Two Concepts of 'Society as a Moral System': Evans-Pritchard's Heterodoxy

Author(s): T. M. S. Evens
Source: Man, New Series, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Jun., 1982), pp. 205-218
Published by: Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland
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TWO CONCEPTS OF 'SOCIETY AS A MORAL SYSTEM':
EVANS-PRITCHARD'S HETERODOXY
T. M. S. EVENS
ofNorthCarolinaat ChapelHill
University

It is arguedthat,contrary to thereceivedview,thereis notonebutat leasttwosignificant

conceptions ofsocietyas a moralsystem inthestructural tradition.
functionalist Theyexpress a
weakanda strongsenseof'morality' Thisconceptual
respectively. is a pregnant
equivocation
construction of Durkheim's sociologyandis dramatically
broughtforth by Evans-Pritchard's
notorious recommendation to turnawayfromorthodox tosemantic
functionalism analysis.As
theequivocation impliesthatsocialanthropologyis boundbya stultifying dualism,
analytical
profound changeofpresuppositions seemsa prescribedtherapy.

FredrikBarth (I966: I-2) in saying

is, I think,half-right

viewhasbeen,as I haveunderstood
The structuralist's on choices[of
it,that[the]constraints
insociety]
individuals is a moralsystem.
aremoral:society Thisviewleadstoa typeofanalysis
whereregularitiesin thepatternof behaviour are relatedto a setof moralconstraintsand
whichstipulate
incentives thecritical
featuresofthatregularity....
By thistransformation,one form,in thesenseofa setof regular ofbehaviour,
patterns is
intoanother,
translated virtually
congruent form,madeup of moralinjunctions, whichare
madelogicallypriorto behaviour.The modeldoesnotdepictanyintervening socialprocess
betweenthemoralinjunction andthepattern. Thereis indeedno scienceofsociallifein this
procedure, ofhowactualforms,
no explanation muchlessfrequency inbehaviour,
distributions
comeabout,beyondtheaxiomatic: whatpeopledo is influenced bymoralinjunctions.

By 'structuralist'Barthof coursehas in mind 'structural functionalist'.

For my purposes,thequotation deserves exegesis on one count:it attributes
to the structuralfunctionalistthe view that 'society is a moral system',and it
opposes to thisview the aspirationof a 'science of social life'.The opposingof
scientific'explanation'to understanding in terms of 'moral injunctions'sug-
gests that Barth hopes to replace, once and for all, 'reason' with 'cause' in
social-anthropologicalanalysis. He rejectsstructural-functionalist analysisas
being tautologicaland merely'axiomatic', and aspiresinsteadto know how
'actual forms'of behaviourcome about. Evidently,as in anotherplace (Evens
I977) I have soughtto demonstratemorefully,Barthconceivesof societyas a
natural ratherthan moral system,and of science as a positivistratherthan
relativistpursuit. All this suggeststhat when he berateshim for failingto
'depict any interveningsocial process' betweenmoral rules and behavioural
patterns,Barth has in mind not simplythat the structuralfunctionalist has
Man (N. S.) I7, 205-2 I8

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206 T. M. S. EVENS

botched thejob, but ratherthathis efforts in thisregardmustcome to grief.

For in the absence of a determinatesocial system,the sense of a process
interveningbetween moralityand behaviourbecomes problematical,if not
irreparablyobscure.
Barth insists that for the structuralfunctionalist the 'constraintsand in-
centives' that determinesocial behaviourare 'moral'. However, I thinkthat
thisclaim, thoughstandardfarein the discipline,is confusing.Social anthro-
pology is gravelycharacterised by at leasttwo conceptsof 'societyas a moral
system',one employinga 'weak' and one a 'strong9senseof 'moral'. As I use
these terms, the weak sense of 'moral' gives to the idea of choice a trivial
content,while the strongsense takesthatidea veryseriously.
My object is basically twofold. Both goals are modest but, I fancy,
important.The firstis to demonstratethatthe conceptof 'societyas a moral
system'is significantly ambiguousin 'the' structural tradition,
functionalist and
to unpack that ambiguity.The second is to directattentionto a categorical
dualism which has underlainsocial anthropology'sattemptsto come to grips
with itselfas a mode of systematicinquiry.This dualism may be variously
denominatedand herehas alreadybeeninsinuatedby thepolemicaloppositions
rehearsedfromBarth.Indeed,I choseto beginby quotingProfessorBarth,not
so as to tiltwithhim,butratherbecause-in presenting thedualismin question
and the receivedwisdom concerningfunctionalism's attachmentto a moral-
systemconceptionso simplyand forthrightly-his argumentservesexception-
ally well to set the scene for my own.
My argumentmay be neatlyexpositedby reviewing,in broad and selective
terms, the thoughtof two functionalist mastersin the relevantconnexion,
namelyEmile Durkheimand E. E. Evans-Pritchard.

