Casse

JMM PROMOTION AND MANAGEMENT, INC. v.
CA 260 SCRA 319 August 5, 1996 (CASE DIGEST)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE
POLICE POWER
JMM PROMOTION AND MANAGEMENT, INC., and KARY
INTERNATIONAL INC., petitioner, v. HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MA. NIEVES CONFESSOR,
then Secretary of the Department of Labor
and Employment, HON. JOSE BRILLANTES, in his
capacity as acting Secretary of the
Department of Labor and Employment and HON.
FELICISIMO JOSON, in his capacity as
Administrator of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration, respondents.
G.R. No. 120095. August 5, 1996
KAPUNAN, J.:
FACTS:
The Federation of Entertainment Talent Managers of the Philippines
(FETMOP for brevity) filed a class suit on January 27, 1995 assailing
that the Department Order No. 3 which establishes various procedures
and requirements for screening performing artists under a new system
of training, testing, certification and deployment of the former and
other related issuance, principally contending that the said orders,
1.)violated the constitutional right to travel; 2.) abridged existing
contracts for employment; and 3.) deprived individual artists of
their licenses without due process of law. FETMOP also averred that
the issuance of the Artist Record Book (ARB) was discriminatory and
illegal and in gross violation of the constitutional right to life
liberty and property. FETMOP prayed for the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction against the orders.
JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. (JMM for brevity) and Kary
International, Inc. (Kary for brevity) filed a motion for intervention
in the civil case which was granted by the trial court on February
15, 1995. However, on February 21, 1995, the trial court issued an
order denying petitioner's prayer for writ of
preliminary injunction and dismissed the compliant. An appeal was
made to the trial court regarding its decision but it was also
however, dismissed. As a consequences, ARB requirement was issed. The
Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's decision and concluded that
the said issuance constituted a valid exercise of Police power.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the the said issuance is a valid exercise of Police
Power.
RULING:
Yes, the ARB requirement and questioned Department Order related to
its issuance were issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to a
valid exercise of Police Power by the State. The proper regulation
of a profession, calling, business or trade has always been upheld
as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of police power by the
state particularly when their conduct afffects either the execution
of a legitimate governmental functions, the preservation of the
State, the public health and welfare and public morals. According to
the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (use your property in
such a fashion so as to not disturb others) it must of course be
within the legitimate range of legislative action to define the mode
and manner in which every one may so use his own property so as not
to pose injury to himself or others.
In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the right
of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measures is
certainly much wider. To pretend that licensing or accreditation
requirements violates due process clause is to ignore the settled
practice, under the mantle of the police power, of regulating entry
to the practice of various trades or profession. Professional leaving
for abroad are required to pass rigid written and practical exams
before they are deemed fit to practice their trade. It is not claimed
that these requirements pose an unwarranted deprivation of a property
right under the due process clause. So long as professionals and
other workers meet reasonable regulatory standards no
such deprivation exists.
Isalyn Echavez vs. Bonto-Perez
G.R. No. 109808 1 March 1995
Chavez is a dancer who was contracted by Centrum Placement & Promotions Corporation to
perform in Japan for 6 months. The contract was for $1.5k a month, which was approved by
POEA. After the approval of said contract, Chavez entered into a side contract reducing her salary
with her Japanese employer through her local manager-agency (Jaz Talents Promotion). The
salary was reduced to $500 and $750 was to go to Jaz Talents. In February 1991 (two years after
the expiration of her contract), Chavez sued Centrum Placement and Jaz Talents for
underpayment of wages before the POEA.
The POEA ruled against her. POEA stated that the side agreement entered into by Chavez with
her Japanese employer superseded the Standard Employment Contract; that POEA had no
knowledge of such side agreement being entered into; that Chavez is barred by laches for
sleeping on her right for two years.
ISSUE: Whether or not Chavez is entitled to relief.
HELD: Yes. The SC ruled that the managerial commission agreement executed by Chavez to
authorize her Japanese Employer to deduct her salary is void because it is against our existing
laws, morals and public policy. It cannot supersede the standard employment contract approved
by the POEA with the following stipulation appended thereto:
It is understood that the terms and conditions stated in this Employment Contract are in
conformance with the Standard Employment Contract for Entertainers prescribed by the POEA
under Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1986. Any alterations or changes made in any part
of this contract without prior approval by the POEA shall be null and void;
The side agreement which reduced Chavez’s basic wage is null and void for violating the POEA’s
minimum employment standards, and for not having been approved by the POEA. Here, both
Centrum Placement and Jaz Talents are solidarily liable.
Laches does not apply in the case at bar. In this case, Chavez filed her claim well within the three-
year prescriptive period for the filing of money claims set forth in Article 291 of the Labor
Code. For this reason, laches is not applicable.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 129239 September 5, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PAUL LAPIZ, accused-appellant.
PUNO, J.:
In an Information1 filed on July 11, 1995 before the Regional Trial Court, 10th Judicial Region,
Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 21, accused-appellant Paul Lapiz was charged with the crime of rape,
committed as follows:
"That on or about February 22, 1995, at 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon, more or less, at
Lusong Creek Patrocenio, Claveria, Misamis Oriental, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, and by means of force and intimidation, drag and box Ruby Geraldez, a 13-year
old girl and succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her (sexual intercourse) against her
will and consent and as a result thereof she suffered traumatic lacerations and pains of (sic)
her vagina.
CONTRARY TO and in violation of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code."
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty and trial ensued. On December 16, 1996, the trial
court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentenced him to
reclusion perpetua and to pay the victim the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages.2 Hence, this
appeal.
The facts are as follows:
Complainant Ruby Geraldez (Ruby) is a niece of appellant Paul Lapiz (Paul) because her
grandmother and the mother of Paul are sisters. When the mother of Ruby died, she was
abandoned by her father and left to the care of Mercy Regalado, a neighbor at Patrocinio, Claveria,
Misamis Oriental where she was living at the time of the Incident. Ruby was then 13 years old,
having been born on May 8, 1981.
On February 22, 1995, at about 5:00 p.m., Ruby was on her way to the creek at Patrocinio, Claveria
to get the cow of Mercy Regalado which she was pasturing, when Paul suddenly appeared from the
bushes. He grabbed Ruby on the neck and started to strangle her. The initial reaction of Ruby was
to shout but Paul ordered her to keep quiet. Though gasping for breath, Ruby refused to be
intimidated and tried to shout for help. To silence her, Paul boxed Ruby on the abdomen which
made her cry in pain. He boxed her again and Ruby fainted.
When Ruby regained consciousness, she was already lying on the ground not far from where she
was initially waylaid by Paul. The appellant who was already naked waist down went on top of her
and it was then she realized that she no longer had her pants and panty on. Paul made the push and
pull movement and succeeded in satisfying his lust on her. Ruby struggled with Paul but she felt so
weak that she could only cry as Paul successfully ravished her. Thereafter, Paul moved away from
Ruby and sat near her feet.
Ruby was lying on the ground and Paul was sitting beside her, both naked from the waist down,
when the wife of Paul came and saw them. She immediately asked her husband what he was doing
and who the girl was. When she recognized Ruby, Paul's wife started to cry, pushed him on the
shoulder and returned to the creek where she was washing clothes. Paul warned Ruby not to tell
anybody about the incident or he would kill her. He left and followed his wife.
Ruby put on her clothes and proceeded to the house of Romeo Lapiz, a brother of Paul, where she
reported the rape to the two children of Romeo. One of them remarked "animal," referring to Paul.
Since the house of Mercy Regalado where she lives is still far, Ruby was advised to spend the night
at the house of Romeo Lapiz. The following morning she was fetched by Mercy Regalado who was
informed of Ruby's fate. She brought Ruby to the police station at Claveria, Misamis Oriental where
they reported the incident. Ruby gave her sworn statement3 to the police and was brought to the
Northern Mindanao Regional Hospital in Cagayan de Oro for medical examination. The Living Case
Report4 issued by the examining doctor shows the following findings:
"GENITAL EXAMINATION:
Mons pubis = sparse fully grown pubic hair
Introitus = nulliparous
Labia majora & minora = coaptated, confluent abrasion measuring 0.3 cm. In greatest
diameter located at the posterior fourchette
Hymen = incomplete superficial lacerations at 2, 5, 7, & 10 o'clock positions at the face of the
watch the edges of w/c are sharp & coaptable.
CONCLUSION:
Medical evidence suggestive of sexual intercourse is present.
REMARKS:
Vaginal smear = negative for spermatozoa.
Extragenital injury seen & examined by the Dept. of Surgery."
In her cross examination, Ruby denied that Paul scolded and slapped her that afternoon of February
22, 1995 because she fought with the latter's 8-year old niece, Raffy Mae Lapiz.
The defense gave a different version.
Appellant testified that on February 22, 1995 at about 5 o'clock p.m., he and his wife were at the
creek washing clothes when they heard the voice of a small child crying. Paul stood up to check and
he saw the complainant Ruby with his niece Raffy Mae who was crying. Paul inquired why Raffy
Mae was crying and the complainant answered, "You are like your niece, you are all idiots." Stunned
by the remark, Paul squeezed the mouth of the complainant and slapped her. She ran home crying
and warned that she would report Paul to Mercy Regalado. Raffy Mae followed suit and likewise
headed for home. Paul repaired back to the creek, helped his wife gather their clothes and they went
home.
The wife of Paul, Ruby Lapiz, declared that her husband never left the creek and that he stayed with
her from the time they started washing clothes until they finished. She claimed that Paul did not rape
the complainant. She denied that she caught them both naked waist down, with the complainant
lying down on the grass and Paul seated near her feet. She also denied that she tapped her
husband on the shoulder upon seeing them in that position.
In his lone assignment of error, appellant asserts that the trial court gravely erred in finding him
guilty. The guilt of the appellant hinges primarily on the credibility of the testimony of private
complainant, Ruby Geraldez.
Accused-appellant contends that it is highly unnatural and incredible that his wife would merely ask
him what happened, tap him on the shoulder and forthwith leave if she really saw them in a very
compromising position. He also claims that it was impossible for him to rape the complainant as his
wife was only three (3) meters away from the scene. His wife also should have noticed somebody or
something moving in the tall grass since complainant allegedly struggled with appellant. Further, he
contends that it is contrary to normal human behavior for complainant to run to the house of Romeo
Lapiz because a girl of tender age would naturally want to be with her parents or, in this case, her
guardian and employer, Mercy Regalado.
We find no merit in the appeal.
The case law in rape cases is settled: (1) to accuse a man of rape is easy, but to disprove it is
difficult though the accused may be innocent; (2) considering that in the nature of things, only two
persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be
scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own
merit and should not be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
Equally unquestionable is the principle that as long as the complainant's testimony meets the test of
credibility, the accused may be convicted on its basis.5
After a careful scrutiny of the evidence on record, we find no compelling reason to reverse the
findings of the trial court. The testimony of complainant Ruby Geraldez was given in a direct, candid
and straightforward manner which clearly establishes the guilt of accused-appellant beyond
reasonable doubt, to wit:
The trial court gave full faith and credence to the testimony of complainant Ruby Geraldez. We find
no reason to disturb this finding. As we consistently hold, the trial judge's evaluation of the testimony
of a witness is generally accorded the highest respect unless some weighty circumstance has been
ignored or misunderstood which could change the result of the case. Having had the direct
opportunity to observe the complainant on the witness stand, the trial judge was in a vantage
position to assess her demeanor, and to determine if she was telling the truth or not.7 More
importantly, complainant positively identified appellant as the person who attacked and ravished her
in her statement given to the police and during her testimony in court.
Neither is it proper for us to measure the actions of children who have undergone a traumatic
experience by the norms of behavior expected under the circumstances from mature people.8 Thus,
the fact that the complainant chose to go to the house of her uncle Romeo Lapiz instead of reporting
the matter directly to her guardian-employer does not render her narration doubtful. More so where
complainant has sufficiently explained in her testimony that the house of Romeo Lapiz is nearer
whereas she still has to traverse a hill before she could reach the house of her guardian-employer.
Appellant's defense is based on alibi. His alibi is only corroborated by his wife, who testified in court
without being summoned. Appellant's niece, Raffy Mae Lapiz, whom complainant allegedly
maltreated was not presented as a witness when her testimony could have lent stronger credence to
his alibi. An alibi established mainly by the accused himself is always viewed with suspicion and
received with caution because it can easily be fabricated.9
Appellant urges that the case at bar was filed against him allegedly because he slapped complainant
when she answered back at him. We find it unnatural for a 13-year old, naive and innocent barrio
lass to concoct a story of rape which would drag herself to a lifetime of shame just because she
resented the physical punishment of the appellant.1 0 Her unwavering sincerity and candor while
testifying in court convinces us that she was impelled by a desire to obtain justice for the dastardly
act committed upon her person. Indeed, a girl of tender age like the complainant would not invent a
story of defloration, let alone against her own relative, allow an examination of her private parts and
face a public trial, if she is not motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit apprehended and
punished.11 As well observed by the trial court — "Parenthetically, the offended party would have
been helpless if she was not taken into custody by the Department of Social Welfare and
Development as her mother is already dead while her father had left her to Mercy Regalado.
Offended party's brother could not be contacted and of the aforementioned relatives of the offended
party none ever attended the hearing. Except the State, she practically pursued her fight for justice
single-handedly against all odds."12
Appellant further attempted to establish the motive why he was charged with rape when he testified
that he had an altercation with complainant's employer, Mercy Regalado. Allegedly, he complained
Mercy to the barangay captain as her animals destroyed his plants. Nonetheless, he admitted that
his complaint had been settled before the present case was filed. There being no ill motive on the
part of the complainant, her testimony cannot be denied faith and credit.
It is further averred that the reaction of appellant's wife upon seeing complainant and appellant in a
compromising position is contrary to normal human behavior. We are not persuaded. There is
nothing incomprehensible about the reaction of appellant's wife. We have long recognized that
different people react differently to a given type of situation, and there is no standard form of
behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience. One
person's spontaneous response may be aggression, while another person's reaction may be cold
indifference.13 It is worthy to note that at the time of the incident, appellant's wife was nine (9) months
pregnant and gave birth the following day. This is a mute but eloquent proof of the physical and
emotional turmoil that appellant's wife suffered on account of what she witnessed, which is definitely
more telling than the seeming indifference she initially demonstrated.
The argument that it was impossible for appellant to have raped complainant knowing that his wife is
only a few meters away is unfounded. It is common judicial experience that rapists are not deterred
from committing their odious act by the presence of people nearby. Lust is no respecter of time,
place or kinship. Rape is not only committed in seclusion.14
Appellant's contention that it was improbable for his wife not to have noticed any movement in the
tall grasses if it were true that complainant resisted him begs the question. Complainant testified that
when she regained consciousness, she found herself lying in a different place surrounded by tall
grasses, sunflowers, jackfruit and mango trees. Appellant must have purposely sought that place
because he knew that his wife would not saunter there. In other words, he did not expect his wife to
be in that place. The only explanation then for the wife's unexpected appearance in the place is
because her attention was caught by the stirring movement in the tall grasses while complainant was
struggling with appellant. Rather than weaken the prosecution evidence, appellant's argument
strengthens the testimony of the complainant that she has been raped.
While we affirm the conviction of appellant, the damages awarded by the trial court should be
modified. Current case law holds that a civil indemnity of P50,000.00 is mandatory upon the finding
of the fact of rape, which is distinct from moral damages.15
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-
appellant PAUL LAPIZ is ordered to pay private complainant RUBY GERALDEZ the additional
amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C .J ., Kapunan and Pardo, JJ ., concur.

