https://www.scribd.

com/document/367579813/02-in-
the-Matter-to-Declare-in-Contempt-Hon-Dumatong-
Realino

https://www.scribd.com/document/398942478/Vda-
de-Ballesteros-v-Rural-Bank-of-Canaman-Inc

https://www.scribd.com/document/122837174/Ginete

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/dec2006/gr_1394
42_2006.html

https://www.scribd.com/doc/255429247/Assignement-
3-38-Sarmiento-v-Zaratan-docx

https://www.scribd.com/document/255638112/Manot
ok-vs-Barque-Case-Digest
PCI LEASING & FINANCE, INC., v. SPOUSES GEORGE M.
DAI and DIVINA DAI
539 SCRA 9 (2007), 2ND DIVISION
Spouses George and Divina Dai, (Spouses Dai) obtained a
loan from PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc., (PCI) for the sum of
P3,352,892 payable in monthly installments of P152,265 for
the financing of a vessel-fishing boat. To secure the payment
of the loan, Spouses Dai executed a chattel mortgage over the
vessel in favor of PCI Leasing.
Both the promissory note and the chattel mortgage provided
that, in case of failure to pay the installments or interest due
thereon, the entire amount remaining unpaid shall immediately
become due and payable. Spouses Dai failed to pay the
second and third installments. This prompted PCI a complaint
of replevin before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). In their
Answer, Spouses Dai claimed that, the possession of the
vessel including its registration certificate had been
surrendered to PCI before the filing of the complaint. Spouses
Dai thus prayed for the award of damages and attorney‘s fees
by way of Counterclaim.
The RTC of Cebu resolved both issues but did not award any
damages for both parties. No appeal was filed by either parties
making the decision final and executory. After more than a
year, PCI filed another complaint for deficiency judgement
and/or collection of sum of money before the Cebu RTC. In its
complaint PCI alleged that there is still a deficiency of
P961,000.00 as of January of 1995 and prayed for other
damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the PCI LEASING INC. can still file a claim for
deficiency of payment after a previous decision of the same
facts and evidence has already been decided
HELD:
For res jusdicata to apply, four requisites must be met: (1) the
former judgment or order must be final; (2) it must be a
judgment or an order on the merits; (3) it must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties; and (4) there must be, between the first and
second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and cause
of action.
Replevin, broadly understood, is both a form of principal
remedy and of a provisional relief. It may refer either to the
action itself, i.e., to regain the possession of personal chattels
being wrongfully detained from the plaintiff by another, or to the
provisional remedy that would allow the plaintiff to retain the
thing during the pendency of the action and hold it pendente
lite. The action is primarily possessory in nature and generally
determines nothing more than the right of possession. Replevin
is so usually described as a mixed action, being partly in rem
and partly in personam — in rem insofar as the recovery of
specific property is concerned, and in personam as regards to
damages involved. As an “action in rem,” the gist of the
replevin action is the right of the plaintiff to obtain possession
of specific personal property by reason of his being the owner
or of his having a special interest therein.
PCI after realizing the amount of P2,000,000.00 from the
proceeds of the foreclosure sale, could have prayed for a
deficiency judgment in the same action as in fact it pursued its
claim for attorney’s fees and liquidated damages therein, which
claim was however, dismissed by the trial court. PCI, however,
did not press any demand for such deficiency judgment in said
case and instead filed this present suit for deficiency judgment
long after the trial court rendered judgment in the earlier case.
It cannot, however, evade the application of res judicata by
varying the form of its action herein since the causes of action
in the first case and in the present suit are clearly identical.
GO V. SUNBANUN
G.R. NO. 168240; FEBRUARY 9, 2011
FACTS: Respondents filed a suit for damages against Aurora,
her husband Yiu Wai Sang, and Yiu-Go Employment Agency
for breach of warranty in the fire insurance policies that the
respondents made involving the property rented by petitioner.
The RTC rendered judgment finding only Aurora liable and
ordering her to pay moral damages, attorney’s fees, litigation
expenses and costs.
Aurora filed her Motion for Reconsideration on the last day to
file her appeal. The court in its April 27, 2004 Order denied
said motion.
Atty. Ycong received the notice of denial with a day left to file
her appeal. Explaining that Aurora has been busy campaigning
for the local elections as she was running for the position of
town mayor in Calubian, Leyte and that he and his client have
yet to discuss the pros and cons of appealing the case, Atty.
Ycong sought for the relaxation of the procedural rules by filing
an extension of 15 days to file Aurora’s notice of appeal. The
RTC denied the notice of appeal thereafter filed.
For non-compliance with the formal requirements of a petition,
the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the certiorari petition filed
by petitioner. The CA dismissed the petition for being
procedurally flawed, viz: the Verification/Certification of Non-
Forum Shopping is signed by only one petitioner without a
Special Power of Attorney/Secretary’s Certificate authorizing
her to represent the two (2) other petitioners; the Affidavit of
Service shows that respondents were personally served copies
of the petition but lacks explanation why service of the petition
with this Court was not done personally; counsel for petitioners
failed to indicate his PTR and IBP numbers; certified true
