[G.R. No. L-32409. February 27, 1971.

BACHE & CO. (PHIL.), INC. and FREDERICK E. SEGGERMAN, Petitioners,

v.
HON. JUDGE VIVENCIO M. RUIZ, MISAEL P. VERA, in his capacity as Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, ARTURO LOGRONIO, RODOLFO DE LEON, GAVINO VELASQUEZ,
MIMIR DELLOSA, NICANOR ALCORDO, JOHN DOE, JOHN DOE, JOHN DOE, and JOHN
DOE, Respondents.

San Juan, Africa, Gonzales & San Agustin, for Petitioners.

Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Crispin V . Bautista,

Solicitor Pedro A. Ramirez and Special Attorney Jaime M. Maza for Respondents.

DECISION

VILLAMOR, J.:

This is an original action of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for a writ of
preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction. In their petition Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc., a
corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, and its President,
Frederick E. Seggerman, pray this Court to declare null and void Search Warrant No. 2-M-70
issued by respondent Judge on February 25, 1970; to order respondents to desist from
enforcing the same and/or keeping the documents, papers and effects seized by virtue thereof,
as well as from enforcing the tax assessments on petitioner corporation alleged by petitioners to
have been made on the basis of the said documents, papers and effects, and to order the return
of the latter to petitioners. We gave due course to the petition but did not issue the writ of
preliminary injunction prayed for therein.

The pertinent facts of this case, as gathered from record, are as follows:

On February 24, 1970, respondent Misael P. Vera, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, wrote a
letter addressed to respondent Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search
warrant against petitioners for violation of Section 46(a) of the National Internal Revenue Code,
in relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sections 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209,
and authorizing Revenue Examiner Rodolfo de Leon, one of herein respondents, to make and
file the application for search warrant which was attached to the letter.

In the afternoon of the following day, February 25, 1970, respondent De Leon and his witness,
respondent Arturo Logronio, went to the Court of First Instance of Rizal. They brought with them
the following papers: respondent Vera’s aforesaid letter-request; an application for search
warrant already filled up but still unsigned by respondent De Leon; an affidavit of respondent
Logronio subscribed before respondent De Leon; a deposition in printed form of respondent
Logronio already accomplished and signed by him but not yet subscribed; and a search warrant
already accomplished but still unsigned by respondent Judge.

At that time respondent Judge was hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note, he instructed
his Deputy Clerk of Court to take the depositions of respondents De Leon and Logronio. After
the session had adjourned, respondent Judge was informed that the depositions had already
been taken. The stenographer, upon request of respondent Judge, read to him her stenographic
notes; and thereafter, respondent Judge asked respondent Logronio to take the oath and
warned him that if his deposition was found to be false and without legal basis, he could be
charged for perjury. Respondent Judge signed respondent de Leon’s application for search
warrant and respondent Logronio’s deposition, Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was then sign by
respondent Judge and accordingly issued.

Three days later, or on February 28, 1970, which was a Saturday, the BIR agents served the
search warrant petitioners at the offices of petitioner corporation on Ayala Avenue, Makati,
Rizal. Petitioners’ lawyers protested the search on the ground that no formal complaint or
transcript of testimony was attached to the warrant. The agents nevertheless proceeded with
their search which yielded six boxes of documents.

On March 3, 1970, petitioners filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal praying
that the search warrant be quashed, dissolved or recalled, that preliminary prohibitory and
mandatory writs of injunction be issued, that the search warrant be declared null and void, and
that the respondents be ordered to pay petitioners, jointly and severally, damages and
attorney’s fees. On March 18, 1970, the respondents, thru the Solicitor General, filed an answer
to the petition. After hearing, the court, presided over by respondent Judge, issued on July 29,
1970, an order dismissing the petition for dissolution of the search warrant. In the meantime, or
on April 16, 1970, the Bureau of Internal Revenue made tax assessments on petitioner
corporation in the total sum of P2,594,729.97, partly, if not entirely, based on the documents
thus seized. Petitioners came to this Court.

The petition should be granted for the following reasons:

1. Respondent Judge failed to personally examine the complainant and his witness.

The pertinent provisions of the Constitution of the Philippines and of the Revised Rules of Court
are:

"(3) The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized." (Art. III, Sec. 1, Constitution.)

"SEC. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue but upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined by the judge or justice
of the peace after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized.

"No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.

"SEC. 4. Examination of the applicant. — The judge or justice of the peace must, before issuing
the warrant, personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he
may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to
any affidavits presented to him." (Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court.)
The examination of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, required by Art. III,
Sec. 1, par. 3, of the Constitution, and by Secs. 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of
Court, should be conducted by the judge himself and not by others. The phrase "which shall be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce," appearing in the said constitutional provision, was introduced by
Delegate Francisco as an amendment to the draft submitted by the Sub-Committee of Seven.
The following discussion in the Constitutional Convention (Laurel, Proceedings of the Philippine
Constitutional Convention, Vol. III, pp. 755-757) is enlightening:

"SR. ORENSE. Vamos a dejar compañero los piropos y vamos al grano.

En los casos de una necesidad de actuar inmediatamente para que no se frusten los fines de la
justicia mediante el registro inmediato y la incautacion del cuerpo del delito, no cree Su Señoria
que causaria cierta demora el procedimiento apuntado en su enmienda en tal forma que podria
frustrar los fines de la justicia o si Su Señoria encuentra un remedio para esto casos con el fin
de compaginar los fines de la justicia con los derechos del individuo en su persona, bienes
etcetera, etcetera.

"SR. FRANCISCO. No puedo ver en la practica el caso hipottico que Su Señoria pregunta por
la siguiente razon: el que solicita un mandamiento de registro tiene que hacerlo por escrito y
ese escrito no aparecer en la Mesa del Juez sin que alguien vaya el juez a presentar ese
escrito o peticion de sucuestro. Esa persona que presenta el registro puede ser el mismo
denunciante o alguna persona que solicita dicho mandamiento de registro. Ahora toda la
enmienda en esos casos consiste en que haya peticion de registro y el juez no se atendra
solamente a sea peticion sino que el juez examiner a ese denunciante y si tiene testigos tambin
examiner a los testigos.

"SR. ORENSE. No cree Su Señoria que el tomar le declaracion de ese denunciante por escrito
siempre requeriria algun tiempo?.

"SR. FRANCISCO. Seria cuestio de un par de horas, pero por otro lado minimizamos en todo lo
posible las vejaciones injustas con la expedicion arbitraria de los mandamientos de registro.
Creo que entre dos males debemos escoger. el menor.

x x x

"MR. LAUREL. . . . The reason why we are in favor of this amendment is because we are
incorporating in our constitution something of a fundamental character. Now, before a judge
could issue a search warrant, he must be under the obligation to examine personally under oath
the complainant and if he has any witness, the witnesses that he may produce . . ."cralaw
virtua1aw library

The implementing rule in the Revised Rules of Court, Sec. 4, Rule 126, is more emphatic and
candid, for it requires the judge, before issuing a search warrant, to "personally examine on oath
or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

Personal examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses is necessary to enable
him to determine the existence or non-existence of a probable cause, pursuant to Art. III, Sec. 1,
par. 3, of the Constitution, and Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, both of which
prohibit the issuance of warrants except "upon probable cause." The determination of whether
or not a probable cause exists calls for the exercise of judgment after a judicial appraisal of facts
and should not be allowed to be delegated in the absence of any rule to the contrary.

In the case at bar, no personal examination at all was conducted by respondent Judge of the
complainant (respondent De Leon) and his witness (respondent Logronio). While it is true that
the complainant’s application for search warrant and the witness’ printed-form deposition were
subscribed and sworn to before respondent Judge, the latter did not ask either of the two any
question the answer to which could possibly be the basis for determining whether or not there
was probable cause against herein petitioners. Indeed, the participants seem to have attached
so little significance to the matter that notes of the proceedings before respondent Judge were
not even taken. At this juncture it may be well to recall the salient facts. The transcript of
stenographic notes (pp. 61-76, April 1, 1970, Annex J-2 of the Petition) taken at the hearing of
this case in the court below shows that per instruction of respondent Judge, Mr. Eleodoro V.
Gonzales, Special Deputy Clerk of Court, took the depositions of the complainant and his
witness, and that stenographic notes thereof were taken by Mrs. Gaspar. At that time
respondent Judge was at the sala hearing a case. After respondent Judge was through with the
hearing, Deputy Clerk Gonzales, stenographer Gaspar, complainant De Leon and witness
Logronio went to respondent Judge’s chamber and informed the Judge that they had finished
the depositions. Respondent Judge then requested the stenographer to read to him her
stenographic notes. Special Deputy Clerk Gonzales testified as follows:

"A And after finishing reading the stenographic notes, the Honorable Judge requested or
instructed them, requested Mr. Logronio to raise his hand and warned him if his deposition will
be found to be false and without legal basis, he can be charged criminally for perjury. The
Honorable Court told Mr. Logronio whether he affirms the facts contained in his deposition and
the affidavit executed before Mr. Rodolfo de Leon.