Ynares-Santiago, JJ ., is on leave.
DOUGLAS MILLARES and ROGELIO LAGDA
vs. NLRC, TRANS-GLOBAL MARITIME
AGENCY, INC. and ESSO INTERNATIONAL
SHIPPING CO., LTD. (G.R. No. 110524. July 29,
2002)
CaseDigests
Petitioner Douglas Millares was employed by private respondent ESSO International

through its local manning agency, private respondent Trans-Global on November 16, 1968
as a machinist. In 1975, he was promoted as Chief Engineer which position he occupied
until he opted to retire in 1989.
On June 13, 1989, petitioner Millares applied for a leave of absence for the period July 9
to August 7, 1989 which was approved. On June 21, 1989, petitioner Millares wrote to
Esso International informing it of his intention to avail of the optional retirement plan under
the Consecutive Enlistment Incentive Plan (CEIP) considering that he had already rendered
more than twenty (20) years of continuous service. On July 13, 1989 the intent was denied
on the following grounds, to wit: (1) he was employed on a contractual basis; (2) his
contract of enlistment (COE) did not provide for retirement before the age of sixty (60)
years; and (3) he did not comply with the requirement for claiming benefits under the CEIP.
Millares requested for an extension of his leave of absence but received reply saying that
his post hase already been filled in by another. The adjustment in said rank was required in
order to meet manpower schedules as a result of (his) inability. Millares, in view of his
absence without leave, which is equivalent to abandonment of his position, he had been
dropped from the roster of crew members effective September 1, 1989.
On the other hand, petitioner Lagda was employed by private respondent Esso International
as wiper/oiler in June 1969. He was promoted as Chief Engineer in 1980, a position he
continued to occupy until his last COE expired on April 10, 1989. On May 16, 1989,
petitioner Lagda applied for a leave of absence from June 19, 1989 up to the whole month
of August 1989 which was later approved.
On June 26, 1989, petitioner Lagda wrote a letter to G.S. Stanley, Operations Manager of
respondent Esso International, through respondent Trans-Globals President Michael J.
Estaniel, informing him of his intention to avail of the optional early retirement plan in
view of his twenty (20) years continuous service in the complaint. The request for
availment of the optional early retirement scheme was denied on the same grounds upon
which petitioner Millares request was denied.
On August 3, 1989, he requested for an extension of his leave of absence up to August 26,
1989 and the same was approved. However, on September 27, 1989, Lagda was advised
that in view of his unavailability for contractual sea service, he had been dropped from the
roster of crew members effective September 1, 1989.
On October 5, 1989, petitioners Millares and Lagda filed a complaint-affidavit for illegal
dismissal and non-payment of employee benefits.
Issues:
I. Are petitioners regular or contractual employees whose employments are terminated
everytime their contracts of employment expire?
Ii. Assuming that petitioners are regular employees, were they dismissed without just cause
so as to be entitled to reinstatement and backwages, including payment of 100% of their
total credited contributions to the consecutive enlistment incentive plan (ceip)?
Iii. Does the provision of the poea standard contract for seafarers on board foreign vessels
(sec. C., duration of contract) preclude the attainment by seamen of the status of regular
employees?
Iv. Does the decision of the court in g.r. no. 110524 contravene international maritime law,
allegedly part of the law of the land under section 2, article ii of the constitution?
V. Does the same decision of the court constitute a departure from its ruling in coyoca vs.
Nlrc (g.r. no. 113658, march 31, 1995)?
It is clear that seafarers are considered contractual employees. They can not be considered
as regular employees under Article 280 of the Labor Code. Their employment is governed
by the contracts they sign every time they are rehired and their employment is terminated
when the contract expires. Their employment is contractually fixed for a certain period of
time. They fall under the exception of Article 280 whose employment has been fixed for a
specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined
at the time of engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed
is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.[19] We need
not depart from the rulings of the Court in the two aforementioned cases which indeed
constitute stare decisis with respect to the employment status of seafarers.
Petitioners insist that they should be considered regular employees, since they have
rendered services which are usually necessary and desirable to the business of their
employer, and that they have rendered more than twenty (20) years of service. While this
may be true, the Brent case has, however, held that there are certain forms of employment
which also require the performance of usual and desirable functions and which exceed one
year but do not necessarily attain regular employment status under Article 280. Overseas
workers including seafarers fall under this type of employment which are governed by the
mutual agreements of the parties.
Filipino seamen are governed by the Rules and Regulations of the POEA. The Standard
Employment Contract governing the employment of All Filipino seamen on Board Ocean-
Going Vessels of the POEA, particularly in Part I, Sec. C specifically provides that the
contract of seamen shall be for a fixed period.And in no case should the contract of seamen
be longer than 12 months
Moreover, it is an accepted maritime industry practice that employment of seafarers are for
a fixed period only. Constrained by the nature of their employment which is quite peculiar
and unique in itself, it is for the mutual interest of both the seafarer and the employer why
the employment status must be contractual only or for a certain period of time. Seafarers
spend most of their time at sea and understandably, they can not stay for a long and an
indefinite period of time at sea.[21] Limited access to shore society during the employment
will have an adverse impact on the seafarer. The national, cultural and lingual diversity
among the crew during the COE is a reality that necessitates the limitation of its period.[22]
Petitioners make much of the fact that they have been continually re-hired or their contracts
renewed before the contracts expired (which has admittedly been going on for twenty (20)
years). By such circumstance they claim to have acquired regular status with all the rights
and benefits appurtenant to it.
Such contention is untenable. Undeniably, this circumstance of continuous re-hiring was
dictated by practical considerations that experienced crew members are more
preferred.Petitioners were only given priority or preference because of their experience and
qualifications but this does not detract the fact that herein petitioners are contractual
employees. They can not be considered regular employees.
From all the foregoing, we hereby state that petitioners are not considered regular or
permanent employees under Article 280 of the Labor Code. Petitioners employment have
automatically ceased upon the expiration of their contracts of enlistment (COE). Since
there was no dismissal to speak of, it follows that petitioners are not entitled to
reinstatement or payment of separation pay or backwages, as provided by law.
With respect to the benefits under the Consecutive Enlistment Incentive Plan (CEIP), we
hold that the petitioners are still entitled to receive 100% of the total amount credited to
him under the CEIP. Considering that we have declared that petitioners are contractual
employees, their compensation and benefits are covered by the contracts they signed and
the CEIP is part and parcel of the contract.
The CEIP was formulated to entice seamen to stay long in the company. As the name
implies, the program serves as an incentive for the employees to renew their contracts with
the same company for as long as their services were needed. For those who remained loyal
to them, they were duly rewarded with this additional remuneration under the CEIP, if
eligible. While this is an act of benevolence on the part of the employer, it can not, however,
be denied that this is part of the benefits accorded to the employees for services rendered.
Such right to the benefits is vested upon them upon their eligibility to the program.
The CEIP provides that an employee becomes covered under the Plan when he completes
thirty-six (36) months or an equivalent of three (3) years of credited service with respect to
employment after June 30, 1973
Neither can we consider petitioners guilty of poor performance or misconduct since they
were recipients of Merit Pay Awards for their exemplary performances in the company.
Anent the letters dated June 21, 1989 (for Millares) and June 26, 1989 (for Lagda) which
private respondent considered as belated written notices of termination, we find such
assertion specious. Notwithstanding, we could conveniently consider the petitioners