It is of course truethatDurkheimviewedsocietyas essentially'a moralpower'

(Durkheim 1953: 54). But it is importantto be clear about what exactlyhe
meantor wantedto emphasiseby thisassertion.For,whenall is said and done,
what he seems to have had in mindis less thatsocietyis a moralphenomenon
than thatmoralityis a social one.
As is well known,1the corpus of Durkheim'swork is riddledwitha basic
anomaly. Although he was deeply concernedto establishconceptuallythe
autonomy of social from psychologicalor individualreality,he was also
squarelycommittedto makingsociologya positivescience.As a result,despite
his greatand genial insightsinto the autonomousnatureof society,his grasp
thereofwas fullof positivistresidueand design.Hence, oncehe had established,
to his theoreticalsatisfaction,
thedistinctive realityof society,his comprehen-
sive (though remittent)methodwas, in the mannerof positivism,to reduce
analyticallyall thingssocial to thatreality.Perhapsthemost pointedexample
of this sociologism is his analysis of religion.Morality,which he saw as
integrallylinked to religion (Lukes I973: 4I3), was given much the same
reductionisttreatmentby him.

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 T. M. S. EVENS 207

Durkheim (I96I: io8 sqq.) was acutelyaware of the Kantianparadox that

moral rulesare imperativeswhichentailtheautonomyof theiradherents.But
Kant's solution (that moralityhas no authoritybut Reason or Will) is
metaphysical,and Durkheimrejectedit in favourof one morein keepingwith
a positivescience. As he saw it (I96I: I20, II5), 'willingacceptanceis nothing
less than enlightenedassent';which is to say, informedcompliancewith 'the
natureof things'virtuallyconstitutes autonomy.As it stands,thisargumentis
more dialecticalthanpositive.For as long as 'enlightenment' and 'thenatureof
things' go undetermined,that is, so long as the categoryof the good or
desirable remains open, therecan be no certaintyin moral reasoningand
therefore, in his words (I96I: I20), no 'scienceof moralmatters'.No wonder,
then,thathe did not leave theargumentin thisform,but wenton to stipulate
that by 'the natureof things'he meant 'the natureof society',and thatby
'enlightenment'he meant a positiveknowledge of thatnature:'the good is
society' (I96I: 96, I I7' I I4 sqq.).
Lukes (I973: 4I7-I8) makesout in Durkheim'sworkfivedistinct
under-
standingsof the 'moral' as thisnotion relatesto thatof the 'social'. All five
pertaindecidedlyto thesocial characterof morality(ratherthantheotherway
round),but only thefirstneed concernus here:'an actionis moralifand onlyif
it is aimed at a socialor impersonal,ratherthanindividualor personal,end'
(Lukes I973: 4I7, originalemphases).For Durkheim(I953: 52), moralitynot
only 'begins withlifein thegroup' but also ends there.'Man . . . actsmorally
only when he takesthecollectivity as thegoal ofhis conduct'(I96I: 256); more
simply,'To act morallyis to act in termsof the collectiveinterest'(I96I: 59);
more simplystill,'societyis theend of all moralactivity'(1953: 52).
It is eminentlyarguable(cf. GouldnerI97I: I23), then,thatDurkheimwas
more concerned to propound that moralityis society'sinstrumentthan to
establish that society is constitutedthroughthe exercise of men's moral
faculties.He appearsto have arrivedat this(functionalist)
positionas follows.
Briefly,he foundthatbecausewe dependon it forour moraldevelopment,we
experiencesociety'as constituting a moral power superiorto our own', such
that 'our will defersto its imperatives'(I953: 56); then,by way of ethical
naturalism,or so it would seem, he slipped to the deonticconclusionthat
societydoes indeed constitute'an end thatsurpassesus' (I953: 56).
By identifying the 'good' with society,Durkheim(despitethe factthathe
ingeniouslymanagedto excepthimselffromthisdeterminism2) obviatesmoral
choice. In otherwords, in his theorythegood is whollydetermined forus and
not at all by us.
As the point is both deeply involved and criticalto my argument,let me
make more of it. By predetermining the good, Durkheimeffectively vitiates
the formalnatureof thatcategory.As a consequence,he trivialisestheidea of
moral choice. For wherethesubstantiveends of moralityare alreadygiven,in
an importantsense thereis nothingleftto determine.To fillup withcontent
the categoryof the good is to emptyof meaningtheidea of moralchoice. For
these reasons, I maintain that Durkheim was predominantlyinclined to
conceive of societyas moral only in a weak sense.
Two objectionscome to mindhere. First,in view of Durkheim'sargument