copies of the assailed decision dated January 26, 2004
attached to the petition is a mere photocopy of a certified true
copy; the copies of pleadings and other relevant documents
referred to in the petition which would support the allegations
therein are not attached.
ISSUE: May the formal deficiencies in the petition before the
CA be relaxed in the interest of justice?
HELD: The signatures/authorizations of Sang and Yiu-Go
Employment Agency in the verification and certification on non-
forum shopping are not necessary. The signatures may be
dispensed with as these parties are not involved in the petition.
Non-submission of certified true copy of the January 26, 2004
Decision and copies of the Complaint and Answer is not fatal.
Not all pleadings and parts of case records are required to be
attached, but only those which are material and pertinent that
they may provide the basis for a determination of a prima facie
case for abuse of discretion.
Failure to indicate PTR and IBP Official Receipt Numbers are
not fatal. The failure of petitioner’s former counsel, Atty. Ycong,
to indicate in the petition before the CA his PTR and IBP
numbers for the year 2004 was obviously an oversight.
However, whenever practicable, personal service and personal
filing of pleadings are always the preferred modes of service.
Should one deviate from the general rule, it is mandatory for
him/her to submit a written explanation why the pleading was
not personally filed/served. Otherwise, the court has the
discretion to consider the paper as not filed. Therefore, there
was no grave abuse on the part of the CA in exercising its
discretion to dismiss Aurora’s petition.
Nevertheless, in spite of petitioner’s error, the ‘fresh period
rule’ amendment as held in Neypes v. Court of Appeals will be
applied to her benefit.
GRANTED.
DOMINGO NEYPES, ET AL. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET
AL.
G.R. No. 141524 (September 14, 2005)
FACTS:
Petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles
of land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary
injunction before the RTC against the private respondents.
Later, in an order, the trial court dismissed petitioners’
complaint on the ground that the action had already prescribed.
Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal
on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on March
18, 1998, filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998,
the trial court issued another order dismissing the motion for
reconsideration which petitioners received on July 22, 1998.
Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of
appeal and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.
On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of
appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late. This was
received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration but this too was denied in an order
dated September 3, 1998. Via a petition for certiorari and
mandamus under Rule 65, petitioners assailed the dismissal of
the notice of appeal before the CA. In the appellate court,
petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice
of appeal. They argued that the 15-day reglementary period to
appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this was the
day they received the final order of the trial court denying their
motion for reconsideration. When they filed their notice of
appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they
were well within the reglementary period for appeal. On
September 16, 1999, the CA dismissed the petition. It ruled
that the 15-day period to appeal should have been reckoned
from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12,
1998 order dismissing their complaint. According to the
appellate court, the order was the “final order” appealable
under the Rules.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not receipt of a final order triggers the start of
the 15-day reglmentary period to appeal, the February 12,
1998 order dismissing the complaint or the July 1, 1998 order
dismissing the Motion for Reconsideration.
(2) Whether or not petitioners file their notice of appeal on time.
HELD:
(1) The July 1, 1998 order dismissing the motion for
reconsideration should be deemed as the final order. In the
case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc., the trial court
declared petitioner non-suited and accordingly dismissed his
complaint. Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, he filed an
omnibus motion to set it aside. When the omnibus motion was
filed, 12 days of the 15-day period to appeal the order had
lapsed. He later on received another order, this time dismissing
his omnibus motion. He then filed his notice of appeal. But this
was likewise dismissed ― for having been filed out of time.
The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have appealed
within 15 days after the dismissal of his complaint since this
was the final order that was appealable under the Rules. The
SC reversed the trial court and declared that it was the denial
of the motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a
complaint which constituted the final order as it was what
ended the issues raised there. This pronouncement was
reiterated in the more recent case of Apuyan v. Haldeman et
al. where the SC again considered the order denying
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration as the final order which
finally disposed of the issues involved in the case. Based on
the aforementioned cases, the SC sustained petitioners’ view
that the order dated July 1, 1998 denying their motion for
reconsideration was the final order contemplated in the Rules.
(2) YES. To standardize the appeal periods provided in the
Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their
cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15
days within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC,
counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new