eligible under Section III-B of the CEIP (Voluntary Termination), but this would, however,
award them only a measly amount of benefits which to our mind, the petitioners do not
rightfully deserve under the facts and circumstances of the case.
Since petitioners termination of employment under the CEIP do not fall under Section III-
A (Retirement, Death and Disability) or Section III-B (Voluntary Termination), nor could
they be considered under the second paragraph of Section III-C, as earlier discussed; it
follows that their termination falls under the first paragraph of Section III-C for which they
are entitled to 100% of the total amount credited to their accounts. The private respondents
can not now renege on their commitment under the CEIP to reward deserving and loyal
employees as the petitioners in this case.
In taking cognizance of private respondents Second Motion for Reconsideration, the Court
hereby suspends the rules to make them conformable to law and justice and to subserve an
overriding public interest.
Gu-Miro vs. Adorable, G.R. No. 160952, August 20, 2004; 437 SCRA 162
Posted by Pius Morados on November 10, 2011
(Labor Law – Seafarers are not considered regular employees)
Facts: Petitioner services as radio officer on board respondent’s different vessels were terminated due
to the installation of labor saving devices which made his services redundant. Petitioner argued that
aside from the incentive bonus and additional allowances that he is entitled, he should be considered as
a regular employee of respondent company, having been employed onboard the latter’s different
vessels for the span of 10 years and thus, entitled to back wages and separation pay.
Issue: WON seafarers are considered regular employees.
Held: No. Petitioner cannot be considered as a regular employee notwithstanding that the work he
performs is necessary and desirable in the business of the respondent company. The exigencies of the
work of seafarers necessitates that they be employed on a contractual basis. Thus, even with the
continued re-hiring by respondent company of petitioner to serve as radio officer onboard the former’s
different vessels, this should be interpreted not as a basis for regularization but rather a series of
contract renewals.
RAVAGO vs ESSO EASTERN MARINE Case Digest
[G.R. No. 158324. March 14, 2005]
ROBERTO RAVAGO, petitioner, vs. ESSO EASTERN MARINE, LTD. and TRANS-GLOBAL
MARITIME AGENCY, INC., respondents.
FACTS: The respondent Esso is a foreign company based in Singapore and engaged in maritime
commerce. It is represented in the Philippines by its manning agent and co-respondent Trans-Global,
a corporation organized under the Philippine laws. Roberto Ravago was hired by Trans-Global to work
as a seaman on board various Esso vessels. On February 13, 1970, Ravago commenced his duty as
S/N wiper on board the Esso Bataan under a contract that lasted until February 10, 1971. Thereafter,
he was assigned to work in different Esso vessels where he was designated diverse tasks, such as
oiler, then assistant engineer. He was employed under a total of 34 separate and unconnected
contracts, each for a fixed period, by three different companies, namely, Esso Tankers, Inc. (ETI),
EEM and Esso International Shipping (Bahamas) Co., Ltd. (EIS), Singapore Branch. Ravago worked
with Esso vessels until August 22, 1992, a period spanning more than 22 years.
Shortly after completing his latest contract with Esso, Ravago was granted a vacation leave with pay.
Preparatory to his embarkation under a new contract, he was ordered to report for a Medical Pre-
Employment Examination, which, according to the records, he passed. He, likewise, attended a Pre-
Departure Orientation Seminar conducted by the Capt. I.P. Estaniel Training Center, a division of
Trans-Global.
One night, a stray bullet hit Ravago on the left leg while he was waiting for a bus ride in Cubao, Quezon
City. He fractured his left proximal tibia and was hospitalized at the Philippine Orthopedic Hospital.
Ravago’s wife, Lolita, informed the petitioners of the incident for purposes of availing medical benefits.
As a result of his injury, Ravago’s doctor opined that he would not be able to cope with the job of a
seaman and suggested that he be given a desk job. For this reason, the company physician found
him to have lost his dexterity, making him unfit to work once again as a seaman. Consequently, instead
of rehiring Ravago, Esso paid him his Career Employment Incentive Plan (CEIP) as of and his final
tax refund. However, Ravago filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement,
backwages, damages and attorney’s fees against Trans-Global and Esso with the POEA Adjudication
Office.
Respondents denied that Ravago was dismissed without notice and just cause. Rather, his services
were no longer engaged in view of the disability he suffered which rendered him unfit to work as a
seafarer. This fact was further validated by the company doctor and Ravago’s attending physician.
They averred that Ravago was a contractual employee and was hired under 34 separate contracts by
different companies.
Ravago insisted that he was fit to resume pre-injury activities and that he was not a mere contractual
employee because the respondents regularly and continuously rehired him for 23 years and, for his
continuous service, was awarded a CEIP payment upon his termination from employment.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Ravago is a regular employee of respondent Esso.
HELD: The SC held that seafarers are contractual, not regular, employees. Seamen and overseas
contract workers are not covered by the term “regular employment” as defined in Article 280 of the
Labor Code.
Petition is denied.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 109583 September 5, 1997
TRANS ACTION OVERSEAS CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR, ROSELLE CASTIGADOR, JOSEFINA MAMON,
JENELYN CASA, PEACHY LANIOG, VERDELINA BELGIRA, ELMA FLORES, RAMONA
LITURCO, GRACE SABANDO, GLORIA PALMA, AVELYN ALVAREZ, CANDELARIA NONO,
NITA BUSTAMANTE, CYNTHIA ARANDILLO, SANDIE AGUILAR, DIGNA PANAGUITON,
VERONICA BAYOGOS, JULIANITA ARANADOR, LEONORA CABALLERO, NANCY BOLIVAR,
NIMFA BUCOL, ZITA GALINDO, ESTELITA BIOCOS, MARJORIE MACATE, RUBY SEPULVIDA,
ROSALIE SONDIA, NORA MAQUILING, PAULINA CORDERO, LENIROSE ABANGAN, SELFA
PALMA, ANTONIA NAVARRO, ELSIE PENARUBIA, IRMA SOBREQUIL, SONY JAMUAT,
CLETA MAYO, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
The issue presented in the case at bar is whether or not the Secretary of Labor and Employment has
jurisdiction to cancel or revoke the license of a private fee-charging employment agency.
From July 24 to September 9, 1987, petitioner Trans Action Overseas Corporation, a private fee-
charging employment agency, scoured Iloilo City for possible recruits for alleged job vacancies in
Hongkong. Private respondents sought employment as domestic helpers through petitioner's
employees, Luzviminda Aragon, Ben Hur Domincil and his wife Cecille. The applicants paid
placement fees ranging from P1,000.00 to P14,000.00, but petitioner failed to deploy them. Their
demands for refund proved unavailing; thus, they were constrained to institute complaints against
petitioner for violation of Articles 32 and 34(a) 1 of the Labor Code, as amended.
Petitioner denied having received the amounts allegedly collected from respondents, and averred
that Aragon, whose only duty was to pre-screen and interview applicants, and the spouses Domincil
were not authorized to collect fees from the applicants. Accordingly, it cannot be held liable for the
money claimed by respondents. Petitioner maintains that it even warned respondents not to give any
money to unauthorized individuals.
POEA Regional Extension Unit Coordinator Edgar Somes testified that although he was aware that
petitioner collected fees from respondents, the latter insisted that they be allowed to make the
payments on the assumption that it could hasten their deployment abroad. He added that Mrs.
Honorata Manliclic, a representative of petitioner tasked to oversee the conduct of the interviews,
told him that she was leaving behind presigned receipts to Aragon as she cannot stay in Iloilo City
for the screening of the applicants. Manliclic, however, denied this version and argued that it was
Somes who instructed her to leave the receipts behind as it was perfectly alright to collect fees.
On April 5, 1991, then Labor Undersecretary Nieves R. Confesor rendered the assailed order, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, respondents are hereby ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the
following claims:
1. Rosele Castigador P14,000.00
2. Josefina Mamon 3,000.00
3. Jenelyn Casa 3,000.00
4. Peachy Laniog 13,500.00
5. Verdelina Belgira 2,000.00
6. Elma Flores 2,500.00
7. Ramona Liturco 2,500.00
8. Grace Sabando 3,500.00
9. Gloria Palma 1,500.00
10. Avelyn Alvarez 1,500.00
11. Candelaria Nono 1,000.00
12. Nita Bustamante 5,000.00
13. Cynthia Arandillo 1,000.00
14. Sandie Aguilar 3,000.00
15. Digna Panaguiton 2,500.00
16. Veronica Bayogos 2,000.00
17. Sony Jamuat 4,500.00
18. Irma Sobrequil 2,000.00
19. Elsie Penarubia 2,000.00
20. Antonia Navarro 2,000.00
21. Selfa Palma 3,000.00
22. Lenirose Abangan 13,300.00

