part of the monstrosity now appearing in and claiming the right to rule the earth"

The publication alluded to has not been introduced in evidence. It has not been incorporated in the
pleadings. I do not think it belongs to the class which is subject to judicial notice. Said statement in the
majority opinion is based only upon a quotation in respondent's brief.

Assuming said publication to be a fact, it is my firm conviction that the writ prayed for must be granted. It is
not unreasonable to assume, as I do, that all sects, churches, denominations, sectarian institutions and
systems of religion that refuse to recognize the supreme authority of the Holy See, consider the same, or its
policies, more or less as a "monstrosity". They may not officially use this word to characterize their opinion
about the Roman Catholic Church, but, their disagreement with the latter must be fundamental or serious
enough for them to consider the position of the Catholic Church comparable to that of a monster.
Otherwise, said religious organizations would nave joined hands with Catholic church or would not have
seceded therefrom. In any event, everyday experience shows that, in the political field, minority parties
generally regard and publicly proclaim that the administration of the Government by the party in power is so
clumsy,, corrupt and inimical to the interest of the people as to be tantamount to, if not worst than, a
monstrosity. If such criticism sufficed to warrant denial to the critic of a license to speak within the hearing
of the "monster", then minority parties could be enjoined from holding public meetings within hearing
distance of public buildings, for the same are occupied, used by, or under the care of men chosen by, and
generally belonging to, the majority party.

In short, carried to its logical conclusion, the proposition that one may be prevented from speaking within the
hearing distance of another, if the former considers the views or policies of the latter as a monstrosity,
would lead to consequences which are inconsistent with the fundamental principles upon which our
Constitution and Republic are based.

10. The case of Fugoso vs. Primicias (45 Off. Gaz., 3280), cited in the majority opinion, is authority in favor
of petitioners herein, for it applied the clear and present danger rule, and no such clear and present
danger exists in the case at bar. It is true that said rule has not been consistently adhered to by this
Court, and that the same has, in effect, shown its preference for the dangerous tendency rule.
However, in every case in which the latter was applied, there had been a tangible specific act of the
party adversely affected thereby, which incited or tended to incite in a substantial manner a breach of
the peace. Thus, in People vs. Evangelista (51 Phil., 254), People vs. Nabong (57 Phil., 455), and
People vs. Feleo (58 Phil., 573), the defendants were found to have advocated the overthrow of the
government by the use of force. The defendant in People vs. Perez (45 Phil., 599), had expressed
himself publicly in favor of beheading our then Governor-General Wood. In the case of
Espuelas vs. People of the Philippines (90 Phil., 524, December 17, 1951), this Court held that the
acts of Espuelas tended to stir up the people against lawful authorities. In
Evangelista vs. Earnshaw (57 Phil., 255), we upheld the refusal of the Mayor of Manila to grant permit
to the communist party to hold further political meetings in said city, after the members of said party
had in public meetings incited the people to rise in arms against the government, for which reason
several criminal cases for sedition were filed against the leaders of said party, who, subsequently,
were convicted of the crimes charged against them.
In the case at bar, it is not claimed that petitioners themselves, or their immediate associates, had ever
performed any illegal or even improper act in preaching the tenets of their faith. Respondent's answer
indicates that, prior to the date set forth in petitioners request for license, or July 27, 1952, said petitioners
had been allowed to hold a religious meeting, though not in the grandstand in question, and seemingly, had
held said meeting. Yet, nothing appears to have been said or done in the course thereof, which could be, or
is being, assailed on legal or moral grounds. Hence, the position taken by respondent mayor is to my mind
absolutely untenable.

Paras, C. J., Reyes, A., and Reyes, J. B. L., JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 139907. March 28, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. MARCELO BATES, Accused-Appellant.

MARCELO BATES, JR. (At-Large), accused.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before us is an appeal taken by accused Marcelo Bates from the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Ormoc City (Branch 35) finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and sentencing
him to suffer imprisonment of forty years of reclusion perpetua.

