B.

Civil Service Commission

Section 1. Composition; Qualifications; Term

GAMINDE V. COA

Facts: Thelma Gaminde was appointed by the President of the Philippines as Commissioner of the Civil
Service Commission, ad interim and assumed office on June 22, 1993 after oath of office. The
Commission on Appointments (COA) and the Congress of the Philippines confirmed the appointment on
September 7, 1993. Gaminde, on February 24, 1998, sought the Office of the President for clarification
on the expiry date of her term of office. In response to her request, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel
opined that her term office will expire on February 2, 2000 instead of February 2, 1999. Relying on said
advisory opinion, Gaminde remained in office after February 2, 1999. However, on February 4, 1999,
Chairman Corazon Alma de Leon wrote COA requesting opinion whether or not Gaminde and her co-
terminus staff may be paid their salaries notwithstanding the expiration of their appointments on
February 2, 1999. The General Counsel of COA issued an opinion on February 18, 1999 that “the term of
Commissioner Gaminde has expired on February 2, 1999 as stated in her appointment conformably with
the constitutional intent.” Consequently, on March 24, 1999, CSC Resident Auditor Flovitas Felipe issued
a Notice of Disallowance, disallowing in audit the salaries and emoluments of Gaminde and her co-
terminus staff effective February 2, 1999. Gaminde appealed COA’s disallowance but it was dismissed,
and affirmed the propriety of the disallowance; and held that the issue of Gaminde’s office term may be
properly addressed by mere reference to her appointment paper which set the expiration date of
February 2, 1999, and that the Commission was bereft of power to recognize an extension of her term,
not even with the implied acquiescence of the Office of the President. Gaminde moved for
reconsideration, but was denied by COA.

Issue: Whether the term of office of Thelma Gaminde, as Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, to
which she was appointed on June 11, 1993, expired on February 2, 1999, as stated in the appointment
paper, or on February 2, 2000, as claimed by her.

Held: The term of office of Thelma P. Gaminde as the CSC Commissioner, as appointed by President Fidel
V. Ramos, expired on February 2, 1999. However, she served as de-facto officer in good faith until
February 2, 2000. The term of office of the Chairman and members of the Civil Service Commission is
prescribed in the 1987 Constitution under Article IX-D, Section 1 (2): “The Chairman and the
Commissioners shall be appointed by the President withthe consent of the Commission on
Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman
shall hold office for seven years, a Commissioner for five years, and another Commissioner for three
years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the
predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity.” Therefore, COA erred in disallowing in audit such salary and other emoluments. Gaminde and
her co-terminus staff are entitled to receive their salary and other emoluments for actual service
rendered.
Mathay Jr. vs CA

FACTS:

During his administration, Simon appointed the three private respondents for the Civil Service Units
pursuant to a Presidential Decree creating such units. It was later held in an opinion of the Ministry of
Justice that the PD wasn’t published in the Official Gazette and therefore, didn’t become a proper law.
Pursuant to this, the CSC issued an order for the revocation of same appointments. The then mayor
Simon remedied this by issuing an ordinance calling for the automatic absorption of the appointees to
the created Department of Public Order and Safety. The said department didn’t quite reach fruition due
to insufficiency of funds and lack of regular and permanent positions to be filled. The mayor then issued
contractual appointments, which was carried over by the next mayor Mathay. But at the expiration of
the said contractual appointments, it was no longer approved, prompting the private respondents to file
a complaint with the CSC. The CSC ordered Mathay to reinstate the private respondents pursuant to the
previous ordinance issued.

HELD: The CSC has no authority to direct the mayor to reinstate the private respondents.

Applying the old LGC, the CSC erred in applying the provisions of the ordinance in ordering the mayor to
reinstate the private respondents. The questioned ordinance ordered the absorption of the personnel of
the defunct CSU into the new DPOS. The ordinance refers to personnel and not to positions. Hence, the
city council is in effect through the ordinance dictating who shall occupy the newly created DPOS
positions. However, a review of the old Local Government Code shows that the power to appoint rests
exclusively with the local chief executive and thus cannot be usurped by the city council through a
simple expedient of enacting an ordinance that provides for the absorption of specific persons to certain
positions.

In upholding the provisions of the ordinance on the automatic absorption of the personnel without
allowance for the exercise of discretion on the part of the mayor, the CA in turn makes the sweeping
statement that the doctrine of separation of powers doesn’t apply to local governments, which is
wrong. The powers of the city council and the mayor are expressly enumerated separately and
delineated in the old LGC. The power to appoint belongs to the city mayor while the power to create,
consolidate, and reorganize city officers and positions supported by local funds belongs to the city
council.
Section 2. SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM

CUEVAS VS. BACAL

FACTS: This case involves the appointment and transfer of career executive service officers (CESOs).
More specifically, it concerns the “appointment” of respondent Josefina G. Bacal, who holds the rank of
CESO III, to the position of Chief Public Attorney in the Public Attorney’s Office, which has a CES Rank
Level I, and her subsequent transfer, made without her consent, to the Office of the Regional Director of
the PAO because of the appointment of Atty. Carina Demaisip to the position of Chief Public Defender
(formerly Chief Public Attorney). Atty. Bacal filed a petition for quo warranto ruled in her favor by the
Court of Appeals. Hence this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUES: Whether: Bacal is entitled of security of tenure considering that she belongs to Career Service;

RULING:

No. The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically confer security of
tenure on its occupant even if he does not possess the required qualifications. Such right will have to
depend on the nature of his appointment, which in turn depends on his eligibility or lack of it. A person
who does not have the requisite qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it in the first
place or, only as an exception to the rule, may be appointed to it merely in an acting capacity in the
absence of appropriate eligibles. Here, Atty. Bacal has a rank of CESO III “appointed” to a position of
CESO I. The appointment extended to him cannot be regarded as permanent even if it may be so
designated.
NSC vs NLRC
UP v REGINO

FACTS: Private respondent Angel Pamplina, a mimeograph operator at the University of the Philippines
was dismissed after being found guilty of causing the leakage of final examination questions. After
seeking relief from Merit Systems Board (MSB), MSB ruled in favor of respondent. Thus, UP appealed to
the Civil Service Commission which sustained the MSB and ordered respondent’s reinstatement. On
RTC, respondent’s immediate reinstatement was also ordered. However, UP contends that under
Section 6(e) of its charter, Act 1870, UP Board of Regents has the power “to appoint, on
recommendation of the president of the university, professors, instructors, lecturers, and other
employees of the university, to fix their compensation and to remove them for cause after an
investigation and hearing shall have been had.”

ISSUE: Whether or not the administrative cases involving the discipline of petitioner’s employees come
under the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.

HELD: Yes. As a mere government-owned or controlled corporation, UP was clearly a part of the Civil
Service under the 1973 Constitution and now continues to be so because it was created by a special law
and has an original charter. As a component of the Civil Service, UP is therefore governed by PD 807 and
administrative cases involving the discipline of its employees come under the appellate jurisdiction of
the Civil Service Commission.

Under the 1973 Constitution, all government-owned or controlled corporations, regardless of the
manner of their creation, were considered part of the Civil Service. Under the 1987 Constitution only
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters fall within the scope of the Civil
Service pursuant to Article IX-B, Section 2(1), which states: “The Civil Service embraces all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters.”
Mateo vs CA

Facts. Sta. Maria was the General Manager of Morong Water District (MOWAD), a quasi-public
corporation. Upon complaint of some of its employees, the Board Members investigated Sta. Maria and
placed him under preventive suspension. San Diego was designated in his place as Acting General
Manager. Sta. Maria was subsequently dismissed. Sta. Maria instituted a Special Civil Action for Quo
Warranto and Mandamus with Preliminary Injunction before the RTC. Petitioner moves to dismiss the
case on the ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction over disciplinary actions of government employees
which is vested exclusively in the Civil Service Commission.

Issue. Does the RTC have jurisdiction over cases involving the dismissal of an employee of quasi-public
corporation?

Held: No. The Civil Service Commission under the Constitution, is the single arbiter of all contests
relating to the Civil service and as such, its judgments are unappealable and subject only to Supreme
Court’s certiorari judgment. The hiring and firing of employees of government-owned and controlled
corporations, which includes water district corporations, are governed by the provisions of the Civil
Service Law and Rules and Regulations.239 Hence, Regional Trial Courts have no jurisdiction to entertain
cases involving dismissal of officers and employees covered by the Civil Service Law.

SC Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, May 16, 1995.

“Appeals from judgments, final orders or resolutions or quasijudicial agencies, like the Civil Service
Commission, shall be taken to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for review within fifteen (15)
days from notice of the assailed judgment, order or resolution”(Mateo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
113219, 14 August 1995, 247 SCRA 284).
DOH vs NLRC
Juco vs NLRC

Point of the Case: the civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of
the government, including government owned or controlled corporations with original charter.

Facts: Petitioner Juco was hired as a project engineer of the respondent National Housing Corporation
(NHC). Subsequently he was separated from the service for having been implicated in a crime of theft
and/or malversation of public funds. Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the NHC
with the Department of Labor but decided to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the National
Labor Relation Commission (NLRC) had no jurisdiction over the case.

Petitioner then filed with the civil service commission with a complaint for illegal dismissal, with
preliminary injunction. Respondent NHC moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that
the Civil Service Commission has no jurisdiction over the case.

Issue: Whether or not employees of government-owned and/or controlled corporations are governed by
the civil service law?

Ruling: Yes. Article 9B Section 2(1) provides that the civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the government, including government owned or controlled
corporations with original charter.
BDCEU-SDM v CALLEJA

POINT OF THE CASE: The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and
agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters. However, Bliss Development Corporation is a government-owned corporation created under
the Corporation Law. It is without a charter, governed by the Labor Code and not by the Civil Service Law
hence, Executive Order No. 180 does not apply to it.

FACTS: On October 10, 1986, petitioner, Bliss Development Corporation Employees Union Sentro ng
Demokratikong Manggagawa (BDCEU-SDM), a duly registered labor union, filed with the Department of
Labor, National Capital Region, a petition for certification election of private respondent Bliss
Development Corporation (BDC). Based on the position papers submitted by the parties, Med-Arbiter
Napoleon V. Fernando, in an order dated January 26, 1987, The Department of Labor dismissed the
petition for lack of jurisdiction stating that the majority of BDC's stocks is owned by the Human
Settlement Development Corporation (HSDC), a wholly-owned government corporation. Therefore, BDC
is subject to Civil Service law, rules and regulations.

Petitioner’s then filed an appeal to the Bureau of Labor Relations which issued an Order dismissing the
appeal on August 7, 1987. Director Pura Ferrer-Calleja of the Bureau of Labor Relations enjoined the
petitioner to register in the Civil Service Commission and the Department of Labor and Employment to
be given the right to organize and bargain collectively under Section 7 of Executive Order No. 180.

ISSUE: Whether or not, Director Pura Ferrer-Calleja of the Bureau of Labor Relations gravely abused her
discretion amount to lack of jurisdiction when she ordered petitioner to register under Section 7 of
Executive Order No. 180.

RULING: Yes. Consequently, public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering petition
to register under Section 7, of Executive Order No. 180 as a precondition for filing a petition for
certification election to which the petitioner is not covered.
Postigo vs Philippine Tuberculosis Society

POINT OF THE CASE: The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and
agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters. However, Bliss Development Corporation is a government-owned corporation created under
the Corporation Law. It is without a charter, governed by the Labor Code and not by the Civil Service Law
hence, Executive Order No. 180 does not apply to it.

FACTS: On October 10, 1986, petitioner, Bliss Development Corporation Employees Union Sentro ng
Demokratikong Manggagawa (BDCEU-SDM), a duly registered labor union, filed with the Department of
Labor, National Capital Region, a petition for certification election of private respondent Bliss
Development Corporation (BDC). Based on the position papers submitted by the parties, Med-Arbiter
Napoleon V. Fernando, in an order dated January 26, 1987, The Department of Labor dismissed the
petition for lack of jurisdiction stating that the majority of BDC's stocks is owned by the Human
Settlement Development Corporation (HSDC), a wholly-owned government corporation. Therefore, BDC
is subject to Civil Service law, rules and regulations.

Petitioner’s then filed an appeal to the Bureau of Labor Relations which issued an Order dismissing the
appeal on August 7, 1987. Director Pura Ferrer-Calleja of the Bureau of Labor Relations enjoined the
petitioner to register in the Civil Service Commission and the Department of Labor and Employment to
be given the right to organize and bargain collectively under Section 7 of Executive Order No. 180.

ISSUE: Whether or not, Director Pura Ferrer-Calleja of the Bureau of Labor Relations gravely abused her
discretion amount to lack of jurisdiction when she ordered petitioner to register under Section 7 of
Executive Order No. 180.

RULING: Yes. Consequently, public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering petition
to register under Section 7, of Executive Order No. 180 as a precondition for filing a petition for
certification election to which the petitioner is not covered.
LRTA V. VENUS

POINT OF THE CASE: The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and
agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters.

FACTS: Petitioner LRTA is a government-owned and controlled corporation while petitioner METRO is a
qualified transportation corporation duly organized in accordance with the provisions of the Corporation
Code. LRTA constructed a light rail transit system and entered into a ten (10)-year Agreement for the
Management and Operation of the Metro Manila Light Rail Transit System with petitioner METRO.
Pursuant to the Agreement, petitioner METRO hired its own employees, including herein private
respondents.

However, on July 25, 2000, a union struck which completely paralyzed the operations of the entire light
rail transit system affecting the mobility of the commuting public. Thus, then Secretary of Labor
Bienvenido E. Laguesma issued on that same day an assumption of jurisdiction order directing all the
striking employees to return to work immediately upon receipt of this Order and for the Company to
accept them back under the same terms and conditions of employment prevailing prior to the strike.

Despite the issuance of the return to work order, the Union officers and members, including herein
private respondent workers, failed to return to work. Hence, they were considered dismissed from
employment; so they filed a petition for illegal dismissal before the NLRC. Labor Arbiter Luis D. Flores
rendered a consolidated judgment in favor of the private respondent workers declaring that the
complainants were illegally dismissed from employment and ordering their reinstatement to their
former positions without loss of seniority and other rights and privileges.

Petitioner LRTA further contends that it is a government-owned and controlled corporation and thus
under the exclusive jurisdiction only of the Civil Service Commission, not the NLRC.

ISSUE: Whether or not LRTA is subject to the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor and the provisions
of the Labor Code thereby allowing the respondents to collect money claims from the petitioner

RULING: No. LRTA being a government-owned and controlled corporation is not under the jurisdiction of
the Department of Labor.

Section 2 (1), Article IX – B, 1987 Constitution expressly provides that the civil service embraces all
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations with original charters.

The employees hired by METRO are covered by the Labor Code and are under the jurisdiction of the
Department of Labor and Employment, whereas the employees of petitioner LRTA are covered by civil
service rules.

Petitioner LRTA cannot be held liable to the employees of petitioner METRO.

Classifications and Appointments

HOME INSURANCE AND GUARANTY CORPORATATION (HIGC) VS CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

POINT OF THE CASE: It is mandated to the Constitution that appointments in the civil service shall be
made only according to merit and fitness to be determined as far as practicable, and except to positions
which are policy- determining, primarily confidential or highly technical, by competitive examination.

FACTS: Private respondent, Daniel R. Cruz was the Vice President, Finance and Administrative Group of
Home Financing Corporation now known as the Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC), from
June 1, 1986 to July 8,

1988, when he was not reappointed as a result of the reorganization of petitioner firm. Initially, the
appointment of private respondent Cruz was approved as temporary by the Civil Service Commission
(COMMISSION for brevity) subject to his completion of the Executive Leadership and Management
Program. On reconsideration, the COMMISSION changed the appointment from temporary to
permanent but still subject to his completion of the leadership program within three (3) years from the
effectivity date of his date of his appointment; otherwise he would be reverted to temporary status. In
July 1988, HIGC underwent a reorganization which resulted among others in the reduction of the
number of Vice-President Positions from (6) to three (3). Respondent Cruz was one of those not
reappointed as he was found to have no civil service eligibility.

On appeal to the HIGC Reorganization Appeals Board, Cruz invoked his permanent appointment and
insisted that the question of his eligibility should be left for determination by the COMMISSION.
However, the Commission issued Resolution No. 89-543 finding Cruz to be a holder of a permanent
career position at HIGC, hence, may be reappointed to a position next lower in rank to Vice President
without reduction in salary or if not reappointed, to avail of the Early Separation Incentive Package. It
further ruled that Cruz should be paid all benefits and privileges due him as Vice President of HIGC.

HIGC contends that respondent Commission committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it issued the questioned Resolutions for being contrary to established
principles governing the civil service shall be made only according to merit and fitness.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Commission committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction

HELD: Yes, the Commission committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. The Court explained that under the Presidential Decree No. 807 also known as the “Civil
Service Decree of the Philippines” provides the following levels of positions in the career service: (a) the
first level which includes clerical, trades,

crafts and custodial service positions involving non-professional or sub-professional work in a non-
supervisory capacity requiring at least four years of college work up to Division Chief Level and the other
level which includes positions in the Career Executive Service which consists of positions whom are
appointed by the President. Entrance to the first two levels shall be through competitive examinations,
while entrance to the third level shall be prescribed by the Career Executive Service Board. Respondent
Cruz has not satisfactorily shown that his former position as Vice-President in the HIGC belongs to the
third level in the career service as prescribed by law. His former position as Vice President is not among
those enumerated by law as falling under the third level, nor has he established that it is one of those
identified by the Career Executive Service Board as of equivalent rank to those listed by law. Neither is it
appointed by the President.

That it is certainly erroneous for respondent COMMISSION to direct HIGC to reappoint Cruz, a non-civil
service eligible, to a position that requires first grade eligibility.
MAUNA VS. CSC

POINT OF THE CASE: The appointing authority is given ample discretion in the selection of and
appointment of qualified persons to vacant positions among those who are qualified. The withdrawal of
an appointment already accepted would be tantamount to removal and would violate security of
tenure.

FACTS: On November 16, 1987, the COMELEC Chairman Ramon H. Felipe, Jr. appointed petitioner Gaga
G. Mauna as Chief Election Officer of the Precincts and Voting Centers Division of the Election and
Barangay Affairs Department (EBAD) of the COMELEC which was approved by Celerina G. Gotladera,
authorized representative of CSC.

