D.

POWER OF APPOINTMENT
Appointment with consent of the Commission on Appointment
-Article 7, Sec 16, 1st Sentence of the 1987 Constitution
The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the
heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of
the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments
are vested in him in this Constitution.
Case: Sarmiento III vs Mison
FACTS:
-The petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
professors of Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin the respondent Salvador Mison from performing the
functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and the respondent Guillermo
Carague, as Secretary of the Department of Budget, from effecting disbursements in payment of
Mison's salaries and emoluments,
-On the ground that Mison's appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is
unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
-The respondents, on the other hand, maintain the constitutionality of respondent Mison's
appointment without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
ISSUES:
1. What are the groups of officers whom the President shall appoint?
2. W/N confirmation of the appointments of Commissioners of the Bureau of Customs by the
Commission on Appointments required.
HELD:
1. Under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, just quoted, there are four (4) groups of officers
whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups, to which we will hereafter refer from time to
time, are:

First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by
law; Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President
alone.

The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments, the President appoints. Those belonging to second, third and fourth
groups may be appointed by the President without such confirmation with COA.

2. NO. It is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not
one of those within the first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on
Appointments is required. As a matter of fact, as already pointed out, while the 1935 Constitution
includes "heads of bureaus" among those officers whose appointments need the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, the 1987 Constitution, on the other hand, deliberately excluded the
position of "heads of bureaus" from appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments

Classification of appointments into regular and ad interim can be used only when referring to the four
(4) categories of appointments made by the President of the Philippines in the first sentence of Sec.
16, Art. VIII of the Constitution, which require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, viz:
a) Heads of executive departments;
b) Ambassadors, other public ministers and
c) consuls;
d) Officers of the armed forces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and
e) Officers whose appointments are vested in the President under the Constitution:

i. Chairmen and members of the Constitutional Commissions

ii. Regular members of the judicial and bar council

Article 8, Section 8(2)

The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the President for a term of four years with
the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Of the Members first appointed, the representative
of the Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the professor of law for three years, the retired Justice
for two years, and the representative of the private sector for one year.

iii. Sectoral Representatives

Article 18, Section 7

Until a law is passed, the President may fill by appointment from a list of nominees by the respective
sectors the seats reserved for sectoral representation in paragraph (2), Section 5 of Article VI of this
Constitution.

Case: Quintos-Deles v. Committee on Constitutional Commission

FACTS:
• This is a special civil action for prohibition and mandamus with injunction seeking to compel
respondent Commission on Appointments to allow petitioner Teresita Quintos-Deles to perform and
discharge her duties as a member of the House of Representatives representing the Women's Sector
and to restrain respondents from subjecting petitioner's appointment to the confirmation process.
• Petitioner and 3 others were appointed as Sectoral Representatives by the President pursuant to
Article VII, Section 16, paragraph 2 and Article XVIII, Section 7 of the Constitution.
• The appointees were scheduled to take their oaths before Speaker Mitra at the Session Hall of
Congress after the Order of Business, however, petitioner and the other sectoral representatives-
appointees were not able to take their oaths and discharge their duties as members of Congress due
to the opposition of some congressmen-members of the Commission on Appointments, who insisted
that sectoral representatives must first be confirmed by the respondent Commission
• before they could take their oaths and/or assume office as members of the House of
Representatives.
• This opposition compelled Speaker Mitra to suspend the oath-taking of the four sectoral
representatives.

RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT:
1. The appointment of petitioner Deles was not acted upon by the Commission on Appointments
when Congress went into recess as required by the Constitution;
2. The case of petitioner Deles for appointment as sectoral representative to the House of
Representatives has become moot and academic not having been finally acted upon at the close of
the session of Congress.
ISSUE:
• Whether or not the Constitution requires that the appointment of sectoral representatives to the
House of Representatives be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
• ▪ Yes, since the seats reserved for sectoral representatives in paragraph 2, Section 5, Art. VI may be
filled by appointment by the President by express provision of Section 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution,
the Court held that it is indubitable that sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives are
among the "other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution,"
referred to in the first sentence of Section 16, Art. VII whose appointments are subject to confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments, which states that, “The President shall nominate and, with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution.
”
• ▪ The appointment of Petitioner was made when Congress was in recess, hence, her appointment
was made by virtue of paragraph 2, Section 16 of Article VII, that, “The President shall have the power
to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such
appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until
the next adjournment of the Congress.” In the same manner, it was implicit in the invocation of
paragraph 2, Section 16, Art. VII as authority for the appointment of Petitioner that the President as
appointing authority recognized that the same requires confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. Finally, considering that Congress had adjourned without respondent Commission on
Appointments having acted on petitioner's appointment, said appointment/nomination had become
moot and academic pursuant to Section 23 of the Rules of respondent Commission.

