Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 96126 August 10, 1992

ESTERIA F. GARCIANO, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, EMERITO LABAJO, LUNISITA MARODA, LALIANA DIONES, CANONISA PANINSORO, DIONISIO ROSAL,
REMEDIOS GALUSO, FLORDELUNA PETALCORIN, MELCHIZEDECH LOON, NORBERTA MARODA and JOSEPH WIERTZ, respondents.

Basilio E. Duaban for petitioner.

Julius Z. Neri for private respondent.

GRIÑ-AQUINO, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the complaint for damages filed by the petitioner against the private
respondents.

The petitioner was hired to teach during the 1981-82 school year in the Immaculate Concepcion Institute in the Island of Camotes. On January 13,
1982, or before the school year ended, she applied for an indefinite leave of absence because her daughter was taking her to Austria where her
daughter was employed (Exh. B). The application was recommended for approval by the school principal, Emerito O. Labajo, and approved by the
President of the school's Board of Directors (Exh. B-1).

On June 1, 1982, Emerito Labajo addressed a letter to the petitioner through her husband, Sotero Garciano (for she was still abroad), informing her
of the decision of Fr. Joseph Wiertz, the school's founder, concurred in by the president of the Parent-Teachers Association and the school faculty,
to terminate her services as a member of the teaching staff because of: (1) the absence of any written contract of employment between her and the
school due to her refusal to sign one; and (2) the difficulty of getting a substitute for her on a temporary basis as no one would accept the position
without a written contract (Exhs. C and 1). Upon her return from Austria in the later part of June, 1982, she received the letter informing her that her
services at the Immaculate Concepcion Institute had been terminated. She made inquiries from the school about the matter and, on July 7, 1982,
the members of the Board of Directors of the school, with the exception of Fr. Joseph Wiertz, signed a letter notifying her that she was "reinstated to
report and do your usual duties as Classroom Teacher . . . effective July 5, 1982," and that "any letter or notice of termination received by you
before this date has no sanction or authority by the Board of Directors of this Institution, therefore it is declared null and void . . ." (Exhs. D and 2).

On July 9, 1982, the president, vice president, secretary, and three members of the Board of Directors, out of a membership of nine (9), resigned
their positions from the Board "for the reason that the ICI Faculty, has reacted acidly to the Board's deliberations for the reinstatement of Mrs.
Esteria F. Garciano, thereby questioning the integrity of the Board's decision" (Exh. E).

On September 3, 1982, petitioner filed a complaint for damages in the Regional Trial Court, Cebu, Branch XI, against Fr. Wiertz, Emerito Labajo,
and some members of the faculty of the school for discrimination and unjust and illegal dismissal.

After trial, the lower court rendered a decision on August 30, 1985, ordering the defendants jointly and severally to pay her P200,000 as moral
damages, P50,000 exemplary damages, P32,400 as lost earnings for nine years, and P10,000 as litigation expenses and attorney's fees.

The defendants (now private respondents) appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 10692), which on August 30, 1990 reversed the trial
court's decision thus:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed, the complaint is dismissed, and defendants-appellants are absolved
from any liability to plaintiff-appellee. With costs against plaintiff-appellee. (p. 13, Rollo.)

The plaintiff-appellee (now petitioner) filed a motion for reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied on October 26, 1990. Hence, this petition
for review wherein the lone error assigned by petitioner reads:

Respondent Court of Appeals gravely erred in absolving the private respondents from liability by faulting the petitioner for her
failure to report back to her work. (p. 6, Rollo.)

After a careful perusal of the petition and the respondents' comments, the Court resolved to deny the petition for lack of merit.
The board of directors of the Immaculate Concepcion Institute, which alone possesses the authority to hire and fire teachers and other employees of
the school, did not dismiss the petitioner. It in fact directed her to report for work. While the private respondents sent her a letter of termination
through her husband, they admittedly had no authority to do so. As the Court of Appeals aptly observed:

We agree with defendants-appellants, however, that they should not have been held liable to plaintiff-appellee for damages.
Defendants-appellants had no authority to dismiss plaintiff-appellee and the latter was aware of this. Hence, the letter of
termination sent to her through her husband (Exhs. C and 1) by defendants-appellants had no legal effect whatsoever. It did not
effectively prevent her from reporting for work. What is more, it was subsequently repudiated by the Board of Directors which
directed her to report for work. (Exhs. D and 2) There was, therefore, no reason why she did not continue with her teaching in
the school. No evidence had been presented to show that defendants-appellants prevented her from reporting for work. The fact
that defendants-appellants had "acidly" received the action of the Board of Directors repudiating their decision to terminate
plaintiff-appellee is not proof that defendants-appellants had effectively and physically prevented plaintiff-appellee from resuming
her post. It was nothing more than a reaction to what defendants-appellants perceived as an affront to their collective prestige. It
would appear, therefore, that plaintiff-appellee voluntarily desisted from her teaching job in the school and has no right to
recover damages from defendants-appellants. (p. 13, Rollo.)

Liability for damages under Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code arises only from unlawful, willful or negligent acts that are contrary to law, or
morals, good customs or public policy.

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith.

Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the
same.

Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

The Court of Appeals was correct in finding that petitioner's discontinuance from teaching was her own choice. While the respondents admittedly
wanted her service terminated, they actually did nothing to physically prevent her from reassuming her post, as ordered by the school's Board of
Directors. That the school principal and Fr. Wiertz disagreed with the Board's decision to retain her, and some teachers allegedly threatened to
resign en masse, even if true, did not make them liable to her for damages. They were simply exercising their right of free speech or their right to
dissent from the Board's decision. Their acts were not contrary to law, morals, good customs or public policy. They did not "illegally dismiss" her for
the Board's decision to retain her prevailed. She was ordered to report for work on July 5, 1982, but she did not comply with that order.
Consequently, whatever loss she may have incurred in the form of lost earnings was self-inflicted. Volenti non fit injuria.

With respect to petitioner's claim for moral damages, the right to recover them under Article 21 is based on equity, and he who comes to court to
demand equity, must come with clean hands. Article 21 should be construed as granting the right to recover damages to injured persons who are
not themselves at fault (Mabutas vs. Calapan Electric Co. [CA] 50 OG 5828, cited in Padilla, Civil Code Annotated, Vol. 1, 1975 Ed., p. 87). Moral
damages are recoverable only if the case falls under Article 2219 in relation to Article 21 (Flordelis vs. Mar, 114 SCRA 41). In the case at bar,
petitioners is not without fault. Firstly, she went on an indefinite leave of absence and failed to report back in time for the regular opening of classes.
Secondly, for reasons known to herself alone, she refused to sign a written contract of employment. Lastly, she ignored the Board of Directors' order
for her to report for duty on July 5, 1982.

The trial court's award of exemplary damages to her was not justified for she is not entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages. (Art.
2234, Civil Code).

In sum, the Court of Appeals correctly set aside the damages awarded by the trial court to the petitioner for they did not have any legal or factual
basis.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz , Medialdea and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 88694 January 11, 1993

ALBENSON ENTERPRISES CORP., JESSE YAP, AND BENJAMIN MENDIONA, petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND EUGENIO S. BALTAO, respondents.

Puruganan, Chato, Chato & Tan for petitioners.

Lino M. Patajo, Francisco Ma. Chanco, Ananiano Desierto and Segundo Mangohig for private respondent.

BIDIN, J.:

This petition assails the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in

CA-GR CV No. 14948 entitled "Eugenio S. Baltao, plaintiff-appellee vs. Albenson Enterprises Corporation, et al, defendants-appellants", which
modified the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch XCVIII in Civil Case No. Q-40920 and ordered petitioner to pay private
respondent, among others, the sum of P500,000.00 as moral damages and attorney's fees in the amount of P50,000.00.

The facts are not disputed.

In September, October, and November 1980, petitioner Albenson Enterprises Corporation (Albenson for short) delivered to Guaranteed Industries,
Inc. (Guaranteed for short) located at 3267 V. Mapa Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila, the mild steel plates which the latter ordered. As part payment
thereof, Albenson was given Pacific Banking Corporation Check No. 136361 in the amount of P2,575.00 and drawn against the account of E.L.
Woodworks (Rollo, p. 148).

When presented for payment, the check was dishonored for the reason "Account Closed." Thereafter, petitioner Albenson, through counsel, traced
the origin of the dishonored check. From the records of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Albenson discovered that the president of
Guaranteed, the recipient of the unpaid mild steel plates, was one "Eugenio S. Baltao." Upon further inquiry, Albenson was informed by the Ministry
of Trade and Industry that E.L. Woodworks, a single proprietorship business, was registered in the name of one "Eugenio Baltao". In addition, upon
verification with the drawee bank, Pacific Banking Corporation, Albenson was advised that the signature appearing on the subject check belonged to
one "Eugenio Baltao."

After obtaining the foregoing information, Albenson, through counsel, made an extrajudicial demand upon private respondent Eugenio S. Baltao,
president of Guaranteed, to replace and/or make good the dishonored check.

Respondent Baltao, through counsel, denied that he issued the check, or that the signature appearing thereon is his. He further alleged that
Guaranteed was a defunct entity and hence, could not have transacted business with Albenson.

On February 14, 1983, Albenson filed with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal a complaint against Eugenio S. Baltao for violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22. Submitted to support said charges was an affidavit of petitioner Benjamin Mendiona, an employee of Albenson. In said
affidavit, the above-mentioned circumstances were stated.

It appears, however, that private respondent has a namesake, his son Eugenio Baltao III, who manages a business establishment, E.L. Woodworks,
on the ground floor of the Baltao Building, 3267 V. Mapa Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila, the very same business address of Guaranteed.

On September 5, 1983, Assistant Fiscal Ricardo Sumaway filed an information against Eugenio S. Baltao for Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang
22. In filing said information, Fiscal Sumaway claimed that he had given Eugenio S. Baltao opportunity to submit controverting evidence, but the
latter failed to do so and therefore, was deemed to have waived his right.

Respondent Baltao, claiming ignorance of the complaint against him, immediately filed with the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal a motion for reinvestigation,
alleging that it was not true that he had been given an opportunity to be heard in the preliminary investigation conducted by Fiscal Sumaway, and
that he never had any dealings with Albenson or Benjamin Mendiona, consequently, the check for which he has been accused of having issued
without funds was not issued by him and the signature in said check was not his.
On January 30, 1984, Provincial Fiscal Mauro M. Castro of Rizal reversed the finding of Fiscal Sumaway and exonerated respondent Baltao. He
also instructed the Trial Fiscal to move for dismissal of the information filed against Eugenio S. Baltao. Fiscal Castro found that the signature in PBC
Check No. 136361 is not the signature of Eugenio S. Baltao. He also found that there is no showing in the records of the preliminary investigation
that Eugenio S. Baltao actually received notice of the said investigation. Fiscal Castro then castigated Fiscal Sumaway for failing to exercise care
and prudence in the performance of his duties, thereby causing injustice to respondent who was not properly notified of the complaint against him
and of the requirement to submit his counter evidence.

Because of the alleged unjust filing of a criminal case against him for allegedly issuing a check which bounced in violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 for a measly amount of P2,575.00, respondent Baltao filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages
against herein petitioners Albenson Enterprises, Jesse Yap, its owner, and Benjamin Mendiona, its employee.

In its decision, the lower court observed that "the check is drawn against the account of "E.L. Woodworks," not of Guaranteed Industries of which
plaintiff used to be President. Guaranteed Industries had been inactive and had ceased to exist as a corporation since 1975. . . . . The possibility is
that it was with Gene Baltao or Eugenio Baltao III, a son of plaintiff who had a business on the ground floor of Baltao Building located on V. Mapa
Street, that the defendants may have been dealing with . . . ." (Rollo, pp. 41-42).

The dispositive portion of the trial court 's decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendants ordering the latter to pay plaintiff jointly
and severally:

1. actual or compensatory damages of P133,350.00;

2. moral damages of P1,000,000.00 (1 million pesos);

3. exemplary damages of P200,000.00;

4. attorney's fees of P100,000.00;

5 costs.

Defendants' counterclaim against plaintiff and claim for damages against Mercantile Insurance Co. on the bond for the issuance
of the writ of attachment at the instance of plaintiff are hereby dismissed for lack of merit. (Rollo, pp. 38-39).

On appeal, respondent court modified the trial court's decision as follows:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED by reducing the moral damages awarded therein from P1,000,000.00
to P500,000.00 and the attorney's fees from P100,000.00 to P50,000.00, said decision being hereby affirmed in all its other
aspects. With costs against appellants. (Rollo, pp. 50-51)

Dissatisfied with the above ruling, petitioners Albenson Enterprises Corp., Jesse Yap, and Benjamin Mendiona filed the instant Petition, alleging that
the appellate court erred in:

1. Concluding that private respondent's cause of action is not one based on malicious prosecution but one for abuse of rights
under Article 21 of the Civil Code notwithstanding the fact that the basis of a civil action for malicious prosecution is Article 2219
in relation to Article 21 or Article 2176 of the Civil Code . . . .

2. Concluding that "hitting at and in effect maligning (private respondent) with an unjust criminal case was, without more, a plain
case of abuse of rights by misdirection" and "was therefore, actionable by itself," and which "became inordinately blatant and
grossly aggravated when . . . (private respondent) was deprived of his basic right to notice and a fair hearing in the so-called
preliminary investigation . . . . "

3. Concluding that petitioner's "actuations in this case were coldly deliberate and calculated", no evidence having been adduced
to support such a sweeping statement.

4. Holding the petitioner corporation, petitioner Yap and petitioner Mendiona jointly and severally liable without sufficient basis in
law and in fact.

5. Awarding respondents —

5.1. P133,350.00 as actual or compensatory damages, even in the absence of sufficient evidence to show
that such was actually suffered.
 5.2. P500,000.00 as moral damages considering that the evidence in this connection merely involved private
respondent's alleged celebrated status as a businessman, there being no showing that the act complained
of adversely affected private respondent's reputation or that it resulted to material loss.

5.3. P200,000.00 as exemplary damages despite the fact that petitioners were duly advised by counsel of
their legal recourse.

5.4. P50,000.00 as attorney's fees, no evidence having been adduced to justify such an award (Rollo, pp. 4-
6).

Petitioners contend that the civil case filed in the lower court was one for malicious prosecution. Citing the case of Madera vs. Lopez (102 SCRA
700 [1981]), they assert that the absence of malice on their part absolves them from any liability for malicious prosecution. Private respondent, on
the other hand, anchored his complaint for Damages on Articles 19, 20, and 21 ** of the Civil Code.

Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which may be observed not only
in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his
due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights: that in their exercise, the norms of
human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may
nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in
Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. Although the
requirements of each provision is different, these three (3) articles are all related to each other. As the eminent Civilist Senator Arturo Tolentino puts
it: "With this article (Article 21), combined with articles 19 and 20, the scope of our law on civil wrongs has been very greatly broadened; it has
become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. It is now difficult to conceive of any malevolent exercise of a right
which could not be checked by the application of these articles" (Tolentino, 1 Civil Code of the Philippines 72).

There is however, no hard and fast rule which can be applied to determine whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked. The
question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated, resulting in damages under Articles 20 and 21 or other applicable
provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each case. (Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 176 SCRA 778
[1989]).

The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the
sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Article 20 speaks of the general sanction for all other provisions of law which do not especially provide
for their own sanction (Tolentino, supra, p. 71). Thus, anyone who, whether willfully or negligently, in the exercise of his legal right or duty, causes
damage to another, shall indemnify his victim for injuries suffered thereby. Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores, and has the following
elements: 1) There is an act which is legal; 2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; 3) and it is done
with intent to injure.

Thus, under any of these three (3) provisions of law, an act which causes injury to another may be made the basis for an award of damages.

There is a common element under Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act must be intentional. However, Article 20 does not distinguish: the act may
be done either "willfully", or "negligently". The trial court as well as the respondent appellate court mistakenly lumped these three (3) articles
together, and cited the same as the bases for the award of damages in the civil complaint filed against petitioners, thus:

With the foregoing legal provisions (Articles 19, 20, and 21) in focus, there is not much difficulty in ascertaining the means by
which appellants' first assigned error should be resolved, given the admitted fact that when there was an attempt to collect the
amount of P2,575.00, the defendants were explicitly warned that plaintiff Eugenio S. Baltao is not the Eugenio Baltao
defendants had been dealing with (supra, p. 5). When the defendants nevertheless insisted and persisted in filing a case — a
criminal case no less — against plaintiff, said defendants ran afoul of the legal provisions (Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil
Code) cited by the lower court and heretofore quoted (supra).

Defendants, not having been paid the amount of P2,575.00, certainly had the right to complain. But that right is limited by certain
constraints. Beyond that limit is the area of excess, of abuse of rights. (Rollo, pp.
44-45).

Assuming, arguendo, that all the three (3) articles, together and not independently of each one, could be validly made the bases for an award of
damages based on the principle of "abuse of right", under the circumstances, We see no cogent reason for such an award of damages to be made
in favor of private respondent.

Certainly, petitioners could not be said to have violated the aforestated principle of abuse of right. What prompted petitioners to file the case for
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against private respondent was their failure to collect the amount of P2,575.00 due on a bounced check
which they honestly believed was issued to them by private respondent. Petitioners had conducted inquiries regarding the origin of the check, and
yielded the following results: from the records of the Securities and Exchange Commission, it was discovered that the President of Guaranteed (the
recipient of the unpaid mild steel plates), was one "Eugenio S. Baltao"; an inquiry with the Ministry of Trade and Industry revealed that E.L.
Woodworks, against whose account the check was drawn, was registered in the name of one "Eugenio Baltao"; verification with the drawee bank,
the Pacific Banking Corporation, revealed that the signature appearing on the check belonged to one "Eugenio Baltao".

In a letter dated December 16, 1983, counsel for petitioners wrote private respondent demanding that he make good the amount of the check.
Counsel for private respondent wrote back and denied, among others, that private respondent ever transacted business with Albenson Enterprises
Corporation; that he ever issued the check in question. Private respondent's counsel even went further: he made a warning to defendants to check
the veracity of their claim. It is pivotal to note at this juncture that in this same letter, if indeed private respondent wanted to clear himself from the
baseless accusation made against his person, he should have made mention of the fact that there are three (3) persons with the same name, i.e.:
Eugenio Baltao, Sr., Eugenio S. Baltao, Jr. (private respondent), and Eugenio Baltao III (private respondent's son, who as it turned out later, was the
issuer of the check). He, however, failed to do this. The last two Baltaos were doing business in the same building — Baltao Building — located at
3267 V. Mapa Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila. The mild steel plates were ordered in the name of Guaranteed of which respondent Eugenio S. Baltao is
the president and delivered to Guaranteed at Baltao building. Thus, petitioners had every reason to believe that the Eugenio Baltao who issued the
bouncing check is respondent Eugenio S. Baltao when their counsel wrote respondent to make good the amount of the check and upon refusal, filed
the complaint for violation of BP Blg. 22.

Private respondent, however, did nothing to clarify the case of mistaken identity at first hand. Instead, private respondent waited in ambush and
thereafter pounced on the hapless petitioners at a time he thought was propitious by filing an action for damages. The Court will not countenance
this devious scheme.

The criminal complaint filed against private respondent after the latter refused to make good the amount of the bouncing check despite demand was
a sincere attempt on the part of petitioners to find the best possible means by which they could collect the sum of money due them. A person who
has not been paid an obligation owed to him will naturally seek ways to compel the debtor to pay him. It was normal for petitioners to find means to
make the issuer of the check pay the amount thereof. In the absence of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad faith, moral damages cannot
be awarded and that the adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of damages, for
the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate (Rubio vs. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 488 [1986]).

In the case at bar, private respondent does not deny that the mild steel plates were ordered by and delivered to Guaranteed at Baltao building and
as part payment thereof, the bouncing check was issued by one Eugenio Baltao. Neither had private respondent conveyed to petitioner that there
are two Eugenio Baltaos conducting business in the same building — he and his son Eugenio Baltao III. Considering that Guaranteed, which
received the goods in payment of which the bouncing check was issued is owned by respondent, petitioner acted in good faith and probable cause
in filing the complaint before the provincial fiscal.

To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person, and
that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless. Concededly, the mere act of submitting a
case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution. (Manila Gas Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA
602 [1980]). Still, private respondent argues that liability under Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code is so encompassing that it likewise includes
liability for damages for malicious prosecution under Article 2219 (8). True, a civil action for damages for malicious prosecution is allowed under the
New Civil Code, more specifically Articles 19, 20, 26, 29, 32, 33, 35, and 2219 (8) thereof. In order that such a case can prosper, however, the
following three (3) elements must be present, to wit: (1) The fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was himself the
prosecutor, and that the action was finally terminated with an acquittal; (2) That in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause;
(3) The prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice (Lao vs. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 58, [1991]).

Thus, a party injured by the filing of a court case against him, even if he is later on absolved, may file a case for damages grounded either on the
principle of abuse of rights, or on malicious prosecution. As earlier stated, a complaint for damages based on malicious prosecution will prosper only
if the three (3) elements aforecited are shown to exist. In the case at bar, the second and third elements were not shown to exist. It is well-settled
that one cannot be held liable for maliciously instituting a prosecution where one has acted with probable cause. "Probable cause is the existence of
such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the
person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. In other words, a suit will lie only in cases where a legal prosecution has been
carried on without probable cause. The reason for this rule is that it would be a very great discouragement to public justice, if prosecutors, who had
tolerable ground of suspicion, were liable to be sued at law when their indictment miscarried" (Que vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 169 SCRA 137
[1989]).

The presence of probable cause signifies, as a legal consequence, the absence of malice. In the instant case, it is evident that petitioners were not
motivated by malicious intent or by sinister design to unduly harass private respondent, but only by a well-founded anxiety to protect their rights
when they filed the criminal complaint against private respondent.

To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and
humiliate a person, that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless.
Concededly, the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious
prosecution. Proof and motive that the institution of the action was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person
must be clearly and preponderantly established to entitle the victims to damages (Ibid.).

In the case at bar, there is no proof of a sinister design on the part of petitioners to vex or humiliate private respondent by instituting the criminal
case against him. While petitioners may have been negligent to some extent in determining the liability of private respondent for the dishonored
check, the same is not so gross or reckless as to amount to bad faith warranting an award of damages.
The root of the controversy in this case is founded on a case of mistaken identity. It is possible that with a more assiduous investigation, petitioners
would have eventually discovered that private respondent Eugenio S. Baltao is not the "Eugenio Baltao" responsible for the dishonored check.
However, the record shows that petitioners did exert considerable effort in order to determine the liability of private respondent. Their investigation
pointed to private respondent as the "Eugenio Baltao" who issued and signed the dishonored check as the president of the debtor-corporation
Guaranteed Enterprises. Their error in proceeding against the wrong individual was obviously in the nature of an innocent mistake, and cannot be
characterized as having been committed in bad faith. This error could have been discovered if respondent had submitted his counter-affidavit before
investigating fiscal Sumaway and was immediately rectified by Provincial Fiscal Mauro Castro upon discovery thereof, i.e., during the reinvestigation
resulting in the dismissal of the complaint.

Furthermore, the adverse result of an action does not per se make the act wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of moral damages. The law
could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate, such right is so precious that moral damages may not be charged on those who
may even exercise it erroneously. And an adverse decision does not ipso facto justify the award of attorney's fees to the winning party (Garcia vs.
Gonzales, 183 SCRA 72 [1990]).

Thus, an award of damages and attorney's fees is unwarranted where the action was filed in good faith. If damage results from a person's
exercising his legal rights, it is damnum absque injuria (Ilocos Norte Electric Company vs. Court of Appeals, 179 SCRA 5 [1989]).

Coming now to the claim of private respondent for actual or compensatory damages, the records show that the same was based solely on his
allegations without proof to substantiate the same. He did not present proof of the cost of the medical treatment which he claimed to have
undergone as a result of the nervous breakdown he suffered, nor did he present proof of the actual loss to his business caused by the unjust
litigation against him. In determining actual damages, the court cannot rely on speculation, conjectures or guesswork as to the amount. Without the
actual proof of loss, the award of actual damages becomes erroneous (Guilatco vs. City of Dagupan, 171 SCRA 382 [1989]).

Actual and compensatory damages are those recoverable because of pecuniary loss — in business, trade, property, profession, job or occupation
— and the same must be proved, otherwise, if the proof is flimsy and unsubstantiated, no damages will be given (Rubio vs. Court of Appeals, 141
SCRA 488 [1986]). For these reasons, it was gravely erroneous for respondent court to have affirmed the award of actual damages in favor of
private respondent in the absence of proof thereof.

Where there is no evidence of the other party having acted in wanton, fraudulent or reckless, or oppressive manner, neither may exemplary
damages be awarded (Dee Hua Liong Electrical Equipment Corporation vs. Reyes, 145 SCRA 488 [1986]).

As to the award of attorney's fees, it is well-settled that the same is the exception rather than the general rule. Needless to say, the award of
attorney's fees must be disallowed where the award of exemplary damages is eliminated (Article 2208, Civil Code; Agustin vs. Court of Appeals, 186
SCRA 375 [1990]). Moreover, in view of the fact that there was no malicious prosecution against private respondent, attorney's fees cannot be
awarded him on that ground.

In the final analysis, there is no proof or showing that petitioners acted maliciously or in bad faith in the filing of the case against private respondent.
Consequently, in the absence of proof of fraud and bad faith committed by petitioners, they cannot be held liable for damages (Escritor, Jr. vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 155 SCRA 577 [1987]). No damages can be awarded in the instant case, whether based on the principle of abuse of
rights, or for malicious prosecution. The questioned judgment in the instant case attests to the propensity of trial judges to award damages without
basis. Lower courts are hereby cautioned anew against awarding unconscionable sums as damages without bases therefor.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. C.V. No. 14948 dated May 13, 1989, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Costs against respondent Baltao.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

# Footnotes

** "Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone
his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

"Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the
same.

"Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 187587 June 5, 2013

NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO MASIGASIG, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES - PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 187654

WESTERN BICUTAN LOT OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., represented by its Board of Directors, Petitioner,
vs.
MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES - PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ.:

Before us are consolidated Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision 1promulgated on 29 April 2009 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97925.

THE FACTS

The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:

On 12 July 1957, by virtue of Proclamation No. 423, President Carlos P. Garcia reserved parcels of land in the Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig,
Parañaque, Province of Rizal and Pasay City for a military reservation. The military reservation, then known as Fort William McKinley, was later on
renamed Fort Andres Bonifacio (Fort Bonifacio).

On 28 May 1967, President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos) issued Proclamation No. 208, amending Proclamation No. 423, which
excluded a certain area of Fort Bonifacio and reserved it for a national shrine. The excluded area is now known as Libingan ng mga Bayani, which is
under the administration of herein respondent Military Shrine Services – Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (MSS-PVAO).

Again, on 7 January 1986, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2476, further amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded
barangaysLower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal Village from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and declared it open for disposition under
the provisions of Republic Act Nos. (R.A.) 274 and 730.

At the bottom of Proclamation No. 2476, President Marcos made a handwritten addendum, which reads:

"P.S. – This includes Western Bicutan

(SGD.) Ferdinand E. Marcos"2

The crux of the controversy started when Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the Official Gazette 3 on 3 February 1986, without the above-
quoted addendum.

Years later, on 16 October 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino (President Aquino) issued Proclamation No. 172 which substantially reiterated
Proclamation No. 2476, as published, but this time excluded Lots 1 and 2 of Western Bicutan from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and
declared the said lots open for disposition under the provisions of R.A. 274 and 730.