trial or motion for reconsideration. Henceforth, this “fresh
period rule” shall also apply to Rule 40, Rule 42, Rule 43 and
Rule 45. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal
period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying
the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full
or partial) or any final order or resolution.
The SC thus held that petitioners seasonably filed their notice
of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from July
22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for
reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with
Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal
shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final
order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word “or”
signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from
another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which
it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of “or” in the above
provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within
15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from
notice of the “final order,” which we already determined to refer
to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or
reconsideration.
Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section
39 of BP 129 which shortened the appeal period from 30 days
to 15 days to hasten the disposition of cases. The original
period of appeal (in this case March 3-18, 1998) remains and
the requirement for strict compliance still applies. The fresh
period of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts
to file a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In
this manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed
decision is given another opportunity to review the case and, in
the process, minimize and/or rectify any error of judgment.
While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to have
judgments of courts become final at some definite time, we
likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly.
To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of
appeal within 15 days from receipt of the RTC’s decision or file
it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the “final order”)
denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if
either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and
executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided
in Rule 41, Section 3. Petitioners here filed their notice of
appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of the order
denying their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998.
Hence, the notice of appeal was well within the fresh appeal
period of 15 days, as already discussed.
NOTE:
The “FRESH PERIOD RULE” do not apply to Rule 64 (Review
of Judgments and Final Orders or Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit)
because Rule 64 is derived from the Constitution. It is likewise
doubtful whether it will apply to criminal cases.
JAIME TAN VS CA
G.R. No. 136368; 16 Jan. 2002
FACTS:
On January 22, 1981, Tan, for a consideration of P59,200
executed a deed of absolute sale over the property in question
in favor of spouses Jose Magdangal and Estrella Magdangal.
Simultaneous with the execution of this deed, the same
contracting parties entered into another agreement whereunder
Tan was given one (1) year within which to redeem or
repurchase the property. Tan failed to redeem the property
until his death on January 4, 1988. On May 2, 1988, Tan's
heirs filed before the RTC at Davao City a suit against the
Magdangals for reformation of instrument alleging that while
Tan and the Magdangals denominated their agreement as
deed of absolute sale, their real intention was to conclude an
equitable mortgage.
RTC rendered judgment finding for Tan, portion of which reads:
1) The Deed of Absolute Sale is, in accordance with the true
intention of the parties, hereby declared and reformed an
equitable mortgage;
2) The plaintiff is ordered to pay the defendants within 120
days after the finality of this decision P59,200 plus interest at
the rate of 12% per annum from May 2, 1988, the date the
complaint was filed, until paid;
3)xxx.
On Sept. 28, 1995, CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.
Both parties received the decision of the appellate court on
Oct. 5, 1995. On March 13, 1996, the clerk of court of the
appellate court entered in the Book of Entries of Judgement the
decision xxx and issued the corresponding Entry of Judgment
which, on its face, stated that the said decision has on Oct. 21,
1995 become final and executory.
Magdangals filed in the RTC a Motion for Consolidation and
Writ of Possession alleging that the 120-day period of
redemption of the petitioner has expired.
On June 10, 1996, the RTC allowed the petitioner to redeem
the lot in question. It ruled that the 120-day redemption period
should be reckoned from the date of Entry of Judgment in the
CA or from March 13, 1996. The redemption price was
deposited on April 17, 1996.
ISSUE:
What rule should govern the finality of judgment favorably
obtained in the trial court by the petitioner?
HELD:
From 1991-1996, the years relevant to the case at bar, the rule
that governs finality of judgment is Rule 51 of the Revised
Rules of Court. Its sections 10 and 11 provide:
SEC. 10. Entry of judgments and final resolutions. If no appeal
or motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed within the time
provided in these Rules, the judgment or final resolution shall
forthwith be entered by the clerk in the book of entries of
judgments. The date when the judgments or final resolution
becomes executory shall be deemed as the date of its entry.
The record shall contain the dispositive part of the judgment or
final resolution and shall be signed by the clerk, with a
certificate that such judgment or final resolution has become
final and executory.
