U.S.
Supreme Court courts tells us no more than that the appellant Coates
Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971)
No. 117
Argued January 11, 1971
Decided June 1, 1971
402 U.S. 611
APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
Syllabus
Cincinnati, Ohio, ordinance making it a criminal offense
for
"three or more persons to assemble . . . on any of the
sidewalls . . . and there conduct themselves in a manner
annoying to persons passing by . . . ,"
which has not been narrowed by any construction of
the Ohio Supreme Court, held violative on its face of the
due process standard of vagueness and the
constitutional right of free assembly and association.
Pp.402 U. S. 614-616.
21 Ohio St.2d 66, 255 N.E.2d 247, reversed.
STEWART, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in
which DOUGLAS, HARLAN, BRENNAN, and MARSHALL,
JJ., joined. BLACK, J., filed a separate
opinion, post, p. 402 U. S. 616. WHITE, J., filed a
dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C.J., and
BLACKMUN, J., joined, post, p. 402 U. S. 617.
MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the
Court.
A Cincinnati, Ohio, ordinance makes it a criminal
offense for
"three or more persons to assemble . . . on any of the
sidewalks . . . and there conduct themselves in a
manner annoying to persons passing by. . . . [Footnote
1] "
Page 402 U. S. 612
The issue before us is whether this ordinance is
unconstitutional on its face.
The appellants were convicted of violating the
ordinance, and the convictions were ultimately affirmed
by a closely divided vote in the Supreme Court of Ohio,
upholding the constitutional validity of the ordinance.
21 Ohio St.2d 66, 255 N.E.2d 247. An appeal from that
judgment was brought here under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2),
[Footnote 2] and we noted probable jurisdiction, 398
U.S. 902. The record brought before the reviewing
was a student involved in a demonstration and the
other appellants were pickets involved in a labor
dispute. For, throughout this litigation, it has been the
appellants' position that the ordinance on its face
violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the
Constitution. Cf. Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U. S.
43.
In rejecting this claim and affirming, the convictions the
Ohio Supreme Court did not give the ordinance any
construction at variance with the apparent plain import
of its language. The court simply stated:
"The ordinance prohibits, inter alia, 'conduct . . .
annoying to persons passing by.' The word 'annoying' is
a widely used and well understood word; it is not
necessary to guess its meaning. 'Annoying' is the
present participle of the transitive verb 'annoy,' which
means to trouble, to vex, to impede, to incommode, to
provoke, to harass or to irritate. "
Page 402 U. S. 613
"We conclude, as did the Supreme Court of the United
States in Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U. S. 611, 390 U. S.
616, in which the issue of the vagueness of a statute
was presented, that the ordinance"
"clearly and precisely delineates its reach in words of
common understanding. It is a 'precise and narrowly
drawn regulatory statute [ordinance] evincing a
legislative judgment that certain specific conduct be . . .
proscribed.'"
21 Ohio St.2d at 69, 255 N.E.2d at 249.
Beyond this, the only construction put upon the
ordinance by the state court was its unexplained
conclusion that "the standard of conduct which it
specifies is not dependent upon each complainant's
sensitivity." Ibid.But the court did not indicate upon
whose sensitivity a violation does depend -- the
sensitivity of the judge or jury, the sensitivity of the
arresting officer, or the sensitivity of a hypothetical
reasonable man. [Footnote 3]
Page 402 U. S. 614
We are thus relegated, at best, to the words of the
ordinance itself. If three or more people meet together
on a sidewalk or street corner, they must conduct
themselves so as not to annoy any police officer or
other person who should happen to pass by. In our
opinion, this ordinance is unconstitutionally vague
because it subjects the exercise of the right of assembly
to an unascertainable standard, and unconstitutionally
broad because it authorizes the punishment of
constitutionally protected conduct.
Conduct that annoys some people does not annoy
others. Thus, the ordinance is vague not in the sense
that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an
imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but
rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is
specified at all. As a result, "men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning." Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.
S. 385, 269 U. S. 391.
It is said that the ordinance is broad enough to
encompass many types of conduct clearly within the
city's constitutional power to prohibit. And so, indeed,
it is. The city is free to prevent people from blocking
sidewalks, obstructing traffic, littering streets,
committing assaults, or engaging in countless other
forms of antisocial conduct. It can do so through the
enactment and enforcement of ordinances directed
with reasonable specificity toward the conduct to be
prohibited. Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U. S. 111, 394 U. S.
118,394 U. S. 124-125 (BLACK, J., concurring). It cannot
constitutionally do so through the enactment and
enforcement of an ordinance whose violation may
entirely depend upon whether or not a policeman is
annoyed. [Footnote 4]
Page 402 U. S. 615
But the vice of the ordinance lies not alone in its
violation of the due process standard of vagueness. The
ordinance also violates the constitutional right of free
assembly and association. Our decisions establish that
mere public intolerance or animosity cannot be the
basis for abridgment of these constitutional
freedoms. See Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576, 394 U.
S. 592; Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536, 379 U. S. 551-
553; Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229, 372 U. S.
238; Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1; Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 310 U. S. 311; Schneider v.
State, 308 U. S. 147, 308 U. S. 161. The First and
Fourteenth Amendments do not permit a State to make
criminal the exercise of the right of assembly simply
because its exercise may be "annoying" to some
people. If this were not the rule, the right of the people
to gather in public places for social or political purposes
would be continually subject to summary suspension
through the good faith enforcement of a prohibition
against annoying conduct.. [Footnote 5]
Page 402 U. S. 616
And such a prohibition, in addition, contains an obvious
invitation to discriminatory enforcement against those
whose association together is "annoying" because their
ideas, their lifestyle, or their physical appearance is
resented by the majority of their fellow citizens.
[Footnote 6]
The ordinance before us makes a crime out of what
under the Constitution cannot be a crime. It is aimed
directly at activity protected by the Constitution. We
need not lament that we do not have before us the
details of the conduct found to be annoying. It is the
ordinance on its face that sets the standard of conduct
and warns against transgression. The details of the
offense could no more serve to validate this ordinance
than could the details of an offense charged under an
ordinance suspending unconditionally the right of
assembly and free speech.
The judgment is reversed.
[Footnote 1]
"It shall be unlawful for three or more persons to
assemble, except at a public meeting of citizens, on any
of the sidewalks, street corners, vacant lots or mouths
of alleys, and there conduct themselves in a manner
annoying to persons passing by, or occupants of
adjacent buildings. Whoever violates any of the
provisions of this section shall be fined not exceeding
fifty dollars ($50.00), or be imprisoned not less than
one (1) nor more than thirty (30) days or both."
Section 901-L6, Code of Ordinances of the City of
Cincinnati (1956).
[Footnote 2]
"Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest
court of a State in which a decision could be had, may
be reviewed by the Supreme Court as follows: "
"* * * *"
"(2) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity
of a statute of any state on the ground of its being
repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the
United States, and the decision is in favor of its validity."
[Footnote 3]
Cf. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, where
this Court upheld a statute that punished "offensive,
derisive or annoying" words. The state courts had
construed the statute as applying only to such words
"as have a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by
the persons to whom, individually, the remark is
addressed." The state court also said:
"The word 'offensive' is not to be defined in terms of
what a particular addressee thinks. . . . The test is what
men of common intelligence would understand would
be words likely to cause an average addressee to fight. .
. . The English language has a number of words and
expressions which, by general consent, are 'fighting
words' when said without a disarming smile. . . . Such
words, as ordinary men know, are likely to cause a fight.
So are threatening, profane or obscene revilings.
Derisive and annoying words can be taken as coming
within the purview of the statute as heretofore
interpreted only when they have this characteristic of
plainly tending to excite the addressee to a breach of
he peace."
This Court was "unable to say that the limited scope of
the statute as thus construed contravenes the
Constitutional right of free expression." 315 U.S. at 315
U. S. 573.
[Footnote 4]
In striking down a very similar ordinance of Cleveland,
Ohio, as constitutionally invalid, the Court of Appeals
for Cuyahoga County said:
"As it is written, the disorderly assembly ordinance
could be used to incriminate nearly any group or
individual. With little effort, one can imagine many . . .
assemblages which, at various times, might annoy some
persons in the city of Cleveland. Anyone could become
an unwitting participant in a disorderly assembly, and
suffer the penalty consequences. It has been left to the
police and the courts to decide when and to what
extent ordinance Section 13.1124 is applicable. Neither
the police nor a citizen can hope to conduct himself in a
lawful manner if an ordinance which is designed to
regulate conduct does not lay down ascertainable rules
and guidelines to govern its enforcement. This
ordinance represents an unconstitutional exercise of
the police power of the city of Cleveland, and is
therefore void."
Cleveland v. Anderson, 13 Ohio App.2d 83, 90, 234
N.E.2d 304, 309-310.
[Footnote 5]
In striking down a very similar ordinance of Toledo,
Ohio, as constitutionally invalid, the Municipal Court of
that city said:
"Under the provisions of Sections 17-10 and 17-11,
arrests and prosecutions, as in the present instance,
would have been effective as against Edmund
Pendleton, Peyton Randolph, Richard Henry Lee,
George Wythe, Patrick Henry, Thomas Jefferson,
George Washington and others for loitering and
congregating in front of Raleigh Tavern on Duke of
Gloucester Street in Williamsburg, Virginia, at any time
during the summer of 1774 to the great annoyance of
Governor Dunsmore and his colonial constables."
City of Toledo v. Sims, 14 Ohio Op.2d 66, 69, 169 N.E.2d
516, 520.
[Footnote 6]
The alleged discriminatory enforcement of this
ordinance figured prominently in the background of the
serious civil disturbances that took place in Cincinnati in
June, 1967. See Report of the National Advisory
Commission on Civil Disorders 26-27 (1968).
MR. JUSTICE BLACK.
First. I agree with the majority that this case is properly
before us on appeal from the Supreme Court of Ohio.
Second. This Court has long held that laws so vague that
a person of common understanding cannot know what
is forbidden are unconstitutional on their face. Lanzetta
v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451 (1939), United States v.
Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81 (1921). Likewise, laws
which broadly forbid conduct or activities which are
protected by the Federal Constitution, such as, for
instance, the discussion of political matters, are void on
their face. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88
Page 402 U. S. 617
(1940). On the other hand, laws which plainly forbid
conduct which is constitutionally within the power of
the State to forbid but also restrict constitutionally
protected conduct may be void either on their face or
merely as applied in certain instances. As my Brother
WHITE states in his opinion (with which I substantially
agree), this is one of those numerous cases where the
law could be held unconstitutional because it prohibits
both conduct which the Constitution safeguards and
conduct which the State may constitutionally punish.
Thus, the First Amendment, which forbids the State to
abridge freedom of speech, would invalidate this city
ordinance if it were used to punish the making of a
political speech, even if that speech were to annoy
other persons. In contrast, however, the ordinance
could properly be applied to prohibit the gathering of
persons in the mouths of alleys to annoy passersby by
throwing rocks or by some other conduct not at all
connected with speech. It is a matter of no little
difficulty to determine when a law can be held void on
its face and when such summary action is
inappropriate. This difficulty has been aggravated in this
case, because the record fails to show in what conduct
these defendants had engaged to annoy other people.
In my view, a record showing the facts surrounding the
conviction is essential to adjudicate the important
constitutional issues in this case. I would therefore
vacate the judgment and remand the case with
instructions that the trial court give both parties an
opportunity to supplement the record so that we may
determine whether the conduct actually punished is
the kind of conduct which it is within the power of the
State to punish.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, dissenting.
The claim in this case, in part, is that the Cincinnati
ordinance is so vague that it may not constitutionally
Page 402 U. S. 618
be applied to any conduct. But the ordinance prohibits
persons from assembling with others and "conduct[ing]
themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing
by. . . ." Cincinnati Code of Ordinances § 901-L6. Any
man of average comprehension should know that some
kinds of conduct, such as assault or blocking passage on
the street, will annoy others and are clearly covered by
the "annoying conduct" standard of the ordinance. It
would be frivolous to say that these and many other
kinds of conduct are not within the foreseeable reach
of the law.
It is possible that a whole range of other acts, defined
with unconstitutional imprecision, is forbidden by the
ordinance. But, as a general rule, when a criminal
charge is based on conduct constitutionally subject to
proscription and clearly forbidden by a statute, it is no
defense that the law would be unconstitutionally vague
if applied to other behavior. Such a statute is not vague
on its face. It may be vague as applied in some
circumstances, but ruling on such a challenge obviously
requires knowledge of the conduct with which a
defendant is charged.
In Williams v. United States, 341 U. S. 97 (1951), a
police officer was charged under federal statutes with
extracting confessions by force and thus, under color of
law, depriving the prisoner there involved of rights,
privileges, and immunities secured or protected by the
Constitution and laws of the United States, contrary to
18 U.S.C. § 242. The defendant there urged that the
standard -- rights, privileges, and immunities secured by
the Constitution -- was impermissibly vague and, more
particularly, that the Court was often so closely divided
on illegal confession issues that no defendant could be
expected to know when he was violating the law. The
Court's response was that, while application of the
statute
Page 402 U. S. 619
to less obvious methods of coercion might raise doubts
about the adequacy of the standard of guilt, in the case
before it, it was
"plain as a pikestaff that the present confessions would
not be allowed in evidence whatever the school of
thought concerning the scope and meaning of the Due
Process Clause."
Id. at 341 U. S. 101. The claim of facial vagueness was
thus rejected.
So too in United States v. National Dairy Corp., 372 U. S.
29 (1963), where we considered a statute forbidding
sales of goods at "unreasonably" low prices to injure or
eliminate a competitor, 15 U.S.C. § 13a, we thought the
statute gave a seller adequate notice that sales below
cost were illegal. The statute was therefore not facially
vague, although it might be difficult to tell whether
certain other kinds of conduct fell within this language.
We said:
"In determining the sufficiency of the notice a statute
must of necessity be examined in the light of the
conduct with which a defendant is charged."
Id. at 372 U. S. 33. See also United States v. Harriss, 347
U. S. 612 (1954). This approach is consistent with the
host of cases holding that
"one to whom application of a statute is constitutional
will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground
that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to
other persons or other situations in which its
application might be unconstitutional."
United States v. Raines, 362 U. S. 17, 362 U. S.
21 (1960), and cases there cited.
Our cases, however, including National Dairy, recognize
a different approach where the statute at issue
purports to regulate or proscribe rights of speech or
press protected by the First Amendment. See United
States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258 (1967); Keyishian v. Board
of Regents, 385 U. S. 589 (1967); Kunz v. New York, 340
U. S. 290 (1951). Although a statute may be neither
vague, overbroad, nor otherwise invalid as applied to
the conduct charged against a particular defendant, he
is
Page 402 U. S. 620
permitted to raise its vagueness or unconstitutional
overbreadth as applied to others. And if the law is
found deficient in one of these respects, it may not be
applied to him either, until and unless a satisfactory
limiting construction is placed on the
statute. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479, 380 U. S.
491-492 (1965). The statute, in effect, is stricken down
on its face. This result is deemed justified since the
otherwise continued existence of the statute in
unnarrowed form would tend to suppress
constitutionally protected rights. See United States v.
National Dairy Corp., supra, at 372 U. S. 36.
Even accepting the overbreadth doctrine with respect
to statutes clearly reaching speech, the Cincinnati
ordinance does not purport to bar or regulate speech
as such. It prohibits persons from assembling and
"conduct[ing]" themselves in a manner annoying to
other persons. Even if the assembled defendants in this
case were demonstrating and picketing, we have long
recognized that picketing is not solely a communicative
endeavor, and has aspects which the State is entitled to
regulate even though there is incidental impact on
speech. In Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 559 (1965), the
Court held valid on its face a statute forbidding
picketing and parading near a courthouse. This was
deemed a valid regulation of conduct, rather than pure
speech. The conduct reached by the statute was
"subject to regulation even though [it was] intertwined
with expression and association." Id. at 379 U. S. 563.
The Court then went on to consider the statute as
applied to the facts of record.

