ALABA, MICHELLE M.
WEEK 11 policy that a public office is a public trust, the
1. ESTRADA V. DESIERTO, G.R. NOS.
146710-15, APRIL 3, 2001
RESOLUTION
FACTS: There was an impeachment complaint filed
against President Estrada. The Philippine National
Police and the Armed Forces of the Philippines
withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the
crowd at EDSA Shrine.
Estrada appeared on television for the first time since
the beginning of the protests and maintains that he
will not resign. He said that he wanted the
impeachment trial to continue, stressing that only a
guilty verdict will remove him from office.
At 6:15pm, Estrada again appeared on television,
calling for a snap presidential election to be held
concurrently with congressional and local elections
on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this
election.
On January 20, 2001, the Supreme Court declared
that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that
Estrada “constructively resigned his post”. Noon of
the same day, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her
oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA,
becoming the 14th president of the Philippines.
At 2:00 pm, Estrada released a letter saying he had
“strong and serious doubts about the legality and
constitutionality of her proclamation as president”,
but saying he would give up his office to avoid being
an obstacle to healing the nation. Estrada and his
family later left Malacañang Palace.
He sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman
from “conducting any further proceedings in cases
filed against him not until his term as president ends.
He also prayed for judgment “confirming petitioner to
be the lawful and incumbent President of the
Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to
discharge the duties of his office, and declaring
respondent to have taken her oath as and to be
holding the Office of the President, only in an acting
capacity pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution.”
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner may invoke
immunity from suits.
HELD: No. As to the issue of the petitioner’s
contention that he is immune from suits, the Court
held that petitioner is no longer entitled to absolute
immunity from suit. The Court added that, given the
intent of the 1987 Constitution to breathe life to the
petitioner, as a non-sitting President, cannot claim
executive immunity for his alleged criminal acts
committed while a sitting President. From the
deliberations, the intent of the framers is clear that
the immunity of the president from suit is concurrent
only with his tenure and not his term.
2. REPUBLIC V. KENDRICK
DEVELOPMENT CORP., G.R. NO.
149576, AUGUST 8, 2006
FACTS: Respondent constructed a concrete
perimeter fence around some parcels of land located
behind the Civil Aviation Training Center of the Air
Transportation Office (ATO) in 1996. As a result, the
ATO was dispossessed of some 30,228 square
meters of prime land. Respondent justified its action
with a claim of ownership over the property. It
presented Transfer Certificate of Titles which was
fake. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed
a complaint for revocation, annulment and
cancellation of certificates of title in behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines in the Regional Trial Court
of Pasay City. Respondent filed its answer which was
purportedly signed by Atty. Onofre Garlitos, Jr. as
counsel for respondent.
During the pendency of the case, the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee and Committee on Justice and
Human Rights conducted a hearing in aid of
legislation on the matter of land registration and
titling. In particular, the legislative investigation
looked into the issuance of fake titles and focused on
how respondent was able to acquire it.
During the congressional hearing Atty. Garlitos,
respondent’s former counsel. He testified that he
prepared respondent’s answer and transmitted an
unsigned draft to respondent’s president, Mr. Victor
Ong. The signature appearing above his name was
not his. He authorized no one to sign in his behalf
either. And he did not know who finally signed it.
With Atty. Garlitos’ revelation, the Republic promptly
filed an urgent motion to declare respondent in
default, predicated on its failure to file a valid answer.
The Republic argued that, since the person who
signed the answer was neither authorized by Atty.
Garlitos nor even known to him, the answer was
effectively an unsigned pleading.
The trial court issued a resolution granting the
Republic’s motion. Meanwhile, respondent sought
reconsideration but the trial court denied it.
Aggrieved, respondent elevated the matter to the
Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari seeking

to set aside the RTC resolution. Respondent
contended that the trial court erred in declaring it in
default for failure to file a valid and timely answer
which the CA yield to. The Republic moved for
reconsideration but it was denied. Thus, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Kenrick failed to file a valid
answer on the ground that its pleading was unsigned
by its counsel Atty. Garlitos.
HELD: Yes. Pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 7, a pleading
must be “signed by the party or counsel representing
him.” The law is clear, and the counsel’s duty and
authority to sign a pleading is personal to him and
may not be delegated to just any person.
The signature of counsel constitutes an assurance by
him that he has read the pleading; that, to the best of
his knowledge, information and belief, there is a good
ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for
delay. Under the Rules of Court, it is counsel alone,
by affixing his signature, who can certify to these
matters.
The preparation and signing of a pleading constitute
legal work involving practice of law which is reserved
exclusively for the members of the legal profession.
Counsel may delegate the signing of a pleading to
another lawyer but cannot do so in favor of one who
is not.
3. PEOPLE V. GAUDIA, G.R. NO. 146111,
FEBRUARY 23, 2004
FACTS: On the afternoon of March 24, 1997,
accused appellant, Rolendo Gaudia, raped Remelyn
Loyola (3 1/2 years old), at the grove of ipil- ipil trees
near the victim’s house. The parents of appellant
offered to pay the amount of P15,000.00, for the
crime that their son committed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the offers of compromise
made by the parents of the accused to witness’
husband may be taken against the accused
HELD: No. Following the Principle of Res Inter Alios
Acta Alteri Nocere Non Debet, the actions of the
acussed parents in offering to compromise cannot
prejudice the accused, since he was not a party to
the said conversation, nor was it shown that he was
privy to the offer of compromise made by them to the
mother of the victim.
Similarly, appellant’s charge that the offers of
compromise allegedly made by the parents of the
appellant to Amalia, and by the appellant himself to
Amalia’s husband should not have been taken
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
against him by the trial court, even if sustained, will
not exculpate him. To be sure, the offer of
compromise allegedly made by appellant to Amalia
Loyola’s husband is hearsay evidence, and of no
probative value. It was only Amalia who testified as
to the alleged offer, and she was not a party to the
conversation which allegedly transpired at the
Hagonoy Municipal Jail. A witness can only testify on
facts which are based on his personal knowledge or
perception.
The offer of compromise allegedly made by the
appellant’s parents to Amalia may have been the
subject of testimony of Amalia. However, following
the principle of res inter alios acta alteri nocere non
debet , the actions of his parents cannot prejudice
the appellant, since he was not a party to the said
conversation, nor was it shown that he was privy to
the offer of compromise made by them to the mother
of the victim. They cannot be considered as evidence
against appellant but we reiterate that these errors
are not enough to reverse the conviction of the
appellant.
4. PEOPLE V. RAQUEL, G.R. NO. 119005,
DECEMBER 2, 1996
FACTS: At midnight, accused knocked on door of the
house of the Spouses Gambalan. Agapita Gambalan
opened the door and heavily armed men emerged,
declared hold-up, and fired their guns at him. Juliet
Gambalan went out of their room after hearing
gunshots and saw her husbands’ lifeless body while
a man took her husbands gun and left. Juliet also
saw a man fall beside their water pump while two
other men raw away. Accused Sabas Raquel,
Valeriano Raquel and Amado Ponce were indicted
for robbery w/ homicide in RTC. All pleaded not guilty
in arraignment While trial was in progress and before
he could give a testimony, accused Amado Ponce
escaped from jail. The trial court found all accused
guilty
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in
convicting accused Sabas Raquel and Valeriano
Raquel of crime charged despite absence of
evidence positively implicating them as perpetrators
of crime
HELD: Yes. The prosecution failed to establish
beyond reasonable doubt the real identities of the
perpetrators of, much less participation of herein
appellants, in crime charged.
Identification of the appellants as culprits was based
chiefly on the extrajudicial statement of accused
Amado Ponce pointing to them as his co-perpetrators

of the crime. Ponce escaped from jail before her
could testify and has been at large since then.
The extrajudicial statements of an accused
implicating a co-accused may not be utilized against
the latter, unless these are repeated in open court.
If the accused never had the opportunity to cross-
examine his co-accused on the latters extrajudicial
statements, it is elementary that the same are
hearsay as against said accused.
A distinction, obviously, should be made between
extrajudicial and judicial confessions. The former
deprives the other accused of the opportunity to
cross-examine the confessant, while in the latter his
confession is thrown wide open for cross-
examination and rebuttal
Res inter alios rule ordains that the rights of a party
cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or
omission of another. An extrajudicial confession is
binding only upon the confessant and is not
admissible against his co-accused. Since it would not
only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly
unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of
mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not
to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought
their acts or conduct be used as evidence against
him.
Although rule has exceptions, such do not apply to
present case.
a. There exists no evidence linking appellants to
the crime.
b. Extrajudicial statement was made in violation
of the constitutional rights of accused
(admitted in testimony of officer)
Without the positive identification of appellants, the
evidence of the prosecution is not sufficient to
overcome the presumption of innocence guaranteed
by the Bill of Rights to them.
5. PEOPLE V. LISING, G.R. NO. 106210-
11, JANUARY 30, 1998, 285 SCRA 595
FACTS: Rodolfo Manalili, a businessman, asked
Felimon Garcia, his townmate, if he knew somebody
who could allegedly affect the arrest of Robert
Herrera, the suspect in the killing of his brother.
Garcia introduced Roberto Lising, Enrico Dizon and
another man to Manalili. During the meeting, Manalili
offered to pay them P50,000 for the job. On April 23-
24, Lising's group met with Vic Lisboa and conducted
a surveillance on the Castaños residence.
On April 25, the group saw a man and a woman who
happened to be Cochise Bernabe, 26 years old and
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
a new graduate of the UP College of Law, and
Beebom Castaños, 22 -years old and a graduating
student of the UP College of Mass Communication,
leave the Castaños residence in a green box type
Lancer car. The group followed the Lancer car with
Lising, Dizon and Manga riding in a black car and
Lisboa and Garcia in a motorcycle. The Lancer car
stopped at Dayrit's Ham and Burger House on Timog
Circle. Alighting from the car, they were accosted by
Dizon and Manga.
On June 21, two security guards told the CAPCOM
that their friends Raul Morales and Jun Medrano,
both employees of Roberto Lising, informed them
that Lising killed a man and a woman in their
warehouse. On June 23, Raul Morales was picked up
and told his story. On June 25, the body of Cochise
was exhumed. The cause of his death was multiple
stab wounds. The next day, Beebom's body was
exhumed from a shallow grave, 2 kilometers from
where Cochise's body was found..
On July 1, 1992, the Court held Manalili, Lising,
Garcia, Manga and Dizon guilty of the crime of
double murder qualified with treachery and
aggravated by premeditation and abuse of public
position by Lising, Manga and Dizon. The Court also
held Lising, Dizon and Manga guilty of the crime of
slight illegal detention aggravated by use of a motor
vehicle. The accused were acquitted of the crime of
kidnapping, since the use of the car was done only to
facilitate the commission of the crime of slight illegal
detention
ISSUE: Whether or not Garcia’s liability is mitigated
by (1) his lack of intent or motive, (2) his acts were
made under the compulsion of an irresistible force, &
(3) his voluntary surrender, which would make him
merely an accomplice to the crime
HELD: No. To be exempt from criminal liability, a
person invoking irresistible force or uncontrollable
fear must show that the force exerted was such that
it reduced him to a mere instrument who acted not
only without will but against his will. Such compulsion
must be of some character as to leave the accused
no opportunity for self-defense in equal combat or for
escape. Garcia's participation and presence from the
time the abduction was hatched, up to the killing of
the victims is undisputed.
6. REPUBLIC V. BAUTISTA, G.R. NO.
169801, SEPTEMBER 11, 2007
FACTS: As pointed out by petitioner Department of
Health (DOH), Rescue Security’s own personnel
officer, Oliver Liangco, testified that in the morning of
8 April 1996, he went to the DOH premises after he
received at work a phone call from a certain Lourdes

Macabulos, Planning Officer of DOH-Region 3.
According to Liangco, Macabulos informed him about
the incident, prompting him to proceed to the DOH
premises and make an ocular inspection of the
storeroom. Furthermore, Liangco testified that
Macabulos accompanied him when he inspected the
storeroom and even verbally conveyed to him that
the drugs inside the storeroom were missing.
ISSUE: Does the notice to Liangco sufficiently
comply with the requirement under the Contract of
Security Services?
HELD: Yes. This fact alone is sufficient proof that
Rescue Security had been informed of the loss
through its personnel, Oliver Liangco. Under Rule
130, Section 26 of the Rules on Evidence, the act,
declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact
may be given in evidence against him. This rule is
based upon the notion that no man would make any
declaration against himself, unless it is true.
7. PEOPLE V. SABAGALA, G.R. NO.
131040, OCTOBER 5, 2001
FACTS: Michael Framio Sabagala raped the private
complainant Annie P. Cosip. The OSG focused on
the offer of marriage made by appellant to the victim
which it claims is an admission of guilt. Appellant
offered to marry private complainant in his desperate
attempt to free himself from any liability.
ISSUE: Was the offer of marriage in this case
deemed an admission of guilt?
HELD: Yes. In a number of cases, we have held that
an offer of marriage is considered an admission of
guilt by the accused. If it were true that he did not
commit the crime, there is no reason why appellant
would go to the extent of offering to marry the woman
who supposedly fabricated false charges against
him. This is not in accord with ordinary human
experience. He would have stood his ground and
defended his innocence. In sum, we find no error in
the finding of guilt made by the trial court.
8. GUTIERREZ V. PALATTAO, A.M. NO.
RTJ-95-1326, JULY 8, 1998
FACTS: Annabelle R. Gutierrez was convicted by
respondent Judge Rodolfo G. Pallatao of Branch 33,
Regional Trial Court of Manila, for Violation of the
Bouncing Checks Law (Batas Pambansa Blg. 22)
and for Estafa under Article 315 (2)(d) of the Revised
Penal Code. Aggrieved by what she perceived as a
wrongful conviction, she filed this administrative case
against respondent for Serious Misconduct, Graft
and Corruption, Knowingly Rendering an Unjust
Decision, Falsification of Public Document, and
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
Gross Ignorance of the Law. She averred that, since
the checks that were the bases of the informations
against her were not presented in evidence by the
prosecution, her conviction was erroneous and the
respondent should be held administratively liable
therefor.
Undoubtedly, respondent Judge based the judgment
of conviction, not on the checks themselves, as these
were not proffered in evidence, but on petitioner's
written statement, dated November 15, 1995, which
respondent judge considered as admission on the
part of the petitioner that, she had indeed, issued the
bouncing checks subject of the informations but that
she had replaced them with new checks.
ISSUE: Whether or not the complainant's letter which
respondent Judge construed as an admission proves
beyond reasonable doubt her culpability
HELD: No. By its very nature, an "admission is the
mere acknowledgement of a fact or of circumstances
from which guilt may be inferred, tending to
incriminate the speaker, but not sufficient of itself to
establish his guilt." In other words, it is a "statement
by defendant of fact or facts pertinent to issues
pending, in connection with proof of other facts or
circumstances, to prove guilt, but which is, of itself,
insufficient to authorize conviction." From the above
principles, this Court can infer that an admission in
criminal cases is insufficient to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the commission of the crime
charged.
By itself, herein complainant's letter dated November
15, 1995, which respondent Judge construed as an
admission that she indeed issued the checks subject
of the Informations filed against her and that she was
replacing them with new ones, does not prove
beyond reasonable doubt her culpability under B.P.
22 and Article 315 (2)(d) of the Revised Penal Code.
To establish her guilt, it is indispensable that the
checks she issued for which she was subsequently
charged, be offered in evidence because the
gravamen of the offense charged is the act of
knowingly issuing a check with insufficient
funds. Clearly, it was error to convict complainant on
the basis of her letter alone.
9. ALONTE V. SAVELLANO JR., G.R. NO.
131652, MARCH 9, 1998
FACTS: Petitioners were charged for rape before the
RTC of Binan, Laguna. A petition for a change of
venue to RTC of Manila was filed by the offended
party. During the pendency of such petition, the
offended party executed an affidavit of desistance.
The court granted the change of venue. Public
respondent Judge Savellano issued warrant of arrest

for both petitioners. Alonte surrendered and
Concepcion posted bail.
They pleaded “not guilty” to the charge. Thereafter,
the prosecution presented Juvie and had attested the
voluntariness of her desistance the same being due
to media pressure and that they would rather
establish new life elsewhere. Case was then
submitted for decision and Savellano sentenced both
accused to reclusion Perpetua. Savellano
commented that Alonte waived his right to due
process when he did not cross examine Juvie when
clarificatory questions were raised about the details
of the rape and on the voluntariness of her
desistance.
ISSUE: Whether petitioners-accused were denied of
due process.
HELD: Yes. There is no showing that Alonte waived
his right. The standard of waiver requires that it “not
only must be voluntary, but must be knowing,
intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the
relevant circumstances and likely consequences.”
Mere silence of the holder of the right should not be
so construed as a waiver of right, and the courts must
indulge every reasonable presumption against
waiver. The case is remanded to the lower court for
retrial and the decision earlier promulgated is
nullified.
Jurisprudence acknowledges that due process in
criminal proceedings, in particular, require:
(a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is properly
clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the
matter before it;
(b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the
person of the accused;
(c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be
heard; and
(d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful
hearing.
The above constitutional and jurisprudential
postulates, by now elementary and deeply imbedded
in our own criminal justice system, are mandatory
and indispensable. The principles find universal
acceptance and are tersely expressed in the oft-
quoted statement that procedural due process
cannot possibly be met without a “law which hears
before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and
renders judgment only after trial.”
10. GARDINER V. MAGSALIN, G.R. NO. L-
48185, AUGUST 18, 1941
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
FACTS: On October 30,1940, the herein petitioner,
as Acting Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga, filed an
information against the said Catalino Fernandez and
the herein respondents Pedro Yalung, Eugenio
Villegas, Maximo Manlapid, Magno Icban, and
Rufino Maun, charging them with having conspired
together to kill, and that they did kill, one Gaudencio
Vivar, with evident premeditation.
Upon arraignment Catalino Fernandez pleaded guilty
and his five coaccused, not guilty. At the trial of the
latter, the former was called by the fiscal as his first
witness, to testify to the alleged conspiracy. Upon
objection of counsel for the defense, the respondent
judge did not permit the witness Catalino Fernandez
to testify against his coaccused, on the ground that
he being a conspirator, his act or declaration is not
admissible against his coconspirators until the
conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act
or declaration, under section 12, rule 123 of the Rules
of Court. A written motion for reconsideration,
supported with lengthy argument, was filed by the
fiscal to no avail. Hence the present petition for
mandamus.
The only question raised here is the interpretation of
section 12 of rule 123, which reads as follows:
"Sec. 12. Admission by conspirator. The act or
declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy
and during its existence, may be given in evidence
against the coconspirator after the conspiracy is
shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration."
ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of the friend of
Fernandez is admissible against Fernandez's co-
accused
HELD: No. The said provision is a re-enactment of
paragraph 6, section 298 of the old Code of Civil
Procedure, which provided that after proof of a
conspiracy, the act or declaration of a conspirator
relating to the conspiracy may be given in evidence.
This rule has a well-settled meaning in jurisprudence,
but apparently the respondents completely missed it.
It is one of the exceptions to the "res inter alios" rule.
It refers to an extrajudicial declaration of a
conspirator not to his testimony by way of direct
evidence.
For illustration, let us suppose that after the formation
but before the consummation of the alleged
conspiracy between Catalino Fernandez and his five
coaccused, the former borrowed a bolo from a friend,
stating that he and his coaccused were going to kill
Gaudencio Vivar. Such act and declaration of
Fernandez could not be given in evidence against his
coaccused unless the conspiracy be proven first. The

testimony of Fernandez's friend to the effect that
Fernandez borrowed his bolo and told him that he
(Fernandez) and his coaccused were going to kill
Gaudencio Vivar would be admissible against
Fernandez, but not against his coaccused unless the
conspiracy between them be proven first. It is
admissible against Fernandez because the act,
declaration, or omission of a party as to a relevant
fact may be given in evidence against him (section 7,
rule 123). But, without proof of conspiracy, it is not
admissible against Fernandez's co-accused because
the act and declaration of Fernandez are res inter
olios as to his coaccused and, therefore, cannot
affect them. But if there is conspiracy, each
conspirator is privy to the acts of the others; the act
of one conspirator is the act of all the coconspirators.
11. PEOPLE V. CUI, G.R. NO. 121982,
SEPTEMBER 10, 1999
FACTS: Merlita A. Jasa charged Manuel Cui, Jr. of
the crime of rape, under Art. 335, Par. 1 of the
Revised Penal Code. The testimony of the
complainant is said to be corroborated by Patrolman
Manampan, the Desk Officer who investigated the
case. He told the court that the accused admitted to
him that he used force in having sexual intercourse
with the complainant. But the prosecution cannot
avail of such entry in the police record. The alleged
statement of the accused given during police
investigation does not help the prosecution any in
view of the rule that a statement taken from the
accused without first informing him of his rights under
the Constitution, and without the assistance of
counsel, is inadmissible. According to Patrolman
Manampan himself, the only persons present when
the accused was investigated were Patrolman
Manampan, the complainant, Patrolman de Guzman
and Atty. Jasa, the brother of the complainant. So the
accused was without any assistance from counsel at
the time he made in writing the alleged extrajudicial
confession; neither was there any evidence adduced
to prove that the accused waived his right to be
assisted by counsel.
ISSUE: Whether or not the extrajudicial confession
of the accused is admissible
HELD: No. As repeatedly enunciated by the Court,
the weakness of the defense will not be allowed to
strengthen the evidence for the prosecution, and that
the prosecution must rely on the strength of its own
evidence and not on the weakness of that of the
defense.
The accused is presumed innocent until proved
otherwise, and it is only by proof beyond reasonable
doubt, which requires moral certainty, that this
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
presumption of innocence can be overcome.
Therefore, it is the duty of the prosecution to prove
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. In
the case at bar, the prosecution fell short of this duty.
Hence, the constitutional presumption of innocence
calls for a reversal of the judgment of the trial court.
12. PEOPLE V. FLORES, G.R. NO. 71980,
MARCH 18, 1991
FACTS: The victim, a registered nurse, did not have
the slightest idea that she would fall into the abyss of
death on that fateful night of September 21, 1984.
She was mercilessly raped and killed by four men.
The morning after, her naked body with a branch of
ipil-ipil inserted into her private part, was found lying
prostrate with several hack and stab wounds. She
was identified as Mercedes M. Dulay.
Appellants' principal objection to the judgment of
conviction is that it is based primarily on the
confession of their co-defendant, Flores, who was the
prosecution's sole eyewitness to the crimes.
ISSUE: Whether or not the extrajudicial confession
of Flores is admissible
HELD: No. The general rule that the confession of an
accused may be given in evidence against him but
that it is not competent evidence against his co-
accused, admits of exceptions. Thus, this Court has
held that where several accused are tried together for
the same complaint, the testimony lawfully given by
one during the trial implicating the others is
competent evidence against the latter. The
extrajudicial admission or confession of a co-
conspirator out of court is different from the testimony
given by a co-accused during trial. The first is
admissible against the declarant alone, but the
second is perfectly admissible against his co-
accused' who had the right and opportunity to cross-
examine the declarant.
In this case, the extrajudicial confession of Flores is
inadmissible because he was not assisted by
counsel. Moreover, his extrajudicial confession may
not even be accorded probative value in view of his
admission of the crime in open court. That being the
case, only his judicial confession should be weighed
and considered.
13. VILLANUEVA V. BALAGUER, G.R. NO.
180197, JUNE 23, 2009
FACTS: Petitioner Villanueva argues that by not
responding to the above letter which expressly urged
them to reply if the statements therein contained are
untrue, respondents in effect admitted the matters
stated therein, pursuant to the rule on admission by

silence in Sec. 32, Rule 130,30 and the disputable
presumption that acquiescence resulted from a belief
that the thing acquiesced in was conformable to the
law or fact.
ISSUE: Does the failure of the addressee to respond
to a letter containing statements attributing to him
commission of acts constituting actionable wrong,
hence, adverse to his interest, and of such nature as
would call for his reaction, reply, or comment if
untrue, constitute his admission of said statements,
consequently, may be used in evidence against him?
HELD: No. Petitioner’s argument lacks merit. One
cannot prove his claim by placing the burden of proof
on the other party. Indeed, "(a) man cannot make
evidence for himself by writing a letter containing the
statements that he wishes to prove. He does not
make the letter evidence by sending it to the party
against whom he wishes to prove the facts [stated
therein]. He no more can impose a duty to answer a
charge than he can impose a duty to pay by sending
goods. Therefore a failure to answer such adverse
assertions in the absence of further circumstances
making an answer requisite or natural has no effect
as an admission."
Moreover, the rule on admission by silence applies to
adverse statements in writing if the party was
carrying on a mutual correspondence with the
declarant. However, if there was no such mutual
correspondence, the rule is relaxed on the theory that
while the party would have immediately reacted by a
denial if the statements were orally made in his
presence, such prompt response can generally not
be expected if the party still has to resort to a written
reply.
In the same manner, we also cannot assume an
admission by silence on the part of Balaguer by virtue
of his failure to protest or disclaim the attribution to
him by the newspapers that he is the source of the
articles. As explained above, the rule on admission
by silence is relaxed when the statement is not made
orally in one’s presence or when one still has to resort
to a written reply, or when there is no mutual
correspondence between the parties.
As for the publications themselves, newspaper
articles purporting to state what the defendant said
are inadmissible against him, since he cannot be held
responsible for the writings of third persons. As
correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, "while the
subject news items indicated that Balaguer was the
source of the columnists, proving that he truly made
such statements is another matter." Petitioner failed
to prove that Balaguer did make such statements.
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
Notably, petitioner did not implead the editorial staff
and the publisher of the alleged defamatory
articles. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, he should
have at least presented the authors of the news
articles as witnesses to prove his case against
respondents in the absence of an express admission
by the latter that the subject news articles have been
caused by them.
Petitioner also claims that respondents have
admitted that they held a press conference and
caused the publication of the news articles, based on
the testimony of Balaguer.
Admissions, however, should be clear and
unambiguous which can hardly be said of Balaguer’s
above testimony. If Balaguer intended to admit the
allegation that he conducted a press conference and
caused the publication of the news articles, he could
have done so. Instead, Balaguer specifically denied
these allegations in paragraphs 4 and 5 of his
Answer.
14. PEOPLE V. ABO, G.R. NO. 107235,
MARCH 2, 1994
FACTS: Adelia Velasco de Chavez accuses Ladislao
Abo (prisoner) of the crime of rape. Abo would like to
discredit her testimony.
ISSUE: May the testimony of Adelia be discredited?
HELD: No. There is nothing in the second assigned
error which would discredit the testimony of the
victim. We find no substantial inaccuracy in her
testimony describing the accused as having a scar
on his face and agree with the trial court that the
inaccuracy is on a minor point. It must be stressed
that the victim did not personally know the accused.
Nevertheless, as stated above, there was
spontaneity in her recognition of the accused as her
rapist. She did not, as well, hesitate to point to him as
the rapist at the police station. The accused admitted
this fact when he testified in court. But he did not
testify that he protested the accusation or that he
immediately told the policeman present that the
accusation was false. That accusation, if untrue,
naturally called for a denial. Then too, he further
testified on direct examination that he was confronted
by the victim's husband, Raymundo de Chavez, at
the police station:
15. PEOPLE V. ALEGRE, G.R. NO. L-30423,
NOVEMBER 7, 1979
FACTS: Ramiro Alegre and Jesus Medalla contend
that the lower court erred in utilizing the extrajudicial
confessions of Melecio Cudillan (now deceased) as
evidence against herein appellants; in concluding

from the alleged "Silence" of appellants when
allegedly pointed to by Melecio Cudillan as "his
companions" in the commission of the crime, an
admission of guilt; and in giving undue weight and
credence to the testimony of an inmate of the Pasay
City Jail that appellants admitted to him their
participation in the crime.
ISSUE: Whether or not the extrajudicial confession
of Cudillan may be used as evidence against the two
accused
HELD: No. The extrajudicial confessions of Melecio
Cudillan (Exhibits "A", "A- I " to "A-6" and "F", "F-1"
and "F-2"), on the basis of which the trial court was
able to reconstruct how Melecio Cudillan committed
the crime in question, cannot be used as evidence
and are not competent proof against appellants
Ramiro Alegre and Jesus Medalla, under the
principle of "res inter alios acta alteri nocere non
debet" there being no independent evidence of
conspiracy. As a general rule, the extrajudicial
declaration of an accused, although deliberately
made, is not admissible and does not have probative
value against his co- accused. It is merely hearsay
evidence as far as the other accused are
concerned. While there are recognized exceptions
to this rule, the facts and circumstances attendant in
the case at bar do not bring it within the purview of
such exceptions. The only evidence, therefore,
linking the appellants to the crime would be their
purported tacit admissions and/or failure to deny their
implications of the crime made by Melecio Cudillan,
and/or their purported verbal confessions to
Hernando Carillo, an inmate of the Pasay City jail.
16. PEOPLE V. PARAGSA, G.R. NO. L-44060,
JULY 20, 1978
FACTS: Paragsa admits having sexual intercourse
with Mirasol, the complaining witness, but he stoutly
denied that he did so by employing force or
intimidation against Mirasol. He claims he and
Mirasol were sweethearts; that on the day of the
incident, it was Mirasol who invited him to the latter's
house where they had sexual intercourse after
kissing each other; and that the intercourse they had
that afternoon was, as a matter of fact, their third
sexual intercourse.
Mirasol did not bother at all to rebut the testimony of
Paragsa and his witnesses to the effect that the
accused and Mirasol were actually sweethearts; and
that they had had two previous sexual
communications before July 13, 1971, one of which
happened on June 29, 1971 in the house of the
accused, where Mirasol and the accused slept
together in the evening of the same day after the
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
mother of the accused and Mirasol had returned from
the town fiesta of Bantayan, Cebu.
ISSUE: Whether or not the silence of Mirasol may be
construed as an admission of the truth of such
assertion
HELD: Yes. The rule allowing silence of a person to
be taken as an implied admission of the truth of the
statements uttered in his presence is applicable in
criminal cases. But before the silence of a party can
be taken as an admission of what is said, it must
appear: (1) that he heard and understood the
statement; (2) that he was at liberty to interpose a
denial; (3) that the statement was in respect to some
matter affecting his rights or in which he was then
interested, and calling, naturally, for an answer; (4)
that the facts were within his knowledge; and (5) that
the fact admitted or the inference to be drawn from
his silence would be material to the. These requisites
of admission by silence all obtain in the present case.
Hence, the silence of Mirasol on the facts asserted
by the accused and his witnesses may be safely
construed as an admission of the truth of such
assertion.
17. PEOPLE V. LORENZO, G.R. NO. 110107,
JANUARY 26, 1995
FACTS: For having allegedly killed her husband on
30 July 1990, accused-appellant Dolores Lorenzo, a
policewoman, was charged with the crime of
parricide in an information filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Tuguegarao, Cagayan, on 30
March 1992. The information was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 2060-92-TUG and raffled to
Branch 5. The accusatory portion thereof reads as
follows:
That on or about July 30, 1990, in the Municipality of
Tuguegarao, Province of Cagayan, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
PO1 Dolores C. Lorenzo, armed with a bolo and a fan
knife, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation
and with treachery did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, stab, hack
and chop one, Agapito Lorenzo, her own husband,
inflicting upon him several injuries on the different
parts of his body which caused his death.
ISSUE: Whether or not the statement by the accused
was an admission or a confession
HELD: It was an admission. We do not, however,
agree with the trial court's characterization of the
appellant's declaration that she killed her husband as
an extrajudicial confession. It is only an admission. It
is clear from Sections 26 and 33, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court that there is a distinction between

