SPECPRO WEEK 2
appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established
1. Utulo v. Pasion Vda De Garcia
Facts:
Juan Garcia Sanchez died intestate and in the proceedings
instituted in the CFI Tarlac for the administration of his
property, Leona Pasion Vda. De Garcia (surviving spouse) was
appointed judicial administratrix. Sanchez left legitimate
children, named Juan, Patrocinio and Luz Garcia. Luz Garcia
married Pablo Utulo and during the pendency of the
administration proceedings of her father, she died. Her only
forced heirs were her mother and husband. Pablo filed a
petition, which stated the following:
1. That Luz’ only heirs were himself and his mother-in-law
2. That the only property left by Luz consisted in the share
due her from the intestate of her father, Juan Sanchez
3. That he should be named administrator of the Luz’
property
Leona objected to the petition and alleged that inasmuch as the
said deceased left no indebtedness, there was no occasion for
the said judicial administration. However stated that should
the court grant administration of the property, she should be
appointed the administratrix as she had a better right than
Pablo.
Issue:
1. Whether judicial administration of the property left by Luz
Garcia lies with the consequent appointment of an
administrator
2. Whether Leona has a better right to the said office than
Pablo
Held:
1. No. The general rule is that when a person dies leaving
property in the Philippine Islands, his property should be
judicially administered and the competent court should
by law, in case the deceased left no will, or in case he had left
one should he fail to name an executor therein. This rule,
however, is subject to the exceptions. First, when all the
heirs are of lawful age and there are no debts due
from the estate, they may agree in writing to
partition the property without instituting the judicial
administration or applying for the appointment of an
administrator. According to the second, if the property
left does not exceed six thousand pesos, the heirs may
apply to the competent court, after the required
publications, to proceed with the summary partition and,
after paying all he known obligations, to partition all the
property constituting the inheritance among themselves
pursuant to law, without instituting the judicial
administration and the appointment of an administrator.
There is no weight in the argument adduced by
Pablo to the effect that his appointment as judicial
administrator is necessary so that he may have
legal capacity to appear in the intestate of the
deceased Juan Garcia Sanchez. As he would appear
in the said intestate by the right of representation,
it would suffice for him to allege in proof of his
interest that he is a usufructuary forced heir of his
deceased wife who, in turn, would be a forced heir
and an interested and necessary party if she were
living. In order to intervene in said intestate and to
take part in the distribution of the property it is not
necessary that the administration of the property
of his deceased wife be instituted an
administration, which will take up time and
occasion inconveniences and unnecessary
 expenses.
2. Thus, there is no need to determine which of the parties has
preferential right to the office of administrator.
2. Hernandez v. Andal
Cresencia, Maria, Aquilina, Pedro and Basilia Hernandez are
brother and sisters, who acquired in common a parcel of land
from their deceased father. Maria and Aquilina sold to the
spouses Andal a portion thereof, which they purport to be
their combined shares by virtue of a verbal partition made
among the siblings Hernandez.
After the sale, Cresencia attempted to repurchase the land sold
to Andal but the latter refused to sell the same. Later, Andal
resold the same to Maria and Aquilina. Maria and
Aquilina alleged that there had been an oral partition among
them and their brother and sisters, and that there are
witnesses ready to prove such partition. However, Cresencia
asserted that under the Rules of Court, parol evidence of
partition is inadmissible.
ISSUE: Whether or not oral evidence is admissible in proving
a contract of partition
among heirs
As a general proposition, transactions, so far as they affect the
parties, are required to be reduced to writing either as a
condition of jural validity or as a means of providing evidence
to prove the transactions. Written form exacted by the statute
offrauds, for example, “is for evidential purposes only.” The
Civil Code, too, requires the accomplishment of acts or
contracts in a public instrument, not in order to validate the
act or contract but only to insure its efficacy so that after the
existence of the acts or contracts has been admitted, the party
bound may be compelled to execute the document. It must be
noted that where the law intends a writing or other formality
to be the essential requisite to the validity of the transactions
it says so in clear and unequivocal terms. Section 1 of Rule 74
of the Rules of Court contains no such express or clear
declaration that the required public instruments is to be
constitutive of a contract of partition or an inherent element
of its effectiveness as between the parties. The requirement
that a partition be put in a public document and registered has
for its purpose the protection of creditors and at the same time
the protection of the heirs themselves against tardy claims.