On December 28, 1987, private respondent Cristeto J. Limbaco, the incumbent Assistant Chief Election
Officer filed a protest against the petitioner's appointment before the COMELEC on the grounds
that (1) he is more qualified than petitioner; (2) he is next-in-rank as Assistant Chief Election Officer; and
(3) he is more senior than petitioner, having been employed by the COMELEC since 1979. The COMELEC
en banc dismissed the private respondent’s protest for lack of merit.

Aggrieved by the said resolution, private respondent filed an appeal before the Merit System Protection
Board (MSPB) of respondent Civil Service Commission, hence the appointment of Atty. Mauna was
revoked.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Civil Service Commission acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in revoking the appointment of the petitioner.

RULING: Yes. The Court held that as a civil service employee with a permanent appointment, petitioner
cannot be removed except for cause provided by law. Well-entrenched is the rule on security of tenure
that such an appointment is issued and the moment the appointee assumes a position in the civil service
under a completed appointment, he acquires a legal, not merely equitable right (to the position), which
is protected not only by statute, but also by the Constitution [Article IX-B, Section 2, paragraph (3)] and
cannot be taken away from him either by revocation of the appointment, or by removal, except for
cause, and with previous notice and hearing.
RIMONTE VS. CSC

Point of the Case: The power of appointment of the Civil Service Commission is essentially discretionary
provided the appointee is qualified. Even though someone is said to be better or proved to have
superior credentials, the head of the agency who is the appointing power is the one most
knowledgeable to decide who can best perform the functions of the office.

FACTS: Petitioner was the incumbent Planning Officer III in the Office of the Ombudsman Conrado M.
Vasquez issued Office Order No. 90-32 directing the implementation of the performance appraisal
system as a basis for evaluation of providing for the General Policy and Procedural Guidelines in the
Placement of Personnel for the New Staffing Pattern.

Petitioner applied to different positions including any of the positions of Records Officer V of the Central
Records Division. Petitioner was appointed to the position of Associate Graft Investigation Officer III
while Henrietta F. Roque was appointed Records Officer V. Petitioner filed a protest on Roque's
appointment to CSC and assailed that he has the better qualifications than her. However, CSC denied his
protest, the same with his motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether CSC’s appointment to Roque is proper when the petitioner has better qualification than
her.

RULING: Yes. CSC is correct in ruling that the appointment of Roque to the position is proper and that
she is qualified to the disputed position. In this case, CSC founds out that Roque possesses all
qualifications to the position. Now the discretion to appoint her leaves to the appointing authority. The
CSC is the single arbiter of all contests relating to Civil Service; as such its judgement are unappealable
and subject only to certiorari jurisdiction of the Court. CSC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
the exercise of its jurisdiction in attesting to the appointment of Roque. As long as the appointee is
qualified, the CSC has no choice but to attest and to respect the appointment even if it be proved that
there are others with superior credentials. The law limits the Commission’s authority only to whether or
not the appointees possess the legal qualifications and the appropriate civil service eligibility, nothing
else.
Gloria v. De Guzman

Point of the case: Appointments in civil service, which is essentially discretionary, is to be performed by
the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee
should possess the qualifications required by law. Such exercise of the discretionary power of
appointment cannot be controlled, not even by the Court as long as it is exercised properly by the
appointing authority.

Facts: Petitioners, are the Chairman and a member of the Board of Trustees in PSCA filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, with the end in view of nullifying the Decision and
Order of respondent Judge de Guzman, Jr. Questioned in effect by the petitioners is only

the portion of the judgment ordering the reinstatement of private respondent Rosario V. Cerillo to the
position of Coordinator for Extension Services.

Private respondents were employees of the PAFCA which was created by PD 1078, which under it, the
Board of Trustees is vested with authority, among others, to appoint, as it did appoint, officials and
employees of the college, except the members of the Board of Trustees themselves and the President of
the college. In line with this authority, the PAFCA Board of Trustees issued Resolution No. 91-026, which
declared that All faculty/administrative employees are also subject to the required civil service
eligibilities, in accordance with pertinent civil service law, rules and regulations. Thus, private
respondents were issued only temporary appointments because at the time of their appointment, they
lacked appropriate civil service eligibilities or otherwise failed to meet the necessary qualification
standards for their respective positions.

Issue: Whether or not respondent Judge de Guzman, Jr. erred in his decision of reinstating private
respondent Cerillo to the position of Coordinator for Extension Services.

Held: Yes, the questioned order of reinstatement amounts to an undue interference by the Court in the
exercise of the discretionary power of appointment vested in the PSCA Board of Trustees.
Reinstatement is technically issuance of a new appointment which is essentially discretionary, to be
performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that
the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. Such exercise of the discretionary
power of appointment cannot be controlled, not even by the Court as long as it is exercised properly by
the appointing authority.
SANA v. CAREER EXECUTIVE SERVICE BOARD

POINT OF THE CASE: Section 2 par. 2 of Article IX-B of the Constitution states that appointments in the
civil service shall be made only according to merit and fitness to be determined by competitive
examination. EO 883 thus encroaches upon the power of the CESB to promulgate rules, standards and
procedures on the selection, classification, compensation and career development of members of the
Career Executive service vested by law with the CESB.

FACTS: On May 28, 2010, President Arroyo issued EO 883 granting the rank of CESO III or higher to
officers and employees occupying legal positions who have obtained graduate degrees in law and
successfully passed the bar examinations. Thereafter, CESB issued Resolution No. 870 finding no legal
impediment for the President to vest CESO rank to executive officials during the periods covered by the
constitutional ban on midnight appointment and statutory ban on pre-election appointment and
recommended 13 officials.

On July 30, 2010, President Aquino issued EO 3 expressly revoking EO 883 and all administrative orders,
proclamations, rules and regulations that conflict with EO 3. On August 4, 2010, petitioner filed the
instant petition assailing EO 883 and the subsequent appointment of the 13 executive officials to CESO
rank. He contended that it violates the constitutional ban on midnight appointment under Section 15,
Article VII of the Constitution.

ISSUES: Whether or not the petition has merit.

RULING: No. The Supreme Court dismissed the case for being moot and academic. It explained that the
issue is no longer present because President Aquino already revoked the assailed EO 883 by issuing EO
3. As basis for the repeal, EO 3 cited Section 2 par. 2 of Article IX-B of the Constitution stating that
appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and fitness to be determined by
competitive examination. It posited that EO 883 encroaches upon the power of the CESB to promulgate
rules, standards and procedures on the selection, classification, compensation and career development
of members of the Career Executive service vested by law with the CESB.
SAMSON V. CA

Facts: Feliciano Talens was Assistant Secretary to the Mayor of Caloocan.

The newly-elected mayor, Marcial Samson, released an Administrative Order qualifying the services of
Talens as non-competetive and terminating his employment on the ground of “lack and loss of
confidence”. He appointed Liwas as replacement. Petitioner justifies that as Assistant Secretary, like the
Secretary, renders non-competitive service which is primarily confidential and highly technical in nature
where termination may be made due to lack and loss of confidence.

However, respondent contends that he is not a non-competitive employee and thus, can only be
removed for cause and after due process has been observed. Thus, he filed with the Court of First
Instance of Caloocan to annul the disputed administrative order, to enjoin the petitioner mayor,
treasurer, and auditor from enforcing the same, and to compel all the said public officials to pay private
respondent the salaries and emoluments due to him. The CFI, as well as the CA, ruled in favor of Talens.

Issue: Is the termination without cause or due process of Talen’s services as Assistant Secretary to the
Mayor legal on the ground of lack or loss of confidence?

Ruling: NO. The position of Assistant Secretary to the Mayor cannot be classified as non-competitive.
Since the position is not enumerated nor does it qualify as Secretary or Head of Departments under
Section 5 of the Civil Service Law, then the position is classified as competitive. Employees of
competitive classification cannot be terminated on the ground of lack or loss of confidence, rather only
for cause and after due process.
Non-Competitive

Astraquillo vs Manglapus

FACTS: Isabelo J. Astraquillo was appointed by the President as Ambassador to United Arab Emirates.
After occupying the post for 2 years, his wife and cousin-in-law was accused of improper interference
with his functions. Thus the Secretary of Foreign Affairs recommended to the President AstraquilloS’
termination as Ambassador, it is approved by the authority of the President.

Alunan Glang was appointed by President Aquino as Ambassador to Kuwait. Two years afterwards he
received telex message from Sec. of Foreign Affairs informing him that his services as ambassador is
terminated and directing him to vacate his post.

Alejandro Melchor Jr. was also appointed by the President Aquino as Ambassador. And just the same
the secretary of FA recommended to the president the termination of the services of Melchor, which
was approved.

Summary: It is a consolidated and jointly considered cases because they all turn upon a common legal
issue. The consolidated petition is questioning the validity of the termination of petitioners
appointment as political or non-career members of the country’s Foreign Service by authority of the
President of the Philippines who approved the recommendation for termination issued by the Sec. of
Foreign affairs.

ISSUE: Whether or not their services as Philippine Diplomats were under the circumstances, at the
pleasure of the President, terminable without cause or need of investigation?

HELD: YES, since under the “non-career” service in accordance to Section 6 of P.D. 807 all three
petitioners: Astroquillo, GLang and Melchor Jr. whose appointments to the Foreign Service were made
on “bases other than those of the usual test of merit and fitness utilized for the career service.” This
being so, their tenure was co-terminus with that of the appointing authority subject to his pleasures.

Wherefore, the petitions in the cases embraced in this opinion are all denied, with costs against the
petitioners.
Office of the President vs Buenaobra

Facts: The office of the Ombudsman’s Special Prosecution Officer filed an information against Nita
Buenaobra, Chairman of the Komisyon sa Wikang Pilipino, with the Sandiganbayan for violation of
Section 4€ of R.A No. 3019 for allegedly causing undue injury to the government through gross
inexcusable negligence in connection with the unauthorized reprinting of the Disyunaryo ng Wiking
Pilipinno. The Sandiganbayan ordered a reinvestigation while the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission
conducted a parallel administrative investifation against respondent charging her with the same acts
and ommissions subject of the Sandigan bayan case. On April 11, 2003, petition adopted PAGC’s
recommendation and dismissed respondent from office.

Issue: Whether or not respondent being a presidential appointee and a holder of a non-career service
position could be removed from service by the President

Ruling: No. The court held that non-career service personnel enjoy security of tenure. Thus, they may
not be removed without just cause and observance of due process
Primarily Confidential

Borres vs CA
Grino vs CSC

Statement of the Facts:

Petitioner Sixto Demaisip was the first appointed Provincial Attorney of Iloilo. He resigned and
recommended respondent Teotimo Arandela as his replacement. The OIC governor approved the
recommendation and assigned Arandela as his replacement.

On February 2, 1988, petitioner Simplicio Griño assumed office as the newly elected governor of Iloilo.
One month later, he informed respondent Arandela and all the legal officers at the Provincial Attorney's
Office about his decision to terminate their services. In his letter, petitioner Griño made mention of an
article pertaining to the Iloilo office of the Provincial Attorney which appeared in the Panay News and
which "undermined that trust and confidence" that he reposed on them. Petitioner Demaisip was
reappointed by Governor Griño as the Provincial Attorney

Arandela appealed the action taken by Governor Grino to the Merit Systems Protection Board of the
CSC. The MSPB declared the termination illegal, and ordered Arandela and others to be immediately
restored to their positions, with backwages. This was affirmed by the CSC.

Gov. Grino now filed a petition for review assailing the decision of the MSPB and CSC. He relied on the
case of Cadiente, which ruled that a city legal officer was a primarily confidential position. He argued
that since a provincial attorney and a city legal officer has similar functions, the provincial attorney is
also a primarily confidential position, one requiring utmost confidence on the part of the mayor to be
extended to said officer

Issue:

WON the position of a Provincial Attorney and Legal Officer were confidential in character and thus can
be terminated upon loss of trust

Ruling:

Yes the Provincial Attorney and Legal officer were confidential position.

In Cadiente vs. Santos, the court ruled that the position of a city legal officer is undeniably one which is
primarily confidential in this manner:

“The position of a City Legal Officer is one requiring that utmost confidence on the part of the mayor be
extended to said officer. The relationship existing between a lawyer and his client, whether a private
individual or a public officer, is one that depends on the highest degree of trust that the latter entertains
for the counsel selected. The phrase "primarily confidential" "denotes not only confidence in the
aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which insures freedom
of intercourse, without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust on
confidential matters of state”

The court agreed to the petitioners that the Cadiente case can be made applicable to the provincial
attorneys.

The positions of city legal officer and provincial attorney were created under RA5185, which categorized
them together as positions of trust. Both the provincial attorney and the city legal officer serve as a legal
adviser and legal officer for the civil cases of the province and the city that they work for. Their services
are precisely categorized by law to be “trusted services.”

A comparison of these 2 positions under the LGC would reveal the close similarity of the 2 positions.
Said functions clearly reflect the highly confidential nature of the 2 offices and the need for a
relationship based on trust between the officer and the head of the LGU he serves. The fact that the
position of Arandela as provincial attorney has already been classified as under career service and
certified as permanent by the CSC cannot conceal or alter its highly confidential nature. Since in the
Cadiente case the city legal officer was declared by this Court to be primarily confidential, the Court
must also hold that the position of provincial attorney is also primarily confidential. To rule otherwise
would be tantamount to classifying 2 positions with the same nature and functions in to incompatible
categories

Arandela’s termination is valid. The tenure of an official holding a primarily confidential position ends
upon loss of confidence. He was not dismissed or removed from office, his term merely expired.

With respect to the legal assistants and subordinates of the provincial attorney (who were also
terminated along with Arandela), they have been employed due to their technical qualifications. Their
positions are highly technical in character and not confidential. Thus they are PERMANENT EMPLOYEES
and they belong to the category of CLASSIFIED employees under the CSL. Thus, the positions are
permanent and they enjoy security of tenure.
SANTOS v MACARAIG

FACTS: Rosalinda Santos was an ambassadress sent to Geneva for a mission. On her trip, she bought a
discounted ticket which provided that she could bring someone with her so she brought

with her adopted daughter. Some of her co-workers complained because they thought that Santos used
government fund to finance her daughter’s fare. It was later found out that the cost of the said ticket is
actually 50% less than the amount that was given to Santos to be used for her expenses for the trip.
Nevertheless, because of her refusal to appear before the disciplinary board, she was found guilty of
misconduct. Upon her appeal to the Office of the President and after review, then president Corazon
Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 122 which declared Santos guilty of dishonesty. She was then
removed from her post and was replaced.

ISSUE: Whether or not Santos should be reinstated to her office.

RULING: No. Even though the Supreme Court found evidence which showed that Santos was not guilty
of misconduct or dishonesty as in fact what she did of securing a ticket which was 50% the cost of what
was allotted for her travel expense for tickets and thus was beneficial to the government (for she helped
save and lessen the expenses), the SC does not have the power to reverse the recall done to Santos. She
cannot be reinstated by the SC to her position for the removal power of the president is solely her
prerogative. Further, the position held by Santos is primarily confidential. Her position lasts upon the
pleasure of the president. When the pleasure turns into displeasure she is not actually removed from
her position or office but rather her term merely expires. Also, her position involves a foreign relation
which is vested solely in the executive. The SC cannot inquire upon the wisdom or unwisdom of the
exercise of such prerogative. Thus, the assignment to and recall from posts of ambassadors are
prerogatives of the President, for her to exercise as the exigencies of the foreign service and the
interests of the nation may from time to time dictate.
Hilario vs CSC

FACTS: Petitioner Nescito C. Hilario was the Quezon City Attorney appointed by the then OIC Mayor
Brigido R. Simon, Jr. On July 24, 1992, the newly-elected mayor, Ismael Mathay, Jr. issued a letter to
petitioner which informed him that pursuant to Sec. 481, Art. II of the Local Government Code of 1991
the position of City Legal officer is coterminous with the appointing authority, thus, he is already
resigned. Respondent Vice Mayor Charito L. Planas filed a complaint with the CSC against petitioner and
sought that respondents be found administratively liable for usurpation, grave misconduct, being
notoriously undesirable, gross insubordination, and conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of
the service. CSC resolved to hold in abeyance any administrative disciplinary action against petitioner.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether Petitioner’s position as city legal officer is not confidential; and

(2) Whether Respondent CSC has no authority to remove or terminate the services of petitioner.

HELD:

By virtue of Republic Act No. 5185, both the provincial attorney and city legal officer serve as the legal
adviser and legal officer for the civil cases of the province and the city that they work for. Their services
are precisely categorized by law as confidential. Although respondent Planas is a public official, there is
nothing under the law to prevent her from filing a complaint directly with the CSC against petitioner.
Thus, when the CSC determined that petitioner was no longer entitled to hold the position of City Legal
Officer, it was acting within its authority under the Administrative Code to hear and decide complaints
filed before it.

Sec. 481, Art. II of Local Government Code of 1991 provision is but a reiteration of the principle that
since the position of City Legal Officer is a confidential one, it is perforce deemed to be coterminous
with that of the appointing authority.
Rosete vs CA
CSC vs Salas

Facts: On Oct 07, 1989, respondent salas was appointed by the PAGCOR chairman as internal security
staff member and assigned to the casino at the Manila Pavilion Hotel. His employment was terminated
by the Board of Directors of PAGCOR on Dec 03, 1991 for loss of confidence.

Issue: Whether or not Salas is a confidential employee.

Held: No. It is the nature of the position which finally determines whether a position is primarily
confidential, policy-determining or highly technical. The occupant of a particular position could be
considered a confidential employee if the predominant reason why he was chosen by the appointing
authority was the latter’s belief that he can share a close relationship with the occupant. Where the
position occupied is remote fro that of the appointing authority, the element of trust between them is
no longer predominant
Achacoso vs. Macaraig

Facts: Tomas D. Achacoso was appointed Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration on October 16, 1987, and assumed office on October 27, 1987. On January 2, 1990, in
compliance with a request addressed by the President of the Philippines to “all Department Heads,
Undersecretaries, Assistant Secretaries, Bureau Heads,” and other government officials, he filed a
courtesy resignation. This was accepted by the President on April 3, 1990, “with deep regrets.” On April
10, 1990, the Secretary of Labor requested him to turn over his office to the Deputy Administrator as
officer-in-charge. In a letter dated April 19, 1990, he protested his replacement and declared he was not
surrendering his office because his resignation was not voluntary but filed only in obedience to the
President’s directive. On the same date, respondent Jose N. Sarmiento was appointed Administrator of
the POEA, vice the petitioner. Achacoso was informed thereof the following day and was again asked to
vacate his office.