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 208 T. M. S. EVENS

for the ethical internalisationof society ('at the same time that [society]
dominatesus it entersintous' (I953: I04 & parti passim)),does he not manage
theoreticallyto allow us a due automony? No, for the argumentfrom
internalisationis specious. As the veryidea of internalisation presupposesthe
radicaldivisionit is meantto mediate,how can it serveitspurpose?In effect, it
is a thoroughlylinguisticresponseto a substantivedilemma-it purportsto
give us our due by givingour name to theopposition.The thesisof theethical
internalisationof societygrantsus a relativeautomonyin appearanceonly;in
factit preservesthe unmitigatedtheoreticalhegemonyof society.
The second objectionis moresubstantial.It mightbe arguedthatevenwhen
the good is wholly circumscribed,a choice remains,to wit, that between
moralityand immorality.But this argument,thoughnot exactlywrong, is
mal-observant.As I understandits mostfundamental meaning,'moralchoice'
presupposesalternativesbetweenwhich reasonmakes it essentially difficult
to
decide. However, by definitiontherecan be no (good) reasonforelectingthe
trulyimmoralalternative.Were such a reasonavailable,thenby thetermsof
thediscourseit would be implicitthattheimmoralalternative is a moralthing
to do. In the relevantsense, therefore,the 'choice' between moralityand
immorality,inasmuchas-itis no contest,is no choice. I am not suggestingthat
it is impossible to elect the immoral course of action, but ratherthat that
decision distinctlyimplies the understanding thatin generalmoralityis less
thancertain.For authenticchoice entailsessentialambiguity.
If thepointhas a captiousair,perhapsI can makeit plainer.Wheremorality
is fixed positively,the alternativeof immoralitycan scarcelyappear as a
genuineoption. For ifmoralityis utterlycertainthenit standsto reasonthatit
is more a matterof naturalnecessitythanof factitiousdesign.In whichcase,
the 'choice' between moralityand immoralityamountsat best to Hobson's.
Under such an absolutistregime,the facultyof moral choice remainsa tacit
proclivity,an unliberatedfunction.It is onlywhen moralityof thisfixedkind
is mediatedby an indefeasibly immoralact, thatmoralityand immoralitycan
presentthemselvesas truealternatives. That is to say, it is only in theethical
breach thatthe facultativecapacity,the possibilityof choice,is disclosedand
therewithmaximallyengaged.The consummateimmoralact does not merely
break the law but also breakswithit; by realisinga coursecontraryto it, the
immoralact servesto dissolvethelaw's uttercertainty. And once thelaw is no
longer crediblycertain,moralchoiceas suchbecomesa realpossibility.
This argument,about the reflexivedevelopmentof moral choice, is not
original here. It may also be found, to name one prominentplace, in the
biblicalstoryof Genesis,wheretheFall describesan ascentto moralconscious-
ness in termsof a descentfromdivineprovidence.Though thisconsideration
may be difficultto weigh here, it does lend to my argumenta certain
paradigmaticauthority.
My argumenthas more than terminologicalsignificance,as it implies a
differenceto the conduct of sociological inquiry.Under the weak sense of
societyas a moral system,and as a logicalcorollaryofit, society'saccessibility
to naturalscience remainsin principleunproblematical. The weak senseneed
make no bones about science'squest forcertainknowledge,and where data

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 T. M. S. EVENS 209

exhibita characteristic and implacableindeterminism, comportsreadilywith

notions of probabilityand chance, perhaps the last conceptualstands of a
positivescience.
So long as moralitywas thoughtby him to be a matterof themaximisation
of social utility,and conformityto moral injunctionsto be in the natureof
things,Durkheim could ground his theoryon what logical positivistscall a
protocol proposition,to wit: under 'normal' or 'healthy'conditions,social
conductfunctionson behalfof society.This propositionmightwell be thought
of as thelaw of structuralfunctionalism.As a matterof formand logic,it is to
social science what, say, the law of gravityis to astronomicalscience.These
considerationssurelypurportthatDurkheim'sconceptof 'societyas a moral
system'need have no quarrelwithnaturalscience.

Durkheim's posture in this regardis perhapsmost vividlydisplayedin the

work of his Britishdisciple,Radcliffe-Brown, especiallyin thelatter'sA natural
scienceofsociety(I957). Radcliffe-Brown, unawarethatmoralityhas
apparently
a 'moral' as distinct from a 'natural' force, exposited his mechanically
positivisticview thatsocietyis a 'naturalsystem'.By thishe meantthatsociety
is a systemcomposed of phenomenallyreal unitsstandingin relationships of
mutual interdependenceand exhibitinglaws 'immanentin the universe'and
'always true', thatis, 'naturallaws' (I957: 14). As to his feltindebtednessto
Durkheimforthisview, his citationof whathe regardedas the'basic postulate'
of the French school speaks for itself:'We must assume that human con-
ventionsand works of art . . . can be treatedas thoughtheywere entianaturae.
ofthisis-lesfaitssociaux
Durkheim'sformulation sontdeschoses'3
(I957: I5I).
If my argumentis correct,thata moral-system approachand naturalscience
can go hand in hand, thenit may be asked how it is that,as Barthclaims,the
structuralfunctionalisthas failed to depict 'any interveningsocial process'
between moral injunctionsand behaviouralpatterns? My responseis thatthis
claim is at best rathersuperficialand at worstuntrue.
Consider,forexample,Gluckman's(I959; I96I) well-known
analysesof
conflict,and Turner's(I957) of ritual.FranklyI do not see how one mighteven
be temptedto thinkthatthesevery sophisticatedanalysesdescribea simple
explanatoryrefrainof 'injunction-behaviour-injunction'. Indeed,a strongcase
can be made (Moore I975) thatwhat Gluckmanand Turnerimplicitlydepict
by these functionalistaccountsare social processeswhereinindividualinter-
actantsare constrainedto make 'choices' against,ratherthan for,social in-
determinacy.4The especial constraintsthat concernthese two scholarsare
cross-cuttingloyalties and politico-economicambition, that is, nominally
non-normativeconditions.
Now, judging fromthe core of Barth'stheory(I966), whathe has in mind
'by interveningsocial process' is not withoutsubstantialconnexionto con-
ditions of this kind, non-normativeconditions serving to constrainthe
'choices' of individual interactants.Not only, then, do these functionalist

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210 T. M. S. EVENS

analysesdepictprocessesthatintervenebetweenmoralityand behaviour,but,I
would argue,theyalso depictones whichareappropriablefromthestandpoint
of Barth's own analyticaldesigns.This is no place to go intodetailon Barth's
meaning.But enough has been said to indicatethat,thoughit drawsattention
to an importanttheoreticalconsideration,Barth's presentchargeagainstthe
structuralfunctionalistsshould not be accepteduncritically.
Therefore,contraryto Barthand, I expect,the receivedopinion,the view
that society is a moral systemis not necessarilyincongruentwith a natural
science of society.