an admission and a confession. These sections
reads as follows:
Sec. 26. Admission of a party. — The act, declaration
or admission of a party as to a relevant fact may be
given in evidence against him.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 33. Confession. — The declaration of an
accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense
charged, or of any offense necessarily included
therein, may be given in evidence against him.
In a confession. there is an acknowledgment of guilt.
Admission is usually applied in criminal cases to
statements of fact by the accused which do not
directly involve an acknowledgment of guilt of the
accused or of the criminal intent to commit the
offense with which he is charged.
18. PEOPLE V. RAPEZA, G.R. NO. 169431,
APRIL 4, 2007
FACTS: Appellant Jerry Rapeza was charged of
murder for killing the spouses Cesar Ganzon and
Priscilla Libas. Appellee contends that upon the
supplied information that the appellant wanted to
confess, SPO2 Ciriaco Gapas invited the former for
questioning and thus was brought to the police
station without informing his rights. The Solicitor
General further contends that the appellant was not
informed of his constitutional right at the time of his
alleged detention for the custodial investigation
began only when the investigators started to elicit
information from him which took place at the time he
was brought to the house of Atty. Reyes. Moreover,
appellant did not interpose any objection to having
Atty. Reyes as his counsel.
However, the appellant testified that he claims that
he affixed his thumb mark through violence and
intimidation. He stresses that he was not informed of
his rights during the time of his detention when he
was already considered a suspect as the police had
already received information of his alleged
involvement in the crimes. Neither did a competent
and independent counsel assist him from the time he
was detained until trial began. Appellant likewise
maintains that although the Sinumpaang Salaysay
states that his rights were read to him, there was no
showing that his rights were explained to him in a way
that an uneducated person like him could
understand.
The RTC found him guilty of both crimes. The Court
of Appeals upheld the trial court.
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
ISSUE: Whether appellant’s extrajudicial confession
is admissible in evidence to warrant the verdict of
guilt.
HELD: No. The constitutional requirement obviously
had not been observed. Settled is the rule that the
moment a police officer tries to elicit admissions or
confessions or even plain information from a suspect,
the latter should, at that juncture, be assisted by
counsel, unless he waives this right in writing and in
the presence of counsel. Appellant did not make any
such waiver.
x x x The competent or independent lawyer so
engaged should be present from the beginning to
end, i.e., at all stages of the interview, counseling or
advising caution reasonably at every turn of the
investigation, and stopping the interrogation once in
a while either to give advice to the accused that he
may either continue, choose to remain silent or
terminate the interview.
The standards of "competent counsel" were not met
in this case given the deficiencies of the evidence for
the prosecution. Although Atty. Reyes signed the
confession as appellant’s counsel and he himself
notarized the statement, there is no evidence on how
he assisted appellant. The confession itself and the
testimonies of SPO2 Gapas and SPO2 Cuizon bear
no indication that Atty. Reyes had explained to
appellant his constitutional rights.
Furthermore, Atty. Reyes was not appellant’s
counsel of choice but was picked out by the police
officers allegedly through the barangay officials.
Appellant’s failure to interpose any objection to
having Atty. Reyes as his counsel cannot be taken as
consent under the prevailing circumstances. As
discussed earlier, appellant was not properly
informed of his rights, including the right to a counsel
preferably of his own choice.
It was made to appear in the alleged confession that
appellant was informed of his right to a counsel of his
own choice and that if he cannot afford the services
of one, the police shall provide him with one, it was
overlooked that it was not similarly made to appear in
the same statement that appellant was advised that
he had the option to reject the counsel provided for
him by the police authorities.
19. LADIANA V. PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 144293,
DECEMBER 4, 2002
FACTS: Prior to the conduct of the examination-in-
chief on Cortez, the defense counsel made an
admission as to the authorship, authenticity, and
voluntariness of the execution of the counter-affidavit
of accused Ladiana, which was subscribed and

sworn to before Cortez. In said counter-affidavit,
accused Ladiana allegedly admitted to making the
fatal shots on Francisco. However, accused Ladiana
allegedly did so in self-defense as Francisco was
then purportedly attacking accused Ladiana and had,
in fact, already inflicted a stab wound on the arm of
accused Ladiana.
ISSUE: Whether or not the statement by the accused
was an admission or a confession
HELD: It was an admission. We do not, however,
agree with the Sandiganbayan’s characterization of
petitioner’s Counter-Affidavit as an extrajudicial
confession. It is only an admission. Sections 26 and
33 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
distinguish one from the other as follows:
"SEC. 26. Admissions of a party. – The act,
declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact
may be given in evidence against him.
"SEC. 33. Confession. – The declaration of an
accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense
charged, or of any offense necessarily included
therein, may be given in evidence against him."
In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt;
in an admission, there is merely a statement of fact
not directly involving an acknowledgment of guilt or
of the criminal intent to commit the offense with which
one is charged.26 Thus, in the case at bar, a
statement by the accused admitting the commission
of the act charged against him but denying that it was
done with criminal intent is an admission, not a
confession. The Counter-Affidavit in question
contains an admission that petitioner actually shot
the victim when the latter was attacking him.
20. BOSTON BANK OF THE PHILS. V.
MANALO, G.R. NO. 158149, FEBRUARY 9, 2006
FACTS: Xavierville Estate, Inc. (XEI) sold to The
Overseas Bank of Manila (OBM) some residential
lots in Xavierville subdivision. Nevertheless, XEI
continued selling the residential lots in the
subdivision as agent of OBM.
Carlos Manalo, Jr. proposed to XEI, through its
President Emerito Ramos, to purchase two lots in the
Xavierville subdivision and offered as part of the
downpayment the P34,887.66 Ramos owed him.
XEI, through Ramos, agreed. Ramos confirmed the
reservation of the lots. The spouses constructed a
house on the property.The spouses were notified of
XEI’s resumption of selling operations. However,
they did not pay the balance of the downpayment
because XEI failed to prepare a contract of
conditional sale and transmit the same to them. XEI
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
also billed them for unpaid interests which they also
refused to pay.
XEI turned over its selling operations to OBM.
Subsequently, Commercial Bank of Manila (CBM)
acquired the Xavierville Estate from OBM. CBM
requested Perla Manalo to stop any on-going
construction on the property since it (CBM) was the
owner of the lot and she had no permission for such
construction. Perla informed them that her husband
had a contract with OBM, through XEI, to purchase
the property. She promised to send CBM the
documents. However, she failed to do so. Thus, CBM
filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the
spouses. But later on, CBM moved to withdraw its
complaint because of the issues raised. In the
meantime, CBM was renamed the Boston Bank of
the Philippines.
Then, the spouses filed a complaint for specific
performance and damages against the bank before
the RTC. The spouses alleged that they had always
been ready and willing to pay the installments on the
lots sold to them but no contract was forthcoming.
The spouses further alleged that upon their partial
payment of the downpayment, they were entitled to
the execution and delivery of a Deed of Absolute Sale
covering the subject lots. During the trial, the spouses
adduced in evidence the separate Contracts of
Conditional Sale executed between XEI and 3 other
buyers to prove that XEI continued selling residential
lots in the subdivision as agent of OBM after the latter
had acquired the said lots.
The trial court ordered the petitioner to execute a
Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the spouses upon
the payment of the spouses of the balance of the
purchase price. It ruled that under the August 22,
1972 letter agreement of XEI and the spouses, the
parties had a "complete contract to sell" over the lots,
and that they had already partially consummated the
same. The Court of Appeals sustained the ruling of
the RTC, but declared that the balance of the
purchase price of the property was payable in fixed
amounts on a monthly basis for 120 months, based
on the deeds of conditional sale executed by XEI in
favor of other lot buyers. Boston Bank filed a Motion
for the Reconsideration of the decision. CA denied
the MR.
ISSUE: Whether or not the terms of the 3 deeds of
conditional sale executed by XEI in favor of the other
lot buyers in the subdivision, which contained uniform
terms of 120 equal monthly installments, constitute
evidence that XEI also agreed to give the Manalo
spouses the same mode and timeline of payment
HELD: No. The bare fact that other lot buyers were
allowed to pay the balance of the purchase price of

lots purchased by them in 120 or 180 monthly
installments does not constitute evidence that XEI
also agreed to give the respondents the same mode
and timeline of payment.
Under Section 34, Rule 130 of the Rvised Rules of
Court, evidence that one did a certain thing at one
time is not admissible to prove that he did the same
or similar thing at another time, although such
evidence may be received to prove habit, usage,
pattern of conduct or the intent of the parties.
Habit, custom, usage or pattern of conduct must be
proved like any other facts. The offering party must
establish the degree of specificity and frequency of
uniform response that ensures more than a mere
tendency to act in a given manner but rather, conduct
that is semi-automatic in nature. The offering party
must allege and prove specific, repetitive conduct
that might constitute evidence of habit. The examples
offered in evidence to prove habit, or pattern of
evidence must be numerous enough to base on
inference of systematic conduct. Mere similarity of
contracts does not present the kind of sufficiently
similar circumstances to outweigh the danger of
prejudice and confusion. In determining whether the
examples are numerous enough, and sufficiently
regular, the key criteria are adequacy of sampling
and uniformity of response. It is only when examples
offered to establish pattern of conduct or habit are
numerous enough to lose an inference of systematic
conduct that examples are admissible.
Respondents failed to allege and prove that, as a
matter of business usage, habit or pattern of conduct,
XEI granted all lot buyers the right to pay the balance
of the purchase price in installments of 120 months
of fixed amounts with pre-computed interests, and
that XEI and the respondents had intended to adopt
such terms of payment relative to the sale of the two
lots in question. Indeed, respondents adduced in
evidence the three contracts of conditional sale
executed by XEI and other lot buyers merely to prove
that XEI continued to sell lots in the subdivision as
sales agent of OBM after it acquired said lots, not to
prove usage, habit or pattern of conduct on the part
of XEI to require all lot buyers in the subdivision to
pay the balance of the purchase price of said lots in
120 months.
21. PEOPLE V. SANTOS, G.R. NO. 100225-26,
MAY 11, 1993
FACTS: Santos in effect questions the trial court for
admitting a sworn statement by one Ronaldo
Guerrero (Exhibit "EE"), a witnesses in another
criminal case (Criminal Case No. 8117) where
appellant Santos was also charged with the murder
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
of one Daniel Nuguera which had taken place in the
very same site where Bautista and Cupcupin were
ambushed, i.e., at the corner of Yangco Street and
Estrella Street, Malabon, Metro Manila. When the
prosecution first presented the sworn statement of
Guerrero in order to show criminal propensity on the
part of appellant Santos, the defense objected to
admission of such sworn statement; the trial court
sustained the objection and rejected the evidence for
the purpose it was initially offered. However, the trial
court admitted the same as falling within one or more
of the exceptions set out in Section 34, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court, which reads:
Sec. 34. Similar Acts as Evidence. —
Evidence that one did or did not do a certain
thing at one time is not admissible to prove
that he did or did not do the same or a similar
thing at another time; but it may be received
to prove a specific intent or knowledge,
identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom
or usage and the like.
Santos now complains that the affidavit of Ronaldo
Guerrero was hearsay evidence, considering that the
prosecution did not present Ronaldo Guerrero as a
witness during the trial.
ISSUE: Did the trial court err in admitting the affidavit
of Guerrero?
HELD: No. We consider that the trial court did not
commit reversible error in admitting the Guerrero
affidavit for the limited purpose for proving knowledge
or plan or scheme, and more specifically, that
appellant knew that the particular corner of two (2)
particular streets in Manila was a good place to
ambush a vehicle and its passengers. Appellant also
had waived the hearsay character of this evidence by
failure seasonably to object to the admission of the
affidavit; it is too late in that day to raise the hearsay
rule in the appellant's memorandum after prosecution
and defense had presented their respective cases
and had made their respective offers of
evidence. Finally, and in any case, as pointed out by
the Solicitor General, the exclusion of the Guerrero
affidavit would not result in any change in the result
reached by the trial court. For that result is essentially
and adequately based upon the positive identification
of appellant Santos as one of the gunmen by Bautista
and Bohol.
22. PEOPLE V. DADLES, G.R. NOS. 118620-
21, SEPTEMBER 1, 1997
FACTS: As regards the victims Salvador and Antonio
Alipan, the appellant points out that the testimony of
Luzviminda who witnessed the alleged kidnapping
demonstrate that the victims were not deprived of
 ALABA, MICHELLE M.

their liberty because they went with the appellant and

his companions peacefully without being subjected to
threats and coercion.

ISSUE: Whether or nor the contention of Dadles is

correct
HELD: No. The court is not convinced. That the
victims' hands were not tied nor guns poked at their
sides when they were taken by the appellant's do not
conclusively preclude the deprivation of their liberty.
The circumstances surrounding the taking of
Salvador and Antonio, particularly the appellant and
his companions' previous conduct in kidnapping
victims Alipio and Dionisio, plainly demonstrate their
intent to likewise deprive Salvador and Antonio of
their liberty.
True it is that "evidence that one did or did not do a
certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove
that he did or did not do the same or similar thing at
another time." However, "it may be received to prove
a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system,
scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like."

WEEK 12
1. REPUBLIC vs. HEIRS OF FELIPE ALEJAGA
SR.G. R. No. 146030 - December 3, 2002
FACTS: Felipe Alejaga, Sr filed a Free Patent
Application covering a parcel of land at Dumolog,
Roxas City. Before such application, it appears that
on December 27, 1978, Efren L. Recio, Land
Inspector, submitted a report of his investigation and
verification of the land to the District Land Office,
Bureau of Lands, City of Roxas. The District Land
Officer of Roxas City approved the application and
the issuance of Free Patent to the applicant. On
March 16, 1979, the patent was also ordered to be
issued and the patent was forwarded to defendant
Register of Deeds, City of Roxas, for registration and
issuance of the corresponding Certificate of Title.
Thereafter, Original Certificate of Title was issued to
Alejaga Sr by the Register of Deeds.
The heirs of Ignacio Arrobang requested the Director
of Lands for an investigation for irregularities in the
issuance of the title of a foreshore land in favor of
Respondent. Isagani Cartagena, Supervising Special
Investigator, Legal Division, Land Management
Bureau (formerly Bureau of Lands) submitted his
Report dated April 17, 1989. The Chief, Legal
Division, Land Management Bureau, Manila,
recommended to the Director of Lands appropriate
civil proceeding for the cancellation of Free Patent
and the corresponding Original Certificate in the
name of respondent.
The government through the Solicitor General
instituted an action for Annulment/Cancellation of
Patent and Title and Reversion against respondents.
RTC rendered decision declaring Free Patent
Application and issuance of Original Certificate of
Title in the name of Felipe Alejaga is by means of
fraud hence, null and void ab initio.
Court of Appeals, reversed RTC ruling stating that,
petitioner failed to prove its allegation that
respondents had obtained the free patent and the
Certificate of Title through fraud and
misrepresentation. The CA brushed aside as
hearsay Isagani Cartagenas testimony that Land
Inspector Efren L. Recio had not conducted an
investigation on the free patent application of Felipe
Alejaga Sr. The CA added that petitioner had failed
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
to support its claim that the lot covered by
respondents free patent and title was foreshore land.
ISSUE: Is the report made by Cartagena be
considered as only hearsay and thus cannot be
admitted?
HELD: No. The report had not been successfully
rebutted. In that report, Recio supposedly admitted
that he had not actually conducted an investigation
and ocular inspection of the parcel of land.
Cartagenas statement on Recios alleged admission
may be considered as "independently relevant." A
witness may testify as to the state of mind of another
person -- the latters knowledge, belief, or good or bad
faith -- and the formers statements may then be
regarded as independently relevant without violating
the hearsay rule.
Thus, because Cartagena took the witness stand and
opened himself to cross-examination, the
Investigation Report he had submitted to the director
of the Bureau of Lands constitutes part of his
testimony. Those portions of the report that consisted
of his personal knowledge, perceptions and
conclusions are not hearsay. On the other hand, the
part referring to the statement made by Recio may be
considered as independently relevant. The doctrine
on independently relevant statements holds that
conversations communicated to a witness by a third
person may be admitted as proof that, regardless of
their truth or falsity, they were actually made.
Evidence as to the making of such statements is not
secondary but primary, for in itself it (a) constitutes a
fact in issue or (b) is circumstantially relevant to the
existence of such fact.
Since Cartagenas testimony was based on the report
of the investigation he had conducted, his testimony
was not hearsay and was, hence, properly admitted
by the trial court. Based on the foregoing badges of
fraud, it is sustained that petitioners contention that
the free patent granted to Felipe Alejaga Sr. is void.
Such fraud is a ground for impugning the validity of
the Certificate of Title. The invalidity of the patent is
sufficient basis for nullifying the Certificate of Title
issued in consequence thereof, since the latter is
merely evidence of the former.Verily, the court
upheld petitioners claim that the issuance of the
Alejagas patent and title was tainted with fraud

2. SPOUSES QUIRINO DELA CRUZ and GLORIA
DELA CRUZ vs. PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC
(PPI) G.R. No. 158649 (February 18, 2013)
FACTS: Spouses Dela Cruz operated the Barangay
Agricultural Supplyin Aliaga, Nueva Ecija engaged in
the distribution and sale of fertilizers and agricultural
chemical products, among others. At the time
material to the case, Quirino, a lawyer, was the
Municipal Mayor of Aliaga, Nueva Ecija.
Gloria applied for and was granted by respondent
PPI a regular credit line of ₱200,000.00 for a 60- day
term, with trust receipts as collaterals. Gloria
executed three more documents on September 14,
1978. The 60-day credit term lapsed without Gloria
paying her obligation under the Trust Receipt/SCS.
Hence, PPI wrote collection letters to her. As of July
9, 1985, the statement of account (Exhibit V) showed
a grand total liability of ₱240,355.10.
The trial court ordered petitioners "to pay the plaintiff
the amount of ₱240,335.10 plus 16% interest until
fully paid, attorney’s fees and cost of litigation. CA
affirmed.
ISSUE Whether the decision of the RTC
notwithstanding that the award to PPI of the amount
of ₱240,335.10 plus 16% interest per annum was
based on hearsay evidence
HELD: No. With Exhibit V (statement of account)
being a private document, authentication pursuant to
the rules on evidence was a condition for its
admissibility. Llanera, admittedly the person who had
prepared the document, was competent to testify on
the due execution and authenticity of Exhibit V. Such
authentication was done in accordance with Rule 132
of the Rules of Court, whose Section 20 states:
Section 20. Proof of private document. – Before
any private document offered as authentic is
received in evidence, its due execution and
authenticity must be proved either:
(a)By anyone who saw the document executed or
written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the
signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be
identified as that which it is claimed to be.
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
Nor have the petitioners proved that the entries
contained in Exhibit V were incorrect and
untruthful. They cannot be permitted to do so now
at this stage of final appeal, especially after the
lower courts found and accepted the statement of
account contained therein to be properly
authenticated and trustworthy. Indeed, the Court
is in no position to review and overturn the lower
courts’ unanimous finding and acceptance without
strong and valid reasons because they involved
an issue of fact.
3. PHILIPPINE FREE PRESS, INC. v. COURT OF
APPEALS and LIWAYWAY PUBLISHING, INC.,
[G.R. NO. 132864. October 24, 2005]
FACTS: Petitioner is a domestic corporation
engaged in the publication of Philippine Free Press
Magazine, one of the . . . widely circulated political
magazines in the Philippines sought the annulment
of the sale to private respondent because they
alleged that there was a vitiated consent by force and
intimidation by Gen. Menzi who was negotiating the
sale for and on behalf of the then President Marcos.
Sometime during the middle of 1973, Locsin, Sr. was
contacted by Brig. Gen. Hans Menzi, the former aide-
de-camp of then President Marcos concerning the
sale of the [petitioner]. Locsin, Sr. requested that the
meeting be held inside the [petitioner] Building and
this was arranged by Menzi (TSN, 27 May 1993, pp.
69-70). During the said meeting, Menzi once more
reiterated Marcos's offer to purchase both the name
and the assets of [petitioner] adding that "Marcos
cannot be denied" (TSN, 27 May 1993, p. 71). Locsin,
Sr. refused but Menzi insisted that he had no choice
but to sell. Locsin, Sr. then made a counteroffer that
he will sell the land, the building and all the
machineries and equipment therein but he will be
allowed to keep the name of the [petitioner].On
February 26, 1987, [petitioner] filed a complaint for
Annulment of Sale against [respondent] Liwayway
and the PCGG before the Regional Trail Court of
Makati, Branch 146 on the grounds of vitiated
consent and gross inadequacy of purchase price. On
motion of defendant PCGG, the complaint against it
was dismissed on October 22, 1987. (Words in
bracket and underscoring added)
ISSUE: is the CA correct in considering the
testimonial evidence as hearsay which clearly
established threats made upon petitioner ?

HELD: Yes. The evidence referred to as hearsay
pertains mainly to the testimonies of Messrs. Locsin,
Sr. and Teodoro Locsin, Jr. (the Locsins,
collectively), which, in gist, established the following
facts: 1) the widely circulated Free Press magazine,
which, prior to the declaration of Martial Law, took the
strongest critical stand against the Marcos
administration, was closed down on the eve of such
declaration, which closure eventually drove petitioner
to financial ruin; 2) upon Marcos' orders, Mr. Locsin,
Sr. was arrested and detained for over 2 months
without charges and, together with his family, was
threatened with execution; 3) Mr. Locsin, Sr. was
provisionally released on the condition that he
refrains from reopening Free Press and writing
anything critical of the Marcos administration; and 4)
Mr. Locsin, Sr. and his family remained fearful of
reprisals from Marcos until the 1986 EDSA
Revolution.
Jurisprudence instructs that evidence of statement
made or a testimony is hearsay if offered against a
party who has no opportunity to cross-examine the
witness. Hearsay evidence is excluded precisely
because the party against whom it is presented is
deprived of or is bereft of opportunity to cross-
examine the persons to whom the statements or
writings are attributed.15 And there can be no
quibbling that because death has supervened, the
late Gen Menzi, like the other purported Marcos
subalterns, Messrs. Baizas and De Vega, cannot
cross-examine the Locsins for the threatening
statements allegedly made by them for the late
President.
Like the Court of Appeals, we are not unmindful of
the exception to the hearsay rule provided in Section
38, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 38. Declaration against interest. - The
declaration made by a person deceased or unable to
testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact
asserted in the declaration was at the time it was
made so far contrary to the declarant's own interest,
that a reasonable man in his position would not have
made the declaration unless he believed it to be true,
may be received in evidence against himself or his
successors-in-interest and against third persons.
Even if petitioner succeeds in halving its testimonial
evidence, one-half purporting to quote the words of a
live witness and the other half purporting to quote
what the live witness heard from one already dead,
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
the other pertaining to the dead shall nevertheless
remain hearsay in character.
The all too familiar rule is that "a witness can testify
only to those facts which he knows of his own
knowledge".20 There can be no quibbling that
petitioner's witnesses cannot testify respecting what
President Marcos said to Gen. Menzi about the
acquisition of petitioner's newspaper, if any there be,
precisely because none of said witnesses ever had
an opportunity to hear what the two talked about.
Neither may petitioner circumvent the
hearsay rule by invoking the exception under the
declaration-against-interest rule. In context, the only
declaration supposedly made by Gen. Menzi which
can conceivably be labeled as adverse to his interest
could be that he was acting in behalf of Marcos in
offering to acquire the physical assets of petitioner.
Far from making a statement contrary to his own
interest, a declaration conveying the notion that the
declarant possessed the authority to speak and to act
for the President of the Republic can hardly be
considered as a declaration against interest.
4. SALVADOR COMILANG vs. FRANCISCO
BURCENA and MARIANO BURCENA G.R. No.
146853 February 13, 2006
FACTS: Francisco and Mariano Burcena together
with their mother, Dominga Reclusado Vda. de
Burcena, filed a complaint for annulment of document
with damages against Salvador Comilang.
They alleged that they are the owners of the subject
property in question, that they acquired it through
their earnings while working abroad and that it was
declared for taxation purposes in Dominga’s name
only as administrator thereof and Comilang caused
the execution of a Deed of Donation over said
property by taking advantage of Dominga’s
blindness, old age and physical infirmity, hence, the
said Deed of Donation is null and void.
In his Answer, Comilang contends that the Deed of
Donation was freely and voluntarily executed by
Dominga in consideration of her love and affection for
him and that the subject property was acquired by
Dominga together with her two sisters long before
respondents went to Hawaii.
During the pendency of the case and before she
could take the witness stand, Dominga died.
Witnesses for the plaintiffs were respondents and

their aunt, Margarita Burcena; while Comilang
testified on his own behalf.
The RTC held that the donation is void because
Dominga could not have validly disposed of the
subject property since it was bought with the money
sent by respondents while working abroad, although
declared for taxation purposes in Dominga’s name.
CA affirmed.
A petition for review on certiorari was filed by
Comilang arguing that Margarita’s statement on the
witness stand that Dominga told her that Francisco
and Mariano Burcena sent her money to buy the
subject property, should not have been given weight
or credence by the RTC and the CA because it is
hearsay and has no probative value.
Francisco and Mariano Burcena maintain that
Margarita’s testimony was not hearsay since
Margarita merely stated what Dominga said.
ISSUE: Should Margarita’s testimony be categorized
as hearsay evidence?
HELD: No. Anent Margarita’s testimony that
Dominga told her that Francisco and Mariano sent
her money to buy the subject property, it cannot be
categorized as hearsay evidence.
Margarita’s testimony was not presented to prove the
truth thereof, but only to establish the fact that
Dominga narrated to Margarita the source of the
funds used in the purchase of the subject property.
What was sought to be admitted in evidence, and
what was actually admitted in evidence, was the fact
that the statement was made by Dominga to
Margarita, not necessarily that the matters stated by
her were true. The said utterance is in the nature of
an independently relevant statement which may be
admitted in evidence as such, but not necessarily to
prove the truth thereof.
Thus, while it is true that the testimony of a witness
regarding a statement made by another person, if
intended to establish the truth of the fact asserted in
the statement, is clearly hearsay evidence, it is
otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement in
the record is merely to establish the fact that the
statement was made or the tenor of such statement.
Regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, when
the fact that it has been made is relevant, the hearsay
rule does not apply and the statement may be shown.
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
As a matter of fact, evidence as to the making of the
statement is not secondary but primary, for the
statement itself may constitute a fact in issue, or be
circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such
a fact. For this reason, the statement attributed to
Dominga regarding the source of the funds used to
purchase the subject property related to the court by
Margarita is admissible if only to establish the fact
that such statement was made and the tenor thereof.
Besides, the testimony of Margarita is not the main
basis for the RTC’s decision. In fact, her testimony is
not indispensable. It merely serves to corroborate the
testimonies of the respondents on the source of the
funds used in purchasing the subject property. The
testimonies of all three witnesses for the plaintiffs
were found to be convincing and credible by the RTC.
This Court will not alter the findings of the RTC on the
credibility of witnesses, principally because trial
courts have vastly superior advantages in
ascertaining the truth and in detecting falsehood as
they have the opportunity to observe the manner and
demeanor of witnesses while testifying.
5. ANNA LERIMA PATULA, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 164457, April 11, 2012
FACTS: Petitioner, a sales representative at
Footlucker’s Chain of Stores, was charged with
estafa for failure to account for the proceeds of the
sales and deliver the collection to the said company.
During the trial, prosecution, in order to prove that
collectibles lawfully belonging to the company where
misappropriated by the accused, submitted the
following documentary evidence: (a) the receipts
allegedly issued by petitioner to each of her
customers upon their payment, (b) the ledgers listing
the accounts pertaining to each customer with the
corresponding notations of the receipt numbers for
each of the payments, and (c) the confirmation
sheets accomplished by Guivencan herself. The
ledgers and receipts were marked and formally
offered as Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives,
inclusive. Prosecution also presented Guivencan to
testify on the entries in the documentary evidence.
Petitioner’s counsel interposed a continuing
objection on the ground that the figures entered in
Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives, inclusive, were
hearsay because the persons who had made the
entries were not themselves presented in court.