In the case before us, I would deal with the Cincinnati

ordinance as we would with the ordinary criminal
statute. The ordinance clearly reaches certain conduct,
but may be illegally vague with respect to other
conduct. The statute is not infirm on its face, and, since
we have no information from this record as to what
conduct was

Page 402 U. S. 621

charged against these defendants, we are in no position

to judge the statute as applied. That the ordinance may
confer wide discretion in a wide range of circumstances
is irrelevant when we may be dealing with conduct at
its core.

I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Ohio

Supreme Court.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 82511 March 3, 1992
GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO
CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and IMELDA
SALAZAR, respondents.
Castillo, Laman, Tan & Pantaleon for petitioner.
Gerardo S. Alansalon for private respondent.
ROMERO, J.:
For private respondent Imelda L. Salazar, it would seem
that her close association with Delfin Saldivar would
mean the loss of her job. In May 1982, private
respondent was employed by Globe-Mackay Cable and
Radio Corporation (GMCR) as general systems analyst.
Also employed by petitioner as manager for technical
operations' support was Delfin Saldivar with whom
private respondent was allegedly very close.
Sometime in 1984, petitioner GMCR, prompted by
reports that company equipment and spare parts worth
thousands of dollars under the custody of Saldivar were
missing, caused the investigation of the latter's
activities. The report dated September 25, 1984
prepared by the company's internal auditor, Mr.
Agustin Maramara, indicated that Saldivar had entered
into a partnership styled Concave Commercial and
Industrial Company with Richard A. Yambao, owner and
manager of Elecon Engineering Services (Elecon), a
supplier of petitioner often recommended by Saldivar.
The report also disclosed that Saldivar had taken
petitioner's missing Fedders airconditioning unit for his
own personal use without authorization and also
connived with Yambao to defraud petitioner of its
property. The airconditioner was recovered only after
petitioner GMCR filed an action for replevin against
Saldivar.1
It likewise appeared in the course of Maramara's
investigation that Imelda Salazar violated company
reglations by involving herself in transactions conflicting
with the company's interests. Evidence showed that she
signed as a witness to the articles of partnership
between Yambao and Saldivar. It also appeared that
she had full knowledge of the loss and whereabouts of
the Fedders airconditioner but failed to inform her
employer.
Consequently, in a letter dated October 8, 1984,
petitioner company placed private respondent Salazar
under preventive suspension for one (1) month,
effective October 9, 1984, thus giving her thirty (30)
days within which to, explain her side. But instead of
submitting an explanations three (3) days later or on
October 12, 1984 private respondent filed a complaint
against petitioner for illegal suspension, which she
subsequently amended to include illegal dismissal,
vacation and sick leave benefits, 13th month pay and
damages, after petitioner notified her in writing that
effective November 8, 1984, she was considered
dismissed "in view of (her) inability to refute and
disprove these findings. 2
After due hearing, the Labor Arbiter in a decision dated
July 16, 1985, ordered petitioner company to reinstate
private respondent to her former or equivalent position
and to pay her full backwages and other benefits she
would have received were it not for the illegal dismissal.
Petitioner was also ordered to pay private respondent
moral damages of P50,000.00. 3
On appeal, public respondent National Labor Relations,
Commission in the questioned resolution dated
December 29, 1987 affirmed the aforesaid decision
with respect to the reinstatement of private
respondent but limited the backwages to a period of
two (2) years and deleted the award for moral
damages. 4
Hence, this petition assailing the Labor Tribunal for
having committed grave abuse of discretion in holding
that the suspension and subsequent dismissal of private
respondent were illegal and in ordering her
reinstatement with two (2) years' backwages.
On the matter of preventive suspension, we find for
petitioner GMCR.
The inestigative findings of Mr. Maramara, which
pointed to Delfin Saldivar's acts in conflict with his
position as technical operations manager, necessitated
immediate and decisive action on any employee closely,
associated with Saldivar. The suspension of Salazar was
further impelled by th.e discovery of the missing
Fedders airconditioning unit inside the apartment
private respondent shared with Saldivar. Under such
circumstances, preventive suspension was the proper
remedial recourse available to the company pending
Salazar's investigation. By itself, preventive suspension
does, not signify that the company has adjudged the
employee guilty of the charges she was asked to answer
and explain. Such disciplinary measure is resorted to for
the protection of the company's property pending
investigation any alleged malfeasance or misfeasance
committed by the employee.5
Thus, it is not correct to conclude that petitioner GMCR
had violated Salazar's right to due process when she
was promptly suspended. If at all, the fault, lay with
private respondent when she ignored petitioner's
memorandum of October 8, 1984 "giving her ample
opportunity to present (her) side to the Management."
Instead, she went directly to the Labor Department and
filed her complaint for illegal suspension without giving
her employer a chance to evaluate her side of the
controversy.
But while we agree with the propriety of Salazar's
preventive suspension, we hold that her eventual
separation from employment was not for cause.
What is the remedy in law to rectify an unlawful
dismissal so as to "make whole" the victim who has not
merely lost her job which, under settled Jurisprudence,
is a property right of which a person is not to be
deprived without due process, but also the
compensation that should have accrued to her during
the period when she was unemployed?
Art. 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides:
Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular
employment, the employer shall not
terminate the services of an employee
except for a just cause or when
authorized by this Title. An employee
who is unjustly dismissed from work shall
be entitled to reinstatement without loss
of seniority rights and other privileges
and to his full backwages, inclusive of
allowances, and to his other benefits or
their monetary equivalent computed
from the time his compensation was
withheld from him up to the time of his
actual reinstatement. 6 (Emphasis
supplied)
Corollary thereto are the following provisions of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code:
Sec. 2. Security of Tenure. — In cases of
regular employments, the employer shall
not terminate the services of an
employee except for a just cause as
provided in the Labor Code or when
authorized by existing laws.
Sec. 3. Reinstatement. — An employee
who is unjustly dismissed from work shall
by entitled to reinstatement without loss
of seniority rights and to
backwages."7 (Emphasis supplied)
Before proceeding any furthers, it needs must be
recalled that the present Constitution has gone further
than the 1973 Charter in guaranteeing vital social and
economic rights to marginalized groups of society,
including labor. Given the pro-poor orientation of
several articulate Commissioners of the Constitutional
Commission of 1986, it was not surprising that a whole
new Article emerged on Social Justice and Human
Rights designed, among other things, to "protect and
enhance the right of all the people to human dignity,
reduce social, economic and political inequalities, and
remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth
and political power for the common good." 8 Proof of
the priority accorded to labor is that it leads the other
areas of concern in the Article on Social Justice, viz.,
Labor ranks ahead of such topics as Agrarian and
Natural Resources Reform, Urban Land Roform and
Housing, Health, Women, Role and Rights of Poople's
Organizations and Human Rights.9
The opening paragraphs on Labor states
The State shall afford full protection to
labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full
employment and equality of
employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all
workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining and negotiations, and
peaceful concerted activities, including
the right to strike in accordance with
law. They shall be entitled to security of
tenure, humane conditions of work, and
a living wage. They shall also participate
in policy and decision-making processes
affecting their rights and benefits is may
be provided by law.10(Emphasis
supplied)
Compare this with the sole.provision on Labor in the
1973 Constitution under the Article an Declaration of
Principles and State Policies that provides:
Sec. 9. The state shall afford protection
to labor, promote full employment and
equality in employment, ensure equal
work opportunities regardless of sex,
race, or creed, and regulate the relations
between workers and employers. The
State shall ensure the rights of workers
to self-organization, collective
baegaining, security of tenure, and just
and humane conditions of work. The
State may provide for compulsory
arbitration. 11
To be sure, both Charters recognize "security of tenure"
as one of the rights of labor which the State is
mandated to protect. But there is no gainsaying the fact
that the intent of the framers of the present
Constitution was to give primacy to the rights of labor
and afford the sector "full protection," at least greater
protection than heretofore accorded them, regardless
of the geographical location of the workers and
whether they are organized or not.
It was then CONCOM Commissioner, now Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr., who substantially contributed to the
present formulation of the protection to labor provision
and proposed that the same be incorporated in the
Article on Social Justice and not just in the Article on
Declaration of Principles and State Policies "in the light
of the special importance that we are giving now to
social justice and the necessity of emphasizing the
scope and role of social justice in national
development." 12
If we have taken pains to delve into the background of
the labor provisions in our Constitution and the Labor
Code, it is but to stress that the right of an employee
not to be dismissed from his job except for a just or
authorized cause provided by law has assumed greater
importance under the 1987 Constitution with the
singular prominence labor enjoys under the article on
Social Justice. And this transcendent policy has been
translated into law in the Labor Code. Under its terms,
where a case of unlawful or unauthorized dismissal has
been proved by the aggrieved employee, or on the
other hand, the employer whose duty it is to prove the
lawfulness or justness of his act of dismissal has failed
to do so, then the remedies provided in Article 279
should find, application. Consonant with this liberalized
stance vis-a-vis labor, the legislature even went further
by enacting Republic Act No. 6715 which took effect on
March 2, 1989 that amended said Article to remove any
possible ambiguity that jurisprudence may have
generated which watered down the constitutional
intent to grant to labor "full protection." 13
To go back to the instant case, there being no evidence
to show an authorized, much less a legal, cause for the
dismissal of private respondent, she had every right,
not only to be entitled to reinstatement, but ay well, to
full backwages." 14
The intendment of the law in prescribing the twin
remedies of reinstatement and payment of backwages
is, in the former, to restore the dismissed employee to
her status before she lost her job, for the dictionary
meaning of the word "reinstate" is "to restore to a
state, conditione positions etc. from which one had
been removed"15 and in the latter, to give her back the
income lost during the period of unemployment. Both
remedies, looking to the past, would perforce make her
"whole."
Sadly, the avowed intent of the law has at times been
thwarted when reinstatement has not been
forthcoming and the hapless dismissed employee finds
himself on the outside looking in.
Over time, the following reasons have been advanced
by the Court for denying reinstatement under the facts
of the case and the law applicable thereto; that
reinstatement can no longer be effected in view of the
long passage of time (22 years of litigation) or because
of the realities of the situation; 16 or that it would be
"inimical to the employer's interest; " 17 or that
reinstatement may no longer be feasible; 18 or, that it
will not serve the best interests of the parties
involved; 19 or that the company would be prejudiced
by the workers' continued employment; 20 or that it will
not serve any prudent purpose as when supervening
facts have transpired which make execution on that
score unjust or inequitable 21 or, to an increasing
extent, due to the resultant atmosphere of "antipathy
and antagonism" or "strained relations" or
"irretrievable estrangement" between the employer
and the employee. 22
In lieu of reinstatement, the Court has variously
ordered the payment of backwages and separation
pay 23 or solely separation pay. 24
In the case at bar, the law is on the side of private
respondent. In the first place the wording of the Labor
Code is clear and unambiguous: "An employee who is
unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement. . . . and to his full backwages. . .
." 25 Under the principlesof statutory construction, if a
statute is clears plain and free from ambiguity, it must
be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation. This plain-meaning rule
or verba legis derived from the maxim index animi
sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests on the
valid presumption that the words employed by, the
legislature in a statute correctly express its intent or will
and preclude the court from construing it
differently. 26 The legislature is presumed to know the
meaning of the words, to:have used words advisedly,
and to have expressed its intent by the use of such
words as are found in the statute.27 Verba legis non est
recedendum, or from the words of a statute there
should be no departure. Neither does the provision
admit of any qualification. If in the wisdom of the Court,
there may be a ground or grounds for non-application
of the above-cited provision, this should be by way of
exception, such as when the reinstatement may be
inadmissible due to ensuing strained relations between
the employer and the employee.
In such cases, it should be proved that the employee
concerned occupies a position where he enjoys the
trust and confidence of his employer; and that it is likely
that if reinstated, an atmosphere of antipathy and
antagonism may be generated as to adversely affect
the efficiency and productivity of the employee
concerned.
A few examples, will suffice to illustrate the Court's
application of the above principles: where the
employee is a Vice-President for Marketing and as such,
enjoys the full trust and confidence of top
management; 28 or is the Officer-In-Charge of the
extension office of the bank where he works; 29 or is an
organizer of a union who was in a position to sabotage
the union's efforts to organize the workers in
commercial and industrial establishments; 30 or is a
warehouseman of a non-profit organization whose
primary purpose is to facilitate and maximize voluntary
gifts. by foreign individuals and organizations to the
Philippines; 31 or is a manager of its Energy Equipment
Sales. 32
Obviously, the principle of "strained relations" cannot
be applied indiscriminately. Otherwisey reinstatement
can never be possible simply because some hostility is
invariably engendered between the parties as a result
of litigation. That is human nature. 33
Besides, no strained relations should arise from a valid
and legal act of asserting one's right; otherwise an
employee who shall assert his right could be easily
separated from the service, by merely paying his
separation pay on the pretext that his relationship with
his employer had already become strained. 34
Here, it has not been proved that the position of private
respondent as systems analyst is one that may be
characterized as a position of trust and confidence such
that if reinstated, it may well lead to strained relations
between employer and employee. Hence, this does not
constitute an exception to the general rule mandating
reinstatement for an employee who has been
unlawfully dismissed.
On the other hand, has she betrayed any confidence
reposed in her by engaging in transactions that may
have created conflict of interest situations? Petitioner
GMCR points out that as a matter of company policy, it
prohibits its employees from involving themselves with
any company that has business dealings with GMCR.
Consequently, when private respondent Salazar signed
as a witness to the partnership papers of Concave (a
supplier of Ultra which in turn is also a supplier of