"Q And thereafter?

"A And thereafter, he signed the deposition of Mr. Logronio.

"Q Who is this he?

"A The Honorable Judge.

"Q The deposition or the affidavit?

"A The affidavit, Your Honor."

Thereafter, respondent Judge signed the search warrant.

The participation of respondent Judge in the proceedings which led to the issuance of Search
Warrant No. 2-M-70 was thus limited to listening to the stenographer’s readings of her notes, to
a few words of warning against the commission of perjury, and to administering the oath to the
complainant and his witness. This cannot be considered a personal examination. If there was an
examination at all of the complainant and his witness, it was the one conducted by the Deputy
Clerk of Court. But, as stated, the Constitution and the rules require a personal examination by
the judge. It was precisely on account of the intention of the delegates to the Constitutional
Convention to make it a duty of the issuing judge to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses that the question of how much time would be consumed by the judge in examining
them came up before the Convention, as can be seen from the record of the proceedings
quoted above. The reading of the stenographic notes to respondent Judge did not constitute
sufficient compliance with the constitutional mandate and the rule; for by that manner
respondent Judge did not have the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the complainant and
his witness, and to propound initial and follow-up questions which the judicial mind, on account
of its training, was in the best position to conceive. These were important in arriving at a sound
inference on the all-important question of whether or not there was probable cause.

2. The search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense.

Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was issued for" [v]iolation of Sec. 46(a) of the National Internal
Revenue Code in relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof particularly Secs. 53, 72, 73,
208 and 209." The question is: Was the said search warrant issued "in connection with one
specific offense," as required by Sec. 3, Rule 126?

To arrive at the correct answer it is essential to examine closely the provisions of the Tax Code
referred to above. Thus we find the following:

Sec. 46(a) requires the filing of income tax returns by corporations.

Sec. 53 requires the withholding of income taxes at source.

Sec. 72 imposes surcharges for failure to render income tax returns and for rendering false and
fraudulent returns.

Sec. 73 provides the penalty for failure to pay the income tax, to make a return or to supply the
information required under the Tax Code.

Sec. 208 penalizes" [a]ny person who distills, rectifies, repacks, compounds, or manufactures
any article subject to a specific tax, without having paid the privilege tax therefore, or who aids
or abets in the conduct of illicit distilling, rectifying, compounding, or illicit manufacture of any
article subject to specific tax . . .," and provides that in the case of a corporation, partnership, or
association, the official and/or employee who caused the violation shall be responsible.

Sec. 209 penalizes the failure to make a return of receipts, sales, business, or gross value of
output removed, or to pay the tax due thereon.

The search warrant in question was issued for at least four distinct offenses under the Tax
Code. The first is the violation of Sec. 46(a), Sec. 72 and Sec. 73 (the filing of income tax
returns), which are interrelated. The second is the violation of Sec. 53 (withholding of income
taxes at source). The third is the violation of Sec. 208 (unlawful pursuit of business or
occupation); and the fourth is the violation of Sec. 209 (failure to make a return of receipts,
sales, business or gross value of output actually removed or to pay the tax due thereon). Even
in their classification the six above-mentioned provisions are embraced in two different titles:
Secs. 46(a), 53, 72 and 73 are under Title II (Income Tax); while Secs. 208 and 209 are under
Title V (Privilege Tax on Business and Occupation).

Respondents argue that Stonehill, Et. Al. v. Diokno, Et Al., L-19550, June 19, 1967 (20 SCRA
383), is not applicable, because there the search warrants were issued for "violation of Central
Bank Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code;" whereas, here Search Warrant
No 2-M-70 was issued for violation of only one code, i.e., the National Internal Revenue Code.
The distinction more apparent than real, because it was precisely on account of the Stonehill
incident, which occurred sometime before the present Rules of Court took effect on January 1,
1964, that this Court amended the former rule by inserting therein the phrase "in connection
with one specific offense," and adding the sentence "No search warrant shall issue for more
than one specific offense," in what is now Sec. 3, Rule 126. Thus we said in Stonehill:

"Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search
warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of
Court that ‘a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offense.’ Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph,
directing that ‘no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.’"

3. The search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized.

The documents, papers and effects sought to be seized are described in Search Warrant No. 2-
M-70 in this manner:

"Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals, columnars, receipts and
disbursements books, customers ledgers); receipts for payments received; certificates of stocks
and securities; contracts, promissory notes and deeds of sale; telex and coded messages;
business communications, accounting and business records; checks and check stubs; records
of bank deposits and withdrawals; and records of foreign remittances, covering the years 1966
to 1970."

The description does not meet the requirement in Art III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and of Sec.
3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, that the warrant should particularly describe the
things to be seized.

In Stonehill, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, said:

"The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search
warrants was compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and
seized, to wit:

‘Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,

portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or paper showing all business
transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss
statements.’

"Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal.
The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned
corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of
Rights — that the things to be seized be particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its
major objective: the elimination of general warrants."

While the term "all business transactions" does not appear in Search Warrant No. 2-M-70, the
said warrant nevertheless tends to defeat the major objective of the Bill of Rights, i.e., the
elimination of general warrants, for the language used therein is so all-embracing as to include
all conceivable records of petitioner corporation, which, if seized, could possibly render its
business inoperative.
In Uy Kheytin, Et. Al. v. Villareal, etc., Et Al., 42 Phil. 886, 896, this Court had occasion to
explain the purpose of the requirement that the warrant should particularly describe the place to
be searched and the things to be seized, to wit:

". . . Both the Jones Law (sec. 3) and General Orders No. 58 (sec. 97) specifically require that a
search warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be
seized. The evident purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the things to be seized to
those, and only those, particularly described in the search warrant — to leave the officers of the
law with no discretion regarding what articles they shall seize, to the end that ‘unreasonable
searches and seizures’ may not be made, — that abuses may not be committed. That this is the
correct interpretation of this constitutional provision is borne out by American authorities."cralaw
virtua1aw library

The purpose as thus explained could, surely and effectively, be defeated under the search
warrant issued in this case.

A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the
description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow (People v. Rubio; 57
Phil. 384); or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact — not of law — by which the
warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure (idem., dissent of Abad
Santos, J.,); or when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the
offense for which the warrant is being issued (Sec. 2, Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court). The
herein search warrant does not conform to any of the foregoing tests. If the articles desired to
be seized have any direct relation to an offense committed, the applicant must necessarily have
some evidence, other than those articles, to prove the said offense; and the articles subject of
search and seizure should come in handy merely to strengthen such evidence. In this event, the
description contained in the herein disputed warrant should have mentioned, at least, the dates,
amounts, persons, and other pertinent data regarding the receipts of payments, certificates of
stocks and securities, contracts, promissory notes, deeds of sale, messages and
communications, checks, bank deposits and withdrawals, records of foreign remittances, among
others, enumerated in the warrant.

Respondents contend that certiorari does not lie because petitioners failed to file a motion for
reconsideration of respondent Judge’s order of July 29, 1970. The contention is without merit. In
the first place, when the questions raised before this Court are the same as those which were
squarely raised in and passed upon by the court below, the filing of a motion for reconsideration
in said court before certiorari can be instituted in this Court is no longer a prerequisite. (Pajo,
etc., Et. Al. v. Ago, Et Al., 108 Phil., 905). In the second place, the rule requiring the filing of a
motion for reconsideration before an application for a writ of certiorari can be entertained was
never intended to be applied without considering the circumstances. (Matutina v. Buslon, Et Al.,
109 Phil., 140.) In the case at bar time is of the essence in view of the tax assessments sought
to be enforced by respondent officers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue against petitioner
corporation, On account of which immediate and more direct action becomes necessary.
(Matute v. Court of Appeals, Et Al., 26 SCRA 768.) Lastly, the rule does not apply where, as in
this case, the deprivation of petitioners’ fundamental right to due process taints the proceeding
against them in the court below not only with irregularity but also with nullity. (Matute v. Court of
Appeals, Et Al., supra.)

It is next contended by respondents that a corporation is not entitled to protection against

unreasonable search and seizures. Again, we find no merit in the contention.
"Although, for the reasons above stated, we are of the opinion that an officer of a corporation
which is charged with a violation of a statute of the state of its creation, or of an act of Congress
passed in the exercise of its constitutional powers, cannot refuse to produce the books and
papers of such corporation, we do not wish to be understood as holding that a corporation is not
entitled to immunity, under the 4th Amendment, against unreasonable searches and seizures. A
corporation is, after all, but an association of individuals under an assumed name and with a
distinct legal entity. In organizing itself as a collective body it waives no constitutional immunities
appropriate to such body. Its property cannot be taken without compensation. It can only be
proceeded against by due process of law, and is protected, under the 14th Amendment, against
unlawful discrimination . . ." (Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 50 L. ed. 652.)