Memorandum Order No. 119, implementing Proclamation No. 172, was issued on the same day.

Through the years, informal settlers increased and occupied some areas of Fort Bonifacio including portions of the Libingan ng mga Bayani. Thus,
Brigadier General Fredelito Bautista issued General Order No. 1323 creating Task Force Bantay (TFB), primarily to prevent further unauthorized
occupation and to cause the demolition of illegal structures at Fort Bonifacio.
On 27 August 1999, members of petitioner Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc. (NMSMI) filed a Petition with the Commission on
Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP), where it was docketed as COSLAP Case No. 99-434. The Petition prayed for the following: (1) the
reclassification of the areas they occupied, covering Lot 3 of SWO-13-000-298 of Western Bicutan, from public land to alienable and disposable land
pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476; (2) the subdivision of the subject lot by the Director of Lands; and (3) the Land Management Bureau‘s facilitation
of the distribution and sale of the subject lot to its bona fide occupants.4

On 1 September 2000, petitioner Western Bicutan Lot Owners Association, Inc. (WBLOAI) filed a Petition-in-Intervention substantially praying for
the same reliefs as those prayed for by NMSMI with regard to the area the former then occupied covering Lot 7 of SWO-00-001302 in Western
Bicutan.5

Thus, on 1 September 2006, COSLAP issued a Resolution6 granting the Petition and declaring the portions of land in question alienable and
disposable, with Associate Commissioner Lina Aguilar-General dissenting.7

The COSLAP ruled that the handwritten addendum of President Marcos was an integral part of Proclamation No. 2476, and was therefore,
controlling. The intention of the President could not be defeated by the negligence or inadvertence of others. Further, considering that Proclamation

No. 2476 was done while the former President was exercising legislative powers, it could not be amended, repealed or superseded, by a mere
executive enactment. Thus, Proclamation No. 172 could not have superseded much less displaced Proclamation No. 2476, as the latter was issued
on October 16, 1987 when President Aquino‘s legislative power had ceased.

In her Dissenting Opinion, Associate Commissioner Lina AguilarGeneral stressed that pursuant to Article 2 of the Civil Code, publication is
indispensable in every case. Likewise, she held that when the provision of the law is clear and unambiguous so that there is no occasion for the
court to look into legislative intent, the law must be taken as it is, devoid of judicial addition or subtraction. 8 Finally, she maintained that the
Commission had no authority to supply the addendum originally omitted in the published version of Proclamation No. 2476, as to do so would be
tantamount to encroaching on the field of the legislature.

Herein respondent MSS-PVAO filed a Motion for Reconsideration,9 which was denied by the COSLAP in a Resolution dated 24 January 2007.10

MSS-PVAO filed a Petition with the Court of Appeals seeking to reverse the COSLAP Resolutions dated 1 September 2006 and 24 January 2007.

Thus, on 29 April 2009, the then Court of Appeals First Division rendered the assailed Decision granting MSS-PVAO‘s Petition, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions dated September 1, 2006 and January 24, 2007
issued by the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems in COSLAP Case No. 99-434 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu
thereof, the petitions of respondents in COSLAP Case No. 99-434 are DISMISSED, for lack of merit, as discussed herein. Further, pending urgent
motions filed by respondents are likewise

DENIED. SO ORDERED.11 (Emphasis in the original)

Both NMSMI12 and WBLOAI13 appealed the said Decision by filing their respective Petitions for Review with this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.

THE ISSUES

Petitioner NMSMI raises the following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 DID NOT
INCLUDE ANY PORTION OF WESTERN BICUTAN AS THE HANDWRITTEN NOTATION BY PRESIDENT MARCOS ON THE SAID
PROCLAMATION WAS NOT PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE.

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT PROCLAMATION NO. 172 LIKEWISE
EXCLUDED THE PORTION OF LAND OCCUPIED BY MEMBER OF HEREIN PETITIONER.

III
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE HON. COSLAP HAS BROAD
POWERS TO RECOMMEND TO THE PRESIDENT >INNOVATIVE MEASURES TO RESOLVE EXPEDITIOUSLY VARIOUS LAND CASES. 14

On the other hand, petitioner WBLOAI raises this sole issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WAS NOT DECLARED
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE BY VIRTUE OF PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 BECAUSE THE HANDWRITTEN ADDENDUM OF PRESIDENT
FERDINAND E. MARCOS INCLUDING WESTERN BICUTAN IN PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE PUBLICATION. 15

Both Petitions boil down to the principal issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the subject lots were not alienable and disposable
by virtue of Proclamation No. 2476 on the ground that the handwritten addendum of President Marcos was not included in the publication of the said
law.

THE COURT‘S RULING

We deny the Petitions for lack of merit.

Considering that petitioners were occupying Lots 3 and 7 of Western Bicutan (subject lots), their claims were anchored on the handwritten
addendum of President Marcos to Proclamation No. 2476. They allege that the former President intended to include all Western Bicutan in the
reclassification of portions of Fort Bonifacio as disposable public land when he made a notation just below the printed version of Proclamation No.
2476.

However, it is undisputed that the handwritten addendum was not included when Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the Official Gazette.

The resolution of whether the subject lots were declared as reclassified and disposable lies in the determination of whether the handwritten
addendum of President Marcos has the force and effect of law. In relation thereto, Article 2 of the Civil Code expressly provides:

ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided.
This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.

Under the above provision, the requirement of publication is indispensable to give effect to the law, unless the law itself has otherwise provided. The
phrase "unless otherwise provided" refers to a different effectivity date other than after fifteen days following the completion of the law‘s publication
in the Official Gazette, but does not imply that the requirement of publication may be dispensed with. The issue of the requirement of publication
was already settled in the landmark case Tañada v. Hon. Tuvera,16 in which we had the occasion to rule thus:

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or
extended. An example, as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision, is the Civil Code which did
not become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such publication." The general rule did not apply
because it was "otherwise provided."

It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The reason is that such omission would offend
due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it. Surely, if the legislature could validly provide
that a law shall become effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after
publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result; and they would be so not because of a failure to comply
with it but simply because they did not know of its existence. Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can
think of many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may affect before they can
begin to operate.

xxxx

The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit
there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President
Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionably does
not apply directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may question in the
political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an
intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even
if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which
shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the
same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be
published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.

xxxx

Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects
only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public place after a favored
individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are
meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.

xxxx

We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. As
correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g.,
"with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication
requirement.1âwphi1 This is not even substantial compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act for FY
1975, a presidential decree undeniably of general applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration. The evident purpose was
to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.

xxxx

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious
pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication
intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint, parry or cut unless
the naked blade is drawn. (Emphases supplied)

Applying the foregoing ruling to the instant case, this Court cannot rely on a handwritten note that was not part of Proclamation No. 2476 as
published. Without publication, the note never had any legal force and effect.

Furthermore, under Section 24, Chapter 6, Book I of the Administrative Code, "the publication of any law, resolution or other official documents in
the Official Gazette shall be prima facie evidence of its authority." Thus, whether or not President Marcos intended to include Western Bicutan is not
only irrelevant but speculative. Simply put, the courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words appearing
in the law.17 This Court cannot rule that a word appears in the law when, evidently, there is none. In Pagpalain Haulers, Inc. v. Hon. Trajano,18 we
ruled that "under Article 8 of the Civil Code, 'judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal
system of the Philippines.' This does not mean, however, that courts can create law. The courts exist for interpreting the law, not for enacting it. To
allow otherwise would be violative of the principle of separation of powers, inasmuch as the sole function of our courts is to apply or interpret the
laws, particularly where gaps or lacunae exist or where ambiguities becloud issues, but it will not arrogate unto itself the task of legislating." The
remedy sought in these Petitions is not judicial interpretation, but another legislation that would amend the law ‗to include petitioners' lots in the
reclassification.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petitions are hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 97925 dated 29 April 2009 is AFFIRMED in toto. Accordingly, this Court's status quo order dated 17 June 2009 is hereby LIFTED.
Likewise, all pending motions to cite respondent in contempt is DENIED, having been rendered moot. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice, Chairperson

WE CONCUR:
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 162155 August 28, 2007

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and ARTURO V. PARCERO in his official capacity as Revenue District Officer of Revenue
District No. 049 (Makati), Petitioners,
vs.
PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP, INC., Respondent.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari1 seeks to set aside the August 1, 2003 decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 64782 and its
February 9, 2004 resolution denying reconsideration.3

On March 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap, vice chair of respondent Primetown Property Group, Inc., applied for the refund or credit of income tax respondent
paid in 1997. In Yap's letter to petitioner revenue district officer Arturo V. Parcero of Revenue District No. 049 (Makati) of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR),4 he explained that the increase in the cost of labor and materials and difficulty in obtaining financing for projects and collecting
receivables caused the real estate industry to slowdown.5 As a consequence, while business was good during the first quarter of 1997, respondent
suffered losses amounting to ₱71,879,228 that year.6

According to Yap, because respondent suffered losses, it was not liable for income taxes.7 Nevertheless, respondent paid its quarterly corporate
income tax and remitted creditable withholding tax from real estate sales to the BIR in the total amount of ₱26,318,398.32.8 Therefore, respondent
was entitled to tax refund or tax credit.9

On May 13, 1999, revenue officer Elizabeth Y. Santos required respondent to submit additional documents to support its claim. 10 Respondent
complied but its claim was not acted upon. Thus, on April 14, 2000, it filed a petition for review11 in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).

On December 15, 2000, the CTA dismissed the petition as it was filed beyond the two-year prescriptive period for filing a judicial claim for tax refund
or tax credit.12 It invoked Section 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC):

Sec. 229. Recovery of Taxes Erroneously or Illegally Collected. -- No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any
national internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been
collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have been excessively or in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit
has been duly filed with the Commissioner; but such suit or proceeding may be maintained, whether or not such tax, penalty, or sum has been paid
under protest or duress.

In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the expiration of two (2) years from the date of payment of the tax or penalty
regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after payment: Provided, however, That the Commissioner may, even without a claim
therefor, refund or credit any tax, where on the face of the return upon which payment was made, such payment appears clearly to have been
erroneously paid. (emphasis supplied)

The CTA found that respondent filed its final adjusted return on April 14, 1998. Thus, its right to claim a refund or credit commenced on that date.13

The tax court applied Article 13 of the Civil Code which states:

Art. 13. When the law speaks of years, months, days or nights, it shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each;
months, of thirty days; days, of twenty-four hours, and nights from sunset to sunrise.

If the months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number of days which they respectively have.

In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last included. (emphasis supplied)

Thus, according to the CTA, the two-year prescriptive period under Section 229 of the NIRC for the filing of judicial claims was equivalent to 730
days. Because the year 2000 was a leap year, respondent's petition, which was filed 731 days 14 after respondent filed its final adjusted return, was
filed beyond the reglementary period.15
Respondent moved for reconsideration but it was denied.16 Hence, it filed an appeal in the CA.17

On August 1, 2003, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the CTA.18 It ruled that Article 13 of the Civil Code did not distinguish between a
regular year and a leap year. According to the CA:

The rule that a year has 365 days applies, notwithstanding the fact that a particular year is a leap year. 19

In other words, even if the year 2000 was a leap year, the periods covered by April 15, 1998 to April 14, 1999 and April 15, 1999 to April 14, 2000
should still be counted as 365 days each or a total of 730 days. A statute which is clear and explicit shall be neither interpreted nor construed.20

Petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied.21 Thus, this appeal.

Petitioners contend that tax refunds, being in the nature of an exemption, should be strictly construed against claimants.22 Section 229 of the NIRC
should be strictly applied against respondent inasmuch as it has been consistently held that the prescriptive period (for the filing of tax refunds and
tax credits) begins to run on the day claimants file their final adjusted returns.23 Hence, the claim should have been filed on or before April 13, 2000
or within 730 days, reckoned from the time respondent filed its final adjusted return.

The conclusion of the CA that respondent filed its petition for review in the CTA within the two-year prescriptive period provided in Section 229 of the
NIRC is correct. Its basis, however, is not.

The rule is that the two-year prescriptive period is reckoned from the filing of the final adjusted return.24 But how should the two-year prescriptive
period be computed?

As already quoted, Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that when the law speaks of a year, it is understood to be equivalent to 365 days.
In National Marketing Corporation v. Tecson,25 we ruled that a year is equivalent to 365 days regardless of whether it is a regular year or a leap
year.26

However, in 1987, EO27 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 was enacted. Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I thereof provides:

Sec. 31. Legal Periods. — "Year" shall be understood to be twelve calendar months; "month" of thirty days, unless it refers to a specific
calendar month in which case it shall be computed according to the number of days the specific month contains; "day", to a day of twenty-four hours
and; "night" from sunrise to sunset. (emphasis supplied)

A calendar month is "a month designated in the calendar without regard to the number of days it may contain." 28 It is the "period of time running from
the beginning of a certain numbered day up to, but not including, the corresponding numbered day of the next month, and if there is not a sufficient
number of days in the next month, then up to and including the last day of that month."29 To illustrate, one calendar month from December 31, 2007
will be from January 1, 2008 to January 31, 2008; one calendar month from January 31, 2008 will be from February 1, 2008 until February 29,
2008.30

A law may be repealed expressly (by a categorical declaration that the law is revoked and abrogated by another) or impliedly (when the provisions
of a more recent law cannot be reasonably reconciled with the previous one).31Section 27, Book VII (Final Provisions) of the Administrative Code of
1987 states:

Sec. 27. Repealing clause. — All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulation, or portions thereof, inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.

A repealing clause like Sec. 27 above is not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the laws to be abolished. 32 Thus,
the provision above only impliedly repealed all laws inconsistent with the Administrative Code of 1987.1avvphi1

Implied repeals, however, are not favored. An implied repeal must have been clearly and unmistakably intended by the legislature. The test is
whether the subsequent law encompasses entirely the subject matter of the former law and they cannot be logically or reasonably reconciled.33

Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 deal with the same subject matter — the
computation of legal periods. Under the Civil Code, a year is equivalent to 365 days whether it be a regular year or a leap year. Under the
Administrative Code of 1987, however, a year is composed of 12 calendar months. Needless to state, under the Administrative Code of 1987, the
number of days is irrelevant.

There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of computing legal periods under the Civil Code and the Administrative Code of
1987. For this reason, we hold that Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, being the more recent law, governs the
computation of legal periods. Lex posteriori derogat priori.

Applying Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 to this case, the two-year prescriptive period (reckoned from the time
respondent filed its final adjusted return34 on April 14, 1998) consisted of 24 calendar months, computed as follows:
Year 1 1st calendar month April 15, 1998 to May 14, 1998

2nd calendar month May 15, 1998 to June 14, 1998

3rd calendar month June 15, 1998 to July 14, 1998

4th calendar month July 15, 1998 to August 14, 1998

5th calendar month August 15, 1998 to September 14, 1998

6th calendar month September 15, 1998 to October 14, 1998

7th calendar month October 15, 1998 to November 14, 1998

8th calendar month November 15, 1998 to December 14, 1998

9th calendar month December 15, 1998 to January 14, 1999

10th calendar month January 15, 1999 to February 14, 1999

11th calendar month February 15, 1999 to March 14, 1999

12th calendar month March 15, 1999 to April 14, 1999

Year 2 13th calendar month April 15, 1999 to May 14, 1999

14th calendar month May 15, 1999 to June 14, 1999

15th calendar month June 15, 1999 to July 14, 1999

16th calendar month July 15, 1999 to August 14, 1999

17th calendar month August 15, 1999 to September 14, 1999

18th calendar month September 15, 1999 to October 14, 1999

19th calendar month October 15, 1999 to November 14, 1999

20th calendar month November 15, 1999 to December 14, 1999

21st calendar month December 15, 1999 to January 14, 2000

22nd calendar month January 15, 2000 to February 14, 2000

23rd calendar month February 15, 2000 to March 14, 2000

24th calendar month March 15, 2000 to April 14, 2000

We therefore hold that respondent's petition (filed on April 14, 2000) was filed on the last day of the 24th calendar month from the day respondent
filed its final adjusted return. Hence, it was filed within the reglementary period.

Accordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED. The case is REMANDED to the Court of Tax Appeals which is ordered to expeditiously proceed to hear
C.T.A. Case No. 6113 entitled Primetown Property Group, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue and Arturo V. Parcero.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
 ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court‘s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.

PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.

Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.

Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the
project of partition filed by the executor in Civil Case No. 37089 therein.1äwphï1.ñët

The facts of the case are as follows:

Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he
had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis
Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy
Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.

On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of
administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife,
Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each
and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives,
namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal
shares.1äwphï1.ñët

Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First
Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.

The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of
shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various
amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it released from time to time
according as the lower court approved and allowed the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on account
of their respective legacies.

On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its "Executor's Final Account, Report of
Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares
of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00
each or a total of P120,000.00. In the project of partition, the executor — pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament
— divided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages.

On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that
they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.

Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which is evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27,
1964 by the executor.1

After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the
oppositions and approving the executor's final account, report and administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it
applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on June 11, 1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court
to raise the issue of which law must apply — Texas law or Philippine law.

In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia,
L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the
present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death.2 So that even
assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a
reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex
rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved
are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from
ours.3 Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments.
Rather, they argue that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil
Code.

Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with
regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d)
the capacity to succeed. They provide that —

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights
and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may he the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.

Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that —

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good
customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a
foreign country.

prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase,
"notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil
Code, while reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been
their purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As
further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be
governed by the national law of the decedent.

It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend
the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the
decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.

Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one to govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate —
arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a
separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the
effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law
cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no
forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be
determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against appellants. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.

Footnotes1
He later filed a motion praying that as a legal heir he be included in this case as one of the oppositors-appellants; to file or adopt the opposition of
his sisters to the project of partition; to submit his brief after paying his proportionate share in the expenses incurred in the printing of the record on
appeal; or to allow him to adopt the briefs filed by his sisters — but this Court resolved to deny the motion.
2San Antonio, Texas was his legal residence.
3Lim vs. Collector, 36 Phil. 472; In re Testate Estate of Suntay, 95 Phil. 500.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 81262 August 25, 1989

GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP., and HERBERT C. HENDRY, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RESTITUTO M. TOBIAS, respondents.

Atencia & Arias Law Offices for petitioners.

Romulo C. Felizmena for private respondent.

CORTES, J.:

Private respondent Restituto M. Tobias was employed by petitioner Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation (GLOBE MACKAY) in a dual
capacity as a purchasing agent and administrative assistant to the engineering operations manager. In 1972, GLOBE MACKAY discovered fictitious
purchases and other fraudulent transactions for which it lost several thousands of pesos.

According to private respondent it was he who actually discovered the anomalies and reported them on November 10, 1972 to his immediate
superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and to petitioner Herbert C. Hendry who was then the Executive Vice-President and General Manager of GLOBE
MACKAY.

On November 11, 1972, one day after private respondent Tobias made the report, petitioner Hendry confronted him by stating that he was the
number one suspect, and ordered him to take a one week forced leave, not to communicate with the office, to leave his table drawers open, and to
leave the office keys.

On November 20, 1972, when private respondent Tobias returned to work after the forced leave, petitioner Hendry went up to him and called him a
"crook" and a "swindler." Tobias was then ordered to take a lie detector test. He was also instructed to submit specimen of his handwriting,
signature, and initials for examination by the police investigators to determine his complicity in the anomalies.

On December 6,1972, the Manila police investigators submitted a laboratory crime report (Exh. "A") clearing private respondent of participation in
the anomalies.

Not satisfied with the police report, petitioners hired a private investigator, retired Col. Jose G. Fernandez, who on December 10, 1972, submitted a
report (Exh. "2") finding Tobias guilty. This report however expressly stated that further investigation was still to be conducted.

Nevertheless, on December 12, 1972, petitioner Hendry issued a memorandum suspending Tobias from work preparatory to the filing of criminal
charges against him.

On December 19,1972, Lt. Dioscoro V. Tagle, Metro Manila Police Chief Document Examiner, after investigating other documents pertaining to the
alleged anomalous transactions, submitted a second laboratory crime report (Exh. "B") reiterating his previous finding that the handwritings,
signatures, and initials appearing in the checks and other documents involved in the fraudulent transactions were not those of Tobias. The lie
detector tests conducted on Tobias also yielded negative results.

Notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating Tobias from the anomalies and the fact that the report of the private investigator, was, by its own
terms, not yet complete, petitioners filed with the City Fiscal of Manila a complaint for estafa through falsification of commercial documents, later
amended to just estafa. Subsequently five other criminal complaints were filed against Tobias, four of which were for estafa through Falsification of
commercial document while the fifth was for of Article 290 of' the Revised Penal Code (Discovering Secrets Through Seizure of
Correspondence).lâwphî1.ñèt Two of these complaints were refiled with the Judge Advocate General's Office, which however, remanded them to
the fiscal's office. All of the six criminal complaints were dismissed by the fiscal. Petitioners appealed four of the fiscal's resolutions dismissing the
criminal complaints with the Secretary of Justice, who, however, affirmed their dismissal.

In the meantime, on January 17, 1973, Tobias received a notice (Exh. "F") from petitioners that his employment has been terminated effective
December 13, 1972. Whereupon, Tobias filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The labor arbiter dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the labor arbiter's decision. However, the Secretary of Labor, acting on petitioners' appeal from the
NLRC ruling, reinstated the labor arbiter's decision. Tobias appealed the Secretary of Labor's order with the Office of the President. During the
pendency of the appeal with said office, petitioners and private respondent Tobias entered into a compromise agreement regarding the latter's
complaint for illegal dismissal.

Unemployed, Tobias sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO). However, petitioner Hendry, without being asked by
RETELCO, wrote a letter to the latter stating that Tobias was dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty.

Private respondent Tobias filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of petitioners.
Petitioner Hendry, claiming illness, did not testify during the hearings. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch IX, through Judge Manuel
T. Reyes rendered judgment in favor of private respondent by ordering petitioners to pay him eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as actual
damages, two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as moral damages, twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary damages, thirty
thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney's fees, and costs. Petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals. On the other hand,
Tobias appealed as to the amount of damages. However, the Court of Appeals, an a decision dated August 31, 1987 affirmed the RTC decision in
toto. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration having been denied, the instant petition for review on certiorari was filed.

The main issue in this case is whether or not petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent.

Petitioners contend that they could not be made liable for damages in the lawful exercise of their right to dismiss private respondent.

On the other hand, private respondent contends that because of petitioners' abusive manner in dismissing him as well as for the inhuman treatment
he got from them, the Petitioners must indemnify him for the damage that he had suffered.

One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the codification of "some basic principles that are to be observed for the rightful
relationship between human beings and for the stability of the social order." [REPORT ON THE CODE COMMISSION ON THE PROPOSED CIVIL
CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, p. 39]. The framers of the Code, seeking to remedy the defect of the old Code which merely stated the effects of the
law, but failed to draw out its spirit, incorporated certain fundamental precepts which were "designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the
fountain of good conscience" and which were also meant to serve as "guides for human conduct [that] should run as golden threads through society,
to the end that law may approach its supreme ideal, which is the sway and dominance of justice" (Id.) Foremost among these principles is that
pronounced in Article 19 which provides:

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith.

This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must be observed not
only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give
everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise,
the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such,
may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in
Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article
19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its
violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.

Article 20, which pertains to damage arising from a violation of law, provides that:

Art. 20. Every person who contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the
same.

However, in the case at bar, petitioners claim that they did not violate any provision of law since they were merely exercising their legal right to
dismiss private respondent. This does not, however, leave private respondent with no relief because Article 21 of the Civil Code provides that:

Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

This article, adopted to remedy the "countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have
actually suffered material and moral injury" [Id.] should "vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is
impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes" [Id. it p. 40; See also PNB v. CA, G.R. No. L-27155, May 18,1978, 83
SCRA 237, 247].

In determining whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked, there is no rigid test which can be applied. While the Court has not
hesitated to apply Article 19 whether the legal and factual circumstances called for its application [See for e.g., Velayo v. Shell Co. of the Phil., Ltd.,
100 Phil. 186 (1956); PNB v. CA, supra; Grand Union Supermarket, Inc. v. Espino, Jr., G.R. No. L-48250, December 28, 1979, 94 SCRA 953; PAL
v. CA, G.R. No. L-46558, July 31,1981,106 SCRA 391; United General Industries, Inc, v. Paler G.R. No. L-30205, March 15,1982,112 SCRA 404;
Rubio v. CA, G.R. No. 50911, August 21, 1987, 153 SCRA 183] the question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated
resulting in damages under Article 20 or Article 21 or other applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each case. And in the
instant case, the Court, after examining the record and considering certain significant circumstances, finds that all petitioners have indeed abused
the right that they invoke, causing damage to private respondent and for which the latter must now be indemnified.

The trial court made a finding that notwithstanding the fact that it was private respondent Tobias who reported the possible existence of anomalous
transactions, petitioner Hendry "showed belligerence and told plaintiff (private respondent herein) that he was the number one suspect and to take a
one week vacation leave, not to communicate with the office, to leave his table drawers open, and to leave his keys to said defendant (petitioner
Hendry)" [RTC Decision, p. 2; Rollo, p. 232]. This, petitioners do not dispute. But regardless of whether or not it was private respondent Tobias who
reported the anomalies to petitioners, the latter's reaction towards the former upon uncovering the anomalies was less than civil. An employer who
harbors suspicions that an employee has committed dishonesty might be justified in taking the appropriate action such as ordering an investigation
and directing the employee to go on a leave. Firmness and the resolve to uncover the truth would also be expected from such employer. But the
high-handed treatment accorded Tobias by petitioners was certainly uncalled for. And this reprehensible attitude of petitioners was to continue when
private respondent returned to work on November 20, 1972 after his one week forced leave. Upon reporting for work, Tobias was confronted by
Hendry who said. "Tobby, you are the crook and swindler in this company." Considering that the first report made by the police investigators was
submitted only on December 10, 1972 [See Exh. A] the statement made by petitioner Hendry was baseless. The imputation of guilt without basis
and the pattern of harassment during the investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil
Code. The Court has already ruled that the right of the employer to dismiss an employee should not be confused with the manner in which the right
is exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal is done abusively, then the employer is liable for damages to the employee [Quisaba
v. Sta. Ines-Melale Veneer and Plywood Inc., G.R. No. L-38088, August 30, 1974, 58 SCRA 771; See also Philippine Refining Co., Inc. v. Garcia,
G.R. No. L-21871, September 27,1966, 18 SCRA 107] Under the circumstances of the instant case, the petitioners clearly failed to exercise in a
legitimate manner their right to dismiss Tobias, giving the latter the right to recover damages under Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil
Code.

But petitioners were not content with just dismissing Tobias. Several other tortious acts were committed by petitioners against Tobias after the
latter's termination from work. Towards the latter part of January, 1973, after the filing of the first of six criminal complaints against Tobias, the latter
talked to Hendry to protest the actions taken against him. In response, Hendry cut short Tobias' protestations by telling him to just confess or else
the company would file a hundred more cases against him until he landed in jail. Hendry added that, "You Filipinos cannot be trusted." The threat
unmasked petitioner's bad faith in the various actions taken against Tobias. On the other hand, the scornful remark about Filipinos as well as
Hendry's earlier statements about Tobias being a "crook" and "swindler" are clear violations of 'Tobias' personal dignity [See Article 26, Civil Code].