It was also shown in a certification that Mr. Tomas D. Achacoso III has not participated in a Career
Executive Service Development Program (CESDP) and is not a CES eligible. This is to certify further that
Mr. Achacoso was not appointed to a rank in the CES and is not therefore a member of the Career
Executive Service. But the petititioner contends that if he were to be intended to be a temporary
appointment then he wouldn’t have served for more than twelve months in his position.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner Achacoso was illegally terminated from his position which he
alleges to be permanent.

Ruling: No, His appointment wasn’t permanent and his termination is legal. The mere fact that a position
belongs to the Career Service does not automatically confer security of tenure on its occupant even if he
does not possess the required qualifications. Such right will have to depend on the nature of his
Appointment, which in turn depends on his eligibility or lack of it. A person who does not have the
requisite qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it in the first place or, only as an
exception to the rule, may be appointed to it merely in an acting capacity in the absence of appropriate
eligibles. The appointment extended to him cannot be regarded as permanent even if it may be so
designated.
FELIX v. BUENASEDA

FACTS: Dr. Alfredo B. Felix joined the National Center for Mental Health on May 26, 1980 as a Resident
Physician. In August of 1983, he was promoted to the position of Senior Resident Physician 6 a position
he held until the Ministry of Health reorganized the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH) in
January of 1988, pursuant to Executive Order No. 119.

Under the reorganization, petitioner was appointed to the position of Senior Resident Physician in a
temporary capacity immediately after he and other employees of the NCMH allegedly tendered their
courtesy resignations to the Secretary of Health. 7 In August of 1988, petitioner was promoted to the
position of Medical Specialist I (Temporary Status), which position was renewed the following year.

On August 20, 1991, after reviewing petitioner's service record and performance, the Medical
Credentials Committee of the National Center for Mental Health recommended non-renewal of his
appointment as Medical Specialist I. The petitioner’s poor performance, frequent tardiness and
inflexibility as among the factors responsible for the recommendation not to renew his appointment.
The petitioner filed a petition with the Merit System Protection Board (MSPB) complaining about the
alleged harassment by respondents and questioning the non-renewal of his appointment which was
dismissed for being tainted with any legal infirmity. Said decision was appealed to the Civil Service
Commission which dismissed the same, hence this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not, the Civil Service Commission erred in holding that by submitting his courtesy
resignation and accepting his temporary appointment, the petitioner had effectively divested himself of
his security of tenure.

RULING: No. The facts of the case at bench is clear that, the petitioner accepted a temporary
appointment (Medical Specialist I). The Civil Service Commission has correctly pointed out that the
temporary appointment of petitioner as Medical Specialist I can be terminated at any time; and that any
renewal of such appointment is within the discretion of the appointing authority.
Pamantasan ng Maynila vs CSC
Province of the Camarines Sure vs CA

Facts: On 1 Jan 1960, private respondent Dato was appointed as Private Agent by the then Governor of
Camarines Sur, Maleniza. On 12 Oct 1972, he was promoted and was appointed Assistant Provincial
Warden by then Governor Alfelor, Sr. Because he had no civil service eligibility for the position he was
appointed to, Dato could not be legally extended a permanent appointment. Hence, what was extended
to him was only a temporary appointment. Thereafter, the temporary appointment was renewed
annually. On 1 Jan 1974, Governor Alfelor approved the change in Dato’s employment status from
temporary to permanent upon the latter’s representation that he passed the civil service examination
for supervising security guards. Said change of status however, was not favorably acted upon by the Civil
Service Commission (CSC) reasoning that Dato did not possess the necessary civil service eligibility for
the office he was appointed to. His appointment therefore remained temporary. On 16 Mar 1976, Dato
was indefinitely suspended by Governor Alfelor after criminal charges were filed against him for
allegedly conniving and/or consenting to evasion of sentence of some detention prisoners. On 19 Mar
1976, Mr. Rama, head of the Camarines Sur Unit of the CSC, wrote the Governor of Camarines Sur a
letter informing him that the status of Dato has been changed from temporary to permanent, the latter
having passed the examination for Supervising Security Guard. The change of status was to be made
retroactive to 11 Jun 1974, the date of release of said examination.

Issue. Whether or not Tito Dato’s subsequent qualification for civil service eligibility ipso facto convert
his temporary status to that of permanent?

Held. No. The fact that private respondent obtained civil service eligibility later on is of no moment as
his having passed the supervising security guard examination, did not ipso facto convert his temporary
appointment into a permanent one. In the instant case, what is required is a new appointment since a
permanent appointment is not a continuation of the temporary appointment. Moreover, the CSC does
not have the power to make the appointment itself or to direct the appointing authority to change the
employment status of an employee. The duty of the CSC is to attest appointments and after that
function is discharged, its participation in the appointment process ceases. CSC should have ended its
participation in the appointment of private respondent on 1 Jan 1974 when it confirmed

the temporary status of the latter who lacked the proper civil service eligibility. When it issued the
foregoing communication on 19 March 1976, it stepped on the toes of the appointing authority, thereby
encroaching on the discretion vested solely upon the latter.
PEZA vs Mercado

FACTS: On May 16, 1999 the respondent, Gloria Mercado was promoted to the position of Deputy
Director General for Policy and Planning and it was indicated the same as on permanent basis, but with
following condition, She has no Security of Tenure unless she obtains CESO or CSEE Eligibility (Career
Executive Service Officer/Career Service Executive Eligibility). On June 1, 2000, the PEZA Director
General by letter on the same date advised the respondent of the termination of her appointment
effective on the closing hours of the day and later, the PEZA Board convened in an Executive Session and
passed a resolution appointing Wilhelm G. Ortaliz as Deputy Director General for Policy and Planning.

Mercado filed a Quo Warranto to the RTC of Pasay City, questioning the June 1, 2000 PEZA Board
Resolution appointing Ortaliz as Deputy Director General for Policy and Planning contending that her
degree in Master in National Security Administration (MNSA) automatically conferred upon her CES
eligibility but it was dismissed by the RTC. It was raised to Court of Appeals and the Appellate Court
reversed the trial courts decision. It held that since respondent was promoted to the position of Deputy
Director General for Policy and Planning on a permanent status, she cannot be summarily removed; and
that respondents MNSA degree obtained on July 12, 1993 automatically conferred on her CES eligibility
pursuant to Executive Order No. 696, as amended by Executive Order No. 771. The appellate court went
on to hold that even if respondent was not a CES eligible, she is still qualified for the position as the
requirement under Sec. 11 of Republic Act No. 7916 that appointees to Deputy Director General
positions must have career executive service eligibility is no longer found under Sec. 11 of Republic Act
No. 8748. It ratiocinated that the deletion of such requirement indicated that the legislature intended to
do away with the eligibility requirement.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decision of the Trial Court.

HELD: Yes, the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decision of the Trial Court. The Court explained
that even though the respondent attained a MNSA Degree, she was not conferred automatic eligibility.
For her to acquire CES eligibility and CES Rank, she need to passed series of examination before she
could qualify for appointment to CES ranks and Provided that she meets and complies with other
requirements of the CES Board and the Office of the President to qualify rank for appointment.

The position of Deputy Director General for Policy and Planning can be considered as a “Primary
Confidential”. The nature of the office must be such as to require close intimacy between the appointee
and appointing authority which insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment, or freedom
from misgiving of betrayal of personal trust on confidential matters of the State. The primary purpose of
providing for the declaration of a position as “primarily confidential” is “to exempt these categories
from competitive examination as a means for determining the merit and fitness”.
CSC VS. CA

FACTS: A Complaint for Grave Misconduct and Moonlighting with Urgent Prayer for Preventive
Suspension and Disarming was filed by the stockholders and board members of United Workers
Transport Corp. (UWTC) against SPO1 Gannapao before the Philippine National Police, Inspectorate
Division, Camp Crame, Quezon City. The Philippine National Police ChiefRecaredo A. Sarmiento II
rendered a Decision imposing the three (3) months suspension without pay of respondent for being
GUILTY of the charge of serious irregularities in the performance of duties. But the respondent appealed
to the Civil Service Commission to conduct a hearing or a reinvestigation alleging lack of due process. On
April 3, 2002, the Civil Service Commission dismissed the appeal. However, the order dated February 26,
2001 of then DILG Secretary Alfredo S. Lim affirming the suspension of Gannapao for a period of three
(3) months is modified to dismissal from the service. On May 30, 2002, Gannapao filed a petition for
review with the Court of Appeals assailing the Resolution of the Civil Service Commission. On January 8,
2003, CSC through the Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment on the Petition specifically
stating among others that Gannapao was not entitled to a preliminary injunction. On January 14, 2003,
the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution granting Gannapao’s motion for issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining, restraining and prohibiting CSC from implementing its assailed CSC
Resolution dismissing respondent.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Civil Service Commission acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the respondent from service.

RULING: Yes. The Court held that prior to the finality of the CSC Decision dismissing him, private
respondent has a clear and unmistakable right to his current position in the police service.
Unquestionably, the right to employment, oftentimes the lowly employees only noble source of bread
and butter, is entitled to protection by the State. the immediate implementation of the not yet final
penalty of dismissal from the service would surely cause private respondent (and his family) irreparable
damage. As pleaded in his Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Preliminary Injunction, his salary and benefits as a policeman are his family’s only source of income.
Permanent

Luego v. Civil Service Commission

Facts. Petitioner Luego was appointed Administrative Officer II in the Office of the City Mayor in Cebu
City by the then Mayor. The appointment was described as “permanent” but the respondent Civil
Service Commission(CSC) stamped and approved it as “temporary” as it was contested by the private
respondent although the CSC itself admitted Luego had satisfied all

legal requirements. After hearings, the CSC found the private respondent better qualified and directed
him to be appointed in place of Luego. Luego argues his earlier appointment is permanent.

Issue. Is the Civil Service Commission authorized to disapprove a permanent? appointment and order a
replacement thereto?

Held. No. It was not for the CSC to reverse and call an appointment temporary when it has been
rightfully indicated by the appointing authority as permanent. Neither can it order a replacement on
ground that the other is better “qualified.” Being permanent, Luego’s appointment is protected by the
Constitution. Unlike the Commission on Appointments which, by the mandate of the Constitution, could
review the wisdom of the appointment, the CSC is constrained to the non-discretionary authority of
determining whether or not the appointee meets all the required conditions laid down by the law. Thus,
when the appointee is qualified and all the other legal requirements are satisfied; the CSC has no choice
but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws. The appointment which has
satisfied all legal requirements cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified
who should have been preferred for that is a political question which only the appointing authority can
decide. Luego is declared entitled to the office in dispute by virtue of his permanent appointment.
Pangilinan v. Maglaya

Facts: Petitioner, Teodoro B. Pangilinan joined the government service on July 18, 1966, when he was
appointed agent in the National Bureau of Investigation, a position for which he had the appropriate
civil service eligibility. He had risen to Supervising Agent when he resigned to accept appointment as
Executive Director of the Land Transportation Office on July 8, 1987. He assumed office on July 16, 1987.
On September 27, 1991, the petitioner called a press conference exposing, what the media later
described as "the license plate mess." He also announced his intention to file graft charges
with the Ombudsman against Prado, Sabalza and Undersecretary Jose Valdecañas, also of the DOTC. The
following day, Secretary Prado relieved Pangilinan as Executive Director of the LTO and replaced him
with Guillermo Maglaya as officer-in-charge. The petitioner complains that he has been removed from
office without due process and just cause in disregard of his constitutional security of tenure. Worse, his
removal was made in bad faith, immediately after his expose of certain anomalies in which superiors
were involved.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is permanent appointee, who can claim a secure of tenure.

Held: No. Pangilinan was only an acting appointee because he did not have the requisite qualifications;
as such, he could not claim security of tenure. The Court has repeatedly held that this guaranty is
available only to permanent appointees. The fact that Pangilinan was qualified for his initial
appointment as agent in the NBI does not mean he was qualified for all other positions he might later
occupy in the civil service. The law does not prescribe uniform qualifications for all public positions
regardless of nature or degree.
Reorganization

Santiago vs CSC

Facts: Customs Commissioner Wigberto Tanada appointed Santiago from Collector of Customs I to
Collector of Customs III. Respondent Jose, a Customs Collector II, filed a protest with the Merit Systems
Promotion Board against Santiago's promotional appointment mainly on the ground that he was next-
in-rank to the position of Collector of Customs III. The Board decided to revoke Santiago's appointment
and directed that Jose be appointed in his stead. The Civil Service Commission affirmed the Board
Resolution. The Commission ruled that respondent Jose has far better qualifications in terms of
educational attainment, civil service eligibilities, relevant seminars and training courses taken. It added
that the Commission is empowered to administer and enforce the merit system as mandated by the
Constitution and to approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil
service. Thus, Santiago appealed.

Issue: Should Santiago's promotional appointment be upheld?

Held: Yes. There is "no mandatory nor peremptory requirement in the Civil Service Law that persons
next-in-rank are entitled to preference in appointment. What it does provide is that they would be
among the first to be considered for the vacancy, if qualified, and if the vacancy is not filled by
promotion, the same shall be filled by transfer or other modes of appointment."

One who is next-in-rank is entitled to preferential consideration for promotion to the higher vacancy but
it does not necessarily follow that he and no one else can be appointed. The rule neither grants a vested
right to the holder nor imposes a ministerial duty on the appointing authority to promote such person to
the next higher position.

The power to appoint is a matter of discretion. The appointing power has a wide latitude of choice as to
who is best qualified for the position. To apply the next-in-rank rule peremptorily would impose a rigid
formula on the appointing power contrary to the policy of the law that among those qualified and
eligible, the appointing authority is granted discretion and prerogative of choice of the one he deems fit
for appointment.

True, the Commission is empowered to approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to
positions in the civil service and disapprove those where the appointees do not possess the appropriate
eligibility or required qualification. However, "all the commission is actually allowed to do is check
whether or not the appointee possesses the appropriate civil service eligibility or the required
qualifications. If he does, his appointment is approved; if not, it is disapproved. No other criterion is
permitted by law to be employed by the Commission when it acts on, or as the decree says, "approves"
or "disapproves" an appointment made by the proper authorities. ...To be sure, it has no authority to
revoke the said appointment simply because it believed that the private respondent was better qualified
for that would have constituted an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the appointing
authority."

There is no reason to disturb Santiago's promotional appointment. The minimum qualifications and the
standard of merit and fitness have been adequately satisfied as found by the appointing authority. The
latter has not been convincingly shown to have committed any grave abuse of discretion.
MONTECILLO vs. CSC

Facts:

Seeking to nullify Resolution No. 972512 for having been issued by respondent Civil Service Commission
allegedly with grave abuse of discretion, petitioners assail the validity of CSC Memorandum Circular No.
22, Series of 1991, on the ground that its issuance amounted to an abuse of respondent's power to
promulgate rules and regulations pursuant to the Civil Service Law.

Following our decision in Davao City Water District vs. Civil Service Commission, employee positions in
the Metropolitan Cebu Water District (MCWD) were re-classified during the latter part of 1995 to
conform with position descriptions and corresponding salary grades in the civil service. Accordingly,
while the personnel structure of the MCWD was being modified, three of its employees -- petitioners
Asela B. Montecillo, Marilou Joan V. Ortega and Charrishe Dosdos -- applied for promotional
appointment to the position of "Secretary to the Assistant General Manager" or "Private Secretary C", as
the position later came to be known. At the time of their application, petitioners had been occupying
the position of "Department Secretary" and were employed in the MCWD for six to seven years.

When their appointment was forwarded to the CSC FO, the latter refused to approve the appointments
of the petitioners on the ground that the position was a "primarily confidential" and "co-terminous"
position. This ruling was upheld by the CSC Regional Office and affirmed on appeal by respondent.

Issue: W/N the reclassification of MCWD is a valid ground to hinder the promotional appointment of
the petitioner

Held: Yes, the reclassification of MCWD is a valid ground to hinder the promotional appointment of the
petitioner.

In the Civil Service as may properly be classified as primarily confidential under Section 12, Chapter 3,
Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987.10 To our mind, this signifies that the enumeration found in
Section 6, Article IV of the Civil Service Decree, which defines the non-career service, is not an exclusive
list. Respondent could supplement the enumeration, as it did when it issued Memorandum Circular No.
22, s. of 1991, by specifying positions in the civil service, which are considered primarily confidential and
therefore their occupants are co-terminous with the official they serve
Gatmaitan vs Gonzales

Facts: Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, challenging the May 9, 2001 Decision1 and July 24, 2001 Resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals3 (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 61506 which affirmed the Decision4 of the Office of the Ombudsman in
OMB-ADM-0-00-0135 dismissing the administrative complaint of petitioner Rudigario C. Gatmaitan
against private respondent Dr. Ricardo B. Gonzales, for lack of substantial evidence.

The herein petition arose from complaint of the petitioner charging the respondent for grave
misconduct, grave abuse of authority, harassment and oppression.

In defense the respondent , through his counter-affidavit, averred that with respect to the Hospital
Order 184 s. 1999, it was a legitimate act of the respondent when he reassigned Mr. Gatmaitan to OR-
DR Complex based on Section 10, Rule VII of the Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order 292
which reads:

A reassignment is the movement of an employee from one organizational unit to another in the same
department or agency which does not involve a reduction in rank, status or salary and does not require
the issuance of appointment.

In fact, under CSC Resolution No. 96-3986 clearly states that ‘reassignment is generally presumed to
have been made in the interest of the service . . .,’ therefore, as shown under the penultimate
paragraph of the said order such act was made with the same purpose.

Petitioner filed a reply to private respondent’s counter-affidavit9 insisting that he was constructively
dismissed when the latter issued Hospital Order No. 184, s. 1999; and claiming that said order directed
him to perform menial duties such as the daily disposal of garbage and unnecessary junks, continuous
mopping of the OR corridor and the like.

Adopting the simplification of issues made by the Office of the Ombudsman, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the latter’s decision stating that the reassignment was made – "in the interest of the service" –
that the order was issued for this purpose is even presumed under Civil Service Rules absent any proof
of harassment, coercion, intimidation, or other personal reasons therefor. Moreover, the CA held that
private respondent had in his favor the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties
which the petitioner failed to rebut since he failed to present any evidence to prove malice and bad faith
in the issuance of the questioned order.

As to petitioner’s charge of diminution in rank, the CA noted that petitioner’s appointment as Hospital
Housekeeper is without any specific station or unit assignment hence he can always be reassigned to
clean or maintain the upkeep of one station to another, whenever and wherever his services are much
needed since he cannot claim a vested right to the station to which he was originally assigned nor to
security of tenure thereat.