"In Linn v. United States, 163 C.C.A. 470, 251 Fed. 476, 480, it was thought that a different rule
applied to a corporation, the ground that it was not privileged from producing its books and
papers. But the rights of a corporation against unlawful search and seizure are to be protected
even if the same result might have been achieved in a lawful way." (Silverthorne Lumber
Company, Et. Al. v. United States of America, 251 U.S. 385, 64 L. ed. 319.)

In Stonehill, Et. Al. v. Diokno, Et Al., supra, this Court impliedly recognized the right of a
corporation to object against unreasonable searches and seizures, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the
legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple
reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the
personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or the interest of
each of them in said corporations, whatever, the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is
well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have
been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely
personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. Consequently, petitioners herein may not
validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized
from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to
the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the
seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against
them in their individual capacity . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

In the Stonehill case only the officers of the various corporations in whose offices documents,
papers and effects were searched and seized were the petitioners. In the case at bar, the
corporation to whom the seized documents belong, and whose rights have thereby been
impaired, is itself a petitioner. On that score, petitioner corporation here stands on a different
footing from the corporations in Stonehill.

The tax assessments referred to earlier in this opinion were, if not entirely — as claimed by
petitioners — at least partly — as in effect admitted by respondents — based on the documents
seized by virtue of Search Warrant No. 2-M-70. Furthermore, the fact that the assessments
were made some one and one-half months after the search and seizure on February 25, 1970,
is a strong indication that the documents thus seized served as basis for the assessments.
Those assessments should therefore not be enforced.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is granted. Accordingly, Search Warrant No. 2-M-70
issued by respondent Judge is declared null and void; respondents are permanently enjoined
from enforcing the said search warrant; the documents, papers and effects seized thereunder
are ordered to be returned to petitioners; and respondent officials the Bureau of Internal
Revenue and their representatives are permanently enjoined from enforcing the assessments
mentioned in Annex "G" of the present petition, as well as other assessments based on the
documents, papers and effects seized under the search warrant herein nullified, and from using
the same against petitioners in any criminal or other proceeding. No pronouncement as to costs.
 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-28642 April 30, 1976

MARIA CASTRO and CO LING petitioners,

vs.
HONORABLE JAVIER PABALAN, Judge of the Court of First Instance of La Union, and
SGT. ERNESTO LUMANG, respondents.

Marcelino B. Florentino for petitioners.

Jose L Yumang for respondent Sgt. Ernesto Lumang. Hon. Javier Pabalan for and in his own
behalf.

FERNANDO, J.:

This Court is confronted anew in this certiorari proceeding with the claim that a search warrant
issued without complying with the requisites of the Constitution 1 and the Rules of Court 2 should
have been nullified, but was not in the challenged order of respondent Judge Javier
Pabalan. 3 More specifically, it was the failure of the application for the search warrant as well as
the search warrant itself to specify the specific offense, to examine the applicant as well as his
witnesses on the part of respondent Judge, and to describe with particularity the place to be
searched and the things to be seized, that were singled out to justify the assertion of illegality.
When required to answer, respondent Judge did not bother to refute specifically the allegations
of the petition for certiorari, but merely contented himself with inviting attention to the challenged
order as well as the resolutions denying the motion for reconsideration and with the statement
that he "has no particular prayer to ask the Supreme Court," an assertion thereafter repeated in
the second paragraph of his two-paragraph answer that he "has no request to make in this
particular case leaving the issues entirely to the discretion of the Supreme Court." 4 The tone of
diffidence, almost of apology, is easy to understand. It is difficult to resist the thought that
respondent Judge failed to pay heed to authoritative decisions of this Court. The most cursory
perusal of the application for search warrant 5 by respondent Lumang and the search warrant
itself, 6 yields no other conclusion. Respondent Judge ignored what the Constitution requires on
two points, the existence of a probable cause and the particular description of the things to be
seized. The limitation as to the specific offense as mandated by the Rules of Court was not
observed either. Even on the assumption then that he could not

relevant According to the former: "A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense to be determined by the municipal or city judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. No
search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense." Section 4 provides: "The
municipal or city judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine on oath or
affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in
writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him." be held
chargeable with knowledge of the leading Stonehill decision, 7 announced barely twenty days
before the search warrant in question was issued, still from Alverez v. Court of First
Instance 8 the first to be decided under the 1935 Constitution, promulgated in 1937, to Oca v.
Marquez, 9 that came out in 1965, this Court had adhered firmly to the view that for a search
warrant to escape the imputation of being unreasonable, there should be strict conformity with
the requirements of the Constitution and the applicable procedural rules. The finding then
should have been against the validity of the search warrant. Nonetheless, insofar as such order
limited itself to requiring the return solely of the liquor, the pack of playing cards, the bottle of
distilled water and five bottles of Streptomycin, all of which may be considered as personal
effects of petitioners, with the rest of the goods taken falling under the category of things
forbidden by law and therefore need not be restored, 10 it can be sustained. So we rule.

In the opening paragraph of the application for search warrant, respondent Ernesto I. Lumang
admitted that "he has been informed" and therefore was of the belief that petitioners Maria
Castro and Co Ling, whose place of residence was not even indicated, although subsequently
mention was made of their being at Barrio Padasil, Bangar, La Union, "have in possession
narcotics and other contraband." 11 There is a claim that he had verified the report and that
therefore he had "reasons to believe that a Search Warrant should be issued to enable the
undersigned to take possession" of such narcotics and other contraband. 12 The application was
accompanied by the joint affidavit of a Sergeant Francisco C. Molina and a Corporal Lorenzo G.
Apilado of the Philippine Constabulary. 13 Again, mention was merely made of their information
about narcotics and other contraband being kept by petitioners. They did allege therein that they
conducted rigid surveillance, but all they could come out with is that petitioner Co Ling is an
overstaying alien for almost ten years conducting such traffic and that after verification, he was
not registered in the Immigration Office. 14 Then, on the very same day, July 10, 1967, the
search warrant was issued for illegal traffic of narcotics and contraband. 15 Again, there was
reference to the possession by petitioners of such forbidden goods. As to the complete and
detailed description of the properties to be seized, the search warrant merely mentioned illegal
traffic of narcotics and contraband inside the warehouse and premises of petitioners. 16 In the
resolution upholding the validity of the search warrant, respondent Judge did state the following:
"On July 10, 1967, Ernesto Lumang, Sgt. of the PC, with a long service behind, appeared in
chamber before the Presiding Judge of Branch I of this Court. With him were Sgt. Molina and
Cpl. Apilado both of the PC Command of La Union. The three submitted to the Presiding Judge
in chamber an application for search warrant which is Exhibit I in this case and a joint affidavit
supporting the search warrant asked. As Sgt. Lumang said, testifying regarding this incident,
those appearing were asked, although not in writing and not recorded, some questions by the
Presiding Judge regarding their request of the search warrant on the knowledge of Molina and
Apilado on the facts stated on the application and on the joint affidavit. The inquiry was brief.
The barrio to be searched was handwritten in ink, Maria Cristina cancelling the typewritten
name Padasil. But this correction was not done in the duplicates. Anyhow Padasil and Maria
Cristina are adjoining barrios. After the routine taking of their oath and examination questions
and answers, the Presiding Judge of this Branch signed the application for search warrant, the
joint affidavits, and forthwith issued the search warrant which is Exhibit C." 17

As set forth at the outset, failure to abide by both the Constitution and the procedural law in
terms of the existence of a probable cause, a particular description of the property to be seized
and the requirement that there be only one specific offense, is quite manifest.

1. This excerpt from the epochal opinion of former Chief Justice Concepcion in Stonehill v.
Diokno 18 is highly relevant: "Two points must be stressed in connection with — this
constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant
shall particularly describe the things to be seized. None of these requirements has been
complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon applications
stating that the natural and juridical persons therein named had committed a 'violation of Central
Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.' In
other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof
with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for
the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same
presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has
performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our
criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any
specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be a legal heresy, of the highest order, to
convict anybody of a 'violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code,' — as alleged in the aforementioned applications —
without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or codes."19 That same approach is
reflected in the two subsequent cases of Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. v. Ruiz 20 and Asian Surety &
Insurance Co., Inc. v. Herrera. 21 It bears repeating, as was emphasized in Stonehill v. Diokno,
that the averments as to the alleged commission of the offenses imputed to petitioner
were abstract. As admitted in the challenged order, the inquiry was brief. Subsequently,
reference was made to "the routine taking of [their oath] and examination questions and
answers ..." 22 Nor can such perfunctory manner in which respondent Judge conducted the
required "examination under oath" be justified merely because respondent Lumang was "a
Sergeant of the PC, with a long service behind [him]." 23Moreover, contrary to the Rules of
Court, he did not even bother to take the depositions of the witnesses in writing, attaching them
to the record. 24 There was thus a manifest and palpable violation of the constitutional standard
as to the quantum of proof to show the existence of probable cause, as so clearly enunciated in
Stonehill.

