G.R. No.

112019 January 4, 1995

LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-
SANTOS, respondents.

VITUG, J.:

Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial provision introduced
by the Family Code is Article 36 (as amended by E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July 1987),
which declares:

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance of Leouel Santos
("Leouel"), brings into fore the above provision which is now invoked by him.
Undaunted by the decisions of the court a quo1 and the Court of Appeal,2 Leouel
persists in beseeching its application in his attempt to have his marriage with
herein private respondent, Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos ("Julia"), declared a nullity.

It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the
Philippine Army, first met Julia. The meeting later proved to be an eventful day for
Leouel and Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two exchanged vows before Municipal
Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly thereafter, by a
church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's parents at the J. Bedia
Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy, and he
was christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound
to happen, Leouel averred, because of the frequent interference by Julia's parents into
the young spouses family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel"
over a number of other things, like when and where the couple should start living
independently from Julia's parents or whenever Julia would express resentment on
Leouel's spending a few days with his own parents.

On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a nurse
despite Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, or on 01
January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first time by long distance telephone. She
promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never
did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the United States, where he underwent a training
program under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up to
25 August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with, Julia
but all his efforts were of no avail.

Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the regional trial
Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 30, a complaint for "Voiding of marriage Under
Article 36 of the Family Code" (docketed, Civil Case No. 9814). Summons was served by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation in Negros Oriental.

On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel), opposed the
complaint and denied its allegations, claiming, in main, that it was the petitioner who
had, in fact, been irresponsible and incompetent.

A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of their marriage
was ruled out by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to the court).

On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly been set, albeit
unsuccessfully, by the court, Julia ultimately filed a manifestation, stating that she
would neither appear nor submit evidence.

On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.3

Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the decision of the trial
court.4

The petition should be denied not only because of its non-compliance with Circular 28-
91, which requires a certification of non-shopping, but also for its lack of merit.

Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to
communicate with him, for more than five years are circumstances that clearly show
her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life. In his own words,
Leouel asserts:

. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because respondent

Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos failed all these years to communicate with the
petitioner. A wife who does not care to inform her husband about her
whereabouts for a period of five years, more or less, is psychologically
incapacitated.

The family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity." The deliberations
during the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee, which has drafted the
Code, can, however, provide an insight on the import of the provision.

Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
 xxx xxx xxx

Art. 36. . . .

(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or
mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even
if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.

On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon Law, Justice (Jose
B.L.) Reyes suggested that they say "wanting in sufficient use," but Justice
(Eduardo) Caguioa preferred to say "wanting in the sufficient use." On the
other hand, Justice Reyes proposed that they say "wanting in sufficient
reason." Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that the idea is that one is
not lacking in judgment but that he is lacking in the exercise of judgment.
He added that lack of judgment would make the marriage voidable. Judge
(Alicia Sempio-) Diy remarked that lack of judgment is more serious than
insufficient use of judgment and yet the latter would make the marriage
null and void and the former only voidable. Justice Caguioa suggested
that subparagraph (7) be modified to read:

"That contracted by any party who, at the time of the

celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to discharge
the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of
incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."

Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was wanting in sufficient use of
reason of judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage" refers
to defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea in
subparagraph (7), but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligations.

Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is also a psychological or

mental incapacity, why is "insanity" only a ground for annulment and not
for declaration or nullity? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that in
insanity, there is the appearance of consent, which is the reason why it is a
ground for voidable marriages, while subparagraph (7) does not refer to
consent but to the very essence of marital obligations.

Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in subparagraph (7), the word

"mentally" be deleted, with which Justice Caguioa concurred. Judge Diy,
however, prefers to retain the word "mentally."
Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7) refers to psychological
impotence. Justice (Ricardo) Puno stated that sometimes a person may be
psychologically impotent with one but not with another. Justice (Leonor
Ines-) Luciano said that it is called selective impotency.

Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies in the fact that in
inserting the Canon Law annulment in the Family Code, the Committee
used a language which describes a ground for voidable marriages under
the Civil Code. Justice Caguioa added that in Canon Law, there are
voidable marriages under the Canon Law, there are no voidable marriages
Dean Gupit said that this is precisely the reason why they should make a
distinction.

Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the defects in marriage cannot
be cured.

Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is "insanity" a ground
for void ab initio marriages? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that
insanity is curable and there are lucid intervals, while psychological
incapacity is not.

On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the phrase "even if such
lack or incapacity is made manifest" be modified to read "even if such lack
or incapacity becomes manifest."

Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of the marriage, it is

not apparent.

Justice Caguioa stated that there are two interpretations of the phrase
"psychological or mentally incapacitated" — in the first one, there is
vitiation of consent because one does not know all the consequences of the
marriages, and if he had known these completely, he might not have
consented to the marriage.

xxx xxx xxx

Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making psychological incapacity

a ground for voidable marriages since otherwise it will encourage one
who really understood the consequences of marriage to claim that he did
not and to make excuses for invalidating the marriage by acting as if he
did not understand the obligations of marriage. Dean Gupit added that it
is a loose way of providing for divorce.

xxx xxx xxx

Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of incapacity by
reason of defects in the mental faculties, which is less than insanity, there
is a defect in consent and, therefore, it is clear that it should be a ground
for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is
capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid
intervals and there are cases when the insanity is curable. He emphasized
that psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has
nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage.

xxx xxx xxx

On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.) Romero inquired if

they do not consider it as going to the very essence of consent. She asked
if they are really removing it from consent. In reply, Justice Caguioa
explained that, ultimately, consent in general is effected but he stressed
that his point is that it is not principally a vitiation of consent since there is
a valid consent. He objected to the lumping together of the validity of the
marriage celebration and the obligations attendant to marriage, which are
completely different from each other, because they require a different
capacity, which is eighteen years of age, for marriage but in contract, it is
different. Justice Puno, however, felt that psychological incapacity is still a
kind of vice of consent and that it should not be classified as a voidable
marriage which is incapable of convalidation; it should be convalidated
but there should be no prescription. In other words, as long as the defect
has not been cured, there is always a right to annul the marriage and if the
defect has been really cured, it should be a defense in the action for
annulment so that when the action for annulment is instituted, the issue
can be raised that actually, although one might have been psychologically
incapacitated, at the time the action is brought, it is no longer true that he
has no concept of the consequence of marriage.

Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not cohabitation be a

defense? In response, Justice Puno stated that even the bearing of children
and cohabitation should not be a sign that psychological incapacity has
been cured.

Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still insanity of a

lesser degree. Justice Luciano suggested that they invite a psychiatrist,
who is the expert on this matter. Justice Caguioa, however, reiterated that
psychological incapacity is not a defect in the mind but in the
understanding of the consequences of marriage, and therefore, a
psychiatrist will not be a help.
Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that there is a lucid interval
in insanity, there are also momentary periods when there is an
understanding of the consequences of marriage. Justice Reyes and Dean
Gupit remarked that the ground of psychological incapacity will not apply
if the marriage was contracted at the time when there is understanding of
the consequences of marriage.5

xxx xxx xxx

Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity to copulate

among the grounds for void marriages. Justice Reyes commented that in
some instances the impotence that in some instances the impotence is only
temporary and only with respect to a particular person. Judge Diy stated
that they can specify that it is incurable. Justice Caguioa remarked that the
term "incurable" has a different meaning in law and in medicine. Judge
Diy stated that "psychological incapacity" can also be cured. Justice
Caguioa, however, pointed out that "psychological incapacity" is
incurable.

Justice Puno observed that under the present draft provision, it is enough
to show that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one was
psychologically incapacitated so that later on if already he can comply
with the essential marital obligations, the marriage is still void ab initio.
Justice Caguioa explained that since in divorce, the psychological
incapacity may occur after the marriage, in void marriages, it has to be at
the time of the celebration of marriage. He, however, stressed that the idea
in the provision is that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations, which incapacity continues and later becomes manifest.

Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is possible that
after the marriage, one's psychological incapacity become manifest but
later on he is cured. Justice Reyes and Justice Caguioa opined that the
remedy in this case is to allow him to remarry.6

xxx xxx xxx

Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:

Art. 37. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time

of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated, to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage shall
 likewise be void from the beginning even if such incapacity
becomes manifest after its solemnization.

Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be substituted with "although."

On the other hand, Prof. Bautista proposed that the clause "although such
incapacity becomes manifest after its solemnization" be deleted since it
may encourage one to create the manifestation of psychological
incapacity. Justice Caguioa pointed out that, as in other provisions, they
cannot argue on the basis of abuse.

Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and physical
incapacities, which are lesser in degree than psychological incapacity.
Justice Caguioa explained that mental and physical incapacities are vices
of consent while psychological incapacity is not a species of vice or
consent.

Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the minutes of
their February 9, 1984 meeting:

"On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that the phrase
"psychological or mental impotence" is an invention of some
churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why
it is considered a weak phrase. He said that the Code of
Canon Law would rather express it as "psychological or
mental incapacity to discharge . . ."

Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word "mental" precisely to
distinguish it from vice of consent. He explained that "psychological
incapacity" refers to lack of understanding of the essential obligations of
marriage.

Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last meeting, they have
decided not to go into the classification of "psychological incapacity"
because there was a lot of debate on it and that this is precisely the reason
why they classified it as a special case.

At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there having been
annulments of marriages arising from psychological incapacity, Civil Law
should not reconcile with Canon Law because it is a new ground even
under Canon Law.

Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common provision in Civil
Law and in Canon Law, are they going to have a provision in the Family
 Code to the effect that marriages annulled or declared void by the church
on the ground of psychological incapacity is automatically annulled in
Civil Law? The other members replied negatively.

Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37 should be retroactive

or prospective in application.

Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity because it is their
answer to the problem of church annulments of marriages, which are still
valid under the Civil Law. On the other hand, Justice Reyes and Justice
Puno were concerned about the avalanche of cases.

Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a vote, which the
Committee approved.

The members voted as follows:

(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero were for prospectivity.

(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof. Bautista and Director
Eufemio were for retroactivity.

(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.

Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the prescriptive period of ten
years within which the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage
should be filed in court. The Committee approved the suggestion.7

It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in ultimately
deciding to adopt the provision with less specificity than expected, has in fact, so
designed the law as to allow some resiliency in its application. Mme. Justice Alicia V.
Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code Committee, has been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N.
Bellosillo in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994); thus:8

The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for
fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee
would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis,
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which,
although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect
since the provision was taken from Canon Law.
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law,9 which
reads:

Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:

1. who lack sufficient use of reason;

2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning

essentila matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and accepted
mutually;

3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. (Emphasis supplied.)

Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that persuasive for having
no juridical or secular effect, the jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the time
of the code's enactment, nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as impertinent for its value
as an aid, at least, to the interpretation or construction of the codal provision.

One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties, 10 giving an account on how the third
paragraph of Canon 1095 has been framed, states:

The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any doubt that the
legislator intended, indeed, to broaden the rule. A strict and narrow norm
was proposed first:

Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of

marriage because of a grave psycho-sexual anomaly (ob
gravem anomaliam psychosexualem) are unable to contract
marriage (cf. SCH/1975, canon 297, a new canon, novus);

then a broader one followed:

. . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam

psychicam) . . . (cf. SCH/1980, canon 1049);

then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to the pope (cf.
SCH/1982, canon 1095, 3);

finally, a new version was promulgated:

because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas naturae psychiae).

 So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological anomaly, then
the term anomaly was altogether eliminated. it would be, however,
incorrect to draw the conclusion that the cause of the incapacity need not
be some kind of psychological disorder; after all, normal and healthy
person should be able to assume the ordinary obligations of marriage.

Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity" defies any precise definition
since psychological causes can be of an infinite variety.

In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage," written by Ignatius

Gramunt, Javier Hervada and LeRoy Wauck, the following explanation appears:

This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit

oneself to the essentials of marriage. Some psychosexual disorders and
other disorders of personality can be the psychic cause of this defect,
which is here described in legal terms. This particular type of incapacity
consists of a real inability to render what is due by the contract. This could be
compared to the incapacity of a farmer to enter a binding contract to
deliver the crops which he cannot possibly reap; (b) this inability to
commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the
conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help,
the procreation and education of offspring; (c) the inability must be
tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The mere difficulty of assuming
these obligations, which could be overcome by normal effort, obviously does not
constitute incapacity. The canon contemplates a true psychological disorder which
incapacitates a person from giving what is due (cf. John Paul II, Address to R.
Rota, Feb. 5, 1987). However, if the marriage is to be declared invalid
under this incapacity, it must be proved not only that the person is
afflicted by a psychological defect, but that the defect did in fact deprive
the person, at the moment of giving consent, of the ability to assume the
essential duties of marriage and consequently of the possibility of being
bound by these duties.

Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former
Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of
Manila (Branch 1), who opines that psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave
or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it
must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of
the party involved.
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most
importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the
use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not been
meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by
some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like
circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's "Void and Voidable Marriages in the
Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's
"Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be
taken and construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing
precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should
refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
intensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
pschologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not
evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual
relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code
which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the
void marriage to be "legitimate."

The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a
party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to
Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or
homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for
legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code,
however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances
being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of
psychological incapacity.

Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every

circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of
that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no
precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered
opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological
disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.
Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should continue to be
reminded that innate in our society, then enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now
still indelible in Article 1 of the Family Code, is that —

Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man a

woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable
social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed
by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements
may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits
provided by this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)

Our Constitution is no less emphatic:

Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the
nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote
its total development.

Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the

family and shall be protected by the State. (Article XV, 1987 Constitution).

The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus of our laws on
marriage and the family, and they are doubt the tenets we still hold on to.

The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the
standards required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably,
Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither
law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual
problem.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno Kapunan
and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

 Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

It is difficult to dissent from a well-written and studied opinion as Mr. Justice Vitug's
ponencia. But, after an extended reflection on the facts of this case, I cannot see my way
clear into holding, as the majority do, that there is no ground for the declaration of
nullity of the marriage between petitioner and private respondent.

To my mind, it is clear that private respondent has been shown to be psychologically

incapacitated to comply with at least one essential marital obligation, i.e. that of living
and cohabiting with her husband, herein petitioner. On the other hand, it has not been
shown that petitioner does not deserve to live and cohabit with his wife, herein private
respondent.

There appears to be no disagreement that the term "psychological incapacity" defies

precision in definition. But, as used in Article 36 of the Family Code as a ground for the
declaration of nullity of a marriage, the intent of the framers of the Code is evidently to
expand and liberalize the grounds for nullifying a marriage, as well pointed out by
Madam Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero in her separate opinion in this case.

While it is true that the board term "psychological incapacity" can open the doors to
abuse by couples who may wish to have an easy way out of their marriage, there are,
however, enough safeguards against this contingency, among which, is the intervention
by the State, through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the
parties and/or fabrication of evidence.

In their case at bench, it has been abundantly established that private respondent Julia
Rosario Bedia-Santos exhibits specific behavior which, to my mind, shows that she is
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital obligations, to writ:

a. It took her seven (7) months after she left for the United States to call up
her husband.

b. Julia promised to return home after her job contract expired in July
1989, but she never did and neither is there any showing that she
informed her husband (herein petitioner) of her whereabouts in the U.S.A.

c. When petitioner went to the United States on a mission for the

Philippine Army, he exerted efforts to "touch base" with Julia; there were
no similar efforts on the part of Julia; there were no similar efforts on the
part of Julia to do the same.
 d. When petitioner filed this suit, more than five (5) years had elapsed,
without Julia indicating her plans to rejoin the petitioner or her
whereabouts.

e. When petitioner filed this case in the trial court, Julia, in her answer,
claimed that it is the former who has been irresponsible and incompetent.

f. During the trial, Julia waived her right to appear and submit evidence.

A spouse's obligation to live and cohabit with his/her partner in marriage is a basic
ground rule in marriage, unless there are overpowering compelling reasons such as, for
instance, an incurable contagious disease on the part of a spouse or cruelty of one
partner, bordering on insanity. There may also be instances when, for economic and
practical reasons, husband and wife have to live separately, but the marital bond
between the spouses always remains. Mutual love and respect for each other would, in
such cases, compel the absent spouse to at least have regular contracts with the other to
inform the latter of his/her condition and whereabouts.

In the present case, it is apparent that private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos has
no intention of cohabiting with petitioner, her husband, or maintaining contact with
him. In fact, her acts eloquently show that she does not want her husband to know of
her whereabouts and neither has she any intention of living and cohabiting with him.

To me there appears to be, on the part of private respondent, an unmistakeable

indication of psychological incapacity to comply with her essential marital obligations,
although these indications were made manifest after the celebration of the marriage.

It would be a great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a much too
restrictive interpretation of the law and compel the petitioner to continue to be married
to a wife who for purposes of fulfilling her marital duties has, for all practical purposes,
ceased to exist.

Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the Court makes
today. Is it not, in effect directly or indirectly, facilitating the transformation of
petitioner into a "habitual tryster" or one forced to maintain illicit relations with another
woman or women with emerging problems of illegitimate children, simply because he
is denied by private respondent, his wife, the companionship and conjugal love which
he has sought from her and to which he is legally entitled?

I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a sanction for absolute
divorce but I submit that we should not constrict it to non-recognition of its evident
purpose and thus deny to one like petitioner, an opportunity to turn a new leaf in his
life by declaring his marriage a nullity by reason of his wife's psychological incapacity
to perform an essential marital obligation.

I therefore vote to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE the marriage between
petitioner Leouel Santos and private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos VOID on
the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code.

ROMERO, J., concurring:

I agree under the circumstances of the case, petitioner is not entitled to have his
marriage declared a nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of private
respondent.

However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and the Civil Code Revision Committee of the UP Law Center, I
wish to add some observations. The letter1 dated April 15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V.
Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the Family Law and Civil Code Revision Committee to
then Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the background of the
inclusion of the present Article 36 in the Family Code.

During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought of
including a chapter on absolute divorce in the draft of a new Family Code
(Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been tasked by the IBP and the UP
Law Center to prepare. In fact, some members of the Committee were in
favor of a no-fault divorce between the spouses after a number of years of
separation, legal or de-facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to
prepare a proposal for an action for dissolution of marriage and the effects
thereof based on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of separation
between the spouses, with or without a judicial decree of legal separation,
and (b) whenever a married person would have obtained a decree of
absolute divorce in another country. Actually, such a proposal is one for
absolute divorce but called by another name. Later, even the Civil Code
Revision Committee took time to discuss the proposal of Justice Reyes on
this matter.

Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee and

Family Law Committee started holding joint meetings on the preparation
of the draft of the New Family Code, they agreed and formulated the
definition of marriage as —

"a special contract of permanent partnership between a man

and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable
 social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents
are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except
that marriage settlements may fix the property relations
during the marriage within the limits provided by law."

With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional

concept of marriage of the Filipino people as a permanent, inviolable,
indissoluble social institution upon which the family and society are
founded, and also realizing the strong opposition that any provision on
absolute divorce would encounter from the Catholic Church and the
Catholic sector of our citizenry to whom the great majority of our people
belong, the two Committees in their joint meetings did not pursue the idea of
absolute divorce and instead opted for an action for judicial declaration of
invalidity of marriage based on grounds available in the Canon Law. It was
thought that such an action would not only be an acceptable alternative to divorce
but would also solve the nagging problem of church annulments of marriages on
grounds not recognized by the civil law of the State. Justice Reyes was thus
requested to again prepare a draft of provisions on such action for
celebration of invalidity of marriage. Still later, to avoid the overlapping of
provisions on void marriages as found in the present Civil Code and those
proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage
on grounds similar to the Canon Law, the two Committees now working
as a Joint Committee in the preparation of a New Family Code decided to
consolidate the present provisions on void marriages with the proposals
of Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of an additional kind of void
marriage in the enumeration of void marriages in the present Civil Code,
to wit:

"(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the

time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of
reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of
marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack
of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."

as well as the following implementing provisions:

"Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked

or pleaded only on the basis of a final judgment declaring
the marriage void, without prejudice to the provision of
Article 34."
 "Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the
absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe."

xxx xxx xxx

It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today

may already dissolved or annulled on the grounds proposed by the Joint
Committee on declaration of nullity as well as annulment of marriages,
thus rendering an absolute divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a
conference with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo University as well as
another meeting with Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of
Pampanga, the Joint Committee was informed that since Vatican II, the
Catholic Church has been declaring marriages null and void on the
ground of "lack of due discretion" for causes that, in other jurisdictions,
would be clear grounds for divorce, like teen-age or premature marriages;
marriage to a man who, because of some personality disorder or
disturbance, cannot support a family; the foolish or ridiculous choice of a
spouse by an otherwise perfectly normal person; marriage to a woman
who refuses to cohabit with her husband or who refuses to have children.
Bishop Cruz also informed the Committee that they have found out in
tribunal work that a lot of machismo among husbands are manifestations
of their sociopathic personality anomaly, like inflicting physical violence
upon their wives, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence
or addiction, and psychological anomaly. . . . (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, by incorporating what is now Article 36 into the Family Code, the Revision
Committee referred to above intended to add another ground to those already listed in
the Civil Code as grounds for nullifying a marriage, thus expanding or liberalizing the
same. Inherent in the inclusion of the provision on psychological incapacity was the
understanding that every petition for declaration of nullity based on it should be
treated on a case-to-case basis; hence, the absence of a definition and an enumeration of
what constitutes psychological incapacity. Moreover, the Committee feared that the
giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis. But the law requires that the same be existing at the time of marriage
although it be manifested later.