Issue: Whether or not THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING
AND CONCLUDING THAT PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO BE REASSIGNED TO HIS FORMER POSITION AS
HEAD OF THE HOUSEKEEPING UNIT OF THE HOSPITAL AND TO RECOVER FROM THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENT MORAL, NOMINAL/ CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGE.
Held: No, THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING AND
CONCLUDING THAT PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO BE REASSIGNED TO HIS FORMER POSITION AS HEAD OF
THE HOUSEKEEPING UNIT OF THE HOSPITAL

The Court finds their respective definitions under Rule VUU of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V
of E.O. No. 292, Section 10 of the Rule clearly defines "reassignment" as the movement of an employee
from one organizational unit to another in the same department or agency which does not involve a
reduction in rank, status, or salary and does not require the issuance of an appointment while the
succeeding Section 11 of the same Rule defined "demotion" as a movement from one position to
another involving the issuance of an appointment with diminution in duties, responsibilities, status or
rank which may or may not involve a reduction in salary. Further, note that Section 26(7), Book V, Title I,
Subtitle A of the 1987 Revised Administrative Code recognizes reassignment as a management
prerogative vested in any department or agency of government embraced in the civil service:

(7) Reassignment. An employee may be re-assigned from one organizational unit to another in the same
agency; Provided, That such re-assignment shall not involve a reduction in rank, status and salary

As can be gleamed from the above, there was no demotion involved in the transfer of petitioners work
station since what transpired was merely a reassignment brought about by the exigencies of the service.
The law is clear on this point – a demotion would entail the issuance of another appointment that would
have given petitioner diminution in duties, responsibilities, status or rank – yet no appointment to this
effect was ever issued. As aptly observed by the Solicitor General in his Comment,18 there is no showing
that petitioner, upon the effectivity of Hospital Order No. 184, was stripped of his plantilla position as
hospital housekeeper which lends credence to the claim that Hospital Order No. 184 merely amounted
to petitioner’s reassignment rather than to his demotion. Moreover, the rationale behind the Hospital
Order was aptly explained by private respondent as follows:

The justification for the transfer is very obvious. The manpower needs of the Nursing Service alone is
very great. The transfer was instituted in the exigencies and necessities of the service. The priority of the
OR-DR Comp
NIEVES VS BLANCO

POINT OF THE CASE: The constitutionality of the reassignment of employees outside the geographical
location of their present place of work.

FACTS: Respondent issued Regional Office Order No. 09 which directed the petitioner’s reassignment
from DTI-Sorsogon to DTIs provincial office in Albay (DTI-Albay). Petitioner appealed his reassignment to
the CSCs Regional Office in Legazpi City (CSC Regional Office No. V) which, however, dismissed his appeal
for failure to comply with the requirements of an appeal. Petitioner instituted the instant petition for
review on certiorari asserting that a reassignment outside geographical location should not be restricted
to a reassignment from one regional office to another or from the regional office to the central office
and vice-versa. He insists that it should include movement from one provincial office to another because
one such office is necessarily outside the

geographical location of the other. Further, he avers that the CA should have accorded respect and
finality

to the CSCs interpretation of the provisions of the Revised Rules on Reassignment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the reassignment order by the respondent is valid although it is outside the
geographical location and without the consent of the employee concerned.

HELD: No, the Court held that if the employee is without a station-specific place of work is reassigned
outside the geographical location of his/her present place of work, then the following rules apply: first, if
the reassignment is with the consent of the employee concerned, then the period of the same shall have
no limit; second, if the reassignment is without the consent of the employee concerned, then the same
should not exceed the maximum period of one year.
Appointment vs Designation

Binamira vs. Garrucho, Jr.

POINT OF THE CASE: Appointment is essentially executive while designation is legislative in nature.
Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual
who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its confirmation, the
appointment results in security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure
because of the nature of his office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition by
law of additional duties on an incumbent official. Where the person is merely designated and not
appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be
replaced at will by the appointing authority

FACTS: Ramon Binamira seeks reinstatement to the office of General Manager of the Philippine Tourism
Authority from which he claims to have been removed without just cause in violation of his security of
tenure by the new Secretary of Tourism respondent Peter Garrucho. The petitioner bases his claim on
the communication (memorandum) addressed to him by the then Minister of Tourism Gonzales. And,
based on a memorandum sent by then Pres. Corazon Aquino, stating that petitioner is an appointed
official, hence, he holds an office of permanent capacity unless a new person be appointed to serve in
the latter’s place.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was an appointed official

HELD: No. Where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall
hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority.

Put into perspective, the Secretary of Tourism is designated Chairman of the Board of Directors of the
Philippine Tourism Authority, or where, under the Constitution, three Justices of the Supreme Court are
designated by the Chief Justice to sit in the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of
Representatives. Appointment is essentially executive while designation is legislative in nature. The
designation is considered only an acting or temporary appointment, which does not confer security of
tenure on the person named.
1. Loss Confidence

Hernandez vs Villegas

FACTS: Respondent Villegas is a lawyer and civil service eligible and was appointed as Director of
Security of the Bureau of Customs on Nov. 1, 1955. A year after his appointment, he was sent to the
United States to study. He returned to the Philippines after one year of study. Upon his return, he was
TEMPORARILY assigned as Arrastre Superintendent and at the same time, he still received his salary as
Director of Security of the Bureau of Customs.

John Keefe was designated as Director of Security of the Bureau of Customs on an ACTING capacity. On
January 1958, Secretary of Finance herein petitioner proposed that both Villegas and Keefe be
appointed to the current position they hold from TEMPORARY to PERMANENT APPOINTMENT.
Respondent did not know about such chances in appointment and so on March 1958; he informed the
Bureau of Customs Commissioner that he was resuming his duties and functions of his office as Director
of Security of the Bureau. As well, he wrote to other concerned officials asking them to disapprove the
promotional appointment of Keefe. He then filed a case for quo warranto in the CIF of Manila which
granted Villegas the right to collect back-pay as Director of Security and CA affirms the decision. Thus
this case is filed.

ISSUES: Whether or not the Office of the Director of Security of the Bureau of Customs IS A PRIMARY
CONFIDENTIAL POSITION

RULING The Court of Appeals relied mainly on Section 671 of the Revised Administrative Code — the
following officers and employees constitute the unclassified service:

Positions which may be declared by the President of the Philippines, upon recommendation of the
Commissioner of Civil Service, as policy-determining, primarily confidential, or highly technical

The only authority who, by constitutional and, legal provisions, is competent to classify a position into
primary confidential is the President. The heads of departments and the Commissioner of Civil Service
can only recommend or make comments.

For the Court, they do not need to consider the position involved in this case is primarily confidential,
because, even assuming the position to be, it is nevertheless SUBJECT to the Constitutional provision
that "No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause." (Phil.
Const., Art. XII, sec. 4)

It is to be understood of course that officials and employees holding primarily confidential positions
continue only for so long as confidence in them endures. The termination of their official relation can be
justified on the ground of loss of confidence because in that case their cessation from office involves no
removal but merely the expiration of the term of office — two different causes for the termination of
official relations recognized in the Law of Public Officers. But the point is that as long as confidence in
them endures — and it has been shown that it has been lost in this case — the incumbent is entitled to
continue in office.
2. Abolition of Office

BRIONES v OSMENA

POINT OF THE CASE: While abolition of the office does not imply removal of the incumbent, the rule is
true only where the abolition is made in good faith; the right to abolish cannot be used to cover the
discharge of employees in violation of the civil service law nor can it be exercised for personal or
political reasons.

FACTS: Both petitioners are a civil service eligible and have a permanent working status. An action for
mandamus with damages to declare the abolition of the petitioner’s position void, and to order the
respondent City Mayor to reinstate them to their former positions.

Ordinance No. 192 abolished 15 positions in the City Mayor’s office and 17 positions in the Office of the
Municipal Board with an alleged economic and efficient reason for the abolition.

ISSUE: Whether or Not the abolition of office and cause of removal of petitioners’ positions valid.

RULING: No. The removal of petitioner’s position is invalid. The merit system will be ineffective if no
safeguards are placed around the separation and removal of the public employees. The Committees’
report requires that removal shall be made only for cause’ and in the manner provided by law.

The reason given for the abolition of the positions is untrue, and constitutes a mere subterfuge for the
removal without cause of the said appellees, in violation of Civil Service tenures as provided by the
Constitution. Prior to the abolition of the positions, the office of the City Mayor no less than 35 new
positions calling for an outlay of 68,100pesos per annum.

A decent respect for the Civil Service provisions of our Constitution dictates that civil service eligible,
who have rendered long and honorable services, should not be sacrificed in favor of non-eligible given
positions of recent creation, nor should be left at the mercy of political changes.
3. Reorganization

Romualdez-Yap vs CSC

FACTS: Petitioner Conchita Romualdez-Yap started working with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) on
September 20, 1972. After several promotions, she was appointed in 1983 as a Senior Vice President
assigned to the Fund Transfer Department. The case at bar is a special civil action for certiorari assailing
Res. No. 92-201 of the respondent which upheld the petitioner’s separation from PNB in light of EO 80
or the Revised Charter of PNB. Petitioner contends that there is an existence of bad faith in its
reorganization and that there is an erroneous application of the one year prescriptive period for quo
warranto proceedings in her case.

ISSUE: Is the reorganization of PNB, a government-owned or controlled corporation performing

ministrant functions, valid?

HELD: Ministrant functions are those undertaken by way of advancing the general interests of society
and are merely optional. Commercial or universal banking is, ideally, not a governmental but a private
sector endeavor, an optional function of the government. There are functions of the government which
it may exercise to promote merely the welfare, progress, and prosperity of the people. Thus,
reorganization of such corporations like PNB is valid so long as they are done in good faith as prescribed
in the Dario v. Mison doctrine. Accordingly, the reorganization of PNB is found to be done in good faith
by the Court.
Fernandez vs Sto Tomas

FACTS: Petitioners Salvador Fernandez is the Director of the Office Personnel Inspection and Audit
(OPIA)and Anicia de Lima is serving as the Director of the Personnel Relations (OPR) both at the Central
Office of the Civil Service Commission (CSC). During their tenure, the herein public respondents Hon.
Sto. Tomas and Hon. Ereneta, Chairman and Commissioner, respectively, signed Resolution No. 94-3710
where the authority to effect changes were provided in Section 17 Book V of Executive Order 292. The
Commission finds it imperative to effect changes in the organization to streamline its operations and
improve delivery of service. In its Resolution, the Commission also finds it necessary to immediately
effect changes in the organization of Central Offices in view of the need to implement new programs in
lieu of those functions which were transferred to the Regional Office. The Offices of the petitioners were
merged together with the Office of Career Systems and Standards (OCSS) to form the Research and
Development Office (RDO).

Despite the petitioners’ objections, Chairman Sto. Tomas expressed the determination of the
Commission to implement Resolution No. 94-3710 unless restrained by higher authority. Petitioners
received Office Orders from the Commission assigning them to Regional Offices in Legazpi City Region V
and San Fernando in Pampanga Region III with positions as Director IV. Petitioners filed an Urgent
Motion for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and prayed that public respondents be restrained
from enforcing the said Office Orders which was granted in a Resolution dated 27 September1994. The
Commission filed its own comment and moved to lift the TRO. The Office of the Solicitor General also
filed a separate comment defending the validity of Resolution No. 94-3710 and urging dismissal of the
petition. The petitioners argued that said Resolution effected the “abolition” of public offices, something
which may be done only by the same legislative authority which had created those public offices in the
first place.

Issue: Whether or NOT the reassignment of petitioners to Regional Offices constitute a violation of their
constitutional right to security of tenure?

Ruling: No. Section 26 (7) Book V, Title I, Subtitle A of the 1987 Revised Administrative Code recognizes
reassignment as a management prerogative vested un the Commission and, for that matter, in any
department or agency of government embraced in the civil service:

“(7) Reassignment. An employee may be re-assigned from one organizational unit to another in the
same agency, Provided, that such re-assignment shall not involve a reduction in rank status and salary.”

The reassignment of petitioners Fernandez and de Lima from their previous positions had been effected
with express statutory authority and did not constitute removals without lawful cause. The
reassignment did not involve any violation of the constitutional right of petitioners to security of tenure
considering that they retained their positions of Director IV and would continue to enjoy the sane rank,
status, and salary at their new assigned stations which they had enjoyed at the Head Office of the
Commission in Metro Manila.
Chato vs. Natividad

Point of the case: Reorganization given by the government in which the cause is provided by law will still
push through for the benefit of the commission and the service it gives. It is not to be halted by a mere
disliking of an officer to his newly designated area.

Facts: On October 26, 1993, President Fidel V. Ramos issued E.O. No. 132, entitled “Approving the
Streamlining of the Bureau of Internal Revenue.” Pursuant to this Order, Commissioner Liwayway
Vinzons R. Chato issued on December 1, 1993 Revenue Administrative Order No. 5-93, “Redefining the
areas of jurisdiction and renumbering of regional district offices.”in which the order subdivided nineteen
revenue regions provided for under the National Internal Revenue Code into 115 revenue districts and
renumbered the resulting revenue district office (RDOs). In addition, it abolished the previous
classification of RDOs into Class A-1, A, B, C, and D and provided that henceforth all RDOs shall be
treated as the same class.

On December 10, 1993, petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue, citing the “exigencies of the
revenue service,” issued Revenue Travel Assignment Order No. 80-93 (RTAO 80-93), directing ninety
revenue district officers to report to new assignments in the redesignated and renumbered revenue
district offices nationwide.

Among those affected by the reassignment was private respondent Salvador Nori Blas who was ordered
to report to Revenue District No. 14 in Tuguegarao, Cagayan. In turn, petitioner Solon B. Alcantara was
ordered to report to Blas’ former post in San Fernando, Pampanga, now known as Revenue District No.
21. Blas questioned the above reassignment arguing that it constituted demotion since he was
transferred from the larger RD in San Fernando, Pampanga to the smaller one in Tuguegarao.

Issue: Whether or not the reassignment of the respondent is in violation of his security of tenure.

Ruling: No, it does not violate his security of tenure, nor does it demote him. the preservation of the
status quo is not alone sufficient to justify the issuance of an injunction. The plaintiff must show that he
has a clear legal right; that such right has been violated; and that he is entitled to the relief he demands,
consisting in restraining the commission of the acts complained of. Indeed, private respondent’s transfer
is part of a nationwide reshuffle or reassignment of revenue district officers designed to improve
revenue collection. More specifically the objective of the reassignment, as stated in Revenue
Administrative Order No. 5-93, is “to strengthen the decentralization of the Bureau’s set-up for the
purpose of maximizing tax assessments and revenue collections, intensifying enforcement of revenue
laws and regulations and bringing the revenue service closer to the taxpaying public.” It could be that
private respondent is being transferred to a revenue district which he claims has less revenue capacity
than San Fernando, Pampanga, precisely to improve the capacity of the new assignment.
DIVINAGRACIA v. STO TOMAS

POINT OF THE CASE: No officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except
for cause provided by law. The primordial purpose of our civil service laws is to establish and maintain a
merit system in the selection of public officers and employees without regard to sex, color, social status
or political affiliation. But there are times when appointments to public office are dominated by partisan
favoritism and patronage, where tenurial rights are subject to the whims of officialdom.

FACTS: In a letter dated 17 June 1985 Mayor Anastacio M. Prila terminated Filomena R. Mancita on the
ground that the Office of Municipal Development Coordinator (MDC) was abolished and renamed as
Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator (MPDC) as a result of the reorganization of the local
government of Pili. Private respondent Prescilla B. Nacario who was then the Municipal Budget Officer
(MBO) was appointed MPDC on 10 June 1985.

On 1 October 1991, petitioner Alexis D. San Luis, Cashier II of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), was temporarily appointed MBO of Pili by Secretary Guillermo N. Carague of
the Department of Budget and Management. When control over the Local Government Officers Services
was returned to the local government units by virtue of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160
as implemented by E.O. 503), San Luis was reappointed to the same position on 22 June 1992, this time
in a permanent capacity, by petitioner Delfin N. Divinagracia, Mayor of Pili.

Meanwhile, Mancita appealed her termination to the Merit Systems and Protection Board (MSPB). 8
On 20 June 1989 the MSPB ordered Mayor Divinagracia to reinstate Mancita to the position of MPDC.
On 15 October 1990, Mayor Divinagracia informed private respondent Nacario that she was being
relieved of her position as MPDC in order to comply with the MSPB decision to reinstate Mancita as
MPDC.

In a letter dated 8 December 1992 public respondent opined that the reinstatement of Mancita to the
position of MPDC was not a valid cause for Nacario’s termination, and since she was the former MBO
she had the right to return to that position. On 15 March 1993 Mayor Divinagracia wrote to CSC
Chairperson Patricia A. Sto. Tomas seeking a reconsideration of her opinion of 8 December 1992. Mayor
Divinagracia explained the factual circumstances behind the ouster of Mancita and the resulting
appointment of Nacario to the position of MPDC, arguing that San Luis was validly appointed by the
Secretary of the Budget and confirmed by the CSC, hence, entitled to security of tenure.

On 27 May 1993 public respondent issued CSC Resolution No. 93-1996 denying the request of Mayor
Divinagracia for a reconsideration, hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Civil Service Commission erred in reinstituting Precilla Nacario to her
previously vacated office as MBO, thereby ousting Alexis San Luis.

RULING: No. We deny the petition. The appointment of San Luis as MBO carried with it a condition,
which states: Provided that the separation of the former incumbent is in order. Considering that the
separation of Nacario who was the former incumbent was not in order, San Luis should relinquish his
position in favor of private respondent Nacario. This is, of course, without prejudice to San Luis'
right to be reinstated to his former position as Cashier II of the DENR, he being also a permanent
appointee equally guaranteed security of tenure. However Judge Davide Jr dissents that it is private
respondent Prescilla B. Nacario who should bear the prejudicial consequence of the reinstatement of
Filomena R. Mancita to the position of MPDC), and that in restoring Nacario to the position of MBO and
ousting therefrom petitioner Alexis San Luis, the public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion.
Vinzon-Chato vs Zenarosa

Facts: CIR issued RMC 37-93 which effectively reclassified Fortune’s products from 20-45% ad valorem
tax to 55%. CTA declared the issuance defective. Fortune filed with the RTC complaint for damages
against Vinzons-Chato in her private capacity. Chato filed a motion to dismiss. On motion to dismiss, RTC
denied. CA affirmed, SC held that Vinzons Chato liable under Art 32 and no need to prove bad faith to be
liable. Petition denied

However, in the 2008 MR decision, the SC reversed their decision. SC held that petitioner should not be
held liable. For a public officer with a duty owing to the public, officer can only be liable IF when the
complaining individual suffers a particular or special injury on account of the public officer’s improper
performance or non-performance of his public duty. He must show a wrong which he specially suffers,
and damage alone does not constitute a wrong. Petition granted

ISSUE: May a public officer be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in connection with
the discharge of the functions of his/her office? (Y)

HELD: General rule: a public officer is not liable for damages which a person may suffer arising from the
just performance of his official duties and within the scope of his assigned tasks.

