Communities Cagayan Inc.

vs Spouses Nanol
GR No. 176791 November 14, 2012

Facts: Sometime in 1994, respondent-spouses Arsenio and Angeles Nanol entered into contract to Sell with
petitioner Communities Cagayan, Inc., whereby the former agreed to sell to respondent-spouses a house and
Lots 17 and 19″ locate Block 16, Camella Homes Subdivision, Cagayan de Oro City, for the price of P
368,000.00. Respondent-spouses, however, did not avail of petitioner’s inhouse financing due to its
high interest rates. Instead, they obtained a loan from Capitol Development Bank, a sister company of
petitioner, using the property as collateral. To facilitate the loan, a simulated sale over the
property was executed by petitioner in favor of respondent-spouses. Accordingly, titles were transferred in
the names of respondent-spouses under Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 105202 and
105203, and submitted to Capitol Development Bank for loan processing. Unfortunately, the bank
collapsed and closed before it could release the loan. Thus, on November 30, 1997, respondent-
spouses entered into another Contract to Sell with petitioner over the same property for the same price of
P 368,000.00. This time, respondent-spouses availed of petitioner’s in-house
financing thus, undertaking to pay the loan over four years, from 1997 to 2001. Sometime in
2000, respondent Arsenio demolished the original house and constructed a three-story house allegedly
valued at P 3.5 million, more or less.18 In July 2001, respondent Arsenio died, leaving his wife, herein
respondent Angeles, to pay for the monthly amortizations.

Issue: Whether or not respondents are considered builders in good faith entitled to indemnification for
necessary and useful expenses and/or to buy the land under the provisions of the New Civil Code.

Held: Yes. As a general rule, Article 448 on builders in good faith does not apply
where there is a contractual relation between the parties, such as in the instant case. We went over
the records of this case and we note that the parties failed to attach a copy of the Contract to
Sell. As such, we are constrained to apply Article 448 of the Civil Code, which provides viz:

ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith,
shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting,
after payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who
built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However,
the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the
building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to
appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the
lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.

Article 448 of the Civil Code applies when the builder believes that he is the owner of the land or
that by some title he has the right to build thereon, or that, at
least, he has a claim of title thereto. Concededly, this is not present in the
instant case. The subject property is covered by a Contract to Sell hence ownership still remains
with petitioner being the seller. Nevertheless, there were already
instances where this Court applied Article 448 even if the builders do not have a claim of title over the
property. Thus:

This Court has ruled that this provision covers only cases in which the builders, sowers or planters
believe themselves to be owners of the land or, at least, to have a claim of title thereto. It does
not apply when the interest is merely that of a holder, such as a mere tenant,
agent or usufructuary. From these pronouncements, good faith is identified by the belief that the land
is owned; or that – by some title – one has the right to build, plant, or sow thereon.

However, in some special cases, this Court has used Article 448 by recognizing good faith beyond
this limited definition. Thus, in Del Campo v. Abesia, this provision was applied to
one whose house – despite having been built at the time he was still co-owner – overlapped
with the land of another. This article was also applied to cases wherein a builder had constructed
improvements with the consent of the owner. The Court ruled that the law deemed the builder to be in
good faith. In Sarmiento v. Agana, the builders were found to be in good faith despite their reliance on
the consent of another, whom they had mistakenly believed to be the owner of the land.

In fine, the Court applied Article 448 by construing good faith beyond its limited definition. We find no
reason not to apply the Court’s ruling in Spouses Macasaet v. Spouses Macasaet in this
case. We thus hold that Article 448 is also applicable to the instant case. First, good
faith is presumed on the part of the respondent-spouses. Second, petitioner failed to rebut this
presumption. Third, no evidence was presented to show that petitioner opposed or objected to the
improvements introduced by the respondent-spouses. Consequently, we can validly
presume that petitioner consented to the improvements being constructed. This presumption is bolster
ed by the fact that as the subdivision developer, petitioner must have given the respondent-
spouses permits to commence and
undertake the construction. Under Article 453 of the Civil Code, “it is understood that there is bad
faith on the part of the landowner whenever the act was done with his knowledge and without opposition
on his part.”
[G.R. No. 149295. September 23, 2003]
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. GENEROSO DE JESUS

FACTS:

Respondent filed a complaint against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Occidental Mindoro for
recovery of ownership and possession, with damages, over the questioned property. On 26 March 1993, he
had caused a verification survey of the property and discovered that the northern portion of the lot was being
encroached upon by a building of petitioner to the extent of 124 square meters. Despite two letters of demand
sent by respondent, petitioner failed and refused to vacate the area.