The Information states:

That on or about the 28th day of November 1995, at around 5:30 oclock in the afternoon, in Brgy. Esperanza,
Ormoc City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused MARCELO BATES
and MARCELO BATES, JR., conspiring together and confederating with and mutually helping and aiding one
another, with treachery, evident premeditation and intent to kill, being then armed with long bolos, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab and hack to death the person of the victim herein, JOSE
BOHOLST without giving the latter sufficient time to defend himself, thereby inflicting upon him multiple
wounds which caused his instantaneous death. Death Certificate and Autopsy Report are hereto attached. In
violation of Article 248, Revised Penal Code.1cräläwvirtualibräry

Upon arraignment, Marcelo Bates entered a plea of not guilty.

The version of the prosecution:

Around 2:00 in the afternoon of November 28, 1995, Edgar Fuentes, Simon Fuentes and Jose Boholst left
Barangay Esperanza, Ormoc City to deliver copra to a certain Fely Rodado at Barangay Green Valley, Ormoc
City. After delivering copra around 5:00 in the afternoon, the three men headed back to Barangay Esperanza.
While they were along a trail leading to the house of Carlito Bates, the latter suddenly emerged from the thick
banana plantation surrounding the trail, aiming his firearm at Jose Boholst who was then walking ahead of his
companions. Jose grabbed Carlitos right hand and elbow and tried to wrest possession of the firearm. While
the two were grappling for possession, the gun fired, hitting Carlito who immediately fell to the ground. At
that instant, Marcelo Bates and his son Marcelo Bates, Jr., brother and nephew of Carlito, respectively,
emerged from the banana plantation, each brandishing a bolo. They immediately attacked Jose hacking him
several times. Jose fell to the ground and rolled but Marcelo and his son kept on hacking him. Marcelo, then,
turned to Simon and Edgar and shouted huwes de kutsilyo. Upon hearing the same, Simon and Edgar
ran.2cräläwvirtualibräry

Around 5:30 of the same afternoon, Concepcion Boholst, wife of Jose, was at their home preparing dinner.
Upon being informed by a certain Violeta Fuentes that Jose was waylaid, she immediately went to the place
where the incident reportedly happened which is less than a hundred meters from their house. There, she saw
Marcelo Bates and his son Marcelo, Jr. hacking Jose who was lying face up. She pleaded for them to stop but
they did not listen. She did not see Carlito. She went home fearing for her life, thinking that Marcelo and his
son might turn their ire on her.3cräläwvirtualibräry
The version of the defense:

Around 5:00 in the afternoon of November 28, 1995, Ponciano Sano went to the house of Marcelo Bates.
Ponciano was sent by Barangay Captain Feliseo Sano to get a chicken from Marcelo. While they were trying to
catch a chicken, they noticed Jose Boholst, Edgar Fuentes, and Simon Fuentes approach the house of Carlito
Bates which is about twenty meters away from Marcelos house. Thereafter, they saw Jose drag Carlito out of
the latters house while both were arguing and grappling. Marcelo immediately ran towards Jose and Carlito
but when Marcelo was about to approach them, Jose shot Carlito with a gun. Edgar and Simon ran away. Upon
seeing Carlito fall to the ground, Marcelo attacked Jose but the latter also fired a shot at him. However,
Marcelo was able to duck and avoid being shot. Jose was about to shoot Marcelo a second time but the latter
retaliated by hacking Jose with a bolo hitting him on his neck and causing him to fall to the ground. Marcelo
then went to the aid of his brother Carlito but upon seeing that he was already dead, he went back to where
Jose was lying and again hacked him. Thereafter, Ponciano picked up the gun used by Jose and surrendered it
to Barangay Captain Sano. Marcelo also surrendered himself to the said barangay captain. During the whole
incident Marcelo Bates, Jr. was not present.4cräläwvirtualibräry

Upholding the prosecution evidence, the trial court rendered its Judgment, dated June 4, 1999, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:

Wherefore, all the foregoing considered, the Court finds the accused Marcelo Bates GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as charged and hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment of
forty (40) years reclusion perpetua after appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, and
to pay the offended party the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity and another sum of P50,000.00 as moral
damages.