2. Then again, the Constitution requires, for the validity of a search warrant, that there be a
particular description of "the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." 25 As
was admitted by the judge in the challenged resolution, there was a mistake concerning the
residence of petitioners, which was set forth in the search warrant as being in Barrio Padasil
when in fact it is in Barrio Maria Cristina. He would gloss over such inaccuracy by saying that
they were, anyway, adjoining barrios. As to the premises to be searched, it may be admitted
that the deficiency in the writ is not of sufficient gravity to call for its invalidation. Nonetheless,
and again in line with Stonehill v. Diokno, the Constitution is quite explicit that there be a
particular description of the things to be seized. That requisite was not complied with in this
case. That would explain why the searching party felt it had a free hand and did take possession
of various kinds of goods, including personal effects, which respondent Judge himself would
have them return. What was aptly characterized as a "major objective" of this constitutional
provision, the elimination of general warrants, was thus frustrated. It need not be stressed anew
that this Court is resolutely committed to the doctrine that this constitutional provision is of a
mandatory character and therefore must be strictly complied with. 26 To quote from the landmark
American decision of Boyd v. United States: 27 "It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the
constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. Their motto
should be obsta principis." 28

3. Another infirmity was the failure to comply with the basic procedural requisite that a search
warrant "shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offense." 29 Here reference was made to "an illegal traffic of narcotics and contraband." The
latter is a generic term covering all goods exported from or imported into the country contrary to
applicable statutes. Necessarily then, more than one offense could arise from the activity
designated as illegal traffic of narcotics and contraband. As a matter of fact, in the challenged
order, reference was made to at least three charges having been filed, the violation of Section
203 of the Internal Revenue Code, its Section 1039 on tax evasion, as well as illegal possession
of opium. It would seem that once again what was correctly pointed out by Chief Justice
Concepcion in Stonehill v. Diokno as unjustified and unwarranted finds application. Nor can
there be any plausibility to the possible excuse, to repeat what was said before, that the
Stonehill opinion having been rendered only twenty days previous to the issuance of the search
warrant, respondent Judge could not be held chargeable with a knowledge thereof, considering
that as far back as July 30, 1965, two years earlier, in Oca v. Marquez, 30 this Court, through the
then Justice J. P. Bengzon, enunciated: "The decision herein has applied the provisions of th
Old Rules of Court since this case arose under said Rules. Attention of the Bench and Bar is
however called to the fact that effective January 1, 1964 the issuance of search warrants is
governed by Section 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court which among other things
requires that a search warrant must be in connection with one specific offense." 31

4. As was made clear at the outset, though, the illegality of the search warrant does not call for
the return of the things seized, the possession of which is prohibited by law. This is the
established doctrine in this jurisdiction. As far back as Uy Kheytin v. Villareal, 32 a 1920 decision,
it was held: "That although in the issuance of the search warrant in question the judge did not
comply with the requirements of section 98 of General Orders No. 58, the petitioners are not
entitled to the return of the opium. and its paraphernalia which were found and seized under
said warrant, and much less are they entitled to be exonerated because of such omission of the
judge." 33 Among the authorities cited is Cooley: "'Search-warrants have heretofore been
allowed to search for stolen goods, for goods supposed to have been smuggled into the country
in violation of the revenue laws, for implements of gaming or counterfeiting, for lottery tickets or
Prohibited liquors kept for sale contrary to law, for obscene books and papers kept for sale or
circulation, and for powder or other explosive and dangerous material so kept as to endanger
the public safety.'" 34So, also, in Yee Sue Koy v. Almeda, 35 handed down in 1940, Justice
Laurel, speaking for this Court, stated: "If it be true, furthermore, without, however, deciding the
point, that as alleged by the respondents the articles in question constitute the corpus delicti of
the Usury Law, their return to the petitioners cannot be ordered." 36 Magoncia v.
Palacios, 37 promulgated in 1948, reiterated such a doctrine. Thus: "En el asunto de Uy
Kheytin contra Villareal (42 Jur. Fil. 935), los recurrentes pidieron la devolucion del opio de que
se incautaron los constabularies al registrar su casa armados con un mandamiento de registro
expedido sin cumplir las disposiciones de los articulos 96 y 98 de la Orden General No. 58;
sostenian que los requisites exigidos por dichos articulos no se habian cumplido, y por tanto, el
mandamiento de registro era ilegal, como si no existiera; que al registro se ha hecho sin
mandamiento de registro debidamente expedido. Este Tribunal denego la peticion, declarando
que la irregularidad de la expedicion del mandamiento de registro ne era suficiente causa para
ordenar la devolucion del opio. El Hon. Juez recurrido no abuso de su discrecion al denegar la
devolucion al acusado del paltik, 42 municiones y una granada de mano, tampoco abuso de su
sana discrecion al denegar la peticion del acusado de que se prohiba al Fiscal Provincial y al
Jefe de Policia de Asingan, Pangasinan a presentar tales efectos como prueba en la vista." 38

5. This decision leaves open the question of the legality of any possible use that may be made
by the prosecuting authorities of the articles seized under an invalid search warrant. Here,
again, the Yee Sue Koy opinion of Justice Laurel is illuminating, especially in view of the
inadmissibility of evidence illegally seized under the present Constitution 39 At this stage, the
question does not have to be faced. The words of Justice Laurel follow: "While we reiterate the
rule that the seizure of books and documents by means of a search warrant ' for the purpose of
using them as evidence in a criminal case against the person in whose possession they were
found is unconstitutional because it makes the warrant unreasonable, and it is equivalent to a
violation of the constitutional provision prohibiting the compulsion of an accused to testify
against himself ..., the said rule has no applicable force in the present case. ... In the application
for the issuance of the search warrant in question, it was alleged that the articles seized were
'being used by it (Sam Sing & Co.) in connection with its activities of lending money at usurious
rate of interest in violation of the Usury Law,' and it is now suggested (memoranda of
respondents) that the only object of the agents of the Anti-Usury Board in keeping the articles is
to prevent the petitioners from employing them as a means of further violations of the Usury
Law. In this state of the record, without deciding the question whether the petitioners will in fact
use the articles in question, if returned, for illegal purposes, we are not prepared to order the
return prayed for by the petitioners. (Cf. People v. Rubio, 57 Phil. 384, 394-395.)" 40

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the order of September 12, 1967 denying the
motion of petitioners to annul the search warrant as well as the resolutions of October 26, 1967
and January 29, 1968 denying the motions for reconsiderations are reversed, the decision of
this Court being that the search warrant in question is tainted by illegality for being violative both
of the Constitution and the Rules of Court. It is likewise the decision of this Court that
notwithstanding the illegality of such search warrant, the challenged order of respondent Judge
can be sustained only insofar as it would limit the return of the articles seized to the liquor, the
pack of playing cards, the bottle of distilled water and five bottles of Streptomycin taken under
such search warrant. No costs.
 EN BANC

G.R. No. L-64261 December 26, 1984

JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS, JR., BAYANI SORIANO and J. BURGOS MEDIA
SERVICES, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE
CONSTABULARY, THE CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER, PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY COMMAND,
THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, ET AL., respondents.

Lorenzo M. Tañada, Wigberto E. Tañada, Martiniano Vivo, Augusto Sanchez, Joker P. Arroyo,
Jejomar Binay and Rene Saguisag for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:

Assailed in this petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injunction is the validity of two [2] search warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by
respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano, Executive Judge of the then Court of First Instance of
Rizal [Quezon City], under which the premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon
City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of
the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office
and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the
printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers,
documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of
petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized.

Petitioners further pray that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued
for the return of the seized articles, and that respondents, "particularly the Chief Legal Officer,
Presidential Security Command, the Judge Advocate General, AFP, the City Fiscal of Quezon
City, their representatives, assistants, subalterns, subordinates, substitute or successors" be
enjoined from using the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and
the other accused in Criminal Case No. Q- 022782 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
entitled People v. Jose Burgos, Jr. et al. 1

In our Resolution dated June 21, 1983, respondents were required to answer the petition. The
plea for preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction was set for hearing on June 28, 1983,
later reset to July 7, 1983, on motion of the Solicitor General in behalf of respondents.

At the hearing on July 7, 1983, the Solicitor General, while opposing petitioners' prayer for a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction, manifested that respondents "will not use the
aforementioned articles as evidence in the aforementioned case until final resolution of the
legality of the seizure of the aforementioned articles. ..." 2 With this manifestation, the prayer for
preliminary prohibitory injunction was rendered moot and academic.
Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition on the ground that petitioners had come
to this Court without having previously sought the quashal of the search warrants before
respondent judge. Indeed, petitioners, before impugning the validity of the warrants before this
Court, should have filed a motion to quash said warrants in the court that issued them. 3 But this
procedural flaw notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness
and urgency of the constitutional issues raised not to mention the public interest generated by
the search of the "We Forum" offices, which was televised in Channel 7 and widely publicized in
all metropolitan dailies. The existence of this special circumstance justifies this Court to exercise
its inherent power to suspend its rules. In the words of the revered Mr. Justice Abad Santos in
the case of C. Vda. de Ordoveza v. Raymundo, 4 "it is always in the power of the court
[Supreme Court] to suspend its rules or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever
the purposes of justice require it...".