Petitioner asserted that when it acquired the lot and the building sometime in 1981 from then Mayor
Bienvenido Ignacio, the encroachment already was in existence and to remedy the situation, Mayor Ignacio
offered to sell the area in question (which then also belonged to Ignacio) to petitioner at P100.00 per square
meter which offer the latter claimed to have accepted. The sale, however, did not materialize when, without the
knowledge and consent of petitioner, Mayor Ignacio later mortgaged the lot to the Development Bank of the
Philippines.

The trial court decided the case in favor of respondent declaring him to be the rightful owner.

The Court of Appeals sustained the trial court.

ISSUE: W/N PETITIONER IS A BUILDER IN GOOD FAITH

HELD:

In reference to Article 448, et seq., of the Civil Code, a builder in good faith is one who, not being the owner of
the land, builds on that land believing himself to be its owner and unaware of any defect in his title or mode of
acquisition.

The essence of good faith lies in an honest belief in the validity of ones right, ignorance of a superior claim,
and absence of intention to overreach another. Applied to possession, one is considered in good faith if he is
not aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it. Evidently, petitioner
was quite aware, and indeed advised, prior to its acquisition of the land and building from Ignacio that a part of
the building sold to it stood on the land not covered by the land conveyed to it.
Equally significant is the fact that the building, constructed on the land by Ignacio, has in actuality been part of
the property transferred to petitioner. Article 448, of the Civil Code refers to a piece of land whose ownership is
claimed by two or more parties, one of whom has built some works (or sown or planted something) and not to
a case where the owner of the land is the builder, sower, or planter who then later loses ownership of the land
by sale or otherwise for, elsewise stated, where the true owner himself is the builder of works on his own land,
the issue of good faith or bad faith is entirely irrelevant.

In fine, petitioner is not in a valid position to invoke the provisions of Article 448 of the Civil Code.
Heirs of Durano Sr. vs Spouses Uy
344 SCRA 238 [GR No. 136456 October 24, 2000]
Facts: As far back as August 1970, a 128 hectare of land located in the barrios of Dunga and
Cahumayhumayan, Danao City. On December 27, 1973, the late Congressman Ramon Durano Sr. together
with his son Ramon Durano III, and the latter’s wide Elizabeth Hotchkins-Durano, instituted an action for
damages against spouses Angeles Sepulveda Uy and Emigdio Beng Sing Uy, Spouses Faustino Alatan and
Valeriana Garro, Spouses Rufino Lavador and Aurelia Mata, Silvestre Ramos, Hermogenes Tito, Teotimo
Gonzales, Primitiva Garro, Julian Garro, Ismael Garro, Bienvido Castro, Glicerio Alcala, Felemon Lavador,
Candelario Lumantao, Garino Quimbo, Justino Tito, Marcelino Gonzales, Salvador Duyday, Venancia Repaso,
Leodegracia Gonzales, Jose dela Calzada, Restituta Gonzales, and Cosme Ramos before branch XVII of the
then Court of First Instance of Cebu, Danao City.. Herein respondents are the possessors of the subject parcel
of land which they are cultivating, it was used to be owned by CEPCO who later sold the same to Durano &
Co. On September 15, 1990, Durano & Co sold the disputed property to petitioner Ramon Durano III, who
procured the registration of these lands in his name under TCT no. T-103 and T-104. The different parts of the
entire land was bulldozed by the petitioner’s company resulting to the destruction of plants and other products
that were placed by the respondents. Hence, a claim for damages was lodged against herein petitioner. The
respondents presented tax declaration covering the different areas of the parcel of land that is titled in each of
them as proof that they are entitled for the said damages.
Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate entity can be applied in order to make
Durano & Co liable for damages.
Held: Yes. The court of appeals applied the well-recognized principle of piercing the corporate veil, i.e. the law
will regard the act of the corporation as the ac of its individual stockholders, when it is shown that the
corporation was used merely as an alter ego by those persons in the commission of fraud or other illegal acts.
That the test in determining the applicability of the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction is as follows:
1. Control, not mere majority or complete stock control, but complete domination, not only of finances but
of policy and business practice in respect to the transaction attacked so that the corporate entity as to
this transaction had at the time no separate mind, will or existence of its own.
2. Such control must, have been used by the defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to perpetrate the
violation of statutory or other positive legal duty, on dishonest and unjust acts in contravention of
plaintiff’s legal right; and
3. The aforesaid control and breach of duty must proximately cause the injury or unjust loss complained
of.
The absence of any one of these elements prevents the piercing the corporate veil. In applying the
instrumentality or alter ego doctrine, the courts are concerned with reality not form, with how the corporation
operated and the individual defendants relationship to that operation.
[ GR No. 92161, Mar 18, 1991 ]
SIMPLICIO BINALAY v. GUILLERMO MANALO
FACTS
Manalo acquired 2 lots which were originally owned by Judge Taccad from 2 different people (the latter’s
daughter and from an earlier purchaser). These lots were later consolidated into Lot 307, a total of 10.45
hectares. The lot was beside the Cagayan River, which, due to flooding, would place a portion of the land
underwater during the rainy season (September to December). On sunny days, however, the land would be
dried up for the entire dry season (January to August). When a survey of the land was conducted on a rainy
month, a portion of the land that Manalo bought was then underwater and was thus left unsurveyed and
excluded from Lot 307.