The next tortious act committed by petitioners was the writing of a letter to RETELCO sometime in October 1974, stating that Tobias had been
dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty. Because of the letter, Tobias failed to gain employment with RETELCO and as a result of which,
Tobias remained unemployed for a longer period of time. For this further damage suffered by Tobias, petitioners must likewise be held liable for
damages consistent with Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Petitioners, however, contend that they have a "moral, if not legal, duty to forewarn other
employers of the kind of employee the plaintiff (private respondent herein) was." [Petition, p. 14; Rollo, p. 15]. Petitioners further claim that "it is the
accepted moral and societal obligation of every man to advise or warn his fellowmen of any threat or danger to the latter's life, honor or property.
And this includes warning one's brethren of the possible dangers involved in dealing with, or accepting into confidence, a man whose honesty and
integrity is suspect" [Id.]. These arguments, rather than justify petitioners' act, reveal a seeming obsession to prevent Tobias from getting a job, even
after almost two years from the time Tobias was dismissed.

Finally, there is the matter of the filing by petitioners of six criminal complaints against Tobias. Petitioners contend that there is no case against them
for malicious prosecution and that they cannot be "penalized for exercising their right and prerogative of seeking justice by filing criminal complaints
against an employee who was their principal suspect in the commission of forgeries and in the perpetration of anomalous transactions which
defrauded them of substantial sums of money" [Petition, p. 10, Rollo, p. 11].

While sound principles of justice and public policy dictate that persons shall have free resort to the courts for redress of wrongs and vindication of
their rights [Buenaventura v. Sto. Domingo, 103 Phil. 239 (1958)], the right to institute criminal prosecutions can not be exercised maliciously and in
bad faith [Ventura v. Bernabe, G.R. No. L-26760, April 30, 1971, 38 SCRA 5871.] Hence, in Yutuk V. Manila Electric Co., G.R. No. L-13016, May
31, 1961, 2 SCRA 337, the Court held that the right to file criminal complaints should not be used as a weapon to force an alleged debtor to pay an
indebtedness. To do so would be a clear perversion of the function of the criminal processes and of the courts of justice. And in Hawpia CA, G.R.
No. L-20047, June 30, 1967. 20 SCRA 536 the Court upheld the judgment against the petitioner for actual and moral damages and attorney's fees
after making a finding that petitioner, with persistence, filed at least six criminal complaints against respondent, all of which were dismissed.

To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a design to vex and humiliate a person and that it
was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that the charges were false and groundless [Manila Gas Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. L-44190,
October 30,1980, 100 SCRA 602]. Concededly, the filing of a suit by itself, does not render a person liable for malicious prosecution [Inhelder
Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. 52358, May 301983122 SCRA 576]. The mere dismissal by the fiscal of the criminal complaint is not a ground for an
award of damages for malicious prosecution if there is no competent evidence to show that the complainant had acted in bad faith [Sison v. David,
G.R. No. L-11268, January 28,1961, 1 SCRA 60].

In the instant case, however, the trial court made a finding that petitioners acted in bad faith in filing the criminal complaints against Tobias,
observing that:
xxx

Defendants (petitioners herein) filed with the Fiscal's Office of Manila a total of six (6) criminal cases, five (5) of which were for
estafa thru falsification of commercial document and one for violation of Art. 290 of the Revised Penal Code "discovering secrets
thru seizure of correspondence," and all were dismissed for insufficiency or lack of evidence." The dismissal of four (4) of the
cases was appealed to the Ministry of Justice, but said Ministry invariably sustained the dismissal of the cases. As above
adverted to, two of these cases were refiled with the Judge Advocate General's Office of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to
railroad plaintiffs arrest and detention in the military stockade, but this was frustrated by a presidential decree transferring
criminal cases involving civilians to the civil courts.

xxx

To be sure, when despite the two (2) police reports embodying the findings of Lt. Dioscoro Tagle, Chief Document Examiner of
the Manila Police Department, clearing plaintiff of participation or involvement in the fraudulent transactions complained of,
despite the negative results of the lie detector tests which defendants compelled plaintiff to undergo, and although the police
investigation was "still under follow-up and a supplementary report will be submitted after all the evidence has been gathered,"
defendants hastily filed six (6) criminal cases with the city Fiscal's Office of Manila, five (5) for estafa thru falsification of
commercial document and one (1) for violation of Art. 290 of the Revised Penal Code, so much so that as was to be expected,
all six (6) cases were dismissed, with one of the investigating fiscals, Asst. Fiscal de Guia, commenting in one case that,
"Indeed, the haphazard way this case was investigated is evident. Evident likewise is the flurry and haste in the filing of this case
against respondent Tobias," there can be no mistaking that defendants would not but be motivated by malicious and unlawful
intent to harass, oppress, and cause damage to plaintiff.

xxx

[RTC Decision, pp. 5-6; Rollo, pp. 235-236].

In addition to the observations made by the trial court, the Court finds it significant that the criminal complaints were filed during the pendency of the
illegal dismissal case filed by Tobias against petitioners. This explains the haste in which the complaints were filed, which the trial court earlier
noted. But petitioners, to prove their good faith, point to the fact that only six complaints were filed against Tobias when they could have allegedly
filed one hundred cases, considering the number of anomalous transactions committed against GLOBE MACKAY. However, petitioners' good faith
is belied by the threat made by Hendry after the filing of the first complaint that one hundred more cases would be filed against Tobias. In effect, the
possible filing of one hundred more cases was made to hang like the sword of Damocles over the head of Tobias. In fine, considering the haste in
which the criminal complaints were filed, the fact that they were filed during the pendency of the illegal dismissal case against petitioners, the threat
made by Hendry, the fact that the cases were filed notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating Tobias from involvement in the anomalies
committed against GLOBE MACKAY, coupled by the eventual dismissal of all the cases, the Court is led into no other conclusion than that
petitioners were motivated by malicious intent in filing the six criminal complaints against Tobias.

Petitioners next contend that the award of damages was excessive. In the complaint filed against petitioners, Tobias prayed for the following: one
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) as actual damages; fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as exemplary damages; eight hundred thousand
pesos (P800,000.00) as moral damages; fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as attorney's fees; and costs. The trial court, after making a computation
of the damages incurred by Tobias [See RTC Decision, pp. 7-8; Rollo, pp. 154-1551, awarded him the following: eighty thousand pesos
(P80,000.00) as actual damages; two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as moral damages; twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as
exemplary damages; thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney's fees; and, costs. It must be underscored that petitioners have been guilty of
committing several actionable tortious acts, i.e., the abusive manner in which they dismissed Tobias from work including the baseless imputation of
guilt and the harassment during the investigations; the defamatory language heaped on Tobias as well as the scornful remark on Filipinos; the
poison letter sent to RETELCO which resulted in Tobias' loss of possible employment; and, the malicious filing of the criminal complaints.
Considering the extent of the damage wrought on Tobias, the Court finds that, contrary to petitioners' contention, the amount of damages awarded
to Tobias was reasonable under the circumstances.

Yet, petitioners still insist that the award of damages was improper, invoking the principle of damnum absque injuria. It is argued that "[t]he only
probable actual damage that plaintiff (private respondent herein) could have suffered was a direct result of his having been dismissed from his
employment, which was a valid and legal act of the defendants-appellants (petitioners herein).lâwphî1.ñèt " [Petition, p. 17; Rollo, p. 18].

According to the principle of damnum absque injuria, damage or loss which does not constitute a violation of a legal right or amount to a legal wrong
is not actionable [Escano v. CA, G.R. No. L-47207, September 25, 1980, 100 SCRA 197; See also Gilchrist v. Cuddy 29 Phil, 542 (1915); The
Board of Liquidators v. Kalaw, G.R. No. L-18805, August 14, 1967, 20 SCRA 987]. This principle finds no application in this case. It bears repeating
that even granting that petitioners might have had the right to dismiss Tobias from work, the abusive manner in which that right was exercised
amounted to a legal wrong for which petitioners must now be held liable. Moreover, the damage incurred by Tobias was not only in connection with
the abusive manner in which he was dismissed but was also the result of several other quasi-delictual acts committed by petitioners.

Petitioners next question the award of moral damages. However, the Court has already ruled in Wassmer v. Velez, G.R. No. L-20089, December
26, 1964, 12 SCRA 648, 653, that [p]er express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in the cases
mentioned in Article 21 of said Code." Hence, the Court of Appeals committed no error in awarding moral damages to Tobias.
Lastly, the award of exemplary damages is impugned by petitioners. Although Article 2231 of the Civil Code provides that "[i]n quasi-delicts,
exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence," the Court, in Zulueta v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., G.R.
No. L- 28589, January 8, 1973, 49 SCRA 1, ruled that if gross negligence warrants the award of exemplary damages, with more reason is its
imposition justified when the act performed is deliberate, malicious and tainted with bad faith. As in the Zulueta case, the nature of the wrongful acts
shown to have been committed by petitioners against Tobias is sufficient basis for the award of exemplary damages to the latter.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 09055 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr. and Bidin, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., took no part.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-44748 August 29, 1986

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILS., INC. (RCPI). petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LORETO DIONELA, respondents.

O. Pythogoras Oliver for respondents.

PARAS, J.:

Before Us, is a Petition for Review by certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals, modifying the decision of the trial court in a civil case for
recovery of damages against petitioner corporation by reducing the award to private respondent Loreto Dionela of moral damages from P40,000 to
Pl5,000, and attorney's fees from P3,000 to P2,000.

The basis of the complaint against the defendant corporation is a telegram sent through its Manila Office to the offended party, Loreto Dionela,
reading as follows:

176 AS JR 1215PM 9 PAID MANDALUYONG JUL 22-66 LORETO DIONELA CABANGAN LEGASPI CITY

WIRE ARRIVAL OF CHECK FER

LORETO DIONELA-CABANGAN-WIRE ARRIVAL OF CHECK-PER

115 PM

SA IYO WALANG PAKINABANG DUMATING KA DIYAN-WALA-KANG PADALA DITO KAHIT BULBUL MO

(p. 19, Annex "A")

Plaintiff-respondent Loreto Dionela alleges that the defamatory words on the telegram sent to him not only wounded his feelings but also caused
him undue embarrassment and affected adversely his business as well because other people have come to know of said defamatory words.
Defendant corporation as a defense, alleges that the additional words in Tagalog was a private joke between the sending and receiving operators
and that they were not addressed to or intended for plaintiff and therefore did not form part of the telegram and that the Tagalog words are not
defamatory. The telegram sent through its facilities was received in its station at Legaspi City. Nobody other than the operator manned the teletype
machine which automatically receives telegrams being transmitted. The said telegram was detached from the machine and placed inside a sealed
envelope and delivered to plaintiff, obviously as is. The additional words in Tagalog were never noticed and were included in the telegram when
delivered.

The trial court in finding for the plaintiff ruled as follows:

There is no question that the additional words in Tagalog are libelous. They clearly impute a vice or defect of the plaintiff.
Whether or not they were intended for the plaintiff, the effect on the plaintiff is the same. Any person reading the additional
words in Tagalog will naturally think that they refer to the addressee, the plaintiff. There is no indication from the face of the
telegram that the additional words in Tagalog were sent as a private joke between the operators of the defendant.

The defendant is sued directly not as an employer. The business of the defendant is to transmit telegrams. It will open the door
to frauds and allow the defendant to act with impunity if it can escape liability by the simple expedient of showing that its
employees acted beyond the scope of their assigned tasks.

The liability of the defendant is predicated not only on Article 33 of the Civil Code of the Philippines but on the following articles
of said Code:

ART. 19.- Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone
his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
 ART. 20.-Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the
same.

There is sufficient publication of the libelous Tagalog words. The office file of the defendant containing copies of telegrams
received are open and held together only by a metal fastener. Moreover, they are open to view and inspection by third parties.

It follows that the plaintiff is entitled to damages and attorney's fees. The plaintiff is a businessman. The libelous Tagalog words
must have affected his business and social standing in the community. The Court fixes the amount of P40,000.00 as the
reasonable amount of moral damages and the amount of P3,000.00 as attorney's fee which the defendant should pay the
plaintiff. (pp. 15-16, Record on Appeal)

The respondent appellate court in its assailed decision confirming the aforegoing findings of the lower court stated:

The proximate cause, therefore, resulting in injury to appellee, was the failure of the appellant to take the necessary or
precautionary steps to avoid the occurrence of the humiliating incident now complained of. The company had not imposed any
safeguard against such eventualities and this void in its operating procedure does not speak well of its concern for their
clientele's interests. Negligence here is very patent. This negligence is imputable to appellant and not to its employees.

The claim that there was no publication of the libelous words in Tagalog is also without merit. The fact that a carbon copy of the
telegram was filed among other telegrams and left to hang for the public to see, open for inspection by a third party is sufficient
publication. It would have been otherwise perhaps had the telegram been placed and kept in a secured place where no one may
have had a chance to read it without appellee's permission.

The additional Tagalog words at the bottom of the telegram are, as correctly found by the lower court, libelous per se, and from
which malice may be presumed in the absence of any showing of good intention and justifiable motive on the part of the
appellant. The law implies damages in this instance (Quemel vs. Court of Appeals, L-22794, January 16, 1968; 22 SCRA 44).
The award of P40,000.00 as moral damages is hereby reduced to P15,000.00 and for attorney's fees the amount of P2,000.00
is awarded. (pp. 22-23, record)

After a motion for reconsideration was denied by the appellate court, petitioner came to Us with the following:

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that Petitioner-employer should answer directly and primarily for the civil
liability arising from the criminal act of its employee.

II

The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that there was sufficient publication of the alleged libelous telegram in
question, as contemplated by law on libel.

III

The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that the liability of petitioner-company-employer is predicated on Articles 19
and 20 of the Civil Code, Articles on Human Relations.

IV

The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in awarding Atty's. fees. (p. 4, Record)

Petitioner's contentions do not merit our consideration. The action for damages was filed in the lower court directly against respondent corporation
not as an employer subsidiarily liable under the provisions of Article 1161 of the New Civil Code in relation to Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code.
The cause of action of the private respondent is based on Arts. 19 and 20 of the New Civil Code (supra). As well as on respondent's breach of
contract thru the negligence of its own employees. 1

Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of receiving and transmitting messages. Everytime a person transmits a message
through the facilities of the petitioner, a contract is entered into. Upon receipt of the rate or fee fixed, the petitioner undertakes to transmit the
message accurately. There is no question that in the case at bar, libelous matters were included in the message transmitted, without the consent or
knowledge of the sender. There is a clear case of breach of contract by the petitioner in adding extraneous and libelous matters in the message sent
to the private respondent. As a corporation, the petitioner can act only through its employees. Hence the acts of its employees in receiving and
transmitting messages are the acts of the petitioner. To hold that the petitioner is not liable directly for the acts of its employees in the pursuit of
petitioner's business is to deprive the general public availing of the services of the petitioner of an effective and adequate remedy. In most cases,
negligence must be proved in order that plaintiff may recover. However, since negligence may be hard to substantiate in some cases, we may apply
the doctrine of RES IPSA LOQUITUR (the thing speaks for itself), by considering the presence of facts or circumstances surrounding the injury.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of the appellate court is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Feria (Chairman), Fernan, Alampay, and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 In contracts the negligence of the employee (servant) is the negligence of the employer (master). This is the master and servant rule.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-17396 May 30, 1962

CECILIO PE, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
ALFONSO PE, defendant-appellee.

Cecilio L. Pe for and in his own behalf as plaintiff-appellant.

Leodegario L. Mogol for defendant-appellee.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Plaintiffs brought this action before the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover moral, compensatory, exemplary and corrective damages in the
amount of P94,000.00 exclusive of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.

Defendant, after denying some allegations contained in the complaint, set up as a defense that the facts alleged therein, even if true, do not
constitute a valid cause of action.

After trial, the lower court, after finding that defendant had carried on a love affair with one Lolita Pe, an unmarried woman, being a married man
himself, declared that defendant cannot be held liable for moral damages it appearing that plaintiffs failed to prove that defendant, being aware of
his marital status, deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita's affection. So it rendered decision dismissing the complaint.1äwphï1.ñët

Plaintiffs brought this case on appeal before this Court on the ground that the issues involved are purely of law.

The facts as found by the trial court are: Plaintiffs are the parents, brothers and sisters of one Lolita Pe. At the time of her disappearance on April
14, 1957, Lolita was 24 years old and unmarried. Defendant is a married man and works as agent of the La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory. He
used to stay in the town of Gasan, Marinduque, in connection with his aforesaid occupation. Lolita was staying with her parents in the same town.
Defendant was an adopted son of a Chinaman named Pe Beco, a collateral relative of Lolita's father. Because of such fact and the similarity in their
family name, defendant became close to the plaintiffs who regarded him as a member of their family. Sometime in 1952, defendant frequented the
house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. The two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted
clandestine trysts not only in the town of Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. They exchanged love notes with each
other the contents of which reveal not only their infatuation for each other but also the extent to which they had carried their relationship. The rumors
about their love affairs reached the ears of Lolita's parents sometime, in 1955, and since then defendant was forbidden from going to their house
and from further seeing Lolita. The plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese national. The affair between
defendant and Lolita continued nonetheless.

Sometime in April, 1957, Lolita was staying with her brothers and sisters at their residence at 54-B España Extension, Quezon City. On April 14,
1957, Lolita disappeared from said house. After she left, her brothers and sisters checked up her thing and found that Lolita's clothes were gone.
However, plaintiffs found a note on a crumpled piece of paper inside Lolita's aparador. Said note, written on a small slip of paper approximately 4"
by 3" in size, was in a handwriting recognized to be that of defendant's. In English it reads:

Honey, suppose I leave here on Sunday night, and that's 13th of this month and we will have a date on the 14th, that's Monday morning at
10 a.m.

Reply

Love

The disappearance of Lolita was reported to the police authorities and the NBI but up to the present there is no news or trace of her whereabouts.

The present action is based on Article 21 of the New Civil Code which provides:

Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner which is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.

There is no doubt that the claim of plaintiffs for damages is based on the fact that defendant, being a married man, carried on a love affair with Lolita
Pe thereby causing plaintiffs injury in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy. But in spite of the fact that plaintiffs have clearly
established that in illicit affair was carried on between defendant and Lolita which caused great damage to the name and reputation of plaintiffs who
are her parents, brothers and sisters, the trial court considered their complaint not actionable for the reason that they failed to prove that defendant
deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita's affection Thus, the trial court said: "In the absence of proof on this point, the court may not presume
that it was the defendant who deliberately induced such relationship. We cannot be unmindful of the uncertainties and sometimes inexplicable
mysteries of the human emotions. It is a possibility that the defendant and Lolita simply fell in love with each other, not only without any desire on
their part, but also against their better judgment and in full consciousness of what it will bring to both of them. This is specially so with respect to
Lolita, being an unmarried woman, falling in love with defendant who is a married man."

We disagree with this view. The circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolita's affection cannot lead, to any other conclusion than that it
was he who, thru an ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him. This is shown by the fact that
defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. Because of the frequency of his
visits to the latter's family who was allowed free access because he was a collateral relative and was considered as a member of her family, the two
eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine love affairs not only in Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a
barrio school. When the rumors about their illicit affairs reached the knowledge of her parents, defendant was forbidden from going to their house
and even from seeing Lolita. Plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese national. Nevertheless, defendant
continued his love affairs with Lolita until she disappeared from the parental home. Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of
events than that defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of
having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man.
Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of
the new Civil Code.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Defendant is hereby sentenced to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as damages and
P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses of litigations. Costs against appellee.

Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993

GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.

Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.

Corleto R. Castro for private respondent.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to review and set aside the Decision1 of the respondent Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 24256 which affirmed in toto the 16 October 1939 Decision of Branch 38 (Lingayen) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pangasinan in Civil Case No. 16503. Presented is the issue of whether or not damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the
basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

The antecedents of this case are not complicated:

On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the aforesaid trial court a complaint 2 for damages against the
petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. She alleges in said complaint that: she is twenty-two (22) years old, single,
Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her community; petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen
residing at the Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges
in Dagupan City; before 20 August 1987, the latter courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on the condition that they would get
married; they therefore agreed to get married after the end of the school semester, which was in October of that year; petitioner then visited the
private respondent's parents in Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987, the petitioner
forced her to live with him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin before she began living with him; a week before the filing of the complaint,
petitioner's attitude towards her started to change; he maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries;
during a confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint, petitioner repudiated their
marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and; the petitioner is already married to someone living in Bacolod City. Private
respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages in the amount of not less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for
actual expenses amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees and costs, and granting her such other relief and remedies as may be just and equitable.
The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 16503.

In his Answer with Counterclaim,3 petitioner admitted only the personal circumstances of the parties as averred in the complaint and denied the rest
of the allegations either for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof or because the true facts are those
alleged as his Special and Affirmative Defenses. He thus claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private
respondent; he neither sought the consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to live in his apartment; he did not maltreat her, but only told
her to stop coming to his place because he discovered that she had deceived him by stealing his money and passport; and finally, no confrontation
took place with a representative of the barangay captain. Insisting, in his Counterclaim, that the complaint is baseless and unfounded and that as a
result thereof, he was unnecessarily dragged into court and compelled to incur expenses, and has suffered mental anxiety and a besmirched
reputation, he prayed for an award of P5,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses and P25,000.00 as moral damages.

After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial Order4 embodying the stipulated facts which the parties had agreed
upon, to wit:

1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, while the defendant is single, Iranian citizen
and resident (sic) of Lozano Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan City since September 1, 1987 up to the present;

2. That the defendant is presently studying at Lyceum Northwestern, Dagupan City, College of Medicine, second year medicine
proper;
 3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette , Fernandez Avenue, Dagupan City since July, 1986 up to the
present and a (sic) high school graduate;

4. That the parties happened to know each other when the manager of the Mabuhay Luncheonette, Johhny Rabino introduced
the defendant to the plaintiff on August 3, 1986.

After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered on 16 October 1989 a decision5 favoring the private
respondent. The petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter damages and attorney's fees; the dispositive portion of the decision reads:

IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant.

1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos as moral damages.

2. Condemning further the defendant to play the plaintiff the sum of three thousand (P3,000.00) pesos as atty's fees and two
thousand (P2,000.00) pesos at (sic) litigation expenses and to pay the costs.

3. All other claims are denied.6

The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a) petitioner and private respondent were lovers, (b) private respondent is
not a woman of loose morals or questionable virtue who readily submits to sexual advances, (c) petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false
pretenses, promised to marry private respondent, d) because of his persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered by him,
(e) by reason of that deceitful promise, private respondent and her parents — in accordance with Filipino customs and traditions — made some
preparations for the wedding that was to be held at the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs and chickens, inviting friends and relatives and
contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill his promise to marry her and (g) such acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has abused
Philippine hospitality, have offended our sense of morality, good customs, culture and traditions. The trial court gave full credit to the private
respondent's testimony because, inter alia, she would not have had the temerity and courage to come to court and expose her honor and reputation
to public scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was false.7

The above findings and conclusions were culled from the detailed summary of the evidence for the private respondent in the foregoing decision,
digested by the respondent Court as follows:

According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at the time and that she never had a boyfriend before, defendant started
courting her just a few days after they first met. He later proposed marriage to her several times and she accepted his love as
well as his proposal of marriage on August 20, 1987, on which same day he went with her to her hometown of Bañaga,
Bugallon, Pangasinan, as he wanted to meet her parents and inform them of their relationship and their intention to get married.
The photographs Exhs. "A" to "E" (and their submarkings) of defendant with members of plaintiff's family or with plaintiff, were
taken that day. Also on that occasion, defendant told plaintiffs parents and brothers and sisters that he intended to marry her
during the semestral break in October, 1987, and because plaintiff's parents thought he was good and trusted him, they agreed
to his proposal for him to marry their daughter, and they likewise allowed him to stay in their house and sleep with plaintiff during
the few days that they were in Bugallon. When plaintiff and defendant later returned to Dagupan City, they continued to live
together in defendant's apartment. However, in the early days of October, 1987, defendant would tie plaintiff's hands and feet
while he went to school, and he even gave her medicine at 4 o'clock in the morning that made her sleep the whole day and night
until the following day. As a result of this live-in relationship, plaintiff became pregnant, but defendant gave her some medicine
to abort the fetus. Still plaintiff continued to live with defendant and kept reminding him of his promise to marry her until he told
her that he could not do so because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod City. That was the time plaintiff left defendant,
went home to her parents, and thereafter consulted a lawyer who accompanied her to the barangay captain in Dagupan City.
Plaintiff, her lawyer, her godmother, and a barangay tanod sent by the barangay captain went to talk to defendant to still
convince him to marry plaintiff, but defendant insisted that he could not do so because he was already married to a girl in
Bacolod City, although the truth, as stipulated by the parties at the pre-trial, is that defendant is still single.

Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after defendant had informed them of his desire to marry Marilou, he already
looked for sponsors for the wedding, started preparing for the reception by looking for pigs and chickens, and even already
invited many relatives and friends to the forthcoming wedding. 8

Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of Appeals which docketed the case as CA-G.R. CV No. 24256. In his
Brief,9 he contended that the trial court erred (a) in not dismissing the case for lack of factual and legal basis and (b) in ordering him to pay moral
damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs.

On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the challenged decision 10 affirming in toto the trial court's ruling of 16 October 1989. In
sustaining the trial court's findings of fact, respondent Court made the following analysis:

First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she met defendant who was already 29 years old at the time, does not appear
to be a girl of loose morals. It is uncontradicted that she was a virgin prior to her unfortunate experience with defendant and
never had boyfriend. She is, as described by the lower court, a barrio lass "not used and accustomed to trend of modern urban
 life", and certainly would (sic) not have allowed
"herself to be deflowered by the defendant if there was no persuasive promise made by the defendant to marry her." In fact, we
agree with the lower court that plaintiff and defendant must have been sweethearts or so the plaintiff must have thought because
of the deception of defendant, for otherwise, she would not have allowed herself to be photographed with defendant in public in
so (sic) loving and tender poses as those depicted in the pictures Exhs. "D" and "E". We cannot believe, therefore, defendant's
pretense that plaintiff was a nobody to him except a waitress at the restaurant where he usually ate. Defendant in fact admitted
that he went to plaintiff's hometown of Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, at least thrice; at (sic) the town fiesta on February 27,
1987 (p. 54, tsn May 18, 1988), at (sic) a beach party together with the manager and employees of the Mabuhay Luncheonette
on March 3, 1987 (p. 50, tsn id.), and on April 1, 1987 when he allegedly talked to plaintiff's mother who told him to marry her
daughter (pp. 55-56, tsn id.). Would defendant have left Dagupan City where he was involved in the serious study of medicine to
go to plaintiff's hometown in Bañaga, Bugallon, unless there was (sic) some kind of special relationship between them? And this
special relationship must indeed have led to defendant's insincere proposal of marriage to plaintiff, communicated not only to her
but also to her parents, and (sic) Marites Rabino, the owner of the restaurant where plaintiff was working and where defendant
first proposed marriage to her, also knew of this love affair and defendant's proposal of marriage to plaintiff, which she declared
was the reason why plaintiff resigned from her job at the restaurant after she had accepted defendant's proposal (pp. 6-7, tsn
March 7, 1988).

Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man of good moral character and must think so low and have so little
respect and regard for Filipino women that he openly admitted that when he studied in Bacolod City for several years where he
finished his B.S. Biology before he came to Dagupan City to study medicine, he had a common-law wife in Bacolod City. In
other words, he also lived with another woman in Bacolod City but did not marry that woman, just like what he did to plaintiff. It is
not surprising, then, that he felt so little compunction or remorse in pretending to love and promising to marry plaintiff, a young,
innocent, trustful country girl, in order to satisfy his lust on her. 11

and then concluded:

In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was defendant-appellant's fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love
for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest
and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these (sic) fraud and deception on appellant's part that
made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage. And as these acts of
appellant are palpably and undoubtedly against morals, good customs, and public policy, and are even gravely and deeply
derogatory and insulting to our women, coming as they do from a foreigner who has been enjoying the hospitality of our people
and taking advantage of the opportunity to study in one of our institutions of learning, defendant-appellant should indeed be
made, under Art. 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to compensate for the moral damages and injury that he had caused
plaintiff, as the lower court ordered him to do in its decision in this case. 12

Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26 March 1991; he raises therein the single issue of whether or not Article 21 of
the Civil Code applies to the case at bar. 13

It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had not committed any moral wrong or injury or violated any good custom or
public policy; he has not professed love or proposed marriage to the private respondent; and he has never maltreated her. He criticizes the trial
court for liberally invoking Filipino customs, traditions and culture, and ignoring the fact that since he is a foreigner, he is not conversant with such
Filipino customs, traditions and culture. As an Iranian Moslem, he is not familiar with Catholic and Christian ways. He stresses that even if he had
made a promise to marry, the subsequent failure to fulfill the same is excusable or tolerable because of his Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to
the Muslim Code which purportedly allows a Muslim to take four (4) wives and concludes that on the basis thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that
he does not posses good moral character. Moreover, his controversial "common law life" is now his legal wife as their marriage had been
solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As to his unlawful cohabitation with the private respondent, petitioner claims that even if
responsibility could be pinned on him for the live-in relationship, the private respondent should also be faulted for consenting to an illicit
arrangement. Finally, petitioner asseverates that even if it was to be assumed arguendo that he had professed his love to the private respondent
and had also promised to marry her, such acts would not be actionable in view of the special circumstances of the case. The mere breach of
promise is not actionable. 14

On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her Comment to the petition and the petitioner had filed his Reply thereto, this Court gave
due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda, which they subsequently complied with.

As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the petitioner's arguments in support of his thesis, it is clear that questions of fact, which boil
down to the issue of the credibility of witnesses, are also raised. It is the rule in this jurisdiction that appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's
findings as to the credibility of witnesses, the latter court having heard the witnesses and having had the opportunity to observe closely their
deportment and manner of testifying, unless the trial court had plainly overlooked facts of substance or value which, if considered, might affect the
result of the case. 15

Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and trial courts had overlooked any fact of substance or values which could
alter the result of the case.
Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is not
the function of this Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence introduced by the parties before the lower court. There are, however,
recognized exceptions to this rule. Thus, in Medina vs.Asistio, Jr., 16 this Court took the time, again, to enumerate these exceptions:

xxx xxx xxx

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257
[1953]); (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurb or impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3)
Where there is a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco v. People, 95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts (Cruz v. Sosing,
L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.) (6) When
the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of
both appellate and appellee (Evangelista v. Alto Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]);
(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970];
Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based (Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondents (Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970]).

Petitioner has not endeavored to joint out to Us the existence of any of the above quoted exceptions in this case. Consequently, the factual findings
of the trial and appellate courts must be respected.

And now to the legal issue.

The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. 17 Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the
New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so. The reason therefor is set forth in the report of the Senate Committees on the Proposed
Civil Code, from which We quote:

The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not actionable has been definitely decided in the
case of De Jesus vs. Syquia. 18 The history of breach of promise suits in the United States and in England has shown that no
other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to
the abolition of rights of action in the so-called Heart Balm suits in many of the American states. . . . 19

This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this
jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically
enumerate and punish in the statute books. 20

As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:

But the Code Commission had gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or determined by positive law. Fully sensible that
there are countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually
suffered material and moral injury, the Commission has deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the
proposed Civil Code the following rule:

Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the nineteen-year old daughter of "X". A promise of
marriage either has not been made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the present laws, there is no
crime, as the girl is above nineteen years of age. Neither can any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed.
Therefore, though the grievous moral wrong has been committed, and though the girl and family have suffered incalculable
moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring action for damages. But under the proposed article, she and her parents would
have such a right of action.

Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved, would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold
number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes. 21

Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
 is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises
as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is an Anglo-American or common law concept. Torts is much broader than culpa
aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but international criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment
and deceit. In the general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil
Code, intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or
omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. 22 In between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the
absence of Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even postulated that together with Articles
19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more supple and
adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. 23

In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the
proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of
the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle
scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages
pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and
reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy.

In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry
plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said
promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him
preparatory to their supposed marriage." 24 In short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single
Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction — the kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its example earlier adverted to. The
petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction punished under either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code because the
private respondent was above eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the seduction.

Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied in a breach of promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral
seduction. Thus, in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,25 this Court denied recovery of damages to the woman because:

. . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10)
years younger than the complainant — who was around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high
school teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed to be — when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere
apprentice pilot, but, also, because the court of first instance found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner
because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" him by having a fruit of their engagement even before they
had the benefit of clergy.

In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 26 while this Court likewise hinted at possible recovery if there had been moral seduction, recovery was eventually
denied because We were not convinced that such seduction existed. The following enlightening disquisition and conclusion were made in the said
case:

The Court of Appeals seem to have overlooked that the example set forth in the Code Commission's memorandum refers to a
tort upon a minor who had been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual intercourse,
or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of
confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9
Phil. 595).

It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that —

To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or inducement and the woman
must yield because of the promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the
intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56) She must be
induced to depart from the path of virtue by the use of some species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which
are calculated to have and do have that effect, and which result in her person to ultimately submitting her
person to the sexual embraces of her seducer (27 Phil. 123).

And in American Jurisprudence we find:

On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion or deception is the essence of
the injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recovery.

Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual desire of curiosity of the female,
and the defendant merely affords her the needed opportunity for the commission of the act. It has been
emphasized that to allow a recovery in all such cases would tend to the demoralization of the female sex,
 and would be a reward for unchastity by which a class of adventuresses would be swift to profit. (47 Am. Jur.
662)

xxx xxx xxx

Over and above the partisan allegations, the fact stand out that for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a
woman of adult age, maintain intimate sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is
incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been
deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not
have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of
marriage, and would have cut short all sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his defendant did not
intend to fulfill his promise. Hence, we conclude that no case is made under article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of
action being alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing the complaint. 27

In his annotations on the Civil Code, 28 Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras, who recently retired from this Court, opined that in a breach of promise
to marry where there had been carnal knowledge, moral damages may be recovered:

. . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the intercourse was due to mutual lust. (Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,
L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960; Batarra vs. Marcos, 7 Phil. 56 (sic); Beatriz Galang
vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-17248, Jan. 29, 1962). (In other words, if the CAUSE be the promise to marry, and the EFFECT
be the carnal knowledge, there is a chance that there was criminal or moral seduction, hence recovery of moral damages will
prosper. If it be the other way around, there can be no recovery of moral damages, because here mutual lust has intervened). . .
.

together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as the expenses for the wedding presentations (See Domalagon v. Bolifer,
33 Phil. 471).

Senator Arturo M. Tolentino 29 is also of the same persuasion:

It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos, 30 still subsists, notwithstanding the incorporation of the present article31 in the
Code. The example given by the Code Commission is correct, if there was seduction, not necessarily in the legal sense, but in
the vulgar sense of deception. But when the sexual act is accomplished without any deceit or qualifying circumstance of abuse
of authority or influence, but the woman, already of age, has knowingly given herself to a man, it cannot be said that there is an
injury which can be the basis for indemnity.

But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by willfulness (sic), the action lies. The court, however, must weigh the
degree of fraud, if it is sufficient to deceive the woman under the circumstances, because an act which would deceive a girl
sixteen years of age may not constitute deceit as to an experienced woman thirty years of age. But so long as there is a
wrongful act and a resulting injury, there should be civil liability, even if the act is not punishable under the criminal law and there
should have been an acquittal or dismissal of the criminal case for that reason.

We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the effect that granting, for argument's sake, that he did promise to marry the
private respondent, the latter is nevertheless also at fault. According to him, both parties are in pari delicto; hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the
Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Batarra vs. Marcos, 32 the private respondent cannot recover damages from the petitioner. The latter even
goes as far as stating that if the private respondent had "sustained any injury or damage in their relationship, it is primarily because of her own
doing, 33 for:

. . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will become a doctor sooner or later. Take notice that she is a plain high
school graduate and a mere employee . . . (Annex "C") or a waitress (TSN, p. 51, January 25, 1988) in a luncheonette and
without doubt, is in need of a man who can give her economic security. Her family is in dire need of financial assistance. (TSN,
pp. 51-53, May 18, 1988). And this predicament prompted her to accept a proposition that may have been offered by the
petitioner. 34

These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It is clear that he harbors a condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the
private respondent on account of the latter's ignoble birth, inferior educational background, poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable
employment. Obviously then, from the very beginning, he was not at all moved by good faith and an honest motive. Marrying with a woman so
circumstances could not have even remotely occurred to him. Thus, his profession of love and promise to marry were empty words directly intended
to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing that indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his life's partner. His
was nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal of
marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's concept of morality and brazenly defied the
traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It can even be said that the petitioner committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard of
Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every person to act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise
of his rights and in the performance of his obligations.
No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions.

The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private respondent may not have been impelled by the purest of intentions, she
eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual congress not out of lust, but because of moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms of
conscience about the entire episode for as soon as she found out that the petitioner was not going to marry her after all, she left him. She is not,
therefore, in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal fault." 35At most, it
could be conceded that she is merely in delicto.

Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where his transgression has been brought about by the
imposition of undue influence of the party on whom the burden of the original wrong principally rests, or where his consent to the
transaction was itself procured by
fraud. 36

In Mangayao vs. Lasud, 37 We declared:

Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault, there should be no action by one against the other (Art. 1412, New
Civil Code). This rule, however, has been interpreted as applicable only where the fault on both sides is, more or less,
equivalent. It does not apply where one party is literate or intelligent and the other one is not. (c.f. Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40 Phil.
209).

We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent, let it not be said that this Court condones the deplorable behavior of her
parents in letting her and the petitioner stay together in the same room in their house after giving approval to their marriage. It is the solemn duty of
parents to protect the honor of their daughters and infuse upon them the higher values of morality and dignity.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the instant petition is hereby DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 101749 July 10, 1992

CONRADO BUNAG, JR., petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, First Division, and ZENAIDA B. CIRILO, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

Petitioner appeals for the reversal of the decision 1 of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on May 17, 1991 in CA-G.R. CV No. 07054,
entitled "Zenaida B. Cirilo vs. Conrado Bunag, Sr. and Conrado Bunag, Jr.," which affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
XI at Bacoor, Cavite, and, implicitly, respondent court's resolution of September 3, 1991 2 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Respondent court having assiduously discussed the salient antecedents of this case, vis-a-vis the factual findings of the court below, the evidence
of record and the contentions of the parties, it is appropriate that its findings, which we approve and adopt, be extensively reproduced hereunder:

Based on the evidence on record, the following facts are considered indisputable: On the afternoon of September 8, 1973,
defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. brought plaintiff-appellant to a motel or hotel where they had sexual intercourse. Later that
evening, said defendant-appellant brought plaintiff-appellant to the house of his grandmother Juana de Leon in Pamplona, Las
Piñas, Metro Manila, where they lived together as husband and wife for 21 days, or until September 29, 1973. On September
10, 1973, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. and plaintiff-appellant filed their respective applications for a marriage license with the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Bacoor, Cavite. On October 1, 1973, after leaving plaintiff-appellant, defendant-appellant
Bunag, Jr. filed an affidavit withdrawing his application for a marriage license.

Plaintiff-appellant contends that on the afternoon of September 8, 1973, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr., together with an
unidentified male companion, abducted her in the vicinity of the San Juan de Dios Hospital in Pasay City and brought her to a
motel where she was raped. The court a quo, which adopted her evidence, summarized the same which we paraphrased as
follows:

Plaintiff was 26 years old on November 5, 1974 when she testified, single and had finished a college course
in Commerce (t.s.n., p. 4, Nov. 5, 1974). It appears that on September 8, 1973, at about 4:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, while she was walking along Figueras Street, Pasay City on her way to the San Juan de Dios
Canteen to take her snack, defendant, Conrado Bunag, Jr., came riding in a car driven by a male
companion. Plaintiff and defendant Bunag, Jr. were sweethearts, but two weeks before September 8, 1973,
they had a quarrel, and Bunag, Jr. wanted to talk matters over with plaintiff, so that he invited her to take
their merienda at the Aristocrat Restaurant in Manila instead of at the San Juan de Dios Canteen, to which
plaintiff obliged, as she believed in his sincerity (t.s.n., pp. 8-10, Nov. 5, 1974).

Plaintiff rode in the car and took the front seat beside the driver while Bunag, Jr. seated himself by her right
side. The car travelled north on its way to the Aristocrat Restaurant but upon reaching San Juan Street in
Pasay City, it turned abruptly to the right, to which plaintiff protested, but which the duo ignored and instead
threatened her not to make any noise as they were ready to die and would bump the car against the post if
she persisted. Frightened and silenced, the car travelled its course thru F.B. Harrison Boulevard until they
reached a motel. Plaintiff was then pulled and dragged from the car against her will, and amidst her cries
and pleas. In spite of her struggle she was no match to the joint strength of the two male combatants
because of her natural weakness being a woman and her small stature. Eventually, she was brought inside
the hotel where the defendant Bunag, Jr. deflowered her against her will and consent. She could not fight
back and repel the attack because after Bunag, Jr. had forced her to lie down and embraced her, his
companion held her two feet, removed her panty, after which he left. Bunag, Jr. threatened her that he would
ask his companion to come back and hold her feet if she did not surrender her womanhood to him, thus he
succeeded in feasting on her virginity. Plaintiff described the pains she felt and how blood came out of her
private parts after her vagina was penetrated by the penis of the defendant Bunag, Jr. (t.s.n. pp. 17-24, Nov.
5, 1974).
 After that outrage on her virginity, plaintiff asked Bunag, Jr. once more to allow her to go home but the latter
would not consent and stated that he would only let her go after they were married as he intended to marry
her, so much so that she promised not to make any scandal and to marry him. Thereafter, they took a taxi
together after the car that they used had already gone, and proceeded to the house of Juana de Leon,
Bunag, Jr.'s grandmother in Pamplona, Las Piñas, Metro Manila where they arrived at 9:30 o'clock in the
evening (t.s.n., p. 26, Nov. 5, 1974). At about ten (10) o'clock that same evening, defendant Conrado Bunag,
Sr., father of Bunag, Jr. arrived and assured plaintiff that the following day which was a Monday, she and
Bunag, Jr. would go to Bacoor, to apply for a marriage license, which they did. They filed their applications
for marriage license (Exhibits "A" and "C") and after that plaintiff and defendant Bunag, Jr. returned to the
house of Juana de Leon and lived there as husband and wife from September 8, 1973 to September 29,
1973.

On September 29, 1973 defendant Bunag, Jr. left and never returned, humiliating plaintiff and compelled her
to go back to her parents on October 3, 1973. Plaintiff was ashamed when she went home and could not
sleep and eat because of the deception done against her by defendants-appellants (t.s.n., p. 35, Nov. 5,
1974).

The testimony of plaintiff was corroborated in toto by her uncle, Vivencio Bansagan who declared that on
September 8, 1973 when plaintiff failed to arrive home at 9:00 o'clock in the evening, his sister who is the
mother of plaintiff asked him to look for her but his efforts proved futile, and he told his sister that plaintiff
might have married (baka nag-asawa, t.s.n., pp. 5-6, March 18, 1976). However, in the afternoon of the next
day (Sunday), his sister told him that Francisco Cabrera, accompanied by barrio captain Jacinto Manalili of
Ligas, Bacoor, Cavite, informed her that plaintiff and Bunag, Jr. were in Cabrera's house, so that her sister
requested him to go and see the plaintiff, which he did, and at the house of Mrs. Juana de Leon in
Pamplona, Las Piñas, Metro Manila he met defendant Conrado Bunag, Sr., who told him, "Pare, the children
are here already. Let us settle the matter and have them married."

He conferred with plaintiff who told him that as she had already lost her honor, she would bear her sufferings as Boy Bunag, Jr.
and his father promised they would be married.

Defendants-appellants, on the other hand, deny that defendant-appellant Conrado Bunag, Jr. abducted and raped plaintiff-
appellant on September 8, 1973. On the contrary, plaintiff-appellant and defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. eloped on that date
because of the opposition of the latter's father to their relationship.

Defendant-appellants claim that defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. and plaintiff-appellant had earlier made plans to elope and get
married, and this fact was known to their friends, among them, Architect Chito Rodriguez. The couple made good their plans to
elope on the afternoon of September 8, 1973, when defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr., accompanied by his friend Guillermo
Ramos, Jr., met plaintiff-appellant and her officemate named Lydia in the vicinity of the San Juan de Dios Hospital. The
foursome then proceeded to (the) aforesaid hospital's canteen where they had some snacks. Later, Guillermo Ramos, Jr. took
Lydia to Quirino Avenue where she could get a ride home, thereby leaving the defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. and plaintiff-
appellant alone. According to defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr., after Guillermo Ramos, Jr. and Lydia left, he and plaintiff-appellant
took a taxi to the Golden Gate and Flamingo Hotels where they tried to get a room, but these were full. They finally got a room at
the Holiday Hotel, where defendant-appellant registered using his real name and residence certificate number. Three hours
later, the couple check out of the hotel and proceeded to the house of Juana de Leon at Pamplona, Las Piñas, where they
stayed until September 19, 1873. Defendant-appellant claims that bitter disagreements with the plaintiff-appellant over money
and the threats made to his life prompted him to break off their plan to get married.

During this period, defendant-appellant Bunag, Sr. denied having gone to the house of Juan de Leon and telling plaintiff-
appellant that she would be wed to defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. In fact, he phoned Atty. Conrado Adreneda, member of the
board of directors of Mandala Corporation, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr.'s employer, three times between the evening of
September 8, 1973 and September 9, 1973 inquiring as to the whereabouts of his son. He came to know about his son's
whereabouts when he was told of the couple's elopement late in the afternoon of September 9, 1973 by his mother Candida
Gawaran. He likewise denied having met relatives and emissaries of plaintiff-appellant and agreeing to her marriage to his
son. 3

A complaint for damages for alleged breach of promise to marry was filed by herein private respondent Zenaida B. Cirilo against petitioner Conrado
Bunag, Jr. and his father, Conrado Bunag, Sr., as Civil Case No. N-2028 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIX at Bacoor, Cavite. On August 20,
1983, on a finding, inter alia, that petitioner had forcibly abducted and raped private respondent, the trial court rendered a decision 4 ordering
petitioner Bunag, Jr. to pay private respondent P80,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, P20,000.00 by way of
temperate damages, and P10,000.00 for and as attorney's fees, as well as the costs of suit. Defendant Conrado Bunag, Sr. was absolved from any
and all liability.

Private respondent appealed that portion of the lower court's decision disculpating Conrado Bunag, Sr. from civil liability in this case. On the other
hand, the Bunags, as defendants-appellants, assigned in their appeal several errors allegedly committed by trial court, which were summarized by
respondent court as follows: (1) in finding that defendant-appellant Conrado Bunag, Jr. forcibly abducted and raped plaintiff-appellant; (2) in finding
that defendants-appellants promised plaintiff-appellant that she would be wed to defendant-appellant Conrado Bunag, Jr.; and (3) in awarding
plaintiff-appellant damages for the breach of defendants-appellants' promise of marriage. 5

As stated at the outset, on May 17, 1991 respondent Court of Appeals rendered judgment dismissing both appeals and affirming in toto the decision
of the trial court. His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner Bunag, Jr. is before us on a petition for review, contending that (1)
respondent court failed to consider vital exhibits, testimonies and incidents for petitioner's defense, resulting in the misapprehensions of facts and
violative of the law on preparation of judgment; and (2) it erred in the application of the proper law and jurisprudence by holding that there was
forcible abduction with rape, not just a simple elopement and an agreement to marry, and in the award of excessive damages. 6

Petitioner Bunag, Jr. first contends that both the trial and appellate courts failed to take into consideration the alleged fact that he and private
respondent had agreed to marry, and that there was no case of forcible abduction with rape, but one of simple elopement and agreement to marry.
It is averred that the agreement to marry has been sufficiently proven by the testimonies of the witnesses for both parties and the exhibits presented
in court.

This submission, therefore, clearly hinges on the credibility of the witnesses and evidence presented by the parties and the weight accorded thereto
in the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. In effect, what petitioner would want this Court to do is to evaluate and analyze
anew the evidence, both testimonial and documentary, presented before and calibrated by the trial court, and as further meticulously reviewed and
discussed by respondent court.

The issue raised primarily and ineluctably involves questions of fact. We are, therefore, once again constrained to stress the well-entrenched
statutory and jurisprudential mandate that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are, as a rule, conclusive upon this Court. Only questions of law,
distinctly set forth, may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, subject to clearly settled exceptions in
case law.

Our jurisdiction in cases brought to us from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to the latter, its
findings of fact being conclusive. This Court has emphatically declared that it is not its function to analyze or weigh such evidence all over again, its
jurisdiction being limited to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by the lower court. Barring, therefore, a showing that the findings
complained of are totally devoid of support in the record, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion, such
findings must stand, for this Court is not expected or required to examine or contrast the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the
parties. 7 Neither does the instant case reveal any feature falling within, any of the exceptions which under our decisional rules may warrant a
review of the factual findings of the Court of Appeals. On the foregoing considerations and our review of the records, we sustain the holding of
respondent court in favor of private respondent.

Petitioner likewise asserts that since action involves a breach of promise to marry, the trial court erred in awarding damages.

It is true that in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the time-honored rule that an action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law,
apart from the right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. 8 Generally, therefore, a breach of
promise to marry per se is not actionable, except where the plaintiff has actually incurred expenses for the wedding and the necessary incidents
thereof.

However, the award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified in or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
Correlatively, under Article 21 of said Code, in relation to paragraph 10 of said Article 2219, any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for moral damages. 9 Article 21 was adopted to
remedy the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless even though they have actually suffered material
and moral injury, and is intended to vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human
foresight to specifically provide for in the statutes. 10

Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, the acts of petitioner in forcibly abducting private respondent and having carnal knowledge
with her against her will, and thereafter promising to marry her in order to escape criminal liability, only to thereafter renege on such promise after
cohabiting with her for twenty-one days, irremissibly constitute acts contrary to morals and good customs. These are grossly insensate and
reprehensible transgressions which indisputably warrant and abundantly justify the award of moral and exemplary damages, pursuant to Article 21
in relation to paragraphs 3 and 10, Article 2219, and Article 2229 and 2234 of Civil Code.

Petitioner would, however, belabor the fact that said damages were awarded by the trial court on the basis of a finding that he is guilty of forcible
abduction with rape, despite the prior dismissal of the complaint therefor filed by private respondent with the Pasay City Fiscal's Office.

Generally, the basis of civil liability from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable. In other words, criminal liability will give rise to civil liability ex delicto only if the same felonious act or omission results in damage or injury to
another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof. 11 Hence, extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability
unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. 12

In the instant case, the dismissal of the complaint for forcible abduction with rape was by mere resolution of the fiscal at the preliminary investigation
stage. There is no declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil case might arise did not exist. Consequently, the dismissal did not
in any way affect the right of herein private respondent to institute a civil action arising from the offense because such preliminary dismissal of the
penal action did not carry with it the extinction of the civil action.

The reason most often given for this holding is that the two proceedings involved are not between the same parties. Furthermore, it has long been
emphasized, with continuing validity up to now, that there are different rules as to the competency of witnesses and the quantum of evidence in
criminal and civil proceedings. In a criminal action, the State must prove its case by evidence which shows the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, while in a civil action it is sufficient for the plaintiff to sustain his cause by preponderance of evidence only. 13Thus, in Rillon, et al.
vs. Rillon, 14 we stressed that it is not now necessary that a criminal prosecution for rape be first instituted and prosecuted to final judgment before
a civil action based on said offense in favor of the offended woman can likewise be instituted and prosecuted to final judgment.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, and the assailed judgment and resolution are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 120706. January 31, 2000.]

RODRIGO CONCEPCION, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. NESTOR NICOLAS and ALLEM NICOLAS, Respondents.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

Petitioner Rodrigo Concepcion assails in this petition for review on certiorari the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 12 December 1994 which
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City ordering him to pay respondent spouses Nestor Nicolas and Allem Nicolas the sums
of P50,000.00 for moral damages, P25,000.00 for exemplary damages and P10,000.00 for attorney‘s fees, plus the costs of suit.* Petitioner claims
absence of factual and legal basis for the award of damages.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary

The courts a quo found that sometime in 1985 the spouses Nestor Nicolas and Allem Nicolas resided at No. 51 M. Concepcion St., San Joaquin,
Pasig City, in an apartment leased to them by the owner thereof, Florence "Bing" Concepcion, who also resided in the same compound where the
apartment was located. Nestor Nicolas was then engaged in the business of supplying government agencies and private entities with office
equipment, appliances and other fixtures on a cash purchase or credit basis. Florence Concepcion joined this venture by contributing capital on
condition that after her capital investment was returned to her, any profit earned would be divided equally between her and Nestor.

Sometime in the second week of July 1985 Rodrigo C. Concepcion, brother of the deceased husband of Florence, angrily accosted Nestor at the
latter‘s apartment and accused him of conducting an adulterous relationship with Florence. He shouted, "Hoy Nestor, kabit ka ni Bing! Binigyan ka
pa pala ni Bing Concepcion ng P100,000.00 para umakyat ng Baguio. Pagkaakyat mo at ng asawa mo doon ay bababa ka uli para magkasarilinan
kayo ni Bing." 1

To clarify matters, Nestor went with Rodrigo, upon the latter‘s dare, to see some relatives of the Concepcion family who allegedly knew about the
relationship. However, those whom they were able to see denied knowledge of the alleged affair. The same accusation was hurled by Rodrigo
against Nestor when the two (2) confronted Florence at the terrace of her residence. Florence denied the imputations and Rodrigo backtracked
saying that he just heard the rumor from a relative. Thereafter, however, Rodrigo called Florence over the telephone reiterating his accusation and
threatening her that should something happen to his sick mother, in case the latter learned about the affair, he would kill Florence.

As a result of this incident, Nestor Nicolas felt extreme embarrassment and shame to the extent that he could no longer face his neighbors. Florence
Concepcion also ceased to do business with him by not contributing capital anymore so much so that the business venture of the Nicolas spouses
declined as they could no longer cope with their commitments to their clients and customers. To make matters worse, Allem Nicolas started to doubt
Nestor‘s fidelity resulting in frequent bickerings and quarrels during which Allem even expressed her desire to leave her husband. Consequently,
Nestor was forced to write Rodrigo demanding public apology and payment of damages. Rodrigo pointedly ignored the demand, for which reason
the Nicolas spouses filed a civil suit against him for damages.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary

In his defense, Rodrigo denied that he maligned Nestor by accusing him publicly of being Florence‘s lover. He reasoned out that he only desired to
protect the name and reputation of the Concepcion family which was why he sought an appointment with Nestor through Florence‘s son Roncali to
ventilate his feelings about the matter. Initially, he discussed with Nestor certain aspects of the joint venture in a friendly and amiable manner, and
then only casually asked the latter about his rumored affair with his sister-in-law.