GMCR), she was deemed to have placed. herself in an
untenable position as far as petitioner was concerned.
However, on close scrutiny, we agree with public
respondent that such a circumstance did not create a
conflict of interests situation. As a systems analyst,
Salazar was very far removed from operations involving
the procurement of supplies. Salazar's duties revolved
around the development of systems and analysis of
designs on a continuing basis. In other words, Salazar
did not occupy a position of trust relative to the
approval and purchase of supplies and company assets.
In the instant case, petitioner has predicated its
dismissal of Salazar on loss of confidence. As we have
held countless times, while loss of confidence or breach
of trust is a valid ground for terminations it must rest an
some basis which must be convincingly
established. 35 An employee who not be dismissed on
mere presumptions and suppositions. Petitioner's
allegation that since Salazar and Saldivar lived together
in the same apartment, it "presumed reasonably that
complainant's sympathy would be with Saldivar" and its
averment that Saldivar's investigation although
unverified, was probably true, do not pass this Court's
test. 36 While we should not condone the acts of
disloyalty of an employee, neither should we dismiss
him on the basis of suspicion derived from speculative
inferences.
To rely on the Maramara report as a basis for Salazar's
dismissal would be most inequitous because the bulk of
the findings centered principally oh her friend's alleged
thievery and anomalous transactions as technical
operations' support manager. Said report merely
insinuated that in view of Salazar's special relationship
with Saldivar, Salazar might have had direct knowledge
of Saldivar's questionable activities. Direct evidence
implicating private respondent is wanting from the
records.
It is also worth emphasizing that the Maramara report
came out after Saldivar had already resigned from
GMCR on May 31, 1984. Since Saldivar did not have the
opportunity to refute management's findings, the
report remained obviously one-sided. Since the main
evidence obtained by petitioner dealt principally on the
alleged culpability of Saldivar, without his having had a
chance to voice his side in view of his prior resignation,
stringent examination should have been carried out to
ascertain whether or not there existed independent
legal grounds to hold Salatar answerable as well and,
thereby, justify her dismissal. Finding none, from the
records, we find her to have been unlawfully dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution of public
respondent National Labor Relations Commission dated
December 29, 1987 is hereby AFFIRMED. Petitioner
GMCR is ordered to REINSTATE private respondent
Imelda Salazar and to pay her backwages equivalent to
her salary for a period of two (2) years only.
This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Paras, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado,
Davide, Jr. and Nocon, JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., concurs in the result.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Padilla, JJ., took no part.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 109445 November 7, 1994
FELICITO BASBACIO, petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
FRANKLIN DRILON in his capacity as Secretary of
Justice, respondent.
Amparita S. Sta. Maria for petitioner.
MENDOZA, J.:
This case presents for determination the scope of the
State's liability under Rep. Act No. 7309, which among
other things provides compensation for persons who
are unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned but on
appeal are acquitted and ordered released.
Petitioner Felicito Basbacio and his son-in-law, Wilfredo
Balderrama, were convicted of frustrated murder and
of two counts of frustrated murder for the killing of
Federico Boyon and the wounding of the latter's wife
Florida and his son Tirso, at Palo, Calanuga, Rapu-Rapu,
Albay, on the night of June 26, 1988. The motive for the
killing was apparently a land dispute between the
Boyons and petitioner. Petitioner and his son-in-law
were sentenced to imprisonment and ordered
immediately detained after their bonds had been
cancelled.
Petitioner and his son-in-law appealed. Only
petitioner's appeal proceeded to judgment, however,
as the appeal of the other accused was dismissed for
failure to file his brief.
On June 22, 1992 the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision acquitting petitioner on the ground that the
prosecution failed to prove conspiracy between him
and his son-in-law. He had been pointed to by a
daughter of Federico Boyon as the companion of
Balderrama when the latter barged into their hut and
without warning started shooting, but the appellate
court ruled that because petitioner did nothing more,
petitioner's presence at the scene of the crime was
insufficient to show conspiracy.
Based on his acquittal, petitioner filed a claim under
Rep. Act No. 7309, sec. 3(a), which provides for the
payment of compensation to "any person who was
unjustly accused, convicted, imprisoned but
subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of
acquittal."1 The claim was filed with the Board of Claims
of the Department of Justice, but the claim was denied
on the ground that while petitioner's presence at the
scene of the killing was not sufficient to find him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt, yet, considering that there
was bad blood between him and the deceased as a
result of a land dispute and the fact that the convicted
murderer is his son-in-law, there was basis for finding
that he was "probably guilty."
On appeal, respondent Secretary of Justice affirmed the
Board's ruling. Said the Secretary of Justice in his
resolution dated March 11, 1993:
It is believed therefore that the phrase
"any person . . . unjustly accused,
convicted and imprisoned" in Section
3(a) of R.A. No. 7309 refers to an
individual who was wrongly accused and
imprisoned for a crime he did not
commit, thereby making him "a victim of
unjust imprisonment." In the instant
case, however, Claimant/Appellant
cannot be deemed such a victim since a
reading of the decision of his acquittal
shows that his exculpation is not based
on his innocence, but upon, in effect, a
finding of reasonable doubt.
Petitioner brought this petition for review on certiorari.
Neither Rule 45 nor Rep. Act No. 7309, however,
provides for review by certiorari of the decisions of the
Secretary of Justice. Nonetheless, in view of the
importance of the question tendered, the Court
resolved to treat the petition as a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65.
Petitioner questions the basis of the respondent's ruling
that to be able to recover under sec. 3(a) of the law the
claimant must on appeal be found to be innocent of the
crimes of which he was convicted in the trial court.
Through counsel he contends that the language of sec.
3(a) is clear and does not call for interpretation. The
"mere fact that the claimant was imprisoned for a crime
which he was subsequently acquitted of is already
unjust in itself," he contends. To deny his claim because
he was not declared innocent would be to say that his
imprisonment for two years while his appeal was
pending was justified. Petitioner argues that there is
only one requirement for conviction in criminal cases
and that is proof beyond reasonable doubt. If the
prosecution fails to present such proof, the
presumption that the accused is innocent stands and,
therefore, there is no reason for requiring that he be
declared innocent of the crime before he can recover
compensation for his imprisonment.
Petitioner's contention has no merit. It would require
that every time an accused is acquitted on appeal he
must be given compensation on the theory that he was
"unjustly convicted" by the trial court. Such a reading of
sec. 3(a) is contrary to petitioner's professed canon of
construction that when the language of the statute is
clear it should be given its natural meaning. It leaves
out of the provision in question the qualifying word
"unjustly" so that the provision would simply read: "The
following may file claims for compensation before the
Board: (a) any person who was accused, convicted,
imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a
judgment of acquittal."
But sec. 3(a) requires that the claimant be
"unjustly accused, convicted [and] imprisoned." The
fact that his conviction is reversed and the accused is
acquitted is not itself proof that the previous conviction
was "unjust." An accused may be acquitted for a
number of reasons and his conviction by the trial court
may, for any of these reasons, be set aside. For
example, he may be acquitted not because he is
innocent of the crime charged but because of
reasonable doubt, in which case he may be found civilly
liable to the complainant, because while the evidence
against him does not satisfy the quantum of proof
required for conviction, it may nonetheless be sufficient
to sustain a civil action for damages.2 In one case the
accused, an alien, was acquitted of statutory rape with
homicide because of doubt as to the ages of the
offended parties who consented to have sex with him.
Nonetheless the accused was ordered to pay moral and
exemplary damages and ordered deported.3 In such a
case to pay the accused compensation for having been
"unjustly convicted" by the trial court would be utterly
inconsistent with his liability to the complainant. Yet to
follow petitioner's theory such an accused would be
entitled to compensation under sec. 3(a).
The truth is that the presumption of innocence has
never been intended as evidence of innocence of the
accused but only to shift the burden of proof that he is
guilty to the prosecution. If "accusation is not
synonymous with guilt,"4so is the presumption of
innocence not a proof thereof. It is one thing to say that
the accused is presumed to be innocent in order to
place on the prosecution the burden of proving beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty. It is quite
another thing to say that he is innocent and if he is
convicted that he has been "unjustly convicted." As this
Court held in a case:
Though we are acquitting the appellant
for the crime of rape with homicide, we
emphasize that we are not ruling that he
is innocent or blameless. It is only the
constitutional presumption of innocence
and the failure of the prosecution to
build an airtight case for conviction
which saved him, not that the facts of
unlawful conduct do not exist.5
To say then that an accused has been "unjustly
convicted" has to do with the manner of his conviction
rather than with his innocence. An accused may on
appeal be acquitted because he did not commit the
crime, but that does
not necessarily mean that he is entitled to
compensation for having been the victim of an "unjust
conviction." If his conviction was due to an error in the
appreciation of the evidence the conviction while
erroneous is not unjust. That is why it is not, on the
other hand, correct to say as does respondent, that
under the law liability for compensation depends
entirely on the innocence of the accused.
The phrase "unjustly convicted" has the same meaning
as "knowingly rendering an unjust judgment" in art. 204
of the Revised Penal Code. What this Court held in In re
Rafael C. Climaco 6 applies:
In order that a judge may be held liable
for knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment, it must be shown beyond
doubt that the judgment is unjust as it
is contrary to law or is not supported by
the evidence, and the same was made
with conscious and deliberate intent to
do an injustice . . . .
To hold a judge liable for the rendition of
manifestly unjust judgment by reason of
inexcusable negligence or ignorance, it
must be shown, according to Groizard,
that although he has acted without
malice, he failed to observe in the
performance of his duty, that diligence,
prudence and care which the law is
entitled to exact in the rendering of any
public service. Negligence and ignorance
are inexcusable if they imply a manifest
injustice which cannot be explained by a
reasonable interpretation. Inexcusable
mistake only exists in the legal concept
when it implies a manifest injustice, that
is to say, such injustice which cannot be
explained by a reasonable
interpretation, even though there is a
misunderstanding or error of the law
applied, yet in the contrary it results,
logically and reasonably, and in a very
clear and indisputable manner, in the
notorious violation of the legal precept.
Indeed, sec. 3(a) does not refer solely to an unjust
conviction as a result of which the accused is unjustly
imprisoned, but, in addition, to an unjust accusation.
The accused must have been "unjustly accused, in
consequence of which he is unjustly convicted and then
imprisoned. It is important to note this because if from
its inception the prosecution of the accused has been
wrongful, his conviction by the court is, in all
probability, also wrongful. Conversely, if the
prosecution is not malicious any conviction even
though based on less than the required quantum of
proof in criminal cases may be erroneous but not
necessarily unjust.
The reason is that under Rule 112, sec. 4, the question
for the prosecutor in filing a case in court is not
whether the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
but only whether "there is reasonable ground to believe
that a crime has been committed and the accused
is probably guilty thereof." Hence, an accusation which
is based on "probable guilt" is not an unjust accusation
and a conviction based on such degree of proof is
not necessarily an unjust judgment but only an
erroneous one. The remedy for such error is appeal.
In the case at bar there is absolutely no evidence to
show that petitioner's conviction by the trial court was
wrongful or that it was the product of malice or gross
ignorance or gross negligence. To the contrary, the
court had reason to believe that petitioner and his co-
accused were in league, because petitioner is the
father-in-law of Wilfredo Balderrama and it was
petitioner who bore the victim a grudge because of a
land dispute. Not only that. Petitioner and his
coaccused arrived together in the hut of the victims and
forced their way into it.
The Court of Appeals ruled there was no conspiracy
only because there was no proof that he did or say
anything on the occasion. Said the appellate court.
Both eyewitness testimonies fail to show
the appellant Felicito Basbacio to have
committed any act at all. Both fail to
show Felicito Basbacio as having said
anything at all. Both fail to show Felicito
Basbacio as having committed anything
in furtherance of a conspiracy to commit
the crimes charged against the
defendants. It seems to be a frail and
flimsy basis on which to conclude that
conspiracy existed between actual killer
Wilfredo Balderrama and Felicito
Basbacio to commit murder and two
frustrated murders on that night of June
26, 1988. It may be asked: where was
the coming together of the two
defendants to an agreement to commit
the crimes of murder and frustrated
murder on two counts? Where was
Basbacio's contribution to the
commission of the said crimes? Basbacio
was — as the record shows — nothing
but part of the dark shadows of that
night. . . .
One may take issue with this ruling because precisely
conspiracy may be shown by concert of action and
other circumstances. Why was petitioner with his son-
in-law? Why did they apparently flee together? And
what about the fact that there was bad blood between
petitioner and the victim Federico Boyon? These
questions may no longer be passed upon in view of the
acquittal of petitioner but they are relevant in
evaluating his claim that he had been unjustly accused,
convicted and imprisoned before he was released
because of his acquittal on appeal. We hold that in view
of these circumstances respondent Secretary of Justice
and the Board of Claims did not commit a grave abuse
of its discretion in disallowing petitioner's claim for
compensation under Rep. Act No. 7309.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and
Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
# Footnotes
1 The statute in pertinent parts provide:
Sec. 3. Who may File Claims. — The
following may file claims for
compensation before the Board:
a) any person who was unjustly accused,
convicted, imprisoned but subsequently
released by virtue of a judgment of
acquittal;
b) any person who was unjustly detained
and released without being charged;
c) any victim of arbitrary or illegal
detention by the authorities as defined
in the Revised Penal Code under a final
judgment of the court; and
d) any person who is a victim of violent
crimes. For purposes of this Act, violent
crimes shall include rape and shall
likewise refer to offenses committed
with malice which resulted in death or
serious physical and/or psychological
injuries, permanent incapacity or
disability, insanity, abortion, serious
trauma, or committed with torture,
cruelty or barbarity.
Sec. 4. Award Ceiling. — For victims of
unjust imprisonment or detention, the
compensation shall be based on the
number of months of imprisonment or
detention and every fraction thereof
shall be considered one
month: Provided, however, That in no
case shall such compensation exceed
One thousand pesos (P1,000.00) per
month.