However, it is over just this unseemingcongruencythat Evans-Pritchard

decided to do mightybattlewithhis chosentheoretical orientation.In his I950
Marett Lecture (I963: 26), he took the positionthatif social anthropology
'studiessocietiesas moralsystemsand not as naturalsystems',thenit 'is a kind
of historiography,and thereforeof philosophyor art'; such a social anthro-
pology is 'interestedin designratherthanin process... seekspatternsand not
scientificlaws, and interprets ratherthanexplains'.Evidently,even thoughin
other respectshis predilectionforfunctionalist analysisremainedoutspoken,
Evans-Pritchardchose to take the conceptof moralityseriously,so seriously,
in fact,thathe was compelledby reason to break with the idea of a natural
science of society.
As I grasp thegeneticlogic of Evans-Pritchard's position,to take'morality'
thusseriouslyis to regardmoralchoiceas an essentiallyautonomicratherthan
mechanical practice. Therefore,if society trulyproceeds by way of moral
choice, its course can always be otherwise,for so can its ends. This in-
determinist and 'creationist'conceptis whatI have in mindby thestrongsense
of 'societyas a moralsystem'.On it,thebuttresses of 'chance'and 'probability'
notwithstanding, thereis no room forthinkingthata moralsystemis afterall
merelya naturalsystem.Under thestrongsenseof 'societyas a moralsystem',
theprocessof social lifemaybe seento be a matterof moralratherthannatural
selection. Whereaswith 'moral selection'thereis -atwork a trueselector,an
activeagentmakingchoices,thisis preciselynotthecase withnaturalselection,
whereintheveryidea of selectionis probablya linguisticresiduumof thetime
when God was thoughtto while away his hoursmakingworldlydecisions.
The indeterminism pertainingto moralselectiondoes not derivesolelyfrom
the limitationsof our investigatory powers and frominsufficient knowledge.
Werewe in a positionto know all thefactsaboutmoralconduct,we would still
be ill equipped to predictitscourse.For, beyonda certainpointofinquiryinto
moral conduct, theresimplyis no factof the matter-in otherwords, the
situationof moral choice is basicallyambiguous.
Therefore,when it comes to analysingthe moralprocess,'probability'and
'chance' are not enough.5Stochasticalnotionssuch as thesesystematically fail
to attendto the factthattheindeterminism characterisingthemoralprocessis
as much a creativefunctionas it is a representation of our epistemological

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 T. M. S. EVENS 2II

inadequacies. Needless to say, theoversightcan be consequential,not onlyfor

researchdesignand theoreticalunderstanding, but also, sinceour self-imageis
involved, forthe moral processitself.
The main pointis this.Moral selectionentailschoicethatis in realmeasure
autonomous;and in so faras itis, theconductthatensuesfromitcannotbe said
to be determinedin the same sense that,say, the pathof a planetor even the
fate of a species are, ordinarily,said to be determined.For what is self-
determinedis, by definition, uniquelydetermined, and therefore mustyieldan
ever original run of events,in a word, a 'history'.Hence Evans-Pritchard
concluded thatsocial anthropologyoughtto be doing history.
In lightof thishermeneuticsof Evans-Pritchard's position,it may be seen
why Barth mightbe given to thinkthatwhere societyis viewed as a moral
system,efforts to depicta processintermediary betweenruleand behaviourare
likelyto come to grief.If societyis a moralsystem,thenit is self-determining,
which can only mean thatthereis no rigorouslydifferentiable processor no
positive mechanismlinkingrule to behaviour.In effect,underthesecircum-
stances thereis between rule and behaviournothingfora positivescienceto
depict.6
Still, as I interpretEvans-Pritchard'sheterodoxy,if the process of moral
selectiondoes not yield to positivescrutiny,neitherdoes it resistall under-
standing.Though betweenruleand behaviourthereobtainsno positivelinking
mechanism,if moral choice is reallya matterof choice, thenneithercan the
translationof rule into behaviourbe entirelydirect.The idea of choice makes
no more sensein thecompleteabsenceof limitsthanit does in theircertainand
comprehensivepresence.7 That moral choices are not determinedin the
positivesense,does not meanthattheygo completely'undetermined'; theyare
indeed 'determined',but by projectsand reasonsratherthanby causes.
Now projects and reasons have to do with somethingthat is tneantor
intendedby someone. That is, by presuminga meaningful fill,an intermediate
reality,projectsand reasonspurportthatsubjectand objectareneitherseparate
nor entirelydistinct.In effect,whereas causalitypresupposescleanly dis-
tinguishableparticularsand energeticor operative relations,projects and
reasons take for grantedthe encompassingwhole and mindfulor participa-
toryrelations.
Therefore,where moral selectionprevails,the resultingcourse of events
may be seen to be keyedto signification ratherthanto materialexistence-it is
meaningfulness,above and beyond entitativeprocess,thatcomes to inform
what happens.
Given thiscircumstance, it standsto reasonthatanthropological understand-
ing will be the rewardof thosewho seek in thefieldgood reasonsratherthan
efficientcauses. To recall Evans-Pritchard'swords, the studentof social life
who concernshimselfanalyticallywith 'process' ratherthan 'design', 'laws'
ratherthan'patterns',and 'explanation'ratherthan'interpretation', is bound to
do so in vain. For if it is meaningfulconstructsthat mainly engage our
investigativeattentions,then 'intelligibility
is explanation'and anthropology
must be a 'branchof semanticsor hermeneutics'(Evans-Pritchard I963: 49).
This pictureof social anthropologyimpliesthatthe best, indeed the only,

