2019 BAR EXAMINATIONS

CIVIL LAW
(Questions and Suggested Answers)

1. In January 2018, Mrs. A, a married woman on her sixth (6th) month of pregnancy, was crossing
a street when she was suddenly hit by a car being recklessly driven by Mr. X. As a result, Mrs.
A sustained serious injuries and further, suffered an unintentional abortion. Mrs. A was
hospitalized for two (2) months, during which she incurred ₱400,000.00 in medical fees. Her
expenses were all duly substantiated by official receipts. During the two (2)-month period of her
confinement, she was unable to report for work and earn any salary, which was established at
the rate of ₱50,000.00 per month. Mrs. A then filed a civil case for damages against Mr. X.

a) xxx
b) xxx
c) May Mrs. A claim damages on behalf of her unborn baby? Explain. (3%)

Suggested Answer:

No, Mrs. A cannot claim damages on behalf of her unborn baby. Since an action for pecuniary damages
on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no
action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it
received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause
of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death,
since no transmission to anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical personality (or juridical
capacity as distinguished from capacity to act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of
a conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same
article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child should be
subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the condition specified in the following article"
(Geluz v. CA, G.R. No. L-16439, July 20, 1961). In the present case, since the unborn child lacked the
needed juridical personality due to the unintentional abortion, Mrs. A cannot claim damages on behalf
of her unborn baby.

2. Hand W were married in 1990. H, being a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP),
was deployed to a rebel-infested area in 1992. Since then, W has not heard from her husband,
H.

One day, the AFP informed W that H had been declared missing since 1995. In consequence, W
diligently pursued all available means to ascertain her husband's whereabouts, but to no avail.

Firmly believing that H had already died, W filed a claim before the AFP in 2008 for the death
benefits of the missing serviceman. However, the AFP, despite being cognizant of H's status,
would not act on the claim, contending that H could not be presumed dead unless a judicial
declaration to this effect is issued by the proper court.

In what instance/s is a judicial declaration of presumptive death necessary? In this case, is the
contention of the AFP correct? Explain. (3%)

Suggested Answer:

A judicial declaration of presumptive death is necessary under Article 41 of the Family Code for the
purpose of contracting a valid subsequent marriage.

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 No, the contention of the AFP is not correct. Here, W was not seeking the declaration of the presumptive
death as a prerequisite for remarriage but to claim the death benefits due to the missing serviceman.
W was relying on the presumption of death under either Article 390 or Article 391 of the Civil Code as
the basis of her petition. A petition for declaration of presumptive death based on the Civil Code is not
allowed. Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of evidence, thus an action brought
exclusively to declare a person presumptively dead under either of the said articles actually presents
no actual controversy that a court could decide. In such action, there would be no actual rights to be
enforced, no wrong to be remedied nor any status to be established. A court action to declare a person
presumptively dead under Articles 390 and 391 would be unnecessary as the presumption in the said
articles is already established by law (Tadeo-Matias v. Republic, G.R. No. 230751, April 25, 2018).

3. Mr. Reyes is legally married to Mrs. Reyes. During the subsistence of their marriage, Mr. Reyes
cohabited with another woman, Ms. Cruz. Out of Mr. Reyes and Ms. Cruz's illicit relationship, a
child named C was born. In C's birth certificate, "Cruz" appears as the child's surname, although
Mr. Reyes expressly acknowledged C as his child.

In 2018, Mr. Reyes and Ms. Cruz ended their relationship. Mr. Reyes thereafter lodged a petition
in court for parental custody and change or correction of C's surname in the child's birth
certificate from "Cruz" to "Reyes." At that time, C was only ten (10) years old.

(a) Should Mr. Reyes be granted custody of C? Explain. (2.5%)

(b) Can Mr. Reyes validly compel the change or correction of C's surname from "Cruz" to
"Reyes"? Explain. (2.5%)

Suggested Answer:

(a) No, Mr. Reyes cannot be granted custody of C. C is an illegitimate child and parental authority over
illegitimate children is lodged by Art. 176 of the Family Code on the mother; hence, Mr. Reyes’
prayer has no legal mooring. Since parental authority is given to the mother, then custody over the
minor illegitimate child also goes to the mother, unless she is shown to be unfit (Grande v. Antonio,
G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014).