Respondents likewise urge dismissal of the petition on ground of laches. Considerable stress is
laid on the fact that while said search warrants were issued on December 7, 1982, the instant
petition impugning the same was filed only on June 16, 1983 or after the lapse of a period of
more than six [6] months.

Laches is failure or negligence for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 5

Petitioners, in their Consolidated Reply, explained the reason for the delay in the filing of the
petition thus:

Respondents should not find fault, as they now do [p. 1, Answer, p. 3,

Manifestation] with the fact that the Petition was filed on June 16, 1983, more
than half a year after the petitioners' premises had been raided.

The climate of the times has given petitioners no other choice. If they had waited
this long to bring their case to court, it was because they tried at first to exhaust
other remedies. The events of the past eleven fill years had taught them that
everything in this country, from release of public funds to release of detained
persons from custody, has become a matter of executive benevolence or
largesse

Hence, as soon as they could, petitioners, upon suggestion of persons close to

the President, like Fiscal Flaminiano, sent a letter to President Marcos, through
counsel Antonio Coronet asking the return at least of the printing equipment and
vehicles. And after such a letter had been sent, through Col. Balbino V. Diego,
Chief Intelligence and Legal Officer of the Presidential Security Command, they
were further encouraged to hope that the latter would yield the desired results.

After waiting in vain for five [5] months, petitioners finally decided to come to
Court. [pp. 123-124, Rollo]

Although the reason given by petitioners may not be flattering to our judicial system, We find no
ground to punish or chastise them for an error in judgment. On the contrary, the extrajudicial
efforts exerted by petitioners quite evidently negate the presumption that they had abandoned
their right to the possession of the seized property, thereby refuting the charge of laches against
them.

Respondents also submit the theory that since petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. had used and marked
as evidence some of the seized documents in Criminal Case No. Q- 022872, he is now
estopped from challenging the validity of the search warrants. We do not follow the logic of
respondents. These documents lawfully belong to petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and he can do
whatever he pleases with them, within legal bounds. The fact that he has used them as
evidence does not and cannot in any way affect the validity or invalidity of the search warrants
assailed in this petition.

Several and diverse reasons have been advanced by petitioners to nullify the search warrants in
question.

1. Petitioners fault respondent judge for his alleged failure to conduct an examination under oath
or affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses, as mandated by the above-quoted
constitutional provision as wen as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court .6 This objection,
however, may properly be considered moot and academic, as petitioners themselves conceded
during the hearing on August 9, 1983, that an examination had indeed been conducted by
respondent judge of Col. Abadilla and his witnesses.

2. Search Warrants No. 20-82[a] and No. 20- 82[b] were used to search two distinct places: No.
19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City, respectively. Objection is interposed to the execution of Search Warrant No. 20-
82[b] at the latter address on the ground that the two search warrants pinpointed only one place
where petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was allegedly keeping and concealing the articles listed
therein, i.e., No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City. This assertion is based on that portion of
Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b] which states:

Which have been used, and are being used as instruments and means of
committing the crime of subversion penalized under P.D. 885 as amended and
he is keeping and concealing the same at 19 Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City.

The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. Precisely, two search warrants were
applied for and issued because the purpose and intent were to search two distinct premises. It
would be quite absurd and illogical for respondent judge to have issued two warrants intended
for one and the same place. Besides, the addresses of the places sought to be searched were
specifically set forth in the application, and since it was Col. Abadilla himself who headed the
team which executed the search warrants, the ambiguity that might have arisen by reason of the
typographical error is more apparent than real. The fact is that the place for which Search
Warrant No. 20- 82[b] was applied for was 728 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City, which address appeared in the opening paragraph of the said warrant. 7 Obviously
this is the same place that respondent judge had in mind when he issued Warrant No. 20-82 [b].

In the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be searched with
sufficient particularity, it has been held "that the executing officer's prior knowledge as to the
place intended in the warrant is relevant. This would seem to be especially true where the
executing officer is the affiant on whose affidavit the warrant had issued, and when he knows
that the judge who issued the warrant intended the building described in the affidavit, And it has
also been said that the executing officer may look to the affidavit in the official court file to
resolve an ambiguity in the warrant as to the place to be searched." 8

3. Another ground relied upon to annul the search warrants is the fact that although the warrants
were directed against Jose Burgos, Jr. alone, articles b belonging to his co-petitioners Jose
Burgos, Sr., Bayani Soriano and the J. Burgos Media Services, Inc. were seized.

Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the personal properties that may be
seized under a search warrant, to wit:

Sec. 2. Personal Property to be seized. — A search warrant may be issued for

the search and seizure of the following personal property:

[a] Property subject of the offense;

[b] Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of

the offense; and

[c] Property used or intended to be used as the means of

committing an offense.

The above rule does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by the person
against whom the search warrant is directed. It may or may not be owned by him. In fact, under
subsection [b] of the above-quoted Section 2, one of the properties that may be seized is stolen
property. Necessarily, stolen property must be owned by one other than the person in whose
possession it may be at the time of the search and seizure. Ownership, therefore, is of no
consequence, and it is sufficient that the person against whom the warrant is directed has
control or possession of the property sought to be seized, as petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was
alleged to have in relation to the articles and property seized under the warrants.

4. Neither is there merit in petitioners' assertion that real properties were seized under the
disputed warrants. Under Article 415[5] of the Civil Code of the Philippines, "machinery,
receptables, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry
or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to
meet the needs of the said industry or works" are considered immovable property. In Davao
Sawmill Co. v. Castillo9 where this legal provision was invoked, this Court ruled that machinery
which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement,
property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having
only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner.

In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which
the machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact
bolted to the ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.

5. The questioned search warrants were issued by respondent judge upon application of Col.
Rolando N. Abadilla Intelligence Officer of the P.C. Metrocom.10 The application was
accompanied by the Joint Affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, 11 members
of the Metrocom Intelligence and Security Group under Col. Abadilla which conducted a
surveillance of the premises prior to the filing of the application for the search warrants on
December 7, 1982.
It is contended by petitioners, however, that the abovementioned documents could not have
provided sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause upon which a warrant may validly
issue in accordance with Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which provides:

SEC. 3. ... and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer
as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

We find petitioners' thesis impressed with merit. Probable cause for a search is defined as such
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense
are in the place sought to be searched. And when the search warrant applied for is directed
against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive
materials, as in the case at bar, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a
specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is
intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice. Thus, the broad statement in Col.
Abadilla's application that petitioner "is in possession or has in his control printing equipment
and other paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which were used and are all
continuously being used as a means of committing the offense of subversion punishable under
Presidential Decree 885, as amended ..." 12 is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy
the requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding of the
existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search
warrant and it was a grave error for respondent judge to have done so.

Equally insufficient as basis for the determination of probable cause is the statement contained
in the joint affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, "that the evidence gathered
and collated by our unit clearly shows that the premises above- mentioned and the articles and
things above-described were used and are continuously being used for subversive activities in
conspiracy with, and to promote the objective of, illegal organizations such as the Light-a-Fire
Movement, Movement for Free Philippines, and April 6 Movement." 13

In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the
judge, ... after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce; 14 the Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by the complainant
or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified.
In Alvarez v. Court of First Instance, 15 this Court ruled that "the oath required must refer to the
truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the
purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit
and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause." As couched, the
quoted averment in said joint affidavit filed before respondent judge hardly meets the test of
sufficiency established by this Court in Alvarez case.

Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally
objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants. The search warrants describe
the articles sought to be seized in this wise:

1] All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo (equipment,

typewriters, cabinets, tables, communications/recording equipment, tape
 recorders, dictaphone and the like used and/or connected in the printing of the
"WE FORUM" newspaper and any and all documents communication, letters and
facsimile of prints related to the "WE FORUM" newspaper.

2] Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publication to

promote the objectives and piurposes of the subversive organization known as
Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement;
and,

3] Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE FORUM" and

other subversive materials and propaganda, more particularly,

1] Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;

2] DATSUN pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969

3] A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 524;

4] TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665;

and,

5] TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 427 with
marking "Bagong Silang."

In Stanford v. State of Texas 16 the search warrant which authorized the search for "books,
records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written
instruments concerning the Communist Party in Texas," was declared void by the U.S. Supreme
Court for being too general. In like manner, directions to "seize any evidence in connectionwith
the violation of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise" have been held too general, and that portion of a
search warrant which authorized the seizure of any "paraphernalia which could be used to
violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut General Statutes [the statute dealing with the crime of
conspiracy]" was held to be a general warrant, and therefore invalid. 17 The description of the
articles sought to be seized under the search warrants in question cannot be characterized
differently.