The object of registration is to serve as constructive
notice. It must follow that the intrinsic validity of partition not
executed with the prescribed formalities does not come into
play when, as in this case, there are no creditors or the rights
of creditors are not affected. No rights of creditors being
involved, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into
an agreement for distribution in a manner and upon a plan
different from those provided by law. Judgment reversed.
3. Torres v. Torres
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE of PAZ E. SIGUION
TORRES, deceased, ALBERTO S. TORRES, petitioner-appellant, vs.
CONCHITA TORRES and ANGEL S. TORRES, oppositors-appellees.
Tolentino & Garcia for oppositor-appellee Angel S. Torres.
Narciso Peña for oppositor-appellee Conchita Torres. SYLLABUS
1. ESTATES OF DECEASED PERSONS; SUMMARY SETTLEMENT;
NO NECESSITY FOR INSTITUTION OF SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS. —
Where the decedent left no debts and the heirs or legatees are all
of age, there is no necessity for the institution of special
proceedings and the appointment of an administrator for the
settlement of the estate, because the same can be effected either
extrajudicially or through an ordinary action for partition. 2. ID.;
ID.; UNVERIFIED ALLEGATION THAT ESTATE HAS EXISTING
DEBT OR OTHER PROPERTIES IN THE POSSESSION OF ONE OF
THE HEIRS, ARE NOT SUFFICIENT CAUSE FOR
ADMINISTRATION PROCEEDINGS; CASE AT BAR — Facts: The
heirs of the deceased had already entered into an extrajudicial
partition and settlement of the estate, on the representation that
there existed no debts, but one alleged heir petitions to place the
estate under his administration predicated mainly on alleged
inability of the heirs to agree on a physical division of the
properties. D E C I S I O N BARRERA, J p: In a petition Aled in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasay branch) on January 4, 1961,
Alberto S. Torres, claiming to be one of the four legitimate
children of Paz E. Siguion Torres who died intestate on December
18, 1959, prayed for the issuance in his favor of letters of
administration in connection with the properties left by the
decedent, with an aggregate value of about P300,000.00. It was
also alleged therein that petitioner was unaware of any existing
debt or obligation contracted by the deceased or by her estate,
from any of the heirs or from third persons. This petition was
opposed by Conchita Torres, one of the heirs, on the ground that
the appointment of an administrator is unnecessary in view of the
fact that on January 27, 1960, the heirs of the deceased (including
petitioner) had already entered into an extrajudicial partition and
settlement of the estate, pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 74 of the
Rules of Court. This was answered by petitioner who, while
admitting that such extrajudicial partition was signed by the
heirs, contended that attempts at the actual designation of their
respective shares had failed thus needing the court's
intervention. It CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com
was also claimed that some properties of considerable value were
not included in said extrajudicial partition. In a supplemental
answer to the opposition, subsequently filed, petitioner likewise
alleged that the estate has an existing debt of P50,000.00 from
third persons, a fact which he claimed was not incorporated in the
petition, through oversight. Petitioner, however, offered to
amend the petition before presentation of evidence, with leave of
court. On July 21, 1961, the court, finding that an extrajudicial
settlement had already been entered into by the heirs, dismissed
the petition. Hence, the institution of the present appeal.
Petitioner-appellant does not controvert the execution of an
extrajudicial deed of partition of the estate, which, according to
appellee, contains the following provisions: "1. That they
(Alberto, Angel, Eduardo and Conchita, all surnamed Torres) are
the only legitimate children who survive the deceased Paz
Siguion Vda. de Torres; xxx xxx xxx "3. That the said decedent died
without leaving any will and her only surviving heirs are the
aforementioned parties who are her legitimate children; "4. That
the deceased left no debts; xxx xxx xxx "6. That pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court and in view of the difficulty
of making a physical division of the above properties, the parties
have agreed to settle the aforementioned estate by continuing the
co-ownership on all the above properties in the following
proportion: Alberto Torres — 1/4 undivided interest Angel
Torres — 1/4 undivided interest Eduardo Torres — 1/4
undivided interest Conchita Torres — 1/4 undivided interest"
(Emphasis supplied). It appears from the pleadings filed herein
that the petition to place the estate under administration was
predicated mainly on the alleged inability of the heirs to agree on
a physical division of the properties. The alleged existence of an
indebtedness and noninclusion in the list incorporated in the
deed of extrajudicial partition, of certain properties that form
part of the estate, seemed to be merely an afterthought as the
reference to them was made only in the answer to the opposition
and motion for dismissal of the petition, and is not made under
oath. There is also no allegation as to the particulars of the debt
and the omitted properties sufficient to identify them. In the
circumstances, we agree with the lower court that a special
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased is not
here necessary. Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, provides:
"SECTION 1. Extra-judicial settlement by agreement between
heirs. — If the decedent left no debts and the heirs and legatees
are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial
guardians, the parties may without securing letters of
administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit
by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the Register
of Deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary
action of partition. If there is only one heir or one legatee, he may
adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit
filed in the office of the Register of Deeds. It shall be presumed
that the decedent left no debt if no creditor files a petition for
letters of administration CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017
cdasiaonline.com within two years after the death of the
decedent." Thus, where the decedent left no debts and heirs or
legatees are all of age, as in this case, there is no necessity for the
institution of special proceedings and the appointment of an
administrator for the settlement of the estate, because the same
can be effected either extrajudicially or through an ordinary
action for partition. (Guico, et al. vs. Bautista, et al. L-14921,
December 31, 1960). If there is an actual necessity for court
intervention, as contended by appellant, in view of the heirs'
failure to reach an agreement as to how the estate would be
divided physically, the latter, under the aforequoted Rule, have
still the remedy of an ordinary action for partition. This is not to
overlook the allegation that the estate has an outstanding
obligation of P50,000.00. It is to be noted, however, that
appellant, as heretofore observed, did not specify from whom and
in what manner the said debt was contracted. Indeed, the bare
allegation that "the estate has an existing debt of P50,000.00 from
third persons" cannot be considered a concise statement to
constitute a cause of action. It must be for this reason that the
lower court, notwithstanding the existence of such averment in
appellant's supplemental answer to the opposition, dismissed the
petition filed by said appellant. Nor does the unverified statement
that there are other properties, not included in the deed of
extrajudicial partition in the possession of one of the heirs, justify
the institution of an administration proceeding because the same
questions that may arise as to them, viz. the title thereto, and their
partition, if proven to belong to the intestate, can be properly and
expeditiously litigated in an ordinary action of partition.
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the order appealed from, the
same is hereby affirmed, with cost against the appellant. So
ordered. Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador,
Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal,
JJ., concur.
4. Arcillas v. Montejo
FACTS
- Eustaquio Arcillas died intestate.
- Geronimo Arcillas, one of the heirs of the deceased, in the
November 12 petition sought the cancellation of TCT No. RT-
244 in the name of the deceased and prayed for the issuance of
a new certificate of title in the names of the heirs in the
enumerated proportions alleged in the petition.
- It was claimed that at various dates after the death of the
deceased, several transactions affecting Lot No. 276 transpired,
prominent among which were the separate sales of their
respective shares and participation executed by 4 other
children of the deceased in favor of co-heir Vicente Arcillas.
- 5 other children of the deceased filed a petition on November
16 praying for the issuance of letters of administration in favor
of Aurelio Arcillas, the petitioner preparatory to the final
settlement of the deceased's estate. The petition states that the
deceased left an estate consisting of real property in
Zamboanga City with a probable value of not less than P6,000
and that deceased left no debts remaining unpaid.
- Petitioner filed his opposition to the November 12 petition on
the ground that inasmuch as Lot No. 276 was included in the
estate of the deceased for which a petition for administration
had actually been filed and was awaiting resolution, that
petition should be held in abeyance until after the Nov 16
petition was closed and terminated.
- Respondent Judge issued an order temporarily holding in
abeyance resolution of the November 12 petition until the
termination of the intestate proceedings.
- In his answer to the November 16 petition Geronimo Arcillas,
this time joined by Vicente Arcillas and the widow Modesta
Alfaro, opposed the issuance of letters of administration
arguing that inasmuch as Lot No. 276 was the only property left
by the deceased and the deceased left no debts, the petition for
administration was improper.
- Petitioner insisted that there were still other properties of the
estate of the deceased besides Lot No. 276; he likewise took
issue with respondents' view that administration proceedings
could be dispensed with asserting, firstly, that there was no
unanimity among the heirs for extrajudicial partition and,
secondly, that some of the heirs had been unduly deprived of
their participation in the estate.
- Respondent court denied the November 16 petition for the
issuance of letters of administration and at the same time gave
due course to the November 12 petition.
- Unable to have this order reconsidered petitioner filed the
petition for certiorari with mandamus and preliminary
injunction.
ISSUE
WON respondent Judge acted properly in dismissing the
administration proceedings under the authority of Section 1,
Rule 74 of the New Rules of Court upon averments that the
estate left no debts and all the heirs entitled to share in its
distribution are all of age
HELD
- NO. Under Rule 74.1, if the decedent left no will and no debts
and the heirs and legatees are all of age, or the minors are
represented by their judicial guardians, the parties may,
without securing letters of administration, divide the estate
among themselves as they see fit by means of a public
instrument filed in the office of the Register of Deeds and
should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of
partition.