SEC.11. Execution of judgment. Except where the judgment or
final order or resolution, or a portion thereof, is ordered to be
immediately executory, the motion for its execution may only
be filed in the proper court after its entry.
The 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, however,
amended the rule on finality of judgment by providing in section
1, Rule 39 as follows:
Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. Execution
shall issue as a matter of right, on motion, upon a judgment or
order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the
expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has
been duly perfected.
If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the
execution may forthwith be applied for in the court of origin, on
motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified
true copies of the judgment or judgments or final order or
orders sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with
notice to the adverse party.
The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when
the interest of justice so requires, direct the court of origin to
issue the writ of execution.
SC hold that section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Procedure should not be given retroactive effect in this case as
it would result in great injustice to the petitioner. Undoubtedly,
petitioner has the right to redeem the subject lot and this right
is a substantive right. Petitioner followed the procedural rule
then existing as well as the decisions of this Court governing
the reckoning date of the period of redemption when he
redeemed the subject lot. Unfortunately for petitioner, the rule
was changed by the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure which if
applied retroactively would result in his losing the right to
redeem the subject lot. It is difficult to reconcile the retroactive
application of this procedural rule with the rule of fairness.
Petitioner cannot be penalized with the loss of the subject lot
when he faithfully followed the laws and the rule on the period
of redemption when he made the redemption.
ATIENZA V BOARD OF MEDICINE
G.R. No. 177407 | February 9, 2011 | J. Nachura
FACTS:
1. Due to her lumbar pains, private respondent Editha Sioson
went to Rizal Medical Center (RMC) for check-up on February
1995.
2. Sometime in 1999, due to the same problem, she was
referred to Dr. Pedro Lantin III of RMC who, accordingly,
ordered several diagnostic laboratory tests. She underwent
kidney operation after the tests revealed that her left kidney is
non-functioning and non-visualizing.
3. Private respondent’s husband Romeo Sioson then filed a
complaint for gross negligence and/or incompetence before the
Board of Medicine for the removal of Editha’s fully functional
right kidney, instead of the left, against the doctors who
allegedly participated in the kidney operation, namely: Dr. Judd
dela Vega, Dr. Pedro Lantin, III, Dr. Gerardo Antonio Florendo
and petitioner Rico Rommel Atienza.
4. After Romeo Sioson presented his evidence, Editha filed her
formal offer of documentary evidence, which consisted of
certified photocopies of X-Ray request forms where
interpretation of the ultrasound results were written, for the
purpose of proving that her kidneys were both in their proper
anatomical locations at the time she was operated.
5. Petitioner filed his comments/objections to Editha’s formal
offer of exhibits, alleging that said exhibits are inadmissible
because the same are mere photocopies, not properly
identified and authenticated, intended to establish matters
which are hearsay, and incompetent to prove the purpose for
which they are offered.
6. The formal offer of documentary exhibits of private
respondent was admitted by the BOM. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration of the Order, which was denied on the ground
that BOM should first admit the evidence being offered so that
it can determine its probative value when it decides the case,
and later on determine whether the evidence is relevant or not.
7. Disagreeing with the BOM, Atienza filed a petition for
certiorari with the CA. The CA dismissed the petition for
certiorari for lack of merit. Hence, the present petition for
review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
W/N the exhibits are inadmissible in evidence
HELD:
No. Petition denied. To begin with, it is well-settled that the
rules of evidence are not strictly applied in proceedings before
administrative bodies such as the BOM. Although trial courts
are enjoined to observe strict enforcement of the rules of
evidence, in connection with evidence which may appear to be
of doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or admissibility, we have
held that, “it is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them
on doubtful or technical grounds, but admitting them unless
plainly irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that
their rejection places them beyond the consideration of the
court, if they are thereafter found relevant or competent; on the
other hand, their admission, if they turn out later to be
irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be remedied by
completely discarding them or ignoring them.”
Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or
not the circumstance (or evidence) is to be considered at all.
On the other hand, the probative value of evidence refers to
the question of whether or not it proves an issue.
Second, petitioner’s insistence that the admission of Editha’s
exhibits violated his substantive rights leading to the loss of his
medical license is misplaced in light of Section 20, Article I of
the Professional Regulation Commission Rules of Procedure.
As pointed out by the appellate court, the admission of the
exhibits did not prejudice the substantive rights of petitioner
because, at any rate, the fact sought to be proved thereby, that
the two kidneys of Editha were in their proper anatomical