Exception: a public officer is by law not immune from damages in his/her personal capacity for acts done
in bad faith which, being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of
immunity for official actions.

Specifically, under Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code, civil liability may arise where there is bad faith,
malice, or gross negligence on the part of a superior public officer. And, under Sec. 39 of the same Book,
civil liability may arise where the subordinate public officer’s act is characterized by willfulness or
negligence. In Cojuangco, Jr. V. CA, a public officer who directly or indirectly violates the constitutional
rights of another, may be validly sued for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code even if his acts
were not so tainted with malice or bad faith.

Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for
acts done in the course of the performance of the functions of the office, where said public officer: (1)
acted with malice, bad faith, or negligence; or (2) where the public officer violated a constitutional right
of the plaintiff.
DE GUZMAN V. COMELEC

POINT OF THE CASE: The temporary transfer or assignment of personnel does not violate a security of
tenure and is permissible even without the consent of the employee. However, it cannot be done when
it us a preliminary step toward a removal or a scheme to lure him away from the position.

FACTS: RA 8189 was enacted on June 10, 1996 and approved by President Fidel V. Ramos on June 11,
1996. Section 44 thereof provides the reassignment of election officers which after serving for at least
four (4) years in a particular city or municipality shall automatically be reassigned by the Commission to
a new station outside the original congressional district.

In connection to that, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) promulgated Resolution Nos. 97-00021
and 97- 06102 for the implementation thereof. Thereafter, the COMELEC issued several directives
reassigning the petitioners, who are either City or Municipal Election Officers, to different stations.
Aggrieved by the issuance of the aforesaid directives and resolutions, the petitioners are assailing the
validity of Section 44 of RA 8189, contending that its provision is a violation of the constitutional
guarantee on security of tenure of civil servants.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 44 of RA 8189 violates the constitutional guarantee on security of tenure
of civil servants

RULING: No. It does not violate the security of tenure of civil servants.

The guarantee of security of tenure under the Constitution is not a guarantee of perpetual employment.
It only

means that an employee cannot be dismissed (or transferred) from the service for causes other than
those provided by law and after due process is accorded the employee.
Cuevas vs Bacal

Facts: Josefina G. Bacal passed the Career Executive Service Examinations in 1989. On July 28, 1994, she
was conferred CES eligibility and appointed Regional Director of the Public Attorney’s Office. On January
5, 1995, she was appointed by then President Ramos to the rank of CESO III. On November 5, 1997, she
was designated by the Secretary of Justice as Acting Chief Public Attorney. On February 5, 1998, her
appointment was confirmed by President Ramos so that, on February 20, 1998, she took her oath and
assumed office.

On July 1, 1998, Carina J. Demaisip was appointed “chief public defender” by President Estrada.
Apparently because the position was held by Bacal, another appointment paper was issued by the
President on July 6, 1998 designating Demaisip as “chief public defender (formerly chief public
attorney), PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE vice ATTY. JOSEFINA G. BACAL,
effective July 1, 1998. On the other hand, Bacal was appointed “Regional Director, Public Defender’s
Office” by the President.

On July 7, 1998, Demaisip took her oath of office. President Estrada then issued a memorandum, dated
July 10, 1998, to the personnel of the “Public Defender’s Office” announcing the appointment of
Demaisip as “CHIEF PUBLIC DEFENDER.” Secretary of Justice was notified of the appointments of
Demaisip and Bacal on July 15, 1998.

On July 17, 1998, Bacal filed a petition for quo warranto questioning her replacement as Chief Public
Attorney. The petition, which was filed directly with this Court, was dismissed without prejudice to its
refiling in the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, Bacal brought her case in the CA which ruled in her favor
finding her to be lawfully entitled to the Office of Chief Public Attorney. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not Bacal is entitled to the contested position

Held: No. What should be emphasized in this case is that respondent Josefina G. Bacal is a CESO III and
that the position of Regional Director of the PAO, to which she was transferred, corresponds to her CES
Rank Level III and Salary Grade 28. This was her position before her “appointment” on February 5, 1998
to the position of Chief Public Attorney of the PAO, which requires a CES Rank Level I for appointment
thereto. Respondent Bacal therefore has no ground to complain. She may have been considered for
promotion to Rank I to make her appointment as Chief Public Attorney permanent. The fact, however,
is that this did not materialize as petitioner Carina J. Demaisip was appointed in her place. If respondent
was paid a salary equivalent to Salary Grade 30 while she was holding that office, it was only because,
under the law, if a CESO is assigned to a position with a higher salary grade than that corresponding to
his/her rank, he/she will be allowed the salary of the CES position. As Bacal does not have the rank
appropriate for the position of Chief Public Attorney, her appointment to that position cannot be
considered permanent, and she can claim no security of tenure in respect of that position.

Appointments, assignments, reassignments, and transfers in the Career Executive Service are based on
rank. Thus, security of tenure in the career executive service is thus acquired with respect to rank and
not to position. The guarantee of security of tenure to members of the CES does not extend to the
particular positions to which they may be appointed a concept which is applicable only to first and
second-level employees in the civil service but to the rank to which they are appointed by the President.
Accordingly, respondent did not acquire security of tenure by the mere fact that she was appointed to
the higher position of Chief Public Attorney since she was not subsequently appointed to the rank of
CESO I based on her performance in that position as required by the rules of the CES Board.

Within the Career Executive Service, personnel can be shifted from one office or position to another
without violation of their right to security of tenure because their status and salaries are based on their
ranks and not on their jobs. Mobility and flexibility in the assignment of personnel, the better to cope
with the exigencies of public service, is thus the distinguishing feature of the Career Executive Service.
Petitioners are, therefore, right in arguing that respondent, “as a CESO, can be reassigned from one CES
position to another and from one department, bureau or office to another. Further, respondent, as a
CESO, can even be assigned or made to occupy a CES position with a lower salary grade. In the instant
case, respondent, who holds a CES Rank III, was correctly and properly appointed by the appointing
authority to the position of Regional Director, a position which has a corresponding CES Rank Level III.”

Indeed, even in the other branches of the civil service, the rule is that, unless an employee is appointed
to a particular office or station, he can claim no security of tenure in respect of any office. This rule has
been applied to such appointments as Director III or Director IV or Attorney IV or V in the Civil Service
Commission since the appointments are not to specified offices but to particular ranks; Election
Registrars; Election Officers, also in the Commission on Elections; and Revenue District Officers in the
Bureau of Internal Revenue.

Moreover, as Bacal herself does not have the requisite qualification for the position of Chief Public
Attorney, she cannot raise the lack of qualification of petitioner. As held in Carillo v. Court of Appeals,
“in a quo warranto proceeding the person suing must show that he has a clear right to the office
allegedly held unlawfully by another. Absent that right, the lack of qualification or eligibility of the
supposed usurper is immaterial
4. Qualification

MAYOR VS. MACARAIG

POINT OF THE CASE: Officers may not be removed at the mere will of those vested with the power of
removal, or without cause. Moreover, the cause must relate to and effect the administration of the
office, and must be restricted to something of a substantial nature directly affecting the rights and
interests of the public.

FACTS: Jovencio L. Mayor, a member of the Philippine Bar for fifteen (15) years, was appointed Labor
Arbiter in 1986 after he had, according to him, met the prescribed qualifications and passed rigid
screening process. Fearing that he would be removed from office on account or the expected
reorganization, he filed in this Court assailing RA 6715 which declares vacant positions of the
Commissioners, Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations
Commission, and operates to remove the incumbents upon the appointment and qualification of their
successors. So basically, the petitioners here were removed from office pursuant to RA 6715 because of
the changes in Qualifications:

The old law declared that Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters should be members of the Bar,
with at least two (2) years experience in the field of labor management relations. They were appointed
by the President upon recommendation of the Chairman, and were subject to the Civil Service Law, rules
and regulations.

On the other hand, RA 6715 requires that the Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters shall likewise
be members of the Philippine Bar, but in addition must have been in the practice of law in the
Philippines for at least seven (7) years, with at least three (3) years experience or exposure in the field of
labor-management relations. For purposes of

reappointment, however, incumbent Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least five (5) years may be considered as already qualified. They are
appointed by the President, on recommendation of the Secretary of Labor and Employment, and are
subject to the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners’ removal under RA 6715 is unconstitutional.

RULING: Yes. Security of tenure is a protected right under the Constitution. The right is secured to all
employees in privates as well as in public employment. No officer or employee in the civil service, the
Constitution declares, shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law. Now, a
recognized cause for several or termination of employment of a Government officer or employee is the
abolition by law of his office as a result of reorganization carried out by reason of economy or to remove
redundancy of functions, or clear and explicit constitutional mandate for such termination of
employment.
5. Abandonment; Acceptance of Incompatible/Other Employment

CANONIZADO VS. AGUIRRE

Point of the Case: When a regular government employee is illegally dismissed, his position never
became vacant under the law and he is considered as not having left his office. The new appointments
made in order to replace him are not valid.

FACTS: Petitioners were duly appointed Commissioners of the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM)
– created by virtue of RA 6975. Upon the passing of the amendatory law, RA 8851 a.k.a Philippine
National Police Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998, it declared that the terms of the current
Commissioners were deemed as expired upon its effectivity. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of
sections 4 and 8 of RA 8551. Petitioners argue that their removal from office by virtue of section 8 of RA
8551 violates their constitutionally guaranteed right to security of tenure. Public respondents insist that
the express declaration in section 8 of RA 8551 that the terms of petitioners offices are deemed expired
discloses the legislative intent to impliedly abolish the NAPOLCOM created under RA 6975 pursuant to a

bona fide reorganization. Petitioners posit the theory that the abolition of petitioners offices was a
result of a reorganization of the NAPOLCOM allegedly effected by RA 8551.

ISSUES: WHETHER OR NOT petitioners were removed by virtue of a valid abolition of their office by
Congress.

HELD: NO. The court ruled that the petitioners were not removed by virtue of a valid abolition of their
office by Congress. First of all, RA 8551 did not expressly abolish petitioners positions. “Public
respondents would have this Court believe that RA 8551 reorganized the NAPOLCOM resulting in the
abolition of petitioners offices. We hold that there has been absolutely no attempt by Congress to effect
such a reorganization. No bona fide reorganization of the NAPOLCOM having been mandated by
Congress, RA 8551, insofar as it declares the terms of office of the incumbent Commissioners,
petitioners herein, as expired and resulting in their removal from office, removes civil service employees
from office without legal cause and must therefore be struck down for being constitutionally infirm.”

Thus, petitioners are entitled to be reinstated to office. It is of no moment that there are now new
appointees to the NAPOLCOM. It is a well-entrenched principle that when a regular government
employee is illegally dismissed, his position never became vacant under the law and he is considered as
not having left his office. The new appointments made in order to replace petitioners are not valid
Salvador v. CA

Point of the case: An employee of the civil service can only be removed or suspended, if a law provides
for it. If illegally dismissed and can be reinstated as long as the reinstatement of an illegally dismissed
worker or employee has not been carried out he can seek employment or work anywhere, including in a
foreign country and the bare fact of his being actually employed elsewhere in any capacity cannot affect
his right to reinstatement.

Facts: Petitioner Conrado Salvador had been a permanent employee of DENR since 1964. Sometime in
1987, reorganization of the DENR under EO 192, commenced. This resulted in the conversion of the
positions of several DENR employees to coterminous, with their term of office ending December 31,
1991. With such threat of termination, several of petitioner’s co-employees filed on December 19, 1991
a Petition for Prohibition and Mandmus to stop the DENR from terminating their services.

Meanwhile, the petitioner, who previously held the position of Forestry Supervisor II for almost 8 years,
was constrained to accept reappointment as a Senior Executive Assistant I, SG-17, a coterminous
position with a term not to exceed 3 years. However, petitioner filed a protest and was “promoted, to
the position of Forester III, SG-18, a position still lower in rank and salary than that of Forestry
Supervisor II, which he previously held. Petitioner was terminated and it was deemed terminated from
the service as his position being a coterminous position. Thus, petitioner joined his co-employees as
intervenor in G.R. No. 103121, believing that his removal from the service was illegal.

Accordingly, on 1993, respondent Civil Service Commission issued in a Resolution, directing the DENR to
issue appointments to the petitioners and intervenors, petitioner Conrado Salvador included, in G.R. No.
103121, under the same terms and conditions as their employment before the 1987 reorganization.

However, despite the Decision and the Resolution of respondent Civil Service Commission, the DENR still
failed and refused to reinstate petitioner to his former position or to an equivalent thereof. The
petitioner filed for a Motion to CA, which was denied.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner should be reinstated.

Held: Yes, faced with the clear mandate of G.R. No. 103121 upon respondent DENR to reinstate the
petitioners (and petitioner Conrado C. Salvador, as intervenor) to their former or equivalent positions in
the DENR without loss of seniority and other benefits, and to issue regular and permanent appointments
to them for the positions in the new organization and staffing pattern corresponding to their positions in
the 1986 plantilla, said respondent cannot do otherwise but comply.

Even though, in the assailed Resolution, respondent Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner falls outside
the scope of said decision since he accepted a permanent position and thus became different from the
petitioners therein who were in danger of losing their jobs. But The anxiety and fear of losing one’s job
after more than twenty-seven continuous years of service with the DENR, experienced by petitioner
during the time of the reorganization of DENR, must have compelled him to accept a position which was
not only lower but of a coterminous status. Any man in such an uncertain and economically threatening
condition would be expected to take whatever measures are available to ensure a means of sustenance
for himself and his family. This would include finding employment as soon as possible in order to meet
the daily financial demands of his family. Petitioners application for and acceptance of a lower position
in the DENR, under the circumstances, was the practical and responsible thing to do, and cannot be
construed against him such as to foreclose his right to question the legality of his termination and to
claim the position he held previous to the reorganization. Succinctly put, applying for new employment
was not a choice for petitioner but a necessity.
Due Process in Removal

ENRIQUE v. CA

POINT OF THE CASE: The supposed denial of administrative due process has been cured by the fact that
the petitioners were informed of the charges levelled against them and were given reasonable
opportunity to present their defenses. Petitioners even moved for a reconsideration of the adverse CSC
decision. After the denial of their motion, petitioners appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court,
which, in turn, considered said appeal.

FACTS: The petitioners were charged and consequently dismissed by the CSC for facilitating illegal
operations during 1983 Professional Board Examinations for Teachers (PBET). Petitioners denied the
charges against them and moved for an immediate dismissal of the case. They asked for a formal
hearing if the dismissal of the case, as well as the lifting of their preventive suspension, was not possible.
CSC denied the request for a formal hearing, resolved to proceed summarily against the respondents in
accordance with Section 40 of PD 807. The petitioner then filed the present petition contending that
they were denied due process and their dismissal through summary proceeding was improper.

ISSUES: Whether or not the petitioners were denied due process.

RULING: No. The Supreme Court sustained the validity of Section 40 so long as the respondents in the
administrative case are duly informed of the charges against them and are given the opportunity to
present their side.

In the case at bench, petitioners were informed of the charges levelled against them and were given
reasonable opportunity to present their defenses. As a matter of fact, petitioners admitted that they
filed their answer to the formal charges against them and submitted additional evidence when asked to
do so. Petitioners even moved for a reconsideration of the adverse CSC decision. After the denial of their
motion, petitioners appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court, which, in turn, considered said
appeal. Hence, the supposed denial of administrative due process has been cured.

Although Section 40 of PD 807, which allows CSC to immediately dismiss a charged employee, has been
repealed by RA 6654 in 1988, commission of the acts imputed to petitioners took place on or before
November 1983 or long before the repeal of Section 40 of P.D. No. 807. Hence, the operative law is still
said Section 40.
CSC vs Magnaye

Point of the Case: prohibition in Article IX (B) (2) (3) of the Constitution against dismissal of a civil service
officer or employee "except for cause provided by law" is a guaranty of both procedural and substantive
due process.

Facts: Mayor Roman H. Rosales of Lemery, Batangas, appointed Magnaye as Utility Worker I at the
Office of Economic Enterprise [Operation of Market] (OEE). After a few days, Mayor Rosales detailed
him to the Municipal Planning and Development Office.

In the May elections of that year, Mayor Rosales was defeated by Raul L. Bendaña, who assumed office
on June 30, 2001. Thereafter, Magnaye was returned to his original assignment at the OEE. On July 11,
2001, Bendaña also placed him on detail at the Municipal Planning and Development Office to assist in
the implementation of a Survey on the Integrated Rural Accessibility Planning Project.

On August 13, 2001, the new mayor served him a notice of termination from employment effective the
following day for unsatisfactory conduct and want of capacity Magnaye questioned his termination
before the CSC head office on the ground that Mayor Bendaña was not in a position to effectively
evaluate his performance because it was made less than one and one-half months after his (Mayor
Bendaña's) assumption to office. He added that his termination was without basis and was politically
motivated.

Issue: Whether or not the termination of Magnaye was in accordance with the pertinent laws and the
rules.

Ruling: Yes. Tria v. Chairman Patricia Sto. Tomas that the prohibition in Article IX (B) (2) (3) of the
Constitution against dismissal of a civil service officer or employee "except for cause provided by law" is
a guaranty of both procedural and substantive due process. Procedural due process requires that the
dismissal comes only after notice and hearing, while substantive due process requires that the dismissal
be "for cause."

Magnaye was denied procedural due process when he received his notice of termination only a day
before he was dismissed from the service. Evidently, he was effectively deprived of the opportunity to
defend himself from the charge that he lacked the capacity to do his work and that his conduct was
unsatisfactory. As well, during his appeal to the CSCRO-IV, he was not furnished with the submissions of
Mayor Bendaña that he could have opposed. He was also denied substantive due process because he
was dismissed from the service without a valid cause for lack of any factual or legal basis for his want of
capacity and unsatisfactory conduct.
Rubenecia vs CSC

Point of the Case: The fundamental rule of due to process requires that a person be accorded notice and
an opportunity to be heard.