If the accused is a detainee, the period of his imprisonment shall be credited to him in full provided he abides
in writing by the terms and conditions for convicted prisoners, otherwise, for only four-fifths (4/5) thereof.

SO ORDERED.

Aggrieved, Marcelo Bates brought the present appeal. He raises the following:

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING EXCULPATORY WEIGHT TO THE DEFENSE INTERPOSED BY
ACCUSED APPELLANT.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE AND
INCONSISTENT TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.

III

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY
DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE ITS ATTENDANCE IN THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME
CHARGED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT DID NOT ACT IN SELF-DEFENSE.
IV

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING PASSION AND OBFUSCATION AS A MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE IN FAVOR OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT ON ASSUMPTION THAT THE LATTER DID NOT ACT IN SELF-
DEFENSE.5cräläwvirtualibräry

Appellant claims self-defense. Under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, anyone who acts in defense of his
person or rights do not incur any criminal liability provided that the following circumstances concur: First,
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; second, reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent
or repel it; and third, lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.6 It is a settled
rule that when an accused admits killing the victim but invokes self-defense, it is incumbent upon him to prove
by clear and convincing evidence that he acted in self-defense; and as the burden of the evidence is thus
shifted to him, he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the
prosecution.7cräläwvirtualibräry

After scrutiny of the evidence presented, we agree with the trial court that self-defense was not established
by appellant. He testified that he initially inflicted only a single hack wound on the neck of Jose causing the
latter to fall to the ground. He then went to the aid of his brother Carlito but upon finding that he was already
dead, he went back to where Jose fell. Appellant admitted that at that time, Jose was in a lying position still
alive but hardly moving.8 Under such a situation, Jose could have hardly put up any defense, much less, make
an aggressive move against appellant. Despite Joses condition, appellant repeatedly hacked Jose. Granting
that Jose was the one who first committed unlawful aggression, appellant was no longer justified in further
inflicting wounds upon Jose because at that time, the latter was already lying helpless on the ground. At that
moment, unlawful aggression on the part of Jose had ceased. It is a settled rule that when unlawful aggression
ceases, the defender has no longer any right to kill or wound the former aggressor, otherwise, retaliation and
not self-defense is committed.9 Hence, the fact that unlawful aggression on the part of Jose already ceased
when Marcelo repeatedly hacked him rules out the possibility of self-defense, whether complete or
incomplete.10 Thus, the first assigned error is without merit.

In his second assigned error, appellant questions the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. We have time
and again, held that the issue of credibility is a question best addressed to the province of the trial court
because of its unique position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses
deportment on the stand while testifying which opportunity is denied to the appellate courts; and absent any
substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the trial courts assessments and conclusions, the
reviewing court is generally bound by the formers findings, particularly when no significant facts and
circumstances were shown to have been overlooked or disregarded which when considered would have
affected the outcome of the case.11 In the present case, the trial court found the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses to be more credible than those of the defense witnesses.

We find no cogent reason to depart from the findings of the trial court.

Prosecution witness Edgar Fuentes testified that Jose and Carlito grappled for possession of the gun. Appellant
insists that this is belied by the absence of gunpowder burns on the wound of Carlito. Appellant cites the
medical findings and the testimony of Dr. Rogelio Mercado who conducted the autopsy on the bodies of Jose
and Carlito, to the effect that the absence of gunpowder burns on the wound of Carlito would indicate that he
and Jose did not fight for the possession of the gun. We are not convinced.
The finding of the physician is not certain and conclusive as it is contradicted by no less than appellant himself
when he testified, as follows:

Q. After you noticed Jose Boholst with two companions went to your house of your elder brother, what did
you notice if there was any?