23. Paulina Cordero 1,400.00
24. Nora Maquiling 2,000.00
25. Rosalie Sondia 2,000.00
26. Ruby Sepulvida 3,500.00
27. Marjorie Macate 1,500.00
28. Estelita Biocos 3,000.00
29. Zita Galindo 3,500.00
30. Nimfa Bucol 1,000.00
31. Nancy Bolivar 2,000.00
32. Leonora Caballero 13,900.00
33. Julianita Aranador 14,000.00
The complaints of Ma. Luz Alingasa, Nimfa Perez, and Cleta Mayo are hereby
dismissed in view of their desistance.
The following complaints are hereby dismissed for failure to appear/prosecute:
1. Jiyasmin Bantillo 6. Edna Salvante
2. Rosa de Luna Senail 7. Thelma Beltiar
3. Elnor Bandojo 8. Cynthia Cepe
4. Teresa Caldeo 9. Rosie Pavillon
5. Virginia Castroverde
The complaints filed by the following are hereby dismissed for lack of evidence:
1. Aleth Palomaria 5. Mary Ann Beboso
2. Emely Padrones 6. Josefina Tejero
3. Marybeth Aparri 7. Bernadita Aprong
4. Lenia Biona 8. Joji Lull
Respondent agency is liable for twenty eight (28) counts of violation of Article 32 and
five (5) counts of Article 34 (a) with a corresponding suspension in the aggregate
period of sixty six (66) months. Considering however, that under the schedule of
penalties, any suspension amounting to a period of 12 months merits the imposition
of the penalty of cancellation, the license of respondent TRANS ACTION
OVERSEAS CORPORATION to participate in the overseas placement and
recruitment of workers is hereby ordered CANCELLED, effective immediately.
SO ORDERED.2 (Emphasis supplied)
On April 29, 1991, petitioner filed its Motion for Temporary Lifting of Order of Cancellation alleging,
among other things, that to deny it the authority to engage in placement and recruitment activities
would jeopardize not only its contractual relations with its foreign principals, but also the welfare,
interests, and livelihood of recruited workers scheduled to leave for their respective assignments.
Finally, it manifested its willingness to post a bond to insure payment of the claims to be awarded,
should its appeal or motion be denied.
Finding the motion to be well taken, Undersecretary Confesor provisionally lifted the cancellation of
petitioner's license pending resolution of its Motion for Reconsideration filed on May 6, 1991. On
January 30, 1992, however, petitioner's motion for reconsideration was eventually denied for lack of
merit, and the April 5, 1991, order revoking its license was reinstated.
Petitioner contends that Secretary; Confesor acted with grave abuse of discretion in rendering the
assailed orders on alternative grounds, viz.: (1) it is the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) which has the exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear and decide illegal
recruitment cases, including the authority to cancel recruitment licenses, or (2) the cancellation order
based on the 1987 POEA Schedule of Penalties is not valid for non-compliance with the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987 regarding its registration with the U.P. Law Center.
Under Executive Order No. 7973 (E.O. No. 797) and Executive Order No. 247 (E.O. No. 247),4 the
POEA was established and mandated to assume the functions of the Overseas Employment
Development Board (OEDB), the National Seamen Board (NSB), and the overseas employment
function of the Bureau of Employment Services (BES). Petitioner theorizes that when POEA
absorbed the powers of these agencies, Article 35 of the Labor Code, as amended, was rendered
ineffective.
The power to suspend or cancel any license or authority to recruit employees for overseas
employment is vested upon the Secretary of Labor and Employment. Article 35 of the Labor Code,
as amended, which provides:
Art. 5. Suspension and/or Cancellation of License or Authority — The Minister of

Labor shall have the power to suspend or cancel any license or authority to recruit
employees for overseas employment for violation of rules and regulations issued by
the Ministry of Labor, the Overseas Employment Development Board, and the
National Seamen Board, or for violation of the provisions of this and other applicable
laws, General Orders and Letters of Instructions.
In the case of Eastern Assurance and Surety Corp. v. Secretary of

Labor,5 we held that:
The penalties of suspension and cancellation of license or authority are prescribed

for violations of the above quoted provisions, among others. And the Secretary of
Labor has the power under Section 35 of the law to apply these sanctions, as well as
the authority, conferred by Section 36, not only to "restrict and regulate the
recruitment and placement activities of all agencies," but also to "promulgate rules
and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions" governing
said activities. Pursuant to this rule-making power thus granted, the Secretary of
Labor gave the POEA,6 "on its own initiative or upon filing of a complaint or report or
upon request for investigation by any aggrieved person, . . (authority to) conduct the
necessary proceedings for the suspension or cancellation of the license or authority
of any agency or entity" for certain enumerated offenses including —
1) the imposition or acceptance, directly or indirectly, of any amount of money, goods

or services, or any fee or bond in excess of what is prescribed by the Administration,
and
2) any other violation of pertinent provisions of the Labor Code and other relevant
laws, rules and regulations.7
The Administrator was also given the power to "order the dismissal of the case of the
suspension of the license or authority of the respondent agency or contractor or
recommend to the Minister the cancellation thereof." 8 (Emphasis supplied)
This power conferred upon the Secretary of Labor and Employment was echoed in People
v. Diaz,9 viz.:
A non-licensee or non-holder of authority means any person, corporation or entity

which has not been issued a valid license or authority to engage in recruitment and
placement by the Secretary of Labor, or whose license or authority has been
suspended, revoked or cancelled by the POEA or the Secretary. (Emphasis
supplied)
In view of the Court's disposition on the matter, we rule that the power to suspend or cancel any
license or authority to recruit employees for overseas employment is concurrently vested with the
POEA and the Secretary of Labor.
As regards petitioner's alternative argument that the non-filing of the 1987 POEA Schedule of
Penalties with the UP Law Center rendered it ineffective and, hence, cannot be utilized as basis for
penalizing them, we agree with Secretary Confesor's explanation, to wit:
On the other hand, the POEA Revised Rules on the Schedule of Penalties was
issued pursuant to Article 34 of the Labor Code, as amended. The same merely
amplified and particularized the various violations of the rules and regulations of the
POEA and clarified and specified the penalties therefore (sic). Indeed, the
questioned schedule of penalties contains only a listing of offenses. It does not
prescribe additional rules and regulations governing overseas employment but only
detailed the administrative sanctions imposable by this Office for some enumerated
prohibited acts.
Under the circumstances, the license of the respondent agency was cancelled on the
authority of Article 35 of the Labor Code, as amended, and not pursuant to the 1987
POEA Revised Rules on Schedule of Penalties. 10
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Accordingly, the
decision of the Secretary of Labor dated April 5, 1991, is AFFIRMED. No costs.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
For Our consideration is an appeal from the Decision[1] dated September
30, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03974, which
affirmed with modification the Decision[2] dated March 26, 2009 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Manila City, Branch 52, in Criminal Case No.
04-225062, which found accused-appellant Fe Abella y Buhain (Abella)
guilty of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale.
The Information[3] reads:
That in or about and during the period comprised between October 8, 2003
and March 18, 2004, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused conspiring and confederating with another whose true name, real
identity and present whereabouts is still unknown, and mutually helping
each other, representing herself to have the capacity to contract, enlist and
transport Filipino workers for employment abroad, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously for a fee, recruit and promise
employment/job placement to the following persons:
Mary Jean Mateo y Sanchez

Grace Marcelino y dela Pena
Nobella Castro y Fernandez
Imelda Miguel y Factor
Lolita Pansoy y Garcia
Ester Castro y Pamisttan
Janice Belvis y Morales
Ruby Badua y Cabacungan
Visitation Rosete y Cedron
Generoso Gumpal y Bangloy
Fernando Callang y Buhanget
Joselito Danver Huta y Catano
as Laundrywomen/Laundrymen and Waiter in Istanbul, Turkey and Dubai,
without first having secured the required license or authority from the
Department of Labor and Employment, charged or accept directly or
indirectly from said complainants amounts which are in excess of or greater
than those specified in the schedule of allowable fees prescribed by the
Department of Labor and Employment under Memorandum Order No. 5,
Series of 1985 and having failed to deploy aforesaid complainants,
continuously fails to reimburse despite demands, the expenses they
incurred in connection with the documentation and processing for their
deployment.
Upon arraignment, Abella, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the

offense charge.
In the course of the trial, the prosecution presented Imelda F. Miguel

(Miguel), Grace P. Marcelino (Marcelino), Fernando B. Callang (Callang),
Mildred Versoza (Versoza), and Senior Police Officer (SPO) 1 Jaime Bunag
(Bunag) as witnesses.
Miguel testified that she came to know Abella through Zeny Agpalza
(Agpalza) and Lina Mateo (Mateo), who informed her that Abella could
help her get work abroad. Interested, Miguel met Abella at the latter's
office, bearing the name Rofema Business Consultancy (RBC), at 1807
Nakpil St., Barangay 697, Malate, Manila. During their meeting, Abella
offered Miguel work as a laundry woman in Istanbul, Turkey, with a salary
of $600.00 to $700.00 but Miguel must undergo training in laundry
service and pay a placement fee of PI 00,000.00. Miguel, however, was able
to raise and pay only P30,000.00[4] as placement fee on November 17, 2003
for which Abella issued a cash voucher signed by Abella herself in Miguel's
presence. Miguel also claimed that she underwent training in laundry
service for five days at the Executive Technical Consultants Trade Test and
Training Center, valued at P5,000.00, which was sponsored by Abella.
Miguel was issued a certification after said training. Abella discussed with
Miguel the details of the latter's job abroad and provided Miguel with a
photocopy of their written agreement, together with the certificate
evidencing registration by Abella of the business name of RBC. Until the
day that Miguel gave her testimony before the RTC, Abella, contrary to her
representation and promise, was not able to deploy Miguel as a
laundrywoman in Istanbul, Turkey, and neither did Abella return the
placement fee of P30,000.00 which Miguel had paid.[5]
Marcelino narrated that she came to know Abella through Rosette Danao
(Danao). Danao first recruited Marcelino to work as a domestic helper in
Saipan, but later turned over Marcelino's application to Agpalza who was in
charge of those applying for jobs in Turkey. Danao and Agpalza both
referred to Abella as their Manager. Marcelino paid a total of
P50,000.00[6] for the processing of her papers in four installments:
P10,000.00 on November 24, 2003; P15,000.00 on December 3, 2003;
P10,000.00 on December 23, 2003, and P15,000.00 on January 15, 2004,
all personally received by Abella either at the RBC office or at McDonald's,
Ermita, and evidenced by vouchers signed by Abella. Nothing happened to
Marcelino's application and the amounts she had paid to Abella were not
returned to her.[7]
According to Callang, he was recruited by Danao, Abella's agent, who

brought him to the RBC office in Malate, Manila. At the RBC office, Abella
told Callang of the job order for laundryman in Istanbul, Turkey with a
monthly salary of $600.00 and for which the placement fee was
P65,000.00. Callang paid to Abella P10,000.00 on November 17, 2003;
P10,000.00 on December 23, 2003; and P20,000.00 on January 9, 2004,
for a total of P40,000.00,[8] evidenced by a voucher signed by Abella in
Callang's presence. The first two payments were made at the RBC office
while the last payment was at McDonald's, Ermita. Callang was not
deployed for employment abroad, neither was he able to recover the
amount he paid to Abella.
Versoza was an employee at the Licensing Division of the Philippine

Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). Versoza recounted that
upon the instruction of Yolanda Paragua (Paragua), Officer-in-Charge
(OIC) of the POEA Licensing Division, she verified from the database and
other records of their office whether Abella/RBC had license to recruit
workers for employment abroad. Versoza found out that Abella/RBC had
no such license and she prepared a Certification to that effect, which was
signed by OIC Paragua in her presence. In compliance with the subpoena
duces tecum issued by the RTC, Versoza personally appeared before the
trial court to identify OIC Paragua's signature on the Certification.[9]
SPO1 Bunag was the investigator assigned to the case and affirmed on the
witness stand that he was the one who took down the private
complainants' Sinumpang Salaysay Pag-aresto, and prepared Abella's
Booking Sheet and Arrest Report and letter of referral for inquest dated
March 19, 2004.
Only Abella herself testified for the defense.