Facts: Petitioner Ruble Rubenecia assails Civil Service Commission ("CSC" or "Commission") Resolution
No. 94-0533, dated 25 January 1994, aquitting him of a charge of insubordination but finding him guilty
of several other administrative charges and imposing upon him the penalty of dismissal from the
service. He also questions the validity of CSC Resolution No. 93-2387 dated 29 June 1993, which
allegedly abolished the Merit System Protection Board ("MSPB") and authorized the elevation of cases
pending before that body to the Commission.

Teachers of Catarman National High School in Catarman, Northern Samar, filed before the MSPB an
administrative complaint against petitioner Rubenecia, the School Principal, for dishonesty, nepotism,
oppression and violation of Civil Service Rules. After a preliminary inquiry, the MSPB on 15 January 1992
formally charged Rubenecia and required him to file an answer with the CSC Regional Office in Tacloban
City. On 24 February 1992, petitioner Rubenecia, instead of filing an answer, requested that he be
furnished with copies of the documents submitted by complainants in support of the charges against
him. Petitioner did not answer to the accusations given to him.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner had been accorded due process in connection with rendition of CSC
Resolution No. 94-0533 finding him guilty and ordering his dismissal from the service.

Ruling: Yes. The fundamental rule of due to process requires that a person be accorded notice and an
opportunity to be heard. These requisites were respected in the case of petitioner Rubenecia.

Commission hereby resolves to find Ruble Rubenecia guilty of Dishonesty, Nepotism,

Oppression and Violation of Civil Service Rules and Ragulations. Accordingly, he is meted, out the
penalty of dismissal from the service.
PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE BOARD OF DIRECTORS vs MARIE JEAN C. LAPID

POINT OF THE CASE: The constitutionality of removing an employee of the civil service commission.

FACTS: Filed against the Respondent an administrative complaint for allegedly confronting,
badmouthing and shouting invectives at Mr. Guemo, in the presence of other employees and seeking
assistance from the PSCO. The PCSO Board of Directors found her guilty of discourtesy in the course of
official duties and grave misconduct and imposed on her the penalty of dismissal from service.

On appeal with the CSC, the Commission dismissed the respondent’s appeal for being moot and
academic. Moreover, they ruled that the respondent is a casual employee which means that she is not
entitled to security of tenure. However, the CA reversed the decision of the Commission by reinstating
the respondent in the service until the expiration of her casual employment.

ISSUE: Whether or not her termination from service was executed with due process

HELD: No, the Supreme Court held that the CSC itself found that Lapid was denied due process as she
was never formally charged with the administrative offenses of Discourtesy in the Course of Official
Duties and Grave Misconduct, for which she was dismissed from the service. To somehow remedy the
situation, the petitioners mentioned in their Memorandum before the CA that there was no reason
anymore to pursue the administrative charge against Lapid and to investigate further as this was
superseded by Memorandum dated September 14, 2005 recommending the termination of respondent
Lapid’s casual employment. They pointed out that this was precisely the reason why no Formal Charge
was issued.
Security of Tenure

Chua vs. Civil Service Commission

POINT OF THE CASE: A co-terminous employee is a non-career civil servant, like casual and emergency
employees, R.A. 6683 expressly extends its benefits for early retirement to regular, temporary, casual
and emergency employees.

FACTS: Petitioner Lydia Chua was hired and re-hired in four (4) successive projects during a span of
fifteen (15) years under the National Irrigation Administration. Upon approval of Republic Act No. 6683-
Early Retirement Law providing for benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation from the
government service as well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization, she filed to be eligible
for said benefit, taking to mind that she is a among those eligible. The Civil Service Commission (CSC)
however denied her application, attesting that the employment of Chua was as co- terminous with the
NIA projects which in turn was contractual in nature.

ISSUE: Whether or not Chua can avail of the benefit of RA 6683 as an official/employee governed by the
CSC

HELD: Yes. A co-terminous employee is a non-career civil servant, like casual and emergency employees,
R.A. 6683 expressly extends its benefits for early retirement to regular, temporary, casual and
emergency employees. Workers belonging to a work pool, hired and re-hired continuously from one
project to another were considered non-project-regular and permanent employees. R.A. 6683. Co-
terminous or project personnel, on the other hand, who have rendered years of continuous service
should be included in the coverage of the Early Retirement Law, as long as they file their application
prior to the expiration of their term, and as long as they comply with CSC regulations promulgated for
such purpose.
NLTD vs CSC

Point of the Case: Sec. 2 Art. 9-B of the Constitution: No officer or employee of the civil service shall be
removed or suspended except for cause provided by law.

FACTS: On 1977, petitioner Garcia, a Bachelor of Laws graduate and a first grade civil service eligible was
appointed Deputy Register of Deeds VII under permanent status. Said position was later reclassified to
Deputy Register of Deeds III pursuant to PD 1529, to which position, petitioner was also appointed
under permanent status up to September 1984. Executive Order No. 649 which took effect authorized
the restructuring of the Land Registration Commission to National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration and regionalizing the Offices of the Registers therein, petitioner Garcia was issued an
appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds II on October 1, 1984, under temporary status, for not being a
member of the Philippine Bar. She appealed to the Secretary of Justice but her request was denied.
Petitioner Garcia moved for reconsideration but her motion remained unacted. On October 23, 1984,
petitioner Garcia was administratively charged with Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service. While said case was pending decision, her temporary appointment as such was renewed in
1985. In a Memorandum dated October 30, 1986, the then Minister, now Secretary, of Justice notified
petitioner Garcia of the termination of her services as Deputy Register of Deeds II on the ground that
she was "receiving bribe money". Said Memorandum of Termination which took effect on February 9,
1987, was the subject of an appeal to the Inter-Agency Review Committee which in turn referred the
appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). MSPB then dropped the appeal of petitioner
Garcia on the ground that since the termination of her services was due to the expiration of her
temporary appointment, her separation is in order. Her motion for reconsideration was denied on
similar ground." However, the Civil Service Commission through a Resolution directed that Garcia be
restored to her position as Deputy Register of Deeds II or its equivalent in the NALTDRA. It held that the
new requirement of BAR membership as mandated under said Executive Order, would not apply to her
but only to the filling up of vacant lawyer positions on or after February 9, 1981, the date said Executive
Order took effect."

ISSUE: Whether or not the Reinstatement of Garcia by order of the Civil Service Commission is Valid.

HELD: No, The Court held that the Reinstatement was invalid. That Under express terms of EO 649 Sec 8,
mandates that all positions in the Land Registration Commission and in the registries of deeds and all
Position therein shall cease to exist from the date specified in the implementing order. The Court also
said that Garcia had no vested interest in an office. That there was no absolute right to hold it except for
constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards to salary and tenure. That the
abolishment of the office was done in good faith and that the primary purpose of the Law was enacted
to improve the service and the additional qualification as member of the bar was not merely added to
deny Garcia of her former position.
CABAGNOT v CSC

POINT OF THE CASE: The efficiency of a civil service system depends largely on the morale of the officers
and employees in the service. Morale, in turn can be fatally undermined when the security of officers in
the possession of their office is unprotected against the arbitrary action of superior officers. Hence,
basic in any civil service is a guarantee of security of tenure, a guarantee against arbitrary impairment,
whether total or partial, of the right to continue in the position held.

FACTS: A new organizational structure and staffing pattern of the provincial government of Aklan was
approved by the Joint Commission on Local Government Personnel Administration. The reorganization
provided regular plantilla positions. Petitioner herein, issued a Memorandum inviting all provincial
officials and employees to apply for any of the authorized positions. 21 supposedly aggrieved employees
jointly appealed to petitioner pursuant to Section 18 of the Rules on Government Reorganization issued
by the Civil Service Commission and Sections 2, 3, 4, 5 and 12 of Republic Act 6656(1988) entitled An Act
to Protect the Security of Tenure of Civil Officers and Employees in the Implementation of Government
Reorganization. Upon appeal, CSC found that irregularities attended the election of the two members
representing the first and second level personnel to the Placement Committee. The Commission found
no reason for displacing the services of private respondents primarily because there are eighty-four (84)
additional positions for the Office of the Governor alone. The CSC found that sixteen (16) of the
seventeen (17) private respondents were demoted because of the wide disparity between the former
positions held by them and the positions to which they were proposed by petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or Not CSC committed grave abuse of discretion in reinstating the dismissed employees.

RULING: Yes. With respect to the sixteen private respondents, respondent Commission committed no
grave abuse of discretion in ordering that they be immediately appointed and restored to their positions
or positions of comparable or equivalent rank without loss of seniority rights with back salaries reckoned
from dates they should properly have been appointed thereto effective the date of the reorganization of
said province. It is within the power of public respondent to order the reinstatement of government
employees who have been unlawfully dismissed. The CSC, as the central personnel agency, has the
obligation to implement and safeguard the constitutional provisions on security of tenure and due
process. In the present case, the issuance by the CSC of the questioned resolutions, for the reasons
clearly explained therein, is indubitably in the performance of its constitutional task of protecting and
strengthening the civil service.

However, with respect to private respondent Oczon, we hold that respondent Commission did commit
grave abuse of discretion in ordering his reinstatement with back salary, considering that he was not
terminated as a result of the reorganization.
Marohombsar vs CA

Point of the Case: Ad interim appointments are permanent but their terms are only until the Board
disapproves them.

Facts: Private respondent Billante S. Guinar-Mahurom was appointed as Technical Assistant assigned to
the Office of the Chancellor of the Mindanao State University sometime in 1988. That appointment was
confirmed by the Board of Regents in its Resolution No. 279, series of 1988, promulgated on November
8, 1988. When the Salary Standardization Law (R.A. 6788) was enacted, private respondent's position
was converted into Executive Assistant II. However, since private respondent at that time was not a Civil
Service eligible, she was extended a temporary appointment duly noted by the Board of Regents
(Resolution No. 1, series of 1991).

When private respondent passed the Civil Service career professional examinations, she was
immediately extended a permanent appointment by then MSU President Ahmad Alonto, Jr. on May 3,
1991. Private respondent continued to hold the position until February 15, 1993 when she received the
letter of termination from petitioner Marohombsar after the latter had assumed office as President of
the University (January 5, 1993). The cause of termination, which was made effective on February 28,
1993, was "in view of the urgent need to establish a new order and maintain the trust and confidence
reposed upon the Office of the President as demanded by the standards of Public Service."

Private respondent thereafter sought a reconsideration of her termination but her request was denied,
hence, on April 30, 1993, she filed a complaint for illegal termination before the Regional Office No. 12
of the Civil Service Commission.

Issue: whether an employee holding an ad interim appointment may be terminated at any time and for
any cause as advanced by petitioner.

Ruling: No. the appointment extended to private respondent by then MSU President Alonto, Jr. was
issued without condition nor limitation as to tenure. The permanent status of private respondent's
appointment as Executive Assistant II was recognized and attested to by the Civil Service Commission
Regional Office No. 12. Petitioner's submission that private respondent's ad interim appointment is
synonymous with a temporary appointment which could be validly terminated at any time is clearly
untenable. Ad interim appointments are permanent but their terms are only until the Board disapproves
them.
Ong vs OP

Point of the Case: It is established that no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or
suspended except for cause provided by law. However, this admits of exceptions for it is likewise settled
that the right to security of tenure is not available to those employees whose appointments are
contractual and co-terminous in nature.

FACTS: Petitioner Ong joined the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) as a career employee in 1978.
He held the position of NBI Director I from July 14, 1998 to February 23, 1999 and NBI Director II from
February 24, 1998 to September 5, 2001. On September 6, 2001, petitioner was appointed Director III by
the President.

On June 3, 2004, the petitioner received from respondent Reynaldo Wycoco Memorandum Circular No.
02-S.2004 informing him that his appointment, being co-terminus with the appointing authority's
tenure, would end effectively at midnight on June 30, 2004 and, unless a new appointment would be
issued in his favor by the President consistent with her new tenure effective July 1, 2004, he would be
occupying his position in ade facto/hold- over status until his replacement would be appointed.

On December 01, 2004, the President appointed respondent Victor A. Bessat as NBI Director III as
replacement of the petitioner. Ong filed before the CA a petition for quo warranto. He sought for the
declaration as null and void of (a) his removal from the position of NBI Director III; and (b) his
replacement by respondent Victor Bessat (Bessat). Ong likewise prayed for reinstatement and
backwages. The CA denied the petition. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA err in sustaining the validity of Ong's removal?

HELD: This Court notes that MC No. 02-S.2004 did not in effect remove Ong from his post. It merely
informed Ong that records of the NBI showed that his co-terminous appointment had lapsed into a de
facto/hold-over status. It likewise apprised him of the consequences of the said status.

Be that as it may, if we were to assume for argument's sake that Wycoco removed Ong from his position
as Director III by virtue of the former's issuance of MC No. 02-S.2004, still, the defect was cured when
the President herself issued Bessat's appointment on December 1, 2004. The appointing authority, who
in this case was the President, had effectively revoked Ong's appointment.

Ong lacked the CES eligibility required for the position of Director III and his appointment was "co-
terminus with the appointing authority." His appointment being both temporary and co-terminous in
nature, it can be revoked by the President even without cause and at a short notice.
Electioneering or Partisan Political Activity

Santos vs Yatco

Point of the Case: The constitutional prohibition on political partisanship (sic) does not apply to
members of the Cabinet. Their positions are essentially political and they may engage in partisan
political activity.

Facts. Petitioner Santos, then Secretary of National Defense and head of the Department of National
Defense, was sought to be enjoined from electioneering, in view of the explicit provision of the Civil
Service Act of 1959 which prohibits all officers and employees in the civil service, “whether in the
competitive or classified, or non-competitive or unclassified service,” from engaging directly or indirectly
in partisan political activities or taking part in any election except to vote.” Santos was conducting a
house-to-house campaign for Governor Martin, candidate of the Nacionalista Party in the Province of
Bulacan. Judge Yatco of the Court of First instance of Rizal issued an order prohibiting Santos from
campaigning personally or in an official capacity.

Issue. Whether or not a member of the Cabinet be enjoined from partisan activities?

Held. No. The position of Secretary of National Defense is not embraced and included within the term
"officers and employees in the civil service" as disclosed in the proceedings in the Constitutional
Convention wherein the attempt of Delegate Mumar to include the heads of executive departments
within the civil service was rejected. The positions of the members of the Cabinet are essentially political
and they may engage in partisan political activity. Moreover, Santos was acting as member of the
Cabinet in discussing the issues before the electorate and defending the actuations of the
Administration to which he belongs. Members of the Cabinet are supposed to be the alter ego of the
President and are in fact usually chosen principally for the political influence they were expected to
exert for the purpose of ensuring support for the administration.
Right to Self-Organization and Right to Strike

SSS EMPLOYEES v. CA

Point of the Case: Employees in the civil service may not resort to strikes, walk-outs and other
temporary work stoppages to pressure the Government to accede to their demands.

Facts. SSS Employees Association (SSEA) went on strike after the Social Security Service (SSS) failed to
act on the union’s demands.251 Hence, SSS filed with the RTC a complaint which prayed for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the strike, for the strikers to be ordered to return to
work, for the SSEA to be ordered to pay damages, and for the strike to be declared illegal.

Issue. Whether or not the employees of the SSS covered by the prohibition against strikes?

Held. Yes. Under the Constitution “the civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters”252 and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation
with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil
service and are covered by the Civil Service Commission’s memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being
the case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.
Nieves vs Blanco

POINT OF THE CASE: The constitutionality of the reassignment of employees outside the geographical
location of their present place of work.

FACTS: Respondent issued Regional Office Order No. 09 which directed the petitioner’s reassignment
from DTI-Sorsogon to DTIs provincial office in Albay (DTI-Albay). Petitioner appealed his reassignment to
the CSCs Regional Office in Legazpi City (CSC Regional Office No. V) which, however, dismissed his appeal
for failure to comply with the requirements of an appeal. Petitioner instituted the instant petition for
review on certiorari asserting that a reassignment outside geographical location should not be restricted
to a reassignment from one regional office to another or from the regional office to the central office
and vice-versa. He insists that it should include movement from one provincial office to another because
one such office is necessarily outside the

geographical location of the other. Further, he avers that the CA should have accorded respect and
finality

to the CSCs interpretation of the provisions of the Revised Rules on Reassignment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the reassignment order by the respondent is valid although it is outside the
geographical location and without the consent of the employee concerned.

HELD: No, the Court held that if the employee is without a station-specific place of work is reassigned
outside the geographical location of his/her present place of work, then the following rules apply: first, if
the reassignment is with the consent of the employee concerned, then the period of the same shall have
no limit; second, if the reassignment is without the consent of the employee concerned, then the same
should not exceed the maximum period of one year.
Balingasan vs CA
JACINTO V. CA

POINT OF THE CASE: In general, workers in the public sector do not enjoy the right to strike.

FACTS: Petitioners are public school teachers from various schools in Metropolitan Manila. Between the
period September 17 to 21, 1990, they incurred unauthorized absences in connection with the mass
actions then staged; and on September 17, 1990, DECS Secretary Isidro Cariño immediately issued a
return-to-work order.

However, the directive was ignored by petitioners. Thus, Secretary Cariño issued formal charges and
preventive suspension orders against them. An investigation committee was then created to look into
the matter. However, during the investigation, petitioners did not file their answers or controvert the
charges against them. As a consequence, Sec. Cariño, in his decisions found them guilty as charged and
imposed the penalty of dismissal, except with respect to petitioners Merlinda Jacinto and Adelina
Agustin who were meted only six (6) months suspension. The petitioners appealed contending that they
do not seek to establish that they have a right to strike. Rather, they tenaciously insist that their
absences during certain dates in September 1990 were a valid exercise of their constitutional right to
engage in peaceful assembly to petition the government for a redress of grievances. They claim that
their gathering was not a strike; therefore, their participation therein did not constitute any offense.

ISSUE: Whether or not the absences of the petitioners constitute a proper exercise of the right to
peaceful assembly and right to strike

RULING: No. It does not constitute a proper exercise of their rights because there are standards for
allowable limitations such as the legitimacy of the purposes of the association the overriding
considerations of national security and the preservation of democratic institutions. As regards the right
to strike, the Constitution itself qualifies its exercise with the proviso "in accordance with
law." Strike, as defined by law, means any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of
employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. It cannot be denied that the mass action or
assembly staged by the petitioners resulted in the non-holding of classes in several public schools during
the corresponding period. It is also settled in jurisprudence that, in general, workers in the public sector
do not enjoy the right to strike.
DE LA CRUZ VS CA

POINT OF THE CASE: the right to peaceably assemble and petition the Government for redress of
grievances is guaranteed by the Constitution, the liberty must be exercised within reasonable limits. It
must not prejudice the interest to the public service.