Admittedly, the provision on psychological incapacity, just like any other provision of
law, is open to abuse. To prevent this, "the court shall take order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent
collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed."2 Moreover, the judge, in interpreting the provision on a case-to-case basis,
must be guided by "experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the
civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provisions was taken from Canon
Law."3

The constitutional and statutory provisions on the family4 will remain the lodestar
which our society will hope to achieve ultimately. Therefore, the inclusion of Article 36
is not to be taken as an abandonment of the ideal which we all cherish. If at all, it is a
recognition of the reality that some marriages, by reason of the incapacity of one of the
contracting parties, fall short of this ideal; thus, the parties are constrained to find a way
of putting an end to their union through some legally-accepted means.

Any criticism directed at the way that judges have interpreted the provision since its
enactment as to render it easier for unhappily-married couples to separate is addressed,
not to the wisdom of the lawmakers but to the manner by which some members of the
Bench have implemented the provision. These are not interchangeable, each being
separate and distinct from the other.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

It is difficult to dissent from a well-written and studied opinion as Mr. Justice Vitug's
ponencia. But, after an extended reflection on the facts of this case, I cannot see my way
clear into holding, as the majority do, that there is no ground for the declaration of
nullity of the marriage between petitioner and private respondent.

To my mind, it is clear that private respondent has been shown to be psychologically

incapacitated to comply with at least one essential marital obligation, i.e. that of living
and cohabiting with her husband, herein petitioner. On the other hand, it has not been
shown that petitioner does not deserve to live and cohabit with his wife, herein private
respondent.

There appears to be no disagreement that the term "psychological incapacity" defies

precision in definition. But, as used in Article 36 of the Family Code as a ground for the
declaration of nullity of a marriage, the intent of the framers of the Code is evidently to
expand and liberalize the grounds for nullifying a marriage, as well pointed out by
Madam Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero in her separate opinion in this case.

While it is true that the board term "psychological incapacity" can open the doors to
abuse by couples who may wish to have an easy way out of their marriage, there are,
however, enough safeguards against this contingency, among which, is the intervention
by the State, through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the
parties and/or fabrication of evidence.
In their case at bench, it has been abundantly established that private respondent Julia
Rosario Bedia-Santos exhibits specific behavior which, to my mind, shows that she is
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital obligations, to writ:

a. It took her seven (7) months after she left for the United States to call up
her husband.

b. Julia promised to return home after her job contract expired in July
1989, but she never did and neither is there any showing that she
informed her husband (herein petitioner) of her whereabouts in the U.S.A.

c. When petitioner went to the United States on a mission for the

Philippine Army, he exerted efforts to "touch base" with Julia; there were
no similar efforts on the part of Julia; there were no similar efforts on the
part of Julia to do the same.

d. When petitioner filed this suit, more than five (5) years had elapsed,
without Julia indicating her plans to rejoin the petitioner or her
whereabouts.

e. When petitioner filed this case in the trial court, Julia, in her answer,
claimed that it is the former who has been irresponsible and incompetent.

f. During the trial, Julia waived her right to appear and submit evidence.

A spouse's obligation to live and cohabit with his/her partner in marriage is a basic
ground rule in marriage, unless there are overpowering compelling reasons such as, for
instance, an incurable contagious disease on the part of a spouse or cruelty of one
partner, bordering on insanity. There may also be instances when, for economic and
practical reasons, husband and wife have to live separately, but the marital bond
between the spouses always remains. Mutual love and respect for each other would, in
such cases, compel the absent spouse to at least have regular contracts with the other to
inform the latter of his/her condition and whereabouts.

In the present case, it is apparent that private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos has
no intention of cohabiting with petitioner, her husband, or maintaining contact with
him. In fact, her acts eloquently show that she does not want her husband to know of
her whereabouts and neither has she any intention of living and cohabiting with him.

To me there appears to be, on the part of private respondent, an unmistakeable

indication of psychological incapacity to comply with her essential marital obligations,
although these indications were made manifest after the celebration of the marriage.
It would be a great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a much too
restrictive interpretation of the law and compel the petitioner to continue to be married
to a wife who for purposes of fulfilling her marital duties has, for all practical purposes,
ceased to exist.

Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the Court makes
today. Is it not, in effect directly or indirectly, facilitating the transformation of
petitioner into a "habitual tryster" or one forced to maintain illicit relations with another
woman or women with emerging problems of illegitimate children, simply because he
is denied by private respondent, his wife, the companionship and conjugal love which
he has sought from her and to which he is legally entitled?

I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a sanction for absolute
divorce but I submit that we should not constrict it to non-recognition of its evident
purpose and thus deny to one like petitioner, an opportunity to turn a new leaf in his
life by declaring his marriage a nullity by reason of his wife's psychological incapacity
to perform an essential marital obligation.

I therefore vote to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE the marriage between
petitioner Leouel Santos and private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos VOID on
the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code.

ROMERO, J., concurring:

I agree under the circumstances of the case, petitioner is not entitled to have his
marriage declared a nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of private
respondent.

However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and the Civil Code Revision Committee of the UP Law Center, I
wish to add some observations. The letter1 dated April 15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V.
Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the Family Law and Civil Code Revision Committee to
then Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the background of the
inclusion of the present Article 36 in the Family Code.

During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought of
including a chapter on absolute divorce in the draft of a new Family Code
(Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been tasked by the IBP and the UP
Law Center to prepare. In fact, some members of the Committee were in
favor of a no-fault divorce between the spouses after a number of years of
separation, legal or de-facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to
prepare a proposal for an action for dissolution of marriage and the effects
thereof based on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of separation
between the spouses, with or without a judicial decree of legal separation,
and (b) whenever a married person would have obtained a decree of
absolute divorce in another country. Actually, such a proposal is one for
absolute divorce but called by another name. Later, even the Civil Code
Revision Committee took time to discuss the proposal of Justice Reyes on
this matter.

Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee and

Family Law Committee started holding joint meetings on the preparation
of the draft of the New Family Code, they agreed and formulated the
definition of marriage as —

"a special contract of permanent partnership between a man

and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable
social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents
are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except
that marriage settlements may fix the property relations
during the marriage within the limits provided by law."

With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional

concept of marriage of the Filipino people as a permanent, inviolable,
indissoluble social institution upon which the family and society are
founded, and also realizing the strong opposition that any provision on
absolute divorce would encounter from the Catholic Church and the
Catholic sector of our citizenry to whom the great majority of our people
belong, the two Committees in their joint meetings did not pursue the idea of
absolute divorce and instead opted for an action for judicial declaration of
invalidity of marriage based on grounds available in the Canon Law. It was
thought that such an action would not only be an acceptable alternative to divorce
but would also solve the nagging problem of church annulments of marriages on
grounds not recognized by the civil law of the State. Justice Reyes was thus
requested to again prepare a draft of provisions on such action for
celebration of invalidity of marriage. Still later, to avoid the overlapping of
provisions on void marriages as found in the present Civil Code and those
proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage
on grounds similar to the Canon Law, the two Committees now working
as a Joint Committee in the preparation of a New Family Code decided to
consolidate the present provisions on void marriages with the proposals
of Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of an additional kind of void
marriage in the enumeration of void marriages in the present Civil Code,
to wit:
 "(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of
reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of
marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack
of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."

as well as the following implementing provisions:

"Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked

or pleaded only on the basis of a final judgment declaring
the marriage void, without prejudice to the provision of
Article 34."

"Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the

absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe."

xxx xxx xxx

It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today

may already dissolved or annulled on the grounds proposed by the Joint
Committee on declaration of nullity as well as annulment of marriages,
thus rendering an absolute divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a
conference with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo University as well as
another meeting with Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of
Pampanga, the Joint Committee was informed that since Vatican II, the
Catholic Church has been declaring marriages null and void on the
ground of "lack of due discretion" for causes that, in other jurisdictions,
would be clear grounds for divorce, like teen-age or premature marriages;
marriage to a man who, because of some personality disorder or
disturbance, cannot support a family; the foolish or ridiculous choice of a
spouse by an otherwise perfectly normal person; marriage to a woman
who refuses to cohabit with her husband or who refuses to have children.
Bishop Cruz also informed the Committee that they have found out in
tribunal work that a lot of machismo among husbands are manifestations
of their sociopathic personality anomaly, like inflicting physical violence
upon their wives, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence
or addiction, and psychological anomaly. . . . (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, by incorporating what is now Article 36 into the Family Code, the Revision
Committee referred to above intended to add another ground to those already listed in
the Civil Code as grounds for nullifying a marriage, thus expanding or liberalizing the
same. Inherent in the inclusion of the provision on psychological incapacity was the
understanding that every petition for declaration of nullity based on it should be
treated on a case-to-case basis; hence, the absence of a definition and an enumeration of
what constitutes psychological incapacity. Moreover, the Committee feared that the
giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis. But the law requires that the same be existing at the time of marriage
although it be manifested later.

Admittedly, the provision on psychological incapacity, just like any other provision of
law, is open to abuse. To prevent this, "the court shall take order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent
collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed."2 Moreover, the judge, in interpreting the provision on a case-to-case basis,
must be guided by "experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the
civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provisions was taken from Canon
Law."3

The constitutional and statutory provisions on the family4 will remain the lodestar
which our society will hope to achieve ultimately. Therefore, the inclusion of Article 36
is not to be taken as an abandonment of the ideal which we all cherish. If at all, it is a
recognition of the reality that some marriages, by reason of the incapacity of one of the
contracting parties, fall short of this ideal; thus, the parties are constrained to find a way
of putting an end to their union through some legally-accepted means.

Any criticism directed at the way that judges have interpreted the provision since its
enactment as to render it easier for unhappily-married couples to separate is addressed,
not to the wisdom of the lawmakers but to the manner by which some members of the
Bench have implemented the provision. These are not interchangeable, each being
separate and distinct from the other.

Footnotes

1 Per Judge Enrique Garovillo.

2 Penned by Justice Jainal Rasul, concurred in by Justice Pedro Ramirez

and Ramon Mabutas, Jr.

3 Rollo, 37-42.

4 Rollo, 13-18.

5 Deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee, July 26, 1986.

6 Deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee, August 2, 1986.

7 Deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee, August 9, 1986.

8 In her "Handbook on the Family Code."

9 Marriage in Canon Law, Delaware: Michael Glazier, Inc., 1986, 129-130.

C 1095 Sunt incapaces matrimonii contrahendi:

1. qui sufficiente rationis usu carent;

2. qui laborant gravi defectu discretionis iudicii circa iura et official

matrimonialia essentialia mutuo tradenda et acceptanda;

3. qui ob causas naturae psychicae obligationes matrimonii essentiales assumere

non valent.

10 Ibid., 131-132.

11 Handbook on the Family Code, First Edition, 1988.

ROMERO, J., concurring:

1 Written pursuant to the request of Assemblywoman Mercedes

Cojuangco-Teodoro during the March 23, 1985 joint meeting of the Family
Law and Civil Code Revision Committee at the UP Law Center for
comments on P.B. 3149 (Pacificador Bill) on Divorce, P.B. No. 1986
(Monfort and Collantes Bill) on Recognition of Church Annulments of
Marriages, P.B. No. 2347 (Sitoy Bill) on Additional Grounds for
Annulment of Marriage and Legal Separation and P.B. 1350 (Kalaw Bill)
on Equal Rights of Filipino Women which were pending before her Sub-
Committee.

2 FAMILY CODE, Art. 48.

3 J.A. v. SEMPIO-DIY, HANDBOOK OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, 37 (1988).

4 As quoted in the majority opinion.

G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006

LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner,

vs.
MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad truth has unsettled
many a love transformed into matrimony. Any sort of deception between spouses, no
matter the gravity, is always disquieting. Deceit to the depth and breadth unveiled in
the following pages, dark and irrational as in the modern noir tale, dims any trace of
certitude on the guilty spouse’s capability to fulfill the marital obligations even more.

The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals dated 29 November 2001 and 24 October 2002. The Court of Appeals had
reversed the judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati declaring the
marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner) and Marie Ivonne F. Reyes (respondent),
null and void. After careful consideration, we reverse and affirm instead the trial court.

Antecedent Facts

Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and
respondent was 36 years of age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married
before a minister of the Gospel4 at the Manila City Hall, and through a subsequent
church wedding5 at the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila on 6
December 1990.6 Out of their union, a child was born on 19 April 1991, who sadly died
five (5) months later.

On 8 March 1993,7 petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent

declared null and void. He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family
Code alleging that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondent’s incapacity existed at the
time their marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to the present.8

As manifestations of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed

that respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation,
income, educational attainment and other events or things, 9 to wit:

(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son,10 and
instead introduced the boy to petitioner as the adopted child of her family. She only
confessed the truth about the boy’s parentage when petitioner learned about it from
other sources after their marriage.11

(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and
kill her when in fact, no such incident occurred.12

(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo

Gardiner, and told some of her friends that she graduated with a degree in psychology,
when she was neither.13

(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold
Recording Company (Blackgold); yet, not a single member of her family ever witnessed
her alleged singing activities with the group. In the same vein, she postulated that a
luncheon show was held at the Philippine Village Hotel in her honor and even
presented an invitation to that effect14 but petitioner discovered per certification by the
Director of Sales of said hotel that no such occasion had taken place.15

(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those names,
sent lengthy letters to petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and touting her as the
"number one moneymaker" in the commercial industry worth P2 million.16 Petitioner
later found out that respondent herself was the one who wrote and sent the letters to
him when she admitted the truth in one of their quarrels.17 He likewise realized that
Babes Santos and Via Marquez were only figments of her imagination when he
discovered they were not known in or connected with Blackgold.18

(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her payslip to
make it appear that she earned a higher income. She bought a sala set from a public
market but told petitioner that she acquired it from a famous furniture dealer.19 She
spent lavishly on unnecessary items and ended up borrowing money from other people
on false pretexts.20

(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his
officemates to monitor his whereabouts. When he could no longer take her unusual
behavior, he separated from her in August 1991. He tried to attempt a reconciliation but
since her behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in November 1991.21

In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede (Dr. Abcede),
a psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V.

Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they
conducted, that petitioner was essentially a normal, introspective, shy and conservative
type of person. On the other hand, they observed that respondent’s persistent and
constant lying
to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic relationship that
should be based on love, trust and respect.22 They further asserted that respondent’s
extreme jealousy was also pathological. It reached the point of paranoia since there was
no actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner was having an affair with another
woman. They concluded based on the foregoing that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations.23

In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her marital obligations
by attending to all the needs of her husband. She asserted that there was no truth to the
allegation that she fabricated stories, told lies and invented personalities.24 She
presented her version, thus:

(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because she was afraid of
losing her husband.25

(2) She told petitioner about David’s attempt to rape and kill her because she surmised
such intent from David’s act of touching her back and ogling her from head to foot.26

(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had been teaching
psychology at the Pasig Catholic School for two (2) years.27

(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive producer of
Channel 9 and she had done three (3) commercials with McCann Erickson for the
advertisement of Coca-cola, Johnson & Johnson, and Traders Royal Bank. She told
petitioner she was a Blackgold recording artist although she was not under contract
with the company, yet she reported to the Blackgold office after office hours. She
claimed that a luncheon show was indeed held in her honor at the Philippine Village
Hotel on 8 December 1979.28

(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by her and the writers
thereof were not fictitious. Bea Marquez Recto of the Recto political clan was a resident
of the United States while Babes Santos was employed with Saniwares.29

(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband but averred that she
merely asked the latter in a diplomatic matter if she was the one asking for chocolates
from petitioner, and not to monitor her husband’s whereabouts.30

(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported almost ten people
from her monthly budget of P7,000.00.31

In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a child prior to their
marriage, the other lies attributed to her by petitioner were mostly hearsay and
unconvincing. Her stance was that the totality of the evidence presented is not sufficient
for a finding of psychological incapacity on her part.32
In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a psychiatrist,
to refute the allegations anent her psychological condition. Dr. Reyes testified that the
series of tests conducted by his assistant,33 together with the screening procedures and
the Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological Rating Scale (CPRS) he himself conducted, led
him to conclude that respondent was not psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential marital obligations. He postulated that regressive behavior, gross neuroticism,
psychotic tendencies, and poor control of impulses, which are signs that might point to
the presence of disabling trends, were not elicited from respondent.34

In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the evaluation conducted by
Dr. Reyes as (i) he was not the one who administered and interpreted respondent’s
psychological evaluation, and (ii) he made use of only one instrument called CPRS
which was not reliable because a good liar can fake the results of such test.35

After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioner’s evidence and held that
respondent’s propensity to lying about almost anything−her occupation, state of health,
singing abilities and her income, among others−had been duly established. According
to the trial court, respondent’s fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and
personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made her
psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and
significance to her marriage.36 The trial court thus declared the marriage between
petitioner and respondent null and void.

Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the
Archdiocese of Manila annulled the Catholic marriage of the parties, on the ground of
lack of due discretion on the part of the parties.37 During the pendency of the appeal
before the Court of Appeals, the Metropolitan Tribunal’s ruling was affirmed with
modification by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, which held instead
that only respondent was impaired by a lack of due discretion.38 Subsequently, the
decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal was upheld by the Roman
Rota of the Vatican.39

Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the Catholic tribunals.
Still, the appellate court reversed the RTC’s judgment. While conceding that respondent
may not have been completely honest with petitioner, the Court of Appeals
nevertheless held that the totality of the evidence presented was insufficient to establish
respondent’s psychological incapacity. It declared that the requirements in the case of
Republic v. Court of Appeals40 governing the application and interpretation of
psychological incapacity had not been satisfied.

Taking exception to the appellate court’s pronouncement, petitioner elevated the case to
this Court. He contends herein that the evidence conclusively establish respondent’s
psychological incapacity.
In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily influenced by the credence
accorded by the RTC to the factual allegations of petitioner.41 It is a settled principle of
civil procedure that the conclusions of the trial court regarding the credibility of
witnesses are entitled to great respect from the appellate courts because the trial court
had an opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which
may indicate their candor or lack thereof.42 The Court is likewise guided by the fact that
the Court of Appeals did not dispute the veracity of the evidence presented by
petitioner. Instead, the appellate court concluded that such evidence was not sufficient
to establish the psychological incapacity of respondent.43

Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of petitioner as the operative
facts. Still, the crucial question remains as to whether the state of facts as presented by
petitioner sufficiently meets the standards set for the declaration of nullity of a marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code. These standards were definitively laid down in the
Court’s 1997 ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals44 (also known as the Molina case45),
and indeed the Court of Appeals cited the Molina guidelines in reversing the RTC in the
case at bar.46 Since Molina was decided in 1997, the Supreme Court has yet to squarely
affirm the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.47 In
fact, even before Molina was handed down, there was only one case, Chi Ming Tsoi v.
Court of Appeals,48 wherein the Court definitively concluded that a spouse was
psychologically incapacitated under Article 36.

This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the misperception that the remedy
afforded by Article 36 of the Family Code is hollow, insofar as the Supreme Court is
concerned.49 Yet what Molina and the succeeding cases did ordain was a set of
guidelines which, while undoubtedly onerous on the petitioner seeking the declaration
of nullity, still leave room for a decree of nullity under the proper circumstances. Molina
did not foreclose the grant of a decree of nullity under Article 36, even as it raised the
bar for its allowance.

Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36

Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at
the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization."50 The concept of psychological
incapacity as a ground for nullity of marriage is novel in our body of laws, although
mental incapacity has long been recognized as a ground for the dissolution of a
marriage.