Before Abella took the witness stand, her counsel, Atty. Rodrigo Marinas,
moved that the following private complainants: Mary Jean S. Mateo,
Nobella F. Castro, Lolito G. Pansoy, Ester P. Castro, Janice M. Belvis, Ruby
C. Badua, Generoso B. Gumpal, and Joselito Danver C. Huta, be
provisionally dropped as such from the Information for their repeated
failure to appear and testify in support of their complaints.[10] Without
objection from Assistant City Prosecutor Francisco L. Salomon, the RTC
granted the defense's motion, thus, leaving Miguel, Marcelino, and Callang
as private complainants.
Abella anchored her defense on denial. Abella alleged that she had been
working as a cashier since November 11, 2004 at RBC, a travel agency
registered with the Department of Trade and Industry. As cashier at RBC,
Abella's main duty was to receive payments from clients for which she
issued cash vouchers. Abella claimed that she did not personally meet the
clients nor did she directly receive money from them, as the clients coursed
their payments through Agpalza, an RBC agent. Agpalza would then turn
over the payments to Abella, for which the latter issued cash vouchers; and
Abella would subsequently hand over the payments to RBC owner,
Elizabeth Reyes (Reyes). Abella disputed private complainants' assertion
and insisted that she did not promise private complainants employment
abroad. During her re-direct examination, Abella refuted her purported
arrest and confrontation with private complainants. Abella maintained that
she voluntarily went with Agpalza to the police headquarters and that she
and Agpalza were detained at the second floor while private complainants
were kept at the ground floor of the police headquarters.
On March 26, 2009, the RTC rendered a Decision with the following
verdict:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused FE ABELLA y BUHAIN guilty

beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Recruitment in large scale
and imposes upon her the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
Php100,000.00.
FE ABELLA y BUHAIN is also ordered to return to, or refund the sums of

money she had received from the following private complainants: a) Imelda
Miguel the sum of Php30,000.00; b) Fernando Callang the amount of
Php40,000.00; and c) Grace Marcelino the amount of Php50,000.00.
With costs against the accused.[11]
Aggrieved, Abella appealed before the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals, in a Decision dated September 30, 2010, affirmed the
RTC judgment of conviction but with the modification increasing the
amount of fine imposed against Abella. The dispositive portion of the said
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The

Decision dated 26 March 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 52, in Criminal Case No. 04-225062 finding accused-appellant Fe
Abella y Buhain guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment in
large scale, sentencing her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and
ordering her to pay a fine and to return to private complainants Imelda
Miguel, Fernando Callang and Grace Marcelino the amounts of
Php30,000.00, Php40,000.00 and Php50,000.00, respectively, is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the amount of fine is
increased from Php100,000.00 to Php500,000.00. Costs against accused-
appellant.[12]
Hence, the present appeal.
In her Supplemental Brief, Abella contends that the prosecution failed to

prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt as the first element of illegal
recruitment in large scale, i.e., the accused undertook a recruitment activity
under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code or any prohibited practice under
Article 34 of the same Code, is wanting. Abella points out that: (a) it was
not Abella who enticed private complainants to apply for work overseas
given that by private complainants' own testimonies, they learned about the
job opportunities abroad not from Abella, but from Agpalza, Mateo, and
Danao, who were so persuasive that private complainants travelled from
their respective provinces to Manila just to meet Abella; (b) if it were true
that Abella received money from private complainants, she would have
already fled after getting private complainants' money so as to evade arrest;
and (c) the prosecution presented a mere photocopy of the handwritten
agreement supposedly executed by Abella in Miguel's favor, and
considering that the contents of such agreement are in issue in this case,
the RTC wrongfully accorded much weight to such evidence.
We find no merit in the instant appeal.
To constitute illegal recruitment in large scale, three elements must concur:

(a) the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable
him to lawfully engage in recruitment placement of workers: (b) the
offender undertakes any of the activities within the meaning of
"recruitment and placement" under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code, or any
of the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the same Code
(now Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995); and (c) the offender
committed the same against three or more persons, individually or as a
group.[13]
Article 13(b) of the Labor Code defines "recruitment and placement" as

"any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring
or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising
or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not."
It also provides that "any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or
promises for a fee, employment to two or more persons shall be deemed
engaged in recruitment and placement."
Article 38 of the same Code particularly defines "illegal recruitment" as

follows:
ART. 38. Illegal Recruitment. - (a) Any recruitment activities, including the
prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to be
undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority, shall be deemed
illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this Code. The Department of
Labor and Employment or any law enforcement officer may initiate
complaints under this Article.
(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall

be considered an offense involving economic sabotage and shall be
penalized in accordance with Article 39 hereof.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a
group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with
one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise
or scheme defined under the first paragraph hereof. Illegal recruitment is
deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more
persons individually or as a group.
Republic Act No. 8042 broadened the concept of illegal recruitment under
the Labor Code and provided stiffer penalties, especially if it constitutes
economic sabotage, either illegal recruitment in large scale or illegal
recruitment committed by a syndicate. Under Section 6 of Republic Act No.
8042, the following acts constitute "illegal recruitment":
SEC. 6. Definition. - For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall

mean any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting,
utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referring,
contract services, promising or advertising for employment
abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-
licensee or non-holder of authority contemplated under Article 13(f)
of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor
Code of the Philippines: Provided, That any such non-licensee or non-
holder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment
abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged. It shall
likewise include the following acts, whether committed by any person,
whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority:
(a) To charge or accept directly or indirectly any amount greater than that
specified in the schedule of allowable fees prescribed by the Secretary of
Labor and Employment, or to make a worker pay any amount greater than
that actually received by him as a loan or advance;
(b) To furnish or publish any false notice or information or document in

relation to recruitment or employment;
(c) To give any false notice, testimony, information or document or commit

any act of misrepresentation for the purpose of securing a license or
authority under the Labor Code;
(d) To induce or attempt to induce a worker already employed to quit his

employment in order to offer him another unless the transfer is designed to
liberate a worker from oppressive terms and conditions of employment;
(e) To influence or attempt to influence any person or entity not to employ

any worker who has not applied for employment through his agency;
(f) To engage in the recruitment or placement of workers in jobs harmful to

public health or morality or to the dignity of the Republic of the
Philippines;
(g) To obstruct or attempt to obstruct inspection by the Secretary of Labor

and Employment or by his duly authorized representative;
(h) To fail to submit reports on the status of employment, placement

vacancies, remittance of foreign exchange earnings, separation from jobs,
departures and such other matters or information as may be required by
the Secretary of Labor and Employment;
(i) To substitute or alter to the prejudice of the worker, employment

contracts approved and verified by the Department of Labor and
Employment from the time of actual signing thereof by the parties up to
and including the period of the expiration of the same without the approval
of the Department of Labor and Employment;
(j) For an officer or agent of a recruitment or placement agency to become

an officer or member of the Board of any corporation engaged in travel
agency or to be engaged directly or indirectly in the management of a travel
agency;
(k) To withhold or deny travel documents from applicant workers before

departure for monetary or financial considerations other than those
authorized under the Labor Code and its implementing rules and
regulations;
(1) Failure to actually deploy without valid reason as determined by the

Department of Labor and Employment; and
(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in

connection with his documentation and processing for purposes
of deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually
take place without the worker's fault. Illegal recruitment when
committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an
offense involving economic sabotage.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a

group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one
another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed
against three (3) or more persons individually or as a
group. (Emphases ours.)
The elements of illegal recruitment in large scale are all obtaining in this
case and that the prosecution had sufficiently proved that Abella is guilty of
said offense.
First, it is undisputed that neither Abella nor RBC was licensed as a

recruitment agency. The Certification[14] dated May 17, 2005 signed by OIC
Paragua of the POEA Licensing Division states that "per available records
of this Office, Fe Abella y Buhain, in her personal capacity, and ROFEMA
BUSINESS CONSULTANCY with address at 1807 Nakpil St., Brgy. 697,
Malate, Manila, are not licensed by this Administration to recruit workers
for overseas employment. Any recruitment activity undertaken by the
above-named person/entity is deemed illegal." Versoza, the POEA
Licensing Division employee who actually perused the database and other
records of their office, prepared the Certification for OIC Paragua's
signature, and personally witnessed OIC Paragua signing the said
Certification, appeared as witness before the RTC to authenticate the
Certification as one of the documentary evidence for the prosecution. A
POEA certification is a public document issued by a public officer in the
performance of an official duty; hence, it is prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated pursuant to Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court.[15] Public documents are entitled to a presumption of regularity,
consequently, the burden of proof rests upon the person who alleges the
contrary. Abella does not negate the contents of the Certification but merely
argues that it has no bearing on whether or not she represented herself to
the private complainants as someone authorized to recruit for overseas
employment.
Second, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that Abella had
engaged in recruitment activities. The trial and appellate courts accorded
weight and credence to the consistent testimonies of private complainants
Miguel, Marcelino, and Callang that at separate instances, Agpalza, Mateo,
and/or Danao brought private complainants to the RBC office and
introduced them to Abella, and it was Abella herself who offered and
promised private complainants jobs in Istanbul, Turkey, in consideration of
placement fees. Miguel's testimony is further supported by a handwritten
agreement[16] signed by Abella, stating in detail the terms of Miguel's
alleged overseas employment, and we quote:
1. Salary is $400 excluding overtime. There is a probationary period of

3 months.
2. Free board and lodging, one yr. contract renewable, 8 working hrs.
3. Total placement is P100TH, P50TH cash out and P50TH salary

deduction. Training fee of P4,500 & PDOS is included in the
placement fee.
4. Downpayment of P25,000 to be used in the stamping of visa in the

passport. After 1 week, applicant will receive a xeroxed copy of
his/her passport with stamped visa.
5. After downpayment, applicant will start training for 5 days, 8:00 AM-
5:00 PM.
6. Remaining balance of P25TH will be given upon signing of the

contract.
7. Downpayment is refundable in case of failure to process papers

within the time frame agreed upon which is within 2 months time. In
case of refund certain charges will be deducted so the applicant
cannot get the full amount of downpayment.
8. Every payday, the applicant should deposit certain amount which

they can afford to the ATM account of the company.
9. Before departure, an Attorney's Affidavit will be prepared signed by

Ms. Fe Abella, the applicant, one member of the applicant[']s family
particularly the nearest kin and the Agent handling the applicant. In
case the applicant does not comply with the payment of the remaining
placement (P50TH), the member of the family will be answerable for
his/her obligation.
10. Ms. Fe Abella will be the one answerable for expired medical
certificate.
11. In case problems arise in Turkey, applicant should approach the