(b) No, Mr. Reyes cannot validly compel the change or correction of C's surname from "Cruz" to
"Reyes”. The general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or her mother.
The exception provided by R.A. 9255 (An Act allowing Illegitimate children to use the Surname of
their Father) is in case his or her filiation is expressly recognized by the father through the record
of birth appearing in the civil register or when an admission in a public document or private
handwritten instrument is made by the father. In such a situation, the illegitimate child may use the
surname of the father. Art. 176 of the Family Code gives illegitimate children the right to decide if
they want to use the surname of their father or not. It is not the father or the mother who is granted
by law the right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate children. The use of the word "may" in
the provision readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use
the surname of his illegitimate father. The word "may" is permissive and operates to confer
discretion upon the illegitimate children (Grande v. Antonio, G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014).

4. F, a Filipina, married J, a Japanese, in the Philippines. After three (3) years, they had a falling
out and thus, separated. Soon after, F initiated a divorce petition in Japan which was not
opposed by J because under Japanese law, a grant of divorce will capacitate him to remarry.
F's divorce petition was then granted by the Japanese court with finality.

May the legal effects of the divorce decree be recognized in the Philippines, and consequently,
capacitate F to remarry here? Explain. (3%)

Suggested Answer:

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 Yes, the legal effects of the divorce decree may be recognized in the Philippines, and consequently,
capacitate F to remarry here. Foreign divorce decrees obtained to nullify marriages between a Filipino
and an alien citizen may already be recognized in this jurisdiction, regardless of who between the
spouses initiated the divorce; provided that the party petitioning for the recognition of such foreign
divorce decree — presumably the Filipino citizen — must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate
its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce
proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien
spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband
or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like
circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien-initiated proceeding. Therefore, Art.
26(2) of the Family Code should not make a distinction. In both instances, it is extended as a means to
recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien
spouses are severed by operation of the latter's national law. Here, provided F proves the divorce as a
fact and demonstrates its conformity to the foreign law allowing it, the legal effects of the decree will be
recognized and consequently capacitate her to remarry (Morisono v. Morisono, G.R. No. 226013, July
2, 2018, citing Republic v. Manalo, G.R No. 221029, April 24, 2018).

5. X and Y were in a live-in relationship for the longest time, and were already blessed with a child,
Z. They finally decided to get married on March 15, 2020. When X's parents found about the
news, they were thrilled and thus, donated in favor of Z, the family heirloom, particularly, a gold
ring valued at ₱250,000.00, which X and Y orally accepted on behalf of their minor child. One
day, X and Y got into a serious quarrel, which resulted in them setting aside their marriage
plans.

(a) Is the donation to Z valid? Explain. (3%)

(b) Assuming that the donation to Z is valid, may X's parents revoke the donation on the ground
that the marriage of X with Y did not push through? Explain. (3%)

Suggested Answer:

(a) No, the donation to Z is not valid. Under Art. 748 of the Civil Code, the donation of a movable may
be made orally or in writing. An oral donation requires the simultaneous delivery of the thing or of
the document representing the right donated. If the value of the personal property donated exceeds
five thousand pesos (P5000), the donation and the acceptance shall be made in writing. Otherwise,
the donation shall be void.

In the instant case, the donated gold ring valued at P250,000 was only orally accepted, which does
not conform to the formalities required by law. As such, lacking the required written acceptance,
the donation in favor of Z is void.

(b) No, assuming it is valid, X's parents may not revoke the donation on the ground that the marriage
of X with Y did not push through. First, the ground cited by X’s parents is not one among those
provided under Art.764 of the Civil Code for failure to comply with conditions nor Art. 765 for
ingratitude.

Second, while the ground cited is one among those which would allow revocation of a donation
propter nuptias. However, here, there was no donation propter nuptias. Art. 82 of the Family Code
provides that donations by reason of marriage are those which are made before its celebration, in
consideration of the same, and in favor of one or both of the future spouses. Art. 86 of the same
Code provides that non-celebration of the marriage is one of the grounds for revocation of the
donation by reason of marriage. Here, it is clear that the donation was made in favor of the child
and not in favor of one or both of the future spouses, thus this does not fall squarely within the
contemplation of donation propter nuptias. Hence, not being a donation propter nuptias, it cannot
be revoked on the ground of non-celebration of the marriage between X and Y.