- Rodriguez, et al. v. Tan: sec.1 does not preclude the heirs from
instituting administration, proceedings, even if the estate has
no debts or obligation, if they do not desire to resort for good
reasons to an ordinary action of partition. While Section 1
allows the heirs to divide the estate among themselves as they
may be fit, or to resort to an ordinary action of partition, it does
not compel them to do so if they have good reasons to take a
different course of action. Said Section is not mandatory or
compulsory as may be gleaned from the use made therein of the
word may.
- Having decided to institute administration proceedings
instead of resorting to the less expensive modes of settlement
of the estate, i.e. extrajudicial settlement or ordinary action for
partition, the heirs may not then be rebuffed in the exercise of
their discretion granted under Section I of Rule 74 of the Rules
of Court merely on the ground that the expenses usually
common in administration proceedings may deplete the funds
of the estate.
- The resultant delay and necessary expenses incurred
thereafter are consequences which must be deemed to have
been voluntarily assumed by the heirs themselves so that they
may not in the future be heard to complain of these matters.
Besides, the truth or veracity of petitioner's claim as to the
alleged existence of other properties of the deceased aside from
the lot in question can be more adequately ascertained in
administration proceedings rather than in any other action.
Disposition Appealed orders set aside
5. Ermac v. Medelo
Petition for certiorari to set aside the order of respondent court
of June 25, 1970, in its Special Proceedings No. 1517, approving
the project of partition filed by private respondent, pursuant to
the order of the same court providing for summary settlement
of the intestate estate of the deceased spouses Potenciano
Ermac and Anastacia Mariquit as well as of the order of July 15,
1970 denying reconsideration of the first order.
The above-named spouses both died leaving as the only
property to be inherited by their heirs a parcel of land, Lot 1327,
Cad. 292, covered by OCT No. RP-355 (262) of the Register of
Deeds of Iligan City, with an assessed value of P590.00.
Accordingly, herein respondent Cenon Medelo, one of the
grandchildren of the said spouses, (being one of the children of
their predeceased daughter Digna Ermac) filed a petition for
summary settlement of said estate. All requirements having
been complied with, and there being no opposition thereto, on
January 21, 1970, respondent court issued an order granting
the same, enumerating all the heirs entitled to participate in the
inheritance and ordering petitioner to present the proper
project of partition of the lot aforementioned. On February 2,
1970, however, petitioner Pedro Ermac, one of the children of
the deceased spouses, moved for reconsideration of the order
of settlement, praying for the elimination of Lot 1327 from the
estate on the ground that it belongs to him and his wife. This
motion was denied, the court ruling that the proper remedy is
a separate suit. Accordingly, petitioner, together with his
children, filed the corresponding action, Civil Case No. 1564 of
the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte. And when upon
submission of the project of partition, the respondent court
approved the same over his objection predicated on the
pendency of Civil Case No. 1564, petitioner moved for
reconsideration, but the motion was denied. Hence, the present
petition.
The sole question to be resolved here is whether or not
respondent court exceeded its jurisdiction or gravely abused its
discretion in approving the project of partition covering Lot No.
1327 notwithstanding that it is being claimed by petitioners in
a separate civil action to be their property and not of the estate.
Such being the case, the petition cannot prosper.
The policy of the law is to terminate proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of deceased persons with the least loss
of time. This is specially true with small estates for which the
rules provide precisely a summary procedure dispensing with
the appointment of an administrator together with the other
involved and cumbersome steps ordinarily required in the
determination of the assets of the deceased and the persons
entitled to inhirit therefrom and the payment of his obligations.
Definitely, the probate court is not the best forum for the
resolution of adverse claims of ownership of any property
ostensibly belonging to the decedent's estate.1 While there are
settled exceptions to this rule as applied to regular
administration proceedings,2 it is not proper to delay the
summary settlement of a deceased person just because an heir
or a third person claims that certain properties do not belong
to the estate but to him.3 Such claim must be ventilated in an
independent action, and the probate court should proceed to
the distribution of the estate, if there are no other legal
obstacles to it, for after all, such distribution must always be
subject to the results of the suit. For the protection of the
claimant the appropriate step is to have the proper annotation
of lis pendens entered.