Philippine Embassy.
Abella is challenging the probative value of the above handwritten

agreement on the ground that it is a mere photocopy. Abella reasons that
since the contents of said agreement are in issue, the best evidence rule
applies. The original of the agreement is the best evidence of Abella making
representations that she had the power to send private complainants
abroad to work.
The non-presentation of the original copy of the handwritten agreement is

not fatal to the prosecution's case. Miguel personally testified before the
RTC as to the circumstances of her recruitment by Abella. Abella made
verbal, and not only written, promises to Miguel of employment abroad.
The handwritten agreement merely substantiates Miguel's testimony at
best. In People v. Pabalan,[17] we affirmed the sufficiency of testimonial
evidence to prove receipt by therein accused-appellant of placement fees,
even in the absence of documentary evidence such as receipts issued by
accused-appellant, thus:
[T]he absence of receipts for some of the amounts delivered to the accused
did not mean that the appellant did not accept or receive such payments.
Neither in the Statute of Frauds nor in the rules of evidence is the
presentation of receipts required in order to prove the existence of a
recruitment agreement and the procurement of fees in illegal recruitment
cases. Such proof may come from the testimonies of witnesses.[18]
Abella denies representing to private complainants that she was capable of

deploying workers to Istanbul, Turkey. Abella avows that she was a mere
cashier at RBC who issued vouchers for payments made by clients and that
she subsequently turned over such payments to Reyes, the true owner of
RBC.
We are not swayed by Abella's bare allegations, which conspicuously lacked

any corroborative evidence. If Abella was really a mere employee at RBC,
then she could have presented basic evidence of her employment, such as
appointment papers, an identification card, or payslips. Also, the vouchers
for the placement fees paid by private complainants were issued and signed
by Abella herself, without any indication that she issued and signed the
same on behalf of Reyes, the purported true owner of RBC. There is
likewise absence of any proof of Abella's turnover to or Reyes's receipt of
the amounts received from private complainants.
In contrast, the private complainants Miguel, Marcelino, and Callang were

positive and categorical in their testimonies that Abella promised them
employment abroad in exchange for their payment of placement fees.
Abella herself provided Miguel with a Certification proving Abella's
registration of the business name RBC; hence, negating Abella's claim that
RBC is actually owned by another person, Reyes. The private complainants'
testimonies were consistent and corroborative of one another on material
points, such as the placement fees asked of them, the nature of work
available, and their employment destination, which is, Istanbul, Turkey.
Well-settled is the rule that the trial court, having the opportunity to
observe the witnesses and their demeanor during the trial, can best assess
the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies. Abella's mere denial
cannot prevail over the positive and categorical testimonies of the private
complainants. The findings of the trial court are accorded great respect
unless the trial court has overlooked or misconstrued some substantial
facts, which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. Furthermore,
factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
are deemed binding and conclusive.[19]
Lastly, it was established that there were at least three victims in this case,
namely, Miguel, Marcelino, and Callang, who all testified before the RTC in
support of their respective complaints.
Based on the foregoing, there is no doubt, as the RTC found and the Court
of Appeals affirmed, that Abella is guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale,
which constitutes economic sabotage under the last paragraph of Section 6
of Republic Act No. 8042.
Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042 provides that "[t]he penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00) nor more than One million pesos (PI,000,000.00) shall be
imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage as defined
herein." Hence, we sustain the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
P500,000.00 imposed on Abella by the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM in toto the Decision dated September 30,

2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03974.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Bersamin, Perlas-Bernabe, and Jardeleza, JJ.,

concur.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 208686 July 1, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
ALELIE TOLENTINO a.k.a. "Alelie Tolentino y Hernandez," Appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
This is an appeal from the 29 November 2012 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 04558, affirming the trial court's decision, finding appellant Alelie Tolentino (appellant) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment and estafa.
The Facts
Appellant was charged with illegal recruitment and five (5) counts of estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. The Informations against appellant read:
CRIM. CASE NO. 02-755
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses ALELIE TOLENTINO of the crime of Illegal
Recruitment committed as follows:
That on or about [or sometime in] the last week of August, 2001 and 1st week of November, 2001
and thereafter, in the City of Muntinlupa, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused jointly with NARCISA SANTOS did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously advertise for employment, enlist, contract and promise employment to the
following persons: LEDERLE PANESA, ORLANDO LAYOSO, JIMMY LEJOS, MARCELINO LEJOS
and DONNA MAGBOO for a fee without first securing license and/or permit from the government
agency concerned.
Contrary to law.2
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses ALELIE TOLENTINO of the crime of Estafa
under Art. 315 Par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, committed as follows:
That on or about or sometime in the first week of August 2001 and thereafter, in the City of
Muntinlupa, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, by means of deceit, fraudulent acts and false pretenses executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, did [then] and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud one LEDERLE PANESA, in the following manner: accused represented to the
said complainant that she could secure work for the said complainant at Korea and she is capable of
processing the travel visa and other documents for her travel and employment at Korea and
demanded from the said complainant to pay the amount of ₱75,000.00 as placement fee; accused
well knew that such representations were false and made only to induce complainant to part with her
money as in fact complainant gave and delivered the amount of ₱15,000.00 as partial payment to
the accused; and accused once in possession of the said amount, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert the same to her own personal use
and benefit to the damage and prejudice of the said complainant in the amount of ₱15,000.00.
Contrary to law.3
That on or about or sometime in the first week of November, 2001 and thereafter, in the City of
accused conspiring and confederating with NARCISA SANTOS, and both of them mutually helping
and aiding one another, by means of deceit, fraudulent acts and false pretenses executed prior to or
feloniously defraud one ORLANDO LAYOSO, in the following manner: accused represented to the
processing the travel visa and other documents for [his] travel and employment at Korea and
well knew that such representations were false and made only to induce complainant to part with
[his] money as in fact complainant gave and delivered the amount of ₱35,000.00 as partial payment
to the accused; and accused once in possession of the said amount, did then and there willfully,
Contrary to law.4
feloniously defraud one DONNA MAGBOO, in the following manner: accused represented to the
processing the travel visa and other documents for her travel and employment at Korea and
well knew that such representations were false and made only to induce complainant to part with her
money as in fact complainant gave and delivered the amount of ₱35,000.00 as partial payment to
the accused; and accused once in possession of the said amount, did then and there willfully,
Contrary to law.5
under Art. 315 Par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, committed as follows: That on or
about or sometime in the first week of November, 2001 and thereafter, in the City of Muntinlupa,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring
and confederating with NARCISA SANTOS, and both of them mutually helping and aiding one
another, by means of deceit, fraudulent acts and false pretenses executed prior to or simultaneously
with the commission of the fraud, did [then] and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud one
JIMMY LEJOS, in the following manner: accused represented to the said complainant that she could
secure work for the said complainant at Korea and she is capable of processing the travel visa and
other documents for [his] travel and employment at Korea and demanded from the said complainant
to pay the amount of ₱80,000.00 as placement fee; accused well knew that such representations
were false and made only to induce complainant to part with [his] money as in fact complainant gave
and delivered the amount of ₱35,000.00 as partial payment to the accused; and accused once in
possession of the said amount, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriate, misapply and convert the same to her own personal use and benefit to the damage
and prejudice of the said complainant in the amount of ₱35,000.00.
Contrary to law.6
feloniously defraud one MARCELINO LEJOS, in the following manner: accused represented to the
processing the travel visa and other documents for [his] travel and employment at Korea and
well knew that such representations were false and made only to induce complainant to part with
[his] money as in fact complainant gave and delivered the amount of ₱20,000.00 as partial payment
to the accused; and accused once in possession of the said amount, did then and there willfully,
Contrary to law.7
Private complainants Orlando Layoso, Donna Magboo, Jimmy Lejos, and Marcelino Lejos8 alleged
that sometime in the first week of November 2001, they had a meeting with appellant Alelie
Tolentino (appellant) in her office at the 3rd floor, Arevalo Building, Alabang, Muntinlupa City.
Appellant told them the procedure for overseas employment and offered them assistance to find
work abroad for a fee of ₱80,000. Appellant showed them pictures of those she allegedly helped find
work abroad and told them that they would be earning $630 monthly as factory workers in Korea.
When asked about her license to recruit overseas workers, appellant told private complainants that
she would show it to them at some other time. On 14 November 2001, private complainants again
met with appellant at her office and each of them gave appellant ₱20,000 as partial payment of the
agreed fee, which included expenses for medical examination and processing of their documents for
work in Korea. Appellant promised to secure their visas and employment contracts within three
months.
On 30 January 2002, private complainants met with appellant, who was accompanied by a certain
Narcisa Santos, at Wendy’s in Arquiza Street, Manila for signing of contract. However, the names
written on the employment contracts were not private complainants’ names. Appellant explained that
the contracts were supposedly for other applicants who sought her services but later backed out.
Appellant assured them that original contracts bearing their names would subsequently be provided.
Private complainants signed the contracts and paid ₱15,000 each as their second partial payment.
On 7 February 2002, private complainants received information that the Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group arrested appellant for illegal recruitment. When private complainants confronted
appellant at the Manila City Hall where she was held, they demanded the return of their payments
amounting to ₱35,000 each, except for Marcelino Lejos whose total payment only amounted to
₱20,000. Appellant denied the charges against her and promised them that they would get their
money back. Subsequently, private complainants were able to secure a certification from the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) that appellant was not licensed to recruit
workers for overseas employment.
Another complainant, Lederle Panesa, alleged that in August 2001, she met with appellant, who
offered her work in Korea for a placement fee of ₱75,000. On 7 September 2001, Panesa gave
appellant ₱15,000 as initial payment. Appellant assured Panesa that she would be leaving for Korea
on the second week of November 2001 and that the balance of the placement fee could be paid
upon her receipt of the visa. However, after said meeting, Panesa no longer heard from appellant,
which prompted Panesa to visit appellant’s office. Appellant informed Panesa that there were no job
openings in Korea at that time. Appellant offered Panesa employment in other countries such as
Malaysia and Palau, but Panesa refused the offer and demanded the return of her money.
Nevertheless, appellant was able to persuade Panesa to wait until December 2001. Appellant never
contacted Panesa thereafter. On 7 February 2002,Panesa was informed that appellant was
apprehended for illegal recruitment. Panesa proceeded to the Office of the City Prosecutor in Manila,
but failed to confront appellant. It was only then that Panesa learned about appellant not being
authorized by the POEA to recruit workers for overseas employment.
For the defense, appellant was presented as the lone witness. Appellant denied the charges against
her. She testified that she was introduced to private complainants by a certain Cezar Manonson and
that the owner of the office she is renting is her relative. Private complainants allegedly sought her
help regarding possible work in Korea and that she merely explained the procedure for overseas
employment to them. She was hesitant to help them because she does not recruit workers as she
herself was also applying for work as factory worker through Narcisa Santos. She admitted having
received money from private complainants and issuing receipts for the payments, upon instructions
from Narcisa Santos. She confirmed her signature on the petty cash vouchers she issued to private
complainants, evidencing their payments. She testified that she gave the payments to Narcisa
Santos. However, she admitted that she does not have proof that she indeed turned over the money
to Narcisa Santos.
On 9 June 2010, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Alelie (also known as Alelie Tolentino) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of large scale illegal recruitment, which constitutes economic
sabotage in Criminal Case Case No. 02-755 and sentences her to life imprisonment and to pay a
fine of ₱500,000.00; and five counts of estafa under Article 315 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, in the following criminal cases and sentences her, as follows:
In Criminal Case No. 02-756, an indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor in its
maximum to four years two months and one day of prision correccional in its maximum as the
maximum period, and to pay the private complainant the amount of ₱5,000.00 as and for moral
damages. Accused is further ordered to return the amount of ₱15,000.00 she illegally collected from
the private complainant.
In Criminal Case Nos. 02-757, 02-758 and 02-759, an indeterminate penalty [of] six months of
arresto mayor in its maximum to twelve years of prision mayor in its maximum, and to pay the private
complainants individually each in the amount of ₱15,000.00 as and for moral damages. Accused is
further ordered to return the amount of ₱35,000.00 she illegally collected each from the private
complainants.
In Criminal Case No. 02-760, an indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor in its
maximum as the minimum period to six years and one day of prision mayor in its minimum as the
maximum period, and to pay the private complainant the amount of ₱8,000.00 as and for moral
damages. Accused is further ordered to return the amount of ₱20,000.00 she illegally collected from
the private complainant.
Her full period of preventive imprisonment shall be credited in her favor in accordance with Article 29
of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.9
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision. The Court of Appeals held that
the prosecution adequately proved that appellant engaged in illegal recruitment in large scale. The
Court of Appeals noted that appellant admitted that she had no authority or valid license to engage
in recruitment and placement of workers. The testimonies and the documentary evidence submitted
by the prosecution showed that appellant led complainants to believe that she had the power or
ability to send private complainants to Korea to work as factory workers and that the latter were
convinced to give their payment to appellant in order to be employed. Appellant even issued petty
cash vouchers acknowledging receipt of private complainants’ payment and she made them sign
Trainee Agreements, which were purportedly their contract with their Korean employer. Based on
the facts and evidence presented, the Court of Appeals concluded that appellant clearly engaged in
illegal recruitment activities. Appellant’s claim that it was Narcisa Santos who recruited the private
complainants and who profited from the illegal transaction was disregarded by the Court of Appeals
for lack of evidence. The Court of Appeals noted that it was appellant who dealt directly with private
complainants.
On the charge of estafa, the Court of Appeals likewise upheld appellant’s conviction for said crime.
The evidence presented to prove appellant’s liability for illegal recruitment also established her
liability for estafa. The Court of Appeals ruled that a person may be charged and convicted
separately of illegal recruitment under Republic Act No. 8042 (RA 8042) in relation to the Labor
Code, and estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code.
Hence, this appeal.
The Court's Ruling