The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting marriage persons "who are
not in the full enjoyment of their reason at the time of contracting marriage."51
Marriages with such persons were ordained as void,52 in the same class as marriages
with underage parties and persons already married, among others. A party’s mental
capacity was not a ground for divorce under the Divorce Law of 1917,53 but a marriage
where "either party was of unsound mind" at the time of its celebration was cited as an
"annullable marriage" under the Marriage Law of 1929.54 Divorce on the ground of a
spouse’s incurable insanity was permitted under the divorce law enacted during the
Japanese occupation.55 Upon the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, a marriage
contracted by a party of "unsound mind" was classified under Article 85 of the Civil
Code as a voidable marriage.56 The mental capacity, or lack thereof, of the marrying
spouse was not among the grounds for declaring a marriage void ab initio.57 Similarly,
among the marriages classified as voidable under Article 45 (2) of the Family Code is
one contracted by a party of unsound mind.58

Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a vice of consent, just like
insanity impinges on consent freely given which is one of the essential requisites of a
contract.59 The initial common consensus on psychological incapacity under Article 36
of the Family Code was that it did not constitute a specie of vice of consent. Justices
Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both members of the Family Code revision committee that
drafted the Code, have opined that psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent, and
conceded that the spouse may have given free and voluntary consent to a marriage but
was nonetheless incapable of fulfilling such rights and obligations.60 Dr. Tolentino
likewise stated in the 1990 edition of his commentaries on the Family Code that this
"psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations does not
affect the consent to the marriage."61

There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of Article 36 as phrased by

the Family Code committee. Tolentino opined that "psychologically incapacity to
comply would not be

juridically different from physical incapacity of consummating the marriage, which

makes the marriage only voidable under Article 45 (5) of the Civil Code x x x [and thus]
should have been a cause for annulment of the marriage only."62 At the same time,
Tolentino noted "[it] would be different if it were psychological incapacity to
understand the essential marital obligations, because then this would amount to lack of
consent to the marriage."63 These concerns though were answered, beginning with
Santos v. Court of Appeals,64 wherein the Court, through Justice Vitug, acknowledged
that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage."65

The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the
obligations of marriage, as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them, was
further affirmed in the Molina66 case. Therein, the Court, through then Justice (now
Chief Justice) Panganiban observed that "[t]he evidence [to establish psychological
incapacity] must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such extent that the person could not have known the obligations he
was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereto."67
Jurisprudence since then has recognized that psychological incapacity "is a malady so
grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities
of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume."68

It might seem that this present understanding of psychological incapacity deviates from
the literal wording of Article 36, with its central phase reading "psychologically
incapacitated to comply

with the essential marital obligations of marriage."69 At the same time, it has been
consistently recognized by this Court that the intent of the Family Code committee was
to design the law as to allow some resiliency in its application, by avoiding specific
examples that would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis. Rather, the preference of the revision committee was for "the judge to
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, in the findings
of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals which, although not binding on

the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from
Canon Law."70

We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag:71

Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a
marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case.
Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a
ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with
another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the
appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that
of the trial court.72

The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological incapacity, as

intended by the revision committee, was not cast in intractable specifics. Judicial
understanding of psychological incapacity may be informed by evolving standards,
taking into account the particulars of each case, current trends in psychological and
even canonical thought, and experience. It is under the auspices of the deliberate
ambiguity of the framers that the Court has developed the Molina rules, which have
been consistently applied since 1997. Molina has proven indubitably useful in providing
a unitary framework that guides courts in adjudicating petitions for declaration of
nullity under Article 36. At the same time, the Molina guidelines are not set in stone, the
clear legislative intent mandating a case-to-case perception of each situation, and Molina
itself arising from this evolutionary understanding of Article 36. There is no cause to
disavow Molina at present, and indeed the disposition of this case shall rely primarily
on that precedent. There is need though to emphasize other perspectives as well which
should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.

Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first in Santos then in Molina, of
the considered opinion of canon law experts in the interpretation of psychological
incapacity. This is but unavoidable, considering that the Family Code committee had
bluntly acknowledged that the concept of psychological incapacity was derived from
canon law,73 and as one member admitted, enacted as a solution to the problem of
marriages already annulled by the Catholic Church but still existent under civil law.74 It
would be disingenuous to disregard the influence of Catholic Church doctrine in the
formulation and subsequent understanding of Article 36, and the Court has expressly
acknowledged that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the local Church, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts.75 Still, it must be emphasized that the Catholic Church is hardly
the sole source of influence in the interpretation of Article 36. Even though the concept
may have been derived from canon law, its incorporation into the Family Code and
subsequent judicial interpretation occurred in wholly secular progression. Indeed,
while Church thought on psychological incapacity is merely persuasive on the trial
courts, judicial decisions of this Court interpreting psychological incapacity are binding
on lower courts.76

Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the
adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. All too frequently,
this Court and lower courts, in denying petitions of the kind, have favorably cited
Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively state that "[t]he State
recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total developmen[t]," and that
"[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall
be protected by the State." These provisions highlight the importance of the family and
the constitutional protection accorded to the institution of marriage.

But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to
marriage as a social institution and the foundation of the family. It remains the province
of the legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy and
the modalities to protect it, based on whatever socio-political influences it deems
proper, and subject of course to the qualification that such legislative enactment itself
adheres to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the case, it also falls on the
legislature to put into operation the constitutional provisions that protect marriage and
the family. This has been accomplished at present through the enactment of the Family
Code, which defines marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects,
imposes the limitations that affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the
grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. While it may appear
that the judicial denial of a petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the
constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such action in fact merely enforces a
statutory definition of marriage, not a constitutionally ordained decree of what
marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not be
the only constitutional considerations to be taken into account in resolving a petition for
declaration of nullity.

Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a

psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement of
this constitutional protection of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in promoting
marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the foundation of the
nation, there is a corresponding interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-
equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio marriages under Article 36 do not further
the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as they promote wedlock
among persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to
understand or comply with the essential obligations of marriage.

These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the present petition.

Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case

As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines presently recognized in the judicial
disposition of petitions for nullity under Article 36. The Court has consistently applied
Molina since its promulgation in 1997, and the guidelines therein operate as the general
rules. They warrant citation in full:

1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of
marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees
marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the
whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected"’ by the
state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological–not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such
an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming,
or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application
of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root
cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature
fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.

3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of

the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the
parties exchanged their "I do’s." The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.

4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or

incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to
the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as
an essential obligation of marriage.

5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability,
not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a
natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element
in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to

71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220,
221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
 7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the
Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:

"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume
the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature."

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our
civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate
tribunal. Ideally—subject to our law on evidence—what is decreed as canonically
invalid should also be decreed civilly void.77

Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the Solicitor General issue a
certification stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition to the petition.78 This
requirement however was dispensed with following the implementation of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages.79 Still, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that
the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State to
take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed. Obviously, collusion is not an issue in this case, considering
the consistent vigorous opposition of respondent to the petition for declaration of
nullity. In any event, the fiscal’s participation in the hearings before the trial court is
extant from the records of this case.

As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now deemed binding on this Court,
owing to the great weight accorded to the opinion of the primary trier of facts, and the
refusal of the Court of Appeals to dispute the veracity of these facts. As such, it must be
considered that respondent had consistently lied about many material aspects as to her
character and personality. The question remains whether her pattern of fabrication
sufficiently establishes her psychological incapacity, consistent with Article 36 and
generally, the Molina guidelines.

We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina.

First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological
incapacity of his spouse. Apart from his own testimony, he presented witnesses who
corroborated his allegations on his wife’s behavior, and certifications from Blackgold
Records and the Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed respondent’s claims
pertinent to her alleged singing career. He also presented two (2) expert witnesses from
the field of psychology who testified that the aberrant behavior of respondent was
tantamount to psychological incapacity. In any event, both courts below considered
petitioner’s evidence as credible enough. Even the appellate court acknowledged that
respondent was not totally honest with petitioner.80

As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of nullity under Article
36 must be able to establish the cause of action with a preponderance of evidence.
However, since the action cannot be considered as a non-public matter between private
parties, but is impressed with State interest, the Family Code likewise requires the
participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney, fiscal, or Solicitor General,
to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is
not fabricated or suppressed. Thus, even if the petitioner is able establish the
psychological incapacity of respondent with preponderant evidence, any finding of
collusion among the parties would necessarily negate such proofs.

Second. The root cause of respondent’s psychological incapacity has been medically or
clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly
explained in the trial court’s decision. The initiatory complaint alleged that respondent,
from the start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal behavior "of peren[n]ially telling
lies, fabricating ridiculous stories, and inventing personalities and situations," of writing
letters to petitioner using fictitious names, and of lying about her actual occupation,
income, educational attainment, and family background, among others.81

These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further linked to medical

or clinical causes by expert witnesses from the field of psychology. Petitioner presented
two (2) such witnesses in particular. Dr. Abcede, a psychiatrist who had headed the
department of psychiatry of at least two (2) major hospitals,82 testified as follows:

WITNESS:

Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit provided to me, I can say that
there are a couple of things that [are] terribly wrong with the standards. There are a
couple of things that seems (sic) to be repeated over and over again in the affidavit. One
of which is the persistent, constant and repeated lying of the "respondent"; which, I
think, based on assessment of normal behavior of an individual, is abnormal or
pathological. x x x

ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)

Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because of these actuations of the respondent
she is then incapable of performing the basic obligations of her marriage?

A- Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one owes towards another. The lack of
concern, the lack of love towards the person, and it is also something that endangers
human relationship. You see, relationship is based on communication between
individuals and what we generally communicate are our thoughts and feelings. But
then when one talks and expresse[s] their feelings, [you] are expected to tell the truth.
And therefore, if you constantly lie, what do you think is going to happen as far as this
relationship is concerned. Therefore, it undermines that basic relationship that should
be based on love, trust and respect.

Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior of the respondent in
constantly lying and fabricating stories, she is then incapable of performing the basic
obligations of the marriage?

xxx

ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)

Q- Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza, who is the third witness
for the petitioner, testified that the respondent has been calling up the petitioner’s
officemates and ask him (sic) on the activities of the petitioner and ask him on the
behavior of the petitioner. And this is specifically stated on page six (6) of the transcript
of stenographic notes, what can you say about this, Mr. witness?

A- If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is paranoid, which means that
there is no actual basis on her suspect (sic) that her husband is having an affair with a
woman, if carried on to the extreme, then that is pathological. That is not abnormal. We
all feel jealous, in the same way as we also lie every now and then; but everything that
is carried out in extreme is abnormal or pathological. If there is no basis in reality to the
fact that the husband is having an affair with another woman and if she persistently
believes that the husband is having an affair with different women, then that is
pathological and we call that paranoid jealousy.

Q- Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be considered psychologically

incapacitated to perform the basic obligations of the marriage?

A- Yes, Ma’am.83

The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only the psychological
incapacity of respondent, but also the psychological capacity of petitioner. He
concluded that respondent "is [a] pathological liar, that [she continues] to lie [and] she
loves to fabricate about herself."84

These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological incapacity on the case
record, particularly the trial transcripts of respondent’s testimony, as well as the
supporting affidavits of petitioner. While these witnesses did not personally examine
respondent, the Court had already held in Marcos v. Marcos85 that personal examination
of the subject by the physician is not required for the spouse to be declared
psychologically incapacitated.86 We deem the methodology utilized by petitioner’s
witnesses as sufficient basis for their medical conclusions. Admittedly, Drs. Abcede and
Lopez’s common conclusion of respondent’s psychological incapacity hinged heavily
on their own acceptance of petitioner’s version as the true set of facts. However, since
the trial court itself accepted the veracity of petitioner’s factual premises, there is no
cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn therefrom by
petitioner’s expert witnesses.

Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial court explicated its
finding of psychological incapacity in its decision in this wise:

To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage. It has
been shown clearly from her actuations that respondent has that propensity for telling
lies about almost anything, be it her occupation, her state of health, her singing abilities,
her income, etc. She has this fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and
personalities. She practically lived in a world of make believe making her therefore not
in a position to give meaning and significance to her marriage to petitioner. In
persistently and constantly lying to petitioner, respondent undermined the basic tenets
of relationship between spouses that is based on love, trust and respect. As concluded
by the psychiatrist presented by petitioner, such repeated lying is abnormal and
pathological and amounts to psychological incapacity.87

Third. Respondent’s psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at

the time of and even before the celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends and
made up letters from fictitious characters well before she married petitioner. Likewise,
she kept petitioner in the dark about her natural child’s real parentage as she only
confessed when the latter had found out the truth after their marriage.

Fourth. The gravity of respondent’s psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her

disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. It is immediately discernible
that the parties had shared only a little over a year of cohabitation before the
exasperated petitioner left his wife. Whatever such circumstance speaks of the degree of
tolerance of petitioner, it likewise supports the belief that respondent’s psychological
incapacity, as borne by the record, was so grave in extent that any prolonged marital life
was dubitable.

It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false
pretenses in order to induce petitioner into marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a
failure on the part of respondent to distinguish truth from fiction, or at least abide by
the truth. Petitioner’s witnesses and the trial court were emphatic on respondent’s
inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the pathologic nature of her mistruths, which
according to them, were revelatory of respondent’s inability to understand and perform
the essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person unable to distinguish between
fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the
marital bond, much less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding obligations
attached to marriage, including parenting. One unable to adhere to reality cannot be
expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional commitments.

The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent allegedly tried her
best to effect a reconciliation, she had amply exhibited her ability to perform her marital
obligations. We are not convinced. Given the nature of her psychological condition, her
willingness to remain in the marriage hardly banishes nay extenuates her lack of
capacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations. Respondent’s ability to even
comprehend what the essential marital obligations are is impaired at best. Considering
that the evidence convincingly disputes respondent’s ability to adhere to the truth, her
avowals as to her commitment to the marriage cannot be accorded much credence.

At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family Code which states that a
marriage may be annulled if the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, and
Article 46 which enumerates the circumstances constituting fraud under the previous
article, clarifies that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank,
fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the
annulment of marriage." It would be improper to draw linkages between
misrepresentations made by respondent and the misrepresentations under Articles 45
(3) and 46. The fraud under Article 45(3) vitiates the consent of the spouse who is lied
to, and does not allude to vitiated consent of the lying spouse. In this case, the
misrepresentations of respondent point to her own inadequacy to cope with her marital
obligations, kindred to psychological incapacity under Article 36.

Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as
embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the
spouses to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual
help and support. As noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see how an inveterate
pathological liar would be able to commit to the basic tenets of relationship between
spouses based on love, trust and respect.

Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the
fact that the marriage of the parties was annulled by the Catholic Church. The appellate
court apparently deemed this detail totally inconsequential as no reference was made to
it anywhere in the assailed decision despite petitioner’s efforts to bring the matter to its
attention.88 Such deliberate ignorance is in contravention of Molina, which held that
interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts.
As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila decreed the
invalidity of the marriage in question in a Conclusion89 dated 30 March 1995, citing the
"lack of due discretion" on the part of respondent.90 Such decree of nullity was affirmed
by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal,91 and the Roman Rota of the
Vatican.92 In fact, respondent’s psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a
restrictive clause93 was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibiting respondent from
contracting another marriage without the Tribunal’s consent.

In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
pronounced:

The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial consent is considered

ontologically defective and wherefore judicially ineffective when elicited by a Part
Contractant in possession and employ of a discretionary judgment faculty with a
perceptive vigor markedly inadequate for the practical understanding of the conjugal
Covenant or serious impaired from the correct appreciation of the integral significance
and implications of the marriage vows.

The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude required by law that based
on the depositions of the Partes in Causa and premised on the testimonies of the
Common and Expert Witnesse[s], the Respondent made the marriage option in tenure
of adverse personality constracts that were markedly antithetical to the substantive
content and implications of the Marriage Covenant, and that seriously undermined
the integrality of her matrimonial consent in terms of its deliberative component. In
other words, afflicted with a discretionary faculty impaired in its practico-concrete
judgment formation on account of an adverse action and reaction pattern, the
Respondent was impaired from eliciting a judicially binding matrimonial consent.
There is no sufficient evidence in the Case however to prove as well the fact of grave
lack of due discretion on the part of the Petitioner.94

Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at not only by the trial
court, but also by canonical bodies. Yet, we must clarify the proper import of the
Church rulings annulling the marriage in this case. They hold sway since they are
drawn from a similar recognition, as the trial court, of the veracity of petitioner’s
allegations. Had the trial court instead appreciated respondent’s version as correct, and
the appellate court affirmed such conclusion, the rulings of the Catholic Church on this
matter would have diminished persuasive value. After all, it is the factual findings of
the judicial trier of facts, and not that of the canonical courts, that are accorded
significant recognition by this Court.

Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such
psychological incapacity be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
It was on this score that the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court,
the appellate court noting that it did not appear certain that respondent’s condition was
incurable and that Dr. Abcede did not testify to such effect.95

Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially separated, he
returned to her, desiring to make their marriage work. However, respondent’s aberrant
behavior remained unchanged, as she continued to lie, fabricate stories, and maintained
her excessive jealousy. From this fact, he draws the conclusion that respondent’s
condition is incurable.

From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded that respondent’s
condition is incurable? It would seem, at least, that respondent’s psychosis is quite
grave, and a cure thereof a remarkable feat. Certainly, it would have been easier had
petitioner’s expert witnesses characterized respondent’s condition as incurable. Instead,
they remained silent on whether the psychological incapacity was curable or incurable.

But on careful examination, there was good reason for the experts’ taciturnity on this
point.

The petitioner’s expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the trial court rendered
its decision on 10 August 1995. These events transpired well before Molina was
promulgated in 1997 and made explicit the requirement that the psychological
incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
requirement was not expressly stated in Article 36 or any other provision of the Family
Code.

On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in January 1995, began its
discussion by first citing the deliberations of the Family Code committee,96 then the
opinion of canonical scholars,97 before arriving at its formulation of the doctrinal
definition of psychological incapacity.98 Santos did refer to Justice Caguioa’s opinion
expressed during the deliberations that "psychological incapacity is incurable,"99 and
the view of a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the
Archdiocese of Manila that psychological incapacity must be characterized "by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."100 However, in formulating the
doctrinal rule on psychological incapacity, the Court in Santos omitted any reference to
incurability as a characteristic of psychological incapacity.101

This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months before the trial court came
out with its own ruling that remained silent on whether respondent’s psychological
incapacity was incurable. Certainly, Santos did not clearly mandate that the incurability
of the psychological incapacity be established in an action for declaration of nullity. At
least, there was no jurisprudential clarity at the time of the trial of this case and the
subsequent promulgation of the trial court’s decision that required a medical finding of
incurability. Such requisite arose only with Molina in 1997, at a time when this case was
on appellate review, or after the reception of evidence.

We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca,102 the Court countered an argument that Molina and
Santos should not apply retroactively

with the observation that the interpretation or construction placed by the courts of a law
constitutes a part of that law as of the date the statute in enacted.103 Yet we approach
this present case from utterly practical considerations. The requirement that
psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable is one that necessarily cannot be divined without expert opinion. Clearly in
this case, there was no categorical averment from the expert witnesses that respondent’s
psychological incapacity was curable or incurable simply because there was no legal
necessity yet to elicit such a declaration and the appropriate question was not
accordingly propounded to him. If we apply Pesca without deep reflection, there would
be undue prejudice to those cases tried before Molina or Santos, especially those
presently on appellate review, where presumably the respective petitioners and their
expert witnesses would not have seen the need to adduce a diagnosis of incurability. It
may hold in those cases, as in this case, that the psychological incapacity of a spouse is
actually incurable, even if not pronounced as such at the trial court level.

We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the interpretation of Article 36
relies heavily on a case-to-case perception. It would be insensate to reason to mandate
in this case an expert medical or clinical diagnosis of incurability, since the parties
would have had no impelling cause to present evidence to that effect at the time this
case was tried by the RTC more than ten (10) years ago. From the totality of the
evidence, we are sufficiently convinced that the incurability of respondent’s
psychological incapacity has been established by the petitioner. Any lingering doubts
are further dispelled by the fact that the Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably
consider incurability as an integral requisite of psychological incapacity, were
sufficiently convinced that respondent was so incapacitated to contract marriage to the
degree that annulment was warranted.

All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration
of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC correctly ruled, and the Court
of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court.

There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing as it does the marital
bond as having been inexistent in the first place. It is possible that respondent, despite
her psychological state, remains in love with petitioner, as exhibited by her persistent
challenge to the petition for nullity. In fact, the appellate court placed undue emphasis
on respondent’s avowed commitment to remain in the marriage. Yet the Court decides
these cases on legal reasons and not vapid sentimentality. Marriage, in legal
contemplation, is more than the legitimatization of a desire of people in love to live
together.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC dated 10 August
1995, declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID
under Article 36 of the Family Code, is REINSTATED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairman

ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairman, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Attestation by the
Division’s Chairman, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1Penned by Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes, concurred in by Associate Justices
Renato C. Dacudao and Mariano C. Del Castillo; See rollo, pp. 67-84.

2 Rollo, p. 86.

3Penned by Judge (now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals) Josefina

Guevara-Salonga.

4Solemnized by Rev. Victor M. Navarro, Minister of the PCCC, Las Piñas, Metro
Manila.