In contesting the decision of the appellate court, petitioner Rodrigo Concepcion raises the following issues: (a) whether there is basis in law for the
award of damages to private respondents, the Nicolas spouses; and, (b) whether there is basis to review the facts which are of weight and influence
but which were overlooked and misapplied by the respondent appellate court.

Petitioner argues that in awarding damages to private respondents, the Court of Appeals was without legal basis to justify its verdict. The alleged act
imputed to him by respondent spouses does not fall under Arts. 26 2 and 2219 3 of the Civil Code since it does not constitute libel, slander, or any
other form of defamation. Neither does it involve prying into the privacy of another‘s residence or meddling with or disturbing the private life or family
relation of another. Petitioner also insists that certain facts and circumstances of the case were manifestly overlooked, misunderstood or glossed
over by respondent court which, if considered, would change the verdict. Impugning the credibility of the witnesses for private respondents and the
manner by which the testimonial evidence was analyzed and evaluated by the trial court, petitioner criticized the appellate court for not taking into
account the fact that the trial judge who penned the decision was in no position to observe first-hand the demeanor of the witnesses of respondent
spouses as he was not the original judge who heard the case. Thus, his decision rendered was flawed.

The Court has ruled often enough that its jurisdiction in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is limited to
reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless the factual findings complained of are devoid of support by the evidence on record or the assailed
judgment is based on misapprehension of facts. 4 The reason behind this is that the Supreme Court respects the findings of the trial court on the
issue of credibility of witnesses, considering that it is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and
observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. 5 Thus it accords the highest respect, even finality, to the evaluation made by
the lower court of the testimonies of the witnesses presented before it.

The Court is also aware of the long settled rule that when the issue is on the credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will not generally disturb the
findings of the trial court; however, its factual findings may nonetheless be reversed if by the evidence on record or lack of it, it appears that the trial
court erred. 6 In this respect, the Court is not generally inclined to review the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals unless its findings are
erroneous, absurd, speculative, conjectural, conflicting, tainted with grave abuse of discretion, or contrary to the findings culled by the trial court of
origin. 7 This rule of course cannot be unqualifiedly applied to a case where the judge who penned the decision was not the one who heard the
case, because not having heard the testimonies himself, the judge would not be in a better position than the appellate courts to make such
determination. 8

However, it is also axiomatic that the fact alone that the judge who heard the evidence was not the one who rendered the judgment but merely relied
on the record of the case does not render his judgment erroneous or irregular. This is so even if the judge did not have the fullest opportunity to
weigh the testimonies not having heard all the witnesses speak nor observed their deportment and manner of testifying. Thus the Court generally
will not find any misapprehension of facts as it can be fairly assumed under the principle of regularity of performance of duties of public officers that
the transcripts of stenographic notes were thoroughly scrutinized and evaluated by the judge himself.chanrobles.com : virtual law library

Has sufficient reason then been laid before us by petitioner to engender doubt as to the factual findings of the court a quo? We find none. A
painstaking review of the evidence on record convinces us not to disturb the judgment appealed from. The fact that the case was handled by
different judges brooks no consideration at all, for preponderant evidence consistent with their claim for damages has been adduced by private
respondents as to foreclose a reversal. Otherwise, everytime a Judge who heard a case, wholly or partially, dies or leaves the service, the case
cannot be decided and a new trial will have to be conducted. That would be absurd; inconceivable.

According to petitioner, private respondents‘ evidence is inconsistent as to time, place and persons who heard the alleged defamatory statement.
We find this to be a gratuitous observation, for the testimonies of all the witnesses for the respondents are unanimous that the defamatory incident
happened in the afternoon at the front door of the apartment of the Nicolas spouses in the presence of some friends and neighbors, and later on,
with the accusation being repeated in the presence of Florence, at the terrace of her house. That this finding appears to be in conflict with the
allegation in the complaint as to the time of the incident bears no momentous significance since an allegation in a pleading is not evidence; it is a
declaration that has to be proved by evidence. If evidence contrary to the allegation is presented, such evidence controls, not the allegation in the
pleading itself, although admittedly it may dent the credibility of the witnesses. But not in the instant case.

It is also argued by petitioner that private respondents failed to present as witnesses the persons they named as eyewitnesses to the incident and
that they presented instead one Romeo Villaruel who was not named as a possible witness during the pre-trial proceedings. Charging that Villaruel‘s
testimony is not credible and should never have been accorded any weight at all, petitioner capitalizes on the fact that a great distance separates
Villaruel‘s residence and that of private respondents as reflected in their house numbers, the former‘s number being No. 223 M. Concepcion St.,
while that of the Nicolas spouses, No. 51 along the same street. This being so, petitioner concludes, Villaruel could not have witnessed the ugly
confrontation between Rodrigo and Nestor. It appears however from Villaruel‘s testimony that at the time of the incident complained of, he was
staying in an apartment inside the compound adjacent to that of the Nicolas spouses. Whether his apartment was then numbered 223 is not stated.
What is definite and clear is his statement that he and Nestor Nicolas were neighbors on 14 July 1985.chanrobles.com : chanrobles.com.ph

There are other inconsistencies pointed out by petitioner in the testimonial evidence of private respondents but these are not of such significance as
to alter the finding of facts of the lower court. Minor inconsistencies even guarantee truthfulness and candor, for they erase any suspicion of a
rehearsed testimony. 9 Inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses with on minor details and collateral matters do not affect the substance of
their testimonies. 10

All told, these factual findings provide enough basis in law for the award of damages by the Court of Appeals in favor of respondents. We reject
petitioner‘s posture that no legal provision supports such award, the incident complained of neither falling under Art. 2219 nor Art. 26 of the Civil
Code. It does not need further elucidation that the incident charged of petitioner was no less than an invasion on the right of respondent Nestor as a
person. The philosophy behind Art. 26 underscores the necessity for its inclusion in our civil law. The Code Commission stressed in no uncertain
terms that the human personality must be exalted. The sacredness of human personality is a concomitant consideration of every plan for human
amelioration. The touchstone of every system of law, of the culture and civilization of every country, is how far it dignifies man. If the statutes
insufficiently protect a person from being unjustly humiliated, in short, if human personality is not exalted — then the laws are indeed defective. 11
Thus, under this article, the rights of persons are amply protected, and damages are provided for violations of a person‘s dignity, personality, privacy
and peace of mind.

It is petitioner‘s position that the act imputed to him does not constitute any of those enumerated in Arts 26 and 2219. In this respect, the law is
clear. The violations mentioned in the codal provisions are not exclusive but are merely examples and do not preclude other similar or analogous
acts. Damages therefore are allowable for actions against a person‘s dignity, such as profane, insulting, humiliating, scandalous or abusive
language. 12 Under Art. 2217 of the Civil Code, moral damages which include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury, although incapable of pecuniary computation, may be recovered if
they are the proximate result of the defendant‘s wrongful act or omission.chanrobles.com : red

There is no question that private respondent Nestor Nicolas suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social
humiliation as a proximate result of petitioner‘s abusive, scandalous and insulting language. Petitioner attempted to exculpate himself by claiming
that he made an appointment to see Nestor through a nephew, Roncali, the son of Florence, so he could talk with Nestor to find out the truth about
his rumored illicit relationship with Florence. He said that he wanted to protect his nephews and nieces and the name of his late brother (Florence‘s
husband). 13 How he could be convinced by some way other than a denial by Nestor, and how he would protect his nephews and nieces and his
family‘s name if the rumor were true, he did not say. Petitioner admitted that he had already talked with Florence herself over the telephone about
the issue, with the latter vehemently denying the alleged immoral relationship. Yet, he could not let the matter rest on the strength of the denial of his
sister-in-law. He had to go and confront Nestor, even in public, to the latter‘s humiliation.
Testifying that until that very afternoon of his meeting with Nestor he never knew respondent, had never seen him before, and was unaware of his
business partnership with Florence, his subsequent declarations on the witness stand however belie this lack of knowledge about the business
venture for in that alleged encounter he asked Nestor how the business was going, what were the collection problems, and how was the money
being spent. He even knew that the name of the business, Floral Enterprises, was coined by combining the first syllables of the name Florence and
Allem, the name of Nestor‘s wife. He said that he casually asked Nestor about the rumor between him and Florence which Nestor denied. Not
content with such denial, he dared Nestor to go with him to speak to his relatives who were the source of his information. Nestor went with him and
those they were able to talk to denied the rumor.

We cannot help noting this inordinate interest of petitioner to know the truth about the rumor and why he was not satisfied with the separate denials
made by Florence and Nestor. He had to confront Nestor face to face, invade the latter‘s privacy and hurl defamatory words at him in the presence
of his wife and children, neighbors and friends, accusing him — a married man — of having an adulterous relationship with Florence. This definitely
caused private respondent much shame and embarrassment that he could no longer show himself in his neighborhood without feeling distraught
and debased. This brought dissension and distrust in his family where before there was none. This is why a few days after the incident, he
communicated with petitioner demanding public apology and payment of damages, which petitioner ignored.

If indeed the confrontation as described by private respondents did not actually happen, then there would have been no cause or motive at all for
them to consult with their lawyer, immediately demand an apology, and not obtaining a response from petitioner, file an action for damages against
the latter. That they decided to go to court to seek redress bespeaks of the validity of the their claim. On the other hand, it is interesting to note that
while explaining at great length why Florence Concepcion testified against him, petitioner never advanced any reason why the Nicolas spouses,
persons he never knew and with whom he had no dealings in the past, would sue him for damages. It also has not escaped our attention that, faced
with a lawsuit by private respondents, petitioner sent his lawyer, a certain Atty. Causapin, to talk not to the Nicolas spouses but to Florence, asking
her not to be involved in the case, otherwise her name would be messily dragged into it. Quite succinctly, Florence told the lawyer that it was not for
her to decide and that she could not do anything about it as she was not a party to the court case.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing premises, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City, Br. 167, holding Rodrigo Concepcion liable to the spouses Nestor Nicolas and Allem Nicolas for P50,000.00 as moral damages,
P25,000.00 for exemplary damages, P10,000.00 for attorney‘s fees, plus costs of suit, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 195549 September 3, 2014

WILLAWARE PRODUCTS CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
JESICHRIS MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision 1 dated November 24,
2010 and Resolution2 dated February 10, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 86744.

The facts, as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), are as follows:

[Respondent] Jesichris Manufacturing Company ([respondent] for short) filed this present complaint for damages for unfair competition with prayer
for permanent injunction to enjoin [petitioner] Willaware Products Corporation ([petitioner] for short) from manufacturing and distributing plastic-made
automotive parts similar to those of [respondent].

[Respondent] alleged that it is a duly registeredpartnership engaged in the manufacture and distribution of plastic and metal products, with principal
office at No. 100 Mithi Street, Sampalukan, Caloocan City. Since its registration in 1992, [respondent] has been manufacturing in its Caloocan plant
and distributing throughout the Philippines plastic-made automotive parts. [Petitioner], on the other hand, which is engaged in the manufacture and
distribution of kitchenware items made of plastic and metal has its office near that of [respondent]. [Respondent] further alleged that in view of the
physical proximity of [petitioner‘s] office to [respondent‘s] office, and in view of the fact that some of the [respondent‘s] employeeshad transferred to
[petitioner], [petitioner] had developed familiarity with [respondent‘s] products, especially its plastic-made automotive parts.

That sometime in November 2000, [respondent] discovered that [petitioner] had been manufacturing and distributing the same automotive parts with
exactly similar design, same material and colors but was selling these products at a lower price as [respondent‘s] plastic-made automotive parts and
to the same customers.

[Respondent] alleged that it had originated the use of plastic in place of rubber in the manufacture ofautomotive underchassis parts such as spring
eye bushing, stabilizer bushing, shock absorberbushing, center bearing cushions, among others. [Petitioner‘s] manufacture of the same automotive
parts with plastic materialwas taken from [respondent‘s] idea of using plastic for automotive parts. Also, [petitioner] deliberately copied
[respondent‘s] products all of which acts constitute unfair competition, is and are contrary to law, morals, good customs and public policy and have
caused [respondent] damages in terms oflost and unrealizedprofits in the amount of TWO MILLION PESOS as of the date of [respondent‘s]
complaint.

Furthermore, [petitioner‘s] tortuous conduct compelled [respondent] to institute this action and thereby to incur expenses in the way of attorney‘s
fees and other litigation expenses in the amount of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (₱500,000.00).

In its Answer, [petitioner] denies all the allegations of the [respondent] except for the following facts: that it is engaged in the manufacture and
distribution of kitchenware items made of plastic and metal and that there‘s physical proximity of [petitioner‘s] office to [respondent]‘s office, and that
someof [respondent‘s] employees had transferred to [petitioner] and that over the years [petitioner] had developed familiarity with [respondent‘s]
products, especially its plastic made automotive parts.

As its Affirmative Defenses, [petitioner] claims that there can be no unfair competition as the plastic-made automotive parts are mere reproductions
of original parts and their construction and composition merely conforms to the specificationsof the original parts of motor vehicles they intend to
replace. Thus, [respondent] cannot claim that it "originated" the use of plastic for these automotive parts. Even assuming for the sake of argument
that [respondent] indeed originated the use of these plastic automotive parts, it still has no exclusive right to use, manufacture and sell these as it
has no patent over these products. Furthermore, [respondent] is not the only exclusive manufacturer of these plastic-made automotive parts as
there are other establishments which were already openly selling them to the public.3

After trial on the merits, the RTC ruled in favor of respondent. It ruled that petitioner clearly invaded the rights or interest of respondent by
deliberately copying and performing acts amounting to unfair competition. The RTC further opined that under the circumstances, in order for
respondent‘s property rights to be preserved, petitioner‘s acts of manufacturing similar plastic-made automotive parts such as those of respondent‘s
and the selling of the sameproducts to respondent‘s customers, which it cultivated over the years, will have to be enjoined. The dispositive portion of
the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the defendant liable to plaintiff Two Million (₱2,000,000.00) Pesos, as actual damages, One
Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00) Pesos as attorney‘s fees and One Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00) Pesos for exemplary damages. The court
hereby permanently [enjoins] defendant from manufacturing the plastic-made automotive parts as those manufactured by plaintiffs.

SO ORDERED.4

Thus, petitioner appealed to the CA.

On appeal, petitioner asserts that ifthere is no intellectual property protecting a good belonging to another,the copying thereof for production and
selling does not add up to unfair competition as competition is promoted by law to benefit consumers. Petitioner further contends that it did not lure
away respondent‘s employees to get trade secrets. It points out that the plastic spare parts sold by respondent are traded in the market and the
copying of these can be done by simplybuying a sample for a mold to be made.

Conversely, respondent averred that copyright and patent registrations are immaterial for an unfair competition case to prosper under Article 28 of
the Civil Code. It stresses that the characteristics of unfair competition are present in the instant case as the parties are trade rivals and petitioner‘s
acts are contrary to good conscience for deliberately copying its products and employing its former employees.

In a Decision dated November 24,2010, the CA affirmed with modification the ruling of the RTC. Relevant portions of said decision read:

Despite the evidence showing thatWillaware took dishonest steps in advancing its business interest against Jesichris, however, the Court finds no
basis for the award by the RTC of actual damages. One is entitled to actual damages as one has duly proven. The testimony of Quejada, who was
engaged by Jesichris in 2001 to audit its business, only revealed that there was a discrepancy between the sales of Jesichris from 2001 to 2002. No
amount was mentioned. As for Exhibit "Q," which is a copy of the comparative income statement of Jesichris for 1999-2002, it shows the decline of
the sales in 2002 in comparison with those made in 2001 but it does not disclose if this pertains to the subject automotive parts or to the other
products of Jesichris like plates.

In any event, it was clearly shown that there was unfair competition on the part of Willaware that prejudiced Jesichris. It is only proper that nominal
damages be awarded in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱200,000.00) in order to recognize and vindicate Jesichris‘ rights. The
RTC‘s award of attorney‘s fees and exemplary damages is also maintained.

xxxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated April 15, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 131, in Civil Case No.
C-19771 is hereby MODIFIED. The award of Two Million Pesos (₱2,000,000.00) actual damages is deleted and in its place, Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos nominal damages is awarded.

SO ORDERED.5

Dissatisfied, petitioner moved for reconsideration. However, the same was denied for lack of merit by the CA in a Resolution dated February 10,
2011.

Hence, the present Petition for Review wherein petitioner raises the following issues for our resolution:

(1) Whether or not there is unfair competition under human relations when the parties are not competitors and there is actually no damage
on the part of Jesichris?

(2) Consequently, if there is no unfair competition, should there be moral damages and attorney‘s fees?

(3) Whether or not the addition of nominal damages is proper although no rights have been established?

(4) If ever the right of Jesichris refersto its copyright on automotive parts, should it be considered in the light of the said copyrights were
considered to be void by no less than this Honorable Court in SC GR No. 161295?

(5) If the right involved is "goodwill" then the issue is: whether or not Jesichris has established "goodwill?"6

In essence, the issue for our resolution is: whether or not petitioner committed acts amounting to unfair competition under Article 28 of the Civil
Code.

Prefatorily, we would like to stress that the instant case falls under Article 28 of the Civil Code on humanrelations, and not unfair competition under
Republic Act No. 8293,7 as the present suit is a damage suit and the products are not covered by patent registration. A fortiori, the existence of
patent registration is immaterial in the present case.
The concept of "unfair competition"under Article 28 is very much broader than that covered by intellectual property laws. Under the present article,
which follows the extended concept of "unfair competition" in American jurisdictions, the term coverseven cases of discovery of trade secrets of a
competitor, bribery of his employees, misrepresentation of all kinds, interference with the fulfillment of a competitor‘s contracts, or any malicious
interference with the latter‘s business.8

With that settled, we now come to the issue of whether or not petitioner committed acts amounting tounfair competition under Article 28 of the Civil
Code.

We find the petition bereft of merit.

Article 28 of the Civil Code provides that "unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor through the use of force,
intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed method shall give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby
suffers damage."

From the foregoing, it is clear thatwhat is being sought to be prevented is not competitionper sebut the use of unjust, oppressive or high- handed
methods which may deprive others of a fair chance to engage in business or to earn a living. Plainly,what the law prohibits is unfair competition and
not competition where the means usedare fair and legitimate.

In order to qualify the competition as "unfair," it must have two characteristics: (1) it must involve an injury to a competitor or trade rival, and (2) it
must involve acts which are characterized as "contrary to good conscience," or "shocking to judicial sensibilities," or otherwise unlawful; in the
language of our law, these include force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed method. The public injury
or interest is a minor factor; the essence of the matter appears to be a private wrong perpetrated by unconscionable means. 9

Here, both characteristics are present.

First, both parties are competitors or trade rivals, both being engaged in the manufacture of plastic-made automotive parts. Second, the acts of the
petitioner were clearly "contrary to good conscience" as petitioner admitted having employed respondent‘s formeremployees, deliberately copied
respondent‘s products and even went to the extent of selling these products to respondent‘s customers. 10

To bolster this point, the CA correctly pointed out that petitioner‘s hiring of the former employees of respondent and petitioner‘s act of copying the
subject plastic parts of respondent were tantamount to unfair competition, viz.:

The testimonies of the witnesses indicate that [petitioner] was in bad faith in competing with the business of [respondent].1âwphi1 [Petitioner‘s] acts
can be characterized as executed with mischievous subtle calculation. To illustrate, in addition to the findings of the RTC, the Court observes that
[petitioner] is engaged in the production of plastic kitchenware previous to its manufacturing of plasticautomotive spare parts, it engaged the
services of the then mold setter and maintenance operator of [respondent], De Guzman, while he was employed by the latter. De Guzman was hired
by [petitioner] in order to adjust its machinery since quality plastic automotive spare parts were not being made. It baffles the Court why [petitioner]
cannot rely onits own mold setter and maintenance operator to remedy its problem. [Petitioner‘s] engagement of De Guzman indicates that it is
banking on his experience gained from working for [respondent].

Another point we observe is that Yabut, who used to be a warehouse and delivery man of [respondent], was fired because he was blamed of spying
in favor of [petitioner]. Despite this accusation, he did not get angry. Later on, he applied for and was hired by [petitioner] for the same position he
occupied with [respondent]. These sequence of events relating to his employment by [petitioner] is suspect too like the situation with De Guzman.11

Thus, it is evident that petitioner isengaged in unfair competition as shown by his act of suddenly shifting his business from manufacturing
kitchenware to plastic-made automotive parts; his luring the employees of the respondent to transfer to his employ and trying to discover the trade
secrets of the respondent.12

Moreover, when a person starts an opposing place of business, not for the sake of profit to himself, but regardless of loss and for the sole purpose
of driving his competitor out of business so that later on he can take advantage of the effects of his malevolent purpose, he is guilty of wanton
wrong.13 As aptly observed by the courta quo, the testimony of petitioner‘s witnesses indicate that it acted in bad faith in competing with the
business of respondent, to wit: [Petitioner], thru its General Manager, William Salinas, Jr., admitted that it was never engaged in the business of
plastic-made automotive parts until recently, year 2000:

Atty. Bautista: The business name of Willaware Product Corporation is kitchenware, it is (sic) not? Manufacturer of kitchenware and distributor
ofkitchenware, is it not? Mr. Salinas: Yes, sir. Atty. Bautista: And you said you have known the [respondent] Jesichris Manufacturing Co., you have
known it to be manufacturing plastic automotive products, is it not? Mr. Salinas: Yes, sir. Atty. Bautista: In fact, you have been (sic) physically
become familiar with these products, plastic automotive products of Jesichris? Mr. Salinas: Yes, sir.

How [petitioner] was able to manufacture the same products, in terms of color, size, shape and composition as those sold by Jesichris was due
largely to the sudden transfer ofJesichris‘ employees to Willaware.

Atty. Bautista: Since when have you been familiar with Jesichris Manufacturing Company?
Mr. Salinas: Since they transferred there (sic) our place.

Atty. Bautista: And that was in what year? Mr. Salinas: Maybe four (4) years. I don‘t know the exact date.

Atty. Bautista: And some of the employees of Jesichris Manufacturing Co. have transferred to your company, is it not?

Mr. Salinas: Yes, sir.

Atty. Bautista: How many, more or less?

Mr. Salinas: More or less, three (3).

Atty. Bautista: And when, in what year or month did they transfer to you?

Mr. Salinas: First, November 1.

Atty. Bautista: Year 2000?

Mr. Salinas: Yes sir. And then the other maybe February, this year. And the other one, just one month ago.

That [petitioner] was clearly outto take [respondent] out of business was buttressed by the testimony of [petitioner‘s] witness, Joel Torres:

Q: Are you familiar with the [petitioner], Willaware Product Corporation?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Will you kindly inform this court where is the office of this Willaware Product Corporation (sic)?

A: At Mithi Street, Caloocan City, sir.

Q: And Mr. Witness, sometime second Saturday of January 2001, will you kindly inform this court what unusual even (sic) transpired between you
and Mr. Salinas on said date?

A: There was, sir.

Q: What is that?

A: Sir, I was walking at that time together with my wife going to the market and then I passed by the place where they were having a drinking spree,
sir.

Q: You mentioned they, who were they who were drinking at that time?

A: I know one Jun Molina, sir.

Q: And who else was there?

A: William Salinas, sir.

Q: And will you kindly inform us what happened when you spotted upon them drinking?

A: Jun Molina called me, sir.

Q: And what happened after that?

A: At that time, he offered mea glass of wine and before I was able to drink the wine, Mr. Salinas uttered something, sir.

Q: And what were those words uttered by Mr. Salinas to you?

A: "O, ano naapektuhan na kayo sa ginaya (sic) ko sa inyo?"

Q: And what did you do after that, after hearing those words?

A: And he added these words, sir. "sabihin mo sa amo mo, dalawang taon na lang pababagsakin ko na siya."

Q: Alright, hearing those words, will you kindly tell this court whom did you gather to be referred to as your "amo"?

A: Mr. Jessie Ching, sir.14

In sum, petitioner is guilty of unfair competition under Article 28 of the Civil Code.

However, since the award of Two Million Pesos (₱2,000,000.00) in actual damages had been deleted and in its place Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos (₱200,000.00) in nominal damages is awarded, the attorney's fees should concomitantly be modified and lowered to Fifty Thousand Pesos
(₱50,000.00).

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 24, 2010 and Resolution dated February 10, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86744 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the award of attorney's fees be lowered to Fifty Thousand
Pesos (₱50,000.00).

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013

SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING, Petitioners, v. ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR. AND ALLAN CHOACHUY, Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

―The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel respect for [one‘s] personality as a unique individual whose claim to
privacy and [non]-interference demands respect.‖1

This Petition for Review on Certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the July 10, 2007 Decision3 and the September 11, 2007
Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01473.

Factual Antecedents

On August 23, 2005, petitioner-spouses Bill and Victoria Hing filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City a Complaint 5 for Injunction
and Damages with prayer for issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), docketed as Civil Case
MAN-5223 and raffled to Branch 28, against respondents Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan Choachuy.

Petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of a parcel of land (Lot 1900-B) covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 42817
situated in Barangay Basak, City of Mandaue, Cebu;6 that respondents are the owners of Aldo Development & Resources, Inc. (Aldo) located at
Lots 1901 and 1900-C, adjacent to the property of petitioners;7 that respondents constructed an auto-repair shop building (Aldo Goodyear Servitec)
on Lot 1900-C; that in April 2005, Aldo filed a case against petitioners for Injunction and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction/TRO, docketed
as Civil Case No. MAN-5125;8 that in that case, Aldo claimed that petitioners were constructing a fence without a valid permit and that the said
construction would destroy the wall of its building, which is adjacent to petitioners‘ property;9 that the court, in that case, denied Aldo‘s application for
preliminary injunction for failure to substantiate its allegations;10 that, in order to get evidence to support the said case, respondents on June 13,
2005 illegally set-up and installed on the building of Aldo Goodyear Servitec two video surveillance cameras facing petitioners‘ property;11 that
respondents, through their employees and without the consent of petitioners, also took pictures of petitioners‘ on-going construction;12 and that the
acts of respondents violate petitioners‘ right to privacy.13 Thus, petitioners prayed that respondents be ordered to remove the video surveillance
cameras and enjoined from conducting illegal surveillance.14

In their Answer with Counterclaim,15 respondents claimed that they did not install the video surveillance cameras,16 nor did they order their
employees to take pictures of petitioners‘ construction.17 They also clarified that they are not the owners of Aldo but are mere stockholders.18

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On October 18, 2005, the RTC issued an Order19 granting the application for a TRO. The dispositive portion of the said Order
reads:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the application for a [T]emporary [R]estraining [O]rder or a [W]rit of [P]reliminary [I]njunction is granted. Upon the filing and approval
of a bond by [petitioners], which the Court sets at P50,000.00, let a [W]rit of [P]reliminary [I]njunction issue against the [respondents] Alexander
Choachuy, Sr. and Allan Choachuy. They are hereby directed to immediately remove the revolving camera that they installed at the left side of their
building overlooking the side of [petitioners‘] lot and to transfer and operate it elsewhere at the back where [petitioners‘] property can no longer be
viewed within a distance of about 2-3 meters from the left corner of Aldo Servitec, facing the road.