ISSUE: Whether or not testimony of a witness
pertaining to entries in a document made by another
person constitutes hearsay and may not be admitted
as evidence.
HELD: Section 36 of Rule 130, Rules of Court, a rule
that states that a witness can testify only to those
facts that she knows of her personal knowledge; that
is, which are derived from her own perception, except
as otherwise provided in the Rules of Court. The
personal knowledge of a witness is a substantive
prerequisite for accepting testimonial evidence that
establishes the truth of a disputed fact. A witness
bereft of personal knowledge of the disputed fact
cannot be called upon for that purpose because her
testimony derives its value not from the credit
accorded to her as a witness presently testifying but
from the veracity and competency of the extrajudicial
source of her information.
The reason for the exclusion of hearsay evidence is
that the person from whom the witness derived the
information on the facts in dispute is not in court and
under oath to be examined and cross-examined.
Moreover, the theory of the hearsay rule is that when
a human utterance is offered as evidence of the truth
of the fact asserted, the credit of the assert or
becomes the basis of inference, and, therefore, the
assertion can be received as evidence only when
made on the witness stand, subject to the test of
cross- examination. However, if an extrajudicial
utterance is offered, not as an assertion to prove the
matter asserted but without reference to the truth of
the matter asserted, the hearsay rule does not apply.
For example, in a slander case, if a prosecution
witness testifies that he heard the accused say that
the complainant was a thief, this testimony is
admissible not to prove that the complainant was
really a thief, but merely to show that the accused
uttered those words. This kind of utterance is hearsay
in character but is not legal hearsay. The distinction
is, therefore, between (a) the fact that the statement
was made, to which the hearsay rule does not apply,
and (b) the truth of the facts asserted in the
statement, to which the hearsay rule applies.
Hence, as Guivencan’s testimony intends to prove an
asserted fact, i.e., misappropriation on the part of the
accused through documentary evidence of which the
witness has no personal knowledge, the same is
inadmissible for being a hearsay evidence.
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
6. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. REY GADO
G.R. No. 129556 November 11, 1998
FACTS: Rey Gado seeks reversal of the judgment of
conviction rendered by Branch 276 of the Regional
Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region
stationed in Muntinlupa City.
The Information dated July 14, 1992 charging
accused-appellant and his co-accused Emma Gallos
with Murder.
On November 21, 1994, both accused-appellant Rey
Gado, and his co-accused Emma Gallos, who
voluntarily appeared in court upon notice, were
arraigned and both entered a plea of not guilty.
Emma Gallos was then also ordered to be detained.
The two accused, on their part, sought refuge in their
defense of alibi. Rey Gado claimed to have been
tending the store of his brother at Sucat, Cupang,
Muntinlupa, about five kilometers away from the
place where the incident happened, while Emma
Gallos averred that she was at home tending to her
sick daughter.
The trial court rendered judgment acquitting Emma
Gallos. Rey Gado was, however, convicted of the
crime of murder
Accused-appellant vigorously takes exception to the
trial court's admission of the testimony of Melencio
Manalang, Sr., who testified in regard to the
statements and declarations of his son concerning
his assailants, claiming that the said declarations are
not in the nature of a dying declaration for the simple
reason that they were not made under a clear
consciousness of an impending death.
ISSUE: Whether the statements, uttered by the
victim before he died partake of the nature of a dying
declaration or not.
HELD: Yes. As a rule, a dying declaration is hearsay
and is inadmissible as evidence. In order that a dying
declaration may be admissible as evidence, four
requisites must concur, namely: that the declaration
must concern the cause and surrounding
circumstances of the declarant's death; that at the
time the declaration was made, the declarant was
under a consciousness of an impending death; that
the declarant is competent as a witness; and that the

declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide,
murder or parricide, in which the declarant is a victim.
Capitalizing on the fact that the victim was still able
to stand and walk even after the first declaration was
made, accused-appellant contends that there could
not have possibly been a belief of a looming and
impending death on the part of the victim.
We cannot quite agree. From the established facts in
the case at bar, the trial court correctly considered
the declaration of the victim a dying declaration and,
therefore, admissible. The declarant was conscious
of his impending death. This may be gleaned not only
from the victim's insistence right after he reached
their house that he should immediately be brought to
the hospital and that he was becoming weaker by the
moment, but also from the serious nature of his
wounds (People vs. Sarabia, 127 SCRA 100 [1984]
and the fact that the said victim died shortly
afterwards (People v. Araja, 105 SCRA 133 [1981]).
Even assuming that the victim's utterances were not
made under a firm belief of an impending death, the
victim's statements may, at the very least, form part
of the res gestae. For the admission of evidence as
part of the res gestae, it is required that (a) the
principal act, the res gestae, be a startling
occurrence, (b) the statements forming part thereof
were made before the declarant had the opportunity
to contrive, and (c) the statements refer to the
occurrence in question and its attending
circumstances (People vs. Siscar, 140 SCRA 316
[1985]). We have ruled that while the statement of the
victim may not qualify as a dying declaration because
it was not made under the consciousness of
impending death (People vs. Palamos, 49 Phil. 601
[1926]), it may still be admissible as part of the res
gestae if it was made immediately after the incident
(People vs. Reyes, 52 Phil. 538 [1928]), or a few
hours thereafter (People vs. Tumalip, 60 SCRA 303
[1974]). Definitely, the victim's statement in the case
at hand was made immediately after the incident,
before he could even have the opportunity to contrive
or concoct a story. Of relevance, too, is the fact that
on two occasions, first at their house, and later while
he was being brought to the hospital, he identified
one and the same person as his assailant.
Where the elements of both a dying declaration and
a statement as part of the res gestae are present, as
in the case at bar, the statement may be admitted as
a dying declaration and at the same time as part of
the res gestae.
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
7. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
FLORENCIO ODENCIO and GUIAMELON MAMA
G.R. No. L-31961 January 9, 1979
FACTS: At about seven o'clock in the evening of
June 29, 1968, Prowa Talib (Palua Talib), a forty-year
old farmer, felled down by a volley of shots. Setie
rushed to the aid of her husband.
While Setie was comforting her husband, he
allegedly told her that he was going to die. He
directed her to remember what had happened to him
and that they had seen Guiamelon Mama and Poren
armed with guns. Prior to that shooting incident,
Prowa Talib had reported to the barrio captain that
Florencio Odencio had stolen his lumber.
Ngelam Towa (Nilan Tuwa), another neighbor and
the uncle of Setie heard, the gunshots on the
occasion in question. He hastened to Talib's house.
Setie told him that Guiamelon Mama had shot Talib.
She advised her uncle not to use his flashlight
because Guiamelon was still in the vicinity. Setie also
told Towa that Florencio Odencio had shot Oranen.
Towa left Talib's house in order to get assistance
from his father-in-law. While crossing the trail his
flashlight focussed on Florencio Odencio with two
companions leaving the scene of the crime.
Policemen arrived at Talib's house. Setie informed
them that Guiamelon was the gunwielder. They
brought Talib to a medical clinic where he was
interrogated by Patrolman Joaquin Sañada Talib told
Sañada that his assailants were Guiamelon,
Florencio Odencio and Florencio's father, Joseph
Odencio. Due to the critical condition of Talib
(nagaagonto), he was not able to sign his dying
declaration as taken down by Patrolman Sañada
Talib was brought to the hospital. He died on the
following day.
In his defense, Florencio, a thirty-two year-old farmer,
denied that he shot Talib and that he had a
misunderstanding with Oranen and Talib with both of
whom he was acquainted. Florencio testified that he
was in his house when the shooting occurred.
ISSUE: WON the dying declaration of the deceased
is sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.
HELD: Yes.

In disbelieving the alibis of Florencio and Guiamelon,
the trial court observed that the accused were
indubitably Identified as the assailants in Talib's
dying declarations to his wife and Patrolman Sañada.
Setie Mamalintao in her statement to the police
declared that she was able to recognize Florencio
and Guiamelon because there was a "big torch" in
front of her house and Karaing's house.
Talib's antemortem statement fortifies the testimony
of his widow, an eyewitness. Also, two other
witnesses saw the appellants leaving the scene of
the crime.
Moreover, Talib's dying declaration was sufficiently
proven. The rule is that a dying declaration may be
oral or written If oral, the witness, who heard it, may
testify thereto without the necessity, of course, of
reproducing exactly the words of the decedent, if he
is able to give the substance thereof. An unsigned
dying declaration may be used as a memorandum by
the witness who took it down. Thus, the guilt of the
appellants was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
8. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FRANCISCO
SANTOS y BAINGAN @ PRAN and VILLAMOR
ASUNCION G.R. No. 94545 April 4, 1997
FACTS: Francisco Santos was charged with murder
of David Ambre. The prosecution presented as
witness Corazon and Pedro Dayao, as well as the
victim’s wife, Lolita Ambre. The witnesses saw David
fall after being shot and heard that his wife asked him
who shot him and answered “Pare Pran”. Lolita knew
that her husband was referring to Francisco, the
godfather of their youngest child.
ISSUE: Does the ante mortem statement of the
victim identifying Francisco constitute as a dying
declaration sufficient to sustain the latter’s
conviction?
HELD: Yes. A dying declaration is entitled to the
highest credence because no person who knows of
his impending death would make a careless and false
accusation. “As an exception to the hearsay rule, the
requisites for its admissibility are as follows: (1) the
declaration is made by the deceased under the
consciousness of his impending death; (2) the
deceased was at the time competent as a witness;
(3) the declaration concerns the cause and
surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death;
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
and (4) the declaration is offered in a criminal care
wherein the declarant's death is the subject of inquiry.
In the case at bar, the victim's declaration consisted
of the words "Pare Pran." Under the circumstances,
however, he could not have been expected to
articulate his awareness of something so obvious —
the inevitability of his demise — or to have the energy
to do so. The nature and extent of said injuries
underscored the seriousness of his condition and
they later proved by themselves that the utterances
of the deceased were made under a consciousness
of an impending death. That his demise thereafter
came swiftly, although not instantaneously, further
emphasized the victim's realization of the
hopelessness of his recovery.
9. People v. Serenas, G.R. No. 188124, June 29,
2010, 622 SCRA 485
FACTS: Jonel Falabrica Serenas alias "Joe-An"
(Joe-An) and Joel Lorica Labad (Joel) are convicted
of the crime of murder. Niño Noel Ramos (Niño) had
just brought his girlfriend, Dianne Charisse Gavino
(Dianne), home in Sto. Niño, Parañaque City. On his
way back to La Huerta, he passed by a bridge
connecting the barangays of Sto. Niño and La
Huerta. Thereat, Niño was stabbed and mauled.4
Cesar Ramos (Cesar), Niño’s brother, was in the
vicinity of N. Domingo Street in La Huerta when he
heard a commotion on the bridge. As he was about
to proceed to the bridge, he met Niño and noticed
that his brother was soaked in his own blood. Niño
relayed to Cesar that he was stabbed by Joe-An.
Cesar immediately brought Niño to the hospital
where the latter expired thirty (30) minutes later.
ISSUE: Are the accused guilty based on the
declaration of the victim?
HELD: We respect the findings that Jonel Falabrica
Serenas is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder
not by virtue of identification by Dianne but as
established by the dying declaration of the victim.
Upon the other hand, we reverse the conviction of
Joel Lorica Labad.
We cannot simply brush aside the fact that while
Dianne pointed to the persons who threatened to do
harm on the victim, she failed to identify who the
perpetrators of the crime are. To the mind of the
Court, this omission in Dianne’s affidavit is so glaring

on a material point, i.e., the failure to attribute
authorship to the crime. Therefore, the testimony of
Dianne altogether becomes suspect.
Nevertheless, the prosecution’s case did not
necessarily crumble. The victim’s dying declaration is
a most telling evidence identifying Joe-an.
As an exception to the rule against hearsay evidence,
a dying declaration or ante mortem statement is
evidence of the highest order and is entitled to utmost
credence since no person aware of his impending
death would make a careless and false accusation.28
In order for a dying declaration to be held admissible,
four requisites must concur: first, the declaration
must concern the cause and surrounding
circumstances of the declarant's death; second, at
the time the declaration was made, the declarant
must be under the consciousness of an impending
death; third, the declarant is competent as a witness;
and fourth, the declaration must be offered in a
criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in
which the declarant is the victim.29
Niño’s ante mortem statement was relayed to his
brother Cesar.
All requisites for a dying declaration were sufficiently
met by the statement of the victim communicated to
Cesar. First, the statement pertained to Niño being
stabbed, particularly pin-pointing Joe-An as the
perpetrator. Second, Niño must have been fully
aware that he was on the brink of death considering
his bloodied condition when Cesar met him near the
bridge. Third, the competence of Niño is
unquestionable had he survived the stabbing
incident. Fourth, Niño’s statement was being offered
in a criminal prosecution for his murder.
Note however that based on the testimonies of
witnesses, there was no direct evidence linking
appellant Joel to the crime.
While the police officers caught Joel hiding under the
bridge, this incident appears to be circumstantial and
cannot stand to prove Joel’s complicity without any
corroborating evidence. Admittedly, Joel’s defense of
denial and alibi are inherently weak, however, it is
doctrinal that the weakness of the defense cannot be
the basis for conviction. The primary burden still lies
with the prosecution whose evidence must stand or
fall on its own weight and who must establish by proof
beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
before there can be conviction.32 At this juncture, we
acquit appellant Joel.
With respect to Joe-An, the lower courts properly
appreciated the presence of treachery in qualifying
the crime to murder.
10. DANILO L. PAREL vs. SIMEON B.
PRUDENCIO G.R. No. 146556 April 19, 2006
FACTS: Simeon Prudencio filed a complaint for
recovery of possession and damages against Danilo
Parel with the RTC Baguio. Prudencio is claiming that
he is the owner of a two-storey residential house
located at No. 61 Forbes Park National Reservation
near Department of Public Service (DPS) compound,
Baguio City.
In 1973, when the 2nd floor of the house was already
habitable, he allowed Parel’s parents to live there and
supervise the construction below. When the house
was finished, the Parel family was allowed to live
there since they have no house of their own..
In November 1985, Prudencio wrote Florentino a
notice for them to vacate the said house as the
former was due for retirement and he needed the
place. Danilo’s parents heeded this when they
migrated to US in 1986, however, Danilo and his
family unlawfully entered and took possession of the
ground floor of the house; and refused to leave
despite many demands.
Prudencio filed an action for recovery of possession,
and also asked from Parel for a monthly rentalof
P3.000 until he leaves the premises, plus moral and
exemplary damages and costs.
Parel alleged that his parents are co-owners of the
house and that his parents spent their own resources
in improving the house; that the construction workers
were hired by Florentino, and that Florentino was an
awardee of the land on which the house stands.
The RTC declared that the house is co-owned by
Parel and Prudencio. It rejected the affidavit
executed by Florentino declaring the house as owned
by respondent saying that it was executed because
of an advisement addressed to the late Florentino by
the City Treasurer concerning the property’s tax
assessment and Florentino since it should be the
respondent who should pay the taxes; and that the
affidavit cannot be accepted for being hearsay.

However, this was reversed by the CA which ruled
that the affidavit of Florentino, stating that he is not
the owner of the subject house but respondent, as
conclusive proof of respondent’s sole ownership of
the subject house. It ruled that Prudencio had shown
sufficient evidence to support his complaint for
recovery of possession when he presented the
affidavit dated September 24, 1973 executed by
Florentino and sworn to before the Assistant City
Assessor of Baguio City, G.F. Lagasca, which reads:
”I, FLORENTINO PAREL, 42 years of age,
employee, and residing at Forbes Park,
Reservation No. 1, after having been sworn
to according to law depose and say:
That I am an occupant of a residential
building located at Forbes Park, Reservation
No. 1, Baguio City which is the subject of an
advice emanating from the Office of the City
Assessor, Baguio City, for assessment and
declaration for taxation purposes;
That I am not the owner of the building in
question;
That the building in question is owned by Mr.
Simeon B. Prudencio who is presently
residing at 55 Hyacinth, Roxas District,
Quezon City.”
ISSUE: Whether or not Florentino’s affidavit should
be given weight as conclusive proof of Prudencio’s
sole ownership
HELD: Yes. The affidavit should be given weight as
conclusive proof of Prudencio’s sole ownership of the
property.
Section 37. Dying declaration. — The declaration of
a dying person, made under the consciousness of an
impending death, may be received in any case
wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as
evidence of the cause and surrounding
circumstances of such death.
Section 38. Declaration against interest. — The
declaration made by a person deceased, or unable
to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the
fact is asserted in the declaration was at the time it
was made so far contrary to declarant's own interest,
that a reasonable man in his position would not have
made the declaration unless he believed it to be true,
may be received in evidence against himself or his
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
successors in interest and against third persons.
(32a)
The theory under which such declarations are
received in evidence notwithstanding they are
hearsay is that the necessity of the occasion renders
the reception of such evidence advisable and, further
that the reliability of such declaration asserts facts
which are against his own pecuniary or moral
interest.
In this case, on the basis of the said affidavit, it is safe
to presume that he would not have made such
declaration unless he believed it to be true, as it is
prejudicial to himself as well as to his children’s
interests as his heirs. A declaration against interest is
the best evidence which affords the greatest certainty
of the facts in dispute.
There is also no evidence that Florentino revoked
such affidavit, even when the criminal complaint for
trespass to dwelling was filed by Prudencio and even
when a complaint for unlawful detainer was filed
against petitioner and his wife also in 1988 which was
subsequently dismissed on the ground that
respondent’s action should be an accion publiciana
which is beyond the jurisdiction of the MTC,
The building plan of the house was in the name of
Prudencio and his wife and the house was built in
accordance to said plan. Prudencio was the one
paying the real estate property taxes on the house
under his name since 1974. While tax receipts and
declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of
ownership, they constitute at least proof that the
holder has a claim of title over the property. However
as applicable in this case, the taxes, taken with the
other circumstances, it was concluded that
Prudencio is the sole owner of the house.
11. People v. Bernal GR 113685, June 19, 1997
FACTS: It appears that on August 5, 1991, around
11:30 in the morning, while Roberto Racasa and
Openda, Jr. were engaged in a drinking spree, they
invited Bernal, who was passing by, to join them.
After a few minutes, Bernal decided to leave both
men, apparently because he was going to fetch his
child. Thereafter, two men arrived, approached
Openda, Jr., and asked the latter if he was "Payat."
When he said yes, one of them suddenly pulled out
a handgun while the other handcuffed him and told
him "not to run because they were policemen" and

because he had an "atraso" or a score to settle with
them. They then hastily took him away. Racasa
immediately went to the house of Openda, Jr. and
informed the latter's mother of the abduction.
Likewise, a certain Salito Enriquez, a tailor and a
friend of Openda, Jr., testified that sometime in
January 1991, Openda, Jr. confided to him that he
and Bernal's wife Naty were having an affair. One
time, Naty even gave Openda, Jr. money which they
used to pay for a motel room. He advised Naty "not
to do it again because she (was) a married woman.
Undoubtedly, his wife's infidelity was ample reason
for Bernal to contemplate revenge.
ISSUE: Whether or not the statement made by
Openda, Jr. (victim) is a declaration against interest?
HELD: Yes, Motive is generally irrelevant, unless it is
utilized in establishing the identity of the perpetrator.
Coupled with enough circumstantial evidence of facts
from which it may be reasonably inferred that the
accused was the malefactor, motive may be sufficient
to support a conviction. Openda, Jr.'s revelation to
Enriquez regarding his illicit relationship with Bernal's
wife is admissible in evidence, pursuant to Section
38, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence,
Sec. 38. Declaration against interest. The declaration
made by a person deceased, or unable to testify,
against the interest of the declarant, if the fact
asserted in the declaration was at the time it was
made so far contrary to declarant's own interest, that
a reasonable man in his position would not have
made the declaration unless he believed it to be true,
may be received in evidence against himself or his
successors-in-interest and against third persons.
Openda, Jr., having been missing since his
abduction, cannot be called upon to testify. His
confession to Enriquez, definitely a declaration
against his own interest, since his affair with Naty
Bernal was a crime, is admissible in evidence 13
because no sane person will be presumed to tell a
falsehood to his own detriment.
12. Parel v. Prudencio, G.R. No. 146556
FACTS: On February 27, 1992, Simeon Prudencio
(respondent) filed a complaint for recovery of
possession and damages against petitioner with the
RTC Baguio alleging that: he is the owner of a two-
storey residential house located at No. 61 Forbes
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
Park National Reservation near Department of Public
Service (DPS) compound, Baguio City; such property
was constructed solely from his own funds and
declared in his name under Tax Declaration No.
47048; he commenced the construction of said
house in 1972 until its completion three years later;
when the second floor of said house became
habitable in 1973, he allowed petitioner’s parents,
Florentino (now deceased) and Susan Parel, to move
therein and occupy the second floor while the
construction of the ground floor was on-going to
supervise the construction and to safeguard the
materials; when the construction of the second floor
was finished in 1975, respondent allowed petitioner’s
parents and children to transfer and temporarily
reside thereat; it was done out of sheer magnanimity
as petitioner’s parents have no house of their own
and since respondent’s wife is the older sister of
Florentino, petitioner’s father; in November 1985,
respondent wrote Florentino a notice for them to
vacate the said house as the former was due for
retirement and he needed the place to which
petitioner’s parents heeded when they migrated to
U.S. in 1986; however, without respondent’s
knowledge, petitioner and his family unlawfully
entered and took possession of the ground floor of
respondent’s house; petitioner’s refusal to vacate the
house despite repeated demands prompted
respondent to file the instant action for recovery of
possession.
The RTC did not give credence to the tax
declaration as well as the several documents
showing the City Assessor’s assessment of the
property all in respondent’s name since tax
declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership. It
rejected the affidavit executed by Florentino
declaring the house as owned by respondent saying
that the affidavit should be read in its entirety to
determine the purpose of its execution; that it was
executed because of an advisement addressed to
the late Florentino by the City Treasurer concerning
the property’s tax assessment and Florentino,
thought then that it should be the respondent who
should pay the taxes; and that the affidavit cannot be
accepted for being hearsay.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner was able to prove by
preponderance of evidence that his father was a co-
owner of the subject two-storey residential house.
HELD: Respondent presented the affidavit dated
September 24, 1973 executed by Florentino and

sworn to before the Assistant City Assessor of
Baguio City, G.F. Lagasca, which reads:
I, FLORENTINO PAREL, 42 years of age, employee,
and residing at Forbes Park, Reservation No. 1, after
having been sworn to according to law depose and
say:
That he is the occupant of a residential building
located at Forbes Park, Reservation No. 1, Baguio
City which is the subject of an advicement addressed
to him emanating from the Office of the City
Assessor, Baguio City, for assessment and
declaration for taxation purposes;
That I am not the owner of the building in question;
That the building in question is owned by Mr. Simeon
B. Prudencio who is presently residing at 55
Hyacinth, Roxas District, Quezon City.
Further, affiant say not.
Section 38 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
provides:
SEC. 38. Declaration against interest. – The
declaration made by a person deceased, or unable
to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the
fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was
made so far contrary to the declarant's own interest,
that a reasonable man in his position would not have
made the declaration unless he believed it to be true,
may be received in evidence against himself or his
successors-in-interest and against third persons.
The theory under which declarations against interest
are received in evidence notwithstanding they are
hearsay is that the necessity of the occasion renders
the reception of such evidence advisable and, further
that the reliability of such declaration asserts facts
which are against his own pecuniary or moral
interest.
The affiant, Florentino, who died in 1989 was
petitioner’s father and had adequate knowledge with
respect to the subject covered by his statement. In
said affidavit, Florentino categorically declared that
while he is the occupant of the residential building, he
is not the owner of the same as it is owned by
respondent who is residing in Quezon City. It is safe
to presume that he would not have made such
declaration unless he believed it to be true, as it is
prejudicial to himself as well as to his children’s
interests as his heirs.
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
A declaration against interest is the best evidence
which affords the greatest certainty of the facts in
dispute.
Notably, during Florentino’s lifetime, from 1973, the
year he executed said affidavit until 1989, the year of
his death, there is no showing that he had revoked
such affidavit even when a criminal complaint for
trespass to dwelling had been filed by respondent
against him (Florentino) and petitioner in 1988
regarding the subject house which the trial court
dismissed due to the absence of evidence showing
that petitioner entered the house against the latter’s
will and held that the remedy of respondent was to
file an action for ejectment;12 and even when a
complaint for unlawful detainer was filed against
petitioner and his wife also in 1988 which was
subsequently dismissed on the ground that
respondent’s action should be an accion publiciana
which is beyond the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial
Court.
13. People v. Pruna, G.R. No. 138471
FACTS: On January 27, 1995, an information for
rape was filed against accused-appellant Manuel
Pruna y Ramirez or Erman Pruna y Ramirez
(hereafter PRUNA), the accusatory portion of which
reads:
That on or about January 3, 1995 at Sitio
Tabing-ilog, Brgy. Panilao, Pilar, Bataan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused thru force
and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously lie and succeed to
have sexual intercourse with the offended
party, Lizette Arabelle Gonzales, a 3-year-old
minor girl, against the will and consent of the
latter, to her damage and prejudice.
Dr. Emelita Quiroz, an obstetrician and gynecologist
at the Bataan Provincial Hospital, testified that on 3
January 1995, she conducted a complete physical
examination on Lizette and took wet smear specimen
from her vaginal wall through scraping. The urinalysis
report includes a positive finding for "sperm cells." Dr.
Quiroz explained that the presence of sperm cells in
the vaginal canal signified that sexual intercourse
and ejaculation had occurred on the person of the
patient. There was no laceration; but there was
hyperemia, which means reddening of the tissue
around the vaginal opening.