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6. Name at least two (2) exclusions from the following property regimes as enumerated under the
Family Code:

(a) Absolute community of property (2%)

(b) Conjugal partnership of gains (2%)

Suggested Answer:

ACP (GEF) CPG (BERG)

1. Property acquired during the marriage by
Gratuitous title by either spouse, and the
fruits as well as the income thereof, if any,
unless it is expressly provided by the donor,
testator or grantor that they shall
form part of the community property;
2. Property for personal and Exclusive use of
either spouse however, jewelry shall form
part of the community property;
3. Property acquired before the marriage by
either spouse who has legitimate
descendants by a Former marriage, and the
fruits as well as the income, if any, of such
property (Family Code, Art. 92).
1. That which is Brought to the marriage as his
or her own;
2. That which each acquires during the
marriage by Gratuitous title;
3. That which is acquired by right of
Redemption, by barter or by exchange with
property belonging to only one of the
spouses; and
4. That which is purchased with Exclusive
money of the wife or of the husband (Family
Code, Art. 109).

7. Believing that he owned a certain parcel of land and completely unaware of any defect in his
title thereto, Mr. A started to build a house thereon. When Mr. P, the real owner of the land
learned of Mr. A's actions, Mr. P immediately demanded Mr. A to leave the premises. However,
Mr. A refused to leave, and instead, asserted that as a builder in good faith, Mr. P is obliged to
sell the land to him.

(a) Is the claim of Mr. A correct? Explain. (3%)

(b) Assuming that Mr. P all the while, knew but did not object to Mr. A's construction of the
house on his property, may Mr. A compel Mr. P to purchase the said improvement due to Mr.
P's bad faith? Explain. (3%)

Suggested Answer:

(a) No, the claim of Mr. A is not correct. Under Art. 448 of the Civil Code, when the builder believes
that he is the owner of the land, the real owner of the land has two options: (1) he may appropriate
the improvements for himself after reimbursing the builder in good faith the necessary and useful
expenses under Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil Code; or (2) he may sell the land to the builder in
good faith, unless its value is considerably more than that of the improvements, in which case, the
builder in good faith shall pay reasonable rent. The real owner of the land cannot refuse to exercise
either option. It is the owner of the land who is authorized to exercise the option, because his right
is older, and because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory
thing (Spouses De Vera v. Spouses Mayandoc, G.R. No. 211170, July 3, 2017). In the instant case,
Mr. P would need to choose between his options and is not simply obliged to sell the land to Mr. A
as what the latter asserted.

(b) Yes, Mr. A may compel Mr. P to purchase the said improvement due to Mr. P's bad faith. Under
Art. 454 of the Civil Code, when the landowner acted in bad faith and the builder proceeded in good
faith, the provisions of Art. 447 of the Civil Code shall apply. Art. 447 provides that owner of the
land shall pay their value and, if he acted in bad faith, he shall also be obliged to the reparation of
damages. The builder, in the case where the landowner is in bad faith, may remove the

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 improvements even if it may result to injury to such improvements. Thus, if Mr. A does not prefer
to the latter, he may compel Mr. P to pay for the improvement plus damages because of Mr. P’s
bad faith.

8. Mr. E leased a piece of land from Mr. F to be used for his sawmill business for a period of ten
(10) years. Consequently, Mr. E placed heavy machineries thereon to be used for his
aforementioned business, with the intention of removing them after the expiration of the lease
period.
Are Mr. E's heavy machineries considered real properties under the Civil Code? Explain. (3%)

Suggested Answer:

No, Mr. E's heavy machineries are not considered real properties under the Civil Code. Art. 415 (5) of
the Civil Code provides that machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner
of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land,
and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works are immovable property.

Machinery which is movable in its nature only becomes immobilized when placed in a plant by the
owner of the property or plant, but not when so placed by a tenant, a usufructuary, or any person having
only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner. Here, Mr. E is a mere
lessee and not the owner of the property or plant, thus the aforementioned heavy machineries are not
real properties within the contemplation of Art. 415 (5) (Davao Saw Mill Co. v. Castillo, G.R. No. L-
40411, August 7, 1935).

9. Ms. U is a usufructuary of a piece of land owned by Mr. L. During the existence of the usufruct,
Ms. U introduced various useful improvements on the land. Upon termination of the usufruct,
Mr. L requested Ms. U to remove the said improvements, but Ms. U refused, demanding instead
that Mr. L reimburse her the value of the same.

(a) What is a usufruct? (2%)

(b) Is Ms. U's demand proper? Explain. (3%)

Suggested Answer:

(a) Usufruct is a real right, of a temporary nature, which authorizes its holder to enjoy all the benefits
which results from the normal enjoyment of another’s property, with the obligation to return, at the
designated time, either the same thing or, in special cases, its equivalent.

Usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another with the obligation of preserving its form and
substance, unless the title constituting it or the law otherwise provides (Civil Code, Art. 562).

(b) No, Ms. U's demand is not proper. Art. 579 of the Civil Code provides that the usufructuary may
make on the property held in usufruct such useful improvements or expenses for mere pleasure as
he may deem proper, provided he does not alter its form or substance; but he shall have no right
to be indemnified therefor. He may, however, remove such improvements, should it be possible to
do so without damage to the property. Thus, Ms. U does not have a right to demand Mr. L to
reimburse the useful improvements introduced by her.

10. Village Hand Village L are adjoining residential villages in a mountainous portion of Antipolo
City, Rizal, with Village L being lower in elevation than Village H. In an effort to beautify Village
H, its developer, X, Inc., constructed a clubhouse which included an Olympic-sized swimming
pool and an artificial lagoon on a portion of land overlooking Village L.

During the monsoon season, the continuous heavy rains caused Village H's swimming pool and
artificial lagoon to overflow, resulting into a massive spillover that damaged various properties

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 in Village L. Aggrieved, the homeowners of Village L filed a complaint for damages against X,
Inc. In defense, X, Inc. contended that pursuant to the Civil Code, Village L, as the lower estate,
was obliged to receive the waters descending from Village H, the higher estate. Hence, it cannot
be held liable for damages.

Is X, Inc.'s position tenable? Explain. (3%)

Suggested Answer:

No, X, Inc.'s position is untenable. Art. 637 of the Civil Code provides that lower estates are obliged to
receive the waters which naturally and without the intervention of man descend from the higher estates,
as well as the stones or earth which they carry with them. The owner of the lower estate cannot
construct works which will impede this easement; neither can the owner of the higher estate make
works which will increase the burden. A similar provision is found in the Water Code of the Philippines
(P.D. No.1067).

In the instant case, the swimming pool and artificial lagoon constructed by X Inc. consequently
increased the burden, as the continuous heavy rains being collected by these artificial works resulted
to massive spillover damaging the properties in Village L. While the aforecited provisions impose a
natural easement upon the lower estate to receive the waters which naturally and without the
intervention of man descend from higher states. However, where the waters which flow from a higher
state are those which are artificially collected in man-made swimming pool and lagoons, any damage
occasioned thereby entitles the owner of the lower or servient estate to compensation (Remman
Enterprises, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 125018, April 6, 2000). Thus, for constructing said artificial works
resulting damage to Village L’s properties, X Inc. is liable for damages

11. Mr. R is the registered owner of a parcel of land located in Cebu City covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 1234 issued in 1955. Since his acquisition of the lot, Mr. R and his
family had been in continuous, open, and peaceful possession thereof. Mr. R died in 1980,
resulting in the land being transferred in the names of his heirs, i.e., A, B, and C, who became
registered owners thereof as per TCT No. 5678. During the entire time, said land had never been
encumbered or disposed, and that its possession always remained with them.

Sometime in 1999, A, B, and C wanted to build a concrete fence around the parcel of land, but
they were opposed by Mrs. X, who started claiming ownership over the same property on the
strength of a Deed of Absolute Sale purportedly entered into by her with Mr. R during the time
that he was still alive. Aggrieved, A, B, and C intend to file a complaint for quieting of title against
Mrs. X.

(a) What are the substantive requisites for the action to prosper? Do they obtain in this case?
Explain. (3%)
(b) Within what period should A, B, and C file the complaint for quieting of title? Explain. (2%)
(c) Assuming that B and C are residing abroad, may A, without the knowledge of B and C, file
the complaint for quieting of title on behalf of all the heirs? Explain. (2%)

Suggested Answer:

(a) For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the
plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of
the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his
title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity
or legal efficacy. Legal title denotes registered ownership, while equitable title means beneficial
ownership (Heirs of Extremadura v. Extremadura, G.R. No. 211065, June 15, 2016). Here, the
above requisites are present as A, B and C have legal title in the subject real property and the deed
of absolute sale allegedly made in favor of Mrs. X cast cloud on the title of the heirs.

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 (b) An action to quiet title to property in the possession of plaintiff is imprescriptible. One who is in
actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be owner thereof may wait until his possession is
disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason for the rule
being, that his undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to the seek the aid of a court of
equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on
his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession (Iglesia ni Cristo v.
Ponferrada, G.R. No. 168943, October 27, 2006).