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2I2 T. M. S. EVENS

way to accomplishour analyticalchargeis to practise,albeitto peculiarends

(social scientificones), the very 'process' we study,namely,meaningcon-
struction.As befitsa 'process' of self-determination, the makingof meaning
describes,hermeneutically (RicoeurI97I), a circlein motionor, cybernetically
(Crosson I967), a feedbackloop. A figureof this kind, both circularand
advancing,is one dialecticalresponseto Meno's epistemologicalparadox (in
Plato's dialogue by thatname): a man cannotask reallyeitherabout what he
knows or about what he does notknow; forifhe knows,thenhe does notneed
to ask, and ifhe does notknow, thenhe has nothingto ask about. Accordingto
what I taketo be Evans-Pritchard's (hermeneutic)solution,a manproceedsby
plumbingthe meaningof the partsby reference to thatof thewhole, and the
meaningof thewhole by reference to thatof theparts,constructing
something
novel in the exchange.
Thus, in orderto understandmeanings,meaningmustbe made of them.As
and it was
a disciplinaryprocedure,thisactivityis typicallycalled translation;
indeed Evans-Pritchard's well knownconclusionthatthetaskof social anthro-
pology is 'to translateone set of ideas intotermsof another[our own], so that
theymay become intelligible'(I963: 58).8

I have insistedthatstructural functionalismis characterisedby not one but (at

least) two conceptsof 'societyas a moralsystem',a weak and a strong.True,
the developmentof the strongconceptconstitutesa certainshiftaway from
positivefunctionalism. Nevertheless,as evidencedby Durkheim'sambiguity,
the strongconcept has been implicitrightfromthe startin functionalism's
apprehensionof societyas a primemover,a consideredwhole or individual.
Durkheim'sambiguitywas fairlydramatisedby Radcliffe-Brown's and Evans-
Pritchard'scontrastingvisionsof a naturalscienceof societyand an historio-
graphicalsemanticsrespectively, and by now has been stretchedtight.
As it has been usual to thinkof structuralfunctionalism in termsof a fixed
and unitarytheoreticalframework,thisfindingof irregularity at theverycore
of thatframeworkseemsusefulifonlyas a prophylactic againsthistoricalmis-
apprehension.However, the findinghas an even more directbearingon our
enterprise,as it stronglysuggeststhatour stock of theoreticalknowledgeis
heavilyencumberedwith dualism.
Why should it be the case thatour view of societyas a moral systemis
divided so? For an answerwe may take a hintfromBarth'spolemic against
structuralfunctionalism. In settingover and againsteach otherthetwo views
of society,as a moraland a naturalorderrespectively, Barth,needlessto say,
implicatesan ontologicaldualism.But it is thissame dualism,of moralityand
nature,thatbasicallyinformsthetwo sensesof 'societyas a moralsystem'.The
weak senseis weak and thestrongstrongpreciselybecauseeach takesmorality
and natureto be mutuallyexclusiveontologicaldomains,and triesto resolve
thisdualistbind by reducingone domain to theother.
This reductionismis consequential.To focus on one empiricallydoubtful