On the other hand, Pruna denied having raped
Lizette. He claimed that in the morning of 3 January
1995, he was in his house preparing coffee for
Carlito. After Carlito left, several men arrived and
boxed him for reasons not known to him. Carlito and
the latter’s friend then brought him to the barangay
hall. There, Lizette’s father boxed him. He was
thereafter brought to the Pilar Municipal Jail.
ISSUE: Whether or not Lizette was a competent and
credible witness considering that she was allegedly
only 3 years old when the alleged rape occurred and
5 years old when she testified.
HELD: Yes. As a general rule, when a witness takes
the witness stand, the law, on ground of public policy,
presumes that he is competent. The court cannot
reject the witness in the absence of proof of his
incompetency. The burden is, therefore, upon the
party objecting to the competency of a witness to
establish the ground of incompetency.
Section 21 of Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence
enumerates the persons who are disqualified to be
witnesses. Among those disqualified are "[c]hildren
whose mental maturity is such as to render them
incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which
they are examined and relating them truthfully."
No precise minimum age can be fixed at which
children shall be excluded from testifying. The
intelligence, not the age, of a young child is the test
of the competency as a witness. It is settled that a
child, regardless of age, can be a competent witness
if he can perceive and, in perceiving, can make
known his perception to others and that he is capable
of relating truthfully the facts for which he is
examined.
In determining the competency of a child witness, the
court must consider his capacity (a) at the time the
fact to be testified to occurred such that he could
receive correct impressions thereof; (b) to
comprehend the obligation of an oath; and (c) to
relate those facts truly to the court at the time he is
offered as a witness. The examination should show
that the child has some understanding of the
punishment which may result from false swearing.
The requisite appreciation of consequences is
disclosed where the child states that he knows that it
is wrong to tell a lie, and that he would be punished if
he does so, or that he uses language which is
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
equivalent to saying that he would be sent to hell for
false swearing. A child can be disqualified only if it
can be shown that his mental maturity renders him
incapable of perceiving facts respecting which he is
being examined and of relating them truthfully.
In this case, appellant questions the competency of
Lizette as a witness solely on the ground of her age.
He failed to discharge the burden of showing her
mental immaturity. From the above-quoted
testimony, it can be gleaned that Lizette had the
capacity of observation, recollection, and
34
communication and that she could discern the
consequence of telling a lie. We, therefore, sustain
the trial court in admitting her testimony and
according it great weight.
We are not persuaded by appellant’s assertion that
LIZETTE should not be allowed to testify two years
after the alleged rape "when the interplay of frail
memory combines with the imagination of earlier
years." It must be noted that it is a most natural
reaction for victims of criminal violence to have a
lasting impression of the manner in which the crime
was committed and the identity of the person
responsible therefor.
In a string of cases, we have said that the testimony
of a rape victim who is of young or tender age is
credible and deserves full credit, especially where no
motive is attributed to the victim that would make her
testify falsely against the accused. Indeed, a girl of
such age as Lizette would not concoct a story of
defloration; allow the examination of her private
parts; and undergo the expense, trouble,
inconvenience, and the trauma of a public trial unless
she was in fact raped.
14. CORAZON DEZOLLER TISON AND RENE R.
TISON vs COURT OF APPEALS G.R. no. 121027
July 31, 1997
FACTS: This is a case of an action for reconveyance
of a parcel of land and an apartment. Teodora
Guerrero died and left a parcel of land and an
apartment. Her husband Martin Guerrero adjudicates
the said land to him and consequently sold to
Teodora Domingo. The nephews and nieces Tison et
al seek to inherit by right of representation from the
property disputed property presenting documentary
evidence to prove filial relation. The respondent
contended that the documents/evidence presented is

inadmissible for being hearsay since the affiants
were never presented for cross-examination.
ISSUE: Is evidence presented hearsay evidence and
inadmissible?
HELD: The evidence submitted does not conform to
the rules on their admissibility; however the same
may be admitted by reason of private respondent's
failure to interpose any timely objection thereto at the
time they were being offered in evidence. It is
elementary that an objection shall be made at the
time when an alleged inadmissible document is
offered in evidence; otherwise, the objection shall be
treated as waived, since the right to object is merely
a privilege which the party may waive.
The primary proof that was considered in
ascertaining the relationship between the parties
concerned is the testimony of Corazon Dezoller
Tison to the effect that Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in
her lifetime, or sometime in 1946, categorically
declared that the former is Teodora's niece. Such a
statement is considered a declaration about pedigree
which is admissible, as an exception to the hearsay
rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, subject to the following conditions: (1) that the
declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that the
declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is
the subject of inquiry; (3) that such relationship be
shown by evidence other than the declaration; and
(4) that the declaration was made ante litem motam,
that is, not only before the commencement of the suit
involving the subject matter of the declaration, but
before any controversy has arisen thereon.
15. BEN-HUR NEPOMUCENO vs. ARHBENCEL
ANN LOPEZ, represented by her mother
ARACELI LOPEZ, Respondent.
G.R. No. 181258 March 18, 2010
FACTS: Respondent Arhbencel Ann Lopez
(Arhbencel), represented by her mother Araceli
Lopez (Araceli), filed a Complaint1with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City for recognition
and support against Ben-Hur Nepomuceno
(petitioner).
Arhbencel claimed to have been begotten out of an
extramarital affair of petitioner with Araceli; that
petitioner refused to affix his signature on her
Certificate of Birth; and that, by a handwritten note
dated August 7, 1999, petitioner nevertheless
obligated himself to give her financial support in the
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
amount of ₱1,500 on the 15th and 30th days of each
month beginning August 15, 1999.
Petitioner countered that Araceli had not proven that
he was the father of Arhbencel; and that he was only
forced to execute the handwritten note on account of
threats coming from the National People’s Army.
The trial court held that Arhbencel’s Certificate of
Birth was not prima facie evidence of her filiation to
petitioner as it did not bear petitioner’s signature; that
petitioner’s handwritten undertaking to provide
support did not contain a categorical
acknowledgment that Arhbencel is his child; and that
there was no showing that petitioner performed any
overt act of acknowledgment of Arhbencel as his
illegitimate child after the execution of the note.
On appeal, petitioner contends that nowhere in the
documentary evidence presented by Araceli is an
explicit statement made by him that he is the father
of Arhbencel; that absent recognition or
acknowledgment, illegitimate children are not entitled
to support from the putative parent; that the
supposed payment made by him of Araceli’s hospital
bills was neither alleged in the complaint nor proven
during the trial; and that Arhbencel’s claim of
paternity and filiation was not established by clear
and convincing evidence.
ISSUE: Has Arhbencel’s claim of paternity and
filiation established by clear and convincing
evidence?
HELD: No. The Rules on Evidence include provisions
on pedigree. The relevant sections of Rule 130
provide:
SEC. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. — The
act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to
testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person
related to him by birth or marriage, may be received
in evidence where it occurred before the controversy,
and the relationship between the two persons is
shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration. The word "pedigree" includes
relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death,
the dates when and the places where these facts
occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces
also facts of family history intimately connected with
pedigree.
SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding
pedigree. — The reputation or tradition existing in a

family previous to the controversy, in respect to the
pedigree of any one of its members, may be received
in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a
member of the family, either by consanguinity or
affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books
or charts, engraving on rings, family portraits and the
like, may be received as evidence of pedigree.
This Court's rulings further specify what incriminating
acts are acceptable as evidence to establish filiation.
In Pe Lim v. CA, a case petitioner often cites, we
stated that the issue of paternity still has to be
resolved by such conventional evidence as the
relevant incriminating verbal and written acts by the
putative father. Under Article 278 of the New Civil
Code, voluntary recognition by a parent shall be
made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before
a court of record, or in any authentic writing. To be
effective, the claim of filiation must be made by the
putative father himself and the writing must be the
writing of the putative father. A notarial agreement to
support a child whose filiation is admitted by the
putative father was considered acceptable evidence.
Letters to the mother vowing to be a good father to
the child and pictures of the putative father cuddling
the child on various occasions, together with the
certificate of live birth, proved filiation. However, a
student permanent record, a written consent to a
father's operation, or a marriage contract where the
putative father gave consent, cannot be taken as
authentic writing. Standing alone, neither a certificate
of baptism nor family pictures are sufficient to
establish filiation.
In the present case, Arhbencel relies, in the main, on
the handwritten note executed by petitioner which
reads:
Manila, Aug. 7, 1999
I, Ben-Hur C. Nepomuceno, hereby undertake to give
and provide financial support in the amount of
₱1,500.00 every fifteen and thirtieth day of each
month for a total of ₱3,000.00 a month starting Aug.
15, 1999, to Ahrbencel Ann Lopez, presently in the
custody of her mother Araceli Lopez without the
necessity of demand, subject to adjustment later
depending on the needs of the child and my income.
The abovequoted note does not contain any
statement whatsoever about Arhbencel’s filiation to
petitioner. It is, therefore, not within the ambit of
Article 172(2) vis-à-vis Article 175 of the Family Code
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
which admits as competent evidence of illegitimate
filiation an admission of filiation in a private
handwritten instrument signed by the parent
concerned.
The note cannot also be accorded the same weight
as the notarial agreement to support the child
referred to in Herrera. For it is not even notarized.
And Herrera instructs that the notarial agreement
must be accompanied by the putative father’s
admission of filiation to be an acceptable evidence of
filiation. Here, however, not only has petitioner not
admitted filiation through contemporaneous actions.
He has consistently denied it.
The only other documentary evidence submitted by
Arhbencel, a copy of her Certificate of Birth, has no
probative value to establish filiation to petitioner, the
latter not having signed the same.
At bottom, all that Arhbencel really has is petitioner’s
handwritten undertaking to provide financial support
to her which, without more, fails to establish her claim
of filiation. The Court is mindful that the best interests
of the child in cases involving paternity and filiation
should be advanced. It is, however, just as mindful of
the disturbance that unfounded paternity suits cause
to the privacy and peace of the putative father’s
legitimate family.
16. FRANCISCO L. JISON vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and MONINA JISON G.R. No. 124853
February 24, 1998
FACTS: Monina Jison alleged that Francisco had
been married to a certain Lilia Lopez Jison since
1940. At the end of 1945 or the start of 1946,
however, Francisco impregnated Esperanza F.
Amolar (who was then employed as the nanny of
Francisco's daughter, Lourdes). As a result, Monina
was born on 6 August 1946, in Dingle, Iloilo, and
since childhood, had enjoyed the continuous, implied
recognition as an illegitimate child of Francisco by his
acts and that of his family. Monina prayed for a
judicial declaration of her illegitimate status and that
FRANCISCO support and treat her as such.
Francisco alleged that he could not have had sexual
relations with Esperanza Amolar during the period
specified in the complaint as she had ceased to be in
his employ as early as 1944, and did not know of her
whereabouts since then.

The trial court categorized Monina’s many evidences
as hearsay evidence, incredulous evidence, or self-
serving evidence. Monina appealed to the Court of
Appeals and sought the reversal of the trial court's
decision. She alleged, among others, that the trial
court erred in rejecting the admissibility of the duly
identified notes and letter of the relatives of the
appellee as hearsay.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the testimonies of
Monina’s witnesses were sufficient to establish
Monina's filiation and it declared her to be the
illegitimate daughter of Francisco. Francisco assails
the various notes and letters written by his relatives
(Exhs. S to V) as they were not identified by the
authors.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Exhibits S to V may be
admissible in evidence
HELD: No. As to Exhibits "S," "T," "U" and "V," the
various notes and letters written by Francisco's
relatives, namely Mike Alano, Emilio Jison, Mariquit
Lopez and Fernando Lopez, respectively, allegedly
attesting to Monina's filiation, while their due
execution and authenticity are not in issue, as
MONINA witnessed the authors signing the
documents, nevertheless, under Rule 130, Section
39, the contents of these documents may not be
admitted, there being no showing that the declarants-
authors were dead or unable to testify, neither was
the relationship between the declarants and Monina
shown by evidence other than the documents in
question.41 As to the admissibility of these
documents under Rule 130, Section 40, however,
this requires further elaboration.
Rule 130, Section 40, provides:
Sec. 40. Family reputation or tradition
regarding pedigree. — The reputation or
tradition existing in a family previous to the
controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any
one of its members, may be received in
evidence if the witness testifying thereon be
also a member of the family, either by
consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family
bibles or other family books or charts,
engravings on rings, family portraits and the
like may be received as evidence of
pedigree. (emphasis supplied)
It is evident that this provision may be divided
into two (2) parts: the portion containing the first
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
underscored clause which pertains to testimonial
evidence, under which the documents in question
may not be admitted as the authors thereof did not
take the witness stand; and the section containing the
second underscored phrase. What must then be
ascertained is whether Exhibits S to V, as private
documents, fall within the scope of the clause "and
the like" as qualified by the preceding phrase "entries
in family bibles or other family books or charts,
engravings on rights [and] family portraits,"
We hold that the scope of the enumeration
contained in the second portion of this provision, in
light of the rule of ejusdem generis, is limited to
objects which are commonly known as "family
possessions," or those articles which represent, in
effect, a family's joint statement of its belief as to the
pedigree of a person. These have been described as
objects "openly exhibited and well known to the
family," or those "which, if preserved in a family, may
be regarded as giving a family tradition." Other
examples of these objects which are regarded as
reflective of a family's reputation or tradition
regarding pedigree are inscriptions on tombstones,
monuments or coffin plates.
Plainly then, Exhibits S to V, as private
documents not constituting "family possessions" as
discussed above, may not be admitted on the basis
of Rule 130, Section 40. Neither may these exhibits
be admitted on the basis of Rule 130, Section 41
regarding common reputation,47 it having been
observed that:
The weight of authority appears to be
in favor of the theory that it is the general
repute, the common reputation in the family,
and not the common reputation in
community, that is a material element of
evidence going to establish pedigree. . . .
[Thus] matters of pedigree may be proved by
reputation in the family, and not by reputation
in the neighborhood or vicinity, except where
the pedigree in question is marriage which
may be proved by common reputation in the
community.
Their inadmissibility notwithstanding,
Exhibits "S" to "V," inclusive, may, in like manner as
MONINA's school records, properly be admitted as
part of her testimony to strengthen her claim that,
indeed, relatives of FRANCISCO recognized her as
his daughter.

17. Mendoza v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 86302
FACTS: The complaint was filed on August 21, 1981,
in the Regional Trial Court in Cebu City. Teopista
Toring Tufiacao, the herein private respondent,
alleged that she was born on August 20, 1930, to
Brigida Toring, who was then single, and defendant
Casimiro Mendoza, married at that time to Emiliana
Barrientos. She averred that Mendoza recognized
her as an illegitimate child by treating her as such and
according her the rights and privileges of a
recognized illegitimate child.
Casimiro Mendoza, then already 91 years old,
specifically denied the plaintiffs allegations and set
up a counterclaim for damages and attorney's fees.
Amplifying on her complaint, Teopista testified that it
was her mother who told her that her father was
Casimiro.
Lolito Tufiacao corroborated his mother and
said he considered Casimiro his grandfather
because Teopista said so. He would kiss his hand
whenever they saw each other and Casimiro would
give him money. Casimiro used to invite him to his
house and give him jackfruits. when his grandfather
learned that he was living on a rented lot, the old man
allowed him to build a house on the former's land.
Isaac testified that his uncle Casimiro was the
father of Teopista because his father Hipolito,
Casimiro's brother, and his grandmother, Brigida
Mendoza, so informed him. He worked on Casimiro's
boat and whenever Casimiro paid him his salary, he
would also give him various amounts from P2.00 to
P10.00 to be delivered to Teopista. Isaac also
declared that Casimiro intended to give certain
properties to Teopista.
ISSUE: Whether or not Teopista was in continuous
possession of her claimed status of an illegitimate
child of Casimiro Mendoza.
HELD: Yes. But although Teopista has failed to show
that she was in open and continuous possession of
the status of an illegitimate child of Casimiro, we find
that she has nevertheless established that status by
another method.
What both the trial court and the respondent court did
not take into account is that an illegitimate child is
allowed to establish his claimed filiation by "any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
laws," according to the Civil Code, or "by evidence or
proof in his favor that the defendant is her father,"
according to the Family Code. Such evidence may
consist of his baptismal certificate, a judicial
admission, a family Bible in which his name has been
entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree,
admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses,
and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130
of the Rules of Court.
The trial court conceded that "the defendant's
parents, as well as the plaintiff himself, told
Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac Mendoza, that
Teopista was the daughter of the defendant." It
should have probed this matter further in light of Rule
130, Section 39, of the Rules of Court, providing as
follows:
Sec. 39. — Act or declarations about pedigree. —
The act or declaration of a person deceased, or
unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another
person related to him by birth or marriage, may be
received in evidence where it occurred before the
controversy, and the relationship between the two
persons is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration. The word "pedigree" includes
relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death,
the dates when and the places where these facts
occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces
also facts of family history intimately connected with
pedigree.
The statement of the trial court regarding Teopista's
parentage is not entirely accurate. To set the record
straight, we will stress that it was only Isaac Mendoza
who testified on this question of pedigree, and he did
not cite Casimiro's father. His testimony was that he
was informed by his father Hipolito, who was
Casimiro's brother, and Brigida Mendoza, Casimiro's
own mother, that Teopista was Casimiro's illegitimate
daughter.
Such acts or declarations may be received in
evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule
because "it is the best the nature of the case admits
and because greater evils are apprehended from the
rejection of such proof than from its admission.16
Nevertheless, precisely because of its nature as
hearsay evidence, there are certain safeguards
against its abuse. Commenting on this provision,
Francisco enumerates the following requisites that
have to be complied with before the act or declaration
regarding pedigree may be admitted in evidence:

1. The declarant is dead or unable to testify.
2. The pedigree must be in issue.
3. The declarant must be a relative of the
person whose pedigree is in issue.
4. The declaration must be made before the
controversy arose.
5. The relationship between the declarant and
the person whose pedigree is in question must be
shown by evidence other than such declaration.
All the above requisites are present in the case at
bar. The persons who made the declarations about
the pedigree of Teopista, namely, the mother of
Casimiro, Brigida Mendoza, and his brother, Hipolito,
were both dead at the time of Isaac's testimony. The
declarations referred to the filiation of Teopista and
the paternity of Casimiro, which were the very issues
involved in the complaint for compulsory recognition.
The declarations were made before the complaint
was filed by Teopista or before the controversy arose
between her and Casimiro. Finally, the relationship
between the declarants and Casimiro has been
established by evidence other than such declaration,
consisting of the extrajudicial partition of the estate of
Florencio Mendoza, in which Casimiro was
mentioned as one of his heirs.
The said declarations have not been refuted.
If we consider the other circumstances narrated
under oath by the private respondent and her
witnesses, such as the financial doles made by
Casimiro to Brigida Toring, the hiring of Teopista's
husband to drive the passenger truck of Casimiro,
who later sold the vehicle and gave the proceeds of
the sale to Teopista and her husband, the permission
he gave Lolito Tufiacao to build a house on his land
after he found that the latter was living on a rented
lot, and, no less remarkably, the joint savings account
Casimiro opened with Teopista, we can reasonably
conclude that Teopista was the illegitimate daughter
of Casimiro Mendoza.
18. THE ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC COMPANY
vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, (First
Division) LILIAN JUAN LUIS, JANE JUAN YABES,
VIRGINIA JUAN CID, GLORIA JUAN CARAG, and
PURISIMA JUAN G.R. No. L-53401 November 6,
1989
FACTS: Luis, et. al.’s Version
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
Strong typhoon "Gening" buffeted the province of
Ilocos Norte, bringing heavy rains and consequent
flooding. Between 5:30 and 6:00 A.M., after the
typhoon had abated and when the floodwaters were
beginning to recede, Isabel Lao Juan (a.k.a. Nana
Belen), proceeded to the Five Sisters Emporium, of
which she was the owner and proprietress, to look
after the merchandise therein that might have been
damaged. She was followed by Aida Bulong, a
Salesgirl at the Five Sisters Grocery, also owned by
Nana Belen, and by Linda Alonzo Estavillo, a ticket
seller at the YJ Cinema, which was partly owned by
Nana Belen. Aida and Linda walked side by side at a
distance of between 5 and 6 meters behind Nana
Belen. Suddenly, Nana Belen screamed "Ay" and
quickly sank into the water. The two girls attempted
to help, but fear dissuaded them from doing so
because on the spot where Nana Belen sank they
saw an electric wire dangling from a post and moving
in snake-like fashion in the water. Upon their shouts
for help, Ernesto dela Cruz tried to go to Nana Belen,
but at four meters away from her, he turned back
shouting that the water was grounded.
When Antonio Yabes was informed by
Ernesto that his mother-in law had been electrocuted,
he acted immediately. With his wife Jane, together
with Ernesto and one Joe Ros, Yabes passed by the
City Hall to request the police to ask the people of
INELCO to cut off the electric current. Then Yabes
instructed his boys to fish for the body of Nana Belen,
which was recovered about two meters from an
electric post.
In another place, at about 4:00 A.M. on same
date, Engineer Antonio Juan, Power Plant Engineer
of the NPC, noticed certain fluctuations in their
electric meter which indicated such abnormalities as
grounded or short-circuited lines. On his way to the
Laoag NPC Compound on an inspection, he saw
grounded and disconnected lines. Electric lines were
hanging from the posts to the ground. Since he could
not see any INELCO lineman, he decided to go to the
INELCO Office. Engr. Juan saw an electric wire
about 30 meters long strung across the street "and
the other end was seeming to play with the current of
the water." Engr. Juan passed by the house of Nana
Belen. Using the resuscitator, he tried to revive Nana
Belen. His efforts proved futile. Rigor mortis was
setting in. On the left palm of Nana Belen, Engr. Juan
noticed a hollow wound.

Dr. Jovencio Castro, Municipal Health Officer,
examined the body at about 8:00 A.M. The skin was
grayish or, in medical parlance, cyanotic, which
indicated death by electrocution. On the left palm, the
doctor found an "electrically charged wound" or a first
degree burn. About the base of the thumb on the left
hand was a burned wound. The certificate of death
prepared by Dr. Castro stated the cause of' death as
,'circulatory shock electrocution".
INELCO’s version
It presented the testimonies of its officers and
employees, namely, Conrado Asis, electric engineer;
Loreto Abijero, collector-inspector; Fabico Abijero,
lineman; and Julio Agcaoili, president-manager of
INELCO seeking to prove that on and even before
the date of the incident, the electric service system
of the INELCO in the whole franchise area, did not
suffer from any defect that might constitute a hazard
to life and property. The service lines, devices and
other INELCO equipment in the area had been
newly-installed prior to the date in question. As a
public service operator and in line with its business of
supplying electric current to the public, INELCO had
installed safety devices to prevent and avoid injuries
to persons and damage to property in case of natural
calamities such as floods, typhoons, fire and others.
It had 12 linesmen charged with the duty of making a
round-the-clock check-up of the areas respectively
assigned to them.
It asserts that although a strong typhoon
struck the province of Ilocos Norte, putting streets
under water, only a few known places were reported
to have suffered damaged electric lines. Abijero
testified that he did not see any cut or broken wires
in or near the vicinity. What he saw were many
people fishing out the body of Nana Belen. Dr.
Antonio Briones was presented to show that Nana
Belen could not have died of electrocution. Dr.
Briones testified to the following: Without an autopsy
on the cadaver of the victim, no doctor, not even a
medicolegal expert, can speculate as to the real
cause of death. Cyanosis could not have been found
in the body of the deceased three hours after her
death, because cyanosis which means lack of
oxygen circulating in the blood and rendering the
color of the skin purplish, appears only in a live
person. The presence of the elongated burn in the
left palm of the deceased is not sufficient to establish
her death by electrocution; since burns caused by
electricity are more or less round in shape and with
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
points of entry and exit. Had the deceased held the
lethal wire for a long time, the laceration in her palm
would have been bigger and the injury more massive.
INELCO claims that Nana Belen could have died
simply either by drowning or by electrocution due to
negligence attributable only to herself and not to
petitioner. It pointed out that Nana Belen, without
INELCO's knowledge, caused the installation of a
burglar deterrent by connecting a wire from the main
house to the iron gate and fence of steel matting,
thus, charging the latter with electric current
whenever the switch is on. INELCO then conjectures
that the switch to said burglar deterrent must have
been left on, hence, causing Nana Belen’s
electrocution when she tried to open her gate.
CFI Decision
Ruled in favor of INELCO
CA Decision
Reversed the CFI Ruling
ISSUE: Did the CA commit grave abuse of
discretion in considering the purely hearsay alleged
declarations of Ernesto de la Cruz as part of the res
gestae?
RULING: No
By a preponderance of evidence, it was
shown that Nanay Belen died of electrocution, a
conclusion which can be primarily derived from the
photographed burnt wounds on the left palm of
Nanay Belen. Such wounds undoubtedly point to the
fact that she had clutched a live wire of INELCO. This
was corroborated by the testimony of Dr. Castro who
actually examined the body of the deceased a few
hours after the death and described the said burnt
wounds as a "first degree burn and that they were
"electrically charged". Furthermore, witnesses Linda
and Aida added that after Nanay Belen screamed
"Ay" and sank into the water, they tried to render
some help but were overcome with fear by the sight
of an electric wire dangling from an electric post,
moving in the water in a snake-like fashion. It justifies
CA in concluding that "(t)he nature of the wounds as
described by the witnesses who saw them can lead
to no other conclusion than that they were "burns,"
and there was nothing else in the street where the
victim was wading thru which could cause a burn
except the dangling live wire of defendant company"

CA properly applied the principle of res gestae. There
is no sufficient reason to discredit the testimonies of
Linda and Aida who were with Nana Belen during that
morning. They were one in the affirmation that Nana
Belen, while wading in the waist-deep flood five or six
meters ahead of them, suddenly screamed "Ay" and
quickly sank into the water. When they approached
Nana Belen to help, they were stopped by the sight
of an electric wire dangling from a post and moving
in snake-like fashion in the water. Ernesto also tried
to approach the deceased, but he turned back
shouting that the water was grounded. These bits of
evidence carry much weight. For the subject of the
testimonies was a startling occurrence, and the
declarations may be considered part of the res
gestae.
For the admission of the res gestae in evidence, the
following requisites must be present:
(1) that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling
occurrence;
(2) that the statements were made before the
declarant had time to contrive or devise;
(3) that the statements made must concern the
occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances.
We do not find any abuse of discretion on the CA'
part in view of the satisfaction of said requisites in the
case at bar.
The statements made relative to the startling
occurrence are admitted in evidence precisely as an
exception to the hearsay rule on the grounds of
trustworthiness and necessity. "Trustworthiness"
because the statements are made instinctively
(Wesley vs. State, 53 Ala. 182), and "necessity"
because such natural and spontaneous utterances
are more convincing than the testimony of the same
person on the stand (Mobile vs. Ascraft 48 Ala. 31).
Therefore, the fact that the declarant, Ernesto, was
not presented to testify does not make the testimony
of Linda and Aida hearsay since the said declaration
is part of the res gestae. Similarly, we considered part
of the res gestae a conversation between two
accused immediately after commission of the crime
as overheard by a prosecution witness (People vs.
Reyes, 82 Phil. 563).
19. MARK BAYQUEN, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS AND THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES. G.R. No. 93851 March 6, 1992
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
FACTS: Bernadette Estepa’s testifies the following:
Before 4:00 a.m. of July 25, 1984, Bernadette Estepa
was awakened by a commotion outside her room as
if a door was being closed. Thinking that it was only
her brother, she returned to her bed and went back
to sleep. After about 5 minutes, she was awakened
by the alarm clock which she previously set at 4:00.
She called out Bong several times but nobody
answered so she got up to wake him up per his
request.
As she was calling his name she heard two gunshots
coming from downstairs. Immediately she went down
and there she saw at the stair landing her brother,
Bong, lying face down. She lifted him up and noticed
that he was bleeding. She asked him "why". Bong
answered in Ilocos, "Pinaltogandak ken sinasakdak"
(They shot and stabbed me.) Bernadette asked him
who did it and he answered clearly, "Mark Bayquen
and Boco".
Wilfredo Boco and Mark Bayquen were charged
before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City,
Branch VI for the crime of Homicide defined and
penalized under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioner faults the appellate court for upholding the
trial court's reliance on the sole testimony of
Bernadette Estepa, the deceased's sister, who had
pointed to Wilfredo Boco and Mark Bayquen ads the
persons who "shot and stabbed" her brother Bong
Estepa, based on Bong's dying declaration. The
petitioner believes that the ante-mortem statements
should have been disregarded considering that they
were revealed 14 days after Bong Estepa's death on
July 24, 1984 or on August 8, 1984.
Bernadette's excuse in the present case for not
divulging the dying declaration of her brother, Bong
Estepa, was that she was afraid because she was all
alone since her parents, brothers and sisters were all
abroad. Strangely, however, this was not her attitude,
when, in the morning of the incident, she ventured out
into the dark alone at 4:00 in the morning, walked
down the stairs despite the sound of two gunshots.
Nonetheless, granting her fears, We cannot
understand why she still failed to go to the police
authorities upon arrival from Germany of her father
and her mother, brothers and sister, from the States.
The physical presence of these persons would have
provided her the necessary moral support and would
have shielded her from feared reprisals.

Petitioner asks instead that the statements of
Bernadette Estepa, uttered immediately after the
incident be given credence, since these were made
spontaneously without any opportunity to fabricate or
concoct any statement. Petitioner stated in his appeal
brief:
Interviewed right after the death of the brother by
investigating policeman MELENCIO SANTOS of the
Baguio City Police Department and asked who killed
her brother, she replied that her brother could hardly
talk.
Interviewed that same morning by Dr. Florita Ferrer-
Garcia, Officer-in-Charge of the Baguio Health
Department, for purposes of giving her consent to the
autopsy of her brother, she was asked who killed her
brother and her answer was that a robber killed her
brother without naming any names.
Again, interviewed by her own barangay captain,
Alberto Della, who even offered her the protection of
his office and even provided her with a rifle, when
asked if she knew the assailants of her brother, she
said "NO".
The herein accused-appellant respectfully submits
that these statements must be given great weight in
analyzing the whole body of evidence against the
accused. Aside from Bernadette Estepa, no one was
presented to corroborate her testimony. Upon her
sole testimony therefore rest the entire case.
ISSUE: Should the accused be considered criminally
liable based on the dying declarations of Bong
Estepa as part of res gestae given by her sister
Bernadette Estepa?
HELD: No. The utterances of the witness Bernadette
Estepa to the policeman, to the doctor, and to her
barangay captain were spontaneous declarations,
without premeditation on her part. She was still
suffering under the strain of a startling occurence, the
stimuli of which did not allow her any opportunity to
fabricate or dissimulate. It is the respectful
submission of herein accused-appellant that such
statements and utterances under the obtaining
conditions fall under the res gestae rule, that is, they
are part of the res gestae.
As between the spontaneous statements of
Bernadette Estepa, therefore, and those which she
gave before the NBI two weeks after her brother's
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
death, it is clear that the former statements should be
given weight and credence.
20. DBP POOL OF ACCREDITED INSURANCE
COMPANIES vs. RADIO MINDANAO NETWORK,
INC. G.R. No. 147039 January 27, 2006
FACTS: Radio Mindanao Network, Inc. (RMN)
obtained a fire insurance for its office in Bacolod City
with DBP Pool of Accredited Insurance Companies
(DBP) and with Provident Insurance Corp. Under the
insurance insurance policy, specifically condition no.
6 ( c ) and (d), it does not cover any loss or damage
occasioned by or through or in consequence, directly
or indirectly, of any of the following consequences,
namely: (c) War, invasion, act of foreign enemy,
hostilities, or warlike operations (whether war be
declared or not), civil war. (d) Mutiny, riot, military or
popular rising, insurrection, rebellion, revolution,
military or usurped power.
On July 27, 1988, RMN’s office in Bacolod was razed
by armed men. RMN was denied recovery of
damages from the insurance companies on the
ground that the burning was caused by members of
the Communist Party of the Philippines/New
People’s Army (CPP/NPA) thus was covered under
the exception under the insurance policy. DBP and
Provident made such assertions based on the fire
investigation report of SFO III Leonardo Rochar and
LTC Nicolas Torres, that the bystanders heard the
armed men shouting “Mabuhay ang NPA” after they
set fire to the building.
RMN filed action for recovery of sum of
money against tge insurance companies. The trial
court ruled in favor of RMN stating that there was no
sufficient evidence to prove that the burning was
perpetrated by the NPA as the statements made by
the bystanders were hearsay. DBP and Provident
appealed to the CA, which affirmed the ruling of the
RTC.
ISSUE: WON the testimony of the bystanders is
considered as res gestae
HELD: No, it is not res gestae. In order for res gestae
to apply as an exception to the hearsay rule, the
following must be present: : (1) that the principal act,
the res gestae, be a startling occurrence; (2) the
statements were made before the declarant had the
time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) that

the statements must concern the occurrence in
question and its immediate attending circumstances.
Res gestae refers to those exclamations and
statements made by either the participants, victims,
or spectators to a crime immediately before, during,
or after the commission of the crime, when the
circumstances are such that the statements were
made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance
inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there
was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and
to fabricate a false statement.
In the instance case, it cannot be said that these
utterances were made spontaneously by the
bystanders and before they had the time to contrive
or devise a falsehood. Both SFO III Rochar and Lt.
Col. Torres received the bystanders’ statements
while they were making their investigations during
and after the fire. It is reasonable to assume that
when these statements were noted down, the
bystanders already had enough time and opportunity
to mill around, talk to one another and exchange
information, not to mention theories and
speculations, as is the usual experience in
disquieting situations where hysteria is likely to take
place. It cannot therefore be ascertained whether
these utterances were the products of truth. That the
utterances may be mere idle talk is not remote.
Evidence that persons who burned the radio facilities
shouted “Mabuhay ang NPA” does not furnish logical
conclusion that they are member [sic] of the NPA or
that their act was an act of rebellion or insurrection.
Additional convincing proof need be submitted.
Defendants failed to discharge their responsibility to
present adequate proof that the loss was due to a risk
excluded.”
21. PEOPLE VS. PALMONES [G.R. No. 136303.
July 18, 2000]
FACTS: The case evolved from a shooting incident
that happened in Kidapawan, Sultan Kudaratthat
involved a police officer AsimMamansal as the victim
who was killed later and the brothers
AnthonyMelchor and Anthony Baltazar Palmones as
the accused-assailants.
That one night in April 27, 1997, the victim was shot
in a dark place, together with his paramour, while
riding home by an unidentified person who later were
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
known through the prosecution’s witness testimony
as the Palmones brothers.
The identity of the two accused was raised based on
the testimony of Sony Boy Redovan, the witness of
the prosecution who was also a nephew of the victim,
who testified that before the death of his uncle, the
later was able to declare that the accused-assailant
were the Palmones brothers. That the witness
Redovan was able to talk with his uncle nearly an
hour before it dies, and that the same declared who
shot him.
The same testimony was also testified by Inspector
Tagum who said that he was able to ask the victim
while in the emergency room, about the identity of his
perpetrator, and that were Juany and Tony
Palmones.
The two accused were convicted for a crime of
murder in the RTC based largely on the alleged dying
declaration of the victim through the testimonies of
the witnesses Sonny Boy Redovan and Inspector
Tagum and the apparent weakness of their defense.
Hence, this appeal by the accused-appellants to the
Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the court a quo erred in considering the
alleged dying declaration of AsimMamansal as an
exception to the hearsay rule.
2. Whether the court a quo erred in considering the
alleged dying declaration of AsimMamansal as part
of the Res Gestae Rule.
HELD:
1. Yes. There was an error in considering the alleged
dying declaration of AsimMamansal for it lacks some
of the requirements to be an exceptions to the rule of
inadmissibility of hearsay evidence for it to be
admissible as evidence to the court.
Section 31, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 31. Dying declaration. – The declaration of a
dying person, made under a consciousness of an
impending death, may be received in a criminal case
wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as
evidence of the cause and surrounding
circumstances of such death