(c) Yes, A, even without the knowledge of B and C, may file the complaint for quieting of title on behalf
of all the heirs. A, B and C as co-heirs are co-owners of the subject property. As such co-owners,
each of the heirs may properly bring an action for ejectment, forcible entry and detainer, or any kind
of action for the recovery of possession of the subject properties. Thus, a co-owner may bring such
an action, even without joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed
to be instituted for the benefit of all (Iglesia ni Cristo v. Ponferrada, G.R. No. 168943, October 27,
2006).

12. D, an Overseas Filipino Worker, was on his way home to the Philippines after working for so
many years in the Middle East. He had saved ₱100,000.00 in his local savings account which he
intended to use to start up a business in his home country. On his flight home, tragedy struck
as a suicide bomber blew up the plane. All the passengers, including D, died. He left behind his
widowed mother M; his common-law wife, W, who is the mother of his twin sons, T and S; and
his brother, B. He left no will, no debts, no other relatives, and no other properties except the
money in his savings account.

Who are the heirs entitled to inherit from D and how much should each receive? Explain. (5%)

Suggested Answer:

His widowed mother and twin sons are entitled to inherit from D. Art. 991 of the Civil Code provides
that if legitimate ascendants are left, the illegitimate children shall divide the inheritance with them taking
one-half of the estate, whatever be the number of the ascendants or of the illegitimate children. Thus,
the widowed mother - M gets ₱50,000.00 while the twin sons – T and S, shall receive the other half or
₱25,000.00 each. The common-law wife cannot inherit from him as a compulsory heir, as she is not a
legitimate spouse.

13. M, single, named his sister N in his will, as a devisee over a certain parcel of land that he owned,
with the obligation of preserving the land and transferring it, upon N's death, to her illegitimate
daughter O, who was then only a year old.

Is the condition imposed on N to preserve the land and to transmit it upon her death to O a valid
case of fideicommissary substitution? Explain. (3%)

Suggested Answer:

Yes, the condition imposed on N to preserve the land and to transmit it upon her death to O is a valid
case of fideicommissary substitution. For there to be a valid fideicommissary substitution, Art. 863 of
the Civil Code provides the following requisites: (1) There must be a first heir (fiduciary) primarily called
to the enjoyment of the estate; (2) There must be a second heir (fideicommissary) to whom the property
is transmitted by the first heir; (3) An obligation clearly and expressly imposed by the testator upon such
first heir to preserve the estate and to transmit it to the second heir; (4) The first and second heir must
be only one degree apart; and (5) Both the first and second heir must be living (or at least conceived)
at the time of the death of the testator. Here, all the above requisites are present as N, the supposed
fiduciary is obliged to preserve and transmit the property to O, her illegitimate child who is one degree
apart from her.

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14. Prior to his death, H, married to W, with children X, Y, and Z, executed a holographic will entirely
written, dated, and signed by him. In his will, H instituted W, X, and Y as his heirs, and
consequently, made testamentary dispositions in their favor. H, however, expressly disinherited
Z on the ground that the latter once filed a civil case against him in order to collect a particular
sum of money he previously owed Z.

(a) Was the disinheritance of Z proper? Explain. (3%)

(b) Assuming that the disinheritance of Z was improper, how will it affect the institution of heirs
and testamentary dispositions made in H's will? Explain. (3%)

Suggested Answer:

(a) No, the disinheritance of Z is not proper. For there to be a valid disinheritance, it must be for a
cause expressly stated by law. Art. 919 (2) of the Civil Code provides that children or descendant
may be disinherited when a child or descendant has accused the testator of a crime for which the
law prescribes imprisonment for six years or more, if the accusation has been found groundless.
The requisites of this ground are: (1) the heir must have accused the testator of a crime; (2) the
penalty prescribed by law for such must be 6 years imprisonment or more; and (3) the accusation
must have been found groundless. Here, Z filed a civil case and not a criminal case, thus the above
requisites are not present, making the disinheritance not proper.

(b) Art. 918 of the Civil Code provides that disinheritance without a specification of the cause, or for a
cause the truth of which, if contradicted, is not proved, or which is not one of those set forth in this
Code, shall annul the institution of heirs insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited; but the
devises and legacies and other testamentary dispositions shall be valid to such extent as will not
impair the legitime.

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