FACTS: The petitioners are public school teachers from various schools in Metro Manila who were
simultaneously charged, preventively suspended, and eventually dismissed in October 1990 by then
Secretary Isidro D. Carino of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports. It was alleged that the
teachers participated in the mass action/illegal strike on September 19-21, 1990. They also violated the
return-to-work order issued by the DECS and the petitioners was given a 5 day period to explain their
side but failed to do so. Hence they were found guilty as charged and subsequently dismissed from
office by Sec. Casino.

Petitioners appealed to Civil Service Commission, and the CSC found the petitioners guilty of conduct to
“prejudicial to the best interest of the service” for having participated in the mass actions and imposed
upon them the reduced penalty of 6 months suspension. However in view of the length of time that
petitioners had been out of the service by reason of the immediate implementation of the dismissal
orders of Sec. Carino, the CSC ordered the automatic reinstatement in the service without back wages.
Petitioner contends to the Court the decision of the CSC affirmed by the CA, that their only offense was
to exercise their constitutional right to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of
their grievances and insists that the actions of September/October 1990 were not “strikes” as there was
no actual disruption of classes.

ISSUE: Whether or not the teacher’s conducts are prejudicial “to the best interest of the service”

HELD: Yes, the mass actions amounted to a prohibited strike of civil service servants. Although the right
to peaceably assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances is guaranteed by the
Constitution, this liberty must be exercised within reasonable limits. The public school teachers
committed acts prejudicial to the interest of the service by staging the mass protests on regular school
days, abandoning their classes and failing to return despite the return to work order.
GSIS VS. KAPISANAN

POINT OF THE CASE: Resort to the intent of the framers points to the understanding that the right to
organize does not include the right to strike. The Constitution, however, does not say that government
employees may not be the statutory right to strike.

FACTS: A four-day October 2004 concerted demonstration, rallies were held in front of the GSIS main
office in Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City by GSIS personnel, among them members of the herein respondent
Kapisanan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa GSIS (KMG or the Union), a public sector union of GSIS rank-and-file
employees against petitioner Garcia and his management style. While the Mayor of Pasay City allegedly
issued a rally permit, the absence of the participating GSIS employees was not covered by a prior
approved leave.

On or about October 10, 2004, the manager of the GSIS Investigating Unit issued a memorandum
directing 131 union and non-union members to show cause why they should not be charged
administratively for their participation in said rally. In reaction, KMG’s counsel, Atty. Manuel Molina,
sought reconsideration of said directive on the ground, among others, that the subject employees
resumed work on October 8, 2004 in obedience to the return-to-work order thus issued. The plea for
reconsideration was, however, effectively denied by the filing, on October 25, 2004, of administrative
charges against some 110 KMG members for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service.

ISSUE: Whether or not the mass action staged by or participated in by said GSIS employees partook a
strike or prohibited concerted mass action.

RULING: Yes. In each of the formal charges, the employee’s act of attending, joining, participating and
taking part in the strike/rally is a transgression of the rules on strike in the public sector. The denounced
filing of the administrative charges is prima facie tenable, in as much as engaging in mass actions
resulting actions work stoppage or service disruption constitutes, in the minimum, the punishable
offense of acting prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Temporary Employees

Ricardo T. Gloria vs. Court of Appeals

Point of the Case: Temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible even w/o the
employee’s prior consent, it cannot be done when the transfer is a preliminary step toward his removal,
or a scheme to lure him away from his permanent position, or designed to indirectly terminate his
service, or force hid resignation. Such a transfer would in effect circumvent the provision which
safeguards the tenure of office of those who are in the Civil Service.

Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari brought by Secretary and Director for the NCR of DECS,
to question the decision of CA.

The respondent was appointed as Schools Division Superintendent, Division of City of Schools in Quezon
City. In later years, the petitioner Secretary Gloria recommend the respondent to be reassigned as
Superintendent of the MIST to fill up the vacancy. It was approved by the President through a
recommendation letter. The respondent was being informed of her reassignment, the latter requested
to the petitioner to reconsider the reassignment but the former denied the request.

So, the respondent filed an instant petition to the CA. The CA granted the respondent petition and
restrained the petitioner from implementing the reassignment of the respondent.

Petitioners are now before the court seeking relief from the decision of the appellate Court.

Issue: W/N the reassignment of the private respondent is violative of his security of tenure.

Held: Yes, the reassignment of the private respondent is violative of his security of tenure.

It can be inferred from the Memorandum of the petitioner for President to the effect that the
reassignment of the private respondent will “best fit his qualifications and experience” being an expert
in vocational and technical education. It can thus be gleaned that subject of reassignment of private
respondent is more than temporary as the latter has been described as fit for the reassigned job, being
an expert to the field. Besides, there is nothing in the memorandum to show that the reassignment is
temporary or would only last until a permanent replacement is found. Such feature of reassignment in
question is definitely violative of the security of tenure of the private respondent.

As cited in early jurisprudence, Security of tenure is a fundamental and constitutionally guaranteed

feature of civil service. The mantle of its protection extends not only to employees removed w/o cause
but also to cases of unconsented transfers which are tantamount to illegal removals.
Section 3. Purpose of Civil Service System

Lazo v. Civil Service Commission

Facts: The CSC received a letter from a complainant reporting that the petitioner has boated to him that
he had bought his career service eligibility from the CSC for a certain amount.

Acting on the report, the CSC directed its regional office to investigate the matter. The latter found that
the complainant was a fictitious individual and there being no witnesses to support the allegation and so
they recommend for the dismissal of the latter. However, as this is a serious case, the CSC ordered the
examination of the answer sheets of petitioner retrieved and hand checked. The rechecking disclosed
that petitioner’s actual score was 34. 48% not 76.46% as indicated in his certificate of eligibility.

The petitioner was charged with dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service but again the regional office recommended for the dismissal of the case for lack of
evidence linking petitioner to the irregularity.

CSC dismissed the case but revoked his eligibility for being null and void. Petitioner asked for
reconsideration but the CSC denied the motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: W/N the CSC acted with grave abuse of discretion and denied petitioner’s right to due process by
unilaterally revoking petitioner’s eligibility w/o a formal investigation or an opportunity given to him to
examine and go over his answer sheet in CSE.

Held: No, the CSC acted without grave abuse of discretion and denied petitioner’s right to due process
by unilaterally revoking petitioner’s eligibility w/o a formal investigation.

Under the Constitution, the CSC is the Central personnel agency of the Government charged with the
duty of determining questions of qualifications of merit and fitness of those appointed in the Civil
Service. Its power to issue a certificate of eligibility carries with it the power to revoke a certificate for
being null and void.

The CSC cannot motu propio revoke a certificate of eligibility w/o notice and hearing to the examinees
concerned but in this case, w/c simply involves the rechecking of examination papers and nothing more
than a reevaluation of documents already in the records of the CSC according to a standard answer key
previously set by it, notice and hearing was not required. The question before the CSC did not require
evidentiary hearing. Instead, what applied is the rule of res ipsa loquitur.

The petitioner was given right to be heard but he did not make good use of it by showing that his score
was 76.64% and not 43.48%. he just contends that he should be given a chance to see the examination
sheet himself.
Section 6. Prohibition of Appointment of “Lame Ducks”

People vs Sandiganbayan

Facts: Villapando, the respondent, ran for Mayoral candidacy while Tiape, a relative of Villapando’s wife,
ran for Mayoral candidacy as well in other municipality. After the election, Villapando wins while Taipe
loss the candidacy. When the respondent was the elected Mayor, he designated Tiape as the Municipal
Administrator.

Subsequent thereto, Villapando and Tiape were charged of violating the Art. 244 of the RPC however,
Tiape died. Meanwhile, Villapando pleaded not guilty. The Sandiganbayan acquitted Villapando.

The Sandiganbayan contends that the legal qualification mentioned in Art. 244 of RPC are merely on the
question of whether Tiape at the time of his designation as Municipal Administrator, was lacking of legal
qualifications. They further contend that the qualification to hold office refers to educational
attainment, CSE or experience.

Issue: W/N the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in interpreting that the legal disqualification in Art. 244 of RPC does not include the one year
prohibition imposed in losing candidates as enunciated in the Constitution and the LGC

Held: Yes, the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in interpreting that the legal disqualification in Art. 244 of RPC does not include the one year
prohibition imposed in losing candidates as enunciated in the Constitution and the LGC.

The Art. IX Sec 6 of the Constitution clearly prohibits losing candidates w/in one year after such election
to be appointed to any office in the Government or any government-owned or controlled corporations
or in any of their subsidiaries.

In the case at bar, the appointment of Tiape as the Municipal Administrator after losing the election
clealr violates the Art. IX section 6 of the Constitution.
Section 7. Prohibitions; Appointments; Office; Employment

Flores vs Drilon

Facts. The proviso in Sec. 13(d)260 of the “Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992,”261 which
reads “Provided, however, That for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the
mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the
Subic Authority,” under which Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), was challenged on the ground
that it infringes, among others, Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which states that “no
elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public officer or
position during his tenure,” because the City Mayor of Olongapo City is an elective official and the
subject posts are public offices.

Issue. Does the aforequoted proviso violate the constitutional proscription against appointment or
designation of elective officials to other government posts?

Held. Yes. The view that an elective official may be appointed to another post if allowed by law or by the
primary functions of his office, ignores the clear-cut difference in the wording of the two (2) paragraphs
of Sec. 7, Art. IX-B, of the Constitution.262While the second paragraph authorizes holding of multiple
offices by an appointive official when allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, the first
paragraph appears to be more stringent by not providing any exception to the rule against appointment
or designation of an elective official to the government post, except as are particularly recognized in the
Constitution itself. Moreover, Congress did not contemplate making the subject SBMA posts as ex officio
or automatically attached to the Office of the Mayor of Olongapo City without need of appointment.
The phrase “shall be appointed”263 unquestionably shows the intent to make the SBMA posts
appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of Mayor of Olongapo City. The view that an elective
official may be appointed to another post if allowed by law or by the primary functions of his office,
ignores the clear-cut difference in the wording of the two (2) paragraphs of Sec. 7, Art. IX-B, of the
Constitution.259 While the second paragraph authorizes holding of multiple offices by an appointive
official when allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, the first paragraph appears to
be more stringent by not providing any exception to the rule against appointment or designation of an
elective official to the government post, except as are particularly recognized in the Constitution itself.
In re Eduardo Escala

Facts: Respondent was appointed by the Court as SC Chief Judicial, Security Division, OAS on July 14,
2008. He was qualified for the position for being employed as Chief Inspector of the PNP Aviation
Security Group.

During the course of his employment, anonymous letter reached the OAS reporting respondent’s gross
violation of CSLaw on the prohibition against dual employment in the government service. The latter
alleged that respondent accepted employment from the court and remained active Member of the PNP.
Upon OAS’ inquiries the allegation was confirmed.

The respondent admitted his fault but further contends that it was in good faith and without concealing
any material fact from the Honourable SC. On January 24, 2008 he applied for optional retirement and
was informed that his application will be effective on March 31, 2008. However, as part of the new
policy the effectivity of his application will be extended on July 14, 2008, but when he applied for the
said position in SC he declared that PNP had yet to formally approve my application for optional
retirement. In the urgent need of his duty in the SC, he accepted the position but his optional retirement
was not immediately acted upon and he was considered retired on September 30, 2009.

Issue: W/N the respondent violates the art IX sect 7 of the 1987 Constitution

Held: Yes, the respondent violates the art IX sect 7 of the 1987 Constitution.

His offer of mitigating circumstance of delay of processing of his retirement papers is unacceptable
because in the records of the PNP he only started processiong his requirement for optional retirement
when he was already connected with the Court which is on August 26, 2008.
LA CARLOTA CITY VS. ROJO

Facts: On March 18, 2004, then V-mayor Jalandoon appointed the respondent, who had just tendered
his resignation as member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod the day preceding such appointment as
Sangguniang Panlungsod Secretary. The status of appointment was permanent. The next day Jalandoon
submitted the respondent appointment to CSC but it was considered as permanently recalled or
withdrawn for it was found with infirmities.

It was brought to the CSC Regional Office but before they can decide on the matter the petitioner
intervened, they contends that the resignation of Rojo is ineffective having not complied with the
provision quorum under certain section of RA 7160 and that respondent was still an incumbent member
of sangguniang panlungsod when the vice mayor appointed him as Sangguniang Panlungsod Secretary.

The CSC Regional set aside the rulings of the CSCFO’s. the resignation of the respondent is valid having
been tendered with the majority of the council members. They brought the petition on the CSC but it
was dismissed again. They brought it to the CA but the CA affirmed the decision of CSC.

Issue: W/N the appointment of respondent violated the constitutional proscription against eligibility of
an elective official during his tenure.

Held: No, the appointment of respondent does not violated the constitutional proscription against
eligibility of an elective official during his tenure.

The resolution of the matter requires the interpretation of certain provisions of RA 7160.

A majority of the 13 members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod or at least 7 members is needed to

constitute a quorum to transact official business. Since 7 members were present at the regular session
on the resignation of the respondent, clearly his resignation is validly accepted.
Section 8. Prohibitions; Compensations; Foreign Gift/Office/Title

Sadueste vs. Municipality of Surigao

Facts: The plaintiff as district engineer for the Province of Surigao was on March 10 1936 designated as
sanitary and waterworks engineer for the same province with an additional compensation of not more
than P60 a month payable for the income of the waterworks system under his supervision. However, the
municipal council having failed to provide necessary appropriation for his service hence, the plaintiff
instituted an action for its recovery with claim of damages. The complaint was dismissed.

Issue: W/N the double compensation of the plaintiff violates the prohibition of Art. IX Section 8 of the
Constitution

Held: Yes, the double compensation of the plaintiff violates the prohibition of Art. IX Section 8 of the
Constitution

Under Art. IX Section 8 of the Constitution “no officer or employee of the government shall receive
additional or double compensation unless specifically authorized by law. There being no law specifically
authorized the appellant to receive additional compensation for his services as Sanitary and Waterworks
Engr., his claim therefor must fail.
Peralta vs Mathay

Facts: As set forth in the brief of petitioner, the GSIS, in a resolution duly passed, granted him an
optional gratuity of 40,336.07. Of that amount, he was not able to collect the sum of P7, 032. 26 as
COLA, P1,275 as incentive bonus, and P 1, 775 as Christmas bonus. Such items were not passed in audit.
The view of respondent Gen. being that they should be deducted from his gratuity, although during
petitioner’s incumbency as Trustee, no question was raised when he was paid such allowance and
bonuses. Respondent auditor general justified his action on the that they partake of the nature of
additional compensation, a trustee’s remuneration being fixed by law in the form of per diem of P25 for
every board meeting of the GSIS attended.

Issue: W/N COLA, incentive bonus, and Christmas bonus are additional compensation.

Held: Yes, COLA not nature of reimbursement unlike per diem. Incentive bonus and Christmas bonus are
obviously additional compensation.

It is expressly provided in the Constitution “No officer or employee of the Government shall receive
additional or double compensation unless specifically authorized by law” this is to manifest a
commitment to the fundamental principle that a public office is a public trust.

A per diem is commonly identified with the daily allowance “for each day he was away from his home
base”. It is usual signification is thus that a reimbursement for expenses incurred in the performance of
one’s duties.

A similar approach is called for in determining the nature of COLA. If it could rightfully be considered as
in the nature of reimbursement rather than additional emoluments or perquisites then the ruling of
respondent Auditor General cannot find support in the Constitution.
SANTOS V CA

Facts: Herein petitioner is a retired Judge of the MeTC of Quezon City receiving his retirement gratuity
under the law for his entire years in the government service; and five years thereafter has been
regularly receiving a monthly pension. On 2 December 1993, petitioner re-entered the government
service. He was appointed Director III of the Traffic Operation Center of the MMA. On 30 August 1996,
the MMDA issued a Memorandum to petitioner informing him that in view of his “voluntary option to
be separated from the service” his services would automatically cease effective at the close of office
hours on 15 September 1996, and that he would be entitled to “separation benefits equivalent to one
and one-fourth (1¼) monthly salary for every year of service as provided under Section 11 of the MMDA
Law.”

Petitioner assails the decision of 19 August 1999 of the Court of Appealsin CA-G.R. SP No. 48301, which
held that petitioner’s separation pay under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7924 should be limited to the number
of years of his service in the Metropolitan Manila Authority (MMA) only, excluding his years of service as
judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City for which he has already been given
retirement gratuity and pension.

Issue: Whether or not, in the computation of petitioner’s separation pay, his years in service in the
Judiciary should be excluded and that his separation pay would be solely confined to his services in the
MMA.

Held: The Supreme Court affirmed the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals and the Civil Service
Commission that in the computation of petitioner’s separation pay, his years in service in the Judiciary
should be excluded and that his separation pay would be solely confined to his services in the MMA.

The retirement benefit which petitioner had received or has been receiving under R.A. No. 910, as
amended, do not constitute double compensation. He could continue receiving the same even if after
his retirement he had been receiving salary from the defunct MMA as Director III thereof. This is but
just because said retirement benefits are rewards for his services as MeTC Judge, while his salary was his
compensation for his services as Director III of the MMA.

However, to credit his years of service in the Judiciary in the computation of his separation pay under
R.A. No. 7924 notwithstanding the fact that he had received or has been receiving the retirement
benefits under R.A. No. 910, as amended, would be to countenance double compensation for exactly
the same services, i.e., his services as MeTC Judge. Such would run counter to the policy of this Court
against double compensation for exactly the same services. More important, it would be in violation of
the first paragraph of Section 8 of Article IX-B of the Constitution, which proscribes additional, double,
or indirect compensation.
Cabili vs CSC

Facts: The facts show that LEAP represented by its Chairman filed a complaint before the CSC against the
petitioners, Cabili, Chairman of Board of Trustees and his Administrator both of them work in LWUA.
They call for an investigation and opinion for the entitled to per diems, representation and
transportation allowance, discretionary fund, and other extraordinary and miscellaneous expenses from
the Olongapo City Water District where he was designated as member of BOD. He received these
monetary benefits in addition to his compensation as deputy Administrator of LWUA.

The CSC ruled that it is illegal for any LWUA officer or employee who sits as member of the BOD of a
water district to receive additional or indirect compensation in the form of RATA, EME, rice allowance,
and medical/dental benefits; uniform allowance, and Christmas bonus, cash gift, and productivity
incentive bonus. They are only entitled to receive per diems pursuant to Section 13 of PD 198.