IT IS SO ORDERED.20

Respondents moved for a reconsideration21 but the RTC denied the same in its Order22 dated February 6, 2006.23 Thus:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Issue a [W]rit of [P]reliminary [I]njunction in consonance with the
Order dated 18 October 2005.

IT IS SO ORDERED.24nadcralavvonlinelawlibrary

Aggrieved, respondents filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari25 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with application for a TRO and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On July 10, 2007, the CA issued its Decision26 granting the Petition for Certiorari. The CA ruled that the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued
with grave abuse of discretion because petitioners failed to show a clear and unmistakable right to an injunctive writ. 27 The CA explained that the
right to privacy of residence under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code was not violated since the property subject of the controversy is not used as a
residence.28 The CA also said that since respondents are not the owners of the building, they could not have installed video surveillance
cameras.29 They are mere stockholders of Aldo, which has a separate juridical personality.30 Thus, they are not the proper parties.31
The falloreads:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us GRANTING the petition filed in this case. The assailed orders
dated October 18, 2005 and February 6, 2006 issued by the respondent judge are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.32nadcralavvonlinelawlibrary

Issues

Hence, this recourse by petitioners arguing that:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

I.

THE X X X [CA] COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE THE ORDERS OF THE [RTC] DATED 18
OCTOBER 2005 AND 6 FEBRUARY 2006 HOLDING THAT THEY WERE ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

II.

THE X X X [CA] COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER SPOUSES HING ARE NOT ENTITLED TO THE
WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ON THE GROUND THAT THERE IS NO VIOLATION OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL AND CIVIL RIGHT
TO PRIVACY DESPITE THE FACTUAL FINDINGS [OF] THE RTC, WHICH RESPONDENTS CHOACHUY FAILED TO REFUTE, THAT THE
ILLEGALLY INSTALLED SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS OF RESPONDENTS CHOACH[U]Y WOULD CAPTURE THE PRIVATE ACTIVITIES OF
PETITIONER SPOUSES HING, THEIR CHILDREN AND EMPLOYEES.

III.

THE X X X [CA] COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT SINCE THE OWNER OF THE BUILDING IS ALDO
DEVELOPMENT AND RESOURCES, INC. THEN TO SUE RESPONDENTS CHOACHUY CONSTITUTE[S] A PURPORTEDLY UNWARRANTED
PIERCING OF THE CORPORATE VEIL.

IV.

THE X X X [CA] COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT IGNORED THE SERIOUS FORMAL DEFICIENCIES OF BOTH THE PETITION
AND THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DATED 15 MARCH 2006 OF RESPONDENT[S] CHOACH[U]Y AND GAVE X X X THEM DUE
COURSE AND CONSIDERATION.33

Essentially, the issues boil down to (1) whether there is a violation of petitioners‘ right to privacy, and (2) whether respondents are the proper parties
to this suit.

Petitioners’ Arguments

Petitioners insist that they are entitled to the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction because respondents‘ installation of a stationary camera
directly facing petitioners‘ property and a revolving camera covering a significant portion of the same property constitutes a violation of petitioners‘
right to privacy.34 Petitioners cite Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, which enjoins persons from prying into the private lives of others.35 Although the
said provision pertains to the privacy of another‘s residence, petitioners opine that it includes business offices, citing Professor Arturo M.
Tolentino.36 Thus, even assuming arguendo that petitioners‘ property is used for business, it is still covered by the said provision.37

As to whether respondents are the proper parties to implead in this case, petitioners claim that respondents and Aldo are one and the same, and
that respondents only want to hide behind Aldo‘s corporate fiction.38 They point out that if respondents are not the real owners of the building,
where the video surveillance cameras were installed, then they had no business consenting to the ocular inspection conducted by the court.39

Respondents’ Arguments

Respondents, on the other hand, echo the ruling of the CA that petitioners cannot invoke their right to privacy since the property involved is not used
as a residence.40 Respondents maintain that they had nothing to do with the installation of the video surveillance cameras as these were installed by
Aldo, the registered owner of the building,41 as additional security for its building. 42 Hence, they were wrongfully impleaded in this case.43

Our Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

The right to privacy is the right to be let alone.

The right to privacy is enshrined in our Constitution44 and in our laws. It is defined as ―the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of one‘s
person or from intrusion into one‘s private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a person‘s ordinary sensibilities.‖45 It is the right of an
individual ―to be free from unwarranted publicity, or to live without unwarranted interference by the public in matters in which the public is not
necessarily concerned.‖46 Simply put, the right to privacy is ―the right to be let alone.‖47

The Bill of Rights guarantees the people‘s right to privacy and protects them against the State‘s abuse of power. In this regard, the State recognizes
the right of the people to be secure in their houses. No one, not even the State, except ―in case of overriding social need and then only under the
stringent procedural safeguards,‖ can disturb them in the privacy of their homes. 48

The right to privacy under Article 26(1)

of the Civil Code covers business offices
where the public are excluded therefrom
and only certain individuals are allowed
to enter.

Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, on the other hand, protects an individual‘s right to privacy and provides a legal remedy against abuses that may be
committed against him by other individuals. It states:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar
acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other
relief:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

(1) Prying into the privacy of another‘s residence;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

xxxx

This provision recognizes that a man‘s house is his castle, where his right to privacy cannot be denied or even restricted by others. It includes ―any
act of intrusion into, peeping or peering inquisitively into the residence of another without the consent of the latter.‖ 49 The phrase ―prying into the
privacy of another‘s residence,‖ however, does not mean that only the residence is entitled to privacy. As elucidated by Civil law expert Arturo M.
Tolentino:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

Our Code specifically mentions ―prying into the privacy of another‘s residence.‖ This does not mean, however, that only the residence is entitled to
privacy, because the law covers also ―similar acts.‖ A business office is entitled to the same privacy when the public is excluded therefrom
and only such individuals as are allowed to enter may come in. x x x50 (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, an individual‘s right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be confined to his house or residence as it may extend to
places where he has the right to exclude the public or deny them access. The phrase ―prying into the privacy of another‘s residence,‖ therefore,
covers places, locations, or even situations which an individual considers as private. And as long as his right is recognized by society, other
individuals may not infringe on his right to privacy. The CA, therefore, erred in limiting the application of Article 26(1) of the Civil Code only to
residences.

The “reasonable expectation of privacy”

test is used to determine whether there
is a violation of the right to privacy.

In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy, courts use the ―reasonable expectation of privacy‖ test. This test determines
whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and whether the expectation has been violated. 51 In Ople v. Torres,52 we enunciated that
―the reasonableness of a person‘s expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether, by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an
expectation of privacy; and (2) this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable.‖ Customs, community norms, and practices may,
therefore, limit or extend an individual‘s ―reasonable expectation of privacy.‖53 Hence, the reasonableness of a person‘s expectation of privacy must
be determined on a case-to-case basis since it depends on the factual circumstances surrounding the case.54

In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically everywhere for the protection and safety of everyone. The installation of
these cameras, however, should not cover places where there is reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the consent of the individual, whose right
to privacy would be affected, was obtained. Nor should these cameras be used to pry into the privacy of another‘s residence or business office as it
would be no different from eavesdropping, which is a crime under Republic Act No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law.

In this case, the RTC, in granting the application for Preliminary Injunction, ruled that:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

After careful consideration, there is basis to grant the application for a temporary restraining order. The operation by [respondents] of a revolving
camera, even if it were mounted on their building, violated the right of privacy of [petitioners], who are the owners of the adjacent lot. The camera
does not only focus on [respondents‘] property or the roof of the factory at the back (Aldo Development and Resources, Inc.) but it actually spans
through a good portion of [the] land of [petitioners].

Based on the ocular inspection, the Court understands why [petitioner] Hing was so unyielding in asserting that the revolving camera was set up
deliberately to monitor the on[-]going construction in his property. The monitor showed only a portion of the roof of the factory of [Aldo]. If the
purpose of [respondents] in setting up a camera at the back is to secure the building and factory premises, then the camera should revolve only
towards their properties at the back. [Respondents‘] camera cannot be made to extend the view to [petitioners‘] lot. To allow the [respondents] to do
that over the objection of the [petitioners] would violate the right of [petitioners] as property owners. ―The owner of a thing cannot make use thereof
in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person.‖55

The RTC, thus, considered that petitioners have a ―reasonable expectation of privacy‖ in their property, whether they use it as a business office or
as a residence and that the installation of video surveillance cameras directly facing petitioners‘ property or covering a significant portion thereof,
without their consent, is a clear violation of their right to privacy. As we see then, the issuance of a preliminary injunction was justified. We need not
belabor that the issuance of a preliminary injunction is discretionary on the part of the court taking cognizance of the case and should not be
interfered with, unless there is grave abuse of discretion committed by the court. 56 Here, there is no indication of any grave abuse of discretion.
Hence, the CA erred in finding that petitioners are not entitled to an injunctive writ.

This brings us to the next question: whether respondents are the proper parties to this suit.

A real party defendant is one who has a

correlative legal obligation to redress
a wrong done to the plaintiff by reason
of the defendant's act or omission which
had violated the legal right of the former.

Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

SEC. 2. Parties-in-interest. — A real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party-in-interest.

A real party defendant is ―one who has a correlative legal obligation to redress a wrong done to the plaintiff by reason of the defendant‘s act or
omission which had violated the legal right of the former.‖57

In ruling that respondents are not the proper parties, the CA reasoned that since they do not own the building, they could not have installed the
video surveillance cameras.58 Such reasoning, however, is erroneous. The fact that respondents are not the registered owners of the building does
not automatically mean that they did not cause the installation of the video surveillance cameras.

In their Complaint, petitioners claimed that respondents installed the video surveillance cameras in order to fish for evidence, which could be used
against petitioners in another case.59 During the hearing of the application for Preliminary Injunction, petitioner Bill testified that when respondents
installed the video surveillance cameras, he immediately broached his concerns but they did not seem to care, 60 and thus, he reported the matter to
the barangay for mediation, and eventually, filed a Complaint against respondents before the RTC. 61 He also admitted that as early as 1998 there
has already been a dispute between his family and the Choachuy family concerning the boundaries of their respective properties.62 With these
factual circumstances in mind, we believe that respondents are the proper parties to be impleaded.

Moreover, although Aldo has a juridical personality separate and distinct from its stockholders, records show that it is a family-owned corporation
managed by the Choachuy family.63

Also quite telling is the fact that respondents, notwithstanding their claim that they are not owners of the building, allowed the court to enter the
compound of Aldo and conduct an ocular inspection. The counsel for respondents even toured Judge Marilyn Lagura-Yap inside the building and
answered all her questions regarding the set-up and installation of the video surveillance cameras.64 And when respondents moved for
reconsideration of the Order dated October 18, 2005 of the RTC, one of the arguments they raised is that Aldo would suffer damages if the video
surveillance cameras are removed and transferred.65 Noticeably, in these instances, the personalities of respondents and Aldo seem to merge.

All these taken together lead us to the inevitable conclusion that respondents are merely using the corporate fiction of Aldo as a shield to protect
themselves from this suit. In view of the foregoing, we find that respondents are the proper parties to this suit.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated July 10, 2007 and the Resolution dated September 11, 2007 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01473 are hereby REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. The Orders dated October 18, 2005 and February 6, 200[6] of
Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City in Civil Case No. MAN-5223 are hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-26737 July 31, 1969

LAURA CORPUS, and the minors RICARDO, TERESITA and CORAZON, all surnamed MARCIA and represented by their mother LAURA
CORPUS, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
FELARDO PAJE and THE VICTORY LINER TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., defendants-appellees.

Crispin D. Baizas and Associates for plaintiffs-appellants.

Flores, Macapagal, Ocampo and Balbastro for defendants-appellees.

CAPISTRANO, J.:

This is a direct appeal on questions of law from an order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 6880 of
that court.

On December 23, 1956, a passenger bus of the Victory Liner Transportation Co., Inc., driven by Felardo Paje, collided within the municipality of
Lubao, Pampanga, with a jeep driven by Clemente Marcia, resulting in the latter's death and in physical injuries to two other persons.

An information for homicide and double serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence was filed against Felardo Paje in the Court First
Instance of Pampanga. The heirs of Clemente Marcia reserved their right to institute a separate civil action for damages. On November 7, 1960, the
accused, Felardo Paje, was found guilty and convicted of the crime charged in the information. Said defendant appealed the judgment of conviction
to the Court of Appeals. On November 21, 1961, while defendant's appeal was pending decision in the Court of Appeals, Clemente Marcia's heirs,
namely, his widow, Laura Corpus, and their minor children, instituted in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a separate civil action (Civil Case No.
6880) for damages based upon the criminal act of reckless imprudence against Felardo Paje and the Victory Liner Transportation Co., Inc.,
defendants, praying that said defendants be ordered to pay jointly and severally the amounts of damages claimed by the plaintiffs. On November 9,
1962, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision in the appeal of Felardo Paje reversing the appealed judgment and acquitting the appellant
after finding that the reckless imprudence charged against him did not exist, and that the collision was a case of pure accident.

On December 29, 1962, the defendants filed in the civil action a motion to dismiss on the ground that the action was barred by the acquittal by the
Court of Appeals of the defendant Felardo Paje in the criminal action. The motion was denied.

At the pre-trial of the civil case, the defendants asked the court to rule on their special defense that plaintiffs' cause of action based upon a quasi-
delict had prescribed considering that the complaint was brought four years and eleven months after the collision and that according to Article 1144
of the Civil Code an action based upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within four years. The lower court, in its order of May 31, 1966, dismissed
the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs' action was based upon a quasi-delict and that it had prescribed. The plaintiffs appealed direct to this
Court on questions of law from the order dismissing the complaint.

Plaintiffs-appellants contend that the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint. The contention is unmeritorious in view of the following
considerations.

(1) The acquittal of the defendant Felardo Paje by the Court of Appeals in the criminal action on the ground that the reckless imprudence or criminal
negligence charged against him did not exist and that the collision was a case of pure accident, was a bar to the civil action for damages for the
death of Clemente Marcia, which action was based upon the same criminal negligence of which the defendant Felardo Paje was acquitted in the
criminal action. In the celebrated case of Chantangco vs. Abaroa, which was an appeal from the Philippine Supreme Court to the United States
Supreme Court, 218 U.S. 476; 54 L. Ed. 1116; 40 Phil. 1056, Mr. Justice Lurton, speaking for the Supreme Court of the United States, said:

It is true that one of the plaintiffs in the present case reserved whatever right he may have had to bring a civil action. This was obviously of
no avail, inasmuch as there resulted a judgment for the defendant, and the plain inference from the foregoing is that a verdict of acquittal
must carry with it exemption from civil responsibility.

Criminal negligence, that is, reckless imprudence, is not one of the three crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code which authorizes the
institution of an independent civil action, that is, of an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, which shall proceed independently of
the criminal prosecution and shall be proved only by a preponderance of evidence. Said article mentions only the crimes of defamation, fraud
(estafa) and physical injuries. Although in the case of Dyogi, et al. vs. Yatco, et al., G.R. No. L-9623, January 22, 1957, this Court held that the term
"physical injuries" used in article 33 of the Civil Code includes homicide, 1 it is to be borne in mind that the charge against Felardo Paje was for
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, and not for homicide and physical injuries. In the case of People vs. Buan, G.R. No. L-25366, March 29,
1968, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, speaking for the Supreme Court, said that the "offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the
negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty; it does not
qualify the substance of the offense." It is, therefore, clear that the charge against Felardo Paje was not for homicide but for reckless imprudence,
that is, criminal negligence resulting in homicide (death of Clemente Marcia) and double physical injuries suffered by two other persons. As reckless
imprudence or criminal negligence is not one of the three crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code, there is no independent civil action for
damages that may be instituted in connection with said offense. Hence, homicide through reckless imprudence or criminal negligence comes under
the general rule that the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal action is a bar to his civil liability based upon the same criminal act notwithstanding
that the injured party reserved 2 his right to institute a separate civil action (Chantangco vs. Abaroa, supra). In the language of the Rules of Court
(Rule 111, Sec. 3) the extinction of the criminal action by acquittal of the defendant on the ground that the criminal act charged against him did not
exist, necessarily extinguished also the civil action for damages based upon the same act.

(2) Assuming, arguendo, that the civil action for damages for the death of Clemente Marcia was based upon a quasi-delict, 3 the trial court's finding
that on that basis the action had prescribed is correct. An action upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within four (4) years (Article 1146, Civil
Code). The four-year prescriptive period began to run from the day the quasi-delict was committed, or from December 23, 1956, and the running of
the said period was not interrupted by the institution of the criminal action for reckless imprudence. (Paulan vs. Sarabia, G.R. No. L-10542, July 31,
1958.)

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the order appealed from is affirmed, with special pronouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Castro, Fernando and Barredo, JJ., concur.

1äwphï1.ñët Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez and Teehankee, JJ., concur in the result.
Reyes, J.B.L., and Zaldivar, JJ., took no part.

Footnotes

1This
and the following footnotes express my opinion on certain controversial articles of the New Civil Code, which was drafted when I was
a member of the Code Commission.

(a) The holding in the case of Dyogi, et al. vs. Yatco, etc., et al., supra, at the term "physical injuries" used in Article 33 of the Civil Code
includes homicide or murder, is contrary to the letter and spirit of the law. I recall that when the draft of what is now Article 33 of the New
Civil Code was presented for deliberation by Code Commission Chairman Dean Jorge C. Bocobo, a great civilian, before the Code
Commission (then composed of besides Chairman Bocobo, Professor Guillermo B. Guevarra, Dean Pedro Y. Ylagan, and Dean Francisco
R. Capistrano, members), said Chairman made, in substance, the following remarks: In America the injured party in crime has the
initiative, through his lawyer he immediately files a civil action for damages against the offender. In the Philippines the offended party
depends upon the fiscal to demand in the criminal action the damages he has suffered. I think it is about time to educate our people the
American way by giving the injured party in crime the initiative to go to court through his lawyer to demand damages, and for this purpose
we should give him an independent civil action for damages. Let us begin with just three crimes which are of common occurrence, namely,
defamation, fraud, and physical injuries. Depending upon the success of the experiment, when the new Civil Code may come up for
revision about fifty (50) or one hundred (100) years from now, it will be up to our successors in the Code Commission to add more crimes
to the three already mentioned or make the provision comprise all crimes causing damages to the injured party. This civil action, as in
America, should proceed independently of the criminal action and should be proved only by preponderance of evidence. Defamation may
be oral or written. Fraud comprises all forms of estafa. Physical Injuries is to be understood in its ordinary meaning and does not include
homicide or murder because where physical injuries result in homicide or murder, the reason for the law (namely, to give the injured party
personally the initiative to demand damages by an independent civil action) ceases, for the reason that a dead person can no longer
personally, through his lawyer institute an independent civil action for damages. (All the members of the Code Commission agreed with
the Chairman and the draft of the article was unanimously approved.)

In the Revised Penal Code, the crime of homicide is treated in Title Eight (Crimes Against Persons), Chapter One (Destruction of life),
while the crime of physical injuries is separately treated in Chapter Two of the same title. This shows that the two crimes are distinct from
each other, that physical injuries is not included in homicide.

(b) Article 32 (drafted by Code Commission Chairman Bocobo) of the Civil Code is also intended, insofar as it provides for an independent
civil action, to educate the Filipino the American way by going immediately to the courts to file a civil action for damages in vindication of
his constitutional rights and liberties enumerated in the article in case of violation of any of them.

(c) Article 34 of the Civil Code, insofar as it authorizes the institution of an independent civil action, is also intended for the same purpose.

2(a) The crime of reckless imprudence resulting in the death of Clemente Marcia and physical injuries to two other persons not being one
of the three crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code which authorizes the institution of an independent civil action for damages,
the heirs of the deceased correctly reserved their right to institute a separate civil action for damages against the bus driver, Felardo Paje,
who stood charged with the crime of homicide and double physical injuries through reckless imprudence. The reservation was in
accordance with what is now Rule 111, Section 1, of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Institution of criminal and civil action. — When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of a civil liability arising from the
offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his
right to institute it separately.

The civil action for damages against Felardo Paje was prematurely instituted in view of Rule 111, Section 3, which, in part, provides:

Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but after the criminal action has been commenced
the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action.

At any rate, said civil action was correctly suspended in the Court of First Instance until final judgment by the Court of Appeals in the
criminal action was rendered pursuant to Section 3(b) of said Rule 111 which provides that:

After a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted, and the same shall be
suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered.

The decision of the Court of Appeals acquitting the appellant Felardo Paje of the crime of reckless imprudence charged against him on the
ground that it did not exist, extinguished the civil action for damages filed against him, in accordance with Section 3(c) of Rule 111 which
states that:

Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. ....

This rule finds support in the celebrated case of Chantangco vs. Abaroa, supra.

(b) Section 2 of Rule 111 which provides:

Independent civil action. — In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an
independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of
the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

is defective and imperfect in many ways:

First. Article 31 of the Civil Code does not provide for an independent civil action. An independent civil action is an action that is based
upon the same criminal act as in the case of Articles 32, 33 and 34. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act
or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action being based upon an obligation not arising from the criminal act but from a
different source, is not an independent civil action within the meaning of Articles 32, 33 and 34. Article 31 (drafted by Code Commissioner
Capistrano) which provides that:

When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.

states a self-explanatory rule different and distinct from that laid down in Articles 32, 33 and 34. For example: A is prosecuted for the crime
of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The heirs of the deceased institute a civil action for damages against him based upon quasi-
delict, under Article 2177 of the Civil Code, which is separate and distinct from criminal negligence punished as a crime or delict under the
Revised Penal Code. Quasi-delict is culpa aquiliana and is separate and distinct from criminal negligence, which is a delict. The distinction
is made in Article 2177 itself which in part provides that:

Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.

Code Commission Chairman Bocobo, who drafted Article 2177 of the New Civil Code, took the distinction from modern authorities in civil
law. Accordingly, the report of the Code Commission on the Project of Civil Code makes reference to the sources of the distinction, thus:

The foregoing provision though at first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and
civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter, is a distinct and independent negligence, which is the 'culpa
aquiliana' or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence.
Such distinction between criminal negligence and 'culpa extra-contractual' or 'quasi-delict' has been sustained by decisions of the
Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as clear, sound, and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist." .

Therefore, under the proposed article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall
not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a 'quasi-delict' or
'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery. (Capistrano, Civil Code of the Philippines, With Comments and Annotations,
Vol. 4, p. 470.)

Second. As above explained, Article 2177 of the Civil Code does not provide for an independent civil action in crime. The article precisely
distinguishes quasi-delict or civil negligence from criminal negligence (reckless imprudence) and authorizes the institution of a civil action
for damages based upon quasi-delict and not upon criminal negligence, which is a delict and not a quasi-delict. In accordance with Article
31, the civil action for damages based upon quasi-delict may proceed independently of the criminal proceeding for criminal negligence and
regardless of the result of the latter. Hence, even if the defendant is acquitted in the criminal action of the charge of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide, the civil action for damages for the death of the deceased based upon quasi-delict may proceed to judgment.

Third. The proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111, with reference to the correctly cited Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code, is contrary to the
letter and spirit of the said articles, for these articles were drafted for the purpose explained in footnote one and are intended to constitute
as exceptions to the general rule stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111. The proviso, which is procedural, may also be regarded as
an unauthorized amendment of substantive law, Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code, which do not provide for the reservation required
in the proviso.

In view of all the foregoing, Section 2 of Rule 111 should be amended so as to read as follows:

Independent civil action. — In the cases provided for in Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil
action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party before or after the criminal action is
instituted. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Notice shall be given in the criminal action of the institution of the civil action or of the intention to institute the same.

3The prayer of the complaint in the civil action asked that the defendants, Felardo Paje and the Victory Liner Transportation Co., Inc., be
ordered to pay jointly and severally the damages claimed by plaintiffs. This prayer, considering the action as one upon a quasi-delict, is
not in accordance with law. In quasi-delict, according to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the obligation to pay damages is demandable not
only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The article then, in part continues: "The
owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise, are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service
of the branches in which the latter are employed, or on the occasion of their functions." Hence, the bus driver, Felardo Paje, was
responsible for the quasi-delict, he being, in the language of the American law, a tort-feasor. Likewise, the bus operator, Victory Liner
Transportation Co., Inc., was liable for the quasi-delict of its bus driver. This liability is not solidary but primary, with right to full
reimbursement pursuant to Article 2181, which provides: .

Whoever pays for the damages caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in
satisfaction of the claim.

The prayer of the complaint, based upon a quasi-delict, against the bus driver, Felardo Paje, and the bus operator, Victory Liner
Transportation Co., Inc., should have been that the plaintiffs recover the damages claimed from either of them. The bus operator
defendant Victory Liner Transportation Co., Inc., could have filed a third-party complaint against the defendant bus driver, pleading its right
for reimbursement under Article 2181.

When is the bus operator solidarily liable with the bus driver? Article 2184 of the Civil Code provides:

In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have by the use of due
diligence, prevented the misfortune. .... "If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of article 2180 are applicable.

This article (drafted by Code Commission Chairman Bocobo) is intended to cover only the owners of private motor vehicles for private
use. It is not generally applicable to motor vehicles for public use and convenience because the operator thereof, usually a corporation,
cannot in the very nature of things, be in the motor vehicle at the time of the mishap. However, if the manager of the bus company was in
the bus at the time of the mishap, Article 2184 may be applied by analogy.

In the case of De Leon Brokerage Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-15247, February 28, 1962, it was held that in quasi-
delict, the bus operator is solidarily liable with the bus driver in view of article 2194 of the Civil Code which provides:

"The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.

This article (drafted by Code Commissioner Capistrano) merely restates the basic rule in American law that joint tort-feasors are jointly
and severally liable for the tort. In the case of a quasi-delict committed by a bus driver, he alone is the tort-feasor; the bus operator is not a
joint tort-feasor. For this reason the liability of the bus operator is not governed by Article 2194 but by Article 2180.

Joint tort-feasors in American law are the same as co-authors or co-principals of a quasi-delict in the civil law, and it is only to them that
Article 2194 is applicable. A bus operator is not a co-author or co-principal of the tort committed by its bus driver; hence, it cannot be
made solidarily liable with the bus driver under Article 2194. Its liability is that of an employer under Article 2180, with right to full
reimbursement under Article 2181.

To make the bus operator solidarily liable with the driver would diminish its right to full reimbursement from the driver because in passive
solidarity, the solidary debtors share equally in the obligation (Article 1208, Civil Code). Consequently, if the bus operator's liability were
solidary, in the event of full payment by it of the obligation, its right to reimbursement from the bus driver would only be of one-half of the
obligation because its share of the solidary obligation would be one-half. This would result in reducing by one-half its right to full
reimbursement under Article 2181.

The prayer for solidary liability in the complaint against the defendants Felardo Paje and the Victory Liner Transportation Co. Inc.,
considering the complaint as based upon criminal negligence, is likewise not in the accordance with law. In crime committed by an
employee within the scope of his duties, the employer's liability is subsidiary, not solidary, in accordance with Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code which provides:.

ART. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. — The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to
employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen,
apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 108395 March 7, 1997

HEIRS OF THE LATE TEODORO GUARING, JR., petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., and ANGELES CUEVAS, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 20, which
ordered respondent Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and its driver, Angeles Cuevas, to pay various amounts in damages to petitioners, the heirs of
the late Teodoro Guaring, Jr.