In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme Courts calls to mind a notable chapter in English
history: the era of disaccord between the Tudor Government and the English Press, when
"Officers of the Crown were given roving commissions to search where they pleased in order to
suppress and destroy the literature of dissent both Catholic and Puritan Reference herein to
such historical episode would not be relevant for it is not the policy of our government to
suppress any newspaper or publication that speaks with "the voice of non-conformity" but poses
no clear and imminent danger to state security.

As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and printing offices of the
"Metropolitan Mail" and the "We Forum newspapers. As a consequence of the search and
seizure, these premises were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the printing and
publication of said newspapers were discontinued.

Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the
press guaranteed under the fundamental law, 18 and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners'
freedom to express themselves in print. This state of being is patently anathematic to a
democratic framework where a free, alert and even militant press is essential for the political
enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.

Respondents would justify the continued sealing of the printing machines on the ground that
they have been sequestered under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 885, as amended,
which authorizes "the sequestration of the property of any person, natural or artificial, engaged
in subversive activities against the government and its duly constituted authorities ... in
accordance with implementing rules and regulations as may be issued by the Secretary of
National Defense." It is doubtful however, if sequestration could validly be effected in view of the
absence of any implementing rules and regulations promulgated by the Minister of National
Defense.

Besides, in the December 10, 1982 issue of the Daily Express, it was reported that no less than
President Marcos himself denied the request of the military authorities to sequester the property
seized from petitioners on December 7, 1982. Thus:

The President denied a request flied by government prosecutors for

sequestration of the WE FORUM newspaper and its printing presses, according
to Information Minister Gregorio S. Cendana.

On the basis of court orders, government agents went to the We Forum offices in
Quezon City and took a detailed inventory of the equipment and all materials in
the premises.

Cendaña said that because of the denial the newspaper and its equipment
remain at the disposal of the owners, subject to the discretion of the court. 19

That the property seized on December 7, 1982 had not been sequestered is further confirmed
by the reply of then Foreign Minister Carlos P. Romulo to the letter dated February 10, 1983 of
U.S. Congressman Tony P. Hall addressed to President Marcos, expressing alarm over the
"WE FORUM " case. 20 In this reply dated February 11, 1983, Minister Romulo stated:

2. Contrary to reports, President Marcos turned down the recommendation of our

authorities to close the paper's printing facilities and confiscate the equipment
and materials it uses. 21

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Search Warrants Nos. 20-82[a] and 20-82[b] issued by
respondent judge on December 7, 1982 are hereby declared null and void and are accordingly
set aside. The prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction for the return of the seized articles is
hereby granted and all articles seized thereunder are hereby ordered released to petitioners. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967

HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL

BECK, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in
his capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL
PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and
ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of Manila;
JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG,
Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ,
Municipal Court of Quezon City, respondents.

Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Meer, Meer and Meer and Juan T. David for
petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro,
Assistant Solicitor General Frine C. Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason and Solicitor C.
Padua for respondents.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin1 — hereinafter referred
to as Respondents-Prosecutors — several judges2 — hereinafter referred to as Respondents-
Judges — issued, on different dates,3 a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners
herein4 and/or the corporations of which they were officers,5 directed to the any peace officer, to
search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or
residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit:

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,

journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers
showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and
profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).

as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or
"used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the
applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."

Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the
Constitution and the Rules of Court — because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with
particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in
the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the
aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and
seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money
seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in
accordance with law — on March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this
original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending
final disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining
Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives from using the effects seized as
aforementioned or any copies thereof, in the deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in
due course, thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the contested search warrants and
declaring the same null and void, and commanding the respondents, their agents or
representatives to return to petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the
Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under
the search warrants in question.

In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the contested search warrants are
valid and have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any,
were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible
in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned
searches and seizures.

On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition.
However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as
the papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the corporations above mentioned
are concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards the papers, documents and things
found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.7

Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in
question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the
offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of
petitioners herein.

As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the
legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple
reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the
personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of
each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be.8 Indeed, it
is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have
been impaired thereby,9 and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely
personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may not
validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized
from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to
the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the
seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against
them in their individual capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been held:

. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to

the corporation did not relate to nor did it affect the personal defendants. If these papers
were unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional rights of or any one were invaded,
they were the rights of the corporation and not the rights of the other defendants. Next, it
is clear that a question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only by one whose
rights have been invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the
constitutional rights of defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of
whose homes had not been disturbed; nor could they claim for themselves the benefits
of the Fourth Amendment, when its violation, if any, was with reference to the rights
of another. Remus vs. United States (C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore, that
the question of the admissibility of the evidence based on an alleged unlawful search
and seizure does not extend to the personal defendants but
 embraces only the corporation whose property was taken. . . . (A Guckenheimer & Bros.
Co. vs. United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786, 789, Emphasis supplied.)

With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein,
the aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction
previously issued by this Court, 12 thereby, in effect, restraining herein Respondents-
Prosecutors from using them in evidence against petitioners herein.

In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions need be
settled, namely: (1) whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures
made under the authority thereof, are valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the preceding
question is in the negative, whether said documents, papers and things may be used in
evidence against petitioners herein.1äwphï1.ñët

Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general
warrants and that accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority there of are null and
void. In this connection, the Constitution 13provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue
but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set
forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.

None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the
same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named
had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said
applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a
consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the
existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that
the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or
committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of
fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein
petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation
of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code," — as alleged in the aforementioned applications — without reference to any determinate
provision of said laws or

To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the
most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the
domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims
caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the
constitutional provision above quoted — to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not
difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party in power
feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search
warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of
Court 14 by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search
warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Not
satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search
warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."

The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants
was compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized,
to wit:

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts,

ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers
showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and
related profit and loss statements.

Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal.
The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned
corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of
Rights — that the things to be seized be particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its
major objective: the elimination of general warrants.

Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that,
even if the searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents,
papers and things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein. Upon
mature deliberation, however, we are unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in the
Moncado case must be abandoned. Said position was in line with the American common law
rule, that the criminal should not be allowed to go free merely "because the constable has
blundered," 16 upon the theory that the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches
and seizures is protected by means other than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully
obtained, 17 such as the common-law action for damages against the searching officer, against
the party who procured the issuance of the search warrant and against those assisting in the
execution of an illegal search, their criminal punishment, resistance, without liability to an
unlawful seizure, and such other legal remedies as may be provided by other laws.

However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually
adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge
Learned Hand:

As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which
has been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the
constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending
official may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the
prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their
wrong will that wrong be repressed.18

In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already declared:
 If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence
against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring
his rights to be secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as
those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The
efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as
they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by
years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the
fundamental law of the land.19

This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent decisions on the same
Federal Court. 20After reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court held, in Mapp vs.
Ohio (supra.):

. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of the right of
privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen years on our books,
are led by it to close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by
official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved to all persons as a
specific guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct. We hold that all evidence
obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same
authority, inadmissible in a State.

Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against
the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against
them by the same sanction of exclusion as it used against the Federal Government.
Were it otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule the assurance against
unreasonable federal searches and seizures would be "a form of words," valueless and
underserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so
too, without that rule the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral
and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means
of coercing evidence as not to permit this Court's high regard as a freedom "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty." At the time that the Court held in Wolf that the
amendment was applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause, the cases of
this Court as we have seen, had steadfastly held that as to federal officers the Fourth
Amendment included the exclusion of the evidence seized in violation of its provisions.
Even Wolf "stoutly adhered" to that proposition. The right to when conceded operatively
enforceable against the States, was not susceptible of destruction by avulsion of the
sanction upon which its protection and enjoyment had always been deemed dependent
under the Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne Cases. Therefore, in extending the substantive
protections of due process to all constitutionally unreasonable searches — state or
federal — it was logically and constitutionally necessarily that the exclusion doctrine —
an essential part of the right to privacy — be also insisted upon as an essential
ingredient of the right newly recognized by the Wolf Case. In short, the admission of the
new constitutional Right by Wolf could not tolerate denial of its most important
constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence which an accused had
been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to grant the
right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment. Only last year the Court itself
recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule to "is to deter — to compel respect
for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way — by removing the
incentive to disregard it" . . . .
 The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire
system of constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. Having once
recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable
against the States, and that the right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by
state officers is, therefore constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that right to
remain an empty promise. Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like
effect as other basic rights secured by its Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit
it to be revocable at the whim of any police officer who, in the name of law enforcement
itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our decision, founded on reason and truth,
gives to the individual no more than that which the Constitution guarantees him to the
police officer no less than that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the
courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice. (emphasis
ours.)

Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the
applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the
commission of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no
reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon
the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to
find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant.
The only possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity
of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of
the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.

Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search warrant
and/or make unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect the constitutional
guarantee under consideration, overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in general,
committed By agents of the party in power, for, certainly, those belonging to the minority could
not possibly abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the handicap under which the
minority usually — but, understandably — finds itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one
must not lose sight of the fact that the psychological and moral effect of the possibility 21 of
securing their conviction, is watered down by the pardoning power of the party for whose benefit
the illegality had been committed.