5 Solemnized by the Parish Priest, Rev. Fr. Rodolfo Aguirre Gallardo.

6 Rollo, pp. 69, 91.

7 Records, pp. 1-5.

8 Id. at 1-2.

9 Id. at 2-3. See also rollo, pp. 69, 91.

10 Named Tito F. Reyes II, born on 21 January 1982.

11 Supra note 8.

12 Rollo, pp. 69, 92.

13 Id. at 70, 92.

14 Id. at 95.

15 Supra note 13.

16 Id. at 70, 92.

17 TSN, 8 September 1993, p. 12.

18 Id. at 12-13. See also records, p. 91.

19 Rollo, pp. 71, 92.

20 Id.; records, p. 3.

21 Rollo, pp. 71, 92.

22 Id. at 71-72, 92-93.

23 Id.

24 Id. at 93.

25 Id. at 74, 94.

26 Id.

27 Id. at 73, 93.

28 Id.

29 Id.

30 Id. at 74, 94.

31 Id. at 73, 94.

32 Id. at 77-78.

33 Miss Francianina Sanches.

34 Rollo, p. 94.

35 Id. at 72, 93; TSN, 23 March 1995, pp. 15-17.

36 Rollo, pp. 95-96.

37 Id. at 97-98.

38 Id. at pp. 99-100.

39 Id. at 101-103.

40 335 Phil. 664 (1997).

41 Rollo, p. 95.

42 Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 321 Phil. 105, 126 (1995),
citing Serrano v. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA 107 (1991).

43 Rollo, p. 82.
44 Supra note 40.

45The petitioning spouse and co-respondent in the case being Roridel O. Molina.
Id.

46 Rollo, p. 78.

47There were two cases since 1997 wherein the Court did let stand a lower court
order declaring as a nullity a marriage on the basis of Article 36. These cases are
Sy v. Court of Appeals, 386 Phil. 760 (2000), and Buenaventura v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. Nos. 127358 & 127449, 31 March 2005, 454 SCRA 261. However, in
Sy, the Court found that the marriage was void ab initio due to the lack of a
marriage license at the time the marriage was solemnized, and thus declined to
pass upon the question of psychological incapacity. In Buenaventura, since the
parties chose not to challenge the trial court’s conclusion of psychological
incapacity and instead raised questions on the award of damages and support,
the Court did not review the finding of psychological incapacity.

48 334 Phil. 294 (1997).

49It does not escape this Court’s attention that many lower courts do grant
petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36, and that these decisions are
not elevated for review to the Supreme Court.

50 See Family Code, Art. 36.

51 Translated from the original Spanish by Justice F.C. Fisher. See F.C. Fisher, The
Civil Code of Spain with Philippine Notes and References 45 (Fifth Ed., 1947).
The original text of Article 83 (2) of the Spanish Civil Code reads: "No pueden
contraer matrimonio: x x x (2) Los que no estuvieren en el pleno ejercicio du su razon al
tiempo de contraer matrimonio."

52 See Spanish Civil Code. (1889) Art. 101.

53 Act No. 2710 (1917).

54 See Act No. 3613 (1929), Sec. 30 (c)

55 See Executive Order No. 141 (1943), Sec. 2 (5).

Unless the party of unsound mind, after coming to reason, freely cohabited
56

with the other as husband or wife. See Civil Code, Art. 85 (3).

57 See Civil Code, Art. 80.

58Subject to the same qualifications under Article 85 (3) of the Civil Code. See
note 56.

59 See Civil Code, Art. 1327 (2) in relation to Art. 1318 (1).

60See Santos v. Court of Appeals, 310 Phil. 21, 32-33 (1995). See also A. Sempio
Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines 37 (1988). A contrary view
though was expressed by Justice Ricardo Puno, also a member of the Family
Code commission. See Santos v. Court of Appeals, ibid.

61I A. Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines: Commentaries and Jurisprudence

274-275 (1990 ed.).

62 Id.

63 Id. at 274.

64 Supra note 60.

65Id. at 40, emphasis supplied. The Court further added, "[t]here is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
‘psychological incapacity’ to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to marriage." Id.

66Supra note 40.

67 Id. at 677.

68 Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840, 851 (2000).

69It may be noted that a previous incarnation of Article 36, subsequently rejected
by the Family Code Commission, stated that among those void ab initio
marriages are those "contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the
essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made
manifest after the celebration." See Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 60, at 30.

70Salita v. Magtolis, G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994, 233 SCRA 100, 107-108; citing
A. Sempio-Diy, supra note 60, at 37, emphasis supplied. See also Santos v. Court
of Appeals, supra note 60, at 36; Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra note 40, at
677.
71 G.R. No. 109975, 9 February 2001, 351 SCRA 425.

72Id. at 431; citing Republic v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 198, 214 (1997),
Padilla, J., Separate Statement.

73 See Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 60, at 32-39.

74 See Sempio-Diy, supra note 60, at 36.

75 Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra note 40, at 678.

76Thus, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, supra note 48, wherein the
psychological incapacity of the petitioner was recognized by the Court from the
fact that he did not engage in sexual relations with his wife during their ten (10)
month marital cohabitation, remains a binding precedent, even though it was
decided shortly before the Molina case.

77 Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra note 40, at 676-680.

78 Id. at 680.

79See Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco, G.R. No. 158896, 27 October 2004, 441

SCRA 422, 435.

80 Rollo, p. 82.

81 Records, pp. 2-3.

University of Santo Tomas Hospital and UERM Memorial Medical Center. Dr.
82

Abcede likewise was the past president of the Philippine Psychiatrist

Association. TSN, February 23, 1994, p. 6.

83 TSN, 23 February 1994, pp. 7-9, 11-12.

84 TSN, 23 March 1995, p. 12.

85397 Phil. 840 (2000).

86 Id. at 850.

87 Rollo, pp. 95-96.

As shown by the Motion(s) for Early Resolution of the Case filed by petitioner
88

with the canonical declarations attached as annexes.

89 Id. at 97-98.

90The Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila based the decree of

invalidity on the ground of lack of due discretion on the part of both parties. On
appeal, however, the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal modified the
judgment by holding that lack of due discretion applied to respondent but there
was no sufficient evidence to prove lack of due discretion on the part of
petitioner. See also note 38.

91 Rollo, pp. 99-100.

92 Id. at 101-103.

93"A restrictive clause is herewith attached to this sentence of nullity to the effect
that the respondent may not enter into another marriage without the express
consent of this Tribunal, in deference to the sanctity and dignity of the sacrament
of matrimony, as well as for the protection of the intended spouse."; rollo, p. 97.

94 Rollo, p. 99. Emphasis supplied, citations omitted.

95 Rollo, p. 82.

96 Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 60, at 30-36.

97 Id. at 37-39.

98 Id. at 39-40.

99 Id. at 33.

100 Id. at 39.

101"It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and
most importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee
itself, that the use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the
Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as,
likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence,
immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's "Void and
Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law,"
quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the
American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for Marriage
Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed
independently of but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our
law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article
68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe
love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt
that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological
incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other
hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This
conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers
children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage
to be "legitimate."

"The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like

the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely
renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family
Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality
should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for
legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of
the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these
various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and
severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.

"Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established,

every circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and
other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully
examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity
is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists,
psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines
might be helpful or even desirable." Santos v. Court of Appeals, id. at 39-
41.

102 G.R. No. 136921, 17 April 2001, 356 SCRA 588.

103 Id. at 593.

G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997

CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.

TORRES, JR., J.:

Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its journey
over troubled waters. Laws are seemingly inadequate. Over time, much reliance has
been placed in the works of the unseen hand of Him who created all things.

Who is to blame when a marriage fails?

This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her uncaring husband
in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of
the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner appealed the
decision of the trial court to respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758)
which affirmed the Trial Court's decision November 29, 1994 and correspondingly
denied the motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated February 14, 1995.

The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and reproduced by the
Court of Appeals1 its decision are as follows:

From the evidence adduced, the following acts were preponderantly established:

Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila
Cathedral, . . . Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage Contract. (Exh.
"A")

After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa,
Makati, they went and proceeded to the house of defendant's mother.

There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of
their married life.

It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as

newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making love, or having sexual
intercourse, with each other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on one side
thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep . There was no sexual intercourse
between them during the first night. The same thing happened on the second,
third and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy
together during their first week as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City.
But, they did so together with her mother, an uncle, his mother and his nephew.
They were all invited by the defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City
for four (4) days. But, during this period, there was no sexual intercourse
between them, since the defendant avoided her by taking a long walk during
siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room. They
slept together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until
March 15, 1989. But during this period, there was no attempt of sexual
intercourse between them. [S]he claims, that she did not: even see her husband's
private parts nor did he see hers.

Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr.

Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at the Chinese General Hospital, on January 20,
1989.

The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and
still a virgin, while that of her husband's examination was kept confidential up to
this time. While no medicine was prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed
medications for her husband which was also kept confidential. No treatment was
given to her. For her husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but he never
did.

The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he

did not show his penis. She said, that she had observed the defendant using an
eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. And that,
according to her, the defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or
maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the
appearance of a normal man.

The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.

On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage shall be
annulled by reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.

But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for several
reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her very much; (2) that he has no defect on his part
and he is physically and psychologically capable; and, (3) since the relationship is
still very young and if there is any differences between the two of them, it can
still be reconciled and that, according to him, if either one of them has some
incapabilities, there is no certainty that this will not be cured. He further claims,
that if there is any defect, it can be cured by the intervention of medical
technology or science.
 The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their
separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between them. But, the
reason for this, according to the defendant, was that everytime he wants to have
sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he
caresses her private parts, she always removed his hands. The defendant claims,
that he forced his wife to have sex with him only once but he did not continue
because she was shaking and she did not like it. So he stopped.

There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the plaintiff filed this
case against him, and these are: (1) that she is afraid that she will be forced to
return the pieces of jewelry of his mother, and, (2) that her husband, the
defendant, will consummate their marriage.

The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they are still
very young and there is still a chance to overcome their differences.

The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was

examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of finding out whether he is
impotent . As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza submitted his Doctor's Medical Report.
(Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that there is no evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"),
and he is capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")

The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out whether
or not he has an erection and he found out that from the original size of two (2)
inches, or five (5) centimeters, the penis of the defendant lengthened by one (1)
inch and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the defendant had only a soft
erection which is why his penis is not in its full length. But, still is capable of
further erection, in that with his soft erection, the defendant is capable of having
sexual intercourse with a woman.

In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion between
the parties and that the evidence is not fabricated."2

After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the marriage

entered into by the plaintiff with the defendant on May 22, 1988 at the Manila
Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate Conception, Intramuros, Manila, before the
Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera. Without costs. Let a copy of this decision be
furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City. Let another copy be
furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.

SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.

Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:

in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual
intercourse between the parties without making any findings of fact.

II

in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with
petitioner is a psychological incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is totally
absent.

III

in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private
respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of
both.

IV

in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed by the
lower court without fully satisfying itself that there was no collusion between
them.

We find the petition to be bereft of merit.

Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141, private
respondent has the burden of proving the allegations in her complaint; that since there
was no independent evidence to prove the alleged non-coitus between the parties, there
remains no other basis for the court's conclusion except the admission of petitioner; that
public policy should aid acts intended to validate marriage and should retard acts
intended to invalidate them; that the conclusion drawn by the trial court on the
admissions and confessions of the parties in their pleadings and in the course of the trial
is misplaced since it could have been a product of collusion; and that in actions for
annulment of marriage, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be
proved.3

Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:

 Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. — Where an answer fails to tender an
issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's
pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such
pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation the
material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.

The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said provision
seeks to prevent is annulment of marriage without trial. The assailed decision was not
based on such a judgment on the pleadings. When private respondent testified under
oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by oath before the trial court and
was cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in form of a
testimony. After such evidence was presented, it be came incumbent upon petitioner to
present his side. He admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their
separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual intercourse between them.

To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the petitioner,
the Civil Code provides that no judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated
upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and 101[par. 2]) and
the Rules of Court prohibit such annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).

The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage to be
annulled. This only shows that there is no collusion between the parties. When
petitioner admitted that he and his wife (private respondent) have never had sexual
contact with each other, he must have been only telling the truth. We are reproducing
the relevant portion of the challenged resolution denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration, penned with magisterial lucidity by Associate Justice Minerva
Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:

The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not based on
a stipulation of facts. The issue of whether or not the appellant is psychologically
incapacitated to discharge a basic marital obligation was resolved upon a review
of both the documentary and testimonial evidence on record. Appellant admitted
that he did not have sexual relations with his wife after almost ten months of
cohabitation, and it appears that he is not suffering from any physical disability.
Such abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is
strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of this
Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage' within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family
Code (See Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995).4

Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged
refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each other
constitutes psychological incapacity of both. He points out as error the failure of the
trial court to make "a categorical finding about the alleged psychological incapacity and
an in-depth analysis of the reasons for such refusal which may not be necessarily due to
physchological disorders" because there might have been other reasons, — i.e., physical
disorders, such as aches, pains or other discomforts, — why private respondent would
not want to have sexual intercourse from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a short
span of 10 months.

First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a
finding on who between petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual
contact with the other. The fact remains, however, that there has never been coitus
between them. At any rate, since the action to declare the marriage void may be filed by
either party, i.e., even the psychologically incapacitated, the question of who refuses to
have sex with the other becomes immaterial.

Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show that any of
the parties is suffering from phychological incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he
wanted to have sex with private respondent; that the reason for private respondent's
refusal may not be psychological but physical disorder as stated above.

We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed with private
respondent or asked her what is ailing her, and why she balks and avoids him
everytime he wanted to have sexual intercourse with her. He never did. At least, there
is nothing in the record to show that he had tried to find out or discover what the
problem with his wife could be. What he presented in evidence is his doctor's Medical
Report that there is no evidence of his impotency and he is capable of erection.5 Since it
is petitioner's claim that the reason is not psychological but perhaps physical disorder
on the part of private respondent, it became incumbent upon him to prove such a claim.

If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her
essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic
marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to
stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological
incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse
with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.6

Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To
procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through
sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this
obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at
bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital
obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

As aptly stated by the respondent court,

 An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea that the
wife did not want carnal intercourse with him does not inspire belief. Since he
was not physically impotent, but he refrained from sexual intercourse during the
entire time (from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989) that he occupied the same bed
with his wife, purely out of symphaty for her feelings, he deserves to be doubted
for not having asserted his right seven though she balked (Tompkins vs.
Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras, Civil Code, at p. 330). Besides, if it were
true that it is the wife was suffering from incapacity, the fact that defendant did
not go to court and seek the declaration of nullity weakens his claim. This case
was instituted by the wife whose normal expectations of her marriage were
frustrated by her husband's inadequacy. Considering the innate modesty of the
Filipino woman, it is hard to believe that she would expose her private life to
public scrutiny and fabricate testimony against her husband if it were not
necessary to put her life in order and put to rest her marital status.

We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence proved is the
unwillingness or lack of intention to perform the sexual act, which is not
phychological incapacity, and which can be achieved "through proper
motivation." After almost ten months of cohabitation, the admission that the
husband is reluctant or unwilling to perform the sexual act with his wife whom
he professes to love very dearly, and who has not posed any insurmountable
resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative of a hopeless situation, and of a
serious personality disorder that constitutes psychological incapacity to
discharge the basic marital covenants within the contemplation of the Family
Code.7

While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is
actually the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any
legal mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless
unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a
partner in marriage is to say "I could not have cared less." This is so because an ungiven
self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is
sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift
and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of
procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.

It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent.
That is — a shared feeling which between husband and wife must be experienced not
only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion.
Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in each other's feelings at a
time it is needed by the other can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship.
Marriage is definitely not for children but for two consenting adults who view the
relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a continuing
commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.

This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found
themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital
obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate
court.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of the Court of

Appeals dated November 29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition
is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Thirteenth Division: Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, J., ponente, Eduardo G.

Montenegro and Antonio P. Solano, JJ., concurring.

2 Rollo, pp. 20-24.

3 Ibid.

4 Rollo, p. 34.

5 Exhs. "2", "2-B" and "2-C".

6 Psychological Incapacity, G.T. Veloso, p. 20, cited in The Family Code of

the Philippines Annotated, Pineda, 1989 ed., p. 51.

7 Decision, pp. 11-12; Rollo, pp. 30-31.

G.R. No. 126010 December 8, 1999

LUCITA ESTRELLA HERNANDEZ, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MARIO C. HERNANDEZ, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals, dated
January 30, 1996, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18,
Tagaytay City, dated April 10, 1993, which dismissed the petition for annulment of
marriage filed by petitioner.

Petitioner Lucita Estrella Hernandez and private respondent Mario C. Hernandez were
married at the Silang Catholic Parish Church in Silang, Cavite on January 1, 1981 (Exh.
A). 2 Three children were born to them, namely, Maie, who was born on May 3, 1982
(Exh. B), 3 Lyra, born on May 22, 1985
(Exh. C), 4 and Marian, born on June 15, 1989 (Exh. D). 5

On July 10, 1992, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay
City, a petition seeking the annulment of her marriage to private respondent on the
ground of psychological incapacity of the latter. She alleged that from the time of their
marriage up to the time of the filing of the suit, private respondent failed to perform his
obligation to support the family and contribute to the management of the household,
devoting most of his time engaging in drinking sprees with his friends. She further
claimed that private respondent, after they were married, cohabited with another
woman with whom he had an illegitimate child, while having affairs with different
women, and that, because of his promiscuity, private respondent endangered her health
by infecting her with a sexually transmissible disease (STD). She averred that private
respondent was irresponsible, immature and unprepared for the duties of a married
life. Petitioner prayed that for having abandoned the family, private respondent be
ordered to give support to their three children in the total amount of P9,000.00 every
month; that she be awarded the custody of their children; and that she be adjudged as
the sole owner of a parcel of land located at Don Gregorio Subdivision I in Bo. Bucal,
Dasmariñas, Cavite, purchased during the marriage, as well as the jeep which private
respondent took with him when he left the conjugal home on June 12, 1992. 6

On October 8, 1992, because of private respondent's failure to file his answer, the trial
court issued an order directing the assistant provincial prosecutor to conduct an
investigation to determine if there was collusion between the
parties. 7 Only petitioner appeared at the investigation on November 5, 1992.
Nevertheless, the prosecutor found no evidence of collusion and recommended that the
case be set for trial. 8

Based on the evidence presented by the petitioner, the facts are as follows:9

Petitioner and private respondent met in 1977 at the Philippine Christian University in
Dasmariñas, Cavite. Petitioner, who is five years older than private respondent, was
then in her first year of teaching zoology and botany. Private respondent, a college
freshman, was her student for two consecutive semesters. They became sweethearts in
February 1979 when she was no longer private respondent's teacher. On January 1,
1981, they were married.

Private respondent continued his studies for two more years. His parents paid for his
tuition fees, while petitioner provided his allowances and other financial needs. The
family income came from petitioner's salary as a faculty member of the Philippine
Christian University. Petitioner augmented her earnings by selling "Tupperware"
products, as well as engaging in the buy-and-sell of coffee, rice and polvoron.

From 1983 up to 1986, as private respondent could not find a stable job, it was agreed
that he would help petitioner in her businesses by delivering orders to customers.
However, because her husband was a spendthrift and had other women, petitioner's
business suffered. Private respondent often had smoking and drinking sprees with his
friends and betted on fighting cocks. In 1982, after the birth of their first child, petitioner
discovered two love letters written by a certain Realita Villena to private respondent.
She knew Villena as a married student whose husband was working in Saudi Arabia.
When petitioner confronted private respondent, he admitted having an extra-marital
affair with Villena. Petitioner then pleaded with Villena to end her relationship with
private respondent. For his part, private respondent said he would end the affairs, but
he did not keep his promise. Instead, he left the conjugal home and abandoned
petitioner and their child. When private respondent came back, however, petitioner
accepted him, despite private respondent's infidelity in the hope of saving their
marriage.

Upon the recommendation of a family friend, private respondent was able to get a job
at Reynolds Philippines, Inc. in San Agustin, Dasmariñas, Cavite in 1986. However,
private respondent was employed only until March 31, 1991, because he availed himself
of the early retirement plan offered by the company. He received P53,000.00 in
retirement pay, but instead of spending the amount for the needs of the family, private
respondent spent the money on himself and consumed the entire amount within four
months of his retirement.

While private respondent worked at Reynolds Philippines, Inc., his smoking, drinking,
gambling and womanizing became worse. Petitioner discovered that private
respondent carried on relationships with different women. He had relations with a
certain Edna who worked at Yazaki; Angie, who was an operator of a billiard hall; Tess,
a "Japayuki"; Myrna Macatangay, a secretary at the Road Master Driver's School in
Bayan, Dasmariñas, Cavite, with whom he cohabited for quite a while; and, Ruth Oliva,
by whom he had a daughter named Margie P. Oliva, born on September 15, 1989 (Exh.
E). 10 When petitioner confronted private respondent about his relationship with Tess,
he beat her up, as a result of which she was confined at the De la Salle University
Medical Center in Dasmariñas, Cavite on July 4-5, 1990 because of cerebral concussion
(Exh. F). 11

According to petitioner, private respondent engaged in extreme promiscuous conduct

during the latter part of 1986. As a result, private respondent contracted gonorrhea and
infected petitioner. They both received treatment at the Zapote Medical Specialists
Center in Zapote, Bacoor, Cavite from October 22, 1986 until March 13, 1987 (Exhs. G &
H). 12

Petitioner averred that on one occasion of a heated argument, private respondent hit
their eldest child who was then barely a year old. Private respondent is not close to any
of their children as he was never affectionate and hardly spent time with them.