This case arose from an unfortunate vehicular accident which happened on November 7, 1987, along the North Expressway in San Rafael, Mexico,
Pampanga. Involved in the accident were a Mitsubishi Lancer car driven by Teodoro Guaring, Jr., who died as a result of the mishap, Philippine
Rabbit Bus No. 415, driven by Angeles Cuevas, and a Toyota Cressida car, driven by Eligio Enriquez. The Mitsubishi Lancer was heading north, at
the speed of 80 to 90 kilometers per hour. Following it was the Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 415, with Plate No. CVD-584. On the other hand, the
Toyota Cressida was cruising on the opposite lane, bound for Manila.

Petitioners, heirs of Teodoro Guaring, Jr., brought this action for damages, based on quasi delict, in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Their
evidence tended to show that the Rabbit bus tried to overtake Guaring's car by passing on the right shoulder of the road and that in so doing it hit
the right rear portion of Guaring's Mitsubishi Lancer. The impact caused the Lancer to swerve to the south-bound lane, as a result of which it
collided with the Toyota Cressida car coming from the opposite direction.

With Teodoro Guaring, Jr. in the Lancer, seated beside him in front, was Bonifacio Clemente. Riding in the Toyota Cressida driven by Sgt. Eligio
Enriquez was his mother, Dolores Enriquez, who was seated beside him. Seated at the back were his daughter Katherine (who was directly behind
him), his wife Lilian, and his nephew Felix Candelaria.

Killed in the collision were Teodoro Guaring, Jr., who was driving the Lancer, and Dolores Enriquez, who was riding in the Cressida, while injured
were Bonifacio Clemente and the occupants of the Toyota Cressida.

Private respondents, on the other hand, presented evidence tending to show that the accident was due to the negligence of the deceased Guaring.
They claimed that it was Guaring who tried to overtake the vehicle ahead of him on the highway and that in doing so he encroached on the south-
bound lane and collided with the oncoming Cressida of U.S. Air Force Sgt. Enriquez. Private respondents claim that as a result of the collision the
Lancer was thrown back to its lane where it crashed into the Rabbit bus.

On May 16, 1990, the Regional Trial Court rendered judgment finding Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and its driver, Angeles Cuevas, at fault, and
holding them solidarily liable for damages to petitioners. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, ordering the latter to pay the
former, jointly and severally, the sum of:

1. P500,000.00 for loss of earning capacity of the deceased Teodoro Guaring, Jr.;

2. P1,000,000.00 as moral damages;

3. P50,000.00 as and for attorney's fees; and

4. Costs of suit.

From this judgment, private respondent Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. appealed, contending:
 1. The lower court erred in not finding that the proximate cause of the collision was Guaring's negligence in attempting to
overtake the car in front of him.

2. The lower court erred in not holding that PRBL exercised due diligence in the supervision of its employees.

3. The lower court erred in awarding the amount of P500,000.00 in favor of plaintiffs-appellees representing Guaring's loss of
earning capacity.

4. The lower court erred in awarding moral damages in favor of plaintiffs-appellees.

5. The lower court erred in awarding attorney's fees in favor of plaintiffs-appellees.

On December 16, 1992, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, setting aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in the civil action
for damages and dismissing the complaint against private respondents Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and Cuevas, on the strength of a decision
rendered by the Regional Trial Court at San Fernando, Pampanga, in the criminal case, acquitting the bus driver Angeles Cuevas of reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property and double homicide. The appellate court held that since the basis of petitioners' action was the alleged
negligence of the bus driver, the latter's acquittal in the criminal case rendered the civil case based on quasi delict untenable.

Hence, this petition. Petitioners contend that

[1] EVIDENCE IN ONE CASE IS INADMISSIBLE IN ANOTHER CASE AGAINST A PERSON NOT A PARTY IN THE FIRST
CASE AND TO HOLD OTHERWISE IS VIOLATIVE OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS.

[2] THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS WITHOUT FACTUAL FINDINGS AND DID NOT RESOLVE
SQUARELY THE ASSIGNED ERRORS AND IS THEREFORE A VOID JUDGMENT.

[3] ACQUITTAL OF THE ACCUSED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE, WHETHER ON REASONABLE DOUBT OR NOT, IS NO BAR
TO THE PROSECUTION FOR DAMAGES BASED ON QUASI-DELICT.

The question is whether the judgment in the criminal case extinguished the liability of private respondent Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and its
driver, Angeles Cuevas, for damages for the death of Teodoro Guaring, Jr. In absolving private respondents from liability, the Court of Appeals
reasoned:1

Since the appellee's civil action is predicated upon the negligence of the accused which does not exist as found by the trial court
in the said criminal case, it necessarily follows that the acquittal of the accused in the criminal case carries with it the extinction
of the civil responsibility arising therefrom. Otherwise stated, the fact from which the civil action might arise, that is, the
negligence of the accused, did not exist.

The finding in the criminal case that accused Cuevas was not negligent and the proximate cause of the accident was the act of
deceased Guaring in overtaking another vehicle ahead of him likewise exonerates PRB from any civil liability.

Although it did not say so expressly, the appellate court appears to have based its ruling on Rule 111, §2(b) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which provides:

(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in
a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.

This provision contemplates, however, a civil action arising from crime, whereas the present action was instituted pursuant to Art. 2176 of the Civil
Code, which provides:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-
delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

It is now settled that acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability
based on quasi delict. Thus, in Tayag v. Alcantara,2 it was held:

. . . a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty
or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on
both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two
cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (c), Section 3, Rule 111 [now Rule 111, §2(b)], refers
exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act
 considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the
criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. . . .

It is noteworthy that the accident in that case also involved a Philippine Rabbit bus and that, as in this case, the acquittal of the bus driver was based
on reasonable doubt. We held that the civil case for damages was not barred since the cause of action of the heirs was based on quasi delict.

Again, in Gula v. Dianala it was held:3

Since the cause of action of plaintiffs-appellants is based on culpa aquiliana and not culpa criminal, thus precluding the
application of the exception in Sec. 3(c) of Rule 111 [now Rule 111, §2(b)], and the fact that it can be inferred from the criminal
case that defendant-accused, Pedro Dianala, was acquitted on reasonable doubt because of dearth of evidence and lack of
veracity of the two principal witnesses, the doctrine in Mendoza vs. Arrieta, 91 SCRA 113, will not find application. In that case,
the acquittal was not based on reasonable doubt and the cause of action was based on culpa criminal, for which reason we held
the suit for damages barred.

Even if damages are sought on the basis of crime and not quasi delict, the acquittal of the bus driver will not bar recovery of damages because the
acquittal was based not on a finding that he was not guilty but only on reasonable doubt. Thus, it has been held: 4

The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a declaration that the facts
from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based
on reasonable doubt (PNB v. Catipon, 98 Phil. 286) as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases; where the
court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature (De Guzman v. Alvia, 96 Phil. 558;
People v. Pantig, supra) as, for instance, in the felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious mischief committed by certain relatives
who thereby incur only civil liability (See Art. 332, Revised Penal Code); and, where the civil liability does not arise from or is not
based upon the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted (Castro v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 4 SCRA 1093; See
Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 1983 ed., p. 623).

In the present case, the dispositive portion of the decision of the RTC in the criminal case reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court, entertaining reasonable doubt as to his guilt, the accused is hereby acquitted, of the offense of
reckless imprudence resulting to double homicide and damage to property as charged in the Information, without
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.5

It was thus error for the appellate court to skip the review of the evidence in this case and instead base its decision on the findings of the trial court
in the criminal case. In so doing, the appellate court disregarded the fact that this case had been instituted independently of the criminal case and
that petitioners herein took no part in the criminal prosecution. In fact this action was filed below before the prosecution presented evidence in the
criminal action. The attention of the Court of Appeals was called to the decision in the criminal case, which was decided on September 7, 1990, only
when the decision of the trial court in this case was already pending review before it (the Court of Appeals).

The appellate court did not even have before it the evidence in the criminal case. What it did was simply to cite findings contained in the decision of
the criminal court. Worse, what the criminal court considered was reasonable doubt concerning the liability of the bus driver the appellate court
regarded as a categorical finding that the driver was not negligent and, on that basis, declared in this case that "the proximate cause of the accident
was the act of deceased Guaring in overtaking another vehicle ahead of him." The notion that an action for quasi delict is separate and distinct from
the criminal action was thus set aside.

This case must be decided on the basis of the evidence in the civil case. This is important because the criminal court appears to have based its
decision, acquitting the bus driver on the ground of reasonable doubt, solely on what it perceived to be the relative capacity for observation of the
prosecution and defense witnesses.6 The prosecution did not call Bonifacio Clemente to testify despite the fact that shortly after the accident he
gave a statement to the police, pinning the blame for the accident on the Philippine Rabbit bus driver. Indeed, the civil case involved a different set
of witnesses. Petitioners presented Eligio Enriquez who was driving the Cressida, and Bonifacio Clemente, who was a passenger in Guaring's car.
Thus, both had full view of the accident

It is unfair to bind petitioners to the result of the criminal action when the fact is that they did not take part therein. That the witnesses presented on
behalf of the petitioners are different from those presented by the prosecution should have brought home to the appellate court the fundamental
unfairness of considering the decision in the criminal case conclusive of the civil case.

Because the Court of Appeals did not consider the evidence in the civil case, this case should be remanded to it so that it may render another
decision in accordance with the law and the evidence. The issues raised by the petitioners are essentially factual and require the evaluation of
evidence, which is the function of the Court of Appeals in the exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction. They cannot be decided in this Court.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and this case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals with instruction to render
judgment with reasonable dispatch in accordance with law and the evidence presented in Civil Case No. 88-43860.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Romero, Puno and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, p. 60.

2 98 SCRA 723, 728 (1980) (emphasis added).

3 132 SCRA 245, 248-249 (1984).

4 Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 558, 565-566 (1984).

5 RTC decision, p. 31; Rollo, p. 46 (emphasis added).

6 This is apparent from the following excerpt from the decision in the criminal case which the Court of Appeals quoted:

While Edgardo Sobrevilla was seated in the conductor's seat in the front portion of the Philippine Rabbit Bus, Mrs. Lilian
Enriquez was at the back seat of the Cressida car. As between them, it is in accord with ordinary human experience that
Edgardo Sobrevilla was in a better position to see the actual occur[r]ence of the incident.

Confirmatory to the testimony of Edgardo Sobrevilla are the sketches (Exhs. "A" and "A-1") drawn by Pat. Danilo Gonzales, the
investigating Policeman, which reveal no fallen debris on the North bound lane. Fallen debris could have surely occur[r]ed in the
North-bound lane if there was a violent contact between the Mitsubishi Lancer car and the Philippine Rabbit bus in the North
bound lane before the Lancer car left its lane to encroach on the South bound lane. The sketches (Exh. "A"' and "A-1") reveal
very clearly that fallen debris are on the concrete pavement and asphalt shoulder of the South-bound lane, clearly indicative that
the collision between the Lancer and the Cressida occur[r]ed in the lane of the latter.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 141309 June 19, 2007

LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, petitioner,

vs.
FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION, respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Petitioner assails the May 7, 1999 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47167, which affirmed the September 29, 1997 Order2 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marikina, Branch 272, in Civil Case No. 97-341-MK, denying petitioner‘s motion to dismiss. The complaint filed by
respondent sought to recover damages for the alleged violation of its constitutional rights arising from petitioner‘s issuance of Revenue
Memorandum Circular No. 37-93 (RMC 37-93), which the Court declared invalid in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals.3

Petitioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato was then the Commissioner of Internal Revenue while respondent Fortune Tobacco Corporation is an entity
engaged in the manufacture of different brands of cigarettes, among which are "Champion," "Hope," and "More" cigarettes.

On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted Republic Act No. 7654 (RA 7654), which took effect on July 3, 1993. Prior to its effectivity, cigarette
brands ‗Champion," "Hope," and "More" were considered local brands subjected to an ad valorem tax at the rate of 20-45%. However, on July 1,
1993, or two days before RA 7654 took effect, petitioner issued RMC 37-93 reclassifying "Champion," "Hope," and "More" as locally manufactured
cigarettes bearing a foreign brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax.4 RMC 37-93 in effect subjected "Hope," "More," and "Champion" cigarettes
to the provisions of RA 7654, specifically, to Sec. 142,5 (c)(1) on locally manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed at 55%,
and which imposes an ad valorem tax of "55% provided that the minimum tax shall not be less than Five Pesos (P5.00) per pack."6

On July 2, 1993, at about 5:50 p.m., BIR Deputy Commissioner Victor A. Deoferio, Jr. sent via telefax a copy of RMC 37-93 to Fortune Tobacco but
it was addressed to no one in particular. On July 15, 1993, Fortune Tobacco received, by ordinary mail, a certified xerox copy of RMC 37-93. On
July 20, 1993, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration requesting the recall of RMC 37-93, but was denied in a letter dated July 30, 1993.7 The
same letter assessed respondent for ad valorem tax deficiency amounting to P9,598,334.00 (computed on the basis of RMC 37-93) and demanded
payment within 10 days from receipt thereof.8 On August 3, 1993, respondent filed a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), which
on September 30, 1993, issued an injunction enjoining the implementation of RMC 37-93.9 In its decision dated August 10, 1994, the CTA ruled that
RMC 37-93 is defective, invalid, and unenforceable and further enjoined petitioner from collecting the deficiency tax assessment issued pursuant to
RMC No. 37-93. This ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and finally by this Court in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of
Appeals.10 It was held, among others, that RMC 37-93, has fallen short of the requirements for a valid administrative issuance.

On April 10, 1997, respondent filed before the RTC a complaint11 for damages against petitioner in her private capacity. Respondent contended that
the latter should be held liable for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code considering that the issuance of RMC 37-93 violated its constitutional
right against deprivation of property without due process of law and the right to equal protection of the laws.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss12 contending that: (1) respondent has no cause of action against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the
performance of her official function and within the scope of her authority. She claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the Republic and
therefore the latter is the one responsible for her acts; (2) the complaint states no cause of action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith; and (3)
the certification against forum shopping was signed by respondent‘s counsel in violation of the rule that it is the plaintiff or the principal party who
should sign the same.

On September 29, 1997, the RTC denied petitioner‘s motion to dismiss holding that to rule on the allegations of petitioner would be to prematurely
decide the merits of the case without allowing the parties to present evidence. It further held that the defect in the certification against forum
shopping was cured by respondent‘s submission of the corporate secretary‘s certificate authorizing its counsel to execute the certification against
forum shopping. The dispositive portion thereof, states:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the motion to dismiss filed by the defendant Liwayway Vinzons-Chato and the motion to
strike out and expunge from the record the said motion to dismiss filed by plaintiff Fortune Tobacco Corporation are both denied on the
grounds aforecited. The defendant is ordered to file her answer to the complaint within ten (10) days from receipt of this Order.

SO ORDERED.13
The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. However, same was dismissed on the ground that under
Article 32 of the Civil Code, liability may arise even if the defendant did not act with malice or bad faith. The appellate court ratiocinated that Section
38, Book I of the Administrative Code is the general law on the civil liability of public officers while Article 32 of the Civil Code is the special law that
governs the instant case. Consequently, malice or bad faith need not be alleged in the complaint for damages. It also sustained the ruling of the
RTC that the defect of the certification against forum shopping was cured by the submission of the corporate secretary‘s certificate giving authority
to its counsel to execute the same.

Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant recourse contending that the suit is grounded on her acts done in the performance of her functions as a public
officer, hence, it is Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code which should be applied. Under this provision, liability will attach only when there is
a clear showing of bad faith, malice, or gross negligence. She further averred that the Civil Code, specifically, Article 32 which allows recovery of
damages for violation of constitutional rights, is a general law on the liability of public officers; while Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code is
a special law on the superior public officers‘ liability, such that, if the complaint, as in the instant case, does not allege bad faith, malice, or gross
negligence, the same is dismissible for failure to state a cause of action. As to the defect of the certification against forum shopping, she urged the
Court to strictly construe the rules and to dismiss the complaint.

Conversely, respondent argued that Section 38 which treats in general the public officers‘ "acts" from which civil liability may arise, is a general law;
while Article 32 which deals specifically with the public officers‘ violation of constitutional rights, is a special provision which should determine
whether the complaint states a cause of action or not. Citing the case of Lim v. Ponce de Leon,14 respondent alleged that under Article 32 of the
Civil Code, it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of the plaintiff and it is not required that said public officer should have
acted with malice or in bad faith. Hence, it concluded that even granting that the complaint failed to allege bad faith or malice, the motion to dismiss
for failure to state a cause of action should be denied inasmuch as bad faith or malice are not necessary to hold petitioner liable.

The issues for resolution are as follows:

(1) May a public officer be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in connection with the discharge of the functions of his/her
office?

(2) Which as between Article 32 of the Civil Code and Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code should govern in determining whether
the instant complaint states a cause of action?

(3) Should the complaint be dismissed for failure to comply with the rule on certification against forum shopping?

(4) May petitioner be held liable for damages?

On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is not liable for damages which a person may suffer arising from the just performance of his
official duties and within the scope of his assigned tasks.15 An officer who acts within his authority to administer the affairs of the office which he/she
heads is not liable for damages that may have been caused to another, as it would virtually be a charge against the Republic, which is not amenable
to judgment for monetary claims without its consent.16 However, a public officer is by law not immune from damages in his/her personal capacity for
acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of immunity for official actions.17

Specifically, under Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code, civil liability may arise where there is bad faith, malice, or gross negligence on the
part of a superior public officer. And, under Section 39 of the same Book, civil liability may arise where the subordinate public officer‘s act is
characterized by willfulness or negligence. Thus –

Sec. 38. Liability of Superior Officers. – (1) A public officer shall not be civilly liable for acts done in the performance of his official
duties, unless there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence.

xxxx

Section 39. Liability of Subordinate Officers. – No subordinate officer or employee shall be civilly liable for acts done by him in good
faith in the performance of his duties. However, he shall be liable for willful or negligent acts done by him which are contrary to law,
morals, public policy and good customs even if he acts under orders or instructions of his superior.

In addition, the Court held in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,18 that a public officer who directly or indirectly violates the constitutional rights of
another, may be validly sued for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code even if his acts were not so tainted with malice or bad faith.

Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in the course of the performance
of the functions of the office, where said public officer: (1) acted with malice, bad faith, or negligence; or (2) where the public officer violated a
constitutional right of the plaintiff.

Anent the second issue, we hold that the complaint filed by respondent stated a cause of action and that the decisive provision thereon is Article 32
of the Civil Code.
A general statute is one which embraces a class of subjects or places and does not omit any subject or place naturally belonging to such class. A
special statute, as the term is generally understood, is one which relates to particular persons or things of a class or to a particular portion or section
of the state only.19

A general law and a special law on the same subject are statutes in pari materia and should, accordingly, be read together and harmonized, if
possible, with a view to giving effect to both. The rule is that where there are two acts, one of which is special and particular and the other general
which, if standing alone, would include the same matter and thus conflict with the special act, the special law must prevail since it evinces the
legislative intent more clearly than that of a general statute and must not be taken as intended to affect the more particular and specific provisions of
the earlier act, unless it is absolutely necessary so to construe it in order to give its words any meaning at all. 20

The circumstance that the special law is passed before or after the general act does not change the principle. Where the special law is later, it will
be regarded as an exception to, or a qualification of, the prior general act; and where the general act is later, the special statute will be construed as
remaining an exception to its terms, unless repealed expressly or by necessary implication. 21

Thus, in City of Manila v. Teotico,22 the Court held that Article 2189 of the Civil Code which holds provinces, cities, and municipalities civilly liable for
death or injuries by reason of defective conditions of roads and other public works, is a special provision and should prevail over Section 4 of
Republic Act No. 409, the Charter of Manila, in determining the liability for defective street conditions. Under said Charter, the city shall not be held
for damages or injuries arising from the failure of the local officials to enforce the provision of the charter, law, or ordinance, or from negligence while
enforcing or attempting to enforce the same. As explained by the Court:

Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail over the latter, because Republic Act 409 is a special law, intended exclusively
for the City of Manila, whereas the Civil Code is a general law, applicable to the entire Philippines.

The Court of Appeals, however, applied the Civil Code, and, we think, correctly. It is true that, insofar as its territorial application is
concerned, Republic Act No. 409 is a special law and the Civil Code a general legislation; but, as regards the subject matter of the
provisions above quoted, Section 4 of Republic Act 409 establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the City of Manila for "damages
or injury to persons or property arising from the failure of" city officers "to enforce the provisions of" said Act "or any other law or
ordinance, or from negligence" of the city "Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said
provisions." Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code constitutes a particular prescription making "provinces, cities and
municipalities . . . liable for damages for the death of, or injury suffered by, any person by reason" — specifically — "of the defective
condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision." In other words, said
section 4 refers to liability arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the object thereof, whereas Article 2189 governs
liability due to "defective streets," in particular. Since the present action is based upon the alleged defective condition of a road,
said Article 2189 is decisive thereon.23

In the case of Bagatsing v. Ramirez,24 the issue was which law should govern the publication of a tax ordinance, the City Charter of Manila, a
special act which treats ordinances in general and which requires their publication before enactment and after approval, or the Tax Code, a general
law, which deals in particular with "ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges," and which demands publication only after approval.
In holding that it is the Tax Code which should prevail, the Court elucidated that:

There is no question that the Revised Charter of the City of Manila is a special act since it relates only to the City of Manila, whereas the
Local Tax Code is a general law because it applies universally to all local governments. Blackstone defines general law as a universal rule
affecting the entire community and special law as one relating to particular persons or things of a class. And the rule commonly said is that
a prior special law is not ordinarily repealed by a subsequent general law. The fact that one is special and the other general creates a
presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining an exception of the general, one as a general law of the land, the other as
the law of a particular case. However, the rule readily yields to a situation where the special statute refers to a subject in general,
which the general statute treats in particular. Th[is] exactly is the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. Section 17 of the
Revised Charter of the City of Manila speaks of "ordinance" in general, i.e., irrespective of the nature and scope thereof,
whereas, Section 43 of the Local Tax Code relates to "ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges" in particular.
In regard, therefore, to ordinances in general, the Revised Charter of the City of Manila is doubtless dominant, but, that
dominant force loses its continuity when it approaches the realm of "ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other
charges" in particular. There, the Local Tax Code controls. Here, as always, a general provision must give way to a particular
provision. Special provision governs.

Let us examine the provisions involved in the case at bar. Article 32 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates, or in any manner
impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:

xxxx

(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;

xxxx
 (8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;

xxxx

The rationale for its enactment was explained by Dean Bocobo of the Code Commission, as follows:

"DEAN BOCOBO. Article 32, regarding individual rights, Attorney Cirilo Paredes proposes that Article 32 be so amended as to make a
public official liable for violation of another person‘s constitutional rights only if the public official acted maliciously or in bad faith. The Code
Commission opposes this suggestion for these reasons:

"The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or criminal. It is not necessary therefore that there should be malice or bad
faith. To make such a requisite would defeat the main purpose of Article 32 which is the effective protection of individual rights. Public
officials in the past have abused their powers on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of their duties.
Precisely, the object of the Article is to put an end to official abuse by the plea of good faith. In the United States this remedy is in the
nature of a tort.

"Mr. Chairman, this article is firmly one of the fundamental articles introduced in the New Civil Code to implement democracy. There is no
real democracy if a public official is abusing and we made the article so strong and so comprehensive that it concludes an abuse of
individual rights even if done in good faith, that official is liable. As a matter of fact, we know that there are very few public officials who
openly and definitely abuse the individual rights of the citizens. In most cases, the abuse is justified on a plea of desire to enforce the law
to comply with one‘s duty. And so, if we should limit the scope of this article, that would practically nullify the object of the article. Precisely,
the opening object of the article is to put an end to abuses which are justified by a plea of good faith, which is in most cases the plea of
officials abusing individual rights."25

The Code Commission deemed it necessary to hold not only public officers but also private individuals civilly liable for violation of the rights
enumerated in Article 32 of the Civil Code. It is not necessary that the defendant under this Article should have acted with malice or bad faith,
otherwise, it would defeat its main purpose, which is the effective protection of individual rights. It suffices that there is a violation of the
constitutional right of the plaintiff.26

Article 32 was patterned after the "tort" in American law.27 A tort is a wrong, a tortious act which has been defined as the commission or omission of
an act by one, without right, whereby another receives some injury, directly or indirectly, in person, property, or reputation.28 There are cases in
which it has been stated that civil liability in tort is determined by the conduct and not by the mental state of the tortfeasor, and there are
circumstances under which the motive of the defendant has been rendered immaterial. The reason sometimes given for the rule is that otherwise,
the mental attitude of the alleged wrongdoer, and not the act itself, would determine whether the act was wrongful.29 Presence of good motive, or
rather, the absence of an evil motive, does not render lawful an act which is otherwise an invasion of another‘s legal right; that is, liability in tort is
not precluded by the fact that defendant acted without evil intent.30

The clear intention therefore of the legislature was to create a distinct cause of action in the nature of tort for violation of constitutional rights,
irrespective of the motive or intent of the defendant.31 This is a fundamental innovation in the Civil Code, and in enacting the Administrative Code
pursuant to the exercise of legislative powers, then President Corazon C. Aquino, could not have intended to obliterate this constitutional protection
on civil liberties.

In Aberca v. Ver,32 it was held that with the enactment of Article 32, the principle of accountability of public officials under the Constitution acquires
added meaning and assumes a larger dimension. No longer may a superior official relax his vigilance or abdicate his duty to supervise his
subordinates, secure in the thought that he does not have to answer for the transgressions committed by the latter against the constitutionally
protected rights and liberties of the citizen. Part of the factors that propelled people power in February 1986 was the widely held perception that the
government was callous or indifferent to, if not actually responsible for, the rampant violations of human rights. While it would certainly be too naive
to expect that violators of human rights would easily be deterred by the prospect of facing damage suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no
uncertain terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression, joint
tortfeasors.

On the other hand, Sections 38 and 39, Book I of the Administrative Code, laid down the rule on the civil liability of superior and subordinate public
officers for acts done in the performance of their duties. For both superior and subordinate public officers, the presence of bad faith, malice, and
negligence are vital elements that will make them liable for damages. Note that while said provisions deal in particular with the liability of
government officials, the subject thereof is general, i.e., "acts" done in the performance of official duties, without specifying the action or omission
that may give rise to a civil suit against the official concerned.

Contrarily, Article 32 of the Civil Code specifies in clear and unequivocal terms a particular specie of an "act" that may give rise to an action for
damages against a public officer, and that is, a tort for impairment of rights and liberties. Indeed, Article 32 is the special provision that deals
specifically with violation of constitutional rights by public officers. All other actionable acts of public officers are governed by Sections 38 and 39 of
the Administrative Code. While the Civil Code, specifically, the Chapter on Human Relations is a general law, Article 32 of the same Chapter is a
special and specific provision that holds a public officer liable for and allows redress from a particular class of wrongful acts that may be committed
by public officers. Compared thus with Section 38 of the Administrative Code, which broadly deals with civil liability arising from errors in the
performance of duties, Article 32 of the Civil Code is the specific provision which must be applied in the instant case precisely filed to seek damages
for violation of constitutional rights.

The complaint in the instant case was brought under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Considering that bad faith and malice are not necessary in an
action based on Article 32 of the Civil Code, the failure to specifically allege the same will not amount to failure to state a cause of action. The courts
below therefore correctly denied the motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action, since it is enough that the complaint avers
a violation of a constitutional right of the plaintiff.