Accordingly, the instant petition is dismissed, without
prejudice to petitioner having the proper annotation of lis
pendens regarding Civil Case No. 1564 made on the title
covering Lot 1327.
6. Carreon v. Agcaoili
SYLLABUS
1. SALE OF REGISTERED LANDS; GOOD FAITH; FRAUD
NOT PRESUMED. — Where the buyer of the land was an
enlisted man in Philippine constabulary and seldom went home
tovisit his relatives, the mere fact that he was a townmate of the
vendor is not su9cient basis to conclude that he knew that the
latter had children by a ;rst marriage. Fraud cannot be
presumed. It must be established by clear and sufficient
evidence.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; BUYER ONLY CHARGED WITH NOTICE OF
BURDENS ON FACE OF TITLE.
— A buyer of land is not required to do more than rely on the
title. He is only charge with notice of the burdens which are
noted on the face of the title.
DECISION
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J p:
During the marriage of Bonifacio Carreon and Celerina Dauag
the registered land subject of this case was acquired. After the
death of Carreon, his widow Celerina executed on September
24, 1946, an a9davit adjudicating to herself alone the said land.
She declared in said document that she was the only heiress of
her husband. The original certi;cate of titles covering the land
was cancelled and a transfer certi;cate was issued in her name.
There was however annotated on her certi;cate a lien to the
effect that her title was subject to Section 4 of Rule 74 of the
Rules of Court.
On September 25, 1946, she borrowed P1,200.00 from the
Philippine National Bank guaranteed by a mortgage on one-
half of the land. A memorandum of the mortgage was annotated
on her transfer certi;cate. After the maturity of the loan, she
requested a certain
Mr. Pintang to look for a buyer of the land for P3,000.00. One
by the name of Rufo Agcaoiliwas found. The latter made an
advance payment of P1,500.00 and the balance was paid in full
on October 13, 1947. The loan from the bank was paid, the
mortgage was released, and the deed of absolute sale executed
in his favor was registered. 1 A new transfercertificate of title
was issued in the name of Agcaoili. CD Technologies Asia, Inc.
© 2017 cdasiaonline.com
On February 19, 1955, the children of Celerina with the
deceased husband ;led a complaintagainst the spouses Agcaoili
seeking to have the deed of sale executed by their
motherdeclared as one of mortgage and to recover one-half
pro-indiviso of the land described inthe complaint.
Simultaneous with the ;nding of said complaint, Celerina ;led
an action forintervention which was dismissed by the trial
court.
Defendants ;led a motion for summary judgment upon the plea
that the main avermentsof the complaint even if admitted do
not constitute a cause of action and supported their plea with
certain documentary evidence. Plaintiff's ;led an opposition on
the ground that there was a genuine issue which could not be
determined unless a trial is had. The trial court however
allowed the parties to submit evidence in support of their
contentions and after a careful analysis thereof found for
defendants holding that plaintiffs' claim has no legal basis.
As may be gleaned from the appellants' assignments of error,
the present appeal is predicated on the arguments that
appellees were buyers in bad faith; that there existed a trust
relationship between them and appellants; and that such being
the case, the action against appellees is imprescriptible.
There is no clear proof that when Rufo Agcaoili bought the land
he knew of any Eaw in the title of Celerina Dauag. The mere fact
that he was a townmate of Celerina is not su9cient basis to
conclude that he knew that she had children by her ;rst
husband. It has been shown that since 1920 Rufo Agcaoili has
been an enlisted man in the Philippine constabulary and
seldom went home to visit his relatives. A man of such a
situation cannot be expected to know the relatives and children
of his vendor even if they are townmates.
Fraud cannot be presumed. It must be established by clear and
su9cient evidence. Here every indication is that Agcaoili bought
the land in all good faith oblivious of the source of
its acquisition.
If fraud had been committed such was perpetrated by Celerina,
appellants' mother. By her action she induced Agcaoili to
believe that she was the absolute owner of the land which bore
a torrens title. In dealing with it he merely relied on such title.