On July 17, 1979, petitioner entered into a contract to sell (Exh. J) 13 with F & C Realty
Corporation whereby she agreed to buy from the latter a parcel of land at the Don
Gregorio Heights Subdivision I in Bo. Bucal, Dasmariñas, Cavite and placed a partial
payment of P31,330.00. On May 26, 1987, after full payment of the amount of P51,067.10,
inclusive of interests from monthly installments, a deed of absolute sale(Exh. K) 14 was
executed in her favor and TCT No. T-221529 (Exh. M) 15 was duly issued.

According to petitioner, on August 1, 1992, she sent a handwritten

letter 16 to private respondent expressing her frustration over the fact that her efforts to
save their marriage proved futile. In her letter, petitioner also stated that she was
allowing him to sell their owner-type jeepney 17 and to divide the proceeds of the sale
between the two of them. Petitioner also told private respondent of her intention to fill a
petition for the annulment of their marriage.

It does not appear that private respondent ever replied to petitioner's letter. By this
time, he had already abandoned petitioner and their children. In October 1992,
petitioner learned that private respondent left for the Middle East. Since then, private
respondent's whereabouts had been unknown.

Ester Alfaro, petitioner's childhood friend and co-teacher at the Philippine Christian
University, testified during the hearing on the petition for annulment. She said that
sometime in June 1979, petitioner introduced private respondent to her (Alfaro) as the
former's sweetheart. Alfaro said she was not impressed with private respondent who
was her student in accounting. She observed private respondent to be fun-loving,
spending most of his time with campus friends. In November 1980, when petitioner
asked Alfaro to be one of the secondary sponsors at her forthcoming wedding, Alfaro
wanted to dissuade petitioner from going through with the wedding because she
thought private respondent was not ready for married life as he was then unemployed.
True enough, although the couple appeared happy during the early part of their
marriage, it was not long thereafter that private respondent started drinking with his
friends and going home late at night. Alfaro corroborated petitioner's claim that private
respondent was a habitual drunkard who carried on relationships with different
women and continued hanging out with his friends. She also confirmed that petitioner
was once hospitalized because she was beaten up by private respondent. After the first
year of petitioner's marriage, Alfaro tried to talk to private respondent, but the latter
accused her of meddling with their marital life. Alfaro said that private respondent was
not close to his children and that he had abandoned petitioner. 18

On April 10, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision 19 dismissing the petition for
annulment of marriage filed by petitioner. The pertinent portion of the decision reads:
20

The Court can underscore the fact that the circumstances mentioned by
the petitioner in support of her claim that respondent was
"psychologically incapacitated" to marry her are among the grounds cited
by the law as valid reasons for the grant of legal separation (Article 55 of
the Family Code) — not as grounds for a declaration of nullity of
marriages or annulment thereof. Thus, Article 55 of the same code reads
as follows:

Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of

the following grounds:

(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct

directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of
the petitioner;

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;

xxx xxx xxx

(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;

xxx xxx xxx

 (10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without
justifiable cause for more than one year.

xxx xxx xxx

If indeed Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, which mentions

psychological incapacity as a ground for the declaration of the nullity of a
marriage, has intended to include the above-stated circumstances as
constitutive of such incapacity, then the same would not have been
enumerated as grounds for legal separation.

In the same manner, this Court is not disposed to grant relief in favor of
the petitioner under Article 46, paragraph (3) of the Family Code of the
Philippines, as there is no dispute that the "gonorrhea" transmitted to the
petitioner by respondent occurred sometime in 1986, or five (5) years after
petitioner's marriage with respondent was celebrated in 1981. The
provisions of Article 46, paragraph (3) of the same law should be taken in
conjunction with Article 45, paragraph (3) of the same code, and a careful
reading of the two (2) provisions of the law would require the existence of
this ground (fraud) at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence,
the annulment of petitioner's marriage with the respondent on this
ground, as alleged and proved in the instant case, cannot be legally
accepted by the Court.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on January 30, 1996, rendered its
decision affirming the decision of the trial court. Citing the ruling in Santos v. Court of
Appeals, 21 the Court of Appeals held: 22

It is clear in the above law and jurisprudence that the psychological

incapacity of a spouse, as a ground for declaration of nullify of marriage,
must exist at the time of the celebration of marriage. More so, chronic
sexual infidelity, abandonment, gambling and use of prohibited drugs are
not grounds per se, of psychological incapacity of a spouse.

We agree with the Solicitor General that petitioner-appellant failed to

prove that her respondent-husband was psychologically incapacitated at
the time of the celebration of the marriage. Certainly, petitioner-
appellant's declaration that at the time of their marriage her respondent-
husband's character was on the "borderline between a responsible person
and the happy-go-lucky," could not constitute the psychological
incapacity in contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code. In fact,
petitioner-appellant herself ascribed said attitude to her respondent-
husband's youth and very good looks, who was admittedly several years
 younger than petitioner-appellant who, herself, happened to be the
college professor of her respondent-husband. Petitioner-appellant even
described her respondent-husband not as a problem student but a normal
one (p. 24, tsn, Dec. 8, 1992).

The acts and attitudes complained of by petitioner-appellant happened

after the marriage and there is no proof that the same have already existed
at the time of the celebration of the marriage to constitute the
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the respondent Court of Appeals erred —

I. IN FINDING THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL

INCAPACITY OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO
COMPLY WITH HIS ESSENTIAL MARITAL
OBLIGATIONS DID NOT EXIST FROM THE TIME OF THE
CELEBRATION OF THE MARRIAGE.

II. IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS NOT

PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY
WITH HIS ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS.

III. IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL

COURT DENYING THE AWARD OF PERMANENT
CUSTODY OF THE CHILDREN TO PETITIONER.

IV. IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL

COURT DENYING THE PRAYER FOR ISSUANCE OF AN
ORDER REQUIRING PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO GIVE
SUPPORT TO THE THREE CHILDREN IN THE AMOUNT
OF P3,000,00 PER CHILD.

V. IN NOT DECLARING THE REAL PROPERTY

ACQUIRED BY PETITIONER AS HER EXCLUSIVE
PROPERTY.

The issue in this case is whether or not the marriage of petitioner and private
respondent should be annulled on the ground of private respondent's psychological
incapacity.

Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioner failed to
show that private respondent's psychological incapacity existed at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. She argues that the fact that the acts of incapacity of private
respondent became manifest only after the celebration of their marriage should not be a
bar to the annulment of their marriage.

Art. 36 of the Family Code states:

A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,

was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization. 23

In Santos v. Court of Appeals, 24 we held:

"Psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not

physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe
love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly
any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning
of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality,
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition
must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not
evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have
sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54
of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the
judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."

The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like

the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely
renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family
Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality
should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for
legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of
the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these
various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and
severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.

Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established,

every circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and
other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully
examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity
 is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists,
psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines
might be helpful or even desirable.

In the instant case, other than her self-serving declarations, petitioner failed to establish
the fact that at the time they were married, private respondent was suffering from a
psychological defect which in fact deprived him of the ability to assume the essential
duties of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities. As the Court of Appeals pointed
out, no evidence was presented to show that private respondent was not cognizant of
the basic marital obligations. It was not sufficiently proved that private respondent was
really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a psychological nature,
and not merely physical. Petitioner says that at the outset of their marriage, private
respondent showed lack of drive to work for his family. Private respondent's parents
and petitioner supported him through college. After his schooling, although he
eventually found a job, he availed himself of the early retirement plan offered by his
employer and spent the entire amount he received on himself. For a greater part of their
marital life, private respondent was out of job and did not have the initiative to look for
another. He indulged in vices and engaged in philandering, and later abandoned his
family. Petitioner concludes that private respondent's condition is incurable, causing
the disintegration of their union and defeating the very objectives of marriage.

However, private respondent's alleged habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or

perversion, and abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds for finding that
he is suffering from psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family
Code. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality
which make private respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations
of the marital state, and not merely due to private respondent's youth and self-
conscious feeling of being handsome, as the appellate court held. As pointed out in
Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals: 25

The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need given here so as not
to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis (citing Salaita v. Magtolis, supra) nevertheless such root cause must
be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
 explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.

Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise cause
of private respondent's psychological incapacity, if any, in order to show that it existed
at the inception of the marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
rests upon rests petitioner. The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to
protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and
marriage as the foundation of the
family. 26 Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.
27

We, therefore, find no reason to reverse the ruling of respondent Court of Appeals
whose conclusions, affirming the trial court's finding with regard to the non-existence
of private respondent's psychological incapacity at the time of the marriage, are entitled
to great weight and even finality. 28 Only where it is shown that such findings are
whimsical, capricious, and arbitrary can these be overturned.

The conclusion we have reached makes it unnecessary for us to pass upon petitioner's
contentions on the issue of permanent custody of children, the amount for their
respective support, and the declaration of exclusive ownership of petitioner over the
real property. These matters may more appropriately be litigated in a separate
proceeding for legal separation, dissolution of property regime, and/or custody of
children which petitioner may bring.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeal is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Per Justice Lourdes K. Tayao-Jaguros and concurred in by Justices Jorge S.

Imperial (Chairman) and B.A. Adelfuin-De la Cruz.

2 RTC Records, p. 7.

3 Id., p. 8.

4 Id., p. 9.

5 Id., p. 10.
6 Petition, RTC Records, pp. 1-4.

7 RTC Records, p. 24.

8 Id., p. 25.

9 TSN, pp. 6-56, Nov. 13, 1992; pp. 3-31, Dec. 8, 1992.

10 RTC Records, p. 37.

11 Id., p. 38.

12 Id., pp. 39-40a.

13 Id., pp. 41-43.

14 Id., pp. 44-45.

15 Id., p. 47.

16 Id., pp. 49-51.

17 Id., p. 48.

18 TSN, pp. 32-68, Dec. 8, 1992.

19 Per Acting Presiding Judge Eleuterio F. Guerrero.

20 RTC Records, pp. 58-59.

21 310 Phil. 22 (1995).

22 Rollo, pp. 44-46.

23 As amended by E.O. No. 227 dated July 17, 1987.

24 Supra, at 40-41.

25 335 Phil. 664, 676-680 (1997).

26 See Art. II, §12; Art. XV, §§1-2.

27 Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, supra.

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to
those enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail the validity of a marriage, namely,
"psychological incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity, our courts have been
swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void based on this ground.
Although this Court had interpreted the meaning of psychological incapacity in the
recent case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find
difficulty in applying said novel provision in specific cases. In the present case and
in the context of the herein assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor
General has labelled — exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive of his
frustration — Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." Hence,
this Court in addition to resolving the present case, finds the need to lay down
specific guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family
Code.

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January
25, 1993 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in
toto the May 14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad,3 Benguet,
which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo
Molina void ab initio, on the ground of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the
Family Code.

The Facts

This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O.
Molina of a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo
Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on
April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was
born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and
irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with
his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his
parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their
finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that sometime in February 1986,
Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole
breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel,
as a result of which their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel
resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a
few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned
them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of
complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually
quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it
would be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in
order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.

In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could
no longer live together as husband and wife, but contended that their
misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of
insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's
refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's
failure to run the household and handle their finances.

During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:

1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the
Church of St. Augustine, Manila;

2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano

Molina was born on July 29, 1986;

3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;

4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;

5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;

6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner
wife.

Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her
friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a
social worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General
Hospital and Medical Center. She also submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to
"E-1." Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial
conference.

On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The
appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the
RTC's decision. Hence, the present recourse.
 The Issue

In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an
erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as
provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof
to the facts of the case," adding that the appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect
the most liberal divorce procedure in the world which is anathema to our culture."

In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied5 heavily on the
trial court's findings "that the marriage between the parties broke up because of their
opposing and conflicting personalities." Then, it added it sown opinion that "the Civil
Code Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize
the application of our civil laws on personal and family rights. . . ." It concluded that:

As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically

incapacity as a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part
of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or
her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her
conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of
marriage. If said conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to
cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of
marriage, then there is enough reason to leave the spouses to their
individual fates.

In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in
analyzing and deciding the instant case, as it did, hence, We find no
cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions thus made.

Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.

The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is
not equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply
the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect
in their psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital
responsibilities and duties."

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug,
ruled that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical)
incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the
time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of
the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila,7 Justice
Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."

On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the
psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a
"difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital
obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities"
in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties
failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that
they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor
physical) illness.

The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could
nor get along with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem;
neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison
showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological
incapacity. Dr. Sison testified:8

COURT

Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist

based on your findings that it is better for the Court to annul
(sic) the marriage?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q There is no hope for the marriage?

A There is no hope, the man is also living with another

woman.

Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are

psychologically unfit for each other but they are
psychologically fit with other parties?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their

professions?
 A Yes, Your Honor.

The Court has no more questions.

In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were
constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration.
While some effort was made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial
impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being
"conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of expectation
is nor indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's
temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.

During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of
this case vis-a-vis existing law and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the
Family Code and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts interpreting and
applying it, the Court decided to invite two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend
Oscar V. Cruz,9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a
member of the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this occasion to thank
these friends of the Court for their informative and interesting discussions during the
oral argument on December 3, 1996, which they followed up with written memoranda.

From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in
the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed
down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution
and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the
foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting
it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
"protected" by the state.

The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes the permanence, inviolability and solidarity

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological — not physical. although its manifestations and/or symptoms
may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them,
was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known
the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as
not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, 13
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist
and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or

incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily
to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root
causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure
that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying
with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of

the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the

Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code
Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became
effective in 1983 and which provides:
 The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are
unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of
psychological nature. 14

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our
civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decision of such appellate
tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — what is decreed as canonically
invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family
Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive
effect. Here, the State and the Church — while remaining independent, separate and
apart from each other — shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal
of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the
nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General
to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly staring
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court
such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted
for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function
of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the
petition. Such ruling becomes even more cogent with the use of the foregoing
guidelines.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains
valid.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, Jr.,
JJ., concur.

Regalado, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concurs in the result.

 Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., concuring opinion:

I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr. Justice Panganiban but only because
of the peculiar facts of the case. As to whether or not the psychological incapacity exists
in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any
field of the law, on the facts of the case. In Leouel Santos v. Court of Appeals and Julia
Rosario-Bedia Santos, G.R. No. 112019, 4 January 1995, 240 SCRA 20-36, I maintained, and
I still maintain, that there was psychological incapacity on the part of the wife to
discharge the duties of a wife in a valid marriage. The facts of the present case, after an
indepth study, do not support a similar conclusion. Obviously, each case must be
judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but
according to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for
annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case.
The trial judge must take pains in examining the actual millieu and the appellate court
must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial
court.

ROMERO, J., separate opinion:

The majority opinion, overturning that of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
Regional Trial Court ruling. upheld petitioner Solicitor General's position that
"opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity,
for the latter "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their
responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their Psychological nature which renders them
incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties.

In the present case, the alleged personality traits of Reynaldo, the husband, did not
constitute so much "psychological incapacity" as a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal"
or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. "It is not enough to prove
that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is
essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological
(not physical) illness."

I would add that neither should the incapacity be the result of mental illness. For if it
were due to insanity or defects in the mental faculties short of insanity, there is a
resultant defect of vice of consent, thus rendering the marriage annulable under Art. 45
of the Family Code.
That the intent of the members of the U.P. Law Center's Civil Code Revision Committee
was to exclude mental inability to understand the essential nature of marriage and focus
strictly on psychological incapacity is demonstrated in the way the provision in
question underwent revisions.

At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:

(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or
mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even
if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.

The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the following
revised provision even before the session was over:

(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital
obligations, even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest after the
celebration.

Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any reference to
"wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature
or marriage" and to "mentally incapacitated." It was explained that these phrases refer
to "defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of
appreciation of one's marital obligation." There being a defect in consent, "it is clear that
it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent
and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and
there are sanity is curable. . . . Psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties
and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to
marriage."1

My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological incapacity
is, in a sense, insanity of a lesser degree.

As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological or mental

impotence," Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in he earlier February 9, 1984 session that
this term "is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that
is why it is considered a weak phrase." He said that the Code of Canon Law would
rather express it as "psychological or mental incapacity to discharge. . . ." Justice Ricardo
C. Puno opined that sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but
not with another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation and
application of Art. 36 is: "Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the
same sex."

The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the
phrase" and is incurable" but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would give
rise to the question of how they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed
that it would be more problematic. Yet the possibility that one may be cured after the
psychological incapacity becomes manifest after the marriage was not ruled out by
Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy
was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.

For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages, viz:

1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage

as contract;

2. reasons of public policy;

3. special cases and special situations.

The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under "special cases and
special situations," hence its special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as
finally enacted.

Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or
annulling marriages that even comes close to being psychological in nature.

Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the marriage, such
marriage which stands valid until annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.

On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites, some
marriages are void from the beginning.

With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on Marriage,
the drafters, now open to fresh winds of change in keeping with the more permissive
mores and practices of the time, took a leaf from the relatively liberal provisions of
Canon Law.

Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of
contracting marriage: "3. (those) who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are
unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage" provided the model for what is
now Art. 36 of the Family Code: "A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time
of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.

It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types of
marriages with respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes
an intermediate state, the voidable or annullable marriages. When the Ecclesiastical
Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it actually declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it
never really existed in the first place, for a valid sacramental marriage can never be
dissolved. Hence, a properly performed and consummated marriage between two
living Roman Catholics can only be nullified by the formal annulment process which
entails a full tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a formal hearing.

Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law as severing the
marriage ties as to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The
grounds for nullifying civil marriage, not being congruent with those laid down by
Canon Law, the former being more strict, quite a number of married couples have
found themselves in limbo — freed from the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic
Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil marriage under state laws. Heedless of
civil law sanctions, some persons contract new marriages or enter into live-in
relationships.

It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations that the
Civil Law Revision Committee decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of
psychological incapacity into the Family Code — and classified the same as a ground
for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally in existent from the beginning.

A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it did not
provide directly for psychological incapacity, in effect recognized the same indirectly
from a combination of three old canons: "Canon #1081 required persons to 'be capable
according to law' in order to give valid consent; Canon #1082 required that persons 'be
at least not ignorant' of the major elements required in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the
force and fear category) required that internal and external freedom be present in order
for consent to be valid. This line of interpretation produced two distinct but related
grounds for annulment, called 'lack of due discretion' and 'lack of due competence.' Lack of
due discretion means that the person did not have the ability to give valid consent at the time
of the wedding and therefore the union is invalid. Lack of due competence means that the
person was incapable of carrying out the obligations of the promise he or she made during the
wedding ceremony.

"Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s involving
sexual disorders such as homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader
approach to the kind of proof necessary for psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had
reasoned for the first time in several cases that the capacity to give valid consent at the
time of marriage was probably not present in persons who had displayed such
problems shortly after the marriage. The nature of this change was nothing short of
revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious willingness to use this
kind of hindsight, the way was paved for what came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals began
to accept proof of serious psychological problems that manifested themselves shortly after the
ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid consent at the time of the ceremony.

Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert

became increasingly important in such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and
after the ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked to give professional
opinions about a party's mental at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely
challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.

The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to
the addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the
Church to the advances made in psychology during the past decades. There was now the
expertise to provide the all-important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and
premarital causes.

During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal
contract to that of a covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in
annulment cases that a person who could intellectually understand the concept of marriage
could necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real
obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite to
valid matrimonial consent.2

Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity,

"not only to sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a
spouse or both spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential obligations of
marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each
others' body for heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality, the right to the community of the
whole of life, i.e., the right to a developing. lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have
refined the meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for marriage as presupposing the
development of an adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give
themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct person; that the spouses must be
'other oriented' since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and that the
spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal relationship because marriage is more than
just a physical reality but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of
the obligations of marriage depends. according to Church decisions, on the strength of this
interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is
held to impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential
marital obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in
reference to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse.3

Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature
marital relationship:

The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital

commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful commitment to the marriage
partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional
maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the
ordinary stresses and strains of marriage, etc.

Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions

that might lead to the failure of a marriage:

At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal

communion even with the best intentions of the parties. Among the
psychic factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability to fulfill marital
obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with its
fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2)
hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom of sexual choice;
(3) the inadequate personality where personal responses consistently
fallshort of reasonable expectations.

xxx xxx xxx

The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts
whether he or she has a case for an annulment on any other terms. A
situation that does not fit into any of the more traditional categories often
fits very easily into the psychological category.