Anent the issue on non-compliance with the rule against forum shopping, the subsequent submission of the secretary‘s certificate authorizing the
counsel to sign and execute the certification against forum shopping cured the defect of respondent‘s complaint. Besides, the merits of the instant
case justify the liberal application of the rules.33

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 7, 1999 which affirmed the Order
of the Regional Trial Court of Marikina, Branch 272, denying petitioner‘s motion to dismiss, is AFFIRMED. The Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court of Marikina, Branch 272, is hereby DIRECTED to continue with the proceedings in Civil Case No. 97-341-MK with dispatch.

With costs.

SO ORDERED.

Austria-Martinez, Chico-Nazario, Nachura, JJ., concur.

 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 49588. December 21, 1990.]

DIONG BI CHU, alias PATRICK CHANG, CHANG KA HEE and LU LIONG CORPORATION, Petitioners, v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
HON. GREGORIO G. PINEDA, as Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXI; JAIME NAVOA and MILAGROS DE
LEOS, Respondents.

Neri, De Leon & Caldito, for Petitioners.

Recto Law Offices for Private Respondents.

DECISION

PADILLA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the 16 October 1978 resolution 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 08363-SP. The antecedent facts
are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

In a complaint filed by private respondents Jaime Navoa and Milagros de Leos before Military Commission No. 3, docketed as Criminal Case No.
MC-3-57, petitioners Diong Bi Chu alias "Patrick Chang" and Chang Ka Hi alias "Chang Ka Hee", were charged with estafa for violation of Art. 315,
par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. It was alleged in the complaint that thru false pretenses and fraudulent acts, petitioners Diong Bi Chu and
Chang Ka Hee succeeded in inducing private respondents to mortgage a parcel of land belonging to and registered in the name of Jaime Navoa,
and that they (petitioners) misappropriated the proceeds therefrom, causing damages to private respondents in the amount of P670,000.00.

After the prosecution had presented its evidence and rested its case, a demurrer to evidence was filed by Chang Ka Hee. The charge against him
was dismissed on the ground that he had nothing to do with the transaction. 2

On 3 August 1977, Military Commission No. 3 rendered judgment acquitting petitioner Diong Bi Chu alias "Patrick Chang", holding that the
transaction between the parties was a joint venture, requiring each party to contribute to a common fund and that —

"There was no fraus (sic) nor deceit on the part of the accused Diong Bi Chu since it was admitted that Industria Phils. Inc., did have a contract with
the PVTA for the exportation of foreign leaf tobacco for blending purpose. Unfortunately, after the initial shipment, and for the subsequent
shipments, the President prohibited the importation of Virgina leaf tobacco, and for the loss suffered, no one is to blame. This is one of the attendant
risks in a joint venture which could not be foreseen.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

"WHEREFORE, it is the sentence of this Commission that the transaction being a joint venture, with the accused Diong Bi Chu alias Patrick Chang,
acting in good faith and without fault nor negligence, for which he can not in any way be held liable, should and is hereby acquitted of the charge." 3

As an offshoot of the criminal case, on 31 March 1978, private respondents filed a civil action 4 against Diong Bi Chu, Chang Ka Hee and Lu Liong
Corporation for recovery of damages arising from guaranty and fraud, before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch 21, docketed as Civil Case
No. 29077. Petitioners Diong Bi Chu and Chang Ka Hee were the majority stockholders of Lu Liong Corporation.

Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the civil action for damages filed against them, on the ground that the same is barred by the prior judgment of
Military Commission No. 3 and by private respondents‘ failure to reserve their right to file a separate civil action. 5 On 30 May 1978, the court denied
said motion to dismiss. 6 Petitioners‘ first and second motions for reconsideration were likewise denied on 10 July and 31 August 1978, respectively.
7

A petition for certiorari was then filed by herein petitioners before the Court of Appeals, assailing the aforesaid orders of the court a quo. In a
resolution dated 16 October 1978, the appellate court dismissed said petition, holding that the civil action for damages under Art. 33 of the Civil
Code is independent of the criminal case and that the dismissal of the criminal case against petitioner Chang Ka Hee and the acquittal of petitioner
Diong Bi Chu do not constitute a bar to the prosecution of the civil action for damages against them. Petitioners moved for reconsideration of said
resolution, but the same was denied in a resolution dated 29 December 1978. 8

Not satisfied with the foregoing rulings of the Court of Appeals, petitioners filed the petition at bar, raising the sole issue of whether or not a civil
action for damages based on fraud under Art. 33 of the Civil Code is barred by a prior judgment of acquittal in a criminal case.

Art. 33 of the Civil Code provides that" (I)n cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence."cralaw virtua1aw library

To hold a person liable for damages under the foregoing provision, only a preponderance of evidence is required. An acquittal in a criminal case is
not a bar to the filing of an action for civil damages, for one may not be criminally liable and still be civilly liable. Thus, the outcome or result of the
criminal case, whether an acquittal or conviction, is really inconsequential and will be of no moment in the civil action.chanrobles law library : red
To subordinate the civil action contemplated in Arts. 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code to the result of the criminal prosecution would render
meaningless the independent character of the civil action when, on the contrary, the law provides that such civil action "may proceed independently
of the criminal proceeding and regardless of the result of the latter." Art. 33 of the Civil Code contemplates a civil action for recovery of damages that
is entirely unrelated to the purely criminal aspect of the case. This is the reason why only a preponderance of evidence and not proof beyond
reasonable doubt is deemed sufficient in such civil action. 9

The civil action under Art. 33 need not be reserved because the law itself already makes the reservation. 10 In the case of Bonite v. Zosa, 11 it was
held that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Besides, the requirement in Section 2 of Rule 111 of the former Rules on Criminal Procedure that there be a reservation in the criminal case of the
right to institute an independent civil action, has been declared as not in accordance with law. It is regarded as an unauthorized amendment to the
substantive law, i.e. the Civil Code, which does not require such a reservation. In fact, the reservation of the right to file an independent civil action
has been deleted from Section 2, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, in consonance with the decisions of this Court declaring such
requirement of a reservation as ineffective."cralaw virtua1aw library

Thus, dismissal of the criminal case against Chang Ka Hee and acquittal of Diong Bi Chu before Military Commission No. 3 for the charge of estafa
is not a bar to the civil action for damages against them, based on fraud.

While a military commission or tribunal was declared to have no jurisdiction to try, even during the period of martial law, civilians for offenses
allegedly committed by them, as long as the civil courts are open and functioning, 12 however, such ruling applies only to future cases or cases still
on-going or not yet final —

"In the interest of justice and consistency, we hold that Olaguer should, in principle, be applied prospectively only to future cases and cases still
ongoing or not yet final when that decision was promulgated. Hence, there should be no retroactive nullification of final judgments, whether of
conviction or acquittal, rendered by military courts against civilians before the promulgation of the Olaguer decision. Such final sentences should not
be disturbed by the State. Only in particular cases where the convicted person or the State shows that there was serious denial of the Constitutional
rights of the accused should the nullity of the sentence be declared and a retrial be ordered based on the violation of the constitutional rights of the
accused, and not on the Olaguer doctrine. If a retrial is no longer possible, the accused should be released since the judgment against him is null on
account of the violation of his constitutional rights and denial of due process." 13

Applying the foregoing principles, despite the validity of the acquittal of Diong Bi Chu and the dismissal of the criminal case against Chang Ka Hee
by Military Commission No. 3, such fact does not deprive private respondents of their right to recover civil damages against said persons based on
fraud under Art. 33 of the Civil Code.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit, and the case is hereby remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

Paras, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera J., took no part.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-51183 December 21, 1983

CARMEN L. MADEJA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. FELIX T. CARO and EVA ARELLANO-JAPZON, respondents.

Ernesto P. Miel for petitioner.

Gorgonio T. Alvarez for respondents.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1

In Criminal Case No. 75-88 of the defunct Court of First Instance of Eastern Samar, DR. EVA A. JAPZON is accused of homicide through reckless
imprudence for the death of Cleto Madeja after an appendectomy. The complaining witness is the widow of the deceased, Carmen L. Madeja. The
information states that: "The offended party Carmen L. Madeja reserving her right to file a separate civil action for damages." (Rollo, p. 36.)

The criminal case still pending, Carmen L. Madeja sued Dr. Eva A. Japzon for damages in Civil Case No. 141 of the same court. She alleged that
her husband died because of the gross negligence of Dr. Japzon. The respondent judge granted the defendant's motion to dismiss which motion
invoked Section 3(a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which reads:têñ.£îhqwâ£

Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. — In all cases not included in the preceding section the following rules shall be
observed:

(a) Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but after the criminal action has been
commenced the civil action can not be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action. ...

According to the respondent judge, "under the foregoing Sec. 3 (a), Rule 111, New Rules of Court, the instant civil action may be instituted only after
final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action." (Rollo, p. 33.)

The instant petition which seeks to set aside the order of the respondent judge granting the defendant's motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 141 is
highly impressed with merit.

Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court in relation to Article 33 of the Civil Code is the applicable provision. The two enactments are quoted
hereinbelow:têñ.£îhqwâ£

Sec. 2. Independent civil action. — In the cases provided for in Articles 31,32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured
party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence." (Rule 111,
Rules of Court.)

Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution,
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. (Civil Code,)

There are at least two things about Art. 33 of the Civil Code which are worth noting, namely:

1. The civil action for damages which it allows to be instituted is ex-delicto. This is manifest from the provision which uses the expressions "criminal
action" and "criminal prosecution." This conclusion is supported by the comment of the Code Commission, thus:têñ.£îhqwâ£

The underlying purpose of the principle under consideration is to allow the citizen to enforce his rights in a private action brought
by him, regardless of the action of the State attorney. It is not conducive to civic spirit and to individual self-reliance and initiative
 to habituate the citizens to depend upon the government for the vindication of their own private rights. It is true that in many of
the cases referred to in the provision cited, a criminal prosecution is proper, but it should be remembered that while the State is
the complainant in the criminal case, the injured individual is the one most concerned because it is he who has suffered directly.
He should be permitted to demand reparation for the wrong which peculiarly affects him. (Report, p. 46.)

And Tolentino says:têñ.£îhqwâ£

The general rule is that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party reserves his right to institute it separately; and
after a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted. The present
articles creates an exception to this rule when the offense is defamation, fraud, or physical injuries, In these cases, a civil action
may be filed independently of the criminal action, even if there has been no reservation made by the injured party; the law itself
in this article makes such reservation; but the claimant is not given the right to determine whether the civil action should be
scheduled or suspended until the criminal action has been terminated. The result of the civil action is thus independent of the
result of the civil action." (I Civil Code, p. 144 [1974.])

2. The term "physical injuries" is used in a generic sense. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not
only physical injuries but consummated, frustrated and attempted homicide.têñ.£îhqwâ£

The Article in question uses the words 'defamation', 'fraud' and 'physical injuries.' Defamation and fraud are used in their
ordinary sense because there are no specific provisions in the Revised Penal Code using these terms as means of offenses
defined therein, so that these two terms defamation and fraud must have been used not to impart to them any technical meaning
in the laws of the Philippines, but in their generic sense. With this apparent circumstance in mind, it is evident that the terms
'physical injuries' could not have been used in its specific sense as a crime defined in the Revised Penal Code, for it is difficult to
believe that the Code Commission would have used terms in the same article-some in their general and another in its technical
sense. In other words, the term 'physical injuries' should be understood to mean bodily injury, not the crime of physical injuries,
bacause the terms used with the latter are general terms. In any case the Code Commission recommended that the civil action
for physical injuries be similar to the civil action for assault and battery in American Law, and this recommendation must hove
been accepted by the Legislature when it approved the article intact as recommended. If the intent has been to establish a civil
action for the bodily harm received by the complainant similar to the civil action for assault and battery, as the Code Commission
states, the civil action should lie whether the offense committed is that of physical injuries, or frustrated homicide, or attempted
homicide, or even death," (Carandang vs. Santiago, 97 Phil. 94, 96-97 [1955].)

Corpus vs. Paje, L-26737, July 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 1062, which states that reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not included in Article 33
of the Civil Code is not authoritative. Of eleven justices only nine took part in the decision and four of them merely concurred in the result.

In the light of the foregoing, it is apparent that the civil action against Dr. Japzon may proceed independently of the criminal action against her.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted; the order dismissing Civil Case No. 141 is hereby set aside; no special pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñët

Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, De Castro and Escolin, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., concurring:

I concur. Death due to a negligent act may be a delict or quasi-delict. It may create a civil action based on article 100 of the Penal Code or an action
based on culpa aquiliana under article 2176 of the Civil Code. These alternatives are assumed in article 2177 of the Civil Code "but the plaintiff
cannot recover twice for the same act or omission of the defendant" (Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607 and Sudario vs. Acro Taxi and Yuson, 86 Phil.
1. See Formento vs. CA, L-26442, August 29,1969,29 SCRA 437).

The term "physical injuries" in article 33 of the Civil Code includes death and may give rise to an independent civil action (Dyogi vs. Yatco, 100 Phil.
1095).
The rule in Corpus vs. Paje, L-26737, July 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 1062, that reckless imprudence is not included in article 33 of the Civil Code, is not
authoritative doctrine because it was concurred in by only five Justices. Four Justices concurred in the result.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., concurring:

I concur. Death due to a negligent act may be a delict or quasi-delict. It may create a civil action based on article 100 of the Penal Code or an action
based on culpa aquiliana under article 2176 of the Civil Code. These alternatives are assumed in article 2177 of the Civil Code "but the plaintiff
cannot recover twice for the same act or omission of the defendant" (Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607 and Sudario vs. Acro Taxi and Yuson, 86 Phil.
1. See Formento vs. CA, L-26442, August 29,1969,29 SCRA 437).

The term "physical injuries" in article 33 of the Civil Code includes death and may give rise to an independent civil action (Dyogi vs. Yatco, 100 Phil.
1095).

The rule in Corpus vs. Paje, L-26737, July 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 1062, that reckless imprudence is not included in article 33 of the Civil Code, is not
authoritative doctrine because it was concurred in by only five Justices. Four Justices concurred in the result.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-34529 January 27, 1983

MAXIMO MARCIA, AMALIA MOJICA, TIRSO YAP, DAMIANA MARCIA, EDGAR MARCIA, and RENATO YAP, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, FELARDO PAJE, and VICTORY LINER, INC., respondents.

Ricardo J. Francisco, for petitioners.

Flors, Macapagal, Ocampo & Dizon for private respondents.

RELOVA, J.:

Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, which dismissed the
complaint filed by tile petitioners against private respondents in the concept of an independent civil action for damages for physical injuries resulting
from reckless imprudence.

On December 23, 1956, in the municipality of Lubao, Pampanga, a passenger bus operated by private respondent Victory Liner, Inc. and driven by
its employee. private respondent Felardo Paje, collided with a jeep driven by Clemente Marcia, resulting in the latter's death and in physical injuries
to herein petitioners, Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap. Thereupon, an information for homicide and serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence
was filed against Felardo Paje in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga (Criminal Case No. 2745).

On January 23, 1957, an action for damages (Civil Case No. 4425) was filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal by Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap,
together with their respective parents. against the Victory Liner, Inc. and Felardo Paje, alleging that, the mishap was due to the reckless imprudence
and negligence of the latter in driving the passenger bus.

While said Civil Case No. 4425 was in progress in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, the criminal action proceeded in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga (Criminal Case No. 2745). The accused Felardo Paje was convicted of the offense charged. However, on appeal to the Court of
Appeals, he was acquitted in a decision promulgated on November 3, 1982, based on the findings, to wit:

1 That the Victory Liner bus left its post, kilometer post no. 156, in San Marcelino, Zambales, at about 2:00 AM

2 That on the highway at Lubao, Pampanga, between Posts Nos. 83 and 84, the appellant driver thereof, saw a cargo truck
parked in the middle of the right lane of the road to Manila, without

3 That appellant slackened the speed of his truck from 60 km. p.h. to 35 or 40 km. p. h. in order to pass said truck;

4 That the appellant did not see the oncoming jeep until it swerved to the left.

5 That the jeep was still far so appellant attempted to pass the truck but before he could do so, the jeep came very fast at the
center of the road and out of its lane.

6 That the passengers of the bus shouted at the appellant to bring the bus to the side so as to avoid a frontal collision with he
jeep, and appellant brought his bus to the right shoulder of the road going to Bataan;

7 That the jeep driven by the deceased Clemente Marcia was running at a fast pace for which reason the driver lost control and
veered sharply to the right shoulder of the road and crashed into the bus, parked thereat a few seconds before.

8 That appellant was not speeding, was diligent, and hence, not liable for the collision which at the least, was a fortuitous event
for which no one was responsible.

and the conclusion that "CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE is WANTING in this case, and that appellant was NOT even guilty of CIVIL NEGLIGENCE,
Insofar as appellant was concerned, it was a case of PURE ACCIDENT."
As a consequence, herein private respondents, defendants in Civil Case No. 4425 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, moved for the dismissal of
the complaint invoking the decision of the Court of Appeals acquitting Felardo Paje and citing Section I (d), Rule 107 of the Rules of Court now
Section 3 (c), Rule I I I of the New Rules of Court), which reads:

SECTION 1. Rules governing civil actions arising from offenses. — Except as otherwise provided by law, the following rules
shall be observed:

xxx xxx xxx

(d) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in
a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. In the other cases, the persons entitled to the civil
action may institute it in the jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the person who may be liable for restitution of
the thing and reparation or indemnity for the damages suffered.

The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and, thereafter, continued to hear defendants' (herein private respondents) evidence. The following were
presented as defendants' evidence in chief:

(a) the whole record of Criminal Case No. 2745 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in which defendant Felardo Paje was
by reason of the occurrence prosecuted criminally and convicted of homicide with serious physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence;

(b) the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 01691 Cr, acquitting the accused; and

(c) copy of the brief of the said defendant as accused-appellant in the said Court of Appeals case.

On August 10, 1966, the Court of First Instance of Rizal rendered a decision dismissing plaintiffs' complaint against the defendants Victory Liner,
Inc. and Felardo Paje, without pronouncement as to costs.

Petitioners appealed the case to the (Court of Appeals CA-G.R. No. 38964-R) alleging that the acquittal of Paje in the criminal action for homicide
and serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence "is not a ground for dismissing the complaint in the instant civil action; that the instant civil
action is entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action and shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, so that whatever may
have been the result of the criminal action is irrelevant to this civil action; that Section 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court and not Section 3,
paragraph (c) of the said rule applies; that the statement in the decision of the Court of Appeals in the criminal action that defendant Paje as
accused therein was not guilty of civil negligence is without the jurisdiction of the said Court to make and is to be completely disregarded as an
extraneous, officious and void statement which cannot affect in any way the instant civil action; that the records of the criminal action against
defendant Paje are inadmissible evidence; that it has been established in the case at bar, not only by preponderance of evidence but by
uncontradicted, conclusive evidence that petitioners suffered damages as a proximate result of the negligence of respondent Paje and that it has
been established, not only by preponderance of evidence but by uncontradicted, conclusive evidence, that the damages suffered by petitioners as a
result of the negligence of private respondents is in the amount of P250,817.96, and that the latter should be sentenced, jointly and severally, to pay
the same to petitioner.

In the meantime, the heirs of Clemente Marcia who, as aforesaid, died as a result of the collision, instituted a separate civil action in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal (Civil Case No. 6880) for damages based on the alleged reckless imprudence of bus driver Felardo Paje, praying that the
driver and the Victory Liner, Inc. be ordered to pay jointly and severally the amount of damages claimed. The complaint of the heirs of Clemente
Marcia was dismissed by the trial court. Appeal on questions of law was taken to this Court (Laura Corpus et al vs. Felardo Paje at al, 28 SCRA
1062) which, however, affirmed the order for the reason, among others, that "(1) The acquittal of the defendant Felardo Paje by the Court of Appeals
in the criminal action on the ground that the reckless imprudence or criminal negligence charged against him did not exist and that the collision was
a case of pure accident, was a bar to the civil action for damages for the death of Clemente Marcia, which action was based upon the same criminal
negligence of which the defendant Felardo Paje was acquitted in the criminal action."

Following the ruling of this Court in the Corpus vs. Paje decision, respondent Court of Appeals held that the private respondents Cannot be held
civilly liable after it had ruled in the criminal action that negligence was wanting and that the collision was a case of pure accident.

Dissatisfied with the decision, petitioners have come to US alleging that the Court of Appeals erred:

I.

IN NOT HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS INSTANT CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FOR
PHYSICAL INJURIES RESULTING FROM NEGLIGENCE IS AN INDEPENDENT ONE, ENTIRELY SEPARATE AND
DISTINCT FROM THE CRIMINAL ACTION, UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLES 33, 2176 AND 2177 OF THE NEW
(CIVIL CODE AND SECTION 2 OF RULE 111 OF THE RULES OF COURT. AND IN INSTEAD HOLDING THAT THE INSTANT
ACTION IS NOT AMONG THE INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTIONS AUTHORIZED BY THE SAID PROVISIONS.
 II.

IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ACQUITTAL OF RESPONDENT FELARDO PAJE, DRIVER OF RESPONDENT VICTORY
LINER, INC., IN THE CRIMINAL ACTION BASED ON THE SAID PHYSICAL INJURIES AND NEGLIGENCE IS ENTIRELY
IRRELEVANT TO THE INSTANT CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES BY VIRTUE OF THE AFORECITED PROVISIONS OF THE
NEW CIVIL CODE AND THE RULES OF COURT, AND IN INSTEAD HOLDING THAT THE SAID ACQUITTAL IS A BAR TO
THE INSTANT CIVIL ACTION UNDER SECTION 3 (c) OF RULE I I I AND SECTION 49 (c) OF RULE 39 OF THE RULES OF
COURT.

III.

IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN THE INSTANT CIVIL ACTION FOR
DAMAGES, CONSISTING OF THE RECORDS OF THE CRIMINAL ACTION IN THE TRIAL COURT, THE DECISION OF THE
COURT OF APPEALS ACQUITTING RESPONDENT PAJE AND THE COPY OF THE BRIEF OF THE SAID RESPONDENT
AS ACCUSED-APPELLANT, ARE INADMISSIBLE IN THE INSTANT CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES.

IV.

IN NOT HOLDING THAT IT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED IN THE CASE AT BAR, NOT ONLY BY PREPONDERANCE OF
EVIDENCE BUT BY UNCONTRADICTED, CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE, THAT PETITIONERS SUFFERED DAMAGES AS A
PROXIMATE RESULT OF THE NEGLIGENCE OF RESPONDENT PAJE.

V.

IN NOT HOLDING THAT IT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED, NOT ONLY BY PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE BUT BY
UNCONTRADICTED, CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE, THAT THE DAMAGES SUFFERED BY PETITIONERS AS A RESULT OF
THE NEGLIGENCE OF DEFENDANTS IS IN THE AMOUNT OF P250,817.96, AND IN NOT SENTENCING PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY TO PAY THE SAME TO PETITIONERS.

It is the stand of herein petitioners that Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, not Section 3 (c) thereof, should apply in the case at bar.

Sec. 2. Independent civil action. — In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured
party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

We do not agree, Section 2 of Rule 111 merely refers to the institution of an independent civil action without waiting for the filing or termination of the
criminal action and requires only preponderance of evidence to prosper and not proof beyond reasonable doubt as required for conviction in criminal
cases. However, an acquittal based on the finding that the facts upon which civil liability did not exist, bars the filing of an independent civil action if it
is based on the crime. As early as 1952, We have held in the case of Tan vs. Standard Vacuum Oil Company 91 Phil. 672, that "the acquittal of the
accused from the criminal charge will not necessarily extinguish the civil liability unless the court declares in the judgment that the fact from which
the civil liability might arise did not exist. Where the court states 'that the evidence throws no light on the cause of fire and that it was an unfortunate
accident for which the accused cannot be held responsible,' this declaration fits well into the exception of the rule which exempts the accused, from
civil liability. " Likewise, in Albornoz vs. Albornoz, 98 Phil. 785, it was the ruling that "where the judgment in a criminal action contains an express
declaration that the basis of claimant's action did not exist, the latter's action for civil liability is barred under section 1 (d) Rule 107 of the Rules of
Court." And, in De Mesa vs. Priela 24 SCRA 582, this Court, speaking through then Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, ruled that extinction of the
penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which
the civil might arise did not exist. In other cases, the person entitled to the civil action may institute it in the jurisdiction and in the manner provided
by law against the person who may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for the damage suffered (Sec. 3 [c], Rule 111,
Rules of Court.)"

As held in Corpus vs. Paje, supra, reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not one of the three crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil
Code, which provides:

ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution,
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

The above article speaks only of defamation, fraud and physical injuries. The injuries suffered by herein petitioners were alleged to be the result of
criminal negligence; they were not inflicted with malice. Hence, no independent civil action for damages may be instituted in connection therewith.
Further, Section 3 (c), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states that "(c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless
the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist." Otherwise stated, unless the
act from which the civil liability arises is declared to be nonexistent in the final judgment, the extinction of the criminal liability will not carry with it the
extinction of the civil liability. Thus, if a person is charged with homicide and successfully pleaded self-defense, his acquittal by reason thereof will
extinguish his civil liability. He has not incurred any criminal liability. On the other hand, if his acquittal is, for instance, due to the fact that he was not
sufficiently Identified to be the assailant, a civil action for damages may be maintained. His acquittal is not due to non-existence of the crime from
which civil liability might arise, but because he was not, in the eyes of the court, sufficiently Identified as the perpetrator of the crime.

In People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383, this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, said that "the essence of the quasi offense of criminal
negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be
punishable as a felony. The law penalizes the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into
account to determine the penalty; it does not qualify the substance of the offense.

The charge against Felardo Paje was not for homicide and physical injuries but for reckless imprudence or criminal negligence resulting in homicide
(death of Clemente Marcia) and physical injuries suffered by Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap. They are not one of the three (3) crimes mentioned in
Article 33 of the Civil Code and, therefore, no civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution.

The case of Laura Corpus vs. Felardo Paje (supra) is the same as the case at bar, the only difference being the party-plaintiffs or petitioners.
Clemente Marcia died, while Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap suffered physical injuries in the same accident. The heirs of Clemente Marcia filed Civil
Case No. 6880 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal against herein respondents. The case was dismissed and appealed directly to this
Court.1äwphï1.ñët The order appealed from was affirmed, as recorded in Laura Corpus vs. Felardo Paje, 28 SCRA 1062.

The case at bar (Civil Case No. 4425) was filed by Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap against the same defendants in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal. After trial, the case was dismissed and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. It is now before Us on appeal by certiorari from the said decision.

Relative to the admissibility of the documents, to wit; (a) the records of the criminal case against Paje, (b) the decision of the Court of Appeals
acquitting the latter; and (c) copy of the brief of the respondent Paje as accused-appellant, suffice it to say that since petitioners' cause of action is
based on the alleged recklessness and imprudence of respondent Paje it necessarily follows that his acquittal by the Court of Appeals and its
declaration that the mishap was "pure accident" are relevant and material evidence. In fact, the lower court may even take judicial notice of the
decision of the Court of Appeals in said criminal case.

Finally, with respect to the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, well settled is the rule that the same are final and cannot be disturbed by Us,
particularly where they are based, as they are in the case at bar, upon substantial evidence.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. With costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.