As such, the requirements for the admissibility of an
ante mortem statement are: (a) it must concern the
crime and the surrounding circumstances of the
declarant’s death; (b) at the time it was made, the
declarant was under a consciousness of impending
death; (c) the declarant was competent as a witness;
and (d) the declaration was offered in a criminal case
for murder, homicide or parricide wherein which the
decedent was the victim.
In cases where an alleged dying declaration is sought
to be admitted, it must be proven that that the
declaration was made “under a consciousness of
impending death” which means simply that the
declarant is fully aware that he is dying or going to
die from his wounds or injuries soon or imminently, or
shall have a complete conviction that death is at
hand, or there must be “a settled hopeless
expectation.”
In this case, it was not established by the prosecution
that the statements of the declarant concerning the
cause and surrounding circumstances of his death
were made under the consciousness of impending
death. No proof to this effect was ever presented by
the prosecution. It was not shown whether Sonny
Boy Redovan or Inspector Alexander Tagum ever
asked the victim whether he believed that he was
going to die out of his injuries or any other similar
question. Sonny Boy Redovan claimed that he was
able to talk with the victim for around an hour but the
only thing he revealed of their conversation was the
alleged identification of the victim of his two
assailants. For his part, Inspector Tagum admitted
that the only question he asked of the victim was if
the victim knew who had shot him.From these points,
there was no proved that the victim was ever aware
of the seriousness of his condition.
2. Yes. The alleged statements attributed to the
victim cannot be admitted as part of the res gestae
because it lacks the requisites of spontaneity in order
for it to be admitted as part of the res gestae and be
admissible as evidence to the court.
Res gestae refers to those exclamations
and statements made by either the participants,
victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before,
during, or immediately after the commission of a
crime, when the circumstances are such that the
statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or
utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion
and there was no opportunity for the declarant to
deliberate and to fabricate a false statement.
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
In order to admit statements as evidence part of the
res gestae, the element of spontaneity is critical. The
following factors have generally been considered in
determining whether statements offered in evidence
as part of the res gestae have been made
spontaneously: (1) the time that lapsed between the
occurrence of the act or transaction and the making
of the statement; (2) the place where the statement
was made; (3) the condition of the declarant when he
made the statement; (4) the presence or absence of
intervening events between the occurrence and the
statement relative thereto; and (5) the nature and
circumstances of the statement itself.
Tested against these factors to test the spontaneity
of the statements attributed to the victim, we rule that
these statements fail to qualify as part of the res
gestae. When Mamansal allegedly uttered the
statements attributed to him, an appreciable amount
of time had already elapsed from the time that he was
shot as the victim was shot at around 10:00 p.m. but
he only uttered the statements attributed to him about
30 minutes to an hour later. Moreover, he allegedly
made these statements not at the scene of the crime
but at the hospital where he was brought for
treatment. Likewise, the trip from the scene of the
crime to the hospital constituted an intervening event
that could have afforded the victim opportunity for
deliberation. These circumstances, taken together,
indubitably show that the statements allegedly
uttered by Mamansal lack the requisite spontaneity in
order for these to be admitted as part of the res
gestae.
22. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GORGONIO
VILLARAMA alias Baby G.R. No. 139211.
February 12, 2003
FACTS: On November 2, 1996, the spouses
Rosendo and Merlita Tumulak went to the cemetery
to light candles for the dead, leaving behind their
three young children, Arthel, Bernadeth and
Elizabeth (all minors), playing inside their house
without adult supervision.
Appellant, 35-year-old Gorgonio Villarama, elder
brother of the victim’s mother Merlita, arrived at the
Tumulaks house and found the three children by
themselves.
Thereupon, appellant ordered the two older children,
Arthel and Bernadeth, to pasture the goats, leaving
the youngest, Elizabeth, with him. Once alone,
appellant raped his niece Elizabeth.

This was the scene which greeted the prosecutions
eyewitness, Ricardo Tumulak, younger brother of
Elizabeth’s father Rosendo, when he arrived at his
brother’s house to return the bolo he borrowed from
the latter.
Rosendo and Merlita Tumulak got home at about six
oclock in the evening. They were met by Rosendos
parents who told them what happened.
Appellant asserts that the testimonies of the victim’s
parents were hearsay since they did not witness the
actual rape and were only relating the rape as
allegedly told to them by Elizabeth.
ISSUE: Whether or not the testimonies of the victim’s
parents are mere hearsay?
HELD: Yes.
There are several well-entrenched exceptions to the
hearsay rule under Sections 37 to 47 of Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court. Pertinent to the case at bar is
Section 42 which provides:
SEC. 42. Part of the res gestae. - Statements made
by a person while a startling occurrence is taking
place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with
respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given
in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also,
statements accompanying an equivocal act material
to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be
received as part of the res gestae.
To be admissible as part of res gestae, a statement
must be spontaneous, made during a startling
occurrence or immediately prior or subsequent
thereto, and must relate to the circumstance of such
occurrence.29cräläwvirtualibräry
In the case at bar, there is no doubt that the victim
was subjected to a startling occurrence when she
pointed to appellant as her assailant. It is evident
from the records that the statement was spontaneous
because the time gap from the sexual assault to the
time the victim recounted her harrowing experience
in the hands of appellant was very short. Obviously,
there was neither capability nor opportunity for the 4-
year-old victim to fabricate her statement.
The critical factor is the ability or chance to invent a
story of rape. At her age, the victim could not have
had the sophistication, let alone the malice, to tell her
mother that her uncle made her lie down, took off her
panties and inserted his penis inside her vagina.
The shock of an unwelcome genital penetration on a
woman is unimaginable, more so to a four-year-old
child. Such a brutal experience constituted
unspeakable trauma. The fact that Elizabeth was still
crying when her parents arrived reinforces the
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
conclusion that she was still in a traumatic state when
she made the statements pointing to appellant.
23. RODOLFO BELBIS, JR. vs PEOPLE G.R. No.
181052 NOVEMBER 14, 2012
FACTS: On December 9, 1997, Veronica Dacir
heard his live-in partner, Jose Bahillo, shouting and
calling her name. She saw blood at the back of Jose’s
shorts. It was there that he told her that he was held
by petitioner Alberto while Rodolfo stabbed him four
times. He was taken to the hospital and was given
immediate treatment and antibiotics. Although his
wounds were not completely healed, Jose failed to
return to the hospital due to financial constraints.
Veronica brought Jose back to the hospital on
January 1, 1998, because he was complaining of
urinary retention and pains in his left and lumbar
regions. He was diagnosed with having advanced
Pyelonephritis, wherein his kidney was inflamed and
with pus formation and scarring. Subsequently, Joes
died.
The RTC convicted both accused of the crime of
homicide, but appreciated the mitigating
circumstance of incomplete self-defense. The CA
affirmed the decision.
On appeal, the petitioner argue that the CA erred in
ruling that the statements issued by the victim in the
presence of witnesses Veronica Dacir and SPO1
Bataller before he died are dying declarations within
the contemplation of the law as the victim still lived
for one month after the said dying declaration was
made.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a dying declaration
in the case at bar.
HELD: No. A dying declaration is a statement made
by the victim of homicide, referring to the material
facts which concern the cause and circumstances of
the killing and which is uttered under a fixed belief
that death is impending and is certain to follow
immediately, or in a very short time, without an
opportunity of retraction and in the absence of all
hopes of recovery. In other words, it is a statement
made by a person after a mortal wound has been
inflicted, under a belief that death is certain, stating
the facts concerning the cause and circumstances
surrounding his/her death.

As an exception to the hearsay rule, the requisites for
its admissibility are as follows: (1) the declaration is
made by the deceased under the consciousness of
his impending death; (2) the deceased was at the
time competent as a witness; (3) the declaration
concerns the cause and surrounding circumstances
of the declarant’s death; and (4) the declaration is
offered in a criminal case wherein the declarant’s
death is the subject of inquiry.
The fact that the victim was stabbed on December 9,
1997 and died only on January 8, 1998 does not
prove that the victim made the statement or
declaration under the consciousness of an
impending death. The rule is that, in order to make a
dying declaration admissible, a fixed belief in
inevitable and imminent death must be entered by
the declarant. It is the belief in impending death and
not the rapid succession of death in point of fact that
renders the dying declaration admissible. It is not
necessary that the approaching death be presaged
by the personal feelings of the deceased. The test is
whether the declarant has abandoned all hopes of
survival and looked on death as certainly impending.
As such, the CA incorrectly ruled that there were
dying declarations.
The CA should have admitted the statement made by
the victim to Veronica Dacir right after he was
stabbed as part of the res gestae and not a dying
declaration.
All that is required for the admissibility of a given
statement as part of the res gestae, is that it be made
under the influence of a startling event witnessed by
the person who made the declaration before he had
time to think and make up a story, or to concoct or
contrive a falsehood, or to fabricate an account, and
without any undue influence in obtaining it, aside
from referring to the event in question or its
immediate attending circumstances. In sum, there
are three requisites to admit evidence as part of the
res gestae: (1) that the principal act, the res gestae,
be a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were
made before the declarant had the time to contrive or
devise a falsehood; and (3) that the statements must
concern the occurrence in question and its immediate
attending circumstances. It goes without saying that
the element of spontaneity is critical.
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
24. G.R. No. 150464 June 27,
2006SECURITY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY,
Petitioner, vs. ERIC GAN, Respondent.
FACTS: In 1981, respondent Eric Gan opened a
current account with petitioner at its Soler Branch in
Santa Cruz, Manila. Petitioner alleged that it had an
agreement with respondent wherein the latter would
deposit an initial amount in his current account and
he could draw checks on said account provided there
were sufficient funds to cover them. Furthermore,
under a special arrangement with petitioner’s branch
manager then, Mr. Qui, respondent was allowed to
transfer funds from his account to another person’s
account also within the same branch. Respondent
availed of such arrangement several times by
depositing checks in his account and even before
they cleared, he withdrew the proceeds thereof and
transferred them to the other account. These
transactions were covered by what were known as
"debit memos" since respondent had no sufficient
funds to cover the amounts he transferred.
Later on, respondent purportedly incurred an
overdraft or negative balance in his account. As of
December 14, 1982, the overdraft balance came up
to P153,757.78.
In 1991, petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money
against respondent to recover the P297,060.01 with
12% interest per annum from September 16, 1990
until fully paid, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses
and costs of suit.
To prove its claim, petitioner presented Patricio
Mercado who was the bookkeeper who handled the
account of respondent and recorded his transactions
in a ledger. Based on the ledger, the overdraft
resulted from transfers of funds from respondent’s
current account to another person’s account. These
transfers were made under the authority of Qui.
Respondent categorically denied that he ever
authorized these “funds transfers.”
Both the trial court and the CA found that petitioner
failed to substantiate its claim that respondent
knowingly incurred an overdraft against his account.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ledger cards and the
testimony of Patricio Mercado constituted the best
evidence of the transactions made by the respondent
relative to his account

HELD: No. We see no reason to disturb the findings
of the lower courts.
The entries in the ledger, as testified to by Mercado
were not competent evidence to prove that
respondent consented to the transfers of funds.
These entries merely showed that the transfers were
indeed made and that Qui approved them. Neither
can we accept petitioner’s argument that the entries
made by Mercado in the ledger were competent
evidence to prove how and when the negative
balance incurred. Petitioner invokes Section 43 of
Rule 130 (Entries in the course of business).
Under these exceptions to the hearsay rule, the
admission in evidence of entries in corporate books
required the satisfaction of the following conditions:
1. The person who made the entry must be
dead, or unable to testify;
2. The entries were made at or near the time of
the transactions to which they refer;
3. The entrant was in a position to know the
facts stated in the entries;
4. The entries were made in his professional
capacity or in the performance of a duty,
whether legal, contractual, moral or religious;
and
5. The entries were made in the ordinary or
regular course of business or duty.
The ledger entries did not meet the first and third
requisites.
Mercado, petitioner’s bookkeeper who prepared the
entries, was presented to testify on the transactions
pertaining to the account of respondent. It was in the
course of his testimony that the ledger entries were
presented. There was, therefore, neither justification
nor necessity for the presentation of the entries as
the person who made them was available to testify in
court.
Moreover, Mercado had no personal knowledge of
the facts constituting the entries, particularly those
entries which resulted in the negative balance. He
had no knowledge of the truth or falsity of these
entries.
As the Court of Appeals held, there is good reason
why evidence of this nature is incorrigibly hearsay.
Entries in business records which sprung from the
duty of other employees to communicate facts
occurring in the ordinary course of business are
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
prima facie admissible, the duty to communicate
being itself a badge of trustworthiness of the entries,
but not when they purport to record what were
independent agreements arrived at by some bank
officials and a client. In this case, the entries become
mere casual or voluntary reports of the official
concerned. To permit the ledgers, prepared by the
bank at its own instance, to substitute the contract as
proof of the agreements with third parties, is to set a
dangerous precedent. Business entries are allowed
as an exception to the hearsay rule only under certain
conditions specified in Section 43, which must be
scrupulously observed to prevent them from being
used as a source of undue advantage for the party
preparing them.
Thus, petitioner did not prove that respondent had
incurred a negative balance in his account.
Consequently, there was nothing to show that
respondent was indebted to it in the amount claimed.
25. HEIRS OF IGNACIO CONTI V. COURT OF
APPEALS, G.R. NO. 118464
FACTS: Lourdes Sampayo and Ignacio Conti,
married to Rosario Cuario, were the co-owners of the
property. On 17 March 1986 Lourdes Sampayo died
intestate without issue. Subsequently, on 1 April
1987 private respondents Josefina S. Reyes and the
others were all represented by their Attorney-in-Fact
Lydia S. Reyes, with Lolita A. Sampayo acting also in
her own behalf and as Attorney-in-Fact of Norma A.
Sampayo, all claiming to be collateral relatives of the
deceased Lourdes Sampayo, filed an action for
partition and damages.
The spouses Ignacio Conti and Rosario Cuario
refused the partition on the ground that private
respondents failed to produce any document to prove
that they were the rightful heirs of Lourdes Sampayo.
On 30 August 1987 Ignacio Conti died and was
substituted as party-defendant by his children
Asuncion, Francisco, Milagros, Joselito, Luisito,
Diego and Teresita, all surnamed Conti.
At the trial, private respondents presented Lydia
Sampayo Reyes and Adelaida Sampayo to prove
that they were the collateral heirs of the deceased
Lourdes Sampayo and therefore entitled to her rights
as co-owner of the subject lot. Bringing with her the
original copy of her certificate of live birth showing
that her father was Inocentes Reyes and her mother
was Josefina Sampayo, Lydia Sampayo Reyes
testified that she was one of the nieces of Lourdes
Sampayo, being the daughter of Josefina Sampayo,

the only living sibling of Lourdes. Lydia also testified
that Lourdes had another sister named Remedios J.
Sampayo who died in 1948, and two brothers,
Manuel J. Sampayo and Luis J. Sampayo who died
in 1983 and 1960, respectively. To prove that
Josefina, Remedios, Luis and Manuel were siblings
of Lourdes, their baptismal certificates together with
a photocopy of the birth certificate of Manuel
Sampayo were offered in evidence. These
documents showed that their father and mother, like
Lourdes Sampayo, were Antonio Sampayo and
Brigida Jaraza.
The certificates of baptism presented as part of the
testimony of Lydia Sampayo Reyes were prepared
by Rev. Franklin C. Rivero who duly certified that all
data therein written were in accordance with the
church records, hence, the lower left portion of the
documents bearing the seal of the church with the
notation as to where the documents were logged in
particular. The baptismal certificates were presented
in lieu of the birth certificates because the repository
of those documents, the Office of the Civil Registrar
of Lucena City, had been razed by fire on two
separate occasions, 27 November 1974 and 30
August 1983, thus all civil registration records were
totally burned. On the other hand, a photocopy of
Manuel’s birth certificate dated 25 October 1919
showed that it was issued by the Local Civil Registrar
of Lucena, Tayabas (now Lucena City).
Adelaida Sampayo, widow of Manuel Sampayo,
testified that her husband Manuel was the brother of
the deceased Lourdes, and with the death of Manuel,
Luis and Remedios, the only living sibling of Lourdes
was Josefina.
To rebut whatever rights the alleged heirs of Lourdes
had over the subject lot, petitioners presented
Rosario Cuario Conti, Rosa Ladines Malundas and
Rodolfo Espineli. Rosario testified that the subject
property was co-owned in equal shares by her
husband Ignacio Conti and Lourdes Sampayo and
that her family (Rosario) had been staying in the
subject property since 1937. 11 In fact, she said that
her late husband Ignacio Conti paid for the real estate
taxes 12 and spent for the necessary repairs and
improvements thereon 13 because by agreement
Lourdes would leave her share of the property to
them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the documentary and
testimonial evidence submitted are competent and
adequate proofs that private respondents are
collateral heirs of Lourdes Sampayo
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
HELD: The entries made in the Registry Book may
be considered as entries made in the course of the
business under Section 43 of Rule 130, which is an
exception to the hearsay rule. The baptisms
administered by the church are one of its transactions
in the exercise of ecclesiastical duties and recorded
in the book of the church during the course of its
business.
It may be argued that baptismal certificates are
evidence only of the administration of the sacrament,
but in this case, there were four (4) baptismal
certificates which, when taken together, uniformly
show that Lourdes, Josefina, Remedios and Luis had
the same set of parents, as indicated therein.
Corroborated by the undisputed testimony of
Adelaida Sampayo that with the demise of Lourdes
and her brothers Manuel, Luis and sister Remedios,
the only sibling left was Josefina Sampayo Reyes,
such baptismal certificates have acquired evidentiary
weight to prove filiation.
Petitioners’ objection to the photocopy of the
certificate of birth of Manuel Sampayo was properly
discarded by the court a quo and respondent Court
of Appeals. According to Sec. 3, par. (1), Rule 130,
of the Rules of Court, when the subject of inquiry is
the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself
except when the original has been lost or destroyed
or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on
the part of the offeror. The loss or destruction of the
original certificate of birth of Manuel J. Sampayo was
duly established by the certification issued by the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Lucena City to
the effect that its office was completely destroyed by
fire on 27 November 1974 and 30 August 1983,
respectively, and as consequence thereof, all civil
registration records were totally burned.chanroble
26. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner, vs.
JAIME M. RAMOS, NILDA RAMOS, ERLINDA
ILANO, MILAGROS ILANO, DANIEL ILANO AND
FELIPA JAVALERA, respondents. G.R. No. 92740
March 23, 1992
FACTS: Respondents are officers of the Negros
Telephone Company who held confirmed tickets for
PAL. The tickets were brought sometime in August
1985. Among the conditions included in plaintiffs
tickets is the following:

1. CHECK-IN TIME- at least one hour before
PUBLISHED departure time of your flight. We will
consider your accommodation forfeited in favor of
waitlisted passenger if you fail to check-in at least 30
minutes before PUBLISHED departure time.
Respondents claim in their Complaint that they went
tot he check-in counter of the PAL's Naga branch at
least one (1) hour before the published departure
time but no one was at the counter until 30 minutes
before departure, but upon checking -in and
presentation of their tickets to the employee/clerk
who showed up, their tickets were cancelled and the
seats awarded to chance passengers; plaintiffs had
to go to Manila by bus, and seek actual, moral and
exemplary damages, and attorney's fees for breach
of contract of carriage.
PAL disclaim any liability, claiming that the non-
accommodation of plaintiff on the said flight was due
to their having check-in (sic) late for their flight. It is
averred even if PAL is found liable to the plaintiffs
such liability is confined to, and limited by, the CAB
Economic Regulations No. 7 in conjunction with P.D.
589.
RTC found PAL guilty of breach of contract of
carriage. PAL appealed to the Court of Appeals who
affirmed the RTC’s decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondents were
late in checking-in for their flight from Naga City to
Manila.
HELD: Yes. As a rule, the determination of a
question of fact depends largely on the credibility of
witnesses unless some documentary evidence is
available which clearly substantiates the issue and
whose genuineness and probative value is not
disputed.
The private respondents claim that they were on time
in checking-in for their flight; that no PAL personnel
attended to them until much later which accounted
for their late check-in; that PAL advanced the check-
in time and the departure of their flight resulting in
their non-accommodation; and that they suffered
physical difficulties, anxieties and business losses.
The evidence on record does not support the above
contentions. We note that there were two other
confirmed passengers who came ahead of the
private respondents names Capati and Go but were
refused accommodation because they were late. The
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
private respondents submitted no controverting
evidence. As clearly manifested above, the
intervening time between Capati and Go and the
private respondents took only a mere second. If
indeed, the private respondents were at the check-in
counter at 3:30 p.m., they could have been the first
ones to be attended to by Araquel than Capati and
Go.
In the absence of any controverting evidence, the
documentary evidence presented to corroborate the
testimonies of PAL's witnesses are prima facie
evidence of the truth of their allegations. The plane
tickets of the private respondents (with emphasis on
the printed condition of the contract of carriage
regarding check-in time as well as on the notation
"late 4:02" stamped on the flight coupon by the
check-in clerk immediately upon the check-in of
private respondents) and the passenger Manifest of
Flight PR 264 (which showed the non-
accommodation of Capati and Go an the private
respondents)are entries made in the regular course
of business which the private respondents failed to
overcome with substantial and convincing evidence
other than their testimonies. Consequently, they
carry more weight and credence.
A writing or document made contemporaneously with
a transaction in which are evidenced facts pertinent
to an issue, when admitted as proof of those facts, is
ordinarily regarded as more reliable proof and of
greater probative force than the oral testimony of a
witness as to such facts based upon memory and
recollection. Spoken words could be notoriously
unreliable as against a written document that speaks
a uniform language.
27 NESTLE vs. FY SONS
G.R. No. 150780 May 5, 2006
FACTS: NESTLE and FY SONS entered into a
distributorship agreement whereby NESTLE would
supply its products for FY SONS to distribute to its
food service outlets. A deed of assignment was also
executed by respondent in favor of NESTLE
assigning the time deposit of a certain Calixto
Laureano in the amount of P500,000 to secure FY
SONS credit purchases from NESTLE. A special
power of attorney was likewise executed by
Laureano authorizing the FY SONS to use the time
deposit as collateral.

NESTLE fined FY for allegedly selling 50 cases of
Krem-Top liquid coffee creamer to Lu Hing Market, a
retail outlet in Tarlac. This was purportedly
proscribed by the agreement. Respondent paid the
fine. In September 1990, Krem-Top liquid coffee
creamer was sold to Augustus Bakery and Grocery,
an act again allegedly in violation of the agreement.
NESTLE imposed a P40,000 fine which FY refused
to pay.
FY wrote petitioner to complain about the latter’s
breaches of their agreement and the various acts of
bad faith committed by NESTLE against it. In turn, on
NESTLE sent FY a demand letter and notice of
termination, alleging that the latter had outstanding
accounts of P995,319.81. When the alleged
accounts were not settled, NESTLE applied the
P500,000 time deposit as partial payment.
Respondent filed a complaint for damages against
petitiner, alleging bad faith.
Both the CA and the RTC found, among others, that
NESTLE indeed failed to provide support to FY, its
distributor; that NESTLE unjustifiably refused to
deliver stocks to FY; that the imposition of the
P20,000 fine was void for having no basis; that
NESTLE failed to prove FY’s alleged outstanding
obligation; that NESTLE terminated the agreement
without sufficient basis in law or equity and in bad
faith; and that petitioner should be held liable for
damages. Hence, NESTLE appealed.
NESTLE argues that the CA should not have
disregarded the testimony of its witness, Cristina
Rayos, who prepared the statement of account on
the basis of the invoices and delivery orders
corresponding to the alleged overdue accounts of
respondent. NESTLE further contends that the
testimony of Rayos was an exception to the hearsay
rule under Section 43, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:
Entries in the course of business. — Entries
made at, or near the time of the transactions to which
they refer, by a person deceased, or unable to testify,
who was in a position to know the facts therein
stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if
such person made the entries in his professional
capacity or in the performance of duty and in the
ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
ISSUE:Is the testimony of Rayos an exception to the
hearsay rule and thus be validly admitted?
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
HELD: No. The provision does not apply in this case
because it does not involve entries made in the
course of business. Rayos testified on a statement of
account she prepared on the basis of invoices and
delivery orders which she, however, knew nothing
about. She had no personal knowledge of the facts
on which the accounts were based since, admittedly,
she was not involved in the delivery of goods and was
merely in charge of the records and documents of all
accounts receivable as part of her duties as credit
and collection manager. She thus knew nothing of
the truth or falsity of the facts stated in the invoices
and delivery orders, i.e., whether such deliveries
were in fact made in the amounts and on the dates
stated, or whether they were actually received by
respondent. She was not even the credit and
collection manager during the period the agreement
was in effect.16 This can only mean that she merely
obtained these documents from another without any
personal knowledge of their contents.
The foregoing shows that Rayos was incompetent to
testify on whether or not the invoices and delivery
orders turned over to her correctly reflected the
details of the deliveries made. Thus, the CA correctly
disregarded her testimony.
Furthermore, the invoices and delivery orders
presented by NESTLE were self-serving. Having
generated these documents, NESTLE could have
easily fabricated them. NESTLE’s failure to present
any competent witness to identify the signatures and
other information in those invoices and delivery
orders cast doubt on their veracity.
28. BARCELON, ROXAS SECURITIES, INC. (now
known as UBP Securities, Inc.) vs. CIR G. R. No.
157064 (August 7, 2006)
FACTS: Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the
trading of securities. On 14 April 1988, petitioner
filed its Annual Income Tax Return for taxable
year 1987. After an audit investigation conducted
by the BIR, respondent CIR issued an
assessment for deficiency income tax in the
amount of P826,698.31 arising from the
disallowance of the item on salaries, bonuses and
allowances in the amount of P1,219,093,93 as
part of the deductible business expense since
petitioner failed to subject the salaries, bonuses
and allowances to withholding taxes.
This assessment was covered by Formal
Assessment Notice dated 1 February 1991,

which, respondent alleges, was sent to petitioner
through registered mail on 6 February 1991.
However, petitioner denies receiving the formal
assessment notice.
Petitioner filed a formal protest but subsequently,
the latter received a letter from the respondent
denying the protest with finality.
On 31 July 1998, petitioner filed a petition for
review with the CTA. The CTA found the BIR
records submitted by the respondent immaterial,
self-serving, and therefore insufficient to prove
that the assessment notice was mailed and duly
received by the petitioner.
CA - reversed the CTA decision, the CA found the
evidence presented by the respondent to be
sufficient proof that the tax assessment notice was
mailed to the petitioner, therefore the legal
presumption that it was received should apply
ISSUE Whether or not Rule 130 Section 44 is
applicable in this case
HELD: No. In the present case, petitioner denies
receiving the assessment notice, and the
respondent was unable to present substantial
evidence that such notice was, indeed, mailed or
sent by the respondent before the BIR’s right to
assess had prescribed and that said notice was
received by the petitioner. The respondent
presented the BIR record book where the name of
the taxpayer, the kind of tax assessed, the registry
receipt number and the date of mailing were
noted. The BIR records custodian, Ingrid Versola,
also testified that she made the entries therein.
Respondent offered the entry in the BIR record
book and the testimony of its record custodian as
entries in official records in accordance with
Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, 24
which states that:
Section 44. Entries in official
records. - Entries in official records made in
the performance of his duty by a public
officer of the Philippines, or by a person in
the performance of a duty specially enjoined
by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated.
The foregoing rule on evidence, however, must be
read in accordance with this Court’s
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
pronouncement in Africa v. Caltex (Phil.), Inc.,
where it has been held that an entrant must have
personal knowledge of the facts stated by him or
such facts were acquired by him from reports
made by persons under a legal duty to submit the
same.
There are three requisites for admissibility under
the rule just mentioned:
(a) that the entry was made by a
public officer, or by another person
specially enjoined by law to do so;
(b) that it was made by the public
officer in the performance of his duties, or
by such other person in the performance
of a duty specially enjoined by law; and
(c) that the public officer or other
person had sufficient knowledge of the
facts by him stated, which must have been
acquired by him personally or through
official information x x x.
In this case, the entries made by Ingrid Versola were
not based on her personal knowledge as she did not
attest to the fact that she personally prepared and
mailed the assessment notice. Nor was it stated in
the transcript of stenographic notes 26 how and from
whom she obtained the pertinent information.
Moreover, she did not attest to the fact that she
acquired the reports from persons under a legal duty
to submit the same. Hence, Rule 130, Section 44
finds no application in the present case. Thus, the
evidence offered by respondent does not qualify as
an exception to the rule against hearsay evidence.
29 G.R. No. 107735 February 1, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. RICARDO
SAN GABRIEL
FACTS: The accused is now before us on appeal.
The evidence shows that at around seven o'clock in
the evening of 26 November 1989, within the vicinity
of Pier 14 at North Harbor along Marcos Road,
Manila, a fistfight ensued between Jaime Tonog on
one hand and the accused Ricardo San Gabriel
together with "Ramon Doe" on the other. The fight
was eventually broken up when onlookers pacified
the protagonists. Ricardo and Ramon then hastened
towards Marcos Road but in no time were back with
bladed weapons. They approached Tonog
surreptitiously, surrounded him and simultaneously