He was not required to do more. He is only charged with notice
of the burdens which are noted on the face of said title. So after
he bought the land and a new title was issued in his name, he
became a purchaser thereof for value and a holder of a good and
valid title. 2
On the transfer certi;cate of title issued to Agcaoili there was
annotated a statement that it was subject to Section 4, Rule 74
of the Rules of Court. This was an annotation carried over from
Celerina's transfer certificate. Section 4, Rule 74, provides the
following:
"SEC. 4. Liability of distributees and estate. — If it shall appear
at any time within two years after the settlement and
distribution of an estate in accordance with the provisions of
either of the ;rst two sections of this rule, that an heir or other
person has been unduly deprived of his lawful participation in
the estate,such heir or such other person may compel the
settlement of the estate in the
courts in the manner hereinafter provided for the purpose of
satisfying such
lawful participation. And if within the same time of two years,
it shall appear that there are debts outstanding against the
estate which have not been paid, or that an heir or other person
has been unduly deprived of his lawful participation payable in
money, the court having jurisdiction of the estate may, by order
for that purpose, after hearing, settle the amount of such debts
or lawful participation and order how much and in what
manner each distributee shall contribute in the payment
thereof, and may issue execution, if circumstances require,
against the bond provided in the preceding section or against
the real estate belonging to the deceased, or both. Such bond
and such real estate shall remain charged with a liability to
creditors, heirs or other persons for the full period of two years
after such distribution, notwithstanding any transfer of the real
estate that may have been made."
The above lien is effective only for a period of two years. From
September 28, 1946, when a transfer certi;cate of title was
issued to Celerina, to September 8, 1949 when the deed of sale
in favor of Agcaoili was issued and registered, more than two
years had elapsed.
We sustain the lower court's opinion that thenceforth the right
to have such lien cancelled became vested on appellee Agcaoili
and that the same had became functus o;cio. 3 And there being
no fraud in the transaction on the part of appellee, nor proof
that he knew of any legal in;rmity in the title of his vendor, we
;nd no reason to apply the proposition that he is deemed to be
holding the land in trust for the children of Celerina Dauag.
WHEREFORE , the decision appealed from is affirmed,
without pronouncement as to costs.
7. McMicking v. Sy Conbieng
Facts: One Engracio Palanca was appointed administrator of
the estate of Margarita Jose. Mariano Ocampo became one of
the sureties of Engracio Palanca. After the execution of the
bond, said Palanca took possession of all the property of
Margarita Jose. Later on, Mariano Ocampo died, testate.
Doroteo Velasco was appointed administrator of the estate of
Mariano Ocampo while Pio de la Guardia Barretto (defendant)
qualified as one of the sureties of said Doroteo Velasco.
Doroteo Velasco, as administrator, filed with the court a
complete report and inventory of the property of the deceased,
together with a statement of all his debts and liabilities. The
Court of First Instance affirmed and approved the partition.
Pursuant to such agreement and order of the court approving
the same, Doroteo Velasco, delivered to the devisees and
legatees of Mariano Ocampo, all of the property of said
decedent leaving in the hands of said administrator no property
or thing of value whatever belonging to said estate.
Meanwhile, Engracio Palanca was removed from office as
administrator of the estate of Margarita Jose, and Jose
McMicking (plaintiff) was appointed in his stead. Said Palanca
was removed from office by reason of the fact that he failed and
refused to render an account of the property and funds of the
estate of the said Margarita Jose. At the time of his removal he
was indebted to the estate in the sum of P41,960.15.
For the default of Engracio Palanca, Mcmicking filed a claim in
the amount of 30,000 to the estate of Pio de la Guardia Barretto
as the surety of Doroteo Velasco who is the administrator of the
estate of Mariano Ocampo who in turn is the surety of said
Engracio Palanca.
The lower court dismissed the case and rendered judgment in
favour of defendant.
Issue: Whether plaintiff may claim against the defendant as the
surety of Doroteo Velasco.
Held: SC affirmed the lower court’s decision. The Court based
their decision upon the ground that Doroteo Velasco, for whom
the deceased Pio de la Guardia Barretto was surety, would not
have been liable himself had this action been commenced
against him. If the principal is not liable upon the obligation,
the surety cannot be.
At the head of the law of administration of the Philippine
Islands stand sections 596 and 597 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. They are as follows:
"SEC. 596.Settlement of intestate estates, without legal
proceedings, in certain cases. — Whenever all the heirs of a
deceased person are of lawful age and legal capacity, and there
are no debts due from the intestate estate, or all the debts have
been paid by the heirs, the heirs may, by a family council as
known under Spanish law, or by agreement between
themselves, duly executed in writing, apportion and divide the
estate among themselves, as they may see fit, without
proceedings in court.
"SEC. 597.In such case distributees liable for debts. — But if it
shall appear, at any time within two years after such settlement
and distribution of the estate, that there are debts outstanding
against the estate which have not been paid, any creditor may
compel the settlement of the estate in the courts in the manner
hereinafter provided, unless his debt shall be paid, with
interest; and the administrator appointed by the court may
recover the assets of the estate from those who have received
them, for the purpose of paying the debts; and the real estate
belonging to the deceased shall remain charged with the
liability to creditors for the full period of two years after such
distribution, notwithstanding any transfers thereof that may
have been made."