locations at the time she was operated on, is presumed under
Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court on Disputable
presumptions.
The exhibits are certified photocopies of X-ray Request Forms
filed in connection with Editha’s medical case, which contained
handwritten entries interpreting the results of the examination.
The fact sought to be established by the admission of Editha’s
exhibits, that her “kidneys were both in their proper anatomical
locations at the time” of her operation, need not be proved as it
is covered by mandatory judicial notice. These exhibits do not
constitute hearsay evidence of the anatomical locations of
Editha’s kidneys because the position and removal may still be
established through a belated ultrasound or x-ray of her
abdominal area.
Contrary to the assertion of petitioner, the best evidence rule is
also inapplicable. Section 3 of Rule 130 provides:
1. Best Evidence Rule
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. –
When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original document
itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of
the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter
fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other
documents which cannot be examined in court
without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established
from them is only the general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a
public officer or is recorded in a public office.
The subject of inquiry in this case is whether respondent
doctors before the BOM are liable for gross negligence in
removing the right functioning kidney of Editha instead of the
left non-functioning kidney, not the proper anatomical locations
of Editha’s kidneys. As previously discussed, the proper
anatomical locations of Editha’s kidneys at the time of her
operation at the RMC may be established not only through the
exhibits offered in evidence.
In fact, the introduction of secondary evidence, such as copies
of the exhibits, is allowed, especially as one of the witnesses
testified that the Records Office of RMC no longer had the
originals of the exhibits “because [it] transferred from the
previous building, x x x to the new building” and ultimately, the
originals cannot be produced.
BANTOLINO VS COCA-COLA BOTTLERS
G.R. No. 153660; June 10, 2003
DOCTRINE:
The Rules of Court, specifically on Rules of Evidence does not
strictly apply to an administrative body performing quasi-judicial
functions.
The failure of the affiants to appear in court for purposes of
cross-examination shall not render their affidavits inadmissible
as it will negate the rationale and purpose of the nature of
summary proceedings.
Strict observance of the rules with respect to Verification and
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping allows an exception upon
showing of reasonable cause for failure to observe the same.
A waiver and quitclaim which is contrary to public policy may
be recognized as valid and binding if the agreement is
voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable
settlement. Where a person making the waiver did so
voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was doing, and
the consideration of the quitclaim is credible and reasonable,
the transaction shall be valid and binding.
FACTS:
62 employees of the Coca-Cola (the company) filed a
complaint for unfair labor practice.
Allegedly, the employees, in the performance of their duties as
route helpers, bottle segregators, and others, where replaced
and prevented from entering the company premises.
Such act by the employer is deemed an illegal dismissal.
The company averred that there was no employer-employee
relationship thus the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction.
The Labor Arbiter then rendered a decision in favor of the
employees and ordering the company to reinstate the
complainants to their former posistions with all the rights,
privileges and benefits due regular employees, and to pay their
full back wages.
Coca-Cola then appealed the decision to the NLRC which
sustained the findings of the Labor Arbiter.
Then, the company elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the existence of an employer-employee
relationship but set aside the favorable decision of 7
employees for lack of sufficient evidence.
According to the CA, the affidavits of the 7 employees should
not have been given probative value for their failure to affirm
the contents thereof and to undergo cross-examination.
Only those 3 employees where declared regular employees
since they were the only ones subjected to cross-examination.
ISSUE:
WON the affidavits should be given probative value despite the
failure of the affiants to affirm their contents and undergo test
of cross-examination.
HELD:
The Rules of Evidence are not strictly observed in proceedings
before administrative bodies like the NLRC where decisions
may be reached on the basis of position papers only. Citing
Rase v. NLRC, tt was not necessary for the affiants to appear
and testify and be cross-examined as it would negate the
rationale and purpose of the summary nature of the
proceedings mandated by the Rules and to make mandatory
the application of the technical rules of evidence.
MAYON HOTEL & RESTAURANT, PACITA O. PO vs.
ROLANDO ADANA, et al.
G.R. No. 157634 May 16, 2005
FACTS:
Petitioner Mayon Hotel & Restaurant (MHR) hired herein 16
respondents as employees in its business in Legaspi City. Its
operation was suspended on March 31, 1997 due to the
expiration and non-renewal of the lease contract for the space
it rented. While waiting for the completion of the construction of
its new site, MHR continued its operation in another site with 9
of the 16 employees. When the new site constructed and MHR
resumed its business operation, none of the 16 employees was
recalled to work.
MHR alleged business losses as the reason for not reinstating