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 T. M. S. EVENS 213

matter(cf. Evens I978), in Barth'swork it tendsto resultin a sordidview of

human beings-they are seen to act out of the basest of motivationsonly,
self-regard.In Durkheim'swork,in parallelvein,as Gouldner(I97I: I20 sqq.)
has recentlypropounded,the reductionismtendsto yieldan equallyunhappy
picture,but now of thesocial system-it is made out to be guidedalwaysand
everywhereby collectiveutilityalone, its individualmembersappearingto
count for nothingin themselves.To me, since each is keyed to a kind of
individual(in Durkheim'scase, thecollectiveconceivedofas an individual)and
a correspondingprudentialist accountof things,thesetwo views of man and
social life-Barth's and Durkheim's-are squarelyin the warp of occidental
thoughtand hence smack of sociocentrism.9
For relief,then,may we look to the strongversionof 'societyas a moral
system'? I do not thinkso, as it too is securelybound by the dualism in
question. Obviously, in opposing interpretative to explanatoryanalysis,the
strongversion,like the weak, takesforgrantedthatit mustchoose decisively
betweenmoralityand nature;onlyin itscase it makesitsstandwiththeformer
ontologicalpredicationratherthanwith thelatter.
Nor does thisreversediscrimination escapegraveconsequences.Specifically,
an exclusively interpretative approach logically makes it difficult,if not
impossible,to bringintoaccountthecontingent flowof social events.Such an
approachis definitively positedon theidea of meaning as meaning,and therefore
eitherbegs or altogetherrationalisesthequestionof existentialprocessand the
concretecoefficient.
To make the point anotherway, a semanticanthropologybegins with
relationsbetween concreteparticularsratherthanwith the particularsthem-
selves. In effect,it presumesthe whole insteadof the part. But, for all its
seemliness,this holism or relativismis constitutionally retarded.As, forthe
obvious reason thatto do so would impairits own logical consistencyas an
anthropologyof meaning,suchan approachcannotbringbackintoaccountthe
contreteparticularsit has (so rightly)relativised.That is to say, it cannot
relativiseitsown relativismandgroundtherelationsit takesforgranted,at least
not without compromising its own integrityby making fundamentally
uncertainthe meaningof meaning.Hence, in theinterestof self-preservation
and, ironically,at thebehestof a positivisticpresumptionof meaningas such,
semantic anthropologymust fall shortof consummatingits own relativist
programme. 10
It is hardlysurprising,then,thatEvans-Pritchard's work,mostparticularly,
his classic analysis (1940) of the Nuer political order, has been roundly
criticised(cf. PetersI967; Leach I96I: 8, 297, 305; Nicholas I966; Kuper 1973:
II8-I9) foran excessiveconcernwithnativemeaningsand models,and fora
correlativefailureto give the materialfactsof social lifetheiranalyticaldue.
Althoughit was writtenat least a decade beforeEvans-Pritchard made public
his notoriousrepudiationof thereceiveddisciplinary view, The Nuer,withits
brilliantanalysisof indigenoustimeand space, and its incipientstructuralism
(cf. Dumont 1975), is richlyprecociousin thatheterodoxturnof mind. As
Dumont has put it, the fuseof the bomb exploded by Evans-Pritchard in his
MarettLecture'had been burningforat least ten years' (1975: 334).

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214 T. M. S. EVENS

It is somewhat curious, though,in lightof such hard empiricistcriticism,

that The Nuer has also been faultedfornot quite coming to termswith the
semanticand syntacticsides of thispeople's social order.Thus, forexample,
Dumont (1975: 336, 342) thinksthat while the book is remarkablefor its
independentdiscoveryof (French)structuralism, itsachievementin thisregard
is marredby a submergedanalytical'substantivism'.11
The factthatthisbook has come underfirefrombothanalyticalcampsof the
morality/nature oppositionis perhapstelling.It suggests-what I thinkclose
examinationof his later work would confirm-that Evans-Pritchardnever
reallymanaged to reconcile,at leastnot forpurposesof ethnographic analysis,
his advocacy of a strongmoral-system conceptionwithhis resistant allegiance
to structuralfunctionalism.
Lienhardt(I974: 301, originalemphasis)reportsthat,despitehis rejectionof
Radcliffe-Brown'svision of a naturalscienceof society,'E-P remaineddeeply
committedto the scientific statusof social anthropology'.12 And, afterresum-
ing the critique he had wrought in his Marett Lecture, Evans-Pritchard
himselfelsewhere (ig5i: 58) proclaimed:'I do not want it to be thought
that, in criticisingsome of the underlyingassumptionsof functionalism, I
do not regardmyselfas in otherrespectsa functionalist and follower in the
footsteps of my teachers,ProfessorMalinowski and ProfessorRadcliffe-
Brown'. Indeed, as I read his work, especiallyhis Nuer studies,when push
came to shove, he was prone to abandon 'interpretation' and fall back on
'explanation'.
The point I am makingis this.Perhapsunwillingto give up in his struggle
with the ambiguityat the core of Durkheim'swork,in his own work Evans-
Pritchardseems to have been peculiarlytornbetweenthetwo epistemological
perspectives implicit in the opposition between 'morality' and 'nature'.
Though, in contrastto my own view of thematter,Dumont is keen to argue
that The Nuer is more structuralist than functionalist, he (1975: 342) also
discernsin thatremarkableanalysisa 'radicalambiguity'ofjust the sortI am
speaking.
To interjecta somewhatpersonalnote, when I asked him (underinformal
circumstances)forhis opinion of Evans-Pritchard's heterodoxy,Max Gluck-
man observed,in words to thiseffect, thatEvans-Pritchard's radicalperception
of social anthropologycould make littledifference, since in the practiceof
analysis that master had to proceed in much the same way that he, Max
Gluckman, had to proceed. Though (reverentstudentthatI was) I failedto
take it at the time, thereis in Gluckman'scommenta lesson as neat as it is
ironic. He was right;but he was rightnot only because Evans-Pritchard was
unable to resistthe methodof empiricism,but also because in practiceMax
Gluckman was unable to avoid interpretative analysis!Surely,as Handelman
(1976: 11-12) alludes, Gluckman's (I963) detectionand translationof the
'reasonable man' among the Barotse and his laterstudy (i965) of the ideas
in this.people's jurisprudenceconstitutephenomenologically fecundpieces of
work.
No doubt manysocial anthropologists have extrudeddialecticalinsightsand
analysis. According to Kuper, The Nuer stands 'as the supremeexample in