As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a

shift in their use. Whereas originally the emphasis was on the parties'
inability to exercise proper judgment at the time of the marriage (lack of
due discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties' to
assume or carry out their responsibilities an obligations as promised (lack of due
competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of due
competence is that the at the time the marriage was entered into civil
divorce and breakup of the family almost is of someone's failure out marital
responsibilities as promised at the time the marriage was entered into.4

In the instant case, "opposing and conflicting personalities" of the spouses were not
considered equivalent to psychological incapacity. As well in Santos v. Court of Appeals
cited in the ponencia, the Court held that the failure of the wife to return home from the
U.S. or to communicate with her husband for more then five years is not proof of her
psychological incapacity as to render the marriage a nullity.5 Therefore, Art. 36 is
inapplicable and the marriages remain valid and subsisting.

However in the recent case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,6 this Court upheld both
the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals in declaring the presence of
psychological incapacity on the part of the husband. Said petitioner husband, after ten
(10) months' sleeping with his wife never had coitus with her, a fact he did not deny but
he alleged that it was due to the physical disorder of his wife which, however, he failed
to prove. Goaded by the indifference and stubborn refusal of her husband to fulfill a
basic marital obligation described as "to procreate children based on the universal
principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of
marriage," the wife brought the action in the lower court to declare the marriage null.

The Court, quoting Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan
Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch I) on Psychological
incapacity concluded:

If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his

or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and
constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological
incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is
equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a
spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a
sign of psychological incapacity.

We declared:

This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found
themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital
obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate
court.

1 concur with the majority opinion that the herein marriage remains valid and
subsisting absent psychological incapacity (under Art. 36 of the Family Code) on the
part of either or both of the spouses.

VITUG, J., concurring:

I fully concur with my esteemed 'colleague Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in his
ponencia, and I find to be most helpful the guidelines that he prepared for the bench and
the bar in the proper appreciation of Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209 ("The Family
Code of the Philippines"). The term "psychological incapacity" was neither defined nor
exemplified by the Family Code. Thus —

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

The Revision Committee, constituted under the auspices of the U.P. Law Center,
which drafted the Code explained:

(T)he Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-
to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law.1

Article 36 of the Family Code was concededly taken from Canon 1095 of the New Code
of Canon Law —

Canon 1095. (The following persons) are incapable of contracting

marriage; (those) —

1. who lack sufficient use of reason;

2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning

essential matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and accepted
mutually;

3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the

essential obligations of marriage —

that should give that much value to Canon Law jurisprudence as an aid to the
interpretation and construction of the statutory enactment.2

The principles in the proper application of the law teach us that the several provisions
of a Code must be read like a congruent whole. Thus, in determining the import of
"psychological incapacity" under Article 36, one must also read it along with, albeit to be
taken as distinct from, the other grounds enumerated in the Code, like Articles 35, 37, 38
and 41 that would likewise, but for distinct reasons, render the marriage merely
voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal separation. Care must be
observed so that these various circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if
the law were indifferent on the matter.
I would wish to reiterate the Court's' statement in Santos vs. Court of Appeals;3 viz:

(T)he use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the

Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of
psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities,
extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances. . . Article
36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of,
but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on
marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render
help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the
law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with
the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code
which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of
nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."

The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like

the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely
renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family
Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality
should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for
legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of
the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these
various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and
severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological
incapacity.4

In fine, the term "psychological incapacity," to be a ground for then nullity of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code, must be able to pass the following tests; viz:

First, the incapacity must be psychological or mental, not physical, in nature;

Second, the psychological incapacity must relate to the inability, not mere refusal, to
understand, assume end discharge the basic marital obligations of living together,
observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering mutual help and support;
Third, the psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is contracted
although its overt manifestations and the marriage may occur only thereafter; and

Fourth, the mental disorder must be grave or serious and incurable.

It may well be that the Family Code Revision Committee has envisioned Article 36, as
not a few observers would suspect, as another form of absolute divorce or, as still others
would also put it, to be a alternative to divorce; however, the fact still remains that the
language of the law has failed to carry out, even if true, any such intendment. It might
have indeed turned out for the better, if it were otherwise, there could be good reasons
to doubt the constitutionality of the measure. The fundamental law itself, no less, has
laid down in terse language its unequivocal command on how the State should regard
marriage and the family, thus —

Section 2, Article XV:

Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the

family and shall be protected by the State.

Section 12, Article II:

Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect
and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution . . . .

Section 1, Article XV:

Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the
nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote
its total development. (The 1987 Constitution)

The case of Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, might here be significant not so much for
the specific issue there resolved but for the tone it has set. The Court there has held that
constitutional provisions are to be considered mandatory unless by necessary
implication, a different intention is manifest such that to have them enforced strictly
would cause more harm than by disregarding them. It is quite clear to me that the
constitutional mandate on marriage and the family has not been meant to be simply
directory in character, nor for mere expediency or convenience, but one that demands a
meaningful, not half-hearted, respect.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., concuring opinion:

I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr. Justice Panganiban but only because
of the peculiar facts of the case. As to whether or not the psychological incapacity exists
in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any
field of the law, on the facts of the case. In Leouel Santos v. Court of Appeals and Julia
Rosario-Bedia Santos, G.R. No. 112019, 4 January 1995, 240 SCRA 20-36, I maintained, and
I still maintain, that there was psychological incapacity on the part of the wife to
discharge the duties of a wife in a valid marriage. The facts of the present case, after an
indepth study, do not support a similar conclusion. Obviously, each case must be
judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but
according to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for
annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case.
The trial judge must take pains in examining the actual millieu and the appellate court
must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial
court.

ROMERO, J., separate opinion:

The majority opinion, overturning that of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
Regional Trial Court ruling. upheld petitioner Solicitor General's position that
"opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity,
for the latter "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their
responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their Psychological nature which renders them
incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties.

In the present case, the alleged personality traits of Reynaldo, the husband, did not
constitute so much "psychological incapacity" as a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal"
or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. "It is not enough to prove
that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is
essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological
(not physical) illness."

I would add that neither should the incapacity be the result of mental illness. For if it
were due to insanity or defects in the mental faculties short of insanity, there is a
resultant defect of vice of consent, thus rendering the marriage annulable under Art. 45
of the Family Code.

That the intent of the members of the U.P. Law Center's Civil Code Revision Committee
was to exclude mental inability to understand the essential nature of marriage and focus
strictly on psychological incapacity is demonstrated in the way the provision in
question underwent revisions.

At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:
 (7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or
mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even
if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.

The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the following
revised provision even before the session was over:

(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital
obligations, even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest after the
celebration.

Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any reference to
"wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature
or marriage" and to "mentally incapacitated." It was explained that these phrases refer
to "defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of
appreciation of one's marital obligation." There being a defect in consent, "it is clear that
it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent
and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and
there are sanity is curable. . . . Psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties
and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to
marriage."1

My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological incapacity
is, in a sense, insanity of a lesser degree.

As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological or mental

impotence," Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in he earlier February 9, 1984 session that
this term "is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that
is why it is considered a weak phrase." He said that the Code of Canon Law would
rather express it as "psychological or mental incapacity to discharge. . . ." Justice Ricardo
C. Puno opined that sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but
not with another.

One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation and
application of Art. 36 is: "Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the
same sex."
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the
phrase" and is incurable" but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would give
rise to the question of how they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed
that it would be more problematic. Yet the possibility that one may be cured after the
psychological incapacity becomes manifest after the marriage was not ruled out by
Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy
was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.

For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages, viz:

1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage

as contract;

2. reasons of public policy;

3. special cases and special situations.

The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under "special cases and
special situations," hence its special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as
finally enacted.

Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or
annulling marriages that even comes close to being psychological in nature.

Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the marriage, such
marriage which stands valid until annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.

On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites, some
marriages are void from the beginning.

With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on Marriage,
the drafters, now open to fresh winds of change in keeping with the more permissive
mores and practices of the time, took a leaf from the relatively liberal provisions of
Canon Law.

Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of
contracting marriage: "3. (those) who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are
unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage" provided the model for what is
now Art. 36 of the Family Code: "A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time
of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types of
marriages with respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes
an intermediate state, the voidable or annullable marriages. When the Ecclesiastical
Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it actually declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it
never really existed in the first place, for a valid sacramental marriage can never be
dissolved. Hence, a properly performed and consummated marriage between two
living Roman Catholics can only be nullified by the formal annulment process which
entails a full tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a formal hearing.

Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law as severing the
marriage ties as to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The
grounds for nullifying civil marriage, not being congruent with those laid down by
Canon Law, the former being more strict, quite a number of married couples have
found themselves in limbo — freed from the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic
Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil marriage under state laws. Heedless of
civil law sanctions, some persons contract new marriages or enter into live-in
relationships.

It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations that the
Civil Law Revision Committee decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of
psychological incapacity into the Family Code — and classified the same as a ground
for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally in existent from the beginning.

A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it did not
provide directly for psychological incapacity, in effect recognized the same indirectly
from a combination of three old canons: "Canon #1081 required persons to 'be capable
according to law' in order to give valid consent; Canon #1082 required that persons 'be
at least not ignorant' of the major elements required in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the
force and fear category) required that internal and external freedom be present in order
for consent to be valid. This line of interpretation produced two distinct but related
grounds for annulment, called 'lack of due discretion' and 'lack of due competence.' Lack of
due discretion means that the person did not have the ability to give valid consent at the time
of the wedding and therefore the union is invalid. Lack of due competence means that the
person was incapable of carrying out the obligations of the promise he or she made during the
wedding ceremony.

"Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s involving
sexual disorders such as homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader
approach to the kind of proof necessary for psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had
reasoned for the first time in several cases that the capacity to give valid consent at the
time of marriage was probably not present in persons who had displayed such
problems shortly after the marriage. The nature of this change was nothing short of
revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious willingness to use this
kind of hindsight, the way was paved for what came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals began
to accept proof of serious psychological problems that manifested themselves shortly after the
ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid consent at the time of the ceremony.

Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert

became increasingly important in such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and
after the ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked to give professional
opinions about a party's mental at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely
challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.

The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to
the addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the
Church to the advances made in psychology during the past decades. There was now the
expertise to provide the all-important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and
premarital causes.

During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal
contract to that of a covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in
annulment cases that a person who could intellectually understand the concept of marriage
could necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real
obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite to
valid matrimonial consent.2

Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity,

"not only to sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a
spouse or both spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential obligations of
marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each
others' body for heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality, the right to the community of the
whole of life, i.e., the right to a developing. lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have
refined the meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for marriage as presupposing the
development of an adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give
themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct person; that the spouses must be
'other oriented' since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and that the
spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal relationship because marriage is more than
just a physical reality but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of
the obligations of marriage depends. according to Church decisions, on the strength of this
interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is
held to impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential
marital obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in
reference to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse.3

Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature
marital relationship:
 The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital
commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful commitment to the marriage
partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional
maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the
ordinary stresses and strains of marriage, etc.

Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions

that might lead to the failure of a marriage:

At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal

communion even with the best intentions of the parties. Among the
psychic factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability to fulfill marital
obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with its
fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2)
hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom of sexual choice;
(3) the inadequate personality where personal responses consistently
fallshort of reasonable expectations.

xxx xxx xxx

The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts
whether he or she has a case for an annulment on any other terms. A
situation that does not fit into any of the more traditional categories often
fits very easily into the psychological category.

As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a

shift in their use. Whereas originally the emphasis was on the parties'
inability to exercise proper judgment at the time of the marriage (lack of
due discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties' to
assume or carry out their responsibilities an obligations as promised (lack of due
competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of due
competence is that the at the time the marriage was entered into civil
divorce and breakup of the family almost is of someone's failure out marital
responsibilities as promised at the time the marriage was entered into.4

In the instant case, "opposing and conflicting personalities" of the spouses were not
considered equivalent to psychological incapacity. As well in Santos v. Court of Appeals
cited in the ponencia, the Court held that the failure of the wife to return home from the
U.S. or to communicate with her husband for more then five years is not proof of her
psychological incapacity as to render the marriage a nullity.5 Therefore, Art. 36 is
inapplicable and the marriages remain valid and subsisting.
However in the recent case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,6 this Court upheld both
the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals in declaring the presence of
psychological incapacity on the part of the husband. Said petitioner husband, after ten
(10) months' sleeping with his wife never had coitus with her, a fact he did not deny but
he alleged that it was due to the physical disorder of his wife which, however, he failed
to prove. Goaded by the indifference and stubborn refusal of her husband to fulfill a
basic marital obligation described as "to procreate children based on the universal
principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of
marriage," the wife brought the action in the lower court to declare the marriage null.

The Court, quoting Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan
Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch I) on Psychological
incapacity concluded:

If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his

or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and
constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological
incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is
equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a
spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a
sign of psychological incapacity.

We declared:

This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found
themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital
obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate
court.

1 concur with the majority opinion that the herein marriage remains valid and
subsisting absent psychological incapacity (under Art. 36 of the Family Code) on the
part of either or both of the spouses.

VITUG, J., concurring:

I fully concur with my esteemed 'colleague Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in his
ponencia, and I find to be most helpful the guidelines that he prepared for the bench and
the bar in the proper appreciation of Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209 ("The Family
Code of the Philippines"). The term "psychological incapacity" was neither defined nor
exemplified by the Family Code. Thus —
 Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

The Revision Committee, constituted under the auspices of the U.P. Law Center,
which drafted the Code explained:

(T)he Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-
to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law.1

Article 36 of the Family Code was concededly taken from Canon 1095 of the New Code
of Canon Law —

Canon 1095. (The following persons) are incapable of contracting

marriage; (those) —

1. who lack sufficient use of reason;

2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning

essential matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and accepted
mutually;

3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the

essential obligations of marriage —

that should give that much value to Canon Law jurisprudence as an aid to the
interpretation and construction of the statutory enactment.2

The principles in the proper application of the law teach us that the several provisions
of a Code must be read like a congruent whole. Thus, in determining the import of
"psychological incapacity" under Article 36, one must also read it along with, albeit to be
taken as distinct from, the other grounds enumerated in the Code, like Articles 35, 37, 38
and 41 that would likewise, but for distinct reasons, render the marriage merely
voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal separation. Care must be
observed so that these various circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if
the law were indifferent on the matter.

I would wish to reiterate the Court's' statement in Santos vs. Court of Appeals;3 viz:
 (T)he use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the
Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of
psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities,
extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances. . . Article
36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of,
but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on
marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render
help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the
law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with
the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code
which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of
nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."

The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like

the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely
renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family
Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality
should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for
legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of
the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these
various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and
severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological
incapacity.4

In fine, the term "psychological incapacity," to be a ground for then nullity of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code, must be able to pass the following tests; viz:

First, the incapacity must be psychological or mental, not physical, in nature;

Second, the psychological incapacity must relate to the inability, not mere refusal, to
understand, assume end discharge the basic marital obligations of living together,
observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering mutual help and support;

Third, the psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is contracted
although its overt manifestations and the marriage may occur only thereafter; and
Fourth, the mental disorder must be grave or serious and incurable.

It may well be that the Family Code Revision Committee has envisioned Article 36, as
not a few observers would suspect, as another form of absolute divorce or, as still others
would also put it, to be a alternative to divorce; however, the fact still remains that the
language of the law has failed to carry out, even if true, any such intendment. It might
have indeed turned out for the better, if it were otherwise, there could be good reasons
to doubt the constitutionality of the measure. The fundamental law itself, no less, has
laid down in terse language its unequivocal command on how the State should regard
marriage and the family, thus —

Section 2, Article XV:

Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the

family and shall be protected by the State.

Section 12, Article II:

Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect
and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution . . . .

Section 1, Article XV:

Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the
nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote
its total development. (The 1987 Constitution)

The case of Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, might here be significant not so much for
the specific issue there resolved but for the tone it has set. The Court there has held that
constitutional provisions are to be considered mandatory unless by necessary
implication, a different intention is manifest such that to have them enforced strictly
would cause more harm than by disregarding them. It is quite clear to me that the
constitutional mandate on marriage and the family has not been meant to be simply
directory in character, nor for mere expediency or convenience, but one that demands a
meaningful, not half-hearted, respect.

Footnotes

1 Rollo pp. 25-33.

2 Sixteenth Division composed of J., Segundino G. Chua, ponente and

chairman JJ., Serafin V.C. Guingona and Ricardo P. Galvez, concurring.

3 Presided by Judge Heilia S. Mallare-Phillipps.

4 Solemnized by Fr. Jesus C. Encinas.

5 The Court of Appeals reproduced in its Decision a substantial portion of

the RTC Decision is follows:

"To sustain her claim that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to

comply with his marital obligations, petitioner testified that he is
immature, irresponsible, dependent, disrespectful, arrogant, a chronic liar,
and an infidel. These characteristics of respondent are based on
petitioner's testimony that the former failed to be gainfully employed after
he was relieved from the office of the Government Corporate Counsel
sometime in February, 1986. leaving petitioner as the sole breadwinner of
the family. Also when they were separated in fact, respondent practically
abandoned both petitioner-mother and son except during the first few
months of separation when respondent regularly visited his son and gave
him a monthly allowance of P1,000.00 for about two to four months.
Respondent is likewise dependent on his parents for financial aid and
support as he has no savings, preferring to spend his money with his
friends and peers. A year after their marriage, respondent informed
petitioner that he bought a house and lot at BF Homes, Parañaque for
about a million pesos. They then transferred there only for the petitioner
to discover a few months later that they were actually renting the house
with the respondent's parents responsible for the payment of the rentals.
Aside from this. respondent would also lie about his salary and ability.
And that at present, respondent is living with his mistress and their child.
which fact he does not deny.

It is unfortunate that the marriage between petitioner and respondent

turned sour if we look at the background of their relationship. During
their college days, when they were still going steady, respondent observed
petitioner to be conservative, homely, and intelligent causing him to
believe then that she would make an ideal wife and mother. Likewise,
petitioner fell in love with respondent because of his thoughtfulness and
gentleness. After a year, however, they decided to break their relationship
because of some differences in their personalities. Almost five (5) years
later, while they were working in Manila, petitioner and respondent
rekindled their love affair. They became very close and petitioner was
glad to observe a more mature respondent. Believing that they know each
other much better after two years of going steady, they decided to settle
down and get married. It would seem. therefore, that petitioner and
respondent knew each other well and were then prepared for married life.
During their marriage, however, the true personalities of the parties
cropped-up and dominated their life together. Unexpectedly on both their
parts, petitioner and respondent failed to respond properly to the
situation. This failure resulted in their frequent arguments and fighting's.
In fact, even with the intervention and help of their parents who arranged
for their possible reconciliation, the parties could not come to terms.

It seems clear at this stage that the marriage between the parties broke-up
because of their opposing and conflicting personalities (sic). Neither of
them can accept and understand the weakness of the other. No one gives
in and instead, blame each other for whatever problem or
misunderstanding/s they encounter. In fine, respondent cannot be solely
responsible for the failure of other (sic) marriage. Rather, this resulted
because both parties cannot relate to each other as husband and wife
which is unique and requisite in marriage.

Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a

woman with the basic objective of establishing a conjugal and family life.
(Article 1, Family Code). The unique element of permanency of union
signifies a continuing, developing, and lifelong relationship between the
parties. Towards this end, the parties must fully understand and accept
the (implications and consequences of being permanently) united in
marriage. And the maintenance of this relationship demands from the
parties, among others, determination to succeed in their marriage as well
as heartfelt understanding, acceptance, cooperation, and support for each
other. Thus, the Family Code requires them to live together, to observe
mutual (love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
Failure to observe) and perform these fundamental roles of a husband and
a wife will most likely lead to the break-up of the marriage. Such is the
unfortunate situation in this case. (Decision, pp. 5-8; Original Records, pp.
70-73).

6 240 SCRA 20, 34, January 4, 1995.

7 Quoted from Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code,

First Edition, 1988.

8 TSN, April 6, 1991, p. 5.

9 The National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal reviews all decisions of

the marriage tribunals of each archdiocese in the country. Aside from
heading the Appellate Tribunal, Most. Rev. Cruz is also incumbent
president of the Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines,
Archbishop of Dagupan-Lingayen, and holds the degrees of Doctor of
Canon Law and Doctor of Divinity. Archbishop Cruz was also Secretary-
General of the Second Plenary Council of the Philippines — PCP II — held
from January 20, 1991 to February 17, 1991, which is the rough equivalent
of a parliament or a constitutional convention in the Philippine Church,
and where the ponente, who was a Council member, had the privilege of
being overwhelmed by his keen mind and prayerful discernments.