the respondents. On various dates, respondents filed
complaints for underpayment of wages, money claims and
illegal dismissal.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not respondents were illegally dismissed by
petitioner;
2. Whether or not respondents are entitled to their money
claims due to underpayment of wages, and nonpayment of
holiday pay, rest day premium, SILP, COLA, overtime pay, and
night shift differential pay.
HELD:
1. Illegal Dismissal: claim for separation pay
Since April 1997 until the time the Labor Arbiter rendered its
decision in July 2000, or more than three (3) years after the
supposed “temporary” lay-off, the employment of all the
respondents with petitioner had ceased, notwithstanding that
the new premises had been completed and the same resumed
its operation. This is clearly dismissal – or the permanent
severance or complete separation of the worker from the
service on the initiative of the employer regardless of the
reasons therefor.
Article 286 of the Labor Code is clear — there is termination of
employment when an otherwise bona fide suspension of work
exceeds six (6) months. The cessation of employment for more
than six months was patent and the employer has the burden
of proving that the termination was for a just or authorized
cause.
While we recognize the right of the employer to terminate the
services of an employee for a just or authorized cause, the
dismissal of employees must be made within the parameters of
law and pursuant to the tenets of fair play. And in termination
disputes, the burden of proof is always on the employer to
prove that the dismissal was for a just or authorized cause.
Where there is no showing of a clear, valid and legal cause for
termination of employment, the law considers the case a
matter of illegal dismissal.
If doubts exist between the evidence presented by the
employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted
in favor of the latter — the employer must affirmatively show
rationally adequate evidence that the dismissal was for a
justifiable cause. It is a time-honored rule that in controversies
between a laborer and his master, doubts reasonably arising
from the evidence, or in the interpretation of agreements and
writing should be resolved in the former's favor. The policy is to
extend the doctrine to a greater number of employees who can
avail of the benefits under the law, which is in consonance with
the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and
protection of labor.
2. Money claims
The Supreme Court reinstated the award of monetary claims
granted by the Labor Arbiter.
The cost of meals and snacks purportedly provided to
respondents cannot be deducted as part of respondents'
minimum wage. As stated in the Labor Arbiter's decision.
Even granting that meals and snacks were provided and
indeed constituted facilities, such facilities could not be
deducted without compliance with certain legal requirements.
As stated in Mabeza v. NLRC, the employer simply cannot
deduct the value from the employee's wages without satisfying
the following: (a) proof that such facilities are customarily
furnished by the trade; (b) the provision of deductible facilities
is voluntarily accepted in writing by the employee; and (c) the
facilities are charged at fair and reasonable value. The law is
clear that mere availment is not sufficient to allow deductions
from employees' wages.
As for petitioners repeated invocation of serious business
losses, suffice to say that this is not a defense to payment of
labor standard benefits. The employer cannot exempt himself
from liability to pay minimum wages because of poor financial
condition of the company. The payment of minimum wages is
not dependent on the employer's ability to pay.
Ong Chia vs. Republic of the Philippines
G.R. No. 127240. March, 27, 2000
FACTS:
The trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to
Philippine citizenship. The State, however, through the Office
of the Solicitor General, among others for having failed to state
all his former placer of residence in violation of C.A. No. 473,
§7 and to support his petition with the appropriate documentary
evidence. Petitioner admits that he failed to mention said
address in his petition, but argues that since the Immigrant
Certificate of Residence containing it had been fully published,
with the petition and the other annexes, such publication
constitutes substantial compliance with §7.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the documents annexed by the State to its
appelant’s brief without having been presented and formally
offered as evidence under Rule 132, Section 34 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence justified the reversal of of the Trial Court’s
decision.
HELD:
YES. Decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed. Petition
was denied.
RATIO:
It is settled that naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced
and strictly construed in favor of the government and against
the applicant. [T]he rule of strict application of the law in
naturalization cases defeat petitioner’s argument of “substantial
compliance” with the requirement under the Revised
Naturalization Law.
[T]he reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence
which has not been formally offered is to afford the opposite
party the chance to object to their admissibility. Petitioner
cannot claim that he was deprived of the right to object to the
authenticity of the documents submitted to the appellate court
by the State.
SASAN vs NLRC
G.R. No 176240; 17 Oct. 2008
FACTS:
Sasan et al are employed by Helpmate, Inc (HI), a janitorial
and messengerial service provider, and assigned to E PCI
Bank in Gorordo Branch, Cebu City. Their services were cut off
when EPCI decided to bid out the janitorial and messengerial
jobs to two other service providers. Sasan et al then filed an
action for illegal dismissal alleging that they are regular