The big picture is this: Cagayan River running from south to north, forks at a certain point to form two braches
(western and eastern) and then unites at the other end, further north, to form a narrower strip of land. The
eastern branch of the river cuts through Lot 307, and is flooded during the rainy season. The unsurveyed
portion, on the other hand, is the bed of the eastern branch. Note that the fork exists only during the rainy
season while the “island”/elongated strip of land formed in the middle of the forks becomes dry and perfect for
cultivation when the Cagayan river is at its ordinary depth. The strip of land in the middle of the fork totaled
22.7 hectares and was labeled Lot 821-822. Lot 821 is directly opposite Lot 307 and is separated by the
eastern branch of the river’s fork.

Manalo claims that Lot 821 belongs to him by way of accretion to the submerged portion of the land to which it
is adjacent. Petitioners (Binalay, et al) who possess the Lot 821, on the other hand, insist that they own it. They
occupy the other edges of the lot along the river bank (i.e. the fertile portions on which they plant tobacco and
other agricultural products) and also cultivate the western strip during the summer.

Manalo filed 2 cases for forcible entry which were both dismissed. Later on, he filed a complaint for quieting of
title, possession, and damages against petitioner. The trial court and the CA ruled in favor of Manalo, saying
that Lot 821 and Lot 307 cannot be considered separate and distinct from each other. They reasoned that
when the land dries up for the most part of the year, the two are connected. [Note: The CA applied the ruling in
Gov’t of the Phil Islands vs. Colegio de San Jose, which was actually inappropriate because the subject matter
in this case was a lake so that the definition of a “bed” was different.]

ISSUE:
Whether or not Manalo owns Lot 821 by way of accretion

RULING: No.
The disputed property is not an accretion. It is the action of the heavy rains that cause the highest ordinary
level of waters of the Cagayan River during the rainy season. The depressed portion is a river bed and is thus
considered property of public domain.
The SC observed the following:
a) The pictures identified by Manalo during his direct examination depict the depressed portion as a river bed.
The dried up portion had dike-like slopes (around 8m) on both sides connecting it to Lot 307 and Lot 821 that
are vertical and very prominent.
b) The eastern bed already existed even before Manalo bought the land. It was called “Rio Muerte de
Cagayan.”
c) Manalo could not have acquire ownership of the land because article 420 of the civil code states that rivers
are property of public dominion. The word “river” includes the running waters, the bed, and the banks. [The
seller never actually owned that part of the land since it was public property]
d) The submerged area (22.72 ha) is twice the area of the land he actually bought. It is difficult to suppose that
such a sizable area could have been brought about by accretion.
More importantly, the requisites of accretion in article 457 were not satisfied. These are: 1) that the deposition
of the soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; 2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the
river (or sea); and 3) the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of the rivers (or the sea
coast). The accretion should’ve been attached to Lot 307 for Manalo to acquire its ownership. BUT, the
claimed accretion lies on the bank of the river; not adjacent to Lot 307 but directly opposite it – across the river.
Aside from that, the dike-like slopes which were very steep may only be formed by a sudden and forceful
action like flooding. The steep slopes could not have been formed by the river in a slow and gradual manner.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS V. CONSORCIA CABANGIS, ET AL
G.R. No. L-28379 March 27, 1929

FACTS
Lots 36, 39 and 40, which are subject to cadastral proceeding of the City of Manila were formerly a part of a
large parcel of land belonging to the predecessor of the herein claimants and appellees.