10 Justice Puno was a former member of the Court of Appeals, retired

Minister of Justice, author, noted civil law professor and the law
practitioner.

Article XV

THE FAMILY

Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino Family as the foundation of the
nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote
its total development.

Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the

family and shall be protected by the state.

Sec. 3. The State shall defend:

(1) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their

religious connections and the demands of responsible parenthood;

(2) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition,
and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty.
exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development;

(3) The right of the family to a family living wage and income;

(4) The right of families or family associations to participate in the

planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them.

Sec. 4. The family has the duty to care for its elderly members but the state
may also do so through just programs of social security.

Art. 1 Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man

and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an
inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage
settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the
limits provided by this Code.

13 Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994.

14 This text is taken from the Memorandum of Archbishop Cruz. On the

other hand, the text used in Santos v. CA reads:

"Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:

xxx xxx xxx

3. Who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the

essential obligations of marriage.

The difference in wording between this and that in Arch. Cruz's

Memorandum is due to the fact that the original Canon is written in Latin
and both versions are differently-worded English translations.

ROMERO, J., separate opinion:

1 Justice Caguioa's explanation in the Minutes of July 26, 1986 of the Civil
Code Revision Committee of the U.P. Law Center.

2 Zwack , Joseph P. Annulment, A Step-by-Step Guide.

3 The Code of Canon Law, A Text and Commentary, The Canon Law
Society of America, Paulist Press, New York, 1985.

4 Zwack, ibid., p. 47.

5 G.R. No. 112019, 240 SCRA 20 (1995).

6 G.R. No. 119190 (1997).

VITUG, J., concurring:

1 Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo, quoting Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-

Diy, In Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100.

2 In Santos vs. Court Appeals, 240 SCRA 20.

3 Supra.
G.R. No. 136490 October 19, 2000

BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner,

vs.
WILSON G. MARCOS, respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be

established by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however,
that the respondent should be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a conditio
sine qua non for such declaration.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the July 24, 1998 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No.
55588, which disposed as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the contested decision is set aside and the marriage between the parties
is hereby declared valid."2

Also challenged by petitioner is the December 3, 1998 CA Resolution denying her

Motion for Reconsideration.

Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had ruled thus:

"WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and respondent

Wilson G. Marcos, solemnized on September 6, 1982 in Pasig City is declared null and
void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. The conjugal properties, if any, is
dissolved [sic] in accordance with Articles 126 and 129 of the same Code in relation to
Articles 50, 51 and 52 relative to the delivery of the legitime of [the] parties' children. In
the best interest and welfare of the minor children, their custody is granted to petitioner
subject to the visitation rights of respondent.

"Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each to the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Pasig City where the marriage was solemnized, the National Census and Statistics
Office, Manila and the Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong City for their appropriate
action consistent with this Decision.

"SO ORDERED."
The Facts

The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:

"It was established during the trial that the parties were married twice: (1) on September
6, 1982 which was solemnized by Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu at the Municipal Court of
Pasig (Exh. A); and (2) on May 8, 1983 which was solemnized by Rev. Eduardo L.
Eleazar, Command Chaplain, at the Presidential Security Command Chapel in
Malacañang Park, Manila (Exh. A-1). Out of their marriage, five (5) children were born
(Exhs. B, C, D, E and F).

"Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1973. Later
on, he was transferred to the Presidential Security Command in Malacañang during the
Marcos Regime. Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the other hand, joined the Women's
Auxilliary Corps under the Philippine Air Force in 1978. After the Edsa Revolution,
both of them sought a discharge from the military service.

"They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the Malacañang
Palace, she as an escort of Imee Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President
Ferdinand Marcos. Through telephone conversations, they became acquainted and
eventually became sweethearts.

"After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No. 1702 Daisy Street, Hulo
Bliss, Mandaluyong, a housing unit which she acquired from the Bliss Development
Corporation when she was still single.

"After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in 1987 and then
engaged in different business ventures that did not however prosper. As a wife, she
always urged him to look for work so that their children would see him, instead of her,
as the head of the family and a good provider. Due to his failure to engage in any
gainful employment, they would often quarrel and as a consequence, he would hit and
beat her. He would even force her to have sex with him despite her weariness. He
would also inflict physical harm on their children for a slight mistake and was so severe
in the way he chastised them. Thus, for several times during their cohabitation, he
would leave their house. In 1992, they were already living separately.

"All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling "magic uling" and chickens.
While she was still in the military, she would first make deliveries early in the morning
before going to Malacañang. When she was discharged from the military service, she
concentrated on her business. Then, she became a supplier in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines until she was able to put up a trading and construction company, NS Ness
Trading and Construction Development Corporation.
"The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took place on October 16, 1994, when they had a
bitter quarrel. As they were already living separately, she did not want him to stay in
their house anymore. On that day, when she saw him in their house, she was so angry
that she lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and
even on her mother who came to her aid. The following day, October 17, 1994, she and
their children left the house and sought refuge in her sister's house.

"On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical examination at the
Mandaluyong Medical Center where her injuries were diagnosed as contusions (Exh. G,
Records, 153).

"Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and driver, went to him at
the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong to look for their missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them,
he got mad. After knowing the reason for their unexpected presence, he ran after them
with a samurai and even [beat] her driver.

"At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were renting a house in
Camella, Parañaque, while the appellant was residing at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong.

"In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the children described
their father as cruel and physically abusive to them (Exh. UU, Records, pp. 85-100).

"The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D., for

psychological evaluation (Exh. YY, Records, pp. 207-216), while the appellant on the
other hand, did not.

"The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his
marital obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to support his family and
his violent attitude towards appellee and their children, x x x."3

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity had not been established
by the totality of the evidence presented. It ratiocinated in this wise:

"Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the root cause of the spouse's
psychological incapacity which should also be medically or clinically identified,
sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision. The incapacity
must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage and shown
to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It must also be grave enough to
bring about the disability of the parties to assume the essential obligations of marriage
as set forth in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 225 of the Family Code and such non-
complied marital obligations must similarly be alleged in the petition, established by
evidence and explained in the decision.
"In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to any psychological or
psychiatric evaluation. The psychological findings about the appellant by psychiatrist
Natividad Dayan were based only on the interviews conducted with the appellee.
Expert evidence by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists is essential if only
to prove that the parties were or any one of them was mentally or psychically ill to be
truly incognitive of the marital obligations he or she was assuming, or as would make
him or her x x x unable to assume them. In fact, he offered testimonial evidence to show
that he [was] not psychologically incapacitated. The root cause of his supposed
incapacity was not alleged in the petition, nor medically or clinically identified as a
psychological illness or sufficiently proven by an expert. Similarly, there is no evidence
at all that would show that the appellant was suffering from an incapacity which [was]
psychological or mental - not physical to the extent that he could not have known the
obligations he was assuming: that the incapacity [was] grave, ha[d] preceded the
marriage and [was] incurable."4

Hence, this Petition.5

Issues

In her Memorandum,6 petitioner presents for this Court's consideration the following
issues:

"I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set aside the findings
by the Regional Trial Court of psychological incapacity of a respondent in a
Petition for declaration of nullity of marriage simply because the respondent did
not subject himself to psychological evaluation.

II. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the demeanor of all the
witnesses should be the basis of the determination of the merits of the Petition."7

The Court's Ruling

We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or psychological examination of

respondent is not a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity.
Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence she presented does not show such incapacity.

Preliminary Issue: Need for Personal Medical Examination

Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results of various tests that were
submitted to determine respondent's psychological incapacity to perform the
obligations of marriage should not have been brushed aside by the Court of Appeals,
simply because respondent had not taken those tests himself. Petitioner adds that the
CA should have realized that under the circumstances, she had no choice but to rely on
other sources of information in order to determine the psychological capacity of
respondent, who had refused to submit himself to such tests.

In Republic v. CA and Molina,8 the guidelines governing the application and the
interpretation of psychological incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the Family Code9
were laid down by this Court as follows:

"1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of
marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it 'as the foundation of the nation.' It decrees
marriage as legally 'inviolable,' thereby protecting it from dissolution at the
whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be 'protected' by the
state.

xxx xxx xxx

2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such
an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming,
or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application
of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root
cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature
fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.

3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the celebration' of

the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the
parties exchanged their 'I do's.' The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.

4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or

incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to
the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
 obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as
an essential obligation of marriage.

5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, 'mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability,
not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a
natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element
in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to

71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220,
221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.

7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the

Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts.

xxx xxx xxx

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down
unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from
the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi
contemplated under Canon 1095."10

The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court
in Santos v. Court of Appeals:11 "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not
require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is
important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's
psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to.

Main Issue: Totality of Evidence Presented

The main question, then, is whether the totality of the evidence presented in the present
case -- including the testimonies of petitioner, the common children, petitioner's sister
and the social worker -- was enough to sustain a finding that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated.

We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent
failed to provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical
abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of
psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects"
were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.

Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job
and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this
period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support,
and even left the family home.

Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the
inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his
condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi
driver.1âwphi1

Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that
cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a
serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of
the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These
marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the
Family Code.

Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not
be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral
corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity,
abandonment and the like.12 At best, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to
grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.
Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law, this Court laid down
the procedural requirements for its invocation in Molina. Petitioner, however, has not
faithfully observed them.

In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of petitioner
to show that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability; and for her failure to observe the guidelines outlined in
Molina.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed Decision AFFIRMED, except that
portion requiring personal medical examination as a conditio sine qua non to a finding
of psychological incapacity. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Penned by Justice Bernardo LL Salas with the concurrence of Justices Fermin A.

Martin Jr. (Division chairman) and Candido V. Rivera (member).

2 CA Decision, pp. 12-13; rollo, pp. 38-39.

3 CA Decision, pp. 5-7; rollo, pp. 31-33.

4 CA Decision, pp. 10-11; rollo, pp. 36-37.

5 This case was deemed submitted for resolution on February 24, 2000, upon
receipt by this Court of respondent's Memorandum, which was signed by Atty.
Virgilio V. Macaraig. Petitioner's Memorandum, signed by Atty. Rita Linda V.
Jimeno, had been filed earlier on November 5, 1999.

6 Rollo, p. 70; original in upper case.

7 Memorandum for petitioner, p. 6; rollo, p. 70.

8 268 SCRA 198, February 13, 1997, per Panganiban, J.

9 "Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

"The action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under this Article
shall prescribe in ten years after its celebration."

10 Supra, pp. 209-213.

11 240 SCRA 20, 34, January 4, 1995, per Vitug, J.

12 "Article 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following
grounds:

(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against

the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner;

(2) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change

religious or political affiliation;

(3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common

child, or a child of the petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance
in such corruption or inducement;

(4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more

than six years, even if pardoned;

(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;

(6) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;

(7) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage,

whether in the Philippines or abroad;

(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;

(9) Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner; or

(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause

for more than one year.

For purposes of this Article, the term 'child' shall include a child by nature
or by adoption."
G.R. No. 136921 April 17, 2001

LORNA GUILLEN PESCA, petitioner

vs.
ZOSIMO A PESCA, respondent.

VITUG, J.:

Submitted for review is the decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 27 May
1998, in C.A. G.R. CV. No. 52374, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court
("RTC") of Caloocan City, Branch 130, which has declared the marriage between
petitioner and respondent to be null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological
incapacity on the part of respondent.

Petitioner Lorna G. Pesca and respondent Zosimo A. Pesca first met sometime in 1975
while on board an inter-island vessel bound for Bacolod City. After a whirlwind
courtship, they got married on 03 March 1975. Initially, the young couple did not live
together as petitioner was still a student in college and respondent, a seaman, had to
leave the country on board an ocean-going vessel barely a month after the marriage. Six
months later, the young couple established their residence in Quezon City until they
were able to build their own house in Caloocan City where they finally resided. It was
blissful marriage for the couple during the two months of the year that they could stay
together - when respondent was on vacation. The union begot four children, 19-year old
Ruhem, 17-year old Rez, 11-year old Ryan, and 9-year old Richie.

It started in 1988, petitioner said, when she noticed that respondent surprisingly
showed signs of "psychological incapacity" to perform his marital covenant. His "true
color" of being an emotionally immature and irresponsible husband became apparent.
He was cruel and violent. He was a habitual drinker, staying with friends daily from
4:00 o'clock in the afternoon until 1:00 o'clock in the morning. When cautioned to stop
or, to at least, minimize his drinking, respondent would beat, slap and kick her. At one
time, he chased petitioner with a loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in the
presence of the children. The children themselves were not spared from physical
violence.

Finally, on 19 November 1992, petitioner and her children left the conjugal abode to live
in the house of her sister in Quezon City as they could no longer bear his violent ways.
Two months later, petitioner decided to forgive respondent, and she returned home to
give him a chance to change. But, to her dismay, things did not so turn out as expected.
Indeed, matters became worse.

On the morning of 22 March 1994, about eight o'clock, respondent assaulted petitioner
for about half an hour in the presence of the children. She was battered black and blue.
She submitted herself to medical examination at the Quezon City General Hospital,
which diagnosed her injuries as contusions and abrasions. Petitioner filed a complaint
with the barangay authorities, and a case was filed against respondent for slight
physical injuries. He was convicted by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City
and sentenced to eleven days of imprisonment.

This time, petitioner and her children left the conjugal home for good and stayed with
her sister. Eventually, they decided to rent an apartment. Petitioner sued respondent
before the Regional Trial Court for the declaration of nullity of their marriage invoking
psychological incapacity. Petitioner likewise sought the custody of her minor children
and prayed for support pendente lite .

Summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served on respondent on 25 April
1994 by personal service by the sheriff. As respondent failed to file an answer or to enter
his appearance within the reglementary period, the trial court ordered the city
prosecutor to look into a possible collusion between the parties. Prosecutor Rosa C.
Reyes, on 03 August 1994, submitted her report to the effect that she found no evidence
to establish that there was collusion between the parties. 1âwphi1.nêt

On 11 January 1995, respondent belatedly filed, without leave of court, an answer, and
the same, although filed late, was admitted by the court. In his answer, respondent
admitted the fact of his marriage with petitioner and the birth of their children. He also
confirmed the veracity of Annex "A" of the complaint which listed the conjugal
property. Respondent vehemently denied, however, the allegation that he was
psychologically incapacitated.

On 15 November 1995, following hearings conducted by it, the trial court rendered its
decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent to be null and void
ab initio on the basis of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent and ordered
the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.

Respondent appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals, contending that the
trial court erred, particularly, in holding that there was legal basis to declare the
marriage null and void and in denying his motion to reopen the case.

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and declared the marriage
between petitioner and respondent valid and subsisting. The appellate court said:

"Definitely the appellee has not established the following: That the appellant
showed signs of mental incapacity as would cause him to be truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenant, as so provided for in Article 68 of the Family Code;
that the incapacity is grave, has preceded the marriage and is incurable; that his
incapacity to meet his marital responsibility is because of a psychological, not
 physical illness; that the root cause of the incapacity has been identified
medically or clinically, and has been proven by an expert; and that the incapacity
is permanent and incurable in nature.

"The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies in the plaintiff and any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity."1

Petitioner, in her plea to this Court, would have the decision of the Court of Appeals
reversed on the thesis that the doctrine enunciated in Santos vs. Court of Appeals,2
promulgated on 14 January 1995, as well as the guidelines set out in Republic vs. Court
of Appeals and Molina,3 promulgated on 13 February 1997, should have no retroactive
application and, on the assumption that the Molina ruling could be applied
retroactively, the guidelines therein outlined should be taken to be merely advisory and
not mandatory in nature. In any case, petitioner argues, the application of the Santos
and Molina dicta should warrant only a remand of the case to the trial court for further
proceedings and not its dismissal.

Be that as it may, respondent submits, the appellate court did not err in its assailed
decision for there is absolutely no evidence that has been shown to prove psychological
incapacity on his part as the term has been so defined in Santos.

Indeed, there is no merit in the petition.

The term "psychological incapacity," as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a

marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, has been explained by the Court, in
Santos and reiterated in Molina. The Court, in Santos, concluded:

"It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and
most importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee
itself, that the use of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' under Article 36 of the
Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as,
likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence,
immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Balumad's 'Void and
Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law,'
quoting form the Diagnostic Statistical Manuel of Mental Disorder by the
American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's 'Handbook II for Marriage
Nullity Cases'). Article 36 of the Family. Code cannot be taken and construed
independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our
law on marriage. Thus correlated, 'psychological incapacity' should refer to no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article
 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe
love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt
that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological
incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated."

The- "doctrine of stare decisis," ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that
judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of
the Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal maxim - "legis interpretado legis vim
obtinet" - that the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has
the force of law.3 The interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted and
construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the statute is enacted. It
is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view
is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of
parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance
therewith5 under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non respicit."

The phrase "psychological incapacity ," borrowed from Canon law, is an entirely novel
provision in our statute books, and, until the relatively recent enactment of the Family
Code, the concept has escaped jurisprudential attention. It is in Santos when, for the
first time, the Court has given life to the term. Molina, that followed, has additionally
provided procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in trying cases for
annulment of marriages grounded on psychological incapacity. Molina has
strengthened, not overturned, Santos.

At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and
in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of
respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant a
declaration of nullity of the marriage. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility,
invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological incapacity.

The Court reiterates its reminder that marriage is an inviolable social institution and the
foundation of the family6 that the State cherishes and protects. While the Court
commisserates with petitioner in her unhappy marital relationship with respondent,
totally terminating that relationship, however, may not necessarily be the fitting
denouement to it. In these cases, the law has not quite given up, neither should we.

WHEREFORE, the herein petition is DENIED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Vitug, J.C.; Melo, J.A.R; Panganiban, A.V.; Gonzaga-Reyes, M.P.; Sandoval-Gutierez, A.,
Concur.

Footnotes:

1 Rollo. pp. 42-43

2 240 SCRA 20.

3 268 SCRA 198.

4 People vs. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607

5Unciano Paramedical College, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 285; Tanada
vs. Guingona, 235 SCRA 507; Columbia Pictures, Inc., vs. Court of Appeals, 261
SCRA 144.

6 See Section 2, Article XV, 1987 Constitution.

G.R. No. 192718 February 18, 2015

ROBERT F. MALLILIN, Petitioner,

vs.
LUZ G. JAMESOLAMIN and the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court
assailing the November 20, 2009 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its June 1,
2010 Resolution,2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 78303-MIN, which reversed and set aside the
September 20, 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, Cagayan de Oro
City(RTC-Br.37), declaring the marriage between petitioner Robert F. Mallilin (Robert)
and private respondent Luz G. Jamesolamin (Luz) null and void.

The Facts:

Robert and Luz were married on September 6, 1972. They begot three (3) children.

On March 16, 1994, Robert filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage before
the RTC, Branch 23, Cagayan de Oro City (RTC-Br. 23). On March 7, 1996, RTC-Br. 23
denied the petition. Robert appealed this judgment before the CA where it was
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 54261. On January 29, 1999, the CA reversed the RTC-Br.
23 decision "due to lack of participation of the State as required under Article 48 of the
Family Code."3 The case was remanded to the RTC for further proceedings and its
records were thereafter transferred from RTC-Br. 23 to RTC-Br. 37, as the latter was
designated as Family Court pursuant to the Family Code Act of 1997.

In the complaint, Robert alleged that at the time of the celebration of their marriage, Luz
was suffering from psychological and mental incapacity and unpreparedness to enter
into such marital life and to comply with its essential obligations and responsibilities.
Such incapacity became even more apparent during their marriage when Luz exhibited
clear manifestation of immaturity, irresponsibility, deficiency of independent rational
judgment, and inability to cope with the heavy and oftentimes demanding obligation of
a parent.

Luz filed her Answer with Counterclaim contesting the complaint. She averred that it
was Robert who manifested psychological incapacity in their marriage. Despite due
notice, however, she did not appear during the trial. Assistant City Prosecutor Isabelo
Sabanal appeared for the State. When Robert testified, he disclosed that Luz was
already living in California, USA, and had married an American. He also revealed that
when they were still engaged, Luz continued seeing and dating another boyfriend, a
certain Lt. Liwag. He also claimed that from the outset, Luz had been remiss in her
duties both as a wife and as a mother as shown by the following circumstances: (1) it
was he who did the cleaning of the room because Luz did not know how to keep order;
(2) it was her mother who prepared their meal while her sister was the one who washed
their clothes because she did not want her polished nails destroyed; (3) it was also her
sister who took care of their children while she spent her time sleeping and looking at
the mirror; (4) when she resumed her schooling, she dated different men; (5) he
received anonymous letters reporting her loitering with male students; (6) when he was
not home, she would receive male visitors; (7) a certain Romy Padua slept in their house
when he was away; and (6) she would contract loans without his knowledge.