These sections provide for the voluntary division of the whole
property of the decedent without proceedings in court. The
provisions which they contain are extremely important. The
wisdom which underlies them is apparent. It is the undisputed
policy of every people which maintains the principle of private
ownership of property that he who owns a thing shall not be
deprived of its possession or use except for the most urgent and
imperative reasons and then only so long as is necessary to
make the rights which underlie those reasons effective. It is a
principle of universal acceptance which declares that one has
the instant right to occupy and use that which he owns, and it
is only in the presence of reasons of the strongest and most
urgent nature that principle is prevented from accomplishing
the purpose which underlies it. The force which gave birth to
this stern and imperious principle is the same force which
destroyed the feudal despotism and created the democracy of
private owners.
These provisions should, therefore, be given the most liberal
construction so that the intent of the framers may be fully
carried out. They should not be straitened or narrowed but
should rather be given that wideness and fullness of application
without which they cannot produce their most beneficial
effects.
Standing, as we have said, at the head of the law of
administration of these Islands, they are the first provisions to
which our attention is directed in seeking a legal method for the
division and distribution of the property of deceased persons.
They are thus made prominent. And justly so. The purpose
which underlies them, as we have already intimated, is to put
into one's hands the property which belongs to him not only at
the earliest possible moment but also with the least possible
expense. By permitting the partition and division without
proceedings in court no time is lost and substantially all
expense and waste are saved. This is as it should be. The State
fails wretchedly in its duty to its citizens if the machinery
furnished by it for the division and distribution of the property
of a decedent is so cumbersome, unwieldy and expensive that a
considerable portion of the estate is absorbed in the process of
such division. Where administration is necessary, it ought to be
accomplished quickly and at very small expense; and a system
which consumes any considerable portion of the property
which it was designed to distribute is a failure. It being
undoubted that the removal of property from the possession of
its owner and its deposit in the hands of another for
administration is a suspension of some of his most important
rights of property and is attended with an expense sometimes
entirely useless and unnecessary, such procedure should be
avoided whenever and wherever possible.
As we have already indicated, the basis of the liability of a surety
on an administrator's bond is the fault or failure of the
principal. The liability of the principal precedes that of the
surety. If Velasco incurred no liability, then his surety incurred
none.
8. Pereira v. Court of Appeals,
FACTS:
1. Andres de Guzman Pereira, an employee of the Philippine Air
Lines, passed away without a will
a. survived by his legitimate spouse of ten months, the
herein petitioner Victoria Bringas Pereira, and his sister
Rita Pereira Nagac, the herein private respondent.
2. Nagac filed before RTC for the issuance of letters of
administration in her favor pertaining to the estate of the
deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira.
a. REASONS:
i. he and Victoria Bringas Pereira are the only
surviving heirs of the deceased
ii. deceased left no will
iii. there are no creditors of the deceased
iv. deceased left several properties
v. the spouse of the deceased had been working in
London as an auxiliary nurse and as such one-half
of her salary forms part of the estate of the
deceased.
b. Victoria opposed: there exists no estate of the
deceased for purposes of administration and praying in
the alternative, that if an estate does exist, the letters of
administration relating to the said estate be issued in
her favor as the surviving spouse.
c. RULING: appointed Rita Pereira Nagac administratrix
of the intestate estate
3. CA: appointed Rita Pereira Nagac administratrix of the
intestate estate
ISSUE: Is a judicial administration proceeding necessary when the
decedent dies intestate without leaving any debts?
HELD:
1. GENERAL RULE: when a person dies leaving property, the
same should be judicially administered and the competent
court should appoint a qualified administrator
a. EXCEPTION: when all the heirs are of lawful age and
there are no debts due from the estate, they may agree
in writing to partition the property without instituting the
judicial administration or applying for the appointment
of an administrator.
2. Where partition is possible, either in or out of court, the estate
should not be burdened with an administration proceeding
without good and compelling reasons.
a. It has been uniformly held that in such case the judicial
administration and the appointment of an administrator
are superfluous and unnecessary proceedings .