• Appointment without the consent of the Commission on Appointments

• Article 7, Section 16 (1), 1987 Constitution
The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the
heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of
the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments
are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law
to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the
President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
o All other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law
o Those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint
Cases: Soriano v. Lista
FACTS:
• Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo appointed the public respondents to different positions in the Philippine
Coast Guards (PCG) and their subsequent assumption of office without confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments (CA).
• Despite the lack of confirmation by CA, respondents had assumed their duties and functions.
• Petitioner questioned the constitutionality and legality, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, of the
permanent appointments made by the President.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
• The appointees should be prohibited from discharging their duties and functions as such officers of
PCG because of the failure to undergo the confirmation process by CA.
ISSUE:
• Whether or not the President’s appointments in the PCG, without confirmation from the CA, is
unconstitutional.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
• PCG is under the DOTC and no longer part of the Philippine Navy or the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, the promotions and appointments of respondent officers of the PCG, or any PCG officer
from the rank of captain and higher for that matter, do not require confirmation by the CA.
• It is clear from the foregoing provision of the Constitution that only appointed officers from the rank
of colonel or naval captain in the armed forces require confirmation by the CA. The rule is that the
plain, clear and unambiguous language of the Constitution should be construed as such and should
not be given a construction that changes its meaning.
• The enumeration of appointments subject to confirmation by the CA under Section 16, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution is exclusive. The clause "officers of the armed forces from the rank
• of colonel or naval captain" refers to military officers alone. This is clear from the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission on the proposed text of said Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution.
Since the promotions and appointments of respondent officers are not covered by the above-cited
provision of the Constitution, the same need not be confirmed by the CA.

Bautista v. Salonga
FACTS:
• Pres. Cory Aquino appointed Bautista as permanent Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights
(CHR). She took her oath of office and immediately acted as such.
• President appointed the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights pursuant to
the second sentence in Section 16, Art. VII, that is, without the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments (CA) because they are among the officers of government "whom he (the President)
may be authorized by law to appoint." And Section 2(c), Executive Order No. 163, 5 May 1987,
authorizes the President to appoint the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights.
• Secretary of the CA wrote a letter to Bautista requesting for her presence along with several
documents at the office of CA.
• Bautista refused to be placed under CA's review hence this petition filed with the Supreme Court.
• While waiting for the progress of the case, President Aquino appointed Hesiquio R. Mallillin as
"Acting Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights" but he was not able to sit in his appointive
office because of Bautista's refusal to surrender her post.
• Malilin invoked EO 163-A which provides that the tenure of the Chairman and the Commissioners of
the CHR should be at the pleasure of the President thus stating that Bautista shall be subsequently
removed as well.

RESPONDENT MALILIN’S CONTENTION:

• With or without confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, Bautista, as Chairman of the
CHR, can be removed from said office at any time, at the pleasure of the President; and that with the
disapproval of Bautista's appointment (nomination) by the CA, there was greater reason for her
removal by the President and her replacement with Mallillin.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Bautista's appointment is subject to CA's confirmation.
2. Whether or not Bautista's appointment is an ad interim appointment.

SUPREME COURT RULING:

• No, it is within the authority of the President, vested upon her by the Constitution, that she appoints
executive officials. The 2nd sentence of the provision Section 16, Article VII provides that the President
is authorized by law to appoint, without confirmation of CA, several government officials. The position
of Chairman of CHR is not among the positions mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art VII of
the 1987 Constitution, which provides the appointments which are to be made with the confirmation
of CA. It therefore follows that the appointment of the Chairman of CHR by the President is to be
made and finalized even without the review or participation of CA. Bautista's appointment as the
Chairman of CHR, therefore, was already a completed act on the day she took her oath as the
appointment was finalized upon her acceptance, expressly stated in her oath.
• Bautista is the lawful incumbent of the office of Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights by
virtue of her appointment, as such, by the President on 17 December 1988, and her acceptance
thereof, is not to say that she cannot be removed from office before the expiration of her seven (7)
year term. She certainly can be removed but her removal must be for cause and with her right to due
process properly safeguarded.
• Provisions of EO 163-A is unconstitutional and thus cannot be invoked by Mallillin. The Chairman of
CHR cannot be removed at the pleasure of the President for it is constitutionally guaranteed that they
must have a term of office.
• Under the Constitutional design, ad interim appointments do not apply to appointments solely for
the President to make, i.e., without the participation of the Commission on Appointments. Ad interim
appointments, by their very nature under the 1987 Constitution, extend only to appointments where
the review of the Commission on Appointments is needed. That is why ad interim appointments are
to remain valid until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment
of Congress; but appointments that are for the President solely to make, that is, without the
participation of the Commission on Appointments, cannot be ad interim appointments.

Calderon v. Carale

FACTS:
• In 1989, RA 6715 was passed. This law amended PD 442 or the Labor Code. RA 6715 provides that
the Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) shall all be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the
Commission of Appointments (CA).
• Pursuant to the law, Pres. Cory Aquino assigned Carale as the Chairman and the Commissioners
respectively of the NLRC, the appointment was not submitted to the CA for its confirmation.
• Calderon questioned the appointment saying that without the confirmation by the CA, such an
appointment is in violation of RA 6715.
• Calderon asserted that RA 6715 is not an encroachment on the appointing power of the executive
contained in Sec 16, Art. 7, of the Constitution, as Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of other officers appointed by the President additional to those
mentioned in the first sentence of Sec 16 of Article 7 of the Constitution.
• The Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that RA 6715 which amended the Labor Code
transgresses Section 16, Article VII by expanding the confirmation powers of the Commission on
Appointments without constitutional basis.

ISSUE:
• Whether or not Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the CA of appointments extended by
the President to government officers additional to those expressly mentioned in the first sentence of
Sec. 16, Art. 7 of the Constitution whose appointments require confirmation by the CA.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
• No. Art. 215 of the Labor Code as amended by RA 6715 insofar as it requires the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments of appointments of the Chairman and Members of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) is hereby declared unconstitutional.
• The 2nd sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII refers to all other officers of the government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law and those whom the President may be
authorized by law to appoint.
• Indubitably, the NLRC Chairman and Commissioners fall within the second sentence of Section 16,
Article VII of the Constitution, more specifically under the "third groups" of appointees referred to in
Mison, i.e. those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. Undeniably, the Chairman
and Members of the NLRC are not among the officers mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16,
Article VII whose appointments requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. To the
extent that RA 6715 requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the appointments
of respondents Chairman and Members of the National Labor Relations Commission, it is
unconstitutional because:
o It amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution by adding thereto
appointments requiring confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and

o It amends by legislation the second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution, by imposing the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments on appointments which are otherwise entrusted
only with the President.
Manalo v. Sistoza

FACTS:
• President Cory Aquino signed into law Republic Act 6975, creating the Department of Interior and
Local Government (DILG).
• The said Act states that the PNP Chief, Chief Superintendent and Director General shall be
appointed by the President subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
• Pursuant thereto, Pres. Aquino, through Executive Secretary Franklin S. Drilon, promoted 15 police
officers to permanent positions in the Philippine National Police (PNP) with the rank of Chief
Superintendent to Director.
• The said police officers took their oath of office and assumed their respective positions.
• Thereafter, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM), under the then Secretary Salvador
M. Enriquez III, authorized disbursements for their salaries and other emoluments.
• Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, as a taxpayer suit, to assail the legality of subject
appointments and disbursements made therefor.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
1. RA 6975 requires confirmation of the appointments of officers from the rank of senior
superintendent and higher by the CA;
2. The PNP is akin to the Armed Forces where the Constitution specifically requires confirmation by
the CA, and
3. Respondent Secretary in allowing and/or effecting disbursements in favor of respondent officers
despite the unconstitutionality and illegality of their appointments is acting without or in excess of his
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the appointment PNP officers need CA confirmation
2. Whether or not the PNP is akin to the AFP
3. Whether or not Sections 26 and 31 of Republic Act 6975 are constitutional

SUPREME COURT RULING:

1. Under Section 16, Article VII, of the Constitution, there are four groups of officers of the government
to be appointed by the President:

First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by
law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President
alone.
It is well-settled that only presidential appointments belonging to the first group require the
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The appointments of respondent officers who are
not within the first category, need not be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. As held in
the case of Tarrosa vs. Singson, Congress cannot by law expand the power of confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments and require confirmation of appointments of other government
officials not mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
2. The Philippine National Police is separate and distinct from the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

The Constitution, no less, sets forth the distinction. Under Section 4 of Article XVI of the 1987
Constitution, “The Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be composed of a citizen armed force which
shall undergo military training and service, as may be provided by law. It shall keep a regular force
necessary for the security of the State.”
On the other hand, Section 6 of the same Article of the Constitution ordains that: “The State shall
establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in character to be
administered and controlled by a national police commission. The authority of local executives over
the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law.”
The police force is different from and independent of the armed forces and the ranks in the military
are not similar to those in the Philippine National Police. Thus, directors and chief superintendents of
the PNP, such as the herein respondent police officers, do not fall under the first category of
presidential appointees requiring the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

3. Sections 26 and 31 of Republic Act 6975 which empower the Commission on Appointments to
confirm the appointments of public officials whose appointments are not required by the Constitution
to be confirmed are unconstitutional. The rest of Republic Act 6975 stands. It is well-settled that when
provisions of law declared void are severable from the main statute and the removal of the
unconstitutional provisions would not affect the validity and enforceability of the other provisions, the
statute remains valid without its voided sections.
Rufino v. Endriga
FACTS:
• Two groups of appointed members of the Board of Trustees of the Cultural Center of the Philippines
(CCP) are contesting each other’s appointment.
• The Endriga group, sitting as current members, was appointed by Pres. Ramos and is assailing the
appointment of the Rufino group, replacing all 7 members of the Endriga group, by Pres. Estrada.
• Endriga group avers that the appointment into the Board of the Rufino group transgressed PD 15 –
creation of Board of Trustees of CCP.
• As stated in PD 15, specifically Section 6, appointment into the Board shall only be made by a
majority vote of the trustees; presidential appointments can only be made when the Board is entirely
vacant to uphold the CCP’s charter of independence from pressure or politics.
• Rufino group stands by their appointment since the provision on appointments stated in Section 6,
PD 15 is violative of Section 16, Article 7 of the Constitution.
• The Board cannot invoke the charter of autonomy to extend to appointment of its members.

ISSUE:
• Whether or not it is an invalid delegation of the President's appointing power under the
Constitution?
SUPREME COURT RULING:
• No. The source of the President's power to appoint, as well as the Legislature's authority to delegate
the power to appoint, is found in Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. The power to appoint
is the prerogative of the President, except in those instances when the Constitution provides
otherwise. Usurpation of this fundamentally Executive power by the Legislative and Judicial branches
violates the system of separation of powers that inheres in our democratic republican government.
• Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President appoints three groups of officers.
• The grant of the power to appoint to the heads of agencies, commissions, or boards is a matter of
legislative grace. Congress has the discretion to grant to, or withhold from, the heads of agencies,
commissions, or boards the power to appoint lower-ranked officers.
• This is in contrast to the President's power to appoint which is a self-executing power vested by the
Constitution itself and thus not subject to legislative limitations or conditions. The power to appoint
conferred directly by the Constitution on the Supreme Court en banc and on the Constitutional
Commissions is also self-executing and not subject to legislative limitations or conditions.
• The framers of the 1987 Constitution clearly intended that Congress could by law vest the
appointment of lower-ranked officers in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
• The CCP is a public corporation governed by a Board of Trustees. The CCP, being governed by a
board, is not an agency but a board for purposes of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

Upon recommendation of the Judicial and Bar Council

- Members of the Supreme Court and all other courts (Article 8, Sec 9, 1987 Constitution)
SECTION 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the
President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every
vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days from the
submission of the list.

- Ombudsman and Deputes (Article 11, Sec 9, 1987 Constitution)

SECTION 9. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be appointed by the President from a list of at
least six nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council, and from a list of three nominees for
every vacancy thereafter. Such appointments shall require no confirmation. All vacancies shall be filled
within three months after they occur.