In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court dated June
29, 1962, petitioners allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments, House No.
2008, Dewey Boulevard, House No. 1436, Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the Army-
Navy Club, should be included among the premises considered in said Resolution as
residences of herein petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl
Beck, respectively, and that, furthermore, the records, papers and other effects seized in the
offices of the corporations above referred to include personal belongings of said petitioners and
other effects under their exclusive possession and control, for the exclusion of which they have
a standing under the latest rulings of the federal courts of federal courts of the United States. 22

We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of and control
over the aforementioned records, papers and effects, and the alleged "personal" nature thereof,
has Been Advanced, not in their petition or amended petition herein, but in the Motion for
Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of June 29, 1962. In other words, said
theory would appear to be readjustment of that followed in said petitions, to suit the approach
intimated in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered and amended. Then, too, some of the
affidavits or copies of alleged affidavits attached to said motion for reconsideration, or submitted
in support thereof, contain either inconsistent allegations, or allegations inconsistent with the
theory now advanced by petitioners herein.

Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions said motion for
reconsideration, and the contents of the aforementioned affidavits and other papers submitted in
support of said motion, have sufficiently established the facts or conditions contemplated in the
cases relied upon by the petitioners; to warrant application of the views therein expressed,
should we agree thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it necessary to express our opinion
thereon, it being best to leave the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the
future.

We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby,
abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as
specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures
therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection
with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of herein
petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the
documents, papers and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are
concerned; that the aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as
it is hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as
regards the documents, papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices
and other premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to
costs.

It is so ordered.
G.R. No. L-31757 October 29, 1982

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. PIO MARCOS, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City and Benguet
Province and YU CUA SIO, owner and Manager, Suntory Grocery, respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

Yolando R. Busmente for private respondent.

RELOVA, J.:

Petitioner, through the Solicitor General, filed this petition to review on certiorari the order dated
October 13, 1969 of respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet
Province, declaring the issuance by the City Court of Search Warrant No. 459, as contrary to
law and ordering the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) agents and any person in
possession of the articles seized by virtue of the search warrant to deliver and return the same
to Yu Cua Sio, owner and/or manager of the Suntory Grocery.

On June 15, 1969, NBI Supervising Agent Jose Vicente filed an application for the issuance of a
search warrant with the City Court of Baguio City which provides, among others, the following:

That he has been reliably informed and verily believes that the owner and/or
manager of the Suntory Grocery, of 36 Rajah Soliman St., Baguio City has in his
possession and control stocks of San Miguel Gin, product of the La Tondeña,
Inc., Manila, which is adulterated, bearing fake auxiliary stamps, and using crown
caps not produced by the company, which is in violation of the provisions of
Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal Code.

... and therefore has reason enough to believe that a search warrant should be
issued to enable the undersigned to take possession and control and bring it to
this Court said stock, as evidence in the above case under investigation.

City Judge Patricio Perez of Baguio City, acting on the aforesaid application issued on June 15,
1967, Search Warrant No. 459, under the following terms:

Whereas, after examination under oath of Supervising Agent, NBI Jose Vicente
and Cesar de Leon, both of the NBI Regional Office, at Dagupan City, this Court
finds that there is probable cause to believe that the owner and/or manager of
the Suntory Grocery, located at No. 36 Rajah Soliman St., Baguio City, is in
possession such stock of La Tondena product, San Miguel Gin, which is
adulterated, bearing auxiliary stamps which is tampered and possession of
falsified or fake crown caps, which is now under investigation by the National
Bureau of Investigation, in this City.
 Therefore, you are hereby commanded during the day only to make an
immediate search on the premises of the store and/or grocery owned by the
Manager and/or proprietor of the Suntory Grocery which is located in No. 36
Rajah Soliman, of this City and if you should find the same to bring it forthwith
before me in the City Court of Baguio to be dealt with as the law directs.

Armed with said search warrant, the NBI agents, on June 19, 1967, searched the premises of
the Suntory Grocery located at 36 Rajah Soliman St., Baguio City, owned and managed by
private respondent Yu Cua Sio. During the search conducted in the presence of private
respondent and his wife, the NBI agents seized the following articles which were properly
inventoried and receipted:

(1) One (1) bundle consisting of rubber siphon, trainer and funnel;

(2) One (1) galvanized tank, 15" in diameter, 2 feet in height;

(3) One (1) mounted crown cap sealer with accessories;

(4) Six (6) cases of San Miguel Gin, round bottles, fined with suspected
adulterated Gin and bearing BIR stamps dated 6 April 1967;

(5) Two(2)cases of San Miguel Gin empty bottles;

(6) One (1) case containing ten (10) San Miguel Gin (adulterated) and 14 empty
bottles, without stamps;

(7) One (1) bundle consisting of two (2) bottles believed to be containing genuine
San Miguel Gin which was marked as standard; and

(8) One (1) paper bag containing 122 auxiliary stamps dated 6 April 1967,
without perforation and bearing successive serial numbers starting from
43,000,000.

Private respondent Yu Cua Sio filed a motion to quash Search Warrant No. 459 with the City
Court of Baguio. In an Order dated February 3, 1969, the inferior court ordered the NBI agents
who seized and confiscated the various articles from the store of Yu Cua Sio to return the same
immediately to him.

On appeal, the Court of First Instance of Baguio City, reversed the decision of the City Court
and sustained the validity of the questioned search warrant. However, upon motion for
reconsideration filed by private respondent Yu Cua Sio, respondent Judge, on October 13,
1969, reconsidered his decision and declared the issuance of Search Warrant No. 459 as
contrary to law and, forthwith, ordered the NBI agents to deliver and return the articles seized by
virtue of the search warrant to private respondent Yu Cua Sio.

The only legal issue posed for resolution in this case is the validity of Search Warrant No. 459
issued by City Judge Patricio Perez of Baguio City which respondent Judge declared as null
and void in his order dated October 13, 1969 on the grounds that (1) the same was issued "for
more than one specific offense in violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of the New Rules of Court
which states 'no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense' "; and, (2) that
the search warrant was issued to fish for evidence.

Petitioner claims that the lower court erred (1) when it held that the questioned search warrant
violates the provisions of Section 3, Rule 126 of the New Rules of Court; (2) in holding that the
search warrant in question was issued to fish for evidence; and (3) in declaring Search Warrant
No. 459 as contrary to law and in ordering the return of the articles seized by virtue of said
search warrant to respondent Yu Cua Sio.

We find merit in the petition. The search warrant issued by the City Court did not mention any
specific offense deemed to have been violated by respondent Yu Cua Sio. It is in the application
filed by the NBI agents which states that the owner and/or manager of the Suntory Grocery has
in his possession and control stocks of San Miguel Gin which are adulterated and therefore,
violative of the provisions of Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal Code. These articles of
the Revised Penal Code are entitled: "Substituting and Altering Trademarks, Tradenames, or
Service marks" and "Unfair Competition and Fraudulent Registration of Trademark and
Tradename," respectively. As aptly stated by the Solicitor General, "the specific acts defining
said offenses and mentioned in said articles are closely allied to each other that in a sense, the
punishable acts defined in one of them can be considered as including, or necessarily included
in the other."

There is no merit also in the pronouncement by respondent Judge that the search warrant was
issued to fish for evidence just because the application for search warrant states that its
purpose is "to take possession and control of the articles to be used as evidence in the above
case under investigation."

The search warrant as issued mentions that respondent has in his possession and control
stocks of La Tondeña product which are adulterated, with fake auxiliary stamps, and are using
crown caps which are not produced by the company. The articles seized in the premises of
respondent Yu Cua Sio show that he was in possession of these articles mentioned in the
application for search warrant and in the search warrant itself. Possession of said fake stamps
is illegal and the same should not be returned to respondent Yu Cua Sio.

ACCORDINGLY, the order of respondent Judge, dated October 13, 1969, is SET ASIDE, and
private respondent Yu Cua Sio is hereby ordered to return the articles seized if they had been
delivered to him by the NBI agents.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 50720. March 26, 1984.]

SORIANO MATA, Petitioner, v. HON. JOSEPHINE K. BAYONA, in her capacity as

Presiding Judge of the City Court of Ormoc, BERNARDO GOLES and REYNALDO
MAYOTE, Respondents.

Valeriano R. Ocubillo for Petitioner.