stabbed him in the stomach and at the back, after
which the assailants ran towards the highway leaving
Tonog behind on the ground. He was then brought to
Mary Johnston Hospital where he was pronounced
dead on arrival.
Dr. Marcial G. Cenido, Medico-Legal Officer of the
Western Police District, autopsied the cadaver of the
victim and reported that it sustained two (2)
penetrating stab wounds each caused by a single-
bladed instrument. He opined that both wounds were
fatal.
The accused further claimed that he even stayed with
the victim and called out the latter's companions to
bring him to the hospital; that prosecution witness
Brenda Gonzales only arrived at the crime scene
after Tonog was already taken to the hospital; that
Brenda even inquired from him what happened and
then prodded him to testify; that his refusal coupled
with the fact that he owed Gonzales some money
earned him the ire of the latter and that was why he
was charged for the death of Tonog.
RTC convicted the accused for murder. Hence this
appeal.
ISSUE: did the trial court erred in giving credence to
the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Brenda
Gonzales and Pio Ochobillo?
HELD: No. The accused leans heavily on the
Advance Information Sheet prepared by Pat. Steve
Casimiro which did not mention him at all and named
only "Ramon Doe" as the principal suspect. This
cannot defeat the positive and candid testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses. Entries in official records,
as in the case of a police blotter, are only prima facie
evidence of the facts therein stated. They are not
conclusive. The entry in the police blotter is not
necessarily entitled to full credit for it could be
incomplete and inaccurate, sometimes from either
partial suggestions or for want of suggestions or
inquiries, without the aid of which the witness may be
unable to recall the connected collateral
circumstances necessary for the correction of the first
suggestion of his memory and for his accurate
recollection of all that pertain to the subject. It is
understandable that the testimony during the trial
would be more lengthy and detailed than the matters
stated in the police blotter. Significantly, the Advance
Information Sheet was never formally offered by the
defense during the proceedings in the court below.
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
Hence any reliance by the accused on the document
must fail since the court cannot consider any
evidence which has not been formally offered
Parenthetically, the Advance Information Sheet was
prepared by the police officer only after interviewing
Camba, an alleged eyewitness. The accused then
could have compelled the attendance of Camba as a
witness. The failure to exert the slightest effort to
present Camba on the part of the accused should
militate against his cause.
Entries in official records made in the performance of
his duty by a public officer or by a person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law are
prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.But to
be admissible in evidence three (3) requisites must
concur: (a) The entry was made by a police officer or
by another person specially enjoined by law to do so;
(b) It was made by the public officer in the
performance of his duties or by such other person in
the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law;
and, (c) The public officer or other person had
sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which
must have been acquired by him personally or
through official information.
30. PETER TARAPEN vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 173824. August 28, 2008
FACTS: Tarapen was charged before the RTC of
Baguio City with Frustrated Homicide for attacking
and assaulting James Lacbao Pangoden. The day
after, the victim died from the injuries he sustained.
Dr. Lindo Mensalvas and Dr. Rizal Leo Cala,
physicians at the SLU Hospital and BGHMC,
respectively, attended to the victim. They
respectively issued a medico-legal certificate
containing the injuries sustained by the victim.
In the findings of Dr. Mensalvas, James suffered
injuries on the "left frontoparietal and left
frontotemporo parietal" areas of his head.
However, from the medico-legal certificate issued by
Dr. Cala and with his testimony in court, it is clear that
the victim suffered injuries on the right side of his
head. Also, Molly and Silmana Linglingen, vendors in
the vicinity, claimed that James was hit on the right
side of the head.
ISSUE: Which medical findings should the Court
believe?

HELD: The Court believes in the findings made by
Dr. Cala as contained in the medico-legal certificate
he issued showing that the victim suffered injuries on
the right side of his head, consistent with the
declarations of prosecution witnesses that the victim
was, from behind, struck with a shovel twice on the
right side of the head. We give more weight to this
medical certificate, because the same was issued by
a government doctor. By actual practice, only
government physicians, by virtue of their oaths as
civil service officials, are competent to examine
persons and issue medical certificates which will be
used by the government. As such, the medical
certificate carries the presumption of regularity in the
performance of his functions and duties.
Moreover, under Section 44, Rule 130, Revised
Rules of Court, entries in official records made in the
performance of official duty are prima facie evidence
of the facts therein stated. Dr. Cala’s findings that the
victim sustained injuries on the right side of his head
are, therefore, conclusive in the absence of evidence
proving the contrary, as in this case. We cannot
consider the contents of the medical certificate
issued by Dr. Mensalvas sufficient to controvert the
findings of Dr. Cala. As held by this Court, an
unverified medical certificate not issued by a
government physician is unreliable.
Even assuming arguendo that we give more weight
to the medical certificate issued by Dr. Mensalvas,
this does not mean that the testimonies of Molly and
Silmana Linglingen shall be disbelieved. It is noted
that Dr. Mensalvas testified that the victim sustained
a wound on the right side of his head, possibly
caused by a steel shovel. Such a finding is consistent
with the claim of Molly and Silmana Linglingen that
the victim was hit on the right side of the head.
Though there can be inconsistencies of the
testimonies of the witnesses with Dr. Mensalvas’s
other findings (i.e., injuries on the left portion of the
head) this does not mean that we should totally doubt
and discard the other portions of their testimonies.
Well-settled is the rule that the testimony of a witness
may be believed in part and disbelieved in another,
depending on the corroborative evidence or the
probabilities and improbabilities of the case. Where a
part of the testimony of a witness runs counter to the
medical evidence submitted, it is within the sound
discretion of the court to determine which portions of
the testimony to reject as false and which to consider
worthy of belief.
31. PNOC Shipping and Transport Corp. v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 107518
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
FACTS: This is a civil case for damages arising from
a sea collision incident when plaintiff's tanker hit
respondent's fishing boat, causing the boat to sink.
The lower court and CA ruled in favor of respondent
on the basis of documentary exhibits presented,
mainly the price quotations. These price quotations
were issued personally to Del Rosario who requested
for them from dealers of equipment similar to the
ones lost at the collision of the two vessels. However,
these are not published in any list, register, periodical
or other compilation nor containing data of everyday
professional need and relied upon in the work of the
occupation.
ISSUE: Whether or not price quotations considered
commercial list, thus can be admissible in evidence?
HELD: No. Price quotations are not within the
purview of commercial lists as these are not standard
handbooks or periodicals, containing data of
everyday professional need and relied upon in the
work of the occupation. These are simply letters
responding to the queries of Del Rosario.
The price quotations are ordinary private writings
which under the Revised Rules of Court should have
been proffered along with the testimony of the
authors thereof. Del Rosario could not have testified
on the veracity of the contents of the writings even
though he was the seasoned owner of a fishing fleet
because he was not the one who issued the price
quotations.
A document is a commercial list if:
(1) it is a statement of matters of interest to persons
engaged in an occupation;
(2) such statement is contained in a list, register,
periodical or other published compilation; (3) said
compilation is published for the use of persons
engaged in that occupation, and
(4) it is generally used and relied upon by persons in
the same occupation.
32. MAURICIO MANLICLIC and PHILIPPINE
RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., vs. MODESTO
CALAUNAN G.R. NO. 150157 : January 25, 2007]
FACTS: The vehicles involved in this case are: (1)
Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 353 with plate number

CVD-478, owned by petitioner PRBLI and driven by
petitioner Mauricio Manliclic; and (2) owner-type jeep
with plate number PER-290, owned by respondent
Modesto Calaunan and driven by Marcelo Mendoza.
At approximately Kilometer 40 of the North Luzon
Expressway in Barangay Lalangan, Plaridel,
Bulacan, the two vehicles collided. The front right
side of the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear left side
of the jeep causing the latter to move to the shoulder
on the right and then fall on a ditch with water
resulting to further extensive damage. The bus
veered to the left and stopped 7 to 8 meters from
point of collision.
By reason of such collision, a criminal case was filed
before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, charging
petitioner Manliclic with Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical
Injuries. Subsequently on 2 December 1991,
respondent filed a complaint for damages against
petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI before the RTC of
Dagupan City, docketed as Civil Case No. D-10086.
The criminal case was tried ahead of the civil case.
Among those who testified in the criminal case were
respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and
Fernando Ramos.
When the civil case was heard, counsel for
respondent prayed that the transcripts of
stenographic notes (TSNs)4 of the testimonies of
respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and
Fernando Ramos in the criminal case be received in
evidence in the civil case in as much as these
witnesses are not
The trial court subpoenaed the Clerk of Court of
Branch 8, RTC, Malolos, Bulacan, the court where
Criminal Case No. 684-M-89 was tried, to bring the
TSNs of the testimonies of respondent Calaunan,5
Marcelo Mendoza6 and Fernando Ramos7 in said
case, together with other documentary evidence
marked therein.
Instead of the Branch Clerk of Court, it was Enrique
Santos Guevara, Court Interpreter, who appeared
before the court and identified the TSNs of the three
afore-named witnesses and other pertinent
documents he had brought.8 Counsel for respondent
wanted to mark other TSNs and documents from the
said criminal case to be adopted in the instant case,
but since the same were not brought to the trial court,
counsel for petitioners compromised that said TSNs
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
and documents could be offered by counsel for
respondent as rebuttal evidence.
ISSUE: Are the TSNs presented admissible?
The TSNs containing the testimonies of respondent
Calaunan,18 Marcelo Mendoza19 and Fernando
Ramos20 should not be admitted in evidence for
failure of respondent to comply with the requisites of
Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
For Section 47, Rule 13021 to apply, the following
requisites must be satisfied: (a) the witness is dead
or unable to testify; (b) his testimony or deposition
was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or
administrative, between the same parties or those
representing the same interests; (c) the former case
involved the same subject as that in the present case,
although on different causes of action; (d) the issue
testified to by the witness in the former trial is the
same issue involved in the present case; and (e) the
adverse party had an opportunity to cross-examine
the witness in the former case.22
Admittedly, respondent failed to show the
concurrence of all the requisites set forth by the
Rules for a testimony given in a former case or
proceeding to be admissible as an exception to the
hearsay rule. Petitioner PRBLI, not being a party in
Criminal Case No. 684-M-89, had no opportunity to
cross-examine the three witnesses in said case. The
criminal case was filed exclusively against petitioner
Manliclic, petitioner PRBLI’s employee. The cases
dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers
uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they are not
parties to the criminal cases instituted against their
employees.23
Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner PRBLI was
not a party in said criminal case, the testimonies of
the three witnesses are still admissible on the ground
that petitioner PRBLI failed to object on their
admissibility.
It is elementary that an objection shall be
made at the time when an alleged inadmissible
document is offered in evidence; otherwise, the
objection shall be treated as waived, since the right
to object is merely a privilege which the party may
waive. Thus, a failure to except to the evidence
because it does not conform to the statute is a waiver
of the provisions of the law. Even assuming ex gratia
argumenti that these documents are inadmissible for
being hearsay, but on account of failure to object

thereto, the same may be admitted and considered
as sufficient to prove the facts therein asserted.24
Hearsay evidence alone may be insufficient to
establish a fact in a suit but, when no objection is
made thereto, it is, like any other evidence, to be
considered and given the importance it deserves.25
33. JOSEPH E. ESTRADA vs. ANIANO DESIERTO,
in his capacity as Ombudsman, RAMON
GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME
AND CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES
FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE VERA,
DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO CAPULONG and
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. G.R. No. 146710-
15 March 2, 2001
FACTS: On October 4, 2000, petitioner then
President of the Republic of the Philippines Joseph
Ejercito Estrada was accused by Ilocos Sur
Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson of receiving millions
of pesos from jueteng lords.
The exposẻ immediately ignited reactions of rage.
The next day, October 5, 2000, Senator Teofisto
Guingona, Jr., then the Senate Minority Leader, took
the floor and delivered a fiery privilege speech
entitled "I Accuse." He accused the petitioner of
receiving some P220 million in jueteng money from
Governor Singson from November 1998 to August
2000. He also charged that the petitioner took from
Governor Singson P70 million on excise tax on
cigarettes intended for Ilocos Sur. The privilege
speech was referred by then Senate President
Franklin Drilon, to the Blue Ribbon Committee (then
headed by Senator Aquilino Pimentel) and the
Committee on Justice (then headed by Senator
Renato Cayetano) for joint investigation.
Petitioner now contends that the respondent
Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting the
investigation of the cases filed against him due to the
barrage of prejudicial publicity on his guilt. He
submits that the respondent Ombudsman has
developed bias and is all set to file the criminal cases
in violation of his right to due process.
ISSUE: WON newspaper publications can deprive
an accused of his due process right to fair trial.
HELD: No. In Martelino, et al. vs. Alejandro, et al.,
the Court held that to warrant a finding of prejudicial
publicity there must be allegation and proof that the
judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that
they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case
at bar, we find nothing in the records that will prove
that the tone and content of the publicity that
attended the investigation of petitioners fatally
infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ
Panel.
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects
of publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel,
for these are basically unbeknown and beyond
knowing. To be sure, the DOJ Panel is composed of
an Assistant Chief State Prosecutor and Senior State
Prosecutors. Their long experience in criminal
investigation is a factor to consider in determining
whether they can easily be blinded by the klieg lights
of publicity. Indeed, their 26-page Resolution carries
no indubitable indicia of bias for it does not appear
that they considered any extra-record evidence
except evidence properly adduced by the parties.
The length of time the investigation was conducted
despite its summary nature and the generosity with
which they accommodated the discovery motions of
petitioners speak well of their fairness. At no
instance, we note, did petitioners seek the
disqualification of any member of the DOJ Panel on
the ground of bias resulting from their bombardment
of prejudicial publicity.
Applying the above ruling, there is not
enough evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin the
preliminary investigation of the petitioner by the
respondent Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to offer
more than hostile headlines to discharge his burden
of proof. He needs to show more weighty social
science evidence to successfully prove the impaired
capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision.
Well to note, the cases against the petitioner are still
undergoing preliminary investigation by a special
panel of prosecutors in the office of the respondent
Ombudsman. No allegation whatsoever has been
made by the petitioner that the minds of the members
of this special panel have already been infected by
bias because of the pervasive prejudicial publicity
against him. Indeed, the special panel has yet to
come out with its findings and the Court cannot
second guess whether its recommendation will be
unfavorable to the petitioner.
The records show that petitioner has instead charged
respondent Ombudsman himself with bias. To quote
petitioner's submission, the respondent Ombudsman
"has been influenced by the barrage of slanted news
reports, and he has buckled to the threats and
pressures directed at him by the mobs." News
reports have also been quoted to establish that the
respondent Ombudsman has already prejudged the
cases of the petitioner and it is postulated that the
prosecutors investigating the petitioner will be
influenced by this bias of their superior.
Again, the evidence proffered by the petitioner is
insubstantial. The accuracy of the news reports
referred to by the petitioner cannot be the subject of
judicial notice by this Court especially in light of the
denials of the respondent Ombudsman as to his
alleged prejudice and the presumption of good faith
and regularity in the performance of official duty to
which he is entitled.

34. LINTANG BEDOL vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS G.R. No. 179830 December
3, 2009
FACTS: Bedol was the chair of Provincial Board of
Canvassers for the province of Maguindano. He
failed to attend the scheduled canvassing of the
Provincial Certificates of Canvass. Bedol explained
that, while in his custody and possession, the election
paraphernalia were stolen. Due to absences in the
next scheduled investigative proceedings and due to
failure and refusal to submit a written explanation of
his absences, respondent [petitioner] was issued a
contempt charge by COMELEC. Among the
allegations of the complaint against him was that he
publicly displayed disrespect for the authority of the
COMELEC through the media (interviews on national
television channels, and in newspapers and radios)
by flaunting an armory of long firearms and side arms
in public, and posing for the front page of a national
broadsheet, with a shiny pistol tucked in a holster
ISSUE: are the newspaper clippings admissible as
evidence?
HELD: Yes. The Court held that not all hearsay
evidence is inadmissible and how over time,
exceptions to the hearsay rule have emerged.
Hearsay evidence may be admitted by the courts on
grounds of "relevance, trustworthiness and
necessity." Another exception to the hearsay rule is
the doctrine of independently relevant statements,
where only the fact that such statements were made
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
is relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is
immaterial.
Here, the newspaper clippings were introduced to
prove that petitioner deliberately defied or challenged
the authority of the COMELEC. As ratiocinated by the
COMELEC in the challenged Resolution, it was not
the mere content of the articles that was in issue, but
petitioner’s conduct when he allowed himself to be
interviewed in the manner and circumstances,
adverted to in the COMELEC Resolution, on a
pending controversy which was still brewing in the
COMELEC. While petitioner claimed that he was
misquoted, he denied neither the said interview nor
his picture splashed on the newspaper with a firearm
holstered at his side but simply relied on his objection
to the hearsay nature of the newspaper clippings. It
should be stressed that petitioner was no ordinary
witness or respondent. He was under the
administrative supervision of the COMELEC and it
was incumbent upon him to demonstrate to the
COMELEC that he had faithfully discharged his
duties as dictated by law. His evasiveness and
refusal to present his evidence as well as his reliance
on technicalities to justify such refusal in the face of
the allegations of fraud or anomalies and newspaper
publication mentioned to the Contempt Charge and
Show Cause Order amounted to an implied
admission of the charges leveled against him.

WEEK 13
1. Jimenez v. Commission on Ecumenical
Mission and Relations of the United Presbyterian
Church in the USA, G.R. No. 140472, June 10,
2002, 383 SCRA 326
FACTS: The [petitioners] are sisters and the children
of . . . Nicanor Teodoro and Francisca Ciriaco. They
filed their complaint in 1982 alleging that their mother
was the owner of the subject property which was
titled in her name under OCT No. 11757. Said
property is now covered by TCT No. 90689 in the
name of [respondent] United Church of Christ in the
Philippines (or UCCP) for this was donated to it by
the Commission on Ecumenical Mission in that Deed
of Donation dated July 1, 1977. [Petitioners] claim
that their parents never sold the lot to the Board of
Foreign Missions nor any one else, and that their
purported signatures on the impugned Deed of Sale
have been found to be forgeries by government
handwriting experts. Relying on this [respondents]
filed this suit [imputing] the fraudulent act upon
[respondents] and thus asked for the declaration of
nullity of the subject deed and of TCT No. 90689
issued in the name of UCCP, the reconveyance of
the subject property in their favor, and for the award
of damages.
The RTC favored the petitioners and held that there
was forgery. The CA reversed the RTC which had
"placed unquestioning faith and reliance on the
findings of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
and the Philippine Constabulary (PC) Crime
Laboratory Service." The appellate court doubted the
findings of the NBI and the PC handwriting experts
ISSUE: Was there forgery?
HELD: No. It is also hornbook doctrine that the
opinions of handwriting experts, even those from the
NBI and the PC, are not binding upon courts. This
principle holds true especially when the question
involved is mere handwriting similarity or
dissimilarity, which can be determined by a visual
comparison of specimens of the questioned
signatures with those of the currently existing ones.
Handwriting experts are usually helpful in the
examination of forged documents because of the
technical procedure involved in analyzing them. But
resort to these experts is not mandatory or
indispensable to the examination or the comparison
of handwriting. 15 A finding of forgery does not
depend entirely on the testimonies of handwriting
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
experts, because the judge must conduct an
independent examination of the questioned signature
in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its
authenticity.
Moreover, Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court explicitly authorizes the court, by itself, to make
a comparison of the disputed handwriting "with
writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party
against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to
be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge."
After comparing the questioned signatures, the CA
concluded that they were not forged. We affirm its
finding.
"The findings of the handwriting experts are not
conclusive upon the court. On the contrary, courts
can totally disregard them and make their own
separate independent finding for themselves on the
matter. As this Court has once observed, the
authenticity of signatures is not a highly technical
issue in the same sense that questions concerning,
e.g., quantum physics or topology or molecular
biology, would constitute matters of a highly technical
nature. The opinion of a handwriting expert is
certainly much less compelling upon a judge than an
opinion rendered by a specialist of a highly technical
issue. The signatures on a questioned document can
be sighted by a judge who can and should exercise
independent judgment on the issue of authenticity of
such signatures (Gamido v. CA 251 SCRA 101). And
this exactly what we have done here. We have
examined and analyzed the subject signatures, and
have found no substantial indicia or reason to
suspect their authenticity. Contrary to the findings of
the NBI and PC, upon comparison of the questioned
signature of Francisca with her sample signatures on
Exh. "F’, ‘G’ and ‘H’ we find resemblances but no
stark and distinguishing difference. The slight
dissimilarities do not indicate forgery for these are
natural, expected and inevitable variations in genuine
signatures made by one and the same person. Even
the sample signatures of Nicanor submitted by the
appellees show clear variations in structure, flourish,
and style. Those found in Exhibits ‘F’, ‘G’, ‘H’, ‘V’ and
‘W’ are markedly different from that in Exhibit ‘X’. It
must be pointed out that the crux of the matter here
is forgery and any positive assertion of it can not just
be accepted blandly. Forgery cannot be presumed, it
must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.
Those who make the allegation of forgery have the
burden of proving it since a mere allegation is not
evidence. The evidence of the appellees’ failed to
prove the forgery they claim.

2. HEIRS OF SEVERA P. GREGORIO, represented
by its Administratrix BUENCONSEJO PINEDA
VDA. DE VIVAR, Petitioners, v. COURT OF
APPEALS, RICARDO SANTOS, ROSALINA
PALOMO, SPOUSES WILSON TAN and BENITA
LUI TAN, Respondents.
FACTS: On October 30, 1986, the heirs of Severa
Gregorio filed with the trial court the instant complaint
against spouses Tan for cancellation of title and/or
reconveyance with damages alleging that the deeds
of conveyance were forged and are therefore void.
Petitioners fault the Court of Appeals for not giving
credence to the testimony of NBI handwriting expert
Bienvenido Albacea, who examined the deed of sale
in question and concluded that the signature thereon
purporting to be that of the late Severa Gregorio is
forged. They contend that, as borne out by the
records, Albacea conducted an examination of the
original copy of subject deed of sale at the Office of
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City and on the
basis of such examination, he arrived at the
conclusion that the signature appearing thereon was
forged. Unfortunately, as a result of the fire of which
destroyed the Quezon City Hall, the records of the
case were all burned including the original copy of the
aforesaid deed of sale; and the said original copy of
the deed of sale could not be produced in court
thereby necessitating the presentation of a certified
true xerox copy thereof.
Petitioners claim that what was actually examined by
the NBI expert on September 10, 1987 at the Office
of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City was the
original copy of the deed of sale dated July 14, 1971
but a fire accident supervened preventing its
introduction during trial.
ISSUE: Whether or not the opinion of the handwriting
expert should be considered as conclusive evidence
to support an allegation of forgery
HELD: No. Due to the technicality of the procedure
involved in the examination of forged documents, the
expertise of questioned document examiners is
usually helpful. However, resort to questioned
document examiners is not mandatory and while
probably useful, they are not indispensable in
examining or comparing handwriting. A finding of
forgery does not depend entirely on the testimony of
handwriting experts. Although such testimony may
be useful, the judge still exercises independent
judgement on the issue of authenticity of the
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
signatures under scrutiny. The judge cannot rely on
the mere testimony of the handwriting expert.
A judge must therefore conduct an
independent examination of the signature itself in
order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its
authenticity and this cannot be done without the
original copy being produced in court.
3.CECILIO C. HERNANDEZ, MA. VICTORIA C.
HERNANDEZ-SAGUN, TERESA C. HERNANDEZ-
VILLA ABRILLE and NATIVIDADCRUZ-
HERNANDEZ vs. JOVITA SAN JUAN-SANTOS
G.R. No. 166470 and G.R. No. 169217 August 7,
2009
FACTS: Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez (or
Lulu) was born on February 14, 1947 to the spouses
Felix Hernandez and Maria San Juan Hernandez.
Unfortunately, the latter died due to complications
during childbirth. After Maria's death, Felix left Lulu in
the care of her maternal uncle, Sotero C. San Juan.
On December 16, 1951, Felix married Natividad
Cruz. The union produced three children, herein
petitioners. Meanwhile, as the only child of Maria and
the sole testate heir of Sotero, Lulu inherited valuable
real properties from the San Juan family. In 1968,
upon reaching the age of majority, Lulu was given full
control of her estate. Nevertheless, because Lulu did
not even finish her elementary education, Felix
continued to exercise actual administration of Lulu’s
properties. Upon Felix's death in 1993, petitioners
took over the task of administering Lulu's properties.
During the period of their informal administration
(from 1968 until 1993), Felix and petitioners
undertook various “projects” involving Lulu’s real
properties. In 1974, Felix allegedly purchased one of
Lulu’s properties for an undisclosed amount to
develop the Marilou Subdivision. Thus, Lulu signed a
special power of attorney (SPA) believing that she
was authorizing Ma. Victoria to appear in court on her
behalf when she was in fact unknowingly authorizing
her half-sister to sell the said property to the Manila
Electric Company for P18,206,400. In September
1998, Lulu sought the assistance of her maternal first
cousin, respondent Jovita San Juan-Santos, after
learning that petitioners had been dissipating her
estate. She confided to Jovita that she was made to
live in the basement of petitioners’ home and was
receiving a measly daily allowance of P400 for her
food and medication.
Respondent was appalled as Lulu was severely
overweight, unkempt and smelled of urine. She later

found out that Lulu was occupying a cramped room
lit by a single fluorescent lamp without running water.
Due to Lulu's poor hygiene, respondent brought her
to several physicians for medical examination. Lulu
was found to be afflicted with tuberculosis,
rheumatism and diabetes from which she was
suffering several complications.
On October 2, 1998, respondent filed a petition for
guardianship in the RTC of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch
76. She alleged that Lulu was incapable of taking
care of herself and managing her estate because she
was of weak mind. Subsequently, petitioners moved
to intervene in the proceedings to oppose the same.
Cecilio, Teresa and Ma. Victoria, for their part,
claimed that the issue of Lulu’s competency had
been settled in 1968 (upon her emancipation) when
the court ordered her legal guardian and maternal
uncle, Ciriaco San Juan, to deliver the properties for
her to manage. They likewise asserted that Lulu was
literate and, for that reason, aware of the
consequences of executing an SPA.
During the hearing, Lulu was presented and asked to
testify on her genealogy and experiences with the
San Juan and Hernandez families. Lulu identified and
described her parents, stepmother, half-siblings and
maternal relatives. Medical specialists testified to
explain the results of Lulu’s examinations which
revealed the alarming state of her health.
Furthermore, they unanimously opined that in view of
Lulu’s intelligence level (which was below average)
and fragile mental state, she would not be able to
care for herself and self-administer her medications.
ISSUE: Whether or not the opinion of Lulu’s
attending physician regarding her mental illness
where inadmissible in evidence as they were not
experts in psychiatry
HELD: They are admissible. Under Section 50, Rule
103 of the Rules of Court, an ordinary witness may
give his opinion on the mental sanity of a person with
whom he is sufficiently acquainted. Lulu's attending
physicians spoke and interacted with her. Such
occasions allowed them to thoroughly observe her
behavior and conclude that her intelligence level was
below average and her mental stage below normal.
Their opinions were admissible in evidence.
Furthermore, where the sanity of a person is
at issue, expert opinion is not necessary. The
observations of the trial judge coupled with evidence
establishing the person's state of mental sanity will
suffice. Here, the trial judge was given ample
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
opportunity to observe Lulu personally when she
testified before the RTC.
Under Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of
Court, persons who, though of sound mind but by
reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar
causes are incapable of taking care of themselves
and their property without outside aid, are considered
as incompetents who may properly be placed under
guardianship. The RTC and the CA both found that
Lulu was incapable of taking care of herself and her
properties without outside aid due to her ailments and
weak mind. Thus, since determining whether or not
Lulu is in fact an incompetent would require a
reexamination of the evidence presented in the
courts a quo, it undoubtedly involves questions of
fact. Petitioners are furthermore ordered to render to
respondent, Lulu’s legal guardian, an accurate and
faithful accounting of all the properties and funds they
unlawfully appropriated for themselves from the
estate of Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez, within
thirty (30) days from receipt of this decision. If
warranted, the proper complaints should also be filed
against them for any criminal liability in connection
with the dissipation of Maria Lourdes San Juan
Hernandez’s estate and her unlawful abduction from
the custody of her legal guardian.
4. ERNESTO M. FULLERO v. PEOPLE [G.R. NO.
170583 : September 12, 2007]
FACTS: In 1977, petitioner was employed as a
telegraph operator at the Bureau of
Telecommunications Office in Iriga City (BTO, Iriga
City). In 1982, he became the Acting Chief Operator
of the same office until 1994.
A Personal Data Sheet (PDS) dated 8 January 1988,
purportedly accomplished and signed by petitioner,
states that he passed the Civil Engineering Board
Examination given on 30-31 May 1985 in Manila with
a rating of 75.8%. It appears that he submitted the
PDS to the Bureau of Telecommunications Regional
Office, Legazpi City (BTO, Legazpi City).
Petitioner denied executing and submitting the
subject PDS containing the statement that he passed
the 30-31 May 1985 board examination for civil
engineering. He likewise disowned the signature and
thumbmark appearing therein. He claimed that the
stroke of the signature appearing in the PDS differs
from the stroke of his genuine signature. He added
that the letters contained in the PDS he
accomplished and submitted were typewritten in
capital letters since his typewriter does not have