In all other cases, the maximum amount

for which the Board may approve a claim
shall not exceed Ten thousand pesos
(P10,000.00) or the amount necessary to
reimburse the claimant the expenses
incurred for hospitalization, medical
treatment, loss of wage, loss of support
or other expenses directly related to the
injury, whichever is lower. This is without
prejudice to the right of the claimant to
seek other remedies under existing laws.

2 The Civil Code provides in Art. 29:

"When the accused in a criminal
prosecution is acquitted on the ground
that his guilt has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action
for damages for the same act or
omission may be instituted. Such action
requires only a preponderance of
evidence. Upon motion of the
defendant, the court may require the
plaintiff to file a bond to answer for
damages in case the complaint should
be found to be malicious.

"If in a criminal case the judgment of

acquittal is based upon reasonable
doubt, the court shall so declare. In the
absence of any declaration to that
effect, it may be inferred from the text
of the decision whether or not the
acquittal is due to that ground."
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 177333 April 24, 2009
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION
(PAGCOR) represented by ATTY. CARLOS R. BAUTISTA,
JR., Petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE GAMING JURISDICTION INCORPORATED
(PEJI), ZAMBOANGA CITY SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE
AUTHORITY, et al., Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for Prohibition.
Republic Act No. 7903 (R.A. No. 7903), which
was enacted into law on February 23, 1995, created the
Zamboanga City Special Economic Zone
(ZAMBOECOZONE) and the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority.
Among other things, the law gives the ZAMBOECOZONE
Authority the following power under Sec. 7 (f), viz:
Section 7.
xxxx
(f) To operate on its own, either directly or through a
subsidiary entity, or license to others, tourism-related
activities, including games, amusements and
recreational and sports facilities;
xxxx
Apparently in the exercise of its power granted under
the above provision, public respondent
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority passed Resolution No.
2006-08-03 dated August 19, 2006 approving the
application of private respondent Philippine E-Gaming
Jurisdiction, Inc. (PEJI) to be a Master
Licensor/Regulator of on-line/internet/electronic
gaming/games of chance.
PEJI forthwith undertook extensive advertising
campaigns representing itself as such licensor/regulator
to the international business and gaming community,
drawing the Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR) to file the present petition for
Prohibition which assails the authority of the
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate, license, or
regulate the operation of games of chance in the
ZAMBOECOZONE.
PAGCOR contends that R.A. No. 7903, specifically
Section 7(f) thereof, does not give power or authority
to the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate, license,
or regulate the operation of games of chance in the
ZAMBOECOZONE. Citing three (3) statutes, which it
claims are in pari materia with R.A. No. 7903 as it
likewise created economic zones and provided for the
powers and functions of their respective governing and
administrative authorities, PAGCOR posits that the
grant therein of authority to operate games of chance is
clearly expressed, but it is not similarly so in Section 7(f)
of R.A. No. 7903.
Thus PAGCOR cites these three statutes and their
respective pertinent provisions:
Republic Act No. 7227, or the "Bases Conversion and
Development Authority Act" enacted on March 13,
1992:
Section 13. The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority. –
xxxx
(b) Powers and functions of the Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority. – The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority,
otherwise known as the Subic Authority, shall have the
following powers and functions:
xxxx
(7) To operate directly or indirectly or license tourism-
related activities subject to priorities and standards set
by the Subic Authority including games and
amusements, except horse-racing, dog-racing and
casino gambling which shall continue to be licensed by
the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR) upon recommendation of the Conversion
Authority; to maintain and preserve the forested areas
as a national park;
xxxx
Republic Act No. 7922 or the "Cagayan Economic Zone
Act of 1995" enacted on February 24, 1995:
Section 6. Powers and Functions of the Cagayan
Economic Zone Authority – The Cagayan Economic
Zone Authority shall have the following powers and
functions:
xxxx
(f) To operate on its own, either directly or through a
subsidiary entity, or license to others, tourism-related
activities, including games, amusements, recreational
and sports facilities such as horse-racing, dog-racing
gambling, casinos, golf courses, and others, under
priorities and standards set by the CEZA;
xxxx
And Republic Act No. 7916 or the "Special Economic
Zone Act of 1995," enacted on February 24, 1995
authorizing other economic zones established under
the defunct Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA)
and its successor Philippine Economic Zone Authority
(PEZA) to establish casinos and other games of chance
under the license of PAGCOR by way of the ipso facto
clause, viz:
SECTION 51. Ipso Facto Clause. - All privileges, benefits,
advantages or exemptions granted to special economic
zones under Republic Act No. 7227 shall ipso facto be
accorded to special economic zones already created or
to be created under this Act. The free port status shall
not be vested upon the new special economic zones.
PAGCOR maintains that, compared with the above-
quoted provisions of the ecozone-related statutes,
Section 7(f) of R.A. No. 7903 does not categorically
empower the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate,
license, or authorize entities to operate games of
chance in the area, as the words "games" and
"amusement" employed therein do not include "games
of chance." Hence, PAGCOR concludes,
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority’s grant of license to private
respondent PEJI encroached on its (PAGCOR’s)
authority under Presidential Decree No. 1869 vis-a-vis
the above-stated special laws to centralize and regulate
all games of chance.
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority, in its Comment,1 contends
that PAGCOR has no personality to file the present
petition as it failed to cite a superior law which proves
its claim of having been granted exclusive right and
authority to license and regulate all games of chance
within the Philippines; and that, contrary to PAGCOR’s
assertion, the words "games" and "amusements" in
Section 7(f) of R.A. No. 7903 include "games of chance"
as was the intention of the lawmakers when they
enacted the law.
In its Reply Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam,2 PAGCOR cites
the November 27, 2006 Opinion3 rendered by the
Office of the President through Deputy Executive
Secretary for Legal Affairs Manuel B. Gaite, the
pertinent portions of which read:
Coming to the issue at hand, the ZAMBOECOZONE
Charter simply allows the operation of tourism-related
activitiesincluding games and amusements without
stating any form of gambling activity in its grant of
authority to ZAMBOECOZONE.
xxxx
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that
under its legislative franchise (RA 7903), the
ZAMBOECOZONE is not authorized to enter into any
gaming activity by itself unless expressly authorized by
law or other laws specifically allowing the same.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Court finds that, indeed, R.A. No. 7903 does not
authorize the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate
and/or license games of chance/gambling.
Section 7(f) of R.A. No. 7903 authorizes the
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority "[t]o operate on its own,
either directly or through a subsidiary entity, or license
to others, tourism-related activities, including games,
amusements and recreational and sports facilities."
It is a well-settled rule in statutory construction that
where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation.4
The plain meaning rule or verba legis, derived from the
maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the index of
intention), rests on the valid presumption that the
words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly
express its intention or will, and preclude the court
from construing it differently. For the legislature is
presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have
used them advisedly, and to have expressed the intent
by use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba
legis non est recedendum. From the words of a statute
there should be no departure.5
The words "game" and "amusement" have definite and
unambiguous meanings in law which are clearly
different from "game of chance" or "gambling." In its
ordinary sense, a "game" is a sport, pastime, or contest;
while an "amusement" is a pleasurable occupation of
the senses, diversion, or enjoyment.6 On the other
hand, a "game of chance" is "a game in which chance
rather than skill determines the outcome," while
"gambling" is defined as "making a bet" or "a play for
value against an uncertain event in hope of gaining
something of value." 7
A comparison of the phraseology of Section 7(f) of R.A.
No. 7903 with similar provisions in the three cited
statutes creating ECOZONES shows that while the three
statutes, particularly R.A. No. 7922 which authorized
the Cagayan Economic Zone Authority to directly or
indirectly operate gambling and casinos within its
jurisdiction, categorically stated that such power was
being vested in their respective administrative bodies,
R.A. No. 7903 did not.
The spirit and reason of the statute may be passed
upon where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity,
contradiction, injustice, or defeat the clear purpose of
the lawmakers.8 Not any of these instances is present in
the case at bar, however. Using the literal meanings of
"games" and "amusement" to exclude "games of
chance" and "gambling" does not lead to absurdity,
contradiction, or injustice. Neither does it defeat the
intent of the legislators. The lawmakers could have
easily employed the words "games of chance" and
"gambling" or even "casinos" if they had intended to
grant the power to operate the same to the
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority, as what was done in R.A. application of the statute presents the agency with
No. 7922 enacted a day after R.A. No. 7903. But they unique opportunity and experiences for discovering
did not. deficiencies, inaccuracies, or improvements in the
statute.8
The Court takes note of the above-mentioned Opinion
of the Office of the President which, after In fine, Section 7(f) did not grant to the
differentiating the grant of powers between the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority the power to operate
Cagayan Special Economic Zone and the and/or license games of chance/gambling.
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority, states that while the
former is authorized to, among other things, operate WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Public
gambling casinos and internet gaming, as well as enter respondent Zamboanga Economic Zone Authority is
into licensing agreements, the latter is not. The relevant DIRECTED to CEASE and DESIST from exercising
portions of said Opinion read: jurisdiction to operate, license, or otherwise authorize
and regulate the operation of any games of chance.
The difference in the language and grant of powers to And private respondent Philippine Gaming Jurisdiction,
CEZA and ZAMBOECOZONE is telling. To the former, the Incorporated is DIRECTED to CEASE and DESIST from
grant of powers is not only explicit, but amplified, while operating any games of chance pursuant to the license
to the latter the grant of power is merely what the law granted to it by public respondent.
(RA 7903) states. Not only are the differences in
language telling, it will be noted that both charters of SO ORDERED.
CEZA and ZAMBOECOZONE were signed into law only
one (1) day apart from each other, i.e., February 23, CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
1995 in the case of ZAMBOECOZONE and February 24, Associate Justice
1995 in the case of CEZA. x x x Accordingly, both laws Acting Chairperson
have to be taken in the light of what Congress intended
them to be, and the distinction that the lawmakers WE CONCUR:
made when they enacted the two laws.
PRESBITERO J.
Coming to the issue at hand, the ZAMBOECOZONE DANTE O. TINGA
VELASCO, JR.
Charter simply allows the operation of tourism-related Associate Justice
Associate Justice
activities including games and amusements without
stating any form of gambling activity in its grant of TERESITA J.
authority to ZAMBOECOZONE. On the other hand, the LEONARDO DE ARTURO D. BRION
grant to CEZA included such activities as horse-racing, CASTRO* Associate Justice
dog-racing and gambling casinos. Associate Justice