The petitioner filed for a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CSC. The appealed as well
in the CA, the latter partially granted the petition; “the petitioners are entitled to per diem, RATA and
travel allowance. They are not, however, entitled to rice allowance, medical/dental benefits, Christmas
bonus/cash gift, and EME, because these constitute additional, double, and direct compensation.

Issue: Whether or not the grant of certain allowances and benefits to LWUA designated representatives
to the Board of water districts violates the Section 8 Art. IX of the Constitution.

Held: Yes, the grant of certain allowances and benefits to LWUA designated representatives to the Board
of water districts violates the Section 8 Art. IX of the Constitution.

We reiterated in De Jesus and in Baybay Water District v. Commission on Audit18 that "words and
phrases in a statute must be given their natural, ordinary, and commonly accepted meaning." Section 13
of P.D. No. 198 specifies per diem as the compensation of members of the board of directors of water
districts. It even limits the total amount of per diems they are allowed to receive each month. Above all,
Section 13 expressly states that they shall receive no compensation other than the specified per diems.
The prohibition cannot be any clearer. Thus, both De Jesus and Baybay hold that P.D. No. 198 authorizes
the directors of water districts to receive only per diems, and no other compensation or allowance in
whatever form.
Benguet State University vs Colting

Facts: Before this court is a petition for review on Certiorari filed by petitioner seeking to nullify COA
decision on disallowing the rice subsidy and health care allowance to the employees of BSU.

In pursuant to Section 4 of the new passed RA 8292, the Board of Regents of BSU passed and approved
resolution No. 794, granting rice subsidy and health care allowance to its employees.

However, the COA disallowed the granting of rice subside and health care allowance on the contention
that RA 8292 does not provide for the grant of the said allowance.

Issue: W/N petitioner is authorized to grant Health Care allowance and rice subsidy to its employees

Held: No, petitioner is authorized to grant Health Care allowance and rice subsidy to its employees.

The Article IX section 8 clearly provides that “No elective or appointed public officers or employee shall
receive additional, double, or indirect compensation unless specified by the law”

In the contention of the petitioner that the allowance and subsidy that was given to them is authorized
by RA 8292 section 4 is a wrong interpretation. What the phrase “other programs/ projects of the
University or college” in Section 4 should be on the same nature as instruction, research, and extension
that will uplift the quality of education. In BSU case the said subsidy and allowance are in no way
intended for academic programs similar to instruction, research, and extension. Therefore Section 4
cannot therefore, be relied upon by BSU as the legal basis for the grant of the allowances.
Herrera vs NPC

Facts: All NPC employees, including the petitioners, were separated from the service. As a result, all
employees who held permanent position at the NPC opted for and were paid the corresponding
separation pay equivalent to one and a half month’s salary per year of service, nonetheless, a number of
employees also claimed retirement benefits under CA no. 186, as amended by RA no. 660 and 1616.
Under these laws, government employees who have rendered at least 20 years of service are entitled to
a gratuity equivalent to one month’s salary for every year of service for the first 20 years, one and a half
months’ salary for every year of service over 20 but below 30 years, and two months’ salary for every
year of service in excess of 30 years.

The NPC, on the other hand, took the position that the grant of retirement benefits to displaced
employees in addition to separation pay was inconsistent with the constitutional proscription on the
grant of a double gratuity. Unable to amicably resolve this matter with its former employees, the NPC
filed on September 18, 2003, a Petition for Declaratory Relief10 against several parties,11 including the
petitioners, before the RTC of Quezon City, to obtain confirmation that RA No. 9136 did not specifically
authorize NPC to grant retirement benefits in addition to separation pay.1

Issue: W/N the employees of NPC are entitled for separation and retirement pay

Held: No, the employees of NPC are entitled for separation and retirement pay.

Section 8 of Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution prohibits the grant of both separation pay and
retirement benefits. In said constitutional provision, it is clear that additional or indirect compensation is
barred by law and only [allowed] when so specifically authorized by law. Furthermore, on the Private
Respondents' contention that the second paragraph should be applied in their [case], the same will not
hold water. This is so because "retirement benefits" [are] not synonymous to pension or gratuities as
contemplated by law.

R.A. 9136 did not clearly and unequivocally authorize the payment of additional benefits to Private
Respondents as the benefits referred to in such law should not be interpreted to include retirement
benefits in addition to their separation pay. Separation from service due to [the] restructuring of the
[electric] power industry should not be interpreted to mean "retirement" as both are different in every
respect. The law specifically defines the meaning of "separation" by virtue of the restructuring.

Section 8 of Article IX(B) of the Constitution provides that "[n]o elective or appointive public officer or
employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by
law". In prior decisions, we have ruled that there must be a clear and unequivocal statutory provision to
justify the grant of both separation pay and retirement benefits to an employee.21 Here, absent an
express provision of law, the grant of both separation and retirement benefits would amount to double
compensation from one single act of separation from employment.
NEA vs CSC

Facts: By way of a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner
National Electrification Administration (NEA) seeks to annul and set aside the Decision of CA.

Issue: W/N the payment to NEA personnel designated to cooperatives of allowances and other benefits
on top of their regular salaries

Held: We agree with the CA when it affirmed public respondent's finding that payment to NEA personnel
designated to cooperatives of

allowances and other benefits on top of their regular salaries from petitioner becomes violative of their
own charter which does not provide for such payment and, thus, inimical to the best interest of public
service. It also violates the first paragraph of Section 8, Article IX-B of the Constitution, which proscribes
additional, double, or indirect compensation, to wit:

No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect
compensation, unless specifically authorized by law.
Doctrine of Finality

YAP v COA

Facts: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition, in accordance with rule 65 of the rules of court.

The petitioner is a permanent employee of Department Manager of the National Development

Company, a government-owned and controlled corporation with original charter. He was appointed by
the BOD of Manila Gas Corporation, a subsidiary of NDC as V-president for Finance while remaining a
regular employee of NDC. The additional honoraria and various allowances was given to him for the
additional position.’

In the course of regular audit, the Corporate Auditor of MGC issued following disallowances against the
petitioner on the ground that the appointment to MGC is unconstitutional. The petitioner sought for
reconsideration from respondent COA argued that his assignment to MGC is required to his primary
function. However, the COA denied the petition and upheld the ruling of CAO II further contends that
allowances and reimbursement claimed by petitioner failed to pass the test of public purpose
requirement of the law.

Issue: W/N the COA acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it
affirmed the disallowances on a ground relied upon by the respondent

Held: No, the COA did not acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it
affirmed the disallowances on a ground relied upon by the respondent.

We have previously declared that it is the general policy of the court to sustain the decisions of
administrative authorities, specifically one that was constitutionally created like herein respondent COA,
and has presumed expertise in laws they are entrusted to enforce. It is in fact, an oft-repeated rule that
findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but also finality when the decision and
order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, may this court entertain a petition for certiorari under rule
65 of the rules of Court.

In the case at bar, the COA is in the best position to determine which allowances and benefits may be
properly allowed under the circumstances, as it is the sole constitutional body mandated to examine,
audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, expenditures or uses of funds or
properties owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to the government owned or controlled corporation
like the MGC.
Sergio I. Carbonilla vs Board of Airlines and Office of the President vs Board of Airlines

Facts: Before the Court are two petitions for review assailing for a decisions.

The BOC issued an Administrative order amending CAO 7-92. The DOF approved it. The amendment is
an adjustment of overtime pay of customs personnel from the exchange rate of P25 to US 1 to the then
exchange rate of P55 to US 1

The respondent contends that it learned of the proposed increased in overtime rates only sometime.
The BOC demanding payment of overtime pay to the BAR member, the latter refused and manifested
their intention to file a petition with the COC and or DOF to suspend the implementation however it was
dismissed by the latter so they filed the petition to the Office of the President as so, the petition was
denied.

BAR filed a petition for review under rule 45 before the CA. In which, the CA granted the petition.

Petitioners Carbonilla, et al. filed an Omnibus Motion to Intervene before the Court of Appeals on the
ground that as customs personnel, they would be directly affected by the outcome of the case.
Petitioners Carbonilla, et al. also adopted the Comment filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).

The Court of Appeals denied the motion for intervention filed by Carbonilla, et al. The Court of Appeals
ruled that the petition before it involved the resolution of whether the decision of the Office of the
President was correctly rendered. The Court of Appeals held that the intervenors’ case was for collection
of their unpaid overtime services and their interests could not be protected or addressed in the
resolution of the case. The Court of Appeals ruled that Carbonilla, et al. should pursue their case in a
separate proceeding against the proper respondents.

Carbonilla filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied

The Office of the President, et al. also filed a motion for reconsideration dated 28 July 2009 assailing the
9 July 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals. However, it was also denied.

Issue:

 W/N the CA seriously erred in law in issuing the decision in denying the petitioner Carbonilla, et
al intervention and motion for reconsideration.
 W/N the Court of Appeals acted beyond its jurisdiction when it passed upon the validity of CAO
7-92 and Section 3506 of the TCCP.

Held:

 No, the CA seriously did not erred in law in issuing the decision in denying the petitioner
Carbonilla, et al intervention and motion for reconsideration.

Carbonilla, et al. were really after the payment of their differential or back payments for services
rendered. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly denied the motion for intervention.

It should be stressed that the allowance or disallowance of a motion for intervention is addressed to the
sound discretion of the courts.23 The permissive tenor of the Rules of Court shows the intention to give
the courts the full measure of discretion in allowing or disallowing the intervention.24 Once the courts
have exercised this discretion, it could not be reviewed by certiorari or controlled by mandamus unless
it could be shown that the discretion was exercised in an arbitrary or capricious manner.25 Carbonilla, et
al. failed to show that the Court of Appeals rendered its resolution in an arbitrary or capricious manner.

In addition, Carbonilla, et al. admitted in their petition that their motion for reconsideration of the 26
February 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals had been denied in open court during the oral
arguments held by the Court of Appeals on 16 December 2009.26 Carbonilla, et al. did not act on the
denial of this motion but only pursued their motion for reconsideration of the 9 July 2009 Decision of
the Court of Appeals. Hence, the denial of Carbonilla, et al.’s motion for intervention had already
attained finality.

Having ruled against the right of Carbonilla, et al. to intervene, we see no reason to rule on the other
issues they raise unless raised in G.R. No. 194276.

 No, the Court of Appeals did not acted beyond its jurisdiction when it passed upon the validity
of CAO 7-92 and Section 3506 of the TCCP.

According to Section 8, Rule 51 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure also states: “Section 8. Questions
that may be decided. - No error which does not affect the jurisdiction over the subject matter or the
validity of the judgment appealed from or the proceedings therein, will be considered unless stated in
the assignment of errors, or closely related to or dependent on an assigned error and properly argued in
the brief, save as the court may pass upon plain errors and clerical errors.”

The Court of Appeals deemed it necessary to rule on the issue for the proper determination of these
cases. The Court has ruled that the Court of Appeals is imbued with sufficient authority and discretion to
review matters, not otherwise assigned as errors on appeal, if it finds that their consideration is
necessary in arriving at a complete and just resolution of the case or to serve the interests of justice or
to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice. Further, while it is true that the issue of constitutionality must be
raised at the first opportunity, this Court, in the exercise of sound discretion, can take cognizance of the
constitutional issues raised by the parties in accordance with Section 5(2)(a), Article VII of the 1987
Constitution.

The Office of the President, et al. argue that the Court of Appeals should have denied BAR’s petition
because it had no jurisdiction over the issues raised, involving the validity and collection of money
charges authorized by Customs Law, which are under the jurisdiction of the CTA.

The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over BAR’s petition stems from Section 1 in relation to Section 3,
Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which states that appeals from "awards, judgments, final
orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
functions[,]" which includes the Office of the President, may be taken to the Court of Appeals. BAR’s
petition for review to the Court of Appeals from the 12 March 2007 Decision and 14 March 2008
Resolution of the Office of the President falls within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.

As noted by the Court of Appeals, the Office of the President took cognizance of Cruz’s letter dated 4
December 2006 requesting for a review of the 31 August 2006 letter of Usec. Mendoza. Deputy Exec.
Sec. Gaite required BAR to pay the appeal fee and submit its appeal memorandum. Thereafter, the
Office of the President issued its 12 March 2007 Decision affirming the decision of the Department of
Finance and then denied BAR’s motion for reconsideration in its 14 March 2008 Resolution. BAR’s only
recourse is to file a petition for review before the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules on
Civil Procedure. The exercise by the Court of Appeals of its appellate jurisdiction over the decision of the
Office of the President is entirely distinct from the issue of whether BAR committed a procedural error
in elevating the case before the Office of the President instead of filing its appeal before the CTA
PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY VS COA

Facts The Board of Directors of PEZA is composed of 13 members which include the undersecretaries of
DOF, DOLE, DILG, DENR, DA, DOST, DOE, and DPWH which were granted with per diems by PEZA for
every attendance in meeting.

The PEZA auditor, issued notice of disallowance on the ff. payments of per diems to ex officio members
of the PEZA board. The disallowance is based on the en banc resolution.

The petitioner file for a reconsideration but it was not granted so, they filed a petition for review before
the COA to assail the denial of its appeal by the office of the Cluster Director.

The COA however, denied the petition for lack of merit.

Issue: W/N the COA erred in denying the petition for lack of merit.

Held: No, the COA did not erred in denying the petition for lack of merit.

The legal basis to grant per diems to ex-officio members of the PEZA board, including their
representatives, had already been settled by no less than the Court en banc in the case of Bitonio Jr.
when we held that the amendatory law, RA 8748, purposely deleted the last paragraph of Section 11 of
RA 7916 that authorized the grant of per diems to PEZA board members as it was conflict with the
proscription laid down in 1987 constitution.

Prescinding from the above, the petitioner is indeed, not entitled to receive per diems for his
attendance at board meetings during his tenure as member of the BOD of the PEZA.

Thus, when the Constitution has already explained a prohibition this Court finds no reason to revisit the
doctrine laid down therein as said interpretation, to this Court mind, is in consonance with what our
Constitution provides.
DIMAGIBA VS. ESPARTERO

Facts: Petitioners were employees of LIVECOR, a Government-owned and controlled corporation with
original charter. In some time, LIVECOR and HSDC entered into a trust management whereby the former
would undertake the task of managing, administering, disposing, and liquidating the corporate assets,
projects, and accounts of HDSC. Due to this agreement, the petitioners were given certain basic function
in the HSDC. However, their position was being abolished. As a result they were given separation
packages and as well, the HSDC terminate their services because their separation from LIVECOR, would
no longer allow them to perform their function at HSDC.

Subsequently, petitioner wrote letter to HDSC requesting for the processing of their HSDC gratuity pay
however, on their replied letter they stated that petitioner would not be entitled to gratuity pay.

So, petitioner filed with the Office of the Ombudsman charging the respondents with grave misconduct,
conduct to the prejudicial of best interest of the service, inefficiency and incompetence in the
performance of their official duty.

The Ombudsman rendered its decision and found the respondent guilty and thereby meted out the
penalty of dismissal.

The CA reversed the decision of the Ombudsman. The CA found that the gratuity packages received by
petitioners from HSDC constituted the prohibited additional or double compensation under the
Constitution. It found no evidence to support the Ombudsman decision finding respondents guilty of the
administrative charges as they acted accordingly as public officers. Anent the issue of the timeliness of
the filing of the petition, the CA ruled that petitioners filed their appeal within the 15-day period
prescribed under Section 4 of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, relying on the case of Fabian v. Desierto.25
However, since there was no clear pronouncement that appeals of Ombudsman decision in
administrative cases cannot be made under Section 4 of Rule 43, the dismissal of the petition on the
ground that it was filed beyond the 10-day period provided under Section 27 of RA 6770, or the
Ombudsman Act of 1989, would result to glaring injustice to respondents; and that dismissal of appeals
purely on technical grounds is frowned upon especially if it will result to injustice.

Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT GAVE DUE COURSE TO
RESPONDENTS' PETITION FOR REVIEW DESPITE BEING FILED BEYOND THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD OF
TEN (10) DAYS SET BY SECTION 27 OF REPUBLIC ACT 6770.

Held: Yes, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT GAVE DUE COURSE TO RESPONDENTS'
PETITION FOR REVIEW DESPITE BEING FILED BEYOND THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD OF TEN (10) DAYS
SET BY SECTION 27 OF REPUBLIC ACT 6770.

Section 27 of RA 6770 provides as follows: Section 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. - All
provisionary orders of the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory.

Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are
conclusive. Any order directed or decision imposing the penalty of public censure re reprimand,
suspension of not more than one month’s salary shall be final and unappealable. In all administrative
cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the SC by
filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order,
directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court.

The then Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman likewise contain a similar provision.
Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 0730 provides as follows:

Sec. 7. Finality and Execution of Decision - Where the respondent is absolved of the charge and in case
of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than
one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final, executory and
unappealable. In all other cases, the decision shall become final after the expiration of ten (10) days
from receipt thereof by the respondent, unless a motion for reconsideration or petition for certiorari,
shall have been filed by him as prescribed in Section 27 of R.A. 6770.

In Fabian v. Desierto,31 we declared unconstitutional Section 27 of RA 6770 and Section 7, Rule III of
A.O. No. 7 and any other provision of law implementing the aforesaid Act and insofar as they provide for
appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the Supreme Court.
We held that such provision was violative of Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution as it expanded our
appellate jurisdiction without our advice and concurrence; and that it was also inconsistent with Section
1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which provides that a petition for review on certiorari shall apply only to
a review of judgments or final orders of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax
Appeals, the Regional Trial Court, or other courts authorized by law. We then said:

As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 should be struck down as
unconstitutional, and in line with the regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals from decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the
provisions of Rule 43.32

Thus, it appeared that the period provided under Section 27 of RA 6770 which is ten days must be
observed in filing a petition with the CA assailing the Ombudsman decision in administrative case.

In this case, respondents filed with the CA their motion for extension of time to file petition for review
under Rule 43 on September 11, 2000, i.e., on the 15th day from receipt of the Ombudsman order
denying their motion for reconsideration, and filed the petition on September 19, 2000. At the time the
petition was filed, the matter of which reglementary period must apply, whether 10 days under Section
27 of RA 6770 or 15 days under Section 4, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, had not been established with
definiteness until the Barata case was decided later. Considering that the Fabian ruling stated that Rule
43 of the Rules of Court should be the proper mode of appeal from an Ombudsman decision in
administrative cases, and Section 4 of Rule 43 provides for 15 days from receipt of the order appealed
from, the motion for extension to file petition which was filed on the 15th day from receipt of the
Ombudsman order is considered timely filed.