In addition, Robert presented the testimony of Myrna Delos Reyes Villanueva

(Villanueva), Guidance Psychologist II of Northern Mindanao Medical Center.

On May 8, 2000, while the case was pending before the trial court, Robert filed a petition
for marriage annulment with the Metropolitan Tribunal of First Instance for the
Archdiocese of Manila (Metropolitan Tribunal).

On October 10, 2002, the Metropolitan Tribunal handed down a decision declaring their
marriage invalid ab initio on the ground of grave lack of due discretion on the part of
both parties as contemplated by the second paragraph of Canon1095. This decision was
affirmed by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal (NAMT).

Prior to that, on September 20, 2002,the RTC had rendered a decision declaring the
marriage null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of Luz as
she failed to comply with the essential marital obligations.

The State, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), interposed an appeal
with the CA. The OSG argued that Robert failed to make a case for declaration of nullity
of his marriage with Luz. It pointed out that the real cause of the marital discord was
the sexual infidelity of Luz. Such ground, the OSG contended, should not result in the
nullification of the marriage under the law, but merely constituted a ground for legal
separation.

The CA, in its November 20, 2009 Decision,4 granted the petition and reversed the RTC
decision. The decision, including the decretal portion, partially reads:

[W]e find that the trial court committed a reversible error. Closer scrutiny of the records
reveals, as correctly noted by the Solicitor General, sexual infidelity are not rooted on
some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. x x x.

xxxx
In the case at bar, apart from his self-serving declarations, the evidence adduced by
Robert fell short of establishing the fact that at the time of their marriage, Luz was
suffering from a psychological defect which in fact deprived [her] of the ability to
assume the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities.

xxxx

We commiserate with the plaintiff-appellee’s undeserved marital plight. Yet, Our

paramount duty as a court compels Us to apply the law at all costs, however harsh it
may be on whomsoever is called upon to bear its unbiased brunt.

FOR THESE REASONS, the appealed Decision dated September 20, 2002 in Civil Case
No. 94-178 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.

SO ORDERED.5

Robert filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the CA in its June 1, 2010
Resolution,6 stating that the arguments of Robert were mere rehash of the same ground,
arguments and discussion previously pointed out by him, and that no new substance
was brought out to warrant the reconsideration or reversal of its decision.

Hence, this petition.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS’ HOLDING THAT THE ABSENCE

OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EXAMINATION OF THE WIFE UNDERSCORES
THE EVIDENTIAL GAP TO SUSTAIN THE DECISION OFTHE RTC
DECLARING THE MARRIAGE OF PETITIONER TO RESPONDENT NULL
AND VOID ON THE GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY IS
CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.

II

THE RESPONDENT WIFE WAS ALSO DECLARED BY THE NATIONAL

APPELLATE MATRIMONIAL TRIBUNAL OF THE CATHOLIC BISHOP’S
CONFERENCE OF THE PHILIPPINES AS GUILTY OF GRAVE LACKOF DUE
DISCRETION.

III
 THE RESPONDENT WIFE WAS ALSO FOUND BY THE LOWER COURT AS
PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL
MARITAL OBLIGATIONS.

Robert now argues that he has sufficiently proven the nullity of his marriage even in the
absence of any medical, psychiatric or psychological examination of the wife by a
competent and qualified professional. To bolster his claim, he avers that the
Metropolitan Tribunal already declared that Luz exhibited grave lack of discretion in
judgment concerning the essential rights and obligations mutually given and accepted
in marriage. The said decision was affirmed by the NAMT.

Robert further argues that the sexual indiscretion of Luz with different men coupled
with the fact that she failed to function as a home maker to her family and as a
housewife to him incapacitated her from accepting and complying with her essential
marital obligations. For said reason, he asserts that the case of Luz was not a mere case
of sexual infidelity, but clearly an illness that was rooted on some debilitating
psychological condition which incapacitated her to carry out the responsibilities of a
married woman. Robert avers that a sex maniac is not just a mere sexual infidel but one
who is suffering from a deep psychological problem.

Position of the State

The OSG argues that the CA correctly ruled that the totality of evidence presented by
Robert was not sufficient to support a finding that Luz was psychologically
incapacitated. His evidence fell short of establishing his assertion that at the time of
their marriage, Luz was suffering from a psychological defect which deprived her of the
ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities.

With regard to the findings of the Metropolitan Tribunal and the NAMT, the OSG
claims that the same were only given persuasive value and were not controlling or
decisive in cases of nullity of marriage. Further, the decision was based on grave lack of
discretion of judgment concerning matrimonial rights and obligations due to outside
factors other than psychological incapacity as contemplated in Article 36 of the Family
Code. The OSG also raises the strong possibility of collusion between the parties as
shown by the events that took place after the issuance of the March 7, 1996 RTC
Decision. The OSG wrote:

Significantly, the chronological events after the trial court issued its March 7, 1996
Decision unmistakably show the collusion between the parties to obtain the reliefs
pleaded. Among others, respondent’s Retraction of Testimony was executed without
the presence of counsel sometime in 1998, a few months before she married an
American. This irregularity was even noticed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 54261:
 xxxx

The involvement and active participation of the Solicitor General became indispensable,
in the present recourse, when, in a whirlwind turn of events, the Appellee made a
VOLTE FACE executed a "Retraction of Testimony" and a "Waiver of Custody" waiving
custody of Franco Mark J Mallillin, still a minor, her son by the Appellant. It bears
stressing that the Appellee, in the Court a quo, obdurately denied the material
allegations of the Appellant’s complaint and declared that it was the Appellant who
was psychologically incapacitated. The sudden turn-about of the appellee, in the
present recourse, to the extent of disowning her testimony in the Court a quo and even
praying for the reversal of the Decision of the Trial Court is strongly suggestive, if not
constitutive, of collusion or a modus vivendi between the parties, outlawed by the
Family Code of the Philippines and the Constitution. x x x

The Court’s Ruling

The main issue is whether the totality of the evidence adduced proves that Luz was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage
warranting the annulment of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.

The petition is bereft of merit.

A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the Family

Code which provides:

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligation of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization. "Psychological incapacity," as a ground to nullify a marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental – not merely
physical – incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, among others, include
their mutual obligations to live together; observe love, respect and fidelity; and render
help and support. There is hardly a doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.7

Psychological incapacity as required by Article 36 must be characterized by (a) gravity,

(b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious
such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in
marriage. It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although
the overt manifestations may only emerge after the marriage. It must be incurable or,
even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.8

In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Eduardo C. De Quintos, Jr.,9 the Court reiterated
the well-settled guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage,
embodied in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,10 based on Article 36 of the
Family Code. Thus:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. x x x.

xxxx

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. x x x.

xxxx

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of
the marriage. x x x.

xxxx

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent

or incurable. x x x.

xxxx

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. x x x.

xxxx

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to

71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220,
221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
 (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts.

x x x.

xxxx

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. x x x.

Guided by these pronouncements, the Court is of the considered view that Robert’s
evidence failed to establish the psychological incapacity of Luz.

First, the testimony of Robert failed to overcome the burden of proof to show the nullity
of the marriage. Other than his self-serving testimony, no other evidence was adduced
to show the alleged incapacity of Luz. He presented no other witnesses to corroborate
his allegations on her behavior. Thus, his testimony was self-serving and had no serious
value as evidence.

Second, the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity of Luz was not medically
or clinically identified, and sufficiently proven during the trial. Based on the records,
Robert failed to prove that her disposition of not cleaning the room, preparing their
meal, washing the clothes, and propensity for dating and receiving different male
visitors, was grave, deeply rooted, and incurable within the parameters of
jurisprudence on psychological incapacity.

The alleged failure of Luz to assume her duties as a wife and as a mother, as well as her
emotional immaturity, irresponsibility and infidelity, cannot rise to the level of
psychological incapacity that justifies the nullification of the parties' marriage. The
Court has repeatedly stressed that psychological incapacity contemplates "downright
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital
obligations," not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part
of the errant spouse.11 Indeed, to be declared clinically or medically incurable is one
thing; to refuse or be reluctant to perform one's duties is another. Psychological
incapacity refers only to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage.12

As correctly found by the CA, sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not,
by themselves, constitute grounds for declaring a marriage void based on psychological
incapacity. Robert argues that the series of sexual indiscretion of Luz were external
manifestations of the psychological defect that she was suffering within her person,
which could be considered as nymphomania or "excessive sex hunger." Other than his
allegations, however, no other convincing evidence was adduced to prove that these
sexual indiscretions were considered as nymphomania, and that it was grave, deeply
rooted, and incurable within the term of psychological incapacity embodied in Article
36. To stress, Robert’s testimony alone is insufficient to prove the existence of
psychological incapacity.

In Sivino A. Ligeralde v. May Ascension A. Patalinghug and the Republic of the

Philippines,13 the Court ruled that the respondent’s act of living an adulterous life
cannot automatically be equated with a psychological disorder, especially when no
specific evidence was shown that promiscuity was a trait already existing at the
inception of marriage. The petitioner must be able to establish that the respondent’s
unfaithfulness was a manifestation of a disordered personality, which made her
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.

Third, the psychological report of Villanueva, Guidance Psychologist II of the Northern

Mindanao Medical Center, Cagayan deOro City, was insufficient to prove the
psychological in capacity of Luz. There was nothing in the records that would indicate
that Luz had either been interviewed or was subjected to a psychological examination.
The finding as to her psychological incapacity was based entirely on hearsay and the
self-serving information provided by Robert.

Fourth, the decision of the Metropolitan Tribunal is insufficient to prove the

psychological incapacity of Luz. Although it is true that in the case of Republic v. Court
of Appeals and Molina,14 the Court stated that interpretations given by the NAMT of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts, still it is subject to the law on evidence. Thus:

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our
civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate
tribunal. Ideally – subject to our law on evidence– what is decreed as [canonically]
invalid should be decreed civilly void x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

Pertinently, Rule 132, Section 34 of the Rules of Evidence provides:

The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose
of which the evidence is offered must be specified.

In this regard, the belated presentation of the decision of the NAMT cannot be given
value since it was not offered during the trial, and the Court has in no way of
ascertaining the evidence considered by the same tribunal.
Granting that it was offered and admitted, it must be pointed out that the basis of the
declaration of nullity of marriage by the NAMT was not the third paragraph of Canon
1095 which mentions causes of a psychological nature similar to Article 36 of the Family
Code, but the second paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers to those who suffer from
grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and
obligations to be mutually given and accepted. For clarity, the pertinent portions of the
NAMT decision are as follows:

The FACTS on the Case prove with the certitude required by law that based on the
deposition of the petitioner – the respondent understandably ignored the proceedings
completely for which she was duly cited for Contempt of Court – and premised on the
substantially concordant testimonies of the Witnesses, the woman Respondent
demonstrated in the external forum through her action and reaction patterns, before
and after the marriage-in-fact, her grave lack of due discretion in judgement for
marriage intents and purposes basically by reason of her immaturity of judgement as
manifested by her emotional ambivalence x x x.

WHEREFORE, this COLLEGIAL COURT OF APPEALS, having invoked the Divine

Name and having in mind the Law, the Jurisprudence and the Facts pertaining to the
Case, hereby declares and decrees the confirmation of the nullity decision rendered by
the Metropolitan Tribunal of First Instance for the Archdiocese of Manil on the
Marriage Case MALLILIN – JAMISOLAMIN with Prot. N. 63/2000 on the ground
provided by Canon 1095 par. 2CIC on the part of the woman Respondent – but NOT on
the part of the man Petitioner for lack of evidence. (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)15

In Santos v. Santos,6 the Court referred to the deliberations during the sessions of the
Family Code Revision Committee, which drafted the Code, to provide an insight on the
import of Article 36 of the Family Code. It went out to state that a part of the provision
is similar to the third paragraph of Canon 1095 of the Code of Canon Law, which reads:

Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:

1. those who lack sufficient use of reason;

2. those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning the
essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted;

3. those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume

the essential obligations of marriage.(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In Najera v. Najera,17 the Court was also confronted with a similar issue of whether to
consider an annulment by the NAMT as also covering psychological incapacity, the
only ground recognized in our law. In the said case, the NAMT decision was also based
on the second paragraph of Canon 1095. The Court ruled that it was not similar to, and
only annulments under the third paragraph of, Canon 1095 should be considered.
Elucidating, the Court wrote: Petitioner’s argument is without merit.

In its Decision dated February 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals apparently did not have
the opportunity to consider the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Court of Appeals considered the Matrimonial
Tribunal’s decision in its Resolution dated August 5, 2004 when it resolved petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration. In the said Resolution, the Court of Appeals took
cognizance of the very same issues now raised before this Court and correctly held that
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was devoid of merit. It stated:

The Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal dated July 2, 2002, which
was forwarded to this Court only on February 11, 2004, reads as follows:

[T]he FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable witnesses which include a
sister-in-law of Respondent (despite summons from the Court dated June14, 1999, he
did not appear before the Court, in effect waiving his right to be heard, hence, trial in
absentia followed) corroborate and lead this Collegiate Court to believe with moral
certainty required by law and conclude that the husband-respondent upon contracting
marriage suffered from grave lack of due discretion of judgment, thereby rendering
nugatory his marital contract: First, his family was dysfunctional in that as a child, he
saw the break-up of the marriage of his own parents; his own two siblings have broken
marriages; Second, he therefore grew up with a domineering mother with whom [he]
identified and on whom he depended for advice; Third, he was according to his friends,
already into drugs and alcohol before marriage; this affected his conduct of bipolar
kind: he could be very quiet but later very talkative, peaceful but later hotheaded even
violent, he also was aware of the infidelity of his mother who now lives with her
paramour, also married and a policeman; Finally, into marriage, he continued with his
drugs and alcohol abuse until one time he came home very drunk and beat up his wife
and attacked her with a bolo that wounded her; this led to final separation.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second Instance, having invoked the
Divine Name and having considered the pertinent Law and relevant Jurisprudence to
the Facts of the Case hereby proclaims, declares and decrees the confirmation of the
sentence from the Court a quo in favor of the nullity of marriage on the ground
contemplated under Canon 1095, 2 of the 1983 Code of Canon Law.

However, records of the proceedings before the Trial Court show that, other than
herself, petitioner-appellant offered the testimonies of the following persons only, to
wit: Aldana Celedonia (petitioner-appellant’s mother), Sonny de la Cruz (member,
PNP, Bugallon, Pangasinan), and Ma. Cristina R. Gates (psychologist). Said witnesses
testified, in particular, to the unfaithful night of July 1, 1994 wherein the respondent
allegedly made an attempt on the life of the petitioner. But unlike the hearing and
finding before the Matrimonial Tribunal, petitioner-appellant’s sister-in-law and friends
of the opposing parties were never presented before said Court. As to the contents and
veracity of the latter’s testimonies, this Court is without any clue. True, in the case of
Republic v. Court of Appeals, et al. (268 SCRA 198), the Supreme Court held that the
interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts. However, the Highest Tribunal expounded as follows:

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our
civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate
tribunal. Ideally – subject to our law on evidence– what is decreed as [canonically]
invalid should be decreed civilly void x x x.

And in relation thereto, Rule 132, Sec. 34 of the Rules of Evidence states:

The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose
of which the evidence is offered must be specified.

Given the preceding disquisitions, petitioner-appellant should not expect us to give

credence to the Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal when,
apparently, it was made on a different set of evidence of which We have no way of
ascertaining their truthfulness. Furthermore, it is an elementary rule that judgments
must be based on the evidence presented before the court (Manzano vs. Perez, 362
SCRA 430 [2001]). And based on the evidence on record, We find no ample reason to
reverse or modify the judgment of the Trial Court.[31]

Santos v. Santos18 cited the deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code
Revision Committee, which drafted the Code, to provide an insight on the import of
Article 36 of the Family Code. It stated that a part of the provision is similar to the third
paragraph of Canon 1095 of the Code of Canon Law, which reads:

Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:

1. those who lack sufficient use of reason;

2. those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning the
essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted;

3. those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume

the essential obligations of marriage.
It must be pointed out that in this case, the basis of the declaration of nullity of marriage
by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is not the third paragraph of Canon
1095 which mentions causes of a psychological nature, but the second paragraph of
Canon 1095 which refers to those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of
judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given
and accepted. For clarity, the pertinent portion of the decision of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal reads:

The FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable witnesses which include a
sister-in-law of Respondent (despite summons from the Court dated June 14, 1999, he
did not appear before the Court, in effect waiving his right to be heard, hence, trial in
absentia followed) corroborate and lead this Collegiate Court to believe with moral
certainty required by law and conclude that the husband-respondent upon contacting
marriage suffered from grave lack of due discretion of judgment, thereby rendering
nugatory his marital contract x x x.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second Instance, having invoked the
Divine Name and having considered the pertinent Law and relevant Jurisprudence to
the Facts of the Case hereby proclaims, declares and decrees the confirmation of the
sentence from the Court a quo in favor of the nullity of marriage on the ground
contemplated under Canon 1095, 2 of the 1983 Code of Canon Law. x x x.

Hence, even if, as contended by petitioner, the factual basis of the decision of the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is similar to the facts established by petitioner
before the trial court, the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
confirming the decree of nullity of marriage by the court a quo is not based on the
psychological incapacity of respondent. Petitioner, therefore, erred in stating that the
conclusion of Psychologist Cristina Gates regarding the psychological incapacity of
respondent is supported by the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal.

In fine, the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the Decision of the RTC.
(Emphases in the original; Underscoring supplied)

Hence, Robert’s reliance on the NAMT decision is misplaced. To repeat, the decision of
the NAMT was based on the second paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers to those
who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning essential
matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted, a cause not of
psychological nature under Article 36 of the Family Code. A cause of psychological
nature similar to Article 36 is covered by the third paragraph of Canon 1095 of the Code
of Canon Law (Santos v. Santos 19), which for ready reference reads:

Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:

 xxxx

3. those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.

To hold that annulment of marriages decreed by the NAMT under the second
paragraph of Canon 1095 should also be covered would be to expand what the
lawmakers did not intend to include. What would prevent members of other religious
groups from invoking their own interpretation of psychological incapacity? Would this
not lead to multiple, if not inconsistent, interpretations?

To consider church annulments as additional grounds for annulment under Article 36

would be legislating from the bench.1âwphi1 As stated in Republic v. Court of Appeals
and Molina,20 interpretations given by the NAMT of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines are given great respect by our courts, but they are not controlling or
decisive.

In Republic v. Galang,21 it was written that the Constitution set out a policy of
protecting and strengthening the family as the basic social institution, and the marriage
was the foundation of the family. Marriage, as an inviolable institution protected by the
State, cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties. In petitions for declaration of
nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies with the
plaintiff. Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where the parties, or
one of them, could not have validly entered into a marriage by reason of a grave and
serious psychological illness existing at the time it was celebrated, the Court is
compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie.

In fine, the Court holds that the CA decided correctly. Petitioner Robert failed to adduce
sufficient and convincing evidence to prove the alleged psychological incapacity of Luz.

As asserted by the OSG, the allegations of the petitioner make a case for legal
separation. Hence, this decision is without prejudice to an action for legal separation if a
party would want to pursue such proceedings. In this disposition, the Court cannot
decree a legal separation because in such proceedings, there are matters and
consequences like custody and separation of properties that need to be considered and
settled.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 78303-MIN, dated November 20, 2009, and its Resolution, dated June 1,
2010, are hereby AFFIRMED, without prejudice.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.* MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Designated Acting member in lieu of Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion, per

Special Order No. 1910, dated January 12, 2015.

1 Rollo, pp. 47-60, penned by Associate Justice Edgardo A. Camello, and

Associate Justice Edgardo T. Lloren and Associate Justice Leoncia R. Dimagiba,
concurring.
2 Id. at 76-77.

3 Id. at 48.

4 Id. at 47 penned by Associate Justice Edgardo A. Camello, and Associate Justice

Edgardo T. Lloren, with Associate Justice Leoncia R. Dimagiba, concurring.

5 Id. at 57-59.

6 Id. at 76.

7 Republic v. Garcia, G.R. No. 171557, February 12, 2014.

8 Ligarde v. Patalinghug, G.R. No. 168796, April 15, 2010, 618 SCRA 315, 320–321.

9 G.R. No. 159594, November 12, 2012, 685 SCRA 33, 42-43.

10 335 Phil. 664, 676 –678 (1997).

11 Republic v. Encelan, G.R. No. 170022, January 9, 2013, 668 SCRA 215, 221.

12 Republic v. Gracia, supra note 7.

13 Supra note 8, at 322.

14 Supra note 10, at 679.

15 Rollo, p. 83.

16 310 Phil. 21, 37 (1995).

17 609 Phil. 316, 336 (2009), also citing Santos v. Santos, supra.

18 Supra note 16.

19 Supra note 16.

20 Supra note 10, at 679.

21 G.R. No. 168335, June 6, 2011, 650 SCRA 524, 543-544.