small letters. As such, the subject PDS could not be
his because it had both small and capital typewritten
letters. Petitioner was charged with falsification of
public document under paragraph 4, Article 171 of
the Revised Penal Code. He questions the
admissibility of the PDS and the failure to call for a
handwriting expert to examine the signatures.
ISSUE: Whether or not resort to handwriting experts
is mandatory. NO
HELD: No. Exhibits J to R, which are the daily time
records of Magistrado signed by petitioner and which
were offered to compare petitioner's alleged
signature in the PDS with the said exhibits, are
admissible in evidence since they are relevant and
material to the charge of falsification against
petitioner. The signatures of petitioner in the said
exhibits, the authenticity of which were not denied by
petitioner, were presented to prove that these
signatures were similar to petitioner's signature in the
PDS where he made the alleged falsification.
Well-entrenched is the rule that resort to handwriting
experts is not mandatory. Handwriting experts, while
probably useful, are not indispensable in examining
or comparing handwritings or signatures. This is so
since under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence, the handwriting of a person may
be proved by any witness who believes it to be the
handwriting of such person, because he has seen the
person write; or has seen writing purporting to be his
upon which the witness has acted or has been
charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the
handwriting of such person. Moreover, the opinion of
a non-expert witness, for which proper basis is given,
may be received in evidence regarding the
handwriting or signature of a person with which he
has sufficient familiarity.
The Legazpi City RTC was, therefore, not obliged to
put a handwriting expert on the witness stand and
direct the latter to examine petitioner's signatures in
the foregoing exhibits before ruling on their
admissibility. It can, as it did, rely on the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses who are familiar with
petitioner's handwriting/signature in determining the
admissibility of the aforesaid exhibits. It can, by itself,
also compare petitioner's signature in the PDS with
the petitioner's signatures in the subject exhibits with
or without the aid of an expert witness and thereafter
rule on the admissibility of such exhibits based on its
own observation. In short, it can exercise
independent judgment as regards the admissibility of
said exhibits.
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
5. People v. Martinez, G.R. No. 116918 June 19,
1997
FACTS: Bonfilo Martinez and two other unidentified
persons were charged with the special complex
crime of robbery with rape. To prove the value of the
burglarized properties, the prosecution presented an
affidavit executed by Ernesto Buenvinida on March
7, 1994, containing a list of the stolen movables and
with their corresponding values, as now found in the
information. This affidavit was identified and marked
as Exhibit H for the prosecution during the testimony
of SPO4 Abner Castro, the police officer who
conducted an investigation of the incident on
December 28, 1991. In addition to testifying on the
arrest and investigation of appellant, Castro repeated
in open court the respective values of the personal
properties as explained to him by Ernesto Buenvinida
and how he helped Ernesto in the preparation
thereof. The same was formally offered in
evidence to prove, among others, the facts and
amounts contained therein and as testified to by
witness Castro. Although objected to by appellant as
self-serving, the lower court admitted said document
for the purpose for which it was offered and as part
of the testimony of said witness.
ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of Buenvinida
may be admissible
HELD: Yes. Even under the rule on opinions of
ordinary witnesses, the value of the stolen items was
established. It is a standing doctrine that the opinion
of a witness is admissible in evidence on ordinary
matters known to all men of common perception,
such as the value of ordinary household articles. 31
Here, the witness is not just an ordinary witness, but
virtually an expert, since his work as an investigator
of crimes against property has given him both the
exposure to and experience in fixing the current value
of such ordinary articles subject of the crime at bar.
Incidentally, it is significant that appellant never dared
to cross-examine on the points involved, which
opportunity to cross-examine takes the testimony of
Castro out of the hearsay rule, while the lack of
objection to the value placed by Castro bolsters his
testimony under the cited exception to the opinion
rule
6. PASTOR DE JESUS vs COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 127857 June 20, 2006
FACTS: Herein respondents de Jesus, in their
capacity as legal heirs and successors-in-interest to
the property inherited by their late father Fermin de

Jesus (Fermin) filed a petition before the trial court on
3 June 1991, seeking the partition of a parcel of land
left by their deceased grandparents.
From the pleadings and evidence presented by the
parties, the following facts were established: that
respondents de Jesus, are the legitimate children of
Fermin; that Pastor de Jesus is their uncle, being the
brother of Fermin; that the parties are all residents of
Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga-Apayao; that the spouses
Juan and Eustaquia de Jesus were the parents of
Fermin, Consolacion and Pastor de Jesus from
whom they inherited through intestate succession the
parcel of land in dispute consisting of more or less
five (5) hectares located in Ipil, Bulanao, Tabuk,
Kalinga-Apayao; that Juan de Jesus died on 7
December 1964 while Fermin died on 24 September
1979; that as of the filing of the petition, the title to the
property remained in the name of Juan de Jesus.
Mainly in dispute is the claim of respondents de
Jesus that ownership of the said property had never
been transferred to anyone and/or partitioned among
the legal heirs thereto, and that as legitimate children
of Fermin and by right of representation under the law
of intestate succession, they are entitled to their
rightful share of the estate left by their grandfather
Juan de Jesus.
Pastor de Jesus contended that respondents de
Jesus are no longer entitled to their father’s share in
the subject property as the latter has already sold to
Pastor de Jesus his property right along with only
sister Consolacion for a consideration of P10,000.00.
This is evidenced by the notarized Deed of Sale
dated 13 September 1979, which respondent admits
has not yet been registered with the Registry of
Deeds. Pastor de Jesus prayed, among others, for
the dismissal of the petition for lack of factual and
legal basis.
The trial court ordered the Deed of Sale to be
submitted to the NBI for examination in order to
determine its genuineness and due execution.
Respondents de Jesus presented as witnesses Alicia
de Jesus Oakes, Ronaldo de Jesus and the NBI
Handwriting Expert Zenaida Torres. Their rebuttal
witnesses were Ronaldo and Maura Maramag de
Jesus (Maura).
On the other hand, Pastor de Jesus’s witnesses were
his sister Consolacion, Atty. Marcos C. Diasen, Jr.,
Zenaida Tuazon and himself.
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
The Trial Court ruled that the extra-judicial settlement
is null and void.
The Court of Appeals stated that the rule that "a
notarized document is admissible in evidence without
proof of its due execution and is conclusive as to the
truthfulness of its contents" is not absolute and may
be rebutted by evidence to the contrary, which
respondents de Jesus were able to present
convincingly in the case at bar. The appellate court
thus declared that the notarized Deed of Sale is null
and void. Inconsistently, however, it declared the
same valid and binding with regard to Pastor de
Jesus and his sibling Consolacion.
ISSUE: Should the testimony of the parties witnesses
should be given more weight than the opinion of an
expert witness?
HELD: Yes. It is true that the opinion of handwriting
experts are not necessarily binding upon the court,
the expert’s function being to place before the court
data upon which the court can form its own opinion.
Handwriting experts are usually helpful in the
examination of forged documents because of the
technical procedure involved in analyzing them. But
resort to these experts is not mandatory or
indispensable to the examination or the comparison
of handwriting. A finding of forgery does not depend
entirely on the testimonies of handwriting experts,
because the judge must conduct an independent
examination of the questioned signature in order to
arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its
authenticity.
It bears stressing that the trial court may validly
determine forgery from its own independent
examination of the documentary evidence at hand.
This the trial court judge can do without resorting to
experts, especially when the question involved is
mere handwriting similarity or dissimilarity, which can
be determined by a visual comparison of specimen
of the questioned signatures with those of currently
existing ones. Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court explicitly authorizes the court, by itself, to make
a comparison of the disputed handwriting with
writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party
against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to
be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.
The courts below did exactly this. They conducted
their independent examination of the signatures and
concluded that the disparity of the signatures on page
one (1) and page two (2) of the Deed of Sale is readily
noticeable upon inspection. Moreover, the appellate
court observed that a scrutiny of the documents

where Fermin’s specimen signatures appear show
that most of them do not bear his printed name but
Fermin consistently signed his name in full and never
in the abbreviated style as the one on page one (1)
of the Deed of Sale.
In support of Pastor de Jesus’s contention, on the
other hand, Pastor de Jesus, Consolacion, Atty.
Marcos C. Diasen, Jr., and Zenaida Tuazon all
testified that Fermin signed the Deed of Sale in their
presence.
However, the trial court held that their inconsistent
and incredible testimonies together with the
circumstances at the time of its alleged execution
rendered doubtful the genuineness of the Deed of
Sale. Moreover, the trial court found it irregular that
two (2) typewriters were used in preparing the Deed
of Sale when only one secretary typed the document.
The reason for this was not explained to the full
satisfaction of the trial court.
Thus, considering the testimonies of the witnesses
and a plain comparison of the questioned signatures
with admittedly genuine ones, the Court finds no
reason to reverse the findings of the two lower courts.
Although the Deed of Sale was a public document
having in its favor the presumption of regularity, such
presumption of regularity was adequately refuted by
competent witnesses and the visual analysis of the
signatures made by the courts below.
Since the signatures of Fermin were forged, the Deed
of Sale is effectively nullified. The document should
not be annulled only with respect to Fermin’s share.
The document bearing the forged signatures is in fact
an extrajudicial settlement which requires the assent
of all the heirs to the extrajudicial partition. It is not
binding upon any person who has not participated
therein or had notice thereof.
7. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NOEL LEE
G.R. No. 139070 May 29, 2002
FACTS: This case sentenced Noel Lee to death for
the murder of Joseph Marquez. Lee pleaded not
guilty to the charge. At the trial, the prosecution
presented the following witnesses: (a) Herminia
Marquez, the mother of the victim; (b) Dr. Darwin
Corpuz, a resident doctor at the Manila Caloocan
University (MCU) Hospital; (c) PO2 Rodelio Ortiz, a
police officer who examined the crime scene; and (d)
Dr. Rosaline Cosidon, a medico-legal officer of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory.
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
The prosecution established that Herminia and her
son, Joseph were in the living room of their house
watching a basketball game on television. To
Herminia’s complete surprise, she saw a hand
holding a gun coming out of the open window behind
Joseph. She looked up and saw Noel Lee peering
through the window and holding the gun aimed at
Joseph. Before she could warn him, Lee fired his gun
hitting Joseph’s head. Herminia ran to the window
and saw Lee in a blue sando, flee towards the
direction of his house. Herminia brought Joseph to
the MCU Hospital where he later died.1âwphi1.nêt
Police investigators inquired about the shooting
incident and Herminia subsequently proceeded to
the Caloocan City Police Headquarters where she
gave her sworn statement about the shooting. Upon
request of the Caloocan City police, a post-mortem
examination was made on Joseph’s body. Dr.
Rosaline O. Cosidon, a medico-legal officer of the
PNP Crime Laboratory Service found that the cause
of death is intracranial hemorrhage as a result of
gunshot wounds.
Herminia filed a complaint for murder against Lee,
who is a well-known figure in their neighbourhood
and has several criminal cases pending against him
in Caloocan City. He was charged with frustrated
homicide in 1984 and attempted murder in 1989.
For his defense, Lee presented two witnesses: (a)
Orlando Bermudez, a neighbor; and (b) himself. He
denies the killing of Joseph Marquez and made an
alibi. He also said that Joseph, the victim, had a bad
reputation in their neighborhood as a thief and drug
addict. He presented a letter handwritten by
Herminia, addressed to the Mayor where Herminia
was surrendering her son to the Mayor for
rehabilitation because he was hooked on shabu, and
was a thief. Herminia was scared that eventually
Joseph might not just steal but kill her and everyone
in their household because of his drug habit.
ISSUE: Whether or not Herminia Marquez, the lone
prosecution eyewitness is a credible witness
HELD: Yes. Herminia’s testimony on direct
examination is positive, clear and straightforward.
She did not waver in her narration of the shooting
incident, neither did she waffle in recounting her
son’s death. She was subjected by defense counsel
to rigorous cross and re-cross examinations and yet
she stuck to her testimony given in the direct
examination. She readily gave specific details of the
crime scene, e.g., the physical arrangement of the
sofa and the television set, the height of the sofa, the
 ALABA, MICHELLE M.

wall and the window, because the crime happened
right in her own living room. She explained that she
was unable to warn Joseph because she was
shocked by the sight of Lee aiming a gun at her son.
The tragic events unfolded so fast and by the time
she took hold of herself, her son had been shot dead.
Nonetheless, Lee points out inconsistencies in the
eyewitness’ testimony. In her affidavit of September
30, 1996 given before PO2 Rodelio Ortiz, Herminia
declared that while she and Joseph were watching
television, she saw a hand holding a gun pointed at
her son. The hand and the gun came out of a hole in
the window, i.e., "butas ng bintana." On cross-
examination, Herminia stated that she saw a hand
holding a gun in the open window, i.e., "bukas na
bintana." According to Lee, this inconsistency is a
serious flaw which cannot be repaired by her
statement on the witness stand.
The inconsistency between her affidavit and her
testimony was satisfactorily explained by Herminia
on cross-examination. She corrected her affidavit by
saying in open court that she saw the hand and the
gun coming out of the open window, not from a hole
in the window. In her direct testimony, Herminia
presented a photograph of her living room just the
way it looked from her side on the night of the
shooting. The sofa on which Joseph was seated is
against the wall, with the window a few inches above
the wall. The window is made of transparent glass
with six (6) vertical glass panes pushing outwards.
The entire window is enclosed by iron grills with big
spaces in between the grills. The living room is well-
lit and the area outside the house is also lit by a
fluorescent lamp.
The lone eyewitness’ account of the killing finds
support in the medico-legal report. Dr. Rosalie
Cosidon found that the deceased sustained two
gunshot wounds—one to the right of the forehead,
and the other, to the left side of the back of the
victim’s head. Two slugs were recovered from the
victim’s head. Judging from the location and number
of wounds sustained, Dr. Cosidon theorized that the
assailant could have been more than two feet away
from the victim.
As to character evidence, both sub-paragraphs (1)
and (2) of Section 51 of Rule 130 refer to character
evidence of the accused. And this evidence must be
"pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense
charged," meaning, that the character evidence must
be relevant and germane to the kind of the act
charged, e.g., on a charge of rape, character for
chastity; on a charge of assault, character for
peacefulness or violence; on a charge for
embezzlement, character for honesty and integrity.
Sub-paragraph (3) of Section 51 of the said Rule
refers to the character of the offended party.
Character evidence, whether good or bad, of the
offended party may be proved "if it tends to establish
in any reasonable degree the probability or
improbability of the offense charged." Such evidence
is most commonly offered to support a claim of self-
defense in an assault or homicide case or a claim of
consent in a rape case.

Between Herminia’s testimony in open court and her

sworn statement, any inconsistency therein does not
necessarily discredit the witness. Affidavits are
generally considered inferior to open court
declarations because affidavits are taken ex-parte
and are almost always incomplete and inaccurate.
Oftentimes, they are executed when the affiant’s
mental faculties are not in such a state as to afford
him a fair opportunity of narrating in full the incident
that transpired. They are usually not prepared by the
affiant himself but by another who suggests words to
the affiant, or worse, uses his own language in taking
the affiant’s statements.

Herminia’s declarations are based on her actual

account of the commission of the crime. She had no
ill motive to accuse Lee of killing her son, or at least,
testify falsely against him.

8. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. ALLYSON
BELAGAN [G.R. NO. 132164 : October 19, 2004]
FACTS: The instant case stemmed from two (2)
separate complaints filed respectively by Magdalena
Gapuz, founder/directress of the "Mother and Child
Learning Center," and Ligaya Annawi, a public
school teacher at Fort Del Pilar Elementary School,
against respondent Dr. Allyson Belagan,
Superintendent of the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (DECS), all from Baguio City.
Magdalena charged respondent with sexual
indignities and harassment, while Ligaya accused
him of sexual harassment and various malfeasances.
Magdalena's sworn complaint alleges that in the
course of their school inspection, while both were
descending the stairs of the second floor, respondent
suddenly placed his arms around her shoulders and
kissed her cheek. She was also invited to go out on
a date. Fearful that her application might be
jeopardized and that her husband might harm
respondent, Magdalena just kept quiet.do Gloria.
On the part of Ligaya Annawi, she alleged in her
complaint that on four separate occasions,
respondent touched her breasts, kissed her cheek,
touched her groins, embraced her from behind and
pulled her close to him, his organ pressing the lower
part of her back.
The DECS conducted a joint investigation of the
complaints of Magdalena and Ligaya. In his defense,
respondent denied their charge of sexual
harassment. However, he presented evidence to
disprove the imputations against him. He also
presented the record of cases of Magdalena which
he used to attack the latter’s character.
ISSUE: Whether complaining witness, Magdalena
Gapuz, is credible.
HELD: Yes. Generally, the character of a party is
regarded as legally irrelevant in determining a
controversy. One statutory exception is that relied
upon by respondent, i.e., Section 51 (a) 3, Rule 130
of the Revised Rules on Evidence, which we quote
here:
"SEC. 51. Character evidence not generally
admissible; exceptions. '
(a) In Criminal Cases:
xxx xxx
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
(3) The good or bad moral character of the
offended party may be proved if it tends to establish
in any reasonable degree the probability or
improbability of the offense charged."
It will be readily observed that the above provision
pertains only to criminal cases, not to administrative
offenses. And even assuming that this technical rule
of evidence can be applied here, still, we cannot
sustain respondent's posture.
Not every good or bad moral character of the
offended party may be proved under this provision.
Only those which would establish the probability or
improbability of the offense charged. This means that
the character evidence must be limited to the traits
and characteristics involved in the type of offense
charged.Thus, on a charge of rape - character for
chastity, on a charge of assault - character for
peaceableness or violence, and on a charge of
embezzlement - character for honesty.In one rape
case, where it was established that the alleged victim
was morally loose and apparently uncaring about her
chastity, we found the conviction of the accused
doubtful.
In the present administrative case for sexual
harassment, respondent did not offer evidence that
has a bearing on Magdalena's chastity. What he
presented are charges for grave oral defamation,
grave threats, unjust vexation, physical injuries,
malicious mischief, etc. filed against her. Certainly,
these pieces of evidence are inadmissible under the
above provision because they do not establish the
probability or improbability of the offense charged.
Obviously, in invoking the above provision, what
respondent was trying to establish is Magdalena's
lack of credibility and not the probability or the
improbability of the charge. In this regard, a different
provision applies.
Credibility means the disposition and intention to tell
the truth in the testimony given. It refers to a person's
integrity, and to the fact that he is worthy of belief. A
witness may be discredited by evidence attacking his
general reputation for truth, honesty or integrity.
Section 11, Rule 132 of the same Revised Rules on
Evidence reads:
"SEC. 11. Impeachment of adverse party's witness.
'A witness may be impeached by the party against
whom he was called, by contradictory evidence, by
evidence that his general reputation for truth,
honesty, or integrity is bad, or by evidence that he

has made at other times statements inconsistent with
his present testimony, but not by evidence of
particular wrongful acts, except that it may be shown
by the examination of the witness, or the record of the
judgment, that he has been convicted of an offense."
Although she is the offended party, Magdalena, by
testifying in her own behalf, opened herself to
character or reputation attack pursuant to the
principle that a party who becomes a witness in his
own behalf places himself in the same position as
any other witness, and may be impeached by an
attack on his character or reputation.
With the foregoing disquisition, the Court of Appeals
is correct in holding that the character or reputation
of a complaining witness in a sexual charge is a
proper subject of inquiry. This leads us to the ultimate
question - is Magdalena's derogatory record
sufficient to discredit her credibility? No.
Settled is the principle that evidence of one's
character or reputation must be confined to a time not
too remote from the time in question.In other words,
what is to be determined is the character or
reputation of the person at the time of the trial and
prior thereto, but not at a period remote from the
commencement of the suit. Hence, to say that
Magdalena's credibility is diminished by proofs of
tarnished reputation existing almost a decade ago is
unreasonable. It is unfair to presume that a person
who has wandered from the path of moral
righteousness can never retrace his steps again.
Certainly, every person is capable to change or
reform.
Second, respondent failed to prove that Magdalena
was convicted in any of the criminal cases specified
by respondent. The general rule prevailing in a great
majority of jurisdictions is that it is not permissible to
show that a witness has been arrested or that he has
been charged with or prosecuted for a criminal
offense, or confined in jail for the purpose of impairing
his credibility. This view has usually been based upon
one or more of the following grounds or theories: (a)
that a mere unproven charge against the witness
does not logically tend to affect his credibility, (b) that
innocent persons are often arrested or accused of a
crime, (c) that one accused of a crime is presumed to
be innocent until his guilt is legally established, and
(d) that a witness may not be impeached or
discredited by evidence of particular acts of
misconduct.Significantly, the same Section 11, Rule
132 of our Revised Rules on Evidence provides that
a witness may not be impeached by evidence of
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
particular wrongful acts. Such evidence is rejected
because of the confusion of issues and the waste of
time that would be involved, and because the witness
may not be prepared to expose the falsity of such
wrongful acts. As it happened in this case,
Magdalena was not able to explain or rebut each of
the charges against her listed by respondent.
But more than anything else, Magdalena testified in
a straightforward, candid and spontaneous manner.
Her testimony is replete with details, such as the
number of times she and respondent inspected the
pre-school, the specific part of the stairs where
respondent kissed her, and the matter about her
transient boarders during summer. Magdalena would
not have normally thought about these details if she
were not telling the truth.
9. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JESUS
EDUALINO [G.R. No. 119072 April 11, 1997]
FACTS: Jesus Edualino was charged with the crime
of rape of Rowena Nantiza, a pregnant woman.
Edualino, while admitting that he was at the dance,
denied that he raped Rowena.
ISSUE: Is the moral character of a rape victim
material in the prosecution and conviction of the
accused?
HELD: No. Edualino raises the issue of the character
of Rowena. It is argued that a responsible and decent
married woman, who was then three (3) months
pregnant, would not be out at two (2) o'clock in the
morning getting drunk much less would a decent
Filipina ask a man to accompany her to drink beer. It
is contended that Rowena merely concocted the
charge of rape to save her marriage since her
husband had found out that she was using drugs and
drinking alcohol and even made a spectacle of
herself when she tried to seduce Edualino while she
was under the influence of drug and alcohol. The
Court has ruled that prostitutes can be the victims of
rape.
Even if Edualino's allegations that Rowena was
drunk and under the influence of drugs and that she
cannot be considered a decent and responsible
married woman, were true, said circumstances will
not per se preclude a finding that she was raped.
Edualino cannot successfully argue that no rape
occurred because no medical examination was
conducted to confirm the presence of spermatozoa in

her private parts. A medical examination of the victim
is not a prerequisite in prosecutions for rape.
A person accused of rape can be convicted solely on
the testimony of the victim provided the testimony is
credible, natural, convincing and otherwise
consistent with human nature and the course of
things. After a careful and thorough study of the
records of the case, the Court is convinced that the
constitutional presumption of Edualino's innocence
has been overcome by proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
The Court likewise cannot believe that a married
woman would invent a story that she was raped in an
attempt to conceal addiction to drugs or alcohol, in
order to save her marriage. We fail to understand
how a false rape story can save a marriage.
10. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAFAEL
DIOPITA [G.R. No. 130601, 04 December 2000]
FACTS: Dominga Pikit-pikit was raped by Rafael
Diopita. Exhausted, Dominga slowly stood up, put on
her clothes and walked away in the direction of her
house. Finding it locked, she asked help from her
neighbors who called the police. Thereafter,
Dominga was brought to police station, where SPO1
Stephen Batacan entered her complaint in the police
blotter. Later, she was examined by Dr. Floranne
Lam-Vergara who found her "positive for
spermatocytes."
PO3 Steve dela Cruz, who was on duty at the
Intelligence and Investigation Section, went to the
scene of the crime to investigate and there he
recovered a colored white/yellow, size ten (10)
slipper. Since the victim earlier disclosed that the
suspect headed north after committing the crime, he
proceeded to that direction where he came upon four
(4) houses about fifteen (15) to fifty (50) meters away
from the scene of the crime. A back-up team was
called and they rounded up all the residents therein.
Afterwards, four (4) men who fitted the description of
the suspect were invited to the police station for
questioning. They were Placido Laput, William
Silvano, Vicente Silvano and Diopita.
Dominga saw the four (4) men in a police line-up and
readily pointed at Diopita. The police then had him try
on the recovered slipper; it easily fitted him. Thus,
Diopita was detained while the others were released.
Diopita argued that he was with his wife Flora, son
Ryan and fellow Jehovah’s Witnesses Roger
Custorio and Ruben Suarez at the house of Eulalio
Nisnisan for an informal Bible session upon the
invitation of Juan Nisnisan. He also claimed that
during those hours, he never left the place. Flora,
Roger, Ruben, Eulalio and Juan corroborated his
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
alibi and testified on his good moral character as a
ministerial servant of their faith.
ISSUE: Is the good moral character of the accused
material in ascertaining his guilt of the crime
charged?
HELD: No. The fact that Diopita is endowed with
such "sterling" qualities hardly justifies the conclusion
that he is innocent of the crime charged. Similarly, his
having attained the position of "Ministerial Servant" in
his faith is no guarantee against any sexual
perversion and plunderous proclivity on his part.
Indeed, religiosity is not always an emblem of good
conduct, and it is not the unreligious alone who
succumbs to the impulse to rob and rape. An
accused is not entitled to an acquittal simply because
of his previous good moral character and exemplary
conduct. The affirmance or reversal of his conviction
must be resolved on the basic issue of whether the
prosecution had discharged its duty of proving his
guilt beyond any peradventure of doubt. Since the
evidence of the crime in the instant case is more than
sufficient to convict, the evidence of good moral
character of Diopita is unavailing.
11. OBEDENCIO V. JUDGE MURILLO, A.M. NO.
RTJ-03-1753, FEBRUARY 5, 2004
FACTS: The complainant averred that on May 3,
2000, he and his wife assisted their 14-year-old
daughter, Licel Acenas Obedencio, in filing with the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, Hall of Justice in
Cagayan de Oro City, a criminal complaint for rape
allegedly committed upon her when she was 11
years old by her uncle, Dexter Z. Acenas. hen, Licel
took the witness stand and was asked on matters
contained in her affidavit. She recanted the
allegations in her affidavit-complaint and denied
having been molested by her uncle, Dexter. She
explained that her mother forced her to file the rape
charge because of family inheritance problems.
Respondent judge asserts that, with the filing of the
affidavit of desistance, the court had no other
recourse but to dismiss the case.
ISSUE: Was the judge correct in dismissing the
case?
HELD: No. Licel was only 14 years old, definitely a
minor, on May 22, 2001, when she was presented
before respondent’s sala to affirm the execution of
her affidavit of desistance.
This being the case, said affidavit should have been
executed with the concurrence of her parents. Licel
could not validly give consent to an affidavit of
desistance, for a minor is incompetent to execute

such an instrument. Yet, notwithstanding the
absence of her parents’ conformity to the affidavit of
desistance and lack of notice to them or their lawyer
of the scheduled hearing, respondent judge
dismissed the criminal case. Truly, he should have
exercised more prudence and caution instead of
perfunctorily dismissing the case, considering the
nature and gravity of the offense charged.
At the very least, herein respondent should have
appointed a guardian ad litem for Licel, to protect her
welfare and interest, instead of hastily dismissing the
rape case. The Rule on Examination of a Child
Witness,14 which took effect on December 15, 2000,
governs the examination of child witnesses who are
victims of, accused of, or witnesses to a crime. In the
absence or incapacity of the parents to be the
guardian, Section 5 (a)15 of said rule provides that
the court may appoint a guardian ad litem to promote
the best interests of the child. This rule was already
in effect when respondent judge dismissed the rape
case on May 22, 2001.
12. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. VALENTIN
BARING, JR. G.R. No. 137933 : January 28, 2002
FACTS: Valentin Baring, Jr., herein accused-
appellant, was indicted for statutory rape
committed against a seven-year-old girl in an
information that reads-
That prior to August 2, 1997 and on several
occasions thereto, in the Municipality of Dasmarias,
Province of Cavite, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
lewd designs, by means of force, violence and
intimidation taking advantage of his superior strength
over the person of the victim who is only seven (7)
years old, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, have carnal knowledge of one Jennifer
Donayre, against her will and consent, to her damage
and prejudice.
ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of the child
victim is credible ?
HELD: Yes. We are not at all uninformed in this
regard for we, in a plethora of cases, have
consistently upheld the full weight of a young victims
unwavering testimony. Also, there is Section 22 of
the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness, which
categorically states:
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
Section 22. Corroboration.-
Corroboration shall not be required of a
testimony of a child. His testimony, if credible by
itself, shall be sufficient to support a finding of
fact, conclusion, or judgment subject to the
standard proof required in criminal and non-
criminal cases.
What is important at this point, and we do not hesitate
to reiterate, is that forensic examination inclusive of
physical examination and forensic interview of
sexually assaulted children [adolescents included]
must be conducted with maximum sensitivity to the
young victims feelings of vulnerability and
embarrassment. Great care must be observed in
order to make the examination less stressful lest they
be more traumatic to the victim than the very assault
itself. The value of collecting evidence should always
be weighed against the emotional cost of the
procedure and examination of the child.
13. PEOPLE V. RAMA, G.R. NO. 136304
FACTS: The birth of the New Year in 1998 saw the
loss of Roger and Eufemia Cabiguin's infant child,
Joyce Ann Cabiguin. Joyce Ann Cabiguin, a minor,
one (1) year and six (6) months old was kidnapped
by the abovenamed accused.
The prosecution's story was gathered mainly from
the testimony of five-year old Roxanne Cabiguin, a
cousin of Joyce Ann. Roxanne testified that Rama
called her and told her that if she would bring the
beautiful girl (referring to Joyce Ann) to him, he would
give Roxanne a biscuit. Rama gave her one biscuit.
She ate it. She then carried Joyce Ann to the accused
Rama who ran away with little Joyce Ann.
The defense contends, however, that Roxanne's
testimony, coming from the mouth of a five-year old,
does not deserve credit because she could not
answer many questions and appeared to have been
coached by her grandmother, Diana.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can give credence
to the testimony of the five-year old Roxanne.
HELD: Yes. In the case at bar, while the five-year old
witness, Roxanne, was not able to answer some
questions such as which was her left and her right,
she was straightforward in identifying the accused
Rama as the culprit
The determination of the competence and credibility
of a child as a witness rests primarily with the trial
judge as he had the opportunity to see the demeanor