Appointment of Vice President as Cabinet Member (Article 7, Sec 3, 1987 Constitution)

SECTION 3. There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the same qualifications and term of office
and be elected with and in the same manner as the President. He may be removed from office in the
same manner as the President.

Steps in the Appointing Process

Case: Lacson v. Romero

Facts:
• In July 25, 1946, the Petitioner, Antonio Lacson, was appointed by the President as provincial fiscal of
Negros Oriental which was affirmed by Commission on Appointment.
• He took the office and, thereafter, performed his duties. In May 17, 1949, upon recommendation by
Secretary of Justice, the President nominated him to the post of provincial fiscal in Tarlac and,
• Simultaneously, the President nominated the Respondent, Honorio Romero, to his position as
provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental.
• Both of them were confirmed by the Commission on Appointment.
• The Petitioner neither accepted the appointment nor assumed the office of fiscal of Tarlac but
respondent Romero took his oath of office of the post of fiscal of Negros Oriental, notified the
Solicitor General and, thereafter, proceeded to his station.
• Commotion started between the parties as both of them appeared in the hearings of Judge Narvasa
and Judge Ocampo where the latter judges favors the Respondent.
• When the Petitioner requested payment for his salary as provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental, it was
turned down and instead paid Respondent Romero.
Issue:
• The determination as to who is entitled to the position of provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental,
depends upon the correct answers to several queries such as:
• (1) Did the Commission on Appointments alone, without his acceptance nomination of Lacson to
Tarlac and its confirmation by the thereof create a vacancy in the post of provincial fiscal of Negros
Oriental so that Romero could be lawfully appointed to said vacancy?
• (2) Does the nomination of Lacson to Tarlac and its confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments serve as and is equivalent to a removal of Lacson as fiscal of Negros Oriental? If in the
affirmative, was that removal and lawful?
• (3) Could the President who appointed Lacson as provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental remove him at
will and without cause, or did the post of provincial fiscal in general have attached to it a tenure of
office during which the incumbent may not be removed except for cause?
Rulings:
• The appointment to a government post like that of provincial fiscal to be complete involves several
steps.
o First, comes the nomination by the President.
o Then to make that nomination valid and permanent, the Commission on Appointments of the
Legislature has to confirm said nomination.
o The last step is the acceptance thereof by the appointee by his assumption of office.
• The first two steps, nomination and confirmation, constitute a mere offer of a post. They are acts of
the Executive and Legislative departments of the Government. But the last necessary step to make the
appointment complete and effective rests solely with the appointee himself. He may or he may not
accept the appointment or nomination.
• As to the second question, it is obvious that the intended transfer of Lacson to Tarlac on the basis of
his nomination thereto, if carried out, would be equivalent to a removal from his office in Negros
Oriental. To appoint and transfer him from one province to another would mean his removal or
separation from the first province.
• Article XII, section 4 of said instrument provides that "no officer or employee in the civil service shall
be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law." This constitutional provision is
reproduced word for word in the in the paragraph of sec. 694 of the Rev. Adm. Code, as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 177, section 22.
• It is contended on of the respondent that the power of removal is inherent in the power to appoint
and that consequently, the President had the right to remove the petitioner as provincial fiscal of
Negros Oriental and transfer him to Tarlac. Ordinarily, where there is no constitutional limitation the
contention of the respondent would be tenable; but where as in the Philippines and as already stated
the Constitution forbids the removal of a civil service official or employee like the petitioner except for
cause as provided by law, said right of the Chief Executive is qualified and limited. That constitutional
prohibition is a limitation to the inherent power of the Executive to remove those civil service officials
whom he appoints.
• In view of the foregoing, we are constrained to find and to hold that the transfer of Lacson to Tarlac
by his nomination to the post of provincial fiscal of that province was equivalent to and meant his
removal as provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental; that said removal was illegal and unlawful for lack of
valid cause as provided by law and the Constitution; that the confirmation of the nomination by the
Commission on Appointments did not and could not validate the removal, since the Constitution is
equally binding on the Legislature; that a provincial fiscal is a civil service official or employee whose
tenure of office is protected by the Constitution; and that Antonio Lacson could not be compelled to
accept his appointment as provincial fiscal of Tarlac; that having declined said appointment, he
continued as provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental; that inasmuch as he neither left, abandoned nor
resigned from his post as provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental, there was no vacancy in said post to
which the respondent could be legally appointed; and that consequently, the appointment of the
respondent was invalid.
• In conclusion, we find and declare the petitioner to be the provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental, and
the respondent not being entitled to said post, is hereby ordered to surrender to the petitioner all the
records or papers appertaining to said office that may have come into his possession. The respondent
provincial auditor and provincial treasurer, are hereby ordered to pay to the herein petitioner his
salary from June 16, 1949, and as long as said petitioner continues to be the legal incumbent to the
office in question. Considering that the respondent appears to have acted in good faith and relied
upon his nomination by the President and the confirmation thereof by the Commission on
Appointments, as well as the position taken by the Solicitor-General, who sustained his appointment,
we make no pronouncement as to costs.