xxxx
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that
under its legislative franchise (RA 7903), the
ZAMBOECOZONE is not authorized to enter into any
gaming activity by itself unless expressly authorized by
law or other laws specifically allowing the same.
(Emphasis supplied)
Both PAGCOR and the Ecozones being under the
supervision of the Office of the President, the latter’s
interpretation of R.A. No. 7903 is persuasive and
deserves respect under the doctrine of respect for
administrative or practical construction. In applying said
doctrine, courts often refer to several factors which
may be regarded as bases thereof – factors leading the
courts to give the principle controlling weight in
particular instances, or as independent rules in
themselves. These factors include the respect due the
governmental agencies charged with administration,
their competence, expertness, experience, and informed
judgment and the fact that they frequently are the
drafters of the law they interpret; that the agency is the
one on which the legislature must rely to advise it as to
the practical working out of the statute, and practical
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution,
and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that
the conclusions in the above decision had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 186400 October 20, 2010
CYNTHIA S. BOLOS, Petitioner,
vs.
DANILO T. BOLOS, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court seeking a review of the December
10, 2008 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in an
original action for certiorari under Rule 65 entitled
"Danilo T. Bolos v. Hon. Lorifel Lacap Pahimna and
Cynthia S. Bolos," docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 97872,
reversing the January 16, 2007 Order of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 69 (RTC), declaring its
decision pronouncing the nullity of marriage between
petitioner and respondent final and executory.
On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia
Bolos (Cynthia) filed a petition for the declaration of
nullity of her marriage to respondent Danilo
Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of the Family Code,
docketed as JDRC No. 6211.
After trial on the merits, the RTC granted the petition
for annulment in a Decision, dated August 2, 2006, with
the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring
the marriage between petitioner CYNTHIA S. BOLOS
and respondent DANILO T. BOLOS celebrated on
February 14, 1980 as null and void ab initio on the
ground of psychological incapacity on the part of both
petitioner and respondent under Article 36 of the
Family Code with all the legal consequences provided
by law.
Furnish the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan as well as
the National Statistics Office (NSO) copy of this
decision.
SO ORDERED.2
A copy of said decision was received by Danilo on
August 25, 2006. He timely filed the Notice of Appeal
on September 11, 2006.
In an order dated September 19, 2006, the RTC denied
due course to the appeal for Danilo’s failure to file the
required motion for reconsideration or new trial, in
violation of Section 20 of the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages.
On November 23, 2006, a motion to reconsider the
denial of Danilo’s appeal was likewise denied.
On January 16, 2007, the RTC issued the order declaring
its August 2, 2006 decision final and executory and
granting the Motion for Entry of Judgment filed by
Cynthia.
Not in conformity, Danilo filed with the CA a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul the orders
of the RTC as they were rendered with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction,
to wit: 1) the September 19, 2006 Order which denied
due course to Danilo’s appeal; 2) the November 23,
2006 Order which denied the motion to reconsider the
September 19, 2006 Order; and 3) the January 16, 2007
Order which declared the August 2, 2006 decision as
final and executory. Danilo also prayed that he be
declared psychologically capacitated to render the
essential marital obligations to Cynthia, who should be
declared guilty of abandoning him, the family home and
their children.
As earlier stated, the CA granted the petition and
reversed and set aside the assailed orders of the RTC.
The appellate court stated that the requirement of a
motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal
under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in this case
as the marriage between Cynthia and Danilo was
solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the Family
Code took effect. It relied on the ruling of this Court in
Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli3 to the effect that the
"coverage [of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC] extends only to
those marriages entered into during the effectivity of
the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988."
Cynthia sought reconsideration of the ruling by filing
her Manifestation with Motion for Extension of Time to
File Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Partial
Reconsideration [of the Honorable Court’s Decision
dated December 10, 2008]. The CA, however, in its
February 11, 2009 Resolution,4 denied the motion for
extension of time considering that the 15-day
reglementary period to file a motion for
reconsideration is non-extendible, pursuant to Section
2, Rule 40, 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure
citing Habaluyas v. Japson, 142 SCRA 208. The motion
for partial reconsideration was likewise denied.
Hence, Cynthia interposes the present petition via Rule
45 of the Rules of Court raising the following
ISSUES
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ISSUING THE
QUESTIONED DECISION DATED DECEMBER 10, 2008
CONSIDERING THAT:
 A. THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE
HONORABLE COURT IN ENRICO V. SPS.
MEDINACELI IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE
INSTANT CASE CONSIDERING THAT THE
FACTS AND THE ISSUE THEREIN ARE NOT
SIMILAR TO THE INSTANT CASE.
B. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE
PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE HONORABLE
COURT IS APLLICABLE TO THE INSTANT
CASE, ITS RULING IN ENRICO V. SPS.
MEDINACELI IS PATENTLY ERRONEOUS
BECAUSE THE PHRASE "UNDER THE
FAMILY CODE" IN A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC
PERTAINS TO THE WORD "PETITIONS"
RATHER THAN TO THE WORD
"MARRIAGES."
C. FROM THE FOREGOING, A.M. NO. 02-
11-10-SC ENTITLED "RULE ON
DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF
VOID MARRIAGES AND ANNULMENT OF
VOIDABLE MARRIAGES" IS APPLICABLE TO
MARRIAGES SOLEMNIZED BEFORE THE
EFFECTIVITY OF THE FAMILY CODE.
HENCE, A MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION IS A PRECONDITION
FOR AN APPEAL BY HEREIN RESPONDENT.
D. CONSIDERING THAT HEREIN
RESPONDENT REFUSED TO COMPLY
WITH A PRECONDITION FOR APPEAL, A
RELAXATION OF THE RULES ON APPEAL IS
NOT PROPER IN HIS CASE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ISSUING THE
QUESTIONED RESOLUTION DATED FEBRUARY 11, 2009
CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING AND THE FACTUAL
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.
III
THE TENETS OF JUSTICE AND FAIR PLAY, THE NOVELTY
AND IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUE AND THE SPECIAL
CIRCUMSTANCES IN THIS CASE JUSTIFY AND WARRANT A
LIBERAL VIEW OF THE RULES IN FAVOR OF THE
PETITIONER. MOREOVER, THE INSTANT PETITION IS
MERITORIOUS AND NOT INTENDED FOR DELAY.5
From the arguments advanced by Cynthia, the principal
question to be resolved is whether or not A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC entitled "Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages," is applicable to the case at bench.
Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also
applicable to marriages solemnized before the
effectivity of the Family Code. According to Cynthia, the
CA erroneously anchored its decision to an obiter
dictum in the aforecited Enrico case, which did not even
involve a marriage solemnized before the effectivity of
the Family Code.
She added that, even assuming arguendo that the
pronouncement in the said case constituted a decision
on its merits, still the same cannot be applied because
of the substantial disparity in the factual milieu of the
Enrico case from this case. In the said case, both the
marriages sought to be declared null were solemnized,
and the action for declaration of nullity was filed, after
the effectivity of both the Family Code in 1988 and of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC in 2003. In this case, the marriage
was solemnized before the effectivity of the Family
Code and A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC while the action was
filed and decided after the effectivity of both.
Danilo, in his Comment,6 counters that A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC is not applicable because his marriage with
Cynthia was solemnized on February 14, 1980, years
before its effectivity. He further stresses the
meritorious nature of his appeal from the decision of
the RTC declaring their marriage as null and void due to
his purported psychological incapacity and citing the
mere "failure" of the parties who were supposedly
"remiss," but not "incapacitated," to render marital
obligations as required under Article 36 of the Family
Code.
The Court finds the petition devoid of merit.
Petitioner insists that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs
this case. Her stance is unavailing. The Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated on
March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope. Section 1 of the
Rule, in fact, reads:
Section 1. Scope – This Rule shall govern petitions for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and
annulment of voidable marriages under the Family
Code of the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
leaves no room for doubt. The coverage extends only to
those marriages entered into during the effectivity of
the Family Code which took effect on August 3,
1988.7 The rule sets a demarcation line between
marriages covered by the Family Code and those
solemnized under the Civil Code.8
The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioner’s
interpretation that the phrase "under the Family Code"
in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word "petitions"
rather than to the word "marriages."
A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when
the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity,
there is no room for construction or interpretation.
There is only room for application.9 As the statute is
clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given
its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. This is what is known as the plain-
meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the
maxim, index animi sermo, or "speech is the index of
intention." Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis
non est recedendum, or "from the words of a statute
there should be no departure."10
There is no basis for petitioner’s assertion either that
the tenets of substantial justice, the novelty and
importance of the issue and the meritorious nature of
this case warrant a relaxation of the Rules in her favor.
Time and again the Court has stressed that the rules of
procedure must be faithfully complied with and should
not be discarded with the mere expediency of claiming
substantial merit.11 As a corollary, rules prescribing the
time for doing specific acts or for taking certain
proceedings are considered absolutely indispensable to
prevent needless delays and to orderly and promptly
discharge judicial business. By their very nature, these
rules are regarded as mandatory.12
The appellate court was correct in denying petitioner’s
motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration considering that the reglementary
period for filing the said motion for reconsideration is
non-extendible. As pronounced in Apex Mining Co., Inc.
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 13
The rule is and has been that the period for filing a
motion for reconsideration is non-extendible. The Court
has made this clear as early as 1986 in Habaluyas
Enterprises vs. Japzon. Since then, the Court has
consistently and strictly adhered thereto.1avvphil
Given the above, we rule without hesitation that the
appellate court’s denial of petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration is justified, precisely because
petitioner’s earlier motion for extension of time did not
suspend/toll the running of the 15-day reglementary
period for filing a motion for reconsideration. Under the
circumstances, the CA decision has already attained
finality when petitioner filed its motion for
reconsideration. It follows that the same decision was
already beyond the review jurisdiction of this Court.
In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in setting
aside the RTC decision which denied due course to
respondent’s appeal and denying petitioner’s motion
for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration.
Appeal is an essential part of our judicial system. Its
purpose is to bring up for review a final judgment of the
lower court. The courts should, thus, proceed with
caution so as not to deprive a party of his right to
appeal.14 In the recent case of Almelor v. RTC of Las
Pinas City, Br. 254,15 the Court reiterated: While the
right to appeal is a statutory, not a natural right,
nonetheless it is an essential part of our judicial system
and courts should proceed with caution so as not to
deprive a party of the right to appeal, but rather,
ensure that every party-litigant has the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his
cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.
In the case at bench, the respondent should be given
the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his
appeal considering that what is at stake is the
sacrosanct institution of marriage.
No less than the 1987 Constitution recognizes marriage
as an inviolable social institution. This constitutional
policy is echoed in our Family Code. Article 1 thereof
emphasizes its permanence and inviolability, thus:
Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent
union between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal
and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an
inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and
not subject to stipulation, except that marriage
settlements may fix the property relations during the
marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
This Court is not unmindful of the constitutional policy
to protect and strengthen the family as the basic
autonomous social institution and marriage as the
foundation of the family.16
Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is
not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the
State is vitally interested. The State finds no stronger
anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The
break up of families weakens our social and moral
fabric and, hence, their preservation is not the concern
alone of the family members.17
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-
NACHURA DE CASTRO*
Associate Justice Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
 ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had

been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution

and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 109835 November 22, 1993
JMM PROMOTIONS & MANAGEMENT, INC., petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and
ULPIANO L. DE LOS SANTOS, respondent.
Don P. Porciuncula for petitioner.
Eulogio Nones, Jr. for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
The sole issue submitted in this case is the validity of
the order of respondent National Labor Relations
Commission dated October 30, 1992, dismissing the
petitioner's appeal from a decision of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration on the ground of
failure to post the required appeal bond.1
The respondent cited the second paragraph of Article
223 of the Labor Code as amended, providing that:
In the case of a judgment involving a
monetary award, an appeal by the
employer may be perfected only upon
the posting of a cash or surety bond
issued by a reputable bonding company
duly accredited by the Commission in an
amount equivalent to the monetary
award in the judgment appealed from.
and Rule VI, Section 6 of the new Rules of Procedure of
the NLRC, as amended, reading as follows:
Sec. 6. Bond — In case the decision of a
Labor Arbiter involves a monetary
award, an appeal by the employer shall
be perfected only upon the posting of a
cash or surety bond issued by a
reputable bonding company duly
accredited by the Commission or the
Supreme Court in an amount equivalent
to the monetary award.
The petitioner contends that the NLRC committed
grave abuse of discretion in applying these rules to
decisions rendered by the POEA. It insists that the
appeal bond is not necessary in the case of licensed
recruiters for overseas employment because they are
already required under Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the
POEA Rules not only to pay a license fee of P30,000 but
also to post a cash bond of P100,000 and a surety bond
of P50,000, thus:
Upon approval of the application, the
applicant shall pay a license fee of
P30,000. It shall also post a cash bond of
P100,000 and surety bond of P50,000
from a bonding company acceptable to
the Administration and duly accredited
by the Insurance Commission. The bonds
shall answer for all valid and legal
claims arising from violations of the
conditions for the grant and use of the
license, and/or accreditation
and contracts of employment. The bonds
shall likewise guarantee compliance with
the provisions of the Code and its
implementing rules and
regulations relating to recruitment and
placement, the Rules of the
Administration and relevant issuances of
the Department and all liabilities which
the Administration may impose. The
surety bonds shall include the condition
that the notice to the principal is notice
to the surety and that any judgment
against the principal in connection with
matters falling under POEA's jurisdiction
shall be binding and conclusive on the
surety. The surety bonds shall be co-
terminus with the validity period of
license. (Emphasis supplied)
In addition, the petitioner claims it has placed in escrow
the sum of P200,000 with the Philippine National Bank
in compliance with Section 17, Rule II, Book II of the
same Rule, "to primarily answer for valid and legal
claims of recruited workers as a result of recruitment
violations or money claims."
Required to comment, the Solicitor General sustains the
appeal bond requirement but suggest that the rules
cited by the NLRC are applicable only to decisions of the
Labor Arbiters and not of the POEA. Appeals from
decisions of the POEA, he says, are governed by the
following provisions of Rule V, Book VII of the POEA
Rules:
Sec. 5. Requisites for Perfection of
Appeal. The appeal shall be filed within
the reglementary period as provided in
Section 1 of this Rule; shall be under
oath with proof of payment of the
required appeal fee and the posting of a
cash or surety bond as provided in
Section 6 of this Rule; shall be
accompanied by a memorandum of
appeal which shall state the grounds
relied upon and the arguments in
support thereof; the relief prayed for;
and a statement of the date when the
 appellant received the appealed decision
and/or award and proof of service on
the other party of such appeal.
A mere notice of appeal without
complying with the other requisites
aforestated shall not stop the running of
the period for perfecting an appeal.
Sec. 6. Bond. In case the decision of the
Administration involves a monetary
award, an appeal by the employer shall
be perfected only upon the posting of a
cash or surety bond issued by a
reputable bonding company duly
accredited by the Commission in an
amount equivalent to the monetary
award. (Emphasis supplied)
The question is, having posted the total bond of
P150,000 and placed in escrow the amount of P200,000
as required by the POEA Rules, was the petitioner still
required to post an appeal bond to perfect its appeal
from a decision of the POEA to the NLRC?
It was.
The POEA Rules are clear. A reading thereof readily
shows that in addition to the cash and surety bonds and
the escrow money, an appeal bond in an amount
equivalent to the monetary award is required to perfect
an appeal from a decision of the POEA. Obviously, the
appeal bond is intended to further insure the payment
of the monetary award in favor of the employee if it is
eventually affirmed on appeal to the NLRC.
It is true that the cash and surety bonds and the money
placed in escrow are supposed to guarantee the
payment of all valid and legal claims against the
employer, but these claims are not limited to monetary
awards to employees whose contracts of employment
have been violated. The POEA can go against these
bonds also for violations by the recruiter of the
conditions of its license, the provisions of the Labor
Code and its implementing rules, E.O. 247 (reorganizing
POEA) and the POEA Rules, as well as the settlement of
other liabilities the recruiter may incur.
As for the escrow agreement, it was presumably
intended to provide for a standing fund, as it were, to
be used only as a last resort and not to be reduced with
the enforcement against it of every claim of recruited
workers that may be adjudged against the employer.
This amount may not even be enough to cover such
claims and, even if it could initially, may eventually be
exhausted after satisfying other subsequent claims.
As it happens, the decision sought to be appealed
grants a monetary award of about P170,000 to the
dismissed employee, the herein private respondent.
The standby guarantees required by the POEA Rules
would be depleted if this award were to be enforced
not against the appeal bond but against the bonds and
the escrow money, making them inadequate for the
satisfaction of the other obligations the recruiter may
incur.
Indeed, it is possible for the monetary award in favor of
the employee to exceed the amount of P350,000,
which is the sum of the bonds and escrow money
required of the recruiter.
It is true that these standby guarantees are not
imposed on local employers, as the petitioner observes,
but there is a simple explanation for this distinction.
Overseas recruiters are subject to more stringent
requirement because of the special risks to which our
workers abroad are subjected by their foreign
employers, against whom there is usually no direct or
effective recourse. The overseas recruiter is solidarily
liable with a foreign employer. The bonds and the
escrow money are intended to insure more care on the
part of the local agent in its choice of the foreign
principal to whom our overseas workers are to be sent.
It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in
interpreting a statute (or a set of rules as in this case),
care should be taken that every part thereof be given
effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an
integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of
conflicting provisions. Ut res magis valeat quam
pereat. 2 Under the petitioner's interpretation, the
appeal bond required by Section 6 of the
aforementioned POEA Rule should be disregarded
because of the earlier bonds and escrow money it has
posted. The petitioner would in effect nullify Section 6
as a superfluity but we do not see any such
redundancy; on the contrary, we find that Section 6
complements Section 4 and Section 17. The rule is that
a construction that would render a provision
inoperative should be avoided; instead, apparently
inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever
possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious
whole.
Accordingly, we hold that in addition to the monetary
obligations of the overseas recruiter prescribed in
Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules and the
escrow agreement under Section 17 of the same Rule,
it is necessary to post the appeal bond required under
Section 6, Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules, as a
condition for perfecting an appeal from a decision of
the POEA.
Every intendment of the law must be interpreted in
favor of the working class, conformably to the mandate
of the Constitution. By sustaining rather than annulling
the appeal bond as a further protection to the claimant
employee, this Court affirms once again its
commitment to the interest of labor.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs
against the petitioner. It is so ordered.