of the witness, his apparent intelligence or lack of it,
and his understanding of the nature of the oath.
This conclusion is in accord with the spirit and letter
of the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness (the
"Rule") which became effective last December 15,
2000. The following provisions are apropos:
"Section 1. Applicability of the Rule. --Unless
otherwise provided, this Rule shall govern the
examination of child witnesses who are victims of
crime, accused of a crime, and witnesses to crime. It
shall apply in all criminal proceedings and non-
criminal proceedings involving child witnesses."
"Section 3. Construction of the Rule. --This Rule shall
be liberally construed to uphold the best interests of
the child and to promote the maximum
accommodation of child witnesses without prejudice
to the constitutional rights of the accused."
"Section 6. Competence. --Every child is presumed
qualified to be a witness. However, the court shall
conduct a competency examination of a child, motu
proprio or on motion of a party , when it finds that
substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the
child to perceive, remember, communicate,
distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the
duty to tell the truth in court.
(a) Proof of necessity. --A party seeking a
competency examination must present proof of
necessity of competence examination. The age of the
child by itself is not a sufficient basis for a
competency examination."
The Court has long held that the testimony of a sole
eyewitness is sufficient to support a conviction so
long as it is clear, straightforward and worthy of
credence by the trial court.
The Rule also provides in Section 22, viz:
"Section 22. Corroboration.-- Corroboration shall not
be required of a testimony of a child. His testimony, if
credible by itself, shall be sufficient to support a
finding of fact, conclusion, or judgment subject to the
standard of proof required in criminal and non-
criminal cases."
14. PEOPLE V. PLASENCIA, G.R. NO. 90198
November 7, 1995
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
FACTS: Antonio Plasencia, Roberto Descartin and
Joelito (Julito) Descartin were accused of robbery
with homicide. Francisca Espina, one of the
witnesses, look down to her palm while testifying
where she have notes.
ISSUE: Is the act of Francisca Espina in looking
down to her palm where she have notes written loses
her credibility and the trial court abusing its
discretion?
HELD: No. The use of memory aids during an
examination of a witness is not altogether proscribed.
Section 16, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 16. When witness may refer to memorandum.
— A witness may be allowed to refresh his memory
respecting a fact, by anything written or recorded by
himself or under his direction at the time when the
fact occurred, or immediately thereafter, or at any
other time when the fact was fresh in his memory and
he knew that the same was correctly written or
recorded; but in such case the writing or record must
be produced and may be inspected by the adverse
party, who may, if he chooses, cross-examine the
witness upon it and may read it in evidence. So, also,
a witness may testify from such a writing or record,
though he retain no recollection of the particular
facts, if he is able to swear that the writing or record
correctly stated the transaction when made; but such
evidence must be received with caution.
Allowing a witness to refer to her notes rests on the
sound discretion of the trial court. In this case, the
exercise of that discretion has not been abused; the
witness herself has explained that she merely wanted
to be accurate on dates and details.
15. ROSELLA D. CANQUE vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS and SOCOR CONSTRUCTION
CORPORATION G.R. No. 96202 April 13, 1999
FACTS: Canque, a contractor doing business style
under the name of RDC Construction, and Socor
Construction entered into a contract to supply RDC
with construction materials for the different road
repairs in Cebu City. After the completion of the
projects, Canque refused to pay Socor alleging that
she has already paid Socor 1.4M but did not issue
any receipt thereof and that the materials delivered
were not delivered. Socor presented its Book of
Collectibles evidencing the unpaid obligation of
Canque as well as Dolores Aday, its bookkeeper who
made the entries. Canque opposed the admissibility
of the Book of Collectibles on the ground that it is
 ALABA, MICHELLE M.

hearsay as it will not prove that the materials were is doubly true when the witness stands to gain
delivered were or not. Further, it could not be materially or otherwise from the admission of such
admitted as evidence for other purpose other than evidence
the purpose which it was offered to prove.
Since there were other evidences presented by
ISSUE: Whether or not the Book of Collectibles is Socor to prove the existence of their contract with
admissible as evidence. Canque as well as the accomplishment of the
construction projects, the Court ruled in favor of
HELD: No, it is not admissible as evidence as it Socor.
merely corroborates the testimony of Aday. The
Court held that the bookkeeper has no personal
knowledge of the fact that the materials were
delivered or not. The only person could attest to such
fact was the project engineer alone, who, however
was not presented during trial. Though it is
inadmissible as evidence, it may however be
presented to refresh the memory of the witness. Rule
132, Sec. 16 provides that:

Sec. 16. When witness may refer to

memorandum. — A witness may be allowed to
refresh his memory respecting a fact, by anything
written or recorded by himself or under his direction
at the time when the fact occurred, or immediately
thereafter, or at any other time when the fact was
fresh in his memory and knew that the same was
correctly written or recorded; but in such case the
writing or record must be produced and may be
inspected by the adverse party, who may, if he
chooses, cross examine the witness upon it, and may
read it in evidence. So, also, a witness may testify
from such writing or record, though he retain no
recollection of the particular facts, if he is able to
swear that the writing or record correctly stated the
transaction when made; but such evidence must be
received with caution.

The purpose of the Book was to prove that Canque

was indebted to RDC, thus, the nature of evidence
changed and not the purpose for which it was offered.
Since the Book only corroborated the testimony of
Aday, wherein she did indeed entered the amount of
indebtedness of Canque, it cannot be admitted as
evidence as a witness may not be corroborated by
any written statement prepared wholly by him or her.
She cannot be more credile just because she
supports her open-court declaration with written
statements of the same facts even if she did prepare
them during the occasion in dispute, unless the
proper predicate of her failing memory is priorly laid
down. What is more, even where this requirement
has been satisfied, the express injunction of the rule
itself is that such evidence must be received with
caution, if only because it is not very difficult to
conceive and fabricate evidence of this nature. This

WEEK 14
1. [G.R. No. 107493. February 1, 1996]
NATIVIDAD CANDIDO, assisted by her husband
ALFREDO CANDIDO, and VICTORIA C.
RUMBAUA, assisted by her husband
AMORRUMBAUA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and SOFRONIO DABU, respondents.
FACTS: Petitioners Natividad Candido and Victoria
Rumbaua are co-owners of a first-class irrigated
riceland in Orion, Bataan. Respondent Sofronio
Dabu served as their agricultural tenant. Petitioners
then lodged a complaint with the Regional Trial Court
of Bataan against respondent Dabu for termination of
tenancy relationship and recovery of unpaid rentals
from crop-year 1983 plus attorneys fees and litigation
expenses.
Petitioners averred in their complaint below that a
team from the Ministry of Agrarian Reform had fixed
a provisional rental of twenty-six (26) and twenty-nine
(29) sacks of palay for the rainy and dry seasons,
respectively, which respondent failed to pay
beginning the crop-year 1983 dry season up to the
filing of the complaint.
Private respondent denied the material allegations of
the complaint and claimed that until 1983 their
sharing system was on a 50-50 basis; that his share
in the crop year 1983 dry season was still with
petitioner Natividad Candido who likewise retained
his water pump. He denied any provisional rental
allegedly fixed by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform and
at the same time maintained that only a proposal for
thirteen (13) cavans for the rainy season crop and
twenty-five percent (25%) of the net harvest during
the dry season was put forward. He claimed that he
paid his rentals by depositing thirteen (13) cavans of
palay for the 1984 rainy season crop, thirteen (13)
cavans for 1985 and eight (8) cavans representing
twenty-five percent (25%) of the dry season harvest.
On motion of respondent upon issues being
joined, the case was referred to the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) for a preliminary
determination of the existing relationship between
the parties and for certification as to its propriety for
trial. Thereafter the DAR certified that the case was
proper for trial but only on the issue of non-payment
of rentals and not on the ejectment of respondent
Dabu. Accordingly trial proceeded on the issue of
non-payment of rentals.
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
After finding that no evidence was adduced by
petitioners to prove the provisional rental alleged to
have been fixed by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform,
the lower court dismissed the complaint. The Court
of Appeals confirmed the findings of the court a quo.
ISSUE: W/N the verified complaint and the affidavit
presented by petitioners to the DAR are proofs of the
provisional rentals fixed by it and that it was error for
the trial court not to have taken cognizance of these
documents.
HELD: The Court is not persuaded. It is settled that
courts will only consider as evidence that which has
been formally offered. The affidavit of petitioner
Natividad Candido mentioning the provisional rate of
rentals was never formally offered; neither the
alleged certification by the Ministry of Agrarian
Reform. Not having been formally offered, the
affidavit and certification cannot be considered as
evidence. Thus the trial court as well as the appellate
court correctly disregarded them. If they neglected to
offer those documents in evidence, however vital
they may be, petitioners only have themselves to
blame, not respondent who was not even given a
chance to object as the documents were never
offered in evidence.
A document, or any article for that matter, is not
evidence when it is simply marked for identification;
it must be formally offered, and the opposing counsel
given an opportunity to object to it or cross-examine
the witness called upon to prove or identify it. A
formal offer is necessary since judges are required to
base their findings of fact and judgment only -and
strictly - upon the evidence offered by the parties at
the trial. To allow a party to attach any document to
his pleading and then expect the court to consider it
as evidence may draw unwarranted consequences.
The opposing party will be deprived of his chance to
examine the document and object to its admissibility.
The appellate court will have difficulty reviewing
documents not previously scrutinized by the court
below. The pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules
of Court on the inclusion on appeal of documentary
evidence or exhibits in the records cannot be
stretched as to include such pleadings or documents
not offered at the hearing of the case.
2. TERESITA E. VILLALUZ v. ROLANDO R. LIGON
[G.R. NO. 143721 : August 31, 2005]
FACTS: Teresita E. Villaluz (Villaluz) and respondent
Rolando R. Ligon (Ligon) were engaged in several
businesses. Sometime in 1987, Villaluz borrowed
sums of money from Ligon secured by postdated
checks which later bounced for the reasons "Drawn

Against Insufficient Funds/Account Closed."
Demands were made on Villaluz but she failed to pay
her debt prompting Ligon to institute criminal
proceedings for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.
During the hearing of said cases, Villaluz asked for
the settlement of their controversy and Ligon, as the
First Party, and Villaluz, as the Second Party,
executed a Memorandum of Agreement.
In accordance with said agreement, Villaluz issued a
check which again bounced upon presentment for
the reason that it was drawn against a closed
account. Ligon made several demands on Villaluz but
to no avail.
Since no payment was made, Ligon instituted a
complaint against Villaluz.
Upon failure of Villaluz and her counsel to appear at
the pre-trial conference, the RTC declared Villaluz as
in default and received Ligon's evidence ex-parte.
Villaluz through counsel, filed a Motion for New Trial
and a Motion to Admit Answer which were both
granted by the court.9
Villaluz filed a motion for reconsideration dated May
23, 1996, stating that given the opportunity to testify,
she will re-affirm the contents of her affidavit that was
submitted in support of her Motion for New Trial, or in
the alternative, she will formally offer the same. This
was denied by the RTC in its Order dated July 22,
1996.
Villaluz went to the CA and claimed that the trial court
erred: in not dismissing the case on the ground of
forum shopping; in not granting the defendant the
opportunity to present evidence in her behalf thereby
depriving her of her fundamental right to due process;
and in not considering the evidence already on
record showing that the subject checks had no valid
consideration.
The CA denied the petition that the "Sinumpaang
Salaysay" which she submitted in support of her
motion for new trial cannot be taken into
consideration as the same was not formally offered
in evidence during trial.
ISSUE: Whether or not the affidavit of petitioner
earlier submitted in the motion for new trial should be
considered
HELD: No. Petitioner submitted a "Sinumpaang
Salaysay" stating that she is an illiterate and that
sometime in 1990, Ligon's lawyer deceived her into
signing a Memorandum of Agreement and in issuing
a check for P1.9 M. Petitioner argues that the
"Sinumpaang Salaysay" which she submitted as an
affidavit of merit in support of her motion for new trial
should be considered as part of the records of the
case even without formal offer of the same.
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
We do not agree. There is a need to formally offer
affidavits before the courts to afford the opposing
party the opportunity to ascertain or refute the
veracity of the contents of such statements. Courts
will only consider as evidence that which has not
been formally offered. If an affidavit was never
formally offered, it cannot be considered as evidence.
If petitioner neglected to offer her affidavit in
evidence, however vital it may be, she only has
herself to blame.
The rule is that a document, or any article for that
matter, is not evidence when it is simply marked for
identification; it must be formally offered and the
opposing counsel given an opportunity to object to it
or cross-examine the witness called upon to prove or
identify it. It is necessary that a formal offer is made
since judges are required to base their findings of fact
and judgment only, and strictly, upon the evidence
offered by the parties at the trial. To allow a party to
attach any document to his pleading and expect the
court to consider it as evidence may draw
unwarranted consequences. The opposing party will
be deprived of a chance to examine the document
and object to its admissibility. The appellate court will
also have difficulty reviewing the documents not
previously scrutinized by the court below. Indeed, the
pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules of Court on
the inclusion on appeal of documentary evidence or
exhibits in the records cannot be stretched as to
include such pleadings or documents not offered at
the hearing of the case.
In this case, while the motion for new trial was
granted, it cannot be said that the contents of the
affidavit attached thereto should be treated by the
trial court as evidence for the petitioner as it was not
formally offered during the trial on the merits.
3. JOSE TABUENA vs. CA and EMILIANO
TABERNILLA, JR.
G.R. No. 85423 MAY 6, 1991
FACTS: The subject of the case is a residential land
in Aklan where an action for recovery of ownership
was filed by the Estate of Alfredo Tabernilla against
petitioner Jose Tabuena.
It was found by the RTC that the mother of petitioner
was only allowed to stay on the property by mere
tolerance of Alfredo Tabernilla, on the condition that
she paid the realty tax thereon, which she did until
her death.
Tabuena appealed to the respondent court,
complaining that, in arriving at its factual findings, the
trial court motu proprio took cognizance of Exhibits
"A", "B" and "C", which had been marked by the
plaintiff but never formally submitted in evidence. The
CA, in sustaining the trial court, held that contrary to

the allegations of the appellant, the said exhibits were
in fact formally submitted in evidence as disclosed by
the transcript of stenographic notes, which it quoted
at length.
ISSUE: Whether or not the exhibits were formally
submitted in evidence.
HELD: NO. Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides
in Section 35 thereof as follows:
Sec. 35. Offer of evidence.—The court shall
consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered. The purpose for which the
evidence is offered must be specified.
The mere fact that a particular document is marked
as an exhibit does not mean it has thereby already
been offered as part of the evidence of a party. It is
true that Exhibits "A," "B" and "C" were marked at the
pre-trial of the case below, but this was only for the
purpose of identifying them at that time. They were
not by such marking formally offered as exhibits.
At the trial on the merits, the party may decide to
formally offer The exhibits if it believes they will
advance its cause, and then again it may decide not
to do so at all. In the latter event, such documents
cannot be considered evidence, nor can they be
given any evidentiary value.
Chief Justice Moran explained the rationale of this
rule by stating that “The offer is necessary because it
is the duty of a judge to rest his findings of facts and
his judgment only and strictly upon the evidence
offered by the patties at the trial.”
Even if there be no formal offer of an exhibit,
evidence may still be admitted against the adverse
party if, first, it has been duly identified by testimony
duly recorded and, second, it has itself been
incorporated in the records of the case. But we do not
find that these requirements have been satisfied in
the case before us.
4. PEOPLE vs. EDGARDO YAP and SIMPLICIO
OSMEÑA [G.R. No. 103517 February 9, 1994]
FACTS: Edgardo Yap and Simplicio Osmeña were
charged with a violation of Section 4, Article II of
Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, for
having sold on October 1, 1989 in Ozamiz City six
sticks of marijuana for a consideration of ten pesos.
They pleaded not guilty.
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
From the evidence in this case. it appears that a
report of rampant pushing of prohibited drugs by
notorious pushers "Edgar" and "Simpoy," later
identified as Edgardo Yap and Simplicio Osmeña,
respectively, was submitted by a civilian informer to
the 10th Narcotics Regional Unit of the Philippine
Constabulary (PC).
A buy-bust operation was conducted and they were
arrested. They denied any participation in the
aforestated sale of prohibited drugs. Osmeña
claimed that in the morning of that day, he was in their
house doing some household chores when Yap
came and asked him to accompany him to buy soap
inside the public market.
The two accused claimed that the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses were never offered nor
admitted in evidence, nor were the specific purposes
for which they were offered duly stated, contrary to
Sections 34 and 35, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the claim of the two accused
is correct
HELD: No. In actual practice, there is a difference
between presentation or introduction of evidence and
offer of such evidence at the trial of a case. The
presentation of evidence consists of putting in as
evidence the testimony of the witnesses or the
documents relevant to the issue. An offer of
evidence, on the other hand, means the statement
made by counsel as to what he expects to prove
through the witness. This is what trial lawyers
understand by the "offer of evidence." Thus, "offer of
evidence," as used in Section 34 of Rule 132 must
be understood to include the presentation or
introduction of evidence. What is essential in order
that an offer of testimony may be valid, therefore, is
that the witness be called and asked appropriate
questions.
All the prosecution witnesses were presented and
examined before the court a quo, the questions and
answers being taken down in writing, and such
testimonies were offered thereafter to the trial court.
Had appellants wanted the trial court to reject the
evidence being introduced, they should have raised
an objection thereto. They cannot raise the question
for the first time on appeal. The right to object is a
privilege which the party may waive. It is not
consistent with the ends of justice for a party,
knowing of a supposed secret defect, to proceed and
take his chance for a favorable verdict, with the
power and intent to annul it as erroneous if it should
be against him.

5. PEOPLE VS. GODOY G.R. Nos. 115908-09
FACTS: Godoy was found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes of rape and kidnapping with
serious illegal detention, and sentencing him to the
maximum penalty of death in both cases by the
Regional Trial Court.
The private complainant Mia Taha allegedly said that
her teacher Danny Codoy(Appellant) by means of
force, threat and intimidation, by using a knife and by
means of deceit, have carnal Knowledge with her and
kidnap or detained her, for a period of five.
The defense presented a different version of what
actually transpired.
His defense was that they were lovers, as evidenced
by the letters wrote by the complainant (Mia Taha) to
the accused and the same was corroborated by the
testimonies of the defense witnesses.
ISSUE: Whether or not the testimonies of 2
witnesses prove the geniuses of the alleged
handwritings of Mia Taha and should their
testimonies be given probative value to the pieces of
evidence
HELD: Two other defense witnesses identified the
handwriting on the letters as belonging to Mia Taha.
They are Filomena Pielago and Erna Baradero who
were admittedly the former teachers of complainant
and highly familiar with her handwriting. The greatest
blunder committed by the trial court was in ignoring
the testimonies of these qualified witnesses and
refusing to give any probative value to these two vital
pieces of evidence, on the dubious and lame pretext
that no handwriting expert was presented to analyze
and evaluate the same.
Well-entrenched by now is the rule that resort to
questioned document examiners, more familiarly
called handwriting experts, is not mandatory.
Handwriting experts, while probably useful, are not
indispensable in examining or comparing
handwriting.72 This is so since under Section 22,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the handwriting of a
person may be proved by any witness who believes
it to be the handwriting of such person, because he
has seen the person write, or has seen writing
purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted
or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge
of the handwriting of such person. The said section
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
further provides that evidence respecting the
handwriting may also be given by a comparison,
made by the witness or the court, with writings
admitted or treated as genuine by the party against
whom the evidence is offered or proved to be
genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.
Under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the
handwriting of a person may be proved by any
witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such
person, because he has seen the person write, or
has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the
witness has acted or been charged, and has thus
acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such
person. The said section further provides that
evidence respecting the handwriting may also be
given by a comparison, made by the witness or the
court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by
the party against whom the evidence is offered or
proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.
6. G.R. No. 175991 August 31, 2011
JOSE R. CATACUTAN, Petitioner, vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
FACTS: Private complainant Georgito Posesano
was an Instructor II with Salary Grade 13 while
private complainant Magdalena Divinagracia was an
Education Program Specialist II with Salary Grade
16, both at the Surigao del Norte School of Arts and
Trades (SNSAT).
On June 2, 1997, the Commission on Higher
Education (CHED) Caraga Administrative Region,
appointed and promoted private complainants as
Vocational Instruction Supervisor III with Salary
Grade 18 at SNSAT.4 These promotional
appointments were duly approved and attested as
permanent by the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
on June 3, 1997. Being then the Officer-In-Charge of
SNSAT, the approved appointments were formally
transmitted to the petitioner on June 6, 1997, copy
furnished the concerned appointees. Despite receipt
of the appointment letter, the private complainants
were not able to assume their new position since
petitioner made known that he strongly opposed their
appointments and that he would not implement them
despite written orders from CHED and the CSC,
Caraga Regional Office.8 Thus, on August 2, 1997,
private complainants lodged a formal complaint
against petitioner for grave abuse of authority and
disrespect of lawful orders before the Office of the
Ombudsman for Mindanao.

In an Information dated February 27, 1998, petitioner
was charged before the RTC of Surigao City with
violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 as amended.
During arraignment on September 22, 1998,
petitioner pleaded "not guilty." For his defense,
petitioner admitted that he did not implement the
promotional appointments of the private
complainants because of some procedural lapses or
infirmities attending the preparation of the
appointment papers. According to him, the
appointment papers were prepared by SNSAT
Administrative Officer, Crispin Noguera, using blank
forms bearing the letterhead of SNSAT and not of the
CHED Regional Office who made the appointments.
He also averred that the appointment papers cited
the entire plantilla (1996 Plantilla-OSEC-DECSB-
VOCIS3-19, Pages 1-16) instead of only the
particular page on which the vacant item occurs. He
likewise claimed that he received only the duplicate
copies of the appointments contrary to the usual
procedure where the original appointment papers
and other supporting documents are returned to his
office. Finally, he asserted that the transmittal letter
from the CHED did not specify the date of effectivity
of the appointments. These alleged infirmities, he
contended, were formally brought to the attention of
the CHED Regional Director on June 20, 1997 who,
however, informed him that the subject appointments
were regular and valid and directed him to implement
the same. Still not satisfied, petitioner sought the
intercession of CHED Chairman Angel C. Alcala in
the settlement of this administrative problem but the
latter did not respond. Petitioner alleged that his
refusal to implement the appointments of the private
complainants was not motivated by bad faith but he
just wanted to protect the interest of the government
by following strict compliance in the preparation of
appointment papers.
RTC: holding that the act of the petitioner in
defying the orders of the CHED and the CSC to
implement the subject promotional appointments
despite the rejection of his opposition, demonstrates
his palpable and patent fraudulent and dishonest
purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious
wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will. The
trial court ruled that petitioner’s refusal to implement
the appointments of the private complainants had
caused undue injury to them. Thus, it held petitioner
guilty of the crime charged and accordingly
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
of six (6) years and one (1) month and perpetual
disqualification from public office.
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
On appeal, petitioner’s conviction was affirmed in toto
by the Sandiganbayan. The appellate court ruled that
the Decision of the trial court, being supported by
evidence and firmly anchored in law and
jurisprudence, is correct. It held that petitioner failed
to show that the trial court committed any reversible
error in judgment.
Hence, this petition. In the Court’s Resolution dated
February 26, 2007, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) was required to file its Comment. The OSG
filed its Comment on June 5, 2007 while the Office of
the Special Prosecutor filed the Comment for
respondent People of the Philippines on February 22,
2008.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner’s constitutional
right[s] to due process and equal protection of the law
were violated when he was denied the opportunity to
present [in] evidence the Court of Appeals.
HELD: No. Petitioner was not deprived of his right to
due process.
"Due process simply demands an opportunity to be
heard. "Due process is satisfied when the parties are
afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain
their respective sides of the controversy. "Where an
opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments
or through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial
of procedural due process.
Guided by these established jurisprudential
pronouncements, petitioner can hardly claim denial
of his fundamental right to due process. Records
show that petitioner was able to confront and cross-
examine the witnesses against him, argue his case
vigorously, and explain the merits of his defense. To
reiterate, as long as a party was given the opportunity
to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be
said to have been denied due process of law for the
opportunity to be heard is the better accepted norm
of procedural due process.
There is also no denial of due process when the trial
court did not allow petitioner to introduce as evidence
the CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 51795. It is well
within the court’s discretion to reject the presentation
of evidence which it judiciously believes irrelevant
and impertinent to the proceeding on hand. This is
specially true when the evidence sought to be
presented in a criminal proceeding as in this case,
concerns an administrative matter. As the
Sandiganbayan aptly remarked:

The RTC committed no error in judgment when it did
not allow the Accused-appellant to present the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
51795 (Jose R. Catacutan vs. Office of the
Ombudsman). The findings in administrative cases
are not binding upon the court trying a criminal case,
even if the criminal proceedings are based on the
same facts and incidents which gave rise to the
administrative matter. The dismissal of a criminal
case does not foreclose administrative action or
necessarily gives the accused a clean bill of health in
all respects. In the same way, the dismissal of an
administrative case does not operate to terminate a
criminal proceeding with the same subject matter.
Thus, considering the difference in the
quantum of evidence, as well as the procedure
followed and the sanctions imposed in criminal and
administrative proceedings, the findings and
conclusions in one should not necessarily be binding
on the other. Notably, the evidence presented in the
administrative case may not necessarily be the same
evidence to be presented in the criminal cases.
On the basis of the afore-mentioned precedents, the
Court has no option but to declare that the courts
below correctly disallowed the introduction in
evidence of the CA Decision. "Due process of law is
not denied by the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial,
or incompetent evidence, or testimony of an
incompetent witness. It is not an error to refuse
evidence which although admissible for certain
purposes, is not admissible for the purpose which
counsel states as the ground for offering it."
At any rate, even assuming that the trial court
erroneously rejected the introduction as evidence of
the CA Decision, petitioner is not left without legal
recourse. Petitioner could have availed of the remedy
provided in Section 40, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court which provides:
Section 40. Tender of excluded evidence. – If
documents or things offered in evidence are
excluded by the court, the offeror may have the same
attached to or made part of the record. If the evidence
excluded is oral, the offeror may state for the record
the name and other personal circumstances of the
witness and the substance of the proposed
testimony.
As observed by the appellate court, if the petitioner is
keen on having the RTC admit the CA’s Decision for
whatever it may be worth, he could have included the
same in his offer of exhibits. If an exhibit sought to be
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
presented in evidence is rejected, the party
producing it should ask the court’s permission to
have the exhibit attached to the record.
As things stand, the CA Decision does not form part
of the records of the case, thus it has no probative
weight. Any evidence that a party desires to submit
for the consideration of the court must be formally
offered by him otherwise it is excluded and rejected
and cannot even be taken cognizance of on appeal.
The rules of procedure and jurisprudence do not
sanction the grant of evidentiary value to evidence
which was not formally offered.
First, petitioner could not have committed the acts
imputed against him during the time material to this
case were it not for his being a public officer, that is,
as the Officer-In-Charge (Principal) of SNSAT. As
such public officer, he exercised official duties and
functions, which include the exercise of
administrative supervision over the school such as
taking charge of personnel management and
finances, as well as implementing instruction as far
as appointment of teachers.
Second, petitioner acted with evident bad faith in
refusing to implement the appointments of private
complainants. While petitioner may have laudable
objectives in refusing the implementation of private
complainants’ valid appointments, the Court fails to
see how he can still claim good faith when no less
than the higher authorities have already sustained
the validity of the subject appointments and have
ordered him to proceed with the implementation. "It
is well to remember that good intentions do not win
cases, evidence does."
Third, undue injury to the private complainants was
duly proven to the point of moral certainty. Here, the
private complainants suffered undue injury when
they were not able to assume their official duties as
Vocational Supervisors III despite the issuance of
their valid appointments. As borne out by the records,
they were able to assume their new positions only on
November 19, 1997. So in the interregnum from June
to November 1997, private complainants failed to
enjoy the benefits of an increased salary
corresponding to their newly appointed positions.
Likewise established is that as a result of petitioner’s
unjustified and inordinate refusal to implement their
valid appointments notwithstanding clear and
mandatory directives from his superiors, the private
complainants suffered mental anguish, sleepless
nights, serious anxiety warranting the award of moral
damages under Article 2217 of the New Civil Code.
 ALABA, MICHELLE M.

At this point, the Court just needs to stress that the

foregoing are factual matters that were threshed out
and decided upon by the trial court which were
subsequently affirmed by the Sandiganbayan. Where
the factual findings of both the trial court and the
appellate court coincide, the same are binding on this
Court. In any event, apart from these factual findings
of the lower courts, this Court in its own assessment
and review of the records considers the findings in
order.