From the year 1896 said land began to wear away, due to the action of the waves of Manila Bay, until the year
1901 when the said lots became completely submerged in water in ordinary tides, and remained in such a state.
On 1912, the Government undertook the dredging of Vitas Estuary in order to facilitate navigation, depositing
all the sand and silt taken from the bed of the estuary on the low lands which were completely covered with
water, surrounding that belonging to the Philippine Manufacturing Company, thereby slowly and gradually
forming the lots, the subject matter of this proceeding.

Nobody had declared lot 39 for the purposes of taxation, and it was only in the year 1926 that Dr. Pedro Gil, in
behalf of the claimants and appellees, declared lot No. 40 for such purpose.

The claimants-appellees contend that inasmuch as the said lots once formed a part of a large parcel of land
belonging to their predecessors, whom they succeeded, and their immediate predecessor in interest having
taken possession thereof, said lots belong to them.

ISSUE

To which does the ownership of the reclaimed land belong to?

RULING

The Government owns the reclaimed land in the sense that it has become property of public dominion, because
in letting it remained submerged, the claimants-appellees may be said to have abandoned the same. Having
become part of the sea or seashore, it became property for public use. When the government took steps to make
it land again, its status as public dominion remained unchanged. As provided by Article 5 of the Law of Waters,

ART. 5. Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works constructed by the State, or by the provinces,
pueblos or private persons, with proper permission, shall become the property of the party constructing such
works, unless otherwise provided by the terms of the grant of authority.

Therefore, the claimants- appellees are not entitled to the land.

G.R. No. L-30067 March 23, 1929
PAYATAS ESTATE IMPROVEMENT CO., petitioner-appellant,
vs.
MARIANO TUASON, AUGUSTO TUASON, ET AL., oppositors-appellees.