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 T. M. S.EVENS 215

social anthropologyof successfulabstraction in theanalysisof a singlesociety'

(1973: 117). As I seeit, thebookenjoys a singulardistinctionnotjustbecauseit
is structuralfunctionalism's butalso becauseit plays
mostexquisitedistillation,
the devil with the limitsof thathighlyresilienttheoryof society.Indeed,in
spite of itselfand of the great majorityof its commentators,the book is a
principalfocus of an embryonicdialecticism.It is no wonderthat,to Leach's
(I96I: 305) censureof Evans-Pritchard thatin The Nuerhe arbitrarily detached
the social structurefromits materialbase, Dumont (I975: 33I) feelsso freeto
respond:'It seems on thecontrarythatEvans-Pritchard has traced[there]with
greatsubtletythe manifoldcomplementarity between. .. [thesetwo] facesof
society'.
Still, such dialecticismgives no reason to thinkthat a furthercall to a
dialecticalapproachis unnecessary.The term'dialectic'hasbeenmadeto carrya
diverseand excessivebaggage. As I have no wish to argueabout usage, it will
do to declare thatwhat I intendby the termis theidea thatthe two 'worlds'
which ordinarilyand conceptuallywe take forgranted,namely,the material
and the ideal, are themselvesembedded in an ontic matrixor intermediate
reality;and that,forreasonsofitsdiagnosticambiguity,thisthird'world' is the
primaryrealityand thereforethe generativeone. Now, it seems to me that
what we need is ethnographic analysisthatis overtlyand criticallydialecticalin
this ontological sense, but that what for the most part we get are tacit,
serendipitousdialecticalforayswhich,in a certainsense,are accomplishedin
spiteof theiragents.13 Whilehistoriansand philosophersof science-including
Popper (1972; 1977), Kuhn (1970), Lakatos (1970), Feyerabend (1978),
Radnitzky(I973) and Toulmin(1972)-are well preparedto abandonthe
dualistrepresentation of science(to be eithernaturaland objectiveor moraland
subjective),we, curiously,seem stillinclinedto fashionourselves,in one way
or another,afterthattiredand unhappypicture.
In thisregardmy own inclinationis to look to some considerednotionsuch
as tacit knowledge; some notion which takes as its ontological point of
departureneitherfact nor idea but that which holds between these two
categoricalkinds.14 When our ordinaryontologyis thusinverted,it becomes
presumptivethat to insiston moralitybeing eitherreducibleto natureor a
domain to itselfis too simple.Moralitycan be nothingbut a way or temporal
structureof the basic ambiguitythat such a positive demand contrivesto
eclipse. Correlatively,it becomes transparent that to insiston an either/or
choice between positive science and interpretative analysisis ultimatelyto
arrest the course of sociological inquiry. If society is not the process of
morality,not thatway of ambiguity,thenwhat is? It would follow that,to
returnnow to Barth's desideratum,theambiguitypresentedby themis what
mediatesand processesinjunctionon theone handand behaviouron theother.
Of course,theofferof a processofbasicuncertainty as an 'interveningvariable'
can give no more comfortto the structuralfunctionalist, be he positivist,
or hermeneutical,
structuralist thanit can to the materialinteractionist,be he
Barth or someone else.
However, the developmentof theseideas and of an analyticaldialecticis
beyond the scope of thisarticle.Insteadit has been my purposeto disclosethe

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 2I6 T. M. S. EVENS

conceptualbind to whichsuch a dialecticmightbe a fruitfulanswer.It would

be sad, I think,to find ourselves fatefullylocked into a gross oscillation
conceptualdualism.
betweenthe poles of an arbitrary