Davide and Quiason, JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J, is on leave.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 75222 July 18, 1991
RADIOLA-TOSHIBA PHILIPPINES, INC., through its
assignee-in-insolvency VICENTE J. CUNA, petitioner,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON.
LEONARDO I. CRUZ, as Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Angeles City, Branch No. LVI, EMILIO C. PATINO, as
assignee-in-insolvency of CARLOS and TERESITA
GATMAYTAN, SHERIFF OF ANGELES CITY, REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF ANGELES CITY, SANYO MARKETING
CORPORATION, S & T ENTERPRISES INC., REFRIGERATION
INDUSTRIES INC., and DELTA MOTOR
CORPORATION, respondents.
Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for petitioner.
Procopio S. Beltran, Jr. for private respondents.
BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari of the March 31, 1986
Decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court * in
A.C-G.R. SP No. 04160 entitled "Radiola-Toshiba
Philippines, Inc. vs. Hon. Leonardo I. Cruz, et al."
denying the petition for certiorari and mandamus; and
its Resolution of July 1, 1986 denying the motion for
reconsideration.
The antecedent facts of this case, as found by the then
Intermediate Appellate Court, are as follows:
On July 2, 1980, three creditors filed a petition
for the involuntary insolvency of Carlos
Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan, the private
respondents herein, the case docketed as
Special Proceeding No. 1548 of the then Court
of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
Pampanga and Angeles City.
On July 9, 1980, the respondent court issued an
order taking cognizance of the said petition and
stating inter alia that:
. . . the Court forbids the payment of any
debts, and the delivery of any property
owing and belonging to said
respondents-debtors from other
persons, or, to any other persons for the
use and benefit of the same
respondents-debtors and/or the transfer
of any property by and for the said
respondents-debtors to another, upon
petitioners' putting up a bond by way of
certified and reputable sureties. (Annex
1, Comment).
Counsel for the petitioners-creditors informed
respondent sheriff Angeles City of the aforesaid order
(Annex 2, Ibid) and on March 26, 1981, also
communicated with counsel for the petitioner herein
regarding same order, apprising the latter that "the
personal and real property which have been levied
upon and/or attached should be preserved till the final
determination of the petition aforementioned." (Annex
3, Ibid).
On April 12, 1983, petitioners-creditors filed second
urgent motion for issuance of insolvency order and
resolution of the case, alleging among other things, that
in November, 1982, they filed an urgent motion to issue
insolvency order; on December 2, 1982, they presented
a motion to prohibit the city sheriff of Angeles City from
disposing the personal and real properties of the
insolvent debtors, Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita
Gatmaytan; on January 18, 1983, they (sic) appealed in
the Bulletin Today issue of even date a news item to the
effect that Radiola-Toshiba Phil. Inc. has already shut
down its factory, sometime in March 1983, through
their representative, they caused to be investigated the
real properties in the names of Carlos Gatmaytan and
Teresita Gatmaytan and they were surprised to find out
that some of the aforesaid properties were already
transferred to Radiola-Toshiba Phil. Inc.; and that in
view of such development, it is their submission that
without an insolvency order and a resolution of the
case which was ripe for resolution as early as March 3,
1982, the rights and interest of petitioners-creditors
would be injured and jeopardized. (Annex "C").
On April 15, 1983, petitioner filed an opposition to the
said motion vis-a-vis the prayer that the insolvency
order (which has not been rendered yet by the court)
be annotated on the transfer certificates of title already
issued in its name (Annex "D").
On April 22, 1983, judgment was rendered declaring
the insolvency of respondents-debtors Carlos
Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan.
On April 28, 1983, petitioner filed a supplemental
opposition to the same second urgent motion and
motion to direct respondent sheriff to issue a final
certificate of sale for the properties covered by TCT
Nos. 18905 and 40430 in its favor (Annex "E").
On February 3, 1984, acting upon petitioner's motion
claiming that ownership of certain real properties of the
insolvents had passed to it by virtue of foreclosure
proceedings conducted in Civil Case No. 35946 of the
former Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II, Pasig,
Metro Manila, which properties were not redeemed
within the period of redemption, respondent court
issued an order disposing, thus:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby, confirms the
election of Mr. Emilio C. Patino, as assignee of
all the registered claimants in this case, and, in
consequence thereof, the said assignee is
hereby directed to post a bond in the amount of
P30,000.00 and to take his oath thereafter so as
to be able to perform his duties and discharge
his functions, as such.
The Court, likewise, sets the meeting of all the
creditors with the attendance, of course, of the
assignee, on March 9, 1984, at 8:30., as by that
time the proposals, which the respective
representatives of the parties-claimants desire
to clear with their principals, shall have already
been reported.
The assignee shall see to it that the properties
of the insolvents which are now in the actual or
constructive custody and management of the
receiver previously appointed by the Court on
petitioners' and claimants' proposals be placed
under this actual or constructive custody and
management, such as he is able to do so, as the
Court hereby dissolves the receivership
previously authorized, it having become a
superfluity. (Annex "F").
On May 18, 1984, the Regional Trial Court, Branch CLII,
Pasig, Metro Manila, in Civil Case No. 35946, issued an
order directing respondent Sheriff of Angeles City, or
whoever is acting in his behalf, to issue within seven (7)
days from notice thereof a final deed of sale over the
two (2) parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates
of Titles Nos. 18905 and 40430 in favor of petitioner.
(Annex "G").
In said Civil Case No. 35946, a case for collection of sum
of money covering the proceeds of television sets and
other appliances, the then Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch II, Pasig, Metro Manila, issued a writ of
preliminary attachment on February 15, 1980 upon
application of the petitioner, as plaintiff, which put up a
bond of P350,000.00. On March 4, 1980, 3:00 P.M., levy
on attachment was done in favor of petitioner on the
real properties registered in the names of spouses
Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan under TCT
Nos. 18905 and 40430 of the Registry of Deeds of
Angeles City, per Entry No. 7216 on said titles. (Annex
"A" and "B").
On December 10, 1980, a decision was rendered in
favor of petitioner, ordering private respondents and
their co-defendant Peoples Appliance Center, Inc. to
pay petitioner, jointly and severally, the sum of
P721,825.91 plus interest thereon of 14% per
annum from October 12, 1979 until fully paid;
P20,000.00, for and attorney's fees; and the costs of
suit (Annex "5", Comment). After the said decision in
the aforementioned Civil Case No. 35946 became final
and executory, a writ of execution for the satisfaction
thereof issued on March 18, 1981; and on May 4, 1981,
respondent sheriff of Angeles City sold at auction sale
the attached properties covered by TCT Nos. 18905 and
40430, to petitioner as the highest bidder, and the
certificate of sale was accordingly issued in its favor.
On September 21, 1982, the court ordered the
consolidation of ownership of petitioner over said
properties; but respondent sheriff of Angeles City
refused to issue a final certificate of sale in favor of
petitioner.
On May 30, 1984, petitioners-creditors interposed their
opposition, stating among other things, that subject
motion is improper and premature because it treats of
matters foreign to the insolvency proceedings; and
premature, for the reason that the properties covered
by TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430-Angeles City were
brought to the jurisdiction of the insolvency court for
the determination of the assets of the insolvents
available for distribution to the approved
credits/liabilities of the insolvents. Petitioners-creditors
theorized that the insolvency court is devoid of
jurisdiction to grant the motion referring to matters
involved in a case pending before a coordinate court in
another jurisdiction (Annex "l").
Prior thereto or on July 13, 1984, to be precise,
respondent court came out with its assailed extended
order with the following decretal portion:
WHEREFORE, and also for the reason stated in
the aforequoted order issued in pursuance of a
similar motion of the movant, the Court denies,
as it is hereby denied the motion of Radiola-
Toshiba, dated May 28, 1984 and directs the
latter to participate in the supposed meeting of
all the creditors/claimants presided by the duly
elected assignee. (Annex "J").
On September 8, 1984, herein petitioner Radiola-
Toshiba Philippines, Inc. (RTPI, for short) filed a petition
for certiorari and mandamus with respondent
Intermediate Appellate Court.
The then Intermediate Appellate Court, in a Decision
promulgated on March 31, 1986, denied petitioner's
aforesaid petition. On April 19, 1986, petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied in
a Resolution dated July 1, 1986.
Hence, the instant petition. Herein petitioner raised
two issues —
1. WHETHER OR NOT CERTIORARI IS A REMEDY
DESIGNATED FOR THE CORRECTION OF ERRORS OF
JURISDICTION ONLY; and
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE REFUSAL OF THE COURTS TO
ENFORCE THE LIEN OF PETITIONER ARISING FROM A
LEVY OF ATTACHMENT NOT MADE WITHIN ONE
MONTH NEXT PRECEDING THE COMMENCEMENT OF
THE INSOLVENCY PROCEEDING IS GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION.
The main issue in this case is whether or not the levy on
attachment in favor of the petitioner is dissolved by the
insolvency proceedings against respondent spouses
commenced four months after said attachment.
On this issue, Section 32 of the Insolvency Law (Act No.
1956, as amended), provides:
Sec. 32 — As soon as an assignee is elected or
appointed and qualified, the clerk of the court
shall, by an instrument under his hand and seal
of the court, assign and convey to the assignee
all the real and personal property, estate, and
effects of the debtor with all his deeds, books,
and papers relating thereto, and such
assignment shall relate back to the
commencement of the proceedings in
insolvency, and shall relate back to the acts
upon the adjudication was founded, and by
operation of law shall vest the title to all such
property, estate, and effects in the assignee,
although the same is then attached on mesne
process, as the property of the debtor. Such
assignment shall operate to vest in the assignee
all of the estate of the insolvent debtor not
exempt by law from execution. It shall dissolve
any attachment levied within one month next
preceding the commencement of the insolvency
proceedings and vacate and set aside any
judgment entered in any action commenced
within thirty days immediately prior to the
commencement of insolvency proceedings and
shall set aside any judgment entered by default
or consent of the debtor within thirty days
immediately prior to the commencement of the
insolvency proceedings. (Emphasis supplied)
Relative thereto, the findings of the then Intermediate
Appellate Court are undisputed that the levy on
attachment against the subject properties of the
Gatmaytans, issued by the then Court of First Instance
of Pasig in Civil Case No. 35946, was on March 4, 1980
while the insolvency proceeding in the then Court of
First Instance of Angeles City, Special Proceeding No.
1548, was commenced only on July 2, 1980, or more
than four (4) months after the issuance of the said
attachment. Under the circumstances, petitioner
contends that its lien on the subject properties
overrode the insolvency proceeding and was not
dissolved thereby.
Private respondents, on the other hand, relying on
Section 79 of the said law, which reads:
Sec. 79. When an attachment has been made
and is not dissolved before the commencement
of proceedings in insolvency, or is dissolved by
an undertaking given by the defendant, if the
claim upon which the attachment suit was
commenced is proved against the estate of the
debtor, the plaintiff may prove the legal costs
and disbursements of the suit, and of the
keeping of the property, and the amount
thereof shall be a preferred debt.
and the fact that petitioner and its counsel have full
knowledge of the proceedings in the insolvent case,
argue that the subsequent Certificate of Sale on August
3, 1981, issued in favor of petitioner over the subject
properties, was issued in bad faith, in violation of the
law and is not equitable for the creditors of the
insolvent debtors; and pursuant to the above quoted
Section 79, petitioner should not be entitled to the
transfer of the subject properties in its name.
Petitioner's contention is impressed with
merit.1âwphi1 The provision of the above-quoted
Section 32, of the Insolvency Law is very clear — that
attachments dissolved are those levied within one (1)
month next preceding the commencement of the
insolvency proceedings and judgments vacated and set
aside are judgments entered in any action, including
judgment entered by default or consent of the debtor,
where the action was filed within thirty (30) days
immediately prior to the commencement of the
insolvency proceedings. In short, there is a cut off
period — one (1) month in attachment cases and thirty
(30) days in judgments entered in actions commenced
prior to the insolvency proceedings. Section 79, on the
other hand, relied upon by private respondents,
provides for the right of the plaintiff if the attachment is
not dissolved before the commencement of
proceedings in insolvency, or is dissolved by an
undertaking given by the defendant, if the claim upon
which the attachment suit was commenced is proved
against the estate of the debtor. Therefore, there is no
conflict between the two provisions.
But even granting that such conflict exists, it may be
stated that in construing a statute, courts should adopt
a construction that will give effect to every part of a
statute, if at all possible. This rule is expressed in the
maxim, ut maqis valeat quam pereat or that
construction is to be sought which gives effect to the
whole of the statute — its every word. Hence, where a
statute is susceptible of more than one interpretation,
the court should adopt such reasonable and beneficial
construction as will render the provision thereof
operative and effective and harmonious with each
other (Javellana vs. Tayo, 6 SCRA 1042 [1962]; Statutory
Construction by Ruben E. Agpalo, p. 182).
Neither can the sheriff's sale in execution of the
judgment in favor of the petitioner be considered as a
fraudulent transfer or preference by the insolvent
debtors, which constitute a violation of Sec. 70 of the
Insolvency Law. In the case of Velayo vs. Shell Co. of the
Philippines (100 Phil. 187, [1956]), this Court ruled that
Sections 32 and 70 contemplate only acts and
transactions occurring within 30 days prior to the
commencement of the proceedings in insolvency and,
consequently, all other acts outside of the 30-day
period cannot possibly be considered as coming within
the orbit of their operation.