We find the appeal without merit. The Court of Appeals was correct in affirming the ruling of the trial
court that the appellant’s guilt of the crimes she was accused of was clearly established by the
witnesses and the evidence of the prosecution.
Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale
Article 13(b) of the Labor Code defines recruitment and placement as "any act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals,
contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or
not."
Illegal recruitment, on the other hand is defined under Article 38 of the Labor Code as follows: ART.
38. Illegal Recruitment
(a) Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article
34of this Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be
deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this Code. The Department of Labor and
Employment or any law enforcement officer may initiate complaints under this Article.
(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered
an offense involving economic sabotage and shall be penalized in accordance with Article 39
hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of
three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying out
any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under the first paragraph
hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3)
or more persons individually or as a group.
(c) The Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives shall have
the power to cause the arrest and detention of such non-licensee or non-holder of authority if
after investigation it is determined that his activities constitute a danger to national security
and public order or will lead to further exploitation of job-seekers. The Secretary shall order
the search of the office or premises and seizure of documents, paraphernalia, properties and
other implements used in illegal recruitment activities and the closure of companies,
establishments and entities found to be engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas
employment, without having been licensed or authorized to do so. (Emphases supplied)
Illegal recruitment, as defined under Article 38 of the Labor Code, encompasses recruitment
activities for both local and overseas employment. However, illegal recruitment under this article is
limited to recruitment activities undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority.10 Thus,
under the Labor Code, to constitute illegal recruitment in large scale, three elements must concur:
1. The accused undertook any recruitment activity defined under Art. 13 (b) or any prohibited
practice enumerated under Art. 34 of the Labor Code.
2. He did not have the license or the authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and
placement of workers.
3. He committed the same against three or more persons, individually or as a group.11
RA 8042,12 otherwise known as the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995,"
established a higher standard of protection and promotion of the welfare of the migrant workers, their
families and overseas Filipinos in distress. RA 8042 also broadened the concept of illegal
recruitment for overseas employment and increased the penalties, especially for Illegal Recruitment
in Large Scale and Illegal Recruitment Committed by a Syndicate, which are considered offenses
involving economic sabotage.13 Part II of RA 8042 defines and penalizes illegal recruitment for
employment abroad, whether undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority or by a
licensee or holder of authority.
Section 6 of RA 8042 provides for the definition of illegal recruitment, while Section 7 enumerates
the penalties therefor, thus:
SEC. 6. Definition. – For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referring,
contract services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when
undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of
Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines:
Provided, That any such non-licensee or non-holder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment abroad for two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged. It shall likewise include
the following acts, whether committed by any person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee
or holder of authority:
(a) To charge or accept directly or indirectly any amount greater than that specified in the
schedule of allowable fees prescribed by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, or to
make a worker pay any amount greater than that actually received by him as a loan or
advance;
(b) To furnish or publish any false notice or information or document in relation to recruitment
or employment;
(c) To give any false notice, testimony, information or document or commit any act of
misrepresentation for the purpose of securing a license or authority under the Labor Code;
(d) To induce or attempt to induce a worker already employed to quit his employment in
order to offer him another unless the transfer is designed to liberate a worker from
oppressive terms and conditions of employment;
(e) To influence or attempt to influence any person or entity not to employ any worker who
has not applied for employment through his agency;
(f) To engage in the recruitment or placement of workers in jobs harmful to public health or
morality or to the dignity of the Republic of the Philippines;
(g) To obstruct or attempt to obstruct inspection by the Secretary of Labor and Employment
or by his duly authorized representative;
(h) To fail to submit reports on the status of employment, placement vacancies, remittance of
foreign exchange earnings, separation from jobs, departures and such other matters or
information as may be required by the Secretary of Labor and Employment;
(i) To substitute or alter to the prejudice of the worker, employment contracts approved and
verified by the Department of Labor and Employment from the time of actual signing thereof
by the parties up to and including the period of the expiration of the same without the
approval of the Department of Labor and Employment;
(j) For an officer or agent of a recruitment or placement agency to become an officer or