3. what constitutes "good reason" to warrant a judicial
administration of the estate of a deceased when the heirs are
all of legal age and there are no creditors will depend on the
circumstances of each case.
a. questions as to what property belonged to the
deceased (and therefore to the heirs) may properly be
ventilated in the partition proceedings, especially where
such property is in the hands of one heir.
b. merely to avoid a multiplicity of suits since the heir
seeking such appointment wants to ask for the
annulment of certain transfers of property, that same
objective could be achieved in an action for partition
and the trial court is not justified in issuing letters of
administration.
c. to have legal capacity to appear in the intestate
proceedings
9. Jerez v. Nietes
FACTS
- Oct. 3, 1960: Nicolas Jalandoni died.
- Oct. 27, 1960: A
special proceeding for the settlement of his estate was filed
before Judge Nietes, where petitioner Lucrecia Jerez, his
widow, was appointed as administratrix.
- June 14, 1966:
project of partition and final accounting was submitted
- June
15, 1966: Judge Nietes gave an order approving the
partition.
- June 29, 1966: respondent Lucilo Jalandoni,
alleging that he is an acknowledged natural child of the
deceased, and respondent Victoria Jalandoni de Gorriceta,
alleging that she is an illegitimate daughter, sought to be
allowed to intervene on the ground that they were preterited in
the project of partition which they would have respondent
Judge reject for being contrary to law. - July 8, 1966: Judge
gave an order allowing intervention and reopening the
proceedings to permit the movants "to present whatever
evidence they may have to show their right to participate in the
estate of the deceased."
- Sept. 21, 1966: CA sustained CFI
order.
ISSUES
WON CA erred in sustaining CFI order
HELD
- It is within the power of respondent Judge to reopen the
proceedings and allow intervention. The question remains,
however, whether he did so in the appropriate manner. It is not
the existence of the power but the mode of its exercise that is
open to question.
- CA judges were split. The majority held “that the
determination of a prima facie interest in anestate to justify
reopening proceedings for the settlement thereof is primarily
addressed to the sound discretion and judgment of the probate
court; that, while no supporting documents are appended to the
motion to reopen tending to show the personality to intervene,
said motion is nevertheless verified upon oaths of the claimants
of interest and the probate court has authority to require the
submission of at least a prima facie showing of said interest;
that the motion to reopen was filed before the order closing the
proceedings had achieved finality and during the reglementary
period within which the court still had jurisdiction over the case
and retained full power to amend and control its process and
orders; that, because the closure order had not yet become
final, the requirements of Rule 38 respecting relief from
judgment do not apply and, hence, the failure of the motion to
reopen to allege any of the grounds therein stated is not fatal;
that the better practice in case of the appearance of alleged
preterited heirs is to secure relief by reopening the proceedings
by a proper motion within the reglementary period, it being
desirable that all aspects of a controversy be ventilated in the
same proceeding and thus avoid multiplicity of suits.”
- The CA minority held “that the better policy is to require the
intervenors first to produce prima facie evidence of the claimed
civil status before opening the door and letting them in. Under
Rule 12.2, 'a person may, before or during a trial, be permitted
by the court, in its discretion, to intervene in an action, if he has
legal interest in the matter in litigation.' The possibility of
interlopers getting in for a share in the estate cannot be totally
discounted specially considering that the present intestate
proceedings had been pending for the last 6 years without a
motion to intervene having been filed by the present claimants
in spite of the notice of publication and the in rem character of is directed to require Lucilo Jalandoni and Victoria Jalandoni
the intestate proceedings.” de Gorriceta to present evidence to justify their right to
intervene in SP No. 1562 re Intestate Estate of Nicolas H.
On the power to reopen proceedings and allow intervention
- Jalandoni. In the event that they could so justify such a right,
Ramos v. Ortuzar: The only instance that we can think of in the lower court on the basis of such evidence is to proceed
which a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a conformably to law.
final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of
circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or
inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Even then, the better
practice to secure relief is reopening of the same case by proper
motion

within the reglementary period, instead of an independent

action the effect of which, if successful, would be, as in the
instant case, for another court or judge to throw out a decision
or order already final and executed and reshuffle properties
long ago distributed and disposed of.

- Rather than require any party who can allege a grievance that
his interest was not recognized in a testate or intestate
proceeding to file a separate and independent action, he may
within the reglementary period secure the relief that is his due
by a reopening of the case even after a project of partition and
final accounting had been approved.

On the exercise of the power
- The verified motion on the part

of private respondents did not suffice to call into play the power
of respondent Judge to allow intervention. There must be proof
beyond allegations in such motion to show the interest of the
private movants. In the absence thereof, the action taken by
respondent Judge could be considered
premature.
Dispositive CA resolution MODIFIED in the
sense that Judge Nietes, or whoever may be acting in his place,