53 Phil. 55 – Civil Law – Law on Property – Avulsion vs Alluvium – Accessio Natural

In 1904, Maria Concepcion Canas obtained a Torrens title over a large parcel of land (5,122 hectares) situated
near the Marikina (then Mariquina) River. On the opposite side of the river is situated an equally large parcel of
land belonging to the Tuasons (Mariquina Estate).
In 1920, Concepcion sold her land to Payatas Estate Improvement Co. Payatas Estate had the land surveyed
but this time it is showing that the total land area is 22 hectares less than the original plan. The surveyor
explained that this was due to erosions that took place near the river bank and that some portions of the land
were washed away by the river toward the opposite estate.
Payatas Estate is now claiming some portions of the Mariquina estate. Payatas Estate avers that since the
land is covered by a Torrens title, the rule on accretion is not applicable.
Issue: Whether or not Payatas Estate has a right to claim some portions of the Mariquina Estate.
Held: No. Article 366 of the [Old] Civil Code provides: “any accretions which the banks of rivers may gradually
receive from the effect of the current belong to the owners of the estates bordering thereon.” This provision
applies even to Torrens titled lands.
Accretions of that character are natural incidents to land bordering on running streams and are not affected by
the registration laws. It follows that registration does not protect the riparian owner (Payatas Estate) against
diminution of the area of his land through gradual changes in the course of the adjoining stream.
Avulsion cannot be raised as well as a ground to lay claim over the 22 hectares land now forming part of the
Mariquina estate. There was no evidence presented to show that the increase was due to avulsion. The
presumption is that the change was gradual and cause by erosion of the Payatas bank of the river and
consequent accretion to the Mariquina estate. It follows that the land in question is now a part of that estate
and no longer pertains to the Payatas estate.
REPUBLIC v. ARCADIO IVAN A. SANTOS III, GR No. 160453, 2012-11-12
Facts:
By law, accretion the gradual and imperceptible deposit made through the effects of the current of the water
belongs to the owner of the land adjacent to the banks of rivers where it forms. The drying up of the river is not
accretion. Hence, the dried-up... river bed belongs to the State as property of public dominion, not to the riparian
owner, unless a law vests the ownership in some other person.
respondent Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III (Arcadio Ivan) applied on March 7, 1997 for the registration of Lot 4998-B
(the property) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Parañaque City.
The property, which had... an area of 1,045 square meters, more or less, was located in Barangay San Dionisio,
Parañaque City, and was bounded in the Northeast by Lot 4079 belonging to respondent Arcadio C. Santos, Jr.
(Arcadio, Jr.), in the Southeast by the Parañaque River, in the Southwest by an... abandoned road, and in the
Northwest by Lot 4998-A also owned by Arcadio Ivan.
He alleged that the property had been formed through accretion and had been in their joint open,... notorious,
public, continuous and adverse possession for more than 30 years.
The City of Parañaque (the City) opposed the application for land registration
On May 10, 2000,[4] the RTC granted the application for land registration... the CA affirmed the RTC.
Issues:
ASSUMING THAT THE LAND SOUGHT TO BE REGISTERED WAS "PREVIOUSLY A PART OF THE
PARAÑAQUE RIVER WHICH BECAME AN ORCHARD AFTER IT DRIED UP," THE REGISTRATION OF SAID
PROPERTY IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS CANNOT BE ALTERNATIVELY JUSTIFIED UNDER ARTICLE
461 OF THE CIVIL CODE.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT RULING THAT THE FAILURE OF
RESPONDENTS TO FORMALLY OFFER IN EVIDENCE AN OFFICIAL CERTIFICATION THAT THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE IS FATAL TO THEIR APPLICATION FOR LAND
REGISTRATION.
THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE CONTINUOUSLY, OPENLY,
PUBLICLY AND ADVERSELY OCCUPIED THE SUBJECT PROPERTY FOR MORE THAN THIRTY (30)
YEARS IS NOT SUPPORTED BY WELL-NIGH INCONTROVERTIBLE EVIDENCE.
To be resolved are whether or not Article 457 of the Civil Code was applicable herein; and whether or not
respondents could claim the property by virtue of acquisitive prescription pursuant to Section 14(1) of Presidential
Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration
Decree).
Ruling:
The CA grossly erred in applying Article 457... of the Civil Code to respondents' benefit
Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of rivers.
The deposit of soil, to be considered accretion, must be: (a) gradual and imperceptible; (b) made through the
effects of the current of the water; and
(c) taking place on land adjacent to the banks of rivers.[13] Accordingly, respondents should establish the
concurrence of the elements of accretion to warrant the grant of their application for land registration.
However, respondents did not discharge their burden of proof.
Instead, their evidence revealed that the property was the dried-up... river bed of the Parañaque River, leading
both the RTC and the CA to themselves hold that Lot 4998-B was "the land which was previously part of the
Parañaque River xxx (and) became an orchard after it dried up."
In other words, respondents did not establish at all that the increment of land had formed from the gradual and
imperceptible deposit of soil by the effects of the current.
The RTC and the CA grossly erred in treating the dried-up river bed as an accretion that became respondents'
property pursuant to Article 457 of the Civil Code. That land was definitely not an accretion. The process of
drying up of a river to form dry land involved the... recession of the water level from the river banks, and the
dried-up land did not equate to accretion, which was the gradual and imperceptible deposition of soil on the river
banks through the effects of the current.
The State exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and may not be divested of its right of ownership.
Acquisitive prescription was... not applicable in favor of respondents
Both lower courts erred.
Under Section 14(1), then, applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must prove the following, namely: (a) that
the land forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public domain; and (b) that they have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and... notorious possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide
claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945.
The decision mentioned only that they had paid realty taxes and had caused the survey of the property to be
made. That, to us, was not enough to justify the... foregoing findings, because, firstly, the payment of realty taxes
did not conclusively prove the payor's ownership of the land the taxes were paid for,[25] the tax declarations and
payments being mere indicia of a claim of... ownership;[26] and, secondly, the causing of surveys of the property
involved was not itself an of continuous, open, public and adverse possession
This is simply because Lot 4998-B was not formed through accretion. Hence, the ownership of the land adjacent
to... the river bank by respondents' predecessor-in-interest did not translate to possession of Lot 4998-B that
would ripen to acquisitive prescription in relation to Lot 4998-B.
On the other hand, the claim of thirty years of continuous, open, public and adverse possession of Lot 4998-B
was not even validated or preponderantly established.
Yet, even conceding, for the sake of argument, that respondents possessed Lot 4998-B for more than thirty
years in the character they claimed, they did not thereby acquire the land by prescription or by other means
without any competent proof that the land was already declared... as alienable and disposable by the
Government. Absent that declaration, the land still belonged to the State as part of its public dominion.
These rulings of the Court indicate that the notation on the survey plan of Lot 4998-B, Cad-00-000343 to the
effect that the "survey is inside a map classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Dev't" did not
prove that Lot 4998-B was already classified as... alienable and disposable. Accordingly, respondents could not
validly assert acquisitive prescription of Lot 4988-B.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on
May 27, 2003; DISMISSES the application for registration
Principles:
Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)o the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the
accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the currents of the waters."
The relevant legal provision is Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree),
which pertinently states:
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper [Regional Trial Court] an application
for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945,... or earlier.
xxxx
Article 419 of the Civil Code distinguishes property as being either of public dominion or of private
ownership. Article 420 of the Civil Code lists the properties considered as part of public dominion, namely: (a)
those intended for public use, such as roads,... canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the
State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character; and (b) those which belong to the State,
without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the... national
wealth. As earlier mentioned, Article 502 of the Civil Code declares that rivers and their natural beds are of
public dominion.
Since property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and not susceptible to private appropriation
and acquisitive prescription, the adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in the confirmation
of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or... disposable portions of the public domain. It is only after the
Government has declared the land to be alienable and disposable agricultural land that the year of entry,
cultivation and exclusive and adverse possession can be counted for purposes of an imperfect title.
Indeed, under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State.
all river beds remain property of public dominion... and cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription unless
previously declared by the Government to be alienable and disposable. Considering that Lot 4998-B was not
shown to be already declared to be alienable and disposable, respondents could not be deemed to have acquired
the... property through prescription
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must conclusively
establish the existence of a positive act of the Government, such as a presidential proclamation, executive order,
administrative action, investigation reports of the
Bureau of Lands investigator, or a legislative act or statute. Until then, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title
do not apply.
For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case) must overcome the presumption that
the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.
ACCRETION
Vda. De Nazareno vs. Court of Appeals, Salasalan, Rabaya, Labis
GR No. 98045
June 26, 1996