member of the Board of any corporation engaged in travel agency or to be engaged directly
or indirectly in the management of a travel agency;
(k) To withhold or deny travel documents from applicant workers before departure for
monetary or financial considerations other than those authorized under the Labor Code and
its implementing rules and regulations;
(l) Failure to actually deploy without valid reason as determined by the Department of Labor
and Employment; and
(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his
documentation and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment
does not actually take place without the worker’s fault. Illegal recruitment when committed by
a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more
persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if
committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.
The persons liable for the above offenses are the principals, accomplices and accessories. In case
of juridical persons, the officers having control, management or direction of their business shall be
liable.
SEC. 7. Penalties. –
(a) Any person found guilty of illegal recruitment shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
not less than six (6) years and one (1) day but not more than twelve (12) years and a fine of
not less than Two hundred thousand pesos (₱200,000.00) nor more than Five hundred
thousand pesos (₱500,000.00).
(b) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos
(₱500,000.00) nor more than One million pesos (₱1,000,000.00) shall be imposed if illegal
recruitment constitutes economic sabotage as defined herein.
Provided, however, That the maximum penalty shall be imposed If the person illegally recruited is
less than eighteen (18) years of age or committed by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority.
(Emphases supplied)
Unlike illegal recruitment as defined under the Labor Code which is limited to recruitment activities
undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority, under Article 6 of RA 8042, illegal
recruitment (for overseas employment) may be committed not only by non-licensees or non-holders
of authority but also by licensees or holders of authority. Article 6 enumerates thirteen acts or
practices [(a) to (m)] which constitute illegal recruitment, whether committed by any person, whether
a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority. Except for the last two acts [(l) and (m)]
on the list under Article 6 of RA8042, the first eleven acts or practices are also listed in Article 3414 of
the Labor Code under the heading "Prohibited practices." Thus, under Article 34 of the Labor Code,
it is unlawful for any individual, entity, licensee or holder of authority to engage in any of the
enumerated prohibited practices, but such acts or practices do not constitute illegal recruitment
when undertaken by a licensee or holder of authority. However, under Article 38(A) of the Labor
Code, when a non-licensee or non-holder of authority undertakes such "prohibited practices," he or
she is liable for illegal recruitment. RA 8042 broadened the definition of illegal recruitment for
overseas employment by including thirteen acts or practices which now constitute as illegal
recruitment, whether committed by a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority.
Under RA 8042, a non-licensee or non-holder of authority commits illegal recruitment for overseas
employment in two ways: (1) by any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing,
hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referring, contract services, promising or advertising for
employment abroad, whether for profit or not; and (2) by undertaking any of the acts enumerated
under Section 6 of RA 8042. On the other hand, a licensee or holder of authority is also liable for
illegal recruitment for overseas employment when he or she undertakes any of the thirteen acts or
practices [(a) to (m)] listed under Section 6 of RA 8042. To constitute illegal recruitment in large
scale, the offense of illegal recruitment must be committed against three or more persons,
individually or as a group.
In this case, the prosecution sufficiently proved that appellant engaged in large-scale illegal
recruitment.
First, appellant is a non-licensee or non-holder of authority. Part of the evidence submitted by the
prosecution is a POEA Certification15 dated 10 March 2003, stating that appellant is not licensed by
the POEA to recruit workers for overseas employment. Appellant admitted that she has no valid
license or authority required by law to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers.
Second, despite the absence of a license or authority to undertake recruitment activities, appellant
gave the impression that she has the power or ability to secure work for private complainants in
Korea. Private complainants Orlando Layoso, Donna Magboo, and Jimmy Lejos all testified that
appellant promised them work as factory workers in Korea and induced them to pay placement fees,
which included the expenses for medical examination and the processing of their documents for
work in Korea. Appellant even showed pictures of previous applicants, whom she allegedly helped
find work abroad. Appellant also explained to them the procedure for overseas employment and
promised them that she would secure their visas and employment contracts within three months.
The testimonies of Orlando Layoso, Donna Magboo, and Jimmy Lejos were corroborated by private
respondents Marcelino Lejos and Lederle Panesa, whose Affidavits of Complaint were adopted as
their direct testimonies.
This Court has held in several cases that an accused who represents to others that he could send
workers abroad for employment, even without the authority or license to do so, commits illegal
recruitment.16
Third, there are at least three victims in this case which makes appellant liable for large-scale illegal
recruitment.
Appellant denies that she gave private complainants the distinct impression that she had the power
or ability to send them abroad for work. She insists that she herself had been applying then as a
factory worker in Korea through Narcisa Santos, who had previously deployed her as domestic
helper in Hongkong. Although appellant admits having received payments from private complainants
and issuing receipts, she submits that she did so only upon the instructions of Narcisa Santos, to
whom she turned over the money collected from private complainants.
The Court is not swayed by appellant’s contentions. As found by the trial court and the appellate
court, it was clearly established that appellant dealt directly with the private complainants: she
explained to them the procedure for overseas employment; she charged them placement fees to
cover their medical examination and the processing of their travel documents; she issued petty cash
vouchers with her signature, acknowledging receipts of their payments; she promised the eventual
release of their visas and employment contracts; and she made them sign Trainee Agreements,
purportedly their contract with their Korean employer. Clearly, appellant, despite being a non-
licensee or non-holder of authority, engaged in recruitment activities, making her liable for illegal
recruitment.
Well-settled is the rule that the trial court, having the opportunity to observe the witnesses and their
demeanor during the trial, can best assess the credibility of the witnesses and their
testimonies.17 Appellant’s mere denial cannot prevail over the positive and categorical testimonies of
the complainants.18 The trial court’s findings are accorded great respect unless the trial court has
overlooked or misconstrued some substantial facts, which if considered might affect the result of the
case.19 Furthermore, factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are
deemed binding and conclusive.20
Thus, we affirm the finding of both the trial court and the appellate court that appellant is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment in large scale. However, we modify the penalty
imposed.
The penalty imposed by the trial court in this case for large-scale illegal recruitment, which
constitutes economic sabotage, is life imprisonment and a fine of ₱500,000. Section 7 of RA 8042
provides that the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than ₱500,000 nor more than
₱1,000,000 shall be imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage. Said article further
provides that the maximum penalty shall be imposed if committed by a non-licensee or non-holder of
authority. Thus, the proper penalty in this case is life imprisonment and a fine of ₱1,000,000.
Estafa
We likewise affirm appellant’s conviction for five counts of estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the
Revised Penal Code. It is settled that a person, for the same acts, may be convicted separately for
illegal recruitment under RA 8042 (or the Labor Code), and estafa under Article 315(2)(a)21 of the
Revised Penal Code.22
The elements of estafa are: (1) the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means
of deceit; and (2) the offended party or a third party suffered damage or prejudice capable of
pecuniary estimation.23 In this case, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that appellant
deceived private complainants into believing that she had the authority and capability to send them
to Korea for employment, despite her not being licensed by the POEA to recruit workers for
overseas employment. She even showed them pictures of past applicants whom she allegedly sent
abroad for work. She also assured them that she would be able to secure their visas and
employment contracts once they pay the placement fee. Because of the assurances given by
appellant, private complainants paid appellant a portion of the agreed placement fee, for which
appellant issued petty cash vouchers24 with her signature, evidencing her receipt of the payments.
Clearly, these acts of appellant constitute estafa punishable under Article 315 (2)(a) of the Revised
Penal Code.
The penalty for estafa depends on the amount defrauded. Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code
provides:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period,
if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such
amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its
maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may
be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory
penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the
penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be;
xxxx
Thus, when the amount of fraud is over ₱12,000 but not exceeding ₱22,000, the penalty imposed is
prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, i.e., from 4 years,
2 months and 1 day to 8 years. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code, which is
prision correccional in its minimum to medium period. The time included in this penalty is from 6
months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months.
When the amount of fraud exceeds ₱22,000, the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period,
and adding one year for every ₱10,000 in excess of ₱22,000. But, the total penalty imposed should
not exceed 20 years. The maximum term under the Indeterminate Sentence Law is that which, in
view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code. The
range of penalty under Article 315 is composed of only two periods. To compute the maximum
period of the indeterminate sentence, the total number of years included in the two periods should
be divided into three equal portions, with each portion forming a period. Following this computation,
the minimum, medium, and maximum periods of the prescribed penalty are:
1. Minimum Period – 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 5 years, 5 months and 10 days;
2. Medium Period – 5 years, 5 months and 11 days to 6 years, 8 months and 20 days;
3. Maximum Period – 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years.
Any incremental penalty, i.e. one year for every ₱10,000 in excess of ₱22,000, shall be added to
anywhere from6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years, at the court’s discretion, provided the total
penalty does not exceed 20 years.25
We find that the penalty imposed by the trial court, and affirmed by the appellate court, is not in
accord with the penalty prescribed. The trial court erroneously imposed the minimum period of "six
1âwphi1
months of arresto mayor in its maximum." Hence, we modify the penalty imposed on the five counts
of estafa and we delete the moral damages awarded for having no basis in law. Considering the
number of victims defrauded, we find that a minimum period of 2 years of prision correccional is
appropriate.
In Criminal Case No. 02-756, where the amount defrauded is ₱15,000, and in the absence of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the maximum term shall be taken from the medium period of
the penalty prescribed (i.e. 5 years, 5 months and 11 days to 6 years, 8 months and 20 days).
Appellant should be sentenced to 2 years of prision correccional as minimum to 6 years and 1 day of
prision mayor as maximum.
In Criminal Case Nos. 02-757, 02-758, and 02-759, where the amount defrauded is ₱35,000 each,
the maximum period (anywhere from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years) shall be imposed,
plus the incremental penalty of one year (additional 1 year imprisonment for the ₱10,000 in excess
of ₱22,000). We fix the maximum term at 7 years of prision mayor. Adding the incremental penalty of
1 year to the maximum term, appellant should be sentenced in each of these cases to 2 years of
prision correccional as minimum to 8 years of prision mayor as maximum.
In Criminal Case No. 02-760, where the amount defrauded is ₱20,000, appellant should be
sentenced to 2 years of prision correccional as minimum to 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor as
maximum.
Furthermore, appellant should indemnify private complainants for the amounts paid to her, with legal
interest at the rate of 6% per annum, from the time of demand, which shall be deemed as the same
day the Informations were filed against appellant, until the amounts are fully paid.26 WHEREFORE,
we AFFIRM WITH MODIFICATIONS the Decision dated 29 November 2012 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CRHC No. 04558 to read as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 02-755, appellant Alelie Tolentino is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment in large scale, constituting economic sabotage, as
defined and penalized in Section 6 and Section 7(b) of RA 8042. She is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of life imprisonment and is ordered to pay a fine of One Million Pesos
(₱1,000,000).
reasonable doubt of estafa, as defined and penalized in Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised
Penal Code. She is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 2 years of prision
correccional as minimum to 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor as maximum. She is ordered
to indemnify private complainant Lederle Panesa in the amount of Fifteen Thousand Pesos
(₱15,000) as actual damages, with legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from 28 June
2002, until the said amount is fully paid.
correccional as minimum to 8 years of prision mayor as maximum. She is ordered to
indemnify private complainant Orlando Layoso in the amount of Thirty Five Thousand Pesos
4. In Criminal Case No. 02-758,appellant Alelie Tolentino is found GUILTY beyond

indemnify private complainant Donna Magboo in the amount of Thirty Five Thousand Pesos
indemnify private complainant Jimmy Lejos in the amount of Thirty Five Thousand Pesos
correccional as minimum to 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor as maximum. She is ordered
to indemnify private complainant Marcelino Lejos in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos
SO ORDERED.

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JMM PROMOTION AND MANAGEMENT, INC. v.

CA 260 SCRA 319 August 5, 1996 (CASE DIGEST)

G.R. No. 109808 1 March 1995

underpayment of wages before the POEA.

sleeping on her right for two years.

ISSUE: Whether or not Chavez is entitled to relief.

by the POEA with the following stipulation appended thereto:

Centrum Placement and Jaz Talents are solidarily liable.

Code. For this reason, laches is not applicable.

G.R. No. 129239 September 5, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

CONTRARY TO and in violation of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code."

The facts are as follows:

Mons pubis = sparse fully grown pubic hair

Medical evidence suggestive of sexual intercourse is present.

Vaginal smear = negative for spermatozoa.

Extragenital injury seen & examined by the Dept. of Surgery."

The defense gave a different version.

We find no merit in the appeal.

Davide, Jr., C .J ., Kapunan and Pardo, JJ ., concur.

Petitioner Douglas Millares was employed by private respondent ESSO International

Posted by Pius Morados on November 10, 2011

(Labor Law – Seafarers are not considered regular employees)

Issue: WON seafarers are considered regular employees.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Ravago is a regular employee of respondent Esso.

G.R. No. 109583 September 5, 1997

TRANS ACTION OVERSEAS CORPORATION, petitioner,

1. Rosele Castigador P14,000.00

2. Josefina Mamon 3,000.00

3. Jenelyn Casa 3,000.00

4. Peachy Laniog 13,500.00

5. Verdelina Belgira 2,000.00

6. Elma Flores 2,500.00

7. Ramona Liturco 2,500.00

8. Grace Sabando 3,500.00

9. Gloria Palma 1,500.00

10. Avelyn Alvarez 1,500.00

11. Candelaria Nono 1,000.00

12. Nita Bustamante 5,000.00

13. Cynthia Arandillo 1,000.00

14. Sandie Aguilar 3,000.00

15. Digna Panaguiton 2,500.00

16. Veronica Bayogos 2,000.00

17. Sony Jamuat 4,500.00

18. Irma Sobrequil 2,000.00

19. Elsie Penarubia 2,000.00

20. Antonia Navarro 2,000.00

21. Selfa Palma 3,000.00

22. Lenirose Abangan 13,300.00

24. Nora Maquiling 2,000.00

25. Rosalie Sondia 2,000.00

26. Ruby Sepulvida 3,500.00

27. Marjorie Macate 1,500.00

28. Estelita Biocos 3,000.00

29. Zita Galindo 3,500.00

30. Nimfa Bucol 1,000.00

31. Nancy Bolivar 2,000.00

32. Leonora Caballero 13,900.00

33. Julianita Aranador 14,000.00

The following complaints are hereby dismissed for failure to appear/prosecute:

1. Jiyasmin Bantillo 6. Edna Salvante

2. Rosa de Luna Senail 7. Thelma Beltiar

3. Elnor Bandojo 8. Cynthia Cepe

4. Teresa Caldeo 9. Rosie Pavillon