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Labour Unions
McGraw-Hill/Irwin
Labor Economics, 4th edition Copyright © 2008 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved.
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Introduction
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• The structure of the economy and the labour market has been
changing. Blue collar workers are less prevalent.
• There has been a marked increase in labour force participation
rates of women (who tend to take most of the part-time jobs).
• Workers in oligopolistic industries (where economic rent is
earned) more unionised than workers in industries where there
is little economic rent.
• Etc., etc.
• Deregulation in NZ meant that ‘excess rents’ that unions could
bargain for disappeared in many industries?!
- Also see: Cooper and May (2006), Union Rivitalisation in
Australia and New Zealand, 1995-2005, NZ Journal of
Employment Relations, 31(3), 17 pages.
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• The union chooses a wage and then the firm decides how many
workers to hire to maximise profit.
• The model suggests some workers lose their jobs due to the
union setting a wage above the competitive wage w*.
• Union better off when the labour demand curve is less elastic: It
can choose a higher wage but cause fewer job losses, thereby
obtaining higher utility.
- Recall “Marshall’s rules of derived demand” from chapter
4.7, p. 132! Unions will try to make labour demand and
product demand less elastic etc. etc.
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EM E* Employment
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• Figure 11.5 and formulae (11.1 & 11.2). Note the assumptions
made to draw the figure: Two sectors in the economy, two
demand curves in one diagram, inelastic labour supply etc.
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• By moving off the labour demand curve, the firm and the
monopoly union could make a deal that makes at least one of
them better off without making the other worse off!
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• The upper bound to the wage-employment combinations that the firm can
offer is given by the zero-profit isoprofit curve πZ.
• Line PZ: All points where union’s indifference curves and firm’s isoprofit
curves are tangent. These points are all Pareto optimal. PZ is the contract
curve.
• The efficient contract curve lies to the right of the labor demand curve. An
efficient contract leads to more employment than would be the case with
monopoly unionism. Implies that unions and employers bargain over both
wages and employment.
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Featherbedding
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• On the vertical contract curve, the firm’s output and revenue are
constant.
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EZ E* Employment
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11.6 Strikes
• Economists have problems explaining why strikes occur (maybe they should
ask other social scientists?)!
• Because strikes are costly, they shrink the amount of rents over which the
parties are negotiating.
• When parties have good information about the costs and likely outcome of a
strike, then it is irrational to strike.
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Union's
Rents The firm makes the offer at point RF,
100
keeping $75 and giving the union $25.
The union wants point RU, getting $75
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RU for its members and giving the firm
$25. The parties do not come to an
R* agreement and a strike occurs. The
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strike is costly, and the poststrike
S
40 settlement occurs at point S; each
RF
25 party keeps $40. Both parties could
Firm's have agreed to a prestrike settlement
25 40 50 75 100 Rents at point R*, and both parties would
have been better off.
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• Since the union will experience losses during a strike, it will reduce its wage
demands throughout the duration of a strike (there is a downward-sloping
union resistance curve).
• A firm knows that the union will moderate its demands over time (it knows
the union resistance curve).
• A firm incurs costs during a strike, so it will choose a strike duration that
maximises the present value of profits (the ‘optimal’ length of the strike).
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End of Chapter 11
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