A. This Jose Boholst dragged my elder brother from the door to the yard.

Q. And how far were you at that time when you noticed that Jose Boholst drag your brother?

A. At the same distance of about 20 meters from our house.

Q. While you said that Jose Boholst dragged your brother Carlito Bates, were they arguing with each other?

A. Yes, sir and they were grabbling(sic).

Q. Do you know what they were arguing about?

A. Ive heard that they were arguing about the palm of the coconut tree.

Q. What else did you know if you notice that Carlito Bates was arguing as a matter of fact they were
grabbling(sic) each other, what did you do?

A. Jose Boholst shot my elder brother.

Q. My question is, after you noticed that Jose Boholst and Carlito Bates were arguing, what if any did you do?

A. I approached them.

Q. Why?

A. I was about to settle them down, but when I arrived and my brother already fell down.

Q. What happened to your brother, why did he fell down?

A. Because he was shot by Jose Boholst.12cräläwvirtualibräry

Further, appellant claims that the testimony of Concepcion Boholst should not be given credence. He argues
that if Concepcion really witnessed the killing of her husband, she should have seen the body of Carlito Bates
who was then lying dead on the ground at the place where her husband was allegedly being hacked and
stabbed. We are not persuaded.

We agree with the Office of the Solicitor General that it was natural for Concepcion to fail to notice the body
of Carlito when she was faced with the shocking scene of her husband being hacked and stabbed to death by
appellant and his son. The Supreme Court has long recognized that different people react differently to a given
type of situation, and there is no standard form of behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange,
startling or frightful experience.13 In the present case, it is perfectly normal for Concepcion to be oblivious of
the persons who were present at the crime scene at that time because of the frightening sight that confronted
her.
Appellant points out inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Edgar and Concepcion.
However, it is more apparent than real. Edgar and Concepcion witnessed the crime at different stages of its
execution. The failure of Edgar and Concepcion to see each other at the crime scene can be gathered from
their testimonies that at the time Concepcion arrived at the scene of the crime, Edgar, together with his
brother Simon, already left. Granting that there was indeed an inconsistency in the testimonies of Edgar and
Concepcion such is only a minor flaw that does not affect their credibility. Both did not detract from the main
fact at issue and were consistent in positively identifying appellant and his son as the ones who killed Jose.
Discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses referring to minor details, and not in
actuality touching upon the central fact of the crime, do not impair their credibility.14cräläwvirtualibräry

As to the failure of the prosecution to present other witnesses, the rule is settled that the prosecution is
imbued with the discretion to choose whom to present as witnesses.15 The prosecution need not present
each and every witness but only as may be needed to meet the quantum of proof necessary to establish the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The testimonies of the other witnesses may, therefore, be
dispensed with for being merely corroborative in nature. This Court has ruled that the non-presentation of
corroborative witnesses would not constitute suppression of evidence and would not be fatal to the
prosecutions cause.16 Hence, the non-presentation of Violeta Fuentes, Simon Fuentes and Junior Comesyon
as witnesses for the prosecution is not fatal to its cause nor may it be considered suppression of evidence, as
their testimonies would merely corroborate the earlier testimonies of Edgar and Concepcion.

However, we agree with the contention of the appellant that the trial court erred in appreciating the
qualifying circumstance of treachery.

The pertinent provision of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code reads:

Art. 14. Aggravating circumstances. The following are aggravating circumstances:

16. That the act be committed with treachery (alevosia).

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without
risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

Under established jurisprudence, two conditions must concur to establish treachery: (1) the employment of
means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate, and (2) the
means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted.17 We have held in a line of cases that:

[c]ircumstances which qualify criminal responsibility, such as treachery, cannot rest on mere conjecture, no
matter how reasonable or probable such conjecture may be. They must be based on facts of unquestionable
existence. Such circumstances must be proved as indubitably as the crime itself. Treachery as a qualifying
circumstance should be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.18cräläwvirtualibräry

In the present case, the only evidence presented by the prosecution to prove that there was treachery was the
testimony of Edgar Fuentes that while Jose and Carlito were grappling, he saw appellant and his son emerge
from the thick banana plantation and attack Jose with the bolos they were carrying. This, alone, does not
prove treachery. In People vs. Albao,19 we held that:
As a rule a sudden attack by the assailant, whether frontally or from behind, is treachery, if such mode of
attack was coolly and deliberately adopted by him with the purpose of depriving the victim of a chance to
either fight or retreat. The rule does not apply, however, where the sudden attack was not preconceived and
deliberately adopted but was just triggered by the sudden infuriation on the part of the accused because of
the provocative act of the victim, or where their meeting was purely accidental.