NOTES

This paper has benefitedconsiderablyfromremarksby David Schneider,Don Handelman,

Craig Calhoun and Lee Schlesinger,all of whom gave some priorversiona very thoughtful
reading,and to each of whom I am verygrateful.
1 Cf. especiallyParsons' classicdiscussion(I949).
2
Durkheim's desire to affectthe course of politicalsocietyis well known (cf. Lukes I973:
ch. 26). But he did not considerhis attackon whathe thoughtof as themoralanomieof his times
to be contradictoryto his historicism.On the contrary,much as he (I953: 66) regardedsuch
'demoralization'as a 'pathological'stateof affairsresultingfrompeculiarorganisationalcircum-
stances(such as increasingdiversificationin thedivisionof labour,economicgrowthtoo rapidfor
theforcesof moralityto handle),so he regardedhis remedialendeavoursas a 'normal'functionof
the body social: 'what I am opposing to thecollectiveis thecollectiveitself,but more and better
aware of itself'. As faras he was concerned(Lukes I973: I47), his 'moralscience'was simplyan
inevitablemanifestation of the evolutionof society.
3 For a sanguinaryaccountof Radcliffe-Brown along theselines,see Leach's recentRadcliffe-
Brown Lecture(I976).
4 This interpretation of functionalismis, I think,peculiarlyattractivein relationto theso-called
Manchesterschool. Indeed, Gluckman's abiding analyticalconcernfor 'conflictcumsituation'
eventuallyissuedin, in theworkof certainofhisstudents,an approachthatcentressquarelyon the
individualinteractant, namely,networksanalysis.As I understandit (Evens I977), Barth'soverall
objection to the moral-systemapproachis thatit takes as its point of departurethe collectivity
ratherthanthe individual.
5 My argumenthere owes much to Popper, who, since it may be construedin probabilistic
is notenough'(I972:
terms,holdsthat'indeterminism 226-9).
6 The pointbearssharply,I think,on positivescience'spostulateofcausality.Self-determination
saysthatsomethinggivesriseto itself,whichimpliestheparadoxthatthatsomethingbothis and is
not whatit is. A positivescience,however,mustmakeitsway by showinghow of two thingsone
(the cause) leads to theother(theeffect),in whichcase each mustbe cleanlydistinguishable from
the other.Therefore,wheretheone thingis not quite distinguishable fromtheother,as wherea
self leads to itself,a positive science has no place to go. To such a science a preeminently
undifferentiated or holisticprocess,suchas moralselectionpresents,mustmakean unapproachable
arcanum.In connexionwiththisargument,see Russell's(n.d.) wonderfuldiscussionof causality.
7 The following sentimentof Evans-Pritchard, relatedby Lienhardtin his touchingcom-
memorationin Man (I974), exhibits,more dramatically, a similarunderstanding:
He was not what is called a 'good Catholic', as he would have been thefirstto admit,and with
what seemed to some a paradox maintainedthatonly in the Catholic Churchcould one find
freedomof thought,since only thosewho knew what it was to affirmbeliefin so muchknew
what skepticismreallycould be. So his undoubtedfaithwas accompanied,ifneverdisturbed,
by a sharp apprehensionof the possibilitiesof unbelief,a sympathyforcynics.
Compare the followingunderstanding, by thephilosopherand theologianRicoeur(I966: 482-3),
concerningthe integralconnexionbetweenultimateconstraint and freedomof choice:
But in turn a meditationon irreduciblenecessityends in the exultationof freedomin the
assumptionof responsibility in whichI cry,it is I who move thisbody whichbearsand betrays
me! I transform thisworldwhichsituatesme and engendersme aftertheflesh!I giveriseto being
withinand withoutmyselfby my choice.
8 Today, of course, thisline of thoughtreadilybringsto mindGeertz'santhropology. See also
Crick (I976), whichattemptsto forge,aftertheplan of Evans-Pritchard's heterodoxy,a 'semantic
anthropology'.
9 I am not arguingthatBarth'smethodologicalindividualismdoes not differfromDurkheim's

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 T. M. S. EVENS 217

sociologism;ratherI am concernedto arguethatthedifferences to be foundtheremakeno essential

difference to the dualismunderconsideration,and therefore, ifthedissolutionof sociocentrism is
to be our measure,to the progressof social anthropology.
10 Although,owing to my concernwithEvans-Pritchard, I have talkedhereof semanticanthro-
pology, my argumentappliesalso, ifnot morenaturally,to a semioticanthropology.To takethe
mostobvious example,because it centressquarelyon 'structures', thatis, relations,Levi-Strauss's
anthropologyis definitively relativist.Nevertheless,exceptat the remoteanalyticalpointwhere
theymay be construedas reducibleto thebrain(as ifthebrainwere not relativeto thebody, and
the body to the world, includingthe social world!), Levi-Strauss's'structures'are singularly
intellectualand thereforefornearlyall analyticalpurposesenjoy an unambiguousor absolute(in
contrastto relative)identity.As I see it, the ruleof structuralism-that analysisbeginwithwhat
thereis between a somethingand what thatsomethingis not, thatis, with a relation-has one
exception:itself.
11 And, in threewell-consideredessays,Beidelman(I966; I968; I973) has soughtto fillin some
of the gaps left by Evans-Pritchard'sanalyses of the meaningfulaspects of Nuer social life.
12 So much so, thathe talkedto Lienhardt 'about thejoy and excitementof extroversion to the
ethnographicfacts'and warnedhimof thedangerof "'losing oneselfin theminutiaeofphilosophic
bunkum".'
13 A major exceptionis Bourdieu's (I977) involvedbook.
14 'Tacit knowledge'is due to Michael Polanyi(I967). Sinceitis definitively less thanconscious,
'knowledge' of thiskindsis, paradoxically,notexactlyknown!To use Evans-Pritchard's (I937: 83)
unsurpassedeloquence (forcertainZande understandings), itis a matterof 'ideas . . . imprisonedin
action'. Under such a paradoxical construction,the ontologicaldualisms become heuristicin
'theory' and irrelevantin 'practice'. By virtueof its conflatedontology,the very idea of tacit
knowledge impliesthatsuch seeminglyobvious phenomenaas nature,causes and individualsare
not fundamentalbut derivative.On itsmeasurewhatexistsarenotfullydeterminate, polarentities
(and non-entities)but twilighthalf-entities, the likesof attributes and dispositions,to whichthe
identityconcept can apply only imperfectly.

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