The Solicitor General for Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT AGAINST UNLAWFUL SEARCH AND

SEIZURE; REQUISITES FOR ISSUANCE OF SEARCH WARRANT. — Under the Constitution
"no search warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge or such
other responsible officer as may be authorized by law after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce." More emphatic and detailed
is the implementing rule of the constitutional injunction, Section 4 of Rule 126 which provides
that the judge must before issuing the warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation the
complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach
them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INSUFFICIENCY OF AFFIDAVITS OF COMPLAINANT AND HIS

WITNESSES IN THE CASE AT BAR. — Before issuing a search warrant, the examining Judge
has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and to
attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be
able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, and to hold
liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false. Mere
affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NO "DEPOSITION IN WRITING" ATTACHED TO RECORDS OF CASE IN

CASE AT BAR. — The judge’s insistence that she examined the complainants under oath has
become dubious by petitioner’s claim that at the particular time when he examined all the
relevant papers connected with the issuance of the questioned search warrant, after he
demanded the same from the lower court since they were not attached to the records, he did
not find any certification at the back of the joint affidavit of the complainants. Before he filed his
motion to quash the search warrant and for the return of the articles seized, he was furnished,
upon his request, certified true copies of the said affidavits by the Clerk of Court but which
certified true copies do not bear any certification at the back. Petitioner likewise claims that his
xerox copy of the said joint affidavit obtained at the outset of this case does not show also the
certification of respondent judge. This doubt becomes more confirmed by respondent Judge’s
own admission, while insisting that she did examine thoroughly the applicants, that "she did not
take the deposition of Mayote and Goles because to have done so would be to hold a judicial
proceeding which will be open and public", such that, according to her, the persons subject of
the intended raid will just disappear and move his illegal operations somewhere else. Could it be
that the certification was made belatedly to cure the defect of the warrant? Be that as it may,
there was no "deposition in writing" attached to the records of the case in palpable disregard of
the statutory prohibition heretofore quoted.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DEPOSITIONS, HOW TAKEN. — The searching questions propounded to
the applicants of the search warrant and his witnesses must depend to a large extent upon the
discretion of the Judge just as long as the answers establish a reasonable ground to believe the
commission of a specific offense and that the applicant is one authorized by law, and said
answers particularly describe with certainty the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized. The examination or investigation which must be under oath may not be in public. It
may even be held in the secrecy of his chambers. Far more important is that the examination or
investigation is not merely routinary but one that is thorough and elicit the required information.
To repeat, it must be under oath and must be in writing.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MUST BE STRICTLY COMPLIED WITH; CASE AT BAR. — Nothing can
justify the issuance of the search warrant but the fulfillment of the legal requisites. Thus, in
issuing a search warrant the Judge must strictly comply with the requirements of the
Constitution and the statutory provisions. In the case at bar, the search warrant is tainted with
illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform with essential requisites of taking the depositions
in writing and attaching them to record, rendering the search warrant invalid.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ALTHOUGH ILLEGAL, THINGS SEIZED CANNOT BE RETURNED; CASE AT
BAR. — While the search warrant is illegal, the return of the things seized cannot be ordered. In
Castro v. Pabalan (70 SCRA 478), it was held that the illegality of the search warrant does not
call for the return of the things seized, the possession of which is prohibited.

DECISION

DE CASTRO, J.:

The validity of the search warrant issued by respondent Judge (not reappointed) is challenged
by petitioner for its alleged failure to comply with the requisites of the Constitution and the Rules
of Court.

Specifically, the contention is that the search warrant issued by respondent Judge was based
merely on the application for search warrant and a joint affidavit of private respondents which
were wrongfully it is alleged subscribed, and sworn to before the Clerk of Court of respondent
Judge. Furthermore, there was allegedly a failure on the part of respondent Judge to attach the
necessary papers pertinent to the issuance of the search warrant to the records of Criminal
Case No. 4298-CC wherein petitioner is accused under PD 810, as amended by PD 1306, the
information against him alleging that Soriano Mata offered, took and arranged bets on the Jai
Alai game by "selling illegal tickets known as ‘Masiao tickets’ without any authority from the
Philippine Jai Alai & Amusement Corporation or from the government authorities concerned." 1

Petitioner claims that during the hearing of the case, he discovered that nowhere from the
records of the said case could be found the search warrant and other pertinent papers
connected to the issuance of the same, so that he had to inquire from the City Fiscal its
whereabouts, and to which inquiry respondent Judge replied, "it is with the court." The Judge
then handed the records to the Fiscal who attached them to the records.chanrobles.com : virtual
law library

This led petitioner to file a motion to quash and annul the search warrant and for the return of
the articles seized, citing and invoking, among others, Section 4 of Rule 126 of the Revised
Rules of Court. The motion was denied by respondent Judge on March 1, 1979, stating that the
court has made a thorough investigation and examination under oath of Bernardo U. Goles and
Reynaldo T. Mayote, members of the Intelligence Section of 352nd PC Co./Police District II INP;
that in fact the court made a certification to that effect; and that the fact that documents relating
to the search warrant were not attached immediately to the record of the criminal case is of no
moment, considering that the rule does not specify when these documents are to be attached to
the records. 2 Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order having been denied,
he came to this Court, with the instant petition, praying, among others, that this Court declare
the search warrant to be invalid and all the articles confiscated under such warrant as
inadmissible as evidence in the case, or in any proceedings on the matter.

We hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality for being violative of the Constitution
and the Rules of Court.

Under the Constitution "no search warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be
determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce."
More emphatic and detailed is the implementing rule of the constitutional injunction, Section 4 of
Rule 126 which provides that the judge must before issuing the warrant personally examine on
oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their
depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to
him.

Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining
Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce
and to attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge
may be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold
liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false.

We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to
conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to
the record, rendering the search warrant invalid.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The judge’s insistence that she examined the complainants under oath has become dubious by
petitioner’s claim that at the particular time when he examined all the relevant papers connected
with the issuance of the questioned search warrant, after he demanded the same from the lower
court since they were not attached to the records, he did not find any certification at the back of
the joint affidavit of the complainants. As stated earlier, before he filed his motion to quash the
search warrant and for the return of the articles seized, he was furnished, upon his request,
certified true copies of the said affidavits by the Clerk of Court but which certified true copies do
not bear any certification at the back. Petitioner likewise claims that his xerox copy of the said
joint affidavit obtained at the outset of this case does not show also the certification of
respondent judge. This doubt becomes more confirmed by respondent Judge’s own admission,
while insisting that she did examine thoroughly the applicants, that "she did not take the
deposition of Mayote and Goles because to have done so would be to hold a judicial proceeding
which will be open and public", 3 such that, according to her, the persons subject of the
intended raid will just disappear and move his illegal operations somewhere else.

Could it be that the certification was made belatedly to cure the defect of the warrant? Be that
as it may, there was no "deposition in writing" attached to the records of the case in palpable
disregard of the statutory prohibition heretofore quoted.

Respondent Judge impresses this Court that the urgency to stop the illegal gambling that lures
every man, woman and child, and even the lowliest laborer who could hardly make both ends
meet justifies her action. She claims that in order to abate the proliferation of this illegal
"masiao" lottery, she thought it more prudent not to conduct the taking of deposition which is
done usually and publicly in the court room.

Two points must be made clear. The term "depositions" is sometimes used in a broad sense to
describe any written statement verified by oath; but in its more technical and appropriate sense
the meaning of the word is limited to written testimony of a witness given in the course of a
judicial proceeding in advance of the trial or hearing upon oral examination. 4 A deposition is the
testimony of a witness, put or taken in writing, under oath or affirmation before a commissioner,
examiner or other judicial officer, in answer to interlocutory and cross interlocutory, and usually
subscribed by the witnesses. 5 The searching questions propounded to the applicants of the
search warrant and his witnesses must depend to a large extent upon the discretion of the
Judge just as long as the answers establish a reasonable ground to believe the commission of a
specific offense and that the applicant is one authorized by law, and said answers particularly
describe with certainty the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The
examination or investigation which must be under oath may not be in public. It may even be
held in the secrecy of his chambers. Far more important is that the examination or investigation
is not merely routinary but one that is thorough and elicit the required information. To repeat, it
must be under oath and must be in writing.cralawnad

The other point is that nothing can justify the issuance of the search warrant but the fulfillment of
the legal requisites. It might be well to point out what has been said in Asian Surety & Insurance
Co., Inc. v. Herrera:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"It has been said that of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or more
essential to his peace and happiness than the right of personal security, and that involves the
exemption of his private affairs, books, and papers from inspection and scrutiny of others. While
the power to search and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and
the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the
enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles
of government." 6

Thus, in issuing a search warrant the Judge must strictly comply with the requirements of the
Constitution and the statutory provisions. A liberal construction should be given in favor of the
individual to prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation of the rights secured
by the Constitution. 7 No presumption of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when
an officer undertakes to justify it. 8

While We hold that the search warrant is illegal, the return of the things seized cannot be
ordered. In Castro v. Pabalan, 9 it was held that the illegality of the search warrant does not call
for the return of the things seized, the possession of which is prohibited.

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the order of March 1, 1979 denying the
motion to annul the search warrant as well as the order of March 21, 1979 denying the motion
for reconsideration are hereby reversed, the search warrant, being declared herein as illegal.
Notwithstanding such illegality, the things seized under such warrant, such as stock of "masiao"
tickets; "masiao" issue tickets; bet money; control pad or "masiao" numbers; stamping pad with
rubber stamp marked Ormoc City Jai-Alai," cannot be returned as sought by petitioner. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.