Finally, petitioner correctly argued that the properties

in question were never placed under the jurisdiction of
respondent insolvency court so as to be made available
for the payment of claim filed against the Gatmaytans
in the insolvency proceedings.

Hence, the denial by respondent insolvency court to

give due course to the attachment and execution of
Civil Case No. 35946 of the CFI of Rizal constitutes a
freezing of the disposition of subject properties by the
former which were not within its jurisdiction;
undeniably, a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
want of jurisdiction, correctable by certiorari.

WHEREFORE, the March 31, 1986 decision of the then

Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby Reversed and
SET ASIDE. The attachment and execution sale in Civil
Case No. 35946 of the former CFI of Rizal are given due
course and petitioner's ownership of subject properties
covered by TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430 is ordered
consolidated.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Davide, Jr., JJ.,

concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 162059 January 22, 2008
HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
CAN the Sandiganbayan try a government
scholaran** accused, along with her brother, of
swindling government funds?
MAAARI bang litisin ng Sandiganbayan ang isang iskolar
ng bayan, at ang kanyang kapatid, na kapwa
pinararatangan ng estafa ng pera ng bayan?
The jurisdictional question is posed in this petition for
certiorari assailing the Resolutions1 of the
Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, denying petitioner’s
motion to quash the information and her motion for
reconsideration.
The Antecedents
Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior
student of the University of the Philippines-Cebu. A
student of a state university is known as a government
scholar. She was appointed by then President Joseph
Estrada on December 21, 1999 as a student regent of
UP, to serve a one-year term starting January 1, 2000
and ending on December 31, 2000.
In the early part of 2000, petitioner discussed with
President Estrada the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex
in UP Diliman.2 On September 4, 2000, petitioner, with
her siblings and relatives, registered with the Securities
and Exchange Commission the Office of the Student
Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI).3
One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of
the Vinzons Hall Annex.4 President Estrada gave Fifteen
Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) to the OSRFI as financial
assistance for the proposed renovation. The source of
the funds, according to the information, was the Office
of the President.
The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to
materialize.5 The succeeding student regent, Kristine
Clare Bugayong, and Christine Jill De Guzman, Secretary
General of the KASAMA sa U.P., a system-wide alliance
of student councils within the state university,
consequently filed a complaint for Malversation of
Public Funds and Property with the Office of the
Ombudsman.6
On July 3, 2003, the Ombudsman, after due
investigation, found probable cause to indict petitioner
and her brother Jade Ian D. Serana for estafa, docketed
as Criminal Case No. 27819 of the Sandiganbayan.7 The
Information reads:
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III,
Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses
HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA and JADE IAN D.
SERANA of the crime of Estafa, defined and
penalized under Paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended committed
as follows:
That on October, 24, 2000, or sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-
named accused, HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, a
high-ranking public officer, being then the
Student Regent of the University of the
Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, while in the
performance of her official functions,
committing the offense in relation to her
office and taking advantage of her position, with
intent to gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE
IAN D. SERANA, a private individual, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
defraud the government by falsely and
fraudulently representing to former President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada that the renovation of
the Vinzons Hall of the University of the
Philippines will be renovated and renamed as
"President Joseph Ejercito Estrada Student Hall,"
and for which purpose accused HANNAH
EUNICE D. SERANA requested the amount of
FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00),
Philippine Currency, from the Office of the
President, and the latter relying and believing
on said false pretenses and misrepresentation
gave and delivered to said accused Land Bank
Check No. 91353 dated October 24, 2000 in the
amount of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS
(P15,000,000.00), which check was
subsequently encashed by accused Jade Ian D.
Serana on October 25, 2000 and
misappropriated for their personal use and
benefit, and despite repeated demands made
upon the accused for them to return aforesaid
amount, the said accused failed and refused to
do so to the damage and prejudice of the
government in the aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner moved to quash the information. She
claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not have any
jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her
person, in her capacity as UP student regent.
Petitioner claimed that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as
amended by R.A. No. 8249, enumerates the crimes or
offenses over which the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction.8 It has no jurisdiction over the crime
of estafa.9 It only has jurisdiction over crimes covered
by Title VII, Chapter II, Section 2 (Crimes Committed by
Public Officers), Book II of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC). Estafa falling under Title X, Chapter VI (Crimes
Against Property), Book II of the RPC is not within the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction.
She also argued that it was President Estrada, not the
government, that was duped. Even assuming that she
received the P15,000,000.00, that amount came from
Estrada, not from the coffers of the government.10
Petitioner likewise posited that the Sandiganbayan had
no jurisdiction over her person. As a student regent,
she was not a public officer since she merely
represented her peers, in contrast to the other regents
who held their positions in an ex officio capacity. She
addsed that she was a simple student and did not
receive any salary as a student regent.
She further contended that she had no power or
authority to receive monies or funds. Such power was
vested with the Board of Regents (BOR) as a whole.
Since it was not alleged in the information that it was
among her functions or duties to receive funds, or that
the crime was committed in connection with her official
functions, the same is beyond the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan citing the case of Soller v.
Sandiganbayan.11
The Ombudsman opposed the motion.12 It disputed
petitioner’s interpretation of the law. Section 4(b) of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 clearly contains
the catch -all phrase "in relation to office," thus, the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the charges against
petitioner. In the same breath, the prosecution
countered that the source of the money is a matter of
defense. It should be threshed out during a full-blown
trial.13
According to the Ombudsman, petitioner, despite her
protestations, iwas a public officer. As a member of the
BOR, she hads the general powers of administration
and exerciseds the corporate powers of UP. Based on
Mechem’s definition of a public office, petitioner’s
stance that she was not compensated, hence, not a
public officer, is erroneous. Compensation is not an
essential part of public office. Parenthetically,
compensation has been interpreted to include
allowances. By this definition, petitioner was
compensated.14
Sandiganbayan Disposition
In a Resolution dated November 14, 2003, the
Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s motion for lack of
merit.15 It ratiocinated:
The focal point in controversy is the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan over this case.
It is extremely erroneous to hold that only
criminal offenses covered by Chapter II, Section
2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code are
within the jurisdiction of this Court. As correctly
pointed out by the prosecution, Section 4(b) of
R.A. 8249 provides that the Sandiganbayan also
has jurisdiction over other offenses committed
by public officials and employees in relation to
their office. From this provision, there is no
single doubt that this Court has jurisdiction over
the offense of estafa committed by a public
official in relation to his office.
Accused-movant’s claim that being merely a
member in representation of the student body,
she was never a public officer since she never
received any compensation nor does she fall
under Salary Grade 27, is of no moment, in view
of the express provision of Section 4 of Republic
Act No. 8249 which provides:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction – The Sandiganbayan shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
(A) x x x
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying
the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of
the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically
including:
xxxx
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers
of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations. (Italics supplied)
It is very clear from the aforequoted provision
that the Sandiganbayan has original exclusive
jurisdiction over all offenses involving the
officials enumerated in subsection
(g), irrespective of their salary grades, because
the primordial consideration in the inclusion of
these officials is the nature of their
responsibilities and functions.
Is accused-movant included in the
contemplated provision of law?
 A meticulous review of the existing Charter of
the University of the Philippines reveals that the
Board of Regents, to which accused-movant
belongs, exclusively exercises the general
powers of administration and corporate powers
in the university, such as: 1) To receive and
appropriate to the ends specified by law such
sums as may be provided by law for the support
of the university; 2) To prescribe rules for its
own government and to enact for the
government of the university such general
ordinances and regulations, not contrary to law,
as are consistent with the purposes of the
university; and 3) To appoint, on
recommendation of the President of the
University, professors, instructors, lecturers and
other employees of the University; to fix their
compensation, hours of service, and such other
duties and conditions as it may deem proper; to
grant to them in its discretion leave of absence
under such regulations as it may promulgate,
any other provisions of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, and to remove them for cause
after an investigation and hearing shall have
been had.
It is well-established in corporation law that the
corporation can act only through its board of
directors, or board of trustees in the case of
non-stock corporations. The board of directors
or trustees, therefore, is the governing body of
the corporation.
It is unmistakably evident that the Board of
Regents of the University of the Philippines is
performing functions similar to those of the
Board of Trustees of a non-stock corporation.
This draws to fore the conclusion that being a
member of such board, accused-movant
undoubtedly falls within the category of public
officials upon whom this Court is vested with
original exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of the
fact that she does not occupy a position
classified as Salary Grade 27 or higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989.
Finally, this court finds that accused-movant’s
contention that the same of P15 Million was
received from former President Estrada and not
from the coffers of the government, is a matter
a defense that should be properly ventilated
during the trial on the merits of this case.16
On November 19, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration.17 The motion was denied with finality
in a Resolution dated February 4, 2004.18
Issue
Petitioner is now before this Court, contending that
"THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION IN NOT QUASHING THE
INFORMATION AND DISMISING THE CASE
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT IS HAS NO JURISDICTION
OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION."19
In her discussion, she reiterates her four-fold argument
below, namely: (a) the Sandiganbayan has no
jurisdiction over estafa; (b) petitioner is not a public
officer with Salary Grade 27 and she paid her tuition
fees; (c) the offense charged was not committed in
relation to her office; (d) the funds in question
personally came from President Estrada, not from the
government.
Our Ruling
The petition cannot be granted.
Preliminarily, the denial of a motion to
quash is not correctible by certiorari.
We would ordinarily dismiss this petition
for certiorari outright on procedural grounds. Well-
established is the rule that when a motion to quash in a
criminal case is denied, the remedy is not a petition
for certiorari, but for petitioners to go to trial, without
prejudice to reiterating the special defenses invoked in
their motion to quash.20 Remedial measures as regards
interlocutory orders, such as a motion to quash, are
frowned upon and often dismissed.21 The evident
reason for this rule is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in
a single action.22
In Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,23 the
Court clearly explained and illustrated the rule and the
exceptions, thus:
As a general rule, an order denying a motion to
dismiss is merely interlocutory and cannot be
subject of appeal until final judgment or order is
rendered. (Sec. 2 of Rule 41). The ordinary
procedure to be followed in such a case is to file
an answer, go to trial and if the decision is
adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the
final judgment. The same rule applies to an
order denying a motion to quash, except that
instead of filing an answer a plea is entered and
no appeal lies from a judgment of acquittal.
This general rule is subject to certain exceptions.
If the court, in denying the motion to dismiss or
motion to quash, acts without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion,
then certiorari or prohibition lies. The reason is
that it would be unfair to require the defendant
or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense
of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter or offense, or is not the court of
 proper venue, or if the denial of the motion to
dismiss or motion to quash is made with grave
abuse of discretion or a whimsical and
capricious exercise of judgment. In such cases,
the ordinary remedy of appeal cannot be plain
and adequate. The following are a few examples
of the exceptions to the general rule.
In De Jesus v. Garcia (19 SCRA 554), upon the
denial of a motion to dismiss based on lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, this Court
granted the petition for certiorari and
prohibition against the City Court of Manila and
directed the respondent court to dismiss the
case.
In Lopez v. City Judge (18 SCRA 616), upon the
denial of a motion to quash based on lack of
jurisdiction over the offense, this Court granted
the petition for prohibition and enjoined the
respondent court from further proceeding in
the case.
In Enriquez v. Macadaeg (84 Phil. 674), upon the
denial of a motion to dismiss based on improper
venue, this Court granted the petition for
prohibition and enjoined the respondent judge
from taking cognizance of the case except to
dismiss the same.
In Manalo v. Mariano (69 SCRA 80), upon the
denial of a motion to dismiss based on bar by
prior judgment, this Court granted the petition
for certiorari and directed the respondent judge
to dismiss the case.
In Yuviengco v. Dacuycuy (105 SCRA 668), upon
the denial of a motion to dismiss based on the
Statute of Frauds, this Court granted the
petition for certiorari and dismissed the
amended complaint.
In Tacas v. Cariaso (72 SCRA 527), this Court
granted the petition for certiorari after the
motion to quash based on double jeopardy was
denied by respondent judge and ordered him to
desist from further action in the criminal case
except to dismiss the same.
In People v. Ramos (83 SCRA 11), the order
denying the motion to quash based on
prescription was set aside on certiorari and the
criminal case was dismissed by this Court.24
We do not find the Sandiganbayan to have committed a
grave abuse of discretion.
The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is
set by P.D. No. 1606, as amended, not by
R.A. No. 3019, as amended.
We first address petitioner’s contention that the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is determined by
Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, as amended). We note that petitioner
refers to Section 4 of the said law yet quotes Section 4
of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, in her motion to quash
before the Sandiganbayan.25She repeats the reference
in the instant petition for certiorari26 and in her
memorandum of authorities.27
We cannot bring ourselves to write this off as a mere
clerical or typographical error. It bears stressing that
petitioner repeated this claim twice despite corrections
made by the Sandiganbayan.28
Her claim has no basis in law. It is P.D. No. 1606, as
amended, rather than R.A. No. 3019, as amended, that
determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. A
brief legislative history of the statute creating the
Sandiganbayan is in order. The Sandiganbayan was
created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was
promulgated to attain the highest norms of official
conduct required of public officers and employees,
based on the concept that public officers and
employees shall serve with the highest degree of
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall
remain at all times accountable to the people.29
P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No.
1606 which was promulgated on December 10, 1978.
P.D. No. 1606 expanded the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.30
P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on
March 23, 1983, further altering the Sandiganbayan
jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995
made succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which
was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No.
8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. As it now stands, the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379,
and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the
accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the
time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying
the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of
the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically
including:
" (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors,
members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and
provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and
other city department heads;
" (b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of