employees of PCI, and HI has no authority to dismiss them.
After submission of legal positions to the Labor Arbiter, it
concluded that HI is engaged in labor on contracting as it
operates without substantial capital as required by the Labor
Code, declaring PCI as the principal employer and awarding
money claims to the employees for their illegal dismissal.
PCI and Hi appealed the LA's decision to the NLRC and
submitted for the first time photocopy of documents proving
that they have sufficient capital to operate as an independent
contractor. The NLRC modified the LA's decision taking into
consideration the documentary evidence submitted by HI.
On charges of illegal dismissal, the NLRC ruled that the
complaint for illegal dismissal was prematurely filed, furhter,
deleted the award of backwages and separation pay, but
affirmed the award of 13th month pay and attorneys' fee.
The petitioners appeal to CA, which affirmed the NLRC's
decision. Further, appealed to the SC, hence, this petition.
Sasan et al are employed by Helpmate, Inc (HI), a janitorial
and messengerial service provider, and assigned to E PCI
Bank in Gorordo Branch, Cebu City. Their services were cut off
when EPCI decided to bid out the janitorial and messengerial
jobs to two other service providers. Sasan et al then filed an
action for illegal dismissal alleging that they are regular
employees of PCI, and HI has no authority to dismiss them.
After submission of legal positions to the Labor Arbiter, it
concluded that HI is engaged in labor on contracting as it
operates without substantial capital as required by the Labor
Code, declaring PCI as the principal employer and awarding
money claims to the employees for their illegal dismissal.
PCI and Hi appealed the LA's decision to the NLRC and
submitted for the first time photocopy of documents proving
that they have sufficient capital to operate as an independent
contractor. The NLRC modified the LA's decision taking into
consideration the documentary evidence submitted by HI.
On charges of illegal dismissal, the NLRC ruled that the
complaint for illegal dismissal was prematurely filed, furhter,
deleted the award of backwages and separation pay, but
affirmed the award of 13th month pay and attorneys' fee.
The petitioners appeal to CA, which affirmed the NLRC's
decision. Further, appealed to the SC, hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON the NLRC is allowed to received evidence and give merit
with the same introduced for the first time during appeal?
HELD:
The submission of new evidence before the NLRC is not
prohibited by its new Rules of Procedure. Rules of evidence
prevailing in in courts of law or equity are not controlling in
labor cases. The NLRC and labor arbiters are directed to use
every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each
case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities
of law and procedure all in the interest of substantial justice.
The court further ruled that the petitioners were not illegally
dismissed by HI. Upon the termination of the Contract of
Service between HI and EPCI , the petitioners cannot insist to
continue work for the latter. Their pull-out from EPCI did not
constitute illegal dismissal.
WON the NLRC is allowed to received evidence and give merit
with the same introduced for the first time during appeal?
The submission of new evidence before the NLRC is not
prohibited by its new Rules of Procedure. Rules of evidence
prevailing in in courts of law or equity are not controlling in
labor cases. The NLRC and labor arbiters are directed to use
every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each
case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities
of law and procedure all in the interest of substantial justice.
The court further ruled that the petitioners were not illegally
dismissed by HI. Upon the termination of the Contract of
Service between HI and EPCI , the petitioners cannot insist to
continue work for the latter. Their pull-out from EPCI did not
constitute illegal dismissal.
Pinga vs Santiago
G.R. No. 170354; June 30, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioner Eduardo Pinga was named as one of two defendants
in a complaint for injunction filed by respondent Heirs of
German Santiago, represented by Fernando Santiago. The
Complaint alleged that petitioner and co-defendant Vicente
Saavedra had been unlawfully entering the coco lands of the
respondent, cutting wood and bamboos and harvesting the
fruits of the coconut trees.
Petitioner and his co-defendant disputed respondents'
ownership of the properties in question, asserting that
petitioner's father, Edmundo Pinga, from whom defendants
derived their interest in the properties, had been in possession
thereof since the 1930s. They alleged that as far back as 1968,
respondents had already been ordered ejected from the
properties after a complaint for forcible entry was filed by the
heirs of Edmundo Pinga.
Respondents, as plaintiffs, had failed to present their evidence
and failed to prosecute the case for an unreasonable length of
time. On that ground, the complaint was dismissed. At the
same time, the RTC allowed defendants "to present their
evidence ex-parte."
strike on Sept. 1990. The teachers also violated the return-to-
work order issued by the DECS. Respondents failed to explain
to the DECS despite the 5 day period given. Hence they were
found guilty as charged, and subsequently dismissed from
office by Sec. Carino of the DECS. The Civil Service
Commission, upon appeal, found the teachers guilty of conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of service, and imposed upon
them the reduced penalty of six month’s suspension. However
in view of the length of time that the teachers had been out of
service due to the dismissal issued by Sec. Carino, the CSC
likewise ordered their immediate reinstatement without back
wages.
ISSUE
1. Whether the teachers’ conducts are prejudicial to the best
interest of service.

Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration and prayed
that the entire action be dismissed and petitioner be disallowed
from presenting evidence ex-parte. Respondents claimed that
the order of the RTC allowing petitioner to present evidence
ex-parte was not in accord with established jurisprudence.
They cited cases, particularly City of Manila v. Ruymann and
Domingo v. Santos, which noted those instances in which a
counterclaim could not remain pending for independent
adjudication.
ISSUE: Whether the dismissal of the complaint necessarily
carries the dismissal of the compulsory counterclaim.
HELD:
The constitutional faculty of the Court to promulgate rules of
practice and procedure necessarily carries the power to
overturn judicial precedents on points of remedial law through
the amendment of the Rules of Court. One of the notable
changes introduced in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is the
explicit proviso that if a complaint is dismissed due to fault of
the plaintiff, such dismissal is "without prejudice to the right of
the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a
separate action." The innovation was instituted in spite of
previous jurisprudence holding that the fact of the dismissal of
the complaint was sufficient to justify the dismissal as well of
the compulsory counterclaim.
2. Whether or not the teachers are entitled to back wages for
the period of 3 years pending their appeal deducting the 6
months’ suspension eventually meted out to them.
HELD
1. YES, the mass actions amounted to a prohibited strike of
civil service servants. Although the right to peaceably
assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances is guaranteed by the Constitution, this liberty must
be exercised within reasonable limits. The public school
teachers committed acts prejudicial to the interest of the
service by staging the mass protests on regular school days,
abandoning their classes and failing to return despite the return
to work order.
2. NO, they are not entitled to backwages. The teachers were
neither exonerated nor unjustifiably suspended, the 2
circumstances necessary for the grant of backwages in
administrative disciplinary cases.

In granting this petition, the Court recognizes that the former

jurisprudential rule can no longer stand in light of Section 3,
Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

We hold that under Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of

Civil Procedure, the dismissal of the complaint due to the fault
of plaintiff does not necessarily carry with it the dismissal of the
counterclaim, compulsory or otherwise. In fact, the dismissal of
the complaint is without prejudice to the right of defendants to
prosecute the counterclaim.

The doctrine that the complaint may not be dismissed if the

counterclaim cannot be independently adjudicated is not
available to, and was not intended for the benefit of, a plaintiff
who prevents or delays the prosecution of his own complaint.

DELA CRUZ V. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS

Petitioners are public school teachers who were

simultaneously charged, preventively suspended, and
eventually dismissed by Sec. Carino in Oct. 1990. It was
alleged that the teachers participated in the mass action/ illegal