Constitutional Limitations on the President’s Appointing Power

Article 7, Section 13, 1987 Constitution

SECTION 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any
other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any
franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.

The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President
shall not during his tenure be appointed as members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office
of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices,
including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.

SECTION 14. Appointments extended by an Acting President shall remain effective, unless revoked by
the elected President within ninety days from his assumption or reassumption of office.
SECTION 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his
term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments
to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger
public safety.

Constitutional Limitations on the President’s Appointing Power

-Article 7, Sec 13, 1987 Constitution

The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall
not,unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their
tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession,
participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or
special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid
conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.

The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President
shall not, during his tenure, be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the
Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or
offices, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.

-Article 7, Sec 14, 1987 Constitution

Appointments extended by an Acting President shall remain effective, unless revoked by the elected
President, within ninety days from his assumption or reassumption of office.

-Article 7, Sec 15, 1987 Constitution

Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a
President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.

Cases: DeRama v. Court of Appeals

Facts:
• Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, petitioner Conrado L. de Rama
wrote a letter dated July 13, 1995 to the Civil Service Commission (or CSC), seeking the recall of the
appointments of fourteen (14) municipal employees.
• Justifying his recall request on the allegation that the appointments of the said employees were “
midnight” appointments of the former mayor, Ma. Evelyn S. Abeja, done in violation of Article VII,
Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution.
• The CSC denied petitioner’s request for the recall of the appointments of the fourteen employees,
for lack of merit.
• The CSC upheld the validity of the appointments on the ground that they had already been
approved by the Head of the CSC Field Office in Lucena City, and for petitioner’s failure to present
evidence that would warrant the revocation or recall of the said appointments.
• The CSC opined that the appointing authority can validly issue appointments until his term has
expired, as long as the appointee meets the qualification standards for the position.
Issue:
• Whether or not the appointments made by the outgoing Mayor are forbidden under Art. VII, Sec. 15
of the Constitution. YES
Rulings:
• The CSC correctly ruled that the constitutional prohibition on so-called “midnight appointments,”
specifically those made within 2 months immediately prior to the next presidential elections, applies
only to the President or Acting President.
• There is no law that prohibits local elective officials from making appointments during the last days
of his or her tenure.
De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council
Facts
• The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days after
the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.
• These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory
retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the presidential election.
• Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that “vacancy shall be filled within ninety days
from the occurrence thereof” from a “list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar
Council for every vacancy.” Also considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the
Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President from making appointments within two
months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice
public service or endanger public safety.
• The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the process of
filling up the position of Chief Justice.
• Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically considered” for the position of Chief
Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T.
Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate
Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last
two declined their nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010,
respectively.
• The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because the
prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in the
Supreme Court.
• It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence,
pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the framers intended the prohibition
to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the
Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive Department) was not
written in Article VIII (Judicial Department);
• That the framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the President’s
power to appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensure its independence from “political
vicissitudes” and its “insulation from political pressures,” such as stringent qualifications for the
positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the President shall appoint a
Supreme Court Justice.
• A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly initiated the process,
there being an insistence from some of the oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could only do so once
the vacancy has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010).
• Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume its process until the short list is prepared, in
view of the provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint
one from the short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate
Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
Issue:
• Whether or not the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his
retirement.

Rulings:
• Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the
Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.
• Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.
• The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting
President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
• The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court
shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its
discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days
from the occurrence thereof.
• Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not
have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the
prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such
specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President
making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of
the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
• Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the
power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments
within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive
Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered together with the
other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume
that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended
Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was their intention in respect of
appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a
similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.