FACTS:
Antonio Nazareno is an owner of a titled property situated beside an accretion area along the banks of
Cagayan River. Jose Salasalan & Leo Rabaya leased parcels of land from Nazareno. When Salsalan & Rabaya
stopped paying rentals, Nazareno filed an ejectment suit. The Municipal Trial Court ruled in favor of Nazareno;
the RTC affirmed the decision. Thus, Nazareno filed an application with the Bureau of Lands to perfect his title
over the accretion area being claimed by him.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject land is a public land?

ARGUMENTS:

VDA. DE NAZARENO SALASALAN AND RABAYA

 The subject land is a private land  They contend the public character of
being an accretion to Antonio the subject land.
Nazareno’s titled property.  Mere application of the Miscellaneous
 Art. 457 of the Civil Code which Sales Patent by Nazareno is an
provides that “To the owners of lands admission that the land being applied
adjoining the banks of rivers belong is a public land.
the accretion which they gradually
receive from the effects of the current
of the waters”.
 The accumulation was gradual and
imperceptible, resulting from the
action of the waters or current of the
Balacanas Creek and Cagayan River.

RULING:
The Court ruled that the subject land is part of the public domain since the accretion was man-made or artificial.
Under Article 457 of the Civil Code:

“To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the
effects of the current of the waters.”

But the Court provides the following requisites of accretion (Rules of Alluvion):

1. That the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible;

2. That it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and

3. That the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or sea coast).

In Republic v. CA, “the requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of the current of the river is
indispensable”. In Hilario v. City of Manila, “the word “current” indicates the participation of the body of water in
the ebb and flow of waters due to high and low tide”.
Here, the subject land was the direct result of the dumping of sawdust by the Sun Valley Lumber Co. consequent
to its sawmill operations.