In People vs. Magaro,20 we held that:

The circumstance that an attack was sudden and unexpected to the person assaulted did not constitute the
element of alevosia necessary to raise homicide to murder, where it did not appear that the aggressor
consciously adopted such mode of attack to facilitate the perpetration of the killing without risk to himself.
Treachery cannot be appreciated if the accused did not make any preparation to kill the deceased in such
manner as to insure the commission of the killing or to make it impossible or difficult for the person attacked
to retaliate or defend himself.

There is nothing to indicate from the testimony of Edgar that appellant and his son employed means and
methods to insure that they will be able to attack Jose without risk to themselves arising from any defense
that Jose might make. There is no evidence to show that they purposely remained hidden in the thick banana
plantation awaiting for the opportune time to attack Jose with impunity.

Hence, for failure of the prosecution to prove treachery or any other circumstance which would qualify the
killing of Jose to murder, appellant should only be held liable for the crime of homicide punishable under
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.

Appellant was able to prove the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, as shown by the testimony of
Barangay Captain Feliseo Sano.21cräläwvirtualibräry

Passion and obfuscation may not be properly appreciated in favor of appellant. To be considered as a
mitigating circumstance, passion or obfuscation must arise from lawful sentiments and not from a spirit of
lawlessness or revenge or from anger and resentment.22 In the present case, clearly, Marcelo was infuriated
upon seeing his brother, Carlito, shot by Jose. However, a distinction must be made between the first time
that Marcelo hacked Jose and the second time that the former hacked the latter. When Marcelo hacked Jose
right after seeing the latter shoot at Carlito, and if appellant refrained from doing anything else after that, he
could have validly invoked the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation. But when, upon seeing his
brother Carlito dead, Marcelo went back to Jose, who by then was already prostrate on the ground and hardly
moving, hacking Jose again was a clear case of someone acting out of anger in the spirit of revenge.

Concepcion Boholst testified that the death of her husband, Jose, caused her deep anguish and sleepless
nights.23 The award of moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 is therefore justified. And pursuant to
existing jurisprudence, the heirs of the deceased are entitled to civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 as
correctly awarded by the trial court plus P25,000.00 for temperate damages, representing the expenses they
incurred for the wake and burial of the deceased.24cräläwvirtualibräry

Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, homicide is punishable by reclusion temporal. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law and appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender which is not
offset by any aggravating circumstance, the maximum period of the penalty to be imposed shall be taken from
the minimum of reclusion temporal which is 12 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months; while the minimum
period shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree which is prision mayor or 6 years and 1 day to 12
years.
For the guidance of both the bench and bar, it must be mentioned that the trial court committed an error in
imposing the penalty of forty (40) years of reclusion perpetua. We reiterate our earlier pronouncements in a
number of cases that while Section 21 of RA No. 7659 amended Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code by fixing
the duration of reclusion perpetua from 20 years and 1 day to 40 years, reclusion perpetua remains to be an
indivisible penalty in the absence of a clear legislative intent to alter its original classification as an indivisible
penalty.25 Hence, in applicable cases such as the present case, reclusion perpetua should simply be imposed
without specifying its duration.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City, Branch 35, is MODIFIED. Appellant
Marcelo Bates is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide and is sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as the minimum to twelve
(12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as the maximum; and is ordered to pay the Heirs of Jose
Boholst the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the latters death, P50,000.00 for moral damages and
P25,000.00 as temperate damages.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.