the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department
heads;
"(c ) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying
the position of consul and higher;
" (d) Philippine army and air force colonels,
naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
" (e) Officers of the Philippine National Police
while occupying the position of provincial
director and those holding the rank of senior
superintended or higher;
" (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their
assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the
Office of the Ombudsman and special
prosecutor;
" (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations.
" (2) Members of Congress and officials thereof
classified as Grade "27'" and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989;
" (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice
to the provisions of the Constitution;
" (4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional
Commission, without prejudice to the provisions
of the Constitution; and
" (5) All other national and local officials
classified as Grade "27'" and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989.
B. Other offenses of felonies whether simple or
complexed with other crimes committed by the
public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection a of this section in relation to their
office.
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and
in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14
and 14-A, issued in 1986.
" In cases where none of the accused are
occupying positions corresponding to Salary
Grade "27'" or higher, as prescribed in the said
Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP
officer mentioned above, exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper
regional court, metropolitan trial court,
municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial
court, as the case may be, pursuant to their
respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
" The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over final judgments,
resolutions or order of regional trial courts
whether in the exercise of their own original
jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as
herein provided.
" The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction over petitions for the
issuance of the writs of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus,
injunctions, and other ancillary writs and
processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and
over petitions of similar nature, including quo
warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed
or which may be filed under Executive Order
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided,
That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall
not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.
" The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that
the Supreme Court has promulgated and may
thereafter promulgate, relative to
appeals/petitions for review to the Court of
Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for
review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases
elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the
Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office
of the Ombudsman, through its special
prosecutor, shall represent the People of the
Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in
1986.
" In case private individuals are charged as co-
principals, accomplices or accessories with the
public officers or employees, including those
employed in government-owned or controlled
corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said
public officers and employees in the proper
courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction
over them.
" Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the
contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action
and the corresponding civil action for the
recovery of civil liability shall, at all times, be
simultaneously instituted with, and jointly
 determined in, the same proceeding by the
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the
filing of the criminal action being deemed to
necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil
action, and no right to reserve the filing such
civil action separately from the criminal action
shall be recognized: Provided, however, That
where the civil action had heretofore been filed
separately but judgment therein has not yet
been rendered, and the criminal case is
hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the
appropriate court, said civil action shall be
transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the
appropriate court, as the case may be, for
consolidation and joint determination with the
criminal action, otherwise the separate civil
action shall be deemed abandoned."
Upon the other hand, R.A. No. 3019 is a penal statute
approved on August 17, 1960. The said law represses
certain acts of public officers and private persons alike
which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which
may lead thereto.31 Pursuant to Section 10 of R.A. No.
3019, all prosecutions for violation of the said law
should be filed with the Sandiganbayan.32
R.A. No. 3019 does not contain an enumeration of the
cases over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. In
fact, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 erroneously cited by
petitioner, deals not with the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan but with prohibition on private
individuals. We quote:
Section 4. Prohibition on private individuals. –
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person having
family or close personal relation with any public
official to capitalize or exploit or take advantage
of such family or close personal relation by
directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any
present, gift or material or pecuniary advantage
from any other person having some business,
transaction, application, request or contract
with the government, in which such public
official has to intervene. Family relation shall
include the spouse or relatives by consanguinity
or affinity in the third civil degree. The word
"close personal relation" shall include close
personal friendship, social and fraternal
connections, and professional employment all
giving rise to intimacy which assures free access
to such public officer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly
to induce or cause any public official to commit
any of the offenses defined in Section 3 hereof.
In fine, the two statutes differ in that P.D. No. 1606, as
amended, defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
while R.A. No. 3019, as amended, defines graft and
corrupt practices and provides for their penalties.
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over
the offense of estafa.
Relying on Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, petitioner
contends that estafa is not among those crimes
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. We note that in
hoisting this argument, petitioner isolated the first
paragraph of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, without regard
to the succeeding paragraphs of the said provision.
The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that
statutes should receive a sensible construction so as to
avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion.33 Interpretatio
talis in ambiguis semper fienda est, ut evitetur
inconveniens et absurdum. Where there is ambiguity,
such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and
absurdity is to be adopted. Kung saan mayroong
kalabuan, ang pagpapaliwanag ay hindi dapat maging
mahirap at katawa-tawa.
Every section, provision or clause of the statute must be
expounded by reference to each other in order to
arrive at the effect contemplated by the
legislature.34 The intention of the legislator must be
ascertained from the whole text of the law and every
part of the act is to be taken into view.35 In other
words, petitioner’s interpretation lies in direct
opposition to the rule that a statute must be
interpreted as a whole under the principle that the best
interpreter of a statute is the statute itself.36 Optima
statuti interpretatrix est ipsum statutum. Ang isang
batas ay marapat na bigyan ng kahulugan sa kanyang
kabuuan sa ilalim ng prinsipyo na ang pinakamainam na
interpretasyon ay ang mismong batas.
Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads:
B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or
complexed with other crimes committed by the
public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection a of this section in relation to their
office.
Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other
felonies committed by public officials in relation to their
office. We see no plausible or sensible reason to
exclude estafa as one of the offenses included in
Section 4(bB) of P.D. No. 1606. Plainly, estafa is one of
those other felonies. The jurisdiction is simply subject
to the twin requirements that (a) the offense is
committed by public officials and employees mentioned
in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that
(b) the offense is committed in relation to their office.
In Perlas, Jr. v. People,37 the Court had occasion to
explain that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over an
indictment for estafa versus a director of the National
Parks Development Committee, a government
instrumentality. The Court held then:
 The National Parks Development Committee
was created originally as an Executive
Committee on January 14, 1963, for the
development of the Quezon Memorial, Luneta
and other national parks (Executive Order No.
30). It was later designated as the National Parks
Development Committee (NPDC) on February 7,
1974 (E.O. No. 69). On January 9, 1966, Mrs.
Imelda R. Marcos and Teodoro F. Valencia were
designated Chairman and Vice-Chairman
respectively (E.O. No. 3). Despite an attempt to
transfer it to the Bureau of Forest Development,
Department of Natural Resources, on December
1, 1975 (Letter of Implementation No. 39,
issued pursuant to PD No. 830, dated November
27, 1975), the NPDC has remained under the
Office of the President (E.O. No. 709, dated July
27, 1981).
Since 1977 to 1981, the annual appropriations
decrees listed NPDC as a regular government
agency under the Office of the President and
allotments for its maintenance and operating
expenses were issued direct to NPDC (Exh. 10-A,
Perlas, Item Nos. 2, 3).
The Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over estafa was
reiterated with greater firmness in Bondoc v.
Sandiganbayan.38Pertinent parts of the Court’s ruling in
Bondoc read:
Furthermore, it is not legally possible to transfer
Bondoc’s cases to the Regional Trial Court, for
the simple reason that the latter would not have
jurisdiction over the offenses. As already above
intimated, the inability of the Sandiganbayan to
hold a joint trial of Bondoc’s cases and those of
the government employees separately charged
for the same crimes, has not altered the nature
of the offenses charged, as estafa thru
falsification punishable by penalties higher than
prision correccional or imprisonment of six
years, or a fine of P6,000.00, committed by
government employees in conspiracy with
private persons, including Bondoc. These crimes
are within the exclusive, original jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. They simply cannot be
taken cognizance of by the regular courts, apart
from the fact that even if the cases could be so
transferred, a joint trial would nonetheless not
be possible.
Petitioner UP student regent
is a public officer.
Petitioner also contends that she is not a public officer.
She does not receive any salary or remuneration as a
UP student regent. This is not the first or likely the last
time that We will be called upon to define a public
officer. In Khan, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman, We
ruled that it is difficult to pin down the definition of a
public officer.39 The 1987 Constitution does not define
who are public officers. Rather, the varied definitions
and concepts are found in different statutes and
jurisprudence.
In Aparri v. Court of Appeals,40 the Court held that:
A public office is the right, authority, and duty
created and conferred by law, by which for a
given period, either fixed by law or enduring at
the pleasure of the creating power, an individual
is invested with some portion of the sovereign
functions of the government, to be exercise by
him for the benefit of the public ([Mechem
Public Offices and Officers,] Sec. 1). The right to
hold a public office under our political system is
therefore not a natural right. It exists, when it
exists at all only because and by virtue of some
law expressly or impliedly creating and
conferring it (Mechem Ibid., Sec. 64). There is no
such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an
office, or even an absolute right to hold office.
Excepting constitutional offices which provide
for special immunity as regards salary and
tenure, no one can be said to have any vested
right in an office or its salary (42 Am. Jur. 881).
In Laurel v. Desierto,41 the Court adopted the definition
of Mechem of a public office:
"A public office is the right, authority and duty,
created and conferred by law, by which, for a
given period, either fixed by law or enduring at
the pleasure of the creating power, an individual
is invested with some portion of the sovereign
functions of the government, to be exercised by
him for the benefit of the public. The individual
so invested is a public officer."42
Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with
Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact, a regular tuition fee-
paying student. This is likewise bereft of merit. It is not
only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan also has
jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in P.D. No.
1606. In Geduspan v. People,43 We held that while the
first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials with Salary
Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically
includes other executive officials whose positions may
not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by
express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of
the said court. Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express
provision of law.44
Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the
Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents,
directors or trustees, or managers of government-
owned or controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls
under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out,
the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board
of trustees of a non-stock corporation.45 By express
mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as
contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.
Moreover, it is well established that compensation is
not an essential element of public office.46 At most, it is
merely incidental to the public office.47
Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the
public office. An investment in an individual of some
portion of the sovereign functions of the government,
to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public
makes one a public officer.48
The administration of the UP is a sovereign function in
line with Article XIV of the Constitution. UP performs a
legitimate governmental function by providing
advanced instruction in literature, philosophy, the
sciences, and arts, and giving professional and technical
training.49 Moreover, UP is maintained by the
Government and it declares no dividends and is not a
corporation created for profit.50
The offense charged was committed
in relation to public office, according
to the Information.
Petitioner likewise argues that even assuming that she
is a public officer, the Sandiganbayan would still not
have jurisdiction over the offense because it was not
committed in relation to her office.
According to petitioner, she had no power or authority
to act without the approval of the BOR. She adds there
was no Board Resolution issued by the BOR authorizing
her to contract with then President Estrada; and that
her acts were not ratified by the governing body of the
state university. Resultantly, her act was done in a
private capacity and not in relation to public office.
It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the
averments in the information.51 More than that,
jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories
set up by defendant or respondent in an answer, a
motion to dismiss, or a motion to quash.52 Otherwise,
jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely
upon the whims of defendant or respondent.53
In the case at bench, the information alleged, in no
uncertain terms that petitioner, being then a student
regent of U.P., "while in the performance of her official
functions, committing the offense in relation to her
office and taking advantage of her position, with intent
to gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D.
SERANA, a private individual, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the
government x x x." (Underscoring supplied)
Clearly, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the Sandiganbayan when it did not quash the
information based on this ground.
Source of funds is a defense that should
be raised during trial on the merits.
It is contended anew that the amount came from
President Estrada’s private funds and not from the
government coffers. Petitioner insists the charge has no
leg to stand on.
We cannot agree. The information alleges that the
funds came from the Office of the President and not its
then occupant, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada.
Under the information, it is averred that "petitioner
requested the amount of Fifteen Million Pesos
(P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the Office
of the President, and the latter relying and believing on
said false pretenses and misrepresentation gave and
delivered to said accused Land Bank Check No. 91353
dated October 24, 2000 in the amount of Fifteen
Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00)."
Again, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan
observation that the source of the P15,000,000 is a
matter of defense that should be ventilated during the
trial on the merits of the instant case.54
A lawyer owes candor, fairness
and honesty to the Court.
As a parting note, petitioner’s counsel, Renato G. dela
Cruz, misrepresented his reference to Section 4 of P.D.
No. 1606 as a quotation from Section 4 of R.A. No.
3019. A review of his motion to quash, the instant
petition for certiorari and his memorandum, unveils the
misquotation. We urge petitioner’s counsel to observe
Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
specifically Rule 10.02 of the Rules stating that "a
lawyer shall not misquote or misrepresent."
The Court stressed the importance of this rule
in Pangan v. Ramos,55 where Atty Dionisio D. Ramos
used the name Pedro D.D. Ramos in connection with a
criminal case. The Court ruled that Atty. Ramos
resorted to deception by using a name different from
that with which he was authorized. We severely
reprimanded Atty. Ramos and warned that a repetition
may warrant suspension or disbarment.56
We admonish petitioner’s counsel to be more careful
and accurate in his citation. A lawyer’s conduct before
the court should be characterized by candor and
fairness.57 The administration of justice would gravely
suffer if lawyers do not act with complete candor and
honesty before the courts.58
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Chairperson, Austria-Martinez,
Corona*, Nachura, JJ., concur.